%matplotlib inline
import pandas as pd
import requests
The capitol words project http://capitolwords.org/api/1/.
This is one of the APIs for the Sunlight Foundation. http://sunlightfoundation.com/api/
payload={"phrase":"national security agency", "page":0, "apikey":"YER KEY HERE"}
r=requests.get("http://capitolwords.org/api/1/text.json", params=payload)
You'll need to loop through all the pages--only 50 results at a time.
So as not to overload their servers, let's just all download from my website.
payload={"phrase":"national security agency", "page":0, "apikey":"70a35a7e121e4984a217bb84ab07e85a"}
r=requests.get("http://capitolwords.org/api/1/text.json", params=payload)
result=r.json()
result
{u'num_found': 932, u'results': [{u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/1997/07/11/S7319-4_s-936-as-amended-and-passed/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 105, u'date': u'1997-07-11', u'id': u'CREC-1997-07-11-pt1-PgS7319-4.chunk5887', u'number': 98, u'order': 5887, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1997-07-11/html/CREC-1997-07-11-pt1-PgS7319-4.htm', u'pages': u'S7319-S7400', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u'including the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, as '], u'title': u'S. 936, AS AMENDED AND PASSED', u'volume': 143}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/1997/10/28/H9586_conference-report-on-s-858-intelligence-authorizat/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 105, u'date': u'1997-10-28', u'id': u'CREC-1997-10-28-pt1-PgH9586.chunk201', u'number': 147, u'order': 201, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1997-10-28/html/CREC-1997-10-28-pt1-PgH9586.htm', u'pages': u'H9586-H9610', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u'including the National Security Agency and the Departments of '], u'title': u'CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 858, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998', u'volume': 143}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2005/07/13/S8207-3_leadership-and-coordination-in-language-education/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 109, u'date': u'2005-07-13', u'id': u'CREC-2005-07-13-pt1-PgS8207-3.chunk219', u'number': 94, u'order': 219, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-07-13/html/CREC-2005-07-13-pt1-PgS8207-3.htm', u'pages': u'S8207-S8210', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u"test,'' Serpa said.", u'National Security Agency managers find that many candidates '], u'title': u'LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION IN LANGUAGE EDUCATION', u'volume': 151}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2005/07/13/S8207-3_leadership-and-coordination-in-language-education/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 109, u'date': u'2005-07-13', u'id': u'CREC-2005-07-13-pt1-PgS8207-3.chunk244', u'number': 94, u'order': 244, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-07-13/html/CREC-2005-07-13-pt1-PgS8207-3.htm', u'pages': u'S8207-S8210', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u'the United States and at 265 posts abroad.', u'Likewise, the National Security Agency is aggressively '], u'title': u'LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION IN LANGUAGE EDUCATION', u'volume': 151}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'R000576', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2007/09/05/H10111-2_calling-on-the-government-of-the-peoples-republic-/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 110, u'date': u'2007-09-05', u'id': u'CREC-2007-09-05-pt1-PgH10111-2.chunk10', u'number': 130, u'order': 10, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2007-09-05/html/CREC-2007-09-05-pt1-PgH10111-2.htm', u'pages': u'H10111', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'C.A. Dutch', u'speaker_last': u'Ruppersberger', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. ruppersberger', u'speaker_state': u'MD', u'speaking': [u"Madam Speaker, on rollcall No. 850, I was in a meeting in my district at the National Security Agency with NSA Director, General Alexander. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yea.''"], u'title': u"CALLING ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO REMOVE BARRIERS TO UNITED STATES FINANCIAL SERVICES FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA", u'volume': 153}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/1997/10/28/H9586_conference-report-on-s-858-intelligence-authorizat/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 105, u'date': u'1997-10-28', u'id': u'CREC-1997-10-28-pt1-PgH9586.chunk19', u'number': 147, u'order': 19, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1997-10-28/html/CREC-1997-10-28-pt1-PgH9586.htm', u'pages': u'H9586-H9610', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u'the United States Government:', u'(1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, '], u'title': u'CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 858, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998', u'volume': 143}, {u'bills': [u'S. Res. 281'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2013/10/31/S7733_senate-resolution-281-expressing-the-sense-of-the-/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2013-10-31', u'id': u'CREC-2013-10-31-pt1-PgS7733.chunk0', u'number': 154, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-10-31/html/CREC-2013-10-31-pt1-PgS7733.htm', u'pages': u'S7733', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u' Mr. PAUL submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence: S. Res. 281 Whereas public news reports this week indicate that the United States National Security Agency monitored millions of phone calls in Italy in late 2012 and early 2013; Whereas these reports indicate that the National Security Agency monitored telephone calls made to and from a residence in Rome where then Archbishop Jorge Mario Bergoglio stayed during the conclave selecting Bergoglio, now known as His Holiness Pope Francis, to succeed Pope Benedict XVI; Whereas this story has been widely reported in the American and international media; Whereas the National Security Agency has reportedly denied the allegations; and Whereas these allegations are serious and President Obama should personally address these reports; Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that-- President Obama should directly address the serious allegation whether his administration monitored the calls of Pope Francis or the conclave selecting the Pope.'], u'title': u'SENATE RESOLUTION 281--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE THAT PRESIDENT OBAMA SHOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT REGARDING SPYING ON HIS HOLINESS, POPE FRANCIS', u'volume': 159}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'B000444', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2003/05/15/S6475_united-states-leadership-against-hivaids-tuberculo/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 108, u'date': u'2003-05-15', u'id': u'CREC-2003-05-15-pt2-PgS6475.chunk198', u'number': 73, u'order': 198, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2003-05-15/html/CREC-2003-05-15-pt2-PgS6475.htm', u'pages': u'S6475-S6500', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'Joseph', u'speaker_last': u'Biden', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. biden', u'speaker_state': u'DE', u'speaking': [u'Mr. President, the hour is extremely late. The bottom line of this is that this provides for debt relief for the very countries we are trying to help with AIDS. They are swamped by debt. It is legislation that we have been through before. My staff and I sat with the White House, the National Security Agency. We sat down with the White House today, the National Security Agency representative for hours. We negotiated the exact language.', u'I send the amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.'], u'title': u'UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003--Continued', u'volume': 149}, {u'bills': [u'S. 1050'], u'bioguide_id': u'W000154', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2003/05/21/S6789-9_national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 108, u'date': u'2003-05-21', u'id': u'CREC-2003-05-21-pt1-PgS6789-9.chunk865', u'number': 76, u'order': 865, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2003-05-21/html/CREC-2003-05-21-pt1-PgS6789-9.htm', u'pages': u'S6789-S6843', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'John', u'speaker_last': u'Warner', u'speaker_party': u'R', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. warner', u'speaker_state': u'VA', u'speaking': [u'On behalf of Senator Allard, I offer an amendment on the protection of the operational files of the National Security Agency that would strike section 1035 of S. 1050 and replace it with this amendment. It is cleared on both sides.'], u'title': u'NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004', u'volume': 149}, {u'bills': [u'S. 1901'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2002/01/28/S176-2_statements-on-introduced-bills-and-joint-resolutio/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 107, u'date': u'2002-01-28', u'id': u'CREC-2002-01-28-pt1-PgS176-2.chunk2', u'number': 4, u'order': 2, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-01-28/html/CREC-2002-01-28-pt1-PgS176-2.htm', u'pages': u'S176-S183', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u'S. 1901. A bill to authorize the National Science Foundation and the National Security Agency to establish programs to increase the number of qualified faculty teaching advanced courses conducting research in the field of cybersecurity, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.'], u'title': u'STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS', u'volume': 148}, {u'bills': [u'H.R. 126', u'S. 1121'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2013/06/07/S4024-4_measures-read-the-first-time-s-1121-and-hr-126/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2013-06-07', u'id': u'CREC-2013-06-07-pt1-PgS4024-4.chunk2', u'number': 80, u'order': 2, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-06-07/html/CREC-2013-06-07-pt1-PgS4024-4.htm', u'pages': u'S4024', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u' The bill clerk read as follows:', u'A bill (S. 1121) to stop the National Security Agency from spying on citizens of the United States and for other purposes. A bill (H.R. 126) to direct the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement to provide for management of the free-roaming wild horses in and around the Currituck National Wildlife Refuge.'], u'title': u'MEASURES READ THE FIRST TIME--S. 1121 AND H.R. 126', u'volume': 159}, {u'bills': [u'H.R. 126', u'S. 1121'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2013/06/10/S4027-6_measures-placed-on-the-calendar-s-1121-and-hr-126/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2013-06-10', u'id': u'CREC-2013-06-10-pt1-PgS4027-6.chunk2', u'number': 81, u'order': 2, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-06-10/html/CREC-2013-06-10-pt1-PgS4027-6.htm', u'pages': u'S4027', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u' The legislative clerk read as follows:', u'A bill (S. 1121) to stop the National Security Agency from spying on citizens of the United States and for other purposes. A bill (H.R. 126) to direct the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement to provide for management of the free-roaming wild horses in and around the Currituck National Wildlife Refuge.'], u'title': u'MEASURES PLACED ON THE CALENDAR--S. 1121 AND H.R. 126', u'volume': 159}, {u'bills': [u'S. 2549'], u'bioguide_id': u'S000320', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2000/07/11/S6448_national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 106, u'date': u'2000-07-11', u'id': u'CREC-2000-07-11-pt1-PgS6448.chunk158', u'number': 88, u'order': 158, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2000-07-11/html/CREC-2000-07-11-pt1-PgS6448.htm', u'pages': u'S6448-S6461', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': u'Richard', u'speaker_last': u'Shelby', u'speaker_party': u'R', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. shelby', u'speaker_state': u'AL', u'speaking': [u"I note to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee an issue in the committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S. 2549. on page 126, the report deals with acquisition programs at the National Security Agency (NSA). I fear that the language of the report could have unintended consequences for the on-going efforts to modernize the National Security Agency. The report mandates that the NSA manage its modernization effort as though it were a traditional major defense acquisition program. If this mandate were applied to each of the individual technology efforts within the NSA, such a requirement could impede NSA's flexibility to modernize and upgrade its capabilities. I would ask the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee whether this was the Committee's intent?"], u'title': u'NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001', u'volume': 146}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'T000350', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/1999/01/19/H249-5_furbys-cited-as-threat-to-us-national-security/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 106, u'date': u'1999-01-19', u'id': u'CREC-1999-01-19-pt1-PgH249-5.chunk1', u'number': 8, u'order': 1, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1999-01-19/html/CREC-1999-01-19-pt1-PgH249-5.htm', u'pages': u'H249', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'James', u'speaker_last': u'Traficant', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. traficant', u'speaker_state': u'OH', u'speaking': [u'Mr. Speaker, the President is on trial, we are bombing Baghdad, Kosovo is in turmoil, and the American steel industry is literally being raped.', u'After all this, the National Security Agency has designated a new major threat to our Republic, the furby; that is right, this furby cyberpet, that stands 4 inches tall and sells for $30, has just been designated as the next great threat to our freedom.', u'Beam me up, Mr. Speaker. Beam me up. I say, the only threat these furbys really pose is they seem to appear to be much smarter than the bungling nincompoops at the National Security Agency. I recommend, for $30 a smack, here, that we hire furbys and fire those bureaucrats. Think about that one. Furby this, James Bond.'], u'title': u'FURBYS CITED AS THREAT TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY', u'volume': 145}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2006/03/02/H521_privileged-report-on-resolution-of-inquiry-to-the-/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 109, u'date': u'2006-03-02', u'id': u'CREC-2006-03-02-pt1-PgH521.chunk0', u'number': 25, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-03-02/html/CREC-2006-03-02-pt1-PgH521.htm', u'pages': u'H521', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u' Mr. SENSENBRENNER, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted an adverse privileged report (Rept. No. 109-382) on the resolution (H. Res. 643) directing the Attorney General to submit to the House of Representatives all documents in the possession of the Attorney General relating to warrantless electronic surveillance of telephone conversations and electronic communications of persons in the United States conducted by the National Security Agency, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.'], u'title': u'PRIVILEGED REPORT ON RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL', u'volume': 152}, {u'bills': [u'H.R. 126', u'S. 1121'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2013/06/07/S4021-5_measures-read-the-first-time/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2013-06-07', u'id': u'CREC-2013-06-07-pt1-PgS4021-5.chunk0', u'number': 80, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-06-07/html/CREC-2013-06-07-pt1-PgS4021-5.htm', u'pages': u'S4021', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u' The following bills were read the first time: H.R. 126. An act to direct the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement to provide for management of the free-roaming wild horses in and around the Currituck National Wildlife Refuge. S. 1121. A bill to stop the National Security Agency from spying on citizens of the United States and for other purposes.'], u'title': u'MEASURES READ THE FIRST TIME', u'volume': 159}, {u'bills': [u'H.R. 126', u'S. 1121'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2013/06/10/S4056-2_measures-placed-on-the-calendar/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2013-06-10', u'id': u'CREC-2013-06-10-pt1-PgS4056-2.chunk0', u'number': 81, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-06-10/html/CREC-2013-06-10-pt1-PgS4056-2.htm', u'pages': u'S4056', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u' The following bills were read the second time, and placed on the calendar: S. 1121. A bill to stop the National Security Agency from spying on citizens of the United States and for other purposes. H.R. 126. An act to direct the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement to provide for management of the free-roaming wild horses in and around the Currituck National Wildlife Refuge.'], u'title': u'MEASURES PLACED ON THE CALENDAR', u'volume': 159}, {u'bills': [u'S. 3001'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2008/09/17/S8956-2_text-of-amendments/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 110, u'date': u'2008-09-17', u'id': u'CREC-2008-09-17-pt1-PgS8956-2.chunk7', u'number': 148, u'order': 7, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2008-09-17/html/CREC-2008-09-17-pt1-PgS8956-2.htm', u'pages': u'S8956-S8959', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u'SA 5625. Mr. NELSON of Florida submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 3001, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:', u'At the appropriate place, insert the following:', u"(a) Areas.--This section applies to-- (1) any area in the Gulf of Mexico that is east of the Military Mission Line (as defined in section 102 of the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (43 U.S.C. 1331 note; Public Law 109-432)); (2) the area that is also known as the ``Joint Gulf Range Complex'' or the ``Gulf of Mexico Range''; and (3) any military or national security agency operations, training, or testing area that is used by a military or national security agency of the United States. (b) Prerequisite.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior shall not issue any permit for oil and gas leasing or extraction in an area described in subsection (a) unless and until the President certifies (after receiving advice from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the head of each appropriate national security agency of the United States) that in balancing the national security interests of the United States-- (1) the advantages of oil or gas extraction in the area; outweigh (2) the military and national security missions being conducted in the area."], u'title': u'TEXT OF AMENDMENTS', u'volume': 154}, {u'bills': [u'S. 3001'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2008/09/17/S8956-2_text-of-amendments/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 110, u'date': u'2008-09-17', u'id': u'CREC-2008-09-17-pt1-PgS8956-2.chunk8', u'number': 148, u'order': 8, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2008-09-17/html/CREC-2008-09-17-pt1-PgS8956-2.htm', u'pages': u'S8956-S8959', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u'SA 5626. Mr. NELSON of Florida submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 5498 submitted by Mr. Nelson of Florida and intended to be proposed to the bill S. 3001, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:', u'In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted, insert the following:', u"(a) Areas.--This section applies to-- (1) any area in the Gulf of Mexico that is east of the Military Mission Line (as defined in section 102 of the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (43 U.S.C. 1331 note; Public Law 109-432)); (2) the area that is also known as the ``Joint Gulf Range Complex'' or the ``Gulf of Mexico Range''; and (3) any military or national security agency operations, training, or testing area that is used by a military or national security agency of the United States. (b) Prerequisite.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior shall not issue any permit for oil and gas leasing or extraction in an area described in subsection (a) unless and until the President certifies (after receiving advice from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the head of each appropriate national security agency of the United States) that in balancing the national security interests of the United States-- (1) the advantages of oil or gas extraction in the area; outweigh (2) the military and national security missions being conducted in the area."], u'title': u'TEXT OF AMENDMENTS', u'volume': 154}, {u'bills': [u'S. 3001'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2008/09/12/S8499_text-of-amendments/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 110, u'date': u'2008-09-12', u'id': u'CREC-2008-09-12-pt1-PgS8499.chunk0', u'number': 145, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2008-09-12/html/CREC-2008-09-12-pt1-PgS8499.htm', u'pages': u'S8499-S8501', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u" SA 5498. Mr. NELSON of Florida submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 3001, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SEC. __. PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS FROM OIL AND GAS LEASING IN CERTAIN AREAS. (a) Areas.--This section applies to-- (1) any area in the Gulf of Mexico that is east of the Military Mission Line (as defined in section 102 of the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (43 U.S.C. 1331 note; Public Law 109-432)); (2) the area that is also known as the ``Joint Gulf Range Complex'' or the ``Gulf of Mexico Range''; and (3) any military or national security agency operations, training, or testing area that is used by a military or national security agency of the United States (b) Prerequisite.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior shall not issue any permit for oil and gas leasing or extraction in an area described in subsection (a) unless and until the President certifies (based on written opinions provided by each of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the head of each appropriate national security agency of the United States) that in balancing the national security interests of the United States-- (1) the advantages of oil or gas extraction in the area; outweigh (2) the military and national security missions being conducted in the area. (c) Opinions.--Each written opinion required for an area under subsection (b) shall-- (1) be submitted to the national security committees of Congress in unclassified form, with a classified annex (if applicable); and (2) evaluate the effects of oil or gas extraction on military and national security agency operations, training, or testing in the area."], u'title': u'TEXT OF AMENDMENTS', u'volume': 154}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'B000444', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2004/05/20/S5899-2_ahmed-chalabi/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 108, u'date': u'2004-05-20', u'id': u'CREC-2004-05-20-pt1-PgS5899-2.chunk29', u'number': 72, u'order': 29, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2004-05-20/html/CREC-2004-05-20-pt1-PgS5899-2.htm', u'pages': u'S5899-S5901', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': u'Joseph', u'speaker_last': u'Biden', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. biden', u'speaker_state': u'DE', u'speaking': [u'First of all, I thank the Senator for his compliments that are excessive and not accurate, but I thank him nonetheless. But let me say in a second, I took the time 4 years ago to ask my senior staff to go back and get every major work written by the Straussians, the neocons, I mean it sincerely, and Tony Blinken, former National Security Agency, my chief guy, got together 11 or 12 books, the most seminal volumes written in the last decade by the neoconservatives. These are honorable, bright, serious people--patriotic Americans.', u'If you read what they say, they mean what they say. What they say is the value of America----'], u'title': u'AHMED CHALABI', u'volume': 150}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2003/05/21/S6789-9_national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 108, u'date': u'2003-05-21', u'id': u'CREC-2003-05-21-pt1-PgS6789-9.chunk870', u'number': 76, u'order': 870, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2003-05-21/html/CREC-2003-05-21-pt1-PgS6789-9.htm', u'pages': u'S6789-S6843', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u'protection of the operational files of the National Security Agency)', u'Strike section 1035 and insert the following:', u'(a) Consolidation of Current Provisions on Protection of Operational Files.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by transferring sections 105C and 105D to the end of title VII and redesignating such sections, as so transferred, as sections 703 and 704, respectively. (b) Protection of Operational Files of NSA.--Title VII of such Act, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:'], u'title': u'NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004', u'volume': 149}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'R000146', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2002/05/01/S3688-2_authority-for-committees-to-meet/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 107, u'date': u'2002-05-01', u'id': u'CREC-2002-05-01-pt1-PgS3688-2.chunk4', u'number': 52, u'order': 4, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-05-01/html/CREC-2002-05-01-pt1-PgS3688-2.htm', u'pages': u'S3688', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': u'Harry', u'speaker_last': u'Reid', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. reid', u'speaker_state': u'NV', u'speaking': [u'Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 1, 2002 at 10:15 a.m. to hold a hearing titled, The Future of NATO.', u'Panel 1: The Honorable Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC; and the Honorable Douglas Feith, Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, ', u'Panel 2: General Wesley K. Clark, USA (ret.), Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, The Stephens Group, Washington, DC; and Lt. General William E. Odom USA (ret.), Former Director, National Security Agency, Yale University & The Hudson Institute, Washington, DC.'], u'title': u'AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET', u'volume': 148}, {u'bills': [u'H.R. 2397'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2013/07/25/E1145_personal-explanation/', u'chamber': u'Extensions', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2013-07-25', u'id': u'CREC-2013-07-25-pt1-PgE1145.chunk0', u'number': 108, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-07-25/html/CREC-2013-07-25-pt1-PgE1145.htm', u'pages': u'E1145', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'mr. payne', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u"Mr. Speaker, during an evening series of votes on July 24, 2013, on amendments to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act FY2014 (H.R. 2397), I intended to vote ``yes'' on the Amash/Conyers Amendment (rollcall No. 412), but inadvertently voted ``no''. This amendment would require the government to limit its collection of the records to those that actually pertain to the subject of a duly authorized investigation. The National Security Agency and other agencies would still retain their authority to collect specific records under Section 215, however, blanket collection of telephone records would end. I strongly support both protecting our country and preserving our civil liberties."], u'title': u'PERSONAL EXPLANATION', u'volume': 159}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2013/12/19/H8126_memorials/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2013-12-19', u'id': u'CREC-2013-12-19-pt1-PgH8126.chunk0', u'number': 181, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-12-19/html/CREC-2013-12-19-pt1-PgH8126.htm', u'pages': u'H8126', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u" Under clause 3 of rule XII, memorials were presented and referred as follows: 164. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the House of Representatives of the State of Michigan, relative to House Resolution No. 227 urging the Congress to adopt House Concurrent Resolution 50; to the Committee on Natural Resources. 165. Also, a memorial of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, relative to House Resolution No. 456 urging the Congress to establish a special committee to investigate and report on the National Security Agency's Surveillance program; to the Committee on Rules."], u'title': u'MEMORIALS', u'volume': 159}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2014/07/22/H6634-2_report-on-h-res-649-directing-secretary-of-defense/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2014-07-22', u'id': u'CREC-2014-07-22-pt1-PgH6634-2.chunk0', u'number': 115, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2014-07-22/html/CREC-2014-07-22-pt1-PgH6634-2.htm', u'pages': u'H6634', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u' Mr. McKEON from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 113-547) directing the Secretary of Defense to transmit to the House of Representatives copies of any emails in the possession of the Department of Defense or the National Security Agency that were transmitted to or from the email account(s) of former Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations Division Director Lois Lerner between January 2009 and April 2011, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.'], u'title': u'REPORT ON H. RES. 649, DIRECTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO TRANSMIT EMAILS TO OR FROM LOIS LERNER BETWEEN JANUARY 2009 AND APRIL 2011', u'volume': 160}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'D000599', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2008/06/12/E1220_honoring-the-life-and-service-of-lt-general-willia/', u'chamber': u'Extensions', u'congress': 110, u'date': u'2008-06-12', u'id': u'CREC-2008-06-12-pt1-PgE1220.chunk0', u'number': 97, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2008-06-12/html/CREC-2008-06-12-pt1-PgE1220.htm', u'pages': u'E1220', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': u'Lincoln', u'speaker_last': u'DAVIS', u'speaker_party': u'Democrat', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. lincoln davis of tennessee', u'speaker_state': u'TN', u'speaking': [u'Madam Speaker, born in Putnam County and raised in Cumberland County, Lt. General William E. Odom rose to great prominence in the U.S. military intelligence community and was a widely known expert on matters relating to the Soviet Union.', u'A natural born leader, Odom graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1954. Over the next twenty years Gen. Odom earned a Masters Degree and Ph.D. from Columbia University, was stationed in East Germany for a lengthy period of time, taught at West Point, and served at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.', u"In 1977, he was appointed as the military assistant to President Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. General Odom served in that position till 1981. Shortly after leaving the White House and for a little more than 3 years, Odom held the position of Assistant Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence. By 1985 General Odom was named the 11th Director of the National Security Agency, our nation's largest intelligence agency.", u'Retiring in 1988 from the Army and the National Security Agency, General Odom embarked in a career in academia. Over the next twenty years he taught at Yale University and Georgetown University and was a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute.', u'General Odom is a member of the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame at the United States Army Intelligence Center in Fort Huachuca, Arizona.', u"On behalf of Tennessee's Fourth Congressional District and a grateful nation, we thank General Odom for his service in defense of our country."], u'title': u'HONORING THE LIFE AND SERVICE OF LT. GENERAL WILLIAM ODOM', u'volume': 154}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'B000444', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2005/05/25/S5876_nomination-of-john-robert-bolton-to-be-the-represe/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 109, u'date': u'2005-05-25', u'id': u'CREC-2005-05-25-pt1-PgS5876.chunk40', u'number': 71, u'order': 40, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-05-25/html/CREC-2005-05-25-pt1-PgS5876.htm', u'pages': u'S5876-S5914', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'Joseph', u'speaker_last': u'Biden', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. biden', u'speaker_state': u'DE', u'speaking': [u"Let me restate in my own words, so the Senator from Maryland understands. Let's assume there is the country of Xanadu and an American is meeting with the President of Xanadu. In all probability, an American official is meeting with the President of Xanadu. The National Security Agency--with the ability to intercept conversations by multiple methods--picks up a conversation, or somebody's report of a conversation, between an American and the President of Xanadu. That gets reported back, based on subject matter, to the appropriate officer within the State Department or the Defense Department who they feel should know about this conversation because maybe the President said to the American: You know, we have right here in our country 47 al-Qaida operatives. That should go to the person who has that responsibility.", u'So a lot of stuff went to Mr. Bolton because he is the guy in charge of dealing with nonproliferation and other matters. He would get these NSA, National Security Agency, intercept reports. But in order to protect the identity of the American, for privacy reasons, he would get a statement and it would say: On such and such a date at such and such a time, the President of Xanadu met with an American. They discussed the following things. Here is what they said, here is the conversation.', u'That is what I understand to be--I know to be--the way in which NSA intercept reports treat a case involving an American.'], u'title': u'NOMINATION OF JOHN ROBERT BOLTON TO BE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS', u'volume': 151}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'R000576', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2005/12/17/E2590-3_extending-congratulations-to-mr-william-b-black/', u'chamber': u'Extensions', u'congress': 109, u'date': u'2005-12-17', u'id': u'CREC-2005-12-17-pt1-PgE2590-3.chunk0', u'number': 163, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-12-17/html/CREC-2005-12-17-pt1-PgE2590-3.htm', u'pages': u'E2590', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'C.A. Dutch', u'speaker_last': u'Ruppersberger', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. ruppersberger', u'speaker_state': u'MD', u'speaking': [u'Mr. Speaker, I rise before you today to extend congratulations to a government employee who has shown outstanding dedication through his services to the Department of Defense.', u'Deputy Director, Mr. William B. Black has serviced the Department of Defense for over forty-five years. He is the recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award, which is the highest honor a civilian can receive by the Secretary of Defense. The award is given to an individual whose career reflects exceptional devotion to duty, as well as, significant contributions to the efficiency, economy, or other improvements in the Department of Defense operations.', u"Mr. Black aided in the success of intelligence production and cyber operations for assignments in Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the War on Terror. His determination and ambition has also abetted the National Security Agency's mounting field of information operations as a result of his role as the Special Assistant to the Director for Information Warfare.", u'The National Security Agency was able to participate resolutely in the War on Terror because Mr. Black led signals intelligence and information assurance missions into the digital network era.', u'Mr. Speaker, I ask that you join with me today to recognize Mr. William B. Black for his service to this country. The exceptional work he has done for the Department of Defense warrants great recognition. Dedication to this country and to the betterment of our intelligence operations is a vital part of our success as a powerful nation and should be observed and commended more frequently.'], u'title': u'EXTENDING CONGRATULATIONS TO MR. WILLIAM B. BLACK', u'volume': 151}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'R000146', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2015/05/19/S3009-7_usa-freedom-act/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 114, u'date': u'2015-05-19', u'id': u'CREC-2015-05-19-pt1-PgS3009-7.chunk0', u'number': 77, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2015-05-19/html/CREC-2015-05-19-pt1-PgS3009-7.htm', u'pages': u'S3009-S3010', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'Harry', u'speaker_last': u'Reid', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. reid', u'speaker_state': u'NV', u'speaking': [u'Mr. President, 2 years ago the American people first became aware that the National Security Agency was collecting private information about their phone calls. This is called the Snowden revelation. ', u'Under the banner of national security, the National Security Agency was mining information about home phone calls and how long they lasted. They found out whom they were calling--and not only that. They found out whom the call was between. They also determined how long that call lasted.', u'NSA essentially was conducting a dragnet, without first attempting to determine whether that information was relevant to a national security problem. NSA ran this program under the authorities granted to them by section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which expires on June 1 of this year. The American people were outraged by these revelations and Congress rightly acted.', u"Last year, the House passed a bill by a vote of 303 to 121 to end the NSA's so-called bulk metadata collection program and reform and extend the authority for this program.", u'I brought a similar bill to the floor authored by Senators Leahy and Lee. There was a bipartisan group of Senators who joined them to call for its passage. But sadly, the majority leader--at that time the minority leader--stood in the way of bipartisan reform. Instead of passing meaningful reform, he led a Republican filibuster of this bill. That was one of a couple hundred that was led by my friend.', u"This year, Senators Leahy and Lee worked again with the Chairman and ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee on the USA FREEDOM Act, which ends the National Security Agency's bulk collection program and extends and reforms the authorities under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act.", u"There have been bipartisan and bicameral calls for the Senate to take up that legislation. Yet again, instead of committing to bringing up this bipartisan bill, last month the senior Senator from Kentucky introduced a bill that would extend the authorities for the National Security Agency's bulk collection program for 5\\1/2\\ years. Then the Second Circuit, almost simultaneously--within 24 hours of that decision by the majority leader--found the bulk collection illegal.", u"In reaction to the court's decision, the House last week passed the USA FREEDOM Act by a vote of 338 to 88. By a four-to-one margin, the House voted to end the National Security Agency's illegal bulk data collection program and reform its practices.", u"But even in the face of that court's decision, the majority leader stood once again against bipartisan reform. Instead of heeding the Republican-controlled House's calls for reform, the majority leader introduced a bill that would extend the authorities for the National Security Agency's illegal program for 2 more months.", u'Congressman Goodlatte, the chair of the Judiciary Committee in the House, said they will not accept a short-term extension of the bill. This morning, Leader McCarthy, the second ranking Republican in the House, said they will not accept any extension. That is exactly what the Speaker, Congressman Boehner, said.', u'If we squander this opportunity to deliver sound reforms to this illegal program, we are handling our duties irresponsibly here in the Senate.', u'To stand in the way of reforming these practices is to ignore the voice of the American people. Just yesterday, a new poll commissioned by the American Civil Liberties Union showed that 82 percent of Americans are concerned that the Federal Government is collecting and storing the personal information of Americans, and they do not like it.', u"If we are unable to reform these practices, we are ignoring the ruling of the Second Circuit, which rejected the National Security Agency's bulk collection program, and we are not allowing the American people's voice to be heard.", u'I think, most importantly, if the senior Senator from Kentucky does not allow this commonsense reform simply with a vote on the Senate floor about what happened in the House, they are ignoring the rare bipartisan support that we have.', u"Just last week, 190 House Republicans voted to end the National Security Agency's illegal program. There is bipartisan consensus in favor of ending this program. Many of the Republican leader's own colleagues have called for it as well.", u'Last week, Attorney General Loretta Lynch and James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, wrote a letter to Senator Leahy, the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee. Both the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence voiced their support for the USA FREEDOM Act, saying:', u'Overall, the significant reforms contained in this legislation will provide the public greater confidence in how our intelligence activities are carried out and in the oversight of those activities, while ensuring vital national security authorities remain in place.', u'I agree with that statement. But sadly, the majority leader continues to stand in the way of bipartisan reform to end these illegal practices. As we face the June 1 expiration of these authorities, the majority leader still offers no viable alternative.', u'We cannot allow this program to be extended. The majority leader should listen to the American people because we cannot extend an illegal act. That is what the majority leader is asking us to do.', u'The majority leader should listen to the American people, consider the action of his Republican colleagues, and respect the expertise of the intelligence community.', u'The Senate should act now on the USA FREEDOM Act before it leaves for the Memorial Day recess and restore the confidence of the American people.'], u'title': u'USA FREEDOM ACT', u'volume': 161}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'R000576', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2009/04/30/E1042-2_honoring-daniel-c-gilliam/', u'chamber': u'Extensions', u'congress': 111, u'date': u'2009-04-30', u'id': u'CREC-2009-04-30-pt1-PgE1042-2.chunk0', u'number': 65, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2009-04-30/html/CREC-2009-04-30-pt1-PgE1042-2.htm', u'pages': u'E1042-E1043', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'C.A. Dutch', u'speaker_last': u'Ruppersberger', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. ruppersberger', u'speaker_state': u'MD', u'speaking': [u"Madam Speaker, I rise before you today to honor Daniel C. Gilliam upon his retirement from the position of Deputy Senior Acquisition Executive at the National Security Agency (NSA). In this position Mr. Gilliam has been responsible for all of NSA's acquisitions and management of the Acquisition Directorate's senior leadership. Mr. Gilliam oversees all procurements, liaisons with key industry partners, and directs resources to optimize the organization's effectiveness. Working closely with Acquisition's customers, Mr. Gilliam maintains strategic partnerships with NSA's mission elements to ensure their needs and requirements are met.", u"After earning a Bachelor's degree in Business Management from the University of Maryland, and a Master's degree in Public Administration from the George Washington University in 1979, Mr. Gilliam graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1993. He also attended the Federal Executive Institutes Leadership for a Democratic Society Program in 1996.", u"In 1976, Daniel began his career at NSA as a management support intern. Since then, he has worked on a variety of acquisition and contracting positions to include contracting specialist, contracting officer, and cost/price analyst as well as managing those same disciplines. While participating in NSA's executive development program, Mr. Gilliam worked in the NSA Corporate Policy Office, the NSA Operations Directorate, and served as the Defense Intelligence Agency's Director for Procurement in 1995/1996. From 1997 to 2005, Mr. Gilliam served as the Chief of the Contracting Group, responsible for managing and directing all effort associated with contracting for materials, equipment, and services required to support the missions of the NSA.", u"Certified level III in contracting in accordance with the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. Mr. Gilliam graduated from NSA's Senior Cryptologic Executive Development Program in 1996. He received the Defense Intelligence Director's Award in 1996, and he received the Meritorious Executive Presidential Rank Award in 2002.", u'Madam Speaker, I ask that you join with me today to honor Daniel C. Gilliam in his retirement from the position of Deputy Senior Acquisition Executive at the National Security Agency. His legacy as a brilliant and competent specialist will be forever remembered in his service to defending the security of our nation. It is with great pride that I congratulate Dan Gilliam on his exemplary defense career and his outstanding service at the National Security Agency.'], u'title': u'HONORING DANIEL C. GILLIAM', u'volume': 155}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2006/06/29/S6810_submitted-resolutions/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 109, u'date': u'2006-06-29', u'id': u'CREC-2006-06-29-pt1-PgS6810.chunk0', u'number': 87, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-06-29/html/CREC-2006-06-29-pt1-PgS6810.htm', u'pages': u'S6810-S6811', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u' Mr. CORNYN (for himself and Mr. Roberts) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:', u"Whereas on June 22, 2006, news organizations publicly disclosed the existence of an ongoing, highly classified national security program to track terrorists' financial transactions, known formally as the ``Terrorist Finance Tracking Program''; Whereas the President condemned the unauthorized leak and subsequent publication in the strongest possible terms, calling those acts ``disgraceful'' and explaining that public disclosure of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program ``does great harm to the United States of America''; Whereas the Secretary of the Treasury noted that this unauthorized leak of classified information and subsequent publication ``undermined a highly successful counter- terrorism program and alerted terrorists to the methods and sources used to track their money trails''; Whereas similar to the leaks and public disclosure of the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program, the disclosure of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program puts America's terrorist enemies on notice of tactics used to hunt them down and makes defending against further terrorist attacks more difficult; Whereas Administration officials and the co-chairmen of the 9/11 Commission (a Democrat and a Republican) urged news organizations to refrain from publicly disclosing the existence of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program because of the probable harm to America's national security; Whereas there have been no credible allegations of abuse or infringements on civil liberties in the execution of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program; Whereas the 9/11 Commission in its Final Report concluded that ``information about terrorist money helps us to understand their networks, search them, and disrupt their operations''; Whereas the 9/11 Commission had given the Administration high marks in its pursuit of terrorist-finance networks, and recommended that ``vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U.S. counter-terrorism efforts''; and Whereas the United States must remain vigilant in its War on Terror: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That-- (1) the Senate joins the President in condemning the damaging leaks and subsequent publication of vital national security information about the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program and the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program; and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that the Department of Justice should vigorously and tirelessly investigate and prosecute any and all persons responsible for the unauthorized disclosure to news organizations of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program, and other vital counter-terrorism programs."], u'title': u'SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS', u'volume': 152}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'M000702', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2002/04/25/S3430_tribute-to-michael-jacobs/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 107, u'date': u'2002-04-25', u'id': u'CREC-2002-04-25-pt1-PgS3430.chunk0', u'number': 48, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-04-25/html/CREC-2002-04-25-pt1-PgS3430.htm', u'pages': u'S3430', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': u'Barbara', u'speaker_last': u'Mikulski', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'ms. mikulski', u'speaker_state': u'MD', u'speaking': [u'Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to Michael J. Jacobs as he leaves the National Security Agency. Mr. Jacobs has served our nation for more than 38 years. He has distinguished himself and the National Security Agency in positions of increasing responsibility. Mr. Jacobs capped his illustrious career as the Information Assurance Director of the National Security Agency.', u"Mr. Jacobs is an outstanding example of the many dedicated public servants who fulfill critical needs, often without public recognition. When Mr. Jacobs joined the NSA, the agency's existence was a secret. While the American people now know and appreciate more about the NSA, most of the attention goes to signals intelligence.", u"Mr. Jacobs made his mark fulfilling the NSA's other core mission: information assurance. He has led and shaped the essential effort to develop secure information systems. Our Presidents, our Armed Forces, our diplomats, our intelligence agencies, and other Government leaders depend on secure communications every day. During his tenure, Mr. Jacobs has shaped every part of how our government addresses the Information Assurance needs.", u'Mr. Jacobs demonstrated a real commitment to the long-range needs of America. His initiatives in research and education are key examples. He worked to sustain the Information Assurance Awareness and Training and Education Research Program. He also broke new ground in establishing NSA Centers of Excellence in Information Assurance Education at institutions of higher learning in Maryland and across the country.', u"Mr. Jacobs was stayed ahead of the curve in protecting America's critical information infrastructure. The White House recognized the Information Assurance System Security Education and Training Program (NIEPT) he developed as a model in Government.", u"Mr. Jacobs' embodies the best traditions of our civil service. That's why he has been recognized with the NSA Exceptional Civilian Service Award and the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement.", u'As the Senator from Maryland and a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I want to thank Mr. Jacobs for his dedication to the United States of America. He has served our nation with honor. I wish Mike well as he enters a new phase of his life. '], u'title': u'TRIBUTE TO MICHAEL JACOBS', u'volume': 148}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/1999/05/13/H3112-2_intelligence-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year-200/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 106, u'date': u'1999-05-13', u'id': u'CREC-1999-05-13-pt1-PgH3112-2.chunk76', u'number': 69, u'order': 76, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1999-05-13/html/CREC-1999-05-13-pt1-PgH3112-2.htm', u'pages': u'H3112-H3141', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u' The text of the amendment is as follows:', u'Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Barr of Georgia: At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the following new section:', u"(a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Attorney General shall jointly prepare, and the Director of the National Security Agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report in classified and unclassified form describing the legal standards employed by elements of the intelligence community in conducting signals intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance. (b) Matters Specifically Addressed.--The report shall specifically include a statement of each of the following legal standards: (1) The legal standards for interception of communications when such interception may result in the acquisition of information from a communication to or from United States persons. (2) The legal standards for intentional targeting of the communications to or from United States persons. (3) The legal standards for receipt from non-United States sources of information pertaining to communications to or from United States persons. (4) The legal standards for dissemination of information acquired through the interception of the communications to or from United States persons. (c) Inclusion of Legal Memoranda and Opinions.--The report under subsection (a) shall include a copy of all legal memoranda, opinions, and other related documents in unclassified, and if necessary, classified form with respect to the conduct of signals intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance by elements of the intelligence community, utilized by the Office of the General Counsel of the National Security Agency, by the Office of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, or by the Office of Intelligence Policy Review of the Department of Justice, in preparation of the report. (d) Definition.--As used in this section: (1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (2) The term ``United States persons'' has the meaning given such term under section 101(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(i)). (3) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate."], u'title': u'INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000', u'volume': 145}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'S001172', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2009/07/10/E1725-4_the-comprehensive-national-cybersecurity-initiativ/', u'chamber': u'Extensions', u'congress': 111, u'date': u'2009-07-10', u'id': u'CREC-2009-07-10-pt1-PgE1725-4.chunk0', u'number': 103, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2009-07-10/html/CREC-2009-07-10-pt1-PgE1725-4.htm', u'pages': u'E1725', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'Adrian', u'speaker_last': u'Smith', u'speaker_party': u'R', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. smith of nebraska', u'speaker_state': u'NE', u'speaking': [u'Madam Speaker, in early 2008, President Bush established the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative to address cyberattacks on federal networks and President Obama has committed to fully continue this effort under his administration.', u'Awareness of our vulnerabilities to cyberattack and the need for action is nearly universal and goes beyond party lines.', u'The seriousness of this situation was brought into focus this week, when it was revealed a powerful attack overwhelmed computers at U.S. and South Korean government Web sites.', u'Other targets included the National Security Agency, the State Department, and the New York Stock Exchange.', u'It is our responsibility as a Congress--and my commitment as a member of the House Science and Technology Committee--to ensure we get this issue right, and ensure taxpayer dollars provide a return in the form of lasting and effective security, while also protecting privacy.', u'The need is real, the threat is present and clear, and I want to make sure our country is prepared.'], u'title': u'THE COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE', u'volume': 155}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2008/03/10/H1419-10_intelligence-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year-200/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 110, u'date': u'2008-03-10', u'id': u'CREC-2008-03-10-pt1-PgH1419-10.chunk2', u'number': 40, u'order': 2, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2008-03-10/html/CREC-2008-03-10-pt1-PgH1419-10.htm', u'pages': u'H1419-H1420', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u"Section 444 of the bill would impose additional Senate confirmation requirements on two national security positions--the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) observed that the effectiveness of the Intelligence Community suffers due to delays in the confirmation process; section 444 would only aggravate those serious problems. Senior intelligence officials need to assume their duties and responsibilities as quickly as possible to address the pressing requirements of national security. Instead of addressing the 9/11 Commission's concern, the bill would subject two additional vital positions to a more protracted process of Senate confirmation. Apart from causing such potentially harmful delays, this unwarranted requirement for Senate confirmation would also risk injecting political pressure into these positions of technical expertise and public trust."], u'title': u'INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008--VETO MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 110-100)', u'volume': 154}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'S001167', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2008/06/04/E1132-3_congratulating-the-university-of-idaho/', u'chamber': u'Extensions', u'congress': 110, u'date': u'2008-06-04', u'id': u'CREC-2008-06-04-pt1-PgE1132-3.chunk0', u'number': 91, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2008-06-04/html/CREC-2008-06-04-pt1-PgE1132-3.htm', u'pages': u'E1132', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': u'Bill', u'speaker_last': u'Sali', u'speaker_party': u'R', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. sali', u'speaker_state': u'ID', u'speaking': [u'Madam Speaker, I rise today to recognize and congratulate the University of Idaho for their re-designation as a National Center of Academic Excellence (CAE) in Information Assurance Education (IA).', u'The National Security Agency and Department of Homeland Security has bestowed this distinguished recognition on only ninety-three schools across 37 states and the District of Columbia.', u'In order to be considered a CAE high academic standards must be in place. A CAE is required to have a full-time faculty dedicated to teaching IA, academic courses focused on IA and students involved in IA research projects. CAE students are trained to play a critical role in protecting our national information infrastructure.', u'The University of Idaho will now be eligible to apply for scholarships and grants through both federal and Department of Defense Information Assurance Scholarship Programs.', u'Congratulations to the University of Idaho for this fine distinction and commitment to cultivating the minds of our future leaders.'], u'title': u'CONGRATULATING THE UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO', u'volume': 154}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2006/03/02/H563_reports-of-committees-on-public-bills-and-resoluti/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 109, u'date': u'2006-03-02', u'id': u'CREC-2006-03-02-pt1-PgH563.chunk0', u'number': 25, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-03-02/html/CREC-2006-03-02-pt1-PgH563.htm', u'pages': u'H563', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u' Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:', u'Mr. SENSENBRENNER: Committee on the Judiciary. House Resolution 643. Resolution directing the Attorney General to submit to the House of Representatives all documents in the possession of the Attorney General relating to warrantless electronic surveillance of telephone conversations and electronic communications of persons in the United States conducted by the National Security Agency; adversely (Rept. 109-382). Referred to the House Calendar. Mr. SENSENBRENNER: Committee on the Judiciary. House Resolution 644. Resolution requesting the President and directing the Attorney General to transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution documents in the possession of those officials relating to the authorization of electronic surveillance of citizens of the United States without court approved warrants; adversely (Rep. 109-383). Referred to the House Calendar.'], u'title': u'REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS', u'volume': 152}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2006/06/26/H4533-2_privileged-report-on-resolution-of-inquiry-to-the-/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 109, u'date': u'2006-06-26', u'id': u'CREC-2006-06-26-pt1-PgH4533-2.chunk0', u'number': 84, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-06-26/html/CREC-2006-06-26-pt1-PgH4533-2.htm', u'pages': u'H4533', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u" Mr. SENSENBRENNER, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted an adverse privileged report (Rept. No. 109-528) on the resolution (H. Res. 845) requesting the President and directing the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General to transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution, documents relating to the termination of the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility's investigation of the involvement of Department of Justice personnel in the creation and administration of the National Security Agency's warrantless surveillance program, including documents relating to Office of Professional Responsibility's request for and denial of security clearances, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed."], u'title': u'PRIVILEGED REPORT ON RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY TO THE PRESIDENT', u'volume': 152}, {u'bills': [u'S. Res. 525', u'S. Res. 524', u'S. Res. 526'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2006/06/29/S6787_submission-of-concurrent-and-senate-resolutions/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 109, u'date': u'2006-06-29', u'id': u'CREC-2006-06-29-pt1-PgS6787.chunk0', u'number': 87, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-06-29/html/CREC-2006-06-29-pt1-PgS6787.htm', u'pages': u'S6787', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u' The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated:', u"S. Res. 524. A resolution condemning the unauthorized disclosure and publication of classified information about the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program, and other vital counter-terrorism programs; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mr. Obama): S. Res. 525. A resolution to amend the Standing Rules of the Senate to provide greater transparency in the legislative process; to the Committee on Rules and Administration. By Mrs. CLINTON (for herself and Mr. Brownback): S. Res. 526. A resolution condemning the murder of United States journalist Paul Klebnikov on July 9, 2004, in Moscow, and the murders of other members of the media in the Russian Federation; to the Committee on Foreign Relations."], u'title': u'SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS', u'volume': 152}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'M000355', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2006/07/26/S8317_authority-for-committees-to-meet/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 109, u'date': u'2006-07-26', u'id': u'CREC-2006-07-26-pt1-PgS8317.chunk6', u'number': 100, u'order': 6, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-07-26/html/CREC-2006-07-26-pt1-PgS8317.htm', u'pages': u'S8317', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': u'Mitch', u'speaker_last': u'McConnell', u'speaker_party': u'R', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. mcconnell', u'speaker_state': u'KY', u'speaking': [u"Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet to conduct a hearing on ``FISA for the 21st Century'' on Wednesday, July 26, 2006, at 9 a.m. in Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 226.", u'Panel I: LTG Michael V. Hayden, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Langley, VA; LTG Keith B. Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency, Chief of the Central Security Service, Washington, DC; Steven Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Washington, DC.', u'Panel II: Bryan Cunningham, Partner, Morgan & Cunningham LLC, Denver, CO; Jim Dempsey, Policy Director, Center for Democracy & Technology, Washington, DC; John Schmidt, Partner, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, Chicago, IL; Mary DeRosa, Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins Center for Strategic and International Studies, Technology and Public Policy Program, Washington, DC.'], u'title': u'AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET', u'volume': 152}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'T000457', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2001/04/26/S3937-2_export-administration-act-of-2001-motion-to-procee/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 107, u'date': u'2001-04-26', u'id': u'CREC-2001-04-26-pt1-PgS3937-2.chunk25', u'number': 54, u'order': 25, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2001-04-26/html/CREC-2001-04-26-pt1-PgS3937-2.htm', u'pages': u'S3937-S3966', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'Fred', u'speaker_last': u'Thompson', u'speaker_party': u'R', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. thompson', u'speaker_state': u'TN', u'speaking': [u'I have not thought it through. I think after it was decontrolled in 1994, over the objections of the National Security Agency, the cat was out of the bag. I am not sure it would have made any difference.', u'I think the point is that what we are dealing with today would further decontrol a host of additional items that heretofore you had to have a license to get.', u'Some of those--I would venture to say the large majority of those things--would be harmless. But my concern is whether or not we have a procedure to catch the ones that are not harmless. That is what we are trying to deal with here. I hope we can move in that direction.'], u'title': u'EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 2001--MOTION TO PROCEED', u'volume': 147}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'D000432', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2001/10/10/S10407_aviation-security/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 107, u'date': u'2001-10-10', u'id': u'CREC-2001-10-10-pt1-PgS10407.chunk22', u'number': 135, u'order': 22, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2001-10-10/html/CREC-2001-10-10-pt1-PgS10407.htm', u'pages': u'S10407-S10412', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'Byron', u'speaker_last': u'Dorgan', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. dorgan', u'speaker_state': u'ND', u'speaking': [u'In response, I say, absolutely. In fact, our colleague from Idaho is on the Appropriations Committee. The first thing you have to do is appropriate the money for the agencies--the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency, all the law enforcement functions--and then all of the other functions of the Federal Government. We have to pass the appropriations bills.', u'We are now operating under a continuing appropriations bill because we in Congress did not get our work done by October 1. It is not as if we are not trying. Senator Byrd and Senator Stevens, the chairman and ranking member of the Appropriations Committee, are pushing very hard, and we cannot get the appropriations bills to the floor of the Senate.', u'Do my colleagues know why? Because there is an objection to a motion to proceed to an appropriations bill.'], u'title': u'AVIATION SECURITY', u'volume': 147}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2001/12/06/H9057-5_conference-report-on-hr-2883/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 107, u'date': u'2001-12-06', u'id': u'CREC-2001-12-06-pt1-PgH9057-5.chunk4', u'number': 168, u'order': 4, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2001-12-06/html/CREC-2001-12-06-pt1-PgH9057-5.htm', u'pages': u'H9057-H9065', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u'sec. 506. enhancement of security authorities of national security ', u"Section 506 authorizes the National Security Agency (NSA) security protective officers to exercise their law enforcement functions 500 feet beyond the confines of NSA facilities. At present, NSA's protective jurisdiction does not extend beyond the territorial bounds of its perimeter fences. Additionally, NSA has to rely on several federal, state, and local jurisdictions to respond to threats that occur just outside its fence line. With so many jurisdictions involved, there is a chance that a necessary response could be slowed and thus ineffective. In addition, under current law (Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959) the Administrator of General Services, upon the application of the Director of NSA, may provide for the protection of those facilities that are under the control of or use by the National Security Agency. The General Services Administration has delegated this authority to NSA. This amendment to the National Security Agency Act would provide NSA with the organic authority needed to protect its facilities and personnel without having to obtain a delegation of authority from the General Services Administration. This section parallels authority the Central Intelligence Agency currently has in section 15 of the CIA Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o). The attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the growing threat of terrorism in the United States. The conferees believe the NSA's authority to have a protective detail should be clarified and enhanced 500 feet beyond the confines of NSA's facilities, but were sensitive to the public's reaction to an unlimited grant of law enforcement jurisdiction outside NSA's borders. Therefore, the exercise of this new authority is expressly limited to only those circumstances where NSA security protective officers can identify specific and articulable facts giving them reason to believe that the exercise of this authority is necessary to protect against physical damage or injury to NSA installations, property, or employees. This provision also expressly states that the rules and regulations prescribed by the Director of the NSA for agency property and installations do not extend into the 500 foot area established by this provision. Thus, there will be no restrictions, for example, on the taking of photographs within the 500 foot zone. The conferees do not envision a general grant of police authority in the 500 foot zone, but do envision NSA security protective officers functioning as federal police, for limited purposes, within the 500 foot zone with all attendant authorities, capabilities, immunities, and liabilities. The conferees expect the Director of NSA to coordinate and establish Memoranda of Understanding with all federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies with which NSA will exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the 500 foot zones. The Director of NSA shall submit such Memoranda of Understanding to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives. The Director of NSA is also expected to develop a training plan to familiarize the Agency's security protective officers with their new authorities and responsibilities. The Director of NSA shall submit such plan to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives not later than 30 days after the enactment of this provision. Section 506 also includes a reporting requirement so that the intelligence committees may closely scrutinize the exercise of this new authority. Items Not Included Section 306 of the House bill contained a provision establishing, with respect to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a federal commission on the national security readiness of the United States. The Senate bill had no similar provision. The House recedes."], u'title': u'CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 2883', u'volume': 147}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'T000350', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/1998/06/24/H5068-5_china-gobbling-up-american-national-security-secre/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 105, u'date': u'1998-06-24', u'id': u'CREC-1998-06-24-pt1-PgH5068-5.chunk1', u'number': 84, u'order': 1, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1998-06-24/html/CREC-1998-06-24-pt1-PgH5068-5.htm', u'pages': u'H5068', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': u'James', u'speaker_last': u'Traficant', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. traficant', u'speaker_state': u'OH', u'speaking': [u'Mr. Speaker, on the very day that President Clinton leaves for China, China thumbs their nose at America once again. Check this out.', u'Top U.S. officials say, and I quote: China stole a top secret device off an American satellite. The theft was so serious, our National Security Agency was forced to change all of our communication codes.', u'After all of this, the White House still wants a permanent Most Favored Nation trade status for China.', u'Free trade my ascot, Mr. Speaker.', u'This is a free ride and a free for all for China, who is gobbling up our national security secrets faster than the President can down a Big Mac and a box of fries. Think about that.', u'Mr. Speaker, I want to yield back what secret codes, secrets, and national security we have left.'], u'title': u'CHINA GOBBLING UP AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS', u'volume': 144}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'M001189', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2013/06/12/H3297-2_unacceptable-violations-of-our-fundamental-rights/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2013-06-12', u'id': u'CREC-2013-06-12-pt1-PgH3297-2.chunk1', u'number': 83, u'order': 1, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-06-12/html/CREC-2013-06-12-pt1-PgH3297-2.htm', u'pages': u'H3297', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'Luke', u'speaker_last': u'Messer', u'speaker_party': u'R', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. messer', u'speaker_state': u'IN', u'speaking': [u"Madam Speaker, ``Those who give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.'' Ben Franklin uttered those words several hundred years ago, but his warning is still relevant today.", u'Reports that the National Security Agency has been monitoring the phone records and Internet activities of ordinary citizens should concern every American.', u"The President has said that these surveillance programs don't involve listening to people's phone calls or reading their emails. Americans want to believe their President. Yet his tax agency lied about targeting conservative groups and his Justice Department spied on reporters who were just doing their job.", u"As a Nation, we would be wise to heed Ben Franklin's advice and make sure that there is a bright line between acceptable counterterrorism activities and unacceptable violations of our fundamental rights."], u'title': u'UNACCEPTABLE VIOLATIONS OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS', u'volume': 159}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2013/07/24/H5002_department-of-defense-appropriations-act-2014/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2013-07-24', u'id': u'CREC-2013-07-24-pt1-PgH5002.chunk198', u'number': 107, u'order': 198, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-07-24/html/CREC-2013-07-24-pt1-PgH5002.htm', u'pages': u'H5002-H5031', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u' The text of the amendment is as follows:', u'At the end of the bill (before the short title), add the following: Sec. __. None of funds made available by this Act may be used by the National Security Agency to-- (1) conduct an acquisition pursuant to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for the purpose of targeting a United States person; or (2) acquire, monitor, or store the contents (as such term is defined in section 2510(8) of title 18, United States Code) of any electronic communication of a United States person from a provider of electronic communication services to the public pursuant to section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.', u'The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 312, the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo) and a Member opposed each will control 7\\1/2\\ minutes.', u'The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas.'], u'title': u'DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2014', u'volume': 159}, {u'bills': None, u'bioguide_id': u'R000570', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2013/07/25/E1135-5_department-of-defense-appropriations-act-2014/', u'chamber': u'Extensions', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2013-07-25', u'id': u'CREC-2013-07-25-pt1-PgE1135-5.chunk0', u'number': 108, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-07-25/html/CREC-2013-07-25-pt1-PgE1135-5.htm', u'pages': u'E1135', u'session': 1, u'speaker_first': u'Paul', u'speaker_last': u'Ryan', u'speaker_party': u'R', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. ryan of wisconsin', u'speaker_state': u'WI', u'speaking': [u'Madam Chair, I want to thank Representative Amash for offering this amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2014. We now know that the National Security Agency (NSA) is keeping a phone log of all calls made in the U.S. This issue merits heightened congressional scrutiny. We need to strike a balance between our efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and our protection of civil liberties. The committees with jurisdiction are conducting a thorough review--as they should. I look forward to hearing their recommendations.', u'That said, rewriting laws--especially one that NSA Director Gen. Keith Alexander says is vital to our safety--is not within the scope of the appropriations process. I welcome further discussion about the scope and intent of the PATRIOT Act, and look forward to working with my colleagues to ensure that the law is not overly broad. So though I commend Mr. Amash for raising this issue, I must respectfully vote against his amendment.'], u'title': u'DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2014', u'volume': 159}, {u'bills': [u'S. Res. 344', u'S. Res. 343'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2014/02/04/S763-2_submission-of-concurrent-and-senate-resolutions/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2014-02-04', u'id': u'CREC-2014-02-04-pt1-PgS763-2.chunk0', u'number': 21, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2014-02-04/html/CREC-2014-02-04-pt1-PgS763-2.htm', u'pages': u'S763', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u" The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated: By Mr. McCAIN: S. Res. 343. A resolution establishing a Select Committee of the Senate to make a full and thorough investigation of the unauthorized disclosures of apparently classified information concerning the National Security Agency intelligence-collection programs, operations, and activities, including programs affecting Americans, to make findings based upon the investigation, and to make recommendations based on the investigation and findings; to the Committee on Rules and Administration. By Mr. TOOMEY (for himself and Mr. Casey): S. Res. 344. A resolution congratulating the Penn State University women's volleyball team for winning the 2013 National Collegiate Athletic Association Women's Volleyball Championship; considered and agreed to."], u'title': u'SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS', u'volume': 160}, {u'bills': [u'S. Res. 470'], u'bioguide_id': None, u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2014/06/11/S3606-2_senate-resolution-470-amending-senate-resolution-4/', u'chamber': u'Senate', u'congress': 113, u'date': u'2014-06-11', u'id': u'CREC-2014-06-11-pt1-PgS3606-2.chunk0', u'number': 90, u'order': 0, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2014-06-11/html/CREC-2014-06-11-pt1-PgS3606-2.htm', u'pages': u'S3606-S3607', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': None, u'speaker_last': None, u'speaker_party': None, u'speaker_raw': u'recorder', u'speaker_state': None, u'speaking': [u" Mrs. FEINSTEIN submitted the following resolution; which was placed on the calendar: S. Res. 470 Resolved, SECTION 1. RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMITTEES IN ADVICE AND CONSENT OF SENATE TO INTELLIGENCE APPOINTMENTS. Section 17 of Senate Resolution 400 agreed to May 19, 1976 (94th Congress) is amended to read as follows: ``Sec. 17. (a)(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), the Select Committee shall have jurisdiction to review, hold hearings, and report the nominations of civilian individuals for positions in the intelligence community for which appointments are made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), other committees with jurisdiction over the department or agency of the Executive Branch which contain a position referred to in paragraph (1) may hold hearings and interviews with individuals nominated for such position, but only the Select Committee shall report such nomination. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `intelligence community' means an element of the intelligence community specified in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). ``(b)(1) With respect to the confirmation of the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, or any successor position, the nomination of any individual by the President to serve in such position shall be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and, if and when reported, to the Select Committee for not to exceed 20 calendar days, except that in cases when the 20-day period expires while the Senate is in recess, the Select Committee shall have 5 additional calendar days after the Senate reconvenes to report the nomination. ``(2) If, upon the expiration of the period described in paragraph (1), the Select Committee has not reported the nomination, such nomination shall be automatically discharged from the Select Committee and placed on the Executive Calendar. ``(c)(1) With respect to the confirmation of appointment to the position of Director of the National Security Agency, Inspector General of the National Security Agency, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, or Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance Office, or any successor position to such a position, the nomination of any individual by the President to serve in such position, who at the time of the nomination is a member of the Armed Forces on active duty, shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services and, if and when reported, to the Select Committee for not to exceed 30 calendar days, except that in cases when the 30-day period expires while the Senate is in recess, the Select Committee shall have 5 additional calendar days after the Senate reconvenes to report the nomination. ``(2) With respect to the confirmation of appointment to the position of Director of the National Security Agency, Inspector General of the National Security Agency, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, or Inspector General or the National Reconnaissance Office, or any successor position to such a position, the nomination of any individual by the President to serve in such position, who at the time of the nomination is not a member of the Armed Forces on active duty, shall be referred to the Select Committee and, if and when reported, to the Committee on Armed Services for not to exceed 30 calendar days, except that in cases when the 30-day period expires while the Senate is in recess, the Committee on Armed Services shall have an additional 5 calendar days after the Senate reconvenes to report the nomination. ``(3) If, upon the expiration of the period of sequential referral described in paragraphs (1) and (2), the committee to which the nomination was sequentially referred has not reported the nomination, the nomination shall be automatically discharged from that committee and placed on the Executive Calendar.''."], u'title': u'SENATE RESOLUTION 470--AMENDING SENATE RESOLUTION 400 (94TH CONGRESS) TO CLARIFY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE IN THE PROVISION OF THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE TO...', u'volume': 160}]}
result["num_found"]
932
results=result["results"]
len(results)
50
r=requests.get("http://www.columbia.edu/~mj340/nsa_mentions.json")
results=r.json()
results[100]
{u'bills': [u'H.R. 5825'], u'bioguide_id': u'B000574', u'capitolwords_url': u'http://capitolwords.org/date/2006/09/28/H7853_electronic-surveillance-modernization-act/', u'chamber': u'House', u'congress': 109, u'date': u'2006-09-28', u'id': u'CREC-2006-09-28-pt2-PgH7853.chunk74', u'number': 124, u'order': 74, u'origin_url': u'http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-09-28/html/CREC-2006-09-28-pt2-PgH7853.htm', u'pages': u'H7853-H7876', u'session': 2, u'speaker_first': u'Earl', u'speaker_last': u'Blumenauer', u'speaker_party': u'D', u'speaker_raw': u'mr. blumenauer', u'speaker_state': u'OR', u'speaking': [u"Mr. Speaker, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, H.R. 5825, seeks to expand the administration's power by giving the President greater flexibility over a program that he has already abused. If our experience with this administration proves anything, it is that reducing congressional oversight would be a mistake.", u'Less than a year ago the American public learned how the president had blatantly disregarded the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) by authorizing a warrantless eavesdropping program on American citizens. After this program was uncovered, we discovered that the administration had authorized the National Security Agency to build a massive phone records database. Now the President asks that we pass legislation to legitimatize illegal activities that have already occurred and the current Republican leadership is all too willing to comply.', u'This legislation does not solve any problems or make our country more secure, it simply grants the administration the authority to implement more programs that violate the civil rights and liberties of American citizens.', u'We must hold this administration accountable for its actions and not retroactively approve an illegal program. Surveillance activities must be done consistent with our Constitution and our laws, and should protect both the American people and our freedoms.'], u'title': u'ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MODERNIZATION ACT', u'volume': 152}
results[100]["speaking"]
[u"Mr. Speaker, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, H.R. 5825, seeks to expand the administration's power by giving the President greater flexibility over a program that he has already abused. If our experience with this administration proves anything, it is that reducing congressional oversight would be a mistake.", u'Less than a year ago the American public learned how the president had blatantly disregarded the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) by authorizing a warrantless eavesdropping program on American citizens. After this program was uncovered, we discovered that the administration had authorized the National Security Agency to build a massive phone records database. Now the President asks that we pass legislation to legitimatize illegal activities that have already occurred and the current Republican leadership is all too willing to comply.', u'This legislation does not solve any problems or make our country more secure, it simply grants the administration the authority to implement more programs that violate the civil rights and liberties of American citizens.', u'We must hold this administration accountable for its actions and not retroactively approve an illegal program. Surveillance activities must be done consistent with our Constitution and our laws, and should protect both the American people and our freedoms.']
" ".join(results[100]["speaking"])
u"Mr. Speaker, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, H.R. 5825, seeks to expand the administration's power by giving the President greater flexibility over a program that he has already abused. If our experience with this administration proves anything, it is that reducing congressional oversight would be a mistake. Less than a year ago the American public learned how the president had blatantly disregarded the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) by authorizing a warrantless eavesdropping program on American citizens. After this program was uncovered, we discovered that the administration had authorized the National Security Agency to build a massive phone records database. Now the President asks that we pass legislation to legitimatize illegal activities that have already occurred and the current Republican leadership is all too willing to comply. This legislation does not solve any problems or make our country more secure, it simply grants the administration the authority to implement more programs that violate the civil rights and liberties of American citizens. We must hold this administration accountable for its actions and not retroactively approve an illegal program. Surveillance activities must be done consistent with our Constitution and our laws, and should protect both the American people and our freedoms."
# make a list comprehension that produces a
#LIST of strings of all the speeches
[" ".join(results[i]['speaking']) for i in range(0,(len(results)))]
[u'including the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, as ', u'including the National Security Agency and the Departments of ', u"test,'' Serpa said. National Security Agency managers find that many candidates ", u'the United States and at 265 posts abroad. Likewise, the National Security Agency is aggressively ', u"Madam Speaker, on rollcall No. 850, I was in a meeting in my district at the National Security Agency with NSA Director, General Alexander. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yea.''", u'the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, ', u' Mr. PAUL submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence: S. Res. 281 Whereas public news reports this week indicate that the United States National Security Agency monitored millions of phone calls in Italy in late 2012 and early 2013; Whereas these reports indicate that the National Security Agency monitored telephone calls made to and from a residence in Rome where then Archbishop Jorge Mario Bergoglio stayed during the conclave selecting Bergoglio, now known as His Holiness Pope Francis, to succeed Pope Benedict XVI; Whereas this story has been widely reported in the American and international media; Whereas the National Security Agency has reportedly denied the allegations; and Whereas these allegations are serious and President Obama should personally address these reports; Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that-- President Obama should directly address the serious allegation whether his administration monitored the calls of Pope Francis or the conclave selecting the Pope.', u'Mr. President, the hour is extremely late. The bottom line of this is that this provides for debt relief for the very countries we are trying to help with AIDS. They are swamped by debt. It is legislation that we have been through before. My staff and I sat with the White House, the National Security Agency. We sat down with the White House today, the National Security Agency representative for hours. We negotiated the exact language. I send the amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.', u'On behalf of Senator Allard, I offer an amendment on the protection of the operational files of the National Security Agency that would strike section 1035 of S. 1050 and replace it with this amendment. It is cleared on both sides.', u'S. 1901. A bill to authorize the National Science Foundation and the National Security Agency to establish programs to increase the number of qualified faculty teaching advanced courses conducting research in the field of cybersecurity, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.', u' The bill clerk read as follows: A bill (S. 1121) to stop the National Security Agency from spying on citizens of the United States and for other purposes. A bill (H.R. 126) to direct the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement to provide for management of the free-roaming wild horses in and around the Currituck National Wildlife Refuge.', u' The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (S. 1121) to stop the National Security Agency from spying on citizens of the United States and for other purposes. A bill (H.R. 126) to direct the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement to provide for management of the free-roaming wild horses in and around the Currituck National Wildlife Refuge.', u"I note to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee an issue in the committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S. 2549. on page 126, the report deals with acquisition programs at the National Security Agency (NSA). I fear that the language of the report could have unintended consequences for the on-going efforts to modernize the National Security Agency. The report mandates that the NSA manage its modernization effort as though it were a traditional major defense acquisition program. If this mandate were applied to each of the individual technology efforts within the NSA, such a requirement could impede NSA's flexibility to modernize and upgrade its capabilities. I would ask the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee whether this was the Committee's intent?", u'Mr. Speaker, the President is on trial, we are bombing Baghdad, Kosovo is in turmoil, and the American steel industry is literally being raped. After all this, the National Security Agency has designated a new major threat to our Republic, the furby; that is right, this furby cyberpet, that stands 4 inches tall and sells for $30, has just been designated as the next great threat to our freedom. Beam me up, Mr. Speaker. Beam me up. I say, the only threat these furbys really pose is they seem to appear to be much smarter than the bungling nincompoops at the National Security Agency. I recommend, for $30 a smack, here, that we hire furbys and fire those bureaucrats. Think about that one. Furby this, James Bond.', u' Mr. SENSENBRENNER, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted an adverse privileged report (Rept. No. 109-382) on the resolution (H. Res. 643) directing the Attorney General to submit to the House of Representatives all documents in the possession of the Attorney General relating to warrantless electronic surveillance of telephone conversations and electronic communications of persons in the United States conducted by the National Security Agency, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.', u' The following bills were read the first time: H.R. 126. An act to direct the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement to provide for management of the free-roaming wild horses in and around the Currituck National Wildlife Refuge. S. 1121. A bill to stop the National Security Agency from spying on citizens of the United States and for other purposes.', u' The following bills were read the second time, and placed on the calendar: S. 1121. A bill to stop the National Security Agency from spying on citizens of the United States and for other purposes. H.R. 126. An act to direct the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement to provide for management of the free-roaming wild horses in and around the Currituck National Wildlife Refuge.', u"SA 5625. Mr. NELSON of Florida submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 3001, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: (a) Areas.--This section applies to-- (1) any area in the Gulf of Mexico that is east of the Military Mission Line (as defined in section 102 of the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (43 U.S.C. 1331 note; Public Law 109-432)); (2) the area that is also known as the ``Joint Gulf Range Complex'' or the ``Gulf of Mexico Range''; and (3) any military or national security agency operations, training, or testing area that is used by a military or national security agency of the United States. (b) Prerequisite.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior shall not issue any permit for oil and gas leasing or extraction in an area described in subsection (a) unless and until the President certifies (after receiving advice from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the head of each appropriate national security agency of the United States) that in balancing the national security interests of the United States-- (1) the advantages of oil or gas extraction in the area; outweigh (2) the military and national security missions being conducted in the area.", u"SA 5626. Mr. NELSON of Florida submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 5498 submitted by Mr. Nelson of Florida and intended to be proposed to the bill S. 3001, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted, insert the following: (a) Areas.--This section applies to-- (1) any area in the Gulf of Mexico that is east of the Military Mission Line (as defined in section 102 of the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (43 U.S.C. 1331 note; Public Law 109-432)); (2) the area that is also known as the ``Joint Gulf Range Complex'' or the ``Gulf of Mexico Range''; and (3) any military or national security agency operations, training, or testing area that is used by a military or national security agency of the United States. (b) Prerequisite.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior shall not issue any permit for oil and gas leasing or extraction in an area described in subsection (a) unless and until the President certifies (after receiving advice from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the head of each appropriate national security agency of the United States) that in balancing the national security interests of the United States-- (1) the advantages of oil or gas extraction in the area; outweigh (2) the military and national security missions being conducted in the area.", u" SA 5498. Mr. NELSON of Florida submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 3001, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SEC. __. PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS FROM OIL AND GAS LEASING IN CERTAIN AREAS. (a) Areas.--This section applies to-- (1) any area in the Gulf of Mexico that is east of the Military Mission Line (as defined in section 102 of the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (43 U.S.C. 1331 note; Public Law 109-432)); (2) the area that is also known as the ``Joint Gulf Range Complex'' or the ``Gulf of Mexico Range''; and (3) any military or national security agency operations, training, or testing area that is used by a military or national security agency of the United States (b) Prerequisite.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior shall not issue any permit for oil and gas leasing or extraction in an area described in subsection (a) unless and until the President certifies (based on written opinions provided by each of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the head of each appropriate national security agency of the United States) that in balancing the national security interests of the United States-- (1) the advantages of oil or gas extraction in the area; outweigh (2) the military and national security missions being conducted in the area. (c) Opinions.--Each written opinion required for an area under subsection (b) shall-- (1) be submitted to the national security committees of Congress in unclassified form, with a classified annex (if applicable); and (2) evaluate the effects of oil or gas extraction on military and national security agency operations, training, or testing in the area.", u'First of all, I thank the Senator for his compliments that are excessive and not accurate, but I thank him nonetheless. But let me say in a second, I took the time 4 years ago to ask my senior staff to go back and get every major work written by the Straussians, the neocons, I mean it sincerely, and Tony Blinken, former National Security Agency, my chief guy, got together 11 or 12 books, the most seminal volumes written in the last decade by the neoconservatives. These are honorable, bright, serious people--patriotic Americans. If you read what they say, they mean what they say. What they say is the value of America----', u'protection of the operational files of the National Security Agency) Strike section 1035 and insert the following: (a) Consolidation of Current Provisions on Protection of Operational Files.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by transferring sections 105C and 105D to the end of title VII and redesignating such sections, as so transferred, as sections 703 and 704, respectively. (b) Protection of Operational Files of NSA.--Title VII of such Act, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:', u'Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 1, 2002 at 10:15 a.m. to hold a hearing titled, The Future of NATO. Panel 1: The Honorable Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC; and the Honorable Douglas Feith, Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, Panel 2: General Wesley K. Clark, USA (ret.), Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, The Stephens Group, Washington, DC; and Lt. General William E. Odom USA (ret.), Former Director, National Security Agency, Yale University & The Hudson Institute, Washington, DC.', u"Mr. Speaker, during an evening series of votes on July 24, 2013, on amendments to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act FY2014 (H.R. 2397), I intended to vote ``yes'' on the Amash/Conyers Amendment (rollcall No. 412), but inadvertently voted ``no''. This amendment would require the government to limit its collection of the records to those that actually pertain to the subject of a duly authorized investigation. The National Security Agency and other agencies would still retain their authority to collect specific records under Section 215, however, blanket collection of telephone records would end. I strongly support both protecting our country and preserving our civil liberties.", u" Under clause 3 of rule XII, memorials were presented and referred as follows: 164. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the House of Representatives of the State of Michigan, relative to House Resolution No. 227 urging the Congress to adopt House Concurrent Resolution 50; to the Committee on Natural Resources. 165. Also, a memorial of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, relative to House Resolution No. 456 urging the Congress to establish a special committee to investigate and report on the National Security Agency's Surveillance program; to the Committee on Rules.", u' Mr. McKEON from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 113-547) directing the Secretary of Defense to transmit to the House of Representatives copies of any emails in the possession of the Department of Defense or the National Security Agency that were transmitted to or from the email account(s) of former Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations Division Director Lois Lerner between January 2009 and April 2011, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.', u"Madam Speaker, born in Putnam County and raised in Cumberland County, Lt. General William E. Odom rose to great prominence in the U.S. military intelligence community and was a widely known expert on matters relating to the Soviet Union. A natural born leader, Odom graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1954. Over the next twenty years Gen. Odom earned a Masters Degree and Ph.D. from Columbia University, was stationed in East Germany for a lengthy period of time, taught at West Point, and served at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. In 1977, he was appointed as the military assistant to President Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. General Odom served in that position till 1981. Shortly after leaving the White House and for a little more than 3 years, Odom held the position of Assistant Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence. By 1985 General Odom was named the 11th Director of the National Security Agency, our nation's largest intelligence agency. Retiring in 1988 from the Army and the National Security Agency, General Odom embarked in a career in academia. Over the next twenty years he taught at Yale University and Georgetown University and was a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. General Odom is a member of the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame at the United States Army Intelligence Center in Fort Huachuca, Arizona. On behalf of Tennessee's Fourth Congressional District and a grateful nation, we thank General Odom for his service in defense of our country.", u"Let me restate in my own words, so the Senator from Maryland understands. Let's assume there is the country of Xanadu and an American is meeting with the President of Xanadu. In all probability, an American official is meeting with the President of Xanadu. The National Security Agency--with the ability to intercept conversations by multiple methods--picks up a conversation, or somebody's report of a conversation, between an American and the President of Xanadu. That gets reported back, based on subject matter, to the appropriate officer within the State Department or the Defense Department who they feel should know about this conversation because maybe the President said to the American: You know, we have right here in our country 47 al-Qaida operatives. That should go to the person who has that responsibility. So a lot of stuff went to Mr. Bolton because he is the guy in charge of dealing with nonproliferation and other matters. He would get these NSA, National Security Agency, intercept reports. But in order to protect the identity of the American, for privacy reasons, he would get a statement and it would say: On such and such a date at such and such a time, the President of Xanadu met with an American. They discussed the following things. Here is what they said, here is the conversation. That is what I understand to be--I know to be--the way in which NSA intercept reports treat a case involving an American.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise before you today to extend congratulations to a government employee who has shown outstanding dedication through his services to the Department of Defense. Deputy Director, Mr. William B. Black has serviced the Department of Defense for over forty-five years. He is the recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award, which is the highest honor a civilian can receive by the Secretary of Defense. The award is given to an individual whose career reflects exceptional devotion to duty, as well as, significant contributions to the efficiency, economy, or other improvements in the Department of Defense operations. Mr. Black aided in the success of intelligence production and cyber operations for assignments in Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the War on Terror. His determination and ambition has also abetted the National Security Agency's mounting field of information operations as a result of his role as the Special Assistant to the Director for Information Warfare. The National Security Agency was able to participate resolutely in the War on Terror because Mr. Black led signals intelligence and information assurance missions into the digital network era. Mr. Speaker, I ask that you join with me today to recognize Mr. William B. Black for his service to this country. The exceptional work he has done for the Department of Defense warrants great recognition. Dedication to this country and to the betterment of our intelligence operations is a vital part of our success as a powerful nation and should be observed and commended more frequently.", u"Mr. President, 2 years ago the American people first became aware that the National Security Agency was collecting private information about their phone calls. This is called the Snowden revelation. Under the banner of national security, the National Security Agency was mining information about home phone calls and how long they lasted. They found out whom they were calling--and not only that. They found out whom the call was between. They also determined how long that call lasted. NSA essentially was conducting a dragnet, without first attempting to determine whether that information was relevant to a national security problem. NSA ran this program under the authorities granted to them by section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which expires on June 1 of this year. The American people were outraged by these revelations and Congress rightly acted. Last year, the House passed a bill by a vote of 303 to 121 to end the NSA's so-called bulk metadata collection program and reform and extend the authority for this program. I brought a similar bill to the floor authored by Senators Leahy and Lee. There was a bipartisan group of Senators who joined them to call for its passage. But sadly, the majority leader--at that time the minority leader--stood in the way of bipartisan reform. Instead of passing meaningful reform, he led a Republican filibuster of this bill. That was one of a couple hundred that was led by my friend. This year, Senators Leahy and Lee worked again with the Chairman and ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee on the USA FREEDOM Act, which ends the National Security Agency's bulk collection program and extends and reforms the authorities under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. There have been bipartisan and bicameral calls for the Senate to take up that legislation. Yet again, instead of committing to bringing up this bipartisan bill, last month the senior Senator from Kentucky introduced a bill that would extend the authorities for the National Security Agency's bulk collection program for 5\\1/2\\ years. Then the Second Circuit, almost simultaneously--within 24 hours of that decision by the majority leader--found the bulk collection illegal. In reaction to the court's decision, the House last week passed the USA FREEDOM Act by a vote of 338 to 88. By a four-to-one margin, the House voted to end the National Security Agency's illegal bulk data collection program and reform its practices. But even in the face of that court's decision, the majority leader stood once again against bipartisan reform. Instead of heeding the Republican-controlled House's calls for reform, the majority leader introduced a bill that would extend the authorities for the National Security Agency's illegal program for 2 more months. Congressman Goodlatte, the chair of the Judiciary Committee in the House, said they will not accept a short-term extension of the bill. This morning, Leader McCarthy, the second ranking Republican in the House, said they will not accept any extension. That is exactly what the Speaker, Congressman Boehner, said. If we squander this opportunity to deliver sound reforms to this illegal program, we are handling our duties irresponsibly here in the Senate. To stand in the way of reforming these practices is to ignore the voice of the American people. Just yesterday, a new poll commissioned by the American Civil Liberties Union showed that 82 percent of Americans are concerned that the Federal Government is collecting and storing the personal information of Americans, and they do not like it. If we are unable to reform these practices, we are ignoring the ruling of the Second Circuit, which rejected the National Security Agency's bulk collection program, and we are not allowing the American people's voice to be heard. I think, most importantly, if the senior Senator from Kentucky does not allow this commonsense reform simply with a vote on the Senate floor about what happened in the House, they are ignoring the rare bipartisan support that we have. Just last week, 190 House Republicans voted to end the National Security Agency's illegal program. There is bipartisan consensus in favor of ending this program. Many of the Republican leader's own colleagues have called for it as well. Last week, Attorney General Loretta Lynch and James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, wrote a letter to Senator Leahy, the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee. Both the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence voiced their support for the USA FREEDOM Act, saying: Overall, the significant reforms contained in this legislation will provide the public greater confidence in how our intelligence activities are carried out and in the oversight of those activities, while ensuring vital national security authorities remain in place. I agree with that statement. But sadly, the majority leader continues to stand in the way of bipartisan reform to end these illegal practices. As we face the June 1 expiration of these authorities, the majority leader still offers no viable alternative. We cannot allow this program to be extended. The majority leader should listen to the American people because we cannot extend an illegal act. That is what the majority leader is asking us to do. The majority leader should listen to the American people, consider the action of his Republican colleagues, and respect the expertise of the intelligence community. The Senate should act now on the USA FREEDOM Act before it leaves for the Memorial Day recess and restore the confidence of the American people.", u"Madam Speaker, I rise before you today to honor Daniel C. Gilliam upon his retirement from the position of Deputy Senior Acquisition Executive at the National Security Agency (NSA). In this position Mr. Gilliam has been responsible for all of NSA's acquisitions and management of the Acquisition Directorate's senior leadership. Mr. Gilliam oversees all procurements, liaisons with key industry partners, and directs resources to optimize the organization's effectiveness. Working closely with Acquisition's customers, Mr. Gilliam maintains strategic partnerships with NSA's mission elements to ensure their needs and requirements are met. After earning a Bachelor's degree in Business Management from the University of Maryland, and a Master's degree in Public Administration from the George Washington University in 1979, Mr. Gilliam graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1993. He also attended the Federal Executive Institutes Leadership for a Democratic Society Program in 1996. In 1976, Daniel began his career at NSA as a management support intern. Since then, he has worked on a variety of acquisition and contracting positions to include contracting specialist, contracting officer, and cost/price analyst as well as managing those same disciplines. While participating in NSA's executive development program, Mr. Gilliam worked in the NSA Corporate Policy Office, the NSA Operations Directorate, and served as the Defense Intelligence Agency's Director for Procurement in 1995/1996. From 1997 to 2005, Mr. Gilliam served as the Chief of the Contracting Group, responsible for managing and directing all effort associated with contracting for materials, equipment, and services required to support the missions of the NSA. Certified level III in contracting in accordance with the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. Mr. Gilliam graduated from NSA's Senior Cryptologic Executive Development Program in 1996. He received the Defense Intelligence Director's Award in 1996, and he received the Meritorious Executive Presidential Rank Award in 2002. Madam Speaker, I ask that you join with me today to honor Daniel C. Gilliam in his retirement from the position of Deputy Senior Acquisition Executive at the National Security Agency. His legacy as a brilliant and competent specialist will be forever remembered in his service to defending the security of our nation. It is with great pride that I congratulate Dan Gilliam on his exemplary defense career and his outstanding service at the National Security Agency.", u" Mr. CORNYN (for himself and Mr. Roberts) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary: Whereas on June 22, 2006, news organizations publicly disclosed the existence of an ongoing, highly classified national security program to track terrorists' financial transactions, known formally as the ``Terrorist Finance Tracking Program''; Whereas the President condemned the unauthorized leak and subsequent publication in the strongest possible terms, calling those acts ``disgraceful'' and explaining that public disclosure of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program ``does great harm to the United States of America''; Whereas the Secretary of the Treasury noted that this unauthorized leak of classified information and subsequent publication ``undermined a highly successful counter- terrorism program and alerted terrorists to the methods and sources used to track their money trails''; Whereas similar to the leaks and public disclosure of the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program, the disclosure of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program puts America's terrorist enemies on notice of tactics used to hunt them down and makes defending against further terrorist attacks more difficult; Whereas Administration officials and the co-chairmen of the 9/11 Commission (a Democrat and a Republican) urged news organizations to refrain from publicly disclosing the existence of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program because of the probable harm to America's national security; Whereas there have been no credible allegations of abuse or infringements on civil liberties in the execution of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program; Whereas the 9/11 Commission in its Final Report concluded that ``information about terrorist money helps us to understand their networks, search them, and disrupt their operations''; Whereas the 9/11 Commission had given the Administration high marks in its pursuit of terrorist-finance networks, and recommended that ``vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U.S. counter-terrorism efforts''; and Whereas the United States must remain vigilant in its War on Terror: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That-- (1) the Senate joins the President in condemning the damaging leaks and subsequent publication of vital national security information about the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program and the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program; and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that the Department of Justice should vigorously and tirelessly investigate and prosecute any and all persons responsible for the unauthorized disclosure to news organizations of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program, and other vital counter-terrorism programs.", u"Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to Michael J. Jacobs as he leaves the National Security Agency. Mr. Jacobs has served our nation for more than 38 years. He has distinguished himself and the National Security Agency in positions of increasing responsibility. Mr. Jacobs capped his illustrious career as the Information Assurance Director of the National Security Agency. Mr. Jacobs is an outstanding example of the many dedicated public servants who fulfill critical needs, often without public recognition. When Mr. Jacobs joined the NSA, the agency's existence was a secret. While the American people now know and appreciate more about the NSA, most of the attention goes to signals intelligence. Mr. Jacobs made his mark fulfilling the NSA's other core mission: information assurance. He has led and shaped the essential effort to develop secure information systems. Our Presidents, our Armed Forces, our diplomats, our intelligence agencies, and other Government leaders depend on secure communications every day. During his tenure, Mr. Jacobs has shaped every part of how our government addresses the Information Assurance needs. Mr. Jacobs demonstrated a real commitment to the long-range needs of America. His initiatives in research and education are key examples. He worked to sustain the Information Assurance Awareness and Training and Education Research Program. He also broke new ground in establishing NSA Centers of Excellence in Information Assurance Education at institutions of higher learning in Maryland and across the country. Mr. Jacobs was stayed ahead of the curve in protecting America's critical information infrastructure. The White House recognized the Information Assurance System Security Education and Training Program (NIEPT) he developed as a model in Government. Mr. Jacobs' embodies the best traditions of our civil service. That's why he has been recognized with the NSA Exceptional Civilian Service Award and the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement. As the Senator from Maryland and a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I want to thank Mr. Jacobs for his dedication to the United States of America. He has served our nation with honor. I wish Mike well as he enters a new phase of his life. ", u" The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Barr of Georgia: At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the following new section: (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Attorney General shall jointly prepare, and the Director of the National Security Agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report in classified and unclassified form describing the legal standards employed by elements of the intelligence community in conducting signals intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance. (b) Matters Specifically Addressed.--The report shall specifically include a statement of each of the following legal standards: (1) The legal standards for interception of communications when such interception may result in the acquisition of information from a communication to or from United States persons. (2) The legal standards for intentional targeting of the communications to or from United States persons. (3) The legal standards for receipt from non-United States sources of information pertaining to communications to or from United States persons. (4) The legal standards for dissemination of information acquired through the interception of the communications to or from United States persons. (c) Inclusion of Legal Memoranda and Opinions.--The report under subsection (a) shall include a copy of all legal memoranda, opinions, and other related documents in unclassified, and if necessary, classified form with respect to the conduct of signals intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance by elements of the intelligence community, utilized by the Office of the General Counsel of the National Security Agency, by the Office of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, or by the Office of Intelligence Policy Review of the Department of Justice, in preparation of the report. (d) Definition.--As used in this section: (1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (2) The term ``United States persons'' has the meaning given such term under section 101(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(i)). (3) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.", u'Madam Speaker, in early 2008, President Bush established the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative to address cyberattacks on federal networks and President Obama has committed to fully continue this effort under his administration. Awareness of our vulnerabilities to cyberattack and the need for action is nearly universal and goes beyond party lines. The seriousness of this situation was brought into focus this week, when it was revealed a powerful attack overwhelmed computers at U.S. and South Korean government Web sites. Other targets included the National Security Agency, the State Department, and the New York Stock Exchange. It is our responsibility as a Congress--and my commitment as a member of the House Science and Technology Committee--to ensure we get this issue right, and ensure taxpayer dollars provide a return in the form of lasting and effective security, while also protecting privacy. The need is real, the threat is present and clear, and I want to make sure our country is prepared.', u"Section 444 of the bill would impose additional Senate confirmation requirements on two national security positions--the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) observed that the effectiveness of the Intelligence Community suffers due to delays in the confirmation process; section 444 would only aggravate those serious problems. Senior intelligence officials need to assume their duties and responsibilities as quickly as possible to address the pressing requirements of national security. Instead of addressing the 9/11 Commission's concern, the bill would subject two additional vital positions to a more protracted process of Senate confirmation. Apart from causing such potentially harmful delays, this unwarranted requirement for Senate confirmation would also risk injecting political pressure into these positions of technical expertise and public trust.", u'Madam Speaker, I rise today to recognize and congratulate the University of Idaho for their re-designation as a National Center of Academic Excellence (CAE) in Information Assurance Education (IA). The National Security Agency and Department of Homeland Security has bestowed this distinguished recognition on only ninety-three schools across 37 states and the District of Columbia. In order to be considered a CAE high academic standards must be in place. A CAE is required to have a full-time faculty dedicated to teaching IA, academic courses focused on IA and students involved in IA research projects. CAE students are trained to play a critical role in protecting our national information infrastructure. The University of Idaho will now be eligible to apply for scholarships and grants through both federal and Department of Defense Information Assurance Scholarship Programs. Congratulations to the University of Idaho for this fine distinction and commitment to cultivating the minds of our future leaders.', u' Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows: Mr. SENSENBRENNER: Committee on the Judiciary. House Resolution 643. Resolution directing the Attorney General to submit to the House of Representatives all documents in the possession of the Attorney General relating to warrantless electronic surveillance of telephone conversations and electronic communications of persons in the United States conducted by the National Security Agency; adversely (Rept. 109-382). Referred to the House Calendar. Mr. SENSENBRENNER: Committee on the Judiciary. House Resolution 644. Resolution requesting the President and directing the Attorney General to transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution documents in the possession of those officials relating to the authorization of electronic surveillance of citizens of the United States without court approved warrants; adversely (Rep. 109-383). Referred to the House Calendar.', u" Mr. SENSENBRENNER, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted an adverse privileged report (Rept. No. 109-528) on the resolution (H. Res. 845) requesting the President and directing the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General to transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution, documents relating to the termination of the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility's investigation of the involvement of Department of Justice personnel in the creation and administration of the National Security Agency's warrantless surveillance program, including documents relating to Office of Professional Responsibility's request for and denial of security clearances, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.", u" The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated: S. Res. 524. A resolution condemning the unauthorized disclosure and publication of classified information about the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program, and other vital counter-terrorism programs; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mr. Obama): S. Res. 525. A resolution to amend the Standing Rules of the Senate to provide greater transparency in the legislative process; to the Committee on Rules and Administration. By Mrs. CLINTON (for herself and Mr. Brownback): S. Res. 526. A resolution condemning the murder of United States journalist Paul Klebnikov on July 9, 2004, in Moscow, and the murders of other members of the media in the Russian Federation; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.", u"Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet to conduct a hearing on ``FISA for the 21st Century'' on Wednesday, July 26, 2006, at 9 a.m. in Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 226. Panel I: LTG Michael V. Hayden, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Langley, VA; LTG Keith B. Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency, Chief of the Central Security Service, Washington, DC; Steven Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Panel II: Bryan Cunningham, Partner, Morgan & Cunningham LLC, Denver, CO; Jim Dempsey, Policy Director, Center for Democracy & Technology, Washington, DC; John Schmidt, Partner, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, Chicago, IL; Mary DeRosa, Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins Center for Strategic and International Studies, Technology and Public Policy Program, Washington, DC.", u'I have not thought it through. I think after it was decontrolled in 1994, over the objections of the National Security Agency, the cat was out of the bag. I am not sure it would have made any difference. I think the point is that what we are dealing with today would further decontrol a host of additional items that heretofore you had to have a license to get. Some of those--I would venture to say the large majority of those things--would be harmless. But my concern is whether or not we have a procedure to catch the ones that are not harmless. That is what we are trying to deal with here. I hope we can move in that direction.', u'In response, I say, absolutely. In fact, our colleague from Idaho is on the Appropriations Committee. The first thing you have to do is appropriate the money for the agencies--the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency, all the law enforcement functions--and then all of the other functions of the Federal Government. We have to pass the appropriations bills. We are now operating under a continuing appropriations bill because we in Congress did not get our work done by October 1. It is not as if we are not trying. Senator Byrd and Senator Stevens, the chairman and ranking member of the Appropriations Committee, are pushing very hard, and we cannot get the appropriations bills to the floor of the Senate. Do my colleagues know why? Because there is an objection to a motion to proceed to an appropriations bill.', u"sec. 506. enhancement of security authorities of national security Section 506 authorizes the National Security Agency (NSA) security protective officers to exercise their law enforcement functions 500 feet beyond the confines of NSA facilities. At present, NSA's protective jurisdiction does not extend beyond the territorial bounds of its perimeter fences. Additionally, NSA has to rely on several federal, state, and local jurisdictions to respond to threats that occur just outside its fence line. With so many jurisdictions involved, there is a chance that a necessary response could be slowed and thus ineffective. In addition, under current law (Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959) the Administrator of General Services, upon the application of the Director of NSA, may provide for the protection of those facilities that are under the control of or use by the National Security Agency. The General Services Administration has delegated this authority to NSA. This amendment to the National Security Agency Act would provide NSA with the organic authority needed to protect its facilities and personnel without having to obtain a delegation of authority from the General Services Administration. This section parallels authority the Central Intelligence Agency currently has in section 15 of the CIA Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o). The attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the growing threat of terrorism in the United States. The conferees believe the NSA's authority to have a protective detail should be clarified and enhanced 500 feet beyond the confines of NSA's facilities, but were sensitive to the public's reaction to an unlimited grant of law enforcement jurisdiction outside NSA's borders. Therefore, the exercise of this new authority is expressly limited to only those circumstances where NSA security protective officers can identify specific and articulable facts giving them reason to believe that the exercise of this authority is necessary to protect against physical damage or injury to NSA installations, property, or employees. This provision also expressly states that the rules and regulations prescribed by the Director of the NSA for agency property and installations do not extend into the 500 foot area established by this provision. Thus, there will be no restrictions, for example, on the taking of photographs within the 500 foot zone. The conferees do not envision a general grant of police authority in the 500 foot zone, but do envision NSA security protective officers functioning as federal police, for limited purposes, within the 500 foot zone with all attendant authorities, capabilities, immunities, and liabilities. The conferees expect the Director of NSA to coordinate and establish Memoranda of Understanding with all federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies with which NSA will exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the 500 foot zones. The Director of NSA shall submit such Memoranda of Understanding to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives. The Director of NSA is also expected to develop a training plan to familiarize the Agency's security protective officers with their new authorities and responsibilities. The Director of NSA shall submit such plan to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives not later than 30 days after the enactment of this provision. Section 506 also includes a reporting requirement so that the intelligence committees may closely scrutinize the exercise of this new authority. Items Not Included Section 306 of the House bill contained a provision establishing, with respect to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a federal commission on the national security readiness of the United States. The Senate bill had no similar provision. The House recedes.", u'Mr. Speaker, on the very day that President Clinton leaves for China, China thumbs their nose at America once again. Check this out. Top U.S. officials say, and I quote: China stole a top secret device off an American satellite. The theft was so serious, our National Security Agency was forced to change all of our communication codes. After all of this, the White House still wants a permanent Most Favored Nation trade status for China. Free trade my ascot, Mr. Speaker. This is a free ride and a free for all for China, who is gobbling up our national security secrets faster than the President can down a Big Mac and a box of fries. Think about that. Mr. Speaker, I want to yield back what secret codes, secrets, and national security we have left.', u"Madam Speaker, ``Those who give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.'' Ben Franklin uttered those words several hundred years ago, but his warning is still relevant today. Reports that the National Security Agency has been monitoring the phone records and Internet activities of ordinary citizens should concern every American. The President has said that these surveillance programs don't involve listening to people's phone calls or reading their emails. Americans want to believe their President. Yet his tax agency lied about targeting conservative groups and his Justice Department spied on reporters who were just doing their job. As a Nation, we would be wise to heed Ben Franklin's advice and make sure that there is a bright line between acceptable counterterrorism activities and unacceptable violations of our fundamental rights.", u' The text of the amendment is as follows: At the end of the bill (before the short title), add the following: Sec. __. None of funds made available by this Act may be used by the National Security Agency to-- (1) conduct an acquisition pursuant to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for the purpose of targeting a United States person; or (2) acquire, monitor, or store the contents (as such term is defined in section 2510(8) of title 18, United States Code) of any electronic communication of a United States person from a provider of electronic communication services to the public pursuant to section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 312, the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo) and a Member opposed each will control 7\\1/2\\ minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas.', u'Madam Chair, I want to thank Representative Amash for offering this amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2014. We now know that the National Security Agency (NSA) is keeping a phone log of all calls made in the U.S. This issue merits heightened congressional scrutiny. We need to strike a balance between our efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and our protection of civil liberties. The committees with jurisdiction are conducting a thorough review--as they should. I look forward to hearing their recommendations. That said, rewriting laws--especially one that NSA Director Gen. Keith Alexander says is vital to our safety--is not within the scope of the appropriations process. I welcome further discussion about the scope and intent of the PATRIOT Act, and look forward to working with my colleagues to ensure that the law is not overly broad. So though I commend Mr. Amash for raising this issue, I must respectfully vote against his amendment.', u" The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated: By Mr. McCAIN: S. Res. 343. A resolution establishing a Select Committee of the Senate to make a full and thorough investigation of the unauthorized disclosures of apparently classified information concerning the National Security Agency intelligence-collection programs, operations, and activities, including programs affecting Americans, to make findings based upon the investigation, and to make recommendations based on the investigation and findings; to the Committee on Rules and Administration. By Mr. TOOMEY (for himself and Mr. Casey): S. Res. 344. A resolution congratulating the Penn State University women's volleyball team for winning the 2013 National Collegiate Athletic Association Women's Volleyball Championship; considered and agreed to.", u" Mrs. FEINSTEIN submitted the following resolution; which was placed on the calendar: S. Res. 470 Resolved, SECTION 1. RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMITTEES IN ADVICE AND CONSENT OF SENATE TO INTELLIGENCE APPOINTMENTS. Section 17 of Senate Resolution 400 agreed to May 19, 1976 (94th Congress) is amended to read as follows: ``Sec. 17. (a)(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), the Select Committee shall have jurisdiction to review, hold hearings, and report the nominations of civilian individuals for positions in the intelligence community for which appointments are made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), other committees with jurisdiction over the department or agency of the Executive Branch which contain a position referred to in paragraph (1) may hold hearings and interviews with individuals nominated for such position, but only the Select Committee shall report such nomination. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `intelligence community' means an element of the intelligence community specified in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). ``(b)(1) With respect to the confirmation of the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, or any successor position, the nomination of any individual by the President to serve in such position shall be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and, if and when reported, to the Select Committee for not to exceed 20 calendar days, except that in cases when the 20-day period expires while the Senate is in recess, the Select Committee shall have 5 additional calendar days after the Senate reconvenes to report the nomination. ``(2) If, upon the expiration of the period described in paragraph (1), the Select Committee has not reported the nomination, such nomination shall be automatically discharged from the Select Committee and placed on the Executive Calendar. ``(c)(1) With respect to the confirmation of appointment to the position of Director of the National Security Agency, Inspector General of the National Security Agency, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, or Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance Office, or any successor position to such a position, the nomination of any individual by the President to serve in such position, who at the time of the nomination is a member of the Armed Forces on active duty, shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services and, if and when reported, to the Select Committee for not to exceed 30 calendar days, except that in cases when the 30-day period expires while the Senate is in recess, the Select Committee shall have 5 additional calendar days after the Senate reconvenes to report the nomination. ``(2) With respect to the confirmation of appointment to the position of Director of the National Security Agency, Inspector General of the National Security Agency, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, or Inspector General or the National Reconnaissance Office, or any successor position to such a position, the nomination of any individual by the President to serve in such position, who at the time of the nomination is not a member of the Armed Forces on active duty, shall be referred to the Select Committee and, if and when reported, to the Committee on Armed Services for not to exceed 30 calendar days, except that in cases when the 30-day period expires while the Senate is in recess, the Committee on Armed Services shall have an additional 5 calendar days after the Senate reconvenes to report the nomination. ``(3) If, upon the expiration of the period of sequential referral described in paragraphs (1) and (2), the committee to which the nomination was sequentially referred has not reported the nomination, the nomination shall be automatically discharged from that committee and placed on the Executive Calendar.''.", u"Mr. Speaker, well, there are only 4 days left until the Department of Homeland Security shuts down, so I urge all my GOP colleagues to please take up a clean funding bill for the Department of Homeland Security and take away the threat of another government shutdown. Take that threat off the table. If you won't listen to us on the Democratic side of the aisle, listen to some of your own colleagues. Listen to Senator Ron Johnson who said: ``The political impasse on DHS funding must end.'' Or listen to Representative Mike McCaul, who is chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security. He said: ``We should not be playing politics with the national security agency like DHS, particularly given the high threat environment we're in right now.'' Let's stop the gamesmanship. Let's get back to governing the way the American people want us to. Bring a clean DHS funding bill to the floor.", u"Madam President, while the Senator is still on the floor, I wish to engage in a brief colloquy, ad-libbing this or, as I recall in football, an audible. We have the two people who are most key to this, Senator Lieberman, chairman of our committee, and Senator Collins, our ranking member, who worked very hard with their staff and our staffs to fashion this legislation. In recent years when we heard opposition to doing something on cyber security, the concern we had was there was going to be a top-down. There was going to be Homeland Security, which in its early days did not have a very good reputation. The idea was that somehow Homeland Security was going to be running this top down without a whole lot of input from industry. Basically we have taken even the second most recent version of our bill, and we changed that. What we said is it is not going to be top-down, it is not going to be Homeland Security saying these are the best practices, these are the standards to protect cyber security. Instead we said: Industry, what do you want to tell us? ``Us'' being Homeland Security, ``us'' being the Department of Defense, ``us'' being the National Security Agency, ``us'' being the FBI. What do you think those best practice standards should be? Give us a chance to work on those together. Correct me if I am wrong, but I don't think the deal here is for Homeland Security to say: You have to throw those away; those make no sense, we will do it our way. That is not what is going to happen here. In our meeting yesterday with the folks from the FBI and the National Security Agency, that is not the way it is going to work. It is not the way it works today and it is not the way it is going to work in the future. What does the Senator think?", u' There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) In General.--The Oak Hill property shall be disposed of as follows: (1) The portion of the property which is located west of the Baltimore-Washington Parkway shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Director of the National Park Service, who shall use such portion for parkland purposes. (2) Subject to subsection (b), the portion of the property which is located east of the Baltimore-Washington Parkway and 200 feet and further north of the Patuxent River shall be transferred to the Secretary of the Army (acting through the Chief of Engineers) for use by the Director of the National Security Agency, who may lease such portion to the District of Columbia. (3) The portion of the property which is located east of the Baltimore-Washington Parkway and south of the portion described in paragraph (2) shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Administrator of General Services, who shall in turn convey such portion to Anne Arundel County, Maryland, in accordance with subsection (c). (b) Payment for Construction of New Juvenile Detention Facility for District of Columbia.--As a condition of the transfer under subsection (a)(2), the Director of the National Security Agency shall enter into an agreement with the Mayor of the District of Columbia under which-- (1) the juvenile detention facility for the District of Columbia currently located on the Oak Hill property shall be closed; and (2) subject to appropriations, the Agency shall pay for the construction of a replacement facility at a site to be determined, with priority given to a location within the District of Columbia. (c) Conveyance of Portion of Property to Anne Arundel County.-- (1) In general.--The Administrator of General Services shall convey, without consideration, to Anne Arundel County, Maryland, all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to that portion of the Oak Hill property referred to in subsection (a)(3). (2) Terms and conditions of conveyance.--The conveyance under paragraph (1) shall be carried out under such terms and conditions as may be agreed to by the Administrator and Anne Arundel County, except that, as a condition of the conveyance-- (A) Anne Arundel County shall agree to dedicate a portion of the property which is adjacent to the Patuxent River to parkland and recreational use; and (B) Anne Arundel County shall agree to reimburse the National Security Agency for the amounts paid by the Agency under subsection (b) for the construction of a new juvenile detention facility for the District of Columbia, but only if the County makes 25 percent or more of the property conveyed under this subsection available for purposes other than open space or recreational use.', u"I thank my friend. Just one last point with respect to this technology conference where so many people walked away and thought their privacy was being protected by strong legal protections. General Alexander made additional confusing remarks that were in response to that same question with respect to the protections of law-abiding people. General Alexander said, `` . . . the story that we [the NSA] have millions or hundreds of millions of dossiers on people is absolutely false.'' Now, I have indicated this morning as well, having served on the Intelligence Committee for a long time, I do not have the faintest idea of what anybody is talking about with respect to a dossier. So Senator Udall and I followed that up as well. We asked the Director to clarify that statement. We asked, ``Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans?'' So that, too, is a pretty straightforward question. The question Senators have been asking about this are not very complicated. If you are asking whether the National Security Agency is addressing these privacy issues, I think it is one of the most basic questions you can ask. Does the National Security Agency collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans? If the Agency saw fit, they could simply answer that with a yes or no. Instead, the Director of the Agency replied that while he appreciated our desire to have responses to those questions on the public record, there would not be a public response forthcoming. So to go over the exchange again, the Director of National Security Agency states that `` . . . the story that we have millions or hundreds of millions of dossiers on people is absolutely false.'' Senator Udall and I then asked: Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans? The Agency is unwilling to answer the question. So that is what this debate is all about, is reforming the FISA Amendments Act and, in particular, getting enough information so that it is possible for the Senate to say to our constituents: We are doing oversight over this program. I think right now, based on what we have outlined over the last 3 or more hours, it is clear that on so many of the central questions--the gap, for example, between the secret interpretation of the law and the public interpretation of the law, our inability to find out whether Americans in their wholly domestic communications have had their rights violated, how many law-abiding Americans have had their e-mails and phone calls swept up under FISA authorities, responses to these questions that stem from public remarks made by intelligence officials at public conferences--the inability to get answers to these questions means that this Senate cannot conduct the vigorous oversight that is our charge. I expect we will have colleagues coming in. With the weather, it is a special challenge to get here from our part of the country. I have a parliamentary inquiry. The distinguished chair of the committee already, I believe, got unanimous consent that the time in quorum calls be allocated to both sides. That was my understanding. Is that correct?", u'Madam President, before the Senator from Missouri leaves the floor, I thank him for his statement. I thank him for his kind words about Senator Collins and me, which she certainly deserves and I am glad to be along with her on that ride. I thank him for the specific question and assure the Senator on my behalf, one, that Senator Collins and our committee were focused throughout the deliberations on making sure this substantial reorganization of our intelligence assets not in any way diminish the availability of intelligence to the warfighter. In fact, in the best of all situations, we believe the recommendations that we have made will improve intelligence to the warfighter. By way of reassurance, I want to quote from GEN Michael Hayden, Director of the National Security Agency, who said in testimony before the other body: An empowered national intelligence director who would direct authority over the national agencies should not be viewed as diminishing our ability or willingness to fulfill our responsibilities as combat support agencies. He was speaking on behalf of the three. It was quite illuminating, in talking to General Hayden and others. They are in direct daily contact, particularly with the combatant commanders. They have people out in the field right now with those combatant commanders, particularly in the most active areas of the world, such as the central command, which includes Iraq and Pakistan. After having described that close integration of national intelligence assets with the warfighters, General Hayden concluded: It is inconceivable to me that any future leader of the National Security Agency could or would ever act any differently. GEN James Clapper, head of the NGA, National Geospatial Agency, expressed exactly the same sentiments to us. I want to reassure the Senator from Missouri, more to the point of his question, that to the extent we are able--and I am sure if we are not, the Armed Services Committee will--we will definitely keep a close eye as this new system is implemented to make sure our intention, which is that this reform improves intelligence for our warfighters, in fact is being realized.', u"Mr. Speaker, at a ceremony on October 19, 2001, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) will designate as a ``Milestone in Engineering'' the U.S. Naval Computing Machine Laboratory, in Dayton, Ohio, which I represent. During World War II, the ability to analyze quickly coded enemy messages was one of our most critical military capabilities. To build a machine that could break codes from Nazi submarines, the Navy turned to Dayton's National Cash Register Company (NCR) and Joseph R. Desch, director of its Electrical Research Laboratory. For three years, Desch and his team of dedicated workers developed a machine which allowed our Nation to crack the secret code used by the Nazi military command to communicate its secret plans to its forces in the field. The device, called a Bombe, was the military's highest priority, second only to the development of the Atom Bomb. Its success gave the Allies a significant advantage, hastening the end of the war and saving the lives of American soldiers. Desch and his team faced enormous pressure as they labored daily to construct and produce the code-breaking device. They sacrificed their personal health, both emotional and physical. Many of these heroes are no longer living. Desch died on August 3, 1987, at age 80. The effort has been all but forgotten because of the enormous secrecy surrounding the project. In February and March 2001, the Dayton Daily News ran an extraordinary 8-part series by Jim DeBrosse about Desch. The series brought to light for the first time much information about NCR's code-breaking efforts. The IEEE ceremony later this month will bring additional honor to his memory. Perhaps the greatest tribute to the memory of Joe Desch and his contribution to the war effort would be the permanent display of an original NCR Bombe in Dayton. Of the more than 120 Bombes that were believed to have been constructed in Dayton, the sole known surviving Bombe is displayed at the National Security Agency's National Cryptologic Museum in Ft. Meade, Maryland. I have been in touch with the National Security Agency requesting assistance in tracking down another example of this extraordinary invention. As part the IEEE ceremony, the surviving members of this top-secret project will return to the site of the U.S. Naval Computing Machine Laboratory, at NCR. They will be joined by Desch's daughter, Debbie Anderson, whose persistence has helped the story be told. I offer my congratulations on this award to all the survivors of the project and to Debbie Anderson in honor of her father.", u"Mr. Speaker, I stand before you today to recognize and honor the accomplishments of a truly remarkable woman. On May 5, members of the Flint, Michigan, Northern High School Alumni Association will gather to honor five Distinguished Fellows, members of their alumni community who have contributed to legacy and rich history of Northern High School, and of Flint. One Distinguished Fellow to be honored is the late Ms. Cecile Hershon. Born in Lansing, Michigan in 1920, Cecile Hershon and her family eventually moved to Flint, where she graduated from Northern High School in 1938. In 1944, Cecile was recruited by the United States Army and began her long military career as a civilian clerk in Arlington, Virginia. From there she went on to become a part of the newly merged Army and Navy Signal Services, first known as the Armed Forces Security Agency as is currently what we know as the National Security Agency. Cecile began to further her career with the National Security Agency, becoming adept as intelligence research, analysis, and reporting, and soon became a exceptional cryptographer. She later accepted an overseas position where she continued to perfect her skills, allowing her to function in a variety of supervisory and management positions. Throughout her career, which spanned an incomparable 42 years, Cecile received numerous honors and commendations, including one of the agency's highest honors, the National Meritorious Civilian Service Award in 1986. Cecile also became involved in WIN--Women in NSA, an organization dedicated to increasing personal growth and development among both men and women within the NSA. As a member of WIN, Cecile was honored with their President's Award on two separate occasions. She was also the first recipient of WIN's Dorothy T. Blum Award for excellence in personal and professional development. In addition to being a model employee, Cecile was an ardent humanitarian as well. She was constantly found extending a helping hand to friends, colleagues, and sometimes mere acquaintances, sometimes at her own personal or professional expense, and with no thought of personal gain. Countless members of the NSA and the military attribute their success to Cecile's support and encouragement. There have been many accounts of people who were convinced by Cecile to remain in the NSA, complete their education, and honor familial obligations. Indeed, many of our military are better soldiers due to the influence of Cecile Hershon. Mr. Speaker, Cecile Hershon lived her life in a truly selfless and benevolent manner, and it goes without saying that her influence extends even to this day. Her life's work, serving her country for so long as a civilian, is commanding of the highest respect.", u"Very briefly, Mr. President, I have just received a copy of a letter that has been sent this morning to the majority leader, Senator Reid, and the Republican leader, Senator McConnell, from GEN Keith Alexander of the United States Army, Director of the National Security Agency and Chief of Cyber Command at the Department of Defense. He is a distinguished and honored leader of our military, one of the people who has the greatest single responsibility for protecting our security, both in terms of the extraordinary capabilities the National Security Agency has but now increasingly for the defense of our cyber system. This is a career military officer, not a politician. He is somebody who has a mission, and it is from that sense of responsibility that General Alexander has written to Senator Reid and Senator McConnell. He writes--and I will ask to have it printed in the Record--to express his ``strong support for passage of a comprehensive bipartisan cyber security bill by the Senate this week.'' Why? I continue to quote: The cyber threat facing the Nation is real and demands immediate action. The time to act is now; we simply cannot afford further delay. He adds: Moreover, to be most effective in protecting against this threat to our national security, cyber security legislation should address both information sharing and core critical infrastructure hardening. Then he explains both of those in very compelling language. He also says: Finally, any legislation needs to recognize that cyber security is a team sport. No single public or private entity has all of the required authorities, resources, and capabilities. Within the federal government, the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community are now closely partnered with the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The benefits of this partnership are perhaps best evidenced by the Managed Security Service (MSS) program, which affords protection to certain government components and defense companies. The legislation will help enable us to make these same protections available widely to the private sector. I cannot thank General Alexander enough. He ends by saying this: The President and the Congress have rightly made cyber security a national priority. We need to move forward on comprehensive legislation now. He urged Senators Reid and McConnell ``to work together to get it passed.'' I ask unanimous consent that this very compelling letter from GEN Keith Alexander be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. President, there is such an important subject that is looming over the country right now that Congress can do something about; that is, the possibility of cyber attack. We have had this discussed by a number of people in very high and responsible positions and the threat is real. What the threat means to all of us in our everyday lives is that electrical systems could be shut down, water systems could be shut down, the banking system could be shut down, sewer systems could go awry, and we can go on and on. For months we have been stymied from passing anything because of a disagreement in the business community, which is going to be one of the main recipients of a potential cyber attack. I will choose my words very carefully as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee and say this potential attack is real. It is real not only from rogue players but also some state actors, and we need to get this legislation up and going. I am most encouraged to think we are at a position to get agreement; that the chairman and vice chairman of our Intelligence Committee are going to come together in an agreement. We need to pass this--this week--because this is deadly serious. I refer to a letter that has been made public from the commander of Cyber Command, a four-star general, GEN Keith Alexander. He is also the head of the National Security Agency. He has done a remarkable job. He sent a letter, dated today, to the majority leader imploring the Senate to move. Whatever disagreements there have been over the concern of the Department of Homeland Security being the interfacing agency can be worked out. The National Security Agency--which almost all of us have enormous confidence in--is going to be directly involved. It is my hope and I am expressing optimism that we are going to get this legislation out of here and to the House. If they can't pass it before this August recess, at least we can have some items over the August recess start to be informally conferenced to iron out any differences between the House and the Senate.", u"My colleague is asking a particularly important question because the Director of the National Security Agency, General Alexander, recently spoke at a large technology conference, and he said that with respect to communications from a good guy, which we obviously interpret as a law-abiding American, and someone overseas, the NSA has ``requirements from the FISA Court and the Attorney General to minimize that''--to find procedures to protect the individual, the law-abiding American's rights, essentially meaning, in the words of General Alexander, ``nobody else can see it unless there's a crime that's been committed.'' If people hear that answer to my colleague's question--which, frankly, General Alexander responded to directly--they pretty much say that is what they were hoping to hear; that nobody is going to get access to their communications unless a crime has been committed. The only problem, I would say to my friend, is Senator Udall and I have found out that is not true. It is simply not true. The privacy protections provided by this minimization approach are not as strong as General Alexander made them out to be. Senator Udall and I wrote to General Alexander, and he said--and I put this up on my Web site so all Americans can see the response--the general said: That is not really how the minimization procedures work--these minimization procedures that have been described in such a glowing way--and that the privacy protections are not as strong as we have been led to believe. He may have misspoken and may have just been mistaken, but I am not sure the record would be correct even now had not Senator Udall and I tried to make an effort to follow it up. I can tell the Senator that at this very large technology conference--this was not something that was classified--at a very large technology conference recently in Nevada, what the head of the National Security Agency said was taking place with respect to protecting people, in response to my colleague's questions: Were their e-mails and phone calls protected, the general said to a big group: They are, unless a crime has been committed. The real answer is that is not correct.", u"Mr. Chairman, the amendment I offer this evening clarifies and confirms the scope of two programs that Mr. Snowden illegally exposed while sitting in a hotel room in Communist China. First, the amendment clarifies that under section 702 no U.S. citizen or person in the U.S. can be targeted, period. I say again, no U.S. person under section 702 may be targeted in any way by the United States Government. While there are other specific authorities the U.S. person may be subject to an investigation, the U.S. Government may not do so under section 702. That's what this amendment intends to clarify. The second part of the amendment clarifies section 215, also known as section 501 of FISA. The amendment clarifies that no content of communications can be stored or collected by the National Security Agency--that's no emails, no video clips, no Skype. No record of the actual conversation or the contents thereof may be recorded or collected by the National Security Agency. I can't repeat that enough. That's the intent of this amendment. I want to make clear to everyone that, contrary to the suggestions of some, the NSA has not been acting outside of the scope of its authorities. The Meta-Data program is carefully designed with program layers of oversight by all three branchs of government. This is precisely the way our government ought to operate, with input from Article I and Article II and Article III of the United States Constitution. It is, of course, our duty to ensure that the NSA stays within these legal bounds here in Congress, and this amendment makes those boundaries perfectly clear for everyone to know and understand. And we shouldn't mislead the American people into thinking that the NSA has been acting illegally. There is perhaps no program in the United States Government that is as carefully monitored and overseen as the programs this amendment attempts to clarify. To the extent that some in this Chamber wish to review or provide more protections and controls for these programs, we should proceed through a carefully considered and debated legislative process so that the full implications for our security are clearly understood. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.", u'Madam Chair, I rise in support of the Hastings-Rodriguez Amendment to H.R. 4061, the Cyber Security Enhancement Act. Our amendment aims to address the lack of minority representation in the cyber security industry. In addition it provides for a minority serving institution to participate in the university-industry task force authorized by this legislation. Our country is blessed to have many top-notch universities already training our future cyber security experts. For example, a minority serving institution in my district, the University of Texas--San Antonio, is producing both undergrads and graduate degrees in information assurance and computer science. UTSA has been designated a Center of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education and a Center of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Research by the National Security Agency and Department of Homeland Security. Only 23 programs in the nation have achieved the research designation. Universities like UTSA can play a major role in our national cyber policy and the training of our future cyber workforce. This underlying legislation will set us on our way to prepare our diverse workforce for our current and future needs. I would like to thank my colleague Mr. Hastings for his partnership on this amendment. I urge my colleagues to support the Hastings/Rodriguez amendment and support H.R. 4061.', u"I thank the gentleman. We've had 11 three- and four-star generals and admirals testify that we need a national intelligence assessment of the defense implications of global warming around the planet, and we have done that for the Pentagon. We have done that for the National Security Agency at their request. They believe it's real. They believe it has real implications for the defense of our country where we might have to project force. The same thing is true domestically, however. The same thing is true in terms of how we have to protect our own people because of rising rivers, because of increased drought, because of the melting of the Arctic, because villages are falling into the ocean up in Alaska because of the melting tundra. These are things that affect us here in the United States today. And to say, no, we are going to defund all aspects of that is a mistake. I yield back the balance of my time.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: 1. Funds the FBI, our chief domestic national security agency, to take down terror cells and dirty bombs on U.S. soil ($7 billion). 2. Adds 85 FBI agents and forensic accounting professionals to combat mortgage and financial fraud ($10 million). 3. Funds DEA to fight international drug cartels that finance terrorism and infiltrate our neighborhoods with heroin and meth ($2 billion). 4. Funds ATF to partner with the military to dismantle IEDs that maim and kill our troops on the battlefield ($1 billion). 5. Supports cops on the beat--provides $3.2 billion for state and local law enforcement, $2.1 billion above the previous Administration's request--to help state and local police fight gangs, drugs, crime and child predators. 6. Highest funding level ever for the Violence Against Women Act programs to combat sexual assault and domestic violence and help victims get their lives back together ($415 million). 7. Protects our kids from predators by preventing, investigating and prosecuting crimes against children ($234 million). 8. Advances climate research and restores satellite climate sensors cut by the previous Administration ($270 million). 9. Enhances U.S. competitiveness and innovation by increasing science and technology research at NSF and NIST, a 7 percent increase over last year ($913 million). 10. Restores fiscal responsibility and accountability to ensure stewardship of taxpayer dollars--prohibits funds for lavish banquets, controls cost overruns, and requires IGs to do random audits of grantees.", u"Mr. President, today I would like to commemorate the life of a great soldier, strategic thinker and American, LTG William Odom. I was deeply saddened to learn of his recent sudden death. General Odom served our country with honor and distinction throughout his life. During his time serving as a military adviser in the White House, Director of the National Security Agency, and West Point and Yale professor, General Odom demonstrated an uncanny talent for assessing and advancing U.S. interests in a complex and challenging world. Over the years, the U.S. Congress has benefited greatly from General Odom's clear vision of U.S. interests in the Middle East. General Odom was a strong critic of the Iraq war even before it began. It is unfortunate that more Members of this body did not heed his insightful and prescient warnings of the perils of invading Iraq. His steadfast commitment to ending the war and restoring a balanced and focused national security strategy has been an inspiration. So, too, was his strong opposition to the President's illegal warrantless wiretapping program. Our thoughts are with his wife, son, and family during this difficult time. I hope that they can take some comfort knowing that he will be deeply missed by a grateful Nation. ", u"Madam Speaker, I am proud to rise in support of H.R. 6304. I would like to thank Chairman Reyes, Chairman Conyers, Majority Leader Hoyer, Minority Leader Blunt, and Ranking Member Hoekstra for coming together with a bill that we need on behalf of our country. My district includes the National Security Agency, and many of NSA's employees are my constituents. As a member of the House Committee on Intelligence and the chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, which oversees NSA, I know that the men and women who work for our Nation's intelligence agencies work hard every day to keep our Nation safe. The intelligence agencies must do their work within the laws of this country, and they need those laws to be clear. The NSA employees in my district need a clear law with a bright line between legal and illegal surveillance activities, and this bill provides that. Our Constitution requires checks and balances for the three branches of government. This bill provides that the FISA Court must review surveillance requests to protect the constitutional rights of our citizens. I urge my colleagues to support this bill because it gives our intelligence community the tools they need to keep our Nation safe while protecting the constitutional rights of Americans.", u"Under this bill, large corporations and big government can work together to violate the United States Constitution, use massive databases to spy, to wiretap, to invade the privacy of the American people. There's no requirement for the government to seek a warrant for any intercepted communication that includes a U.S. citizen, as long as the program in general is directed towards foreign targets. This Congress must not allow the names of innocent U.S. citizens to be placed on secret intelligence lists. Under this bill, violations of Fourth Amendment rights and blanket wiretaps will be permissible for the next 4 years. Massive and untargeted collection of communications will continue and with the enactment of this bill. Furthermore, it allows the type of surveillance to be applied to all communications entering and exiting the United States. These blanket wiretaps make it impossible to know whose calls are being intercepted by the National Security Agency. Let's stand up for the fourth amendment. Let's remember, when this country was founded Benjamin Franklin said, those who would give up their essential liberties to achieve a measure of security deserve neither. Vote against it.", u"I ask the Senator from Pennsylvania that I use two of those to respond to this latest statement. Then I will defer to him for his statement. Mr. President, I want to respond to the statement by the Senator from Missouri about what all of the reports from the inspectors general would essentially deal with. I believe he said waste, fraud, and abuse, which is sort of the general purview of inspectors general. That is not my understanding. I understand the inspectors general have been asked to essentially do a review of this. The Inspectors General of the Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, the Department of Defense, and any other elements of the intelligence community that participated in the President's surveillance program-- Shall all work together to do a report which will look into-- I believe the review we are talking about here, and that we are legislating or proposing to legislate, is intended to tell the Congress and tell anybody who reads the report what this program consisted of. That is information we do not have today. And it is entirely appropriate that we get that report before we grant immunity. That is the thrust of my amendment, I hope all of my colleagues will support it. I appreciate my colleague from Pennsylvania yielding me additional time to speak in response. I yield the floor.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Oversight and Resource Enhancement Act of (a) Authority for Additional Judges.--Section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; (2) in paragraph (1), as so designated, by inserting ``at least'' before ``seven of the United States judicial circuits''; (3) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (4) and indenting such paragraph, as so designated, accordingly; and (4) by inserting after paragraph (1), as so designated, the following new paragraph: ``(2) In addition to the judges designated under paragraph (1), the Chief Justice of the United States may designate as judges of the court established by paragraph (1) such judges appointed under Article III of the Constitution of the United States as the Chief Justice determines appropriate in order to provide for the prompt and timely consideration under section 105 of applications under section 104 for electronic surveillance under this title. Any judge designated under this paragraph shall be designated publicly.''. (b) Consideration of Emergency Applications.--Such section is further amended by inserting after paragraph (2), as added by subsection (a) of this section, the following new paragraph: ``(3) A judge of the court established by paragraph (1) shall make a determination to approve, deny, or seek modification of an application submitted under section subsection (f) or (g) of section 105 not later than 24 hours after the receipt of such application by the court.''. (a) Office of Intelligence Policy and Review.-- (1) Additional personnel.--The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review of the Department of Justice is authorized such additional personnel, including not fewer than 21 full- time attorneys, as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation, modification, and review of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) for orders under section 105 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1805) approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. (2) Assignment.--The Attorney General shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among appropriate offices of the National Security Agency in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the Agency in preparing applications described in that paragraph. (b) Federal Bureau of Investigation.-- (1) Additional legal and other personnel.--The National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is authorized such additional legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders under section 105 of that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. (2) Assignment.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among the field offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the Bureau in such field offices in preparing applications described in that paragraph. (c) Additional Legal and Other Personnel for National Security Agency.--The National Security Agency is authorized such additional legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders under section 105 of that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. (d) Additional Legal and Other Personnel for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.--There is authorized for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court such additional personnel (other than judges) as may be necessary to facilitate the prompt and timely consideration by that Court of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders under section 105 of that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Personnel authorized by this paragraph shall perform such duties relating to the consideration of such applications as that Court shall direct. (e) Supplement Not Supplant.--The personnel authorized by this section are in addition to any other personnel authorized by law. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of the National Security Agency shall each, in consultation with the Attorney General-- (1) develop regulations establishing procedures for conducting and seeking approval of electronic surveillance on an emergency basis, and for preparing and properly submitting and receiving applications and orders, under sections 104 and 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804 and 1805); and (2) prescribe related training for the personnel of the applicable agency.", u"Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H. Res. The 9/11 Commission recommended that we change the way Congress oversees the intelligence activities. I am very familiar with those activities as a member of the Committee on Intelligence and also representing constituents who work for the National Security Agency. NSA is in my district. At a time when we have reformed our intelligence agencies and required them to communicate and cooperate and unified their management through the new Director of National Intelligence, it is only right that we unify our oversight of the intelligence community. H. Res. 35 does just that. It will allow us to make more informed and more effective funding decisions. It will enhance the ongoing work of the Intelligence and Appropriations Committees. Our job on national security should be to do what is best to put the safety and the security of our Nation first, above all. We can't get bogged down with our own individual complaints about jurisdiction and power. We have to do what is best for America. I will be proud to vote for H. Res. 35.", u" (7) Make any recommendations for improvements to the MDA targets program. The GAO should work with the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives to define a reporting timeline for this review. The conferees believe that MDA should consider, plan, and budget for a robust testing program--including an adequate number of reliable targets--that includes salvo launches, multiple target engagements, multi-mission tests, liquid target tests, and tests that will stress the systems to determine how they would perform under real-world operational conditions. The conferees plan to monitor the testing and targets program carefully in the coming year. NSA acquisition management The Senate report accompanying S. 1547 (S. Rept. 110-77) directs a series of actions regarding the National Security Agency's (NSA) transformation programs. The conferees endorse this direction, but with two modifications. The Senate report directs that the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) exercise oversight over all major elements of the NSA's Transformation 3.0 activities. The conferees understand that the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) is already supporting the NSA's test and evaluation activities, and directs that JITC be substituted for the DOT&E in complying with the direction in the Senate report. The Senate report also mandates that the NSA's transformation programs may not proceed to Milestone B without certain certifications to Congress. The conferees agree that this language should be understood to mean that the certifications required can be prepared and issued as part of the Milestone B approval process.", u"Mr. Speaker, since the revelation of the National Security Agency's terrorist surveillance program, we have heard all sorts of hysterics from the other side of the aisle. I think now is the time to separate myth from reality. Allegations that the NSA program is illegal are a myth. The reality is that the President's authority to authorize this program is firmly based in both his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief and in the authorization for use of military force which passed Congress after 9/11. Allegations that the NSA program is a domestic eavesdropping program used to spy on innocent Americans are a myth. The reality is that this program is narrowly focused, aimed only at international calls and targeted at al Qaeda and related groups. There are safeguards in place to protect the civil liberties of Americans. Allegations that NSA activities violate the fourth amendment are a myth. The reality is that that program is consistent with the Constitution's protections of civil liberties, including fourth amendment protections. There are people who want you to believe this program is targeting average Americans. Nothing could be further from the truth.", u" Mr. FEINGOLD submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary: Whereas Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and in so doing provided the executive branch with clear authority to wiretap suspected terrorists inside the United States; Whereas the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 has been amended multiple times since 1978, to expand the surveillance authority of the executive branch and address new technological developments; Whereas the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 states that it and the criminal wiretap law are the ``exclusive means by which electronic surveillance'' may be conducted by the United States Government and makes it a crime to wiretap individuals without complying with this statutory authority; Whereas the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 permits the Government to initiate wiretapping immediately in emergencies as long as the Government obtains approval from the court established under section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) within 72 hours of initiating the wiretap; Whereas the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 authorizes wiretaps without the court orders otherwise required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for the first 15 days following a declaration of war by Congress; Whereas the Authorization for Use of Military Force that became law on September 18, 2001 (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), did not grant the President the power to authorize wiretaps of Americans within the United States without obtaining the court orders required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; Whereas the President's inherent constitutional authority does not give him the power to violate the explicit statutory prohibition on warrantless wiretaps in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; Whereas George W. Bush, President of the United States, has authorized and continues to authorize wiretaps by the National Security Agency of Americans within the United States without obtaining the court orders required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; Whereas President George W. Bush has failed to inform the full congressional intelligence committees about this program, as required by the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.); Whereas President George W. Bush repeatedly misled the public prior to the public disclosure of the National Security Agency surveillance program by indicating his Administration was relying on court orders to wiretap suspected terrorists inside the United States, by stating-- (1) on April 20, 2004, that ``When we're talking about chasing down terrorists, we're talking about getting a court order before we do so.''; (2) on July 14, 2004, that ``the government can't move on wiretaps or roving wiretaps without getting a court order''; and (3) on June 9, 2005, that ``Law enforcement officers need a federal judge's permission to wiretap a foreign terrorist's phone, a federal judge's permission to track his calls, or a federal judge's permission to search his property. Officers must meet strict standards to use any of these tools.''; Whereas President George W. Bush has, since the public disclosure of the National Security Agency surveillance program, falsely implied that the program was necessary because the executive branch did not have authority to wiretap suspected terrorists inside the United States, by making statements about the supposed need for the program, including-- (1) on January 25, 2006, stating at the National Security Agency that ``When terrorist operatives are here in America communicating with someone overseas, we must understand what's going on if we're going to do our job to protect the people. The safety and security of the American people depend on our ability to find out who the terrorists are talking to, and what they're planning. In the weeks following September the 11th, I authorized a terrorist surveillance program to detect and intercept al Qaeda communications involving someone here in the United States.''; and (2) on January 31, 2006, asserting during the State of the Union that ``The terrorist surveillance program has helped prevent terrorist attacks. It remains essential to the security of America. If there are people inside our country who are talking with al Qaeda, we want to know about it, because we will not sit back and wait to be hit again.''; and Whereas President George W. Bush inaccurately stated in his January 31, 2006, State of the Union address that ``Previous Presidents have used the same constitutional authority I have, and federal courts have approved the use of that authority.'', even though the President has failed to identify a single instance since the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 became law in which another President has authorized wiretaps inside the United States without complying with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and no Federal court has evaluated whether the President has the inherent authority to authorize wiretaps inside the United States without complying with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the United States Senate does hereby censure George W. Bush, President of the United States, and does condemn his unlawful authorization of wiretaps of Americans within the United States without obtaining the court orders required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, his failure to inform the full congressional intelligence committees as required by law, and his efforts to mislead the American people about the authorities relied upon by his Administration to conduct wiretaps and about the legality of the program.", u"Mr. Speaker, in their rush to be against everything that President Bush is for, Democrats have once again given us reason to question their timing and judgment. A resolution has been introduced in the Senate to censure the President for ordering the National Security Agency to intercept communications of suspected al Qaeda members or related terrorist groups. Apparently, this offends Democrats so much that they seek to scold the President in the midst of the war on terror. To them I ask: How would you monitor terrorist operatives who move to this country, blend in, and wait to strike? Do you think they hang a shingle on their front door reading ``Terrorist in Waiting''? The NSA program is one that provides the speed and agility that is needed as we fight this new kind of war. We must adapt, because in this day and age, terrorists move faster than any court possibly can. A span of just a few hours could make the difference between life and death. Mr. Speaker, we are not questioning the Democrats' patriotism, as they so often charge. We are, however, questioning their poor judgment. They are unwise in opposing what is clearly a vital tool against terrorist organizations and in allowing the censure resolution to the Senate floor which could damage the President as he fights this war on terror.", u"Mr. Speaker, this week a resolution was introduced in the United States Senate that would censure President Bush over the National Security Agency's surveillance program. We have seen the Democrats launch political stunts before, but this one certainly takes the cake. They have determined, on their own, that President Bush has broken the law by authorizing surveillance of al Qaeda communications. They are so intent on opposing everything that President Bush is for that they don't seem to realize or even care about the message this sends to the rest of the world as we fight the war on terror. The fact is, this is a necessary tool in the war on terror, and it is working. As General Michael Hayden, the principle Deputy Director of National Intelligence stated, ``We have learned information from this program that would not otherwise have been available. This information has helped detect and prevent terrorist attacks in the United States and abroad.'' Mr. Speaker, the Democrats have put off releasing their agenda for months now. I guess I can see why, since it includes stripping away important tools to fight the war on terror. Perhaps the Democrats should go back to having no agenda.", u"Mr. President, had I been present to vote on the nomination of Gen. Michael Hayden to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I would have cast a vote of ``no''. I oppose General Hayden's nomination because of his role in the administration's program to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance on U.S. persons--a practice I believe is unlawful under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. During his nomination hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee, General Hayden admitted to participating in the design of the electronic surveillance program during his tenure as director of the National Security Agency. And as the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, General Hayden became the chief advocate for the electronic surveillance program, even taking the unusual step of appearing before the National Press Club to defend the Administration's program. We are all united in fighting terrorism, but we can do it in a legal and constitutional way that gets the bad guys and protects our values and freedoms. While I oppose the nomination of General Hayden because of the controversy surrounding the electronic surveillance program, I wish him the very best and hope that he will turn out to be a strong and independent leader at the CIA. But I also hope that the Intelligence Committees in the House and Senate will conduct careful and thorough oversight over General Hayden and the CIA to ensure that the civil liberties of U.S. citizens are protected. ", u"Mr. President, today I voted to confirm the nomination of General Michael Hayden to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency replacing my friend and Florida colleague Porter Goss. I voted to confirm General Hayden based on his impressive record as a career intelligence officer in a broad spectrum of strategic intelligence activities and programs. He is widely regarded as one of the most qualified intelligence planners and managers among military or civilian intelligence professionals. Despite my vote in favor of his confirmation I remain deeply concerned that recent revelations regarding domestic intelligence collection by the National Security Agency may have violated our laws. In hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence General Hayden often deferred questions about the program, the President's and Justice Department's statements about the program, and his own involvement in the NSA's activity to closed sessions. My Intelligence Committee colleagues pursued these questions and ultimately recommended approval of the nomination on a bipartisan 12-3 vote. I still have many questions about this program and how it was conceived and operated, and I will continue to seek answers to them. However, General Hayden has sufficiently demonstrated his objectivity, independence and openness that I am comfortable with confirming his nomination. Given the threats our Nation faces today and challenges that our intelligence system has had coping with those threats, General Hayden should bring to this position much needed efficient, effective and, most importantly, independent leadership and management. That should be good for our intelligence agencies and good for the Nation.", u"SA 4499. Mr. WARNER proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2766, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; as follows: At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following: The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 20. (a) The Director may collect charges for evaluating, certifying, or validating information assurance products under the National Information Assurance Program or successor program. ``(b) The charges collected under subsection (a) shall be established through a public rulemaking process in accordance with Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-25. ``(c) Charges collected under subsection (a) shall not exceed the direct costs of the program referred to in that subsection. ``(d) The appropriation or fund bearing the cost of the service for which charges are collected under the program referred to in subsection (a) may be reimbursed, or the Director may require advance payment subject to such adjustment on completion of the work as may be agreed upon. ``(e) Amounts collected under this section shall be credited to the account or accounts from which costs associated with such amounts have been or will be incurred, to reimburse or offset the direct costs of the program referred to in subsection (a).''. ______", u' Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows: Mr. HYDE: Committee on International Relations. House Resolution 946. Resolution requesting the President and directing the Secretary of State to provide to the House of Representatives certain documents in their possession relating to strategies and plans either designed to cause regime change in or for the use of military force against Iran; adversely (Rep. 109-526). Referred to the House Calendar. Mr. SENSENBRENNER: Committee on the Judiciary. House Resolution 819. Resolution requesting the President and directing the Attorney General to submit to the House of Representatives all documents in the possession of the President and the Attorney General relating to requests made by the National Security Agency and other Federal agencies to telephone service providers requesting access to telephone communications records of persons in the United States and communications originating and terminating within the United States without a warrant (Rept. 109-527). Referred to the House Calendar.', u"If the Senator will yield, that is correct. Not only did I ask that, but the chairman of the committee asked that, and it was resolved that we were not asking it to be made public, we were not asking those names to necessarily be made available to the whole Foreign Relations Committee, although that was the chairman's preference, and ultimately the chairman concluded it should not even be provided directly to me or the chairman, but it should be made available to the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and the ranking member or vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and they should decide how our committee would review the information. I think the information should be provided to me and to Senator Lugar, as well, but the way this was parsed out, it was going to be that the National Security Agency was going to come and brief the Senate Intelligence Committee, of which I am no longer a member, and--I thought--tell them the names of these Americans. I might add further, the reason for that is, there are unsubstantiated--I emphasize ``unsubstantiated''--allegations that Mr. Bolton may have been seeking the names of these Americans to seek retribution; that it may have been intelligence analysts with whom he disagreed or policymakers against whom he was trying to make a case in terms of the direction of American foreign policy. I do not know that to be the case. The question is why did he need the names.", u"Madam Speaker, this week we passed two milestones in Iraq: The constitution was ratified, and, tragically, the 2,000th American died. These milestones, one positive, one clearly negative, provide us with an opportunity to review our progress in Iraq. This is not a time to debate how we got into Iraq. What is important is resolving the mess. Hear what the experts are saying: Retired Army Lieutenant General William Odom, former head of the National Security Agency, said that the invasion of Iraq ``will turn out to be the greatest strategic disaster in U.S. history.'' Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser under the first President George Bush, said, ``You have to know when to stop using force. You can encourage democracy over time, with assistance, and aid, the traditional way. Not how the neoconservatives'' are trying to do it in Iraq. And Lawrence Wilkerson, a retired lieutenant colonel and former Secretary of State Colin Powell's former Chief of Staff at the State Department, said President Bush's foreign policy was ``ruinous'' and said that ``we have courted disaster in Iraq, in North Korea, in Iran.'' These are not the words of partisans or the board members of MoveOn.org. As these experts and the American people know, it is time for a new direction and new priorities. We can do better. The current path is not a path to success. It is time for the President to level with the American people and produce a plan forward.", u"Mr. President, today I raise my strong concerns about news reports regarding the administration's blatant disregard for American's privacy rights and civil liberties. I am shocked by the recent revelation that President Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without court-approved warrants. I am equally appalled by the Pentagon's dismal enforcement of guidelines that reuire deleting information on American citizens from a counterterrorism database within 3 months if they pose no security threats. Government agencies are not following important rules and procedures designed to protect the American people. Just this summer, the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office issued a report at my request which found that agencies are not following privacy laws designed to protect personal information in Federal data mining systems. Considering that there are nearly 200 data mining systems in the Federal Government, these actions pose real threats to Americans' privacy. Merely having policies and safeguards in place does nothing if agencies are not following the law. As such, I cannot vote to renew some of the most troublesome PATRIOT Act provisions that threaten civil liberties, including the Government's far-reaching powers to obtain personal, medical, library, and business records or coduct ``sneak-and-peek'' searches, without ensuring that meaningful checks and balances are in place. I want to assure the people of Hawaii and all Americans that I am working on legislation to strengthen Federal privacy laws.", u"Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Just to close, I really think this is an important issue to the national security of the country, and the reason why we bring the amendment forward is nonproliferation experts at Harvard University and the Nuclear Threat Initiative headed by Sam Nunn have clearly stated that we need an additional $30 million in fiscal year 2005 to remove highly enriched uranium from two dozen vulnerable research reactor sites throughout the Russian reactor fuel program. That is why we offered the amendment. This is an amendment that would take up obligated balances from the National Security Agency's weapons activities account. So I want to be clear. These are unexpended funds from fiscal year 2004, and shifting these funds will not come at any cost to the NNSA's weapons program or the American taxpayers. Instead, they will help safeguard us against dangerous nuclear and radiological weapons materials, that if they get in the hands of terrorists, as we know they could, could be used to kill thousands or tens of thousands of Americans. I believe, as the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) believes, that this amendment is vital to our national security and to our winning the war on terrorism. Therefore, I urge that my colleagues' support this amendment. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Meehan).", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: (6) The term ``National Intelligence Program''-- (A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs, projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence community; (ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities (whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Information analysis of the Department of Homeland Security; and (ii) includes any other program, project, or activity of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government relating to national intelligence unless the National Intelligence Director and the head of the department, agency, or element concerned determine otherwise; but (B) except as provided in subparagraph (A)(ii), does not refer to any program, project, or activity of the military departments, including any program, project, or activity of the Defense Intelligence Agency that is not part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the date of the enactment of this Act, to acquire intelligence principally for the planning and conduct of joint or tactical military operations by the United States Armed Forces.", u'With the Joint Military Intelligence Program, it is not so clear. That is where there will be, if it is part of a national intelligence program, the budget authority will be with the national intelligence director. But the No. 1 customer is going to be the Department of Defense. We are talking almost as if these are people in different governments. They are going to work this out as they do every day. I will read testimony from General Hayden, the head of the National Security Agency, before the House, August 18. He says: An empowered national intelligence director with direct authority over the national intelligence agencies should not be viewed as diminishing our ability or willingness to fulfill our responsibilities as a combat support agency. General Hayden is a very respected head of one of those agencies--speaking, in fact, for all of them later on--saying to have a national intelligence director with budget authority is not going to diminish our ability or commitment to the combat support agencies. Then he goes on to talk about how he has forward deployed hundreds of people with our U.S. military command, and there is no way that the creation of a national intelligence director, he says, will alter that commitment to the military. We are trying to create some budgetary clear lines to the national intelligence director, not contravening the title 10 responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense.', u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to congratulate Judge A. Jay Cristol of the Southern District of Florida on the completion of his invaluable research on the USS Liberty incident. Judge Cristol's doctoral dissertation details the tragedy that befell the U.S. Navy ship USS Liberty in 1967 when Israeli aircraft fired upon the ship, killing 34 sailors and wounding 171 others. Judge Cristol's dogmatic search persuaded the National Security Agency to release classified transcripts proving that Israel's attack on the USS Liberty was an accident. Judge Cristol's research shows the Israeli forces attacked the American USS Liberty ship because they believed it was an Egyptian ship firing upon their coastline. Through his diligent work and dedication, Judge A. Jay Cristol has assisted in strengthening the relationship between the United States and Israel and resolving unanswered questions about this unfortunate tragedy. I applaud his efforts, and commend him for this important work. Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to join me in applauding Florida's Judge A. Jay Cristol on this important achievement.", u"If the Senator will yield. In addition, I agreed with the White House to further amend my amendment to change the effective date, which was a very important element to the White House. They wanted the original language we had in Lugar-Biden that we moved off of to go to the House bill, and in previous language that we had in other bills, including the original bill which came out of the committee and passed out of here. It had language relating to the effective date when countries could qualify to meet the test for this. The White House wanted it tighter, wanted it more stringent. We took the better part of the afternoon, 3 or 4 hours, negotiating back and forth. We yielded on that point as well. That is the point at which the White House spokesperson from the National Security Agency said to us, ``We have a deal.'' That is when it then got scrubbed. That was even more palatable, I am told, to the speaker and the majority leader. That is as much as I can say firsthand.", u' The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first and second times by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated: S. 1899. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit human cloning; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. EDWARDS: S. 1900. A bill to protect against cyberterrorism and cybercrime, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. By Mr. EDWARDS: S. 1901. A bill to authorize the National Science Foundation and the National Security Agency to establish programs to increase the number of qualified faculty teaching advanced courses conducting research in the field of cybersecurity, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. By Mr. BREAUX: S. 1902. A bill to suspend temporarily the duty on railway passenger coaches of stainless steel; to the Committee on Finance. By Mr. KERRY (for himself, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Bennett, and Mr. Bingaman): S. 1903. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow certain small businesses to defer payment of tax; to the Committee on Finance.', u"I have one more question, if the Senator will yield, and the question is on the issue of having under one umbrella the analysis of all of the intelligence branches--CIA, FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency--on the issue that there were enough dots on the board prior to September 11, that had they been connected, there might have been a veritable blueprint if you put together the July FBI report from Phoenix about the young man taking flight training with Osama bin Laden's picture in his apartment, and the two al-Qaida men who went to Kualai Lumpur, the hijackers known to the CIA and not told to the FBI or INS or the NSA report, on September 10 that there would be an attack the next day, not even translated until September 12, and the information in the computers of Zacarias Moussaoui having been obtained with an appropriate warrant under the Intelligence Surveillance Act. There was a veritable blueprint for what happened on September 11 and there is urgency, urgency, urgency as we speak to get the intelligence agencies to act together and to coordinate the analysis so we may have as full a picture as possible.", u"Mr. President, this morning as I read the Wall Street Journal, I came across Mark Helprin's article called ``The Fire Next Time.'' The thesis of Mr. Helprin is this: The consensus that doing much to protect America is preferable to doing too little has been destroyed. If the President does not rebuild it, we will suffer the consequences. I commend this article to the Senate. I do not think it is totally the President's responsibility. It certainly falls on many of us to help the President and the Secretary of Defense and those in the National Security Agency and the Vice President, all of them working on what should be our defense policy, to find ways to rehabilitate our national defense. Very clearly, we do not have the defense we need for the future. At one point in this article, Mr. Helprin says this: God save the American soldier from those who believe that his life can be protected and his mission accomplished on the cheap. For what they perceive as an extravagance is always less costly in lives and treasure than the long drawn-out wars it deters altogether or shortens with quick victories. I do hope all of us will think about how we can restore our national prestige in terms of being the superpower of the world and having the power to defend that position. I ask unanimous consent this article be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to honor my congressional constituent, Colonel Hugo Valdivia, for his 25 years of service to our country in the United States Air Force. Tomorrow will be Colonel Valdivia's formal retirement at the Pentagon and I wanted us to show our gratitude for his years of dedication to our country. Colonel Valdivia had recently been at the Pentagon, where he had been hand-picked to serve as the Deputy Director for Information Warfare. He serves as the Air Force Advisor on the National Security Panels to the Defense Science Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Quadrennial Review of military missions and forces structure. During his distinguished career, Colonel Valdivia has received numerous accolades, including being selected by the National Security Agency as a finalist in a worldwide competition for information security accomplishments. The Colonel has also been the Chief of the Information Assurance Division for the U.S. European Command. In addition, Colonel Valdivia was the Director for Computer Operations and Software Development for Please join me in showing Colonel Valdivia our gratitude for his sterling service to our country. He joins us here today with his family.", u"I thank the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Shelby. I believe we both agree that the National Security Agency should better address its acquisition issues. However, I note the concerns you raise and agree that the report should not be read to mandate treating each individual technology effort within NSA as a major acquisition program. As the chairman of the Intelligence Committee knows, the Department of Defense (DoD) has an extensive effort to develop various technology projects that could ultimately contribute to one or more major DoD acquisition programs. DoD does not manage these individual technology projects as major acquisition programs, despite the fact that they may contribute to successful fielding of a program being managed as a major acquisition program. It was the committee's intent to ensure that each of the major modernization efforts that NSA must undertake will receive appropriate management attention. it was not the committee's intent that individual technology projects that are contributing to those broader efforts be managed as major acquisition programs on a project-by-project basis. I look forward to working with you to ensure that NSA properly manages its acquisition programs.", u'Mr. President: I rise today to speak about a section in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act that I am particularly proud of, and that is the law enforcement exception in the bill. At the Judiciary Committee mark-up, Senator Grassley and I, along with the assistance of Chairman Hatch and Senator Ashcroft worked to strengthen the law enforcement exception in the bill. We received input on the language from the copyright community and the administration: the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Departments of Commerce and Justice, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The law enforcement exception ensures that the government continues to have access to current and future technologies to assist in their investigative, protective, or intelligence activities. I am concerned that the tools and resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities are preserved--and more importantly, not limited, by passage of S. 2037. Under this bill, a company who contracts with the government can continue to develop encryption/decryption devices under that contract, without having to worry about criminal penalties. Because much of our leading technologies come from the private sector, the government needs to have access to this vital resource for intelligence and law enforcement purposes. The law enforcement exception recognizes that oftentimes governmental agencies work with non-governmental entities--companies, in order to have access to and develop cutting edge technologies and devices. Such conduct should not be prohibited or impeded by this copyright legislation.', u'Mr. President, I rise today to speak about a section in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act that I am particularly proud of, and that is the law enforcement exception in the bill. At the Judiciary Committee markup, Senator Grassley and I, along with the assistance of Chairman Hatch and Senator Ashcroft worked to strengthen the law enforcement exception in the bill. We received input on the language from the copyright community and the administration: the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Departments of Commerce and Justice, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The law enforcement exception ensures that the government continues to have access to current and future technologies to assist in their investigative, protective, or intelligence activities. I am concerned that the tools and resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities are preserved--and more importantly, not limited, by passage of S. 2037. Under that bill, a company who contracts with the government can continue to develop encryption/decryption devices under that contract, without having to worry about criminal penalties. Because much of our leading technologies come from the private sector, the government needs to have access to this vital resource for intelligence and law enforcement purposes. The law enforcement exception recognizes that oftentimes governmental agencies work with non-governmental entities--companies, in order to have access to and develop cutting edge technologies and devices. Such conduct should not be prohibited or impeded by this copyright legislation.', u'Mr. Speaker, I rise today in recognition of an individual who has, for the past 30 years, faithfully and honorably served in the United States of America while in the United States Naval Reserves. His name is Michael D. Widler of Grand Junction, Colorado. During his distinguished career, Mr. Widler, a Master Chief Petty Officer, provided exceptional service and sustained outstanding performance while serving with the Naval Security Group, from October 8, 1969 through October 7, 1998. Master Chief Widler has been the only member in the history of the Security Group Reserve Program to attain the rank of Master Chief Petty Officer in the CTA rating. He has served in numerous active duty and reserve assignments in Colorado, Alaska, Kansas and Washington D.C. He has served as the key enlisted member of national teams where he was instrumental in the development of an action plan to restructure portions of the Naval Reserve program. He served as the national advisor to validate Naval Reserve support billets at the National Security Agency. His career has been distinguished by excellence in leadership and a deep commitment to the United States of America. Master Chief Widler has continuously demonstrated superior management abilities, administrative expertise and an abiding concern for his shipmates. His outstanding performance, inspiring leadership and total dedication to duty have reflected great credit upon himself, the State of Colorado and the United States Navy. Please join me in thanking CTACM Mike Widler for his 30 years of service and on a job well done.', u"Mr. Speaker, today I rise to honor a pioneering constituent and friend, Mrs. Anne Bolgiano. Anne Bolgiano has had a distinguished academic and professional career as a mathematician. Over 40 years ago Anne began her career as a research analyst at the National Security Agency. She performed independent and advanced research on codes and code breaking, working as a guardian of our national security during the early and tenuous stages of the cold war. It was at this time that she began her work on the Federal Government's first computer, ENIAC. Anne Bolgiano is an exceptional talent who advanced through the ranks as quickly as the pay schedule allowed. She was among the Nation's first computer programmers and is a true role model for all female scientists. In addition, Anne is a member of the Sigma Four Society, which admits only those people who score in the 99.99th percentile on their IQ tests. Anne Bolgiano was a true pioneer in the field of technology. She is a wonderful mother, friend, and woman who has done much for this country. Anne Bolgiano should be proud of her many accomplishments, and it is my pleasure to recognize her contributions to this Nation. Shakespeare wrote: ``I count myself in nothing else so happy as in a soul remembering my dear friends.'' Thank you, Anne Bolgiano, my dear friend.", u"The bill (S. 858), as amended, was passed, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (11) The National Reconnaissance Office. (12) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.", u"The Clerk read the Senate bill, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (11) The National Reconnaissance Office. (12) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.", u" The amendment is as follows: In the table in section 2201(a), in the amount column for the item relating to Fallon Naval Air Station, Nevada, strike out ``$14,800,000'' and insert in lieu thereof ``$20,600,000''. Strike out the amount set forth as the total amount at the end of the table in section 2201(a) and insert in lieu thereof ``$512,852,000''. In section 2205(a), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), strike out ``$2,040,093,000'' and insert in lieu thereof ``$2,045,893,000''. In section 2205(a)(1), strike out ``$507,052,000'' and insert in lieu thereof ``$512,852,000''. In the table in section 2401(a), strike out the item relating to the National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland. Strike out the amount set forth as the total amount at the end of the table in section 2401(a) and insert in lieu thereof ``$502,390,000''. In section 2406(a), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), strike out ``$3,421,366,000'' and insert in lieu thereof ``$3,396,166,000''. In section 2406(a)(1), strike out ``$364,487,000'' and insert in lieu thereof ``$339,287,000''. In section 2601(3)(A), strike out ``$208,484,000'' and insert in lieu thereof ``$209,884,000''.", u'Mr. Speaker, why is this important now? In 1995, they found out there was a mole in our national labs. He had been operating during Carter, during Ronald Reagan and George Bush and also Bill Clinton. In 1996, the President was told of this. Nothing has happened. The mole was just arrested last week. That is a national security threat. Even worse, the White House, against the insistence of the National Security Agency, DOD and DOE, let China have three capabilities which are very important to this country and others as well. One was missile boost capability. North Korea and the nations that proliferate like China and Russia give this to Iran, Iraq and North Korea. They can now reach the United States. The second is MIRV. The Chinese stole small nuclear capability, and now they can put it on the tip of a missile in multiple launch. Targeting is also very deadly. They can hit the fourth apartment on 332nd Street in New York City now.', u"Mr. Speaker, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, H.R. 5825, seeks to expand the administration's power by giving the President greater flexibility over a program that he has already abused. If our experience with this administration proves anything, it is that reducing congressional oversight would be a mistake. Less than a year ago the American public learned how the president had blatantly disregarded the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) by authorizing a warrantless eavesdropping program on American citizens. After this program was uncovered, we discovered that the administration had authorized the National Security Agency to build a massive phone records database. Now the President asks that we pass legislation to legitimatize illegal activities that have already occurred and the current Republican leadership is all too willing to comply. This legislation does not solve any problems or make our country more secure, it simply grants the administration the authority to implement more programs that violate the civil rights and liberties of American citizens. We must hold this administration accountable for its actions and not retroactively approve an illegal program. Surveillance activities must be done consistent with our Constitution and our laws, and should protect both the American people and our freedoms.", u"Mr. Chair, I commend Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for continuing their tradition for the third straight year of reporting a bipartisan Intelligence Authorization bill. H.R. 5743, the Intelligence Authorization Act, comes to the floor today after having passed the Intelligence Committee by a unanimous 19 0 vote. The bill allocates resources to critical national security programs including those that detect, prevent, and disrupt potential terrorist attacks against the American people. The bill enhances counter terrorism efforts against al Qaeda and its global affiliates; increases oversight of the spending at intelligence agencies and supports global initiatives to address emerging threats to our national security. The measure provides funding to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency and other agencies, for operations, personnel and equipment. Though much of the funding is classified, each dollar is intended to address the funding needs of this country's clandestine services. The valiant American men and woman who toil anonymously in the shadows of the intelligence world deserve our full support for their dedicated service. The funding authorized by this bill will help ensure they have the resources they need to do their job.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize and honor our veterans. There are no words that can express the gratitude that the American people owe all of the men and women who choose to serve the United States of America in the armed services. We are all humbled by the sacrifice they make--knowingly putting themselves in harm's way while also leaving loved ones behind. This commitment is the mark of America's finest citizens and those who answer to a higher calling. Allow me to honor, from the United States Coast Guard: Sammie Stewart, Jr., Steven Bernard Rising, Omar K. Payton, Shane J. Nicholas, Randy Kevin Jopp, Jr., David R. Hetticher, Andrea Naomi Johnson, Christopher Daniels, William O'Boyle, Jacob G. Bryan, Sandy Guerra, Eric Driggs; from the National Security Agency: Allyn C. McKinney. Finally, it is not our tanks, weapons or machinery that make the United States Armed Forces the best military in the world. It is our young men and women who serve professionally with honor and distinction. If not for these exemplary citizens, freedom and the American way of life would not be safe and secure. For these sacrifices, we respect and should commend their service everyday of the year. Congress has designated, November 11th 2012 as the official day showing our gratitude. Please join me in honoring these American heroes for their bravery and sacrifice in defense of this great nation.", u"Mr. President, I rise today to recognize the important work of Michael J. Mulligan, who retired February 1, 2013. Mr. Mulligan demonstrated great dedication to enhancing the safety and security of the United States Senate, staff, and visitors. Beginning his career as a combat engineer officer in the U.S. Army, Mr. Mulligan served a 15-year tour at Fort Ritchie, MD, as the Chief of Engineering and Plans. During this time, he directed the largest expansion of facilities, infrastructure, and community planning in the installation's history. While on temporary assignment to the Army Corps of Engineers in Kuwait, Mr. Mulligan led technical advisors to provide engineering assistance to restore two war damaged air bases. Mr. Mulligan went on to serve as Director of Facilities at the Alternate Joint Communications Center-Site R. He directed operations to sustain facility excellence in engineering, contingency planning, life support, and logistics in support of Continuity of Operations for the senior DOD leadership--a mission which he ably executed on September Mr. Mulligan was appointed to the Senior Executive Service in 2011. As a senior leader in the National Security Agency, Mr. Mulligan provided invaluable stewardship of an important classified program that supported the National Security Emergency Preparedness program. Furthermore, Mr. Mulligan has authored several writings on public administration and leadership and received numerous service medals and commendations for exceptional public service. I, along with my colleagues in the Senate, congratulate Mr. Mulligan on his well-earned retirement and wish him all the best in his future endeavors. ", u"Mr. President, I rise today in recognition of the service of Ronald L. Fann, who will be retiring August 1, 2013, after 42 years of dedicated service to the Federal Government. Mr. Fann demonstrated great dedication to enhancing the safety and security of the U.S. Senate, its staff, and visitors. Mr. Fann began his career in 1969, as a military intelligence officer in the U.S. Army, where he performed counterintelligence operations against East Germany and the Soviet Union. He continued his intelligence work in Germany as a U.S. Army civilian, protecting our Nation during the height of the Cold War, serving in Bremerhaven and Frankfurt. Mr. Fann went on to work at the Pentagon for the U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, supervising intelligence operations worldwide. In 1986 Mr. Fann was assigned to an important classified program that supported the Nation's national security and emergency preparedness operations. During his 27-year assignment to this project, he was appointed to the National Security Agency's Senior Cryptologic Executive Service in 1991, serving as its deputy and later as program director. Mr. Fann is a proud Texas A&M Aggie alumnus and a graduate of the National War College. I commend Mr. Fann's contributions and longstanding career in public service. I, along with my colleagues from both sides of the aisle, congratulate him on his well-earned retirement and wish him all the best in his future endeavors.", u"Mr. President, since June of 2013, there have been steady and persistent unauthorized disclosures of apparently classified information regarding the activities and practices of the National Security Agency, NSA. These disclosures have caused grave damage to the United States. They have harmed our relations with friends and allies and harmed our ability to combat threats to the United States. They have also undermined public support for U.S. intelligence programs by casting doubt on the candor of key officials, the permissibility of the NSA's activities, the efficacy of the government's oversight, and whether legitimate privacy interests are properly taken into account in connection with important surveillance activities. Last month, the President proposed some changes to how our Nation conducts certain intelligence collection activities. But the President's proposals left many crucial questions unanswered. Now is the time for Congress to improve how it executes its constitutional oversight duties--to examine certain intelligence collection activities and practices and ensure that we are fulfilling our obligation to protect both the security of our Nation and the freedom of our citizens. The vital issues at stake here are complex, broad, and cut across many areas of jurisdiction of established congressional committees, including national security, intelligence, technology, commerce, foreign affairs, and privacy. For these reasons, today I am introducing legislation calling for the establishment of a Senate Select Committee to investigate how these leaks occurred and to make findings and recommendations for legislation to address these issues which are vital to American national security.", u"Mr. Speaker, yesterday in the Judiciary Committee, we had a very vigorous hearing and discussion on the questions of the National Security Agency and privacy for the American people. I have introduced H.R. 2434, the Civilian Contractors Engaged in Intelligence Activities Reduction Act, which has seen a large support from the White House and others about the importance of considering and looking at reduction of outsourcing of our intelligence activities and really bringing in-house the training and the expertise of those handling America's intelligence. I introduced H.R. 2440, which is the FISA Court in the Sunshine Act, which I am very glad that part of it is in H.R. 3361, Uniting and Strengthening America By Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping. This is the bill that deals with the mega trolling that has occurred under the NSA of business records. What America wants is security but balanced with privacy and the respect for the Fourth Amendment, prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure. It is important for this Congress to come together in a bipartisan way to stand up and be on the American people's side so that we can secure them, secure the homeland, but we can also provide for their privacy.", u"I thank the Chair. Our friends in the House have been unequivocal: The Senate must pass the House bill. Senator Boehner said, ``Senate Republicans and Senate Democrats must stand together with the American people and block the President's actions.'' House Appropriations Committee Chairman Hal Rogers said the Senate, ``should pass the bill, which funds a very vital national security agency but also turns back this blanket amnesty which is illegal and unconstitutional.'' That is where we are. The House has sent over the right bill. It does the right thing. It defends the integrity of the Congress. It defends the wishes of the American people, it defends the policy decision of the Congress of the United States, and prohibits the President from doing what he himself said over 20 different times he did not have the power to do. Professor after professor and historians have said the President doesn't have the power to do it. If the President can do this, if he can execute laws Congress has rejected, what will he be able to do in the future?", u"Mr. Speaker, out of necessity to reauthorize the expiring intelligence gathering authorities, I reluctantly vote for H.R. 2048. A recent federal appeals court decision has increased our need to address these authorities. Unfortunately, their pending expiration is now forcing Congress to act hastily rather than take the necessary time to adequately analyze the court's decision and update the laws accordingly. I recognize the distrust created by the Obama Administration's abuse of power, as well as the damage caused by recent intelligence leaks containing fragments, inaccuracies, and speculation. It is unfortunate that those actions will continue to make it more difficult to gather the information necessary to counter terrorism. It is even more alarming that this trend will inevitably make our country less safe. Very few Americans will ever learn the full details of the considerable successes of the National Security Agency (NSA). But through the dedication and commitment of its men and women, the NSA has helped to keep our nation and its citizens safe. I remain confident in their professionalism as they strive to prevent future terrorist attacks and support our warfighters overseas. I believe the first job of the federal government is to defend the country and protect our citizens within the framework of the Constitution, and I will continue to do all I can to contribute to that effort.", u"Mr. President, this is a good example of the chairman of the intel committee, a Republican, and this Senator from Florida, a Democrat and a former member of the intel committee, agreeing and being so frustrated--as was just exemplified by the Senator from North Carolina--that there is so much misunderstanding of what this legislation does. The fact is, as the chairman has just said, ``metadata''--a fancy term--is nothing more than business records of the telephone company. A telephone number is made to another telephone number on such and such a date, at such and such a time, for such and such duration. That is all. We don't know whom the call was from or to. It is when there is the suspicion, through other things that are authorized by court order, that the analyst can get in and open up as to what the content is in order to protect us. Would the Senator from North Carolina agree there is so much misunderstanding in the press, as has been reported, about how this is an invasion of privacy, as if the conversations were the ones that were being held by the National Security Agency? Would the Senator agree with that statement?", u" Mr. McCAIN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration: Whereas since June 2013, publications have revealed details about certain National Security Agency intelligence- collection programs, operations, and activities, including intelligence-collection programs affecting Americans; Whereas such publications appear to be based in substantial part on unauthorized disclosures of classified information concerning intelligence collection; Whereas the unauthorized disclosure of classified information is a felony under Federal law; Whereas the National Security Agency relies on Federal agency contractors to carry out important aspects of its national security mission; Whereas the extent of reliance on contract positions may unwisely increase the number of individuals with potential access to classified information and may increase the risk of unauthorized disclosures; Whereas such unauthorized disclosures may cause damage to United States national security interests, intelligence sources and methods, and relationships with key allies; Whereas senior officials in the intelligence community may have misled Congress or otherwise obfuscated the nature, extent, or use of certain intelligence-collection programs, operations, and activities of the National Security Agency, including intelligence-collection programs affecting Americans; Whereas the provision of incomplete or inaccurate information by officials of the intelligence community has inhibited effective congressional oversight of certain intelligence-collection programs, operations, and activities of the National Security Agency, including intelligence- collection programs affecting Americans, and undermined congressional and public support of these programs; Whereas intelligence-collection programs, operations, and activities of the National Security Agency have been valuable to combating terrorism and ensuring the security of the homeland; Whereas some such programs, operations, and activities that are the subject matter of the unauthorized disclosures may not have been authorized, or may have exceeded that which was authorized, by law, or may not have been permitted under the Constitution of the United States; and Whereas a Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies was established by the President and issued a final report entitled ``Liberty and Security in a Changing World'' on December 12, 2013: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, There is established a select committee of the Senate to be known as the Select Committee on the Investigation of leaks concerning certain activities of the National Security Agency (hereinafter in this Resolution referred to as the ``Select Committee''). (a) General Duties.--The Select Committee is authorized and directed-- (1) to make a full and thorough investigation of the unauthorized disclosures that have occurred since June 2013 of apparently classified information concerning the National Security Agency intelligence-collection programs, operations, and activities, including intelligence-collection programs affecting Americans; (2) to make findings based upon the investigation carried out under paragraph (1); (3) to submit to Congress and the President recommendations based on the investigation carried out under paragraph (1) and the findings made under paragraph (2); and (4) to take any actions necessary and appropriate to carry out paragraphs (1), (2), and (3). (b) Particular Duties.--Without abridging in any way the authority conferred upon the Select Committee in subsection (a), the Senate further expressly authorizes and directs the Select Committee to make a complete investigation and make findings and recommendations related to the following: (1) The unauthorized disclosures of apparently classified information concerning the National Security Agency intelligence-collection programs, operations, and activities, including intelligence-collection programs affecting Americans that have occurred since June 2013, including-- (A) the circumstances under which unauthorized disclosure occurred; (B) the extent of the damage done to United States national security interests, intelligence sources and methods, and relationships with key allies; and (C) how such damage may be mitigated. (2) Contracting by the National Security Agency, in particular-- (A) the extent of reliance by the Agency on contract employees to carry out important aspects of the national security mission of the Agency; (B) the extent to which contractors with access to classified information were properly vetted; (C) the sufficiency of internal controls to ensure only properly cleared contractors with a need to know had access to classified information; (D) whether adequate remedial measures have been put in place to address identified deficiencies in the foregoing areas; and (E) whether any oversight or legislation is needed to reform any issues identified by the use of Federal contractors in the intelligence agencies. (3) The nature and scope of National Security Agency intelligence-collection programs, operations, and activities, including intelligence-collection programs affecting Americans, that were the subject matter of the unauthorized disclosure, including-- (A) the extent of domestic surveillance authorized by law; (B) the legal authority that served as the basis for the National Security Agency intelligence-collection programs, operations, and activities that are the subject matter of those disclosures; (C) the extent to which such programs, operations, and activities that were the subject matter of such unauthorized disclosures may have gone beyond what was authorized by law or permitted under the Constitution of the United States; (D) the extent and sufficiency of oversight of such programs, operations, and activities by Congress and the Executive Branch; and (E) the need for greater transparency and more effective congressional oversight of intelligence community activities. (4) Whether existing laws of the United States are adequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights and privacies of citizens of the United States. (5) The terrorist activities that were disrupted, in whole or in part, with the aid of information obtained through the National Security Agency intelligence-collection programs, operations, and activities that were the subject matter of those disclosures and whether this information could have been promptly obtained by other means. (6) The findings and recommendations of the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies established by the President, including-- (A) the feasibility, costs, and benefits of such findings and recommendations; and (B) the legislative action that would be required to implement those findings and recommendations. (7) The need for specific legislative authority to govern the operations of the intelligence collection activities and practices of the National Security Agency, including recommendations and proposals for legislation. (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the Select Committee shall be composed of 14 members as follows: (1) The chairman and vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. (3) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate. (4) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (5) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate. (6) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate. (7) One Senator selected by the majority leader of the Senate. (8) One Senator selected by the minority leader of the Senate. (b) Alternative Membership.--If the chairman, vice chairman, or ranking member of a committee referred to in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a) declines to serve on the Select Committee, then the majority leader of the Senate in the case of a chairman, or the minority leader of the Senate in the case of a vice chairman or ranking member, shall designate a member from that committee to serve on the Select Committee. (c) Date.--The appointments of the members of the Select Committee shall be made not later than 30 days after the date of adoption of this Resolution. (d) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the Select Committee shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment. (e) Chairman and Vice Chairman.-- (1) Chairman.--The members of the Select Committee who are members of the majority party of the Senate shall elect a chairman for the Select Committee by majority vote. (2) Vice chairman.--The members of the Select Committee who are members of the minority party of the Senate shall elect a vice chairman by majority vote. (f) Service.--Service of a Senator as a member, chairman, or vice chairman of the Select Committee shall not be taken into account for the purposes of paragraph (4) of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate. (a) Governance Under Standing Rules of Senate.--Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Resolution, the investigation and hearings conducted by the Select Committee shall be governed by the Standing Rules of the Senate. (b) Additional Rules and Procedures.--The Select Committee may adopt additional rules or procedures if the chairman and the vice chairman of the Select Committee agree, or if the Select Committee by majority vote so decides, that such additional rules or procedures are necessary or advisable to enable the Select Committee to conduct the investigation and hearings authorized by this Resolution. Any such additional rules and procedures-- (1) shall not be inconsistent with this Resolution or the Standing Rules of the Senate; and (2) shall become effective upon publication in the Congressional Record. (a) In General.--The Select Committee may exercise all of the powers and responsibilities of a committee under rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate. (b) Powers.--The Select Committee may, for the purpose of carrying out this Resolution-- (1) hold hearings; (2) administer oaths; (3) sit and act at any time or place during the sessions, recess, and adjournment periods of the Senate; (4) authorize and require, by issuance of subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the preservation and production of books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, documents, tapes, and any other materials in whatever form the Select Committee considers advisable; (5) take testimony, orally, by sworn statement, by sworn written interrogatory, or by deposition, and authorize staff members to do the same; and (6) issue letters rogatory and requests, through appropriate channels, for any other means of international assistance. (c) Authorization, Issuance, and Enforcement of Subpoenas.-- (1) Authorization.--Subpoenas authorized and issued under this section-- (A) may be done with the joint concurrence of the chairman and the vice chairman of the Select Committee; (B) shall bear the signature of the chairman or the vice chairman of the Select Committee or the designee of such chairman or vice chairman; and (C) shall be served by any person or class of persons designated by the chairman or the vice chairman of the Select Committee for that purpose anywhere within or without the borders of the United States to the full extent provided by law. (d) Enforcement.--The Select Committee may make to the Senate by report or Resolution any recommendation, including a recommendation for criminal or civil enforcement, that the Select Committee considers appropriate with respect to-- (1) the failure or refusal of any person to appear at a hearing or deposition or to produce or preserve documents or materials described in subsection (b)(4) in obedience to a subpoena or order of the Select Committee; (2) the failure or refusal of any person to answer questions truthfully and completely during the person's appearance as a witness at a hearing or deposition of the Select Committee; or (3) the failure or refusal of any person to comply with any subpoena or order issued under the authority of subsection (c). (e) Access to Information.--The Select Committee shall have, to the fullest extent permitted by law, access to any such information or materials obtained by any other department or agency of the United States or by anybody investigating the matters described in section 3. (f) Authority of Other Committees.--Nothing contained in this section shall affect or impair the exercise of any other standing committee of the Senate of any power, or the discharge by such committee of any duty, conferred or imposed upon it by the Standing Rules of the Senate or by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812, chapter (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 180 days after the appointment of members to the Select Committee, the Select Committee shall submit to the Senate and the President a final report on the results of the investigations and studies conducted pursuant to this Resolution, together with any recommendations for Congress and the President based on the investigation and findings of the Select Committee. (b) Interim Reports.--The Select Committee may submit to the Senate such interim reports as the Select Committee considers appropriate. (c) Form of Reports.--Each report submitted under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, and may include a classified annex if necessary. (a) Staff.-- (1) In general.--The Select Committee may employ in accordance with paragraph (2) a staff composed of such clerical, investigatory, legal, technical, and other personnel as the Select Committee, or the chairman and the vice chairman of the Select Committee, considers necessary or appropriate. (2) Appointment of staff.--The staff of the Select Committee shall consist of such personnel as the chairman and the vice chairman shall jointly appoint. Such staff may be removed jointly by the chairman and the vice chairman, and shall work under the joint general supervision and direction of the chairman and the vice chairman. (b) Compensation.--The chairman and the vice chairman of the Select Committee shall jointly fix the compensation of all personnel of the staff of the Select Committee. (c) Reimbursement of Expenses.--The Select Committee may reimburse the members of its staff for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by such staff members in the performance of their functions for the Select Committee. (d) Services of Senate Staff.--The Select Committee may use, with the prior consent of the chair of any other committee of the Senate or the chair of any subcommittee of any committee of the Senate, the facilities of any other committee of the Senate, or the services of any members of the staff of such committee or subcommittee, whenever the Select Committee or the chairman or the vice chairman of the Select Committee considers that such action is necessary or appropriate to enable the Select Committee to carry out its responsibilities, duties, or functions under this Resolution. (e) Detail of Employees.--The Select Committee may use on a reimbursable basis, with the prior consent of the head of the department or agency of Government concerned and the approval of the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, the services of personnel of such department or agency. (f) Temporary and Intermittent Services.--The Select Committee may procure the temporary or intermittent services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof. (g) Payment of Expenses.--There shall be paid out of the applicable accounts of the Senate such sums as may be necessary for the expenses of the Select Committee. Such payments shall be made by vouchers signed by the Chair of the Select Committee and approved in the manner directed by the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate. Amounts made available under this subsection shall be expended in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate. In this Resolution: (1) Classified information.--The term ``classified information'' has the meaning given that term in section 804 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3164)). (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). (a) Effective Date.--This Resolution shall take effect on the date of the adoption of this Resolution. (b) Termination.--The Select Committee shall terminate 60 days after the submittal of the report required by section 6(a). (c) Disposition of Records.--Upon termination of the Select Committee, the records of the Select Committee shall become the records of any committee designated by the majority leader of the Senate with the concurrence of the minority leader of the Senate.", u"Mr. President, I wish to spend a few minutes discussing why I vote against final passage of H.R. 6304, the House companion to S. 2248, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. I would like to begin by commending Senators Rockefeller and Bond who have negotiated this bill, literally for months, in order to reach the compromise that we voted on today. I believe that many aspects of this bill are an improvement, not only to the Protect America Act which passed last August, but also to S. 2248, the bill we voted on in February. I opposed both of those bills. This compromise bill specifies that FISA and certain other statutes are the exclusive means for conducting surveillance on Americans for foreign intelligence purposes. It requires the inspectors general of the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a comprehensive review and issue a report on the President's surveillance program. It requires the intelligence community to create reverse targeting guidelines so that the National Security Agency cannot conduct surveillance of a U.S. citizen without a warrant by targeting a foreigner. Finally, it sunsets this legislation in 4\\1/2\\ half years rather than the 6 years called for in the original bill. All of these measures increase oversight and help protect civil liberties and are helpful changes. However, title II of this bill still grants retroactive immunity to telecommunications companies for actions they may or may not have taken in response to administration requests that may or may not have been legal. As I have stated before, the administration has had years to provide the written legal justification that they gave the telecommunications companies when they requested their cooperation in the aftermath of September 11. A few of my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee and Intelligence Committee were allowed to read certain documents related to this matter after extensive negotiations with the administration. However, I, and the rest of my Senate colleagues who are not on those committees, were denied access to those documents. In addition, the telecommunications companies who have been named in several lawsuits have been prohibited by the administration from providing any information regarding this issue to the courts, to the plaintiffs, to Members of Congress, or to the public. In good conscience, I could not simply trust with blind faith that the administration and telecommunications companies took proper, lawful actions. I therefore supported three attempts to strip or limit this immunity during today's debate. First, Senator Dodd offered an amendment to strike title II. When that failed, Senator Specter offered an amendment to require a Federal district court to assess the constitutionality of the terrorist surveillance program before granting retroactive immunity to the companies alleged to have assisted the program. This amendment also failed. As a final effort, Senator Bingaman offered an amendment which would have stayed all pending cases against the telecommunication companies related to the Government's warrantless surveillance program and delayed the effective date of the immunity provisions until 90 days after Congress receives the required comprehensive report of the inspectors general regarding the program. If Congress took no action in that time, the telecommunications companies would receive immunity. Unfortunately, that amendment also failed. The Senate had three opportunities to implement sensible measures to ensure that the grant of immunity to the telecommunication companies was appropriate. But these amendments were voted down. I believe the result sets a dangerous precedent. We must take the steps necessary to thwart terrorist attacks against our country, but these steps must also ensure that the civil liberties and privacy rights that are core to our democracy are protected. This bill fails to meet this threshold. For these reasons, I oppose the passage of this bill.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss the news reports released today that the National Security Agency has been collecting telephone data on tens of millions of Americans. With these news reports, we have discovered that the NSA, in conjunction with some of our country's largest telecommunications providers, now has a database with the phone records of millions of Americans. While the creation of this database does not involve the NSA listening to or recording our conversations, the agency now has detailed records of calls people have made to business associates, to maybe a family physician, to friends, to family. This program is a significant violation of the privacy of all Americans. Unfortunately, this is not the first time the administration has had the National Security Agency spy on Americans. We discovered just this past December that the President had authorized the NSA to spy domestically. While we still do not have much information on the domestic spying program, we know that hundreds, possibly thousands, of Americans had their telephone conversations and e-mails monitored. President Bush asserts that he authorized the NSA only to intercept the international communications of people with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations. Yet we find out months later that during the same period of time, the NSA has been creating the largest database ever assembled, with information from millions of people. We can hardly say that millions of people here in the United States whose privacy has been invaded have suspected ties to terrorism. The President did this yet again without seeking warrants. This administration has long sought to extend its power and authority at every available opportunity, and this is no exception. If the administration truly needed these phone records, they could have, at the very least, obtained warrants from the FISA court. The fourth amendment clearly states: ``The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.'' I strongly believe that gathering information on millions of American citizens without first obtaining warrants or any judicial oversight clearly violates this core principle of our Constitution. I have to ask, where is the oversight? A program of this magnitude must be considered by Congress. While the President has stated that appropriate Members of Congress have been briefed on intelligence activities, this does not constitute oversight. Congress should hold hearings, question witnesses about the program, and consider its legality. Congress needs to step up and exercise its proper oversight responsibility, something it has failed to do for 5 years. At a minimum, the oversight committees must make a determination on the legality of this program. Mr. Speaker, I have no doubt that the administration will contend that questioning the existence of this database is undermining our Nation's security efforts. It is essential that the President must have the best possible intelligence to protect our Nation, and he must be able to gather this intelligence. However, this has to be done in accordance with our Constitution, the bedrock of our Nation. Despite what this administration would have us believe, securing our Nation from all enemies, both foreign and domestic, can be achieved without violations of our constitutional freedoms.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss the recent reports, and admission by President Bush, that he authorized the National Security Agency to spy domestically, and did so without obtaining warrants. Some have noted that it is highly unusual for a President to publicly acknowledge the existence of highly classified intelligence programs. Some believe this is commendable. But Mr. Speaker, his admission was after the fact. After hundreds, possibly thousands, of Americans have had their telephone calls and e-mails monitored with little to no oversight. After he authorized the NSA, an organization tasked with investigating foreign people and entities, to spy on American citizens and other residents living in this country. And after, Mr. Speaker, he urged the New York Times not to report the existence of this program in the first place. Hardly commendable. Yet these facts alone, though enough to warrant grave concern, are not the end of the story. Further compounding the issue is that the President did this without even seeking warrants, or legal oversight. I wish I could say I was surprised at this, but I cannot. This Administration has pushed the envelope for power and authority at every opportunity and this is clearly no exception. If truly and absolutely necessary, they could have at the very least obtained warrants from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. As the New York Times stated today in an editorial, ``The law governing the National Security Agency was written after the Vietnam War because the government had made lists of people it considered national security threats and spied on them. All the same empty points about effective intelligence gathering were offered then, just as they are now, and the Congress, the courts and the American people rejected them.'' In authorizing this program, this Administration has chosen to ignore precedent, wisdom, and possibly even the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment clearly states ``The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'' I strongly believe that spying on American citizens without first obtaining warrants, or any legal oversight, clearly violates this bedrock principle of our government and our Nation as a whole. I also believe that this program--its inception, its uses, its results, its justification for existence--needs to be thoroughly investigated. I have begun circulating a letter asking the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to conduct investigations of this. I hope my letter will not be ignored. Mr. Speaker, no doubt the Administration and its supporters will attempt to paint those questioning the wisdom of this program's existence as weakening our defenses, and undermining our Nation's security and counterterrorism efforts. This is a weak and pathetic justification. There is no question the President must have the best possible intelligence to protect our Nation and its citizens. There is no question the President must conduct programs that are hidden from the public eye in order to gather this intelligence. The question is whether or not these ends can be achieved in accordance with our Constitution, our laws, and in a manner that reflects our values as a Nation. I hope for the sake of the country, that after the Congress investigates this program, it is not shown that the President broke the law. However, we will only know the answer to that question after Congress exercises its proper oversight responsibility. Something it has failed to do for five years. Despite what this Administration would have us believe, securing our Nation from all enemies both foreign and domestic can be achieved without violations of our civil liberties.", u"Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to the amendment of my good friend from Virginia, Senator Warner. The Warner amendment would effectively undermine the ability of the national intelligence director to manage the intelligence programs by changing the definition in the bill of what constitutes a national intelligence program. Under the Collins-Lieberman bill, the national intelligence program includes all programs--all programs--projects, and activities of a number of national intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. The Collins-Lieberman bill has been carefully crafted to provide the new intelligence director with the consolidated budget, personnel, and tasking authority necessary to manage the newly defined national intelligence program. The Warner amendment seeks to unravel this. It is a major ``undoing'' amendment. It unravels these unified authorities under the intelligence director by giving the Secretary of Defense significant control over the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. I specifically mention this troika of national intelligence agencies--NSA, NGA, and the NRO--because each agency is partially funded through the Joint Military Intelligence Program budget, known as For instance, in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request, 30 percent of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's budget comes from the JMIP. Similarly, hundreds of millions of dollars in the NRO and NSA budgets are funded through JMIP. The Warner amendment would eliminate these programs from the definition of the national intelligence program, thereby splitting the management of these national intelligence agencies between the national intelligence director and the Secretary of Defense. It is very important to note that these programs are not--repeat not--tactical military intelligence programs. The Secretary of Defense would retain control over these tactical military programs under the pending bill. So under the Collins-Lieberman bill, the national intelligence director, consistent with the 9/11 Commission mandate, is given authority over the programs and activities of these three basic programs. But now the Warner amendment would have the Senate say: Hold on, we do not want the director to have complete authority over these agencies. We want a sizable portion of their activities to be jointly shared, jointly managed, jointly tasked by the national intelligence director and the Secretary of Defense. That is exactly what the situation is today and why we are trying to change all of this. It is exactly the type of bifurcated arrangement the 9/11 Commission highlighted as fundamentally dysfunctional. This is exactly the type of crossways organizational setup that inhibits our intelligence community from achieving efficiency and effectiveness of management that we need to protect our national security. This is exactly the type of problem the Collins-Lieberman bill would correct. Adoption of the Warner amendment would strip away from the national intelligence director an essential ability to manage what is now an intelligence community in name but not in reality. I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment. Mr. President, I yield the floor.", u"Madam President, I rise to pay tribute to the excellent work of our intelligence services in capturing Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. This is a major triumph in the war on terror. Our officers from the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, and their counterparts in the Pakistani and intelligence services are to be highly commended. Let there be no doubt, capturing Mohammed is a big deal. He has a long and bloody history. He has been implicated in the 1993 bombing of the Twin Towers. He played a major role in plans to hijack airliners in Asia and crash them into the sea. He may well have been a leader in the attack on the USS Cole, an attack that killed 17 United States sailors and wounded 39 others. He has been implicated in the attacks on the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which killed hundreds and wounded thousands. And he planned the attacks of September 11. It is not just attacks against Americans. He is now wanted by our friends, the Australians, for questioning in connection with the recent bombings in Bali which killed hundreds of those citizens. There has even been a warrant issued by our reluctant allies in France for his role in the bombing of a synagogue that killed a French citizen. Those are the horrible acts of his past that we know about. By capturing Mohammed, what devastating plots have our intelligence services prevented? Hopefully, as they start to learn more from Mohammed, they will also be able to thwart future attacks. Another possibility is that those who would engage in such acts will realize their secrets may now be compromised and, hopefully, they will abandon their plans. Not only did we get Mohammed, their operations planner, we also got Hawsawi, their chief financier. The 9/11 terrorists sent their left-over money to Hawsawi. By taking him out of the al-Qaida operations, we have damaged their ability to move money into terrorists' hands. This should hamper their ability to launch any currently planned operations. I want to thank our intelligence services for the work they do. Yes, there have been mistakes in the past, and there will be human failures in the future. But when we learn of their victories, they should be thanked. That thanks comes with the knowledge that there must be many more instances where we have been protected and there was no public acclaim for these servants of the public. Frankly, without the publicity surrounding this case, we might never have known all the agencies that contributed to the captures. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation do not watch after us alone. We should be thankful for the hard work of the men and women of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. They and others are working around the clock to defend us in the war on terror. It is not just our intelligence agencies that should be thanked. It was our friends in Pakistan who discovered Mohammed, who arrested him, who turned him over. President Musharraf has continued his strong support for the war on terror, and we must continue to work with allies such as Pakistan to eradicate terrorism. Yes, this is a great win in the war on terror, but it was not a victory. We may never actually realize when we have achieved victory; for the men and women who make our intelligence system work will have to continue their vigilance, that quiet and all too often unheralded vigilance. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Mr. President, it is always an honor and a privilege to recognize the men and women of our Armed Forces who have diligently and faithfully maintained the security of this great Nation. We do this on Armed Forces Day and on Veteran's Day, but I believe everyone would agree that we do not recognize these individuals as frequently as their deeds would warrant. Today, I stand to recognize and pay tribute to one of the Nation's outstanding military leaders and unsung heroes, Vice Adm. Mike McConnell, Director of the National Security Agency [NSA], who will retire on March 1, 1996 after having unselfishly served his country for over 29 years. Vice Admiral McConnell's life is truly an American success story. Being the product of humble roots, he attended Furman University in Greenville, SC, also the place of his birth, and was commissioned as a line officer in the Navy in 1967. He served tours in Vietnam, Japan, the Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean as an intelligence officer before being nominated for flag rank and being selected as the Director for Joint Staff Intelligence, J-2. In this critical assignment, he served as the senior military intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS]. Vice Admiral McConnell's leadership skills and expertise were immediately put to use to keep the Nation's senior policymakers informed of developments during the turmoil and revolutionary changes that swept the former Soviet Union during 1990. More important, however, were his contributions to the Nation during the 1991-92 Persian Gulf crisis. Vice Admiral McConnell's service to the Nation during the gulf war, which included keeping Gen. Colin Powell [CJCS] informed of all enemy activity, was instrumental in saving U.S. and coalition lives and directly contributed to bringing about a quick and decisive victory for allied forces. Realizing that Vice Admiral McConnell had much more to offer the Nation, the President recommended him for a two-star elevation to vice admiral and nominated him to serve as Director of the National Security Agency in 1992. Vice Admiral McConnell's greatest contributions to the Nation were yet to come. Becoming NSA's 13th Director in May 1992, he committed himself to ensuring that the United States had the world's best cryptologic organization. Vice Admiral McConnell streamlined NSA's operations while ensuring that the Agency had the requisite skills and resources to meet the quickly evolving technological challenges that faced the Nation. His candor and openness with the Congress and its oversight committees helped ensure that the Nation's legislators were well informed of the Agency's operations and how taxpayer dollars were being spent. Realizing that NSA's support saves lives, he also ensured that the Agency provided matchless support to every major military operation undertaken by the United States during his tenure. Most importantly, he crafted a strategy that will enable NSA to ensure that its people will remain its most critical resource. Mr. President, I close by stating that everyone who calls this great Nation home owed a debt of gratitude to Vice Admiral McConnell. He has quietly, yet dutifully, served the Nation during four different decades and under seven different Commanders in Chief. Those of us who have been fortunate enough to know him personally can attest to his dedication, peerless integrity, and unwavering loyalty to this Nation. It is with a sense of great pride and honor that I salute Vice Adm. Mike McConnell. ", u"Mr. President. I rise today to pay tribute to Meredith Gardner, long unsung contributor to the identification of spies. Described by the FBI's Robert Joseph Lamphere as ``the greatest counter-intelligence tool this country has ever known,'' Gardner was the National Security Agency's leading enabler of the reading of thousands of enciphered cables intercepted from Soviet foreign intelligence in the 1940's. The NSA, under its various names, spent four decades deciphering what Moscow intended to be an unbreakable Soviet cipher. Gardner and his team painstakingly worked on these messages in a project which came to be known eventually as ``VENONA.'' The resulting VENONA decrypts, which were finally revealed publicly in 1995, detail the Soviet's espionage efforts in the United States during and after World War II. Gardner has a genius for learning languages, and is fluent in German, Spanish, French and Russian and has had courses in Old High and Middle High German, Old Norse, Gothic, Lithuanian, and Sanskrit. He taught languages at the Universities of Texas and Wisconsin before being recruited by the U.S. Army's Signals Intelligence Service (the precursor to the National Security Agency) shortly after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. The Army wanted people fluent in many languages to work on breaking German and Japanese codes. Until 1955 Gardner worked at Arlington Hall, a former girl's school located 10 miles outside Washington, which served as the Army's headquarters for code-breaking operations. Gardner soon added Japanese to his repertoire of languages. By chance, he became the first American to read in an intercepted message the Japanese word for atom bomb, ``genshi-bakudan.'' When the war with Japan ended, the NSA phased out its Japanese section. Gardner learned that there was a section working on Soviet Union messages (its existence was kept secret) and he transferred into it. Gardner insists that the most arduous efforts to make the messages readable had already been done before he came along. First, the messages had to be sorted into at least four varieties, each used by representatives of separate Soviet government departments. It had also been discovered that some messages could be paired as having been ``randomized'' by the same pad and page carrying random additive digits (and hence were solvable). Such mixed pairs were worked on by a small group of women led by Katurah ``Katie'' McDonald. This group had already produced a remarkable amount of code text, and the code-groups that had appeared so far had even been indexed in context by a card machine. The material was just awaiting the appointment of a linguist, and Gardner ``appointed himself'' to be it. It was the easy stage, but without it all the preparatory work would have been for nothing. Gardner's reconstruction of the foreign intelligence (VENONA) code book was slow at first, but gained momentum. Because some recruits were named in the messages and given cover names, it became obvious that the FBI ought to receive translations of the cables. Special agent Robert Joseph Lamphere was assigned to be the (very efficient) link between the NSA and FBI. The next is history. Gardner spent 27 years working on the ``Russian problem'' before retiring in 1972. He and his wife of 56 years, Blanche, who also worked for the Army Security Agency, now spend part of their time teaching Latin to a small group of students. I commend Mr. Gardner for the invaluable assistance he has given to our country, which we are only now beginning to realize and understand. I salute Mr. Gardner for his dedicated and important service. ", u"Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege to serve as the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Tactical and Technical Intelligence. This subcommittee oversees intelligence collected by technical means, such as satellites and airplanes and ships. During debate on this bill in the House, I urged my colleagues to support the legislation; and I applauded the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) for his respect of the views of the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), the ranking member, and of all of the Democrats on the committee. I commended as well the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence. I believe that this conference report deserves the same endorsement from the House. It is consistent with the administration's request. It is fair, and it will enhance our nation's security. I want to point out to my colleagues that this conference report is the only authorization for those intelligence activities of a distinctly national character. The intelligence activities that are unique to the Department of Defense are conferenced with the armed services committees, and the authorization of those activities appears in both the National Defense Authorization Act and the Intelligence Authorization Act. These DoD-unique intelligence activities make up a large fraction of the nation's overall intelligence budget. This conference report would add about 1 percent to the President's request for national intelligence activities. As with the House version of the bill, there would be modest increases in the budgets for activities centered in the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and somewhat less money for the National Reconnaissance Office, which manages the acquisition of our intelligence satellites. I am pleased that we have fully funded the major satellite acquisition programs, including the new future imagery architecture, or FIA. These new imagery satellites will greatly increase the volume of imagery we can collect, as well as provide for more frequent coverage of targets, which together will address deficiencies identified in Operation Desert Storm and more recent conflicts. However, these enhanced collection capabilities will not count for much unless we also invest in the means to exploit and disseminate the imagery on the ground. On this score, executive branch planning has been extremely poor. The conference report would require a reduction in planned collection capabilities unless substantial improvements are planned for exploitation and dissemination. I would also like to call attention to significant problems at the National Security Agency. The NSA is facing tremendous challenges coping with the explosive development of commercial communications and computer technology. As the new NSA director has pointed out, while the new technology is providing incredible benefits to our Nation's security and economy, it is taxing in the extreme to those charged with intercepting the communications of hostile powers and drug lords. At the same time, NSA has not demonstrated much prowess in coping with the challenge. The new director of NSA, I believe, grasps the seriousness of the situation. I hope that we have made progress in focusing the attention of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on this critical issue. Fixing NSA's internal problems is only half the answer. A sustained funding increase of some magnitude will also probably be necessary, and there are no obvious candidates yet for offsetting cuts. Action, however, is imperative since the nation cannot navigate with an impaired sense of hearing. In closing, Mr. Speaker, this is a responsible bill that will enhance our nation's security. It supports our military forces and our efforts to combat terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and weapons proliferation. I am pleased to endorse it, and I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support it as well.", u"Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from Florida, the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for yielding to me, and I thank him for the tremendous work that he does for this country, something that is probably not recognized by many people any place in the country other than people in the intelligence community because of the closed nature of what we do. The gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) also is a superb individual in that committee who has helped so much with the intelligence responsibilities of the country. I would like to also thank the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop) who just spoke, who is the ranking member on the subcommittee which I do chair, which is the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence. I also rise in full support of this conference report for the fiscal year 2000 intelligence authorization. As chair of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, I would like to highlight a few major points of committee emphasis over the past year in areas of technical and tactical intelligence. We spent a great deal of time investigating the Chinese embassy bombing. As a subcommittee, we looked at satellite launch failures and intelligence support for military operations. There has been considerable emphasis on the requirements for future satellites and on associated production issues, and a lot of investigation and questions focused on revitalization of our Signals Intelligence capability at the National Security Agency. I am keenly aware of the vital contributions of space-based assets to the United States national security, and there clearly is a future. From diplomacy to precision strikes, our assets in space are essential for confident planning and execution of policy. Continuity in satellite operations hinges on another critical program, space launch. Therefore, the large number of recent launch failures became an issue of intense concern for me personally. Several ongoing investigations are examining reasons for the failures. There is no doubt that the issue is being taken seriously and that very competent government and industry personnel are working to identify and to resolve problems. However, because the cost of each failure can be so enormous, we must strive for the right balance of independent assessments. The committee will continue to scrutinize the launch issues and exercise its oversight duties. Depending on the results of ongoing studies, I am considering a legislative provision mandating review by an independent panel. In our hearings on support for the military, a predominant theme was the continued imbalance between collection and other intelligence assets. For years, the committee has stressed the need for better planning and financing of intelligence processing, analysis and dissemination. This year we are insisting that our future imagery satellite capabilities be at least roughly balanced with ground capabilities. Signals intelligence has also suffered from gaps in what we call ``end to end'' capability, as well as from enormous leaps in target technology. For several years, the committee has insisted that changes are needed at the National Security Agency in order to modernize our SIGINT capabilities and improve efficiency. The committee is most gratified that the new director of NSA, Lieutenant General Mike Hayden, agreed to conduct unrestrained studies of the need for reform, using both an internal and an external team. These studies were just completed. Both endorsed previous committee findings identifying systemic obstacles to efficiency and change. The difficult part, sorting and implementing solutions proposed by the teams, soon begins. General Hayden has our strong support for decisive action that will, by nature, be controversial. We will not rest easy until SIGINT is once again healthy.", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 5825, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act. In 1978, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA for short, in order to provide a mechanism for the domestic collection of foreign intelligence information. The goal of FISA was to secure the integrity of the fourth amendment while protecting the national security interests of the United States. When FISA was enacted, domestic communications and international communications were fundamentally different from one another. Specifically, domestic communications were transmitted via wire, while international communications were transmitted via radio. In modern times international communications are increasingly transmitted through undersea cables which are considered wire. H.R. 5825 provides a technology-neutral definition of electronic surveillance to ensure that international communications are treated the same under the law regardless of the technology used to transmit them. The bill also simplifies the process for getting a FISA court order and returns the focus of FISA to protecting those with a fourth amendment expectation of privacy. On December 16 of last year, based on the leak of classified information, the New York Times published a story regarding a terrorism surveillance program operated by the National Security Agency. The President subsequently acknowledged that he had authorized this program after 9/11 to intercept the international communications of those with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations. Notwithstanding the administration's position that this program is fully consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution, the President has requested that Congress provide additional and specific authorization to ensure that U.S. laws governing electronic surveillance are updated to reflect modern modes of communication. Mr. Speaker, terrorist organizations are global in scope, and rely on electronic communications to plan and execute their murderous designs. We can all agree that electronic communications must not be impervious to detection by U.S. law enforcement intelligence officers whose vigilance has helped avert another terrorist attack on our soil in the 5 years since the 9/11 attacks. As General Hayden testified on July 26, 2006, the National Security Agency intercepts communications and does so for only one purpose: ``To protect the lives, liberties and well beings of the citizens of the United States from those who would do us harm.'' General Hayden also noted that ``the revolution in telecommunications technology has extended the actual impact of the FISA regime far beyond what Congress could ever have anticipated in 1978, and I do not think that anyone can make a claim that the FISA statute was optimized to deal with 9/11 or to deal with the lethal enemy who likely already had combatants inside the United States.'' Mr. Speaker, H.R. 5825 updates FISA to reflect modern technology and the changing nature of the terrorist threat. This legislation combines the Judiciary Committee's provisions that streamline the FISA process with the Intelligence Committee provisions that provided the President much needed statutory flexibility to conduct surveillance of foreign communications. This legislation responds to the urgent need to provide our Nation's law enforcement intelligence communities with 21st-century tools to meet and defeat a 21st-century threat. It is crucial to improving our national efforts to detect and disrupt acts of terrorism before they occur on American soil. This bill is the product of extensive discussion and thoughtful deliberation. It will make America safer while safeguarding American civil liberties. Mr. Speaker, I urge support of this vital legislation. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Madam Speaker, I rise before you today to honor Mr. Richard Schaeffer, Jr., for a distinguished 40-year career with the Federal Government. A graduate from Catholic University of America, Schaeffer holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering. His participation in the Intelligence Fellows Program, National Senior Cryptologic Course, and Executive Development Seminar provided a sound base for his future achievements. As one of the National Security Agency's (NSA) highest ranking senior leaders, the Information Assurance Director, Schaeffer is responsible for the availability of products, services, technology and standards for protecting our nation's critical information systems from adversaries in cyberspace. Prior to holding the position of one of the nation's leading defenders against cyber attacks, Schaeffer was Chief of the National Security Operations Center, which manages the U.S. Cryptological System, serving as the command-and-control center for crisis response. His other major assignments have included Information Assurance Deputy Director, NSA Deputy Chief of Staff, and Director, Infrastructure and Information Assurance. Prior to his work with NSA, Schaeffer served in the United States Marine Corps, including two tours in Vietnam. For his renowned work with the Federal Government, Schaeffer earned numerous awards including Armed Forces Communications and Electronic Association Meritorious Service Award; the Presidential Rank Award; Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service; and Secretary of Defense Productivity Excellence Award, among many others. Madam Speaker, I ask that you join with me today to honor Mr. Richard Schaeffer, Jr., and his illustrious career with the Federal Government. His leadership and loyalty has protected this nation for over 40 years. His dedication to the United States is highly commendable.", u"Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support H.R. 5959. I would first like to thank Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hoekstra for their leadership in helping us put together a good bipartisan bill. I also am going to miss Bud Cramer, Terry Everett, and Heather Wilson. We have all worked well together on this committee. You will be missed. I ask my colleagues to vote for this bill because it supports the men and women who work within the intelligence community. The National Security Agency, the NSA, is headquartered in my district. I personally know that NSA's employees work very hard to ensure our Nation's security. We must continue to invest in the people and resources necessary to make our intelligence community effective. Intelligence is the best defense against terrorism. This bill advances the Cybersecurity Initiative to protect our computer networks, a very important issue that we will be dealing with in the future, cybersecurity attacks. We know now that certain countries are attacking the United States of America through the Internet. Two, it increases research and development so that we can maintain our technical advantage; and, three, invests in both satellite and airborne collection and in the systems needed to process, exploit and distribute this data. The intelligence community faces enduring technical challenges, but this bill provides our people, who are our most important asset, with the tools they need to do their jobs well. In order to protect our country from threats from countries such as China and Russia, we must continue to invest heavily in science and technology. This bill lays the foundation for the future and communicates areas of concern to current intelligence leaders and the next Presidential administration. I urge my colleagues to support this bill and the important work of the intelligence community.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this conference report. We all should be proud of the bipartisan, bicameral product. I want to thank Chairman Reyes and also Ranking Member Hoekstra for your leadership in helping us put this together. It's very important for our country and our national security. It has been 3 years since an intelligence authorization bill has been in front of the President for signature. We worked across the aisle with our Republican counterparts to put America first. We must pass this conference report. We are the most powerful country in the world because we control the skies. Our country faces serious threat from China and Russia. These countries are working continuously to outpace our security efforts, particularly in space. This intelligence authorization addresses those, as well as other critical national security issues. This past year, we have scrutinized all aspects of the intelligence community and insisted upon accountability and results. My congressional district includes the National Security Agency. The men and women of the NSA work tirelessly to keep our soldiers and our civilians on the the front lines safe. They're fighting the war on terrorism 24 hours a day all over the globe. I'm proud that this conference report gives NSA the infrastructure and tools they need to protect our country. This conference report also addresses some critical satellite issues. I assure you this Congress is looking into the problems associated with the space industry. We have made hard decisions. We've recommended changes, and we look to hold the administration accountable in the days ahead. I support this conference report, and I recommend its passage.", u"Mr. Chairman, I rise today for the purposes of explaining my vote on H.R. 5020, which this chamber considered yesterday. I have a high regard for the intelligence officials that serve our country, and I strongly support efforts to make sure that they have the resources to complete their mission competently, professionally, thoroughly and legally. After listening to the debate on this bill, I reached the conclusion that this bill does nothing to rein in this Administration's domestic surveillance program conducted by the National Security Agency. This bill contains some good provisions. It imposes restrictions on the growth of the National Director of intelligence to ensure resources are applied to strengthening the intelligence community's ability to penetrate hard targets, and not just add to the growth in bureaucracy. It fully funds the counter-terrorism program. However, the bill's provisions concerning oversight of domestic counterintelligence activity is tepid at best. I believe we can conduct domestic intelligence activities in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the protections guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. There exists a debate in this country if whether the NSA domestic surveillance program is being conducted within the limits of the FISA. During the debate on the bill, I learned several Members sought to offer a bipartisan amendment clarifying that all surveillance of American citizens must follow the law and be consonant with the 4th Amendment of the Constitution. The Rules Committee denied us an opportunity to consider that amendment. Any process that denies us the opportunity to protect our constitutional guarantees does not deserve my support, and for that reason, I voted against the passage of H.R. 5020.", u"Mr. Speaker, I reject all the ridiculous premises of the resolution: The premise that terrorists would have had no clue that international wire transfers would be subject to monitoring until they read about it in the New York Times; the premise that the media should conceal information leaked by responsible officials who are concerned about the runaway police-state tactics of the Bush Administration; and, the premise that by telling a select few Congressional leaders, the Bush Administration can do whatever it wants, regardless of the lack of constitutional or statutory authority. When concerns were expressed about the far-reaching powers of the Patriot Act, President Bush said any wiretap would require a court order. He lied. When the National Security Agency's (NSA) warrantless wiretapping program was revealed, he said we should trust him to use the program judiciously. When we learned that the NSA also collects millions of domestic telephone records, the President said it wasn't what it seemed. Now, we add financial records to the list, and his only response is to criticize the messenger. What will it take for the do-nothing Republican Congress to start standing up for the Constitution, or at least the prerogatives of the Legislative Branch? If this Congress spent half as much time doing oversight as it did criticizing those who dare question their government, we wouldn't have to find out what our government is doing on the front page of the New York Times. But given that no lie, no unlawful program, no petulant signing statement is too much for the Bush toadies, I salute the Times and other media outlets for their occasional bravery and for maintaining some semblance of accountability in government.", u"Mr. President, I am proud to rise today to commend Dakota State University in Madison, SD, for its outstanding commitment to the national security of the United States through Dakota State University's information assurance program. The program has developed important technologies to protect community banks from information breaches, simultaneously training its undergraduate and graduate students to be leaders in this highly technical field. In 2004, DSU was one of 10 universities receiving National Security Agency designation for this bank-focused program and DSU is the only National Center of Academic Excellence in information assurance that tailors its information assurance curriculum to the banking industry. Recent security breaches by information brokers and financial institutions highlight the importance of DSU's work in this area. I believe strongly that the future of information security will include a combination of careful review and oversight of laws, but also looking to security innovators like DSU and other institutions around the country to protect our financial information. As security innovators, graduates and employees of Dakota State University have engineered a new information technology security company called Secure Banking Solutions, SBS. With 93 banks in South Dakota, SBS will soon be able to provide IT security to most of the community banks in my home State, as well as to protect the personal information of the hardworking South Dakotans that bank at those institutions. The Independent Community Bankers of South Dakota and I have encouraged the replication of the SBS model in other States. The security of banking in all of South Dakota has been greatly enhanced by the university's commitment to innovation in the area of IT security, and I thank Dakota State University for its pioneering leadership in this arena. ", u"There is no institutional, constitutional, or previously asserted rationale that has been offered in denying access of the Intelligence Committee or, for that matter, the Foreign Relations Committee chairman and ranking member to this information. I do not remember the exact quote. It may apply to the information we are seeking on Syria--I am not sure--saying that they did not think it was relevant, but I do not recall. I say to my friend from Maryland, there was no assertion on the part of the NSA, that I am aware of, that asserted that it was executive privilege or even that it was extremely sensitive. We have access to incredibly sensitive information. That is the reason we have an Intelligence Committee. That is the reason we on the Foreign Relations Committee have cross-pollination on that committee. So there is no reason--the Senator asked why they would deny it. The Senator's speculation is as good as mine. It seems to me they can end this thing very quickly. The only request being made is that Senator Lugar, Senator Roberts, chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Rockefeller, and I sit down in a room on the fourth floor of this building that is totally secure, have someone from the National Security Agency come in and say: Here are the 10 intercept reports and the U.S. person names. I know more about--I will date myself--I know more about the PSI of an SS-18 Soviet silo, which is highly classified information. Why am I not able to get information in the execution of my responsibilities under the Constitution that is available to a staff member of an Under Secretary of State? Members can guess for themselves. I do not know why. I know it is just not appropriate.", u"Madam Speaker, as my colleagues have pointed out, a lot of good, hard, work has been put into this bill, which places our committee and the intelligence community on the path of success for achieving the goals set forth in the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the WMD Commissions. The turf battles are ending and we now have a director of National Intelligence to oversee and coordinate efforts, but we all must work together in order to make sure that the DNI can succeed. I thank the gentleman from Michigan (Chairman Hoekstra) and the gentlewoman from California (Ranking Member Harman) for leading by example and promoting bipartisan efforts in our oversight role. I also want to thank our staff for their hard work. Our newly established Subcommittee on Oversight has already taken the reins of leadership and is investigating the abuses that have occurred in our interrogation and detention programs. These abuses only serve to embolden terrorist actions against us and it increases risk to our military forces and American citizens abroad. These abuses also hurt our reputation abroad and allow the insurgents to recruit people to attack us. I also look forward to continuing work with my colleagues on solutions to the security clearance challenges faced by the intelligence community and State and local governments who need to access information to protect our homeland. This bill's endorsement of a multilevel security clearance system will enhance flexibility in hiring practices and access to information. Current clearance wait times sometimes exceed a year. Terrorists will not wait a year, and neither can we. Let me close by praising the excellent work of the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center and the National Security Agency, NSA, based in my district. Our committee recognizes their challenges, and we fully support their efforts in the global war on terrorism and in Iraq and Afghanistan. I urge my Democratic colleagues to join me in supporting this bill.", u'The Senator from Minnesota. Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the remarks made by the great Senator from West Virginia, and he is a great Senator. His 47 years of experience here and wisdom have made him an invaluable Member of this body, a leader of this body, an invaluable mentor to newcomers such as myself, and his fidelity to the Constitution, his understanding of history, his understanding of the appropriate relationship of this body, as an independent branch of Government, with the executive branch has been patriotic, courageous, and right. I thank him for his remarks and for his kind words. I also want to share the outrage that he expressed, and the previous speaker, the distinguished Senator from California expressed, about these disclosures. Yet another one today, reading in the New York Times about the secret spying on American citizens by the National Security Agency, in contravention of law and in contravention of previous policy under Presidents, Republican and Democrat. That, on top of the revelations about secret torture camps being conducted, again extra-illegally, by this administration, to the detriment of the great name of the United States of America. I see that the outstanding Senator from Arizona is on the floor and will follow me with his remarks. To his enormous credit, he has been the champion of putting the United States back on track and assuring that we set the example, the proper example, for the rest of the world in how to conduct itself even under adverse circumstances.', u"Mr. Speaker, while we are locked up here today, I would like to wish my wife Sherry a very happy birthday. This week, I have been telling her, has been a real doozy for civil liberties. We learned that both the Pentagon and the National Security Agency have been spying on thousands of innocent Americans. Apparently, the NSA was doing it at the direction of President Bush. I was shocked to learn that one of those documented instances of the Pentagon domestic spying happened in my district. A student protest against military recruiters at the University of California at Santa Cruz, which occurred this past April, was not only observed for suspicious activity, but the ``threat'' was declared ``credible.'' I cannot condemn these actions strongly enough. Using government time and money to spy on people exercising their constitutional freedoms is just ridiculous. I have already signed on to two letters about these violations of privacy, calling on the NSA to fully explain the constitutionality of their surveillances and calling on the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice to investigate NSA's actions. As Members of Congress, we must be diligent in our oversight of the Pentagon, but our job is next to impossible when the administration hides behind the cloak of national security to thwart the civil liberties of many Americans, as they have done with the Pentagon surveillance program. The Pentagon must come forward with an explanation about why they were spying on the UCSC rally. The right to express differing opinions was one of the founding principles of this country. The voices of the American people must always be heard, whether this admistration agrees with them or not. It is hypocritical for us to urge transparency in foreign governments while ignoring what our own government is doing in violation of its citizens' civil liberties.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to congratulate Judge A. Jay Cristol of the Southern District of Florida on the completion of his invaluable research on the USS Liberty incident. In 1987, Judge Cristol began researching the tragedy that befell the United States Navy ship Liberty and her crew on June 8, 1967. Judge Cristol completed a doctoral dissertation on the subject in 1997 and published his book, The Liberty Incident, in 2002. In his continued quest for the truth, Judge Cristol pressed and finally convinced the National Security Agency to release classified transcripts proving that Israel's attack on the USS Liberty during the Six Day War was, in fact, accidental. On June 8, 1967, Israeli troops detected large explosions along the Sinai shore. The United States had announced two days earlier that it had no warships in the combat zone, and Israeli troops believed that they were experiencing an Egyptian naval bombardment. In response, the Israelis attacked the USS Liberty, which they mistook for being an Egyptian warship, killing 34 American crewmen and wounding 171. For 35 years, conspiracy theories have raged and critics have insisted that Israel attacked the American ship deliberately. Finally, just last month, the NSA, under pressure by Judge Cristol, released transcripts of transmissions from two Israeli helicopter pilots that participated in the 1967 attack. These tapes, which have until now remained classified, serve to conclude the evidence that the tragic event was, in fact, a case of mistaken identity. Judge Cristol's diligent efforts and persistence for the truth over the past sixteen years are to be commended. Through his work, he has helped restore faith in the special relationship that the United States and Israel share. Mr. Speaker, I hope the entire House joins me congratulating Florida Judge Jay Cristol on his achievement.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to an outstanding public servant and extraordinary law enforcement official, Israel Brooks, Jr., as he retires as the United States Marshal for the District of South Carolina. This Newberry County native started out his career serving his country in the United States Marine Corps. In this capacity he served a tour at the National Security Agency in the greater Washington area, and obtained a top-secret crypto clearance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This fueled his interest in pursuing a professional law enforcement career. After leaving the Corps, Israel joined the South Carolina Highway Patrol as a Patrolman in Beaufort County. This was particularly significant because he broke the color barrier in that organization. His enthusiasm and leadership led to a steady succession of promotions, ultimately culminating in his attaining the rank of Major, a position in which he assumed the administrative duties for the entire agency. Because of his exemplary service during his 27 years with the South Carolina Highway Patrol, my friend and colleague, Senator Fritz Hollings, nominated Israel as President Clinton's United States Marshal in South Carolina. He has served in this capacity with distinction since March 1994, even earning his agency the 1995 ``District of the Year'' award from the United States Marshals Service. Israel Brooks' career has been as distinguished as historic. He has received numerous awards for his achievements, and shares his message of success with young people of all ages. As he retires as United States Marshal for the District of South Carolina, I commend him for his dedicated service and the example he has set for future generations. Mr. Speaker, Israel Brooks Jr.'s contributions to South Carolina and the Nation are significant and deserving of high praise and I ask you and my colleagues to join me today in honoring him for the example he sets for all of us. I wish him continued success and Godspeed!", u"Madam President, this has to do with commodity classification. We have had some concern that when people in the business of exporting items come into the Department of Commerce and they get a different classification for a commodity--in other words, something might be subject to license and they believe it should not be subject to license anymore--they can come in and get that consideration. That is appropriate. That needs to be done, but it needs to be done in a manner which protects the Government and the country's interest from a national security standpoint. The executive branch has traditionally dealt with this issue through interagency agreements. We think they need to be updated. The existing agreement is 5 years old and needs to be updated to create an increased role for the Departments of Defense and State. Both the opponents and supporters of this legislation will send a letter to the administration requesting the issuance of a new Executive order on commodity classification to ensure the participation of the National Security Agency. We believe that with regard to many of these issues, as the administration is trying to staff up and with our discussions with them and among each other, we have realized just how outdated the existing agreement is. We are going to send a letter to them to bring this to their attention further, and suggest they issue an Executive order. We assume this will be done in an appropriate manner, and we will not have to take additional action. That option, of course, is always there. Pending that, we think this is an appropriate way to proceed.", u'Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule providing for the consideration of H.R. 4392, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. H.R. 506 is a modified open rule requiring that amendments be preprinted in the Congressional Record. However, Mr. Speaker, the preprinting requirement has been the accepted practice for a number of years because of the sensitive nature of much of the bill and the need to protect its classified documents. The bill is not controversial, and was reported from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by a vote of 12 to 0. Members who wish to do so can go to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence office to examine the classified schedule of authorizations for the programs and activities of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the National Intelligence Program, which includes the CIA as well as the Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Programs, within, among others, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the Departments of State, Treasury and Energy, and the FBI. Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities and Joint Military Intelligence Program of the Department of Defense. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the House considered and passed the authorization for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2001. This bill and the activities it funds is another key and critical component in our national defense. The end of the Cold War has brought us a new set of threats, among them global terrorist operations, narcoterrorism and threats to computer security, in addition to threats against our military, our State Department representatives around the world and our citizens at home. Mr. Speaker, this is a noncontroversial bill, providing authorizations for important national security programs. I urge my colleagues to support this rule so that we may consider H.R. 4392. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.', u"Mr. President, I rise to remind my colleagues that today is National POW/MIA Recognition Day. On this occasion, we should remember and pay tribute to the 2,005 soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who are still missing and unaccounted for, and we stand in solidarity with their loved ones and families. I am humbled by, and grateful for their love of country and sense of duty and honor. It is difficult not to feel uneasy amidst the mixture of somber thoughts and feelings of gratitude and pride that this day brings. Uneasy, because, while we are a nation at peace and the wars in which these men fought are long over, they have not all returned home. These Americans swore an oath to support and defend the Constitution, and with great personal sacrifice, carried through on that promise to their nation. Undoubtedly, many endured years in starved, tortured, isolated misery. Their integrity and heroism are examples of the core values on which this nation was founded. Today, I want to pay special tribute to the dedication and service of the soldiers from my home State of Minnesota who are or were POW/MIAs from the Vietnam war and the Korean war. These great Americans and their families have the gratitude of this free Nation. Yet, we must not rest until all American POW/MIAs are returned and accounted for, and the many questions that have overwhelmed their families are answered. I urge the Senate, the administration, the Departments of Defense and State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Agency to redouble their efforts to bring our soldiers home as quickly as possible. Let us all take heart from the POW/MIA flag, which is displayed every day in the Capitol rotunda and which I display proudly in my offices. ``You Are Not Forgotten.'' I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a list of Minnesota's POW/MIAs from the Vietnam and Korean Wars.", u" The Clerk read as follows: Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. McCollum: Page 10, after line 15, insert the following new section: (a) Report to Congress.--Not later than 1 years after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, jointly, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, including the National Security Agency, and the Departments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, and State, shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China, directed against or affecting the interests of the United States. (b) Delivery of Report.--The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, jointly, shall transmit classified and unclassified versions of the report to the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Chairman and Vice- Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (c) Contents of Report.--Each report under subsection (a) shall include information concerning the following: (1) Political, military, and economic espionage. (2) Intelligence activities designed to gain political influence, including activities undertaken or coordinated by the United Front Works Department of the Chinese Communist Party. (3) Efforts to gain direct or indirect influence through commercial or noncommercial intermediaries subject to control by the People's Republic of China, including enterprises controlled by the People's Liberation Army. (4) Disinformation and press manipulation by the People's Republic of China with respect to the United States, including activities undertaken or coordinated by the United Front Works Department of the Chinese Communist Party.", u"Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Report on the Khobar The Staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has conducted a preliminary inquiry into the United States Intelligence Community's collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence concerning terrorist threats in Saudi Arabia prior to the June 25, 1996, bombing at the Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The Committee staff reviewed raw and finished intelligence produced from late 1994 through June 1996. These products include reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department and others. The staff also interviewed individuals in the Intelligence Community, the Defense Department, and the State Department and accompanied the Chairman of the Committee, Senator Arlen Specter, on a trip to Dhahran, Riyadh, and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries from August 24-29, 1996. During and immediately following the visit to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, Committee staff interviewed field commanders and military personnel who played a critical force protection and security role just prior to and immediately after the blast. The staff also interviewed the FBI lead investigator on the scene in Dhahran, as well as top ranking Intelligence Community personnel. Finally, the staff accompanied Senator Specter to meetings with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and Defense Minister Sultan while in Jeddah, as well as other Middle East leaders with unique insight into terrorist activity in the region such as Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel, President Assad of Syria, and President Arafat of the Palestinian Authority. Since the Khobar blast, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has held seven hearings focusing on terrorism, Saudi, Arbia, and support to the military in the region. The Committee received testimony from Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, CIA Director John Deutch, FBI Director Louis Freeh, numerous other Administration officials, academicians and other experts.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The Honorable Warren B. Rudman, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Senator Rudman is a partner in the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison. From 1980 to 1992, he served in the U.S. Senate, where he was a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence. Previously, he was Attorney General of New Hampshire. Ms. Ann Z. Caracristi, board member. Ms. Caracristi, of Washington, DC, is a former Deputy Director of the National Security Agency, where she served in a variety of senior management positions over a 40-year career. She is currently a member of the DCI/Secretary of Defense Joint Security Commission and recently chaired a DCI Task Force on intelligence training. She was a member of the Aspin/Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community. Dr. Sidney D. Drell, board member. Dr. Drell, of Stanford, California is an Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He has served as a scientific consultant and advisor to several congressional committees, The White House, DOE, DOD, and the CIA. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a past President of the American Physical Society. Mr. Stephen Friedman, board member. Mr. Friedman is Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Columbia University and a former Chairman of Goldman, Sachs, & Co. He was a member of the Aspin/Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community and the Jeremiah Panel on the National Reconnaissance Office.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The Honorable Warren B. Rudman, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Senator Rudman is a partner in the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison. From 1980 to 1992, he served in the U.S. Senate, where he was a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence. Previously, he was Attorney General of New Hampshire. Ms. Ann Z. Caracristi, board member. Ms. Caracristi, of Washington, DC, is a former Deputy Director of the National Security Agency, where she served in a variety of senior management positions over a 40-year career. She is currently a member of the DCI/Secretary of Defense Joint Security Commission and recently chaired a DCI Task Force on intelligence training. She was a member of the Aspin/Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community. Dr. Sidney D. Drell, board member. Dr. Drell, of Stanford, California is an Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He has served as a scientific consultant and advisor to several congressional committees, The White House, DOE, DOD, and the CIA. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a past President of the American Physical Society. Mr. Stephen Friedman, board member. Mr. Friedman is Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Columbia University and a former Chairman of Goldman, Sachs, & Co. He was a member of the Aspin/Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community and the Jeremiah Panel on the National Reconnaissance Office.", u"Mr. Speaker, I also want to commend the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), and also my good friend, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for their hard work in forging this legislation. The conference report includes my amendment, which was adopted by the House on a voice vote back in May, requiring the CIA to report to Congress on its activities in Chile during the early 1970s. It is time that the Central Intelligence Agency accounted for its role in the military coup that toppled the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende and led to his death. The American people need to know how our government supported the rise of Augusto Pinochet, a ruthless dictator who systematically murdered and tortured his enemies. General Pinochet has been under house arrest in London for the past year awaiting trial in Spain for his crimes against humanity. The British courts recently upheld the Spanish judge's petition to extradite him. Last year, the National Security Agency directed the CIA and other government departments and agencies to disclose relevant information regarding Pinochet's military coup and subsequent crimes against humanity. The CIA has not yet complied with this order and has released only a handful of documents to this date. My amendment will ensure that the CIA releases these documents and accounts for its activities during this dark period in Chile's history. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the willingness of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) to work with me on this issue, and I thank him very much for that. I also thank our ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), and also the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) for their strong and effective advocacy on behalf of my amendment. I know full well that our success would not have been possible had it not been for their diligence, attention and good work.", u"Mr. Chair, I rise in support of H.R. 754, the FY 2011 Intelligence Authorization Act. I thank Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for bringing this bipartisan bill to the floor today. This bill sets the funding levels for the 16 agencies that comprise the nation's intelligence community including the Central Intelligence Agency and parts of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigations. It also supports the dedicated and skilled men and women who work in secret at these and other elements of the nation's clandestine services that helped bring Osama bin Laden to justice. H.R. 754 authorizes funding for the counterterrorism analysis and worldwide clandestine operations of the CIA; the tactical intelligence support of the National Security Agency; the electronics surveillance and real-time analysis of the National Geospacial Agency; and the coordination of the National Intelligence Director. The coordinated efforts of all these agencies enable the U.S. to anticipate and respond to emerging threats and to maintain its technological advantage over our adversaries around the world. Bringing Osama bin Laden to justice was the result of the hard work and sacrifice by this nation's intelligence and Special Forces community. These brave men and women are silent warriors who deserve our gratitude and unwavering support. I commend them for their ongoing efforts to disrupt, dismantle and defeat terrorism around the world. I encourage my colleagues to join me in thanking our intelligence professionals for all that they do to keep our country safe and I urge passage of this bill.", u"Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010. This measure authorizes funding for the Office of the National Intelligence Director, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, as well as the foreign intelligence activities of the Defense Department, FBI, State Department and Homeland Security Department. Further, to ensure that these and other activities are conducted in a manner that is consistent with the laws of the United States, the measure increases the levels of oversight of the intelligence community in several key ways. First, the bill modifies the processes for reporting of intelligence activities, including covert actions, to the congressional intelligence committees. The President is required by law to keep congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of intelligence activities, but under extraordinary circumstances, the President can limit these communications to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, and the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate. The bill alters this and requires the President to notify all members of the congressional intelligence committees when the `Gang of Eight' has been contacted and notified of a covert incident and to provide a general description of that briefing. Second, the bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to write regulations to permit the Government Accountability Office to audit the intelligence community. Additionally, the Director of National Intelligence is required to provide a comprehensive report on the use of contractors throughout the intelligence community. This bill funds the U.S. national security and intelligence programs and objectives that help to keep Americans safe. The bill also helps to ensure that these activities are conducted in a manner consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. I encourage my colleagues to join me today in support of this important bill.", u"Mr. Speaker, today I want to bring attention to the cases of four human rights activists who have dedicated themselves to pro-democracy efforts in North Korea. Kim Young Hwan, Yu Jae Gil, Kang Shin Sam, and Lee Sang Yong reportedly were arrested in Dalian, in Communist China, and remain imprisoned by Communist China's Ministry of State Security in the Liaoning Province, near the border with North Korea. These human rights activists are in serious danger. Many fear that Kim in particular, once a North Korean regime insider who has become one of the most outspoken advocates for freedom and human rights for the North Korean people, has been subjected to harsh interrogation and even torture by Chinese state security or North Korean security thugs. Even while living in South Korea, he often suffered harassment and intimidation for his activism and work on NKnet by pro-North Korean sympathizers. As the Daily NK reported on May 16, 2012, if Kim was transported to the Sino-North Korean border to be interrogated by North Korean agents, ``then what is the difference between throwing a piece of meat to a dog and handing Kim to the North Korean National Security Agency, whose men come and go from Dandong as if it were their own house?'' The conditions of the other three activists are unknown because they have been denied consular access to representatives of South Korea, and they have been refused family and attorney visits as well. Like Kim, they were arrested on March 29, 2012 under Communist China's nebulous ``threat to national security'' edict, but further reasons for their detainment have not been provided. There are well-founded concerns that they have undergone harsh interrogations. I commend the ``Committee for the Release of North Korean Human Rights Activist Kim Young Hwan'' for raising awareness of this critical human rights issue, and urge human rights advocates to press for the immediate release of these brave pro-democracy activists.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor Emily E. Randle. Emily is Raymond High School's Valedictorian at Raymond High School for the Class of 2012. She is the daughter of David and Ruth Randle of Utica, Mississippi. Ms. Emily Randle has a 4.2 GPA and is enrolled in both advanced performance and accelerated classes. She has appeared numerous times on the Principal's List while in high school. Emily is also involved in extra-curricular activities. She is the President of the Senior Class, a member of the Beta Club, and a member of the Student Council. Emily is very serious about continuing her education and has received several academic scholarships from colleges and universities in the United States. She has also been selected as a National Achievement Scholarship Finalist, Clinton Alumni Chapter Scholarship Recipient, Rho Lambda Omega Alpha Kappa Alpha Scholarship Recipient, 2012 MS Scholars Award, and Outstanding Young Citizen for the Loyal Order of the Elks Emily is also actively involved in extracurricular activities such as, playing the trumpet in the Raymond High School Band, serving as the drum major for the 2011-2012 school year, and participating in both the Mid-South Honor Band for 2011 and the Capital District Honor Band. Emily is also a member of the Young People's Department at her church, Pearl Street AME Church. After high school, Emily plans to attend Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. She intends to pursue a career in Intelligence Securities with hopes of becoming a research analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations or the National Security Agency. Mr. Speaker, I ask our colleagues to join me in honoring Ms. Emily E. Randle, Valedictorian of Raymond High School Class of 2012.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor a proud veteran from my district who served his country well, loved his family and friends and epitomized generosity and selflessness. As a proud soldier, Patrick Sellers earned his jump wings at Fort Benning before joining the Special Forces as an Intelligence Analyst. He was proud of his military service with good reason. In addition to those coveted Airborne wings, Staff Sergeant Sellers earned a Meritorious Service Medal, an Army Commendation Medal, an Army Achievement Medal, a Joint Services Achievement Medal, a German Armed Forces Badge for Military Proficiency, a Non Commissioned Officers Development Ribbon, the National Defense Service Medal, and the Army Service Medal. He capped off his military service working in the Counter Terrorism Unit at the National Security Agency. But Patrick was more than just a soldier, he was a husband, a son, a brother, an uncle and most importantly, a dad. His wife of 20 years, Tamatha and their 12 year old son William Cade are deeply feeling his sudden loss. So are his extended family, friends, and coworkers, who will remember Patrick for his quick and decisive wit, his ability to relate to anyone in any circumstance and his uncanny ability to disarm people with an exceptional impersonation. Underneath his tough soldier ``get it done'' exterior was a love of life, of family and of football. His passion for NFL Football was evident in his competitive fantasy league. I'm sure there are coaches in the NFL who could have benefitted from his knowledge of the game. To Tamatha, William Cade, his parents Terry and Eulata Sellers, his sister Sharon, niece Katrina and nephew Bryce, as long as you all continue to keep Patrick's spirit alive, the pain of his loss eases a little more. America is grateful for his selfless service and a better place for it.", u"Mr. President, today I would like to pay tribute to Catherine ``Kay'' S. Hill of Dayton, MD. Kay Hill is retiring after a 38-year career with the National Security Agency, NSA, where she led the Agency's efforts to forge partnerships with the State and local governments and the surrounding community. Ms. Hill has put a human face on an agency long known for its secrecy and is legendary in Maryland for her leadership and vision. In 1975 Ms. Hill was recruited by the NSA to establish a commuter transportation office. She oversaw the NSA motor fleet services operation and quickly recognized the need to expand ridesharing beyond the gates. In 1976 she began working with State and local governments to develop a statewide vanpool program that grew to be the largest program in the State. In 1980 NSA was the only Federal agency to receive a Presidential Award in recognition of its successful and groundbreaking Ridesharing Program, which has since been duplicated by other Federal agencies. As a result of her success in forging collaborative partnerships in those early days, Ms. Hill became one of the few public faces of NSA, and Agency leadership began to place more emphasis on working with the broader community. In 1999 NSA management established the office of State and Local Government Relations and Community Partnership and appointed Ms. Hill as its first Director. She has continued her work to partner with the community in a number of areas to address problems of mutual interest like education and workforce development, road improvements, transportation, and other infrastructure issues. Kay Hill is an outstanding Federal employee, dedicated to public service. I am grateful and pleased that because of her advocacy, the NSA enjoys a reputation in the surrounding community as a good neighbor, business partner, and model employer. I wish her all the best as she begins the next phase in her life--one that I hope is both relaxing and productive. ", u"Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly vote for H.R. 3361. I do so because I recognize that important authorities which help keep our people safe expire next year and that there is a significant chance that those authorities may not be renewed. I also recognize that the abuse of government power by the Obama Administration has damaged the trust that the American people have even in the military and civilian professionals at the National Security Agency. An orchestrated campaign of distortions and half-truths has called NSA's trustworthiness into question for too many Americans. That is unfortunate and unfair. The men and women at NSA have had more than a decade of remarkable success, not only in protecting our country from another 9/11-type attack, but supporting our warfighters on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. While few Americans will ever learn the details of their accomplishments, we all benefit from their hard work, dedication to their mission, and professionalism. We should be clear-eyed about the effects of this bill. It makes it harder to gather the information necessary to stop terrorism; it means that it will take longer to find the essential connections of terrorist networks; and this bill makes it less likely, hopefully only slightly less likely, that we will stop future terrorist attacks. But there is no doubt that America will be less safe from terrorist attack after this bill takes effect than it is today. Apparently, that result is inevitable if we are to prevent even worse damage to our country's security and our people's safety. So, I vote today to minimize the damage to our national security while maintaining respect and gratitude for the men and women in the military, intelligence community, and law enforcement who dedicate their lives to keeping us all safe.", u"I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. Madam Speaker, I would like to repeat some things that I have heard over the last couple of weeks about this particular situation: ``I fully believe we should not be playing politics with a national security agency like the Department of Homeland Security, particularly given the high threat environment that we are in right now.'' ``The political impasse on DHS funding must end. Responsible members of both parties must work together to find some way to fund DHS without further delay.'' ``The worst thing we can do is let our enemies think we are backing off, that we are cutting off funding. This involves human lives, and this is too risky a game to be playing here. This is no way to run a government.'' Madam Speaker, those aren't my words. Those are words from Republican Members of this body discussing the reckless game that their party is playing with the funding of the Department of Homeland Security. Every rationale I have heard for not voting for a clean funding bill right now involves some kind of an ideological orientation. We have got a lot of constitutional lawyers, apparently, in this body because people are arguing whether it is constitutional or not. Meanwhile, we face threats day in and day out, both here and abroad, that we are not being able to cope with. There is a great or legendary conservative thinker and writer, William F. Buckley, Jr. He once said: ``Idealism is fine, but as it approaches reality, the costs become prohibitive.'' Right now, the costs to our defense, the security of our Nation are becoming prohibitive. Let's stop this argument. Let's do what we both agree on and fund our Nation's security apparatus.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA FREEDOM Act, which virtually deletes the National Security Agency's database of Americans' phone and email records. The bulk collection of what we know now as metadata will end. Under this bill, the government will now have to seek court approval before petitioning private cell phone companies for records. The court will have to approve each application except in emergencies, and major court decisions will be made public. It is very similar to legislation drafted and introduced last year by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, under the leadership of former Chairman Rogers and myself, together with our colleagues on the Committee on the Judiciary, led by Congressmen Goodlatte and Conyers. That bill passed with an overwhelming bipartisan majority, and I want to thank Congressmen Goodlatte and Conyers, as well as Congressmen Schiff and Nunes, also with Congressmen Sensenbrenner and Nadler and other Members who worked hard and continued the pursuit on this much-needed reform. We need this bill, though, to keep our country safe. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which is the part that legalizes much of NSA's critical work to protect us from terrorists, expires in less than 3 weeks, on June 1. If we do not reauthorize it with the reforms demanded by the public, essential capabilities to track legitimate terror suspects will expire also. That couldn't happen at a worse time. We live in a dangerous world. The threats posed by ISIS and other terrorist groups are just the tip of the iceberg. We also need strong defenses against increasingly aggressive cyberterrorists and the lone wolf terrorists who are often American citizens, for example. This bill restores Americans' confidence that the government is not snooping on its own citizens by improving the necessary checks and balances to our democracy. This bill balances the need to protect our country with the need to protect our constitutional rights and civil liberties.", u"Mr. President, several weeks ago, after a highly classified program was leaked to the media, the President described certain activities of the National Security Agency that he authorized in the weeks following our Nation coming under direct attack on our own soil by Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida terrorists. As described by the President, the Vice President, the Attorney General, and experts from the Department of Justice and the intelligence community, the terrorist surveillance program at NSA targets very specific international communications of suspected and known al-Qaida operatives in a foreign country who are communicating with associates around the world and, occasionally, in a limited way, with individuals inside the United States. The purpose of the program is to collect foreign intelligence in an effort to identify and prevent another devastating attack on our homeland. As we have learned, the terrorist surveillance program is designed with the goal of preventing terrorist attacks in the United States and protecting the lives of Americans. Given the imperative to reliably and immediately detect and disrupt the plots of international terrorists who are intent on killing Americans, the President is acting well within his constitutional authorities. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has been, and continues to be, a valuable tool in protecting our national security interests in many cases. However, the world changed on September 11, 2001, demonstrating the importance that the President have the power and authority to protect the American people from future attacks of terrorism. Both the Constitution and the Congress grant the President that authority. FISA lacks the speed and agility necessary to fight the war on terror, and its bureaucratic requirements prevent the ``hot pursuit'' of international communications necessary to prevent attacks. As vitally important as it is to protect American lives, it is also important that Americans' rights are protected. That is exactly why the administration has put in place a system of responsible measures to ensure our civil liberties are also protected. In doing so, congressional leaders from both parties have been kept informed about the program from the start. Furthermore, this program is reauthorized approximately every 45 days to ensure it is still necessary, and that it is being used properly, and the activities conducted within this program are thoroughly reviewed by lawyers within the National Security Agency and the Department of Justice to ensure the program is only collecting the international communications of suspected terrorists here in the United States and elsewhere. Their oversight includes assuring an aggressive program is in place to assist the highly trained intelligence professionals at NSA verify that all activities are consistent with minimization procedures that weed out the identities of ordinary Americans and preserve civil liberties. I note that FISA, which has been the alternative that the critics of this program have looked to as the real program that should be used, requires a reauthorization every 90 days. Here the President and the administration have taken an additional precaution to protect the privacy rights of Americans by reauthorizing this program approximately every 45 days. On September 11, 2001, terrorists operating covertly inside the United States, and in contact with al-Qaida members overseas, perpetrated the worst attack on domestic soil in American history. Osama bin Laden recently reiterated publicly al-Qaida's intention to attack us again with operatives hiding within our borders. Congress identified al-Qaida as an enemy of this country by passing the authorization for the use of force, authorizing the President to use all necessary and appropriate force to protect our homeland. When the enemy is behind your lines, you must use every lawful tool at your disposal to find and stop them. That is why the President has authorized the terrorist surveillance program. As the 9/11 Commission pointed out, and as also the joint House-Senate Intelligence Committee investigation, as well as the report from the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security in the House, which was filed in July of 2002, reported, two of the terrorist hijackers who flew a jet into the Pentagon, Nawaf al Hamzi and Khalid al Mihdhar, were communicating with members of al-Qaida overseas while they were inside the United States preparing for the deadly attack of September 11. Regrettably, we did not know this until it was too late. GEN Mike Hayden, the former Director of the National Security Agency and the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, indicated that had this program been in place before 9/11, these terrorists could have been detected and identified. Unfortunately, as a result of the public disclosure of this highly classified program, our enemies have learned information they should not have. Our national security has been damaged and Americans have been put at greater risk. In our recent Intelligence Committee open hearing, CIA Director Porter Goss commented that as a consequence of leaks in general, damage has been very severe to our capabilities to carry out our mission. General Hayden observed that our intelligence capabilities are not immune to leaks in the public domain. It is clear that this is an important program necessary to address the previous flaws in our early warning system that allowed at least two of the 9/11 murderers to live among us while they plotted our destruction. This vital program makes it more likely that terrorists will be identified and located in time to prevent another disaster. In fact, that may have already happened. It is a program that is conducted within the President's constitutional authority and is subject to review and oversight. It is also clear that continued leaks over this program are degrading our ability to continue to protect the lives of Americans. Mr. President, I yield the floor.", u"Madam President, I rise to speak on actually two topics; one on extending the unemployment benefit program that is so essential to the people of Maryland and to other fellow Americans and also to comment on the National Security Agency surveillance programs, the need for reform of the program but the need not to reject the mission of the agency and cast a disparaging light on the men and women who work there. Let me start first though talking about unemployment benefits. I come with a great sense of urgency and passion that we need to extend these unemployment benefits that expired January 1. This is one of the coldest spells we have had in decades in the Northeast-Midwest area. I find it unfathomable, when it is so cold, that the big chill in Washington is that we are not going to extend the unemployment benefits, extending a warm helping hand to Americans who have lost their job through no fault of their own and have been unemployed for more than 6 months. Where are our national priorities? If we cannot help one another, be a bridge to get to a job, then what is our government all about? We spend billions overseas--and I support that. We spend billions on tax breaks to send jobs overseas. I do not support that. I want to make sure that for the men and women who do not have a job today but are looking for one every day, that we help them out. Senator Coons, the Senator from Delaware, just spoke and said today it could be your neighbor, tomorrow it could be you. I think we are going to be unemployed unless we start focusing on how to help the middle class. The middle class is shrinking and unemployment is staggering. We have to lower the unemployment rate, although I want to make sure that during this time while we look at how to create jobs, we continue to provide a social insurance program that helps people when they are laid off through no fault of their own. My own home State of Maryland is right this very minute affected by 23,000 people--that is 23,000 families--who have now lost a modest benefit which averages out to about $313 per week. That enables people, while they are looking for work, to be able to pay for their housing, pay for their food, and pay for their heat. There are those who are implying that if we provide unemployment compensation or assistance we are going to encourage sloth, laziness, laggardness; that they are going to kind of lounge around not looking for work. Let me tell the story about Western Maryland. This is not Barbara Mikulski; this is reported in the Baltimore Sun and in the Washington Post. We have a community called Washington County. The unemployment rate is 7.3 percent. Just a few years ago they had a Good Humor plant. They made ice cream. I visited that ice cream plant. Everybody was happy, and they were busy producing Good Humor, which was sold all over this country. Well, 2 years ago it closed, and 400 good-paying jobs left Hagerstown. That is the bad news. The good news is a co-op dairy farmer came in, purchased it, and is now producing milk and ice cream but in smaller amounts. Guess what. They received 1,600 job applications for 36 job openings. They had 36 job openings, and 1,600 people in that small rural county applied for those jobs. There were 44 people for every job available. Hagerstown has a great sense of patriotism. They sent many men and women to fight and die in the two wars we just fought. They have a great work ethic. They need an opportunity to have jobs. Don't tell those people in Hagerstown or in Salisbury or in Baltimore or throughout my State that they are too lazy. Maybe we are lazy; maybe we don't get the job done. One of the quickest ways to jump-start the economy, if we want to, is to pay unemployment compensation. All the data shows that unemployment insurance adds about $1.60 back into the economy. I want to create a sense of urgency. I say to my friends on the other side of the aisle: Over a decade ago, you had a man run for the President of the United States who won. His name is George W. Bush. He campaigned on something that I thought was so interesting. I looked forward to actually hearing more about something he called a compassionate conservative. We understand that people are conservative. We understand that people are fiscally conservative, but the message was that we can be compassionate conservatives. I say to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle: Remember the compassionate conservative message from a decade ago, and remember that man's father said we need the points of light to light up America. I say, let's be a point of light here. Let's add a beacon of hope to the unemployed so we can help them. Don't be critical of those who can't find work. Let's look at how we can have a job strategy. Let's get our infrastructure back so we can create jobs in the construction industry. Let's eliminate the tax breaks that send jobs overseas and bring the jobs back home. Let's do the tax extenders so we can get people working again. Let's put people back to work. Pass unemployment compensation. Let's pass some job creation bills. Let's get America working again, and in order to do that, we need to get to work and pass the unemployment compensation bill. I want to also comment on something else, and that is the NSA, the National Security Agency, which I am very familiar with as a member of the Intelligence Committee, and it is also located in my State. I know the men and women who work there, and I know the mission they provide. I also know that a few months ago a man by the name of Edward Snowden lit up the airwaves with his illegal barrage of revelations about the role of surveillance that the National Security Agency played. Mr. Snowden provided a titillating, mesmerizing inside view of the United States. Whether he was a whistleblower or a traitor, I will leave that for another discussion. Right now we know about NSA surveillance, and it sparked a lot of debate. I think that is good. I think that is healthy. I come to the floor today, first of all, to thank President Obama for establishing a commission to look at this and make recommendations. My view is that we ought to review the recommendations of the Presidential commission. We need to make reform where reform is necessary, but let's not reject the mission of the National Security Agency that has protected us for decades and decades. Let us not reject the men and women who work there every single day, standing sentry to protect us against attacks, whether it is a terrorist attack or a cyber security attack. Yes, we need to protect the civil liberties of the United States of America and honor our Constitution. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, and as part of my principles, I have always said: Before we ask NSA agents--or any member of any intelligence agency--to do anything, we should ask: Is it constitutional? Is it legal? Is it authorized? Is it necessary? Remember the criteria. I recommend that this be the grid of the prism we look at: Constitutional, absolutely; legal, a necessity; and authorize. NSA doesn't do it on its own. The authorization comes from the President and his intelligence apparatus. And last but not at all least, is it necessary to protect people? I think we need to really work on this. President Obama established a review commission. I think it is great, and I think Congress should review it. I know appropriate hearings are already looking into that. At the same time, we should practice reform. I am absolutely on the side of reform. I have joined with my colleagues in supporting reform for these programs. For years I led the fight on the accountability of leadership. Back in 2007, I wanted the head of the National Security Agency confirmed by the Senate. I was stiff-armed by the Congress. I was held back by the Armed Services Committee. We had to deal with the turf wars at the Pentagon: Don't meddle with our generals. Well, I wasn't meddling with the generals. I just think the head of the National Security Agency should be there. So let's get off of the turf wars and fight terrorist wars. Let's restore confidence in the National Security Agency and have its head confirmed by the Senate. I am a great admirer of General Alexander. The committee also recommends that the next head of NSA be a civilian. I think we ought to look at that. I think we ought to examine that and see what is in the best interests of the mission of the agency and what we need to be able to do. But whoever is the head of the National Security Agency, be they civilian or military, I think they ought to be confirmed by the Senate. I also joined across the aisle with my great colleague Senator Coats of Indiana to ask that the NSA inspector general also be confirmed by the Senate to make sure that we have a confirmable position so there is a bona fide whistleblower route with a confirmable inspector general to make sure that NSA is doing the right thing and whistleblowers have an avenue to do it. I also supported transparency to make sure that those NSA programs are accountable and as transparent as they can be. That doesn't mean we reveal the secrets of the United States. Joining with Senators Wyden, Udall, and Heinrich, I have introduced an amendment to make the secret FISA court opinions were publicly available under certain circumstances. I also worked with Senators King, Warner, and Collins to bring greater transparency to the FISA court through amicus curiae, or friend of the court, to assist in the consideration of novel interpretations of the law. There are those who say, in the President's report, that there should be a civil liberties council and a red team that can go in there. Let's talk about that. Let's debate it. Let's make sure there is more than one opinion before the court on its legality. I support those suggestions. Let's look at the constitutionality. One judge recently said the NSA surveillance program, particularly under something called section 215, was shocking, and he said it was not constitutional, but 36 other FISA court opinions by 15 judges said it was constitutional. I am a social worker. I am not a constitutional lawyer. Do you know who decides on what is constitutional? The Supreme Court of the United States. I think that Congress ought to call for--or the executive branch and the President--an expedited review of these programs. I would like to settle, once and for all, whether the programs and laws passed by the Congress in the area of surveillance--I would like to know if they are constitutional. If they are, then we know that. If they are not, then that ends the program. We will follow the law, and we will obey the Constitution of the United States. Let's get to work here. Let's go to work here. Let's make sure that we are bringing about reform. I want to talk about the mission of the agency. The National Security Agency is not a puzzle palace, and it is not some sneaky surveillance agency with people in tan raincoats and fedoras, hiding behind doors and spying on people. In fact, remember what they think they do--they think what they do is constitutional, legal, authorized, and necessary. We need the National Security Agency. There is only one thing the 215 program does: It protects us against counterterrorism. They are there to protect us against counterespionage. They are there to protect us and make sure that weapons of mass destruction are contained. They are advocates for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in cooperation with the CIA and NRO. They also protect us in the area of cyber security. Those 80 million people who recently had their credit cards stolen at Target--we don't know if that was a job that was done in the United States of America. For all we know, it was organized cyber crime coming out of Albania or another Eastern European country with shoddy rules and regulations. We don't know. However, we do know the FBI and the NSA are working on it, as well as others. NSA's job is to look at what is over there. Some of our biggest bank heists in organized cyber crime are coming from over there. Did you know that one of the biggest thefts out of the Medicare Program was done by a cyber heist by organized crime out of Albania? Can you believe that? It was caught. In working with the inspector general at CMS, the FBI, and the NSA, we caught them, got our money back, and now we are back on track. So they do a good job, and we are kind of losing sight as far as these concerns about surveillance. There is no doubt that we protect the civil liberties of the United States of America. We do believe in privacy. I am not going to describe the program or go into it, but I will tell you what really bothers me. What really bothers me is that somehow or another, through the media, and even conversations in this body, we are painting NSA as if it were a bad, villainous, duplicitous, surreptitious agency. That could not be further from the truth. Somehow or another, the men and women who work there every single day, standing sentry on behalf of the United States of America on signals intelligence, are somehow or another to feel that something is wrong. The morale at that Agency is terrible. The morale at that Agency is falling. The morale at that Agency is not in a healthy situation. We have to do something about that by showing respect for the men and women who work there. Most of them are civilians. They are some of the brightest people in the world. Did my colleagues know that the NSA is the largest employer of mathematicians in the world because of the code breakers, the cryptologists? They break codes. Who uses codes? It is not Mother Teresa. Respect. Let's have respect because they are hard at work. While the rest of us were home for Christmas enjoying turkey or home for Thanksgiving, they were out there working. They were making sure there wasn't another Underwear Bomber. When our defenses appear to be lowest--when people are traveling on airplanes, when people are in the holiday spirit--they are working. They are working right now to make sure our Olympic athletes are safe, working with appropriate international law enforcement. They are at it every single day. Can't we give them respect while we sort out constitutionality and legality? Let's sort it out, but let's stop the finger-pointing. I must tell my colleagues that I was taken aback today when I got my National Journal Daily and read where it says ``Obama Invites NSA Top Congressional Critics To Meet.'' I think it is always great when the President speaks with Congress, but he invited the critics of the program to the White House. I think that is good. I would prefer, though, to read--instead of ``inviting the critics,'' the phrase would have said ``reformers.'' Put me in the ``reformer'' category. If there are abuses, I am one of the first to criticize them. I have been part of reform. I intend to be part of reform, but I don't intend to be a part of rejecting the mission, and I don't intend to be a part of any effort that downgrades or downplays the contribution of the men and women who work there. So call the people reformers. I hope the White House and this Congress will signal to the men and women at the National Security Agency that they are respected, that they are valued; as we pursue reform, we will always do our duty to ensure that what they do is constitutional, legal, authorized, and necessary. But don't blame them for the job we asked them to do. I think if we proceed with a spirit of reform rather than blame, we will be able to accomplish a great deal. This is a big day in the Senate. Let's pass unemployment compensation. Let's do the reforms we need, and let's do a good job, as we are supposed to do. I yield the floor.", u"Madam President, we are talking about FISA we use a lot of acronyms in Washington, DC, unfortunately--the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It is a complicated subject, and one, if people have been watching the debate, that is also controversial. There is a lot of passion about this subject. We have people standing up and saying: None of this should be disclosed. We should not be talking about this. This is about the ability to protect our country against terrorists. Of course, we have to listen into communications and intercept communications. It is the only way to find out if there are terrorist acts being plotted by terrorist groups, and so on. There is that kind of thing. There are concerns on the other side by people who say: Wait a second. There is something called a Constitution in this country. There is a right to privacy, a right to expect that the Government will not be spying on American citizens without cause. This is a very controversial and difficult subject. Frankly, nearly everyone, with the possible exception of the chairman and ranking member or maybe one or two others on the Intelligence Committee, knows very little about that which we are discussing. Let me put up a photograph of a door. This is a door in San Francisco, CA, a rather unremarkable photograph of a door. This is a door that is in AT&T's central offices in San Francisco. A courageous employee of AT&T named Mark Klein, who had been with the company for 22 years, blew the whistle on what was happening behind this door. According to Mark Klein, the National Security Agency had connected fiber optic cables to AT&T's circuits through which the National Security Agency could essentially monitor all of the data crossing the Internet. Here is what Mr. Klein had to say went on behind this door: It appears the [National Security Agency] is capable of conducting what amounts to vacuum-cleaner surveillance of all the data crossing the Internet--whether that be people's e- mail, web surfing, or any other data. The description of what was happening at this one telephone company in this one location in San Francisco was this: the intercepting of communications at the AT&T Folsom Street facility, millions, perhaps billions of communications from ordinary Americans coming into and through the facility, which would normally have been the case for a telephone company, and a splitter being used, according to the discussion by Mark Klein, splitting off all of this conversation into an NSA-controlled room, to be eventually evaluated with sophisticated programming, and then going back out in order to complete the communication. So you have effectively a copy of everything that is happening going through with a splitter to a secret room. When this became public, when a whistleblower working for the company said, here is what is happening, there was an unbelievable outcry on both sides. Some people said: What on Earth is happening? We have secret rooms in which the National Security Agency is running all this data and all this information through and spying on American citizens? Others said: What is going on? Who on Earth would have decided they should disclose this publicly? They are going to alert the terrorists to what we are doing. We had both sides aghast that this was disclosed. It is important to say that, initially, almost no one in an official capacity was willing to admit to this. Finally, it was admitted, yes, there was a program. The President said: Yes, there is a program--speaking, apparently, of just this program; we don't know of other programs that exist or may exist, but this program existed without our knowledge. The President indicated this program existed because we are going after the bad guys, and we have a right to do that. And we did this program because the process that had been set up because of abuses with respect to eavesdropping and spying on American citizens decades ago, that process was way too cumbersome, took far too much time, and we needed to streamline that. That is a paraphrase. But there was an admission that this program existed and no additional legal authority needed to empower the President to do it. So that is where we are. Most of us don't know the full extent of this program at all. In fact, my understanding is that rooms like this exist in other parts of the country with other telephone companies where splitters are used to move data to separate rooms and data is evaluated. This whole process comes from several decades ago when something called the FISA Court was set up, a court to evaluate the questions about when it is legal and appropriate and when the Government is able to intercept communications. The FISA Court was established for the very purpose of trying to make the judgment about when it is appropriate to go after the bad guys and how to protect our civil liberties at the same time. The FISA Court was an outgrowth of concern by the Congress when we discovered that there was a time in this country when we had the National Security Agency running secret projects called Shamrock and Minaret to gather both international communications and also domestic communications. Project Shamrock actually started during the Second World War when major communications companies of the day gave the Federal Government access to all of their international traffic. One can imagine, in the fight against the Nazis and the Japanese Imperial Army, the desire for international communications to evaluate things that might threaten this country's security. But the Shamrock program then, as we know, changed over time. At first the goal was to intercept international telegrams relating to foreign targets. Then, soon the Government began to intercept telegrams of U.S. citizens. By the time there were hearings held in the Congress, the National Security Agency was intercepting and analyzing about 150,000 messages per month. Data from Project Shamrock was then used for another project code named Project Minaret, which we now know spied on perceived political opponents of the then-administration of Richard Nixon. Under this program the NSA added Vietnam war protesters to its watch list. After there was a march on the Pentagon, the Army requested that they add antiwar protesters. The list included people such as folk singer Joan Baez and civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. We just celebrated within the week the Federal holiday celebrating the birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr. Yet it was not too many decades ago that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was under surveillance by his own Government. The Congress passed its findings, when it did investigative hearings, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act created the FISA Court. Here is the experience with the FISA Courts. Between 1975 and 2006, there were 2,990 warrants issued by the FISA Court. Only five were denied. What that suggests is that it is not too difficult to get approval by the FISA Court for surveillance. But the President and Mr. McConnell, the head of our intelligence agency, have indicated that there has been a problem. For example, Mr. McConnell cited the capture of three American soldiers who were later killed in Iraq. Right after they were captured there was a period of time when it was critically important to be able to intercept communications in Iraq, and they were encumbered at a time when it was critical to find out who held these soldiers. That is not accurate, and the head of intelligence would have known that. I don't know why he represented that. There is a period of time when in an emergency situation, you can begin surveillance without having to go to FISA. You have to go FISA after that period of time, but you are given an opportunity for emergency surveillance even before you get the approval or even before you go to the FISA Court. What we have learned, however, through all of this process is from a December 2005 report in the newspapers. President Bush had authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop without warrants inside the United States which bypassed the entire FISA Court system. It turns out that most of the large telephone companies in this country had gone along with the administration's request for that activity. We are told that the administration, Attorney General Gonzales, and others furnished the telephone companies with some sort of letter, a certification of sorts. We don't know what that letter was, however, because the administration, citing the State Secrets Act, refuses to allow that to be disclosed. I think if they provide certification to a telephone company--and the telephone company relies on that--by officers of the Federal Government, in good faith, let's have that disclosed. Why should we wonder about the actions of a telephone company? If, in fact, you have an Attorney General of the United States who is certifying, let's find out what this administration did. Let's find out how they did it. Let's not have them tell us you cannot even see what was provided to a telephone company in terms of certification. That, in my judgment, does not pass the red face test. I hope very much we will begin to learn at some point what this administration has done, when they did it, and what the consequences of it are. This issue of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has become a political football by this administration. The last time we debated this, some while ago, it was quite clear that the politics of it were viewed as wonderful politics by the other side and by the White House. But this ought not be about politics at all. This ought to be about two issues, both of which are critically important: One is protecting this country's interests, yes, giving us a chance to make sure we understand what the terrorists are doing, how to foil terrorist attempts to injure this country--it is about that; and that is very important--but it is also about civil liberties and protecting the rights of the American people at the same time. We thought we had done that by putting together the FISA Court. We thought we had done that by establishing a procedure that needed to be followed. We now understand the President, with his lawyers, says those laws do not matter. There is in the Constitution, they say, something about the powers of the Commander in Chief, and he can do whatever he wants. That is a pretty dangerous interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. We debate this in so much ignorance because almost no one knows what this administration has done, and they are preventing us from knowing as much as we should know, in most cases, by claiming protection under the State Secrets Act, and not even allowing the release of the letter that was provided to the telephone companies that cooperated that describes to them the legal authority for doing so. I think there is much to be learned here, much we need to know. I think it is very important, as we reach an agreement on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act--and we should because it is an important circumstance by which we need, in certain cases, when we believe there is information being passed from terrorist to terrorist, and so on--if those communications are being run through this country, we need to be able to intercept and interpret what is happening--but it is critically important we not allow a kind of an approach to this where there is no oversight, there is no check. We have a government of checks and balances. What the President and his people seem to be saying to us is: We are not interested in checks and balances. We have the authority in the Constitution, as we interpret it, and that means it exceeds every law you can pass. We are going to do what we want to do. And if you don't like it, tough luck. And if you don't like it, by the way, what we will say to the American people is you are not willing to stand up for the security of this country. It is outrageous. It is dragging this issue smack-dab in the middle of their little political balloon. But this is a much more important process than that. We need to do this, and we need to get it right in order to protect America. We need to do this, and we need to get it right in order to protect the interests of the American people as well--and that interest of privacy and that interest of making sure that ``big brother government'' is not running all of your telephone calls and all of your e-mails and all of your information through its drift net to find out what you are saying and what you are doing and who you are talking to. That is not what I understand to be the best interests of this country or the guarantees that exist in the Constitution for the American people. That is why this is worth an important controversy and an important fight. It is why it is for us to take enough time to get it right. This is a big issue. We do a lot of things on the floor of the Senate that are not so big--not big issues. They are smaller issues in consequence. This issue is about freedom and liberty and the guarantees given the American people in the Constitution. It is about whether there is a check on Presidential power that assumes they have the power that exceeds all other laws. If we do not have that kind of check and balance in this Government, then we have bigger problems than I thought. So I only wanted to say, with respect to this issue, we do not know much about it. We know at this point that behind this door, as shown on this chart--behind this door--exists information split off what is called a splitter from the main line. Massive amounts of information come into it--in this case, it was AT&T; it could have been other telephone companies--it is split off, and then all of it is evaluated to find out: Is there something there that is suspicious? It is not the way America has ever worked, and not the way it should work. So the more we know, I think the more we will be able to better understand how to do two things at once: protect our country against terrorists, and protect the civil liberties of the American people. Both are important. At least there is one group of people in this political system of ours that believes the first is far more important than the second. They are wrong. They are both important, and both worth standing up for.", u"Madam President, I rise to speak about where we are as we debate the various aspects of the USA FREEDOM Act. However, before I proceed with my statement on the current issue before the Senate, I really wish to note the very sad passing of our Vice President's son, Beau Biden, who passed away at age 46 of brain cancer. Of course, the world knows this now because of the news announcement. Standing on the Senate floor, where I served with the Vice President when he was a U.S. Senator, I just personally want to express my condolences to him on behalf of myself, his friend in the U.S. Senate and his colleague on so many issues, as well as the people of Maryland. Once the news broke over the weekend, many people asked me in my home State: Did you know him? Had you ever met him? There is just a general outpouring of sadness for his family, his wife, his two children, and, of course, the Vice President and his stepmother Jill. So, Mr. Vice President, if you have the opportunity to listen, know that the U.S. Senate is sending our thoughts and our prayers to you during this difficult time. Madam President, I wish to speak now about where we are in terms of our parliamentary situation. Once again, here we are in the Senate where, when all is said and done, more is getting said than is getting done. I am a very strong proponent of the oath I took to defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies. By that I mean we have to be able to protect this country. We need to have a sense of urgency about it. I am not only disappointed, I am deeply, deeply, deeply frustrated that the key authorities of the PATRIOT Act expired last night, when we had a path forward on legislation that would be constitutionally sound, would be legal, and would be authorized. But what did we do? We got ourselves into a parliamentary quagmire with the filibuster of one individual, which now has left us exposed in the world's eyes. Major authorities were given to our intelligence community to be able to pursue the surveillance of potential terrorists, and they have expired. Those authorities included ``lone wolf,'' the roving wiretap, and some other aspects involving surveillance, and we have just let them expire at midnight. Right now, I hope we do what we can to pass the USA FREEDOM Act without delay. We need to get these authorities restored. Do we need reform? Absolutely. But let's not delay. Let's get it going. Others are going to speak later on today on the merits of the USA FREEDOM Act. I believe it is our best opportunity to protect the Nation, while balancing privacy and constitutionally approved surveillance. I do support reforming the PATRIOT Act, but I don't support unilateral disarmament. I don't want to throw the PATRIOT Act away. I don't want to throw away our ability to place potential terrorists under surveillance. I don't want to give in under the guise of some false pretense about privacy where we say, Well, gee, I worry about my privacy, so the terrorists don't need to worry about us being able to pursue them. Our Nation needs to know that when bad guys with predatory intent are plotting against the United States of America, we are going to know about it and we are going to stop it. We are going to know about it because we have the legal authority to track them, put them under surveillance, and we are going to stop them before they do very bad things to our country. The purpose of my comments today is to stand up not only for the ability to have a law but also for the men and women who are working for the intel agencies--for the people who work at the National Security Agency in my own State, the FBI, and other agencies within our intel community who are essential to protecting our country against terrorist attacks, whether it is a ``lone wolf'' or State-sponsored terrorism. These dedicated, patriotic, intelligence professionals want to operate under a rule of law. They want to operate under a rule of law that is constitutional, that is legal, and that is authorized by the U.S. Congress. They are ready to do their job, but they are wondering when we are going to do our job. Congress needs to pass a bill, as promptly as it can, that is constitutional, legal, and authorized. We on the Intelligence Committee have worked long and hard on such a legislative framework. We have cooperated with members of the Judiciary Committee, including Senators Grassley of Iowa and Leahy of Vermont, who have also worked on this. We worked together putting our best ideas forward, doing the targeted reform that was essential, not pursuing unilateral disarmament, and we now have legislation called the USA FREEDOM Act. Is it a perfect bill? No, it is not perfect, but it is constitutional. If we pass it, it will be legal, and it will be authorized. I know the Presiding Officer is a military veteran and I support her for her service. The Presiding Officer knows what it is like when people try to trash America. Ever since Eric Snowden made his allegations, the wrong people have been vilified. The men and women of our intelligence agencies have been vilified as if they were the enemy or the bad guys. I have the great honor to be able to represent the men and women who work at the National Security Agency and some other key intelligence agencies located in my State. They work a 36-hour day. Many times they have worked a 10-day week. When others have been eating turkey or acting like turkeys, they were on their job, doing their job, trying to protect America. Let me tell my colleagues, these people who work for the National Security Agency, for the FBI, and other intelligence agencies are patriots. They are deserving of our respect, and one way to respect them is to pass the law under which they can then operate in a way that is again appropriate. At times, these men and women, ever since Eric Snowden, have been wrongly vilified by those who don't bother to inform themselves about national security structures and the vital functions they perform. Good one-liners and snarky comments have been the order of the day. Now, the National Security Agency is located in my State, but I am not here because it is in my State. I am here because it is located in the United States of America. Thousands of men and women serve in silence without public accolades, protecting us from cyber attacks, against terrorist attacks, as well as supporting our war fighters. I wish the Presiding Officer would have the opportunity to come with me to meet them sometime. They are linguists. They are Ph.D.s. the National Security Agency is the largest employer of mathematicians in America. They are the cyber geeks. Many of them are whiz kids. They are the treasured human capital of this Nation. If they had chosen to go to work in dot-com agencies, they would have stock options and time off and financial rewards far beyond what government service can offer. We need to be able to support them, again, by providing them with the legal authority necessary. Remember, that section 215 is such a small aspect of what these intelligence agencies do as they stand sentry in cyber space protecting us. People act as though that is all NSA does. They haven't even bothered to educate themselves as to the legality and constitutionality of where we are. Now, let's say where we are and let's say where we have been. Much has been said about the PATRIOT Act. It has been sharply criticized. There has been no doubt that it does require reform. That is why the Congress, in its wisdom, when it passed the bill right after 9/11, put in the safeguard of periodic sunsets so we could take a breather and reexamine the law to make sure what we did was appropriate and necessary. Congress did pass the PATRIOT Act so the men and women at the intelligence agencies worked under what they thought was the rule of law that Congress supported. President George Bush also told us and his legal advisors told us that it was constitutional, so people believed it. Those men and women at the intelligence agencies thought they were working under legislation that was constitutional, legal, and authorized because we passed it. Well, now others say it wasn't. Others even want to filibuster about it. They want to quote the Founding Fathers. Well, I don't know about the Founding Fathers, but I know what the ``founding mothers'' would have said. The ``founding mothers'' would have said get off the dime and let's pass this legislation. We do need good intelligence in a world of ISIL, al-Nusra Front, and Al Qaeda. NSA is one of our key agencies on the frontline of defense, and the people of the National Security Agency make up the frontline. As they looked at audits, checks and balances, and oversight, there was no evidence ever of any abuse of inappropriate surveillance on American citizens. We need to know that and we need to recognize that. Those employees thought they were implementing a law, but some in the media--and even some in this body--have made them feel as though they were the wrongdoers. I find this insulting and demeaning. The morale at the National Security Agency was devastated for a long time. People were vilified, families were harassed for even working at the NSA, and, in some instances, I heard even their children were bullied in school. This isn't the way it should be. They thought they were patriots working for America. When the actions of our own government have placed these workers where they feel under attack--they were attacked by sequester and they felt under attack by a government shutdown because many of them were civilian employees at DOD--they were not paid--and now Congress's failure to reform national security has further then said: We can take our time. What you are doing is important, but we have to talk some more. Gee, we have to talk some more. What do you mean we have to talk some more? The only person in the Chamber is my very distinguished colleague, the distinguished colleague from Indiana, whom I work with in such a wonderfully cooperative way on the Intelligence Committee. You know we are not bipartisan, we are nonpartisan for the good of the country. Where is everybody who wanted to speak? Do we see 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 Senators lined up waiting to speak? No. We have to kill time. I don't want to kill time. I am afraid Americans will be killed. We have to get on this legislation and we have to get our act together and we have to pass it. I want the people to know we cannot let them down by our failure to act and to act promptly. I come to the floor to say let's pass the USA FREEDOM Act and let's do it as soon as we can. I know a vote has been set for 11 o'clock tomorrow. That means that it will be almost 35 or 36 hours since the authorities expired, and then it has to go over to the House. So let's move it and let's keep our country safe and let's get our self-respect back. For those who looked at our country, there were three attitudes toward America: One was great respect for who we are, our rule of law; the other was our fear, because we were once the arsenal of democracy; and, third, the yearning to be in a country that worked under a Constitution, a Congress that worked to solve the problems of our Nation. Can we get back to that? I know the Presiding Officer wants to get back to that. I know my colleague here wants to be part of that. Let's get back together, where shoulder to shoulder we shoulder our responsibilities, pass the legislation we need to, protect our country, respect the men and women who work there, and say to any foe in the world that the United States of America stands united and is willing to protect us, and to the men and women who work for us in national security, we will support you by passing legislation promptly that is constitutional, legal, and authorized. Madam President, I yield the floor.", u"``SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED FOR ANY REPEAL OR MODIFICATION OF ``Sec. 109A. No provision of law shall be construed to implicitly repeal or modify this title or any provision thereof, nor shall any provision of law be deemed to repeal or modify this title in any manner unless such provision of law, if enacted after the date of the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Improvement and Enhancement Act of 2007, expressly amends or otherwise specifically cites this title.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for that Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 109 the following new item:``Sec. 109A. Specific authorization required for any repeal or modification of title.''. As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, but not later than seven days after such date, the President shall brief and inform each member of the congressional intelligence committees on the following: (1) The Terrorist Surveillance Program of the National Security Agency. (2) Any program which involves, whether in part or in whole, the electronic surveillance of United States persons in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes, and which is conducted by any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government, or by any entity at the direction of a department, agency, or other element of the United States Government, without fully complying with the procedures set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) or chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States Code. (a) In General.--Upon petition by the United States or any party to the underlying proceedings, the Supreme Court of the United States shall review a final decision on the merits concerning the constitutionality of the Terrorist Surveillance Program in at least one case that is pending in the courts of the United States on the date of enactment of this Act. (b) Expedited Consideration.--It shall be the duty of the Supreme Court of the United States to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter brought under subsection (a). (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``Terrorist Surveillance Program'' means the program identified by the President on December 17, 2005, to intercept international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations. Section 105(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(f)) is amended by striking ``72 hours'' both places it appears and inserting ``168 hours''. Section 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (g), (h), (i), and (j) as subsections (h), (i), (j), and (k), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following new subsection (g): ``(g)(1)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title and subject to the provisions of this subsection, the Attorney General may, with the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, appoint appropriate supervisory or executive personnel within the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency to authorize electronic surveillance on a United States person in the United States on an emergency basis pursuant to the provisions of this subsection. ``(B) For purposes of this subsection, an intelligence agent or employee acting under the supervision of a supervisor or executive appointed under subparagraph (A) may conduct emergency electronic surveillance under this subsection if such supervisor or executive reasonably determines that-- ``(i) an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; and ``(ii) the factual basis exists for the issuance of an order approving such surveillance under this title. ``(2) The supervisors and executives appointed by the Attorney General under paragraph (1) may only be officials as follows: ``(A) In the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, officials at or above the level of Special Agent in Charge. ``(B) In the case of the National Security Agency, officials at or above the level of head of branch of the National Security Agency. ``(3) A supervisor or executive responsible for the emergency employment of electronic surveillance under this subsection shall submit to the Attorney General a request for approval of the surveillance within 24 hours of the commencement of the surveillance. The request shall set forth the ground for the belief specified in paragraph (1), together with such other information as the Attorney General shall require. ``(4)(A) The review of a request under paragraph (3) shall be completed by the official concerned under that paragraph as soon as practicable, but not more than 72 hours after the commencement of the electronic surveillance concerned under paragraph (1). ``(B)(i) If the official concerned determines that the electronic surveillance does not meet the requirements of paragraph (1), the surveillance shall terminate immediately and may not be recommenced by any supervisor or executive appointed under paragraph (1), or any agent or employee acting under the supervision of such supervisor or executive, absent additional facts or changes in circumstances that lead a supervisor or executive appointed under paragraph (1) to reasonably believe that the requirements of paragraph (1) are satisfied. ``(ii) In the event of a determination under clause (i), the Attorney General shall not be required, under section 106(j), to notify any United States person of the fact that the electronic surveillance covered by such determination was conducted before the termination of the surveillance under that clause. However, the official making such determination shall notify the court established by section 103(a) of such determination, and shall also provide notice of such determination in the first report that is submitted under section 108(a) after such determination is made. ``(C) If the official concerned determines that the surveillance meets the requirements of subsection (f), the surveillance may continue, subject to the requirements of paragraph (5). ``(5)(A) An application in accordance with this title shall be made to a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 as soon as practicable but not more than 168 hours after the commencement of electronic surveillance under paragraph (1). ``(B) In the absence of a judicial order approving electronic surveillance commenced under paragraph (1), the surveillance shall terminate at the earlier of-- ``(i) when the information sought is obtained; ``(ii) when the application under subparagraph (A) for an order approving the surveillance is denied; or ``(iii) 168 hours after the commencement of the surveillance, unless an application under subparagraph (A) is pending, in which case the surveillance may continue for up to an additional 24 hours while the judge has the application under advisement. ``(C) If an application under subparagraph (A) for an order approving electronic surveillance commenced under paragraph (1) is denied, or in any other case in which the surveillance is terminated and no order approving the surveillance is issued by a court, the use of information obtained or evidence derived from the surveillance shall be governed by the provisions of subsection (f). ``(D) The denial of an application submitted under subparagraph (A) may be reviewed as provided in section 103. ``(6) Any person who engages in the emergency employment of electronic surveillance under paragraph (1) shall follow the minimization procedures otherwise required by this title for the issuance of a judicial order approving the conduct of electronic surveillance. ``(7) Not later than 30 days after appointing supervisors and executives under paragraph (1) to authorize the exercise of authority in that paragraph, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the court established by section 103(a), the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and bring up to date as required, a report that-- ``(A) identifies the number of supervisors and executives who have been so appointed and the positions held by such supervisors and executives; and ``(B) sets forth guidelines or other directives that describe the responsibilities of such supervisors and executives under this subsection.''. (a) Authority for Additional Judges.--Section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; (2) in paragraph (1), as so designated, by inserting ``at least'' before ``seven of the United States judicial circuits''; (3) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (4) and indenting such paragraph, as so designated, two ems from the left margin; and (4) by inserting after paragraph (1), as so designated, the following new paragraph: ``(2) In addition to the judges designated under paragraph (1), the Chief Justice of the United States may designate as judges of the court established by paragraph (1) such judges appointed under Article III of the Constitution of the United States as the Chief Justice determines appropriate in order to provide for the prompt and timely consideration under section 105 of applications under section 104 for electronic surveillance under this title. Any judge designated under this paragraph shall be designated publicly.''. (b) Consideration of Emergency Applications.--Such section is further amended by inserting after paragraph (2), as added by subsection (a)(4) of this section, the following new paragraph: ``(3) A judge of the court shall make a determination to approve, deny, or seek modification of an application submitted pursuant to section subsection (f) or (g) of section 105 not later than 24 hours after the receipt of such application by the court.''. (a) System Required.--The Attorney General shall, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, develop and implement a secure, classified document management system that permits the prompt preparation, modification, and review by appropriate personnel of the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, and other applicable elements of the United States Government of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) before their submittal to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. (b) Scope of System.--The document management system required by subsection (a) shall-- (1) permit and facilitate the prompt submittal of applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under section 104 or 105(g)(5) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804 and 1805(g)(5)); and (2) permit and facilitate the prompt transmittal of rulings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to personnel submitting applications described in paragraph (1). (a) Office of Intelligence Policy and Review.-- (1) Additional personnel.--The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review of the Department of Justice is hereby authorized such additional personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation, modification, and review of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) for orders under section 105 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1805) approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. (2) Assignment.--The Attorney General shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among appropriate offices of the National Security Agency in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the Agency in preparing applications described in that paragraph. (b) Federal Bureau of Investigation.-- (1) Additional legal and other personnel.--The National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is hereby authorized such additional legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) for orders under section 105 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1805) approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. (2) Assignment.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among the field offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the Bureau in such field offices in preparing applications described in that paragraph. (c) Additional Legal and Other Personnel for National Security Agency.--The National Security Agency is hereby authorized such additional legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) for orders under section 105 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1805) approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. (d) Additional Legal and Other Personnel for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.--There is hereby authorized for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court such additional staff personnel as may be necessary to facilitate the prompt and timely consideration by that Court of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) for orders under section 105 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1805) approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Personnel authorized by this paragraph shall perform such duties relating to the consideration of such applications as that Court shall direct. (e) Supplement Not Supplant.--The personnel authorized by this section are in addition to any other personnel authorized by law. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of the National Security Agency shall each, in consultation with the Attorney General-- (1) develop regulations to establish procedures for conducting and seeking approval of electronic surveillance on an emergency basis, and for preparing and properly submitting and receiving applications and orders, under sections 104 and 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804 and 1805); and (2) prescribe related training for the personnel of the applicable agency. Section 111 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811) is amended by striking ``fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress.'' and inserting ``30 calendar days following any of the following: ``(1) A declaration of war by the Congress. ``(2) An authorization for the use of military force within the meaning of section 2(c)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541(c)(2)). ``(3) A national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or the Armed Forces within the meaning of section 2(c)(3) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541(c)(3)).''. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), no court order shall be required for the acquisition through electronic surveillance of the contents of any communication between one person who is not located within the United States and another person who is not located within the United States for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information even if such communication passes through, or the surveillance device is located within, the United States. (b) Treatment of Intercepted Communications Involving Domestic Party.--If surveillance conducted as described in subsection (a) inadvertently collects a communication in which at least one party is within the United States, the contents of such communications shall be handled in accordance with the minimization procedures set forth in section 101(h)(4) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(h)(4)). (c) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``contents'', ``electronic surveillance'', and ``foreign intelligence information'' have the meaning given such terms in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 Any order issued pursuant to section 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805) authorizing electronic surveillance shall be supported by an individualized or particularized finding of probable cause to believe the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act and the amendments made by this Act. Except as provided in section 103, this Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall take effect on the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.", u"Mr. President, I rise today to re-introduce legislation from the last Congress that would bring all electronic surveillance of terrorists under the color of law and would modernize the rules for conducting such surveillance. I am pleased that Senator Specter, the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee, has co-sponsored this legislation. We all agree that the President and the Intelligence Community should have all the tools they need to find the terrorists before they have a chance to strike us again. This cannot be said too many times in too many ways. We also agree, though, that these intelligence tools can and should be used in a way that protects the constitutional and privacy rights of all Americans. That is the balance that this legislation attempts to strike. Nowhere is this more at issue than in electronic surveillance, where government officials record the content of Americans' phone and electronic communications. This important means of obtaining critical counterterrorism information is at the same time a significant, constitutionally recognized intrusion into Americans' privacy rights. It is worth reminding ourselves of this. We have recently focused on the use of National Security Letters, through which the FBI inappropriately obtained telephone records of at least hundreds of Americans. Electronic surveillance goes far beyond records and collects the actual content--the words spoken over the phone or typed in email. It is also worth reminding ourselves of why this legislation is necessary, as it has been several months before this was the top legislative issue before the Senate. For more than five years since September 11, 2001, the National Security Agency collected the content of calls from or to United States persons--citizens and permanent residents--without a court order as is required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). This surveillance was done without notifying and seeking authorization from the congressional intelligence committees. The President and Vice President have very closely restricted disclosure of information about what they call the ``Terrorist Surveillance Program.'' Until this surveillance came to light through an article in The New York Times in December 2005, only eight members of Congress were briefed on it. Even after the article came out, the White House refused to brief the members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees for several months. Even now, the Intelligence Committee does not have all the information it needs to carry out its Constitutional oversight duties. Throughout 2006, the Judiciary Committee debated various bills to authorize or prohibit electronic surveillance outside of FISA. The bill that Senator Specter and I authored last year, which is being re-introduced today, was reported out of Judiciary on a bipartisan vote on September 13, 2006. The Senate, however, took no legislative action prior to adjournment. Then, on January 17, 2007, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales notified the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee that the FISA Court had authorized the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Since January, the program has proceeded under Court supervision, as is required by FISA. I was pleased that the Administration submitted the TSP to the FISA Court, and that the Court had found a way to issue an order approving this surveillance. I was pleased, but not surprised. I had maintained throughout the legislative debate last year that it would not take many changes for the TSP to fit under the confines of FISA. All it took was the willingness of the Administration to follow legal process. Members may ask, given the recent developments, why legislation is now necessary. There are two reasons. The first is that the Senate should enact this bill is because this Administration has never conceded the point that it cannot conduct electronic surveillance outside of the law. It has put the TSP under FISA Court review, but it asserts that it has the right not to do so. Future Administrations, if not enjoined, may take the same view. I disagree with this legal analysis. Secondly, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the FBI, and the Attorney General have said on many occasions that FISA is outdated and in need of modernization. The current FISA process is too bureaucratic, too slow to initiate electronic surveillance from the time a suspected terrorist's phone or email account is identified. This bill addresses those concerns by providing new flexibility and additional resources to speed the FISA process and allow for the more timely collection of valuable intelligence. Allow me to summarize the legislation. The bill: re-iterates that FISA is the exclusive means for conducting electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes. Specifies that FISA's requirements cannot be written off through contorted interpretations of other statutes. The Administration's tortured argument with respect to the Authorization for the 2001 Use of Military Force (AUMF) notwithstanding, this legislation would specify that FISA's language can only be undone by a specific and direct Act of Congress. Requires that Congress, through the Intelligence Committees, be fully briefed on the Terrorist Surveillance Program and any related surveillance programs. Requires the Supreme Court to review, on an expedited basis, the constitutionality of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Streamlines the current ``emergency procedures'' in FISA. Currently, the Attorney General can authorize surveillance prior to a Court order for 72 hours in an emergency. This legislation would extend the time to one week, which should remove any doubt as to whether Court approval can be sought and obtained in time. The bill also allows the Attorney General to delegate his authority to initiate electronic surveillance in an emergency to specific supervisory officials at the NSA and FBI. Authorizes additional personnel to expedite the writing, submission, and review of FISA applications. Specifically, additional FISA Court judges and staff are authorized, as are additional positions at the Department of Justice, FBI, and NSA. Extends the existing FISA authority--for 15 days of warrantless surveillance following a declaration of war--to any 30-day period following an authorization for the use of military force or a national emergency following a terrorist attack. Allows the National Security Agency to take full advantage of its capabilities to collect intelligence on foreign communications. While foreign-to-foreign communications are not covered now by FISA's requirements, the NSA can only conduct surveillance on these calls if it can be sure, in advance, that a telephone call of email won't transit the United States or unexpectedly end here. In the age of cell phones and the global telecommunications system, this a priori certification is very difficult to make. This legislation therefore specifies that in such inadvertent collection cases, the NSA must minimize the data, but that it has not violated the law. Finally, the legislation clarifies that FISA court orders for electronic surveillance must be individualized to a particular target that the government has probable cause to believe is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. From the briefings I have received as a member of the Intelligence Committee and the hearings held in Judiciary, I am convinced that the Terrorist Surveillance Program is an important anti-terrorism tool that should be continued. It is also clear from the January FISA Court ruling that the Terrorist Surveillance Program can be conducted within the confines of FISA. It is appropriate now for Congress to re-iterate that this is the appropriate arrangement. This is by no means an issue that has been overtaken by events. The Administration continues to support a view of plenary authority in which it can conduct electronic surveillance in violation of FISA. The NSA and the FBI continue to labor under a process that was formed 29 years ago, prior to fundamental changes in the telecommunications system. I urge the Senate to act to ensure that the law is followed and privacy rights upheld, and to provide the Intelligence Community the tools it needs to continue to make us safe. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Dear Congressional Leaders: We are writing to express concern about section 11 of the Stop Trading in Congressional Knowledge Act (the STOCK Act), which requires that the financial disclosure forms of senior executive branch officials be posted on the Internet by August 31. While we agree that the government should have access to the financial information of its senior officials to ensure the integrity of government decision making, we strongly urge that Congress immediately pass legislation allowing an exception from the Internet posting requirement for certain executive branch officials, in order to protect the national security and the personal safety of these officials and their families. The STOCK Act was intended to stop insider trading by Members of Congress. However, section 11 of the Act, which was added without any public hearings or consideration of national security or personnel safety implications, requires that financial data of over 28,000 executive branch officials throughout the U.S. government, including members of the U.S. military and career diplomats, law enforcement officials, and officials in sensitive national security jobs in the Defense Department, State Department and other agencies, be posted on their agency websites. It is not clear what public purpose is served by inclusion of Section 11. We are not aware that any transparency concerns have been raised about the adequacy of the existing review process for executive branch officials, most of whom have devoted their careers to public service. For several decades, executive branch officials have prepared and submitted SF-278 financial disclosure forms to their employing agencies. The completed forms and the extensive financial data they contain are carefully reviewed by agency ethics officers in light of the specific responsibilities of the officials submitting them in order to identify and eliminate potential conflicts of interest. Although the forms may be requested by members of the public, they are not published in hard-copy or on the Internet. Moreover, individuals requesting copies of the forms must provide their names, occupation, and contact information. Agencies generally notify the filing officials about who has requested their personal financial information. In contrast, Section 11 of the STOCK Act would require that the financial disclosure forms of executive branch officials be posted on each agency's website and that a government-wide database be created containing the SF-278s that would be searchable and sortable without the use of a login or any other screening process to control or monitor access to this personal information. We believe that this new uncontrolled disclosure scheme for executive branch officials will create significant threats to the national security and to the personal safety and financial security of executive branch officials and their families, especially career employees. Placing complete personal financial information of all senior officials on the Internet would be a jackpot for enemies of the United States intent on finding security vulnerabilities they can exploit. SF-278 forms include a treasure trove of personal financial information: the location and value of employees' savings and checking accounts and certificates of deposit; a full valuation and listing of their investment portfolio; a listing of real estate assets and their value; a listing of debts, debt amounts, and creditors; and the signatures of the filers. SF-278s include financial information not only about the filing employee, but also about the employee's spouse and dependent children. Posting this detailed financial information on the Internet will jeopardize the safety of executive branch officials-- including military, diplomatic, law enforcement, and potentially intelligence officials--and their families who are posted or travel in dangerous areas, especially in certain countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Embassy and military security officers already advise these officials to post no personal identifying information on the Internet. Publishing the financial assets of these officials will allow foreign governments, and terrorist or criminal groups to specifically target these officials or their families for kidnapping, harassment, manipulation of financial assets, and other abuse. Equally important, the detailed personal financial information--particularly detailed information about debts and creditors--contained in the SF-278s of senior officials is precisely the information that foreign intelligence services and other adversaries spend billions of dollars every year to uncover as they look for information that can be used to harass, intimidate and blackmail those in the government with access to classified information. Yet under the STOCK Act, these SF-278s will be placed on the Internet for any foreign government or group to access without disclosing their identity or purpose and with no notice to the employees or their agencies. We should not hand on a silver platter to foreign intelligence services information that could be used to compromise or harass career public servants who have access to the most sensitive information held by the U.S. government. Section 11 could also jeopardize the safety and security of other executive branch officials, such as federal prosecutors and others who are tracking down and bringing to justice domestic organized crime gangs and foreign terrorists. Crime gangs could easily target the families of prosecutors with substantial assets or debts for physical attacks or threats. Finally, publishing detailed banking and brokerage information of executive branch officials, especially with their signatures, is likely to invite hacking, financial attacks, and identity theft of these officials and their families, particularly by groups or individuals who may be affected by their governmental work. Given these inevitable adverse national security consequences, we urge you to amend the STOCK Act to protect U.S. national security interests and the safety of executive branch officials by creating an exception from the requirements of Section 11 for senior executive branch officials with security clearances. The exception should also apply to other officials based on a determination by an agency head that an exception is necessary to protect the safety of the official or the official's family. At the very minimum, Congress should act to delay implementation of Section 11 until the national security and personal safety implications can be fully evaluated. If the financial disclosure forms of senior executive officials are actually posted on the Internet in August, there will be irreparable damage to U.S. national security interests, and many senior executives and their families may be placed in danger. This issue is too important to be trapped in partisan politics. We urge Congress to act swiftly, before the Congress goes on its summer recess on August 6. Sincerely, Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, 2001-2005; John B. Bellinger III, Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP; Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, 2005-2009; Legal Adviser, National Security Council, The White House, 2001-2005; Joel Brenner, National Counterintelligence Executive, 2006-2009; Inspector General, National Security Agency, 2002-2006; Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, 2005-2009; Jamie Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General, 1994-1997; General Counsel, Department of Defense, 1993-1994; John Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1997-2000; Michael Hayden, General USAF (RET); Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 2006-2009; Director of the National Security Agency 1999-2006; Mike McConnell, Vice Admiral USN (RET); Director of National Intelligence, 2007-2009; Director of the National Security Agency, 1992-1996; Michael B. Mukasey, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton; Attorney General, 2007-2009; U.S. District Judge, Southern District of New York, 1988-2006; John Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State, 2007-2009; Director of National Intelligence, 2005-2007; Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1997-2000; Former U.S. Ambassador; Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 2004-2008; Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 2008-2009; Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Department of Justice, 2006-2008; Juan Zarate, Deputy National Security Advisor, Combating Terrorism, 2005-2009; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, 2004-2005.", u"Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to this bill. Let me begin by acknowledging the enormous work that went into bringing a bill of this scope to the floor. It contains a number of provisions I support, including a 1.8% pay increase for our troops and other measures designed to improve the lives of our servicemembers and their families. I am particularly grateful for the committee's inclusion of nearly $40 million above the President's request for suicide prevention and outreach activities, and twice what I and 100 of my House colleagues had requested earlier this year. I am also grateful for the committee's acceptance of an amendment I offered that mandates a study on the potential relationship between financial stress and suicide among members of the military. In March 2014, we suffered no combat deaths but lost 700 servicemembers and veterans to suicide. We have to end this epidemic, and I hope these additional investments and this study will help bring about that outcome. Moreover, this bill now contains important reforms to our nation's surveillance practices. Three amendments that I either offered or co-sponsored were attached to this bill, and they are worth discussing in some detail. My first amendment would set aside $2 million to expand the Intelligence Community Whistleblowing and Source Protection Directorate, which provides employees of the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other intelligence agencies with a safe, legal, and secure way to report abusive or unlawful practices. The amendment passed unanimously. Currently, this office is literally a one-man operation. Given the fact that there are tens of thousands of federal employees and contractors who work for Intelligence Community elements, it is simply not realistic to expect one person to be able effectively to receive and investigate large numbers of valid complaints from conscientious internal whistleblowers through, no matter how talented. Because of the secrecy of the intelligence community, oversight is impossible without the participation of employees inside the system who know about activities of the agencies. This amendment will help ensure that all employees and contractors in the IC know where and how they should lawfully report potential incidents of waste, fraud, abuse, criminal conduct or whistleblower retaliation. The second amendment, offered with Rep. Alan Grayson (FL-09), would prohibit funds from being used to subvert or interfere with the integrity of a cryptographic standard proposed, developed, or adopted by National Institute of Standards and Technology. Last year, published reports indicated that NSA had slipped language into an encryption standard published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology that created a ``back door'' that NSA--as well as foreign intelligence services or malicious hackers--could exploit. The Holt/Grayson amendment would prohibit that practice and passed unanimously. The last thing the NSA should be doing is weakening encryption standards. This amendment is one of many steps we need to take to prohibit such conduct in the future. The third amendment, offered by me and Reps. Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI-05), Zoe Lofgren (CA-19), Thomas Massie (KY-04), John Conyers, Jr. (MI-13), Ted Poe (TX-02), Tulsi Gabbard (HI-02), Jim Jordan (OH-04), Beto O'Rourke (TX-16), Justin Amash (MI-03), Jerrold Nadler (NY-10), Tom Petri (WI-6), Suzan DelBene (WA-01), Blake Farenthold (TX-27), G. K. Butterfield (NC-01), and Mark Sanford (SC-01) would end two abusive surveillance practices revealed in recent months. First, the amendment would prohibit any warrantless search of the so-called ``702 databases''--the massive government databases, created by the NSA and first disclosed by Edward Snowden, that contain records of the emails and phone calls of millions of innocent U.S. citizens. One of the predictions I and others made in 2008 when Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act became law was that NSA would misuse the law for the ``reverse targeting'' of Americans' communications while collecting against foreigners. As we now know, that is exactly what happened, and those communications--billions of phone calls, emails, text messages and the like--sit on National Security Agency servers, available for search without a warrant. This amendment would bar the NSA from using any funds in this act to conduct any warrantless search of stored communications of Americans collected under Sec. 702 of FISA, thus protecting the privacy and Constitutional rights of all Americans. Second, the amendment would prohibit the NSA and Central Intelligence Agency CIA from installing ``backdoors''--such as malicious software or hardware--into commercially produced products. This provision was originally contained in my Surveillance State Repeal Act, H.R. 2818. Despite efforts by the House leadership to derail the amendment, it passed by a large bipartisan majority of 293-123. This amendment makes a loud and clear point: It's time to stop treating Americans as suspects first and citizens second. Unfortunately, despite the many good and important things contained in H.R. 4870, this bill continues to make the wrong choices for the wrong reasons. The overall spending would be almost $600 billion, a level that is impossible to justify in terms of the threats to the U.S. or in terms of spending by other countries, including potential adversaries. This bill would spend another $10 billion on a failed missile defense system that has not been, and will not be, ever be viable. The so-called ``overseas contingency operations'' fund--the money that fuels the war in Afghanistan and our combat activities elsewhere in the world--is set at nearly $80 billion dollars, and a large slice of that money will be used to continue an American military presence into 2015 and possibly beyond. It includes hundreds of millions of dollars for research on a new nuclear bomber design. And taking the prize for defense-related corporate welfare is the beleaguered F-35 program. Congressional Quarterly reports that the full cost of the program may exceed $1.5 trillion dollars over its lifetime. That is more than we will spend on the entire federal government in the coming year. There are vastly cheaper alternatives that would still provide the United States with a first-rate modern fighter-bomber. Instead, this bill throws still more good money after bad. I am not comfortable with vast sums of money this bill will waste on weapons we don't need and wars we should not be fighting. But I am also not comfortable allowing the National Security Agency to continue collecting and exploiting the communications of tens of millions of innocent Americans. Accordingly, it is with mixed feelings I oppose passage of this bill and I urge my colleagues to do likewise.", u"I thank Mr. Conyers. I rise in opposition to H.R. 3961, legislation to extend the expired provisions of the PATRIOT Act. The three provisions being extended today include the ``roving wiretaps,'' which allow the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to issue secret orders to wiretap any target without having to specify the target or the device. This extension also includes the ``lone wolf'' surveillance provision, which allows intelligence agencies to conduct investigations of non-U.S. individuals not connected to a foreign power or terrorist group, a provision that the administration has never had to use. Finally, this legislation would extend section 215 powers of the PATRIOT Act, which allows the government to order any entity to turn over ``any tangible things'' as long as it specifies its for ``an authorized investigation.'' Section 215 orders constitute a serious violation of Fourth and First Amendment rights by allowing the government to demand access to records often associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights, such as library records. Through years of documentation evidencing abuse of these provisions during the Bush administration, the Department of Justice has failed to hold Bush administration officials accountable for illegal domestic spying by barring any lawsuits to be brought against those officials. Months into this administration, The New York Times reported that the National Security Agency had ``intercepted private e-mail messages and phone calls of Americans in recent months on a scale that went beyond the broad legal limits'' and that the practice was ``significant and systematic.'' Passage of this legislation continues to make Congress complicit in the violations of constitutional rights. A letter written by the American Bar Association in 2005 to Congress expressed grave concern over ``inadequate congressional oversight of government investigations undertaken pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act'' . . . ``to assure that such investigations do not violate the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.'' As Members of Congress swore to protect the rights and civil liberties afforded to us by the Constitution, we have a responsibility to exercise our oversight powers fully, and significantly reform the PATRIOT Act, ensuring that the privacy and civil liberties of all Americans are fully protected. More than 8 years after the passage of the PATRIOT Act, we failed to do so. As National Journal correspondent Shane Harris recently put it, we've witnessed the rise of an ``American Surveillance State.'' We've come to love our fears more than we love our freedoms.", u"Madam Speaker, I rise today to honor the late Dr. Lew Allen, Jr., who passed away on January 4, 2010 at the age of 84. From the mid-1950s through the late 1960s, Dr. Allen worked as a physicist in the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, as a project officer for the Air Force Special Weapons Center, as a special staff officer for the Space Technology Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Director of the Secretary of the United States Air Force. By the 1970s, he was Director of Special Projects and Deputy Commander of Satellite Programs for the Space and Missile Systems Organization, chief of staff Headquarters Air Force Systems Command, director of the National Security Agency, and chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force. In 1982, because of Dr. Allen's expertise in the military space program, he was recruited to serve as director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, JPL. During the years he led JPL, the laboratory launched Galileo to Jupiter, Magellan to Venus, The Infrared Astronomical Satellite Mission--the first-ever space-based observatory to perform a survey of the entire sky at infrared wavelengths--and sent the Voyager 2 spacecraft on its flybys of Uranus and Neptune. A champion of technology, Dr. Allen invested funds into research and development projects that paved the way for new capabilities in space observations. Dr. Allen was the recipient of numerous military awards and decorations including the Department of Defense Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, the Air Force Distinguished Service Medal, and the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal. Additionally, he received the George W. Goddard Award from the Society of Photo-Optical Engineering, the Goddard Memorial Trophy, and the Rotary National Space Trophy. Two awards were named in his honor: the General Lew Allen, Jr. Award presented by the U.S. Air Force, and the Lew Allen Award for Excellence presented by JPL. The Air Force award recognizes sustained job performance, proven leadership, job knowledge and military qualities. The JPL award is given in the early years of an individual's professional career and recognizes significant accomplishments and leadership in scientific research or technological innovation. Without Dr. Lew Allen, Jr.'s extraordinary contributions, the field of science and technology would not be the same today. I extend my sincere condolences to his family and friends.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize the heroic service of Army Corporal Norman N. Chapman, Jr. Born in Pascagoula, Mississippi, Corporal Chapman enlisted in the Army in June of 1964 and attended basic training at Fort Devens. Trained in security, he volunteered for service in Vietnam with the 3rd Radio Research Unit, stationed at Davis Station at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, near the city of Saigon. On April 13, 1966, Corporal Chapman was wounded in a mortar attack. After his recovery, he was transferred to Homestead Air Force Base. In February 1967, Corporal Chapman moved to the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, where he served until his discharge from the Army in 1968. Corporal Chapman's service to our country did not end there. He served as a police officer with the Pensacola Police Department for nearly 25 year in a number of capacities within the Department, from uniform patrol to tactile patrol. He also served in the Detective Bureau, Investigations, and Personnel and Training. In one of the most notable chapters in American criminal history, Mr. Chapman was instrumental in the apprehension and prosecution of serial killer Ted Bundy in 1978. From 1994 to 1998, he served admirably and honorably as Chief of the Pensacola Police Department. The Purple Heart presented to Corporal Chapman is a testament to his life of selfless service to his country, his community, and his family. The medal is given to those who have been wounded or killed while serving in the U.S. Armed Forces, and is one of the oldest decorations bestowed upon service members by the United States. In reviewing his military medical records, the Army has seen fit to award the Purple Heart Medal to Corporal Chapman for wounds sustained as a result of enemy actions in Vietnam. Norm Chapman spent his life protecting our lives and our freedoms as both an Army soldier and Pensacola police officer. His service stands as an example for the young men and women on the battlefields abroad and the young officers on the streets at home. Protecting American citizens has been a way of life for Mr. Chapman, and I am privileged to recognize him for this life of heroism. He and his wife Helen of 45 years have six children--John, Scott, Lydia, Kevin, Keith, and Sarah--and sixteen grandchildren. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the United States Congress, I am honored to venerate the leadership and selfless service of Corporal Norman Chapman. My wife Vicki and I wish him and his family all the best for continued success.", u"Madam Speaker, the right to worship according to the dictates of your conscience is among the most precious freedoms. Tragically this basic freedom has not been realized for millions around the globe. On January 16, the State Department designated the annual ``Countries of Particular Concern.'' This notorious distinction is given to countries deemed particularly severe violators of religious freedom. This year the list included Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Uzbekistan. Oftentimes the most powerful testimony of the repressive nature of these governments is found in the accounts of their own people. Take the words of a 23-year-old Burmese monk: ``We did not expect that the junta would crush down a peaceful demonstration but when they raided the monasteries, shot and arrested the monks. I was so surprised and unbelievable that I could not express how my feelings were. All my beliefs were also destroyed.'' Or the reflections of a Chinese house church leader: ``First, when they arrest you, they try to convince you to give up your faith. And when you surrender to them they will offer you an office in a position such as community member or a position in the Three Self church. If you do not deny your faith and surrender to them, then they will attack you. First they put you into a small place, isolate you, and they let you starve to convince you.'' Or these insights from North Korea: ``North Korea is a prison without bars. The reason why the North Korean system still exists is because of the strict surveillance system. When we provide the information like `this family believes in a religion from their grandfather's generation,' the National Security Agency will arrest each family member. That is why entire families are scared of one another. Everyone is supposed to be watching one another like this . . .''. With the 1998 passage of the International Religious Freedom Act, legislation which I authored, the promotion of religious freedom became official U.S. foreign policy. Sadly, 10 years later, the fight for this ``first freedom'' has never been more necessary. We must commit ourselves anew to standing with persecuted people of faith around the world who against all odds, in the face of fear, intimidation, imprisonment, torture and worse gather secretly to worship as their conscience demands.", u"Madam Speaker, I rise today in honor of Richard C. Proto, former Director of Research for the United States National Security Agency. A great civil servant to our nation, Mr. Proto was born and raised in Connecticut, and he attended New Haven public schools growing up. He played with the Wilbur Cross 1958 New England High School basketball champions and received his bachelor's degree in mathematics from Fairfield University in Fairfield, Connecticut. Mr. Proto went on to receive his Master's degree in mathematics from Boston College in 1964 and joined the NSA following graduation, where he remained for 35 years. During his time with the NSA, Mr. Proto received the Presidential Rank Award for Distinguished Service and the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal. After his retirement in 1999, he remained an advisor to the intelligence community, the national laboratories, and the Institute for Defense Analysis at Princeton, until his death in July of 2008. In a formal ceremony on May 18, 2009, the United States NSA dedicated its Symposium Center to Richard C. Proto, in honor and recognition of his dedicated service to the agency. During the ceremony, Mr. Proto was praised by his former colleagues and recognized for his creation of the still-relied upon ``Proto Algorithm.'' Mr. Proto's family was present and participated in the ceremony. Family members included his brother, Neil Proto, sister, Diana Proto Avino, and four of Mr. Proto's cousins. His parents, Matthew and Celeste Proto, were active in Connecticut's civic and political life. Celeste immigrated to the United States in 1916 from Italy. Mr. Proto's pride for his Italian heritage led him to also found the Antonio Gatto Lodge of the Sons of Italy in Laurel, Maryland. I am honored to join with others in praise for this remarkably-gifted and dedicated public servant from Connecticut. Mr. Proto's strategic and practical aid to the protection of our nation and our country's troops--from the Cold War to the Gulf War--is deserving of recognition and admiration. I ask my colleagues to join with me in honoring the life of this great man.", u"Madam Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to General William E. Odom, a man of unquestionable character and undeniable devotion to our Nation. He served with distinction, provided experienced insight about our Nation's foreign policy decisions, and expressed a rare candor that made him an invaluable resource to everyone that worked with him, including the United States Congress. On Friday, May 30, 2008, General Odom passed away at the age of 75. The course of his career traces the evolution of our military and intelligence communities over the past 25 years. He served as a senior military intelligence official for President Jimmy Carter, and then joined President Ronald Reagan as the director of the National Security Agency during the administration's second term. Following his retirement from the Army in 1988, after 34 years of active duty, General Odom continued his service by teaching at Yale University, working for the Hudson Institute, and writing scholarly works. Chief among his laudable qualities, it was General Odom's candor that proved most refreshing and invaluable. A self-described military hawk, he was among the first military persons to speak out against the invasion of Iraq and he openly advocated a withdrawal. General Odom warned that military action in Iraq would be foolhardy and futile well before the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. In hindsight, his concerns were well founded and have since been validated, but before the invasion he was among the few willing to speak out loudly in opposition to the drumbeat to war. His background and depth gave intellectual credence to the growing opposition to the war, and he demonstrated that there were differences of opinion within our military and intelligence communities on the merits of the invasion. To me and other members of the Defense Appropriations Committee, General Odom was a great source of experience and a wealth of knowledge. I came to rely upon his judgment and took counsel with him privately on issues related to our national defense. He was a thoughtful, steady guide on the most complex matters that face us today, and we are at a loss without him. More importantly, the Nation has lost a true and valued patriot. Madam Speaker, we are saddened by General Odom's passing, and we extend our heartfelt condolences to his family. May others learn from his example and may his memory stay with us forever.", u"Madam Speaker, in December of 2005, I was walking to work and was at 1st and C Street when the front page of the New York Times revealed the existence of a program that had not been previously briefed to the entire Intelligence Committee and to the subcommittee that I, at that time, chaired that oversaw the activities of the National Security Agency. That launched a period of extensive oversight and draft legislation in 2006. In January of 2007, because legislation didn't pass, the administration made an attempt to put this entire program under a FISA law that was not designed and was not updated. I described that at the time as trying to put a twin-size sheet on a king-size bed. It didn't work. By late summer of 2007, we had lost close to two-thirds of our intelligence collection on terrorism. We were unable to respond fast enough when we had problems, particularly in war zones. Just before Memorial Day in 2007, we had three soldiers who were kidnapped in Iraq. We needed an Army of lawyers in Washington D.C. to listen to the communications of the people that we thought had kidnapped them. That delay is not good enough and led to the insistence that we pass the Protect America Act, which this Congress did, over the objections of the Democratic leadership, in August of 2007. The Protect America Act closed an important intelligence gap, but it expired in February of this year, and the gap is at risk of ever widening. The bill that we pass today will protect the civil liberties of Americans and continue to require individualized warrants for anyone in the United States or American citizens anywhere in the world. It will also allow our intelligence agencies to very rapidly follow up on tips and listen to foreigners in foreign countries who are trying to kill Americans. We have restored FISA to its original intent and modernized it for 21st century communications and technology. This is an important step for our intelligence community and will put it on a sound footing for the next several decades. Intelligence, good intelligence, is the first line of defense against terrorism, and today this body will take the next step in making sure we have the tools to be able to listen to our enemies and prevent other terrorist attacks. I would urge my colleagues to support the legislation.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Vice President Cheney convened a meeting in the Situation Room at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, March 10, 2004, with just one day left before the warrantless domestic surveillance program was set to expire. Around him were National Security Agency Director Michael V. Hayden, White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales and the Gang of Eight--the four ranking members of the House and the Senate, and the chairmen and vice chairmen of the intelligence committees. Even now, three months into a legal rebellion at the Justice Department, President Bush was nowhere in the picture. He was stumping in the battleground state of Ohio, talking up the economy. With a nod from Cheney, Hayden walked through the program's vital mission. Gonzales said top lawyers at the NSA and Justice had green-lighted the program from the beginning. Now Attorney General John D. Ashcroft was in the hospital, and James B. Comey, Ashcroft's deputy, refused to certify that the surveillance was legal. That was misleading at best. Cheney and Gonzales knew that Comey spoke for Ashcroft as well. They also knew, but chose not to mention, that Jack L. Goldsmith, chief of the Office of Legal Counsel at Justice, had been warning of major legal problems for months. More than three years later, Gonzales would testify that there was ``consensus in the room'' from the lawmakers, ``who said, `Despite the recommendation of the deputy attorney general, go forward with these very important intelligence activities.' '' By this account--disputed by participants from both parties--four Democrats and four Republicans counseled Cheney to press on with a program that Justice called illegal. In fact, Cheney asked the lawmakers a question that came close to answering itself. Could the House and Senate amend surveillance laws without raising suspicions that a new program had been launched? The obvious reply became a new rationale for keeping Congress out. The Bush administration had no interest in changing the law, according to U.S. District Judge Royce C. Lamberth, chief of the federal government's special surveillance court when the warrantless eavesdropping began. ``We could have gone to Congress, hat in hand, the judicial branch and the executive together, and gotten any statutory change we wanted in those days, I felt like,'' he said in an interview. ``But they wanted to demonstrate that the president's power was supreme.''", u"Madam President, earlier today, I spoke with the Attorney General of the United States. He is going to be testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee tomorrow morning. We anticipate it will be for much of the day. He wished to inform me, as he did Senator Specter, of some changes in the so-called FISA Program. I have been very critical of the administration's actions through the National Security Agency--their wiretapping of Americans, wiretapping of people throughout the country, and apparently doing so without obtaining any warrants. Interestingly enough, the information about this spying on Americans came not from our administration reporting it either through the Intelligence Committee or the Judiciary Committee or the appropriate committees involved; it came out because, like so many other things we find out about, we read about it first in the newspaper. Apparently, the administration has decided not to continue this warrantless spying program on Americans, but instead to seek approval for all wiretaps from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. I say this based on the letter sent to us. This is public; this is not a classified matter. The law has required for years that they do it this way. I welcome the President's decision not to reauthorize the NSA's warrantless spying program because, as I have pointed out for some time, and as other Senators on both sides of the aisle have pointed out, the program was, at very best, of doubtful legality. Since this program was first revealed, I have urged this administration to inform Congress of what the Government is doing and to comply with the checks and balances Congress wrote into law in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. We know we must engage in all surveillance necessary to prevent acts of terrorism, but we can and we should do it in ways that protect the basic rights of all Americans, including the right to privacy. The issue has never been whether to monitor suspected terrorists--everybody agrees with that; all Americans do. The question is whether we can do it legally and with proper checks and balances to prevent abuses. Providing efficient but meaningful court review is a major step toward addressing those concerns. I continue to urge the President to fully inform Congress and the American people about the contours of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court order authorizing the surveillance program and of the program itself. Only with meaningful oversight can we assure the balance necessary to achieve security with liberty. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of a letter from the Attorney General, dated January 17, addressed to me and Senator Specter, which indicates copies to numerous other people, be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. President, William Odom is one of the finest intelligence officers who have served in our military. Retiring at the rank of lieutenant general, his distinguished Army career culminated in his heading up the U.S. Army's intelligence division and the National Security Agency. He has worked tirelessly to help the country understand and deal with the challenges to its security and defense. I have known the general for decades, and, like many of my colleagues, I deeply value his judgment and insight. That is why I read his opinion piece from last Sunday's Washington Post, ``Victory is Not an Option,'' with great interest. General Odom lays out the truths and myths of the Nation's involvement in Iraq. Among the clear truths is that the dream of a real democracy gaining roots in that war-torn country is simply that, a dream. He rightly points out, too, that any Iraqi government is likely to be more anti than pro-American at the end of the day. As for the myths, he sensibly lays out that it is pure fantasy for anyone to think that our presence is actually preventing the horrible carnage from unfolding or holding Iran back from gaining influence with its neighbor. It is similarly a flight of the imagination to think that our military presence is actually stanching--as opposed to encouraging--al-Qaida's involvement in the country. Finally, it is a myth to think that we must stay in Iraq ``to support the troops.'' In fact, he notes, many of our brave men and women in the country understand the cold realities that unfold there every day, and many of them believe that we should get out of Iraq. General Odom makes some sensible suggestions for a new policy direction, something beyond the absurd ``surge'' that is only the same old repast of stay-the-course with a different seasoning. We should get out of Iraq and recognize that our presence there has become a source of instability for the whole Middle East. He smartly suggests that we should work with our international partners to seek order and stability, which will fundamentally alter the balance against the radicals who want to stir up even more strife. I ask unanimous consent that General Odom's article, ``Victory Is Not an Option,'' now be printed in the Record. I urge my colleagues to read this article closely and truly think about what General Odom is saying. The logic is clear and sensible. I think it is incontrovertible.", u"I thank the gentleman. Mr. Speaker, I believe our Republican colleagues are correct. This Congress spoke with one voice on the war on terrorism, and we continue to do so. Indeed, if President Bush had pursued the war on terrorism and the perpetrators of 9/11, instead of getting diverted to Iraq, which had nothing to do with 9/11, then when he hoisted that ``Mission Accomplished'' banner four years ago, it would have had meaning. Instead, we have a burn rate of $10 billion every month in Iraq, $14 million every hour, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, every week, every month of the year. More importantly, the real burn rate is in the loss of more than 3,300 American lives, brave men and women over there fighting for our country; 96 percent of those deaths, almost all of them, lost their life after President Bush declared ``Mission Accomplished.'' Today, the President can veto our attempt to secure a safe, orderly, phased redeployment of our troops from Iraq, but he can't veto reality. Our troops are coming home. It's just a question of what price is paid in blood and money before that happens. The President talks about listening to the commanders and the generals. I wonder if he was listening to General William Odom, the former National Security Agency Director, last Saturday when he said the President has let the Iraq war proceed on ``automatic pilot, making no corrections in the face of accumulating evidence that his strategy cannot be rescued.'' If the President had listened to the generals, we would never have gone into Iraq in the first place. It was General Schwarzkopf who said, we would become ``like [a] dinosaur in a tar pit.'' If he had listened to the generals like General Shinseki, if he had insisted on going into Iraq, he would have sent enough troops to get the job done and not turned over all those weapons dumps to be converted into IEDs. If he had listened to the generals, he would have provided our veterans with the health care that they have earned and deserved instead of subjecting them back here to the facilities and care they found in the United States. The generals who disagree with this President earn a new title: Retired.", u"Madam Speaker, I rise today to congratulate the men and women who serve at Fort George G. Meade for their second place finish in the Army Communities of Excellence competition. The Communities of Excellence award program recognizes top installations from all over the world that demonstrate organizational maturity and outstanding capabilities. Brigadier General John Macdonald, Deputy Commanding General of the Installation Management Command, called the winning installations the ``flagships of performance excellence for the Army.'' I have the pleasure of representing Maryland's Third Congressional District in the House of Representatives, which neighbors Fort Meade and includes many of the surrounding communities. I am therefore acutely aware of the exciting and difficult work that is done at Fort Meade. Colonel Ken McCreedy, garrison commander at Fort Meade, is a tremendous leader. He is charged with management of one of the Army's most important installations and has taken command at a time of great upheaval due to the impact of the 2005 BRAC. Despite these tremendous demands on his time, Colonel McCreedy has also involved himself in the community off post. He certainly deserves this recognition and I congratulate him on his fine work. The men and women who serve with Colonel McCreedy at Fort Meade are exceptional individuals. For 90 years, they have worked to keep our Nation safe. Most people know that the National Security Agency, our military's foremost intelligence agency, is located at Fort Meade but there are many other organizations inside and outside of the intelligence community that contribute to our national security. One example is the Fort Meade Freedom Center, where they are housing soldiers injured in Iraq and Afghanistan. They stepped up to assist Walter Reed in housing these soldiers and provide shuttle service so they may receive their medical treatments. Madam Speaker, I've been fortunate to visit Fort Meade twice in my first few months in Congress. The more I learn about this facility, the more I am impressed. They truly deserve this honor and I congratulate the entire Fort Meade community on their achievement.", u"Madam Chairwoman, I want to first say that I rise in support of H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act. Our Nation is at war. We are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and we are battling terrorists worldwide. We are also witnessing the rise of nuclear powers in Iran and North Korea. We are facing major challenges from China and Russia, who want to gain a technological edge on the United States. America has to stay on the offensive, and the way to do that is with stronger technology. This bill will strengthen our intelligence capabilities and invest much needed resources in new research and development. I am the chairman of the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, which is responsible for overseeing technical intelligence assets, including the National Security Agency. The subcommittee has been working hard to ensure that this bill provides the necessary resources so that the Intelligence Community has the latest cutting-edge research and technology. This is the foundation for good intelligence. Other countries are gaining the ability to take out intelligence assets, such as orbiting satellites. Al Qaeda is finding innovative ways to communicate over the internet to plan attacks. We need to develop smarter tools to collect this information about threats to the U.S. and our allies. This bill refocuses the Intelligence Community on these new and emerging threats. The number one priority is preserving our technical workforce. This bill invests in our scientists and engineers. This bill also addresses the future of research and development across the Intelligence Community. Let me emphasize; we must invest more heavily in research and development. The committee is looking to the Director of National Intelligence to establish an aggressive R&D investment strategy that promotes cooperation among various agencies while allowing each agency to conduct research that fulfills its specific needs. During this time of growth, we need to maintain the good working relationships the Intelligence Community has with our Nation's research centers. In closing, we need to maintain our technology. We should vote for this bill. I have been on the Intelligence Committee for 4 years. I feel very strongly that this committee should be USA first. What we have to deal with is very important. I am very distressed and concerned that the minority at this point, who I have worked with and are excellent friends and I respect, the first bill that we have coming out of as a majority are voting ``no.'' We need to bring consensus together. We need to work as a team. There are some things that we have and some that we don't, but I hope that we will be able to work together in the future and go beyond this tonight.", u"Madam Speaker, the Director of National Intelligence came to the Congress in April and told us that we were not listening to things we needed to be listening to, that we had a problem. And since then we have had numerous hearings, most of them in closed session, about the scope and scale of this problem. And it is worse than we ever thought it was. And, Ms. Harman, I would tell you it is much worse than when you served on the committee. He said, in open session in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ``We are missing a significant portion of what we should be getting.'' It is imperative that we solve this problem before we leave here. This morning without any agreement, without any prior discussion, the Democrats' leadership introduced the bill we are considering tonight. There is no agreement on the text with Republicans in the House; there is no agreement with the Senate, Democrat or Republican; and there is no agreement with the Director of National Intelligence or with the President. In fact, the Director of National Intelligence had not seen the bill until after we were discussing the rule here on the floor. I rise today to oppose this legislation. I must oppose it because it doesn't solve the problem that we must solve. And, in fact, it makes it worse. The Director of National Intelligence told us this afternoon in writing that ``The House proposal is unacceptable and I strongly oppose it.'' He also said, ``The House proposal would not allow me to carry out my responsibility to provide warning and to protect the Nation.'' This bill will not allow our Director of National Intelligence, who has 40 years of experience in this field, the former Director of the National Security Agency under President Clinton, it would not allow him to carry out his duties to protect this Nation. We are going in the wrong direction. I would urge my colleagues to reject this bill before us tonight; and I would urge the Speaker, Ms. Pelosi, to bring another bill to the floor of this House that can be supported by the Senate, by the Republicans, by the Democrats and by our intelligence community and signed by the President so we can close this intelligence gap. But what does it matter? Why should people care? We all remember where we were the morning of 9/11 and who we were with, what we were wearing, who we called first, who we checked on. You never remember the crisis that doesn't happen because it's prevented by good intelligence.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to S. 1927. This bill represents a shocking and grave invasion of long-held constitutional rights of American citizens that--until the abuses of this administration--have been regarded as sacrosanct and inviolable. This bill codifies violating the Fourth amendment ``right of the people to be secure in their person, homes, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures . . .'' S. 1927 will permit the National Security Agency (NSA) to acquire and analyze all international communications of Americans, without any meaningful judicial oversight. It will allow the NSA to gain warrantless and unchecked access to virtually all international communications of Americans with anyone outside the United States. All the government has to do is to declare that the surveillance was directed at people--which includes foreigners and citizens alike--it ``reasonably believed'' to be located outside the United States. It doesn't have to even target terrorists; all that the government needs to do is to determine that the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain ``foreign intelligence information'' outside the United States. These overly broad definitions covers millions of people--and potentially millions of U.S. citizens--and the purpose need not involve the surveillance of suspected terrorists. We are giving the government, and specifically this administration, entirely too much power. One of the two people given extraordinary power to authorize these warrantless intrusions into our private communications is the Attorney General of the United States. Can we be assured that this Attorney General--or any Attorney General for that matter--will have the integrity and sound judgment to faithfully carry out his or her responsibilities in a way which will inflict the least possible harm to the constitutional rights of American citizens? Can we be assured that each Attorney General who is granted this power will have only the national security in mind, and not any political motivation in exercising his or her extraordinary power? Mr. Speaker, we Americans don't like governments which spy on their people. This bill allows just that in our own country. I urge my colleagues to vote no on this bill.", u" Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of Headquarters With Headquarters of''; (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the Office''; and (3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the headquarters of any other element''. Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the Director's designee.''. Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7); (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end; and (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following: ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for basic, applied, and advanced research to meet the technology needs of the intelligence community and to be executed by elements of the intelligence community by-- ``(A) systematically identifying, assessing, and prioritizing the most significant intelligence challenges that require technical solutions; and ``(B) examining options to enhance the responsiveness of research programs; ``(6) submit to Congress an annual report on the science and technology strategy of the Director; and''; and (2) in paragraph (3) of subsection (d)-- (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as subparagraphs (B) and (C), respectively; (B) in subparagraph (B), as so redesignated, by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate''; and (C) by inserting before subparagraph (B), as so redesignated, the following new subparagraph: ``(A) identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence community;''. (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting the following: ``(a) In General.-- ``(1) Establishment.--The''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403- 3(c)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraphs: ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. ``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center.''. (a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the report submitted to Congress under section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote the use of energy efficient computer servers in the United States'' (Public Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later then February 1, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the plan developed under subsection (a). (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. Not later than February 1, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a classified comprehensive listing of all special access programs under the National Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6))). Such listing may be submitted in a form or forms consistent with the protection of national security. (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less frequently than once during fiscal year 2008 and twice during fiscal year 2009, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with regard to the nuclear programs of each such country. (b) Content.--Each report submitted by subsection (a) shall include, with respect of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-- (1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each such country; (2) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting standards and practices, of the sources upon which the intelligence used to prepare the assessment described in paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such sources and an assessment of the reliability of each such source; (3) a summary of any intelligence related to any such program gathered or developed since the previous report was submitted under subsection (a), including intelligence collected from both open and clandestine sources for each such country; and (4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence in the assessment described in paragraph (1). (c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of National Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence Estimate on the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in lieu of a report required by subsection (a). (d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form. (a) Responsibility of the Director of National Intelligence.--Subsection (b) of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in paragraph (3)-- (A) by striking ``2004,'' and inserting ``2004 (50 U.S.C. 403 note),''; and (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon and ``and''; and (3) by inserting after paragraph (3), the following new paragraph: ``(4) conduct accountability reviews of elements of the intelligence community and the personnel of such elements, if appropriate.''. (b) Tasking and Other Authorities.--Subsection (f) of section 102A of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8), as paragraphs (8) and (9), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (6), the following new paragraph: ``(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a congressional intelligence committee, conduct accountability reviews of elements of the intelligence community or the personnel of such elements in relation to significant failures or deficiencies within the intelligence community. ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and procedures for conducting accountability reviews under subparagraph (A). ``(C) The requirements of this paragraph shall not limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. Section 102A(i)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i)(3)) is amended by inserting before the period the following: ``or the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community''. (a) Authorities for Interagency Funding.--Section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (F), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: ``(G) in carrying out this subsection, without regard to any other provision of law (other than this Act and the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643)), expend funds and make funds available to other departments or agencies of the United States for, and direct the development and fielding of, systems of common concern related to the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information; and ``(H) for purposes of addressing critical gaps in intelligence information sharing or access capabilities, have the authority to transfer funds appropriated for a program within the National Intelligence Program to a program funded by appropriations not within the National Intelligence Program, consistent with paragraphs (3) through (7) of subsection (d).''. (b) Authorities of Heads of Other Departments and Agencies.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of any department or agency of the United States is authorized to receive and utilize funds made available to the department or agency by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)), as amended by subsection (a), and receive and utilize any system referred to in such section that is made available to the department or agency. (c) Reports.-- (1) Requirement for reports.--Not later than February 1 of each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2012, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report detailing the distribution of funds and systems during the preceding fiscal year pursuant to subparagraph (G) or (H) of section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)), as added by subsection (a). (2) Content.--Each such report shall include-- (A) a listing of the agencies or departments to which such funds or systems were distributed; (B) a description of the purpose for which such funds or systems were distributed; and (C) a description of the expenditure of such funds, and the development, fielding, and use of such systems by the receiving agency or department. (a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by sections 303 and 304 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(u) Authorities for Interagency Funding.--(1) Notwithstanding section 1346 of title 31, United States Code, or any other provision of law prohibiting the interagency financing of activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B), upon the request of the Director of National Intelligence, any element of the intelligence community may use appropriated funds to support or participate in the interagency activities of the following: ``(A) National intelligence centers established by the Director under section 119B. ``(B) Boards, commissions, councils, committees, and similar groups that are established-- ``(i) for a term of not more than 2 years; and ``(ii) by the Director. ``(2) No provision of law enacted after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 shall be construed to limit or supersede the authority in paragraph (1) unless such provision makes specific reference to the authority in that paragraph.''. (b) Reports.--Not later than February 1 of each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2012, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report detailing the exercise of any authority pursuant to subsection (u) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by subsection (a), during the preceding fiscal year. Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'' the first place it appears. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103G the following new section: (a) Report.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by title III of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to United States citizens for the service of such individuals before 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated company while such company was owned or controlled by the United States Government and operated or managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Report Elements.-- (1) In general.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (A) The history of Air America and associated companies before 1977, including a description of-- (i) the relationship between such companies and the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the United States Government; (ii) the workforce of such companies; (iii) the missions performed by such companies and their employees for the United States; and (iv) the casualties suffered by employees of such companies in the course of their employment with such companies. (B) A description of the retirement benefits contracted for or promised to the employees of such companies before 1977, the contributions made by such employees for such benefits, the retirement benefits actually paid such employees, the entitlement of such employees to the payment of future retirement benefits, and the likelihood that former employees of such companies will receive any future retirement benefits. (C) An assessment of the difference between-- (i) the retirement benefits that former employees of such companies have received or will receive by virtue of their employment with such companies; and (ii) the retirement benefits that such employees would have received and in the future receive if such employees had been, or would now be, treated as employees of the United States whose services while in the employ of such companies had been or would now be credited as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits. (D) Any recommendations regarding the advisability of legislative action to treat employment at such companies as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in light of the relationship between such companies and the United States Government and the services and sacrifices of such employees to and for the United States, and if legislative action is considered advisable, a proposal for such action and an assessment of its costs. (2) Other Content.--The Director of National Intelligence shall include in the report any views of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on the matters covered by the report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate. (c) Assistance of Comptroller General.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall, upon the request of the Director of National Intelligence and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information, assist the Director in the preparation of the report required by subsection (a). (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Air america.--The term ``Air America'' means Air America, Incorporated. (2) Associated company.--The term ``associated company'' means any company associated with or subsidiary to Air America, including Air Asia Company Limited and the Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport, Incorporated. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) as amended by sections 303, 304, and 411 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(v) Consideration of Space Intelligence.-- ``(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall require that space-intelligence related issues and concerns are fully considered in carrying out the authorities of the intelligence community under this Act and under other provisions of law, including in carrying out-- ``(A) the responsibilities and authorities described under subsections (f), (h), and (q); and ``(B) the creation of policy, and in the recruitment, hiring, training, and retention of personnel. ``(2) Additional considerations.--The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that agencies give due consideration to the vulnerability assessment prepared for a given major system, as required in section 506C of this Act, at all stages of architecture and system planning, development, acquisition, operation, and support of a space- intelligence system.''. (a) In General.--Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Section 4(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or''; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. Subsection (j) of section 552a of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or''; (2) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and (3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph: ``(2) maintained by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; or''. (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), respectively; and (3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking paragraphs (3) and (4). (b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further amended-- (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''. Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency (a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended by-- (1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g) and transferring such subsection to the end; and (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection: ``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.-- ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such audits shall be conducted subject to the provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q). ``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that has been terminated or suspended if such covert action was terminated or suspended prior to the last audit of such covert action conducted by the Inspector General and has not been restarted after the date on which such audit was completed. ``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of such audit.''. (b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; (2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; and (3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''. Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking ``the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,''. (a) In General.--Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)''; (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated-- (A) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the protection''; and (B) by striking the semicolon and inserting ``, and the protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) Authorize personnel engaged in the performance of protective functions authorized pursuant to subparagraph (A), when engaged in, and in furtherance of, the performance of such functions, to make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States, if such personnel have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony, except that any authority pursuant to this subparagraph may be exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Director and the Attorney General and such personnel may not exercise any authority for the service of civil process or for the investigation of criminal offenses;''. (b) Requirement To Report.--As soon as possible after the date of an exercise of authority under subparagraph (B) of section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)), as added by subsection (a)(3), and not later than 10 days after such date, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing such exercise of authority. Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended-- (1) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director'' and inserting ``Associate Deputy Director''; (2) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National Clandestine Service''; (3) in subclause (III), by striking ``Deputy Director for Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of Intelligence''; (4) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for Administration'' and inserting ``Director of Support''; and (5) in subclause (V), by striking ``Deputy Director for Science and Technology'' and inserting ``Director of Science and Technology''. Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after ``subsection (a)),''. Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components Subsection (e) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 21. (a) The Director of the National Security Agency is authorized to designate personnel of the National Security Agency to perform protective functions for the Director and for any personnel of the Agency designated by the Director. ``(b)(1) In the performance of protective functions under this section, personnel of the Agency designated to perform protective functions pursuant to subsection (a) are authorized, when engaged in, and in furtherance of, the performance of such functions, to make arrests without a warrant for-- ``(A) any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel; or ``(B) any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if such personnel have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony. ``(2) The authority in paragraph (1) may be exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Director and the Attorney General. ``(3) Personnel of the Agency designated to perform protective functions pursuant to subsection (a) shall not exercise any authority for the service of civil process or the investigation of criminal offenses. ``(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect any authority under any other provision of law relating to the performance of protective functions. ``(d) As soon as possible after the date of an exercise of authority under this section and not later than 10 days after such date, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing such exercise of authority. ``(e) In this section, the term `congressional intelligence committees' means-- ``(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''. (a) Coverage Under Inspector General Act of 1978.-- Subsection (a)(2) of section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8G) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``the Defense Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,''; (2) by inserting ``the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the National Endowment for the Humanities,''; and (3) by inserting ``the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency,'' after ``the National Labor Relations Board,''. (b) Certain Designations Under Inspector General Act of 1978.--Subsection (a) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8H) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) The Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency shall be designees of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for purposes of this section.''. (c) Power of Heads of Elements Over Investigations.-- Subsection (d) of section 8G of that Act-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(d)''; (2) in the second sentence of paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection, by striking ``The head'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (2), the head''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2)(A) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, may prohibit the Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community specified in subparagraph (D) from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation if the Secretary determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. ``(B) If the Secretary exercises the authority under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall submit to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E) an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of the authority not later than 7 days after the exercise of the authority. ``(C) At the same time the Secretary submits under subparagraph (B) a statement on the exercise of the authority in subparagraph (A) to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E), the Secretary shall notify the Inspector General of such element of the submittal of such statement and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such statement. The Inspector General may submit to such committees of Congress any comments on a notice or statement received by the Inspector General under this subparagraph that the Inspector General considers appropriate. ``(D) The elements of the intelligence community specified in this subparagraph are as follows: ``(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(ii) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(iii) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(iv) The National Security Agency. ``(E) The committees of Congress specified in this subparagraph are-- ``(i) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''. (a) Director of National Security Agency.--The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after the first section the following new section: ``Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law.''. (b) Director of National Reconnaissance Office.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (c) Positions of Importance and Responsibility.-- (1) Designation of positions.--The President may designate any of the positions referred to in paragraph (2) as positions of importance and responsibility under section 601 of title 10, United States Code. (2) Covered positions.--The positions referred to in this paragraph are as follows: (A) The Director of the National Security Agency. (B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (d) Effective Date and Applicability.--The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (1) the date of the nomination by the President of an individual to serve in the position concerned, except that the individual serving in such position as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to such position, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or (2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of such position by the individual performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. Section 442(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2)(A) As directed by the Director of National Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall also develop a system to facilitate the analysis, dissemination, and incorporation of likenesses, videos, and presentations produced by ground-based platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations or available as open-source information, into the National System for Geospatial Intelligence. ``(B) The authority provided by this paragraph does not include authority for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to manage tasking of handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations.''; and (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (1)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (1) and (2)''. The Secretary of Defense shall, during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2008, delegate to the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency personnel security authority with respect to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (including authority relating to the use of contractor personnel in investigations and adjudications for security clearances) that is identical to the personnel security authority of the Director of the National Security Agency with respect to the National Security Agency. Subtitle D--Other Elements Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H)-- (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine Corps,''; and (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''. TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters (a) Extension.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking ``September 1, 2004'' and inserting ``December 31, 2008''. (2) Effective date.--Subject to paragraph (3), the amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of such section 1007. (3) Commission membership.-- (A) In general.--The membership of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community established under subsection (a) of section 1002 of such Act (Public Law 107- 306; 116 Stat. 2438) (referred to in this section as the ``Commission'') shall be considered vacant and new members shall be appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as amended by subparagraph (B). (B) Technical amendment.--Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) of such section 1002 is amended by striking ``The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management.'' and inserting ``The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Funding.-- (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the Intelligence Community Management Account, the Director of National Intelligence shall make $2,000,000 available to the Commission to carry out title X of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2437). (2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended. Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing authorizations, if any, granted during the 10-year period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act to engage in intelligence activities related to the overthrow of a democratically elected government. Section 133(b) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364; 120 Stat. 2112) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) by striking ``After fiscal year 2007'' and inserting ``For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2007''; and (B) by inserting ``, in that fiscal year,'' after ``Secretary of Defense''; and (2) in paragraph (2)-- (A) by inserting ``in a fiscal year'' after ``Department of Defense''; and (B) by inserting ``in that fiscal year'' after ``Congress''. Subtitle B--Technical Amendments (a) References to Head of Intelligence Community.--Title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'' in the following: (1) Section 193(d)(2). (2) Section 193(e). (3) Section 201(a). (4) Section 201(b)(1). (5) Section 201(c)(1). (6) Section 425(a). (7) Section 431(b)(1). (8) Section 441(c). (9) Section 441(d). (10) Section 443(d). (11) Section 2273(b)(1). (12) Section 2723(a). (b) Clerical Amendments.--Such title is further amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'' in the following: (1) Section 441(c). (2) Section 443(d). (c) Reference to Head of Central Intelligence Agency.-- Section 444 of such title is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a).''. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears. (b) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence.-- That section is further amended-- (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National Intelligence'' after ``Director''. (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to read as follows: Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; and (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''. The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended as follows: (1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)-- (A) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); and (iii) in paragraph (5)(B), by striking ``or agency involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''; (B) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``paragraph''; and (C) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after ``Acquisition''. (2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''. (3) In section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''. (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643) is amended as follows: (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and inserting ``Department of Justice''. (2) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''. (3) In section 1072(b), in the subsection heading by inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''. (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended as follows: (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)-- (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional culture''; (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; and (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''. (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and inserting ``Federal''; and (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and inserting ``specific''. (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:", u"Mr. President, for months, we have been ready to roll up our sleeves and get back to work on the PATRIOT Act, but the White House has continued to block bipartisan efforts to improve the original bill and accept oversight of its intrusive surveillance programs. Again, and again, the administration has refused to join in serious negotiations with Republicans and Democrats on matters of national security, including the National Security Agency's warrantless wiretaps and the FBI's use of national security letters. The latest proposal offers improvements and deserves to pass; however, it is unacceptable and undemocratic that further amendments could not even be considered. We need to implement these improvements quickly given the administration's disregard of congressional oversight. The proposed reauthorization bill requires public reports on the use of two of the most controversial provisions: section 215 and national security letters. It also requires the inspector general to audit their use, and it mandates a report on any data-mining activities by the Justice Department. Americans deserve national security laws that protect both our security and our constitutional rights, and more changes are clearly needed. One of the most glaring omissions in the proposal is the failure to include a 4-year sunset provision on national security letters, even though it would be consistent with the new reporting and auditing requirements that will take effect. The latest changes provide some additional protection for libraries, but these safeguards should apply to all of the means used by the Government to obtain sensitive information, including financial documents and library records. We also need a report on the Government's use of computerized searches from all Federal agencies, and we will continue to seek such a requirement as part of efforts toward other reforms. We have not yet achieved the 9/11 Commission's goal to maintain governmental powers that enhance our national security while ensuring adequate oversight over their use. With so much at stake, the administration's refusal to work with Congress can only weaken our national security and further undermine the public's trust in their Government. So this battle will go on, and I regret we could not accomplish more in this needed legislation.", u"Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to S. 2271. This bill makes a few cosmetic changes, but the changes do little to address the serious civil liberties concerns that I and countless Americans have raised during the debate over the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act. For example, nothing has been done to integrate needed checks and balances into the National Security Letter (NSL) process. NSLs are requests for financial, telecommunications, credit, and other business records issued directly by government agencies in national security investigations without the approval of a judge. Before the PATRIOT Act, the FBI and other issuing agencies could issue an NSL only if there was some nexus to an agent of a foreign power or terrorist. Post-PATRIOT Act, the government only has to show the request is relevant to an investigation. The lowering of this standard has resulted in an all-time high number of NSLs issued. Passage of this legislation will do nothing to change this disturbing trend or enhance congressional or judicial oversight over NSLs. This bill also fails to address issues related to the President's National Security Agency (NSA) domestic surveillance program. I strongly believe this program must be subject to statutory restrictions, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Congress should not stand by in silence and allow this controversial program to continue unchecked. Unfortunately, in spite of having adequate time to engage in constructive discussions to fix the PATRIOT Act reauthorization Conference Report, the sponsors of S. 2271 chose again to exclude Democrats from negotiations. Instead, they've offered a bill that makes only a few superficial changes to the Conference Report, and because this bill is being considered under suspension of the rules, we don't have an opportunity to offer meaningful amendments that could greatly improve the PATRIOT Act and ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties as well as our national security. I oppose this bill and find it regrettable that an important opportunity to initiate real reforms to this legislation has been squandered.", u"Mr. President, today the Senate will vote on confirmation of three of President Bush's nominations. Once again, the President has nominated experienced, well-qualified individuals who deserve confirmation by the Senate. The President has nominated Brett Kavanaugh to serve as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit. Mr. Kavanaugh has extensive experience in the law, having formerly served as a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy. He later served as Associate White House Counsel, where he worked on a wide variety of legal and constitutional issues. Mr. Kavanaugh also practiced law as a partner in the Washington, DC, law firm of Kirkland & Ellis, and most recently serves as Assistant to the President and staff secretary at the White House. Yesterday I voted in favor of the motion to invoke cloture on Mr. Kavanaugh's nomination, which now allows the Senate to give him an up-or-down vote. I am pleased that the Senate will now be allowed to vote on Mr. Kavanaugh's nomination, and I hope the Senate will continue to give fair up-or-down votes to the other well-qualified judicial nominees the President forwards to the Senate. The President has also nominated GEN Michael Hayden as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. General Hayden is a career Air Force officer with a distinguished history of service to our country. His previous service as Director of the National Security Agency will serve him well in his new role at the CIA, where I believe he will continue to be a strong leader in service to our Nation. Finally, the President has nominated Gov. Dirk Kempthorne to serve as Secretary of the Department of the Interior. Governor Kempthorne has an impressive career in public service, having served as a United States Senator representing the State of Idaho in this body for 6 years. I am confident that his career of public service and his Western State perspective will help him be an effective and responsible steward of our country's public lands, waters, and other natural resources. Unfortunately, a family obligation prevents me from being present during these votes. However, I support each of these nominees and, if present, would vote to confirm them. I therefore ask that the record reflect my support for each of these nominations. (At the request of Mr. Reid, the following statement was ordered to be printed in the Record.)", u"Mr. President, I am casting my vote today in favor of GEN Michael V. Hayden to be Director of Central Intelligence. General Hayden has a strong background in intelligence. He has spent his career in national security and particularly intelligence, serving as Commander of the Air Intelligence Agency and as Director of the National Security Agency. General Hayden has served overseas in leadership positions with the U.S. Government in South Korea and Bulgaria, and is currently Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, serving directly under Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte. General Hayden was straightforward in his answers to tough questions during his confirmation process, showing a clear command of the issues of national security and the challenges facing the intelligence community. The confirmation process has also brought to light General Hayden's leadership qualities. At this time of change and realignment at the CIA, strong leaders are clearly needed. The agency has had a difficult time adapting to the changes in the intelligence community structure and has suffered a decline in morale and sense of mission. By all accounts, General Hayden will bring a welcome change at the top, hopefully infusing the agency with a new sense of direction and relevance that is badly needed. I remain very concerned, however, that the wiretapping activities of the NSA have been insufficiently investigated. General Hayden insisted in his confirmation hearings that he was given unequivocal legal advice each step of the way. I do not doubt that this is true, but I believe that significant and compelling questions still remain about the validity of the legal foundation for the wiretapping programs. I have yet to be convinced that these activities are legal. Even if they are found to be legal, I question whether we really want our Government to be engaged in these activities. But the debate on the NSA activities is far larger than just General Hayden. This debate must go on in depth and focus on the legal and policy issues at stake, not on the personalities of those involved. We need to get the CIA back onto its feet and functioning properly. I believe that General Hayden is capable of doing that. I trust he will put his considerable skills to work in earnest on this task, as its success is critical to our national security.", u"Mr. President, the CIA must at all costs avoid a repeat of the pre-Iraq war intelligence fiasco, when CIA Director Tenet said the case for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was a ``slam dunk,'' and then proceeded to distort and exaggerate underlying intelligence in order to support the administration's Iraq policy. The CIA needs an independent Director who will speak truth to power and provide objective assessments of a professional intelligence community, and not try to please policymakers by telling them what they want to hear. General Hayden not only promises to be independent and objective, General Hayden has proven he has the backbone to do so. For instance, General Hayden is perhaps the only high-level official who has criticized the Department of Defense policy office of Douglas Feith. That office, before the war began, undertook to use a direct pipeline to the White House for distorted intelligence assessments, bypassing mechanisms in place which are intended to produce balanced, objective assessments. General Hayden has done more than speak openly of his concerns about the Feith operation. He acted upon them by placing a cautionary disclaimer on the reporting of his agency relative to the links that Feith and others were trying to create between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida, so that his agency's reports could be misused for that purpose. Again, speaking truth to power, General Hayden showed independence when he stood up against the positions being urged by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld during the recent reforms of the intelligence community. As to the surveillance activities of the National Security Agency, which General Hayden formerly led, many of us have concerns. But those concerns as to the legality and as to the decision to implement the alleged collection of phone numbers called by millions of Americans should be placed at the doorstep of the Attorney General and the White House. I am one of those being briefed on the program, and I have a number of concerns. But my concerns are with the legality and privacy intrusions and effectiveness of the program authorized by the President, and given the legal imprimatur of the Attorney General. I know of no evidence that General Hayden acted beyond the program's guidelines as set up by the President and the Attorney General. I will vote for General Hayden's confirmation.", u"Mr. President, I support the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance with Germany, a close and trusted partner with the United States on law enforcement matters. I would like to address one issue that arose during the review of the treaty. Article 12(1) of the treaty provides that ``Each Party may at the request of the other Party, within its possibilities and under the conditions prescribed by its domestic law . . . take the necessary steps for the surveillance of telecommunications.'' After the revelation last December of the program of warrantless surveillance by the National Security Agency, NSA, the question arose whether the treaty would provide another purported legal authority for the NSA program. My view is that it does not. But the President's lawyers have proffered highly dubious theories for the program, and the Senate should not make assumptions about what the executive branch thinks about a treaty, because ultimately it is the President, not the Senate, who is charged with ``faithfully executing'' it. So I asked the executive branch its legal view about whether the treaty provides any additional legal authority for electronic surveillance--whether for the NSA program or any other program. On April 6, 2006, I wrote the Attorney General of the United States to ask him to confirm that the treaty does not authorize warrantless surveillance. On July 3, after nearly 3 months of deliberation, the Department of Justice responded to my letter. Why it took so long to answer this simple question is unclear. But the response itself is clear: the Justice Department letter concludes that the treaty with Germany would ``in no way expand current authority under U.S. law to conduct electronic surveillance.'' I welcome the Justice Department's response. While I may disagree with the Department about the scope of the current authority under U.S. law to conduct electronic surveillance, I agree with the Department's interpretation that Article 12(1) does not expand that authority. I urge all Senators to support this treaty. I ask unanimous consent that both letters be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger). Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, first, I thank Ranking Member Harman, and Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the heroes of September 11. Our citizens will forever remember September 11 as a day on which our values, our liberties, and our freedoms were attacked. Our Nation's intelligence agencies and law enforcement officials learned to do business differently after 9/11. We learned we need to give our law enforcement and intelligence agencies more powerful and flexible, modern tools to detect terrorists' plans and intentions. As a former prosecutor, I understand the need to balance tough justice issues for criminals but also to respect human rights. By the same logic, we have to learn what terrorists are plotting before they act so that we can keep the country safe, but we have to fight terrorists in a way that also protects Americans' rights. In passing the PATRIOT Act, Congress struck a balance between civil liberties and strong law enforcement. Not a perfect balance but a good one. However, not every effort strikes this balance. The President ordered the National Security Agency to conduct a surveillance program in a way that avoids certain required constitutional checks and balances. The House Intelligence Committee could not oversee the NSA program because most of us were not briefed. At the administration's direction, the judicial branch, in the form of the FISA court, was bypassed. If the administration needs new authorities to monitor terrorists, they should ask Congress for them. I see no reason, however, why this program could not be conducted under the rubric of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The district I represent includes NSA. So I have a special interest in the men and women of the NSA who professionally and honorably serve their country, often in secret. They should not have to worry if they are breaking the law when they follow instructions of the White House and the Attorney General. Our counterterrorism efforts must be governed by the rule of law. To do otherwise would dishonor the heroes of September 11 and their loved ones.", u"Mr. President, I ask that the full text of S. 4051, the ``Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Oversight and Resource Enhancement Act of 2006,'' be printed in the Record. The text of the bill follows. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Oversight and Resource Enhancement Act of 2006''. (a) Authority for Additional Judges.--Section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; (2) in paragraph (1), as so designated, by inserting ``at least'' before ``seven of the United States judicial circuits''; (3) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (4) and indenting such paragraph, as so designated, accordingly; and (4) by inserting after paragraph (1), as so designated, the following new paragraph: ``(2) In addition to the judges designated under paragraph (1), the Chief Justice of the United States may designate as judges of the court established by paragraph (1) such judges appointed under Article III of the Constitution of the United States as the Chief Justice determines appropriate in order to provide for the prompt and timely consideration under section 105 of applications under section 104 for electronic surveillance under this title. Any judge designated under this paragraph shall be designated publicly.''. (b) Consideration of Emergency Applications.--Such section is further amended by inserting after paragraph (2), as added by subsection (a) of this section, the following new paragraph: ``(3) A judge of the court established by paragraph (1) shall make a determination to approve, deny, or seek modification of an application submitted under section subsection (f) or (g) of section 105 not later than 24 hours after the receipt of such application by the court.''. (a) Office of Intelligence Policy and Review.-- (1) Additional personnel.--The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review of the Department of Justice is authorized such additional personnel, including not fewer than 21 full- time attorneys, as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation, modification, and review of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) for orders under section 105 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1805) approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. (2) Assignment.--The Attorney General shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among appropriate offices of the National Security Agency in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the Agency in preparing applications described in that paragraph. (b) Federal Bureau of Investigation.-- (1) Additional legal and other personnel.--The National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is authorized such additional legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders under section 105 of that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. (2) Assignment.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among the field offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the Bureau in such field offices in preparing applications described in that paragraph. (c) Additional Legal and Other Personnel for National Security Agency.--The National Security Agency is authorized such additional legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders under section 105 of that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. (d) Additional Legal and Other Personnel for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.--There is authorized for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court such additional personnel (other than judges) as may be necessary to facilitate the prompt and timely consideration by that Court of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders under section 105 of that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Personnel authorized by this paragraph shall perform such duties relating to the consideration of such applications as that Court shall direct. (e) Supplement Not Supplant.--The personnel authorized by this section are in addition to any other personnel authorized by law. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of the National Security Agency shall each, in consultation with the Attorney General-- (1) develop regulations establishing procedures for conducting and seeking approval of electronic surveillance on an emergency basis, and for preparing and properly submitting and receiving applications and orders, under sections 104 and 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804 and 1805); and (2) prescribe related training for the personnel of the applicable agency. TITLE II--IMPROVEMENT OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY Section 105(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(f)) is amended by striking ``72 hours'' both places it appears and inserting ``168 hours''. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), no court order shall be required for the acquisition through electronic surveillance of the contents of any communication between one person who is not located within the United States and another person who is not located within the United States for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information even if such communication passes through, or the surveillance device is located within, the United States. (b) Treatment of Intercepted Communications Involving Domestic Party.--If surveillance conducted, as described in subsection (a), inadvertently collects a communication in which at least one party is within the United States, the contents of such communications shall be handled in accordance with the minimization procedures set forth in section 101(h)(4) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(h)(4)). (c) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``contents'', ``electronic surveillance'', and ``foreign intelligence information'' have the meaning given such terms in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). The contents of any wire or radio communication sent by a person who is reasonably believed to be inside the United States to a person outside the United States may not be retained or used unless a court order authorized under the Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to amend those provisions of FISA concerning any wire or radio communication sent from outside the United States to a person inside the United States. The constitutionality of such interceptions shall be determined by the courts, including the President's claim that his article II authority supersedes FISA. (a) Electronic Surveillance Under FISA.--Section 108 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1808) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and inserting ``; and''; and (C) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) the authority under which the electronic surveillance is conducted.''; and (2) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following: ``(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General additionally shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on electronic surveillance conducted without a court order.''. (b) Intelligence Activities.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 501 (50 U.S.C. 413)-- (A) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and (B) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection: ``(f) The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the committee for which the person is Chair, may inform, on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual members of such committee of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) or subsection (b) as such Chair considers necessary.''; and (2) in section 502 (50 U.S.C. 414), by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d) Informing of Committee Members.--The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the committee for which the person is Chair, may inform, on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual members of such committee of a report submitted under subsection (a) as such Chair considers necessary.''. (a) In General.--Upon appeal by the United States or any party to the underlying proceedings, the Supreme Court of the United States shall review the final decision of any United States court of appeal concerning the legality of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. (b) Expedited Consideration.--It shall be the duty of the Supreme Court of the United States to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter brought under subsection (a). (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``Terrorist Surveillance Program'' means the program identified by the President of the United States on December 17, 2005, to intercept international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations. In this Act, the term ``Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court'' means the court established by section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)). There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act and the amendments made by this Act. This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall take effect on the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. ", u'Mr. President, I come to the floor to talk about my good friend, John Negroponte. I have known him and Diana and their children--Marina, Alejandra, John, George, and Sophia--for quite some time. I think the Nation is very lucky to have a man of the caliber of John Negroponte on deck, so to speak, and willing to take the assignment of being the new Director of National Intelligence. He has had considerable experience as an ambassador. I remember full well the first time I met him was in Honduras when he was the Ambassador there. We had a rather severe problem, as people will recall; we called them the Contras. But I got to know him fairly well in the time we were down there. When he returned to Washington, I met his wife and was with him and spent time with him on a family basis. I have spent time with him now in his various positions he has had since that time, at the U.N. and in Iraq. He is a man of great talent and depth. I believe there are many of us--and I am one of them--who had severe questions about the direction we were taking in terms of this new Director of National Intelligence and how it would relate to existing agencies and to the State Department and to the Department of Defense and to the National Security Agency and all others who are involved in intelligence and relate to those in the Congress who have the oversight responsibility for the intelligence function and for the classified areas of the activities of our Nation. John Negroponte is a man who can do this job. He is a man of great talent. But more than that, he has demonstrated the ability to work with people and various entities, not only here in our country but throughout the world. This new Director of National Intelligence could well become the most important Cabinet position we have in the years to come. John Negroponte is the man to fashion that office, to determine what it needs in order to function properly at the beginning, and to set the course for this new intelligence agency. So I am here to urge that the Senate promptly approve this nomination and confirm John Negroponte so he can start on this very important task. I yield the floor.', u'Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this bill, which will help us better guide the Department of Homeland Security in its most important responsibilities. I want to thank the gentleman from California (Chairman Cox) and the staff for working so closely with us on areas of the bill that were under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Science, which I am privileged to chair. The Committee on Science created the Science and Technology Directorate, and we want to do everything we can to ensure that it succeeds in this mission. As I have said before many times, the war against terrorism, like the Cold War, will be won in the laboratory as much as on the battlefield. The Committee on Science also played a key role in the establishment of the Information Assurance and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, where our interests have focused on cybersecurity, a grave and underappreciated threat, and one on which DHS unfortunately has focused too little attention and too few resources. We hope that is going to change. This bill will strengthen research and development activities at the Department and will place new and added emphasis on cybersecurity. Specifically, the bill includes language to enhance technology transfer, to improve cybersecurity training, and to create an Assistant Secretary for cybersecurity and to authorize explicitly a cybersecurity research and development program. All of this language either originated in our committee or was worked out in collaboration between the Committee on Science and the Committee on Homeland Security. I am especially pleased that the bill recognizes the need to focus more on cybersecurity. We all recognize it. We want to make sure that the agency follows through and responds accordingly. We need to act both immediately and in the long term. Immediately, we need to shore up existing networks and develop a system to detect, report, and respond to attacks. Over the long term, we need to figure out how to make computers harder to attack. DHS needs to be working with the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the National Security Agency on cybersecurity. But its own contributions are critical. Let me close by thanking the gentleman from California (Chairman Cox) and the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson), ranking member, working together, their staffs, and especially Tom DiLenge, and the entire Committee on Homeland Security by working cooperatively to come up with an excellent bill which has earned our support.', u"Mr. President, once again I thank the distinguished Senator from Vermont and the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania for their leadership on this effort. I wish to take this opportunity to once again express my serious concerns about the PATRIOT Act conference report that is currently before the Senate. As I stated yesterday, as a former attorney general, I am very familiar with the needs of the more than 800,000 men and women working in law enforcement throughout our country, including those engaged in the fight against terrorism. For that reason, I support extending all the expiring powers of the USA PATRIOT Act. I firmly believe we can extend those powers while at the same time providing sufficient checks on those powers to protect America's fundamental civil liberties. That is what the bipartisan SAFE Act did. That is what the bipartisan, unanimously supported Senate bill did. That is what this conference report could have done if it simply addressed the modest concerns my colleagues and I laid out in our letter to conferees with respect to section 215, national security letters, and sneak-and-peek searches. Unfortunately, these concerns were not addressed in the conference report, and I am left with no choice but to work with my colleagues, both Democrats and Republicans, to defeat the bill before us. This morning, the Washington Post and New York Times reported that President Bush signed an Executive order authorizing the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on American citizens without a warrant. These reports suggest that the phone calls and e-mails of hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of Americans have been monitored over the past 3 years without the approval of a judge or even the approval of the secret FISA court. These allegations, if true, are deeply troubling. If we needed a wake-up call about the need for adequate civil liberties protections to be written into our laws, this is the wake-up call. The bill before us does not contain the needed protections. We still have the time to get it right. Several of my colleagues and I have introduced legislation to extend the current PATRIOT Act for 3 months so we can get back to the table and make the necessary and vital improvements that will protect our rights under our Constitution. I urge my colleagues to vote against invoking cloture and in favor of giving Congress the time it needs to preserve the basic rights and freedoms of all Americans. Mr. President, I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, I have enormous respect for the Senator from Alaska. He is an extraordinary Senator, with many years of experience. I do want to assure the Senator from Alaska that, contrary to the implication in his statement, the committee did not adopt the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to declassify the aggregate budget totals of all the agencies that make up the national intelligence program. We did not adopt that recommendation of the 9/11 Commission because, based on our hearings and the testimony of our witnesses, we concluded that that goes too far and might well reveal information that would be helpful to those who would do us harm. The only declassification in the Collins-Lieberman bill is the top line aggregate amount for the entire national intelligence program. It does not declassify the specific appropriations amount distributed to agencies such as the National Security Agency, or the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the CIA, even though the 9/11 Commission recommended declassification at that level. Declassification, the top line, only that aggregate figure which has been estimated in the newspapers many, many times, I believe, will improve congressional and public oversight of the intelligence budget. It will help us with better decisionmaking on resource distribution, and it will make the structure and the management of the intelligence community more transparent. We asked our witnesses, including the Acting Director of the CIA, John McLaughlin, his views. And he, like most of our other expert witnesses, told us that as long as the specifics of the intelligence budget remain classified, there was no harm to national security to declassify just that top line aggregate amount. I think we struck the right balance in this regard. What we did is we included a study asking the national intelligence director to report back to us--to the Congress--on whether further declassification was appropriate. But the only step we took was that top line aggregate amount. If you don't declassify that in order to have a separate appropriation, then you end up, I fear, with the status quo--the money going through DOD accounts once again. That greatly weakens the budget authority of the national intelligence director. Again, I have enormous respect for the Senator from Alaska. I wanted to make clear what our bill does and what it doesn't do, because I think we have reached the right decision.", u"I am looking at the bill. The bill says the President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized and appropriated for the national intelligence program. Then I go back to the page 6 for the definition of national intelligence programs. It says: Refers to all national intelligence programs, projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence community; Includes all programs, projects, and activities (whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Information Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security. That involves five different bills in the appropriations process. We currently put in any one of those five bills a portion of the clandestine activities we are financing with these moneys. So what you are going to tell us is, we no longer can use any portion of those because we are going to disclose the whole amount in every one of those bills. Listen to me. You have not lived with how we have financed the intelligence community. The money is not disclosed. It is put in parts of the budget and you don't know where it is. It rests with Senator Inouye and me, to be honest about it, and we make sure that is what it is. Maybe four people in the House and Senate know where this is. You are telling us to disclose it, without regard to where we put that money--disclose the money that is in each account and it goes into five separate bills. I say that is wrong. Wait until the NID comes into office and have him tell us how we can disclose what should be disclosed to the public. The public should not ask us to disclose this very classified, secret information to protect the future of the country through clandestine activities and acquisitions. I ask the question, does the Senator understand what her bill does? It will disclose the aggregate amount of funds--disclose them all, including the very, very top secret items, which probably three or four people in the White House, a few people in the CIA, or the DIA, and maybe eight people in the Congress would know.", u"Mr. President, first, I thank the distinguished chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee for working so closely with Mr. Lieberman and me on this very important issue to set forth a process for determining what intelligence assets belong in the NIP, the national intelligence program, versus the joint military intelligence program and the tactical program. The Collins-Lieberman bill gives the national intelligence director strong budgetary authority over the national intelligence program. Senator Lieberman and I envision that his program will be composed of the intelligence assets that serve national purposes, meaning those that pertain to the interests of more than one department. In the long run, I strongly believe the budgets for the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office should be wholly within the national intelligence program. Currently, these agencies have split budgets, and the heads of these agencies tell us that leads to a great deal of administrative inefficiency. Now, it is possible that some intelligence assets from the Department of Defense's Joint Military Intelligence Program may ultimately be moved to the national intelligence program, but, of course, military intelligence assets that principally serve joint or tactical military needs should stay within the Department of Defense, and I think the language is very clear on this point. Through this amendment, we have tried to address concerns that both Senators have raised. I think the compromise language does address and alleviate those concerns. The reviews that are underway will help us better define the parts of the intelligence budget that will be completed within 1 year after the effective date, in one case 60 days, in the case that Senator Levin is concerned with the three activities in the Defense Intelligence Agency. The reviews mandated in this compromise amendment will provide a rational process for determining which assets belong in the national intelligence program and which do not. I very much appreciate the cooperation of our colleagues, and I do urge adoption of the amendment.", u"Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my new granddaughter, Patricia Lanier, I would say it is my pleasure today to speak about a very important piece of legislation that our colleagues in this House will pass judgment on. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2417, the fiscal year 2004 intelligence authorization act. I am a fairly new member of this House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is a unique opportunity for Members of the House to serve on this select committee. I came on to the committee at the time that the joint 9-11 hearings were taking place. And as I look around the room today and I observe my colleagues that participated in those joint sessions with the Senate, I want my other colleagues that are not on this committee to know how impressed I was with the leadership of this committee and our participation with the Senate as well. I also want to take this opportunity to thank the staff who have been most kind and generous on both sides of the aisle to participate with us as we have gone through these very tough issues. This is a good bill. It is a complicated bill. It is hard for some Members to understand. For example, traditionally, the executive branch, the Congress, the industry, we focus on expanding the capability of sensors. Sensors are used to take pictures, to intercept communications or to measure some special signature whether they are from satellites, whether they are from aircraft, or whether they are from ships. But the government has underinvested in abilities to task the collection systems properly and to exploit and disseminate the collection data once received. For a number of years this subcommittee that I am on on this committee has worked to improve and rectify that imbalance. This year's bill accomplishes that and expands the concept as well. In years past, the committee has stressed the need for more investment and better management at the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the National Security Agency to improve processing, exploitation and dissemination capabilities for imagery and signals intelligence. The committee sustained these initiatives in the current bill. We also lay a foundation for applying information technology to solve problems revealed by the congressional investigation into the September 11 tragedy as well. This is an important bill. I urge its support. I also want to point out that the missile in space intelligence command in my district is adequately covered by funding under this important piece of legislation.", u"Mr. Chairman, I too want to acknowledge the leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman, and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member. I have been in local politics for 18 years, and we have tremendous leadership on this committee, and I think all members of this committee put the Nation first. I rise in support of H.R. 2417. The bill reflects the committee's support for the Intelligence Community and the men and women who serve in the intelligence agencies. Often unrecognized, these individuals have made great sacrifices to secure our homeland and to support the war in Iraq, the global war on terrorism and other important national priorities. I am proud to represent many of the men and women who work for the National Security Agency, NSA, in Fort Meade, Maryland, my Second Congressional District. This bill addresses concerns for the health and well-being of NSA employees by providing additional funds to ensure a cleaner, healthier and better maintained workforce. It provides tort liability protection to NSA security officers so that they have legal protections similar to those provided other law enforcement officers. The bill gives NSA the authority to provide living quarters to the bright and talented students participating in NASA's summer and cooperative educational programs. It also encourages NASA to continue its acquisition reform initiatives and bring its processes in line with standard commercial and government practices. It increases funds available for the recapitalization and modernization of NASA's technical systems which will allow the Nation's Signals Intelligence Systems to keep pace with changing technology. H.R. 2417 emphasizes the need for the Federal Government to improve information sharing with State and local governments. As the Baltimore County Executive, I was the county executive during 9/11, this is very important, and where appropriate, private companies. To make this possible, the bill allows the Director of Central Intelligence to establish pilot projects to train State and local officials to increase the flow of information between them and Federal agencies. Advisory councils on privacy and civil liberties and State and local issues will help ensure the protection of individual rights, and the needs of State and local governments need to be properly addressed. I am also pleased that this bill provides additional funding to the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center to enhance the analysis of health risks to our deployed forces. Together, the enhancements provided for in H.R. 2417 will contribute to our Nation's efforts to prevent terrorism and to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the globe. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.", u'Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for his kind words, but I especially thank him for his leadership on this issue. I also thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall), the ranking Democrat; the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, on which I serve; and the other cosponsors of this legislation for their leadership in getting this done. This is a serious problem in this country. We are vulnerable in many, many ways to cybercrime and cyberterrorism, and this legislation will help to cure that problem. We are not doing enough in the area of research in this area. We are most certainly not doing enough in the area of producing enough people to work in government and in the private sector to make sure that the computer infrastructure of this country is protected against hackers and criminals and terrorists. This legislation is going to provide more resources for those colleges and universities and other institutions that do this research and train the people. In this area, I have a university in my district, James Madison University, which has been identified by the National Security Agency as an institution of excellence in doing research and, more importantly, education in this area. But when they sit down to write the curriculum on how to prevent cybercrime, to teach people how to work for companies or the government in protecting the computer infrastructure, that curriculum does not even change on an annual basis, does not even change on a monthly basis. It changes on a weekly and daily basis as new information about viruses and other types of computer activity used by criminals and terrorists take place. So I am strongly supportive of this legislation. I look forward to developing more curricula around the country to educate people and provide the literally tens of thousands of new jobs we are going to need in this country in this field, and this legislation lays the groundwork. I commend the gentleman from New York and others for bringing this legislation forward, and I strongly urge my colleagues to support it.', u"Mr. President, I thank the Chair for that clarification. I have sought recognition this morning to express my concern that the legislation submitted by the President for homeland security submitted two days ago to the Congress does not meet the critical need for collection and analysis of intelligence information in one place. Each day there are new disclosures of key information, information which was known prior to September 11, 2001. If it had been activated and put together with other information, this might well have prevented the September 11 attack. This morning's Washington Post has as its major story, in the upper right-hand corner, ``NSA Intercepts On Eve of 9/11 Sent a Warning.'' The first sentence reads: The National Security Agency intercepted two messages on the eve of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon warning that something was going to happen the next day. If that information had been put together with other information which was in the files of Federal intelligence agencies but not focused on, there would have been, I think, an emerging picture providing a warning, not just connecting dots, but a picture which was pretty obvious when all of the pieces were put together. The FBI had the now-famous Phoenix report, which had been submitted in July 2001 by the Phoenix office, telling about aeronautical training to people with backgrounds which indicated potential terrorist leanings, aeronautical students with a large picture of Osama bin Laden in their room and a background which would have supported the inference that those students in training might well have been put up to something. If that had been put together with the confession that was obtained by a Pakistani terrorist known as Abdul Hakim Murad in 1996, who had connections with al-Qaida, when he told of plans to attack the CIA headquarters in Washington by plane and to fly into the White House, there might have been a pretty sharp focus, especially if linked to the information which had been developed by the FBI field office in Minneapolis, that there was a man named Zacarias Moussaoui, who had terrorist connections to al-Qaida, and that plans were being developed and that he was actually to be the twentieth hijacker. That information never came to full fruition because of a failure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to move the matter forward for a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The Judiciary Committee heard testimony from special agent Coleen Rowley about the difficulties of dealing with the FBI, which requires a standard not in accordance with the law, 51 percent, more probable than not where the standard of a warrant does not require that. Had Moussaoui's computer been examined, it would have provided a virtual blueprint for what was about to happen. These are very glaring and fundamental defects in our intelligence system. They have existed for a very long time. We have had a situation where the Director of Central Intelligence, who is supposed to be in charge of all intelligence, does not have key components of the intelligence apparatus under his wing. For example, he does not have access to the National Reconnaissance Office. He does not have unfettered access to the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and certain special Navy units. This is a deficiency which has gone on for a long time. When I chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee during the 104th Congress, I introduced Senate bill 1718. That bill was designed to correct the deficiency that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who nominally and in the public view had access to all of the intelligence information, but, in fact, did not have it. My bill, S. 1718, is only one of many efforts which are currently underway, efforts which are currently under consideration by the White House. However, there is strong opposition by the Department of Defense and opposition by others. I am not characterizing it necessarily as a turf battle. It is a battle which has its origin in the concerns of some in the Department of Defense that the Department of Defense has the responsibility to fight a war and needs access to all of these intelligence matters; that is unique control. The reality is that a structure can be worked out so the Department of Defense is not deprived of access to any of this information in time of war or at any time. However, the Director of Central Intelligence ought to have it in one coordinated place. Now, when you create a Department of Homeland Security, it is obviously very difficult to touch upon matters on the broader picture. That is something that must be done and which must be addressed. When this matter was considered, I raised some of these issues in a meeting which Senators had with the White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and Homeland Security Advisor, Governor Ridge. Recently, there have been additional meetings at the staff level, working together with the White House staff extensively, one of which was last Friday afternoon. During that meeting, my staff made a specific proposal that on the Department of Homeland Security, there should be a repository in one place to gather all of this information. The suggestion which we submitted was that there should be a national terrorism assessment center, a concept developed by someone who is very experienced in intelligence affairs, Charles Battaglia, who spent years in the CIA, as well as the Navy, and who served as majority staff director for the Intelligence Committee during my tenure as chairman during the 104th Congress. The Battaglia proposal to establish a national terrorism assessment center, in my opinion, goes right to the mark. It would be staffed by analysts who would come from the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and a listing of other Federal agencies, including the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which would have access to all of this information. The bill, which was submitted by the President two days ago to establish the Department of Homeland Security, I say respectfully, does not meet this core critical ingredient. For example, referring to intelligence staff, the President's proposal provides at section 201: The Secretary may obtain such material by request. Mr. President, that is hardly the authority that the Secretary of Homeland Defense needs to do his job. If he has to ask somebody in Washington, DC, for something, it is an enormous uncertainty as to whether he will get it. In fact, it is more probable than not that he will not get it. There is a long trail around here to get information from anyone. I have seen that in detail in my time trying to conduct oversight on the FBI or in conducting oversight when I chaired the Intelligence Committee. That information just is not forthcoming. The President's bill further provides that the Secretary may enter into ``cooperative arrangements with other executive agencies to share such material.'' Whether or not there will be such arrangements entered into, and whether the other executive agencies will be agreeable to that, is highly uncertain. The time has long since passed to leave it to the discretion of a large variety of the Federal bureaucrats as to what they will do on intelligence. The time has come for the Congress of the United States in legislation signed by the President to establish central authority in one place, under one roof, to collect all the information which is available. To do any less is dereliction of our duty. That has not been done. The intelligence community has been stumbling along. America stumbled into September 11 because this Congress had not undertaken the approach with the strength to resolve all of these jurisdictional disputes and see to it that this information was under one roof. The Congress of the United States has a fundamental responsibility to provide for the security of the United States. When the Judiciary Committee conducts hearings and finds out that the FBI does not have the procedures in place to know what is in the Phoenix report on a potential terrorist with Osama bin Laden's picture on his wall, when the Judiciary Committee commits oversight and finds out that the FBI Minneapolis office cannot get headquarters to request a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act because they are applying the wrong standard, when the Intelligence Committee conducts oversight on the Director of Central Intelligence and finds his authority lacking because he does not know what many other intelligence agencies are collecting, and when the National Security Agency has on the eve of September 11 specific warnings and these pieces are not put together, the time has come to act. On this legislation, we ought to move ahead with a national terrorism assessment center. This information, as I noted earlier, was communicated by my staff to the White House staff. We did not have it prepared in time, but we had it this week in draft form. However, the matter is now before the Congress. For the information of my colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that this draft proposal be printed in the Congressional Record. It is by no means a finished product, however it might be of some help as we move ahead with hearings on this very important subject in the Congress.", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, it is a distinct, pleasure and honor to serve with the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) on both the Committee on Rules and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule providing for the consideration of H.R. 2883, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, House Resolution 252. This is a modified open rule requiring that amendments be preprinted in the Congressional Reocrd. However, Mr. Speaker, the preprinting requirement has been the accepted practice for a number of years because of the sensitive nature of much of the bill and the need to protect its classified documents. The bill is not controversial and was reported from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by a unanimous vote. I underscore that in these times, since the events of September 11. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is fully mindful of the extraordinary pain suffered by the victims and all of us in America as it pertains to those events. Thus, this year, this bill becomes as important as at any time in America's history. Members who wish to do so can go to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence offices to examine the classified schedule of authorizations for the programs and activities of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the national intelligence program, which includes the CIA as well as the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence programs within, among others, the Department of Defense; the National Security Agency; the Departments of State, Treasury, and Energy; and the FBI. Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities and Joint Military Intelligence Program of the Department of Defense. Mr. Speaker, last week the House considered and passed the authorization for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2002. The intelligence bill we consider today is another critical component in our national defense. Today, as I indicated earlier, more than ever we need to be vigilant about the myriad threats to our national security. Mr. Speaker, while there may be debate on a few worthy amendments, this is a noncontroversial bill providing authorizations for important national security programs. I urge my colleagues to support this rule and to support the underlying bill. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u'Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my good friend and colleague from Florida for yielding me the time. It is a pleasure for me to serve with Chairman Goss on both the Committee on Rules and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule, providing for the consideration of H.R. 2883, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. H. Res. 252 is a modified open rule requiring that amendments be preprinted in the Congressional Record. However, Mr. Speaker, the preprinting requirement has been the accepted practice for a number of years because of the sensitive nature of much of the bill and the need to protect its classified documents. The bill is not controversial and was reported from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by a unanimous vote. Members who wish to do so, and I urge Members to pay attention to this, can go to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Office to examine the classified schedule of authorizations for the programs and activities of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the national intelligence program, which includes the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence programs within, among others, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the Departments of State, Treasury and Energy and the FBI. Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities and Joint Military Intelligence Program of the Department of Defense. Members can go to the committee and review those matters. Mr. Speaker, last week the House considered and passed the authorization for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2002. The intelligence bill we consider today is another critical component in our national defense. Today, more than ever, we need to be vigilant about the myriad threats to our national security. Mr. Speaker, while there will be debate on some worthy amendments, this is a noncontroversial bill providing authorizations for important national security programs. I urge my colleagues to support this rule and to support the underlying bill. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.', u"Mr. Chairman, I rise to express very strong support for this very fine product as produced by the committee. Further, I, too, want to express my deep appreciation, as well as my compliments, to both the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) for creating an atmosphere within our committee on the floor that is totally nonpartisan, a very important element to have the kind of support we need for this product that is so important to the future of our country. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4392. Mr. Chairman, I have a unique responsibility when it comes to the Intelligence Community and the intelligence functions of the United States. I have the pleasure of serving as an authorizer on the Intelligence Committee as its Vice Chairman under Chairman Goss. And, as Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee I have the responsibility for the appropriations for our intelligence systems, people and missions. In these two capacities, I am privileged to have an excellent vantage point from which to understand the U.S. Intelligence Community. Mr. Chairman, I have looked at this year's intelligence budget request from many angles, and I can tell you the bill before us today is a good one. Chairman Goss, and the Ranking Member, Mr. Dixon have done a thorough and responsible job of looking at the capabilities of the intelligence community, its needs, and moreover, its problems that must be addressed and corrected. This bill makes major recommendations for improving the ability of the individual Intelligence Community agencies to communicate and collaborate virtually anywhere in the world. This bill will also improve, and better secure the information technology infrastructures at the National Security Agency. Further, it makes a clear down-payment on improving the real-time tactical reconnaissance assets for the military services. Mr. Chairman, what this bill does is focus the limited funds that we are able to muster on the critical needs of the nation's intelligence functions. Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I would like to note the close working relationship between the Intelligence Committee and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. In my many years as a Member of Congress, I have rarely seen, let alone been able to be part of, such a great working relationship between committees. This working relationship allows both committees to focus on the real problems and priority issues within the Intelligence Community. That, Mr. Chairman, is what this bill does, and I recommend all my colleagues to vote for H.R. 4392.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this conference report. I would first like to commend the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) for his stewardship through the process. I would also like to recognize the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), the ranking member, for his contributions to the committee's efforts as well. Mr. Speaker, this conference report provides very important investments for the intelligence community, including enhancements in many areas that are of specific interest to the military. I wish we could do more, especially given the ever-increasing requirements that are being placed on intelligence to protect our troops who have been sent all over the world for every sort of mission. One of the most important issues facing the intelligence community is the modernization of the National Security Agency. This agency, which supplies signal intelligence to all levels of government, from the most senior policymaker to the pilot in the cockpit, is in many ways the linchpin of our warning capability. But today, this agency is about to be overtaken by technology and by potential adversaries who are increasingly sophisticated. The NSA, in response, is undergoing a unique transition, the success of which will affect the overall capabilities of the intelligence community for the next several decades. The Director of Central Intelligence has made the modernization of NSA his number one priority. The good news is that the NSA director, Lieutenant General Mike Hayden, is committed to leading his agency to overcome the modernization challenge. Those challenges are great. They involve overhauling every aspect of the NSA, from technical collection capabilities, to acquisition programs and personnel structure. General Hayden must be successful. But in order to make the needed changes, he needs certain tools. Perhaps the most critical tool is the ability to move the right people into key positions in the Agency to affect change. Because of the unique and serious situation at NSA, I am pleased that this conference report gives the NSA director that ability through the NSA Voluntary Separation Act. This provision permits the establishment of an early retirement and voluntary separation program for all NSA employees, including the most senior levels of management. With this authority, it is anticipated that the director will be able to accomplish the personnel changes and management changes necessary to see the process of NSA modernization through to completion. General Hayden has our support in these efforts. I urge all my colleagues to support this conference report.", u"Mr. President, a milestone will occur on Saturday, April 18, while the Senate is in recess, which I do not want to go unacknowledged: Dr. Richard Hermann Kastner of Clarksburg, Maryland, will celebrate his 75th birthday. Ralph Waldo Emerson remarked, ``. . . to leave the world a bit better whether by a healthy child, a garden patch, or a redeemed social condition; to know even one life has breathed easier because you have lived. This is to have succeeded.'' I imagine it would be nearly impossible to count how many lives have ``breathed easier'' because of Richard Kastner. For nearly 45 years, he has helped individuals and families cope with drug and alcohol dependency, abuse, discord, illness and death, and seemingly inconsolable grief as a psychiatrist and therapist, and as a friend. He has devoted his life to helping others find meaning in their lives. Richard Kastner is a native New Yorker. He received a bachelor's degree in psychology and biology from New York University, a master's degree in psychology from the City College of New York, his M.D. from Jefferson Medical College, and his doctorate in psychology from New York University. He then went to the University of Minnesota for post-graduate medical training and for his psychiatric residency, which he then continued at St. Elizabeth's Hospital here in Washington. Richard Kastner achieved glittering academic success and then embarked on his career to achieve glittering professional success. He was a captain in the Medical Corps and served as a military psychiatrist at Andrews Air Force Base. He has been a senior psychiatric consultant for the National Security Agency, chief psychiatrist of the Employees Health Service at the National Institutes of Health, and a consulting senior psychiatrist and lecturer at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. He also served as an instructor in the Department of Psychiatry at Harvard University's School of Medicine, and is a Fellow in the Royal Society of Medicine. He is a pilot, husband, and father of three children. Even now, as he turns 75, he maintains a robust private practice, undeterred by age, ailment, or surgery. I suppose the animating force is an unquenchable desire to help others. I want to take this opportunity to congratulate him on his 75th birthday and wish him many more. ", u"Mr. Speaker, the Israeli Ministry of Defense has just issued a statement regarding encryption which states that the decontrol of encryption exports, as allowed by the SAFE Act, (H.R. 695) would threaten Israel's national security. Listen carefully to their exact statement: ``Israel considers the regulation and control of encryption products and technology to be vital to its national security, the combating of terrorism and effective law enforcement. Engagement of any kind in encryption technology in Israel is controlled by the Government of Israel. Israeli government policy will continue to protect sensitive and essential interests by enforcing strict national security policy in this regard. It is Israel's view that all countries should do their utmost to prevent the acquisition of strong encryption technology and products by terrorist and criminal entities.'' And yet, as we all know, H.R. 695 allows for the immediate export of unrestricted encryption technology and allows for the acquisition of strong encryption technology by international terrorists. When questioned about the effects of H.R. 695 (The SAFE Act) Major General David Ivry, Advisor to Israel's Minister of Defense said that ``we would encourage all of our friends in the United States to oppose the bill.'' Any friend of Israel in the United States Congress who are cosponsoring H.R. 695 should ask for a briefing by the NSA and then remove their names from the bill. All Americans who care about Israel's security should find out where their Member of Congress stands on this most important issue. The proponents of this bill maintain that Israel's enemies will eventually possess encryption technology. Even if this is true, it fails to explain why we should rush to place this technology in the hands of our enemies. The Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the National Security Agency and now the Israel Ministry of Defense believe that America and Israel need time to develop countermeasures to address the various threats posed these new technologies and H.R. 695 does not give us this time. The truth is that now that we have the official Israel position on encryption no real friend of Israel should remain a cosponsor of H.R. 695.", u"Mr. President, the Department of Defense and many other government agencies are increasing their use and reliance on information technology for a wide variety of applications. The growing frequency and increasing sophistication of attacks on the Defense Department's computer networks is cause for concern. Other government agencies, as well as the private sector, are also subject to these attacks on their network infrastructure. Last year, the Administration organized an exercise to test the Pentagon's ability to deal with cyber attacks. In this exercise, several computer specialists from the National Security Agency targeted computers used by our military forces in the United States and our forces in the Pacific. Using computers, modems, and software technology widely available on the Internet, these friendly ``hackers'' were able to penetrate unclassified military computer networks in Hawaii, Washington, D.C., Chicago, St. Louis and Colorado. We need to do more to protect the Defense Department networks that are critical for the operation of our military forces around the world. My amendment, which is fully offset, adds $8 million to the Air Force Information Systems Security Program. The additional funds will be used for research by the Air Force and will rely on the expertise of two federally funded research and development centers currently working on issues of information security. These efforts will facilitate the development of information security technology for the Armed Forces, and I urge the Senate to approve it. On page 99, between lines 17 and 18, insert the following: Section 3 of Public Law 99-572 (40 U.S.C. 1003 note) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(c) Additional Funding.-- ``(1) In general.--In addition to amounts made available under subsections (a) and (b), the Secretary of the Army may expend, from any funds available to the Secretary on the date of enactment of this paragraph, $2,000,000 for repair of the memorial. ``(2) Disposition of funds received from claims.--Any funds received by the Secretary of the Army as a result of any claim against a contractor in connection with construction of the memorial shall be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury.''.", u"Mr. Speaker, the do-nothing Congress is limping to a pathetic end, one final $500 billion bill. Just to my left there is a copy bound with twine 2 feet tall. It weighs 40 pounds. Who among the rank and file Members of the House can say they have read and understood the entire package? Half the Members here could not even lift it, let alone read it. The chairman of the Committee on Rules said it was about readiness. For once we are in vague agreement. This bill is about readiness, campaign readiness. It is stuffed to the gills with election-year goodies. The gentleman meant military readiness, but from the quarter of a million dollars that the Pentagon is going to be forced to spend to study the effect of stay-awake gum on the troops, to the C-130J airplanes that they are going to be forced to buy that will be built in the Speaker's district, and they will have to retire other good planes 10 years early to accommodate them, it is much more of an assault on the orderly readiness of our troops than it is a help. Of the $7.5 billion stuffed into the Pentagon budget in this bill, perhaps $1.1 billion, 14 percent, can be said to truly be going to the readiness needs of our men and women in uniform. Is $1 billion more for the Star Wars fantasy that has wasted $50 billion, so far with no successful experiments, is that the readiness that our troops need? I think not. Is $2 billion more for intelligence agencies what they need? Just 3 years ago the National Security Agency lost $4 billion in its budget. That is right, it misplaced $4 billion, because it was trying to hide it from our enemies, and they had a bunch of different bank accounts around. They forgot they had the money until a new auditor came in and found it, and they need another $2 billion? I do not think so. The gentleman spoke about fiscal responsibility. This bill is financed with $20 billion out of the future social security trust fund, the so-called surplus in emergency spending. That is not fiscal responsibility.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of Senate Joint Resolution 5 regarding the appointment of Charlene Barshefsky as U.S. Trade Representative. I had the opportunity to work closely with the Ambassador and Deputy Trade Representative Jeff Lang during negotiations on the WTO Telecommunications Agreement, and I must say that I was pleased with her determination to consult regularly with Congress during these talks, and I do mean regularly. They were most helpful. Perhaps more to the point, I was deeply impressed by what was achieved in Geneva. The agreement covers 95 percent of rural telecom revenue, giving United States firms unprecedented access to markets in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, and covers some 70 countries in its sweep. In my opinion, the agreement is proof that Charlene Barshefsky's reputation as a tough, stalwart negotiator is well-deserved, and I would certainly support the waiver. I am just sorry that we really have to have a waiver because I think the provision in current law is too xenophobic and unrealistic. On a related matter I want to correct a continued misperception that was repeated on the floor of the other body during debate on this measure. The gentleman from South Carolina took a statement from the Record made by the chairman of the House Committee on Commerce, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Bliley], and inferred from it that the administration, by inference USTR, asked this Member to amend section 310(b) of the Communications Act on their behalf. This is simply not so. The statement alluded to our efforts during debate on the Telecommunications Act to satisfy the concerns of the executive branch regarding international investment in U.S. telecommunications firms. However, the chief changes made were in the area of national security, and we worked very closely with the FBI and National Security Agency and the CIA, and the effect was to tighten the law, not the loosen it. The input we received from the executive branch came at the request of the cosponsor, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell], and the advice we received came primarily from the security agencies, as I recall, not from the Office of the Trade Representative. Of course, I did consult with USTR on the effect my language would have on their negotiations, as any responsible legislator would, but these consultations came at my request, not the other way around, and I wanted to point that out for the record.", u"Mr. Speaker, if you want a perfect example of how the election process can be corrupted by using large amounts of money to enact policy which is detrimental to the interests of the American people, you need only look at H.R. 695, the SAFE Act. The SAFE Act was drafted by and for the software industry with no consideration to the national security and public safety needs of the American people. I believe a compromise should be reached between industry's desires and the legitimate law enforcement concerns of the American people. However, Bill Gates, who is worth over $40 billion, is asking Congress to ignore the safety of the American people so he will make more money. Today, police may conduct a search of property or intercept communications only after they prove to a judge that they have probable cause to believe that a crime may occur. We possess the capability to safeguard the status quo in criminal justice by using an encryption process called key recovery. Yet, the sponsors of H.R. 695 are unwilling to accept this compromise. In other words, H.R. 695 eliminates one of our most important law enforcement mechanisms. This is the reason virtually every police and law enforcement organization in the country opposes H.R. 695. The Drug Enforcement Agency, the FBI, the National Security Agency, the National Sheriffs' Association, the District Attorneys Associations and the Association of Chiefs of Police oppose the SAFE Act. Justice Department officials testifying before the House Judiciary Committee stated that the SAFE Act, ``would severely compromise law enforcement's ability to protect the American people from the threats posed by terrorists, organized crime, child pornographers, and other criminals. It is difficult enough to protect the American people from crime without making criminals' tasks any easier. In a letter you received from our top law enforcement officials, they state that encryption bills which do not contain key recovery, such as the SAFE Act ``risk great harm to our ability to enforce the laws and protect our citizens.'' They believe key recovery is essential ``to allow police departments, attorney generals, district attorneys, sheriffs, and Federal authorities to continue to use their most effective investigative techniques, with court approval, to fight crime and espionage and prevent terrorism.", u"Mr. Chairman, I rise to strike the last word. I rise in support of the gentlewoman of California's amendment to H.R. 1555. This Amendment prohibits the CIA and other intelligence agencies from participating in the manufacture, purchase, sale, transport, or distribution of illegal drugs. Let us not forget the history of the CIA and the suggestion that they have been involved in this behavior in the past. We must take action to rid the CIA and other intelligence agencies of any suggestion or taint of wrong doing and address the primary issue of drugs in America. Drugs, in America, take a huge toll year in and year out. They move like a thief in the night and steal our children, our fathers, our mothers, and destroy families and lives. This problem plays itself out every day in my Congressional District. I walk the streets of Chicago's Westside and see the devastation and destruction that drugs leave in their wake. I see children with no parents and parents who mourn the loss of their children, all too soon, and no one can forget a visit to Cook County Hospital and seeing the torturous pain of seeing a baby born addicted to drugs. With these images burning in my mind, I know we must do everything in our power to rectify this situation. In the past week, the media has reported the deaths of two celebrities from drugs, one of whom was a professional athlete in the prime of his life using drugs for the first time. These recent examples illustrate the deadly effect these nefarious substances have on people. We must understand no one is safe from this problem, this national problem. My support of this amendment means that we must be clear in our image and the messages that we send by stating the manufacture, sale, transport, or distribution of illegal drugs is unacceptable at any level of the government. All law enforcement and defense must adhere to certain simple principles. The CIA and NSA (National Security Agency) are no different from the Chicago Police Department or the Illinois State Police or the U.S. Marshals. All must understand that the trafficking of drugs is not acceptable, we must restore faith and confidence in America's enforcement branches, and if intelligence agencies engage in such behavior they must understand the consequences of this behavior. I can think of no better way to restore our confidence in the CIA and NSA than by supporting this amendment. It expresses, in clear and concise terms, what we, as representatives of the people, believe is right. That no intelligence agency shall, under any circumstances, engage in any behavior that facilitates the traffic of drugs.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise to honor Capt. Clell Neil Ammerman, U.S. Navy (Ret.), who passed away last week. Captain Ammerman had a long and distinguished career serving his country in the United States Navy. He graduated with honors from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1954 and quickly proved himself as a capable officer. In 1957, he commanded the USS Ely, one of the first ships to transit the new St. Lawrence Seaway. In 1958, he was assigned to the National Security Agency, and in 1961 received his master's degree in applied mathematics and physics. Captain Ammerman returned to the sea, and in August 1964 was involved in the initial action in the Gulf of Tonkin as an officer aboard the USS Oklahoma City. In 1967, he completed his work in the field of nuclear weapons effects at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore, California, for which he received the Joint Services Commendation Medal. After another year at sea, Captain Ammerman served as Assistant to the Deputy Director, Research and Technology, ODDR&E. That stint earned him the Legion of Merit for outstanding management of research and development programs. But a Navy man belongs to the sea, and in September 1971, Captain Ammerman assumed command of the USS John S. McCain. Between April and October 1972, Captain Ammerman actively engaged the enemy off the coast of the Republic of Vietnam and was awarded the Bronze Star with the Combat ``V.'' He then entered the academic life, serving as professor of naval science and commanding officer for the NROTC Unit at UCLA. In 1976, he again returned to sea, then moved to Newport, Rhode Island, in 1978 to command the Navy's prestigious Surface Warfare Officer's School. Finally, he served as Chief of Staff of Battle Force Seventh Fleet, homeported in Subic Bay, the Philippines. In June of 1984, Captain Ammerman retired from the Navy and settled in Camarillo, California, which is in my district. Until 1995, he continued his relationship with the Navy through his work with naval contractors. His wife of 20 years, Pamela, is national director of the Navy League of the United States. She has also served as my campaign manager for years. Aside from Pam, Captain Ammerman is survived by six children and four grandchildren. Mr. Speaker, I know my colleagues will join me for a moment of prayer for Capt. Clell Neil Ammerman, and in sending our condolences to Pam and all of his family.", u"Madam Chair, first, I would like to focus on two of this bill's most important provisions as it relates to technical and tactical: first, cybersecurity, and, number two, space. The bill makes significant investments in the variety of critical cybersecurity programs, a need highlighted by repeated attacks on the information technology systems of the Federal Government and private industry over the past year. As cybersecurity evolves and intensifies, our intelligence community must be able to respond quickly and with the latest technologies available. The National Security Agency, which I'm proud to say is in my district, has already developed a number of technologies that are already helping to protect us against these threats; but we need to ensure that NSA and other intelligence agencies have the resources that they need to develop and deploy the defenses that will keep our networks running and information secure. This bill helps do that. Second, this bill makes important investments in space. It supports the President's request to develop a new imagery capability. In addition, it supports the Senate proposal, which we must start funding to continue building upon our known capabilities. These are critical investments, and we are prepared to see them through. We must keep major space acquisitions on budget and on schedule. We do not have unlimited resources and cannot afford to have these critical acquisitions spin out of control. I am also pleased that the bill encourages the DNI and Director of the NRO to leverage commercial capabilities to the fullest extent possible. Commercial tools have significantly improved in recent years. Using these capabilities to complement government efforts will not only provide a cost-effective way of meeting our needs; it will support the revitalization of the long-struggling commercial space industry. I also want to make just some response to my peers on the other side. The Intelligence Committee is a very important committee; national security is at stake. We must come together as citizens first. There are a lot of allegations--we understand there are some politics in whatever we do--but when it comes to national security intelligence, we have got to find a way to make sure we focus on the priorities. Those priorities are in this budget. There are some things that we might not all agree with; but in the end, we vote on the bill that we feel is right for our Nation. And believe me, there is nothing that either side will do to help the terrorists; we will go after the terrorists with a vigor.", u"Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Speaker, as a member of the House Intelligence Committee, as chairman of the Technical and Tactical Intelligence Subcommittee and as a proud representative of the National Security Agency, which is in my district, I rise in support of H.R. 2701. It has been nearly 6 years since an intelligence authorization bill has been enacted into law. These bills help ensure that the intelligence community has the tools it needs to keep us safe and that Congress has the tools it needs to be effective in its oversight capacity. The bill before us today does both, and I would like to highlight two provisions. First, the bill includes significant reforms to the way the intelligence community makes major purchases. Our subcommittee has focused much of our time on helping to ensure that we buy the right kind of satellites at the right price. Just like recent reforms to our defense procurement process, this bill helps us protect tax dollars while keeping our country safe and secure. The Nunn-McCurdy provision requires congressional notification when costs run significantly over budget and cancels programs that run 25 percent or more over budget unless we get a reasonable explanation. Second, the bill gives the Director of National Intelligence a voice in the process as we review and update security-related export controls known as ITAR. These regulations restrict what American companies can sell overseas, but there are prohibitions on old, simple, and widely available technologies that are putting American companies at a severe disadvantage to foreign competitors. Before the restrictions went into effect in 1998, 73 percent of the world market for commercial satellites went to U.S. companies. By 2000, that figure had dropped to 27 percent. That's unacceptable. Loosening these outdated restrictions is critical to more than 250,000 American jobs supported by the satellite industry, which has taken a hit with the global economic downturn. Over the past 2 years, the industry has shed about 5 percent of its workforce. In addition to this bill under consideration today, the House has passed an ITAR provision in the Foreign Affairs authorization, and we are waiting for the Senate to act.", u"Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman. Mr. Speaker, every single Member of this body supports giving our Commander in Chief the tools necessary to track terrorists, to intercept their communications, and to disrupt their plots. Any suggestion otherwise, any suggestion that any Member of this body somehow seeks to coddle terrorists who want to attack our Nation and kill our people demeans our discourse and is beneath the dignity of this institution. Make no mistake. Our highest duty is to protect the American people, secure our homeland, strengthen our national security, and defend the Constitution of the United States. This legislation, unfortunately, is deeply flawed and not bipartisan, and would turn the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act on its head. It fails to explicitly preserve FISA's exclusivity. Thus, by implication, it allows the President to conduct surveillance of Americans pursuant to any inherent authority argument. The bill makes sweeping changes to the definition of electronic surveillance, allowing the National Security Agency to listen without warrant to the content of any communication that is from the United States to overseas or vice versa. The bill allows for warrantless surveillance after an armed attack or a terrorist attack or anticipation of an imminent attack; yet these terms are not defined or are loosely defined. It is truly a shame, Mr. Speaker, but not surprising that the majority refused to allow the Members of this House to consider the reasonable bipartisan substitute offered by Congressmen Schiff, Flake, and Inglis, two Republicans, two Democrats, and Congresswoman Harman. The gentlewoman said that we ran out, running down the street. There is a time to stop running down the street and think and give us an opportunity to offer alternatives. What a shame that we have not done that. What a shame we still run. What a shame we still hark to politics rather than the policy. For example, just listen to what William Sessions and William Webster--among others--stated recently. Recall, Mr. Sessions is the former Director of the FBI during the administration of George H.W. Bush, and Mr. Webster is the former Director of the FBI during the Carter and Reagan Administrations and former Director of the CIA during the first Bush Administration. They stated (and I quote): ``Legal uncertainty is exactly what will result if Congress heeds the President's call to enact legislation that replaces the obligation to use the procedures of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act with broad language about relying upon the President's constitutional authority.''", u"Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me. It is quite stunning that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle describe this as a broad, sweeping authority, and that under the NSA program, somehow the President can go on fishing expeditions. The NSA program applies only to international calls and only when those calls involve the telephone number of a known al Qaeda operative. So if it is someone from Hezbollah or some other group, you cannot do it. It has to be al Qaeda. Well, I will tell you, if a call is going from a known terrorist al Qaeda operative in Iraq or Afghanistan or Pakistan to America, I want to know. I want to know what they are saying. If there is anything London taught us, it is that we need to know. And we need to know to be able to stop actions from happening that threaten and endanger our people. The second thing is, the persistent, repeated claim on the other side of the aisle that somehow a FISA court application is a snap of the fingers. Brian Cunningham, former CIA official and Clinton-appointed Federal prosecutor: NSA cannot lawfully under FISA listen to a single syllable until it can prove to the Attorney General, usually in writing, that it can jump through each and every one of FISA's procedural and substantive hoops. And those procedural and substantive hoops mean that the operative at the National Security Agency has to decide there is an issue, has to put it in writing. The lawyers of NSA have to agree. They have to provide paperwork that goes to the lawyers of the Department of Justice. I mean, there are lots of steps to this process. And to imagine that this can be done rapidly, it often takes weeks from what I have heard in briefings. It can take longer than that. To believe that this can be done in 72 hours and protect our people is to close your eyes to the reality of the terrible danger that terrorism possess to people in America and throughout the world.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 5825, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act. The bill before us today allows this Administration to continue its program of unwarranted surveillance of Americans, in direct violation of the rights guaranteed to us by the Constitution and by statute. Mr. Speaker, proponents of this legislation claim that there is no violation or question about the program's legality. If that is, in fact, the case, then why are we considering legislation with the sole purpose of legalizing the President's, and the NSA's, actions? Last December, we learned that President Bush authorized the National Security Agency to spy domestically, without obtaining any warrants. Since that time, we have learned very little about the program, largely due to the Administration's unwillingness to properly inform Congress about the programs components, scope, or its budget. The little we do know, however, is that through this program, hundreds, and possibly thousands, of Americans have had their telephone conversations and emails monitored without any judicial supervision. The Majority has failed in its oversight responsibilities. Nevertheless, we are preparing to pass legislation that legitimizes this little understood, but still extremely troubling program. H.R. 5825 allows the President to authorize warrantless surveillance of communications of ordinary Americans without first obtaining approval from the FISA court. They say they need this because our laws are out of date. This is false and untrue. Current law (FISA) allows the President to act in emergencies and when there is a declaration of war by Congress. The proponents have not come forward with evidence that the current law is not working or failing to protect us. Congress must use the checks and balances placed in our Constitution to curb the Administration's actions. Congress needs to assert its oversight responsibility and fully evaluate this NSA program. And the Administration needs to stop its attempts to extend its power and authority, at every available opportunity, by circumventing our nation's laws. Despite what this Administration would have us believe, securing our nation from all enemies both foreign and domestic can be achieved without violations of our civil liberties and right to privacy. I urge my colleagues to vote no on this misguided and ill-advised legislation.", u" The Clerk read as follows: Mr. Schiff of California moves to recommit the bill H.R. 5825 to the Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith with the following amendment: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: This Act may be cited as the ``NSA Oversight Act''. Congress finds the following: (1) On September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were committed against the United States and its citizens. (2) Such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its right to self-defense by protecting United States citizens both at home and abroad. (3) The Federal Government has a duty to pursue al Qaeda and other enemies of the United States with all available tools, including the use of electronic surveillance, to thwart future attacks on the United States and to destroy the enemy. (4) The President of the United States possesses the inherent authority to engage in electronic surveillance of the enemy outside of the United States consistent with his authority as Commander-in-Chief under Article II of the Constitution. (5) Congress possesses the authority to regulate electronic surveillance within the United States. (6) The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees to the American people the right ``to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures'' and provides that courts shall issue ``warrants'' to authorize searches and seizures, based upon probable cause. (7) The Supreme Court has consistently held for nearly 40 years that the monitoring and recording of private conversations constitutes a ``search and seizure'' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (8) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) was enacted to provide the legal authority for the Federal Government to engage in searches of Americans in connection with intelligence gathering and counterintelligence. (9) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 was enacted with the express purpose of being the exclusive means by which the Federal Government conducts electronic surveillance for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information. (10) Warrantless electronic surveillance of Americans inside the United States conducted without congressional authorization may have a serious impact on the civil liberties of citizens of the United States. (11) United States citizens, such as journalists, academics, and researchers studying global terrorism, who have made international phone calls subsequent to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and are law-abiding citizens, may have the reasonable fear of being the subject of such surveillance. (12) Since the nature and criteria of the National Security Agency (NSA) program is highly classified and unknown to the public, many other Americans who make frequent international calls, such as Americans engaged in international business, Americans with family overseas, and others, have a legitimate concern they may be the inadvertent targets of eavesdropping. (13) The President has sought and signed legislation including the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56), and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458), that have expanded authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. (14) It may be necessary and desirable to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to address new challenges in the Global War on Terrorism. The President should submit a request for legislation to Congress to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 if the President desires that the electronic surveillance authority provided by such Act be further modified. (15) The Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40), passed by Congress on September 14, 2001, authorized military action against those responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001, but did not contain legal authorization nor approve of domestic electronic surveillance for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information except as provided by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.). (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information may be conducted. (b) Future Congressional Action.--Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory authorization for electronic surveillance for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information, other than as an amendment the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific statutory (a) Report.--As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, but not later than 14 days after such date, the President shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report-- (1) on the Terrorist Surveillance Program of the National Security Agency; (2) on any program which involves the electronic surveillance of United States persons in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes, and which is conducted by any department, agency, or other element of the Federal Government, or by any entity at the direction of a department, agency, or other element of the Federal Government, without fully complying with the procedures set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.); and (3) including a description of each United States person who has been the subject of such electronic surveillance not authorized to be conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and the basis for the selection of each person for such electronic surveillance. (b) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form. (c) Access.--The Chair of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate shall provide each member of the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, access to the report submitted under subsection (a). Such access shall be provided in accordance with security procedures required for the review of classified information. (a) Authority for Additional Judges.--The first sentence of section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) is amended by striking ``judicial circuits'' and inserting ``judicial circuits, and any additional district court judges that the Chief Justice considers necessary for the prompt and timely consideration of applications under section 104,''; (b) Consideration of Emergency Applications.--Section 105(f) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(f)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``The judge receiving an application under this subsection shall review such application within 24 hours of the application being submitted.'' (b) In General.--Section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (6), by striking ``detailed description'' and inserting ``summary description''; (B) in paragraph (7)-- (i) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``techniques;'' and inserting ``techniques; and''; (ii) by striking subparagraph (D); and (iii) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (D); and (C) in paragraph (8), by striking ``a statement of the means'' and inserting ``a summary statement of the means''; and (2) in subsection (e)(1)(A), by striking ``or the Director of National Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence, or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (a) Conforming Amendment.--Section 105(a)(5) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(a)(5)) is amended by striking ``104(a)(7)(E)'' and inserting ``104(a)(7)(D)''. Section 105(d) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)), as redesignated by section 7(4), is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) An order issued under this section shall remain in force during the authorized period of surveillance notwithstanding the absence of the target from the United States, unless the Government files a motion to extinguish the order and the court grants the motion.''. Section 105(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(f)) is further amended by striking ``72 hours'' each place it appears and inserting ``168 hours''. Section 111 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811) is amended by striking ``the Congress'' and inserting ``the Congress or an authorization for the use of military force described in section 2(c)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541(c)(2)) if such authorization contains a specific authorization for electronic surveillance under this section.''. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended-- (1) by adding at the end of title I the following new section: (a) Office of Intelligence Policy and Review.-- (1) In general.--The Attorney General may hire and assign personnel to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation, modification, and review of applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) for orders approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes under section 105 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805). (2) Assignment.--The Attorney General shall assign personnel hired and assigned pursuant to paragraph (1) to and among appropriate offices of the National Security Agency in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the National Security Agency in preparing applications under section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of In this Act: (1) The term ``electronic surveillance'' has the meaning given the term in section 101(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(f)). (2) The term ``foreign intelligence information'' has the meaning given the term in section 101(e) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1801(e)).", u"This amendment essentially codifies a very important \nmemorandum of understanding between the Department of Homeland Security \nand the NSA, the National Security Agency. This is a perfect balance \nand exactly the kind of overcoming of stovepipes we need to see in our \ngovernment. Under existing law, the Department of Homeland Security has \nresponsibility for protecting nondefense government, Federal Government \ncyberspace--cyber networks--and the privately owned and operated \ncyberspace, \nwhich actually amounts to some of the most critical cyber \ninfrastructure in our country is privately owned. Today, as Senator McCain suggested, a target of attack by an enemy \nwanting to do us harm could be, for instance, our transit systems, \nfinancial systems, electric grid, and the like. What is embodied in \nthis memorandum of understanding between DHS and NSA--which we will, by \nthis amendment, codify into law--is to maintain the quite appropriate \ninterface of the Department of Homeland Security with the privately \nowned cyber-infrastructure and those who own and operate it, yet \nutilizing the unsurpassed capabilities of NSA. I appreciate that in this colloquy Senator McCain and I are entering \ninto, we both make clear--and I appreciate that his intention here in \noffering this amendment is not to circumvent the need for broader \nlegislation to protect our American cyberspace from theft, \nexploitation, and attack. It happens that the current occupant of the \nchair, the junior Senator from Rhode Island, has been a leader in this \nChamber in pushing us to deal with these kinds of problems. Senator Reid has announced that he will bring a comprehensive cyber-\nsecurity bill to the floor of the Senate in the first work period of \n2012. That is very good news for our security. As Senator McCain said, \nI don't know that we today have a more serious threat to our security \nthan that represented by those who would do us harm by attacking our \ncyber-systems, both public and private. This colloquy makes clear that \nthis is a very significant first step, and that we need to do something \nmore comprehensive and look forward to doing it on a bipartisan basis \nin the first work period in 2012.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise before you today to honor Mr. Charles T. ``Chuck'' Kennedy on the occasion of his retirement with the National Security Agency, NSA, after 31 years of distinguished service. As Chief of the Office of Contracting at NSA, Mr. Kennedy has been responsible for about 36,000 contracting actions per year. His expertise has been used in joint NSA initiatives with other countries and foreign contractors. Mr. Kennedy is also a member of NSA's Power, Space, and Cooling Triage Team. This cross-functional team, made up of leaders throughout the NSA Washington Enterprise, ensures that high-priority mission requirements receive the necessary power and cooling to function. Mr. Kennedy is also a member of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Procurement Executive Council. This interagency team examines procurement challenges, helps streamline processes and establishes contracts. Mr. Kennedy spent his entire career in the contracting field, graduating from his internship in 1983. Over the years, Mr. Kennedy progressed through various management levels that included Chief of the Signals Intelligence Directorate/Research & Development Contracting Office, Chief of the Information Technology Enterprise Contracting Office, Chief of the Mission Support Contracting Office and Chief of the Cost and Economic Analysis Contracting Office. Mr. Kennedy is a recipient of the Meritorious Civilian Service Award. This is NSA's second highest honorary award, given only to extraordinary individual achievements of major significance to NSA, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government. Mr. Kennedy holds two Masters of Science Degrees, a Bachelors of Science Degree and is a graduate of the NSA Senior Cryptologic Course. His certifications include Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act Certified Level 4--Acquisition Corps and NSA Logistician. He holds an unlimited Contracting Officer warrant. Mr. Kennedy and his wife Patti have been married for 34 years. They have three sons and three grandchildren. Mr. Speaker, I ask that you join with me today to honor Mr. Kennedy. His long and dedicated service to the United States government is an inspiration to all of us. It is with great pride that I congratulate Mr. Kennedy on his retirement and wish him the best of luck in the future. ", u"Mr. President, this Sunday, Marine Corps GySgt Thomas Boyd, who is currently serving as a legislative fellow in my office, will receive his promotion to master gunnery sergeant at his home in Uniontown, PA, surrounded by his wife Reagan and his family. I would like to take the opportunity to recognize Tom's accomplishments and selfless service to our Nation. Tom enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1996, following in the footsteps of his father, older brother, and great uncle. He immediately took on the very demanding occupational specialty of signals intelligence, which involves the collection and analysis of enemy communications. It is a unique and critically important specialty that accepts only the highest quality and most trustworthy marines, which tells you a lot about Tom's character. From 2005 to 2009 Tom was stationed at Fort Meade and served at the National Security Agency. His skills were put to the test in three combat deployments, two to Iraq and one to Afghanistan, during which he supported numerous counterterrorism operations that helped make those countries and our own more secure. The Department of Defense recognized his contributions with the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, one of the highest awards the Department can bestow upon a servicemember. Last year the Marine Corps selected Tom for its Congressional Fellowship Program, which, as my colleagues know, is highly selective. Tom is one of only two enlisted Marines selected to serve on Capitol Hill this year. While working in a Senate office is considerably less action-packed than the jobs he has had in the recent past, Tom has tackled all the tasks we have assigned to him with the overwhelming enthusiasm and tenacity we expect from our marines. I know some of our constituents who have met Tom are sometimes surprised to come to my office and find themselves across the table from ``Big Country,'' as Tom is affectionately known among his peers. Then they realize that not only is Tom as dedicated to serving them as any member of any Senator's staff but also that it can be a big advantage to have a man who was clearly born to be a leatherneck on their side. To my colleagues, should you see Tom walking the halls of the Senate, I ask that you take a moment to congratulate him on his promotion and thank him and his family for their sacrifices on behalf of our country. In his personality, professionalism, and selflessness, Tom Boyd reflects the best traditions of the U.S. Marine Corps.", u"Mr. Speaker, on December 20, 2012, I inadvertently cast a ``yes'' vote for this bill. I intended to vote ``no.'' There is no question that this legislation contains some important provisions that will benefit our troops and their families, including a small (1.7%) pay raise, special pay and bonuses (such as special retention pay for aviators, nurses, etc.), additional funding for family housing and support services, and other helpful measures. I was pleased that the final bill included a provision I authored that creates a permanent National Language Service Corps within the Defense Department. The NLSC currently exists as a pilot program that has recruited more than 1,800 members. To date, Corps members have worked with the Department of the Navy, the National Security Agency, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other federal agencies. For instance, the NLSC provided translation and interpretation support services to the U.S. Army Pacific for counterinsurgency training in Thailand. Far too few Americans can speak or understand foreign languages, and as a result, we are hampered in participating in global commerce and in defending our national security. The permanent establishment of the National Language Service Corps is a meaningful step toward helping our government meet its foreign language needs. Unfortunately, this bill fails to address some key issues of concern to my constituents. For example, the bill continues funding for an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle--a provocative and destabilizing system that will waste millions more on our failed national missile defense effort. The bill perpetuates a bloated nuclear weapons complex that does not enhance our security and in fact compromises our nonproliferation efforts. Worse, the bill continues to fund our combat operations in Afghanistan, instead of restricting the use of those funds to withdrawal-related operations only. There is simply no reason--military or political--for us to continue the war in Afghanistan. In the broadest sense, this bill continues the acquisition programs and policies that have been in place for decades. This bill does nothing to fundamentally reshape and downsize our armed forces. It continues Cold War weapons acquisition programs that have no place in a 21st century where the threats are vastly more diffuse and dispersed. For all these reasons, I cannot support this bill.", u"Mr. President, given the events of yesterday, this is the last opportunity for the next 5 years for the Congress to exercise a modest measure of real oversight over this intelligence surveillance law. Here is why. Colleagues, it is not real oversight when the Congress cannot get a yes or no answer to the question of whether an estimate currently exists as to whether law-abiding Americans have had their phone calls and e-mails swept up under the FISA law. That is the case today. Colleagues, it is not real oversight when the Congress cannot get a yes or no answer to the question of whether wholly domestic communications between law-abiding Americans in this country have been warrantlessly intercepted under the law. That is the case today. Colleagues, it is not real oversight when National Security Agency leadership states in a public forum that the Agency does not keep dossiers on millions of Americans and yet they will not give the Congress a yes or no answer as to whether the Agency collects any sort of data on millions of Americans. That is not the case today. What this amendment does is it gives us the opportunity to do real oversight--real oversight--by getting yes or no answers to questions that have been asked repeatedly by members of the Intelligence Committee. The amendment, in order to ensure that national security is protected at an important time in our country's history, gives the President of the United States unfettered discretion to redact any information he believes is necessary in order to protect the country's national security. The amendment does not require any agency to do new work. We have heard cited repeatedly it would be impossible to do an estimate on projections that have been discussed in the past. So we have changed course and we have said all we are seeking is a yes or no answer to the question of whether an estimate has actually been done. This is an important time for American security. It will always be an important time for American security. It is also an important time for American liberty, and this amendment ensures we can strike the appropriate balance between protecting our country's well-being and also protecting the individual liberties we all cherish. I reserve the remainder of my time.", u"Mr. Speaker, the United States loses several hundred of our greatest, those heroes of the Greatest Generation, every day. I speak of the World War II veterans whose valor, courage, and sacrifice stopped the evil shadow of the swastika from falling across the whole of humanity. One of those heroes we lost recently was Gerard L. LaRoche, a World War II veteran of D-Day and the Battle of the Bulge, Mr. Speaker. He was a Harvard-trained linguist who continued to serve his country after the war at the National Security Agency for many years. Gerard went home to be with his savior on October 6. He was 93 years old. Gerard was a Renaissance man. He was a translator, a language teacher, and a professor at several universities and colleges, a choral director, and a calligrapher. He was also a talented draftsman, Mr. Speaker, a violinist, a photographer, a recording engineer, and a furniture maker. Gerard was born of French-Canadian parents in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1920, the oldest of eight children and the son of a noted calligrapher and schoolteacher who encouraged his artistic talents. Mr. Speaker, in 1933, at age 13, Gerard entered the seminary of the Marist Order but left at 21 to study at Boston College, where he received his bachelor's degree and his master's. He specialized in the study of romance languages, and then the outbreak of World War II came and interrupted his studies. He enlisted in the Army and served with the 2nd Armored Division, where he was at Normandy on D-Day Plus Six, and at the Battle of the Bulge. His ability to speak many forms of French soon landed him as an aide to help U.S. military brass communicate with the Belgians and the French. Through all this, he found time to make sketches of the villages, cities, and countryside in England and in Europe. He eventually continued his studies until he received his masters from Harvard in romance philology. While stationed in the southwest of England, he met his future wife, his beloved Joyce Latchem, at a village dance just weeks before D-Day. They were married on October 18, 1947. And now, Mr. Speaker, for a time at least, Gerard has left behind his best friend and loyal wife, Joyce; his daughter, Marianne; two sons, Jerome and David; six grandchildren and 10 great-grandchildren. But they shall all meet again and gather together some day. Mr. Speaker, Gerard LaRoche was a godly man, a devoted patriot and willing soldier, a committed husband, father, and friend. This national treasure will be missed, and we, his fellow Americans, are forever grateful to this noble champion of human freedom. God bless Gerard.", u"Madam President, before the Internet, RCA knew how many records Elvis was selling every day. Before the Internet, Ford knew how many cars they were selling every day. Before the Internet, McDonald's could tell you how many hamburgers it sold each day. Yet the Obama administration cannot tell us how many Americans have tried to sign up for ObamaCare. They can't tell us how many people have tried to sign up for ObamaCare. They haven't told us what level of insurance they bought or in what ZIP Code they live. Not only can they not tell us, they have done their best to keep us from finding out. With WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden spilling our beans every day, what's happening on the ObamaCare exchanges is the only secret left in Washington. The National Security Agency should learn some lessons from Secretary Sebelius. We shouldn't have to rely on anonymous sources to get basic information about what's happening with the ObamaCare exchanges. Yesterday I introduced legislation to require the administration to tell Congress and the American people how many people have tried to sign up, how many did sign up, what level of insurance did they buy, in what ZIP Code do they live, and what the administration is doing to fix the problems. This isn't complicated information. In the Internet age, the administration ought to be able to provide this information every day. They should be able to provide it really every minute. We shouldn't have to pass a law to find these things out. So I hope every Senator will support my legislation. It is a six-page bill. It has been available to the public now for 24 hours. It is easy to read. The stakes are high for every American. So I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions be discharged from further consideration of S. 1590, a bill to require transparency in the operation of the American health benefit exchanges, and that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration. I further ask unanimous consent that the bill be read a third time and passed, and the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table.", u"Mr. President, I rise this evening to speak briefly about the delegation chosen by President Obama to represent the United States at the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2014 Olympic Winter Games in Sochi, Russia. I would also like to offer a few suggested additions to the delegation. As Members know, Janet Napolitano, former Secretary of Homeland Security, will lead the U.S. delegation to the opening ceremonies on February 7. Our Deputy Secretary of State, William Burns, will lead our delegation to the closing ceremonies on February 23. Our two delegations will include tennis legend Billy Jean King, gold medalist figure skater Brian Boitano, gold medalist figure skater Bonnie Blair, silver medalist hockey player Caitlin Cahow, and Olympic gold medalist speed skater Eric Heiden. These individuals are American sports figures who should be lauded for their contributions. I am confident they will represent us well. May I suggest with all seriousness that this delegation could well be expanded. Some have asked what message the President might be trying to send to Russia in choosing this delegation. White House Press Secretary Jay Carney asserted this morning that ``in the selection of the delegation, we are sending the message that the United States is a diverse place.'' Whether we are sending a message or simply pointing to our diversity, I submit our official delegation would be enhanced by adding the following: an American citizen of Russian parentage, perhaps a Russian orphan adopted and raised to adulthood by loving parents in the United States would be a good addition to this delegation or a Syrian American who has fled the barbaric and treacherous rule of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. In addition, an Iranian-American exile from the oppressive and murderous regime in Iran might make an outstanding addition to this delegation. I would also suggest that LTG Keith Alexander, the Director of the National Security Agency in this administration, would be an appropriate representative also of the United States of America. So whether it is messaging that is taking place or simply diversity, I strongly suggest this outstanding delegation could be improved by these individuals and perhaps others. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.", u"Mr. Speaker, as an original cosponsor of the USA Freedom Act, I am disappointed that I cannot support this bill as it is considered on the floor today. Like many Americans, I was shocked to learn about the National Security Agency's domestic spying program that was sweeping up the private communications records of millions of innocent Americans. It goes against American values and our Constitution. That's why two weeks ago I was pleased to join my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee in unanimously supporting the USA Freedom Act as it passed out of the committee. I believed that the compromise, while far from perfect, would help rebuild the public trust in government by ending bulk collection, assuring that government surveillance authorities are rule-bound, narrowly tailored, transparent and subject to oversight, all while ensuring that the nation's intelligence community can protect national security. Unfortunately, since then, negotiations with the Administration have resulted in this bill moving in the wrong direction. While I believe that the intent of this bill is to end bulk collection and I am glad that there is widespread agreement that Congress must act to end bulk collection, I am not convinced the bill effectively achieves this. The weakened definition of ``specific selection term'' must be addressed as this bill moves forward in order to provide absolute certainty that the legislative language achieves this intent, and that the bill's ban on bulk collection is air-tight. Today's bill simply fall short of what is needed to provide a clear guarantee to the public that the massive data collection by the NSA will be put to a full stop. I appreciate the efforts of the Committees and Leadership to support greater transparency in the bill. The transparency reporting amendment that I offered in the Judiciary Committee that is included in the bill will allow companies to disclose information regarding the number and nature of government demands for user information. However, the new manager's amendment that we are considering on the House floor today has weakened this provision by, for example, adding a two-year delay that prohibits companies from issuing transparency reports for new products or services. I offered several amendments to the Rules Committee to address my concerns with the weakened language in the manager's amendment, but none of these amendments were given an opportunity for debate or a vote on the House floor. I thank the Committees and the Leadership for their work to move this important conversation forward, but I simply cannot support the bill in its current form.", u' Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows: Mr. UPTON: Committee on Energy and Commerce. H.R. 4450. A bill to extend the Travel Promotion Act of 2009, and for other purposes, with an amendment (Rept. 113-542, Pt. 1). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union. Mr. ROYCE: Committee on Foreign Affairs. H.R. 4411. A bill to prevent Hezbollah and associated entities from gaining access to international financial and other institutions, and for other purposes; with an amendment (Rept. 113-543, Pt. 1). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union. Mr. GOODLATTE: Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 5036. A bill to amend title 17, United States Code, to extend expiring provisions of the Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act of 2010 (Rept. 113-544). Referred to the Committee on the Whole House on the state of the Union. Mr. GOODLATTE: Committee on the Judiciary. House Resolution 646. Resolution directing the Attorney General to transmit to the House of Representatives copies of any emails in the possession of the Department of Justice that were transmitted to or from the email account(s) of former Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations Division Director Lois Lerner between January 2009 and April 2011 (Rept. 113-545). Referred to the House Calendar. Ms. FOXX: Committee on Rules. House Resolution 677. Resolution providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3136) to establish a demonstration program for competency- based education, and providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 4984) to amend the loan counseling requirements under Higher Education Act of 1965, and for other purposes (Rept. 113-546). Referred to the House Calendar. Mr. McKEON: Committee on Armed Services. House Resolution 649. Resolution directing the Secretary of Defense to transmit to the House of Representatives copies of any emails in the possession of the Department of Defense or the National Security Agency that were transmitted to or from the email account(s) of former Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations Division Director Lois Lerner between January 2009 and April 2011 (Rept. 113-547). Referred to the House Calendar. Mr. GOODLATTE: Committee on the Judiciary. House Joint Resolution 105. Resolution conferring honorary citizenship of the United States on Bernardo de Galvez y Madrid, Viscount of Galveston and Count of Galvez (Rept. 113-548). Referred to the House Calendar.', u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The USA Freedom Act will protect our security and privacy. A recent Baltimore Sun editorial described legislation to reform the government's collection of Americans' phone and email data as a sign that ``bipartisan cooperation in Congress is not completely dead'' (``Reining in the surveillance state,'' May 5). We'd like to remind The Sun that similar legislation to end the mass storage of this data passed the House by an overwhelming bipartisan majority--it garnered more than 300 votes, in fact--over a year ago. In our role as leaders on the House Intelligence Committee, we drafted and introduced last year's bill together with our colleagues on the Judiciary Committee, Reps. Bob Goodlatte and John Conyers. Our success provided the foundation for the legislation that passed the House by an even larger margin on Wednesday. The USA Freedom Act ends the bulk collection of what we now know as ``metadata''--that big database up at the National Security Agency that contains the phone numbers of millions of Americans will go away. The government will now have to seek court approval before petitioning private cell phone companies for records. The court will have to approve each application, except in emergencies, and major court decisions will be made public. We need this reform to keep our country safe. Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which is the part that legalizes much of NSA's critical work to protect us from terrorists, expires in less than three weeks on June 1. If we do not reauthorize it with the reforms demanded by the public, essential capabilities to track legitimate terror suspects will expire, too. That couldn't happen at a worse time--we live in a dangerous world. The threats posed by ISIS and other terror groups are just the tip of the iceberg. We also need strong defenses against increasingly aggressive cyber terrorists and the ``lone wolf'' terrorists who are often American citizens, for example. This bill restores Americans' confidence that the government is not snooping on its own citizens by improving the necessary checks and balances essential to our Democracy. We helped write it last year, we support it this year and we hope Republicans and Democrats continue working together on common sense reforms to protect our national security and our civil liberties.", u"Madam President, reserving the right to object. The PATRIOT Act is a critical tool for our national security. The junior Senator from Utah is correct that three provisions do expire at the end of this month: the so-called roving wiretap provision that will allow intelligence professionals and law enforcement officials to track terrorists no matter what device they might use, the so-called ``lone wolf'' provision that would allow our intelligence authorities to identify and stop terrorists who are not necessarily clearly linked to an overseas terrorist organization, and, finally, section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which has enabled our intelligence professionals at the National Security Agency to help keep our country safe in the so-called telephony metadata program, which was unlawfully disclosed by Edward Snowden 2 years ago, which is why we are able to discuss such a highly classified program. The junior Senator from Utah and I disagree about the program and the legislation. There will be a time for that debate because it is the most important issue we could debating in the United States, our national security and the tools we need to keep our country safe. For the time being, we are on the trade promotion authority bill. That was a decision made last week. This is maybe not the decision that the junior Senator from Utah would have made, and it is not the decision I would have made, but that is where we are. Perhaps we could have been done with the TPA bill if the other side of the aisle had allowed amendments to be processed last week and if there had not been a needless filibuster of the motion to proceed to the bill, but that is water under the bridge. We should move forward in an orderly fashion and process the amendments that are pending on the trade promotion authority bill. We should have a final vote on that bill and then we should move on to the PATRIOT Act reauthorization bill. There will be time for robust debate in public, which is exactly what so many of our Members have been doing in private, given the classified nature of these programs. If we have to work beyond Thursday, I am more than happy to do that. I will even work on Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and into next week, if that is what is necessary to first process the trade bill and then finally to reauthorize the important provisions of the PATRIOT Act. Madam President, I object to the unanimous consent request.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2048, the USA Freedom Act. This bill makes important improvements to the PATRIOT Act, including to Section 2154, which is the underpinning of the National Security Agency's (NSA) nationwide bulk collection program. Yet a ruling last week by the Second Circuit found that the bulk collection of phone records under this section violated the law. The right to privacy is a fundamental American value. And it is clear that the practice of unconstitutional bulk data collection endangers that right. Last week's court decision underscores this--and makes clear that more robust surveillance reforms are needed. While the USA Freedom Act is a good step forward, it does not go far enough. And I recognize the hard work of my good friend and colleague, Ranking Member John Conyers, Jr., on this important bill. More than thirteen years after the passage of the PATRIOT Act, Congress must do more to balance our national security with the protection of our civil liberties. The USA Freedom Act should include more robust protections to prevent the surveillance of individuals with no nexus to terrorism or any specific investigation. This would ensure adequate protections against indiscriminate surveillance from the government and ensure that Section 215 cannot be used to collect Americans' records unrelated to any specific investigation. We should also be working for more robust minimization procedures to ensure that information collected under Section 215 is not stored in databases for years. This type of provision was included in a previous version of this bill and must be restored. We should also work to limit additional authorities outside of Section 215 that have been used to collect Americans' records in bulk. We know that the government has used other authorities--such as administrative subpoena laws--to collect Americans' records in bulk. And finally, H.R. 2048 should be amended to ensure that the government does not use authorities under Section 702 as a backdoor to conduct surveillance on Americans. Section 702 allows the government to intercept contents of Americans' electronic communications with individuals abroad--and stores them in a database--without a warrant. Reforms to Section 702 should be included in this bill. Mr. Speaker, I applaud my colleagues for working in bipartisan manner on this bill. Yet I believe that additional reforms were needed to adequately protect Americans' fundamental right to privacy. More than 13 years after the PATRIOT Act was first passed into law, it is time for Congress to let Section 215 expire and work toward serious and meaningful surveillance reform.", u"TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (a) Director of the National Security Agency.--Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3602) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(b)'' before ``There''; and (2) by inserting before subsection (b), as so designated by paragraph (1), the following: ``(a)(1) There is a Director of the National Security Agency. ``(2) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(3) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law or executive order.''. (b) Position of Importance and Responsibility.-- (1) In general.--The President may designate the Director of the National Security Agency as a position of importance and responsibility under section 601 of title 10, United States Code. (2) Effective date.--Paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in section 8G(a)(2), by striking ``the National Security Agency,''; and (2) in section 12-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or the Federal Cochairpersons of the Commissions established under section 15301 of title 40, United States Code;'' and inserting ``the Federal Cochairpersons of the Commissions established under section 15301 of title 40, United States Code; the Director of the National Security Agency;''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or the Commissions established under section 15301 of title 40, United States Code,'' and inserting ``the Commissions established under section 15301 of title 40, United States Code, the National Security Agency,''. (a) In General.--Except as otherwise specifically provided, the amendments made by sections 401 and 402 shall take effect on October 1, 2014, and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (1) in the case of section 401-- (A) the date of the first nomination by the President of an individual to serve as the Director of the National Security Agency that occurs on or after October 1, 2014; or (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of the Director of the National Security Agency by the individual performing such duties on October 1, 2014; and (2) in the case of section 402-- (A) the date of the first nomination by the President of an individual to serve as the Inspector General of the National Security Agency that occurs on or after October 1, 2014; or (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of the Inspector General of the National Security Agency by the individual performing such duties on October 1, (a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 106 the following: The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.)-- (1) in section 8G(a)(2), as amended by section 402, is further amended by striking ``the National Reconnaissance Office,''; and (2) in section 12, as amended by section 402, is further amended-- (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``or the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office;'' before ``as the case may be;''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``or the National Reconnaissance Office,'' before ``as the case may be;''. (a) In General.--The amendments made by sections 411 and 412 shall take effect on October 1, 2014, and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (1) in the case of section 411-- (A) the date of the first nomination by the President of an individual to serve as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office that occurs on or after October 1, 2014; or (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office by the individual performing such duties on October 1, 2014; and (2) in the case of section 412-- (A) the date of the first nomination by the President of an individual to serve as the Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance Office that occurs on or after October 1, 2014; or (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of the Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance Office by the individual performing such duties on October 1, 2014. (b) Exception for Initial Nominations.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(A) or (2)(A) of subsection (a), an individual serving as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office or the Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance Office on the date that the President first nominates an individual for such position on or after October 1, 2014, may continue to perform in that position after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to the position, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of the position. (c) Incumbent Inspector General.--The individual serving as Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance Office on the date of the enactment of this Act shall be eligible to be appointed by the President to a new term of service under section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.), by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Section 12 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3512) is amended-- (1) by striking the section heading and inserting ``gifts, devises, and bequests''; (2) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) by inserting ``by the Director as a gift to the Agency'' after ``accepted''; and (B) by striking ``this section'' and inserting ``this subsection''; (3) in subsection (b), by striking ``this section,'' and inserting ``subsection (a),''; (4) in subsection (c), by striking ``this section,'' and inserting ``subsection (a),''; (5) in subsection (d), by striking ``this section'' and inserting ``subsection (a)''; (6) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and (7) by inserting after subsection (e) the following: ``(f)(1) The Director may engage in fundraising in an official capacity for the benefit of nonprofit organizations that provide support to surviving family members of deceased Agency employees or that otherwise provide support for the welfare, education, or recreation of Agency employees, former Agency employees, or their family members. ``(2) In this subsection, the term `fundraising' means the raising of funds through the active participation in the promotion, production, or presentation of an event designed to raise funds and does not include the direct solicitation of money by any other means.''. Section 102A(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(j)) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Sensitive Compartmented Information'' and inserting ``Classified Information''; (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a semicolon; (3) in paragraph (4), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and (4) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(5) ensure that the background of each employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community, each contractor to an element of the intelligence community, and each individual employee of such a contractor who has been determined to be eligible for access to classified information is monitored on a continual basis under standards developed by the Director, including with respect to the frequency of evaluation, during the period of eligibility of such employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community, such contractor, or such individual employee to such a contractor to determine whether such employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community, such contractor, and such individual employee of such a contractor continues to meet the requirements for eligibility for access to classified information; and ``(6) develop procedures to require information sharing between elements of the intelligence community concerning potentially derogatory security information regarding an employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community, a contractor to an element of the intelligence community, or an individual employee of such a contractor that may impact the eligibility of such employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community, such contractor, or such individual employee of such a contractor for a security clearance.''. (a) Requirements.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(x) Requirements for Intelligence Community Contractors.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each department of the Federal Government that contains an element of the intelligence community and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall-- ``(1) ensure that-- ``(A) any contractor to an element of the intelligence community with access to a classified network or classified information develops and operates a security plan that is consistent with standards established by the Director of National Intelligence for intelligence community networks; and ``(B) each contract awarded by an element of the intelligence community includes provisions requiring the contractor comply with such plan and such standards; ``(2) conduct periodic assessments of each security plan required under paragraph (1)(A) to ensure such security plan complies with the requirements of such paragraph; and ``(3) ensure that the insider threat detection capabilities and insider threat policies of the intelligence community apply to facilities of contractors with access to a classified network.''. (b) Applicability.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to contracts entered into or renewed after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, shall conduct an analysis of the relative costs and benefits of potential improvements to the process for investigating persons who are proposed for access to classified information and adjudicating whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such information. (b) Contents of Analysis.--In conducting the analysis required by subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall evaluate the costs and benefits associated with-- (1) the elimination of manual processes in security clearance investigations and adjudications, if possible, and automating and integrating the elements of the investigation process, including-- (A) the clearance application process; (B) case management; (C) adjudication management; (D) investigation methods for the collection, analysis, storage, retrieval, and transfer of data and records; and (E) records management for access and eligibility determinations; (2) the elimination or reduction, if possible, of the use of databases and information sources that cannot be accessed and processed automatically electronically, or modification of such databases and information sources, to enable electronic access and processing; (3) the use of government-developed and commercial technology for continuous monitoring and evaluation of government and commercial data sources that can identify and flag information pertinent to adjudication guidelines and eligibility determinations; (4) the standardization of forms used for routine reporting required of cleared personnel (such as travel, foreign contacts, and financial disclosures) and use of continuous monitoring technology to access databases containing such reportable information to independently obtain and analyze reportable data and events; (5) the establishment of an authoritative central repository of personnel security information that is accessible electronically at multiple levels of classification and eliminates technical barriers to rapid access to information necessary for eligibility determinations and reciprocal recognition thereof; (6) using digitally processed fingerprints, as a substitute for ink or paper prints, to reduce error rates and improve portability of data; (7) expanding the use of technology to improve an applicant's ability to discover the status of a pending security clearance application or reinvestigation; and (8) using government and publicly available commercial data sources, including social media, that provide independent information pertinent to adjudication guidelines to improve quality and timeliness, and reduce costs, of investigations and reinvestigations. (c) Report to Congress.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of The head of the entity selected pursuant to section 3001(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(b)) shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report each year through 2017 that describes for the preceding year-- (1) the periods of time required by authorized adjudicative agencies for accepting background investigations and determinations completed by an authorized investigative entity or authorized adjudicative agency; (2) the total number of cases in which a background investigation or determination completed by an authorized investigative entity or authorized adjudicative agency is accepted by another agency; (3) the total number of cases in which a background investigation or determination completed by an authorized investigative entity or authorized adjudicative agency is not accepted by another agency; and (4) such other information or recommendations as the head of the entity selected pursuant to such section 3001(b) considers appropriate. (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until December 31, 2017, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategic plan for updating the process for periodic reinvestigations consistent with a continuous evaluation program. (b) Contents.--The plan required by subsection (a) shall include-- (1) an analysis of the costs and benefits associated with conducting periodic reinvestigations; (2) an analysis of the costs and benefits associated with replacing some or all periodic reinvestigations with a program of continuous evaluation; (3) a determination of how many risk-based and ad hoc periodic reinvestigations are necessary on an annual basis for each component of the Federal Government with employees with security clearances; (4) an analysis of the potential benefits of expanding the Government's use of continuous evaluation tools as a means of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of procedures for confirming the eligibility of personnel for continued access to classified information; and (5) an analysis of how many personnel with out-of-scope background investigations are employed by, or contracted or detailed to, each element of the intelligence community. (c) Periodic Reinvestigations Defined.--In this section, the term ``periodic reinvestigations'' has the meaning given that term in section 3001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(a)). In this title, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the congressional intelligence committees; (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and (3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives. TITLE VI--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) General Responsibility.-- (1) In general.--Section 3001(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(b)) is amended-- (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``Not'' and inserting ``Except as otherwise provided, not''; (B) in paragraph (5), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; (C) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (D) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following: ``(7) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014-- ``(A) developing policies and procedures that permit, to the extent practicable, individuals to appeal a determination to suspend or revoke a security clearance or access to classified information and to retain their government employment status while such challenge is pending; and ``(B) developing and implementing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure proper protections during the process for denying, suspending, or revoking a security clearance or access to classified information, including the ability to appeal such a denial, suspension, or revocation, except that there shall be no appeal of an agency's suspension of a security clearance or access determination for purposes of conducting an investigation, if that suspension lasts no longer than 1 year or the head of the agency or a designee of the head of the agency certifies that a longer suspension is needed before a final decision on denial or revocation to prevent imminent harm to the national security.''. (2) Required elements of policies and procedures.--The policies and procedures for appeal developed under paragraph (7) of section 3001(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as added by subsection (a), shall provide for the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, or the inspector general of the employing agency, to conduct fact-finding and report to the agency head or the designee of the agency head within 180 days unless the employee and the agency agree to an extension or the investigating inspector general determines in writing that a greater period of time is required. To the fullest extent possible, such fact-finding shall include an opportunity for the employee to present relevant evidence such as witness testimony. (b) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access Determinations.--Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(j) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access Determinations.-- ``(1) In general.--Agency personnel with authority over personnel security clearance or access determinations shall not take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, any action with respect to any employee's security clearance or access determination in retaliation for-- ``(A) any lawful disclosure of information to the Director of National Intelligence (or an employee designated by the Director of National Intelligence for such purpose) or the head of the employing agency (or employee designated by the head of that agency for such purpose) by an employee that the employee reasonably believes evidences-- ``(i) a violation of any Federal law, rule, or regulation; or ``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; ``(B) any lawful disclosure to the Inspector General of an agency or another employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the employee reasonably believes evidences-- ``(i) a violation of any Federal law, rule, or regulation; or ``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; ``(C) any lawful disclosure that complies with-- ``(i) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (h) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.); ``(ii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or ``(iii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of section 103H(k)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)); and ``(D) if the actions do not result in the employee or applicant unlawfully disclosing information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction with-- ``(i) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation; ``(ii) testimony for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of any right referred to in clause (i); or ``(iii) cooperation with or disclosing information to the Inspector General of an agency, in accordance with applicable provisions of law in connection with an audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the Inspector General. ``(2) Rule of construction.--Consistent with the protection of sources and methods, nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to authorize the withholding of information from Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who lawfully discloses information to Congress. ``(3) Disclosures.-- ``(A) In general.--A disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) because-- ``(i) the disclosure was made to a person, including a supervisor, who participated in an activity that the employee reasonably believed to be covered by paragraph (1)(A)(ii); ``(ii) the disclosure revealed information that had been previously disclosed; ``(iii) the disclosure was not made in writing; ``(iv) the disclosure was made while the employee was off duty; or ``(v) of the amount of time which has passed since the occurrence of the events described in the disclosure. ``(B) Reprisals.--If a disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) if any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action with respect to the employee making the disclosure, took, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to that employee in reprisal for the disclosure. ``(4) Agency adjudication.-- ``(A) Remedial procedure.--An employee or former employee who believes that he or she has been subjected to a reprisal prohibited by paragraph (1) may, within 90 days after the issuance of notice of such decision, appeal that decision within the agency of that employee or former employee through proceedings authorized by subsection (b)(7), except that there shall be no appeal of an agency's suspension of a security clearance or access determination for purposes of conducting an investigation, if that suspension lasts not longer than 1 year (or a longer period in accordance with a certification made under subsection (b)(7)). ``(B) Corrective action.--If, in the course of proceedings authorized under subparagraph (A), it is determined that the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1), the agency shall take specific corrective action to return the employee or former employee, as nearly as practicable and reasonable, to the position such employee or former employee would have held had the violation not occurred. Such corrective action may include back pay and related benefits, travel expenses, and compensatory damages not to exceed $300,000. ``(C) Contributing factor.--In determining whether the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1), the agency shall find that paragraph (1) was violated if a disclosure described in paragraph (1) was a contributing factor in the adverse security clearance or access determination taken against the individual, unless the agency demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence of such disclosure, giving the utmost deference to the agency's assessment of the particular threat to the national security interests of the United States in the instant matter. ``(5) Appellate review of security clearance access determinations by director of national intelligence.-- ``(A) Appeal.--Within 60 days after receiving notice of an adverse final agency determination under a proceeding under paragraph (4), an employee or former employee may appeal that determination in accordance with the procedures established under subparagraph (B). ``(B) Policies and procedures.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and implement policies and procedures for adjudicating the appeals authorized by subparagraph (A). ``(C) Congressional notification.--Consistent with the protection of sources and methods, at the time the Director of National Intelligence issues an order regarding an appeal pursuant to the policies and procedures established by this paragraph, the Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees. ``(6) Judicial review.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit or require judicial review of any-- ``(A) agency action under this section; or ``(B) action of the appellate review procedures established under paragraph (5). ``(7) Private cause of action.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit, authorize, or require a private cause of action to challenge the merits of a security clearance determination.''. (c) Access Determination Defined.--Section 3001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(9) Access determination.--The term `access determination' means the determination regarding whether an employee-- ``(A) is eligible for access to classified information in accordance with Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access to classified information), or any successor thereto, and Executive Order 10865 (25 Fed. Reg. 1583; relating to safeguarding classified information with industry), or any successor thereto; and ``(B) possesses a need to know under such an Order.''. (d) Existing Rights Preserved.--Nothing in this section or the amendments made by this section shall be construed to preempt, preclude, or otherwise prevent an individual from exercising rights, remedies, or avenues of redress currently provided under any other law, regulation, or rule. (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341), as amended by this title, shall be construed to require the repeal or replacement of agency appeal procedures implementing Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access to classified information), or any successor thereto, and Executive Order 10865 (25 Fed. Reg. 1583; relating to safeguarding classified information with industry), or any successor thereto, that meet the requirements of paragraph (7) of section 3001(b) of such Act, as added by this section. (a) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) If the head of an establishment determines that a complaint or information transmitted under paragraph (1) would create a conflict of interest for the head of the establishment, the head of the establishment shall return the complaint or information to the Inspector General with that determination and the Inspector General shall make the transmission to the Director of National Intelligence and, if the establishment is within the Department of Defense, to the Secretary of Defense. In such a case, the requirements of this section for the head of the establishment apply to each recipient of the Inspector General's transmission.''; (2) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (i); and (3) by inserting after subsection (g) the following: ``(h) An individual who has submitted a complaint or information to an Inspector General under this section may notify any member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, or a staff member of either such Committee, of the fact that such individual has made a submission to that particular Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was made.''. (b) Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B)-- (A) by inserting ``(i)'' after ``(B)''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(ii) If the Director determines that a complaint or information transmitted under paragraph (1) would create a conflict of interest for the Director, the Director shall return the complaint or information to the Inspector General with that determination and the Inspector General shall make the transmission to the Director of National Intelligence. In such a case, the requirements of this subsection for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency apply to the Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(H) An individual who has submitted a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this section may notify any member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, or a staff member of either such Committee, of the fact that such individual has made a submission to the Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was made.''. (c) National Security Act of 1947.--Section 103H(k)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(I) An individual who has submitted a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this section may notify any member of either of the congressional intelligence committees, or a staff member of either of such committees, of the fact that such individual has made a submission to the Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was made.''. (a) Covered Intelligence Community Element Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered intelligence community element''-- (1) means-- (A) the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and (B) any executive agency or unit thereof determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal function the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities; and (2) does not include the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (b) Regulations.--In consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop policies and procedures to ensure that a personnel action shall not be taken against an employee of a covered intelligence community element as a reprisal for any disclosure of information described in 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 601 of this Act. (c) Report on the Status of Implementation of Regulations.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a report on the status of the implementation of the regulations promulgated under subsection (b) to the congressional intelligence committees. (d) Nonapplicability to Certain Terminations.--Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 601 of this Act, and section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341), as amended by section 602 of this Act, shall not apply if-- (1) the affected employee is concurrently terminated under-- (A) section 1609 of title 10, United States Code; (B) the authority of the Director of National Intelligence under section 102A(m) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(m)), if the Director determines that the termination is in the interest of the United States; (C) the authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 104A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3036(e)), if the Director determines that the termination is in the interest of the United States; or (D) section 7532 of title 5, United States Code, if the head of the agency determines that the termination is in the interest of the United States; and (2) not later than 30 days after such termination, the head of the agency that employed the affected employee notifies Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3521) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(1)(D), by striking ``section (a)'' and inserting ``subsection (a)''; and (2) in subsection (c)(2)(E), by striking ``provider.'' and inserting ``provider''. Section 101(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(a)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (5), by striking the semicolon and inserting ``; and''; (2) by striking paragraphs (6) and (7); (3) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (6); and (4) in paragraph (6) (as so redesignated), by striking ``the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board,''. (a) Amendments.--Section 506 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-277; 126 Stat. 2478) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Section 606(5)'' and inserting ``Paragraph (5) of section 605''; and (2) by inserting ``, as redesignated by section 310(a)(4)(B) of this Act,'' before ``is amended''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-277).", u"Madam Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to a young man who died in service to his country and whose name will be forever immortalized at the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) in Corona, California. Cryptologic Technician, Technical, Petty Officer First Class Steven P. Daugherty is an American hero and I know that the men and women who work at NSWC, Corona are honored to have his name grace their new Joint Warfare Assessment Laboratory Building. Today, Armed Forces Day, would have been Steven's 30th birthday. Steven P. Daugherty was born in Apple Valley, California, and was killed in action July 6, 2007, in Baghdad, Iraq, by an improvised explosive device (IED). Steven excelled at an early age: he was student of the month at Barstow High School and made the honor roll at Barstow Community College. After graduating with an associate's degree in liberal studies, Steven enlisted in the Navy, where he worked as part of an elite Navy SEAL team. On that fateful day in July, Petty Officer Steven and his team were returning from an important mission when their vehicle struck an IED, killing him and the two other members of his unit. According to the National Security Agency, the work he and his team performed earlier in the day played a decisive role in thwarting a dangerous group of insurgents trying to kill coalition forces. Today, across from our Nation's Capitol, Steven rests in peace in the sacred ground of Arlington National Cemetery. Steven was respected by his peers as a professional and dedicated cryptologic technician, and his work was vital to the success of important combat missions. He was a decorated Sailor, having been awarded a Bronze Star (with combat ``V'' for Valor), the Purple Heart, a Combat Action Ribbon and other medals and commendations. His name is inscribed on National Security Agency's Memorial Wall, ``They Served in Silence.'' Steven is also the first formal recipient of the National Intelligence Medal for Valor. Steven was a loving 28-year-old father to an adoring 5-year-old son; a loyal brother to three fellow warfighters--two Airmen and one Soldier, Richard, Robert, and Kristine; and a faithful son to his parents, Thomas and Lydia. Most of all, Steven P. Daugherty was a patriot who gave the full measure of devotion defending America's freedom. In naming this important building to honor the sacrifice of Petty Officer Steven P. Daugherty, the Navy dedicates to him the latest addition to the Nation's premiere Joint Warfare Assessment Laboratory at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division. The Daugherty Memorial Assessment Center will stand as an ever-present reminder of Steven--and to every Sailor, Marine, Soldier, and Airman who has given their life in defense of this country. This dedication also commemorates the groundbreaking work NSWC, Corona is doing to support the Joint IED Defeat Organization in its mission to combat the threat of IEDs against our Armed Forces. In addition to supporting needed counter-IED efforts, the Daugherty Memorial Assessment Center greatly enhances NSWC Corona's ability to support key national missions. NSWC, Corona will provide Strike Group interoperability assessment needed to certify ships for deployment; provide critical flight analysis for all Navy surface missile systems; provide performance assessment of Aegis and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships throughout their entire lifecycle; and finally, NSWC, Corona will centralize, process, and distribute the Navy's combat and weapon system data on one of the largest classified networks in the Department of Defense. The Daugherty Memorial Assessment Center is a state-of-the-art analysis and assessment asset that gives the Nation extensive capability to protect our Armed Forces, our country, and our freedom. May the new Daugherty Memorial Assessment Center serve as a reminder to the men and women who carry out the mission of NSWC, Corona how very important their work is to our troops. And may we pledge to always remember Steven P. Daugherty; the goodness he brought to our world and the sacrifice he has made will never be forgotten.", u"SA 3929. Mr. LEAHY (for himself, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Menendez, and Ms. Mikulski) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2248, to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, to modernize and streamline the provisions of that Act, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: On page 82, after the matter following line 5, add the following: (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (2) Terrorist surveillance program and program.--The terms ``Terrorist Surveillance Program'' and ``Program'' mean the intelligence activity involving communications that was authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007. (b) Reviews.-- (1) Requirement to conduct.--The Inspectors General of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Justice, the National Security Agency, and any other element of the intelligence community that participated in the Terrorist Surveillance Program shall work in conjunction to complete a comprehensive review of, with respect to the oversight authority and responsibility of each such Inspector General-- (A) all of the facts necessary to describe the establishment, implementation, product, and use of the product of the Program; (B) the procedures and substance of, and access to, the legal reviews of the Program; (C) communications with, and participation of, individuals and entities in the private sector related to the Program; (D) interaction with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and transition to court orders related to the Program; and (E) any other matters identified by any such Inspector General that would enable that Inspector General to report a complete description of the Program, with respect to such element. (2) Cooperation.--Each Inspector General required to conduct a review under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) work in conjunction, to the extent possible, with any other Inspector General required to conduct such a review; and (B) utilize to the extent practicable, and not unnecessarily duplicate or delay, such reviews or audits that have been completed or are being undertaken by any such Inspector General or by any other office of the Executive Branch related to the Program. (c) Reports.-- (1) Preliminary reports.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Justice, and the National Security Agency, in conjunction with any other Inspector General required to conduct a review under subsection (b)(1), shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an interim report that describes the planned scope of such review. (2) Final report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General required to conduct such a review shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress, to the extent practicable, a comprehensive report on such reviews that includes any recommendations of any such Inspectors General within the oversight authority and responsibility of any such Inspector General with respect to the reviews. (3) Form.--A report submitted under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The unclassified report shall not disclose the name or identity of any individual or entity of the private sector that participated in the Program or with whom there was communication about the Program. (d) Resources.-- (1) Expedited security clearance.--The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the investigation and adjudication of an application by an Inspector General or any appropriate staff of an Inspector General for a security clearance necessary for the conduct of the review under subsection (b)(1) is carried out as expeditiously as possible. (2) Additional legal and other personnel for the inspectors general.--An Inspector General required to conduct a review under subsection (b)(1) and submit a report under subsection (c) is authorized to hire such additional legal or other personnel as may be necessary to carry out such review and prepare such report in a prompt and timely manner. Personnel authorized to be hired under this paragraph-- (A) shall perform such duties relating to such a review as the relevant Inspector General shall direct; and (B) are in addition to any other personnel authorized by law.", u"Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank our ranking member, Mr. LaTourette, for yielding time to me, and I am pleased to speak on an important reauthorization measure, and that's reauthorization of our Coast Guard. Unfortunately, I'm told that even if we pass this bill today, and it will not be passed in totality, it still must be conferenced with the other body, that this authorization is only good through the end of this fiscal year. And, unfortunately, this reauthorization has been delayed, and we will find ourselves back at the beginning gate, starting gate, so to speak. That's one of my disappointments. First, though, before I get into my disappointments, let me commend, first of all, our ranking member, Mr. LaTourette. He's worked tirelessly as the Republican leader of the Coast Guard Subcommittee to try to bring this reauthorization legislation together. He's taken some absolutely terrible proposals that first came out and made them much, much better, and I commend Mr. LaTourette for his hard work on this and trying to reach compromise. I also compliment Mr. Oberstar, my counterpart in the committee, heads up the Democrat side, our chairman, for his efforts to try to bring about bipartisan compromise on the legislation. Mr. Cummings, the chairman of the Coast Guard Subcommittee, has worked with our ranking member. So I thank all of them. Their efforts have been good, and I'm going to cast a vote in favor of this to move the process forward, and I think that's incumbent in my particular position to try to continue to make the bill better. This is a good reauthorization start. I do have two major concerns that I want to say that I am not pleased with, the administration is not pleased with, and I think the United States Coast Guard is not pleased with. First of all, I have opposition to two provisions. Let me speak about the first one, and one you heard a lot about, the safety regime that's created in this bill. Unfortunately, this particular provision, while it may sound good that the safety is being addressed, it really destroys the command and control function that is so essential in a national security agency. Now the Coast Guard's primary responsibility is one of national security. It's also safety, but it is first and foremost, a national security agency. And this regime sets up an unprecedented bureaucracy. It also destroys the command approach that we have had in our services. In fact, it would prescribe the duties, qualifications, and set up a chain of command of senior Coast Guard officials. This represents an extraordinary intrusion upon the service chiefs' authority to command and control a branch of the Armed Forces and, ultimately, the ability of the Secretary and the President to deploy the Coast Guard in an emergency. Now this isn't just my evaluation. This is the Coast Guard, this is the administration, the President's evaluation of what the current language would do. Unfortunately again, we still have this provision that needs to be worked on, and we need to make certain that national security, the ability to command and control a branch of the armed services is not damaged. The second reason that I have concern about this legislation is that unfortunately, the waterside security provisions here that relate to liquefied natural gas terminals and liquefied natural gas tankers requires the Coast Guard to provide security in a manner that is contrary to the existing assistance framework and also at odds with assisted risk-management practices. In simple layman's terms, what's happening is right now when we're having a difficulty of getting a supply of natural gas, and gas prices are soaring. People are seeing natural gas prices reach record levels. We're creating more redtape, more impediments and setting up another regime in which we will limit the supply and also actually create more impediments to getting the supply so the cost can go down and the people who have access to probably one of the best sources of energy has the least amount of damage of any of the fossil fuels to our environment. So those are my two concerns. But, again, I'm going to support the measure. I'm hoping that through conference, we can make the bill much better, that we can address the command regime that's set up here in a new safety bureaucracy, that we can also make certain that we have a supply of liquefied natural gas, access to liquefied natural gas and also bring the prices down for the consumer who's under incredible pressure right now trying to pay bills, meet the costs of increasing energy. So those are my concerns. Again, I want to thank all of the members who've worked on this in the committee, the ranking member Mr. LaTourette, Mr. Oberstar, and Mr. Cummings for their efforts.", u"Mr. Speaker, in December 2005, we learned that the Bush administration was using the National Security Agency, the NSA, to eavesdrop on Americans on U.S. soil without a warrant or judicial oversight, in violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Over a year later, Congress has yet to address this issue, and the NSA's secret surveillance program has continued unabated. Just last week the administration continued its unilateral approach, announcing that notwithstanding its protestations last year, that it could not possibly allow the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to oversee the NSA program; it would now submit to the court's jurisdiction, but not tell the Congress how the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court would oversee the program or why its policies have changed. When Members of Congress questioned the Attorney General and the National Intelligence Director regarding this shift in policy, both officials refused to provide information regarding the nature of the administration's new policy in this area. Indeed, we have no idea whether the administration is now seeking warrants on an individualized basis or broad programmatic approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Congressional silence in this area and others has had other repercussions. Earlier this month Congress was again caught by surprise when we learned that the President has claimed potentially sweeping new powers to open Americans' mail without a court warrant. Again, the administration could obtain a warrant, and quickly, from a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judge, but has chosen not to submit this effort to court supervision. Interestingly, the developments over the last year bear a striking resemblance to events that occurred some 30 years ago, when a series of troubling reports began appearing in the press concerning domestic intelligence activities and surveillance of political activities of U.S. citizens. These revelations and others revealed by the Watergate scandal convinced lawmakers that Congress had been too permissive and trusting, failing to carry out its oversight responsibilities over the executive branch. In response, a U.S. Senate committee was formed to investigate intelligence activities by the government. The United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, commonly referred to as the Church committee, after its Senate chairman, issued more than 50,000 pages of reports in what is considered the most comprehensive review of intelligence activities in the country. Ironically, the reports included sections on mail opening as well as the National Security Agency and fourth amendment rights. In rebuffing recent congressional requests for information on the current NSA program, the administration has made the argument that the NSA surveillance program is too sensitive to be shared with Congress, even to Members in the classified setting. When these same concerns were weighed by the Church committee in 1975, the opposite result was reached, with the committee refusing to neglect its oversight responsibility merely because their work would be harder. In fact, the extensive oversight and the substantial record generated by the Church committee inspired the creation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Both have worked effectively to ensure that the President has the tools necessary to thwart attacks while ensuring respect for the civil liberties of Americans and the adherence to the rule of law. FISA, as it is called, has provided a measure of oversight over foreign intelligence activities on U.S. soil, and with it the confidence of the American people. This administration, however, has undermined that trust by circumventing FISA. Congress should follow the example of the Church committee, by vigorously examining the NSA surveillance program and determining what legislative action is necessary. The administration should cooperate and work with Congress as we engage in our oversight responsibilities, and make the case for statutory change if revisions are required to meet new challenges in the war on terror. If, however, the administration rejects congressional oversight in this area and continues to defy requests for information, Congress should seek other means of redress. I have introduced bipartisan legislation with Representative Jeff Flake that can serve as a basis for examining these issues and restoring the rule of law. The NSA Oversight Act, H.R. 11, would reiterate existing law requiring court approval for the surveillance of Americans on American soil, and would provide greater oversight of NSA's surveillance activity. Our legislation also makes some key changes to FISA in order to streamline and expedite the process in response to the administration's argument that the current framework was too cumbersome. Mr. Speaker, I urge the Congress to fully examine this issue, step up its oversight responsibility, and take legislative action if necessary.", u" The amendment is as follows: In section 601(i)(2)(C) (relating to other documents)-- (1) strike clause (VI) (relating to sworn affidavits); (2) in clause (V), strike the semicolon at the end and insert a period; and (3) in clause (IV), add ``and'' at the end. Strike section 604 (relating to mandatory disclosure of information) and insert the following: (a) In General.--Except as otherwise provided in this section, no Federal agency or bureau, or any officer or employee of such agency or bureau, may-- (1) use the information furnished by the applicant pursuant to an application filed under section 601 and 602, for any purpose, other than to make a determination on the application; (2) make any publication through which the information furnished by any particular applicant can be identified; or (3) permit anyone other than the sworn officers, employees or contractors of such agency, bureau, or approved entity, as approved by the Secretary of Homeland Security, to examine individual applications that have been filed. (b) Required Disclosures.--The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall provide the information furnished pursuant to an application filed under section 601 and 602, and any other information derived from such furnished information, to-- (1) a law enforcement entity, intelligence agency, national security agency, component of the Department of Homeland Security, court, or grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution or a national security investigation or prosecution, in each instance about an individual suspect or group of suspects, when such information is requested by such entity; (2) a law enforcement entity, intelligence agency, national security agency, or component of the Department of Homeland Security in connection with a duly authorized investigation of a civil violation, in each instance about an individual suspect or group of suspects, when such information is requested by such entity; or (3) an official coroner for purposes of affirmatively identifying a deceased individual, whether or not the death of such individual resulted from a crime. (c) Inapplicability After Denial.--The limitations under subsection (a)-- (1) shall apply only until an application filed under section 601 and 602 is denied and all opportunities for administrative appeal of the denial have been exhausted; and (2) shall not apply to the use of the information furnished pursuant to such application in any removal proceeding or other criminal or civil case or action relating to an alien whose application has been granted that is based upon any violation of law committed or discovered after such grant. (d) Criminal Convictions.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, information concerning whether the applicant has at any time been convicted of a crime may be used or released for immigration enforcement and law enforcement purposes. (e) Auditing and Evaluation of Information.--The Secretary may audit and evaluate information furnished as part of any application filed under sections 601 and 602, any application to extend such status under section 601(k), or any application to adjust status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence under section 602, for purposes of identifying fraud or fraud schemes, and may use any evidence detected by means of audits and evaluations for purposes of investigating, prosecuting or referring for prosecution, denying, or terminating immigration benefits. (f) Use of Information in Petitions and Applications Subsequent to Adjustment of Status.--If the Secretary has adjusted an alien's status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence pursuant to section 602, then at any time thereafter the Secretary may use the information furnished by the alien in the application for adjustment of status or in the applications for status pursuant to sections 601 or 602 to make a determination on any petition or application. (g) Criminal Penalty.--Whoever knowingly uses, publishes, or permits information to be examined in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000. (h) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the use, or release, for immigration enforcement purposes of information contained in files or records of the Secretary or Attorney General pertaining to an applications filed under sections 601 or 602, other than information furnished by an applicant pursuant to the application, or any other information derived from the application, that is not available from any other source. (i) References.--References in this section to section 601 or 602 are references to sections 601 and 602 of this Act and the amendments made by those sections.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the conference report on H.R. 2082, the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act. I share many of the concerns raised by Ranking Member Hoekstra, but my primary purpose in speaking today is to express my distaste for the bloated bureaucracy created by this legislation. Mr. Speaker, 3 short years ago the House voted to create a Director of National Intelligence: a small, agile intelligence shop meant primarily to improve coordination and information analysis among and between the various intelligence--gathering agencies. At that time, Democrats fought hard to turn the new agency into a large bureaucracy, replete with a chief information officer, a chief human capital officer, a chief financial officer, an out-of-control inspector general, a comptroller, an ombudsman, multiple privacy officers, and a civil liberties board with unlimited subpoena power--layer upon layer upon layer. But we remained focused on creating better government rather than bigger government, and efforts to create more redundant bureaucracy were ultimately defeated. For better or for worse, the party of smaller government is no longer in control, and this legislation is a perfect example. Evidence of bureaucratic creep is marbled throughout this legislation, from the creation of new offices to forcing even more officials through the cumbersome and slow Senate confirmation process. But nowhere is the problem more prevalent than in the creation of an inspector general for the intelligence community. On the surface, no one can argue against the need for a robust inspector general within the disparate intelligence community. In fact, the creation of one, unified and cohesive IG to oversee all intelligence activities of the Federal Government would probably be a step in the right direction. But that's not what this legislation does. Instead, this bill creates a new IG and places that office awkwardly on top of the many existing IGs at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. As if creating another layer of unnecessary bureaucracy within the intelligence oversight community was not enough, the legislation goes the extra step of elevating the IGs at the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. It's inevitable the existence of six separate IGs within the intelligence community will lead to duplication of effort and turf battles between them. The conferees admit it. Conceding they're creating more problems than they're solving, they direct the IGs to ``expeditiously resolve'' any disputes or turf battles that may arise between them. After spending years trying to find ways to make the intelligence gathering and analysis more streamlined and efficient, this legislation does an about-face, loading up the intelligence community with more bureaucracy and bigger government. Which leads me to my next concern with the legislation: H.R. 2082 represents a significant step backwards in our efforts to modernize our security clearance process. Several years ago, the 9/11 Commission recommended an overhaul of the government's woefully backlogged security clearance process, proposing uniform application, investigation and adjudication procedures as well as a single database to store clearance information. In 2004 Congress responded by enacting the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which placed a single Federal agency in charge of security clearance processes Government-wide and established a unified database for information related to security clearances. Rather than assisting that ongoing effort, H.R. 2082 compounds past problems by allowing the intelligence community to continue to operate in isolated stovepipes. The conference report does this in two ways. First, it places the Director of National Intelligence in charge of developing a ``multi-level security clearance approach'' only for the intelligence community. Separate from the otherwise ``government-wide'' system now being developed, the mandated multi-level system would somehow allow the intelligence community to clear foreign- born applicants better and faster than everyone else. It's not clear how. It's not even clear what this mythical ``multi-level'' approach would do differently in terms of current clearance levels: Confidential, Secret, Top Secret and SCI. But it is painfully clear this is an effort to keep the intelligence agencies from taking part in the larger reform effort. Second, as if to underscore the drive to make sure there are no uniform clearance standards, the bill specifically exempts the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency from the Government-wide system so they can duplicate the whole process on their own. As the primary sponsor of the 2004 legislation calling for a modernized, uniform security clearance process for the Federal Government, I fear these supposed ``reforms'' will do nothing to help improve the security clearance backlog and will likely exacerbate the problems of inconsistent standards, slow processing and a lack of clearance reciprocity. As the former Chairman of the Government Reform Committee, I invested considerable time and energy into highlighting overlap and duplication in Government and finding ways to streamline federal programs and processes. And I think we made some progress in that regard. But H.R. 2082 represents a stark contrast to our efforts to streamline Government. It expands the Federal bureaucracy and propagates the existing stovepipes that have long hindered our efforts to bring the federal government into the 21st century. I urge my colleagues to oppose this legislation.", u"Mr. Speaker, I have reservations about this bill, but I will vote for it today. It is similar to one that I supported earlier this year but that failed to receive the two-thids vote necessary for passage under the procedure that applied to its consideration. In my opinion, the RESTORE Act is far preferable to the legislation--the so-called ``Protect America Act''--that I voted against but which the House, to my regret, approved and is now law. Fortunately, that law will expire early next year, so we have the opportunity--and, I would say, the responsibility--to replace it with a better, more balanced measure. By a more balanced measure, I mean one that fulfills two equally important requirements--first, that of enabling our intelligence community to do its job to protect us against terrorism and other threats, and second, respecting and safeguarding the rights and liberties of all Americans. And while this bill is not perfect, I think it does meet those tests and deserves to be passed today. It is based on the legislation I supported earlier this year but in several important ways it is even better than that bill. For example, it is more carefully focused, applying not to all foreign intelligence but specifically to intelligence collection related to terrorism, espionage, sabotage and threats to national security. It also provides that the minimization rules--the steps agencies will take to limit their actions so as to avoid inadvertent or unnecessary surveillance--as well as the guidelines for intelligence collection regarding all targets must be approved by the FISA court, not merely by an administrative monitor. It includes critical language that says that actions in compliance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and with that law's procedural safeguards, will be the exclusive means to conduct surveillance for intelligence purposes. And the bill restates current law stipulating that surveillance targeting Americans requires an individualized FISA court order. It takes a great step toward greater accountability by requiring an audit of past surveillance activities by the National Security Agency and by mandating record-keeping on any interception of communications by American citizens and legal residents. The bill eliminates ambiguous language in the ``Protect America Act'' that appeared to authorize warrantless searches inside the United States, including physical searches of homes, offices, and medical records. And it makes clear that the Administration cannot conduct surveillance against Americans without probable cause--even if they are outside the United States. Furthermore, this bill, like the one hastily passed earlier this year, is not permanent but will expire at the end of 2009, at which time Congress will be able to reconsider it with the benefit of greater knowledge of how it has worked in practice and whether further refinements should be made. Also important is what the bill doesn't do. It does not provide constitutional protections to foreign terrorists. The bill does not require the government to obtain a FISA order in order to intercept ``foreign to foreign'' communications of suspected terrorists, even if these communications pass through the United States. Nor does this bill permit the National Security Agency to collect the communications of Americans through a ``basket'' court order. Instead, the bill requires the Administration to certify that the targets are not Americans, and if it wants to conduct surveillance on Americans, the Administration must get a formal FISA order. And, as now amended, it includes additional language to make clear that there are other things it will not do. Specifically, it will not prevent the lawful surveillance necessary to: prevent Osama Bin Laden, al Qaeda, or any other terrorist organization from attacking our country, our people, any of our allies. It will not prevent surveillance needed to ensure the safety and security of our Armed Forces or other national security or intelligence personnel. It will not prevent surveillance needed to protect the United States, the American people, or any of our allies from the threat of weapons of mass destruction or any other threats to national security. And it will not prohibit surveillance of, or grant any rights to, undocumented aliens. The bill does grant authority to the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to apply to the FISA court for a single court order, or a ``basket'' order, authorizing surveillance of a suspected terrorist organization abroad for up to one year, as long as there are procedures in place to ensure that only foreigners are targeted and the rights of Americans are preserved. In general, I am wary of the concept of broad scope ``basket warrants,'' which are not normal under our laws. But I am prepared to support this part of the bill on the understanding that it is limited in scope and not applicable within the United States and with the expectation that the question will be revisited if the audits indicate a need for reconsideration of this part of the legislation. In this context, I am glad to note that this legislation is not permanent and will expire at the end of 2009. President Bush has criticized the bill, in part because it does not include a provision granting retroactive immunity for telecommunications companies that assisted in the Administration's secret surveillance program without a warrant. I think it might be appropriate to consider such a provision, but not until the Bush Administration responds to bipartisan requests for information about the past activities of these companies under the program. I am not ready to grant immunity for the companies' past activities while we don't know what activities would be covered. Mr. Speaker, this bill is not perfect, but I am not prepared to insist on perfection at this point. I believe we must do all we can to correct the shortcomings of the ``Protect America Act,'' even if it takes Congress a number of attempts to get it right. The RESTORE Act will give the Administration the authority it says it needs to conduct surveillance on terrorist targets--while restoring many of the protections that the ``Protect America Act'' has taken away. For that reason, I will vote for this bill today.", u"Mr. Speaker, Congressman Price, I rise today to speak on the importance that we as a Nation do all that we can to prevent another terrorist attack on our homeland. Like many of my colleagues, I will never forget the attacks of September 11. My daughter lived in New York City at the time. I remember that morning all too well because I did not know where she was. I did not know how close she was to the proximity of the attacks. For hours and hours, literally, almost 2 days, I could not get through to her, worrying about her safety and her well-being, worrying about how she was. My husband and I were so blessed and so grateful that she was just scared, but certainly safe. But, you know, thousands of other people were not lucky like us. Thousands of others lost their loved ones in that attack. We must do everything in our power to prevent another attack from happening. I rise today to congratulate the hard-working men and women of our intelligence agencies and the first responders on preventing another attempt like 9/11. I, like most Americans, wake up each morning safe, proceed with my day without even worrying about the threat of an attack because I know, from law enforcement to our national security apparatus, thousands of highly trained professionals are diligently watching and working. Men and women using the latest technologies and a lot of muscle are hard at work around the clock making sure that those that want to hurt us are kept at bay. I hope everyone understands that the desire of the terrorist organizations to launch a deadly attack has not gone away. It has not subsided. They are out there. They want to attack us. What has changed is our ability to thwart the attacks. That ability has dramatically increased. The latest in database technology, coupled with surveillance technologies, is proving to be a powerful force in identifying potential attackers. We owe a great deal of gratitude to these men and women on the front lines of our defense here at home as well as abroad. Just this week the media reported that some 200,000 people across the globe are on our watchlist, persons that we have reason to believe wish us harm, wish us death, wish our Nation destruction. But most importantly, 200,000 persons we have already identified as potential threats. When we wake up each morning and turn on our television sets and there is no news of an attack, we do not even think that there might have been one. That in itself is a tribute to the hard work of our national security team. We go about our lives without fear of an attack each day because of the job they are doing. We must give them every tool needed to complete their mission. Their mission is not only important; it is a matter of life and death. Much has been said about the National Security Agency's surveillance program in the media. Much of it is nonsense and distortion. Mr. Speaker, I asked my constituents in a survey what they think of the National Security Agency's surveillance program. Over 2,000 people have responded to date. Almost 80 percent support the program, eighty percent is a huge supermajority of folks representing all kinds of ideologies and political affiliations. Eighty percent. The media just does not always get it, Mr. Speaker, but the American people do. The American people first and foremost want to be safe in their homes and go about their lives without the fear of another attack. They exhibit far more common sense than the media ever gives them credit for. One of our colleagues from the great State of Texas has a great saying that Texas could use a whole lot less of Washington and Washington could use a whole lot more of Texas. Unfortunately, someday, I believe, and I really hope and pray in the very far distant future, we may well be attacked again. That attack may well be much larger in scope than we ever could believe, much larger than 9/11. On that day I hope and I pray we can say honestly and wholeheartedly we did everything we could to prevent it. It is our job, Mr. Speaker. It is our job as Members of Congress to make sure that Americans are safe, safe and free, safe and free from the terrorist attack of yesterday and tomorrow. We have to continue to do that. To do nothing less is not just irresponsible; it is un-American.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak on the importance that we as a nation need to continue to do all we can to prevent another terrorist attack on our homeland. Some of us on this side of the aisle a few weeks ago had the chance to listen to the President, and the President talked about how 9/11 has changed all of us, and it has changed us forever. I remember that day as if it was yesterday. In fact, a few weeks ago I talked again about how when my daughter lived in New York in Manhattan and we as a Nation witnessed the attacks on the Twin Towers, my daughter and I, we had dinner at the Windows on the World just 30 days before the event. And I knew she did not work close to the building, but I did not know the subway system. So when I saw the towers come down I was scared, scared about where she was. I was also horribly afraid that another attack would occur. The thing that was so frustrating was my husband and I could not get through to her because cell phones were the only way to get through and the buildings that housed the towers were destroyed. We did not get through to her for 2 full days. It made me realize how important national security and homeland security are for our Nation. Thank God, we only had fear and did not have regret and sorrow as so many others did. We as a Nation must do everything in our power to prevent another attack. Period. I rise today to congratulate the hard-working men and women of our intelligence agencies and first responders on preventing another attempt since 9/11. The headlines normally fail to mention that it has been over 4 years since our Nation was hit by those terrorists on that horrific day. I, like most Americans, like Congress, wake up every morning feeling safe, proceed with my day without even worrying about the threat of an attack because I know that from law enforcement to our national security apparatus, thousands of highly trained professionals are diligently watching and working and protecting. Men and women using the latest technologies and a lot of muscle are hard at work around the clock making sure that those that want to hurt us are kept away. I hope everyone understands that the desire of the terrorist organizations to launch a deadly attack has not subsided. It is their mission to attack and destroy us, to attack and destroy our way of life. But what has changed is that our ability to thwart attacks has dramatically increased. The latest in database technology, coupled with surveillance technologies, is proving to be a powerful force in identifying those potential attackers who want to kill us. We owe a great deal of gratitude to these men and women on the front lines of our defense. Just this past week the media reported that some 200,000 people across the globe are on our watchlist, persons that we have reason to believe wish to do us harm, but most importantly, 200,000 people we have already identified as potential threats. And when you know who your enemy is, you have got a better chance at seeing them come at you. When we wake up each morning and turn on our television sets and there is no news of an attack, we do not even think that there might have been one. That, in itself, is a tribute to the hard work of our national security team. We go about our lives without fear of another attack because of the job they are doing each and every minute of each and every day for us. And that means we must give them every tool needed to complete their mission. Their mission is not only important, it is a matter of life and death. Our life and death. My life and death. Your life and death, Mr. Speaker. Much has been said about the National Security Agency's surveillance program in the media. Much of it is nonsense and distortion, and I am so glad we have the Official Truth Squad here tonight to talk about that. I asked my constituents in a recent survey what they thought about the National Security Agency's surveillance program. Over 2,000 people have responded to date. Slightly less than 80 percent support the program. Mr. Speaker, 80 percent is a huge number. That is a supermajority of folks, folks like you and me representing all kind of ideologies and political affiliations. Eighty percent want the NSA to continue to do their job so you and I can remain free from terrorist attacks. The American people, first and foremost, want to be safe in their homes and go about their lives without that fear again of another 9/11. They exhibit far more common sense than the media ever gives them credit for. One of our colleagues from the great State of Texas has a great saying that Texas could use a whole lot less of Washington and Washington could use a whole lot more of Texas. I agree. Unfortunately, some day I hope in the very, very far, distant future we may well again be attacked. That attack may well be much larger in scope than 9/11 ever hoped to be. And on that day I hope and I pray that we can all say we did everything in our power we could do to prevent it. That is our responsibility. Do you not agree? It is our responsibility to give this agency the tools necessary to protect the American people from another terrorist attack. I am glad we are giving them those tools. It is our responsibility to see that they continue to have them so that you and I can wake up once again tomorrow morning in the freest nation in the world, free to be able to go about doing our business without fear of an enemy knocking at our door.", u"Mr. President, I rise today to offer a few brief comments on the National Security Agency eavesdropping program. The truth is that we don't know what is going on under this program. And we have an obligation to find out and a committee set up to do just that. Senator Rockefeller has been correct from the beginning to call for a full and thorough Intelligence Committee investigation. I couldn't agree more with my colleague from West Virginia and was deeply disappointed his March 7 motion calling for a full committee investigation failed along party lines. I have been arguing consistently since we found out about this program in December that we need to do here what we did when we originally crafted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA. For several years preceding the enactment of FISA in 1978, the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees conducted extensive public and private hearings and staff investigations that built the record for the act. FISA was a bipartisan product; in the Senate, the original version was sponsored by Senators across the ideological spectrum--including Birch Bayh, Ted Kennedy, Mac Mathias, James Eastland, and Strom Thurmond. The Senate ultimately adopted the bill on April 20, 1978, by a strong bipartisan vote of 95 to 1. At the time the bill was approved in the Senate, I stated that it ``was a reaffirmation of the principle that it is possible to protect national security and at the same time the Bill of Rights.'' I was also a member of the conference committee that produced the final version of the law that was enacted with broad support in October 1978. I was proud of what we were able to accomplish then and sincerely hoped that we could undertake the same serious, thoughtful, bipartisan process here. And the first step is to undertake a full Intelligence Committee investigation, just as my colleague Vice Chairman Rockefeller has been pushing for months. It is essential that such a carefully considered record be developed so we don't act precipitously either to legislate or not to legislate. Issues concerning the core privacy rights of U.S. citizens, whether we are fighting an effective war on terrorism, and the fundamental structure of our separation of powers are directly involved here and deserve a full and thorough examination. At present, our knowledge of the National Security Agency program is severely limited. We need to know much more, for example: No. 1, the nature and scope of the program or programs; No. 2, the extent of the impact on U.S. citizens; No. 3, why the administration did not seek amendments to FISA; No. 4, why some high Justice Department officials were hesitant to approve the program; No. 5, the actual value of the information gathered; No. 6, how decisions are made on whom to target; and No. 7, any procedures followed to protect civil liberties. Senator Rockefeller understands that we need to know the answers to our questions. But politics and protecting the President seem to be the order of the day. I am told one of the committee Republicans went so far as to say that some of the committee Democrats ``believe the gravest threat we face is not Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, but rather the president of the United States.'' That is totally uncalled for; it is ridiculous. I understand a special subcommittee has now been created to conduct at least some oversight over the NSA surveillance program going forward. But this just isn't enough--the whole committee should be undertaking an investigation, and it should be a full and thorough investigation, just as Senator Rockefeller has called for. It also is a grave mistake to put forward legislation authorizing the NSA program outside of the FISA system and in advance of actually knowing anything about the program, as some of my colleagues are proposing. Talk about putting the cart before the horse. So I would hope we learn from history and listen to Senator Rockefeller. Let's go back to what worked so well in the past when we all worked together to craft FISA. Let's first hold a full and thorough investigation in the Intelligence Committee. Then, and only when we know what is going on, should we make a judgment about whether FISA needs to be updated. If additional changes need to be made, this Senator stands ready and willing to engage in that exercise.", u"Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for the time. Madam Speaker, we have had the good fortune in this country for the last 4\\1/2\\ years to have not had another terrorist attack on our soil, and it is not because they haven't tried. The reason for that success boils down to two things: the courage of our soldiers and the quality of our intelligence. Exceptional intelligence is the first line of defense for America in the long war on terrorism. I intend to support this rule today, and I intend to support this bill. I think it is a good bill. It is one that moves us forward to restore our Nation's intelligence capabilities across the board, HUMINT intelligence, technical and tactical intelligence, and strengthens our global understanding and awareness and analysis of what is going on in the world. I intend to support it. I also think this rule is a pretty good rule, and I have to disagree on a couple of points with my colleague from Massachusetts. My colleague from Massachusetts has said we should debate here an amendment that was debated in our committee offered by Ms. Eshoo, one that I was a Republican Member who supported. It asked for the cost of the program that the President has acknowledged exists, the terrorist surveillance program. I believe that whenever a member of an oversight committee asks for the cost of a program, we should get that answer. That answer has now been provided to the committee in a classified letter that is available in the Intelligence Committee spaces. The reason that we didn't need to debate Ms. Eshoo's amendment on the floor today is because we have already gotten the answer to her question, and it doesn't make sense to me to continue to have that debate here on the floor, even though I supported that amendment in committee. So I think we have gone beyond that, and I don't think we have to have that debate and discussion here today on the floor. The second thing that he talks about is having a debate here on the floor on the Flake proposal with some of his colleagues from the Democratic side of the aisle on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The question here for this body is how do we move forward with effective oversight of the National Security Agency program that the President has acknowledged exists. Now, I believe that the President and the Congress share the same goal: we want to keep America safe and free. We have different responsibilities under our Constitution. The President has the responsibility for conducting our foreign affairs. He is the Commander in Chief. He makes sure that agencies follow the law and execute the programs which we have authorized. The Congress appropriates funds. We establish agencies. We authorize programs, and we oversee implementation of those programs. We spy on our enemies. But we also oversee these programs to ensure that those very powerful tools are used within the constraints of our Constitution and the Bill of Rights. That is why I stood up and demanded that this Congress and our committees on intelligence conduct oversight of this program. That oversight is now under way. I think as a responsible body we have to start out by getting the facts. That means hard work that is done largely in secret in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. That oversight is under way, and, for the most part, the National Security Agency has been very forthcoming. We have to understand this program in its details before we make recommendations to this body about any changes in statute or continuing mechanisms for oversight. It would be premature to legislate today on changing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The reality is that technology is changing. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was put in place in 1978, the same year that I graduated from high school. I was one of the last classes at the Air Force Academy to get issued a slide rule. In 1978, the words ``cell phone'' and ``Internet'' were not even in the dictionary. We may need to make some changes to the laws to continue to keep this country both safe and free, but we are not ready today to make those changes effectively. That debate on the floor today would be uninformed and premature. I would ask this House to support this rule today and to also support the work, the continuing work, of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as we do our duty under the Constitution to oversee these vital programs.", u'Mr. President, let me start by saying that the nomination of General Hayden is a difficult one for me. I generally, as a rule, believe the President should be able to appoint members of his Cabinet, of his staff, to positions such as the one General Hayden is nominated for without undue obstruction from Congress. General Hayden is extremely well qualified for this position. Having previously served as head of the National Security Agency and as Deputy Director of National Intelligence under John Negroponte, he has 30 years of experience in intelligence and national security matters. And he was nearly universally praised during his confirmation to Deputy There are several members of the Intelligence Committee, including Senator Levin, who I hold in great esteem, who believe General Hayden has consistently displayed the sort of independence that would make him a fine CIA Director. Unfortunately, General Hayden is being nominated under troubling circumstances, as the architect and chief defender of a program of wiretapping and collection of phone records outside of FISA oversight. This is a program that is still accountable to no one and no law. Now, there is no one in Congress who does not want President Bush to have every tool at his disposal to prevent terrorist attacks--including the use of a surveillance program. Every single American--Democrat and Republican and Independent--who remembers the images of falling towers and needless death would gladly support increased surveillance in order to prevent another attack. But over the last 6 months, Americans have learned that the National Security Agency has been spying on Americans without judicial approval. We learned about this not from the administration, not from the regular workings of the Senate Intelligence Committee, but from the New York Times and USA Today. Every time a revelation came out, President Bush refused to answer questions from Congress. This is part of a general stance by this administration that it can operate without restraint. President Bush is interpreting article II of the Constitution as giving him authority with no bounds. The Attorney General and a handful of scholars agree with this view, and I do not doubt the sincerity with which the President and his lawyers believe in their constitutional interpretation. However, the overwhelming weight of legal authority is against the President on this one. This is not how our Constitution is designed, to give the President unbounded authority without any checks or balances. We do not expect the President to give the American people every detail about a classified surveillance program, but we do expect him to place such a program within the rule of law and to allow members of the other two coequal branches of Government--Congress and the judiciary--to have the ability to monitor and oversee such a program. Our Constitution and our right to privacy as Americans require as much. Unfortunately, we were never given the chance to make that examination. Time and again, President Bush has refused to come clean to Congress. Why is it that 14 of 16 members of the Intelligence Committee were kept in the dark for 4\\1/2\\ years? The only reason that some Senators are now being briefed is because the story was made public in the newspapers. Without that information, it is impossible to make the decisions that allow us to balance the need to fight terrorism while still upholding the rule of law and privacy protections that make this country great. Every democracy is tested when it is faced with a serious threat. As a nation, we have had to find the right balance between privacy and security, between executive authority to face threats and uncontrolled power. What protects us, and what distinguishes us, are the procedures we put in place to protect that balance; namely, judicial warrants and congressional review. These are not arbitrary ideas. They are not new ideas. These are the safeguards that make sure surveillance has not gone too far, that somebody is watching the watchers. The exact details of these safeguards are not etched in stone. They can be reevaluated, and should be reevaluated, from time to time. The last time we had a major overhaul of the intelligence apparatus was 30 years ago in the aftermath of Watergate. After those dark days, the White House worked in a collaborative way with Congress through the Church Committee to study the issue, revise intelligence laws, and set up a system of checks and balances. It worked then, and it could work now. But, unfortunately, thus far, this administration has made no effort to reach out to Congress and tailor FISA to fit the program that has been put in place. I have no doubt that General Hayden will be confirmed. But I am going to reluctantly vote against him to send a signal to this administration that even in these circumstances, even in these trying times, President Bush is not above the law. No President is above the law. I am voting against Mr. Hayden in the hope that he will be more humble before the great weight of responsibility that he has not only to protect our lives but to protect our democracy. Americans fought a Revolution in part over the right to be free from unreasonable searches--to ensure that our Government could not come knocking in the middle of the night for no reason. We need to find a way forward to make sure we can stop terrorists while protecting the privacy and liberty of innocent Americans. We have to find a way to give the President the power he needs to protect us, while making sure he does not abuse that power. It is possible to do that. We have done it before. We could do it again. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.', u"Thank you, Madam President. I wish to commend you and Senator Smith for the eloquent remarks you have just delivered to the American people. We all are shocked by what occurred on September 11, and we recognize that this will be a demarcation date in the history of America. It will be a date upon which we will recognize our loss of innocence and the new reality of our vulnerability. Not since the Civil War has there been a conflict of such violence committed on the territory of the United States as we experienced on Tuesday. As with Pearl Harbor and the assassination of President John Kennedy, all Americans will forever remember where they were and what was in their mind as they heard of the tragic events of last Tuesday. Today our prayers are with the victims in New York and here in the Pentagon and with their families. Our admiration and good wishes go to the brave firefighters, policemen, doctors, nurses, and all the other emergency personnel who are working so hard to find the survivors and to deal with the pain. We pray for our Nation as well. We have entered a new phase in history, one that will unfortunately be marked by a pervasive sense of insecurity. I am fortunate to be a grandfather of 10 beautiful boys and girls. Their mothers called me Tuesday evening to tell me how frightened the grandchildren were and that they were wondering whether their neighborhood, whether their school, and whether their own brothers, sisters, mothers, fathers, and friends would be subject to the same thing they had just seen on television. Every time we take a trip, particularly by airline, we are likely to be reminded of Tuesday's incident. We will also face increased security, particularly at airports and seaports. Our border checkpoints will be reinforced. But all of these are necessary changes. Frankly, I believe the vast majority of Americans will agree that there will be reasonable, new restrictions in light of the new period of American history in which we will now be living. To honor the lives of the victims, we must take steps to assure that other Americans will not be subject to the same fate. A first step in that honoring will be to support the President of the United States of America. He will have some extremely difficult decisions to make in the next few days. Clearly, we are not going to allow this horrific act to go unanswered. As has been the case in so many other incidents of conflict, we will enter this commitment to see that those who have committed these deeds will be brought to justice with great enthusiasm. The real test will be whether we are prepared to make the long march that is likely to be required in order to root out the many cells of terrorists around the world that represent a continuing threat to our security. The President will need our support then even more than now. We also need to rebuild some of our institutions that will be on the front lines of our efforts to assure the security of America. One of those with which I feel a particular responsibility is our national intelligence capability. To deal with terrorism, there is no alternative but to have the most effective capacities to anticipate what the motivations and capabilities of our particular adversaries are and then to be able to interdict those capabilities before they can be put into action. We have seen over the past several years a degradation in some important areas of our intelligence capabilities. We will know in the next few weeks whether those shortfalls bear a part of the responsibility for what happened on Tuesday. Illustrative of the areas in which we are going to need to pay renewed attention and additional new resources will be rebuilding our human intelligence. For a long period during the cold war we became increasingly dependent upon technology as the means of gathering information. That played a critical role. But in this new era there is going to be no substitute for having well-trained, diverse in background and language skills, and technologically competent persons who can represent the interests of the United States in getting inside these organizations so that we will have a level of understanding that will allow us to prepare for and to avoid incidents such as Tuesday's tragedy. We also must make some investments in some of our technological areas, particularly the National Security Agency, which for many years had been our prime means of gathering information by essentially eavesdropping on our adversaries. That capability, which was developed to a very high level during the cold war when most of those communications were over the air, has been degraded as countries, including our own, have gone to other forms of communication. As an example, communicating computer to computer does not allow the kind of detection we have relied on in the past. It is going to be important that we make a new commitment and a new investment to build up that capability to what it has been historically. With the permission of the body, I am submitting for the Congressional Record a recent article which appeared in the Washington Post which examines the National Security Agency, some of its immediate challenges, and the pathway to a stronger and more secure future that is being developed under the direction of its leader, LTG Michael V. Hayden. I ask unanimous consent that be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, one of the most enjoyable aspects of serving on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is that most issues which come before the committee are considered and resolved in a bipartisan way. That has been the committee's history, and each of its chairmen has worked hard to keep to a minimum those issues which might divide the committee along party lines. The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) has been particularly tenacious in this regard. I want to thank him for that, and for the sense of fairness which he brings to the committee's work, especially with respect to the drafting of this bill. Reliable and timely intelligence is an essential component of national security. The United States is without peer in its ability to provide high quality intelligence to policymakers and military commanders. Lives of Americans and people in countries throughout the world are saved as a result. Maintaining that capability in intelligence, though, is expensive. It relies not only on recruiting human intelligence sources, but on the development of systems which are at the forefront of complex technology. Keeping pace with change in that technological environment requires a substantial commitment of resources. That fact is not lost on the President and his national security team. This year the administration's budget request for the national intelligence programs, which include the programs of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, among others, was 6.6 percent above the appropriation last year. That is a healthy increase by any standard. It clearly reflects a commitment by the administration to intelligence, and a willingness to make meeting important intelligence needs a national priority. I support the total amount of money requested by the President for the national intelligence programs in part because of the persuasive justifications made by the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, and other witnesses who appeared before the committee. As a result of information provided during the committee's budget review, some of which was not available to the administration when the budget was submitted, the committee has made changes to the allocations of fund within the budget request. We have also made a very small increase, one-tenth of 1 percent, to the total amount in the President's request. In my judgment, the changes and the increase are necessary, and I support them. Mr. Chairman, I spoke earlier of technological challenges facing our intelligence agencies. Nowhere are the challenges more daunting and the need to successfully address them more acute, than at the National Security Agency. Our ability to continue to collect and process signals intelligence needs to be better ensured. To do so will require new approaches to many aspects of the signals intelligence business. The NSA director, General Hayden, has proposed changes, some of which have already been implemented. He has asked for support from Congress in resources and in other forms. I believe that this bill by and large provides that support. The Director has an important task, and the committee wants him to succeed. Given the consequences if General Hayden's modernization effort is not successful, and the significant amounts of money invested in it, the committee needs, and will, keep a critical eye focused on the NSA. The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), a member of the committee, will be offering at the appropriate time an important amendment which I will support. Currently, the aggregate amount appropriated for intelligence programs and activities is classified on the grounds that to make it public would threaten national security. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) would require the declassification of the aggregate appropriated amount, not for the current fiscal year but for the preceding one. The administration has, on two occasions within the past few years, chosen to disclose amounts appropriated for intelligence. By definition, national security was not threatened by these actions. Extending and regularizing declassification, as advocated by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), in my judgment would provide no information which would constitute a national security threat. On the other hand, this limited look at how much is being spent on intelligence would enable U.S. taxpayers to be better informed about the uses to which tax dollars are being put. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 4392 is an appropriate response to the needs of our intelligence agencies. In some cases, it begins work which we will need to sustain in the future if its promises are to be realized. I urge the adoption of the bill.", u"Mr. Speaker, I come to the House floor; I do not come here often, but I come with very deep concern. A majority of the majority party Members of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary sent a letter to the U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno. The letter that we sent was pursuant to section 592(g) of title 28, United States Code, that she apply for the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate the following matters: The illegal contributions to the Democratic National Committee in connection with the 1996 elections. No. 2, the attempted influence of the 1996 elections by foreign countries, foreign corporations, or persons representing such entities; and, No. 3, the improper fundraising conduct or practices by administration officials, the Democratic National Committee, or individuals working on behalf of the committee in connection with the 1996 elections. We believe that section 591(c) of the Independent Counsel Act necessitates that Attorney General Janet Reno seek the appointment of independent counsel in reference to the matters which I just listed. Accordingly, per section 591(c), the Attorney General has been authorized to initiate the preliminary investigation which is defined by the act and is distinct from the Department's current investigations into the matters. We also believe that it is very clear that the matters referred to are an obvious political conflict of interest for the Attorney General and other political appointees within the Department of Justice. I am well aware that she has held at bay those of us who have been asking for the appointment of special counsel by saying that there is not sufficient credible evidence. I am not so certain how much more credible evidence she needs. Often the Washington Post it seems gets cited here on the House floor, not by Republicans but by Democrats on the House floor, and here we have now Bob Woodward, who gained national attention with regard to President Nixon some years ago, is now talking about allegations that the White House supplied top secret intelligence information to the Democratic National Committee to keep a Latvian businessman with alleged ties to organized crime, international crime, from attending a $25,000 fundraiser with President Clinton. Mr. Speaker, I do not believe anyone in this country has a problem with the National Security Agency advising the President with regard to an individual, whether they should or should not be at a Presidential dinner. It is part of their job. What is distressing, though, is when the National Security Agency leaks top secret, classified information to political operatives, that being that our intelligence architecture was monitoring the international calls of this alleged organized crime individual and syndicate, and the fact that that intelligence was leaked to someone who did not have a right to know, who did not have a security clearance, is a breach of our security at the highest levels within the White House. Why was that done? It was information that was leaked and it was done under this guise, under the pressures of political fundraising. As a matter of fact, to quote out of this article, I guess quoting whomever Bob Woodward is using for his intelligence to write this article, he quotes a White House senior official that the information that was leaked was top secret and it further demonstrates the total politicalization of all intelligence and White House operations, anything and everything was done in the name of fundraising at the White House. Mr. Speaker, the reason that the Committee on the Judiciary had asked for the special counsel deals with the outright admissions by the Vice President, Al Gore, and Ms. Margaret Williams having admitted engaging in fundraising activities, the propriety of which is being questioned by many within the White House itself. I have heard in their defense even the Vice President would say, well, there is no controlling legal authority, some kind of a lawyerly type of language that only lawyers can understand. But when you pull out Title XVIII of the U.S. Code it is very clear, and it being very clear for people that anywhere can understand in America, that fundraising activity is not permitted in Federal buildings. So whether it is out of my congressional office, whether it is out of a senatorial office, whether it is a Cabinet member or the President of the United States, it is wrong, and Janet Reno as the Attorney General of the United States, we seek your appointment with due speed.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor a true American Hero, a man whose focus, drive, intellect and leadership were responsible for spawning innovative systems that have saved lives and ensured the security of our great nation. Pedro Luis Rustan, known as ``Pete'' to all within the Intelligence Community, was an extraordinary American. His passing leaves a void within the Intelligence Community and for all his family and friends. Pete may not have appreciated my remarks because he was never concerned about who received the credit, only that the job was done. However, he was a man who was grateful for the gifts that God gave him and he could think of no greater use for these gifts than service of the Nation that had blessed him and his family with freedom. Pete was born in 1946 in a small city 40 miles from the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay. In August 1967, he made a dramatic escape from Communist Cuba with his father, two sisters, and brother-in-law. They fled to a railway, climbed inside a railroad boxcar and jumped from the moving train as it approached the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo. Pete and his family swam and waded through a snake-infested swamp before reaching multiple tall security fences topped with barbed wire. Pete carried his younger sister on his back over the fences. After being picked up by a Navy patrol craft they sought and received political asylum. In the early 1970s Pete studied electrical engineering at the Illinois Institute of Technology, and was quickly drafted into the Air Force. In the Air Force he served first as an enlisted man, and then successfully completed Officer Candidate School, becoming a U.S. Air Force officer. He eventually went on to graduate school at the University of Florida, from which he received a doctorate in electrical engineering in 1979. During his 26-year career with the U.S. Air Force, Pete ran several advanced technology space programs and was mission manager for a joint NASA--Defense Department project, the Clementine mission, a small, low-cost spacecraft that made history by mapping the surface of the Moon and discovering ice at its south pole. Daniel Golden, a former NASA director, said that Pete always ``seemed to take on things that were impossible.'' He retired from the Air Force in 1997 with the rank of colonel but continued to deliver intelligence systems that accomplished the seemingly impossible with National Security technical systems. After retiring from the Air Force, Pete consulted on commercial space ventures and for federal intelligence agencies. He was on an advisory board that recommended changes at the National Security Agency, one of the country's largest intelligence agencies. As Michael V. Hayden, a former director of the National Security Agency said of Pete, ''He was hands-down the most valuable member of that board. He was creative. He was energetic. He was candid without ever being caustic or unkind.'' After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Pete returned to the government, leading research efforts in satellite reconnaissance for the Defense and Intelligence Communities. He held numerous positions at the National Reconnaissance Organization, NRO, including Director of the Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate, Director of the Ground Enterprise Directorate, Director of Small Satellite Development and most recently, Director of the NRO's Mission Support Directorate. He retired from the NRO officially in October 2011. In each instance he enhanced the capability of the organization and demonstrated his well earned reputation as a technical innovator and advocate of streamlined acquisition principles in space programs. He was a true asset to the NRO and to our country. Pete contributed to improving the world outside of work as well. He personally led missions to a small impoverished town in Honduras where he provided shoes, developed aqueducts and tilapia fish farms. In his private and personal life he also was one who accomplished the seemingly impossible. On June 28, Pedro ``Pete'' Rustan lost his battle with cancer but won his eternal reward after 65 vibrant years, passing away at his home in Woodbridge, Virginia. He is survived by his wife, Alexandra, and children, Peter and Amy. He leaves behind a legacy of intelligence systems and people whom he mentored to continue to achieve the seemingly impossible in his memory. He will be greatly missed in the Intelligence Community and by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.", u" The amendment is as follows:(Purpose: To require a report on the impact of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 on the privacy of the people of the United States) At the end, add the following: (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The central provision of the FISA Amendments of 2008 (Public Law 110-261; 122 Stat. 2436) enacted section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) which provides the government authority to collect the communications of persons reasonably believed to be citizens of foreign countries who are located outside the United States. (2) Such section 702 contained restrictions regarding the acquisition of the communications of United States persons which were intended to protect the privacy of United States persons and prevent intelligence agencies from using the authority in such section to deliberately read or listen to the communications of specific United States persons without obtaining a warrant or emergency authorization to do so. (3) Estimating the total number of communications to or from the United States collected under the authority in such section 702 would provide an indication of the degree to which collection carried out under such section has impacted the privacy of United States persons. (4) Estimating the number of wholly domestic communications collected under the authority in such section 702 would provide a particularly significant indication of the degree to which collection carried out under this authority has impacted the privacy of United States persons. (5) While Congress did not intend to provide authority in such section 702 for elements of the intelligence community to deliberately review the communications of specific United States persons without obtaining individual warrants or emergency authorizations to do so, such section 702 does not include a specific prohibition against this action, and the people of the United States have a right to know whether elements of the intelligence community have deliberately searched through communications collected under such section 702 to find the communications of specific United States persons. (6) Despite requests from numerous Senators, the Director of National Intelligence has declined to state publicly whether-- (A) any entity has made an estimate of the number of United States communications that have been collected under such section 702; (B) any wholly domestic communications have been collected under such section 702; or (C) any element of the intelligence community has attempted to search through communications collected under such section 702 in a deliberate effort to review the communications of a specific United States person without obtaining a warrant or emergency authorization permitting such a search. (7) In public remarks in July 2012, the Director of the National Security Agency stated that ``the story that we have millions or hundreds of millions of dossiers on people is absolutely false''. (b) Report.-- (1) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the impact of the amendments made by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-261; 122 Stat. 2436) and other surveillance authorities on the privacy of United States persons. (2) Content.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) A determination of whether any government entity has produced any estimate regarding-- (i) the total number of communications that-- (I) originated from or were directed to a location in the United States; and (II) have been collected under the authority of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a); or (ii) the total number of wholly domestic communications that have been collected under such authority. (B) If any estimate described in subparagraph (A) was produced, such estimate. (C) An assessment of whether any wholly domestic communications have been collected under the authority of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a). (D) A determination of whether any element of the intelligence community has ever attempted to search through communications collected under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) in a deliberate effort to find the communications of a specific United States person, without obtaining a warrant or emergency authorization to do so. (E) A determination of whether the National Security Agency has collected any type of personally identifiable data pertaining to more than 1,000,000 United States persons. (c) Form of Report.-- (1) Public availability of report.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be made available to the public not later than 15 days after the date such report is submitted to Congress. (2) Redactions.--If the President believes that public disclosure of information in the report required by subsection (b) could cause significant harm to national security, the President may redact such information from the report made available to the public. (3) Submission to congress.--If the President redacts information under paragraph (2), not later than 30 days after the date the report required by subsection (b) is made available to the public under paragraph (1), the President shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a statement explaining the specific harm to national security that the disclosure of such information could cause.", u" SA 3439. Mr. WYDEN (for himself, Mr. Udall of Colorado, Mr. Lee, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Merkley, Mr. Udall of New Mexico, Mr. Begich, Mr. Franken, Mr. Webb, Mrs. Shaheen, Mr. Tester, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Coons, and Mr. Baucus) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 5949, to extend the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 for five years; as follows: At the end, add the following: SEC. 5. REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 ON THE PRIVACY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The central provision of the FISA Amendments of 2008 (Public Law 110-261; 122 Stat. 2436) enacted section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) which provides the government authority to collect the communications of persons reasonably believed to be citizens of foreign countries who are located outside the United States. (2) Such section 702 contained restrictions regarding the acquisition of the communications of United States persons which were intended to protect the privacy of United States persons and prevent intelligence agencies from using the authority in such section to deliberately read or listen to the communications of specific United States persons without obtaining a warrant or emergency authorization to do so. (3) Estimating the total number of communications to or from the United States collected under the authority in such section 702 would provide an indication of the degree to which collection carried out under such section has impacted the privacy of United States persons. (4) Estimating the number of wholly domestic communications collected under the authority in such section 702 would provide a particularly significant indication of the degree to which collection carried out under this authority has impacted the privacy of United States persons. (5) While Congress did not intend to provide authority in such section 702 for elements of the intelligence community to deliberately review the communications of specific United States persons without obtaining individual warrants or emergency authorizations to do so, such section 702 does not include a specific prohibition against this action, and the people of the United States have a right to know whether elements of the intelligence community have deliberately searched through communications collected under such section 702 to find the communications of specific United States persons. (6) Despite requests from numerous Senators, the Director of National Intelligence has declined to state publicly whether-- (A) any entity has made an estimate of the number of United States communications that have been collected under such section 702; (B) any wholly domestic communications have been collected under such section 702; or (C) any element of the intelligence community has attempted to search through communications collected under such section 702 in a deliberate effort to review the communications of a specific United States person without obtaining a warrant or emergency authorization permitting such a search. (7) In public remarks in July 2012, the Director of the National Security Agency stated that ``the story that we have millions or hundreds of millions of dossiers on people is absolutely false''. (b) Report.-- (1) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the impact of the amendments made by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-261; 122 Stat. 2436) and other surveillance authorities on the privacy of United States persons. (2) Content.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) A determination of whether any government entity has produced any estimate regarding-- (i) the total number of communications that-- (I) originated from or were directed to a location in the United States; and (II) have been collected under the authority of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a); or (ii) the total number of wholly domestic communications that have been collected under such authority. (B) If any estimate described in subparagraph (A) was produced, such estimate. (C) An assessment of whether any wholly domestic communications have been collected under the authority of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a). (D) A determination of whether any element of the intelligence community has ever attempted to search through communications collected under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) in a deliberate effort to find the communications of a specific United States person, without obtaining a warrant or emergency authorization to do so. (E) A determination of whether the National Security Agency has collected any type of personally identifiable data pertaining to more than 1,000,000 United States persons. (c) Form of Report.-- (1) Public availability of report.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be made available to the public not later than 15 days after the date such report is submitted to Congress. (2) Redactions.--If the President believes that public disclosure of information in the report required by subsection (b) could cause significant harm to national security, the President may redact such information from the report made available to the public. (3) Submission to congress.--If the President redacts information under paragraph (2), not later than 30 days after the date the report required by subsection (b) is made available to the public under paragraph (1), the President shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a statement explaining the specific harm to national security that the disclosure of such information could cause.", u"Madam President, I just wanted to say a few words on an issue that is of deep concern to many Americans. In 2001, 2006, and in 2011, I voted against the USA PATRIOT Act. I voted against that legislation because I believed in a democratic and constitutional form of government we can effectively combat terrorism without sacrificing the civil liberties and the constitutional protections which make us a free country. The President has said he welcomes a debate on this issue, and I agree with him. There should be a debate. And the debate should center on whether the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is still relevant. If it is, let's abide by it. If it isn't, let's not be hypocrites and let's acknowledge we live in a society, in a nation, where our freedoms and liberties have been severely compromised. But let's not pretend the protections the Fourth Amendment guarantees exist when in fact they do not exist. Here is what the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. That is the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Now, let's talk about what we learned in the last week about the National Security Agency's activities. We learned it is likely that virtually every phone call made by every American is being collected and stored by the United States Government. The time you made that phone call, where you made that phone call, how long you were on the phone, and to whom you made that phone call is now part of the record of the United States Government. Every husband calling a wife, every businessman making a deal, every elected official talking to a constituent, every candidate talking to a campaign manager, every doctor talking to a patient, every lawyer talking to a client, every journalist tracking a story--all of that information and more--is now on file with the United States Government. What is even more alarming is that it is not just the government officials who have access to that information. It turns out it is also available to private contractors such as Booze-Allen, and I assume many other contractors. A few weeks ago, Madam President, you will recall there was a huge uproar in the media, including front-page stories about the Obama administration tracking the phone calls made by reporters from the Associated Press. It was a big deal. Everybody was really concerned about that. While not listening to the calls, they learned who the reporters were speaking to, how long they were speaking, and where the reporters were located. Well, guess what. It turns out what the Obama administration was doing to the AP is nothing unusual. This appears to be exactly what the government has the capability to do to every single American. Furthermore, we have also recently learned the government has the capability to monitor every Web site we visit, every video we see, and every item we search for online. Madam President, everybody understands terrorism is a serious issue and the United States Government--and governments throughout the world--must do everything it can to protect its people. We do not want another 9/11. We do not want another bombing such as the one at the Boston Marathon. We do, however, want our government, our intelligence agencies and law enforcement authorities to be strong and effective in combating terrorism. But it is my very strong opinion we can do that without living in an Orwellian world where the government and private corporations know every telephone call we make, every Web site we visit, every place we go. Is that really the country we want to be? Let's be clear: The technology for monitoring every aspect of our daily lives will only increase in years to come as that technology becomes ever more sophisticated. Opposition to the current NSA policy is coming from across the political spectrum. Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, a conservative Republican from Wisconsin, and one of the authors of the original PATRIOT Act, said in a Thursday letter to Attorney General Eric Holder that he is ``extremely troubled'' by the National Security Agency's seizure of the phone records of millions of Verizon customers through a secret court ruling. Representative Sensenbrenner also said: I do not believe the released FISA order is consistent with the requirements of the PATRIOT Act. How could the phone records of so many innocent Americans be relevant to an authorized investigation as required by the act? Seizing phone records of millions of innocent people is excessive and un-American. That is what Republican Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner said in a press release that accompanied his letter to the Attorney General. It is clear to me the United States Congress has to take a very hard look at the USA PATRIOT Act, and specifically section 215. The bottom line is we must be strong and effective in combating terrorism, but it is absolutely my view we can do that without undermining the constitutional rights that make us a free country. With that, Madam President, I yield the floor.", u"Madam President, Senator Schumer yesterday on the floor talked about what the House is doing, and he described it as ``Alice in Wonderland.'' I don't know if that is an apt description. Maybe it is beyond that. Here is where we are. The House has passed a bill to pay furloughed Federal employees--now, listen to this--once the government opens. Well, why wouldn't we do that? But the problem is that this uncontroversial legislation is kind of unique, isn't it? So now what the Republicans in the House are telling--because they are the ones who set the agenda--they are telling all these Federal workers: What we are going to do for you now--even though we don't like Federal workers and we haven't given you a raise in 3 years--what we are going to do now is give you a paid vacation. That is what it is. These people who want to go to work can't go to work, but they are going to get paid, they know, when they leave here, and we knew that anyway. We heard today that a number of Federal employees are applying for unemployment benefits. So it is really cruel to tell workers they will receive backpay once the government opens and then refuse to open the government. Let's open the government. Hundreds of thousands of furloughed Federal servants want to work. They should be allowed to work. We have, for example, right now in our National Security Agency, 1,000 mathematicians--the numbers may be a little bit wrong but very close--we have 2,500 computer scientists, and 940 Ph.D.s who are home. They cannot work. They cannot get paid. It is not fair to them or our country. Let them work. We get these little piecemeal bits of legislation from the House--for example, open the Park Service. In Nevada, that is great because we have some national forests there. But 87 percent of the land in the State of Nevada is owned by the Federal Government. The vast majority of that land is Bureau of Land Management. We have some beautiful conservation areas. One is called Red Rock, which over 1 million people visit every year. It is closed. So opening the Park Service does not help a place 8 or 9 miles out of Las Vegas where 1 million people come to visit. They come there to do that. Some of the best rock climbing in the world is there. These are ordinary Americans who have not been treated very well during the last several years by the Republicans anyway. No pay raises. They treat Federal employees as if they are a lower class of worker than other people. Now, remember, Federal workers work really hard. The Presiding Officer works hard. All 8 million Federal employees work hard. There are exceptions, just like anyplace else. I met two people yesterday. This hurts. Federal employees not being able to work hurts others. Lockheed announced today that they are laying off 3,000 people. They cannot get inspections done. I was with someone yesterday evening from US Air. They cannot take custody of a $180-million airplane, a brandnew airplane. It is just sitting there. They cannot take custody of that airplane. Why? Because they need a final inspection. This is all throughout America. The Federal Government is involved in aspects of life that everyone has here in America--food inspectors, inspectors for making sure there is safety for a $180 million airplane. Lockheed has things they are building. Some of them are missiles. They have to make sure they are safe and reliable. One man told me that they must, for the warheads in these nuclear weapons, test them after they have been here in service. They just cannot leave them here, they need to test them. The time is here for them to be tested. The safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons--there is nobody to do it. Now we are saying to the Federal employees: We are going to pay you when this is all over, but right now you just stay home. You 1,000 mathematicians, you 940 P.H.Ds, 2,500 computer scientists who work for the National Security Agency: Stay home. Watch TV. Play chess. Do whatever you want to do because we will not let you work. But look ahead; you are going to get paid. On this side of the aisle, we like Federal employees. I like Federal employees. I look with great satisfaction at someone who works for the FBI or the Park Service. I want them to work. This is really an important time for people to visit our monuments, our national treasures, but they cannot do that. So not only does it hurt people who want to go see the Washington Monument up close, but also--not in Washington as much--take the places around our national parks. There are little motels and restaurants that depend on those parks to make a living. Wintertime is coming. The ability to visit these parks is now very limited. I have always cared about Federal employees. They do these jobs. Take the people who work for me and all Members of Congress. I have a Rhodes Scholar. She is a lawyer. She could go out in the private sector and make 10 times more money than she makes here. Why is she not doing that? She has two children. Why does she not do that? Because she cares about public service. I have people who work for me who are graduates of the best schools in America. They are here because they believe in public policy. They believe in being public servants. They are being told they are nonessential. Some Members of Congress are kind of showing off, saying: Well, I am not closing my office. I have closed my office because I do not think my employees should be treated any differently than someone who is working for the Bureau of Land Management or the FBI. They are home.", u"Mr. President, today, I rise to join this bipartisan group calling for support of the USA FREEDOM Act. I want to begin by thanking my friend and colleague from Utah for his hard work and effort on behalf of the American people on this, my friend from Vermont for his actions also, and other Members of this Chamber. Together, what we are trying to do is bring transparency, accountability, and, most importantly, freedom to the American people--freedom from an unnecessary and what has now been declared an illegal invasion of American's privacy. I am talking specifically about section 215 under the PATRIOT Act. Just last week, a Federal appeals court ruled that this National Security Agency program that collects Americans' calls--these records are now illegal. Our national security and protection of our freedom as Americans are not mutually exclusive. Allowing the Federal Government to conduct vast domestic surveillance operations under section 215 provides the government with too much authority. This court's ruling only reaffirms that the NSA is out of control. Under section 215, the FBI can seek a court order directing a business to turn over certain records when they have reasonable grounds to believe the information asked for is ``relevant to an authorized investigation of international terrorism.'' However, the NSA has wrongly interpreted this to mean that all--all--telephone records are relevant. So they are collecting and storing large amounts of data in an attempt to find a small amount of information that might be relevant. If we reauthorize these laws without significant reforms, we are allowing millions of law-abiding U.S. citizens' call records to be held by the Federal Government. I see this as nothing but an egregious intrusion of Americans' privacy. So what does the NSA know? They know someone from my State in Elko, NV, got a call from the NRA and then called their Senator. So what does the NSA know? They know someone from Las Vegas called the suicide hotline for 20 minutes and then called a hospital right after. So what does the NSA know? They know you called your church or received a phone call from political action committees. So does the previous administration, does this administration or perhaps the next administration care about your party affiliation? Do they care about your religious beliefs? Do they care about your health concerns? How about your activities in nonprofit tax-exempt entities? Maybe not today, as the Senator from Utah said, but what about 5 years from now, what about 10 years from now and even 15 years from now? That is why I have been working with my colleagues since the last Congress to pass the USA FREEDOM Act, and I am proud to join as an original cosponsor of this bill in this new Congress. Those reforms are not just a pipeline dream that will die in the Senate. This is a substantive bill that carefully balances the privacy rights of Americans and the needs of the intelligence community as they work to keep us safe. That is why the House Judiciary Committee has passed this bill on a bipartisan basis and the full House of Representatives is expected to pass it later this week. Let me be clear. We are not here to strip the intelligence community of the tools needed to fight terrorism. To my colleagues who feel that the USA FREEDOM Act will do this, I would ask them to read this letter from our intelligence community. In my hand, I have a letter signed by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence that was sent to Senator Leahy last year. I would like to read a portion of this. ``The intelligence community believes that your bill preserves essential intelligence community capabilities; and the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence support your bill and believe that it is a reasonable compromise that enhances privacy and civil liberties and increases transparency.'' We are not here to harm the operational capabilities of the intelligence community who safeguard us every day. What we are here to do is provide the American people the certainty that the Federal Government is working without violating their constitutional rights. That is why I have also consistently opposed and voted against the PATRIOT Act during my time in Congress. I will do everything I can to end the PATRIOT Act, but if I cannot do that, I will work to gut the PATRIOT Act of the most egregious sections that infringe upon American citizens' privacy and their civil liberties. That is what the reforms of the USA FREEDOM Act begin to achieve. This legislation, among other things, will rein in the dragnet collection of data by the National Security Agency. It will stop the bulk collection of American communication records by ending the specific authorization under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. We are reaching a critical deadline as several Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provisions expire at the end of May. I want to be clear that I expect reforms to our surveillance programs, and I will not consent to a straight reauthorization of the illegal activities that occur under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. It is time for our Nation to right this wrong, make significant changes necessary to restore America's faith in the Federal Government, and restore the civil liberties that make our Nation worth protecting. I want to again thank the Senator from Utah and my colleague from the State of Vermont for their hard work and effort on behalf of all Americans in protecting their privacies and their civil liberties. I will turn my time back over to the Senator from Utah.", u"Mr. President, I wanted to speak earlier because I wanted to encourage my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to come to a resolution on this problem. We cannot let this country go dark in terms of its ability to do its duty to defend the United States of America. We have to get off of what we are doing here and start getting down to the business of what we need to do. I have to believe that tonight the world is watching us and they are saying: There goes the United States Senate, and there they go home, ha, ha, ha. They have a program that someone tried to render helpless in terms of our ability to protect ourselves. Edward Snowden literally tried to disgrace the United States. Now here we are working on a program that went through the respective committees, that has the sound and sensible solution, and we have rejected it. I am not here to talk about the program, but I will tell you whom I am ready to talk about--the thousands and thousands and thousands of people who work at the National Security Agency, and I want to talk about what they go through every day. They are out there working a 36-hour day trying to defend the United States of America, and they want to work under a law that is constitutional, is legal, is authorized, so they can do the necessary work to defend the United States of America. They thought they were doing that under the old FISA bill. They thought they were doing that. They were proud of what they were doing. They mustered everything they could give to this country. Then along comes Eric Snowden. Then along come the leaks. Then along comes the pontificating about ``My, my, my, we have to worry about privacy.'' I worry about privacy, too, but I also worry about the safety and security of the United States of America. And I watched the Nation vilify the men and women who work at this Agency. So now, as we work under the current law--which will expire; make no mistake, it will expire--we don't have it together to pass a new law. So they have been vilified for what they have done. They have been vilified for what they have done, in many instances attacked by their neighbors, their children picked on and bullied because their parents work at this Agency. Morale was at a low ebb. Finally, now we are trying to deal with and cope with that. They are proud of their work. And what are we doing? We can't even pass a law. We can't even pass a law. I think that is absolutely outrageous. I am so sorry we are going home. I am so sorry we are going home. So now we will come back next Sunday. I really urge those people--who I know are of good will and well-intentioned--to really work to find a way that when we come back next Sunday, we will be able to vote and move forward and not end up in this ongoing parliamentary quagmire. I worry about our country, and I worry about our ability to govern. This is as serious as it gets. What is the role of a National Security Agency? To be able to operate and function in a way that is constitutional, legal, authorized, and obviously of necessity. So I really feel very strongly about this. And I have watched all this go back and forth. So we spent hours and days and days and days on all of these amendments on trade. That is good. I am glad we did it. But I am not glad we took that long. We had this bill. We knew we had this bill. We waited until the last minute. We got ourselves into a jackpot. Now we really have to find our way out. I just cannot speak more forcibly and enough about this. Well, I will have more to say next week. But I really urge others to do their very best. I know there are people here, such as my colleague Senator Feinstein and others, who have worked on this. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010, S. 1494, that the Senate has approved by unanimous consent. The legislation is the product of a bipartisan effort in the Intelligence Committee, which was reflected by the committee's unanimous vote of 15 to 0 on the bill. I thank Vice Chairman Bond for his efforts on the legislation and the full committee staff for their work. It has been 4 years since the Congress has passed and the President has signed an intelligence authorization act. This has meant that the law has not kept up with changes in the intelligence community and that Congress has not been able to require reforms and provide flexibilities that are sorely needed. I am pleased that the Senate has taken a major step toward enactment. Before summarizing some of the key provisions of this legislation, let me briefly describe the way in which it was written. The committee has worked with the Director of National Intelligence, DNI, ADM Dennis Blair, to identify areas where legislation is needed to better run and oversee the Nation's 16 intelligence agencies. Many of these provisions have been proposed and included in previous legislation reported out by the Intelligence Committee but have yet to be passed into law. At the request of the White House, we have separated issues of terrorist detention and interrogation from this bill and the committee intends to take up legislation on those issues separately. The committee has not changed its position from previous legislation on the need to have an effective and humane interrogation program that operates fully within the nation's laws and international commitments. The major themes of this bill are to strengthen the Director of National Intelligence to make sure that he has the management authorities and flexibilities needed to direct the intelligence community; insist upon stronger accountability and oversight mechanisms for intelligence activities, both within the executive branch and by the Congress; and to fund fully the intelligence community's share of the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the continuing counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations worldwide. There is also a classified annex to this bill, which lays out the authorized funding levels for the National Intelligence Program. The theme of the annex is to shift funds from intelligence activities that are less capable, lower priority, or not performing to those that will provide the Nation with better capabilities for intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. The details of the classified annex are necessarily secret, but all Members are welcome to review them at the committee's offices at any time. Let me describe some of the notable provisions in more detail. To add to the management authorities of the Director of National Intelligence, the bill gives the Director of National Intelligence greater flexibility in personnel matters, including extending the length of time that personnel may be detailed to an intelligence agency to 3 years from the current 1 year. It also provides the Director, working with individual intelligence agencies, to shift or hire personnel by up to 5 percent above authorized personnel levels if intelligence requirements demand doing so. The bill authorizes the DNI to conduct accountability reviews of personnel and elements within the intelligence community, further clarifying that the Director is the senior official in the intelligence community. It seeks to prevent repetitions of information sharing problems by enabling the DNI to purchase necessary equipment or technology to improve information sharing with governmental departments or agencies regardless of whether they are part of the intelligence community. The bill also requires the intelligence community to continue putting in place the information technology necessary to assure information flows between its agencies. The committee has longstanding concerns with the way the intelligence community has briefed, or has failed to brief, the congressional Intelligence Committees on all intelligence activities and covert actions. Two major controversies, over CIA detention and interrogation and over the warrantless surveillance program of the National Security Agency, were both briefed only to the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. The rest of the committee's membership was unaware of these programs for years. The bill strengthens the statutory requirements to keep the congressional intelligence committees ``fully and currently informed'' of intelligence activities and covert actions. The legislation makes clear that there is no exception to the obligation to brief Congress on intelligence activities and covert actions; requires that notifications include a description of the legal authority on which activities are undertaken; and requires that all committee members be provided with the broad outlines--the ``main features''--of intelligence programs in those instances where the sensitive operational details are provided only to a limited number of Senators. In addition to ensuring that notifications to the Congress are conducted, the bill includes a number of additional provisions intended to strengthen intelligence oversight. These include creating an independent inspector general, confirmed by the Senate, to help the DNI oversee the intelligence community and strengthening the inspectors general of the National Security Agency, NSA, Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, National Reconnaissance Office, NRO, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, NGA, by listing them under the Inspector General Act of 1978. They include requiring Senate confirmation for the Directors of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and for the Deputy Director of the CIA. For several years, the Intelligence Committee has viewed these positions as holding substantial budgetary and policy responsibilities. They also include improving the intelligence community's ability to budget, manage finances, and run program acquisitions. I am unable to state publicly why these provisions are so important, but it is fair to say that intelligence agencies have had major failures in this regard. In this bill, we have sought to apply best practices from other parts of the government to intelligence community management and acquisitions with the goal of more efficiently and effectively using taxpayer dollars to fund intelligence activities. Finally, while I am unable to provide specifics due to reasons of classification, let me highlight five other parts of the bill and its classified annex that merit recognition. Satellites. To address a problem created by years of mismanagement and acquisition failures, the annex to this bill recommends a more capable and more affordable imagery satellite architecture that addresses the requirements of both our civilian policymakers and military warfighters. Languages. As our committee report notes, the intelligence community's language capabilities are abysmal. This bill authorizes increased funding to significantly improve language proficiencies. Rather than funding separate initiatives across the various intelligence agencies, this funding is provided to the Director of National Intelligence for allocation and coordination to maximize effectiveness. Research and Development. The U.S. intelligence community leads the world in the technical collection of intelligence. This success is the result of decades of investment in research and development. The annex to this bill recommends increases in investment on research and development to return to the level of funding necessary to maintain the nation's technological edge. Cybersecurity. The committee has held numerous hearings with the Acting Senior Director for Cybersecurity in the National Security Council, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the committee's Technical Advisory Group. I believe strongly that cyber attack and espionage by adversary nations and nonstate actors pose a grave threat to our Nation's national and economic security. I also believe, however, that initiatives underway to provide for security of the government's cyber networks need to be implemented and overseen carefully to ensure that privacy rights are upheld. For this reason, the bill includes a provision that establishes a framework for executive and congressional oversight for cybersecurity. Specifically, it requires reporting to Congress on the legal authorities for cyber-security programs, privacy assessments, and details of the concept of operations for these activities. The provision also requires thorough auditing of cyber-security programs by the relevant inspectors general, especially to determine compliance with law and privacy rights. Finally, the provision authorizes the detail of cyber experts from the intelligence community to the Department of Homeland Security and FBI to assist in their roles in cyber defense and law enforcement. The annex to the bill also adjusts funding levels to ensure that the President's request for cyber-security activities are appropriately funded and are proceeding under clear legal and policy guidance. Report on compliance with laws related to detention and interrogation. As I noted, the administration and our committee continue to conduct reviews of detention and interrogation practices begun after September 11, 2001. This bill requires the DNI to report on how the intelligence community complies with all laws, international obligations, and executive orders related to the detention and interrogation of persons under their control. Following the reporting of our bill on July 22, we have worked with three committees of the Senate to resolve several questions. We have worked with the Armed Services Committee to develop a Senate resolution that will govern the sequence of referral, between that committee and the Intelligence Committee, of nominations for Director of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. That resolution has the support of Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain of the Armed Services Committee, as well as having my and Vice Chairman Bond's support. I will address the proposed resolution in a separate colloquy today with Chairman Levin. We have worked with Ranking Member Cochran of the Appropriations Committee on an agreement to strike, in a managers' amendment, section 341 of the bill that would have expressed the sense of the Senate on an Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence. That internal Senate matter will continue to be discussed within the Senate but will not be a part of this bill. We have worked with Chairman Leahy of the Judiciary Committee to resolve several matters. The managers' amendment that Vice Chairman Bond and I have offered amends three provisions which require the submission of reports on various matters. The purpose of the amendments to sections 336, 407, and 445 is to ensure that the Judiciary Committee receives reports on matters within its jurisdiction. In consultation with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the managers' amendment amends section 411 on a FOIA operational file exemption to state more precisely the intent of the provision. The managers' amendment also strikes section 352 that establishes a FOIA exemption for terrorist identity information that is disseminated for terrorist screening purposes. As a comparable provision has been reported in the House, we expect that the provision will be the subject of further consideration at conference. Mr. President, the vice chairman and I have worked hard to produce bipartisan legislation that provides the intelligence community with the tools and resources needed to keep the Nation safe and to inform decisionmakers. This bill does just that. It strikes a balance between allowing intelligence agencies the latitude to conduct their operations while ensuring their legality and efficiency. I very much appreciate the Senate's approval of this legislation and look forward to bringing a conference report to the Senate as soon as possible.", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen of the House, let me state from the outset that we support our government intercepting each and every conversation involving al Qaeda and its supporters. But I cannot support legislation that not only fails to bring the warrantless surveillance program under the law, but dramatically expands the administration's authority to conduct warrantless surveillance on innocent Americans. This is the Bush bill. It is amazing to me that we would even be taking up a law that fails to regulate the present domestic spying program. Nearly 9 months after we first learned from the New York Times that there was a warrantless surveillance program going on, and we did not know it until then, there has been no attempt to conduct an independent inquiry into its legality. Not only has the Congress failed to conduct any sort of investigation, but the administration summarily rejected all requests for a special counsel or Inspector General review, and when the Office of Professional Responsibility finally opened an investigation, the President of the United States himself squashed it by denying the investigators security clearances. Now, since 1978, there have been 12 amendments to this bill, 51 different changes. So let us not start off acting as though there have never been changes here before. What we are doing, instead of restricting the administration and the National Security Agency, this bill grants the administration more and new authority to conduct warrantless surveillance of American citizens. Not only does the bill permit warrantless surveillance of the international communications of any American who is not a target, but it grants the administration new authority to conduct warrantless surveillance on domestic calls in many new circumstances. We do not like this measure before us because, instead of bringing the President's warrantless surveillance program under the law, what has been done, without much finesse, is to dramatically expand his authority and permit even broader and more intrusive warrantless surveillance of the program and the phone calls and the e-mails of innocent Americans. It raises severe constitutional questions, the fourth amendment and the equal protection of agencies and subjects everything in this area to ill-considered and unfair process. But it is not just the law professors and the civil liberty unions that are supporting it. We have here a statement from former national security officials, and I will insert the statement of former national security officials in the Record at this time. The President has spoken repeatedly and emotionally in recent days about the need for intelligence professionals to have clarity in the law. He has emphasized that it is not fair to ask these men and women to operate in an uncertain legal environment and that, in fact, legal uncertainty hampers operational effectiveness and thereby jeopardizes our national security. Yet legal uncertainty is exactly what will result if Congress heeds the President's call to enact legislation that replaces the obligation to use the procedures of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act with broad language about relying upon the President's constitutional authority. Before FISA was enacted, courts addressed the issue of warrantless surveillance for domestic security purposes but did not clearly resolve the scope of the President's authority regarding foreign intelligence surveillance. FISA was enacted in order to clarify this murky legal area by setting forth a clear process for electronic surveillance of foreign powers and agents of foreign powers. The Executive Branch welcomed the clarity and this law has been viewed as an essential national security tool for 28 years. This legislation would return a complex subject to the murky waters from which FISA emerged by making going to the FISA court or applying FISA in any way optional rather than mandatory. It leaves it to the President to decide when he has the authority to conduct warrantless surveillance of Americans or foreigners. Whether he has made the right determination will not be known unless and until it is challenged in court. If advances in technology or other exigencies not contemplated in FISA present the President with a national security emergency, he should have a window in which to act while promptly seeking appropriate amendments to FISA--and this could be provided for in the statute. But this extraordinary emergency authority should not be permitted effectively to repeal FISA. FISA was a political compromise between the Legislative and Executive branches of government; unforeseen exigencies should require those branches of government to continue to coordinate, not condone unilateralism by either branch. Indeed, the world has become so much more complex, both technologically and socially, than it was in 1978, that making FISA optional rather than mandatory would significantly destabilize the balance struck then between law and policy. As individuals with extensive experience in national security and intelligence, we strongly urge that the requirements of FISA remain just that--requirements, not options. Congress should continue to work to get the facts and if, once they are provided, these facts demonstrate the need for changes in the law, amend it only as needed to meet genuine national security imperatives. Legal clarity is just as essential in this context as any other in which intelligence or law enforcement officers are asked to operate. FISA provides that clarity and should not be abandoned or amended in ways that render it irrelevant. Ken Bass Formerly Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Department of Justice Eugene Bowman Formerly Deputy General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation Mary DeRosa Formerly Special Assistant to the President Formerly Legal Advisor, National Security Counsel Juliette Kayyem Formerly Member, National Commission on Terrorism (The Bremer Commission) Formerly Legal Advisor to the Attorney General, Department of Justice Elizabeth Larson Formerly Senior Staff, House Pennanent Select Committee on Intelligence Formerly Senior Executive, Central Intelligence Agency Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker Formerly General Counsel, National Security Agency Formerly General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency F. Whitten Peters Formerly Secretary of the Air Force Formerly Principal Deputy General Counsel, Department of Defense Stephen Saltzburg Formerly Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice William S. Sessions Formerly Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Formerly Chief United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas Michael A. Smith Formerly Assistant General Counsel, National Security Agency Brit Snider Formerly General Counsel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Formerly Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency Suzanne E. Spaulding Formerly General Counsel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Formerly Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency Michael A. Vatis Formerly Director, National Infrastructure Protection Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation Formerly Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice I lift up the names of two people in particular: William Sessions, the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, formerly Chief Judge of the Western District of Texas; and William H. Webster, formerly Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. There is a wide agreement that this legislation is not what we should be doing. It should be rejected because we are giving the administration unilateral authority to review the call records and e-mails of millions of Americans and permits the administration to use surveillance devices without cause, thereby reinstituting the discredited ``total information awareness'' program that kept records on hundreds of millions of Americans. Hidden in the fine print are provisions which grant the administration authority to maintain permanent records on innocent American citizens, granting the administration new authority to demand personal records without court review, and terminating any and all legal challenges to unlawful wiretapping. So we are joined in our position by the Computer and Communications Industry Association, including Microsoft, Verizon, Google and Intuit; law school deans, 63 of them; 13 former national security officials; the Center for Democracy and Technology; and the Center for National Security Studies. We must fight terrorism, but we must fight it in the right way, consistent with our Constitution and in a manner that serves as a model for the rest of the world. This bill fails that test. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Mr. President, for more than a decade the government's ability and authority to gather information and electronic communications data about those suspected of, or connected to, potential terrorists has greatly increased. You only need to read the newspaper or listen to the news in order to realize how extraordinary this expansion has been. As an American, I believe that if the government is going to have such powerful authorities, it should only be if there is proper oversight, accountability, and transparency. We have to ensure that we maintain both our Nation's security and the fundamental civil liberties upon which our Nation was founded. I have long been troubled by the expansive nature and scope of the USA PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act. There is not enough oversight and ability for Americans to know what their government is doing and be able to get into the debate of whether they want their government to do this. That is why I have consistently fought to include strong protections for the privacy rights and civil liberties of American citizens, as well as sunsets to help ensure proper congressional oversight. Nothing focuses oversight like knowing a law is about to come to an end. So I will introduce at the end of my remarks, along with a bipartisan group of Senators, the FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013. In fact, those of us who are introducing this legislation go across the political spectrum. This is not a partisan issue--this is an American issue. This is an issue about wanting to know what our government is doing and why. As Americans, we have the right to know what our government does and why. In each of the last two Congresses, I introduced legislation to improve and reform the powerful law enforcement tools of the USA PATRIOT Act while at the same time increasing judicial oversight, public accountability, and transparency. Both those bills were reported favorably by the Judiciary Committee with bipartisan support, but Congress ultimately decided to extend all of these authorities, without any modifications or improvements, until 2015. Likewise, when Congress considered reauthorizing the FISA Amendments Act last year, I pushed for a shorter sunset, greater transparency for the American people, and better oversight. I regret the Senate rejected these efforts to apply stricter oversight over these sweeping authorities. The recent public revelations about two classified data collection programs have brought renewed attention to the government's broad surveillance authorities, but they also underscore the need for close scrutiny by Congress. The Director of National Intelligence has acknowledged that they are being conducted pursuant to section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. We have also raised questions about lax oversight by the National Security Agency, when a 29-year-old contract employee can walk off with huge amounts of data without being stopped. It is not enough for the National Security Agency to come here and say that they are doing this to protect the country. I want them to protect the things they are already holding. So the comprehensive legislation I am introducing today will not only improve the privacy protections and accountability provisions associated with these authorities, but it is going to strengthen oversight and transparency provisions in other parts of the USA PATRIOT Act. In recent days, much attention has been rightly focused on section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and the bulk collection of phone call metadata by the National Security Agency and their inability to keep that from being stolen by a 29-year-old contract worker. This measure will narrow the scope of section 215 orders by requiring the government to show both relevance to an authorized investigation and a link to a foreign group or power. The bill also adds more meaningful judicial review of section 215 orders but strikes the one-year waiting period before a recipient can challenge a nondisclosure order for section 215 orders. Now the order comes in and you are told you can't talk about it. No matter whether it damages your business, your relations, or people you are supposed to protect, you can't talk about it for one year. That is a broad generalization of what the nondisclosure orders are. I think those orders should be changed. I think when we have these kinds of ``gag orders'' on Americans, you are going into a very dangerous area. Moreover, this measure would require court review of minimization procedures when information concerning a U.S. person is acquired, retained, or disseminated pursuant to a section 215 order. This is a commonsense oversight requirement already required for other FISA authorities such as wiretaps, physical searches, pen register and trap and trace devices. As I likened it before, we all understand that if a law enforcement agency gets a search warrant to go into your home and search for things, you usually know about it and are able to question that authority. Now if they are collecting things electronically, you don't know about it, you don't know what this is doing to your reputation, to your work, or anything else. We have to have more accountability. The FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act will also reform and improve other authorities contained in the PATRIOT Act that, while perhaps not a topic of recent public debate--and I will not go into some of those aspects here on the floor, also significantly impact the privacy rights of Americans. Some of the things we can talk about, things such as national security letters, so-called NSLs, are used extensively by law enforcement and the intelligence community. They can be issued without the approval of a court, a grand jury, or a prosecutor. Most Americans would be amazed to know that authority exists. Frankly, in a State such as mine where people value their privacy, I think most Vermonters would be really concerned about it. I propose applying a new sunset to the NSL authority. That would require Congress to look at it again and come up with a better idea, or it would end right there. I have long been concerned about the broad scope of these secret requests and the potential for expansive collection of sensitive information without appropriate limitations and a sunset provision would help to ensure proper accountability. Just because we can go out and gather all of this information on Americans, often doing it secretly, doesn't mean we should. Some of us enjoy our privacy. Some of us like to think we are innocent unless proven guilty. My bill would also address constitutional deficiencies regarding the nondisclosure or ``gag orders'' by finally allowing individuals to challenge these orders in court. You grow up hearing from everybody, Well, you can have your day in court. Actually, you don't get your day in court with these ``gag orders.'' The bill would also expand public reporting on the use of NSLs and FISA authorities, including an unclassified report on the impact of the use of these authorities on the privacy of U.S. persons. I have heard a great deal in the last few weeks from people not only in Vermont but elsewhere asking, Can't we have a report the American people can see--not just those of us like myself who have access to classified material, but have an unclassified report on the impact of the use of these authorities on the privacy of Americans? My bill will also address shortcomings in the FISA Amendments Act and apply improvements that I sought during last year's reauthorization debate in the Senate. The existing December 2017 sunset would be shortened to June 2015 to focus attention and ensure timely reexamination of how these authorities are being utilized. The June 2015 sunset will also align with the PATRIOT Act sunset, allowing Congress--and in fact requiring Congress--to address all of these provisions at once, rather than a little piece here and a little piece there. This legislation will also increase accountability by clarifying the scope of annual reviews currently required by law extends to all agencies that have a role in developing targeting and so-called minimization procedures. Finally--and I think this is extremely important--the bill seeks to increase oversight by requiring the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community to conduct a comprehensive review of the FISA Amendments Act and its impact on the privacy rights of all Americans. These are commonsense, practical improvements to ensure that the broad and powerful surveillance tools being used by the government are subject to appropriate limitations, transparency, and oversight. The American people deserve to know how laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act are being used to conduct electronic surveillance, particularly when the surveillance is not just on those that we have reason to be suspicious of, but of all Americans--totally innocent Americans. The American people also deserve to know whether these programs have proven sufficiently effective to justify their extraordinary breadth. If you can collect billions of phone calls, and we have proven technologically you can do that, do we get anything out of it? Or, do we get our information about terrorists the old-fashioned way by actually talking to people, infiltrating terrorist groups, and so forth? Let us make sure we are not doing something just because we can do it, regardless of how it impacts the rights of Americans. The enhanced layers of transparency, oversight, and accountability included in this legislation will ensure we are protecting national security without undermining the privacy rights and civil liberties of law-abiding Americans. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.", u"Madam Speaker, I rise today to honor the extraordinary life of Dr. Frank S. Greene, Jr., technology professional, electrical engineer, venture capitalist, entrepreneur, philanthropist, parent, grandparent and friend. With his passing, December 26, 2009, at the age of 71, we are reminded of his life's journey, his prolific career and the joyful legacy he has inspired. Dr. Greene was born on October 19, 1938, in Washington, DC, to Frank S. Green, Sr. and Irma Olivia Swygert. He was raised in St. Louis, Missouri, where, in 1961, he became one of the first African-American students to graduate from Washington University. He was also among the first cohort of black students to complete the university's U.S. Air Force ROTC Program, and was ultimately promoted to the rank of Air Force Captain, helping to develop high performance computers for the National Security Agency. An avid and industrious scholar, Dr. Greene earned a master's degree in electrical engineering from Purdue University, and his Ph.D. from Santa Clara University, where he was later elected as the first African-American Trustee. As Dr. Greene began a career in the private sector, he maintained close ties to academia and academic pursuits, teaching university courses in electrical engineering and computer science at prestigious universities across the country. In 1965, Dr. Greene joined a research and development team at Fairchild Semiconductor that won the fastest memory chip design patent of the time. In 1971, he founded Technology Development Corporation, a fast-growing computer software and technical services company, which led to the founding of ZeroOne Systems in 1985. In 1993, he co-founded New Vista Capital, a venture capital firm that specialized in funding women-owned and minority-owned businesses. Throughout his career, Dr. Greene earned many accolades, including receiving Washington University's Black Alumni Achievement Award, Santa Clara University's Distinguished Engineering Alumni Award, Purdue University's Outstanding Electrical and Computer Engineer Award, and, in 2002, induction as the first African American into the Silicon Valley Engineering Hall of Fame. All the while, Dr. Greene kept in mind the critical importance of instilling in youth a love of learning and an indomitable belief in the ability to succeed. He began the GO-Positive Foundation to encourage life skills through, ``Vision, Relationships, and Execution,'' with his VRE Leadership Model. Additionally, the Dr. Frank S. Greene Scholars Program is a science, technology, engineering and math initiative contributing to the academic success of African-American students. He was also an active member of many local organizations. I met Dr. Greene years ago while working on the former congressional staff for current mayor, Ron Dellums. Dr. Greene was always a kind and forthright man whose business acumen impressed me tremendously. We worked on many business issues together and, as an elected official, I enjoyed his gracious and consistent support over the years. Frank did so much for young people in the Bay Area and beyond. He was a good friend, and I will miss him. Today, California's 9th Congressional District salutes and honors a wonderful human being, Dr. Frank S. Greene, Jr. Our community is indebted to his life's contribution in countless ways. Dr. Greene was truly a great man and he will be deeply missed by an extended group of family, friends and loved ones. May his soul rest in peace.", u"Mr. President, I wish to pay tribute to a distinguished scholar, accomplished leader, and a treasured member of the Maryland family, Dr. Richard Roca, director of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab, who will soon step down after a decade of distinguished leadership and service in that position. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab is a national treasure. Since it was created in the early days of the Second World War, APL has helped maintain our Nation's military, our intelligence agencies, our space community, and our medical profession on the cutting edge of technological achievements. Now the largest university affiliated research lab in the Nation, the dedicated scientists, engineers, technicians, and researchers at APL have time and again solved the problems no one thought possible, and in the process kept us safe and secure. Since 2000, Dr. Roca has led this uniquely talented and diverse team of world renowned scientists as they rose to the challenges of the post-September 11 world. Dr. Roca was the right leader at the right time to guide APL through these fast-paced and challenging times. Like many visionary leaders in his field, Dr. Roca understands that for a forward-leaning, high-tech institution like the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab can never be static. He knows that in order for APL to play its role solving the problems of the 21st century and helping our Nation's national security apparatus adjust to an ever-changing world, that APL itself must continually be updating and reinventing itself. Dr. Roca's leadership over the last 10 years has embodied that mindset on continual improvement and self-reinvention. During his tenure, APL adapted to a changing world by expanding its roles and capabilities into homeland security, cyber defense, space exploration, and information-centric operations. After September 11, under Dr. Roca's leadership APL established the Electronic Surveillance System for Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics--ESSENCE--at APL to monitor the threats from new diseases in the United States. That system is now on watch across the country to provide early warnings against new epidemics created by nature or by terrorist activity. Dr. Roca was also one of the first to recognize the threat from cyber attacks and call for comprehensive cyber defenses. It was under his leadership that APL established major partnerships with the National Security Agency to develop and test new cybersecurity tools. These are just a few examples of how Dr. Roca saw the world changing and mobilized APL to meet the new challenges. We are safer for his leadership in keeping APL on the cutting edge of helping counter new and emerging threats to our national security. Dr. Roca also kept APL on the cusp of new explorations in space and science. During his tenure, APL helped design, build, and send satellites into space that have explored the Eros asteroid; that are enroute to explore Mercury and Pluto, and which play valuable roles in understanding the Sun's impact on Earth's atmosphere. These contributions to understanding and exploring our universe cannot be overstated. They are major achievements that will lead to decades of scientific study and achievement. So as Dr. Roca comes to the end of his tenure, I want to thank him for his tireless service, his devotion to excellence, his dedication to the mission of the Applied Physics Lab, and for his inspired leadership in keeping APL at the cutting edge of keeping our Nation safe and advancing valuable science in hundreds of different areas. We wish you the very best, Dr. Roca, in whatever the next chapter in your professional life holds for you. Wherever that takes you, know that you will always and forever be a member of the Maryland family. ", u"Madam Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to First Sergeant Quintin Waterman, United States Army. First Sergeant Waterman has served a distinguished career in the United States Army, spanning nearly thirty years, concluding here in the United States House of Representatives as the very first senior Non-Commissioned Officer to serve as a Legislative Liaison Officer. Over the course of the 28 years which First Sergeant Waterman has spent in uniform serving his country, he has been cited by his command as exhibiting outstanding initiative, leadership, and professionalism in all of his actions. In doing so, he has made significant contributions to the welfare of Soldiers, and their families, to say nothing of the service he has provided the people of this nation. During First Sergeant Waterman's career, he has served with distinction as a military language instructor, teaching Russian at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center in Monterey, California. It was there that he was selected to serve as a Brigade Command Language Program Manager. In this capacity, he was responsible for the training and professional development of four subordinate Command Language Program Managers at the largest Command Language Program in the Army's Intelligence and Security Command. Following his assignment at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, First Sergeant Waterman was selected as First Sergeant for B Company, 741st Military Intelligence Battalion. There he led a company of over 112 Soldiers in a number of occupational specialties, providing direct support throughout the Signals and Intelligence Directorate of the National Security Agency. He later performed with distinction at the Deployed Security Operations Center for U.S. Central Command as the Chief of Mission for Counter-Terrorism, Force Protection, and Indications and Warnings in direct support of Operation Enduring Freedom. There is no doubt that Master Sergeant has demonstrated himself as a natural and selfless leader who is willing to lead from the front. Perhaps his most notable service however, was as the very first senior non-commissioned officer in the United States Army to serve as a Legislative Liaison Officer in the U.S. House of Representatives, a post for which he was hand selected for by the Sergeant Major of the Army. As a Legislative Liaison Officer, First Sergeant Waterman was in a unique position to serve as a conduit between the Army, Members of Congress, and their staffs. This is a crucial role which allows the Army to train, equip, and sustain an Army, especially an Army in the time of war. I want to thank First Sergeant Waterman for his tireless and selfless service to the people of our great nation. His career and performance has brought distinction upon himself, the commands he has served under, and the entire United States Army. It is Soldiers like First Sergeant Waterman who make up the finest Army the world has ever seen and I am grateful for his service.", u"Thank you for allowing me this opportunity to say a few words on cyber security in this particular exercise done by universities. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H. Res. 1244, recognizing the National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition for its now 5-year effort to promote cyber security curriculum in institutions of higher education. The Cyber Collegiate Defense Competition is a 3-day event and is the first competition of its kind that focuses on the operational aspect of managing and protecting an existing commercial network infrastructure. Students get a chance to test their knowledge in an operational environment and network within industry professionals who are always on the lookout for up-and-coming engineers. On February 27 and 28 of 2004, a group of educators and students, government and industry representatives gathered in San Antonio, Texas, to discuss the feasibility and desirability of establishing such a program--this particular regular cyber security exercise with a uniformed structure for postsecondary-level students. The Center for Infrastructure Assurance and Security at the University of Texas at San Antonio agreed to host the first Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition for the Southwestern region in April of 2005. The University of Texas at San Antonio is the National Center of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education by the National Security Agency and by the Department of Homeland Security. The University of Texas at San Antonio is in my district, and I have been continually impressed with their pioneering approach to cyber security curricula. They have outstanding faculty and staff, all of whom recognize how critical information assurance is becoming in the 21st century. This year's regional winners included Towson University, DePaul University, Montana Tech, Northeastern University, the University of Washington, Texas A&M University, the University of Louisville, and the California State Polytechnic University at Pomona. I am also honored and privileged to have attended this year's competition and previous events and to have personally had the opportunity to congratulate the winners from Northeastern University, the champions of the national competition. Let me just add that it is exciting to see these young people engage in this competition. We are hoping that, as we move forward, this will grow and allow other universities to participate and get engaged as these are the youngsters, in the words of some of them who describe themselves, who are the geek warriors who defend our infrastructure throughout our country and throughout the world. It was really exciting to see them not only in the competition but to see them participating. We have these unique individuals who are extremely brilliant, who are out there doing a wonderful job, not only for the private sector but for the public sector. In conclusion, I just want to believe that the National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition is poised to expand and grow as cyber security becomes increasingly important for the public and the private sectors throughout the country and throughout the world. I hope this body will continue its strong work in supporting the cyber security profession while making sure we are providing the resources to train the next generation of cyber security professionals. I want to take this opportunity to thank the chairwoman for allowing this particular legislation of recognition to come forward. Thank you very much.", u'Mr. President, section 432 of S. 1494, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2010 that is before the Senate today, provides that the Directors of the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. For several years, the Select Committee on Intelligence has been seeking the enactment of legislation to provide for Senate confirmation of these important positions. The Senate has previously endorsed this effort by including this requirement in the proposed Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year It is our strong hope that the time has come to enact this fundamental measure to ensure adequate oversight of these three agencies whose spending constitutes a significant portion of the entire intelligence budget. In preparation for that, my colleague at the Intelligence Committee, our vice chairman Kit Bond, and I have worked with the leadership of the Armed Services Committee, Chairman Carl Levin and Ranking Member John McCain, to settle on the process by which our two committees will assist the Senate in a careful examination of the qualifications of nominees to head these agencies. The insights of both committees is important in that process because the three entities are housed in the Department of Defense and perform significant responsibilities there while also being major components of the intelligence community. The resolution that we have prepared recognizes the contribution that each of our committees should make to a thorough and timely process. It provides that if the nominee is an Active-Duty military officer, the confirmation process will begin in the Armed Services Committee and, if reported, the nomination will be sequentially referred to the Intelligence Committee for a prescribed period of time; namely, 30 days plus an additional 5 days if the 30-day period expires when the Senate is in recess. If the nominee is a civilian, the confirmation process will begin in the Intelligence Committee with a sequential referral to the Armed Services Committee under those same time limits. To ensure that the sequential referral does not delay completion of the committee part of the nomination process, the resolution provides for the automatic discharge of the nominations from the second committee if it has not reported with the prescribed period of time. This referral system recognizes the equities of each committee and will ensure that the Senate receives the benefit of the recommendations made by the two committees with the expertise necessary to advise the Senate about the qualifications of nominees to head these three important agencies. Although we are not formally introducing the resolution at this time, Vice Chairman Bond joins me in this public commitment to the Senate that we will ask our committee to report the resolution in time for consideration and adoption by the Senate in conjunction with a conference report on the fiscal year 2010 Intelligence authorization. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the resolution, showing its cosponsorship by myself, Senator Levin, Senator Bond, and Senator McCain, be printed in the Record at the conclusion of the colloquy.', u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Ladies and gentlemen of the House, we finally come to the point in time where we consider the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act amendments, and I am delighted to bring this measure to the floor. I begin by observing that there are few rights that are more fundamental to our democracy than the right to have protections against unreasonable search and seizure, and there are few responsibilities that are more important than the government's protecting us from foreign threats. I submit that the measure before us does both of those and regards them as the two most important acts that we can pursue as responsible Members of the Congress. That conflict or tension goes to the very core of who we are as a Nation. Now, for more than 30 years, we have relied on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to strike the appropriate balance between the government's need to protect our rights from foreign attack and our citizens' right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have freedom of speech. The heart of that bargain was that the government could indeed use its awesome power of surveillance but only through independent court review. That's FISA since 1978. Now, a few years ago, the administration unilaterally chose to engage in warrantless surveillance of American citizens without court review. And last August, when this scheme appeared to be breaking down, this administration pushed through a law that it had caused to be drafted that essentially transferred the power of independent review from the courts to the Attorney General of the United States. Today, we will be voting on legislation to restore that proper balance. And so we present to you an uncomplicated consideration of a measure that has three titles. The first allows the government to obtain a single court order to approve surveillance against all members of any known terrorist group. It includes important safeguards to make sure that this power is not used to target innocent Americans. The chairman of the Intelligence Committee has a lot more to say about that. The second title deals with the difficult issue of how we make sure that those telecom carriers who assisted the government in the aftermath of the September 11 tragedy are not placed in a position where they cannot defend themselves in court. And then, finally, the last title provides an accounting of the highly controversial warrantless surveillance program. The administration tells us they have nothing to hide and the program was lawful in their program or its implementation. If that is the case, they should have nothing to fear from this blue ribbon commission that will be created by the enactment of the provision before us. Now, we learned only yesterday that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was continuing to misuse the authorities that we granted it under the PATRIOT Act 6 years ago to unlawfully obtain information about law-abiding Americans. Just yesterday. We learned 4 days ago that the National Security Agency was using its massive power to create a nationwide database of American citizens. Four days ago. And so that's why I believe it important that we include the civil liberties safeguards set forth in the legislation today. We have been working very closely with the American Civil Liberties Union in that regard, and we have a half dozen other organizations that have fully endorsed the bill. The legislation before us gives the administration and the agencies every tool they need to protect our Nation against terrorism, while at the same time protecting our own citizens' civil rights and liberties. I urge that we carefully examine the proposition before us. And I will reserve the balance of my time.", u"Mr. President, I wish to publicly commend and congratulate Colonel Kenneth O. McCreedy, U.S. Army, upon his retirement after 28 years of military service. I have come to know and respect Colonel McCreedy over the last 3 years, while he served as the installation commander of Fort Meade, MD. His tenure as the installation commander was highlighted by his constant civic engagement with the Fort Meade military and civilian community. During this time he signed the first Army Community Covenant in Maryland, solidifying support for servicemembers and their families. Colonel McCreedy was proactive in working with surrounding counties to prepare them for the growth challenges of BRAC 2005. Placing a heavy emphasis on strong community engagement, he worked closely with the Anne Arundel County School Board to secure the International Baccalaureate Program and Homeland Security Signature Program for Meade High School. Colonel McCreedy spearheaded the first two Meade Alliance Education Summits that focused on working with school boards and colleges to develop programs and initiatives to prepare today's students for future careers in the Federal Government. I am extremely grateful for the outstanding leadership and keen sense of community service that Colonel McCreedy has brought to the servicemembers, families, and civilian employees of Fort Meade. Commissioned as a military intelligence officer, Colonel McCreedy first served at Fort Riley, KS as the S2 and Scout Platoon Leader of 3-37 Armor and assistant S2 of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. After completing the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program at the Defense Intelligence College and Spanish instruction at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, CA, Colonel McCreedy was assigned to the U.S. Southern Command in Panama as a country analyst in the J2. Following Operation JUST CAUSE, he was assigned to Fort Hood, TX, where he was a G2 Operations Officer in the Third Corps, commanded a CI/IPW Company in the 163rd Military Intelligence Battalion, and served as the S3 Plans Officer for the 504th Military Intelligence Brigade. After attending school at Fort Leavenworth, KS, Colonel McCreedy served in Germany as the V Corps G2 Plans Officer, S3 of the 302nd Military Intelligence Battalion, and S3 of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. He then served as a member of the Commander's Initiatives Group while on duty in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Returning from Europe in 1999, he served as a Fellow at the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, prior to his assignment to Fort Gordon, GA, as commander of the 201st Military Intelligence Battalion. He next was appointed professor of military science at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, VA. After attending the Army War College, Colonel McCreedy worked in the Force Transformation Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Colonel McCreedy holds a bachelor's degree in history from Washington and Lee University, master's and doctorate degrees in history from the University of California, Berkeley, a Master of Military Art and Science from the Army Command and Staff College, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the Army War College. He is a graduate of both the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies and the Advanced Strategic Art Program. Among his awards and decorations, Colonel McCreedy has earned the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, and the NATO Medal. Mr. President, the Army, the State of Maryland, and the Nation are lucky to have had the service of such a great soldier. He will be sorely missed. Best wishes to Colonel McCreedy and his family. ", u"Madam Speaker I rise in opposition to H.R. 6304, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act (FISA). There is no question that we need to modernize the laws that govern U.S. intelligence to protect our national security, but we must also rigorously defend civil liberties and ensure accountability. That is why I am strongly opposed to any retroactive immunity for those telecommunications companies that are charged with violating those fundamental rights. Legal experts concur that President Bush's wiretapping program was, and is, in violation of the Constitution and applicable federal law. Congress as a whole was kept in the dark for years about these activities. It is our responsibility to protect innocent Americans who expect that their communications will remain private, except in circumstances provided under the law. Corporations that handed over their customers' records, without a valid court order or other legal instrument authorized by statute, undermined fundamental civil protections and privacy rights of Americans. The courts should not be prevented from ruling on the legality of the actions taken by these corporations. And Congress should not meddle in the pending lawsuits. Yes, we need to replace the outdated and controversial Protect America Act (S. 1927) and enable timely intelligence gathering against terrorists. But we must also ensure that power cannot be abused to violate our most precious freedoms. Since the tragedy of September 11, the Bush administration has abused its intelligence gathering powers. In 2005, we learned that the government had circumvented intelligence laws to spy on Americans' phone conversations. Last year, an investigation found that the FBI had misused tools intended to fight terrorism to conduct unrelated domestic surveillance. And earlier this year, reports have surfaced that the FBI requested thousands of phone records to cover up its previous abuses, and that this and other questionably obtained data is being compiled by the National Security Agency in a massive data-mining operation about which we know almost nothing. I cannot in good conscience vote for this bill, which gives the Bush administration even broader spying powers. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act implicitly gives retroactive immunity to telecommunication companies that facilitated warrantless wiretapping over the last 7 years and ensures the dismissal of all cases pending against telecommunication companies. Furthermore, H.R. 6304 permits the government to conduct mass, untargeted surveillance of all communication coming into and out of the United States, without any individualized review, and without any finding of wronging doing. This act permits only minimal court oversight and court review is further trivialized by authorizing the Government to continue a surveillance program even after an application is denied by the court. The legislation also contains a loophole that permits the Government to start spying and wait for up to 7 days to go to court and obtain a warrant. Congress should not allow for the warrantless wiretapping of American citizens. Ensuring our national security must not come at the expense of our basic civil liberties. We can protect our Nation and our rights.", u"And I thank Senator Sanders. A burst of ferocity stunned the room into silence. No other word for it: The vice president's attorney was shouting. ``The president doesn't want this! You are not going to see the opinions. You are out . . . of . . . your . . . lane!'' Five government lawyers had gathered around a small conference table in the Justice Department command center. Four were expected. David S. Addington, counsel to Vice President Cheney, got wind of the meeting and invited himself. If Addington smelled revolt, he was not far wrong. Unwelcome questions about warrantless domestic surveillance had begun to find their voice. Cheney and his counsel would struggle for months to quash the legal insurgency. By the time President Bush became aware of it, his No. 2 had stoked dissent into flat-out rebellion. The president would face a dilemma, and the presidency itself a historic test. Cheney would come close to leading them off a cliff, man and office both. On this second Monday in December 2003, Addington's targets were a pair of would-be auditors from the National Security Agency. He had displeasure to spare for their Justice Department hosts. Perfect example, right here. A couple of NSA bureaucrats breeze in and ask for the most sensitive documents in the building. And Justice wants to tell them, Help yourselves? This was going to be a very short meeting. Joel Brenner and Vito Potenza, the two men wilting under Addington's wrath, had driven 26 miles from Fort Meade, the NSA's eavesdropping headquarters in Maryland. They were conducting a review of their agency's two-year-old special surveillance operation. They already knew the really secret stuff: The NSA and other services had been unleashed to turn their machinery inward, collecting signals intelligence inside the United States. What the two men didn't know was why the Bush administration believed the program was legal. It was an awkward question. Potenza, the NSA's acting general counsel, and Brenner, its inspector general, were supposed to be the ones who kept their agency on the straight and narrow. That's what Cheney and their boss, Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, told doubters among the very few people who knew what was going on. Cheney, who chaired briefings for select members of Congress, said repeatedly that the NSA's top law and ethics officers--career public servants--approved and supervised the surveillance program. That was not exactly true, not without one of those silent asterisks that secretly flip a sentence on its tail. Every 45 days, after Justice Department review, Bush renewed his military order for warrantless eavesdropping. Brenner and Potenza told Hayden that the agency was entitled to rely on those orders. The United States was at war with al-Qaeda, intelligence-gathering is inherent in war, and the Constitution appoints the president commander in chief. But they had not been asked to give their own written assessments of the legality of domestic espionage. They based their answer in part on the attorney general's certification of the ``form and legality'' of the president's orders. Yet neither man had been allowed to see the program's codeword- classified legal analyses, which were prepared by John C. Yoo, Addington's close ally in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel. Now they wanted to read Yoo's opinions for themselves. ``This is none of your business!'' Addington exploded. He was massive in his swivel chair, taut and still, potential energy amping up the menace. Addington's pugnacity was not an act. Nothing mattered more, as the vice president and his lawyer saw the world, than these new surveillance tools. Bush had made a decision. Debate could only blow the secret, slow down vital work, or call the president's constitutional prerogatives into question. The NSA lawyers returned to their car empty-handed.", u'I would like to thank my friend from Florida for the time. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Congress has the constitutional duty to oversee the executive branch. In order to discharge our constitutional oversight responsibility, Congress depends on information obtained through agency reports and direct communication from Department heads. However, we also depend on information provided directly from employees within the agencies who are witnesses to the misuse of taxpayer dollars and alert Congress of the possible corruption or incompetence in management. In 1989, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection Act in an effort to strengthen statutory protections for Federal employees who assist in the elimination of fraud, waste, abuse, illegality or corruption. H.R. 985 would modernize and expand this protection to Federal employees, with added whistleblower protection. For example, the bill would extend protection to FBI agents, CIA agents, employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Agency and the National Security Agency. I think it is important to have whistleblower protection for the intelligence community. I would like to point out, however, that Congress has already passed such legislation. In 1998, Congress passed the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act to encourage the reporting to Congress of wrongdoing within the intelligence agencies. In crafting the 1998 legislation, Congress sought to balance the need for information with national security requirements, giving intelligence community whistleblowers access to Congress but through the intelligence committees. Yesterday, the Rules Committee denied the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Hoekstra, from offering an amendment striking section 10 of the bill. Section 10 conflicts with the provisions of the existing Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998. The amendment, I believe, should have been made in order. National security is obviously one of the most important issues that we deal with. Before we make changes to how Congress handles intelligence oversight, we should have a full and complete debate on that particular provision. We could have done that if the majority had made the Hoekstra amendment in order. Under the bill, defendants in whistleblower cases will now be able to make their cases to any Federal district court if the Merit Systems Protection Board does not take action within 180 days. Part of this provision will allow claims to be processed on a more timely basis than they are now. However, there are possible problems with the provision. Yesterday, Oversight and Government Reform Committee Ranking Member Davis asked the Rules Committee that his amendment be made in order. His amendment sought to retain uniformity in the consideration of whistleblower cases in the Federal courts by keeping in place the current requirement that all whistleblower appeals go through the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, rather than opening up appeals to all circuits. Without the amendment, Federal employee whistleblowers could end up possessing a different set of rights and protections, depending on where they file their claim. However, unfortunately, the majority decided to close down the debate process on that issue, and refused to allow the House to debate that very important and meaningful amendment. I believe the majority should have made those amendments, the Hoekstra amendment and the Davis amendment, in order, along with other important amendments brought before the Rules Committee. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.', u"Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding. As our previous colleague was talking, I think she laid it out pretty well. Are we going to involve the courts in reviewing our foreign intelligence activities? If you take a look at the bill that is out here, it appears that the court is going to be involved in reviewing our intelligence community activities overseas. This becomes the Terrorist Protection Act, not a surveillance program. Do we want a court reviewing our tactics and strategies for foreign intelligence or foreign individuals in foreign locations and lay it out the way that this bill wants? This is not about theory. This is about protecting the homeland, and it is about protecting our troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Does it make sense that when a commander in the field gets the information or gets leads that may protect their soldiers that, rather than following the lead immediately, the first thing that they do is bring in the lawyers to make sure that they get that information in an appropriate and legal way on the battlefield? Is that giving our troops the tools that they need to keep themselves safe and secure and defeat the enemy? Does it make sense when our intelligence frontline folks, whether it's in northern Africa or in the Middle East, get a lead as to individuals who may be targeting the United States, that the first thing that they need to do is get the lawyers involved to make sure that foreign intelligence is collected in an appropriate way, rather than focusing on what needs to keep us safe? After 9/11, we spent a lot of time working together to put together an intelligence community that would, in the future, be able to connect the dots. With this bill that it looks like we're going to consider this afternoon, we won't have to worry about connecting the dots anymore because we will put the barriers in place that means that they will not even be able to collect the dots. But if you believe that this is a bumper sticker war and this is a bumper sticker threat that we face today, this bill is for you. Take a look at the statement by the Director of National Intelligence. The Director of National Intelligence today is the same individual that served many years under President Bill Clinton as the Director of the National Security Agency. Here's what he has to say about this bill: I have reviewed the proposal that the House of Representatives is expected to vote on this afternoon to modify the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The House proposal is unacceptable. I strongly oppose it. The House proposal would not allow me to carry out my responsibility to provide warning and to protect the Nation, especially in our heightened threat environment. I urge Members of Congress to support the legislation I provided last evening to modify FISA to equip our intelligence community with the tools we need to protect our Nation. This is an individual who has a 30-year career in this business. He served President Clinton; he's serving President Bush, but most importantly, it is a career that is distinguished because he has served the country and has kept us safe. Let's respect his opinion. Let's give him the tools that will keep us safe, keep us safe in the homeland and keep our troops safe on the battlefield.", u"Madam Speaker, I'm proud, to join with Intelligence Committee Chairman Reyes today in introducing legislation that will give our intelligence community needed tools to combat foreign threats while preserving civil liberties. Making sure that surveillance activities protect freedom as well as security is critical to waging an effective fight against terrorism. The RESTORE Act extends the ability of the Government to acquire communications of persons abroad for the purpose of terrorism and other national security threats. Earlier this year, in the Protect America Act, PAA, amendments were made to the long-standing consensus approach set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA. Responding to what the administration characterized as pressing concerns, the PAA gave the Government enhanced flexibility to collect foreign intelligence information. But the broad scope of the authority and procedures that allowed the Government to collect this information without up-front court approval raised grave concerns about the need for more safeguards of innocent Americans' communications. The RESTORE Act improves upon the PAA by providing a series of checks and balances while still allowing maximum flexibility. It limits the Government's authority to what the Director of National Intelligence told us he needed--a means to acquire information from telecommunications companies about physical threats to the Nation in which the target is overseas. The RESTORE Act does not require individual warrants when persons reasonably believed to be abroad, but it is firm that a FISA warrant is required to obtain communications of people in the United States. The RESTORE Act settles that FISA is the exclusive means of electronic surveillance, and that no modifications can be made without express statutory authorization. The RESTORE Act will also provide additional resources for the National Security Agency and Department of Justice to ensure that there are no backlogs of critical intelligence gathering. Congressional oversight and full knowledge about surveillance activities is critical in ensuring the Nation's safety. Both the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees need access to court orders, Presidential authorizations, and details of and legal justifications for past wiretapping efforts. The RESTORE Act provides for audits and congressional reports of surveillance programs past, present, and future. Through these reports and audits, with nonclassified aspects where appropriate, Members of Congress and the public will have the opportunity to assess whether the program works as designed. Chairman Reyes and I are committed to vigorous oversight, constant dialogue, and statutory improvements as needed to meet our duty to ensure safety and liberty for all. The administration has continued to deny us the information that Congress is entitled to and which is necessary for a full understanding of the issues at stake. Nevertheless, I believe this legislation will allow us to move forward and respond to the concerns of the administration. This bill will require that information be made available to us and give the Congress the opportunity to assess these procedures and the program on the basis of a complete record. The RESTORE Act's important audit and reporting provisions are essential for when the program will sunset in 2009. At that time, with a new Congress, a new President, and the results of these provisions, we will again strive to provide additional protections for the rights of Americans. For this is an ongoing responsibility that all of us in Congress are working toward--a foreign intelligence gathering system that is effective and flexible, yet bound by procedure and law.", u"Well, Rush Limbaugh is at it again. Unable to defend an indefensible war in Iraq, he has once again resorted to ``sliming'' the messenger. In this case, unbelievably, the messengers he's going after are the brave men and women who have served their country in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other wars. Men and women who serve in Iraq differ from Rush Limbaugh in two critical ways. First, unlike Mr. Limbaugh, they actually served in the military. Second, unlike Mr. Limbaugh, they understand that the war in Iraq is making our country less safe and destroying the military. How dare Rush Limbaugh label anyone who has served in the military as a ``phony soldier.'' How dare he say that his views in Iraq, formed in the comfort of his radio studio, are legitimate, while the views of those whose opinions were forged on the battlefield are not. Could Rush Limbaugh actually face soldiers who have risked their lives and tell them that their beliefs don't matter? These are soldiers like Brandon Friedman, a former rifle platoon leader in the Army's 101st Airborne Division who fought in Afghanistan in 2002 and commanded troops in Iraq. He says, ``The escalation of the war is failing and now the mission must change. The fact is,'' he says, ``the Iraq war has kept us from devoting assets we need to fight terrorists worldwide, as evidenced by the fact that Osama bin Laden is still on the loose and al Qaeda has been able to rebuild. We need an effective strategy that takes the fight to our real enemies abroad, and the best way to do that is to get our troops out of the middle of the civil war in Iraq.'' Is Brandon Friedman a phony? Or Josh Gaines, who earned the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal and the National Defense Service Medal during his 2 years in Iraq, he believes the war in Iraq was a mistake from the beginning. Is he a phony? Or retired General William Odom, the head of the National Security Agency during the Reagan administration. His advice: ``The sensible policy is not to stay the course in Iraq. It is rapid withdrawal, re-establishing strong relations with our allies in Europe, showing confidence in the U.N. Security Council, and trying to knit together a large coalition, including the major states of Europe, Japan, South Korea, China and India to back a strategy for stabilizing the area from the eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan to Pakistan.'' General Odom says: ``Until the United States withdraws from Iraq and admits its strategic error, no such coalition can be formed. Thus those fear leaving a mess are actually helping make things worse while preventing a new strategic approach with some promise of success.'' Does Rush Limbaugh really want to look General Odom in the eye and call him a phony? I believe that we should all pay attention to the views of Brandon Friedman and Josh Gaines and General Odom whose beliefs, like their military experience, are real. And while we're at it, let's pay attention to the 72 percent of American troops serving in Iraq who also think the U.S. should exit the country within the next year, and more than one in four who say the troops should leave immediately, according to the Zogby poll. I guess they're all a bunch of phonies, according to Rush Limbaugh. Our military men and women deserve respect. Apparently, however, Mr. Limbaugh thinks they deserve to be smeared and belittled unless they happen to agree with him. I understand why Rush Limbaugh cannot debate this war on the merits, but bashing soldiers and veterans who disagree with him is unpatriotic and un-American.", u"I know we are coming to the end of this hour, but I think there is something important for Americans to understand. We all remember where we were the morning of 9/11. We remember what we were wearing, what we had for breakfast, whom we were with, and that is seared into our memories. Very few Americans remember where they were when the British Government arrested 16 people who were within 48 hours of walking onto airliners at Heathrow and blowing them up simultaneously over the Atlantic. We don't remember it because it didn't happen. And it didn't happen because American, British, and Pakistani intelligence were working together to disrupt the plot and prevent the terrorist attack. That is what matters here. We want to stop those memories from being created before the event happens. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to say, because we keep hearing that we are not concerned about civil liberties and so forth and that courts ought to look at this rather than making decisions by the President of United States, many people fondly remember Justice ``Whizzer'' White on the United States Supreme Court, an appointee of President John F. Kennedy. And in the seminal case in the Supreme Court dealing with the question of privacy and wiretapping called Katz versus U.S., he said this: ``We should not require the warrant procedure and a magistrate's judgment if the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.'' Because the fourth amendment talks about protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and we never hear on this floor that qualification. It is reasonable. So how do we protect American citizens in this? The process of minimization that we talked about that is followed by everybody in the NSA. And I would just show this to the gentleman. This chart shows the procedures already put into place at the NSA, National Security Agency, to implement the Protect America Act and ensure that Americans' civil liberties are protected by minimization. Look at this: Internal oversight, they have training built on the foundation of compliance training. They have an annual requirement to read the legal compliance and minimization documents. They have advanced training and a competency test. Everybody out there has to take the test and pass or they can't be involved in the program. They have new training in the authority and the competency test. They understand the legislative changes, the documentation and the termination. They have spot checks and audits to assess compliance. They have somebody else come out within their organization and check up on individuals. And then they have an assessment of management controls. In other words, they have multiple reviews on a regular basis of what's going on there. And in addition, what they have done is they are subjected to oversight by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice every 14 days, every 30 days, and every 60 days. And then on top of that, they have the Congress that can look at things. That, the American people should understand, is the seriousness with which the agency is undertaking their responsibility to protect Americans from terrorists overseas and to make sure there is no inadvertent violation of the civil liberties of Americans.", u"Mr. Speaker, when the President invaded Iraq in 2003, the American people were warned that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction posed a great threat to peace. We were told that launching a preemptive war would not make life harder for the Iraqi people nor compromise the security of the international community. And we were promised that the quick war to liberate Iraq would come at no cost to America's prestige abroad. Five years later, it is painfully clear how very wrong the administration was and how dearly we are still paying for its mistakes. The administration launched a war of choice based on half truths, broken promises, and delusions of a swift and easy victory, but the most shameful of the administration's claims was that we were fighting abroad to protect our freedoms at home. The President argued that sending our Nation's brave servicemen and -women into an unwinnable occupation was the only way we would safeguard our civil liberties. Since then, by repeatedly invoking the possibility of threats to our national security right here at home and abroad, the administration has justified its unprecedented attack on our constitutionally protected freedoms. Mr. Speaker, we can no longer allow these attacks to go unchallenged. After authorizing the National Security Agency to openly violate Federal laws by eavesdropping on Americans, the administration successfully worked to legalize warrantless spying on innocent Americans. After consistently disregarding laws designed to promote public access to information, the administration expanded laws that authorized the government to withhold information from Congress and the American people. After championing the virtues of democratic rule of law, the President has openly condoned torture, denied habeas corpus to prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay, and fought every single attempt to hold members and friends of his administration accountable for their actions. This abuse of power at the expense of the rights and freedoms of the American people, often in the name of protecting these very same rights and freedoms, is a shocking betrayal of the will of the American people. Last month, after the House passed legislation ensuring that every contractor in Iraq would be accountable under American criminal law, the administration granted immunity to Blackwater Security employees who were involved in a Baghdad shooting that left 17 civilians dead. This administration will never take responsibility for their actions. It will never end the occupation of Iraq. Instead, the attack on our civil liberties will be the only mission they will have accomplished. Mr. Speaker, it is Congress' responsibility to stand up to this President. We must end the administration's war of choice. We must restore the checks and balances that have been eroded under this President. We must fight for peace and the protection of civil liberties. We must fully fund the safe and orderly withdrawal of all American troops and contractors. Mr. Speaker, we must give Iraq back to the Iraqi people and America back its integrity.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The past year has been tumultuous for Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), but he has emerged from its trials triumphant. It is not quite 12 months since the lawmaker announced he had been diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease, a form of cancer. In his statement disclosing his ailment and the imminent start of chemotherapy, Specter said, ``I have beaten a brain tumor, bypass heart surgery and many tough political opponents, and I'm going to beat this, too.'' He has been as good as his word. He lost his hair but continued to shoulder his heavy workload (and to keep in shape playing squash before he got to his desk in the morning). He was never absent, and his hair is back. At 75, Specter is looking spry. At the time of his diagnosis, the senator had only just secured his chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee, after a tough battle against conservative Republicans who feared he would not fight hard for conservative Supreme Court justices should President Bush have the opportunity to nominate them. Those fears have proved unfounded. There are now two new members of the high court, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, whose conservative credentials are not in doubt. Those on the right trust and hope (just as those on the left believe and fear) that the new justices, replacing the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, will move the court toward conservative textualism and away from the ``living Constitution'' ideas that have produced liberal change on social issues for the past two generations. It is Specter, a supporter of abortion rights, who has presided over these changes to the bench. And he has done so with aplomb and without any hint either of truckling to those on either his right or his left. He rejected, for example, conservative demands that Alito's confirmation hearings be brought forward in December so that the nominee would not be left hanging out as a target for too long. At the same time, he did not allow his own ideological positions to blind him to the nominees' obvious qualifications. Alito's and Roberts's critics were given ample time to air their concerns, yet both were steered swiftly and comparatively easily to confirmation. Bush must surely be well-satisfied with his decision in 2004 to back Specter's re-election despite their obvious differences in ideology, temperament and outlook. Specter is not resting on his laurels. His agenda is dominating Senate business. He is presiding over a Judiciary investigation of the National Security Agency's controversial terrorist surveillance program. And his asbestos reform bill, an effort to clean up a mountain of debilitating litigation, is atop the legislative calendar put together by Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.). People who know Specter rarely make the error of underestimating him. They are even less likely to do so following his performance in the past 12 months.", u'Mr. Speaker, I am so pleased to stand with so many of my colleagues this evening and to talk about an issue that really is one of the central planks of our side of the aisle and the national campaign that we put forward before the American people. I thank you so much for your leadership. I was going to talk at length about the National Security Agency and the issue that has come before us. I look forward to doing that at some point in the future. But I do just want to share a few comments about what we have heard tonight. When I was young, I was a member of an organization, a group, that used to sing a song called Freedom Is Not Free, and the words were something like: freedom is not free, freedom is not free, you have got to pay a price, you have got to sacrifice for your liberty. And I had the privilege of being with the American Legion Post 140 last night, just last night in my district, and met with these men and women. And they went around the room and each of them identified themselves and their branch of service and the conflict and the war in which they served. And I was so humbled to be in the company of such heroes. It just brings to the fore the incredible sacrifices that we as Americans have made over the past number of years for our liberty, for our freedom. I am so pleased with the leadership in the House, the Members who stood up this evening and talked about the difficulty that Americans have comprehending this war on terror; and we do, as you well know, because we do not think like terrorists. We do not understand that mind. We do not understand the mind that would murder innocent individuals. We do not understand the mind that would chop the heads off of innocent individuals. That is just incomprehensible to us. So it does not come easily to us to comprehend the fact that we are in a war. I was so pleased to hear Congressman Conaway talk about Iraq not being the end of this war. There are so many aspects to all of this war. So I am pleased with the leadership in the House, and I am pleased with the leadership of my colleague, the gentlewoman from Tennessee, who is willing to stand up and discuss these issues. I also understood that this is not a Republican issue, it is not a Democrat issue. It is an American issue; it is an American challenge. And so my hope and prayer over the coming year is that all of the Members of the House of Representatives and all of the members of the Senate will embrace the challenge and the battle truly that we have to work together in this war on terror. I yield back to you, and commend you for your wonderful leadership in this area.', u"Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to S. 2271, the PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act, which does not correct the core problems with the original act. Republicans and Democrats alike have asked for moderate changes that would have ensured that these extraordinary new powers are directed solely at terrorists and that each new power had meaningful court review. These efforts that would have put the PATRIOT Act in line with the Constitution and American values were ignored. Not only does the bill remain deeply flawed, S. 2271 was brought to the House under suspension, a procedure limiting debate to 40 minutes and preventing any amendments to address the many concerns expressed by organizations and many of my colleagues. Under S. 2271, the government will still be able to use National Security Letters and secret orders under section 215 to obtain a wide array of private, confidential records--including the medical, financial, library, and bookstore and gun purchase records of individual Americans. The bill requires no evidence linking those records to a suspected terrorist or spy, requires no court oversight or independent review of these secret orders, and prohibits the recipient of such an order from challenging the legality of the order for a year. Second, this bill adds no meaningful protection for library records. It only exempts libraries from National Security Letters if they don't offer Internet access--and the American Library Association puts the number of libraries without Internet access near zero. With over 30,000 national security letters issued every year and two federal courts ruling NSLs unconstitutional, I continue to have strong concerns that this bill does nothing to protect bookstores, libraries, and their customers from excessive searches by the government. Third, under this bill the government can still conduct secret physical searches of homes and offices under a vague standard; and notice can be delayed for weeks, months, or even longer. The Justice Department admits that at least 88 percent of such searches conducted between fall of 2001 and spring of 2005 actually had nothing to do with terrorism. The government can search private homes of Americans who have no connection to terrorism and not even inform them that their home was searched. Finally, roving wiretaps provisions would allow the government agents to eavesdrop on innocent Americans' private conversations without first verifying that a terrorist suspect is actually using the facility or device involved. That means that, on a daily basis, the government can listen in on hundreds, maybe thousands of Americans' private conversations that may not have any connection to terrorism. Given the Bush Administration's extraordinary assertions of presidential power to authorize the National Security Agency (NSA) to engage in intrusive domestic spying of Americans, it is more vital than ever that Congress reasserts its rightful role by correcting the flaws in the PATRIOT Act. I join the majority of Americans who want to protect our Nation's security while preserving Constitutional freedoms and civil liberties. Towns, cities, counties and states have passed over 400 resolutions in opposition to the PATRIOT Act, including the City of Chicago and Evanston in the 9th Congressional District of Illinois. Sweeping and unnecessary Federal surveillance and unchecked law enforcement powers undermine the rights that are the cornerstone of our democracy. The PATRIOT Act debate is far from over: secret record searches must be reformed so they are focused on suspected foreign terrorists and not used to invade the private records of ordinary Americans. Congress can, and must, take steps to fix the Patriot Act to keep America both safe and free. I urge my colleagues to reject the PATRIOT Act and instead call for meaningful checks on the PATRIOT Act's extraordinary powers.", u"Mr. President, the men and women at the CIA today represent the best intelligence professionals in the world, and they deserve the best leadership and support. I have known General Hayden for some time, and I am convinced that he is the right person for this job. My initial concern regarding a military officer directing the world's most sophisticated civilian intelligence agency have been addressed by General Hayden in private conversation as well as at the public hearing. The role and mission of the intelligence community at the Department of Defense where General Hayden has been for over 30 years is different from the role and mission of the CIA. General Hayden has convinced me that he can make the transition from the military side to the civilian side of the intelligence community while continuing to move the CIA in a positive direction of change and transition. General Hayden has been instrumental in building our intelligence capabilities to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Even before becoming the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, General Hayden has demonstrated his willingness to express his opinion and speak his mind. His credibility and integrity are second to none. He brings all these traits to his position as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He also brings with him the experience of leading an organization in transformation when he was at the National Security Agency. Today the CIA is in transformation to position itself from the preeminent intelligence organization during the Cold War to becoming an intelligence organization focused on new threats and national security issues such as countering terrorism, preventing countries such as Iran and North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons, and protecting America's interests in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. General Hayden will face challenges as he continues this transformation to ensure that the CIA continues to be the world class organization it must be to address these threats. This means continuing efforts to replace the old, risk adverse system that was not positioned to address the threats we are facing now and may face in the future. It also means ensuring the Agency does not reverse course by infusing ideas that previously opposed change, information sharing, or oversight. Throughout his career, General Hayden has proven his management and leadership abilities. He will provide the enthusiastic and dedicated officers at CIA the ``top cover'' necessary for them to undertake the innovative approaches to intelligence gathering that is required to penetrate the hard targets of today, and I am confident he will be able to keep the CIA moving on the right course. Finally, General Hayden will head an organization that is responsible for managing our national human intelligence effort. His military experience combined with his experience as the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence will serve him well as he integrates the human intelligence efforts of the Department of Defense, the FBI, and others into the National Clandestine Service, recognizing the requirements and capabilities of those organizations as he establishes common standards designed to further strengthen our country's intelligence capabilities. I believe General Hayden is a qualified and dedicated person to lead the CIA at this critical juncture, and I look forward to working closely with him as the Director of the CIA.", u"Mr. Chairman, on Tuesday night, the House passed H.R. 5631, the Defense Appropriations Act for FY2007. I commend Chairman Young and Ranking Member Murtha for crafting an important piece of legislation that will provide our men and women in uniform with the resources they need to continue their excellent record of service to the Nation. I was proud to vote for that measure, which passed by an overwhelming vote of 407-19. However, I am disappointed that the House did not pass a very important amendment offered by Congressman Schiff to block funding for any surveillance program that does not comply with the safeguards in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. I have been deeply disturbed by the President's decision to expand domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens beyond what is permitted under existing law. As a member of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees, I am fully aware of the dangers posed by those who wish to harm Americans, and I have strongly supported efforts to make our Nation safer. However, President Bush has not yet explained to my satisfaction why powers available to him under existing law cannot meet the needs of the war on terrorism. For example, the Foreign Intelligence Service Act (FISA) already permits the warrantless surveillance of communications by U.S. citizens under certain limited circumstances. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration did not use those emergency powers and instead chose to expand the authority of the National Security Agency (NSA). As I have said before, if President Bush believes that FISA needs to be altered or updated to address new threats, he should make his case to Congress and propose legislative changes. The President's decision to expand domestic surveillance while notifying only a handful of legislators does not constitute Congressional consent and is a danger to our established Constitutional system of checks and balances. While Americans may disagree about the merits of broadening the government's authority to combat terrorism, it is in all of our interests that such important decisions should be made publicly, as they affect the very values of freedom and liberty on which the Nation was founded. Opponents of the Schiff amendment argued that we shouldn't be considering such a significant change in a spending bill. Under normal circumstances, I would agree with that assessment. However, because the House has neglected to consider any legislation to address the serious issue of domestic surveillance, we are left with no other choice. We cannot continue to shirk our Constitutional responsibility to conduct oversight of the executive branch and its activities. We must hold hearings and consider legislation to ensure that our efforts to protect our nation are done consistent with the civil liberties that we hold dear and comply with the Constitution--the supreme law of the land.", u"Mr. Speaker, I am honored to rise today to commemorate the Defense Language Institute's 65th anniversary, and to honor its generations of distinguished faculty and students, without whom the freedom and security we enjoy would not be possible. On November 1, 1941 the DLI (then, nameless and clandestine) commenced its first class in San Francisco, not in a classroom or, much less, at a university. Rather, the crown-jewel of American language instruction and our greatest asset to national security was born in an abandoned airplane hangar. Sixty students, most of whom were second-generation Japanese-Americans, along with four instructors, undertook an unprecedented exercise: to formally train in the language and customs of our enemies for the purposes of translation and intelligence gathering. Their resulting successes in the Pacific theater paved the way for the modern DLI--an academically accredited foreign language training institution--the largest in the world--which enjoys the prestige and renown of a world-class university. Prominent DLI alumni include Air Force Colonel William Fife, a graduate of the Institute's Russian basic course who pioneered airborne reconnaissance during the Cold War. Glenn Nordin, also a graduate of the Russian basic course as well as the Vietnamese advisor course, served as a translator for the Washington-Moscow hotline, as a deputy chief at the National Security Agency and as Executive Secretary of the Director of Central Intelligence Language Committee. And, more recently, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona, who served as personal interpreter and advisor to General Norman Schwarzkopf during Operation Desert Storm. The DLI's Foreign Language Center is well situated at the Presidio of Monterey Presidio. Its proximity to the San Francisco Bay Area and the Central Coast make the Institute a natural destination for native-speaking language instructors of the highest caliber. In turn, DLI has greatly enriched our community by creating a locus of culture and learning. The foreign language training the Defense Language Institute has imparted to ``the best and brightest'' of our U.S. Armed Forces has proven to be one of our Nation's best national security weapons. On March 5, 2005, General John P. Abizaid, the commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), said, ``This ability to cross the cultural divide is not an Army issue. It is a national issue. We have to be able to deal with the people in the rest of the world as the globe shrinks in terms of communication and problem solving and sharing. So this notion of . . . training and educating people here in the U.S., of having the institutions that do it . . . is just so essential.'' ``What will win the global war on terrorism will be people that can cross the cultural divide, reach out to those who want our help, and figure out how to make it happen so [those people] can help themselves. That is how we will win this thing,'' continued Gen. Abizaid. ``So we ignore the DLIs and other institutions of military education at our own peril. I very much ask [this] committee to continue to keep those places functioning, because they are national treasures.'' General Abizaid's sentiments resonate to the very foundations of the Institute and fill its halls with purpose and resolve. Cross cultural understanding coupled with the ability to communicate with our friends and enemies in their own languages will promote U.S. national security, economic and foreign policy interests, making the U.S. the leader of the global community. I am very pleased to join the Secretary of the Army, Francis H. Harvey, the Commandant of DLI, Colonel Tucker B. Mansager, and other distinguished guests to celebrate the 65th anniversary of the Defense Language Institute. Monterey is proud of its rich association with DLI and we all look forward to its future success and continued growth.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 5825, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act. Since the President's illegal domestic wiretapping program became public, I have called for greater oversight and Congressional involvement to ensure that we can provide our intelligence agencies with the tools needed to fight terrorism while protecting essential civil liberties of Americans. The bill before us today does not meet those standards. As a member of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees, I am fully aware of the dangers posed by those who wish to harm Americans, and I have strongly supported efforts to make our nation safer. However, the Bush Administration has not explained to my satisfaction why powers available under existing law cannot meet the needs of the war on terrorism. For example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) already permits the warrantless surveillance of communications under certain limited circumstances. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration did not use those emergency powers and instead chose to expand the authority of the National Security Agency (NSA). The President's decision to expand domestic surveillance, while notifying only a handful of legislators, does not constitute Congressional consent and is a danger to our established Constitutional system of checks and balances. I would have been receptive to modifications to FISA that preserved the vital oversight through the creation of the FISA court system. I am a cosponsor of H.R. 5381, the Lawful Intelligence and Surveillance of Terrorists in an Emergency by NSA (LISTEN) Act, introduced by the ranking Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, the gentlewoman from California, Mrs. Harman. This legislation would mandate that all monitoring of calls, email records and phone records be carried out in accordance with FISA and further asserts that the 2002 authorization for the NSA domestic surveillance program outside of FISA was not within the Bush Administration's authority. Instead, this legislation gives the President broad authority to continue his domestic surveillance program without approval from the FISA court. It uses judicial and Congressional notification as a substitute for legitimate oversight, and it establishes such broad justifications for surveillance that the Administration will have almost unlimited ability to continue its past practices with little to no changes. Disturbingly, it also removes an important protection of current law that requires the government to certify that its warrantless surveillance of foreign agents would not intercept the communications of U.S. citizens. Once again, the President has sought to expand his own authority at the expense of Americans' civil liberties, and Congress has willingly abdicated its oversight authority. I urge my colleagues to vote against this measure so that we can find a better way to crack down on terrorist who would do us harm while safeguarding the rights of Americans.", u"Mr. President, today I honor a dedicated and passionate teacher in my home State of Idaho. In the late summer of 1963 J. Kent Marlor first stepped onto the campus of Ricks College in Rexburg, ID, as a brand new 26-year-old teacher. During that first year, he taught economic history and political science and took the role of debate coach. When asked of his years at Ricks, he said, ``I don't know how I did it the first year I came here . . . I've had chances to go to a number of different places over the years, but have always wanted to stay here [because] I love Idaho. I love the wildlife and the smallness of the school . . . You know all the students [and] the faculty [and] the spirit that has always been here is a great thing for me.'' On August 24, 2006, he retired after 43 years teaching thousands of students in the political science department. He retired as the longest serving instructor in the 118-year history of the institution. Kent is a man well loved by those with whom he has come in contact. He has touched the lives of many of his students and has been able to help them gain confidence and direction in their fields of study. He is a mentor to many and will be missed by faculty and students alike at Ricks College, which became Brigham Young University-Idaho in 2000. During an interview with the Rexburg Standard Journal, Marlor said, ``Success of a teacher is really measured in the success of his students.'' The newspaper reported that Marlor's students are now judges, doctors, attorneys, legislators and editors. I have had firsthand experience with the fruits of Kent Marlor's educational efforts. Over the years, at least 10 of my Senate interns have been his students as well as several current and former members of my staff. When talking about his former students, Marlor said, ``My reward for being a teacher comes when I see what my students have accomplished.'' Before his long and distinguished teaching career, Marlor served his count in Naval Intelligence and at the National Security Agency. He has also served as president of the Idaho Wildlife Federation and the chairman of the Idaho Fish and Game Advisory Committee. At his side in many of these meetings was his wife of over 50 years, Sharon. Together they raised six children who have also been very active in education and in their communities. Even though he has served in our Nation's Armed Forces, intelligence service, and in various community organizations, his most gratifying service has come with the Teton Peaks Council of the Boy Scouts of America. Over the years, Kent and Sharon earned their spot in the Boy Scout Hall of Fame by organizing countless campouts, merit badge camps, Eagle Scout projects and Courts of Honor. In recognition of his efforts, Kent was honored with the Silver Beaver Award in 1982. Sharon was honored with the same award in 1989. Kent loves the outdoors. His love of fishing is legendary in the Upper Snake River Valley. There isn't a lake, reservoir, river, stream, creek, ditch, or puddle that hasn't been explored with his beloved rod and reel at least once in the last 40 years. It is my understanding that Scout troops who go on extended camping trips with Kent don't take much food with them. Wherever they go, Kent is sure to provide plenty of fresh trout for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Kent taught his Scouts to appreciate the beauty around them as well as how to conserve it for future generations. I wish Kent and Sharon Marlor many happy years in retirement and thank them both for the contribution to education and the youth of Idaho. ", u"Mr. President, I join with the chairman of the Intelligence Committee in what he has said. Today the Senate is considering the nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to become the Nation's first Director of National Intelligence. Personally, I strongly support this nomination, and I will discuss the reasons why in a moment. First, however, as the chairman did, I am going to take a few minutes to describe how critical this new position is to our country and its future, the magnitude of the challenges Ambassador Negroponte will face. In 1947, Congress created the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Cold War was upon us and the Nation needed intelligence about our new adversary. The structure we put in place at that time to keep tabs on the Soviet Union grew and took on additional missions over the next 40 years. But the intelligence community stayed primarily focused on that one target of the Soviet Union. Then in 1990, the Soviet Union dissolved. The world changed dramatically, but our intelligence organizations for the most part did not. As a consequence, we have for the past 15 years made do with an intelligence system designed to penetrate and collect information about a single static adversary. There was no one in charge to force change from within, and before September 11 of 2001, there was little impetus for change from without. The National Security Act of 1947, the genesis of all of this, designated the DCI to serve as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, also the principal adviser to the President on intelligence matters, and the head of the U.S. intelligence community--all three of those assignments. The Director of Central Intelligence ran the CIA, advised the President, but, frankly, never exercised the third responsibility, which is probably the most important other than advising the President, and that is managing the intelligence community itself. Even after the events, tragic though they might have been, of 9/11, it took 3 years, two major investigations of those events, and the stunning intelligence failures prior to the Iraq war to break through the entrenched interests and to achieve reform that created the position of director of something called national intelligence, all of it. The difficulty involved in the birth of this new office serves as a warning for the challenges that the Ambassador, if confirmed, as I hope he will be, will face. Bureaucracies are amazingly slow to change. That doesn't say anything bad about the people. That is the way the world works, whether it is corporate, private, or whatever. The bureaucracies are tenacious in defending their turf. Some of the stories are remarkable within the 15 intelligence agencies the Ambassador will have to oversee. Reform of the intelligence community will involve stepping on the turf of some of the most powerful bureaucracies in Washington. And first and foremost among those is the Department of Defense. Eighty percent of our intelligence spending is in the DOD budget. The incoming Director of National Intelligence will have to quickly establish a close working relationship with the Secretary of Defense, but it must be a relationship of equals, and Ambassador Negroponte must be willing to exercise the authority given him by the legislation and the President when he and the Secretary differ. In effect, the Director of National Intelligence supersedes the head of the Department of Defense. Ambassador Negroponte also will encounter and need to manage the CIA, an organization accustomed to operating with tremendous autonomy, a world unto itself. Some of these agencies, such as the National Security Agency--they are called NSA--get acronyms, ``no such agency''--that is part of the way their world operates. That is not to denigrate them, their public service, their public commitment, their willingness to offer up their lives for their country. But bureaucracy of a huge magnitude it surely is. Then there is the FBI, an agency which is dominated by its law enforcement history and struggling to make itself into a full partner in the intelligence community. Some question whether that can be done; my mind is still open to it. They are trying. Most people say it is working at the top but not in the middle, because if you are a lawyer, you have a yellow pad, you go arrest somebody for breaking the law. If you are an intelligence officer, you find somebody you are suspicious of, and you don't arrest that person. You surveil that person, you trail that person, maybe for weeks, months, to find out where that person takes you and what intelligence we can learn from that. But these are powerful organizations with very proud histories. They are populated by dedicated and talented public servants who have contributed to our security for decades. But our needs are now different. All of these agencies now must change the way they do business. Ambassador Negroponte takes charge at a time when the intelligence community is reeling from criticism for the lapses prior to 9/11 and the significant failures related to prewar intelligence on Iraq. The chairman and I worry about that because it affects morale. One doesn't want to affect morale. But on the other hand, intelligence agencies have to reflect the current needs of this country and act accordingly. The loose amalgam of 15 intelligence agencies needs a leader who can change not simply the boxes on an organizational chart but the way we do intelligence. The different agencies traditionally have collected intelligence from their sources, analyzed it, put it into their databases, and then shared it as they deemed appropriate. The chairman and I are very fond--both of us--of saying the word ``share'' is now outmoded. There is a need-to-know basis from time to time. But if you share something, that means you own it and that you make the decision you will share it with somebody. We prefer the modern word for intelligence which is going to have to be ``access,'' that anybody in that business has access to that intelligence automatically by definition unless there is a particular need-to-know restriction. The Director of National Intelligence has to create a new culture where the process of producing intelligence is coordinated across agencies from the beginning. The collection strategies for various targets need to be unified, and the intelligence collected needs to be available to everyone with the proper clearance and the need to know that information. That is the concept of jointness in operation that the Presiding Officer knows well because he is on the Armed Services Committee, as is my colleague, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee. Jointness is a concept the military has used and made work very effectively. It goes back to the Goldwater-Nichols Act almost 20 years ago, and it is something the Intelligence Committee is going to have to learn how to do. Making fundamental changes is absolutely essential in order to make sure our intelligence is timely, objective, and independent of political consideration. The credibility of the intelligence community--and, by extension, the credibility of the United States--has suffered when key intelligence reports such as the prewar intelligence report on Iraq failed the test of being timely, objective, and independent as required by law. It is not something they just ought to be doing; it is required by the 1947 National Security Act. Making major changes in the way the community operates and produces intelligence will be the first step for Ambassador Negroponte. He also must instill a sense of accountability. On this many of us feel strongly. The joint inquiry conducted by the Senate and the House Intelligence Committees into the events of 9/11 called for accountability for the mistakes made prior to the attack where thousands lost their lives. The WMD commission, which finished its work, also highlighted this issue. But despite these findings and despite what one would think the country would assume and expect, no one has been held accountable for the numerous failures to share critical intelligence and act on intelligence warnings in the year and a half prior to the 9/11 attacks. Likewise there has been a lack of accountability over the failings in the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence prior to the Iraq war itself. Accountability means people get fired or people get demoted or people get scolded or, concurrently, people are patted on the back, rewarded, encouraged, motivated further, held up before their colleagues as exemplary because they have done something particularly well. So the Ambassador is not only going to have to deal with problems from the past, but he will have to face immediately the growing scandal surrounding the collection of intelligence through the detention, interrogation, and rendition of suspected terrorists and insurgents. We have been subjected to an almost daily deluge of accusations of abuse stemming from these operations. The intelligence we gain through these interrogations is, frankly, too important to allow shortcomings in this program to continue, and the Director of National Intelligence will be the official responsible for ensuring we have a comprehensive, consistent, legal, and operational policy on the detention and interrogation of prisoners because there is enormous flux in that whole area right now. The lack of clarity in these areas has led to confusion and likely contributed to the abuse we have witnessed. Dealing with the many challenges is a tall order. But if anybody can succeed in the position of DNI, Director of National Intelligence, an entirely new position in the U.S. Government, one of the three or four toughest jobs in Washington, that person is Ambassador Negroponte. He has a 40-year career of public service, as has been indicated, in some of most difficult and critical posts in the Foreign Service: Vietnam, the Paris peace talks, South and Central America, the U.N., and most recently in Baghdad. He has been doing this for 40 years. One of the things I have appreciated particularly about him is that he is not a military person, not a political person, not an intelligence person. He is a diplomat. He is somebody who, through his entire career, has engaged in understanding the nuances of the cultures we have to deal with in the intelligence world and what follows intelligence across the world. But he also knows a great deal about intelligence and the military operations and the political aspects of life simply because you cannot be an ambassador and avoid those things. He is a diplomat, a manager, a negotiator, which is crucial to bringing these agencies together and to go back and forth with the President and the Congress. He has extensive knowledge of the workings of the Government. That is a very prosaic statement, until one takes it at face value. Most people don't. They have extensive knowledge about certain parts of Government. He covers the ballfield. He has the temperament, standing, and self-confidence, frankly, to deal with the Washington bureaucracy. He has a great deal of confidence in himself, and he ought to--he has the backing of somebody called the President of the United States of America. The Intelligence Reform Act provides the Director of National Intelligence with considerable authority. But in Washington, DC, the support of the President is invaluable in exercising authority. To put it another way, a person loses their stature pretty quickly if the President is not backing that person in high-profile decisions, particularly in those instances when decisions meet resistance from the heads of other departments and other agencies which have full call on the President and his attention. The President's support will be absolutely critical to Ambassador Negroponte's success--and succeed he must, Mr. President. The United States faces a period of enormous uncertainty and threat. The problems of international terrorism will be with us for many decades, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a danger at this minute for the entire world and will for decades to come. These are difficult targets for the intelligence community, but these are the things that threaten our security every moment. These are the issues the intelligence community must master. They are our front line of defense. The warfighter has not yet engaged properly until the intelligence has been collected and disseminated and policy is made from that. Ambassador Negroponte must lead all of us into a new era on intelligence. I think he is very well suited for the task, and I look forward to his swift confirmation. In closing, I also hope the Senate moves very quickly to confirm the President's nominee to be Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, and that is LTG Michael Hayden. This is a tandem made in Heaven. General Hayden understands the military, the lifelong service of it. He understands intelligence. He is Director of the National Security Agency. He has a profound, intuitive, knowledge-based understanding of what is under the rocks and what is plainly in sight, what is plainly good or wrong about the intelligence profession. He has led the National Security Agency for the last 6 years. It is an interesting fact that in the National Security Agency, under their roof, is the largest collection of mathematicians in this world. That may be known or not; I suspect it is. But these people do incredibly important things. He has led them now, having been reappointed three times. Together, Ambassador Negroponte and General Hayden make a powerful team. I am very pleased to support them both. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.", u"Mr. Chairman, terrorist events have brought this point to light, dramatically illustrating how the security of the United States is dependent upon its strength in the area of foreign language competency. If the United States is truly committed to continuing as the leader in the global economic community, as well as in the on-going fight against terrorism dictated by the global war on terrorism, some very serious commitments will have to be made in support of language study. Our history, and particularly our recent history, has repeatedly illustrated the consequences of not having adequate foreign language expertise available in times of crisis. In 1988 the satellite communications language training activities (SCOLA) became the first broad-scale provider of authentic foreign television and today provides this resource from 75 countries. From the beginning the Federal Government has recognized the importance of authentic foreign programming as a tool to help teach foreign languages. By watching and listening, students are able to actually experience the foreign culture and develop their language skills in the native real-life environment. This programming is also a vital intelligence resource since it provides significant insight into the internal happenings of the various countries. Throughout its long-time relationship with the Defense Language Institute (DLI), National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department, military and other government sectors, SCOLA has been particularly responsive to requests for programming from specific areas of the world, with a major portion of its current programming schedule developed as a direct result of specific requests. In addition SCOLA offered this resource from regions of the world that never really had a significant presence in the United States before. SCOLA is a unique satellite-based language training activity that provides television programming in a variety of languages from around the world. Language students and seasoned linguists have found this augmentation of their normal language training to be very helpful. SCOLA also has an Internet-based streaming video capability that greatly increases the availability of this training medium to military and civilian linguists, virtually anywhere they can obtain an Internet connection. In addition, SCOLA is developing a digital archive that will allow users anywhere to review and sort language training information on demand. The development of these capabilities will make SCOLA training assistance much more widely available, but requires additional investment. The committee is concerned that even after three years of encouragement from the Congress, and in an operational environment where the value of language training is of great importance to the nation, the Department of Defense has not fully funded the innovative language training concepts that can help sustain and significantly improve the skills of military and civilian linguists in the Department. Mr. Chairman, the Senate FY 2006 Defense Authorization, S. 1042, recommends an increase of $6.0 million in Operations Maintenance--Army, for the Defense Language Institute, for funding of SCOLA related training activities. In light of current events, the significance of SCOLA's widespread availability to the U.S. military and other government users cannot be overstated. It is my hope that with the House and Senate appropriators will ensure that vital funding for SCOLA is included in the final H.R. 2863--Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2006.", u"Mr. Speaker, on June 20-23, 2005, I attended the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Regional Field Hearing in Rapid City, South Dakota in an effort to convince BRAC commissioners to remove Ellsworth Air Force Base--South Dakota's second largest employer--from the Department of Defense's list of military bases recommended for closure. Therefore, I was unavoidably absent from the House of Representatives on these days and was unable to support important legislation brought before the full House. I would like the record to show that had I been present I would have voted in support of H.R. 2863, the Fiscal Year 2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act; H.R. 2475, the Fiscal 2006 Intelligence Authorization Act; and H.J. Res. 110, the Flag Desecration Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fiscal Year 2006 Defense Appropriations bill funds the activities of the Department of Defense including the funds needed to outfit and train our servicemen and women and important benefits and services for members of our military and their families. The bill also includes funding for three partnership programs between the Department of Defense and the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology. These important programs will help bring together a unique array of capabilities offered by the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology to help our Nation's military meet the challenge of transformation and modernization. I will continue to work with my colleagues in the House of Representatives to improve our Nation's commitment to the men and women who serve in the military. There is no question that all Americans owe their freedom to those brave enough to serve in our Nation's military. I also would like to express my support for the Fiscal Year 2006 Intelligence Authorization Act. This bill provides funding for 15 U.S. intelligence agencies and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. government--including the CIA and the National Security Agency, as well as foreign intelligence activities of the Defense Department, FBI, State Department, Homeland Security Department, and other agencies. I will continue working to ensure our Federal intelligence and security agencies receive the resources and funding needed to protect the United States from external and internal threats. Finally, I would like to express my support for the flag desecration amendment to the United States Constitution. This resolution authorizes Congress to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States. Our Nation's flag is a symbol of freedom and a source of pride for all of us fortunate enough to call ourselves Americans. Our Nation has always encouraged free discussion and reasonable disagreement, but the physical desecration of an American flag goes beyond the pale. Such actions are insulting to those who have fought, and died, under the American flag, and I am proud to support efforts to ban flag desecration. In 1989, the Supreme Court held that no laws could prohibit political protesters from burning the American flag and declared unconstitutional the flag desecration laws of 48 states and of the United States. In that case, Texas v. Johnson, Justice Stevens wrote a powerful dissenting opinion that has guided my reasoning on the Amendment for some time. Justice Stevens pointed out the importance of distinguishing between disagreeable ideas and disagreeable conduct. In a particularly apt analogy, Justice Stevens noted that if Johnson had spray painted his message on the Lincoln Memorial, the government could prohibit his ``expression.'' I have always found myself in agreement with the idea that there should be a legitimate interest in preserving the quality of an important national asset. I look forward to continuing to work on these and other important issues in the 109th Congress.", u"Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to facilitate the orderly disposition of an 800 acre parcel of Federal property located in Laurel, Maryland, a portion of which is currently used by the District of Columbia as the Oak Hills Juvenile Detention and Commitment Center. The legislation is a companion to a measure which has been introduced in the House by Representative Benjamin Cardin. The Oak Hill Youth Center, located adjacent to the National Security Agency and the Baltimore-Washington parkway, is a detention facility for juvenile offenders from the District of Columbia between the ages of 12 and 21. It has been plagued by facility and management problems for many years. The buildings at the center are in deplorable condition and fail to meet health and safety standards. Overcrowding, mismanagement, escapes, drug use and abuse of detainees at the center have been the subject of numerous investigations, press reports and lawsuits over the years, and are of great concern to juvenile justice advocates, families of detainees and local residents, alike. Nearly two decades ago, a consent decree stemming from the lawsuit Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, required the District to make improvements at the facility and address the chronic neglect of its adolescent detainees. Since the decree, ``sixty judicial orders, 44 monitoring reports and almost $3 million in court imposed fines'' have been issued in connection with the District's Youth Services Administration failure to fully comply with the decree, according to a July 2001 article in the Washington Post. Last year a report issued by the District's Inspector General's office found that, ``many of the same types of problems that resulted in the 1986 Jerry M. lawsuit still exist today . . .'' The report documented numerous security problems, health issues, deficiencies in management, failures to effectively maintain the safety of female youth housed at the center, and drugs being smuggled into the facility on a continual basis. There is a consensus that the Oak Hill Youth Center should be shutdown. A Blue Ribbon Commission on Youth Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform, established by Mayor Williams in August 2000, recommended in its final 2001 report that the Oak Hill Juvenile Detention center be closed and demolished. The Justice for DC Youth coalition, whose members include parents and juvenile justice advocates, has adamantly supported closing the existing Oak Hill facility and replacing it with a smaller, more homelike facility that is closer to the youth's homes. This measure seeks to ensure the closure of the facility and the orderly disposition of the property, while addressing the concerns of Anne Arundel County, the NSA, the District of Columbia and all surrounding neighborhoods and residences. Above all, it would serve the youth currently being held at the facility by helping to place them in an environment that is more suitable for successful rehabilitation. I hope this measure can be acted upon quickly by the Congress and ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. Speaker, I want to extend the remarks of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Emanuel) where he talked about what this Congress has been doing. I think we also should be afraid of what this Congress is not doing. I would like to talk this evening for just a few minutes about an Inspector General's report which has been issued that looked at the behavior of the FBI and their translation of intelligence tapes that they were gathering since September 11. Now, we found out on September 10, 2001, the day before the horrendous attacks in New York and Pennsylvania and at the Pentagon, that a couple of conversations that were intercepted by the National Security Agency had a couple of messages. One said ``Tomorrow is zero hour.'' Another said, ``The match is about to begin.'' The problem, Mr. Speaker, is that these messages were not translated into English to be analyzed by the FBI until several days later. So this Congress and this President decided to slightly increase the funding for interpreters and linguists to be able to help gather some of this information because if we were able to gather the information and translate it, we would know what the enemy was thinking. So the FBI Inspector General did a report analyzing where we are today, several years later. Checked us out. Mr. Speaker, 120,000 hours of tape, of potentially valuable terrorism-related recordings, have not yet been translated. Now potentially valuable terrorism-related recordings means languages associated with terrorism, 120,000 hours not even looked at. A computer, several computers, supposedly systematically erased some of al Qaeda's recordings. We are erasing them before we even look at them. There is 500,000 hours for all languages not yet translated. That is 30 percent, and 20 percent of the total of the 120,000 hours of potentially valuable terrorism-related recordings. The rule at the FBI is that audio recordings related to al Qaeda must be reviewed in 12 hours. We obviously learned from what happened on September 10 and September 11 and made this rule that within 12 hours we want all of this translated. The fact of the matter is after the IG's report, 36 percent of al Qaeda recordings were not translated within 12 hours. In fact, there are 50 cases where we missed the deadline of translation by a month. Why is this important? Obviously because of what we learned on September 10. This President and this Congress says that the central battle, the central front on the war on terrorism was Iraq, and we are stuck in a quagmire with over 1,000 dead soldiers, thousands of wounded soldiers, thousands of dead Iraqis, innocent Iraqis. But another component of this major war on terror was that we were going to overhaul governmental translation capabilities and we have not done it. Those of us who did not think it was a good idea to go to war were saying spend $200 billion securing our ports, securing our airports, making sure we check the cargo that is going in the planes, make sure we hire enough linguists, make sure we are translating all of these tapes. And we are not doing the job in the United States of America. This is not brain surgery. They are communicating with each other over faxes, e-mails, telephone conversations, cell phones. Why would we not hire enough FBI agents to figure out what they are saying? Because this President had to go to war. This was not glamorous enough for this President, in the trenches, doing what it takes, day by day by day. One hundred twenty thousand hours of tapes that were not even translated. We spent $48 million trying to increase the number of people we hired, and we only hired 300 more, but we have $1.3 billion spent every week in Iraq. Our priorities are screwed up.", u"Mr. President, I ask the Chair to notify me when I have 1 minute remaining. It says in the paper that the FBI is said to lag on translations. It talks about 3 years after 9/11 more than 120,000 hours of potentially valuable terrorism-related recordings have not been translated by the linguists at the FBI. Then it talks about that the al-Qaida messages ``tomorrow is zero hour'' and ``the match is about to begin'' were intercepted by the National Security Agency on September 10 but not translated until days afterwards. Homeland security? Why aren't we getting this done in terms of securing our homeland? We are pouring nearly $5 billion a month into Iraq. We are grossly shortchanging the urgent need to strengthen our ability to prevent terrorist attacks at home and to strengthen our preparedness to respond to them if they occur. As former Republican Senator Warren Rudman, chairman of the Independent Task Force on Emergency Responders, said: ``Homeland security is terribly underfunded.'' That is a Republican Senator who is saying that. That isn't a Democrat. ``Terribly underfunded.'' We see what happens as a result. Our hospitals are unprepared for a bioterrorist attack. Our land borders, our seaports, our shipping containers, our transit systems, our waterways, nuclear power--none of these have sufficient funds for protection against terrorist attacks, even though the Bush administration has put the Nation on high alert for such attacks five times in the last 3 years. You can't pack all these reasons America is not safer into a 30-second television response ad or a news story or an editorial. But as anyone who cares about the issue can quickly learn, our President has no credibility--no credibility--when he keeps telling us that America and the world are safer because he went to war in Iraq and rid us of Saddam Hussein. President Bush's record on Iraq is clearly costing American lives and endangering America and the world. Our President won't change or even admit how wrong he has been and still is. Despite the long line of mistaken blunders and outright deception, there has been no accountability. As election day draws closer, the buck is circling more and more closely over 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Only a new President can right the extraordinary wrongs of the Bush administration on our foreign policy and our national security. On November 2, the American people will decide whether they still have confidence in this President's leadership. When we ask ourselves the fundamental question, whether President Bush has made us safer, there can only be one answer. No, he has not. That is why America needs new leadership. We could have been, and we should have been much safer than we are today. We cannot afford to stay this very dangerous course. This election cannot come soon enough. As I have said before, the only thing America has to fear is 4 more years of George Bush.", u"Mr. President, I rise in support of the Specter amendment. Before I begin, I would like to commend the managers of the bill, Senators Collins and Lieberman, for their extraordinary patience and their hard work as we continue working through this process. Senators Collins and Lieberman are very prominent and hard-working Senators. They have been given a very tough assignment and a limited timeframe in which to complete it. Nevertheless, they have produced a bill which is a step in the right direction. As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I look forward to working with the Senators who serve on the committee of assignment by the leadership as the Senate attempts to make intelligence reform a reality. Simply put, the Specter amendment would give the national intelligence director, or what we call now the NID, the authority to direct and supervise and control our national intelligence collection agencies. In doing so, it will create a clear chain of command that will leave no doubt in anybody's mind that the national intelligence director is in charge and is accountable. There is no rush to judgment on this issue. The debate in which we are currently engaged is the same debate that has been going on for decades, centered on how to grant increased authority to the Director of Central Intelligence, or a new national intelligence director, while leaving undisturbed the intelligence community's structural status quo. Time and time again, those who have struggled with this conundrum have found we simply can't get there from here under that context. In other words, I believe it takes significant organizational change to overcome the inherent conflicts in the current structure of our national intelligence community. True empowerment requires a national intelligence director with both budget authority and the authority to direct and control the activities of the intelligence collection agencies. One without the other will once again leave us with an intelligence head who can neither succeed nor be held fully accountable. Let me state that the bill reported by the Governmental Affairs Committee does address the question of budget authority very effectively. It is significant and well contained. The bill leaves unaddressed, however, the issue of the national intelligence director's authority to direct, to supervise, and control the activities of our national intelligence collection agencies. In short, the bill, in my opinion, preserves divided loyalties inherent in the current structure. Why is it so difficult to give this new NID direct control over all of the intelligence community agencies? It is no secret. The issue centers on the fact that the National Reconnaissance Office, which designs and acquires our spy satellites, the National Security Agency, which collects our signal intelligence, and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, which processes and disseminates our satellite imagery, all fall under the direct control of the Secretary of Defense. These agencies, while essential to the collection of national intelligence, have also been deemed essential to the Pentagon's ability to fight and to win wars. In essence, these agencies serve two masters: The head of the intelligence community and the Secretary of Defense. This tension has existed for decades, and it continues today. As long as the Secretary of Defense directs the day-to-day activities of these agencies, the new national intelligence director will continue to struggle with a structure that undermines his ability to succeed as the head of the intelligence community. It appears to me that under today's bill the national intelligence director's authority concerning collection will be about the same as the DCI's has been for over 50 years. I do not mean to be a pessimist, but history has shown in practice that these authorities to ``establish requirements,'' ``manage the collection task,'' and ``resolve the conflicts'' have limited ability when an agency works with the Secretary of Defense and not for the head of the intelligence community. Why has it been so difficult to streamline the chain of command in the intelligence community? Because when the Defense Department comes up on the radar screen and announces to Congress and the media that its ability to defend America will be undermined if it loses direct control over its intelligence agencies, Members of Congress rightfully pause and they certainly take note. This is especially true today when American forces are engaged in combat. This, however, should not lead to what we call paralysis. During this debate, we have heard a great deal about support to our dedicated, brave men and women in uniform, i.e., the warfighters. Many of my colleagues have argued and will continue to argue that the national intelligence director must not be allowed to direct and supervise the control of activities of our national intelligence collection agencies. In their view, granting such an authority would undermine the Secretary of Defense's ability to fight and win wars. For this to be true, the national intelligence director would have to deny our military commanders the information they need to wage war. I cannot conceive of any circumstance where that would be the case. I am a member of the Armed Services Committee. I am a former Marine officer. I would not sanction any legislation that I thought would limit the ability of our troops to fight and to win wars. I recognize the special requirements of the Department of Defense. As chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I also know that the Department of Defense is only one of the major consumers of intelligence. Important, yes; major, yes; but one. I often hear people referring to the Department of Defense as the principal consumer of intelligence. While the Department is a significant and important consumer of intelligence, we need to remember one thing: The principal consumers of intelligence are the President of the United States, the Congress, and the National Security Council. They are the principal consumers. The Department of Defense is a major consumer. In time, the Department of Homeland Security is likely to become a voracious consumer of intelligence, perhaps on a par with the Department of Defense. I do not believe the defense of the homeland is any less important than prosecuting the war. Consequently it does not make sense to have 80 percent of our intelligence collection apparatus controlled by one consumer, and that is the Department of Defense. If we give the national intelligence director the authority to manage all of the national collection agencies, that will ensure one office is responsible and accountable for meeting the intelligence requirements of all consumers including, of course, that of the Department of Defense. If any Cabinet member believes their intelligence requirements are not being met, he or she can address the issues to the national intelligence director. If a Cabinet member does not agree with NID's decision, they can take it up with the President of the United States. I also note that in testimony before Congress, the directors of two of the Pentagon's intelligence collection agencies--the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency--stated that having their agencies transferred to the control of a national intelligence director would not degrade their level of support to the military. Let me repeat that. The directors of two of the Pentagon's intelligence collection agencies--the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency--stated that having their agencies transferred to the control of a national intelligence director would not degrade their level of support to the military. Additionally, some have argued that giving the national intelligence director line control of agencies with uniformed military personnel would be complicated. There will certainly be some issues to be resolved, to be sure. But the Department of Defense regularly details military personnel to agencies and offices outside of the Department of Defense. We would not be breaking new ground here. We have had civilian control of the military since the founding of this Nation, and I don't see how civilian control by a national intelligence director is qualitatively different than civilian control by the Secretary of Defense. They both work for the President. There has been a lot of talk about that fact in regard to meetings we have had with people in uniform and the Secretary of Defense and a certain Senator asking, How would you feel if your budget was controlled by somebody who didn't wear a uniform? Well, the Secretary of Defense doesn't wear a uniform. When the military appears before the Congress, they don't wear a uniform. Neither does the Secretary of Army, Navy, or Air Force wear a uniform. Let me detail a few examples to illustrate why direct control is so important to the success of the national intelligence director. As recently as last week--I would like for Members to pay attention to this--as recently as last week, the Senate Intelligence Committee received a very troubling briefing in closed session that clearly demonstrated that even on matters relating to the terrorist threat to our homeland, today, now, the terrorist threat that we face, the intelligence agencies still stubbornly refuse to adequately share information. Why are these agencies still not sharing? Some progress has been made. But why are they still not sharing? Is it because the DCI doesn't have adequate budget authority? No. They don't share it because they work for 15 different bosses and no one holds them accountable for information sharing. The national intelligence director can cajole, he can plead, he can consult all he wants; he can promulgate policies and guidelines all day long. He can create grand, trusted information networks. But without a national intelligence director with direct control, there will be no one to force adequate information sharing within the intelligence community. Let us take another example. We have all heard former DCI Tenet's now famous declaration of war against al-Qaida in 1998. Mr. Tenet ordered that no resource was to be spared in this critical effort. He declared war as a result of Osama bin Laden issuing fatwas to kill Americans. What happened as a result of this bold order? Not much. The National Security Agency went its own way, saying: Thank you, Mr. DCI, for your interest in national security, but we are going to retool for a threat that has nothing to do with terrorism. What would have happened if Mr. Tenet had the authorities granted to the national intelligence director under the Collins-Lieberman bill when he made his 1998 declaration? He might have said: We are at war, and the NSA will see that reflected in the budget you will receive in the next year or so, assuming Congress does not make any changes to it. That is budget authority. That is the crowbar he would use in terms of influence. However, with the authorities to direct, supervise, and control, which are provided in the Specter amendment, Mr. Tenet would have been able to order the NSA to stop retooling for the other threat, get to work that day, focus their efforts on al-Qaida. In the 21st century, threats evolve too quickly to wait a year or so for the national intelligence director's budget change to have any effect. The NID must have direct control in order to make immediate changes. The bill before the Senate today is a significant step in the right direction. Credit goes to Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman. There are many good provisions in the bill which should improve the intelligence community, but it is missing something very important--a clear chain of command and accountability. As the examples I have cited demonstrate, a clear chain of command and accountability that comes with it are essential to real and lasting reform. If we do not make the hard choices now, I fear after yet another series of intelligence failures--and Lord knows I do not want to sit as chairman of the Intelligence Committee and have any more ``Oh my God'' hearings in regard to past tragedies from Khobar Towers to embassy bombings to the Khartoum chemical plant to the failure to even try to come as close as possible to predicting the India nuclear blast, Somalia, the USS Cole, and obviously September 11. We do not want to go back down that road. I fear the Senate Intelligence Committee will be right back in its hearing room listening to the newly minted national intelligence director testify while he enjoys a great deal of budget authority he still lacks the real authority to perform the day-to-day operations of our intelligence agencies and therefore lacks ability to lead as we expect and as he must. I urge my colleagues to support the Specter amendment so there is no doubt in anyone's mind that the national intelligence director is in charge and is accountable. I will take a few more moments to comment on some of the debate I have heard concerning this amendment. This is not a new debate. What I heard in the Senate yesterday and today represents an age-old tension that has existed since the intelligence community was created.", u"Mr. President, first of all, I thank the Senator from North Dakota for the thought he has given to this issue. I know he has a great interest in management structures, in making sure we have the most efficient structure possible to serve the taxpayers. So I very much appreciate the spirit with which he has raised these questions. I want to make three concluding points to emphasize some of the points already made by my colleague from Connecticut. First, it was evident as we studied this issue and read the 9/11 Commission Report that the current system does not foster the kind of communication and cooperation we desperately need. It is a series of stovepipes with no one having the ability to make the final decisions, to resolve conflicts, to move resources and people where they are most needed. You cannot go to the President of the United States on everything. I have seen that firsthand in the staffing of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center where the Director feels he needs more resources, other decisions have been made by various agency heads, and there is no one to step in and set the priorities, move the people, and direct the resources. I think our bill really changes that. Like Senator Lieberman, I was struck by Director Tenet's 12/98 memo in which he does this call to be at war and that all resources should be marshaled, and virtually nothing happened. That will change under our structure. There will be accountability under our structure because people will know who is in charge and whose call it is, and that is the national intelligence director. Our organization enhances accountability, cooperation, coordination, communication, and, most of all, results. Second, the 9/11 Commission considered doing the kind of structure you have raised questions about. Essentially, that would be creating a department of intelligence. You would take all of these units out of the other agencies and do a brandnew department. And it felt--and I agree--that would be too disruptive, particularly at a time when we are at war; that it would be expensive, it would be complicated, it would take a long time to put into effect. We have seen that with the Department of Homeland Security. That has been a massive undertaking. I am very proud of the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Admiral Loy, but it has not been without its growing pains. We just could not afford that kind of disruption right now. Third would be the reaction of DOD if we took all of those entities out and put them in a new department. There was testimony of a former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency at a hearing on the House side in August. He said if you pulled those agencies, like the National Security Agency, the DIA, the NGA, the NRO--those that serve DOD and other consumers--if you pulled them out, you would see DOD re-creating within the Department new entities to replace those if you severed that link and transferred them. To quote William Odom, ``You're just going to end up with a big mess'' if you do that. That is why we came up with this structure.", u"Well, two points quickly: I don't go back to 1947, but I go back to 1953 and 1954 under the Hoover Commission. And I would refer you to that report. They ask for a national intelligence coordinator. Allen Dulles would say--he was directing Central Intelligence--you can run the National Security Agency, you over at the Department of Defense, and you can direct and manage military intelligence and these different departments. But take those cold turkey facts of intelligence and information and have them coordinated--not superduper $40 billion. It sounds pretty on paper, but I can tell you right now, that is what was wrong with 9/11. The intelligence was directed, was managed. Why do you think the head of the CIA hammered and slammed his fist on the desk of the President and said, Slam dunk, Mr. President, we got all the information you need on weapons of mass destruction, when he didn't even have an agent in downtown Baghdad. We were about to invade Iraq, and we had not an agent. That was the same director who was the staff director before Gulf Storm and Senator Bill Cohen and I came back to be briefed on Iraq and Baghdad, against Saddam. And George Tenet, the staff director at that time, said: Gentlemen, we don't have an agent in Baghdad. We don't have one in Iraq. We will have to call over to the Defense Department. Here, 11 years later, we still don't have somebody down there. Now we have operative agents and everything else trying to manage elections and what have you. So the idea is to coordinate impartial, objective intelligence facts, not manage intelligence. Secondly, the Congress stays out of it, Senator Collins, most respectfully. The Congress stays out of the affairs of Condoleezza Rice. She is the National Security Adviser. We don't call her up willy-nilly before 15 different committees here on the Hill and say testify here and there. You don't want that. If you are the President, you want it coordinated subject to you. That is what you need. You don't call Karl Rove up here and ask him about political intelligence; you have him working around the clock. He has us Democrats on the run. I want the same kind of job done in domestic intelligence, foreign intelligence, and military intelligence. I want it coordinated for the President so the buck doesn't stop here because the dots were not joined. Now we are about to join the dots in this amendment. Of all people, they say let's don't join them, let's just manage; and we have $40 billion or $30 billion, whatever it is, and we are going to manage indirectly and we are going to screw up the Defense Department, the FBI, civil rights, and everything else, in the head-on rush we have here this afternoon. I yield back the remainder of my time.", u"Madam President, for the national intelligence director to be truly accountable for the intelligence community, the director must have the authority to have a real say in the selection of the heads of the principal agencies of the intelligence community. The 9/11 Commission said that the ability to hire the senior managers is one of the key authorities, critical to the success of the national intelligence director. It is critical to the success of any leader, but particularly it is important for the head of the intelligence community. The 9/11 Commission cited the DCI's current lack of this power as one of the key flaws in the DCI's authorities. Under the Collins-Lieberman bill, the NID will recommend to the President nominees to be the directors of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency--the agencies known better as NSA, NGA, and NRO. The NID is required to obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense before recommending the nominees to the President, and if the Secretary of Defense does not agree with the recommendations of the NID, the director must make that fact known to the President. The distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the managers of this bill each agree that these three critical agencies should remain within the Department of Defense because of the dual role these agencies play. For that reason, we joined forces to oppose the amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania that would have severed the link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense, the reporting link. In our bill, I believe we have taken the right approach. We have left these three agencies within the Department of Defense, but we have made it clear that there is an important reporting responsibility to the national intelligence director and that the national intelligence director will choose the individuals to lead these agencies with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. It is actually the President's nomination, but the recommendations would go from the NID with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. Why did we do that? We struck that balance not only because it was recommended by the 9/11 Commission, and strongly recommended, but because we recognize that these three agencies do not just serve the Department of Defense; they are national intelligence assets. They provide vital intelligence information throughout the intelligence community. In fact, when Senator Lieberman and I met with the head of the NSA, he told us he was on the phone far more often with the Director of the CIA than he is with the Secretary of Defense. These agencies provide critical information to the CIA, to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of Energy, to the Secretary of the Treasury--to all those 15 agencies across our Government that vitally need intelligence information. That is why we have the heads of these agencies recommended by the national intelligence director with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. I point out that if we were to adopt the amendment offered by the Senator from Virginia, we are essentially making no change in current law. Under current law, the Secretary of Defense recommends the appointment of these individuals to the President, and it is the Director of Central Intelligence who concurs in the choice. So essentially the Senator from Virginia is simply restating current law. Current law is not adequate, and we know that that higher authority is a key authority. If we are going to hold the national intelligence director accountable for the intelligence community, we have to give him the authorities he needs to do his job.", u"I truly thank them for their extraordinary service on behalf of our national security generally but also for their work on this amendment. We had some very good discussions about this, and I never had a moment where I felt they were doing this just to protect turf. I know they were pursuing these questions with a genuine interest in what would work best for our national security, both the intelligence and the military sides of it. This is not an uncomplicated problem. We are setting up a national intelligence director. We want that person to coordinate the intelligence community, and budget authority is a critical part of that. Senator Warner is quite right, obviously, in the section that he read from the 9/11 Commission Report. Interestingly, as my colleagues on the Governmental Affairs Committee may remember, when Dr. Zelikow, the chief of staff of the Commission, came before our committee, he said they had changed their mind a bit on putting the Joint Military Intelligence Program into the Department of Defense budget control because of the Commissioners' concern that the national intelligence assets--the National Security Agency, Geospatial Agency, and Reconnaissance--all have a single budgetary accountability, in this case to the national intelligence budget. I believe in the long run that is the way it ought to go. I must say in my own mind, perhaps simplistically, I always believed that what we wanted to do was to say that the national intelligence director should have control over the national intelligence budget; that the Secretary of Defense should have clear control over TIARA, the tactical intelligence budget; and that the Joint Military Intelligence Program was somewhere in between. We had to find a rational way to decide where authority went. I think in some sense what we are saying in this legislation is we are not quite ready to make those decisions. So this amendment that we agreed to essentially freezes the status quo with regard to the JMIP and the particular programs that we discussed in the Defense Intelligence Agency, subjects them to review, consideration of all of the factors--effectiveness, budgetary authority, all the rest, military effectiveness--and then has a decision made ultimately by the Office of Management and Budget on recommendation from the national intelligence director. It is a very strong, balanced, reasonable conclusion which does no damage to the basic purpose of this legislation and provides for, ultimately, a rational allocation of budget authority in the shared interest of our national security, which is, after all, what this is all about. So this is really what legislating is supposed to be about. I thank my colleagues for all the work they and our staffs have done, and I move adoption of the modified amendment.", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, S. 763, which is identical to H.R. 1082 which was introduced by the gentlewoman from Indiana (Ms. Carson), designates the Federal building and United States courthouse located at 46 East Ohio Street, in Indianapolis, Indiana, as the Birch Bayh Federal Building and United States Courthouse. This bill has the bipartisan support of the entire Indiana delegation, and I thank the gentlewoman from Indiana (Ms. Carson) for agreeing to bring S. 763 to the floor in lieu of her bill, which the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure favorably reported out on May 21, 2003. I would like to have inserted into the Record that the gentlewoman from Indiana (Ms. Carson) has been diligent not only in this Congress, but in the last Congress, in attempting to achieve passage of this legislation, not only in this body, but in the other body; and the Bayh family has a great champion on their side when it comes to the gentlewoman. Senator Bayh was born in Terre Haute, Indiana, in 1928 to school teachers, and it is from them he inherited an ethic of public service. Upon graduation from high school, Senator Bayh volunteered for and served in the United States Army from 1946 to 1948. Upon his return, he attended and graduated from the Purdue University School of Agriculture at Lafayette in 1951. This education served him well, since throughout his long career, he always found time to work on and oversee the family farm, growing corn and soybeans for more than four decades. Senator Bayh's political career began in 1954, when, at the age of 26, he was elected to serve in the Indiana House of Representatives. While serving in that body, he served as speaker in 1959 and as the Democratic floor leader in 1957 and 1961. Despite these responsibilities, he also found time to attend and graduate from Indiana University School of Law in 1960, and was admitted to the bar in 1961. In 1962, at the age of 34, Senator Bayh entered the United States Senate where he served three terms from 1963 until 1981. While in the Senate, he served as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, working with the CIA, the National Security Agency and the FBI. He also was a member of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation where he called for and funded efforts to build the District of Columbia's Metro subway system which so many of us enjoy, and to modernize the Amtrak rail system. Senator Bayh is best known as chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee where he authored two amendments to the Constitution, something we will not see any time soon in subsequent Congresses, the 25th Amendment on Presidential and Vice Presidential succession, and the 26th Amendment which lowered the voting age from 21 to 18. This is a fitting tribute to a dedicated public servant. I support this legislation and encourage Members to do the same.", u"Mr. President, I rise today to express my concern about the loss to the U.S. economy of most of our high-end semiconductor chip manufacturing sector, the threat of the subsequent loss of the semiconductor research and design sectors, and the resulting serious national security implications. The composition of the global semiconductor industry has changed dramatically in recent years. East Asian countries are leveraging these changing market forces through their national trade and industrial policies to drive a migration of semiconductor manufacturing to that region, particularly China, through a large array of direct and indirect subsidies to their domestic semiconductor industry. If this accelerating shift in manufacturing overseas continues, the U.S. will lose the ability over time to reliably obtain high-end semiconductor integrated circuits from trusted sources, at a time when these advanced processing components are becoming a crucial defense technology advantage to the U.S. Experts in the military and intelligence sectors have made clear that relying on semiconductor integrated circuits fabricated outside the U.S., e.g. in China, Taiwan and Singapore, is not an acceptable national security option. The economic impact in the U.S. of the loss of manufacturing, research and design has equally serious implications. I would like to direct my colleagues' attention to a White Paper, that I am asking to be included in the Congressional Record, which outlines the fact that this off-shore migration of high-end semiconductor chip manufacturing is a result of concerted foreign government action, through an effective combination of government trade and industrial policies which have taken advantage of opportunities resulting from market forces and changes in the semiconductor industry. This White Paper lists a number of possible actions the defense and intelligence communities should consider to prevent this serious loss of U.S. semiconductor manufacturing and design capability. I have also requested that the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office submit reports and plans of action to respond to this impending national security threat. I have asked that these reports provide an analysis of the semiconductor manufacturing issues that relate to defense and national security, as well as an analysis of the potential solutions that are discussed in the White Paper. I hope these reports will detail the steps that will be taken to counteract this loss of critical components for U.S. defense needs, as well as a timetable for the implementation of such steps. I note that the Armed Services Committee report on the bill we passed yesterday requests similar information. I hope we can act promptly to avoid a potential national security crisis in terms of reliable access to cutting-edge technology necessary to the critical defense needs of our country. The loss goes beyond economics and security. What is at stake here is our ability to be preeminent in the world of ideas on which the semiconductor industry is based. A prompt, concerted effort by the defense and intelligence community in cooperation with industry can reverse this trend of off-shore migration of manufacturing, research and design that is now under way and that will become essentially irreversible if no action is taken in the next few months. I ask consent that my ``White Paper on National Security Aspects of the Global Migration of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry'' be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the rule for the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. I commend the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), who are doing valuable work by looking into the intelligence surrounding Operation Iraqi Freedom. By necessity and design, their work is classified. I feel strongly that their work must continue, but that this issue is beyond the scope of a single committee and is of such importance to our democracy that responsible public hearings by a select committee of users of intelligence are necessary. Members of relevant committees such as the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations, who use intelligence to make policy decisions every day, provide valuable perspective that should be part of a broader review. As a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I am a user of intelligence, and the information I receive shapes the decisions I make for many men and women in uniform every day. Members of Congress and military planners need to have confidence that intelligence is objective and provides a sound basis for policy decisions. No decision is more grave than sending American fighting men and women into harm's way. We have a duty to be certain that public policy that we base these decisions on is credible and real. With American and British soldiers continuing to be killed at an alarming rate in Iraq, we have to be sure that our intelligence is providing a realistic view of the threats they have. Having open hearings by a select committee of policymakers who are customers of intelligence would not only allow Congress to reclaim its vital oversight role, but help convince the American people that their elected officials and President have the right tools to make the right decisions to protect them. Mr. Speaker, this is not about the purview of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I deeply respect the work that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence does, but with all due respect, as a customer of that intelligence, the classified work that the committee does needs to remain classified, but after that work is declassified and moves to the National Security Agency, to the Pentagon, to the military planners, to the differing alphabet soups of agencies, who then take that classified work and begin to shape public policy with it, once that work becomes declassified and is starting to be moved into the public policy realm, I and others in relevant committees, like the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations, need to understand what exactly is being done to that intelligence to either promote it or shape it to perhaps fit a preconceived decision by people in the administration or in other parts of the policy-making chain. I want to know if the intelligence work that is being done so ably by our intelligence people and the analysis done by them has been shaped in any way that would change my mind when I make these decisions. That is why I think we need a select committee. I urge my colleagues to vote no on the rule, but I support the work of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.", u"Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the intelligence authorization bill, and I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for yielding me this time. This bill addresses vital intelligence needs, and may I say there is no greater need nor more important need, in my view, than the need for more and better human intelligence, also known as HUMINT. For America's intelligence community, fighting terrorism, as the chairman has said, is job one and rightly so. In order to learn the plans and intentions of America's terrorist enemies, which we must do to defend against another terrorist attack, we must improve the quality and quantity of intelligence from human sources. Technology certainly can help, but it has limited application. For instance, the overhead collection systems of the Cold War era continue to be a wonderful resource. However, they are not much good for tracking individual terrorists, and they certainly cannot get inside the heads of those individuals who are plotting to kill Americans. For that we must have HUMINT. HUMINT is the force multiplier. As good as the information is that the National Security Agency collects, it is that much more powerful when HUMINT officers down on the ground locate individuals who can tell them just what those electronic signals mean while talking to them in their native language. This authorization bill recognizes this fact, and I am very proud of the significant bipartisan support given to our HUMINT capabilities by the community. As I have said previously, throughout much of the 1990s there was a debate about whether America really needed to spend so much money on defense; and as for intelligence, some people even said there was no longer any need for the CIA. Mr. Chairman, that debate is long over. The task before us now is to continue to provide the necessary resources for HUMINT programs so that our policymakers can have a better, more detailed understanding of what the intelligence analysis means. Unfortunately, the HUMINT programs of the CIA, America's premier HUMINT agency, were nearly starved to death during the mid-1990s; and with the help from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Congress, and now a supportive administration, those programs are being resuscitated and brought back to new life. But despite this renewed commitment, the CIA still has to surge to cover the world's hot spots. This needs to change, and this bill helps us get there. The men and women of the CIA wherever they are found are doing a wonderful job; but they need encouragement, they need support from Congress, and they need the support of the American people. Our committee has again this year, under the leadership of the chairman and with the support of the ranking member, made the commitment to provide the resources to properly support these fine people to add to their numbers, to improve their foreign language skills, and to get them overseas where they are needed and needed badly. The support for the effort of these people must be sustained and a vote on H.R. 2417 is a perfect expression of that support. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.", u"Mr. Speaker, with each passing day, the President's critics become more emboldened in their attacks on what they decry as a misleading impetus to go to war. According to the information they are able to ascertain from 24-hour news channels and the New York Times, they continue to condemn the President's claim that Saddam Hussein had links to al Qaeda. We have all heard their diatribes accusing the President of invading Iraq with little or no evidence that Saddam Hussein worked along Osama bin Laden. I recommend the recent article in the Weekly Standard's current issue that details the memo written in response to the administration's prewar intelligence. It is clear evidence of the nexus of terrorism with terrorist-sponsoring states that many antiwar advocates deny exists at all. According to this memo, dated October 27, 2003, bin Laden and Saddam Hussein had an operational relationship from the early 1990s to 2003 that involved training in explosives, weapons of mass destruction, logistical support for terrorist attacks, al Qaeda training camps, safe haven in Iraq, and Iraq financial support for al Qaeda. Mr. Speaker, the findings put forth in the memo come from a variety of domestic and foreign agencies including the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the CIA, and the National Security Agency. Much of the evidence is detailed, conclusive, and corroborated by multiple sources. Some of it is new information obtained in interviews with high-level Al Qaeda terrorists and Iraqi officials and some reaches back a decade. Not surprisingly, the picture that emerges is one of long-standing collaboration between two of America's most grave enemies. According to the memo which lays out the intelligence in 50 numbered points, Iraq-al Qaeda contacts began in 1990 and continued through mid-March 2003, days before the Iraq war began. So in effect, Mr. Speaker, this information has been accumulated over three administrations. The relationship began shortly before the first Gulf War. According to the memo, bin Laden sent emissaries to Jordan in 1990 to meet with Iraqi government officials. At some unspecified point in 1991, according to CIA analysis, Iraq sought Saddam's assistance to establish links to al Qaeda. Both parties were equally interested in developing that relationship and according to the CIA reporting memo, bin Laden wanted to expand his organization's abilities through ties in Iraq. The cumulative weight of the intelligence is compelling. Even The Washington Post recommends that its readers examine the evidence and decide for themselves. The notion that the pragmatic Saddam Hussein, who had grown closer and closer to extreme terrorists in the 1990s, would avoid any contact with al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden is not a reasonable conclusion to draw. The alliance is a natural one. With al Qaeda now claiming responsibility for the recent attacks on synagogues in Turkey, we are reminded of our duty to respond. Were the President to have completely ignored this information, the world would have to face potentially horrifying consequences. Yet today's critics seem eager to claim even after 9/11 the administration should only have acted against Saddam if it has proven beyond any reasonable doubt that he, Saddam, was in league with al Qaeda. Hopefully, this report provides the evidence that is needed to make this link. This information is reaffirming our need to topple Saddam. After so many years of complacency, weakness, and denial, the President made the decision to oust Saddam. He took the action, the action that was vital to protect our country.", u'Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, first, let me thank my good friend, the gentleman from Sanibel, Florida (Mr. Goss) for yielding me this time. It is a pleasure to serve with the gentleman on both the Committee on Rules and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and, as I said last night, not in a self-serving way, I do not know of any two committees which work harder or more diligently than the two on which the gentleman and I serve. It turns out that we are the only two Members on both of those committees, and what I said last night is we must be gluttons for punishment. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule, providing for the consideration of the conference report to accompany H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. This bill authorizes classified amounts in fiscal year 2004 for 14 United States intelligence agencies and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, including the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, as well as foreign intelligence activities of the Defense Department, FBI, State Department, Homeland Security Department, and other agencies. Members who wish to do so, and I urge Members to do this if they have concerns, can go to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence office to examine the classified schedule of authorizations for the programs and activities of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the national intelligence program. As I said, this includes authorizations for the CIA, as well as the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence programs within, among others, the Department of Defense, NSA, Department of State, Treasury and Energy, and the FBI. Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for the tactical intelligence and related activities and joint military intelligence program of the Department of Defense. The measure covers specific and general intelligence operations including all of our operations that we put forward in any manner. Today, more than ever, we must make the creation of a strong and flexible intelligence apparatus one of the highest priorities of this body. The terrorist attacks of September 11, combined with the continuing threat of further attacks, underscore the importance of this legislation. I am pleased that it has been brought to the floor in a truly bipartisan manner. Thanks to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member, and the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and all of the members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the specific subcommittees, a good job has been done on behalf of this country. Let me say though, Mr. Speaker, that just because this is brought here in a bipartisan manner does not mean that it is a perfect bill; far from it. There are several areas that many of us would have liked to have seen improved. One of them that we have an exacting concern about is the expansion of the executive authorities under section 374, the amendment of the National Financial Services Act. We feel that that bears further scrutiny and certainly, without judicial review in that section, could pose problems at some point in our future. It is something that many of us will continue to review. We also felt very strongly, and I thank my colleague, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) who will speak specifically to it, that we should emphasize the area of language ability in a more dramatic fashion. Mr. Speaker, this bill provides authorizations and appropriations for some of the most important national security programs in this great country. Any hesitation by this body in passing it would be a disservice to the American people. I urge my colleagues to support this rule and the underlying conference report.', u"Time magazine got into it very thoroughly--much more so than the committee that has been leaking. I was disappointed Sunday when I heard my distinguished colleague from Tennessee say: No, he would not take a polygraph test. I am an old trial lawyer. You are not going to convict my client on a polygraph test. We used it in the Hoover Commission 50 years ago, and it is an indicator. I wanted to make sure the staff on the Intelligence Committee--as I found out, I had been doubledealed by the CIA and was told: I cannot give you that information, Senator, because your staff does not have the appropriate clearance. Before you serve here as a Capitol policeman, you have to take a polygraph, and also before you serve in the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service--go down the list--but not the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee. So I learned that in a war you never ask your man to do something you do not do yourself first. So I went over to take a polygraph test. To the very first question, I started off my answer ``in my humble opinion'' and the needle went right off the chart. I flunked. It took 2 hours and they gave me a chance again, and after that 2-hour test, I passed it and came back and I still brought it up that as a member of the Intelligence Committee, they do not have the appropriate clearance. If they want to know where the leaks are, go to the committees. Mr. President, the National Security Agency failed. They had all kinds of warnings about al-Qaida. They had Arabic friends over there. They got the word on September 10 in Arabic that ``the match is about to begin,'' but they didn't translate the Arabic into English until September 12. Now comes the National Security Council. It is interesting that in 1947 we had the same problem of coordination--instituting not only the CIA, but the 1947 National Security Council that the function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration--that is joining--of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security, so as to enable the military services and the other Departments and Agencies of Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security. If you don't have a President right at the catbird seat pointing to them and saying you either talk and coordinate with each other or else you are out, it is not going to be done. You can pass all the bills you want in the U.S. Congress. You are just passing another entity for finger-pointing. They need correlation again and again. Here is exactly what the President said in the National Security Presidential directive he made. I had a copy of it here. It is with respect to ordering the bush National Security Council. Incidentally, what I am saying I had said to him at the Cabinet table over 2 months ago. But on February 13--I ask unanimous consent that this National Security Presidential directive of February 13, 2001, be printed in the Record.", u"Madam President, I would like to recognize the professional dedication, vision, and public service of Mr. Paul Schneider, who is leaving his position as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition. It is an honor for me to recognize the many outstanding achievements he has provided to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, the Navy, and our great Nation. Mr. Schneider has spent almost four decades ensuring our Nation and its naval forces are equipped with the technological supremacy to ensure victory over America's enemies. As our Nation enters the 21st century and faces new and unsettling changes, the leadership and technological achievements Mr. Schneider has nurtured will continue to ensure our strength and freedom. Mr. Schneider began his public service career over 37 years ago at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard as a project engineer to the Submarine Propulsion and Auxiliary Machinery Branch and Waterfront Design Liaison Office. Throughout the 1970s Mr. Schneider was a key member of the Navy's Trident submarine program, where he provided leadership, expertise, and vision in design, engineering, program management, and advanced technology development. The Navy, recognizing Mr. Schneider's leadership and engineering expertise, brought him to the Naval Sea Systems Command in 1981 to be a Deputy Director in the Engineering Directorate where he was responsible for design and engineering of ship and submarine mechanical and electrical support systems and auxiliary machinery. In his next assignment, Mr. Schneider became executive director of the Amphibious, Auxiliary, Mine and Sealift Ships Directorate. Throughout the 1990s, Mr. Schneider continued to be one of the Navy's leading engineers, becoming Executive Director of the Surface Ship Directorate. In October 1994, he became Executive Director and Senior Civilian of the Naval Sea Systems Command where he led efforts to revamp the Navy business process by adopting commercial cost processes and practices in the acquisition of major systems. He also implemented training and education programs to retool the Navy's acquisition workforce for the 21st century. In 1998, Mr. Schneider became Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition. Mr. Schneider has earned numerous awards, including the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award, the Department of the Navy Distinguished and Superior Civilian Service Awards, and Presidential Distinguished and Meritorious Executive Rank Awards. I could go on and on about the many significant contributions made by Paul Schneider throughout his long and distinguished career. There are almost too many to recount. Despite his many professional, technical, and engineering achievements, perhaps his most noteworthy trait is his genuine concern for those around him. He regards as his family the entire community of military personnel, civilian employees, contractors, and industry who faithfully serve the Navy throughout the world. His memberships in the American Society of Naval Engineers, Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, Association of Scientists and Engineers, Navy League and the Naval Institute attest to his dedication to be a friend, counselor, and mentor to many hundreds of junior personnel who have had the pleasure to serve under him during his tenure. I ask my colleagues to join me today as I wish Mr. Paul Schneider all the best in his future as he continues his successful career as Senior Acquisition Executive for the National Security Agency. On behalf of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, I wish Paul and his loving wife Leslie fair winds and following seas.", u"Mr. President, I am opposed to cloture of the Lieberman bill until I have a chance to offer that amendment. I have also voted against cloture on the Gramm-Miller bill because, again, although I have had discussions with Senator Gramm, as I have had discussions with Senator Lieberman, we have not reached fruition. I want an opportunity to include this language about the intelligence directorate on the Gramm-Miller amendment. While I have not taken a position, as I said on Thursday, on whether I will ultimately support the Nelson-Chafee-Breaux amendment, which is backed by labor, or whether I will support the Gramm-Miller amendment, which is the President's preference, it is my hope we can yet work out an accommodation. But I think it is much more important the Senate pass a bill and we go to conference with the House, whichever provisions are included. I grant the provisions labor wants included are important to labor, and I grant the provisions the President wants included are important to the President. But as important as all of those provisions are, they are not as important as getting a bill that can be conferenced with the House, which can be signed by the President, so we can set up this Department of Homeland Security and we can have, under one umbrella, all of the intelligence agencies. It is not that the Secretary is going to tell the CIA agents around the globe where to go, or the FBI agents where to go, or the National Security Agency what to do, or the Defense Intelligence Agency, but as to the analysis, they should all come under one umbrella. That really is the critical factor. That is why I believe the conclusion of this bill on that issue is of greater importance than any other matter in the bill and of greater importance than any other matter which the Congress will consider during this session. So I am prepared to vote for cloture on the Gramm-Miller amendment should I get the chance to offer my amendment. I do not think, as the Senator from Texas said, that he is absolutely entitled to a vote on his proposal without amendment. The rules of the Senate provide that there can be amendments to the Gramm-Miller proposal, just as there can be amendments to the Lieberman bill, just as there can be amendments to any bill. To repeat, I have not yet taken a position as to whether I will favor what labor seeks through the Nelson-Chafee-Breaux proposal or what the President seeks through the Gramm-Miller proposal, but it is of greatest importance that this provision on the Directorate of Intelligence Analysis be adopted and everything be placed under one roof.", u"Madam President, I have sought recognition to urge my colleagues to work to resolve the outstanding differences on the labor-management issues because I believe the two sides are very close. I submit further that it is of vital importance that the Congress proceed to enact legislation on homeland security and the Senate move ahead to iron out the remaining differences, go to conference with the House, and then present a bill to the President for signature. It is imperative that all of the intelligence agencies be brought under one umbrella in an effort to avoid a repetition of 9/11. My analysis shows me that had all of the dots been put together prior to 9/11, 9/11 might well have been avoided. I am not prepared to accept the Intelligence Committee's analysis that another terrorist attack will occur. I believe if we put all the dots together, we can prevent it. Had we had the Phoenix FBI report, together with the information from Kuala Lumpur about two of the hijackers known to the CIA, not told to the FBI or INS, had we had the National Security Agency warning on September 10 that something was going to happen the next day, had the warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act been pursued as to Mr. Zacarias Moussaoui, there would have been a blueprint. But the system broke down because there was not one overall umbrella. What we are faced with now, the differences in the two positions, involves the labor-management issues. Last Thursday, we had a discussion in the Senate where it was agreed that the provisions of the Nelson-Chafee-Breaux amendment did not supplant the provisions of title V which have a national security exemption but were in addition to the existing provisions of title V on collective bargaining. When you take a look at the language in the Nelson amendment, it is very close to the language of the existing law. The existing law refers to counterintelligence, investigative, or national security, and the Nelson amendment refers to counterintelligence or investigative work directly related to terrorism investigation. It may be that the language of Nelson would have to be modified slightly so that instead of providing for a ``majority'' of such employees, it would be a ``significant number'' of such employees. Then with respect to the issue of negotiability, the Gramm-Miller bill has six categories: Performance appraisal under chapter 43, classification under chapter 51, pay rates and systems under chapter 53, labor-management relations under chapter 71, adverse actions under chapter 75, and appeals under chapter 77. The Nelson amendment would leave in four of those categories--performance appraisal, classification, pay rates and systems, and adverse actions--and would subject their implementation to review by the Federal Services Impasses Panel, seven appointees, all appointed by the President. It seems to me we could borrow the language from chapter 71 under labor-management relations, under a national security waiver, and provide flexibility which the President is seeking in the event that there is a national security issue. I believe it is very important we resolve this matter so we can move ahead with enactment of a homeland security bill. As I said last Thursday and repeated yesterday, I have not taken a position in favor either of the provisions of the Nelson amendment or of the provisions which are in the Gramm amendment. But I believe we are so close together these differences can be reconciled. I wonder if I might have the attention of the manager of the bill, the Senator from Connecticut. Will the Senator from Connecticut respond to a question? I ask unanimous consent I may ask a question of the Senator from Connecticut without losing my right to the floor.", u' There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Insert on page 59, line 21, of the Lieberman Amendment No. (c) Homeland Security Assessment.-- (1) establishment.--There is established in the Department the Homeland Security Assessment Center. (2) Head.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence shall be the head of the Center. (3) Responsibilities.--The responsibilities of the Center shall be as follows: (A) To assist the Directorate of Intelligence in discharging the responsibilities under subsection (b) of this section. (B) To provide intelligence and information analysis and support to other elements of the Department. (C) To perform such other duties as the Secretary shall provide. (4) Staff.-- (A) In general.--The Secretary shall provide the Center with a staff of analysts having appropriate expertise and experience to assist the Center in discharging the responsibilities under this section. (B) Private sector analysts.--Analysts under this subsection may include analysts from the private sector. (C) Security clearances.--Analysts under this subsection shall possess security clearances appropriate for their work under this section. (5) Cooperation within department.--The Secretary shall ensure that the Center cooperates closely with other officials of the Department having responsibility for infrastructure protection in order to provide the Secretary with a complete and comprehensive understanding of threats to homeland security and the actual or potential vulnerabilities of the United States in light of such threats. (6) Support.-- (A) In general.--The following elements of the Federal government shall provide personnel and resource support to the Center: (i) Other elements of the Department designated by the Secretary for that purpose. (ii) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (iii) Other elements of the intelligence community, as that term is defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (iv) Such other elements of the Federal Government as the President considers appropriate. (B) Memoranda of understanding.--The Secretary may enter into one or more memoranda of understanding with the head of an element referred to in paragraph (1) regarding the provision of support to the Center under that paragraph. (7) Detail of personnel.-- (A) In general.--In order to assist the Center in discharging the responsibilities under subsection (c), personnel of the agencies referred to in paragraph (2) may be detailed to the Department for the performance of analytic functions and related duties. (B) Covered agencies.--The agencies referred to in this paragraph are as follows: (i) The Department of State. (ii) The Central Intelligence Agency. (iii) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (iv) The National Security Agency. (v) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (6) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (7) Other elements of the intelligence community, as defined in this section. (8) Any other agency of the Federal Government that the Secretary considers appropriate. (C) Cooperative agreements.--Personnel shall be detailed under this subsection pursuant to cooperative agreement entered into for that purpose by the Secretary and the head of the agency concerned. (D) Basis.--The detail of personnel under this subsection may be on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis. (8) Study of placement within intelligence community.--Not later than 90 days after the effective date of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Government Reform and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report assessing the advisability of the following: (A) Placing the elements of the Center concerned with the analysis of foreign intelligence information within the intelligence community under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (B) Placing such elements within the National Foreign Intelligence Program for budgetary purposes.', u' There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: There is little debate that the era of globalization has brought increasingly diverse and complex challenges to U.S. national security. With these challenges comes a rapidly increasing need for a workforce with skills that address these needs, including professional expertise accompanied by the ability to communicate and understand the languages and cultures of key world regions: Russia and the former Soviet Union, China, the Arab world, Iran, Korea, Central Asia and key countries in Africa, Latin America and East Asia. Some 80 federal agencies and offices involved in areas related to U.S. national security rely increasingly on human resources with high levels of language competency and international knowledge and experience. Finding these resources and, in particular, finding candidates for employment as professionals in the U.S. Government, has proven increasingly difficult, and many agencies now report shortfalls in hiring, deficits in readiness, and adverse impacts on operations. Some important documentation of these needs and shortfalls can be found in September 2000 testimony provided to the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, chaired by Senator Thad Cochran. Since 1994, the National Security Education Program (NSEP) has funded outstanding U.S. students, both undergraduate and graduate students, to study those languages and cultures critical to U.S. national security and under-represented in U.S. study. NSEP award recipients make an important contribution to future U.S. national security by working in the federal government or in higher education. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative National Intelligence Council Department of Agriculture Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services Department of Commerce International Trade Administration: U.S. Foreign Commercial Service National Communications & Information Administration (NTIA): Office of International Affairs Department of Defense Defense Intelligence Agency National Security Agency Defense Threat Reduction Agency National Imagery and Mapping Agency Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Strategy and Threat Reduction Department of the Navy: International Programs Office Department of Energy Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Department of Health and Human Services: Office of International and Refugee Health Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Food and Drug Administration Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration INTERPOL Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Labor Office of International Economic Affairs. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence & Research Office of the Legal Adviser Under Secretary for Global Affairs: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau of Consular Affairs Foreign Service Institute Department of Transportation Office of Intelligence & Security U.S. Coast Guard: Office of the Commandant; and Intelligence Coordination Center Federal Aviation Administration: Asst Administrator for Policy Planning & Intl Affairs Federal Highway Administration: Office of International Programs Maritime Administration: Associate Administrator for Policy and Intl Trade Department of the Treasury U.S. Customs Service: Office of International Affairs International Revenue Service: Office of the Commissioner, International U.S. Secret Service Department of Veterans Affairs Assistant Secretary for Public & Intergovernmental Affairs: Intergovernmental & International Affairs U.S. Agency for International Development Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support & Research Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean Broadcasting Board of Governors International Broadcasting Bureau Export-Import Bank of the U.S. Policy Group Federal Communications Commission International Bureau Federal Reserve System International Finance Division International Trade Commission Office of Operations National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of Human Resources and Education Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of International Programs U.S. Postal Service International Business', u"Mr. Speaker, last month the security of the United States Congress' legislative web site, Thomas, was breached by individuals commonly known as computer ``hackers.'' Although little harm was done, the cyberattack illustrates the vulnerability of our nation's computer systems. The simple fact is, computer viruses have attacked business and government information systems, as well as personal home computers. To complicate matters even further, innocent individuals continue to be exploited when their web-based credit card and account information are used for illegal purposes. To combat cyberattacks, the Republican-led Congress is working diligently to explore ways to enhance computer security. Additionally, the Clinton administration has created a panel to review American cyberspace security. In fact, one of the experts selected to serve on the panel as an advisor to President Clinton is Dr. Bob Hoover, President of the University of Idaho. Mr. Speaker, it is a true honor to congratulate Bob today on such a well-deserved accomplishment. I must say, Bob is well qualified for this position, and I know he will represent the State of Idaho, and the nation very, very well. When Bob became the 15th president of the University of Idaho in July 1996, he brought with him 25 years of experience as teacher, researcher and administrator in higher education. His nearly four years of experience at the University of Idaho have seen a period of unparalleled accomplishment. Perhaps his greatest successes, however, have been in the areas of collaboration with various colleges and universities and with the private sector. In northern Idaho, for instance, Bob has been instrumental in the formation of the North Idaho Center for Higher Education, a partnership between the University of Idaho, North Idaho College, Lewis Clark State College, and Idaho State University. Additionally, he is working with the College of Southern Idaho, Idaho State University and Boise State University to expand and strengthen higher education. Even further, in southwestern Idaho he has worked with the University of Idaho Foundation to purchase land in Boise for the construction of a major facility that will allow the university to expand its efforts with Boise State University and Idaho State University. In addition to these efforts, Bob has developed and implemented the University of Idaho Strategic Plan to help guide the school in meeting new goals in teaching, research and outreach. Also, he has been instrumental in the creation of the Inland Northwest Research Alliance, which is now a partner with Bechtel B&W Idaho in the management of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. Without a doubt, Bob's efforts to develop research strength at the University of Idaho has elevated the institution to one of the leading centers of teaching and research, especially in the critical area of computer network security. In fact, in recognition of University of Idaho's expertise in this field, the National Security Agency has designated it as one of the seven national centers of excellence in information security. Just as important, though, I'm pleased to call Bob a friend, and I look forward to working with him in the future to enhance the quality of life in Idaho. Mr. Speaker, I know my colleagues will join me in honoring Dr. Bob Hoover for his long-standing commitment to the State of Idaho and the Nation.", u"Mr. Speaker, today I congratulate New Jersey State Assemblyman John E. Rooney on receiving the New Jersey Conference of Mayors' prestigious Legislator Award. Assemblyman Rooney is one of the most outstanding and respected members of our State Legislature. He is a trusted friend and advisor whose counsel I value greatly. This award recognizes the landmark work he has done in the New Jersey Assembly, particularly initiatives he has sponsored that have helped hold down municipal property taxes. Assemblyman Rooney's dedicated career in public service began in 1976, when he was elected councilman in his hometown of Northvale. In 1979 he became the borough's first Republican mayor in a quarter century--serving and subsequently brought about the first Republican majority on the Borough Council in more than a decade. He was elected to the State Assembly in 1983 and has been re-elected every two years since then. As an assemblyman, he has authored a number of landmark bills, including the legislation that established the Division of Developmental Disabilities and the law giving firefighters the right to know the location of toxic materials at industrial sites. He also sponsored the constitutional amendment eliminating expensive special elections, instead allowing county political committees to fill legislative vacancies. His work in challenging the state's authority over solid waste disposal has saved municipalities millions of dollars and, in turn, helped control property taxes. Born in Brooklyn, New York, Assemblyman Rooney first came to New Jersey to attend Rutgers University, where he graduated magna cum laude with a degree in business management. He also holds a master's degree in marketing from Rutgers, masters in political science and history from the University of Maryland, and a degree in language from Syracuse University. He served in the Air Force as a Russian linguist, where he won commendations from the National Security Agency for outstanding intelligence work. He has made his professional career as a sales executive in the electrical motor and control industry. Active in government, professional and civic organizations, Assemblyman Rooney has been a member of the New Jersey Conference of Mayors, the American Legion, Vietnam Veterans for America, Elks, the Water Pollution Control Federation and the American Management Association. He is a former chairman of the Northern Valley Community Development Program, a former president of the Northern Valley Mayors' Association, and a commissioner of the Bergen County Utilities Authority. Assemblyman Rooney and his wife, Martha, have two adult children, Beth and Patrick. His family has always been supportive, and made it possible for Assemblyman Rooney to serve in this distinguished way. I ask my colleagues in the House of Representatives to join me in congratulating this outstanding public servant, who has helped improve the lives not only of his hometown as Councilman and Mayor but the entire State of New Jersey as a leading legislator. He most certainly has made his community and the State of New Jersey a better place to work, own a home and raise a family.", u"Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), for his accommodation. Let me join my colleagues in wishing Mr. Newcomb well in his future endeavors. Mr. Chairman, this is a good bill. It is a bipartisan bill. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), and the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), have achieved an exceptional level of cooperation in the work of the committee. The bill provides the resources to ensure that the President, the National Security Council, cabinet secretaries and our military forces get the intelligence they need to protect our national security. This bill seeks to redress some of the important problems revealed by the campaign in Kosovo, especially in the area of airborne reconnaissance. These actions include investments beyond those in the President's budget request for the Department of Defense tactical intelligence programs. In all cases, these recommendations were coordinated with the Committee on Armed Services. Our bill in this area reflects the views of the Committee on Armed Services and vice versa. The bill also recommends actions in a number of critical areas in the so-called national intelligence budget. One of these areas is the exploitation of imagery taken from satellites and aircraft, an issue of great concern to the committee for several years. It is clear to all that our ability to exploit is going to fall far behind our capacity to collect, and this is unacceptable. The administration has taken a very positive first step by asking and planning for more funds in this and subsequent budgets, but the amounts remain well short of requirements. The committee added substantial funds to enable the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to begin a major upgrade of its information management capabilities, the necessity for which was specifically emphasized in the Department of Defense Kosovo lessons learned study. Another important problem area concerns the National Security Agency. The telecommunications and information technology industry appears as a whirlwind with NSA, at the moment, trailing in its wake. NSA's new director, General Hayden, is a committed reformer who deserves our support. He has asked the committee to help him by closing down some of the ongoing activities and shifting resources to solving the future problems. The committee has tried to do that in a responsible manner. This bill would give NSA substantially larger resources for modernization. At the same time, the bill would require NSA to expend more time and energy to ensure that its plans are sound. Similarly, we think it is prudent to ensure that the executive branch apply systematic oversight of NSA's complex and expensive modernization program. I am particularly concerned about the impact of launch failures on our intelligence activities. The committee has examined current arrangements by which the Air Force and the NRO procure launch vehicles and manage launch vehicle contracts. The committee proposed that the NRO, in the future, manage its own procurements. It is my hope that this measure will improve accountability and launch reliability, while preserving the very positive partnership between the NRO and the Air Force. Mr. Chairman, this bill would accomplish much and I certainly urge my colleagues to support it.", u"Mr. Chairman, I rise also in very strong support of H.R. 4392, which is the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) are to be commended for the outstanding leadership they have provided for the intelligence community during these difficult times. In a strong decisive and bipartisan sense, they have, I think, been wonderful leaders and supported by a staff which exhibits the exact same characteristics, and those who also serve on it also appreciate it. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, I understand the critical need to invest in and modernize our technical intelligence and intelligence-related systems. Unfortunately, investment in our infrastructure has declined over the years, and we have reached the point where the strains are showing through. Over the past year, news headlines have told us the story over and over again, reminding us of the grave consequences of reduced funding to our intelligence capabilities. Here are a few that made it into the press: Outdated databases at the Defense Intelligence Agency led to the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy; major computer systems failures at the National Security Agency; and outdated systems at the National Imagery and Mapping Agency reduced the levels of support to key consumers of intelligence. These events are stark indications of the condition of the community's basic infrastructure and testimony to the need for revitalization. This year's Authorization Act begins to address these substantial problems, but we understand providing the country with the capabilities it deserves and needs will take years and will require continued and unwavering support from Congress. Simply fixing today's headline problems of outdated and broken systems does not position our Nation well to manage the diverse challenges of the future. Our President must have sufficient capabilities and tools to support his policies to enable strong leadership and proactive diplomacy and to assure our military maintains a significant advantage over its adversaries, if, and when, needed. In order to continue to provide this country the intelligence required, the intelligence community must modernize its infrastructure, and this year's Authorization Act appropriately supports several community initiatives to address this very important issue. I am also pleased that we have incorporated a provision into this year's act to address an ongoing concern within the National Reconnaissance Office and their launch program. This was the outcome of a number of hearings and briefings in my subcommittee. Specifically, the NRO has a long history of overestimating the costs of launches. Our committee has been challenged to bring about appropriate discipline in this process in the past because of the confusing morass of contracts and relationships used by the NRO. A recently completed NRO Inspectors General report confirmed and intensified our concerns. This provision will improve our ability to hold the NRO accountable for their activities and lead to significant savings for the government and American people. Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 is a responsible, reasonable and appropriate request to fund our Nation's national security needs. Our President, our policymakers, our military and the People of the United States deserve nothing less, and I ask the Members of the House to give it their full support.", u"Mr. Chairman, as a member of both the Budget and Intelligence committees, I have been especially sensitive to what we call top line issues--how much money is available overall, and whether it is generally adequate. Pressures to keep down the allocations for defense have also had an adverse ``trickle down'' effect on intelligence, since intelligence is funded within the defense top line. For the last decade, intelligence lost a large part of its buying power, after absorbing reductions both indirectly from inflation and directly from budget resolutions. In this regard, we recently suffered several particularly bad years. The administration's request this year increased somewhat, providing partial relief from the decline. Striving to remain within established financial boundaries, the committee gave the national intelligence agencies only slightly more than the request. The service portion of the budget, where we share jurisdiction with Armed Services, enjoyed greater increases. This willingness to sacrifice a share of the hard-pressed military budget acknowledges the heavy service dependence on tactical intelligence, and the need to improve it. The situation among the national agencies is also problematic. Most of them have been squeezed for a decade and are showing the effects. Personnel numbers have been reduced significantly, but even if reductions continue, it is a struggle to keep personnel costs at the same budget percentage, because the costs per individual are climbing steeply. Personnel are used mainly to process and report the large amounts of collected information; but there are many fewer available to do this, even as much more data pours in from sensors that must become increasingly sophisticated in order to keep up with the targets. As a result, this ``downstream'' part of the business, and our overall efficiency, are suffering greatly. Among the major intelligence agencies, the National Security Agency is particularly hard pressed, since targets and their communications, radar and telemetry technology have been changing at a dramatic pace. NSA requires nearly complete re-tooling to catch up and keep up, but this costs a lot of money. NSA's budget has been in steady decline. On the imagery side, the struggle to pay for exploitation and dissemination of the large volume of imagery required especially by military customers is pretty well know. This is another ``downstream'' problem exacerbated by declining numbers of human photo-interpreters. Five years ago, the House Intelligence Committee warned the administration that we must find a way to make our satellite collectors much less expensive, or the NRO would take a growing portion of the declining intelligence budget, and we be unable to use effectively what they collect. We lost that budget battle. However, it is now clear that our predictions were accurate. And the situation is getting even worse because of cost overruns in NRO programs. We realize that everyone wants a ``peace dividend'' that shifts money from national security programs to domestic priorities. We want one ourselves. However, the breakup of empires historically is accompanied by regional confusion and conflict such as we witness today. Continued U.S. involvement in regional stabilization efforts comes at a price, often a high price. In addition, the breadth and unacceptability of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, proliferation and other cross-border challenges present unique challenges at this particular time. We are striving to make the Intelligence Community more efficient. We have done this within agencies and are suggesting a few precedent-shattering initiatives that cross agency boundaries, in both the communications and analyst areas. But there is only so much we can do, especially within the patchwork of compromises that makes up the congressional process. In several important areas, we are in trouble.", u'Mr. President, today is National POW/MIA Recognition Day. As a Nation we remember and honor all those who were prisoners of war and those who are still MIA. It is altogether fitting that they have this special day where we express gratitude for their service, for their sacrifices, and for the sacrifices of their families. We also take this day to assure the many families who still await the return of a loved one that we have not forgotten. As a former Navy officer, I feel strongly that the United States Government must fulfill its commitments to the men and women who serve in the armed forces. One of these commitments is using every available means to ensure the return of POWs and MIAs at the end of hostilities. We must continue to support the vigorous pursuit of this commitment through on-site investigations being undertaken in Indochina and through a fuller examination of records in the United States, Russia and Asia. I would like us to renew our promise to the families and to the Nation to tirelessly fight for the fullest possible disclosure of information about the many Americans missing or unaccounted for from World War I, World War II, the Korean War, in Southeast Asia, and from the Cold War. As we renew that promise, we can also count some accomplishments. In the past year, the remains of 49 Americans were returned from the war in Southeast Asia; however, 2005 Americans remain unaccounted for from that war--1,511 in Vietnam alone. All year, veterans in Indiana and around the country have been holding commemorative events marking the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. This year has also seen progress in negotiations with the North Korean Government. In June, we witnessed a historic summit between North and South Korea, which could lead to further breakthroughs. Within the past three months, joint United States-North Korean remains recovery operations have returned the remains of 28 Americans. Since 1996, teams from the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii have conducted 15 such operations and recovered remains believed to be 68 soldiers. Though many of these MIA files were dormant for years because we had no diplomatic ties with the North Koreans, advances in DNA identification procedures create the hope that all of these remains will be identified. This is a team effort and requires the firm commitments of the Congress, the Administration, the Departments of Defense and State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Agency. I am hopeful that all of us, through continued humanitarian support and dedicated diplomatic endeavors, will gain further information about the servicemen still missing to honor their sacrifice and provide peace of mind to their loved ones.', u"Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. I want to thank the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Dixon), the ranking member, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman, for the outstanding work that they have done and also the work of the staff which is so invaluable in helping us to come up with this work product. Mr. Speaker, months ago, during the debate on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's reported authorization bill, I highlighted several very positive features of the bill and applauded the bipartisanship and the excellent cooperation in the work of the committee under the leadership of the chairman and the ranking member. I am pleased to note that this conference report sustains the important initiatives and actions recommended in the House bill. This outcome, too, is testament to the sound judgment and hard work of the committee leadership and, indeed, of all my colleagues on the committee. During our meetings with the Senate, and our discussions with the administration, concern arose over a House proposal to require the National Reconnaissance Office to contract separately from the Air Force for the large rockets that carry our reconnaissance satellites into orbit. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence adopted this proposal after substantial investigations and hearings following the disturbing and costly string of launch failures and after several years of unjustified volatility in the NRO's launch budget. The Subcommittee on Tactical and Technical Intelligence, on which I serve as ranking member, concluded that there would be greater accountability and sounder fiscal management if the NRO were assigned clearer responsibility for this aspect of its overall mission. At the same time, I appreciate the concerns that this step could contribute to deterioration of the partnership between the Air Force and the NRO in managing U.S. national security space launch programs. In this regard, I would cite the clear guidance in the statement of managers that we expect the NRO and the Air Force to continue working closely together, including negotiating contracts with industry together to ensure favorable prices. I would add also that I expect the NRO's contract awards to provide appropriate support to DoD's policy of maintaining a competitive space launch industrial base. The NRO and the Air Force are of course subject to higher management authority, and the NRO director himself an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. I would expect that DoD management could check any harmful centrifugal forces in the NRO-Air Force relationship. Mr. Speaker, I will conclude by applauding the vigorous steps contained in the conference report to overcome serious management and resource problems at the National Security Agency and to improve the ability of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to exploit and distribute imagery collected by satellites and aircraft. These agencies and their respective missions remain absolutely critical to diplomacy and military preparedness. I think it is a great conference report. I think we are moving forward. I urge my colleagues and the House to adopt it. I think the committee has done a good job, and we have served our colleagues and the country well.", u"The bill (S. 1668) was passed, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Encouragement.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall take appropriate actions to inform the employees of the covered agencies, and employees of contractors carrying out activities under classified contracts with covered agencies, that-- (A) except as provided in paragraph (4), the disclosure of information described in paragraph (2) to the individuals referred to in paragraph (3) is not prohibited by law, executive order, or regulation or otherwise contrary to public policy; (B) the individuals referred to in paragraph (3) are presumed to have a need to know and to be authorized to receive such information; and (C) the individuals referred to in paragraph (3) may receive information so disclosed only in their capacity as members of the committees concerned. (2) Covered information.--Paragraph (1) applies to information, including classified information, that an employee reasonably believes to provide direct and specific evidence of-- (A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; (B) a false statement to Congress on an issue of material fact; or (C) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, a flagrant abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. (3) Covered individuals.--The individuals to whom information described in paragraph (2) may be disclosed are the members of a committee of Congress having as its primary responsibility the oversight of a department, agency, or element of the Federal Government to which such information relates. (4) Scope.--Paragraph (1)(A) does not apply to information otherwise described in paragraph (2) if the disclosure of the information is prohibited by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the actions taken under subsection (a). (c) Construction With Other Reporting Requirements.-- Nothing in this section may be construed to modify, alter, or otherwise affect any reporting requirement relating to intelligence activities that arises under the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) or any other provision of law. (d) Covered Agencies Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered agencies'' means the following: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (3) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (6) Any other Executive agency, or element or unit thereof, determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal function the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of a bill I am introducing today. It is quite simple in that it would require the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to jointly prepare an annual report on the intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China--and most specifically, those which are directed against or affect the interests of the United States. Some of the news reports on the fundraising scandal suggest that the People's Republic of China has apparently decided to take a more aggressive approach toward influencing American politics. This is occurring at all levels of our political system through the use of legitimate means such as lobbying as well as covert influence operations. At the same time, the Chinese are also relying heavily on the success of their economic espionage efforts to make their economy more competitive with ours. We also have concerns, that I think most Americans share, with the increasing buildup of the Chinese military operations and capabilities, and the potential that that poses a threat to our national security interests in the Pacific rim region. A China specialist at the Department of Defense, summarized the growing threat posed by China's intelligence agencies by saying: The Ministry of State Security is an aggressive intelligence service which is coming of age in the international arena. The combination of a relatively stagnant economy and an increasingly competitive global economic environment will force China to rely more heavily on the illegal acquisition of high technology modernization--Arms production and sales are increasingly being used to gain hard currency and expand global political influence. The MSS will be required to produce intelligence to support this assertive role in the global, commercial and political environments--Western democracies such as the U.S. must adjust the focus of their clandestine intelligence and counter-intelligence operations if they are to meet the MSS's forward posture effectively. The annual report would document significant developments involving China's Ministry of State Security, the Military Intelligence Department of the People's Liberation Army, and other Chinese intelligence entities operating against the United States. The report is specifically intended to cover trends in the following areas: first, political, military, and economic espionage by Chinese intelligence services; second, intelligence activities designed to gain political influence, including activities undertaken or coordinated by the United Front Works Department of the Chinese Communist Party; third, efforts to gain direct or indirect influence through commercial or noncommercial intermediaries subject to control by the People's Republic of China, including enterprises controlled by the People's Liberation Army; and fourth, disinformation and press manipulation by the Government of the People's Republic of China against the United States. Various agencies from the intelligence and law enforcement communities will be tasked to provide input on Chinese intelligence activities within the United States and elsewhere. Some of the agencies being asked to contribute to the annual report will include the following: Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury. The classified version of the annual report will be provided to both the House and Senate. An unclassified version will be prepared so that the American public can be provided with a general summary of the nature of the Chinese intelligence threat to the United States. Mr. Speaker, this bill is very crucial yet very simple. It is not one that requires anything more than a gathering of information for us, but I think it is critical information for us. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.", u"Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. I appreciate the opportunity to speak briefly on this subject. Mr. Speaker, I recognize that the gentleman has already, together with the chairman, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Sensenbrenner], laid out the basic content of the legislation, and I hope I do not duplicate what he has said unnecessarily. I am, of course, in support of H.R. 1903, the Computer Security Enhancement Act of 1997. This bill will increase the protection of electronic information in Federal computer systems, and moreover, will help to stimulate the development of computer hardware and software technologies by American companies. The bill was developed as a collaborative initiative by majority and minority members of the Committee on Science, and I applaud the efforts of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Sensenbrenner], the chairman, in moving the bill expeditiously through the committee and bringing it to the floor as he has on so many other bills before our committee. I would also like to acknowledge the valuable contribution of the gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. Morella], the chair of the Subcommittee on Technology, and the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Gordon], the ranking Democratic member of the subcommittee, who I am sure all of my colleagues recognize actually do the difficult work of developing the language in legislation of this sort and making whatever necessary compromises have to be made. I of course will defer to their judgment as to what needs to be in a bill of this sort. A decade ago the Committee on Science was instrumental in the passage of a measure that gave the National Institute of Standards and Technology the responsibility for the protection of unclassified information in Federal computer systems. Specifically, the Computer Security Act of 1987 charged NIST to develop appropriate technical standards and administrative guidelines as well as guidelines for training Federal employees in security practices. We were just beginning to recognize at that time the importance of these new technology communication initiatives which are becoming such an important part of our lives today. Overall, NIST has received somewhat mixed reviews on its performance in carrying out its responsibilities under the 1987 statute. The agency has been criticized for allowing the National Security Agency to exercise too much influence on the development of standards for unclassified Federal computer systems and for developing standards that were inconsistent with emerging market standards. We in California, of course, are very much concerned with the role we play in global commerce in systems of this sort because such a large part of new developments in this area occur in California and it has become a large part of our economy. Also, according to NIST's external advisory committee, the agency ought to devote greater resources and effort to providing advice and assistance to Federal agencies in order to help them to satisfy their information security needs. H.R. 1903 seeks to elevate NIST's commitment to meeting its responsibilities under the Computer Security Act. It also reinforces the policy established by the 1987 act that NIST has the primary responsibility for the protection of unclassified Federal computer systems and networks. Mr. Speaker, I want to emphasize two important themes of the bill. First, it seeks to expand the use of validated commercially available cryptography technologies by Federal agencies, which will in turn stimulate the U.S. market for computer security products; and, second, the bill puts in place mechanisms to ensure greater public participation in the development of computer security standards and guidelines for Federal systems. The threats to electronic information are much greater than when the Computer Security Act was passed in the House in 1987. H.R. 1903 is an important step toward addressing this vulnerability. Mr. Speaker, I commend H.R. 1903 to my colleagues for their approval and encourage their support for its passage in the House.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to invite Members to join me in honoring the career of Virginia B. Harter, Assistant Commissioner, Debt Management Services, Financial Management Service, Department of the Treasury. Mrs. Harter retires from the Senior Executive Service effective October 31, 1997, after nearly 40 years of employment in the Federal service. Mrs. Harter's career consistently exceeded the high standards for superior performance and is a credit to the Financial Management Service and the Department of the Treasury. Mrs. Harter began her career as a civil servant in 1957 with the National Security Agency. After joining the Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service in 1959, Mrs. Harter rose through the ranks while serving in numerous important management positions. Between 1979 and 1981, Mrs. Harter served as the program manager for the design and development of the Treasury's Direct Deposit/Electronic Funds Transfer Program. As a result of this program, 53 percent of the 840 million Treasury disbursements were made electronically in 1996, saving taxpayers $169 million. Mrs. Harter also served as the Director of the Governmentwide Cash Management Program and Director of the Credit Management/Debt Collection programs at the Financial Management Service. In 1989, Virginia B. Harter was appointed to the position of the Chief Disbursing Officer for the Federal Government. In that capacity, Mrs. Harter joined the Senior Executive Service where she was responsible for directing the issuance of more than 800 million payments valued at over $1.7 trillion annually. Mrs. Harter remained in this position until 1994 when she was appointed to the position of Deputy Associate Commissioner for Reengineering where she led the research and the development of the conceptual design for the world-class government-wide payments process for the future. Mrs. Harter earned the 1995 Presidential Award of Meritorious Executive for the Senior Executive Service for her outstanding contributions in building sound financial management programs government-wide and particularly, for her leadership in creating programs to share financial and technical assistance to the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. In 1996, Virginia Harter was appointed Assistant Commissioner for Debt Management Services at the Financial Management Service. This placed her in the forefront of the Federal Government's effort to recover over $51 billion in non-tax delinquencies owed to the Government. She provided vital leadership in the management and expansion of government-wide debt collection efforts as required by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996. This included services for all Federal agencies and State governments, such as administrative offset, the Treasury Offset Program, and cross-servicing and collection of delinquent debt. Virginia Harter's exceptional knowledge and expertise in implementing the Governmentwide Debt Management Program will be sorely missed by Members of Congress who remain determined to relieve future generations from suffocating Federal budget deficits. I invite my colleagues to join me in saluting a job well done, and in wishing Mrs. Harter an enjoyable and satisfying retirement.", u"President's Periodic Report on the National Emergency Caused by the 1. On August 19, 1994, in Executive Order No. 12924, I declared a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States caused by the lapse of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) and the system of controls maintained under that Act. In that order, I continued in effect, to the extent permitted by law, the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), as amended, the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR 768 et seq.), and the delegations of authority set forth in Executive Order No. 12002 of July 7, 1977 (as amended by Executive Order No. 12755 of March 12, 1991), Executive Order No. 12214 of May 2, 1980, Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990 (subsequently revoked by Executive Order No. 12938 of November 14, 1994), and Executive Order No. 12851 of June 11, 1993. As required by the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I issued a notice on August 15, 1995, continuing the emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12924. 2. I issued Executive Order No. 12924 pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including, but not limited to, the IEEPA. At that time, I also submitted a report to the Congress pursuant to section 204(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)). Section 204 of IEEPA requires follow-up reports, with respect to actions or changes, to be submitted every 6 months. Additionally, section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) requires that the President, within 90 days after the end of each 6-month period following a declaration of a national emergency, report to the Congress on the total expenditures directly attributable to that declaration. To comply with these requirements, I have submitted combined activities and expenditures reports for the 6-month periods from August 19, 1994, to February 19, 1995, and from February 19, 1995, to August 19, 1995. The following report covers the 6-month period from August 19, 1995, to February 19, 1996. 3. Since the issuance of Executive Order No. 12924, the Department of Commerce has continued to administer and enforce the system of export controls, including antiboycott provisions, contained in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). In administering these controls, the Department has acted under a policy of conforming actions under Executive Order No. 12924 to those required under the Export Administration Act, insofar as appropriate. 4. Since my last report to the Congress, there have been several significant developments in the area of export controls: In late 1994, the National Security Advisor directed that an interagency study be prepared to assess the current and future international market for software products containing encryption (PRD/NSC-48). The directive was in response to industry claims that U.S. export controls on certain powerful encryption technologies were providing no benefit to national security, and were hampering the software industry's ability to compete in the global marketplace. On January 11, the Department of Commerce announced the public release of the study, jointly prepared by BXA and the National Security Agency. The study provides an in-depth evaluation of the international market, reviews the availability of foreign encryption software, and assesses the impact that U.S. export controls for encryption have had on the competitiveness of the software industry. The study found that the U.S. software industry still dominates world markets, but the existence of strong export controls, both in the United States and other major countries, is slowing the growth of the international market.", u"Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to endorse the nomination of Mr. Keith R. Hall to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space. I have known Mr. Hall since 1983, when I was first appointed to serve on the Senate Intelligence Committee. I came to know Mr. Hall particularly well during the period from 1987 to 1990, when I served as the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. During that period, the chairman and I relied heavily on Mr. Hall for assessments of the arcane programmatics surrounding the President's budget submissions for the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. Throughout this period, Mr. Hall demonstrated exceptional knowledge and expertise, unflagging energy and integrity, and a truly nonpartisan spirit of cooperation with myself and other members of the minority party on the committee. In 1991, Mr. Hall left the Intelligence Committee to become the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. By all accounts, he served very ably in that position, instituting new procedures to try and eliminate potentially wasteful duplication between national and tactical intelligence programs. From May 1995, until February of this year, Mr. Hall served as the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs. In that position, Mr. Hall was directly responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence for developing the President's National Foreign Intelligence Program. I think it came as no surprise to anyone that Secretary Deutch brought Mr. Hall with him from the Defense Department when he became Director of Central Intelligence. As my colleagues are aware, the National Reconnaissance Office has been the target of substantial controversy in recent years as a result of the costs associated with its new headquarters as well as the accumulation of a vast excess of carry-forward funds that accumulated in various accounts in recent years. Inevitably, these controversies have damaged the morale of the organization, notwithstanding the numerous spectacular achievements of the NRO. There is no doubt in my mind that Mr. Hall will be forthright in all of his dealings with Congress; that he will ensure there is no repetition of such controversies; and that he will be able to maintain and effectively manage the careful cooperation between the Intelligence Community and Defense Department that is necessary for the effective operation of the National Reconnaissance Office. Mr. Hall has earned the confidence of officials at all levels of the administration and he certainly earned my confidence during his able service on the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee. He is an outstanding individual and I urge my colleagues to support his nomination. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of Mr. Hall's complete resume be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) for yielding me this time. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1555, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. I would note, first of all, that this legislation was approved unanimously in the committee, a reflection of the efforts of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman, and ranking Democrat member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), to produce a bipartisan bill. This year I became the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, and in plain language this subcommittee is responsible for oversight of the ways in which intelligence is collected using machines like satellites and airplanes, rather than human beings. The subcommittee is also responsible for intelligence systems and activities that support our military forces tactically. These systems are critically important for virtually all of the intelligence community's missions, from combatting terrorism and narcotics trafficking to supporting our troops in combat in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf. This bill is very consistent with the request submitted by the President. In several areas, the committee recommends modest increases in the amount requested by the President. In general, I am very supportive of these decisions. For example, this bill adds funds to help the National Security Agency reshape itself to keep pace with the incredible growth in the size and complexity of the global telecommunications network. The committee is concerned that NSA needs some organizational and management reforms as well as some engineering expertise from industry to sustain its remarkable record in defense of the Nation. The committee also recommends additional funding in selected areas of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, or NIMA. NIMA faces a very large shortfall in its capacity to exploit the volume of imagery that we will be able to collect in the near future for intelligence needs and for mapmaking. The committee has recommended increased funds for NIMA to begin this expansion and to increase its productivity. The committee has also recommended funds for additional procurement of pictures and products from the commercial sector. On the debit side, the committee recommends a relatively modest reduction in the budget for the National Reconnaissance Office, or NRO, which builds, launches and operates the Nation's intelligence satellites. Included in the committee's recommended actions is a proposal to defer a decision until conference with the Senate on whether to continue production of an NRO satellite or to initiate a new design. I believe that this proposal was a reasonable compromise, and I appreciate the chairman's willingness to accommodate the concerns of Democrats on it. The committee bill also contains recommendations for increases in several important tactical intelligence missions and systems, including the RC-135 signals intelligence aircraft, the Predator and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles, and tactical antisubmarine warfare programs. Since the committee marked up this bill, there have been three successive satellite launch failures to go along with another three suffered just since last August. The Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence held its first briefing yesterday on this very disturbing string of failures, and the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), the chairman of the subcommittee, along with the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) have pledged to continue the subcommittee's examination of this potentially serious problem over the coming months. Mr. Chairman, this bill would provide the funds that are needed to sustain our efforts to combat terrorism, narcotics trafficking and weapons proliferation and to support our military forces. It is a responsible and prudent measure, and I am pleased to support this bill, and I urge my colleagues across the aisle, on both sides of the aisle, to support it as well.", u'Mr. President, Friday, September 17th was National POW/MIA Recognition Day. On this day, we remember, give tribute to, and stand in solidarity with the loved ones and families of the thousands of Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and Airmen who became Prisoners of War and Missing in Action. These Americans swore an oath to support and defend the Constitution and carried that promise through to great sacrifice for their nation. While thousands died, many others endured years in starved, tortured, isolated misery before regaining their freedom. Their perseverance, integrity and heroism are shining examples of the core values on which this nation was founded and became great. As a former Navy officer, I feel strongly that the United States Government must fulfill its commitments to the men and women who serve in the Armed Forces. One of these commitments is ensuring the return of POWs and MIAs at the end of hostilities. The vigorous pursuit of this commitment must continue through on-site investigations being undertaken in Indochina and through a fuller examination of records in the United States, Russia, and Southeast Asia. Through much diligence and hard work, and gradually improving relations with various nations since 1973, 529 American servicemen, formerly listed as unaccounted-for, have been recovered, identified and returned to their families. However, 2054 Americans remain unaccounted-for from the war in Southeast Asia, with 1,530 in Vietnam. We have focused, and rightly so, many of our efforts on Southeast Asia, but we must also honor those who were held prisoner and who are missing in action in other remote parts of the globe. More than 80,000 Americans remain missing and unaccounted for from World War I, World War II and the Korean conflict, and countless others from the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, I have visited Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union on several occasions. During meetings with high level Russian government personnel and members of the Russian military. I have made it clear that Russian cooperation in these areas is a necessity. I am hopeful that American efforts will lead to information and/or evidence of the fates of U.S. servicemen still missing from conflicts during the Cold War. I likewise encourage my colleagues who interact with officials of Laos, Cambodia, Korea, Vietnam and others to press for the same commitment from those officials. Headway is being made, but there is still a long way to go before we have the fullest possible accounting of all POW/MIA personnel. Our great and free Nation owes eternal gratitude to all POW/MIAs and their families for their supreme sacrifice, but we in the Senate shall not rest until all are accounted for. I urge you the administration, the Departments of Defense and State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Agency to redouble our efforts. ', u"Mr. President, I rise today to express my appreciation for the hard work of Julie Roling, a Brookings Institution Fellow who has worked as part of my staff for the past six months. Julie has been a tremendous asset to my legislative staff, and I am fortunate to have had her assistance. When she returns to the National Security Agency in December, I know she will be missed by me and my staff. Very often, Brookings Fellows have reputations that precede them in Capitol Hill offices. Known as some of the best and brightest government employees, they are considered secret weapons to the Members they assist. Julie has been no exception. She came to my office with a wealth of government experience and policy knowledge, as well as a model work ethic and positive attitude. While her expertise lies in defense procurement, Julie welcomed projects in a broad array of new issue areas and contributed a great deal to my legislative staff. Throughout the past six months, Julie has worked on a number of projects dealing with the environment, natural resources, agriculture and trade. Julie led research efforts regarding a controversial wetlands policy during her time in my office. The unfortunate circumstances surrounding this issue pitted the interests of agricultural producers against environmental groups. It was imperative that my staff and I have access to the most recent information, in order to effectively address the concerns of my constituents. Julie's research provided my office with up-to-date and unbiased information that enabled me to communicate clearly with both farmers and environmentalists during this time. Julie handled frequent communication with government agencies and almost daily communications with South Dakotans. Julie also provided valuable assistance on crop insurance legislation this year as well. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate introduced numerous bills to reform the crop insurance program in this Congress, an issue of great importance to the farmers of South Dakota. Julie collected and synthesized information that enabled me and my staff to decide which crop insurance reform bills most effectively addressed the concerns of South Dakota farmers. One of the most challenging tasks Julie undertook was the creation of a comprehensive resource guide regarding restructuring of the electricity industry. The end result of Julie's work was a thorough index of restructuring terms, industry positions, key issues and legislative proposals. Anyone who is familiar with the complexity of deregulation proposals can appreciate the hard work and attention to detail required to create such a resource, which will be invaluable to me as the Senate Energy Committee continues to discuss and evaluate restructuring legislation. Again, I wish to express my deep gratitude to Julie for a job well done. I wish her the very best in her future endeavors. ", u"I want to join with my colleague, first of all, to wish the President well and to work together in a bipartisan manner to put Americans back to work, put them to work now, and keep them working. I am supportive of the Intelligence authorization bill for a number of reasons dealing with the issue of investing in new positions to select high priority needs as FBI surveillance, so increasing the personnel. I'm concerned about the cuts in personnel. The language is very appropriate. In these days, as we celebrate 9/11, I'm concerned about what is appropriate. I'm also interested in moving forward on diversity. We should ensure that our intelligence community reflects the diversity of America, from African Americans to Asians, Latinos, Muslims, people speaking different languages, to be more effective to protect this country. The DNI is going to conduct a review to determine the security implications of moving intelligence systems. I think that is important. I think it is important, as well, to collect information about drug trafficking. And I certainly think it's important to again, as I said, talk about the question of the work force. I am concerned about the requests that I understand may be in the bill on information about Guantanamo Bay detainees, information that could undermine our security. And I am questioning the value of making the Director of the National Security Agency, a Senate conferee, to juxtapose that person in the midst of controversial politics. But I am glad, and I thank Mr. Polis for his leadership on charter schools. I'm proud to say that I've been to the Victory Charter School in Texas, in Houston, the Harmony Charter School, the KIPP Charter School, the Yes Charter School, and a school district, a public system that I am working with, and I love public schools, I am a product of public schools. The North Forest Independent School District, it's finding its way to embrace and coalesce with charter schools. What is the call for that? It is the education of our children with the most important level of education ever, excellence. It is for our children to pass tests, but it is for our children to think and to create and to invent. And I think we can work with charter schools, in particular, who are focusing on science, technology, engineering, and math where there are young people who are actually doing medical center level research, cures by middle schoolers and high schoolers. So I hope that we will deal with the Intelligence bill. I associate myself with the gentleman from Massachusetts. I'm concerned about the human rights violations in Colombia, the monies that may be going to the DAS, and the killing of trade unionists. It's all right to be a neighbor, but it is horrible to take intelligence funds and be part of the killing of trade unionists.", u"Madam Chair, I rise today in favor of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2012, and I yield myself such time as I may consume. When Chairman Rogers and I took over leadership of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we made a commitment to getting back into the practice of passing intelligence budgets. We made a commitment to the men and women of the intelligence community to do what is right--to give our intelligence professionals the resources, capabilities, and authorities they need to keep us safe. We on the Intelligence Committee have a responsibility to provide effective oversight; to help build up the community, not to tear it down; to hold the community accountable for performance while upholding the Constitution and protecting civil liberties. This is even more important today as we approach the 10th anniversary of 9/11, where close to 3,000 innocent Americans lost their lives. The bill makes smart choices by trimming where possible, eliminating duplicative efforts, and ensuring we do not affect the current critical capabilities that protect our Nation now and in the future. The bill aligns our resources with our current threats in a fiscally responsible manner. After the debt debate this last summer, our committee trimmed our budget even further to keep its costs in check. The bill curbs personal growth when appropriate, never affecting the core mission. It invests in new positions for select high-priority needs, such as FBI surveillance officers to keep watch on terrorists, NSA cyber professionals to protect computers from malicious intrusions, and Treasury financial analysts to unravel terrorist plots. We found major savings in operating costs, pushed down the price of programs through intense oversight, required acquisitions to come in on budget and on schedule, and invested in research and technology to keep our competitive edge. We fully funded the President's major satellite program as well as commercial imagery to ensure our intelligence professionals, the warfighters and our allies have the information they need on the front lines around the world. Right now, this bill includes two controversial provisions relating to Guantanamo Bay detainees and another making the Director of the National Security Agency a Senate-confirmed position. These provisions garnered a veto threat from the White House. Chairman Rogers and I worked together to come up with a solution. Today's manager's amendment withdraws the Gitmo and the NSA Director provisions. I encourage all Members to vote in favor of the manager's amendment. If these provisions can be successfully eliminated, I will support this bill and look forward to seeing it become law. This bill will make great investments in space, cyber, and the warfighter. Republicans and Democrats have worked together with our Senate counterparts to make this a good bipartisan bill. Intelligence is clearly the best defense against terrorism. This is even more important as we approach the 10-year anniversary of the September 11 attacks. If this bill is signed into law, it will be the third time in 3 years that the Intelligence Committee passed an Intel authorization act. For the 5 years before that, we did not have an Intelligence bill. With this bill, we are giving the intelligence community guidance and critical direction. We are doing our job. With the passage of the manager's amendment, I believe this is a good bipartisan bill that makes important decisions to protect our families and communities. I urge my colleagues to support it. I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Madam Chair, I rise in support of H.R. 1892, The 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act and to congratulate Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for their close collaboration on the bill and for their willingness to work together to shape a bi-partisan measure. This legislation demonstrates the Intelligence Committee's continued commitment to honoring the sacrifices and dedication of the public servants who comprise the Nation's intelligence community. Sunday marks the 10th anniversary of the attacks of September 11th, 2001. Today this body will consider two pieces of legislation directly relevant to that event. H. Res. 391, which expresses the sense of the House regarding the anniversary of the attacks and H.R. 1892. H.R. 1892, the FY12 Intelligence Authorization Act, authorizes about $80 billion in funding for the 17 agencies that oversee and conduct the nation's intelligence and intelligence-related activities including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the CIA, and the National Security Agency, as well as intelligence activities of the Defense Department, FBI, State Department, Homeland Security Department, and other agencies. The Intelligence Committee has written the bill with enhanced oversight and accountability features to better protect the American taxpayer's investment in national security and to prevent the wasting of resources. In that regard, the bill cuts one billion dollars from the intelligence budget without sacrificing the Nation's security by merging services and finding other savings. The bill is fiscally responsible and preserves national security. I support both H. Res. 391 and H.R. 1892 and encourage my colleagues to do the same. The intelligence apparatus of the country has evolved and improved since the tragic events of September 11th and now collaborates on data collection and analysis in a way that it did not ten years ago. The culture of our intelligence community now has a more open and inclusive attitude across all platforms from the highest levels of government down to the agent in the field. The fruits of that successful collaboration were on bold display on May 1, 2011 when a commando team of Navy Seals brought Osama bin Laden to justice during their secret raid on his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Due to the concerted efforts, dedication and hard work of our Nation's clandestine services and the people who support them, the U.S. is safer now than it was in the days leading up the attacks of September 11th. We meet today in advance of Sunday's anniversary to honor and remember the heroes and victims of 9/11. We also gather to express once again our gratitude to the focused, determined and persistent efforts of the men and women who comprise this Nation's intelligence community for all that they do.", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. This is a good day for the United States, certainly a good day for the men and women who serve so proudly in our intelligence services that work tirelessly to keep America safe. This is a good day to bring the fiscal year 2012 intelligence authorization bill to the floor today. This will be our second intelligence authorization bill since January of this year, when I became chairman and my ranking member took his position as well for the House Intelligence Committee, and it will be the 29th bill in our committee's history. This bill is a vital tool for congressional oversight of the intelligence community's classified activities and is critical to ensuring that our intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities they need to do their important work. Passing an annual intelligence authorization bill is vital to keeping the laws governing our intelligence operations up to date. The FY12 bill sustains our current intelligence capabilities and provides for the development of future capabilities, all while achieving significant savings. The U.S. intelligence community plays a critical role in the war on terrorism and securing the country from many threats that we face today. Effective and aggressive congressional oversight is essential to ensuring continued success in the intelligence community. The intelligence authorization bill funds U.S. intelligence activities spanning 17 separate agencies. This funding totaled roughly $80 billion in fiscal year 2010. The current challenging fiscal environment demands the accountability and financial oversight of our classified intelligence programs that can only come with an intelligence authorization bill. The bill's comprehensive classified annex provides detailed guidance on intelligence spending, including adjustments to costly programs. This bill funds the requirements of the men and women of the intelligence community, both military and civilian, many of whom directly support the war zones or are engaged in other dangerous operations to keep America and Americans safe. It provides oversight and authorization for critical intelligence activities, including the global counterterrorism operations, such as the one that took out Osama bin Laden; cyberdefense by the National Security Agency; countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; global monitoring of foreign militaries and weapons tests; research and development of new technology to maintain our intelligence agencies' technological edge, including work on code breaking and spy satellites. This has been a strategy for a tough fiscal climate. After passage of the Budget Control Act, the committee revamped the bill it reported out of committee back in May to double its budget savings. As a result, the bill is significantly below the President's budget request for fiscal year 2012 and further still below the levels authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2011. These savings--and this is important, Mr. Speaker--were achieved without impacting the intelligence community's important mission, as the cuts of the 1990s did. The bottom line is that this bipartisan bill preserves and advances national security and is also fiscally responsible. The secrecy that is a necessary part of our country's intelligence work requires that the congressional intelligence committees conduct strong and effective oversight on behalf of the American people. That strong and effective oversight is impossible, however, without an annual intelligence authorization bill. And I want to thank both of the staffs for the Republicans and the Democrats, and the members from both the Republicans and Democrats on this committee for coming together in a bipartisan way on the important issue of national security. And I thank my friend, Dutch Ruppersberger, the ranking member, for his leadership in getting us not to one, but to two authorization bills within just 10 months. And that's no small accomplishment, as you might know, Mr. Speaker. With that, I reserve the balance of my time.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Dear Senators Reid and McConnell: We write to urge you to bring cyber security legislation to the floor as soon as possible. Given the time left in this legislative session and the upcoming election this fall, we are concerned that the window of opportunity to pass legislation that is in our view critically necessary to protect our national and economic security is quickly disappearing. We have spoken a number of times in recent months on the cyber threat--that it is imminent, and that it represents one of the most serious challenges to our national security since the onset of the nuclear age sixty years ago. It appears that this message has been received by many in Congress--and yet we still await conclusive legislative action. We support the areas that have been addressed so far, most recently in the House: the importance of strengthening the security of the federal government's computer networks, investing in cyber research and development, and fostering information sharing about cyber threats and vulnerabilities across government agencies and with the private sector. We urge the Senate to now keep the ball moving forward in these areas by bringing legislation to the floor as soon as possible. In addition, we also feel that protection of our critical infrastructure is essential in order to effectively protect our nation, and economic security from the growing cyber threat. Infrastructure that controls our electricity, water and sewer, nuclear plants, communications backbone, energy pipelines and financial networks must be required to meet appropriate cyber security standards. Where market forces and existing regulations have failed to drive appropriate security, we believe that our government must do what it can to ensure the protection of our critical infrastructure. Performance standards in some cases will be necessary--these standards should be technology neutral, and risk and outcome based. We do not believe that this requires the imposition of detailed security regimes in every instance, but some standards must be minimally required or promoted through the offer of positive incentives such as liability protection and availability of clearances. Various drafts of legislation have attempted to address this important area--the Lieberman/Collins bill having received the most traction until recently. We will not advocate one approach over another--however, we do feel strongly that critical infrastructure protection needs to be addressed in any cyber security legislation. The risk is simply too great considering the reality of our interconnected and interdependent world, and the impact that can result from the failure of even one part of the network across a wide range of physical, economic and social systems. Finally, we have commented previously about the important role that the National Security Agency (NSA) can and does play in the protection of our country against cyber threats. A piece of malware sent from Asia to the United States could take as little as 30 milliseconds to traverse such distance. Preventing and defending against such attacks requires the ability to respond to them in real-time. NSA is the only agency dedicated to breaking the codes and understanding the capabilities and intentions of potential enemies, even before they hit ``send.'' Any legislation passed by Congress should allow the public and private sectors to harness the capabilities of the NSA to protect our critical infrastructure from malicious actors. We carry the burden of knowing that 9/11 might have been averted with the intelligence that existed at the time. We do not want to be in the same position again when `cyber 9/11' hits--it is not a question of `whether' this will happen; it is a question of `when.' Therefore we urge you to bring cyber security legislation to the floor as soon as possible. Sincerely, Hon. Michael Chertoff, Hon. J. Mike McConnell, Hon. Paul Wolfowitz, Gen. Michael Hayden, Gen. James Cartwright (RET), Hon. William Lynn III.", u"Mr. President, I am so glad the Presiding Officer is in the chair while I am making these remarks. I wish to salute the Presiding Officer for his service in the Senate and his service to the Nation. One knows he is a member of the U.S. Marine Corps although he no longer wears the uniform. I believe once a marine, always a marine. And his service in Vietnam and to the Nation as Secretary of the Navy is well known and well appreciated. The Presiding Officer has served as a marine in the Marine Corps and as Secretary of the Navy and now in the Senate as a Member of the Democratic Party. The Presiding Officer really serves the Nation. I come to the floor today to talk about cyber security and the need to pass cyber security legislation this week, in this body. And I come to the floor not as a Democrat, I come to the floor as a patriot. I say to my colleagues in the Senate that this week, on this floor, the Senate has a rendezvous with destiny. We have pending before us cyber security legislation, a framework to protect critical infrastructure of the dot-com world against cyber attacks from those who have predatory, hostile intent to the United States of America. We are bogged down. We are not moving. We are once again following what has become a usual pattern in the Senate: when all is said and done, more is going to get said than gets done. But I say to anyone listening and anyone watching, we cannot let that happen. The United States of America is in danger. And this danger is not something in the future. It is not something written in science fiction books. This is not the wave that is going to come. It is happening right now in cyber attacks on our banking services, our personal identity, our trade secrets, and things I will talk about more. The naysayers here say: We can't pass this bill because it will be overregulation and it will lead to strangulation, and, oh my gosh, we can't ask the private sector to spend one dime on protecting itself. Well, I respect healthy criticism, but let me say to my friends, because I want them to know that if anything happens to the United States of America--if the grid goes down, if NASDAQ goes down, if our banking system goes down, if we will not be able to function because the streetlights won't be on and we won't be able to turn the electricity on--I will tell you what will happen. Once again, politicians will overreact, we will overregulate, and we will overspend. In a very judicious, well-thought-out, well-discussed process, we could come up with a legislative framework that would defend the United States of America and at the same time balance that sensible center that another great patriot, Colin Powell, calls us to do: Always look for the middle ground while we look at where we want to go. There is a cyber war, and I want everybody to know about it. Cyber attacks are happening right now. Cyber terrorists are thinking every single day about attacking our critical infrastructure. There are nation states that want to humiliate and intimidate the United States of America and cause catastrophic economic destruction. How do they want to do it? They want to take over our power grids. They want to disrupt our air traffic control. They want to disrupt the financial functioning of the United States of America. Cyber spies are working at breakneck speed to steal many of our state secrets. Cyber criminals are hacking our networks. So what are we talking about in this bill? We are talking about critical infrastructure. Now, I am a Senator from Maryland, and the Presiding Officer is a Senator from Virginia. Does he remember that freaky storm a couple weeks ago? Remember Pepco? Oh, boy. I still have my ears ringing from my constituents calling about Pepco. I can tell you what it was like in Baltimore when that freaky storm hit. You couldn't get around when the stoplights were down. It was like the Wild West getting around. You could go into stores--if they were open--and nothing functioned. The lights weren't on. The refrigeration was off. Businesses were losing hundreds of thousands, if not millions of dollars. There were families, like a mother with an infant child and another child, with no electricity for 5 days who went to hotel rooms. Now, they want to talk about this bill costing too much money? Just look at what it cost the national capital region of the United States of America because of a freaky storm. It took us 5 days to get the utilities back on because of the utility company, but what happens if our destiny is outside of our control, if cyber terrorists have turned off the lights in America and we can't get them turned back on? It is going to cost too much? Wait until this kind of thing happens. I don't want it to happen, and we can prevent it from happening, and we can do it in a way that understands the needs of business. I want to understand the needs of small business, but I sure understand the needs of families. For those who say it is going to cost too much and they have the concerns of the chamber of commerce, fine. I don't want to trash-talk them. My father owned a little neighborhood grocery store. I know what it is like when the electricity goes down. My father lost thousands of dollars because the frozen food melted, lost thousands of dollars when we had a freaky storm because of the refrigeration and his meats and produce went bad. My father lost thousands of dollars years ago in a freaky storm. This bill means that if we come up with the kind of legislation that we want, we can deal with it. Just remember what critical infrastructure means. It means the financial services. It means the grid. So when there is no power, schools are shut down, businesses are shut down, public transit is crippled, no traffic lights are working. By the way, in Virginia didn't 9-1-1 stop working, and they are still investigating? Don't we love to investigate? Well, right now I don't want to investigate and I don't want to castigate, but I sure want the Senate to be able to get going. Then there is the issue of financial services. The FBI is currently investigating 400 reported cases of corporate account attacks where cyber criminals have made unauthorized transfers from bank accounts of U.S. businesses. The FBI tells me they are looking at the attempt to steal $255 million and an actual loss of $85 million. Hackers are already going into the New York Stock Exchange, they are already going into NASDAQ in an attempt to shut down or steal information. Gosh, if we allow this to continue, they could attack and cost us billions of dollars. Does the Presiding Officer remember that in 2010 we had a flash crash? New vocabulary, new things out there. The Dow plunged 1,000 points in a matter of minutes because automatic computer traders shut down. This was the result of turbulent trading. But just imagine if terrorists or nation states that really don't like us--and I am really not going to name them, but we really know who they are--really create flash crashes? I know there are patriots in this Senate who have been the defenders of the Nation in other wars. They have said themselves that they worry about the Asia Pacific, they worry about China. I worry about China too. So while we are looking at the Defense authorization and appropriations--and people want more aircraft carriers to defend us in the blue waters against China. But what happens if there is a cyber attack? Now, we do know how to protect dot-mil, but don't we also want to protect dot-com in the same way? I think so. I salute Senators Lieberman and Collins. They have come forth with a bill that does two things from a national security perspective. First of all, it tells business: You can come in voluntarily. There is no mandate to participate. But if you do come in, you will get liability protection. Wow. In other words, we are actually going to offer incentives. We are actually going to offer good-guy bonuses. We are not going to do it through tax breaks or more things that add to the deficit or debt. We are going to say: Come on in. Participate in both the setting of standards--we want you at the table--and then living by the standards, and for that, you will get liability protection. There are also those who say: We just don't like Department of Homeland Security being in charge. We worry about a cyber Katrina. I worried about that too, but I must say that in all of our meetings, we can see that the Department of Homeland Security has made tremendous advances. I have been one of their sharpest critics in this area, and I have been skeptical from the beginning. But now, as we have moved along and listening to Secretary Napolitano and General Alexander, the head of the National Security Agency, on how they can work together honoring the Constitution and civil liberties, I think we have a good bill. Why do we need this bill? General Alexander, who heads up the National Security Agency and the Cyber Command, says that we are facing attacks and the potential of attacks that are mind-boggling. He talks about the stealing of trade secrets that amounts to the greatest transfer of wealth the country has ever seen. He worries about the security of the grid. He worries about financial services, while he also worries very much about the dot-com. But we live in the United States of America. We have a constitutional government. Our military, no matter how powerful and how strong, has a responsibility to certain areas, but we need a civilian agency in charge of how to protect dot-com, a civilian agency benefiting from the incredible turbo intellectual and technical power of the National Security Agency. So we have a bill that offers the framework. I would say, let's have the bill, let's vote for cloture, and let's have regular order with actual germane amendments. We have patriots here, but who are we for? Are we for protecting America or are we for coming up with the same old platitudes that resist any activity of government at all to protect the American people? I am no Janie-come-lately to this bill. I represent one of the greatest States in America. We are home to the National Security Agency. I have the high honor of being on the Intelligence Committee. I have been working on this topic for almost a decade, and I have watched the threat grow as I watched the technology against us grow in power and the number of people who could attack us in this area. I sit on the Appropriation Committee, where, as a member of the DOD appropriations, I have been proud to work with both the authorizers and Senator Inouye to stand up for Cyber Command, the Tenth Fleet, which is the cyber fleet, and others relating to it. But also what I have been proud of is being able to take a look at what we do need to do here in terms of everything from workforce to protecting others. My subcommittee funds the FBI. Working with Director Mueller, I have been able to see up close and personal the growing threats right here in the United States of America, whether cyber criminals can literally invade large banking. I could give example after example. Working also with other departments, we can see that there are cyber-attacks. We need to be able to do this. I could give other examples and I will do so in the debate, but let me summarize. The attacks are now. The question is, are we going to build a cyber bomb shelter? This is not like the bunkers of old. This is where we work with the private sector. Remember, our grid and our telecommunications are owned and operated by the private sector. We cannot do this without the private sector. We, your government, come together with a legislative framework that is constitutionally sound and legally reliable. The fact is that we will make the best and highest use of our military under that rubric. But at the end of the day we will be able to have a voluntary framework bringing the private sector together with incentives around liability that invite them to participate in the formulation of the regulation, the implementation of the regulation, and living by it. This is not regulation that leads to strangulation, this is regulation that helps them be able to protect the United States of America. Let me conclude. Everybody says: Gee, what could I do? Could I have protected against an attack on the United States of America? What is the name of that little-known group you didn't know how to spell years ago? Al-Qaida? Would we have done everything in the world to protect against the al-Qaida attack? I certainly would. I say today, if you want to protect against the next big attacks on the United States of America, vote for cloture. Let's have an informed debate. Let's find at the end of the day the sensible center that will give us a constitutional but effective way of defending America. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of quorum.", u'Mr. President, I rise to express my disappointment that we are taking a vote that is very premature. Not that we have not been discussing this bill for over a year. I have certainly been one of the first to say that we should vote on a cyber security bill. This is a complicated bill. It is a bill that did not get marked up in committee. In our discussions, we are talking about amendments. I want to say that the proponents of the bill before us have certainly been willing to talk and adjust and try to make changes in the bill. It is not there yet even though we have been meeting pretty much constantly. There are three different groups that have a very strong interest. All of us are interested in getting a cyber security bill, but none of us likes what is before us--well, obviously the proponents of the bill like what is before us. But two other groups are very concerned about further needs in the My concern with S. 3414, on which we are voting on cloture, is on the process, because we have not had a chance to amend this bill. The majority leader is attempting to invoke cloture and fill the tree so that we are not able to put any amendments on this bill at all. It is a bill that will not get 41 votes for sure. And there are many others who are very concerned about the substance of the bill. You cannot have a bill with no amendments that is this important and this technical. Let me state some of my concerns on the bill before us. First, it will actually undermine the current information sharing between the government and the private sector. The biggest priority we have is to get the private sector to the table and to make sure they have the ability to not only give information to the government but get information from the government. Furthermore, they must be able to share among the other industries, if they see a cyber threat, on an expedited basis. No. 2, the Department of Homeland Security would be granted authority over standard setting for private sector systems. That is unacceptable in the private sector and most certainly is not going to produce what is a consensus for getting the information we need. It assumes that government must take the adversarial role against private network owners in order to get cooperation when, in fact, both the government and the private sector share the same goals of increased cyber security. Let me read from a couple of letters we have received with concerns about this bill. The American Bankers Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, the Consumer Bankers Association, and 6 other organizations say: This legislation threatens to undermine important cyber security protections already in place for our customers and institutions. It misses an opportunity to substantially improve cyber threat information sharing between the Federal Government and the private sector. The National Association of Manufacturers says: The creation of a new government-administered program in an agency yet to be named forces unnecessary regulatory uncertainty on the private sector. The defense industry groups are very concerned about not having direct access to the National Security Agency with whom they deal now, and this bill would take that away from their capabilities.', u"It states that the administration strongly supports H.R. 5949, and it goes on to say what the bill would do. It says it is vital and it produced and continues to produce significant information that is vital to defend the Nation against international terrorism and other threats. I am very hopeful this bill will pass without amendment and thereupon can go directly to the President for signature. I yield the floor. Dear Senator Wyden and Senator Udall: Thank you for your 4 May 2012 letter requesting that my office and the National Security Agency (NSA) Inspector General (IG) determine the feasibility of estimating ``how many people inside the United States have had their communications collected or reviewed under the authorities granted by section 702'' of the FISA Amendment Act (FAA). On 21 May 2012, I informed you that the NSA Inspector General, George Ellard, would be taking the lead on the requested feasibility assessment, as his office could provide an expedited response to this important inquiry. The NSA IG provided a classified response on 6 June 2012. I defer to his conclusion that obtaining such an estimate was beyond the capacity of his office and dedicating sufficient additional resources would likely impede the NSA's mission. He further stated that his office and NSA leadership agreed that an IG review of the sort suggested would itself violate the privacy of U.S. persons. As I stated in my confirmation hearing and as we have specifically discussed, I firmly believe that oversight of intelligence collection is a proper function of an Inspector General. I will continue to work with you and the Committee to identify ways that we can enhance our ability to conduct effective oversight. If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact me. Sincerely, Background Paper on Title VII of FISA Prepared by the Department of This paper describes the provisions of Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that were added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA). Title VII has proven to be an extremely valuable authority in protecting our nation from terrorism and other national security threats. Title VII is set to expire at the end of this year, and its reauthorization is the top legislative priority of the Intelligence Community. The FAA added a new section 702 to FISA, permitting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to approve surveillance of terrorist suspects and other foreign intelligence targets who are non-U.S. persons outside the United States, without the need for individualized court orders. Section 702 includes a series of protections and oversight measures to safeguard the privacy and civil liberties interests of U.S. persons. FISA continues to include its original electronic surveillance provisions, meaning that, in most cases, an individualized court order, based on probable cause that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, is still required to conduct electronic surveillance of targets inside the United States. Indeed, other provisions of Title VII extend these protections to U.S. persons overseas. The extensive oversight measures used to implement these authorities demonstrate that the Government has used this capability in the manner contemplated by Congress, taking great care to protect privacy and civil liberties interests. This paper begins by describing how section 702 works, its importance to the Intelligence Community, and its extensive oversight provisions. Next, it turns briefly to the other changes made to FISA by the FAA, including section 704, which requires an order from the FISC before the Government may engage in surveillance targeted at U.S. persons overseas. Third, this paper describes the reporting to Congress that the Executive Branch has done under Title VII of FISA. Finally, this paper explains why the Administration believes it is essential that Congress reauthorize Title VII.1. Section 702 provides valuable foreign intelligence information about terrorists and other targets overseas, while protecting the privacy and ", u"Madam President, I thank my colleagues for their coming to the floor over the past 2 days for a good debate on the reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act, which the Senate approved today by a vote of 73-23. As I described a number of times during this debate, this electronic surveillance tool is among the most important intelligence collection measures we have for identifying and thwarting terrorist plots, as well as stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks against the United States, and for intelligence collection to advise policy decisions. Authorizing the statute for another 5 years will put the Nation's intelligence community on strong ground. I also would like to reiterate the offer I made during the debate to make sure that any Senator interested in getting additional, classified information on the FISA Amendments Act can get that information. In particular, I look forward to working with Senator Merkley to see that significant decisions of the FISA Court--or summaries of those decisions--are reviewed and made public in a way that does not compromise classified information. I also will work with Senator Leahy, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, to seek any additional reviews by the relevant inspectors general to complement the oversight that is already done every year on FISA programs. I will continue to work with Senators Wyden and Udall on the committee to help pursue their oversight requests and interests. Lastly, but very importantly for me, I would like to thank the staff who have worked over the past four years to conduct oversight of the FISA Amendments Act and who worked to get this legislation approved. Their work includes countless hours of meetings with officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Justice, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and even more time reading and analyzing reports, answers, and communications from those departments and agencies. On the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I would like to note first and foremost the dedicated efforts and counsel of Christine Healey, the committee's general counsel, and Eric Losick, counsel on the majority side who have been my main advisors on this legislation. I also appreciate their Republican counterparts, Jack Livingston and Kathleen Rice, with whom we have worked closely and collaboratively in this effort. My appreciation as well goes to Mike Buchwald, my designee on the committee, for his tireless staff work; to Mike Davidson, who was the committee's general counsel during part of this past 4 year period and who set the structure of the committee's ongoing oversight; and to David Grannis, the committee's staff director. Finally, I deeply appreciate the efforts of the majority leader's people and the floor staff--Tommy Ross, Serena Hoy, Gary Myrick, Tim Mitchell, and Tricia Engle--who got this bill to the floor before the expiration of the FISA Amendments Act and who helped guide it through to passage. Thanks to the Senate's vote today, this critical intelligence tool will continue to be available to the Nation's intelligence community. The Senate's oversight of it will continue as well, as I intent to continue the committee's careful review of the program for the next 5 years.", u' The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first and second times by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated: By Ms. LANDRIEU: S. 1112. A bill to amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to require the establishment of teacher evaluation programs; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. By Mr. UDALL of Colorado (for himself, Mr. Begich, and Mr. Bennet): S. 1113. A bill to provide professional development for elementary school principals in early childhood education and development; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. By Mr. BROWN (for himself, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Graham, Ms. Stabenow, Mr. Burr, Ms. Collins, and Mr. Casey): S. 1114. A bill to provide for identification of misaligned currency, require action to correct the misalignment, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. By Mr. SCHUMER: S. 1115. A bill to treat payments by charitable organizations with respect to certain firefighters as exempt payments; to the Committee on Finance. By Mr. SCHUMER (for himself, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Carper, Mr. Menendez, Mr. Coons, and Mrs. Gillibrand): S. 1116. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to equalize the exclusion from gross income of parking and transportation fringe benefits and to provide for a common cost-of-living adjustment, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance. By Ms. STABENOW: S. 1117. A bill to prepare disconnected youth for a competitive future; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. By Mr. WYDEN (for himself, Mr. Portman, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Brown, Ms. Cantwell, Mr. Kirk, and Mr. Bennet): S. 1118. A bill to amend part E of title IV of the Social Security Act to better enable State child welfare agencies to prevent sex trafficking of children and serve the needs of children who are victims of sex trafficking, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. By Ms. COLLINS (for herself and Ms. Mikulski): S. 1119. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for integration of mental health services and mental health treatment outreach teams, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. By Mr. TESTER (for himself and Mr. Udall of Colorado): S. 1120. A bill to provide authorities for the appropriate conversion of temporary seasonal wildland firefighters and other temporary seasonal employees in Federal land management agencies who perform regularly recurring seasonal work to permanent seasonal positions; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. By Mr. PAUL: S. 1121. A bill to stop the National Security Agency from spying on citizens of the United States and for other purposes; read the first time.', u"Mr. Speaker, in light of the recent public revelations about the National Security Agency's extensive surveillance programs, today we are introducing bipartisan legislation that will curtail the excesses of these programs and protect our privacy rights. The ``Limiting Internet and Blanket Electronic Review of Telecommunications and Email (LIBERT-E) Act'' contains commonsense proposals to strengthen our civil liberties and hold our government accountable. Specifically, the LIBERT-E Act provides for the following legislative changes: The legislation reforms access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations. Section 2 of the LIBERT-E Act changes Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act in order to prevent the mass collection of business records that are not material to an authorized foreign intelligence investigation, an international terrorism investigation, or clandestine intelligence activities. Currently, in order to obtain a Section 215 court order, the government need only show that the records are ``relevant'' to such an investigation. Recent reports suggest that the government's view of the ``relevance'' standard includes records of every telephone call on a given network. Section 2 of the LIBERT-E Act would also require that the government show that the relevance of these records to the investigation is based on ``specific and articulable'' facts, that the records are material to the investigation, and that the records ``pertain only to individuals under such investigation.'' In addition, the section removes a list of ``presumptively relevant'' records. The government should be required to show that the records it seeks are, in fact, material to a particular concern. The section also guarantees the recipient of a Section 215 order the right to challenge an accompanying gag order, and ensures notice and due process for any such challenger. The LIBERT-E Act also requires additional disclosures to Congress and the public in Section 3 of the legislation. This section provides for greater accountability and transparency in the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This section amends existing reporting requirements contained in Section 601 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1871) by requiring the Attorney General to make available to all Members of Congress the information currently provided to the House and Senate intelligence and judiciary committees. It also requires that the Attorney General make unclassified summaries of each ``significant'' decision, order, or opinion of the FISA Court available to the public within 180 days of their submission to Congress. Further, this section requires the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice and the Intelligence Community to report on the impact that acquisition of foreign intelligence has had on the privacy of persons located in the United States. Lastly, the fourth section of the LIBERT-E Act requires that each assessment or review required under Title VII of FISA be submitted in unclassified form, with an unclassified index if necessary. I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan measure, which protects our privacy and increases transparency in the government's use of these authorities.", u"Mr. Speaker, this has been a summer of alarming revelations that suggest that our government is drifting far from the principles of individual liberty and constitutionally limited government that defined the American founding and that produced the most free and prosperous Republic in the history of mankind. These developments include: The use of the IRS and other government agencies to single out ordinary Americans because of their political beliefs, with the apparent intent to discourage and intimidate them out of participating in the public policy debate; The use of the Department of Justice to target reporters who were asking embarrassing questions of the administration, in one case, with the threat of prosecution under the Espionage Act; The warrantless seizure of the private records of millions of Americans by the National Security Agency; The increasingly menacing militarization of domestic police agencies; The shakedown of health care providers to fund advocacy and promotion of ObamaCare; Frequent assertions by the President of authority to nullify laws that he deems objectionable or inconvenient, despite his clear constitutional mandate to see that the laws are faithfully executed; The executive's usurpation of the legislative powers of Congress by using the regulatory bureaucracies to impose laws that the elected Congress has specifically refused to enact; Continued suggestions that the executive may order military operations against other governments without provocation and without congressional authorization. This week, we are beginning to learn details of the so-called Federal Data Hub, including an excellent article by John Fund of the National Review. According to Fund: The Department of Health and Human Services is about to hire an army of ``patient navigators'' to inform Americans about the subsidized insurance promised by ObamaCare and assist them in enrolling. These organizers will be guided by the new Federal Data Hub, which will give them access to reams of personal information compiled by Federal agencies, ranging from the IRS to the Department of Defense and the Veterans Administration. Mr. Speaker, the American people are slowly beginning to realize the threat to individual freedom, personal privacy, and fundamental constitutional principles that these developments pose. Some very bright constitutional lines have been crossed. And my constituents keep asking: What is Congress going to do? The House has taken the first steps to restore our constitutional checks and balances by focusing its investigatory attention on the unfolding IRS scandal. It is of critical importance that the facts of the case be fully laid out, those responsible identified and removed from positions of trust or authority, and safeguards enacted to ensure that this sort of abuse never happens again. The House Rules Committee took an important step yesterday by allowing amendments to the Defense Appropriations Act to stop the warrantless seizure of Americans' phone and Internet records by the NSA and to reassert the essential principle with respect to Syria that Congress alone has the prerogative to declare war. The House is in a position to resist many of these abuses and usurpations through its power to appropriate, but it has often been reluctant to fully assert that authority. The conventional wisdom is that the appropriations process will shortly stall and a continuing resolution will be agreed to. That would be a tragic mistake if it leads to the continued funding of these increasingly unconstitutional and authoritarian measures. All appropriations must start in the House, which means that a simple majority of this body by itself could arrest many of these disturbing developments simply by marshalling the courage and determination to just say ``no'' by pulling the purse strings shut. If we fail to do so, I believe that we are allowing our Nation to drift dangerously toward a constitutional crisis with grave implications to the rule of law and to the survival of American liberty.", u"Mr. President, it appears the Republicans understand finally that the government is shut down, but now they are focusing on trying to cherry-pick some of the few parts of government they like. They do not like it all, but they like a few parts of it. Just another wacky idea from the tea party-driven Republicans. You can tell that the tea party Republicans still want to keep the government shut down. If they wanted to reopen the government, they would simply reopen the government by bringing the Senate's bill to their floor and letting it pass with a majority vote. We could reopen the government in a matter of minutes if Speaker Boehner had the courage to stand up to the tea party. I said the word ``we''--they. We support veterans and parks. We support the FBI. We support the Federal Government. That is our job. That is what we do. But we cannot and we will not be forced to choose between parks and cancer research or disease control or highway safety or the FBI or, as we have heard here today, on and on with examples from the National Security Agency, which has cut by more than 70 percent its personnel. The Republicans seem willing to fund veterans, but what about the rest of the government? First, we need to end the government shutdown and then Democrats will be happy to agree on funding for specific items. We would be glad to do that. We would be happy to agree to fund priorities as soon as Congress enacts legislation to reopen the government. The Republican plan is not a serious plan. It is not a plan to run the country. It is not a plan the American people sent us here to do. This is just as clear as the Presiding Officer seated before me--wide-shouldered, Former Governor of West Virginia, someone who has been in government for many decades. It is so clear, here is what it is all about. They have it in words. Here is their plan. Some of the rabble-rousers over there have said what they want to do, which is take little bits and pieces of the Federal Government, send something over for veterans today, parks tomorrow, maybe security agencies tomorrow and the next day, and this will go on for weeks. Well, what will not get funded? ObamaCare. Now, it is so obvious. In fact, one of the Senators said this. In fact, I am paraphrasing part of this. This appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune. It is obvious we cannot end ObamaCare, so we are going to have a different approach. In light of the fact they cannot end ObamaCare, here is the quote: ``In light of that, let's leave ObamaCare for another day and not hold hostage the vast majority of government functions.'' The Utah Republican has claimed credit for kick-starting the effort to use the Federal budget as leverage to halt funding for ObamaCare--a move that led to the impasse and the government shutdown. So they could not do that, so now what they want to do is nitpick these little things while the government is shut down and wait until the end and there is nothing for ObamaCare in spite of the fact that millions of people now have health care today that they did not have yesterday because of the exchanges coming online. We need to reopen the government. The key to that still remains over in the House of Representatives. It is the Senate-passed clean bill for the whole government. If Republicans were serious, they would pass that bill. Doing anything else is just sour grapes. This is not serious. The government is shut down. If they think they are going to come and nitpick us, it will not work. It will not work.", u"Mr. President, I rise to pay tribute to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Matt Olsen. Matt has announced his intention to leave his position later this year after serving as Director of NCTC for over 3 years. Matt is one of the best and brightest public servants with whom I have had the pleasure to work. I wish to take a couple of minutes to thank him for a job well done. As vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have had the opportunity to work very closely with Matt, as he served in a number of key positions in the intelligence community. Regardless of his position, Matt has served with integrity and has provided sound, honest counsel, which has benefited not only me but numerous other Members of this body. At NCTC Matt has overseen several key initiatives that have enhanced NCTC's ability to discover and prevent terrorist attacks, such as the Pursuit Group that was put in place after the failed attack on Northwest flight 253. Matt has been a strong advocate for NCTC's mission, striving to make sure NCTC has the right people and the right data to get the job done. He has done his part and has kept the Center acutely focused on terrorist threats to the homeland. I am certainly glad I supported his nomination and can attest that Matt is a man of his word. Before joining NCTC, Matt served as the National Security Agency's general counsel and as an Associate Deputy Attorney General at the Department of Justice. Matt worked on several national security issues at DOJ but quickly became an expert on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and its implementation. Matt has an excellent perspective of the role of surveillance and keeping this country safe, and I hope he will participate in the public debate on this issue even after his departure from government service. I would like to say a special thanks to his wife Fern and his three children: Elizabeth, Nate, and Will. Matt has missed many nights and weekends with his family as the Director of NCTC and throughout his public service career. I am sure these sacrifices have been difficult at times, but our Nation is better for it. I know Matt has spent every day of his tenure as Director focusing on how best to neutralize the increasing threat posed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Matt's family should be very proud of his outstanding achievements and his dedicated efforts to protect our national security. I understand Matt plans to return to teaching and spend some well-deserved free time with his family. His presence will be missed at NCTC as well as on the Hill. To Matt and his family, thanks again and best wishes for whatever the future holds. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Mr. President, I wish to pay tribute and thank a dedicated and capable individual, Lorenzo Goco, who retired from the Senate on Friday after 20 years of expert service. For the past 6 years, Lorenzo has served as the deputy staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, SSCI. He has worked on the committee since 1995, when he was brought over by Senator Bob Kerrey. He has seen the highs and the lows of Senate life, and has made a valued contribution to the committee, to the Senate, and to the national security of the United States. Since the beginning of my chairmanship of the committee in 2009, Lorenzo has been the heart of the Democratic staff. Without drawing attention to himself, he has gotten things done--whether it meant setting the schedule and wrangling agency witnesses to attend on short notice, assisting the intelligence community to see the wisdom of the committee's approach, or bridging the divide between the majority and minority in the rare case of disagreement, Lorenzo kept the committee on track and headed in the right direction. As the deputy staff director, Lorenzo is responsible for everything but gets the credit for nothing. He has represented the SSCI at the weekly meeting of Democratic staff directors more often than the actual staff director, and he has had my full faith in representing the committee and me countless times. Often, a line of committee staffers will build in front of his door as people seek his advice on how to handle an issue or ask a question about a program. Classification prevents me from relating on the Senate floor most of the projects that Lorenzo has contributed to or overseen in his time on the committee staff. But they include numerous reviews of CIA covert actions, reviews of acquisition programs by the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office, and the budget review of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Due to CIA's declassification of the underlying information, I can say that Lorenzo was part of the committee's excellent work in investigating CIA's role in a shootdown of a missionary plane in Peru. He was instrumental in the committee's report on the prewar intelligence assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and a constant force behind the staff's work on the Study of CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The committee's success in enacting six intelligence authorization bills in the past 6 years is in good measure a result of Lorenzo's work in drafting the legislation and the classified annexes the contain, working with other committees in the Senate and the House, and negotiating provisions with the executive branch. There are plenty of congressional staff that are passionate advocates for aggressive action for this cause or that. Other staff focus on protecting their boss and as a result are more judicious and deliberate. Some are experts on process; some are experts on substance. Lorenzo is all of the above. His depth of experience on intelligence matters is unparalleled today in the Senate. He fights strongly for what he believes in, and has at times pushed me to be stronger on a cause than I might otherwise be. But he is always cool, calm, and collected, and manages to navigate the buffeting winds and tempestuous times that we face all too often. I am sorry to see a key part of my team go, but I wish Lorenzo the best of luck. I have no doubt that he will have more time to spend with his wonderful wife Audrey and his three boys, whom I know are the source of unending pride, and perhaps the occasional bout of parental frustration. With any luck, they'll grow up like their father. Thank you, Lorenzo, for your steadfast service.", u"Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Over the last several years, cyber attacks have become a pressing concern for the United States. Anthem, Home Depot, Sony, Target, JPMorgan Chase, and other companies have been subject to major attacks, resulting in the compromise of personal information of employees and customers alike. Cyber thieves, whether hostile foreign agents or money-seeking criminals, have stolen credit card numbers, accessed medical records, leaked proprietary information, and published confidential emails affecting tens of millions of Americans. This situation cannot continue. The House has passed cybersecurity information-sharing legislation with strong majorities in the past two Congresses. The gentleman from California, Ranking Member Schiff, and I have continued this bipartisan tradition, working closely together to draft a bill that will increase the security of our networks while protecting users' privacy. I see the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) is here. He sponsored this legislation last time, along with the gentleman from Michigan, Chairman Rogers, who is now retired, but I do want to give them a special thanks and gratitude. I hope that we can get this bill across the floor this year. We have also worked closely with leadership--the gentleman from Texas, Chairman McCaul; the gentleman from Virginia, Chairman Goodlatte--and the Senate Intelligence Committee to ensure that our bills complement each other. The Protecting Cyber Networks Act addresses a core problem in our digital security infrastructure. Because of legal ambiguities, many companies are afraid to share information about cyber threats with each other or with the government. If a company sees some threat or attack, this bill will allow the company to quickly report information about the problem without fearing a lawsuit so that other companies can take measures to protect themselves. The bill encourages three kinds of sharing: private-to-private, government-to-private, and private-to-government. In that third scenario, the bill allows companies to share cyber threat information with a variety of government agencies. If banks are comfortable sharing with the Treasury Department, they can share with Treasury. If utilities prefer sharing with the Department of Energy, they can share with Energy. If companies want to share with the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department, or the Commerce Department, they can share with them. The only sharing that this bill does not encourage is direct sharing to the Department of Defense or the National Security Agency. Companies can still share with DOD and NSA, but they will not receive any new liability protections. This bill does not provide the government with any new surveillance authorities. To the contrary, it includes robust privacy protections. It only authorizes the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures: technical information like malware signatures and malicious code. Before companies share with the Federal Government, they must remove all personal information. If companies don't follow those requirements, there is no liability protection. Furthermore, a government agency that receives the information must scrub it a second time. This will ensure all personal information has been removed. Only then can the information be forwarded to other Federal agencies. Finally, the bill provides for strong public and congressional oversight by requiring a detailed biennial inspectors general report relating to the government's receipt, use, and dissemination of cyber threat indicators. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board must also submit a biennial report on the privacy and civil liberties impact of the bill. The increasing pace and scope of cyber attacks cannot be ignored. This bill will strengthen our digital defenses so that American consumers and businesses will not be put at the mercy of cyber criminals. I look forward to passing this legislation. I reserve the balance of my time.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Sen. Mitch McConnell, the Republican majority leader, has made it clear to his colleagues that he wants the USA Patriot Act, including the controversial parts of the legislation scheduled to expire at the end of June, fully extended. He's seems ready to do whatever he can to get his way. The USA Patriot Act was enacted in the days following Sept. 11, when the nation trembled on the verge of panic, with little debate and little opposition in Congress. The Patriot Act has been recognized since on both left and right as unfortunate legislation that granted too much power to the government to snoop into the lives, calls and emails of everyone in the name of national security. Mr. McConnell thought he could force the Senate to either let the law lapse, to panic everyone again, or get an extension without modification until the year 2020. Even as Mr. McConnell praised the National Security Agency's reliance on the act to justify the collection of telephonic ``metadata'' from millions of Americans, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals was writing the decision, released Thursday, declaring the government program, first revealed by Edward Snowden, illegal because the language of the act cannot be read to justify such sweeping government action. The lawsuit was brought by the American Civil Liberties Union and joined by groups, including the National Rifle Association, and welcomed by civil libertarians across the land. To continue the program, the Obama administration would presumably have to persuade Congress to adopt language specifically authorizing the NSA to collect and hold such data. That attempt might be forthcoming. The court's decision gives a boost to the advocates for the USA Freedom Act, which would modify the Patriot Act. The Freedom Act is expected to pass in the House and Mr. McConnell's strategy to kill it in the Senate may not work now, given the appeals court's decision. Sen. Patrick Leahy, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee, read the 97-page opinion and said, ``Congress should take up and pass the bipartisan USA Freedom Act, which would ban bulk collection under Section 215 and enact other meaningful surveillance reforms.'' The opinion of the liberal senator from Vermont is shared by the conservative Rep. James Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, an author of the Patriot Act who has since regretted its excess. He joined the ACLU lawsuit as ``a friend of the court,'' and said Thursday that ``it's time for Congress to pass the USA Freedom Act in order to protect both civil liberties and national security with legally authorized surveillance.'' When the chips are down, blind partisanship, with genuine cooperation, can still be put aside.", u"Mr. President, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is on the front line in defending our country from terrorists, spies, and criminals. The FBI has a long history dating back over 100 years. The FBI started as an agency formed during President Theodore Roosevelt's administration when seven Secret Service agents were sent to the Justice Department to create a new investigative bureau. Since that start, the FBI has developed into a cadre of talented agents who have pioneered new investigative tools advancing law enforcement across the country. For example, the Bureau agents developed advancements in forensic science, such as fingerprint technology and DNA analysis, now utilized to build investigations from the smallest of clues obtained at crime scenes. Such advancements have allowed the FBI to combat organized crime and international terrorists across the country and around the globe. Despite these successes, the FBI has also had its share of failures. These include maintaining secret files on elected officials, the investigation of civil rights leaders, the tragedies at Ruby Ridge and Waco, missing internal spy Robert Hanssen, the corruption and misuse of mob informants in the Boston field office, and the failure to connect the dots leading up to the 9/11 attacks. The FBI has also had problems in failing to manage high-profile projects, such as the procurement of information technology upgrades. They have failed to address personnel problems, such as the double standard for discipline that the Justice Department inspector general found agents believe exists. And there were the serious issues that required reform at the FBI crime lab. These are black marks on the history of the FBI. I have been an outspoken critic of the FBI's culture for many years because of its unwillingness to own up to mistakes. Too often, officials sought to protect the agency's reputation at the expense of the truth. My concerns are magnified by the way the FBI treats internal whistleblowers who come forward and report fraud and abuse. All too often, instead of owning up to problems and fixing them, they circle the wagons and shoot the messenger. The FBI is all too often the exact opposite of an agency that can accept constructive criticism, from both those inside and out. That said, I must give credit to the FBI when it is due. Following the tragedy of 9/11, the FBI has worked to fix the problems that have occurred. There has been a top-to-bottom transformation at the FBI moving it from a pure law enforcement agency to a national security agency. Chief among those lending this transformation has been FBI Director Robert Mueller. Sworn in as Director just 1 week prior to 9/11, Director Mueller has led the charge to ensure that the FBI is updated into a modern national security agency. This transformation includes upgrading the workforce from an agent-driven model to one that includes an ever-increasing number of intelligence analysts. Director Mueller has taken the transformation head-on and has done an admirable job. I applaud the hard work that has been done, but more work remains. That is why we are here today introducing legislation that will extend the term of FBI Director Mueller for 2 additional years. I join my colleagues from the Judiciary and Select Intelligence Committees in introducing a one-time statutory exemption that will extend the term of FBI Director Mueller's term by 2 years. I do this recognizing the good work of Director Mueller and against a backdrop of heightened alert to terrorist attack following the death of Osama bin Laden. However, I do this with a heavy heart because I believe the 10-year term is a good thing for both the FBI and the country. Currently, the law requires that the FBI Director be limited to one single 10-year term. This limitation was put in place in 1976 following a 1968 change in the law making the Director a Presidential appointment. Congress included this term for two main reasons: one, to ensure that the Director was insulated from political influence of the President; two, to ensure that no one individual serves as FBI Director for such a long period of time to amass too much power. The inclusion of a term was part of a series of reforms to government agencies following the Watergate scandal and following the death of former Director J. Edgar Hoover, who had served a 48-year term. The current term limit has been in place for 35 years. In that time, no Director of the FBI has ever served an entire 10-year term and no President has ever suggested the term limit should be extended. However, on September 4, 2011, FBI Director Mueller would be the first to reach the 10-year mark. President Obama has indicated it is his desire to have Director Mueller stay on for an additional 2 years and has asked us to extend the term. While I join my colleagues in introducing this extension, I have also asked that we have a hearing in the Senate Judiciary Committee to address this extension. There are significant constitutional concerns that must be addressed, such as whether Congress has the authority to extend the term of a sitting appointee. A concern of this magnitude needs to be discussed in a formal hearing. Additionally, this would be the first time the Congress will be extending the term of the Director in over 35 years and nearly 37 years since a hearing was held on the term of the Director in the Judiciary Committee. Director Mueller has done an admirable job of reforming an agency under difficult circumstances. While I have my concerns with the precedent that this will set for future Directors--namely, that the term can be extended--I do think that making a one-time exception is warranted in this limited case and with the current existing threats. But I do not want this to become a regular occurrence. This legislation is narrowly tailored to ensure that the intent of Congress is to create only a one-time exception. Further, we will be holding a Judiciary Committee hearing in the near future to address this important, limited, one-time extension. Against that backdrop, I support this extension and look forward to an open debate and discussion surrounding this legislation. By Mr. KOHL (for himself and Mr. Graham): S. 1106. A bill to authorize Department of Defense support for programs on pro bono legal assistance for members of the Armed Forces; to the Committee on Armed Services.", u"Mr. President, at the appropriate time, I hope the Senate will permit us to take action on an amendment I will offer on behalf of myself and Senator Leahy and others. This amendment we have prepared is very simple, but it is absolutely critical to this bill. The amendment would require the inspectors general of the Department of Justice and the National Security Agency and other relevant offices to work together to review the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping program. The inspectors general will analyze this program and then issue a report on what they find. Members of Congress will receive a classified version of the report. The public will receive an unclassified version of the report. Simply put, there is no other way to put this episode behind us. Court cases looking into the administration's warrantless wiretapping have been stymied by concerns about standing, mootness, and the state secrets privilege. If Congress grants retroactive immunity, some of these cases will be eliminated altogether. But either way, court cases are no substitute for an inspector general review when it comes to finding and reporting the facts. Traditional rulings will tell us whether any laws were broken and which ones. The inspector general review will tell us why and how this happened, and it will help us avoid a similar lapse in the future. The administration has decided to share documents with the Senate Judiciary Committee but not with the House Intelligence Committee, or the Judiciary Committee whose FISA bill it doesn't like. It has refused to share any documents with other Members of the House and Senate who are now expected to vote on this legislation. So where are we now? We know that for 5 years the Bush administration conducted a massive program of warrantless surveillance that may have violated the rights of literally millions of innocent Americans. What we do not know is how this program was started, why it was started, what it covered, how many Americans were spied on, or what happened to the information it collected. We are being kept in the dark about one of the most significant and outrageous constitutional violations by the executive branch in modern history. An inspector general review is the only way to shed light on this abuse, the only way to document and assess the administration's warrantless surveillance activities over the past 6 years. The review will help bring clarity, closure, and accountability to this episode. It will help us draw lessons and move on from it. Millions of Americans have been secretly spied on for years. They at least deserve to know the reason. The Senate also deserves to know. Senators who vote to pass this amendment will be not only honoring their constituents' right to learn what was done to them, they will also be enabling themselves to serve their constituents better in the future. The inspector general report will produce information that will assist us in our legislative duties. When Congress takes up FISA in the future, the results of this report will be enormously valuable in helping us to enact legislation to meet the genuine national security and civil liberty needs of the Nation. It is revealing in how quiet the White House has been in opposing the inspector general review. Make no mistake, they have been clear they don't want any kind of investigation into what they did. But their arguments against the inspector general review have been very quiet, indeed, perhaps because they know how transparently weak and self-serving their arguments are. They said we should not have an inspector general review because it might reveal classified information or help our enemies. This argument is nothing more than a scare tactic. The inspectors general public report will contain only unclassified material. Any classified material will go into a classified appendix. It has been said an inspector generals' review might fuel a partisan witch hunt. Senator Leahy and I have drafted this amendment to be tightly limited to the warrantless wiretapping program. The inspectors general will have a very specific mandate, and they will do their work without any political influence whatever. Understanding what happened to the rights of Americans over the past 6 years is not a partisan effort. All Members of Congress should want to learn about the activities in which the administration has engaged. The American people are concerned about what their Government has been up to. They need an independent review to restore trust in the Government and to feel confident that both their security and their liberty are being protected. Finally, I have heard it said the inspectors general are not the appropriate entity to conduct this review. The question is, if not the inspectors general, then who? The inspectors general are experienced and independent; they are trusted by Congress and the American people. They frequently conduct confidential investigations and have procedures in place to protect classified information. It is precisely for situations such as this that we created the inspector general. It has been reported that the Justice Department recently reopened the Office of Professional Responsibility's investigation into the warrantless surveillance program. That is a positive step, but it is not relevant to this amendment. The scope of the OPR investigation is severely limited. It deals with attorney misconduct, and it is confined to the Justice Department. By contrast, the inspector general review will cover all of the relevant agencies, including the National Security Agency, and it will examine the use of warrantless surveillance much more fully. Moreover, the inspectors general are more independent than OPR, and for investigating a warrantless surveillance program authorized by the President, independence is of critical importance. Inspectors general also have a proven track record that gives them unique credibility. For example, the inspector general report on national security letters showed widespread abuse by the FBI, and it helped Congress understand what needs to be done. There is one reason, and only one reason, to oppose this amendment, and that is to cover up the administration's actions. A vote against the inspector general review is a vote for silence and secrecy, for stonewalling and denial. It is a vote to erase the past. Many of the issues we have been debating on FISA are difficult and complicated, and there is room for reasonable people to disagree. But there is no such room on this amendment. It is simple and straightforward. Its potential benefits are great, and its costs are negligible. No matter where one stands on the issues of retroactive immunity for the phone companies, this amendment should be a no-brainer. In fact, for my colleagues who want to eliminate the court cases against the phone companies, this should be even more critical because it will at least preserve some measure of accountability. It will give the Senate critical information to fulfill its constitutional duty to protect the rights of Americans, the separation of powers, and our national security. Many Senators who have been defending retroactive immunity have done so by emphasizing that the phone companies were just following White House orders. If you believe that argument, you should be especially in favor of this amendment because it places the inquiry exclusively on the White House. Here is what the amendment says: The unclassified report shall not disclose the name or identity of any individual or entity of the private sector that participated in the program or with whom there was communication about the program. Even though we oppose retroactive immunity, Senator Leahy and I included that provision because we want to make this amendment as uncontroversial as possible. We want to make it crystal clear that all Senators who take their constitutional duties seriously, whether they are Democrats or Republicans, need to support this amendment. I urge all of my colleagues to pass this amendment and take a vital step toward restoring honesty and the rule of law in America's surveillance policy. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, let me take this opportunity to extend my deep appreciation to my good friend, Senator Reid, for his very genuine persistence in pursuing this Intelligence authorization bill. He has worked hard, both as minority leader and as majority leader, to try to make this happen. I suspect Senator Bond and I will have some fairly strong words to say in agreement about this because I think both of us are very dismayed that despite the very considerable efforts of Vice Chairman Bond and myself--we operate very closely together--to get agreement on this bill, there is still an objection to its consideration, as I understand. It is almost inconceivable to me we are forced to come to this point of cloture and motions to proceed and all kinds of things on a national security bill. I do not understand that, where that comes from, why the motivation, how that happens. In any event, we are talking about the authorization bill of the Intelligence Committee for 2007; and this is already the period for the 2008 authorization bill. It is inexcusable. From 1978 through 2004--that is a long time, 1978 to 2004--every year, there was an authorization bill, like every year there is a military authorization, Armed Services authorization bill. It happens in all major committees. The Senate had an unbroken 27-year record of having authorization bills every single year. This year and the last year--and I think the preceding year--we did not. It is very frustrating to the Senator from Missouri and myself. This should be considered, and is considered, must-pass legislation. It is in the national interest. We are in the middle of a war on terror. Our continued military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan calls for an analysis of what is going on in the intelligence community, putting it into authorization form so it can go on to be discussed and debated on the floor. It is a matter of life and death. But we are being blocked again from considering a bill that provides the legislative roadmap for America's intelligence programs. America is not meant to work that way. Similar to the bills I have mentioned, you have to get authorization. It is done routinely. It is very puzzling. Now, there are 16 separate provisions under our 2007 authorization bill--we are in the period for the 2008 authorization bill--enhancing and clarifying the authority of the Director of National Intelligence. These provisions include improvements to the way we approach and manage human intelligence, which the vice chairman and I feel very strongly about, information sharing, and the ability to manage intelligence community resources. Those are words with a great deal behind them. I, like many of my colleagues, have been increasingly concerned about the seemingly endless stream of leaks of classified information. This bill includes provisions improving the authority of the Director of National Intelligence, whom we put in charge to look at matters such as these, and the Director of the CIA to protect intelligence sources and methods and a provision to increase the penalties for unauthorized disclosure of the identity of a covert agent. The bill also contains numerous provisions intended to improve oversight of the intelligence community. We have not been doing that in the sense that we should, and Vice Chairman Bond and I worked very closely together on this issue. He is a ferocious pursuer of intelligence wherever he can find it, and he usually manages to bring it back with him. Section 408 will establish a statutory inspector general for the intelligence community. The DNI, the Director of National Intelligence, has used his power to create an IG, but the power to do so doesn't mean a requirement to do so. So we would strengthen that position in this legislation and make it more accountable to Congress. Section 434 of the bill strengthens accountability and oversight of the technical intelligence agencies by providing a very important matter: that the heads of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency are to be appointed by the President, as they have been but with the advice and consent of the Senate. That has not been the case. This is an enormous fountain of intelligence, and we think they ought to be responsive to the two Intelligence Committees in the Senate and the House. My colleagues may be surprised that the head of an agency with as central a role in the intelligence community as the National Security Agency or an agency with the enormous budget of the National Reconnaissance Office is not appointed with Senate confirmation. It is really shocking. Whether it was an oversight or not, I have no idea, but it is wrong. Senator Mikulski pointed this out. This bill would correct that. Section 108, cosponsored in committee last year by Senators Levin and Hagel, seeks to improve the timely flow of information to congressional intelligence committees. In other words, things can't be put off for a year or 2 years, 6 months or whatever. We try to enforce our view that we are an oversight group and we intend to be treated as such and we will not be treated in a lesser way. Similar language was included in the intelligence reform legislation that passed the Senate in 2004 and in S. 4, which passed the Senate last month. There are requirements for the provision of specific information, including a report on the implementation of the Detainee Treatment Act and a separate report on the operation of clandestine detention facilities. These are not trivial matters, as the Presiding Officer understands, and they cannot be dealt with trivially by this body, and therefore we need this bill. These provisions are all intended to improve our ability to make decisions leading to better intelligence for the military and policymakers. There is no reason the Senate cannot pass the bill and do so quickly so that we can conference with the House and do that quickly so that we can pass the bill, the authorization bill of 2007, here in April of 2007 and proceed on. I will close by saying: I would remind my colleagues that we are at war in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and we are at war in scores--or potentially at war in scores of countries around the world where al-Qaida is strong and growing, or groups such as the Taliban or others are growing. We can't have delay. This is an important bill. I encourage my colleagues to vote for the motion to invoke cloture and allow this process to move forward. Mr. President, I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, a short time ago the Senate approved the nomination of GEN Michael Hayden to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I think it was an appropriate confirmation by this body, but I do think it is also appropriate to comment on the nomination of General Hayden. Twenty months ago, I came to the Senate floor to oppose the nomination of Porter Goss for the same position, as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. At that time, I stated that the Director of Central Intelligence is a unique position. It should stand above politics. The citizens of the United States have the right to assume that the Director of Central Intelligence is providing objective information and analysis to allow the President to make the best possible decisions. I didn't believe that a partisan choice was the proper choice then, and it seems in fact that was the case. Mr. Goss is an example of where this administration believed that its political agenda was more important than the security of our country. The CIA was in turmoil then, and it is in turmoil now. The Agency's assessments were distrusted then and are still subject to skepticism now. Many more experienced operatives have resigned. Mr. Goss, a political operative chosen by President Bush to lead the Central Intelligence Agency through a difficult period while engaged in a war, failed in this mission. So the administration is trying again. This time, the President has chosen an intelligence veteran. General Hayden has served our Nation for the past 37 years as a distinguished intelligence officer in the U.S. Air Force. He has most recently held positions as Director of the National Security Agency and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. General Hayden is well versed in intelligence matters, he is well known in the community, and I do not believe he is a partisan political operative. There is evidence that General Hayden has been and can be independent and objective. General Hayden is a better choice, a much better choice, than Mr. Goss. However, I still have some concerns. First, there has been much discussion about General Hayden's position in the military and his ability to be independent from the Defense Department in his assessments and in his operations. While the law has always allowed a military officer to serve in this position, I believe there is a valid reason for concern. The fiscal year 2007 national Defense authorization bill addresses this issue. It states that flag and general officers assigned to certain positions in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the CIA shall not be subject to the supervision or control of the Secretary of Defense or exercise any supervision or control of military or civilian personnel in the Department of Defense, except as authorized by law. I believe this is an important provision and only one reason the Defense authorization bill should be considered as soon as possible, to get this position on the books of law. However, I also believe we have to go a step further. I think if a military officer is chosen as the Director of National Intelligence or Director of Central Intelligence, that position should be a terminal assignment. That position should be recognized by the officer and by other members in the Department of Defense and the administration as the final assignment of that particular officer. I believe it best for our national security if an officer who takes one of these top intelligence positions is free from considerations about his future military career--what assignments he might be given, who he might be angering in the Department of Defense, who he might be pleasing within the Department of Defense, either consciously or subconsciously. As I said earlier, intelligence should be above politics, and it also should be above the politics within the Pentagon of assignments and of budgets and of other considerations. A law stating that the position as Director of Central Intelligence or National Intelligence is a final military assignment would help clarify this position in detail. It is an issue I will raise again during the consideration of the Defense authorization bill. General Hayden has agreed, in consultation with Senator Warner and also in consultation with his family, that it is his intent to make this his final military assignment. I have no doubt that he will do that, but I believe it is important to formalize this provision in the law. That is why I will bring this to the attention of our colleagues when the Defense authorization bill comes to the floor. There is another issue, of course, that is of concern. That issue is the administration's terrorist surveillance program. General Hayden headed the National Security Agency when the program was proposed and implemented. From what we know today, that program conducted electronic surveillance of international telephone calls and collected millions of domestic phone records. Let me be clear. A vote in support of General Hayden should not be construed as an endorsement of this administration's surveillance program. Nor should concerns about the administration's programs be viewed as an unwillingness to adopt aggressive intelligence activities against those who truly threaten this country. I believe we still do not know enough of the facts about these programs. From what I do know, however, I have grave concerns. A thorough investigation must be conducted and must be conducted in a timely manner, but General Hayden was not the creator of the program, nor was he the one to provide the legal authority for the program. He stated he needed authority to implement such a surveillance program and the administration provided him with the authority he felt was sufficient. On this issue, at this time I will give General Hayden the benefit of the doubt. I did support the nomination of General Hayden. I am certain he knows he is taking a very difficult job at a very difficult moment. Many other honorable men and women have joined this administration. They have come to this administration with years of experience and expertise, and they have found themselves in very difficult dilemmas, where their experience and their expertise was challenged by this administration. Their objectivity, their sense of duty--not to a particular President but to the country overall--has been seriously challenged. In certain cases, the only remedy for these individuals is to resign rather than continue to support policies that they feel in their hearts and in their minds are not serving the best interests of this country. General Hayden might come to such a decision point, and I hope, given his skill, his experience, and his dedication to duty, that he would take the harder right than the easier wrong. I yield the floor.", u" SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Section 302 is identical to section 302 of the Senate amendment and section 302 of the House bill. Section 303 is identical to section 303 of the House bill. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate Section 304 is identical to section 303 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. Unauthorized disclosures of sensitive intelligence information are of great concern. Such disclosures, regardless of whether they involve an intelligence ``success'' or ``failure,'' can compromise irreplaceable sources and methods, and in some cases, can directly endanger lives. The managers note that the current Executive Order governing classified national security information (E.O. 12958) requires that, in order to classify information, the original classifying authority must determine that unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security and the original classification authority must be able to identify or describe the damage. The managers further note that the current Executive Order specifically prohibits the classification of information in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error or to prevent embarrassment to the government. It is the intent of the managers that the government may meet its burden of proof under this statute by proving that the information was classified under the applicable statute or Executive Order. The government should not be required to prove that damage to the national security actually has or will result from the unauthorized disclosure. Subsection (c)(2) is not intended by the managers to create a defense based on a technical error in the classification markings, or the lack thereof, or to create a right of the defendant to dispute the propriety of the President's classification decision. The managers believe that requiring the government to prove that the classified information is or has been properly classified under an applicable statute or Executive Order strikes the appropriate balance between protecting only that information that would damage the national security if disclosed and not creating a burden of proof that is so great that the government could never meet its burden without having to disclose unnecessarily additional classified information. Section 305 is similar to Section 304 of the House bill. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate recedes, with amendment. Section 4(b)(3) of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, provides the DCI with authority to promulgate regulations governing travel requirements for CIA officers and other federal government employees or members of the Armed Services detailed to the CIA. Subject to regulation, CIA employees and detailees to the CIA may be permitted to use non-American-flag airlines when it is determined to be essential to satisfy mission requirements. The managers believe that this type of flexibility is necessary for other personnel of the Intelligence Community carrying out intelligence community mission requirements, given the nature of the work of the Intelligence Community. This provision is not intended to supersede the CIA's current regulation relating to this matter. Rather, it is a complementary provision meant to ensure an appropriate level of latitude to the Intelligence Community to carry out the critically important activities in pursuit and defense of the national security. Section 306 is similar to Section 306 of the House bill. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate recedes, with technical amendment. Section 307 is similar to Section 304 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes, with technical modifications. Section 309 is identical to Section 306 of the Senate amendment. The House addressed this issue in the classified annex to the report accompanying the bill H.R. 4392, but had no similar statutory proposal. The House recedes. Section 310 is nearly identical to Section 309 of the Senate amendment. The House had no similar provision. The House recedes, with technical amendments. The managers agreed to technical modifications pertaining to the exact description and location of the parcel of land in Washington, D.C., to be designated in honor of the retiring senior Senator from the State of New York. Neither the House bill nor the Senate amendment contained similar provisions. Section 311 establishes the ``National Security Agency Voluntary Separation Act.'' This provision grants to the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) the authority to establish a program for early retirement and voluntary separation pay for NSA employees. The provision allows the Director to either offer early retirement for employees who are at least 50 years of age and have 20 years of service, or who have at least 25 years of service, regardless of age. The Director is also permitted to offer $25,000 in separation pay to eligible applicants. The Director is empowered to deny an employee's application for benefit under this section. The NSA is in a unique period of transition, the success of which will affect the overall capabilities of the Intelligence Community for the next several decades. The Director of Central Intelligence has claimed that the modernization of NSA is his number one priority. There are several aspects to the NSA modernization effort that range from overhauling technical collection, to restructuring acquisition, to new personnel programs, including major outsourcing initiatives. The Director needs the flexibility to institute whatever personnel changes he deems necessary if NSA modernization is to be successful. This provision will give him that needed flexibility. This section is modeled after the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public Law 103- 36). The managers understand that such authority could be seen as setting a precedent, and that other agencies may wish to have such authorities as well. In the managers' view, the situation at NSA is unique, not only in the enormity of the task of modernization, but also in the direct impact on national security should NSA modernization fail. Therefore, the managers believe that this is a necessary step to take for the specific circumstance confronting the NSA. Section 321 reorganizes the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTS-PO). The managers agree that the current DTS-PO management and Diplomatic Telecommunication Service (DTS) operations structure is fundamentally flawed and believe that a new construct for managing the DTS is necessary. They further agree that retaining the current DTS- PO organization, but with a new management approach, is the best means for improving DTS support to all U.S. government users. Funding has been authorized in this legislation for the purposes of overhauling the DTS-PO management and correcting communications and security deficiencies within the DTS. The current organizational structure requires that both the DTS-PO Director and Deputy Director concur on technical, funding, and operational issues before actions can be taken. This management-by-consensus approach abrogates the authority of the Director to make final decisions. It is clear to the managers that this management approach is not working, and that the parent organizations inherently lack the ability, and the will, to work together to resolve their mutual DTS issues of concern. Further, it is clear to the managers that the Office of Management and Budget has been frustrated in its obligations to ensure that executive branch organizations work together. Of significant concern is that, as currently operated, DTS-PO has exhibited substantial interruptions in service and presents serious security concerns for the protection of sensitive government communications. Because of these concerns, the managers, and the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the other committees of jurisdiction, believe that a new management structure for DTS-PO is required and decidedly overdue. Similarly, they are of the view that a transition to a more modern and effective telecommunications system, based on commercial best-business practices, is warranted.", u"Mr. President, the Senate Intelligence Committee just approved the nomination of Mr. Matthew Olsen to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, known as NCTC, by a unanimous voice vote. The distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee spoke on the floor earlier in support of this nomination. I would like to add to his comments and offer my support so that the Senate can take up this nomination quickly and hopefully confirm Mr. Olsen before the Senate goes on its August recess. I have tried to move quickly on this nomination because the period leading up to the tenth anniversary of 9/11 is a period of heightened threat, and one in which all parts of the national security agencies of the government need to be operating at full capacity. Mr. Olsen is currently the general counsel of the National Security Agency and has held a number of senior positions in the Department of Justice, including at the National Security Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Let me take just a moment to discuss the current terrorist threat and the role of the National Counterterrorism Center, or NCTC, which Mr. Olsen will be leading, if confirmed. The NCTC is the central agency within the U.S. government dealing with the identification, prevention, disruption, and analysis of terrorist threats. While it is best known for its role in consolidating and analyzing terrorism-related intelligence, the NCTC also plays an important role in conducting strategic planning for counterterrorism actions across the U.S. Government. As I mentioned before, I believe that the period leading up to the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks is a period of heightened threat. Despite counterterrorism pressure against al-Qaida in Pakistan--including the successful strike against Usama bin Laden in Abbottabad--the group remains dangerous and vengeful. At the same time, the threat from al-Qaida's affiliates and adherents around the world has increased and presents particular challenges. I am especially concerned about the threat to the U.S. homeland from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, as well as threats emanating from terrorist safehavens in Somalia and elsewhere. This means, to me, that this is a crucial time for our counterterrorism establishment to be at full strength. And the NCTC is a linchpin of that establishment. So I am pleased that the President moved quickly to nominate Mr. Olsen--an individual serving in a senior intelligence community position today--to take the helm of the National Counterterrorism Center. As I mentioned previously, Mr. Olsen is currently the general counsel of the National Security Agency. In that capacity, he has the challenging job of ensuring that the NSA's highly technical and highly capable signals intelligence system is operating fully within the law, and using all legal authorities available to it. Before his current position at the NSA, Mr. Olsen served in the Department of Justice in several capacities for 18 years, including 12 years as a Federal prosecutor. Among Mr. Olsen's positions at the Department of Justice, which has been the subject of some recent attention, was that of executive director of the Guantanamo Review Task Force created by Executive Order 13492. The role of the task force was to conduct a detailed review of all of the information available on each of the roughly 240 detainees being held at Guantanamo as of January 2009. It was Mr. Olsen's job to lead the large, interagency effort of more than 100 national security professionals to compile and analyze all intelligence relevant to the detainees, the feasibility of prosecuting them, the ability of a potential country receiving a detainee to mitigate the threat the detainee posed, and whether some detainees should be held in long-term Law of War detention. I will say this to my colleagues. Being the director of a large task force making recommendations on Guantanamo detainees is about as thankless, as difficult, and as controversial a position that I can imagine. Every decision would be reviewed and criticized. But the new Attorney General asked Mr. Olsen to take on this job, and he agreed to do it. That is what we admire about career professionals in government service. And we should respect and reward that dedication and willingness to take on the difficult and unpopular jobs. I note as well that Mr. Olsen has been recommended by his current and past colleagues in the current and the past administration. The Intelligence Committee received letters of recommendation from General Alexander, former Attorney General Mukasey, former DNI McConnell, all three former assistant attorneys general for National Security, former NCTC Director Mike Leiter, and many others. They have all spoken to his capability and to his character. I believe that Mr. Olsen is well qualified for the position, that he will be forthcoming with Congress, and that he will do a good job in leading the NCTC. Prior to serving on the Guantanamo Review Task Force, Mr. Olsen had been the Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the Department of Justice as well as the deputy assistant attorney general with responsibility for intelligence matters. He led the Department's effort to update the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, a process that eventually led to the passage of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. In that position he worked closely with both sides of the aisle, and was an invaluable resource as we found a compromise to update important surveillance authorities and strengthen civil liberty protections. Mr. Olsen was also previously a federal prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, chief of the office's National Security Section, and a special counsel to FBI Director Robert Mueller. The Intelligence Committee has thoroughly reviewed Mr. Olsen's background, he has answered all of our questions, and we held a hearing on July 26 on his nomination. In sum, our due diligence is complete. Now it is up to the Senate to confirm Mr. Olsen so that we do not leave the NCTC without a permanent director as we approach the 10th anniversary of 9/11. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Mr. President, also on two things that do not relate to my comments about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act--I would like to say it is a great honor for me to be able to speak on the floor for the first time with the President pro tempore presiding over the Senate. I know he is going to lead this body well and he has served with great dignity. It is an honor to be here with him on this day, even if it is December 27, 2012, and even though we are, of course, all continuing to think about the former President pro tempore and the services for him that were just completed. I would also like to say I was here when the new Member from Hawaii was sworn in and listened to Mr. Akaka's comments. I have great respect for him and the quiet dignity he brings to everything he does--from weekly demonstrations of his personal faith, which I share with him, to his name being mentioned first in all these quorum calls that have gone on now for, I assume, all the time he has been in the Senate, going back to 1981. But we will miss him, as we will miss his colleague from Hawaii, and we welcome his new colleague today. I get to welcome you personally, Mr. President, with heartfelt appreciation, as the new President pro tempore of the Senate. Following that, I wish to speak on the importance of extending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Amendments Act, I think it is called. While I was serving in the House in 2008, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act had lapsed, and we were not doing the things we should be doing. I was able there to work with my good friend Steny Hoyer, who was the majority whip at the time. I was the minority whip at the time. We had held the reverse of those jobs in the previous Congress. I liked my role as majority whip better. But Mr. Hoyer and I were able to work together, particularly with my predecessor from Missouri, Senator Bond, and Senator Rockefeller--Senator Bond was the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee; Senator Rockefeller was the chairman--as we tried to negotiate how we would extend the FISA Amendments Act. My colleagues here today--many of them remember the challenge we faced in getting that bill done. Many of them, including the current chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, know the importance we placed on the work that is done every day under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. At the time in 2008, we had a very concrete set of examples of what would happen without FISA because, frankly, we were effectively without it. For periods of time in 2007 and 2008, the National Security Agency was unable to fully perform its mission in monitoring many of the activities of known terrorists who were overseas and particularly found it impossible to focus in on new targets--and, again, those are known terrorists not in this country. It was wrong that Congress allowed the act to lapse, and it would be dangerously wrong if we let it happen again on December 31 of this year. Five years ago, I sat through many disturbing intelligence briefings. I remember the sense of urgency expressed by the then-Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell; the then-CIA Director Michael Hayden; and the then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey, as they discussed the consequences we would have to deal with if we continued not to move forward and put this act back in place. The agreement we reached balanced the concerns of those who feared the National Security Agency had overreached with the ongoing authority the intelligence community needed to protect the country. That agreement is before us again to be reauthorized for another 5 years. The FISA Amendments Act protects individuals in the United States from so-called reverse targeting. It is one of the concerns people had 5 years ago. This would be a process which, in theory, could be used to monitor the communications of American citizens under the guise of spying on terrorists. It also continues to ensure that any communication originating in the United States caught in the FISA process is minimized. What does that mean? It means it is handled in a way that American communications cannot be examined unless they have further justification. Meanwhile, the bill updated the antiquated way we monitor terrorist communications, ensuring that our intelligence professionals no longer have to spend countless hours trying to figure out whether an overseas terrorist's communications are traveling over fiber optic wires or through a satellite. I am concerned the amendments we are looking at here not only disrupt the delicate balance we struck in 2008 but also they may mean that this act does not get extended. The House has voted on a straight extension. The only thing standing between the continuation of that 2008 hard-fought and I think properly balanced agreement is a Senate vote on what the House has passed. I will be voting against the amendments. I think some of these amendments are well intended and, in fact, if they were not part of this bill, studies and other things that are being proposed might very well be worth doing but not worth doing in a way that would allow FISA to expire in just a few short days. I am pleased to have been able to serve on both the Senate and the House Select Committees on Intelligence and have witnessed firsthand the important role that FISA plays in protecting our country. I am thankful for the intelligence professionals who serve our country, both in the United States and overseas. I hope, as they observe this debate we are having about FISA, they see a Congress that supports them, supports their families, and supports their important work. Unless the world changes--and, hopefully, it will change--we should never allow our ability to track terrorists overseas to go dark again. That is why it is critically important we pass this bill in the next few hours, why we extend FISA for another 5 years, and give our intelligence professionals the tools they need to protect our country and, frankly, give the Congress, the President, and, most importantly, the American people the obligation to look at this authority again in 5 years and see if we still need it. Today, we need to extend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. I hope we do that. I yield the floor.", u"I would also like to briefly discuss current National Security Agency practices, including its bulk data collection programs and the implication these programs have for the privacy of Nevadans and millions of other law-abiding citizens. Due to published reports in newspapers around the world, Nevadans are well aware that the Federal Government has been collecting phone data of law-abiding citizens without their knowledge through a process known as bulk collection. These practices are mostly authorized by section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. Specifically, section 215 permits the FBI to seek a court order directing a business to turn over certain records when there are reasonable grounds to believe the information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation of international terrorism. ``Relevance'' has been found by the courts to be a broad standard that, in effect, allows large volumes of data to be collected. These same records can be combed through in order to identify smaller amounts of information that are relevant to an ongoing investigation. In other words, it has been established that section 215 allows for massive amounts of data to be collected in order to find the tiny amount of data that would solve an investigation regarding international terrorism. The court's reasoning that this is permitted is because, when submitted, it is likely that the data will produce information that will then help the FBI. Millions of Americans' call records are collected and stored by the NSA because a few numbers may solve an authorized investigation. Supporters of bulk collection practices have defended this program as an important tool in the fight against terror. They have said this is a mechanism to access the logs quickly, and they are not actually listening to the content. President Obama even said: When it comes to telephone calls, nobody is listening to your telephone call. Instead, the government was just sifting through this so-called metadata. The President is correct. They are not listening to the actual calls like the FBI conducting a wiretap, but let me outline that the government can figure out what is going on from those call logs. For example, they will know that an American citizen in Ely, NV, received a call from the local NRA office and then called their Representative and Senators. But they claim that the content of that call remains safe from government intrusion or they will also know that a Nevadan from Las Vegas called a suicide prevention hotline and spoke to an individual for 12 minutes, but they will not know what that person discussed. The question I have is this: Why does the Federal Government have to house this data? I believe it is because Congress has authorized a massive surrender of our constituents' privacy. I want to be clear: I share the concerns of all Americans that we must protect ourselves against threats to the homeland. I also believe we must continue to understand that terrorism is very real and that the United States is the target of those looking to undermine the freedoms we hold as a core of our national identity. Are we sacrificing our own freedoms in the process? Are we sacrificing our constitutional rights that are afforded under the Fourth Amendment? If so, this is a steep price to pay to protect Americans from terrorism. So the next question must be: If the price to protect Americans from terrorism is an incredible loss of individual privacy, what are the results of this program? What has the bulk collection program provided in tangible results that justifies a privacy intrusion of this level? The answer is that two cases have been solved in the collection of millions of records through the use of the program authorized by section 215. We know that because on October 2, 2013, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Leahy, asked the NSA Director Keith Alexander the following question: At our last hearing, the deputy director, Mr. Ingliss, stated that there's only really one example of a case where, but for the use of Section 215, both phone records collection, terrorist activity was stopped. Was Mr. Ingliss right? To which Director Alexander responded, ``He's right. I believe he said two, Chairman.'' Congress has authorized the collection of millions of law-abiding citizens' telephone metadata for years, and it has only solved two ongoing FBI investigations. Of those two investigations, the NSA has publicly identified one. In fact, that case would have easily been handled by obtaining a warrant and going to that telephone company. The case involved an individual in San Diego who was convicted of sending $8,500 to Somalia in support of al-Shabaab, the terrorist organization claiming responsibility for the Kenyan mall attack. The American phone records allowed the NSA to determine that a U.S. phone was used to contact an individual associated with this terrorist organization. I am appreciative that the NSA was able to apprehend this individual, but it does not provide overwhelming evidence that this program is necessary. As Senator Ron Wyden from Oregon noted, the NSA could have gotten a court order to get the phone records in question. In essence, Congress has authorized a program that invades the privacy of millions of Americans with little to show for it. The results simply do not justify this massive invasion of our privacy, and that is why I want to end bulk collection practices authorized under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. I joined Senator Leahy to introduce the bipartisan, bicameral USA Freedom Act. This legislation, among other things, will rein in the dragnet collection of data by the National Security Agency. It will stop the bulk collection of Americans' communication records by ending the authorization provided by section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. Some in this Chamber will argue this removes a massive tool for the NSA to assist the FBI. I disagree with that. All this legislation does is shut down the collection of millions of Americans' metadata by the NSA. If the FBI needs a telephone number, they can go to a FISA judge and get a warrant. The phone company can still provide that data. Chances are a major phone provider will have that data as they keep all detailed records for at least 1 year. When talking broadly about how certain technological developments should be incorporated in our justice system, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court William Douglas once said: The privacy and dignity of our citizens are being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each step may be of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a society quite unlike any we have seen--a society in which government may intrude into the secret regions of a person's life. Here in the Congress it is our responsibility to take great care to acknowledge each possible step that could whittle away our privacy. We must examine its necessity carefully and reasonably. In this case, I do not believe such practices are warranted. We can continue to protect Americans from threats of terrorism without infringing on individual privacy that the Constitution protects under the Fourth Amendment. We should shut down bulk collection practices. With that, I thank the Chair, yield the floor, and suggest the absence of a quorum.", u" Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence Section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (F), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: ``(G) in carrying out this subsection, have the authority-- ``(i) to direct the development, deployment, and utilization of systems of common concern for elements of the intelligence community, or that support the activities of such elements, related to the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information; and ``(ii) without regard to any provision of law relating to the transfer, reprogramming, obligation, or expenditure of funds, other than the provisions of this Act and the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458), to expend funds for purposes associated with the development, deployment, and utilization of such systems, which funds may be received and utilized by any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government for such purposes; and ``(H) for purposes of addressing critical gaps in intelligence information sharing or access capabilities, have the authority to transfer funds appropriated for a program within the National Intelligence Program to a program funded by appropriations not within the National Intelligence Program, consistent with paragraphs (3) through (7) of subsection (d).''. Section 102A(i)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i)(3)) is amended by inserting before the period the following: ``, any Deputy Director of National Intelligence, or the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community''. Section 102A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(b)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``Unless''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall-- ``(A) have access to all national intelligence, including intelligence reports, operational data, and other associated information, concerning the human intelligence operations of any element of the intelligence community authorized to undertake such collection; ``(B) consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods and applicable requirements in Executive Order 12333 (or any successor order) regarding the retention and dissemination of information concerning United States persons, ensure maximum access to the intelligence information contained in the information referred to in subparagraph (A) throughout the intelligence community; and ``(C) consistent with subparagraph (B), provide within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a mechanism for intelligence community analysts and other officers with appropriate clearances and an official need-to-know to gain access to information referred to in subparagraph (A) or (B) when relevant to their official responsibilities.''. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(s) Additional Administrative Authorities.--(1) Notwithstanding section 1532 of title 31, United States Code, or any other provision of law prohibiting the interagency financing of activities described in clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A), in the performance of the responsibilities, authorities, and duties of the Director of National Intelligence or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence-- ``(A) the Director may authorize the use of interagency financing for-- ``(i) national intelligence centers established by the Director under section 119B; and ``(ii) boards, commissions, councils, committees, and similar groups established by the Director; and ``(B) upon the authorization of the Director, any department, agency, or element of the United States Government, including any element of the intelligence community, may fund or participate in the funding of such activities. ``(2) No provision of law enacted after the date of the enactment of this subsection shall be deemed to limit or supersede the authority in paragraph (1) unless such provision makes specific reference to the authority in that paragraph.''. Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``WITH'' and inserting ``OF HEADQUARTERS WITH HEADQUARTERS OF''; (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the Office''; and (3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the headquarters of any other element''. (a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted by Elements of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be carried out by elements of the intelligence community.''. (b) Development of Technology Goals.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (8); and (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraphs: ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology needs of the intelligence community; ``(6) under the direction of the Director, establish engineering standards and specifications applicable to each acquisition of a major system (as that term is defined in section 506A(e)(3)) by the intelligence community; ``(7) ensure that each acquisition program of the intelligence community for a major system (as so defined) complies with the standards and specifications established under paragraph (6); and''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and Technology shall-- ``(1) systematically identify and assess the most significant intelligence challenges that require technical solutions; ``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of research and design programs of the elements of the intelligence community to meet the requirements of the intelligence community for timely support; and ``(3) assist the Director of National Intelligence in establishing research and development priorities and projects for the intelligence community that-- ``(A) are consistent with current or future national intelligence requirements; ``(B) address deficiencies or gaps in the collection, processing, analysis, or dissemination of national intelligence; ``(C) take into account funding constraints in program development and acquisition; and ``(D) address system requirements from collection to final dissemination (also known as `end-to-end architecture').''. (c) Report.--(1) Not later than June 30, 2007, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing a strategy for the development and use of technology in the intelligence community through 2021. (2) The report shall include-- (A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the use of technology; (B) goals for advanced research and development and a strategy to achieve such goals; (C) an explanation of how each advanced research and development project funded under the National Intelligence Program addresses an identified intelligence gap; (D) a list of all current and projected research and development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation dates, and estimated completion dates; and (E) a plan to incorporate technology from research and development projects into National Intelligence Program acquisition programs. (3) The report may be submitted in classified form. (a) Appointment.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended by striking ``the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence''. (2) Applicability.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply with respect to any appointment of an individual as Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community that is made on or after that date. (b) Title.--Such section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'' the first place it appears. (a) Establishment.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103G the following new section: (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting the following: ``(a) In General.-- ``(1) Establishment.--The''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403- 3(c)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraphs: ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. ``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center.''. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 119B the following new section: (a) In General.--Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by inserting before section 701 the following new section: (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (50 U.S.C. 403e-1) is amended to read as follows: ``(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the same manner as such authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of the Office. ``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency in the same manner as such authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of the Agency.''. (b) Repeal of Obsolete Authority.--That section is further amended-- (1) by striking subsection (c); and (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c). (c) Expeditious Payment.--That section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection (d): ``(d) Expeditious Payment.--Payment of an award under this authority in this section shall be made as expeditiously as is practicable after the making of the award.''. (d) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (b), by striking ``to the Central Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff'' and inserting ``to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or to the Central Intelligence Agency''; and (2) in subsection (c), as redesignated by subsection (b)(2) of this section, by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (e) Technical and Stylistic Amendments.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``Personnel Eligible for Awards.--'' after ``(b)''; (B) by striking ``subsection (a) of this section'' and inserting ``subsection (a)''; and (C) by striking ``a date five years before the date of enactment of this section'' and inserting ``December 9, 1978''; and (2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by inserting ``Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--'' after ``(c)''. (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (d), (g), (h), (i), and (j); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (k), (l), and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively. (b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''. Section 4(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or''; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the Director's designee.''. (a) Authority To Exempt.--The Director of National Intelligence may prescribe regulations to exempt any system of records within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from the applicability of the provisions of subsections (c)(3), (c)(4), and (d) of section 552a of title 5, United States Code. (b) Promulgation Requirements.--In prescribing any regulations under subsection (a), the Director shall comply with the requirements (including general notice requirements) of subsections (b), (c), and (e) of section 553 of title 5, United States Code. (a) Appointment of Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--Subsection (a) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a) is amended by inserting ``from civilian life'' after ``who shall be appointed''. (b) Establishment of Position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--Such section is further amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) as subsections (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b): ``(b) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director. ``(3) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the absence or disability of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or during a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (c) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of such section, as redesignated by subsection (b)(1) of this section, is further amended by striking ``subsection (d)'' and inserting ``subsection (e)''. (d) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item: ``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (e) Role of DNI in Appointment.--Section 106(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(C) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (f) Military Status of Individual Serving as Director of Central Intelligence Agency or Administratively Performing Duties of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.-- (1) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces who is serving as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or is engaged in administrative performance of the duties of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall not, while continuing in such service, or in the administrative performance of such duties, after that date-- (A) be subject to supervision or control by the Secretary of Defense or by any officer or employee of the Department of Defense; or (B) exercise, by reason of the officer's status as a commissioned officer, any supervision or control with respect to any of the military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense except as otherwise authorized by law. (2) Except as provided in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), the service, or the administrative performance of duties, described in that paragraph by an officer described in that paragraph shall not affect the status, position, rank, or grade of such officer in the Armed Forces, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of such status, position, rank, or grade. (3) A commissioned officer described in paragraph (1), while serving, or continuing in the administrative performance of duties, as described in that paragraph and while remaining on active duty, shall continue to receive military pay and allowances. Funds from which such pay and allowances are paid shall be reimbursed from funds available to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (g) Effective Date and Applicability.-- (1) Director of central intelligence agency.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall-- (A) take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; and (B) apply upon the occurrence of any act creating a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency after such date, except that if the vacancy occurs by resignation from such position of the individual serving in such position on such date, that individual may continue serving in such position after such resignation until the individual appointed to succeed such resigning individual as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position. (2) Deputy director of central intelligence agency.--The amendments made by subsections (b) through (e) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (A) the date of the nomination by the President of an individual to serve as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, except that the individual administratively performing the duties of the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to the position of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency by the individual administratively performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Responsibility of Director of Central Intelligence Agency Under National Security Act of 1947.--Subsection (e) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a), as redesignated by section 421(b)(1) of this Act, is further amended-- (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4): ``(4) protect intelligence sources and methods of the Central Intelligence Agency from unauthorized disclosure, consistent with any direction issued by the President or the Director of National Intelligence; and''. (b) Protection Under Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section 102A(i)'' and all that follows through ``unauthorized disclosure'' and inserting ``sections 102A(i) and 104A(e)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i), 403-4a(e)(4))''. (c) Construction With Exemption From Requirement for Disclosure of Information to Public.--Section 104A(e)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by subsection (a), and section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended by subsection (b), shall be treated as statutes that specifically exempt from disclosure the matters specified in such sections for purposes of section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code. (d) Technical Amendments to Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended-- (1) in the subsection caption, by striking ``of DCI''; (2) by striking ``section 102A(i)'' and inserting ``sections 102A(i) and 104A(e)(4)''; (3) by striking ``of National Intelligence''; and (4) by inserting ``of the Central Intelligence Agency'' after ``methods''. (a) Additional Exception.--Subsection (h) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a), as redesignated by section 421(b)(1) of this Act, is further amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and (B) by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``position or category of positions'' each place it appears and inserting ``individual, individuals, position, or category of positions''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any individual in the Directorate of Intelligence or the National Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency who is serving in a Senior Intelligence Service position as of December 23, 2005, regardless of whether such individual is a member of the Senior Intelligence Service.''. (b) Report on Waivers.--Section 611(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 118 Stat. 3955) is amended-- (1) by striking the first sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress a report that identifies individuals who, or positions within the Senior Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the National Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency that, are determined by the Director to require a waiver under subsection (h) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) and redesignated by section 421(b)(1) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.''; and (2) in the second sentence-- (A) by striking ``section 104A(g)(2), as so added'' and inserting ``subsection (h)(2) of section 104A, as so added and redesignated''; and (B) by striking ``position or category of positions'' and inserting ``individual, individuals, position, or category of positions''. Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)''; (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated-- (A) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the protection''; and (B) by striking the semicolon and inserting ``, and the protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) Authorize personnel engaged in the performance of protective functions authorized pursuant to subparagraph (A), when engaged in the performance of such functions, to make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States, if such personnel have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony, except that any authority pursuant to this subparagraph may be exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Director and the Attorney General and such personnel may not exercise any authority for the service of civil process or for the investigation of criminal offenses;''. (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to United States citizens for the service of such individuals before 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated company while such company was owned or controlled by the United States Government and operated or managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Report Elements.--(1) The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (A) The history of Air America and associated companies before 1977, including a description of-- (i) the relationship between such companies and the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the United States Government; (ii) the workforce of such companies; (iii) the missions performed by such companies and their employees for the United States; and (iv) the casualties suffered by employees of such companies in the course of their employment with such companies. (B) A description of the retirement benefits contracted for or promised to the employees of such companies before 1977, the contributions made by such employees for such benefits, the retirement benefits actually paid such employees, the entitlement of such employees to the payment of future retirement benefits, and the likelihood that former employees of such companies will receive any future retirement benefits. (C) An assessment of the difference between-- (i) the retirement benefits that former employees of such companies have received or will receive by virtue of their employment with such companies; and (ii) the retirement benefits that such employees would have received and in the future receive if such employees had been, or would now be, treated as employees of the United States whose services while in the employ of such companies had been or would now be credited as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits. (D) The recommendations of the Director regarding the advisability of legislative action to treat employment at such companies as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in light of the relationship between such companies and the United States Government and the services and sacrifices of such employees to and for the United States, and if legislative action is considered advisable, a proposal for such action and an assessment of its costs. (2) The Director of National Intelligence shall include in the report any views of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on the matters covered by the report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate. (c) Assistance of Comptroller General.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall, upon the request of the Director of National Intelligence and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information, assist the Director in the preparation of the report required by subsection (a). (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``Air America'' means Air America, Incorporated. (2) The term ``associated company'' means any company associated with or subsidiary to Air America, including Air Asia Company Limited and the Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport, Incorporated. (a) Termination of Employees.--Subsection (d)(1)(C) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``terminated either by'' and all that follows and inserting ``terminated-- ``(i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the employee; ``(ii) by the employee voluntarily; or ``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the employee to maintain such level of academic standing in the educational course of training as the Director of the National Security Agency shall have specified in the agreement of the employee under this subsection; and''. (b) Authority To Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With NSA.--Subsection (e) of such section is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 21. (a) The Director is authorized to designate personnel of the Agency to perform protective functions for the Director and for any personnel of the Agency designated by the Director. ``(b)(1) In the performance of protective functions under this section, personnel of the Agency designated to perform protective functions pursuant to subsection (a) are authorized, when engaged in the performance of such functions, to make arrests without a warrant for-- ``(A) any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel; or ``(B) any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if such personnel have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony. ``(2) The authority in paragraph (1) may be exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Director and the Attorney General. ``(3) Personnel of the Agency designated to perform protective functions pursuant to subsection (a) shall not exercise any authority for the service of civil process or the investigation of criminal offenses. ``(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect any authority under any other provision of law relating to the performance of protective functions.''. (a) Coverage Under Inspector General Act of 1978.-- Subsection (a)(2) of section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8G) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``the Defense Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,''; (2) by inserting ``the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the National Endowment for the Arts,''; and (3) by inserting ``the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency,'' after ``the National Labor Relations Board,''. (b) Certain Designations Under Inspector General Act of 1978.--Subsection (a) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8H) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) The Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency shall be designees of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for purposes of this section.''. (c) Power of Heads of Elements Over Investigations.-- Subsection (d) of section 8G of that Act-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(d)''; (2) in the second sentence of paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection, by striking ``The head'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (2), the head''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense may prohibit the Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community specified in subparagraph (D) from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation if the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. ``(B) If the Director or the Secretary exercises the authority under subparagraph (A), the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, shall submit to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E) an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of the authority not later than seven days after the exercise of the authority. ``(C) At the same time the Director or the Secretary submits under subparagraph (B) a statement on the exercise of the authority in subparagraph (A) to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E), the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, shall notify the Inspector General of such element of the submittal of such statement and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such statement. The Inspector General may submit to such committees of Congress any comments on a notice or statement received by the Inspector General under this subparagraph that the Inspector General considers appropriate. ``(D) The elements of the intelligence community specified in this subparagraph are as follows: ``(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(ii) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(iii) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(iv) The National Security Agency. ``(E) The committees of Congress specified in this subparagraph are-- ``(i) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''. (a) Director of National Security Agency.--The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after the first section the following new section: ``Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law.''. (b) Director of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.-- Section 441(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2) The Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.''. (c) Director of National Reconnaissance Office.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (d) Positions of Importance and Responsibility.-- (1) Designation of positions.--The President may designate any of the positions referred to in paragraph (2) as positions of importance and responsibility under section 601 of title 10, United States Code. (2) Covered positions.--The positions referred to in this paragraph are as follows: (A) The Director of the National Security Agency. (B) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (C) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (e) Effective Date and Applicability.--(1) The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b), and subsection (c), shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (A) the date of the nomination by the President of an individual to serve in the position concerned, except that the individual serving in such position as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to such position, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of such position by the individual performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Subsection (d) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. Section 442(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2)(A) As directed by the Director of National Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall also analyze, disseminate, and incorporate into the National System for Geospatial-Intelligence, likenesses, videos, or presentations produced by ground-based platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations or available as open-source information. ``(B) The authority provided by this paragraph does not include the authority to manage or direct the tasking of, set requirements and priorities for, set technical requirements related to, or modify any classification or dissemination limitations related to the collection of, handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations.''; and (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (1)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (1) and (2)''. The Secretary of Defense shall, during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2007, delegate to the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency personnel security authority with respect to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (including authority relating to the use of contractor personnel in investigations and adjudications for security clearances) that is identical to the personnel security authority of the Director of the National Security Agency with respect to the National Security Agency. (a) Authority To Pay Incentive.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may pay a cash award authorized by section 4523 of title 5, United States Code, in accordance with the provisions of such section, to any employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation described in subsection (b) as if such employee were a law enforcement officer as specified in such section. (b) Covered Employees.--An employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation described in this subsection is any employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation-- (1) who uses foreign language skills in support of the analyses, investigations, or operations of the Bureau to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities (or maintains foreign language skills for purposes of such support); and (2) whom the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, subject to the joint guidance of the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, may designate for purposes of this section. Title I of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 23 the following new section: Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H)-- (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine Corps,''; and (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''. Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after ``subsection (a)),''. The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended as follows: (1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)-- (A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``subsection''; (B) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); and (iii) in paragraph (5)(B), by striking ``or agency involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''; (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``paragraph''; and (D) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after ``Acquisition''. (2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''. (3) In section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; and (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''. (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458) is further amended as follows: (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 458(e)(10)(B)), by striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and inserting ``Department of Justice''. (2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)-- (A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''. (3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''. (4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''. (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows: (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)-- (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional culture''; (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; and (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''. (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and inserting ``Federal''; and (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and inserting ``specific''. (a) References to Head of Intelligence Community.--Title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'': (1) Section 193(d)(2). (2) Section 193(e). (3) Section 201(a). (4) Section 201(b)(1). (5) Section 201(c)(1). (6) Section 425(a). (7) Section 431(b)(1). (8) Section 441(c). (9) Section 441(d). (10) Section 443(d). (11) Section 2273(b)(1). (12) Section 2723(a). (b) Clerical Amendments.--Such title is further amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'': (1) Section 441(c). (2) Section 443(d). (c) Reference to Head of Central Intelligence Agency.-- Section 444 of such title is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a).''. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended-- (1) in the subsection caption, by striking ``Foreign''; and (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears. (b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National Intelligence'' after ``Director''. (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to read as follows: (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence. (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item: ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'': (A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii). (B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B). (C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)). (D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B). (E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)). (F) Section 5342(a)(1) (in clause (K)). (G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E). (H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)((XIII). (2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' both places it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (B) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows: ``Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications''.", u" Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence Section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (F), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: ``(G) in carrying out this subsection, have the authority-- ``(i) to direct the development, deployment, and utilization of systems of common concern for elements of the intelligence community, or that support the activities of such elements, related to the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information; and ``(ii) without regard to any provision of law relating to the transfer, reprogramming, obligation, or expenditure of funds, other than the provisions of this Act and the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458), to expend funds for purposes associated with the development, deployment, and utilization of such systems, which funds may be received and utilized by any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government for such purposes; and ``(H) for purposes of addressing critical gaps in intelligence information sharing or access capabilities, have the authority to transfer funds appropriated for a program within the National Intelligence Program to a program funded by appropriations not within the National Intelligence Program, consistent with paragraphs (3) through (7) of subsection (d).''. Section 102A(i)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i)(3)) is amended by inserting before the period the following: ``, any Deputy Director of National Intelligence, or the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community''. Section 102A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(b)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``Unless''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall-- ``(A) have access to all national intelligence, including intelligence reports, operational data, and other associated information, concerning the human intelligence operations of any element of the intelligence community authorized to undertake such collection; ``(B) consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods and applicable requirements in Executive Order 12333 (or any successor order) regarding the retention and dissemination of information concerning United States persons, ensure maximum access to the intelligence information contained in the information referred to in subparagraph (A) throughout the intelligence community; and ``(C) consistent with subparagraph (B), provide within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a mechanism for intelligence community analysts and other officers with appropriate clearances and an official need-to-know to gain access to information referred to in subparagraph (A) or (B) when relevant to their official responsibilities.''. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(s) Additional Administrative Authorities.--(1) Notwithstanding section 1532 of title 31, United States Code, or any other provision of law prohibiting the interagency financing of activities described in clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A), in the performance of the responsibilities, authorities, and duties of the Director of National Intelligence or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence-- ``(A) the Director may authorize the use of interagency financing for-- ``(i) national intelligence centers established by the Director under section 119B; and ``(ii) boards, commissions, councils, committees, and similar groups established by the Director; and ``(B) upon the authorization of the Director, any department, agency, or element of the United States Government, including any element of the intelligence community, may fund or participate in the funding of such activities. ``(2) No provision of law enacted after the date of the enactment of this subsection shall be deemed to limit or supersede the authority in paragraph (1) unless such provision makes specific reference to the authority in that paragraph.''. Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``WITH'' and inserting ``OF HEADQUARTERS WITH HEADQUARTERS OF''; (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the Office''; and (3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the headquarters of any other element''. (a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted by Elements of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be carried out by elements of the intelligence community.''. (b) Development of Technology Goals.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (8); and (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraphs: ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology needs of the intelligence community; ``(6) under the direction of the Director, establish engineering standards and specifications applicable to each acquisition of a major system (as that term is defined in section 506A(e)(3)) by the intelligence community; ``(7) ensure that each acquisition program of the intelligence community for a major system (as so defined) complies with the standards and specifications established under paragraph (6); and''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and Technology shall-- ``(1) systematically identify and assess the most significant intelligence challenges that require technical solutions; ``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of research and design programs of the elements of the intelligence community to meet the requirements of the intelligence community for timely support; and ``(3) assist the Director of National Intelligence in establishing research and development priorities and projects for the intelligence community that-- ``(A) are consistent with current or future national intelligence requirements; ``(B) address deficiencies or gaps in the collection, processing, analysis, or dissemination of national intelligence; ``(C) take into account funding constraints in program development and acquisition; and ``(D) address system requirements from collection to final dissemination (also known as `end-to-end architecture').''. (c) Report.--(1) Not later than June 30, 2007, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing a strategy for the development and use of technology in the intelligence community through 2021. (2) The report shall include-- (A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the use of technology; (B) goals for advanced research and development and a strategy to achieve such goals; (C) an explanation of how each advanced research and development project funded under the National Intelligence Program addresses an identified intelligence gap; (D) a list of all current and projected research and development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation dates, and estimated completion dates; and (E) a plan to incorporate technology from research and development projects into National Intelligence Program acquisition programs. (3) The report may be submitted in classified form. (a) Appointment.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended by striking ``the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence''. (2) Applicability.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply with respect to any appointment of an individual as Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community that is made on or after that date. (b) Title.--Such section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'' the first place it appears. (a) Establishment.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103G the following new section: (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting the following: ``(a) In General.-- ``(1) Establishment.--The''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403- 3(c)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraphs: ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. ``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center.''. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 119B the following new section: (a) In General.--Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by inserting before section 701 the following new section: (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (50 U.S.C. 403e-1) is amended to read as follows: ``(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the same manner as such authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of the Office. ``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency in the same manner as such authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of the Agency.''. (b) Repeal of Obsolete Authority.--That section is further amended-- (1) by striking subsection (c); and (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c). (c) Expeditious Payment.--That section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection (d): ``(d) Expeditious Payment.--Payment of an award under this authority in this section shall be made as expeditiously as is practicable after the making of the award.''. (d) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (b), by striking ``to the Central Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff'' and inserting ``to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or to the Central Intelligence Agency''; and (2) in subsection (c), as redesignated by subsection (b)(2) of this section, by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (e) Technical and Stylistic Amendments.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``Personnel Eligible for Awards.--'' after ``(b)''; (B) by striking ``subsection (a) of this section'' and inserting ``subsection (a)''; and (C) by striking ``a date five years before the date of enactment of this section'' and inserting ``December 9, 1978''; and (2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by inserting ``Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--'' after ``(c)''. (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (d), (g), (h), (i), and (j); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (k), (l), and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively. (b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''. Section 4(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or''; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the Director's designee.''. (a) Authority To Exempt.--The Director of National Intelligence may prescribe regulations to exempt any system of records within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from the applicability of the provisions of subsections (c)(3), (c)(4), and (d) of section 552a of title 5, United States Code. (b) Promulgation Requirements.--In prescribing any regulations under subsection (a), the Director shall comply with the requirements (including general notice requirements) of subsections (b), (c), and (e) of section 553 of title 5, United States Code. (a) Establishment of Position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) as subsections (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b): ``(b) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director. ``(3) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the absence or disability of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or during a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of such section, as redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is further amended by striking ``subsection (d)'' and inserting ``subsection (e)''. (c) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item: ``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (d) Role of DNI in Appointment.--Section 106(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(C) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (e) Military Status of Individual Serving as Director of Central Intelligence Agency or Administratively Performing Duties of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.-- (1) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces who is serving as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or is engaged in administrative performance of the duties of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall not, while continuing in such service, or in the administrative performance of such duties, after that date-- (A) be subject to supervision or control by the Secretary of Defense or by any officer or employee of the Department of Defense; or (B) exercise, by reason of the officer's status as a commissioned officer, any supervision or control with respect to any of the military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense except as otherwise authorized by law. (2) Except as provided in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), the service, or the administrative performance of duties, described in that paragraph by an officer described in that paragraph shall not affect the status, position, rank, or grade of such officer in the Armed Forces, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of such status, position, rank, or grade. (3) A commissioned officer described in paragraph (1), while serving, or continuing in the administrative performance of duties, as described in that paragraph and while remaining on active duty, shall continue to receive military pay and allowances. Funds from which such pay and allowances are paid shall be reimbursed from funds available to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (f) Effective Date and Applicability.--The amendments made by subsections (a) through (d) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply upon the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency by the individual administratively performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Responsibility of Director of Central Intelligence Agency Under National Security Act of 1947.--Subsection (e) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a), as redesignated by section 421(b)(1) of this Act, is further amended-- (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4): ``(4) protect intelligence sources and methods of the Central Intelligence Agency from unauthorized disclosure, consistent with any direction issued by the President or the Director of National Intelligence; and''. (b) Protection Under Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section 102A(i)'' and all that follows through ``unauthorized disclosure'' and inserting ``sections 102A(i) and 104A(e)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i), 403-4a(e)(4))''. (c) Construction With Exemption From Requirement for Disclosure of Information to Public.--Section 104A(e)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by subsection (a), and section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended by subsection (b), shall be treated as statutes that specifically exempt from disclosure the matters specified in such sections for purposes of section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code. (d) Technical Amendments to Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended-- (1) in the subsection caption, by striking ``of DCI''; (2) by striking ``section 102A(i)'' and inserting ``sections 102A(i) and 104A(e)(4)''; (3) by striking ``of National Intelligence''; and (4) by inserting ``of the Central Intelligence Agency'' (a) Additional Exception.--Subsection (h) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a), as redesignated by section 421(b)(1) of this Act, is further amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and (B) by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``position or category of positions'' each place it appears and inserting ``individual, individuals, position, or category of positions''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any individual in the Directorate of Intelligence or the National Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency who is serving in a Senior Intelligence Service position as of December 23, 2005, regardless of whether such individual is a member of the Senior Intelligence Service.''. (b) Report on Waivers.--Section 611(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 118 Stat. 3955) is amended-- (1) by striking the first sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress a report that identifies individuals who, or positions within the Senior Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the National Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency that, are determined by the Director to require a waiver under subsection (h) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) and redesignated by section 421(b)(1) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.''; and (2) in the second sentence-- (A) by striking ``section 104A(g)(2), as so added'' and inserting ``subsection (h)(2) of section 104A, as so added and redesignated''; and (B) by striking ``position or category of positions'' and inserting ``individual, individuals, position, or category of positions''. Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)''; (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated-- (A) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the protection''; and (B) by striking the semicolon and inserting ``, and the protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) Authorize personnel engaged in the performance of protective functions authorized pursuant to subparagraph (A), when engaged in the performance of such functions, to make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States, if such personnel have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony, except that any authority pursuant to this subparagraph may be exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Director and the Attorney General and such personnel may not exercise any authority for the service of civil process or for the investigation of criminal offenses;''. (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to United States citizens for the service of such individuals before 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated company while such company was owned or controlled by the United States Government and operated or managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Report Elements.--(1) The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (A) The history of Air America and associated companies before 1977, including a description of-- (i) the relationship between such companies and the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the United States Government; (ii) the workforce of such companies; (iii) the missions performed by such companies and their employees for the United States; and (iv) the casualties suffered by employees of such companies in the course of their employment with such companies. (B) A description of the retirement benefits contracted for or promised to the employees of such companies before 1977, the contributions made by such employees for such benefits, the retirement benefits actually paid such employees, the entitlement of such employees to the payment of future retirement benefits, and the likelihood that former employees of such companies will receive any future retirement benefits. (C) An assessment of the difference between-- (i) the retirement benefits that former employees of such companies have received or will receive by virtue of their employment with such companies; and (ii) the retirement benefits that such employees would have received and in the future receive if such employees had been, or would now be, treated as employees of the United States whose services while in the employ of such companies had been or would now be credited as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits. (D) The recommendations of the Director regarding the advisability of legislative action to treat employment at such companies as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in light of the relationship between such companies and the United States Government and the services and sacrifices of such employees to and for the United States, and if legislative action is considered advisable, a proposal for such action and an assessment of its costs. (2) The Director of National Intelligence shall include in the report any views of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on the matters covered by the report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate. (c) Assistance of Comptroller General.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall, upon the request of the Director of National Intelligence and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information, assist the Director in the preparation of the report required by subsection (a). (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``Air America'' means Air America, Incorporated. (2) The term ``associated company'' means any company associated with or subsidiary to Air America, including Air Asia Company Limited and the Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport, Incorporated. (a) Termination of Employees.--Subsection (d)(1)(C) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``terminated either by'' and all that follows and inserting ``terminated-- ``(i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the employee; ``(ii) by the employee voluntarily; or ``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the employee to maintain such level of academic standing in the educational course of training as the Director of the National Security Agency shall have specified in the agreement of the employee under this subsection; and''. (b) Authority To Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With NSA.--Subsection (e) of such section is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 21. (a) The Director is authorized to designate personnel of the Agency to perform protective functions for the Director and for any personnel of the Agency designated by the Director. ``(b)(1) In the performance of protective functions under this section, personnel of the Agency designated to perform protective functions pursuant to subsection (a) are authorized, when engaged in the performance of such functions, to make arrests without a warrant for-- ``(A) any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel; or ``(B) any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if such personnel have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony. ``(2) The authority in paragraph (1) may be exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Director and the Attorney General. ``(3) Personnel of the Agency designated to perform protective functions pursuant to subsection (a) shall not exercise any authority for the service of civil process or the investigation of criminal offenses. ``(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect any authority under any other provision of law relating to the performance of protective functions.''. (a) Coverage Under Inspector General Act of 1978.-- Subsection (a)(2) of section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8G) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``the Defense Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,''; (2) by inserting ``the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the National Endowment for the Arts,''; and (3) by inserting ``the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency,'' after ``the National Labor Relations Board,''. (b) Certain Designations Under Inspector General Act of 1978.--Subsection (a) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8H) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) The Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency shall be designees of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for purposes of this section.''. (c) Power of Heads of Elements Over Investigations.-- Subsection (d) of section 8G of that Act-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(d)''; (2) in the second sentence of paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection, by striking ``The head'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (2), the head''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense may prohibit the Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community specified in subparagraph (D) from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation if the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. ``(B) If the Director or the Secretary exercises the authority under subparagraph (A), the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, shall submit to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E) an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of the authority not later than seven days after the exercise of the authority. ``(C) At the same time the Director or the Secretary submits under subparagraph (B) a statement on the exercise of the authority in subparagraph (A) to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E), the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, shall notify the Inspector General of such element of the submittal of such statement and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such statement. The Inspector General may submit to such committees of Congress any comments on a notice or statement received by the Inspector General under this subparagraph that the Inspector General considers appropriate. ``(D) The elements of the intelligence community specified in this subparagraph are as follows: ``(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(ii) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(iii) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(iv) The National Security Agency. ``(E) The committees of Congress specified in this subparagraph are-- ``(i) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''. (a) Director of National Security Agency.--The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after the first section the following new section: ``Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law.''. (b) Director of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.-- Section 441(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2) The Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.''. (c) Director of National Reconnaissance Office.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (d) Positions of Importance and Responsibility.-- (1) Designation of positions.--The President may designate any of the positions referred to in paragraph (2) as positions of importance and responsibility under section 601 of title 10, United States Code. (2) Covered positions.--The positions referred to in this paragraph are as follows: (A) The Director of the National Security Agency. (B) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (C) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (e) Effective Date and Applicability.--(1) The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b), and subsection (c), shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (A) the date of the nomination by the President of an individual to serve in the position concerned, except that the individual serving in such position as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to such position, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of such position by the individual performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Subsection (d) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. Section 442(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2)(A) As directed by the Director of National Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall also analyze, disseminate, and incorporate into the National System for Geospatial-Intelligence, likenesses, videos, or presentations produced by ground-based platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations or available as open-source information. ``(B) The authority provided by this paragraph does not include the authority to manage or direct the tasking of, set requirements and priorities for, set technical requirements related to, or modify any classification or dissemination limitations related to the collection of, handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations.''; and (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (1)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (1) and (2)''. The Secretary of Defense shall, during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2007, delegate to the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency personnel security authority with respect to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (including authority relating to the use of contractor personnel in investigations and adjudications for security clearances) that is identical to the personnel security authority of the Director of the National Security Agency with respect to the National Security Agency. (a) Authority To Pay Incentive.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may pay a cash award authorized by section 4523 of title 5, United States Code, in accordance with the provisions of such section, to any employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation described in subsection (b) as if such employee were a law enforcement officer as specified in such section. (b) Covered Employees.--An employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation described in this subsection is any employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation-- (1) who uses foreign language skills in support of the analyses, investigations, or operations of the Bureau to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities (or maintains foreign language skills for purposes of such support); and (2) whom the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, subject to the joint guidance of the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, may designate for purposes of this section. Title I of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 23 the following new section: Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H)-- (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine Corps,''; and (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''. Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after ``subsection (a)),''. The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended as follows: (1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)-- (A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``subsection''; (B) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); and (iii) in paragraph (5)(B), by striking ``or agency involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''; (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``paragraph''; and (D) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after ``Acquisition''. (2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''. (3) In section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; and (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''. (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458) is further amended as follows: (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 458(e)(10)(B)), by striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and inserting ``Department of Justice''. (2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)-- (A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''. (3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''. (4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''. (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows: (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)-- (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional culture''; (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; and (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''. (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and inserting ``Federal''; and (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and inserting ``specific''. (a) References to Head of Intelligence Community.--Title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'': (1) Section 193(d)(2). (2) Section 193(e). (3) Section 201(a). (4) Section 201(b)(1). (5) Section 201(c)(1). (6) Section 425(a). (7) Section 431(b)(1). (8) Section 441(c). (9) Section 441(d). (10) Section 443(d). (11) Section 2273(b)(1). (12) Section 2723(a). (b) Clerical Amendments.--Such title is further amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'': (1) Section 441(c). (2) Section 443(d). (c) Reference to Head of Central Intelligence Agency.-- Section 444 of such title is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a).''. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended-- (1) in the subsection caption, by striking ``Foreign''; and (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears. (b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National Intelligence'' after ``Director''. (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to read as follows: (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence. (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item: ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'': (A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii). (B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B). (C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)). (D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B). (E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)). (F) Section 5342(a)(1) (in clause (K)). (G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E). (H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)((XIII). (2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' both places it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (B) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows:", u" Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence (a) Responsibility of the Director of National Intelligence.--Subsection (b) of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in paragraph (3)-- (A) by striking ``2004,'' and inserting ``2004 (50 U.S.C. 403 note),''; and (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon and ``and''; and (3) by inserting after paragraph (3), the following new paragraph: ``(4) conduct accountability reviews of elements of the intelligence community and the personnel of such elements, if appropriate.''. (b) Tasking and Other Authorities.--Subsection (f) of section 102A of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8), as paragraphs (8) and (9), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (6), the following new paragraph: ``(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the Director determines it is necessary or if requested by a congressional intelligence committee, conduct accountability reviews of elements of the intelligence community or the personnel of such elements in relation to significant failures or deficiencies within the intelligence community. ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and procedures for conducting accountability reviews under subparagraph (A). ``(C) The requirements of this paragraph shall not limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (a) Authorities of the Director of National Intelligence.-- Section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (F), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: ``(G) in carrying out this subsection, without regard to any other provision of law (other than this Act and the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458)), expend funds and make funds available to other department or agencies of the United States for, and direct the development and fielding of, systems of common concern related to the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information; and ``(H) for purposes of addressing critical gaps in intelligence information sharing or access capabilities, have the authority to transfer funds appropriated for a program within the National Intelligence Program to a program funded by appropriations not within the National Intelligence Program, consistent with paragraphs (3) through (7) of subsection (d).''. (b) Authorities of Heads of Other Departments and Agencies.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of any department or agency of the United States is authorized to receive and utilize funds made available to the department or agency by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)), as amended by subsection (a), and receive and utilize any system referred to in such Section 102A(i)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i)(3)) is amended by inserting before the period the following: ``, any Deputy Director of National Intelligence, or the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community[, or the head of any element of the intelligence community]''. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(s) Additional Administrative Authorities.--(1) Notwithstanding section 1346 of title 31, United States Code, or any other provision of law prohibiting the interagency financing of activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B), upon the request of the Director of National Intelligence, any element of the intelligence community may use appropriated funds to support or participate in the interagency activities of the following: ``(A) National intelligence centers established by the Director under section 119B. ``(B) Boards, commissions, councils, committees, and similar groups that are established-- ``(i) for a term of not more than two years; and ``(ii) by the Director. ``(2) No provision of law enacted after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 shall be construed to limit or supersede the authority in paragraph (1) unless such provision makes specific reference to the authority in that paragraph.''. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 404 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsections: ``(t) Authority To Establish Positions in Excepted Service.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence may, with the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned and in coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management-- ``(A) convert such competitive service positions, and their incumbents, within an element of the intelligence community to excepted service positions as the Director of National Intelligence determines necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element; and ``(B) establish the classification and ranges of rates of basic pay for positions so converted, notwithstanding otherwise applicable laws governing the classification and rates of basic pay for such positions. ``(2)(A) At the request of the Director of National Intelligence, the head of a department or agency may establish new positions in the excepted service within an element of such department or agency that is part of the intelligence community if the Director determines that such positions are necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element. ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence may establish the classification and ranges of rates of basic pay for any position established under subparagraph (A), notwithstanding otherwise applicable laws governing the classification and rates of basic pay for such positions. ``(3) The head of the department or agency concerned is authorized to appoint individuals for service in positions converted under paragraph (1) or established under paragraph (2) without regard to the provisions of chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and to fix the compensation of such individuals within the applicable ranges of rates of basic pay established by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(4) The maximum rate of basic pay established under this subsection is the rate for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code. ``(u) Pay Authority for Critical Positions.--(1) Notwithstanding any pay limitation established under any other provision of law applicable to employees in elements of the intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence may, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, grant authority to fix the rate of basic pay for one or more positions within the intelligence community at a rate in excess of any applicable limitation, subject to the provisions of this subsection. The exercise of authority so granted is at the discretion of the head of the department or agency employing the individual in a position covered by such authority, subject to the provisions of this subsection and any conditions established by the Director of National Intelligence when granting such authority. ``(2) Authority under this subsection may be granted or exercised-- ``(A) only with respect to a position which requires an extremely high level of expertise and is critical to successful accomplishment of an important mission; and ``(B) only to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an individual exceptionally well qualified for the position. ``(3) A rate of basic pay may not be fixed under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written approval of the Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by law. ``(4) A rate of basic pay may not be fixed under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate payable for level I of the Executive Schedule under section 5311 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written approval of the President in response to a request by the Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by law. ``(5) Any grant of authority under this subsection for a position shall terminate at the discretion of the Director of National Intelligence. ``(v) Extension of Flexible Personnel Management Authorities.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in order to ensure the equitable treatment of employees across the intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence may, with the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned, or for those matters that fall under the responsibilities of the Office of Personnel Management under statute or Executive Order, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, authorize one or more elements of the intelligence community to adopt compensation authority, performance management authority, and scholarship authority that have been authorized for another element of the intelligence community if the Director of National Intelligence-- ``(A) determines that the adoption of such authority would improve the management and performance of the intelligence community, and ``(B) submits to the congressional intelligence committees, not later than 60 days before such authority is to take effect, notice of the adoption of such authority by such element or elements, including the authority to be so adopted, and an estimate of the costs associated with the adoption of such authority. ``(2) To the extent that an existing compensation authority within the intelligence community is limited to a particular category of employees or a particular situation, the authority may be adopted in another element of the intelligence community under this subsection only for employees in an equivalent category or in an equivalent situation. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `compensation authority' means authority involving basic pay (including position classification), premium pay, awards, bonuses, incentives, allowances, differentials, student loan repayments, and special payments, but does not include authorities as follows: ``(A) Authorities related to benefits such as leave, severance pay, retirement, and insurance. ``(B) Authority to grant Presidential Rank Awards under sections 4507 and 4507a of title 5, United States Code, section 3151(c) of title 31, United States Code, and any other provision of law. ``(C) Compensation authorities and performance management authorities provided under provisions of law relating to the Senior Executive Service.''. Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of Headquarters With Headquarters of''; (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the Office''; and (3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the headquarters of any other element''. (a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted by Elements of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be carried out by elements of the intelligence community.''. (b) Development of Technology Goals.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (9); and (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraphs: ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology needs of the intelligence community; ``(6) under the direction of the Director, establish engineering standards and specifications applicable to each acquisition of a major system (as that term is defined in section 506A(e)(3)) by the intelligence community; ``(7) develop 15-year projections and assessments of the needs of the intelligence community to ensure a robust Federal scientific and engineering workforce and the means to recruit such a workforce through integrated scholarships across the intelligence community, including research grants and cooperative work-study programs; ``(8) ensure that each acquisition program of the intelligence community for a major system (as so defined) complies with the standards and specifications established under paragraph (6); and''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and Technology shall-- ``(1) systematically identify and assess the most significant intelligence challenges that require technical solutions; ``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of research and design programs of the elements of the intelligence community to meet the requirements of the intelligence community for timely support; and ``(3) assist the Director of National Intelligence in establishing research and development priorities and projects for the intelligence community that-- ``(A) are consistent with current or future national intelligence requirements; ``(B) address deficiencies or gaps in the collection, processing, analysis, or dissemination of national intelligence; ``(C) take into account funding constraints in program development and acquisition; and ``(D) address system requirements from collection to final dissemination (also known as `end-to-end architecture').''. (c) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than June 30, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing a strategy for the development and use of technology in the intelligence community through 2021. (2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include-- (A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the use of technology; (B) goals for advanced research and development and a strategy to achieve such goals; (C) an explanation of how each advanced research and development project funded under the National Intelligence Program addresses an identified intelligence gap; (D) a list of all current and projected research and development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation dates, and estimated completion dates; and (E) a plan to incorporate technology from research and development projects into National Intelligence Program acquisition programs. (3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form. Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'' the first place it appears. (a) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103G the following new section: (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 409 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 103H the following new section: (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting the following: ``(a) In General.-- ``(1) Establishment.--The''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403- 3(c)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraphs: ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. ``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center.''. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) In General.--Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), respectively; and (3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking paragraphs (3) and (4). (b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''. Section 4(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or''; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the Director's designee.''. Subsection (j) of section 552a of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or'' at the end; (2) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and (3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph: ``(2) maintained by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; or''. (a) Establishment of Position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--Subsection (a) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsections (b) and (c): ``(b) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director. ``(3) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the absence or disability of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or during a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. ``(c) Military Status of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Not more than one of the individuals serving in the positions specified in subsection (a) and (b) may be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces in active status. ``(2) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces who is serving as the Director or Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or is engaged in administrative performance of the duties of Director or Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall not, while continuing in such service, or in the administrative performance of such duties-- ``(A) be subject to supervision or control by the Secretary of Defense or by any officer or employee of the Department of Defense; or ``(B) exercise, by reason of the officer's status as a commissioned officer, any supervision or control with respect to any of the military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense except as otherwise authorized by law. ``(3) Except as provided in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2), the service, or the administrative performance of duties, described in that paragraph by an officer described in that paragraph shall not affect the status, position, rank, or grade of such officer in the Armed Forces, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of such status, position, rank, or grade. ``(4) A commissioned officer described in paragraph (2), while serving, or continuing in the administrative performance of duties, as described in that paragraph and while remaining on active duty, shall continue to receive military pay and allowances. Funds from which such pay and allowances are paid shall be reimbursed from funds available to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (2) of subsection (e) of such section, as redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is further amended by striking ``subsection (d)'' and inserting ``subsection (f)''. (c) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item: ``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (d) Role of DNI in Appointment.--Section 106(b)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(J) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (e) Effective Date and Applicability.--The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (1) the date of the nomination by the President of an individual to serve as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, except that the individual administratively performing the duties of the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to the position of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or (2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency by the individual administratively performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking ``the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,''. Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)''; (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated-- (A) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the protection''; and (B) by striking the semicolon and inserting ``, and the protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) Authorize personnel engaged in the performance of protective functions authorized pursuant to subparagraph (A), when engaged in the performance of such functions, to make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States, if such personnel have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony, except that any authority pursuant to this subparagraph may be exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Director and the Attorney General and such personnel may not exercise any authority for the service of civil process or for the investigation of criminal offenses;''. Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended-- (1) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director'' and inserting ``Associate Deputy Director''; (2) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National Clandestine Service''; and (3) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for Administration'' and inserting ``Director for Support''. (a) Public Availability.--Not later than September 1, 2007, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall prepare and make available to the public a version of the Executive Summary of the report entitled the ``Office of Inspector General Report on Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001'' issued in June 2005 that is declassified to the maximum extent possible, consistent with national security. (b) Report to Congress.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress a classified annex to the redacted Executive Summary made available under subsection (a) that explains the reason that any redacted material in the Executive Summary was withheld from the public. (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to United States citizens for the service of such individuals before 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated company while such company was owned or controlled by the United States Government and operated or managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Report Elements.--(1) The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (A) The history of Air America and associated companies before 1977, including a description of-- (i) the relationship between such companies and the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the United States Government; (ii) the workforce of such companies; (iii) the missions performed by such companies and their employees for the United States; and (iv) the casualties suffered by employees of such companies in the course of their employment with such companies. (B) A description of the retirement benefits contracted for or promised to the employees of such companies before 1977, the contributions made by such employees for such benefits, the retirement benefits actually paid such employees, the entitlement of such employees to the payment of future retirement benefits, and the likelihood that former employees of such companies will receive any future retirement benefits. (C) An assessment of the difference between-- (i) the retirement benefits that former employees of such companies have received or will receive by virtue of their employment with such companies; and (ii) the retirement benefits that such employees would have received and in the future receive if such employees had been, or would now be, treated as employees of the United States whose services while in the employ of such companies had been or would now be credited as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits. (D) Any recommendations regarding the advisability of legislative action to treat employment at such companies as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in light of the relationship between such companies and the United States Government and the services and sacrifices of such employees to and for the United States, and if legislative action is considered advisable, a proposal for such action and an assessment of its costs. (2) The Director of National Intelligence shall include in the report any views of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on the matters covered by the report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate. (c) Assistance of Comptroller General.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall, upon the request of the Director of National Intelligence and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information, assist the Director in the preparation of the report required by subsection (a). (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``Air America'' means Air America, Incorporated. (2) The term ``associated company'' means any company associated with or subsidiary to Air America, including Air Asia Company Limited and the Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport, Incorporated. Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components (a) Termination of Employees.--Subsection (d)(1)(C) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``terminated either by'' and all that follows and inserting ``terminated-- ``(i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the employee; ``(ii) by the employee voluntarily; or ``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the employee to maintain such level of academic standing in the educational course of training as the Director of the National Security Agency shall have specified in the agreement of the employee under this subsection; and''. (b) Authority To Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With NSA.--Subsection (e) of such section is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 21. (a) The Director is authorized to designate personnel of the Agency to perform protective functions for the Director and for any personnel of the Agency designated by the Director. ``(b)(1) In the performance of protective functions under this section, personnel of the Agency designated to perform protective functions pursuant to subsection (a) are authorized, when engaged in the performance of such functions, to make arrests without a warrant for-- ``(A) any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel; or ``(B) any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if such personnel have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony. ``(2) The authority in paragraph (1) may be exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Director and the Attorney General. ``(3) Personnel of the Agency designated to perform protective functions pursuant to subsection (a) shall not exercise any authority for the service of civil process or the investigation of criminal offenses. ``(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect any authority under any other provision of law relating to the performance of protective functions.''. (a) Coverage Under Inspector General Act of 1978.-- Subsection (a)(2) of section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8G) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``the Defense Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,''; (2) by inserting ``the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the National Endowment for the Arts,''; and (3) by inserting ``the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency,'' after ``the National Labor Relations Board,''. (b) Certain Designations Under Inspector General Act of 1978.--Subsection (a) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8H) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) The Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency shall be designees of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for purposes of this section.''. (c) Power of Heads of Elements Over Investigations.-- Subsection (d) of section 8G of that Act-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(d)''; (2) in the second sentence of paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection, by striking ``The head'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (2), the head''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense may prohibit the Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community specified in subparagraph (D) from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation if the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. ``(B) If the Director or the Secretary exercises the authority under subparagraph (A), the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, shall submit to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E) an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of the authority not later than seven days after the exercise of the authority. ``(C) At the same time the Director or the Secretary submits under subparagraph (B) a statement on the exercise of the authority in subparagraph (A) to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E), the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, shall notify the Inspector General of such element of the submittal of such statement and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such statement. The Inspector General may submit to such committees of Congress any comments on a notice or statement received by the Inspector General under this subparagraph that the Inspector General considers appropriate. ``(D) The elements of the intelligence community specified in this subparagraph are as follows: ``(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(ii) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(iii) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(iv) The National Security Agency. ``(E) The committees of Congress specified in this subparagraph are-- ``(i) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''. (a) Director of National Security Agency.--The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after the first section the following new section: ``Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law.''. (b) Director of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.-- Section 441(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2) The Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.''. (c) Director of National Reconnaissance Office.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (d) Positions of Importance and Responsibility.-- (1) Designation of positions.--The President may designate any of the positions referred to in paragraph (2) as positions of importance and responsibility under section 601 of title 10, United States Code. (2) Covered positions.--The positions referred to in this paragraph are as follows: (A) The Director of the National Security Agency. (B) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (C) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (e) Effective Date and Applicability.-- (1) In general.--The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b), and subsection (c), shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (A) the date of the nomination by the President of an individual to serve in the position concerned, except that the individual serving in such position as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to such position, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of such position by the individual performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Positions of importance and responsibility.--Subsection (d) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. Section 442(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2)(A) As directed by the Director of National Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall also develop a system to facilitate the analysis, dissemination, and incorporation of likenesses, videos, and presentations produced by ground-based platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations or available as open-source information, into the National System for Geospatial Intelligence. ``(B) The authority provided by this paragraph does not include the authority to manage or direct the tasking of, set requirements and priorities for, set technical requirements related to, or modify any classification or dissemination limitations related to the collection of, handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations.''; and (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (1)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (1) and (2)''. The Secretary of Defense shall, during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2008, delegate to the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency personnel security authority with respect to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (including authority relating to the use of contractor personnel in investigations and adjudications for security clearances) that is identical to the personnel security authority of the Director of the National Security Agency with respect to the National Security Agency. Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H)-- (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine Corps,''; and (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''. Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after ``subsection (a)),''. The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended as follows: (1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)-- (A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``subsection''; (B) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); and (iii) in paragraph (5)(B), by striking ``or agency involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''; (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``paragraph''; and (D) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after ``Acquisition''. (2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''. (3) In section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; and (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''. (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458) is further amended as follows: (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 458(e)(10)(B)), by striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and inserting ``Department of Justice''. (2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)-- (A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''. (3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''. (4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''. (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows: (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)-- (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional culture''; (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; and (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''. (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and inserting ``Federal''; and (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and inserting ``specific''. (a) References to Head of Intelligence Community.--Title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'': (1) Section 193(d)(2). (2) Section 193(e). (3) Section 201(a). (4) Section 201(b)(1). (5) Section 201(c)(1). (6) Section 425(a). (7) Section 431(b)(1). (8) Section 441(c). (9) Section 441(d). (10) Section 443(d). (11) Section 2273(b)(1). (12) Section 2723(a). (b) Clerical Amendments.--Such title is further amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'': (1) Section 441(c). (2) Section 443(d). (c) Reference to Head of Central Intelligence Agency.-- Section 444 of such title is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a).''. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended-- (1) in the subsection caption, by striking ``Foreign''; and (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears. (b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National Intelligence'' after ``Director''. (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to read as follows: (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence. (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item: ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'': (A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii). (B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B). (C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)). (D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B). (E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)). (F) Section 5342(a)(1) (in clause (K)). (G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E). (H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)((XIII). (2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' both places it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (B) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows: (a) In General.-- (1) The Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 435 note) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'': (A) Section 704(c)(2)(B). (B) Section 706(b)(2). (C) Section 706(e)(2)(B). (2) Section 705(c) of such Act is amended by striking ``the Director of Central Intelligence, as head of the intelligence community,'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence''. (b) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of section 705(c) of such Act is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''.", u"Pursuant to House Resolution 295 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Simpson (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, all time for general debate had expired. Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered read. The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2004 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The National Reconnaissance Office. (6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (7) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Department of Homeland Security. (14) The Coast Guard. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2004, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2417 of the One Hundred Eighth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2004 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2004 the sum of $192,640,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available until September 30, 2005. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 320 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2004. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2004 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until September 30, 2004. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2004, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2004 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $34,248,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2005, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (a) In General.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2004 the sum of $226,400,000. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise permitted under the Constitution or authorized pursuant to the laws of the United States. (a) Increase of Thresholds for Notice.--Section 602(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 U.S.C. 403-2b(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``$750,000'' each place it appears and inserting ``$5,000,000''; (2) by striking ``$500,000'' each place it appears and inserting ``$1,000,000''; and (3) in paragraph (2), as amended by paragraph (2) of this subsection, by inserting after ``$1,000,000'' the second place it appears, the following: ``but less than $5,000,000''. (b) Notice and Wait Requirements for Emergency Projects.-- Section 602(b)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 U.S.C. 403-2b(b)(2)) is amended-- (1) in the third sentence, by striking ``21-day'' and inserting ``7-day''; and, (2) by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this paragraph, when the Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense jointly determine that an emergency relating to the national security or to the protection of health, safety, or environmental quality exists and that delay would irreparably harm any or all of those interests, the project may begin on the date the notification is received by such committees.''. (a) In General.--(1) Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108; 115 Stat. 1401; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note), as amended by section 351 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2401; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note), is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``two-year'' before ``suspension of reorganization''; and (2) in the text, by striking ``ending on October 1, 2003'' and inserting ``ending on the date that is 60 days after the date on which appropriate congressional committees of jurisdiction (as defined in section 324(d) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 7304(d)) are notified jointly by the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (or the Director's designee) that the operational framework for the office has been terminated''. (a) Authority To Distribute Explosive Materials To Qualified Aliens.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for any person knowingly to distribute explosive materials to any qualified alien-- (1) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in subsection (c)(1), the distribution to, shipment to, transportation to, receipt by, or possession by the alien of the explosive materials is in furtherance of such cooperation; or (2) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in subsection (c)(2), the distribution to, shipping to, transporting to, possession by, or receipt by the alien of explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized military purpose. (b) Authority for Qualified Aliens To Ship Explosive Materials.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for a qualified alien to ship or transport any explosive in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or to receive or possess any explosive which has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce-- (1) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in subsection (c)(1), the possession, shipment, or transportation by the alien of the explosive materials is in furtherance of such cooperation; or (2) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in subsection (c)(2), the possession, shipment, or transportation by the alien of explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized military purpose. (c) Qualified Alien Defined.--In this section, the term ``qualified alien'' means an alien-- (1) who is lawfully present in the United States in cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence; or (2) who is a member of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or other friendly foreign military force (as determined by the Attorney General with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense) who is present in the United States under military orders for training or other military purpose authorized by the United States. Section 313(e)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1424(e)(4)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``when Department of Defense activities are relevant to the determination'' after ``Secretary of Defense''; and (2) by inserting ``and the Secretary of Homeland Security'' after ``Attorney General''. (a) In General.--Section 1101(1) of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401(1)) is amended by inserting ``, except as provided in section 1114,'' before ``means any office''. (b) Definition.--Section 1114 of such Act (12 U.S.C. 3414) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(c) For purposes of this section, the term `financial institution' has the same meaning as in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code, except that, for purposes of this section, such term shall include only such a financial institution any part of which is located inside any State or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the United States Virgin Islands.''. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Pilot Project To Encourage State and Local Officials, As Well As Representatives of Critical Infrastructure, To Collect and Share Relevant Information.--Section 892(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 482) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3)(A) The Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, may conduct projects in several cities to encourage officials of State and local government, as well as representatives of industries that comprise the critical infrastructure in those cities to lawfully collect and to pass on to the appropriate Federal officials information vital for the prevention of terrorist attacks against the United States. ``(B) The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out any duty under this paragraph through the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. ``(C) Under the projects, training shall be provided to such officials and representatives to-- ``(i) identify sources of potential threats through such methods as the Secretary determines appropriate; ``(ii) report information relating to such potential threats to the appropriate Federal agencies in the appropriate form and manner; and ``(iii) assure that all reported information is systematically submitted to and passed on by the Department for use by appropriate Federal agencies. ``(D) The Under Secretary shall carry out the pilot project under this paragraph for a period of 3 years. ``(E) Not later than 1 year after the implementation of the pilot project, and annually thereafter, the Under Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the pilot project conducted under this paragraph. Each such report shall include-- ``(i) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and ``(ii) recommendations on the continuation of the project as well as any recommendations to improve the effectiveness of information collection and sharing by such officials and representatives and the Federal government.''. (b) Pilot Project To Test Use of Tear-line Intelligence Reports.--(1) Subtitle C of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking ``September 1, 2003'' and inserting ``September 1, 2004''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. (a) Reports on Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-293; 110 Stat. 3474; 50 U.S.C. 2366), as amended by section 811(b)(5)(C) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2424; 50 U.S.C. 2366), is amended by striking ``a semiannual'' and inserting ``an annual''. (b) Periodic and Special Reports on Disclosure of Intelligence Information to United Nations.--Section 112(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``semiannually'' and inserting ``annually''. (a) National Security Act of 1947.--Section 112(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6)'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7)''. (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6)'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7)''. (2) Section 15 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``special policemen of the General Services Administration perform under the first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318),'' and inserting ``officers and agents of the Department of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United States Code,''; and (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``the fourth section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) of this section (40 U.S.C. 318c)'' and inserting ``section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code''. (c) National Security Agency Act of 1959.--Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``special policemen of the General Services Administration perform under the first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318)'' and inserting ``officers and agents of the Department of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United States Code,''; and (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``the fourth section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) (40 U.S.C. 318c)'' and inserting ``section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code''. (d) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.-- Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''; and (2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 103(c)(6)'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7)''. (e) Public Law 107-173.--Section 201(c)(3)(F) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173; 116 Stat. 548; 8 U.S.C. 1721(c)(3)(F)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''. (f) Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.-- Section 3535(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added by section 1001(b)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), and section 3545(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added by section 301(b)(1) of the E- Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347), are each amended by inserting ``or any other law'' after ``1978''. (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the intelligence lessons learned as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including lessons relating to the following: (1) The tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. (2) Accuracy, timeliness, and objectivity of intelligence analysis. (3) Intelligence support to policymakers and members of the Armed Forces in combat. (4) Coordination of intelligence activities and operations with military operations. (5) Strengths and limitations of intelligence systems and equipment. (6) Such other matters as the Director considers appropriate. (b) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall include such recommendations on improvement in the matters described in subsection (a) as the Director considers appropriate. (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. (a) In General.--Section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Agency personnel designated by the Director under subsection (a) shall be deemed for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office or employment if the Agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include the use of force, to-- ``(A) protect an individual in the presence of the Agency personnel from a crime of violence; ``(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or ``(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom the Agency personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of violence in the presence of such personnel. ``(2) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United States Code.''. (b) Construction.--Subsection (d) of section 15, as added by subsection (a), shall not be construed as affecting the authorities of the Attorney General under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-694; 28 U.S.C. 2671, 2674, 2679(b), 2679(d)). Section 21(f)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u(f)(2)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Director'' and inserting ``The Director''; and (2) by striking subparagraph (B). (a) Extension of Authority.--Subsection (a) of section 501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2404) is amended by striking ``for fiscal years 2002 and 2003'' and inserting ``for each of fiscal years 2002 through 2005''. (b) Modification.--(1) Subsection (e) of such section is amended to read as follows: ``(e) Prohibition.--No United States Armed Forces personnel, United States civilian employee or contractor engaged by the United States will participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance made available under this section, except for the purpose of acting to protect the life or the physical security of others, in self defense, or during the course of search and rescue operations.''. (c) Technical Amendment.--Subsection (d) of such section is amended by striking ``Sections 556, 567, and 568 of Public Law 107-115, section 8093 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002,'' and inserting ``Section 553 and the certification requirements of section 564(a)(2) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2003 (division E of Public Law 108-7; 117 Stat. 200, 205), and section 8093 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 107-248; 116 Stat. 1558; 10 U.S.C. 182 note),''. (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (b) and (c) shall apply to assistance made available under such section 501 during fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Section 2195 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d)(1) The Director of the National Security Agency may provide a qualifying employee of a defense laboratory of that Agency with living quarters at no charge, or at a rate or charge prescribed by the Director by regulation, without regard to section 5911(c) of title 5. ``(2) In this subsection, the term `qualifying employee' means a student who is employed at the National Security Agency under-- ``(A) a Student Educational Employment Program of the Agency conducted under this section or any other provision of law; or ``(B) a similar cooperative or summer education program of the Agency that meets the criteria for Federal cooperative or summer education programs prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management.''. (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, agency personnel designated by the Director of the National Security Agency under subsection (a) shall be considered for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office or employment when such agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include the use of force, to-- ``(A) protect an individual in the presence of such agency personnel from a crime of violence; ``(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or ``(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such agency personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of violence in the presence of such agency personnel. ``(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the Attorney General under section 2679(d)(1) of title 28, United States Code. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United (a) Research Program.--The Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection, shall carry out a program to incorporate the results of basic research on sensors into the measurement and signatures intelligence systems of the United States, to the extent the results of such research is applicable to such systems. (b) Program Components.--The program under subsection (a) shall review and assess both basic research on sensors and technologies conducted by the United States Government and by non-governmental entities. In carrying out the program, the Director shall protect intellectual property rights, maintain organizational flexibility, and establish research projects, funding levels, and potential benefits in an equitable manner through Directorate. (c) Advisory Panel.--(1) The Director shall establish an advisory panel to assist the Director in carrying out the program under subsection (a). (2) The advisory panel shall be headed by the Director who shall determine the selection, review, and assessment of the research projects under the program. (3)(A) The Director shall appoint as members of the advisory panel representatives of each entity of the MASINT community, and may appoint as such members representatives of national laboratories, universities, and private sector entities. (B) For purposes of this subsection the term ``MASINT community'' means academic, professional, industrial, and government entities that are committed towards the advancement of the sciences in measurement and signatures intelligence. (C) The term for a member of the advisory panel shall be established by the Director, but may not exceed a period of 5 consecutive years. (D) Members of the advisory panel may not receive additional pay, allowances, or benefits by reason of their service on the advisory panel, but may receive per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code. (4) The Director may accept contributions from non- governmental participants on the advisory panel to defray the expenses of the advisory panel. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order except those printed in House Report 108-176. Each amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House Report 108-176.", u"Mr. President, yesterday I spoke to the Senate relative to my assessment of the responsibility for the attacks of September 11, 2001, some of the lessons learned from those attacks, and the status of the implementation of those lessons. I explained that my view was that those terrible events would have been prevented if our national intelligence community had been better organized and more clearly focused on the problem of terrorism. And if the Congress and the President had drawn on those lessons learned from the tragedy of 9/11 and initiated reforms of the intelligence community, we might well have avoided some of the embarrassments of the flawed intelligence on weapons of mass destruction or the misleading use of that intelligence which formed the basis of the war against Iraq. Today I would like to continue my discussion of those lessons that we should have learned and implemented. As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for most of the 107th Congress, I had the honor of cochairing a bipartisan, bicameral committee charged with investigating the events of the intelligence community and their activities before and after the attacks of September 11. We set out to determine whether or not there was anything more we could have done to prevent the attacks and, specifically, if our intelligence community had problems that needed to be corrected. The importance of our task was well understood. The 9/11 attacks were not the work of a crazed individual but, rather, were the result of a sophisticated plot carried out by a group of 19 terrorists and an undetermined number of facilitators who prepared for the execution of their plot over a period of almost 2 years. We can, we must, improve our ability to detect and disrupt plots of this nature. We can do so by ensuring that our intelligence-gathering networks are operating in an optimal manner and that any flaws in our intelligence community are addressed as quickly and effectively as possible. Our committee identified a number of problems with our current intelligence-gathering system. We followed up with recommendations on how to fix these problems. By conducting this inquiry, making these recommendations, Congress not only assumed the responsibility for determining what happened before and after September 11 as related to our intelligence community, but it also assumed a responsibility relative to the implementation of the recommendations. The American people will respond to future terrorist attacks by asking: What did we learn from the previous attack and how has that information been used to give the American people greater protection? They have the right to ask this question and we have an obligation to give them a good answer: What have you done with the information and the lessons learned? How have you implemented those lessons in a way to give me and the American people a greater sense of security? So far, we have not made acceptable progress toward providing an answer to the American people. In fact, if we had to give it today, it would not be an answer of which we would be proud. A large number of the problems identified by the joint inquiry and a series of commissions which preceded the joint inquiry have not been addressed. In my previous statement, I discussed those recommendations which related specifically to the issue of counterterrorism. This morning, I would like to address those recommendations which deal with the structure of the intelligence community. Our national intelligence community is beset by a number of serious problems. There is a lack of leadership at the top and the absence of a coordinated national intelligence policy that gives us agencies with priorities, missions, and resources that do not necessarily complement one another. As an example, in December of 1998, the Director of Central Intelligence, the man who has the statutory responsibility for the coordination of all of our various intelligence agencies, told senior managers of the CIA that he considered the United States to be at war with al-Qaida and that the intelligence community, all of its agencies, working in a coherent manner, should devote as many resources as possible to combating that terrorist organization. While this statement might seem to be a positive step, a step in the right direction, our joint inquiry found that the DCI was either unable or unwilling to enlist other intelligence agencies in this effort. The troops either didn't hear or simply ignored the bugle call of war. The lack of consistent, coordinated priorities is paralleled by a lack of consistent, predictable funding as well as the lack of internal accountability. This shortage of resources meant that the intelligence community simply did not have enough personnel to perform all the functions that were needed. This left the intelligence community ill-prepared to deal with the rapidly changing terrorist threat. One of the reasons for the unpredictability and decline of funding of the intelligence community was the mistaken belief that the end of the cold war yielded a peace dividend for the American people when it came to defense spending, including a reduced need to spend money on intelligence. Mr. President, in fact, the change from the single focus on the Soviet Union and its allies to the current world of diverse, constantly changing, emerging threats such as weapons of mass destruction and international terrorist groups has increased demand and, therefore, the cost of intelligence. The first recommendation made by our commission urges the creation of a Cabinet-level director of national intelligence, appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation. We made this our first recommendation because we think it is the most important recommendation and one that can do the most to prevent another 9/11 tragedy. I gratefully recognize the excellent work of Senator Feinstein in championing this issue. The director of national intelligence would be responsible for establishing consistent priorities for all of our national intelligence agencies and assuring that these agencies work together, rather than independently, by coordinating budgets and resources and managing interagency relationships. We made this recommendation because of the obvious need for strong leadership in our intelligence community. It is clear that prior to 9/11 our intelligence-gathering agencies had no comprehensive strategy for counterterrorism. Intelligence priorities were inconsistently formulated and applied throughout the various agencies and were not effectively leveraged through interagency coordination. The joint inquiry report offers specific details of FBI supervisors who thought there was no need to pay attention to Saudi citizens in the United States while at the same time the CIA was tracking suspected Saudi terrorists around the world. The director of the national security agency, which is responsible for our electronic eavesdropping, described the problem of unclear priorities when he said: ``We had about 5 number 1 priorities.'' Although the Director of Central Intelligence is normally the head of the intelligence community, in practice he has functioned as the head of one of those agencies, the CIA, with limited influence over other organizations. The limited ability of the Director of Central Intelligence to mobilize other intelligence agencies in the war against al-Qaida is a tragic example of this point. Before 9/11, personnel in many intelligence agencies--particularly the FBI--had not even heard his statement on the topic, let alone acted upon it. The DCI does have some budgetary authority, but it cannot be exercised effectively without the cooperation of the Department of Defense since many intelligence agencies are run through the Department of Defense. It is therefore necessary to appoint a strong director of national intelligence who is not the head of any specific intelligence agency. This is a recommendation which has been consistently made by citizens, commissions, and governmentally appointed commissions which have reviewed the intelligence community in the recent past. So far, Congress and the administration have not acted on this first recommendation and indeed appear to be moving in the opposite direction. The recent creation of an Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will serve to further separate the Defense Department from the civilian intelligence agencies rather than improving cooperation. Legislation has been introduced to accomplish this necessary restructuring, but as of this date it has not had a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This is an issue which now sits upon the shoulders of the Congress. If we fail to act, we will be held accountable when the next preventable terrorist act occurs. Another important recommendation was No. 11, which called for the recruitment and development of greater numbers of quality intelligence personnel. Obviously, the need for more counterterrorism training is a major part of this recommendation, as is the need for more linguists and an expanded intelligence community reserve corps that could provide relevant expertise when special circumstances arise. The committee also recommends an expansion of education grant programs, such as the national security education program. Included among the suggestions for improving the workforce was one calling for legislation that instills the concept of jointness or interoperability among the various agencies. This is similar to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which applied the concept of jointness to the military. One way jointness has been instilled in the military is by having service members serve tours of duty with another service or in a multiservice command. This reform is widely recognized as having substantially improved our military's ability to fight and win wars, as was so dramatically demonstrated in Iraq. In the intelligence community, there is too much isolation among intelligence agencies and between those agencies and the users of intelligence. As an example, the intelligence community, having examined the likely means of attack by al-Qaida, identified hijacking of commercial airliners to be used as weapons of mass destruction as a particularly significant part of the arsenal of al-Qaida. However, the Federal Aviation Administration was not notified of this new form of threat. Therefore, the training and protocols of flight crews had been to not attempt to resist hijackers but, rather, to succumb until the plane was on the ground and then let other law enforcement and professionals attempt to negotiate with the hijackers, and that was the form of action that was still in place on September 11. Possibly, had the FAA been aware of this new threat of taking command of a plane not for economic or political purposes but to use it as a weapon, airlines would have been better prepared to deal with this particular generation of hijackers. We need our intelligence community to substantially improve its capability in the same way that the military has. By working and training on a joint basis, intelligence agencies can conserve resources and help personnel gain an appreciation for a wider variety of intelligence-gathering tactics and techniques. If this recommendation had been implemented earlier, it could have reduced our vulnerability. Our joint inquiry found that a shortage of staff was a near universal problem for intelligence agencies before 9/11. For instance, at the CIA's counterterrorism center, employees were required to work extremely long hours with no relief. Overworking these critical personnel made them less effective and lowered their morale to the point where retention had become a problem. Problems similar to that of the CIA's counterterrorism center existed at the FBI, the National Security Agency, and the shortage of Arabic linguists at the National Security Agency became especially pronounced. Linguists continue to be in short supply, in part because qualified linguists cannot be trained overnight. Counterterrorism training has been stepped up in other areas, but raising our capabilities to an adequate level will still require more personnel with enhanced and expanded training. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 included pilot programs for training students who will form the future of the intelligence community. No legislation regarding jointness has yet been passed despite the clear, positive results achieved by previous efforts in similar and relevant parts of the Federal Government. The joint terrorism task forces set up by the FBI have had some success in bringing together officials from different agencies. It was one of these groups which was responsible for the capture of Zaccaria Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker. If more of these task forces had been set up before 2001, and if those that did exist had all the personnel they needed to be effective, we can only imagine what might have been accomplished, what might have been prevented. Recommendation No. 12 regards our national intelligence budget and suggests several measures to ensure our investments in intelligence provide maximum benefits. It calls for more flexibility in the budget to be accompanied by greater oversight and raises the idea of a cost-benefit analysis by an independent agency. It also urges the President and the Congress to develop a budget that includes a sustained, long-term investment in counterterrorism to replace the unpredictable funding stream that currently exists. Providing the intelligence community with an adequate level of base funding would obviously increase budget stability and assist in long-term planning. Contrary to that, for the past several years, counterterrorism programs have been funded primarily through supplemental appropriations which were often in response to a specific event, such as the September 11 tragedy, and therefore the supplemental appropriations varied greatly from one year to the next. Intelligence officials who were interviewed by our joint inquiry were understandably critical of this system since it makes it more difficult to plan sustainable counterterrorism programs. This dynamic still persists, despite its obvious flaws, despite its obvious contribution to the increased--the unnecessarily increased--vulnerability of the American people. There have been significant increases in our intelligence budget, but in 2003, a substantial portion of our counterterrorism budget still came from supplemental appropriations. Another problem with the intelligence budget is the way it is tied to the Defense Department's budget. During the 1990s, we made significant cuts to the Defense Department budget, and the intelligence budget was cut proportionately. While the end of the cold war meant we could reduce the size of our Armed Forces, intelligence requirements actually increased due to the diversification of the threat. In addition, greater budget stability in our efforts to fight terrorism would be better served by greater budget flexibility. It is currently quite difficult for intelligence officials to shift resources from one priority to the other as circumstances require. Even small adjustments require prolonged formalized approvals. For instance, a number of CIA officials were aware of the need for more agents in Afghanistan prior to 2001 but were unable to reassign resources away from other priorities. The Director of the National Security Agency has discussed similar problems. The 2004 Intelligence Authorization Act permits the Director of Central Intelligence to authorize the employment of additional civilian personnel if he believes this is necessary. This is a small step in the right direction, but more flexibility is still needed. This flexibility must be accompanied by increased congressional oversight. It became apparent during the course of our joint inquiry that the intelligence community does not have a clear idea of how much money it spends on counterterrorism, and accounting methods vary among the different agencies. In light of this, it seems appropriate that a cost-benefit analysis from an outside agency would be very helpful, but so far no real efforts have been made to undertake such a step. Recommendation No. 15 suggests that the President and the Congress evaluate and consider revising the intelligence classification process. This task would pursue the twin goals of expanding access to important information and assuring that classified intelligence information is not disclosed inappropriately. The current system of intelligence classification is not the result of a thoughtful, open debate, but is, rather, the product of a series of Executive orders rooted in cold war mentality and issued with little or no consultation of Congress. Many people with extensive knowledge of the system have suggested there is a tendency toward too much secrecy and that this has had a predictably negative effect on the flow of information. There was an interesting column recently in the New York Times talking about one of the core problems within the Government of Saddam Hussein prior to the war, and that was that all parts of that society practiced secrecy and deception; that the army deceived Saddam Hussein as to just what it was doing to prepare for war; scientists deceived Saddam Hussein as to the state of their development of weapons of mass destruction; Saddam Hussein attempted to fool the people of Iraq, and our intelligence agencies were fooled by all of the above. Allowing an increase in a curtain of secrecy to fall over the information of our United States agencies will have the same effect the veil of secrecy did in Iraq, and that is to make us less secure, more vulnerable because we have not shared information in a way that can increase our security. By treating so much of this information as treasure to be guarded, intelligence agencies can actually reduce the information's usefulness. By reducing biases toward excessive secrecy, Congress and the President can help make sure more information gets to the people who need it, particularly those such as first responders, local government, law enforcement officials, and Federal agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Agency. There is a suspicion among many Americans--and I believe it is justified--that classification is being used to shield politically embarrassing information from public scrutiny, as was the case with the information on the role of foreign governments in the September 11 attack. Unfortunately, little progress has been made so far in the task of reviewing the use of classified information, particularly in the area of intelligence. The Intelligence Authorization Act requires the President to report on the barriers to sharing classified information. Congress has not yet given serious consideration to this important topic. Another very important recommendation issued by the joint committee, which has also been largely ignored, is recommendation No. 16, which calls for a new standard of accountability in the intelligence community. Given the continued and increasing use of intelligence information in our national policymaking, whether it is to fight terrorism, to determine the true capability of a potential adversary, or to reduce the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it is critically important that we have accountability mechanisms in place that review intelligence agencies' failures in order to learn from those mistakes. To date, no personnel in intelligence or other affected agencies has been sanctioned as a result of the tragedy of September 11. It is also true that no one has been sanctioned for the apparently incorrect intelligence assessments upon which the case to go to war in Iraq was predicated. Weapons of mass destruction alleged to exist in Iraq have not been found and, according to David Kay, our lead investigator, it is unlikely they will ever be found. This raises in stark terms the responsibility of the President to determine who is accountable for intelligence failures and what should be the appropriate sanction of those responsible. It is as though the chairman of the steamship company that owned the Titanic put all of the blame for the tragedy on the iceberg and declared that was the end of it; the captain of the ship would be let off scot-free. At the same time, it is unclear if any rewards or recognitions have been given for outstanding performance in the intelligence community, outstanding performance such as that of those who contributed to the capture of Saddam Hussein. If we want our intelligence agencies to be as good as they can be and they must and should be, then we must assure that they have systems in place to reward exceptional performance and to deal with bad performance appropriately. Currently, there are no systems performing this function and all attempts to bring accountability to our intelligence-gathering programs have been made in an ad hoc manner. We must demand that the intelligence community establish standards of accountability since reliable intelligence is critical to our security as citizens and our credibility as a nation. The last recommendation I would like to address today is No. 17. This calls for the removal of inappropriate and obsolete barriers between intelligence and law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism. It advises the administration to report to Congress regarding the removal of these barriers so that Congress can take whatever legislative actions are appropriate. Our joint inquiry found that the various agencies engaged in counterterrorism have been surprisingly reluctant to share information with each other. Example: In the months before the September 11 attack, the CIA was aware of two terrorists associated with al-Qaida, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. These two terrorists had attended a planning session in Malaysia, a session at which both the attack on the USS Cole, which was to occur in November of 2000, and the attack on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the failed effort that ended in a field in Pennsylvania had been discussed. Both of these terrorists attended a planning conference for purposes of proceeding with those two terrorist attacks, and then acquired visas for travel to the United States, because the CIA had not informed law enforcement or border protection agencies of the threat posed by these individuals. The FBI and other agencies did not seem to have received this information which could have helped disrupt the 9/11 attack. Similarly, the FBI prevented its agents from participating in an effort to track down these terrorists on the grounds that this was not a job for criminal investigators. The FBI was reluctant to share information regarding counterterrorism because of concerns about legal barriers preventing collaboration between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These concerns sprang partly from an overly restrictive Department of Justice policy and partly from misunderstanding among agents regarding the law. Sharing of intelligence information with law enforcement agencies was seen as particularly difficult, almost taboo. This was a clear contradiction of the law that existed prior to September 11. Legal considerations also seem to have impaired information sharing by the National Security Agency and the CIA as well. However, these agencies, particularly the CIA, were also motivated by an overly zealous desire to protect sources. While protecting sources and methods is certainly an important goal, these sources and methods are not very useful if we cannot effectively use the information they provide to us. From a legislative point of view, significant progress has been made in this area. Congress has passed legislation removing legal restrictions regarding the sharing of intelligence information. Agency heads have updated obsolete and inappropriate guidelines. Intelligence community personnel now seem to have a much clearer picture of what methods and actions are available to them. Unfortunately, while the legislative barriers to information sharing have been removed, the fact is that effective information sharing is still not taking place between intelligence and law enforcement, and this is a special problem between Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies and State and local law enforcement. I frequently hear complaints that agency culture, habit, and inertia, have preserved problems that should have been solved, making this yet another area in which the lessons of 9/11 have not been learned and not been applied effectively. September 11 was a wake-up call. It alerted us to the fact that our intelligence agencies were not performing at the level required during this era of terrorism. We have just received our first report card. The report card is to tell us how well we have done since September 11 in applying lessons learned to the greater protection of the American people. We have received a grade of F. The false assertion of large stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq demonstrates that we have not yet made the reforms to our intelligence agencies that are required. The next report card will come when we have the next intelligence failure. The President and the Congress will both be held accountable if we have not acted on these necessary reforms to protect the safety of the people of America.", u"Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Department of Justice. (10) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (11) The National Reconnaissance Office. (12) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (13) The Coast Guard. (14) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2005, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 4548 of the One Hundred Eighth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2005 under section 102 when the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2005 the sum of $310,466,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2006. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 310 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2005. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2005 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2006. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2005, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2005 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of National Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $42,322,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2007. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of National Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 4548 of the One Hundred Eighth Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law. (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. Funds appropriated for an intelligence or intelligence- related activity of the United States Government for fiscal year 2004 in excess of the amount specified for such activity in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2599) shall be deemed to be specifically authorized by Congress for purposes of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)). Such funds shall remain available until September 30, 2005. (a) Consultation in Preparation.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that any report, review, study, or plan required to be prepared or conducted by a provision of this Act, including a provision of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) or the classified annex to this Act, that involves the intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy is prepared or conducted in consultation with the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate. (2) The Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy may carry out any consultation required by this subsection through an official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, as the case may be, designated by such Secretary for that purpose. (b) Submittal.--Any report, review, study, or plan referred to in subsection (a) shall be submitted, in addition to any other committee of Congress specified for submittal in the provision concerned, to the following committees or subcommittees of Congress, as appropriate: (1) The Committee on Armed Services, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) The Committee on Armed Services, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2005 the sum of $239,400,000. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. (a) Establishment.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 1011(a) of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, is further amended by inserting after section 103F the following new section: (a) Function of Center.--Section 313 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2391; 50 U.S.C. 404n) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (d) and (e), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection (c): ``(c) Function.--The element established under subsection (a) shall provide for timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence for all elements of the intelligence community through-- ``(1) the integration of the translation capabilities of the intelligence community; ``(2) the use of remote-connection capabilities; and ``(3) the use of such other capabilities as the Director considers appropriate.''. (b) Location of Discharge of Function.--Subsection (d) of such section, as so redesignated, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) Personnel of the element established under subsection (a) may carry out the duties and functions of the element at any location that-- ``(A) has been certified as a secure facility by a department or agency of the United States Government; or ``(B) the Director has otherwise determined to be appropriate for such duties and functions''. (a) Assessment Required.--Not later than the date specified in subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress an intelligence assessment that identifies and describes each country or region that is a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist organizations. The assessment shall be based on current all-source intelligence. (b) Submittal Date.--The date of the submittal of the intelligence assessment required by subsection (a) shall be the earlier of-- (1) the date that is six months after the date of the enactment of this Act; or (2) June 1, 2005. It is the sense of Congress that the head of each element of the intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence elements of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury should make available to any committee of Congress with jurisdiction over matters relating to the Office of the Iraq Oil-for-Food Program of the United Nations, upon the request of such committee, any information and documents in the possession or control of such element in connection with any investigation of that Office by such committee. TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (a) In General.--Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (f); and (2) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively. (b) Termination of Funds Remittance Requirement.--(1) Section 2 of such Act is further amended by striking subsection (i). (2) Section 4(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331 note) is amended by striking ``, or section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public Law 103-36; 107 Stat. 104)''. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 19. (a) There is established the National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel. The Panel is a standing panel of the National Security Agency. The Panel shall be appointed by, and shall report directly to, the Director of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Panel shall study and assess, and periodically advise the Director on, the research, development, and application of existing and emerging science and technology advances, advances in encryption, and other topics. ``(c) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply with respect to the Panel.''. (a) Authority.--Funds designated for intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for assistance to the Government of Colombia for counterdrug activities for fiscal year 2005 or 2006, and any unobligated funds available to any element of the intelligence community for such activities for a prior fiscal year, shall be available-- (1) to support a unified campaign by the Government of Colombia against narcotics trafficking and against activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)); and (2) to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including the undertaking of rescue operations. (b) Applicability of Certain Laws and Limitations.--The use of funds pursuant to the authority in subsection (a) shall be subject to the following: (1) Section 556, 567, and 568 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (Public Law 107-115; 115 Stat. 2160, 2165, and 2166). (2) Section 8076 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-287; 118 Stat. 988). (3) The numerical limitations on the number of United States military personnel and United States individual civilian contractors contained in section 1021(c) of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2042). (c) Limitation on Participation of United States Personnel.--No United States Armed Forces personnel or United States civilian contractor employed by the United States Armed Forces may participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance made available under this section, except for the purpose of acting in self defense or during the course of search and rescue operations for United States citizens. TITLE VI--EDUCATION Subtitle A--National Security Education Program (a) In General.--Section 810 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1910) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(c) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005, $8,000,000 to carry out the scholarship, fellowship, and grant programs under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively, of section 802(a)(1).''. (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 802(a)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1902(a)(2)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by inserting ``or from a transfer under section 810(c)'' after ``National Security Education Trust Fund''. (a) Requirement for Employment Agreements.--(1) Section 802(i) of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(5) An undergraduate or graduate student who participates in training in a program under paragraph (1) and has not already entered into a service agreement under subsection (b) shall enter into a service agreement under subsection (b) applicable to an undergraduate or graduate student, as the case may be, with respect to participation in such training in a program under paragraph (1). ``(6)(A) An employee of a department or agency of the Federal Government who participates in training in a program under paragraph (1) shall agree in writing-- ``(i) to continue in the service of the department or agency of the Federal Government employing the employee for the period of such training; ``(ii) to continue in the service of such department or agency, following completion by the employee of such training, for a period of two years for each year, or part of the year, of such training; ``(iii) if, before the completion by the employee of such training, the employment of the employee is terminated by such department or agency due to misconduct by the employee, or by the employee voluntarily, to reimburse the United States for the total cost of such training (excluding the employee's pay and allowances) provided to the employee; and ``(iv) if, after the completion by the employee of such training but before the completion by the employee of the period of service required by clause (ii), the employment of the employee by such department or agency is terminated either by such department or agency due to misconduct by the employee, or by the employee voluntarily, to reimburse the United States in an amount that bears the same ratio to the total cost of such training (excluding the employee's pay and allowances) provided to the employee as the unserved portion of such period of service bears to the total period of service required by clause (ii). ``(C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the obligation to reimburse the United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A) is for all purposes a debt owing the United States. ``(D) The head of the element of the intelligence community concerned may release an employee, in whole or in part, from the obligation to reimburse the United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A) when, in the discretion of the head of the element, the head of the element determines that equity or the interests of the United States so require.''. (2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply to training under section 802(i) of the David L. Boren National Security Act of 1991 that begins on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Increase in Annual Funding.--Section 811 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1911) is amended by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following new subsections: ``(b) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005, $6,000,000 to carry out the grant program for the National Flagship Language Initiative under section 802(a)(1)(D). ``(c) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts made available under this section shall remain available until expended.''. (c) Increase in Number of Participating Educational Institutions.--The Secretary of Defense shall take such actions as the Secretary considers appropriate to increase the number of qualified educational institutions that receive grants under the National Flagship Language Initiative under section 802(i) of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 to establish, operate, or improve activities designed to train students in programs in a range of disciplines to achieve advanced levels of proficiency in those foreign languages that the Secretary identifies as being the most critical to the national security of the United States. (d) Clarification of Authority to Support Studies Abroad.-- Educational institutions that receive grants under the National Flagship Language Initiative may support students who pursue total immersion foreign language studies overseas of foreign languages that are critical to the national security of the United States. (a) Scholarship Program.--(1) Subsection (a)(1) of section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended-- (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (C); (B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D) and inserting ``; and''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(E) awarding scholarships to students who-- ``(i) are United States citizens who--", u" The text of the bill is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Definitions. In this Act: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2013 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2013, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill S. 3454 of the One Hundred Twelfth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.-- (1) Availability to committees of congress.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President. (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except-- (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 415c); (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or (C) as otherwise required by law. (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number of positions for fiscal year 2013 authorized by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in-- (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program; (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or (3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training. (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to the initial exercise of an authority described in subsection (a). (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2013 the sum of $540,721,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2014. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 835 positions as of September 30, 2013. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2013 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2014. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2013, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2013 the sum of The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. Section 113A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h-1) is amended-- (1) by striking ``two years.'' and inserting ``three years.''; and (2) by adding at the end ``A non-reimbursable detail made under this section shall not be considered an augmentation of the appropriations of the receiving element of the intelligence community.''. Section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 112-18; 50 U.S.C. 403-1 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``October 1, 2012,'' and inserting ``October 1, 2013,''; and (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``October 1, 2013,'' and inserting ``October 1, 2014,''. (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each chief information officer for an element of the intelligence community, in consultation with the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall-- (1) conduct an inventory of software licenses held by such element, including utilized and unutilized licenses; and (2) report the results of such inventory to the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. (b) Reporting to Congress.--The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall-- (1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, provide to the congressional intelligence committees a copy of each report received by the Chief Information Officer under subsection (a)(2), along with any comments the Chief Information Officer wishes to provide; and (2) transmit any portion of a report submitted under paragraph (1) involving a component of a department of the United States Government to the committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over such department simultaneously with submission of such report to the congressional intelligence committees. (a) Strategy.--The President shall develop a strategy and a schedule for carrying out the requirements of section 3001(d) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b(d)). Such strategy and schedule shall include-- (1) a process for accomplishing the reciprocity required under such section for a security clearance issued by a department or agency of the Federal Government, including reciprocity for security clearances that are issued to both persons who are and who are not employees of the Federal Government; and (2) a description of the specific circumstances under which a department or agency of the Federal Government may not recognize a security clearance issued by another department or agency of the Federal Government. (b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall inform Congress of the strategy and schedule developed under subsection (a). (a) Plan for Compliance.-- (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Security Agency shall each develop a corrective action plan, with major milestones, that delineates how the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and each such Agency will achieve compliance, not later than September 30, 2013, with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-204; 124 Stat. 2224), and the amendments made by that Act. (2) Submission to congress.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act-- (A) each Director referred to in paragraph (1) shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the corrective action plan required by such paragraph; and (B) the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Security Agency shall each submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives the corrective action plan required by paragraph (1) with respect to the applicable Agency. (b) Review by Inspectors General.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 45 days after the completion of a corrective action plan required by subsection (a)(1), the Inspector General of each Agency required to develop such a plan, and in the case of the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees an assessment of such plan that includes-- (A) the assessment of the Inspector General of whether such Agency or Office is or is not likely to reach compliance with the requirements of the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-204; 124 Stat. 2224), and the amendments made by that Act, by September 30, 2013; and (B) the basis of the Inspector General for such assessment. (2) Additional submission of reviews of certain inspectors general.--Not later than 45 days after the completion of a corrective action plan required by subsection (a)(1), the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Inspector General of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Inspector General of the National Security Agency shall each submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives the assessment of the applicable plan provided to the congressional intelligence committees under paragraph (1). Not later than October 1, 2013, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report assessing the method by which contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with an element of the intelligence community are granted security clearances and notified of classified contracting opportunities within the Federal Government and recommendations for the improvement of such method. Such report shall include-- (1) an assessment of the current method by which contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with an element of the intelligence community are notified of classified contracting opportunities; (2) an assessment of any problems that may reduce the overall effectiveness of the ability of the intelligence community to identify appropriate contractors at any tier under such a contract; (3) an assessment of the role the existing security clearance process has in enhancing or hindering the ability of the intelligence community to notify such contractors of contracting opportunities; (4) an assessment of the role the current security clearance process has in enhancing or hindering the ability of contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with an element of the intelligence community to execute classified contracts; (5) a description of the method used by the Director of National Intelligence for assessing the effectiveness of the notification process of the intelligence community to produce a talented pool of subcontractors; (6) a description of appropriate goals, schedules, milestones, or metrics used to measure the effectiveness of such notification process; and (7) recommendations for improving such notification process. (a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.-- Section 103H(k)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3h(k)(1)(A)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``January 31 and July 31'' and inserting ``October 31 and April 30''; and (2) by striking ``December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30,'' and inserting ``September 30 and March 31,''. (b) Inspector General for the Central Intelligence Agency.-- (1) In general.--Section 17(d)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(1)) is amended-- (A) by striking ``January 31 and July 31'' and inserting ``October 31 and April 30''; (B) by striking ``December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30,'' and inserting ``September 30 and March 31,''; and (C) by striking ``Not later than the dates each year provided for the transmittal of such reports in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947,'' and inserting ``Not later than 30 days after the date of the receipt of such reports,''. (2) Conforming amendments.--Section 507(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b(b)) is amended-- (A) by striking paragraph (1); and (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively. (a) Repeal of Reporting Requirements.-- (1) Acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions.--Section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (50 U.S.C. 2366) is repealed. (2) Safety and security of russian nuclear facilities and nuclear military forces.--Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended-- (A) by striking subsections (a) and (d); and (B) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively. (3) Intelligence community business systems budget information.--Section 506D of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a-6) is amended by striking subsection (e). (4) Measures to protect the identities of covert agents.-- Title VI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) is amended-- (A) by striking section 603; and (B) by redesignating sections 604, 605, and 606 as sections 603, 604, and 605, respectively. (b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.-- (1) Report submission dates.--Section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a)-- (i) in paragraph (1)-- (I) by striking subparagraphs (A), (C), and (D); (II) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (E), (F), (G), (H), and (I) as subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F), respectively; and (III) in subparagraph (D), as so redesignated, by striking Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended as follows: (1) In subsection (b)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end; (ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``program.'' and inserting ``program; and''; and (iii) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) authorize such providers to make known their services to the entities specified in section (a) through Government communication channels.''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(3) The authority in paragraph (1)(D) does not include the authority to distribute gifts or promotional items.''; and (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (2)(E), by striking ``from the sale or exchange of equipment or property of a central service provider'' and inserting ``from the sale or exchange of equipment, recyclable materials, or property of a central service provider.''; and (B) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``subsection (f)(2)'' and inserting ``subsections (b)(1)(D) and (f)(2)''. There is established within the Department of Homeland Security a Homeland Security Intelligence Program. The Homeland Security Intelligence Program constitutes the intelligence activities of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department that serve predominantly departmental missions. Section 1007(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by striking ``Not later than one year after the date on which all members of the Commission are appointed pursuant to section 701(a)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,'' and inserting ``Not later than March (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that-- (1) identifies foreign suppliers of information technology (including equipment, software, and services) that are linked directly or indirectly to a foreign government, including-- (A) by ties to the military forces of a foreign government; (B) by ties to the intelligence services of a foreign government; or (C) by being the beneficiaries of significant low interest or no interest loans, loan forgiveness, or other support by a foreign government; and (2) assesses the vulnerability to malicious activity, including cyber crime or espionage, of the telecommunications networks of the United States due to the presence of technology produced by suppliers identified under paragraph (a) Notification.--In the event of an authorized disclosure of national intelligence or intelligence related to national security to the persons or entities described in subsection (b), the government official responsible for authorizing the disclosure shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees on a timely basis a notification of the disclosure if-- (1) at the time of the disclosure-- (A) such intelligence is classified; or (B) is declassified for the purpose of the disclosure; and (2) the disclosure will be made by an officer, employee, or contractor of the Executive branch. (b) Persons or Entities Described.--The persons or entities described in this subsection are as follows: (1) Media personnel. (2) Any person or entity, if the disclosure described in subsection (a) is made with the intent or knowledge that such information will be made publicly available. (c) Content.--Each notification required under subsection (a) shall-- (1) provide the specific title and authority of the individual authorizing the disclosure; (2) if applicable, provide the specific title and authority of the individual who authorized the declassification of the intelligence disclosed; and (3) describe the intelligence disclosed, including the classification of the intelligence prior to its disclosure or declassification and the rationale for making the disclosure. (d) Exception.--The notification requirement in this section does not apply to a disclosure made-- (1) pursuant to any statutory requirement, including to section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the ``Freedom of Information Act''); (2) in connection with a civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding; (3) as a result of a declassification review process under Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 435 note) or any successor order; or (4) to any officer, employee, or contractor of the Federal government or member of an advisory committee to an element of the intelligence community who possesses an active security clearance and a need to know the specific national intelligence or intelligence related to national security, as defined in section 3(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(5)). (e) Sunset.--The notification requirements of this section shall cease to be effective for any disclosure described in subsection (a) that occurs on or after the date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Personnel Practices.--Section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following: ``(ii)(I) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and ``(II) as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, provided that the determination be made prior to a personnel action; or''. (b) Senior Executive Service.--Section 3132(a)(1)(B) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,'' after ``the Central Intelligence Agency,''. Section 606(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 426) is amended to read as follows: ``(5) The term `intelligence agency' means the elements of the intelligence community, as that term is defined in section 3(4).''. The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation'' for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that such ", u"Mr. President, in February, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center estimated that nearly 20,000 foreign fighters had joined ISIS or other related groups in Syria. Among those, some 3,000 were from Western countries. In other words, many of them either had American passports or those that are part of the visa waiver program and could travel, really, without anything other than that passport in the country. Over 150 were from the United States. Just last week, in describing the widespread nature of this growing threat, FBI Director James Comey said that the FBI is working on hundreds of investigations in the United States, hundreds of investigations. In fact, according to Comey, all 56 of the FBI's field divisions now have open inquiries regarding suspected cases of homegrown terrorism--again, not people coming from Syria or Afghanistan or someplace in the Middle East, these are often Americans who have become radicalized due to the use of social media or the Internet--much as 5 years ago we saw at Fort Hood, TX, a major in the U.S. Army, Nidal Hasan, who had been radicalized by a cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki. Major Hasan actually pulled out his weapon and killed 13 people, 12 uniformed military, 1 civilian, and shot roughly 30 more in a terrible terrorist attack at Fort Hood, TX. So today we are not just worried about a major attack on a significant cultural or economic hub, we also have to worry about ISIS-inspired terrorists all around the country, even as we witnessed in my home State of Texas just on May 3. When you begin to look at the story--that I will ask to be made part of the Record--written by the New York Times on May 11, 2015, it explains how this new threat of homegrown terrorism is inspired. I will quote a few pieces of it: Hours before he drove into a Texas parking lot last week and opened fire with an assault rifle outside a Prophet Muhammad cartoon contest, Elton Simpson, 30, logged onto Twitter. ``Follow @_AbuHu55ain,'' Mr. Simpson posted, promoting a Twitter account believed to belong to Junaid Hussain, a young computer expert from Birmingham, England, who moved to Syria two years ago to join the Islamic State and has become one of the extremist group's celebrity hackers. Well, there is a question--as the article goes on to say--whether or not Mr. Simpson and his colleague, who came, I believe, from Phoenix, AZ, and went on to Garland, TX, to carry out this attack--whether they were actually recruited ahead of time by ISIL or whether ISIL just claimed credit after the fact. But the article goes on to say: It was the first time that the terror group had tried to claim credit for an operation carried out in its name on American soil. . . . Yet Mr. Simpson appears to have been part of a network of Islamic State adherents in several countries, including the group's hub in Syria, who have encouraged attacks and highlighted the Texas event as a worthy target. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, following my remarks, this New York Times article from May 11, 2015, and a Wall Street Journal article from May 12, 2015, by Michael B. Mukasey. So what FBI Director Comey has expressed concern about recently is apparently very real. It is as real as the daily newspaper recounting the attack on May 3 in Garland, TX, of all places. Terrorists are sending a clear signal to those in the United States and other Western countries: If you can't fight us abroad, we are going to bring the fight to you in your own country. This heightened threat environment has led Pentagon officials to raise the security level at U.S. military bases. The last time the threat level was raised to this level was the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks. I still remember when the former admiral, Bobby Inman, who served for a long time in the Navy and then also in the intelligence community, was asked about 9/11. He said: It wasn't so much a failure of intelligence, as it was a failure of imagination. Nobody imagined that terrorists would hijack a plane and fly it into one of our Nation's highest skyscrapers, thus, in the process, killing approximately 3,000 people. So we need to remember not to have a failure of imagination when it comes to the tactics used by terrorists and those who inspire them abroad. Remarks like those from Director Comey and the Director of our National Counterterrorism Center are certainly troubling ones for us to hear, and it counsels caution. While the United States has been mostly successful in thwarting attacks on our homeland since 9/11, the threats are still very real. In fact, the terrorist threat has evolved and become more complex in recent years. In Texas, we rightly recognize that the role of government should be constrained to focus on core functions. At the Federal level, of course, this means things such as passing a budget. But surely it also means protecting our country and its security and the security of the American people. That brings me to some business that we are going to have to conduct here in the Congress sometime within the next couple of weeks before certain provisions of the U.S. PATRIOT Act expire on June 1. I believe that if we allow these provisions to expire, our homeland security will be at a much greater risk. So I think we need to talk a little bit about it and explain not only the threat but what our intelligence community and our national security officials are doing, working with Congress and the administration, to make sure Americans are safe, and the PATRIOT Act is part of it. I recognize there are many who perhaps haven't read the PATRIOT Act or whose memories have perhaps dimmed since those terrible events on 9/11 and who think we don't need the PATRIOT Act. But I would argue that the PATRIOT Act serves as a tool for intelligence and law enforcement officials to protect our Nation from those who are seeking to harm us. Three of those useful tools will expire at the end of the month, including section 215, which allows the National Security Agency to access certain types of data, including phone records. There has been a lot of misunderstanding and, frankly, some of it downright deceptive, about what this does, when, in fact, section 215 is a business records collection provision that happens to be applied to collecting phone records but not the content of phone records. This is one of the misleading statements made by some folks who think we ought to let this provision expire. Right now, under current law, which is set to expire June 1, our intelligence community can get basically three types of information about a phone record: the calling and receiving number, the time of the call, and the duration. That is it--no content, no names or addresses. You can't even get cell tower identification that would tell one where the call is coming from. Much has been said about this program, and, as I said, much of it misleading or downright false, but I want to focus now on the oversight that is built into this program because I think Americans understand we need to take steps in a dangerous world to keep the American people safe, but they also value their privacy, and justly so. We all do. So it is important to remind the American people and our colleagues as we take up this important provision of law about what we have already built into the law to protect the privacy of American citizens who are not engaged in any communication with foreign terrorists or being inspired by foreign terrorists to commit acts of terrorism here in the homeland. Let me talk about the barriers we have created in the law for an NSA--National Security Agency--analyst to overcome before seeing any real information from this data. First, for the NSA to have access to phone records at all--at all--a special court must approve an order requiring telephone companies to provide those call records to the Agency. That order has been in place since roughly 2006, where the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the specialized court created by Congress for this purpose, has issued an order requiring the telephone companies to turn over these call records--again, no content, no name and address, but merely the sending number, the receiving number, and the duration. That is the core information which is required. It is important to point out that these records include only the most basic limited information. They do not include the information I suggested earlier--the content, names and addresses, and the like. So the National Security Agency is not, as some have assumed wrongly, able to retrieve old phone conversations. They do not collect that sort of information, nor are they able to simply listen in on any American's phone conversations under this authority. That would be a violation of the protections Congress has put in place under the provisions of the PATRIOT Act. Before an analyst at the NSA can even search for or query the database, they must go through even more controls, and these are important. To be granted the ability to search the database, the analyst must demonstrate to the FISA Court--the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court created by Congress for this purpose--that there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the phone number is associated with terrorism. This is similar--not the same but similar--in many respects to the protections offered in a criminal case under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution where law enforcement agencies would have to come in and establish probable cause that a crime has been committed before a search would be allowed. But since this is an investigation into foreign-induced terrorist activity, the standard Congress set was a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the phone number is associated with terrorism. If the court determines that standard has been met, they can grant access to the conversation but not under any other circumstance. If the NSA believes the phone number belongs to someone who intends to attack our country, the Agency must go back to court another time to be granted other abilities to surveil that individual. In addition to these checks and balances between the National Security Agency and the courts, all three branches of government have oversight over this program. And strong oversight of the intelligence community is absolutely essential to safeguarding our freedoms and our liberty. Because parts of this program are by and large classified, you are not going to hear public debates about it. Indeed, that puts defenders of the program at some disadvantage to those who attack it--sometimes in a misleading or deceptive sort of way--because it is very difficult to counter that with factual information when they are talking about a classified program, or parts of which are classified. It is important that our enemies don't know exactly what we are doing because then they can wire around it. We live, of course, in a world with many threats, as I said, many of them in our backyard. Many of them can be thwarted with good intelligence and law enforcement. And I make that distinction on purpose--intelligence and law enforcement. Law enforcement--as we learned with 9/11, we can't just treat terrorism as a criminal act. It is a criminal act, but if we are going to stop it, we need access to good intelligence to thwart it before that act actually occurs. It is not enough to say to the American people: Well, we will deploy all of the tools available to law enforcement to prosecute the person who murders innocent people. We need to keep the commitment to protect them from that innocent slaughter in the first place, and the only way we do that is by using legitimate tools of intelligence, such as this program I am discussing. Earlier this year, for example, the United States frustrated a potential attack by a man from Ohio. He was an ISIS sympathizer and had plans to bomb the building we are standing in today, the U.S. Capitol. That potential attack was thwarted by the use of good intelligence under the limitations and strictures and procedures I described a moment ago. Over the past 2 years, the FBI has told us they have stopped 50 American citizens from traveling overseas and joining the Islamic State and then coming back. So clearly the intelligence community has a vital role to play in safeguarding the American people in our homeland. Some in the intelligence community have said the bulk data collection I have described here briefly has led to a safer United States, and it is because of programs such as these that we are much better off than we were pre-9/11. That is very important because the last thing I would think we would want to do here in Congress is to return us to a pre-9/11 mentality when it comes to the threat of terrorism both abroad and here at home and to make it harder for our national security personnel to protect the American people. I believe the portion of the PATRIOT Act in question provides our intelligence community with the tools they need in order to effectively protect all Americans. I have been briefed on this program. We just had a briefing yesterday by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, by the FBI Director, by DOJ personnel, and by the leader of the National Security Agency. It was held downstairs in a secure facility because, as I said, much of it was classified. Much of it we can't talk about without alerting our adversaries to ways to circumvent it. But all responsible Members of Congress have taken advantage of the opportunity to learn about how this program works as part of our oversight responsibilities. I remain convinced that this program, like many others, has helped to keep us safe while using appropriate checks and balances to ensure that our liberties remain intact. And Congress, by maintaining strong oversight of these and other government programs, can have a win-win situation that both protects American lives and protects American liberties. Mr. President, I want to draw my colleagues' attention to an opinion piece that appeared today in the Wall Street Journal that was written by Michael B. Mukasey, who, of course, was a former U.S. district judge and more recently Attorney General of the United States from 2007 to 2009. General Mukasey writes in this article about the Second Circuit opinion that has prompted so much recent discussion about section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and the bulk metadata collection process I described a moment ago. I think he makes some very important points. First of all, he makes the important point that it is a good thing Congress has created a special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court because the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, no matter how good they are as judges, simply doesn't have the experience to deal with parsing the law on intelligence matters and things such as this 215 provision I talked about a moment ago. He makes the important point that intelligence by its nature is forward-looking and our criminal justice system, which is what most courts have experience with, is backward-looking--in other words, something bad has already happened and the police and investigators and prosecutors are trying to bring somebody to justice for committing a criminal act. But our intelligence community is supposed to look forward and to help prevent those terrible accidents or incidents from occurring in the first place. The second point General Mukasey makes in this article is that the Second Circuit panel of judges assumes that many Members of Congress are simply unaware of the provisions of the PATRIOT Act I mentioned earlier--section 215, this metadata collection--which is a terrible and glaring mistake on the part of the Second Circuit panel. As I pointed out yesterday, just as we have done many times previously, Members of the Senate and the Congress generally have regular or at least periodic briefings on these intelligence programs as part of our oversight responsibilities. For the Second Circuit panel to suggest that Congress didn't know what it was talking about when it authorized these programs and when it wrote this provision of the law is simply erroneous. The third point General Mukasey makes is that the judges didn't even stop the program in the first place. So it makes one really wonder why they handed down their opinion about 3 weeks before the expiration of this provision, when Congress is going to have to take up this matter anyway, unless they wanted to have some impact on our deliberations here. What Attorney General Mukasey suggested, I think, is good advice. There needs to be an appeal to the Second Circuit Court en banc and then to the U.S. Supreme Court to get a final word. We don't need to settle on what he calls a ``Rube Goldberg'' procedure that would have data stored and searched by the telephone companies, he says, whose computers can be penetrated and whose employees have neither the security clearance nor the training of the NSA staff. Mr. President, I commend this article to my colleagues.", u"Mr. President, as soon as the copy of my amendment arrives, I will send it to the desk to file, not to offer at this point. Although it is applicable to the Defense bill, I will save it, at the request of the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, for next week's consideration of the Energy bill. It is an amendment to protect the interests of the Department of Defense; to protect the largest testing and training range in the world for our Defense Department. Let me show you where it is. It is in the Gulf of Mexico, off of Florida. It is all of this area outlined in yellow that is east of this longitudinal line. That area in yellow, including this area up here, 125 miles off Pensacola, is what was etched into law in 2006, 2 years ago, as a protected area from drilling for oil and gas. And why is that? Because everything east of that longitude-latitude line, all the way close to the coast of Florida, is the largest testing and training area for the United States military in the world. Now, you may wonder why in the last round of base closures and realignment--and remember, the acronym is BRAC, Base Realignment and Closure Commission, that is what BRAC stands for--in the realignment all of the pilot training for the new F-22 stealth fighter came to Tyndall Air Force Base at Panama City. You may wonder why. Well, that F-22 does a dogfight at 1\\1/2\\ mach. You can imagine what the training radius, the turning radius, is for an F-22 as it is in a dogfight. It is at 1\\1/2\\ times the speed of sound. So it has all of that area out there in which to train. Why also, under the realignment, the BRAC process, did all of the newly developed F-35s, called the Joint Strike Fighter, for the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines--and it is still being developed--why did they determine that all of the pilot training for the new F-35s was going to be at Eglin Air Force Base, which is located right here, right where that military mission line hits the shore? That longitude line--Eglin Air Force Base--why right there? It has all of that training area which is protected airspace. Why is this area off bounds here? Well, certainly when we passed the law 2 years ago, the interests of a $65 million a year tourist industry, dependent on pristine beaches, was considered. And by the way, Florida has more beaches than any other State. As a matter of fact, Florida has more coastline than any other State save Alaska, and Alaska doesn't have a lot of beaches. But we in Florida have barrier islands on most of Florida, and those barrier islands have extraordinary white sand beaches. So certainly that was an interest to protect there. But there is another reason. Guess what is right there. Pensacola Naval Air Station. That is where most of the Navy pilots and Marine pilots, naval aviators, that is where most of them learn to fly. So they have all this training area and they can go out on a carrier and train as Navy pilots. Now, speaking of the U.S. Navy, you will remember about 4 or 5 years ago there was a big brouhaha over the U.S. Atlantic Fleet training down off the island which is a part of Puerto Rico--off the shore of Puerto Rico and the island of Vieques. For decades, the U.S. Navy had trained its pilots there. But the people of Puerto Rico took great umbrage at this, and they wanted it changed and they wanted it removed. They were afraid it was a health hazard, and so the United States acceded to that request. As a result, Vieques was shut down for the Atlantic fleet. Well, where is the Atlantic fleet going to train? They have to train. Well, guess what. They came here--the largest testing and training area for the United States in the world. And in all of this protected space there are designated areas for the Navy, specifically off of Pensacola, up here, and then big areas of this part of the gulf for the Navy. The Air Force has mainly the rest of it, including some Air Force training over here. Now, here is what happens with the Navy. We have the Key West Naval Air Station right here. It is actually not on Key West. There are headquarters there on Key West, but the actual airfield is on the island to the north of Key West called Boca Chica. So what happens is they bring these Navy squadrons that are assigned to an Atlantic Fleet naval aircraft carrier, they fly them into Boca Chica, they spend 2 or 3 weeks there--these are the F-18s and will be the F-35s in the future--and then for that period of time they come out here and they have all of this area that is restricted space in order to train. The good news about that is that when they lift off from the runway here at Boca Chica, within 2 minutes they are over restricted space. So they do not have to fly a long way burning up a lot of fuel to get there. In 2 minutes they are ready to start their aerial training and their dogfights. Now, there is something else that is going on here. Because up here, at Fort Walton Beach, this huge Air Force facility called Eglin Air Force Base, is the test and evaluation center for all of the U.S. military--all of the Department of Defense. And what they do is they take all of these weapons systems--not just airplanes but air-to-surface missiles, air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles--and they shoot them and they train and they test. This is the Air Force test and evaluation center, but for all of the Department of Defense, and we have some weapons systems that we are shooting for hundreds of miles. From here to here is approximately 300 miles. So we have some weapons systems that are shooting hundreds of miles, and as a result, we need all of that. Now, when we passed this law protecting this area from any drilling 2 years ago, I had a statement in writing from the Secretary of Defense of what the policy is of the Department of Defense, which is that they do not want drilling out here in this test, training, and evaluation range. That is the operative policy as confirmed to me by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England, in a phone call with him 2 days ago. That is the operative policy. The Department of Defense, presently the Secretary of the Navy, is considering whether they need all of this, but Secretary England told me that there is no way they are going to have a decision made before we finish our session by the end of this month, and, therefore, we should plan on the operative policy to be that the U.S. Department of Defense does not want any drilling of oil and gas out here because it would mess up their testing, their evaluation, and their training. So the amendment I am going to offer would apply to this Gulf of Mexico area, east of this military mission line, which is this longitude line, everything east of there to the coast. And I want to read it specifically. It is defined as the ``Joint Gulf Range Complex'' or the ``Gulf of Mexico Range.'' It would also include any military or National Security Agency operations training or testing area that is used by a military or national security agency of the United States. It says: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior shall not issue any permit for oil and gas leasing or extraction in an area described--as I have just indicated--unless and until the President certifies, based on written opinions provided by each of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, and the head of each appropriate national security agency of the United States, that in balancing the national security interests of the United States the advantages of oil or gas extraction in the area outweigh the military and national security missions being conducted in the area. In other words, it is a fail-safe approach to say that it is going to force us in the future--whenever we are considering changing laws like this that protect this area for the military, that it shall have the force of law that the Secretary of Interior has to get a written certification from the President that the oil and gas extraction outweighs the military and national security missions being conducted in the area. We are in a time in which our enemies want to do us harm. We are in a time in which we have to be prepared. In order to have that preparation, we not only need the personnel and the intelligence, but we need the equipment. We have to test that equipment under all kinds of conditions to make sure it works when we have to have it work. That is what this testing and evaluation and training range is for. This Senator is not going to let the U.S. defense preparedness be a sacrificial lamb for the interests of the oil and gas companies in order to satisfy their hollow-ring rhetoric that says ``drill, baby, drill.'' You have heard me before on this floor say that the mantra ought not be ``drill, baby, drill.'' As Tom Friedman says, the mantra ought to be ``invent, baby, invent.'' That is how we are going to break the stranglehold of oil that is around our neck. But until we get to that point--and I hope we are rapidly moving to that point of alternative fuels--this Senator is going to stand up and not let the defense preparedness of this country be sacrificed as a lamb on the altar of the oil and gas companies. This Senator also wants to clearly say this to the Gang of 10 that proposes to drill up to 50 miles off the Florida coast. That would bring it up to a point about like this on this map. You can see how that would cut out the heart and the lungs of the military mission test and evaluation. The Gang of 10 that wants to vote on their proposal next week says: By the way, we are going to do that drilling all the way up to 50 miles off of the west coast of Florida, but we are not going to do that off of anybody else's coast. We will let there be drilling at the OK of the States of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, and we are not going to touch anybody else, but we are sure going to touch the west coast of Florida and this military mission line. This Senator wants to clearly say he is not going to let Florida be the sacrificial lamb. I just hope my colleagues understand that this Senator is not going to let that happen. We concocted, crafted, and compromised to pass this law 2 years ago to satisfy the Senator from Louisiana, the Senators from Mississippi, and the Senators from Alabama who wanted additional drilling while at the same time this Senator and my colleague, Senator Martinez, brought to the table that we wanted to protect the military and we wanted to protect Florida. We crafted this compromise. Now, 2 years later, they want to blow it out of the water and they want to blow the U.S. military out of the water. We have a few tools at our disposal called parliamentary rules of the Senate. We are simply not going to let this happen. This Senator is about as bipartisan as anybody on this floor. This Senator is about as reasonable as anybody on this floor. This Senator does believe what the Good Book says, which is ``Come, let us reason together.'' That is how we ought to forge compromise and make law, recognizing that you have to build consensus. That is what we ought to do, and we ought to do it in a bipartisan fashion. But the Gang of 10 wants to run over the interests of this Senator and the interests of the military. Every now and then, we have the opportunity to stand up and say no. I want everybody to be clear where this Senator is. Let me tell you, the Speaker of the House of Representatives came out yesterday with a proposal that this Senator would certainly consider, and I think favorably. What the Speaker of the House has said is honor the 2006 law, and on the rest of the Outer Continental Shelf, all over the United States beyond 100 miles, drill; between 50 and 100 miles, if the State concurs, drill. Those being Federal lands, those revenues would inure to the benefit of the U.S. Treasury, not to the States. This Senator will certainly consider that, but not when they say the interests of Florida and the interests of the Defense Department are the ones that are going to have to completely give, since we worked this and etched it into law for the first time 2 years ago. I want everybody to understand what the position of this Senator is. What I would like to do is to send this amendment to the desk to file. I will not offer it because, as I said, the chairman of our Armed Services Committee has enough on his plate--I am one of his subcommittee chairmen--in order to get this Defense authorization bill passed. But this issue will certainly be ripe next week when we take up the energy provisions. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, before he leaves the Chamber, I simply wish to say to the distinguished chairman of our committee that I thank him for his kind and gracious introductory remarks to me. As he knows, sometimes we agree, as we did in the effort to make public the CIA inspector general's report on 9/11. I appreciated working with the distinguished chairman on that matter. Sometimes we disagree, as we do tonight with respect to the nomination of General Hayden, but Chairman Roberts has always been courteous and fair in our committee and essentially to every member. I thank him for that as he leaves the Chamber tonight. Clearly, Chairman Roberts and Senator Hatch, two distinguished members of our Intelligence Committee, want no part of it, but there are those who want to turn the Hayden nomination into a referendum on who is toughest on terrorism, Republicans or Democrats. These people do America a disservice. I know of no Senator who sympathizes with a terrorist. I know of no Senator who wishes to coddle al-Qaida. I know of no Senator who is anything other than a patriot. Unfortunately, this nomination is being used to divide the Senate and the American people on the issue of terrorism. Just this past Monday, the Washington Post newspaper reported that the White House: Seems eager for a battle over the nomination of Air Force GEN Michael V. Hayden as CIA Director. The article goes on to say: The White House hopes voters will see the warrantless surveillance program Hayden started as head of the National Security Agency as tough on terrorism rather than a violation of civil liberties. I believe the American people deserve better than the White House agenda of false choices. I believe one can fight the terrorists ferociously and protect the liberties of law-abiding Americans. I believe the Senate should not be bullied into thinking that security and liberty are mutually exclusive, and I believe that millions of Americans share that view. From the days of Ben Franklin, security and liberty in America have been mutually reinforcing, and it is our job to maintain this sacred balance. This is harder to do now because across America there is less trust and there is more fear. The lack of trust has been fed by the Bush administration telling the public that they have struck the right balance between security and liberty, but then we have had one media report after another that contradicts that claim. When the media reports come out, the administration says it can't say anything because responding would help the terrorists, but then the administration responds in multiple forums to get out the small shards of information that they believe is helpful to their point of view. The increased fear among our people is nourished by the fact that there are no independent checks on the Government's conduct, as there have been for more than 200 years in America. Law-abiding Americans have no reason to be confident that anyone is independently verifying reports about the administration's reported surveillance of their personal phone calls, e-mails, and Internet use. All of this mistrust and fear has translated into a lack of credibility. The administration has given us, by words and deeds, a national security routine: Do one thing, say another. An absolute prerequisite to running intelligence programs successfully is credibility. Despite the scores of talented, dedicated, patriotic people working at Langley today, the failings of the Agency's recent leadership have left the Agency's credibility diminished. The Agency is now looking at the prospect of its fourth Director since 9/11. The last Director brought partisanship and lost talented professional staff as a result. The Agency's No. 3 man, who resigned this month, is being investigated by the FBI for links to the bribing of a former Congressman. It is long past time to get it right at the This will be the second time I have voted on a Hayden nomination. The first time around, when he was nominated to serve as Deputy National Intelligence Director, I voted for the General. In my view, General Hayden's technical knowledge is not in question. He has always been personable in any discussions the two of us have had, and he has always been extremely easy to talk to. But since I last voted for him, information has come to light that has raised serious questions about whether the General is the right person to lead the CIA. There are serious questions about whether the General will continue to be an administration cheerleader; serious questions regarding his credibility; serious questions about his understanding of and respect for constitutional checks and balances, and the important accountability in Government that they create. Here are the facts: Last December, the New York Times reported that since 9/11, the National Security Agency, which General Hayden was in charge of at the time, initiated a warrantless wiretapping program. General Hayden, reported once more in the media to be the architect of the program, became the main public spokesperson in its defense. At a White House press conference in December of 2005 and at subsequent events, including a speech at the National Press Club this past January, the General vigorously defended the administration's warrantless wiretapping program. Even before the war in Iraq, I was concerned about politicizing intelligence. Since then, I think they are only additional grounds for concern. At his confirmation hearing, General Hayden said he wants to get the CIA out of the news. To me, this was a curious statement, given all the time he has spent on the bully pulpit defending the President's warrantless wiretapping program. Inevitably, any political appointee will have an allegiance to the White House that appointed him or her. But when it comes to positions in the intelligence community, I believe that this allegiance, regardless of whether a Republican or a Democrat is in the White House, should go only so far. It is not good for our great country to have a CIA Director who jumps into every political debate that comes up here in Washington, D.C. It is not good for our great country to have a CIA Director who willingly serves as an administration cheerleader. It is not good for our great country to have a CIA Director who gets trotted out again and again and again to publicly argue for the President's controversial decisions. Politicizing the position renders the CIA Director less effective and less credible. Inevitably, Americans will begin to see the Director as an administration defender rather than a conveyor of the unvarnished truth. And in our next CIA Director, we need more truth and we need less varnish. My second concern rises out of the first. Not only has General Hayden raised questions through his words and actions about politicizing intelligence, but, unfortunately, even when he says something, you cannot trust, based on his words, that what he says is credible. At the National Press Club speech he gave in January defending the NSA warrantless wiretapping program, the General repeatedly stated that the program was limited to international to domestic, or domestic to international calls. For instance, he said: There is always a balancing between security and liberty. We understand that this is a more--I'll use the word ``aggressive''--program than would be traditionally available under FISA. It is also less intrusive. It deals only with international calls. Later, General Hayden said: That is why I mentioned earlier that the program is less intrusive. It deals only with international calls. He explained: The intrusion into privacy--the intrusion into privacy is significantly less. It is only international calls. He added: We are talking about here communications we have every reason to believe are al-Qaida communications, one end of which is in the United States. At the conclusion of the Press Club address, he was asked by a reporter: Can you assure us that all of these intercepts had an international component, and that at no time were any of the intercepts purely domestic? The General said: The authorization given to NSA by the President requires that one end of the communications has to be outside the United States. I can assure you by the physics of the intercept, by how we actually conduct our activities, that one end of these communications are always outside the United States of America. With those final words, the speech and the press conference concluded. But then, just weeks ago, Americans read in the USA Today newspaper that the NSA, according to the paper, was also gathering basic information concerning hundreds of millions of innocent Americans' domestic phone calls. I cannot confirm or deny what was in that article, but I can tell you when I opened the paper that morning and read the article, it raised serious concerns for me about whether the General had been misleading. Unfortunately, this is not a single incident in an otherwise perfect record. There is a pattern of saying one thing and doing another when it comes to the General. For instance, General Hayden said he received legal authority to tap Americans' phone calls without a warrant in 2001. A year later, in 2002, the General testified before Congress's joint 9/11 inquiry that he had no authority to listen to Americans' phone calls in the United States without first obtaining enough evidence for a warrant. As conceded by the General himself, at the time he made these statements to Congress, the NSA was in fact doing the very thing he led us to believe it could not: engaging in warrantless wiretapping on persons here in our country. When I asked the General to explain these contradictions at his confirmation hearing, I didn't get much of a response. At best, I got a nonanswer that reflected the General's skill in verbal gymnastics, but not the type of candor that America needs in its next CIA Director. There is another example that I want to talk briefly about, Mr. President. When General Hayden came before the Senate Intelligence Committee last year in conjunction with his nomination to serve as a deputy to Ambassador Negroponte, I asked him about the NSA Trailblazer Program. This had been one of the General's signature NSA management initiatives, one that had been again reported as one designed to modernize the Agency's information technology infrastructure. In response to my questions--I want to be specific about this because there has been a lot of discussion about it--among a variety of other comments the General made about the Trailblazer Program, at page 44 of the transcript of that 2005 hearing that was held to approve General Hayden to be the deputy to Mr. Negroponte, the General said with respect to the Trailblazer Program: A personal view, now--looking back--we overachieved. Now, I cannot go into detail here on the Senate floor because of the classified nature of the information involved, but suffice it to say today the press is reporting that the program is belly-up and the press is reporting that it is a billion dollars worth of junk software. I take my constitutional responsibility to give advice and consent to the President's nominations very seriously. Last Monday, after the hearing, I did something that I do not customarily do. I reached out to the general once more in an effort to try to find grounds for supporting his nomination. In my office I asked that he keep the Senate Intelligence Committee fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities other than covert actions. In writing, the general responded: Regarding communications with Congress on critical issues, if confirmed as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency I intend to have an open and complete dialog with the full membership of the committee, as indicated by 501(C) 502 and 503 of the National Security Act as amended. So far, so good. But then the general added: As you understand, there will continue to be very sensitive intelligence activities and operations such as covert actions that, consistent with legislative history and longstanding practice, is briefed only to leadership of the committee. On those rare occasions, communications with those Members will be exhaustive. So once again the bottom line, General Hayden's response is ambiguous. If confirmed he intends to sometimes inform Congress and at other times only inform certain Members, without explaining how this will be decided or what his role in the decision will be. Read his response from Monday and you still can't determine when he will brief members of the Senate Intelligence Committee on the activities of the CIA, and when they will be learning about them by reading the morning newspaper. As I stated, the CIA is looking at the prospect of its fourth Director in this dangerous post-9/11 world. Serious reform is needed to get the Central Intelligence Agency headed in the right direction. To make this happen, America needs a CIA Director who says what he means and means what he says. Unfortunately, time and time again, General Hayden has demonstrated a propensity for neither. His words and acts on one occasion cannot be reconciled with words and acts on another. He is a man with a reputation for taking complicated questions and giving simple answers. Unfortunately and repeatedly, when I have asked him simple questions, he has given me complicated answers, or nothing at all. Americans want to believe that their Government is doing everything it can to fight terrorism ferociously and to protect the legal rights and civil liberties of law-abiding Americans. But right now millions of Americans are having trouble locating the checks and balances on Executive power. They don't know what the truth is and they are very concerned about what is next. I believe it is time for the Senate to break that cycle. I remain concerned that what has happened at the National Security Agency under General Hayden will be replicated at the Central Intelligence Agency. For that reason, I oppose the nomination. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Alaska. It is late, and I understand that. I rise to address something which is very important to me, and that is the Defense appropriations bill that may appear to many to be insignificant boilerplate language, when, in fact, is not that at all. Unfortunately, the provision has an enlarged significance in this Congress as a result of the inexplicable and unpardonable failure of the Senate to do something that it has never done before, and that is to fail to pass intelligence authorizations for either fiscal year 2006 or fiscal year 2007. Section 8086 of the Defense appropriations bill waives section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 until the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007. What does that mean? Section 504 provides, with limited exceptions, that no appropriated funds available may be obligated or expended for an intelligence activity unless those funds were specifically authorized by Congress; therefore, by the two Intelligence Committees. This waiver is a standard part of the Defense appropriations bill. Until this Congress, it has served the acceptable function of allowing intelligence communities to begin spending money if the authorization bill is not completed before the beginning of the fiscal year. Under this waiver, as soon as the intelligence authorizations for any given year are enacted, that authorization language would control. In this Congress, however, the boilerplate language has become the substitute for legislative authorization of intelligence activities because the majority leader, to be honest, has refused to bring the intelligence authorization bill to the floor for the past 2 years--for the past 2 years. The Senate's failure to pass this critical national security legislation is unprecedented. Last year was the first time since the establishment of the congressional Intelligence Committees that the Senate failed to pass an annual authorization bill. From 1978 through 2004, the Senate had an unbroken, 27-year record of completing its work on this critical legislation. The intelligence authorization bill has been rightly considered, always, must-pass legislation. Regardless of who controlled the Senate, regardless of who controlled the White House, there was an understanding that the programs authorized by this bill were too important to not have the input of the Congress through the Intelligence Committees. Unfortunately, because of an anonymous objection by a Republican Senator, the majority leader decided to let this important national security legislation die on the vine last year, for the first time, and he appears intent on doing so this year again. The result of this decision by the majority leader will be diminished authority for intelligence agencies to do their jobs of protecting Americans. It also will result in less effective oversight, which was essentially the 9/11 Commission's No. 1 call, and all of this at a time when the intelligence community is undergoing the biggest restructuring in its 50-year history. The annual intelligence authorization is the primary mechanism which the Congress, through the Intelligence Committees, uses to provide guidance and support to America's intelligence agencies, the heart of our effort to protect America's national security. At a time when our security depends so heavily on good intelligence, when our national security has been endangered by not depending sufficiently on good intelligence--or maybe the intelligence wasn't good when it should have been--and we are in the midst of reforming and modernizing our intelligence community, the Senate's failure to act on this legislation is absolutely inexplicable to this Senator and to virtually all the Members of the Intelligence Committees. In reporting the resolution to establish the Intelligence Committee in May 1976, since the first chairman on our side was the Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye, the Committee on Government Operations back then wrote the following: An essential part of the new committee's jurisdiction will be authorization authority over the intelligence activities of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Without this authority, the new committee would not be assured the practical ability to monitor the activities of these agencies. They wrote that back then--and that is: That is what they said. The failure of the Senate to pass intelligence authorization for 2 years threatens to erode the ability of the Intelligence Committee to carry out the mission assigned to it by the Senate. This failure has consequences both immediate and long term. Our intelligence agencies can continue executing the funding made available through the various appropriations bills but without any guidance as to what they should do from the Intelligence Committees. I do not understand this. The Appropriations Committee does an excellent job at providing resources for the intelligence agencies, what they need to operate on. But the roadmap for how the Congress expects those sources to be executed comes from the authorization bill--which seems to no longer exist. The sensitivity and importance of our Nation's intelligence programs makes congressional direction essential every single year. But the creation of an Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2004, and the ongoing development of that office, makes the guidance even more important now. The fiscal year 2006 authorization bill contains 17 separate provisions enhancing or clarifying the authority of the DNI. Those provisions included additional authority to promote information sharing, clarifying the DNI's role in managing human intelligence--all of these, easy to say and difficult to do--providing flexibility in the financing of national intelligence centers, how those centers were to be set up, and elevating the DNI Inspector General to a statutory position. Those important provisions are now included in this fiscal year 2007 bill, and we should act on them as soon as possible. I do not think we are going to, but we should. In the longer term, the Senate's inability to debate and act on this critical legislation will have a more lasting effect on congressional oversight. Both the 9/11 and the Robb-Silberman commission on weapons of mass destruction highlighted the importance of improving oversight as a necessary component of reforming our intelligence capabilities. Oversight. The 9/11 Commission wrote: Of all our recommendations, strengthening Congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and most important. In December 2004, the Senate took steps to strengthen the Senate Intelligence Committee by eliminating member term limits. That had been a long time coming. People were limited to 8 years. They just began to get up to speed and then they were off. Now that has changed. It is at the discretion of the majority leader and the minority leader. We increased our staff and strengthened other procedures. But these improvements were in a sense a hollow victory. Since enactment of the reforms, the majority leader has emasculated the Intelligence Committee by denying it the central tool to carry out oversight, and that is the annual authorization bill which is called for under the law. The majority leader's unwillingness to consider these bills is even more puzzling because of the bipartisan effort that has gone into their development on both sides of this House. Both the fiscal 2006 and 2007 bills passed the Intelligence Committee unanimously. Both were referred to the Armed Services Committee where they were again approved unanimously. Last year, the bill was also referred to the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, which suggested changes that would have been included had we been discussing the bill along with suggestions from the administration in a managers' amendment. Last year's bill and this year's bill contain legislation focused on four important areas about which I am going to talk briefly. I have already mentioned the numerous provisions relating to the authority and the operation of the Office of the DNI, the Director of National Intelligence. The bill also contains additional provisions to foster and improve information sharing and information access. Easy words, hard to do. Section 310 establishes a pilot program giving the Intelligence Committee access to databases of other nonintelligence agencies for the purpose of collecting intelligence on counterterrorism or weapons of mass destruction. While this bill sits on the calendar, that information is now outside the reach of the intelligence community. Many of my colleagues have decried the seemingly endless stream of leaks of classified information. I join them in denouncing the leaks of sensitive material. The authorization bill includes provisions strengthening the authority of the DNI and the Director of the CIA to protect intelligence sources and methods. It also includes a provision, authored by Senator Wyden and adopted by the committee unanimously, to increase the penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of a covert agent. Finally, the authorization bill contains numerous provisions intended to improve oversight of the intelligence community, both from within and from the Congress itself. Section 408 is interesting. Section 408 of the bill proposes the establishment of a statutory inspector general for the intelligence community. I have said that. The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 took a first step toward that end by authorizing the Director of National Intelligence to appoint an inspector general within the Office of the Director. The DNI has done that, and I applaud him for doing so. But the bill will strengthen that position and make it more accountable to the Congress. Section 434 of the bill strengthens accountability further and oversight of the technical agencies by providing that the heads of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency are to be appointed by the President with the Senate's advice and consent. This is in the authorization bill, and if we were to pass it, this would become effective. I think it actually comes as a surprise to many of my colleagues that the head of an agency with as central a role in the intelligence community as the National Security Agency is not appointed with Senate confirmation. In fact, heads of the National Security Agency have customarily only gone through confirmation in connection with their military rank but not for their appointment to the position of the Director of NSA. That is not considered. Section 107 of the bill, sponsored in committee by Senators Levin and Hagel, seeks to improve the timely flow of information to the congressional Intelligence Committees. Similar language was included in the intelligence reform legislation that passed in the Senate in 2004 but did not survive the conference. I applaud Senators Levin and Hagel for their efforts with respect to this issue. There are other provisions requiring specific information, including a report on the implementation of the Detainee Treatment Act and a separate report on the possibility of existence of clandestine detention facilities. I am at a loss to understand what the objection to this legislation is. Maybe somebody does not like the enhancement of oversight. That is our job. That is why the committees were formed. Maybe somebody doesn't want the DNI to have more authority or maybe somebody thinks the Congress should not be getting timely access to information about intelligence programs that are so important. But let me remind all my colleagues that the authorization bill passed the Intelligence Committee unanimously. If somebody has a problem with a provision, bring up the bill, offer an amendment, debate, and vote. That is the way the Senate works. Because of the importance of getting the authorization bill enacted and because I and all the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee have been totally unable to make any headway on this at all now for 2 years, and because I have concluded that it will once again be ignored by the majority leader, I send an amendment to the desk to strike section 8086 of the pending legislation, the fiscal year 2007 Department of Defense appropriations bill.", u"Mr. President, I ask you to let me know when I have consumed an additional 3 minutes, and then I will yield the floor. Mr. President, this is the amendment to our committee bill that was offered by our esteemed colleague, our dear friend, the late Senator Paul Wellstone, and accepted by the Senate, which would have barred companies that set up offshore tax havens from getting Federal homeland security contracts with the Secretary of the Department retaining the singular important right to waive the prohibition for national security reasons. Now the underlying bill, at the last minute, would essentially nullify Senator Wellstone's provision by expanding the list of criteria the Secretary can use in granting a waiver beyond national security reasons to include a host of other provisions that gut the Wellstone proposal. It is just wrong that companies that are going out of the way to circumvent the tax laws of the United States should be allowed to do business and basically to get the money that the taxpayers who pay their taxes have put into the Treasury of the United States, unless there is a national security reason that would be so. Our amendment would strike that provision as well. Our amendment would also move to strike from the bill a measure that would require the Transportation Security Oversight Board to ratify within 90 days emergency security regulations issued by the Transportation Security Agency. If the oversight board does not ratify the regulations, under this bill, they would automatically lapse. Despite the TSA having decided that they are necessary, 90 days later, lacking the Board's approval, they'd disappear. This doesn't make any sense. In the current climate, shouldn't we be trying to find new ways to expedite and implement TSA rules, not ways to disrupt and derail them? This bill is contrary to new procedures that the Senate passed just a year ago in the aviation security bill. Under that law, regulations go into effect and remain in effect unless they are affirmatively disapproved by the Board. I think that's a better system. My esteemed colleague from Texas, Senator Gramm, has claimed that our amendment would strike from the underlying bill the one-year extension of the deadline by which all airlines must install new security scanning equipment. I don't know whether he got that idea based on this provision or not; regardless, he is mistaken. We keep that extension in tact, and striking the new cumbersome approval process, as our amendment seeks to do, would have no effect whatsoever on it. I urge my colleagues to strike this provision. Another provision would extend liability protection to companies that provided passenger and baggage screening in airports on September 11. But we in the Senate already decided against extending such liability protection--in at least three different contexts. First, the airline bailout bill limited the liability of the airlines--but not of the security screeners, due to ongoing concerns about their role leading up to September 11. Then, the conference report on the Transportation Security bill extended the liability limitations to others who might have been the target of lawsuits, such as aircraft manufacturers and airport operators, but again not to the baggage and passenger screeners. The earlier Gramm-Miller substitute and the bipartisan Governmental Affairs Committee-approved legislation also left this provision out for the very same reasons. Now, somehow, this provision is back again. Like that little mole you hit with the mallet in a whack-a-mole game, somehow this provision has reappeared. At this late hour, in this context, it is just inappropriate to reverse the Senate's carefully considered judgment without clear justification. We must strike this provision. Another unnecessary and overreaching provision our amendment seeks to strike would give the Secretary of the new Department broad authority to designate certain technologies as so-called ``qualified anti-terrorism technologies.'' His granting of this designation--which appears to be unilateral, and probably not subject to review by anyone--would entitle companies selling that technology to broad liability protection from any claim arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism, no matter how negligently--or even wantonly and willfully--the company acted. The bill goes well beyond what Republicans were advocating just last month in the Gramm-Miller substitute, which would have provided sellers with indemnification, but wouldn't have left many victims without any compensation at all, as this bill does. This bill seems to say that in many cases, the plaintiff can't recover anything from the seller unless an injured plaintiff can prove that the seller of the product that injured him or her acted fraudulently or with willful misconduct in submitting information to the Secretary when the Secretary was deciding whether to certify the product. Even in cases where a seller isn't entitled to the benefit of that protection, the company still isn't fully--or in many cases even partially--responsible for its actions, even if it knew there was something terribly wrong with its product . Let me say that again. This bill gives protection even to those sellers who knowingly put anti-terrorism products on the market that they know won't work to keep people safe against an attack. Perhaps worst of all, this measure would cap the seller's liability at the limits of its insurance policy. In other words, if injured people were lucky enough to get through the first hurdle and even hold a faulty seller liable, they still could go completely uncompensated even if a liable seller has more than enough money to compensate them. Again, I ask, is this really the kind of provision we want to fold up and cram into this vital legislation? I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to stop, carefully consider the consequences, and then vote for our amendment, which would strike this provision. The substitute bill also unwisely and unnecessarily allows the Secretary to exempt the new Department's advisory committees from the open meetings requirements and other requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). I am well aware that this isn't a provision that will get big headlines but it ought to raise some eyebrows. Agencies throughout government make use of advisory committees that function under these open meetings requirements. Existing law is careful to protect discussions and documents that involve sensitive information in fact, the FACA law currently applies successfully to the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the State Department even the secretive National Security Agency. So why should the Department of Homeland Security alone be allowed to exempt its advisory committees from its requirements? Why should its advisory committees be allowed to meet in total secret with no public knowledge? Again, if those rules work for the Department of Defense and the National Security Agency, I think they can work for the Department of Homeland Security. What is the harm? Conceivably, this could allow the Secretary to create forums that operate in secret in which lobbyists for various special interests could advance their agendas and get back channel access with this and future Administrations, without concern that the public would ever find out--and that's regardless of whether their discussions were about security, business, or anything else. I am not suggesting that this is what the Administration intends, or what the authors of the bill intend, but the danger is real and must be recognized. We all say, and say often, that we're for ``good government''--for openness, integrity, and accountability. But if we pass this bill unamended, few of us will be able to say with confidence that the new Department's advisory committees are designed to be as independent, balanced, and transparent as possible. I know full well that the Homeland Security Department will deal with sensitive information involving life and death, but so does the National Security Agency. So does the FBI. So does the Department of Defense. Their advisory committees aren't allowed to hide themselves away from the public. I hope my colleagues join with me to reject this unfortunate and short-sighted provision. Finally, our amendment would alter a provision in the substitute bill creating a university-based homeland security research center. Now, I have nothing against creating a university research center focused on homeland security. There are currently many effective university center programs--centers for expertise and excellence--established through competitive processes by the National Science Foundation and other science agencies. And the science and technology division in this homeland security bill closely tracks what we proposed in the legislation that came out of the Governmental Affairs Committee--which would give the Department many exciting new tools to harness talent in our universities and companies and focus it on meeting the unprecedented challenge we face to out-think and out-innovate our enemies. But there is a problem with this particular proposal as it is written. Based on the fifteen criteria outlined in the bill, the research center that it would create is described so narrowly, through fifteen specific criteria, that it appears Texas A&M University has the inside track, to say the least, to get the funding and house the center. House aides have admitted as much to The Washington Post. Texas A&M is a fine school that may be perfectly suited to run such a federal research center--but there are many other fine schools that may also be well suited to run a homeland security research center, and Congress should not predetermine the best site. Science in this country has thrived over the years because, by and large, Congress has refused to intervene in science decisions. Science has thrived through peer review and competition over the best proposals--which are fundamentals of federal science policy. We are violating them here. This is nothing short of ``science pork.'' This provision was strongly opposed by the Chairman of the House Science Committee. And it has been roundly criticized by the university community as an inappropriate Congressional intervention in science program selection. My friend, the Senator from Texas, has suggested that a few other institutions conceivably could assemble the qualifications to meet the 15 criteria that Texas A&M has specified. But I urge him to look at the list, which is breathtaking in the particularity of its detail. And even if a handful of schools might meet in theory these requirements, that does not solve our problem. We face grave dangers here, lives are at risk. We should all agree that we need to apply the most competitive possible process, the one that brings our best scientific brainpower brought to bear on this problem. Suppose for the sake of argument that a few other schools technically do qualify. Then think about the agency employee, sitting at his desk at the new department, who receives the application from Texas A&M. A&M meets all the criteria specified in the statue, and meets them to a tee. The employee knows that Representative DeLay wants this done. Realistically, how do we think this decision will turn out? We know how it will turn out. When it comes to making these research funding decisions, we need a playing field that is truly level--not one that only looks level when you tilt your head. Perhaps that is why previous versions of this bill were wise enough not to include this provision. The bipartisan Senate Governmental Affairs Committee bill did not make this mistake. Nor did Senator Gramm include them in his earlier Gramm-Miller substitute. I have worked over the years on science policy issues and legislation with Senator Gramm, and I hasten to point out that this provision certainly did not originate with him. He has a strong understanding of the importance of strong science to our nation's economic and social well-being, of strong federal support for science, and of the need for competitive funding decisions that are based on sound peer review. These provisions did not originate with him. Our amendment keeps the university-based science center program. However, it removes the list of highly-specific criteria that appear to direct it to a particular university. That is the way we will get the best science, not by making Congressional allocations to particular institutions. I was under the impression that this homeland security bill would be clean. What does that mean? That it wouldn't be, for lack of a better word, mucked up with lots of extraneous provisions that are marginally relevant or irrelevant to the central mission of this department, which of course is protecting the American people from Twenty- first Century terrorism with every ounce of talent, every tool, every technology at our disposal. I understand the legislative process. I know that, as a wise person once said, compromise is what makes nations great and marriages happy. I did not expect this substitute bill to look exactly like the bipartisan bill approved by the Governmental Affairs Committee I am privileged to chair. But I did expect that this bill would be clean--and clean it is not. I believe passionately in the need to create a Homeland Security Department. And I recognize and appreciate the many good things in this bill. It has moved much closer to our vision of how to combine our strengths and minimize our weaknesses on intelligence to protect the American people from terrorism. So too has it embraced our creative and comprehensive vision of the new Department's science and technology division. And when we step back and look at the big picture, it looks pretty good. And more important than looking good, it looks and is necessary to protect the American people. But these flaws are real. They are serious. And they are utterly unnecessary. Luckily, they are easy for us to fix. One amendment, one vote. I once again urge my fellow Senators to pass this amendment. There are other colleagues who wish to speak. I would, therefore, ask for the support of my colleagues for the motion to strike.", u"``AUTHORIZATION FOR ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ``Sec. 102A. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other law, the President, acting through the Attorney General may, for periods of up to one year, authorize the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States if the Attorney General certifies in writing under oath that-- ``(1) the acquisition does not constitute electronic surveillance; ``(2) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign intelligence information from or with the assistance of a wire or electronic communications service provider, custodian, or other person (including any officer, employee, agent, or other specified person of such service provider, custodian, or other person) who has access to wire or electronic communications, either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store such communications; ``(3) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information; and ``(4) the proposed minimization procedures with respect to such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h). ``(b) Specific Place Not Required.--A certification under subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific facilities, places, premises, or property at which the acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be directed. ``(c) Submission of Certification.--The Attorney General shall immediately transmit under seal to the court established under section 103(a) a copy of a certification made under subsection (a). Such certification shall be maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice of the United States and the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, and shall remain sealed unless the certification is necessary to determine the legality of the acquisition under section 102B. ``(d) Minimization Procedures.--An acquisition under this section may be conducted only in accordance with the certification of the Attorney General and the minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall assess compliance with such procedures and shall report such assessments to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate under section 108(a). Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) Applications for a court order under this title are authorized if the President has, by written authorization, empowered the Attorney General to approve applications to the court having jurisdiction under this section, and a judge to whom an application is made may, notwithstanding any other law, grant an order, in conformity with section 105, approving electronic surveillance of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information.''. Section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (6), by striking ``detailed description'' and inserting ``summary description''; (B) in paragraph (7)-- (i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``or officials designated'' and all that follows through ``consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``designated by the President to authorize electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes''; (ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``techniques;'' and inserting ``techniques; and''; (iii) by striking subparagraph (D); and (iv) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (D); (C) in paragraph (8), by striking ``a statement of the means'' and inserting ``a summary statement of the means''; (D) in paragraph (9)-- (i) by striking ``a statement'' and inserting ``a summary statement''; and (ii) by striking ``application;'' and inserting ``application; and''; (E) in paragraph (10), by striking ``thereafter; and'' and inserting ``thereafter.''; and (F) by striking paragraph (11). (2) by striking subsection (b); (3) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as subsections (b) through (d), respectively; and (4) in paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (3), by striking ``or the Director of National Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence, or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. Section 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking paragraph (1); and (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as paragraphs (1) through (4), respectively; (2) in subsection (c)(1)-- (A) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``surveillance;'' and inserting ``surveillance; and''; (B) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``approved; and'' and inserting ``approved.''; and (C) by striking subparagraph (F); (3) by striking subsection (d); (4) by redesignating subsections (e) through (i) as subsections (d) through (h), respectively; (5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (4), by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows: ``(2) Extensions of an order issued under this title may be granted on the same basis as an original order upon an application for an extension and new findings made in the same manner as required for an original order and may be for a period not to exceed one year.''; (6) in subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (4), to read as follows: ``(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the Attorney General may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance if the Attorney General-- ``(1) determines that an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; ``(2) determines that the factual basis for issuance of an order under this title to approve such electronic surveillance exists; ``(3) informs a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 at the time of such authorization that the decision has been made to employ emergency electronic surveillance; and ``(4) makes an application in accordance with this title to a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 as soon as practicable, but not more than 168 hours after the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance. If the Attorney General authorizes such emergency employment of electronic surveillance, the Attorney General shall require that the minimization procedures required by this title for the issuance of a judicial order be followed. In the absence of a judicial order approving such electronic surveillance, the surveillance shall terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the application for the order is denied, or after the expiration of 168 hours from the time of authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is earliest. In the event that such application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the electronic surveillance is terminated and no order is issued approving the surveillance, no information obtained or evidence derived from such surveillance shall be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United States person acquired from such surveillance shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. A denial of the application made under this subsection may be reviewed as provided in section Section 106(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806(i)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``radio communication'' and inserting ``communication''; and (2) by striking ``contents indicates'' and inserting ``contents contain significant foreign intelligence information or indicate''. (a) Electronic Surveillance Under FISA.--Section 108 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1808) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and inserting ``; and''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(D) the authority under which the electronic surveillance is conducted.''; and (2) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following: ``(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General additionally shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on electronic surveillance conducted without a court order.''. (b) Intelligence Activities.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 501 (50 U.S.C. 413)-- (A) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and (B) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection: ``(f) The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the committee for which the person is Chair, may inform-- ``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual members of such committee, and ``(2) any essential staff of such committee, of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) or subsection (b) as such Chair considers necessary.''; (2) in section 502 (50 U.S.C. 414), by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d) Informing of Committee Members.--The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the committee for which the person is Chair, may inform-- ``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual members of such committee, and ``(2) any essential staff of such committee, of a report submitted under subsection (a) as such Chair considers necessary.''; and (3) in section 503 (50 U.S.C. 415), by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the committee for which the person is Chair, may inform-- ``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual members of such committee, and ``(2) any essential staff of such committee, of a report submitted under subsection (b), (c), or (d) as such Chair considers necessary.''. (a) Electronic Surveillance.--Section 105(d) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)), as redesignated by section 6(4), is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) An order issued under this section shall remain in force during the authorized period of surveillance notwithstanding the absence of the target from the United States, unless the Government files a motion to extinguish the order and the court grants the motion.''. (b) Physical Search.--Section 304(d) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) An order issued under this section shall remain in force during the authorized period of surveillance notwithstanding the absence of the target from the United States, unless the Government files a motion to extinguish the order and the court grants the motion.''. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and in addition to the immunities, privileges, and defenses provided by any other provision of law, no action, claim, or proceeding shall lie or be maintained in any court, and no penalty, sanction, or other form of remedy or relief shall be imposed by any court or any other body, against any person for an activity arising from or relating to the provision to an element of the intelligence community of any information (including records or other information pertaining to a customer), facilities, or assistance during the period of time beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, in connection with any alleged communications intelligence program that the Attorney General or a designee of the Attorney General certifies, in a manner consistent with the protection of State secrets, is, was, or would be intended to protect the United States from a terrorist attack. This section shall apply to all actions, claims, or proceedings pending on or after the effective date of this Act. (b) Jurisdiction.--Any action, claim, or proceeding described in subsection (a) that is brought in a State court shall be deemed to arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States and shall be removable pursuant to section 1441 of title 28, United States Code. (c) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (2) Person.--The term ``person'' has the meaning given the term in section 2510(6) of title 18, United States Code. (a) Report.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until December 31, 2009, the Director of the National Security Agency, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on the effectiveness and use of minimization procedures applied to information concerning United States persons acquired during the course of a communications activity conducted by the National Security Agency. (b) Requirements.--A report submitted under subsection (a) shall include-- (1) a description of the implementation, during the course of communications intelligence activities conducted by the National Security Agency, of procedures established to minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of nonpublicly available information concerning United States persons; (2) the number of significant violations, if any, of such minimization procedures during the 18 months following the effective date of this Act; and (3) summary descriptions of such violations. (c) Retention of Information.--Information concerning United States persons shall not be retained solely for the purpose of complying with the reporting requirements of this section. (a) Electronic Surveillance.--Section 111 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811) is amended by striking ``for a period not to exceed'' and all that follows and inserting the following: ``for a period not to exceed 90 days following an armed attack against the territory of the United States if the President submits to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate notification of the authorization under this section.''. (b) Physical Search.--Section 309 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1829) is amended by striking ``for a period not to exceed'' and all that follows and inserting the following: ``for a period not to exceed 90 days following an armed attack against the territory of the United States if the President submits to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate notification of the authorization under this section.''. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended-- (1) by adding at the end of title I the following new section:", u"Madam Chair, I rise in reluctant support of this bill. This bill is, by the conventional standards of the House, an appropriate vehicle for meeting many of the routine needs of the Intelligence Community. However, it completely fails to undertake the kind of probing, large-scale reassessment of the structure, mission, and purpose of our intelligence enterprise in a post-bin Laden era. I regret that Congress has not shown the stomach for the kind of thorough, comprehensive, and brave review of intelligence activities that was undertaken by the Church Committee in the 1970's. Given the events of the last decade, such a review is both long overdue and very badly needed. Despite my strong reservations about what this bill does not but should do, I will support this bill. The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment under the 5-minute rule. In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of the Rules Committee print, dated August 31, 2011. That amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered read. The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; Table of contents.Sec. 2. Definitions. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National IntelligenceSec. 401. Report and strategic plan on drug trafficking organizations and impact on public lands.Sec. 402. Application of certain financial reporting requirements to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 403. Public availability of information regarding the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 404. Clarification of status of Chief Information Officer in the Executive Schedule. In this Act: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2012 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 104, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2012, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1892 of the One Hundred Twelfth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.-- (1) Availability to committees of congress.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President. (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (3) Limits on disclosure.--In carrying out paragraph (2), the President may disclose only that budget-related information necessary to execute the classified Schedule of Authorizations and shall not disclose the Schedule or any portion of the Schedule publicly. (c) Use of Funds for Certain Activities in the Classified Annex.--In addition to any other purpose authorized by law, the Federal Bureau of Investigation may expend funds authorized in this Act as specified in the Federal Bureau of Investigation Policy Implementation section of the classified annex accompanying this Act. (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number of full-time equivalent positions for fiscal year 2012 authorized by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary for the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Authority for Conversion of Activities Performed by Contract Personnel.-- (1) In general.--In addition to the authority in subsection (a) and subject to paragraph (2), if the head of an element of the intelligence community makes a determination that activities currently being performed by contract personnel should be performed by employees of such element, the Director of National Intelligence, in order to reduce a comparable number of contract personnel, may authorize for that purpose employment of additional full-time equivalent personnel in such element equal to the number of full-time equivalent contract personnel performing such activities. (2) Concurrence and approval.--The authority described in paragraph (1) may not be exercised unless the Director of National Intelligence concurs with the determination described in such paragraph. (c) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment-- (1) in a student program, trainee program, or similar program; (2) in a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or (3) in details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training. (d) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to the initial exercise of an authority described in subsection (a) or (b). (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2012 the sum of $576,393,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2013. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 777 full-time or full- time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2012. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2012 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2013. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2012, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2012 the sum of $514,000,000. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Not later than 90 days after the end of each of fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report, which may be in classified form, containing the number of personnel hired by such element during such fiscal year that were at any time a recipient of a grant or scholarship under the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.). Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(v) Authority To Establish Positions in Excepted Service.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence of the head of the covered department concerned and in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, may-- ``(A) convert competitive service positions, and the incumbents of such positions, within an element of the intelligence community in such department, to excepted service positions as the Director of National Intelligence determines necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element; and ``(B) establish new positions in the excepted service within an element of the intelligence community in such department, if the Director of National Intelligence determines such positions are necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element. ``(2) An incumbent occupying a position on the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 selected to be converted to the excepted service under this section shall have the right to refuse such conversion. Once such individual no longer occupies the position, the position may be converted to the excepted service. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `covered department' means the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, or the Department of the Treasury.''. Section 102A of the National Seucrity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 304 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(w) Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements Intelligence Community Addendum.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the appropriate elements of the intelligence community and the Secretary of State, shall provide to the President, the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an addendum to each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement accompanying a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters, including interactions with other countries of proliferation concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or missile- related transfers to such countries.''. (a) In General.--Section 506A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a-1) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)''; and (B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) For major system acquisitions requiring a service or capability from another acquisition or program to deliver the end-to-end functionality for the intelligence community end users, independent cost estimates shall include, to the maximum extent practicable, all estimated costs across all pertinent elements of the intelligence community. For collection programs, such cost estimates shall include the cost of new analyst training, new hardware and software for data exploitation and analysis, and any unique or additional costs for data processing, storing, and power, space, and cooling across the life cycle of the program. If such costs for processing, exploitation, dissemination, and storage are scheduled to be executed in other elements of the intelligence community, the independent cost estimate shall identify and annotate such costs for such other elements accordingly.''; and (2) in subsection (e)(2)-- (A) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)''; (B) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking ``associated with the acquisition of a major system,'' and inserting ``associated with the development, acquisition, procurement, operation, and sustainment of a major system across its proposed life cycle,''; and (C) by adding at the end the following: ``(B) In accordance with subsection (a)(2)(B), each independent cost estimate shall include all costs required across elements of the intelligence community to develop, acquire, procure, operate, and sustain the system to provide the end-to-end intelligence functionality of the system, including-- ``(i) for collection programs, the cost of new analyst training, new hardware and software for data exploitation and analysis, and any unique or additional costs for data processing, storing, and power, space, and cooling across the life cycle of the program; and ``(ii) costs for processing, exploitation, dissemination, and storage costs are scheduled to be executed in other elements of the intelligence community, such element shall identify and annotate such costs accordingly.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010.--Subsection (e) of section 552 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (Public Law 111- 83; 123 Stat. 2178) is amended-- (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``15 days'' and inserting ``30 days''; (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``such agreement.'' and inserting ``such agreement and any monitoring assurances provided by such government.''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) The agency or department of the United States responsible for ensuring that the agreement described in paragraph (3) is carried out.''. (b) Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010.--Subsection (e) of section 428 of the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 (division A of Public Law 111-88; 123 Stat. 2963) is amended-- (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``15 days'' and inserting ``30 days''; (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``such agreement.'' and inserting ``such agreement and any monitoring assurances provided by such government.''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) The agency or department of the United States responsible for ensuring that the agreement described in paragraph (3) is carried out.''. (c) Savings Clause.--None of the amendments made by this section shall supersede or otherwise affect the implementation of the following provisions of law: (1) Section 1033 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111q-383; 124 Stat. 4351). (2) Section 1113 of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (Public Law 112-10; 125 Stat. 104). (a) Updates and Consolidation of Language.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506H the following new section:``summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of detainees held at united states naval station, guantanamo bay, cuba ``Sec. 506I. (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of-- ``(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and ``(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. ``(b) Updates.--Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.''. (2) Initial update.--The initial update required by section 506I(b) of such Act, as added by paragraph (1) of this subsection, shall be made publicly available not later than 10 days after the date the first report following the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 is submitted to members and committees of Congress pursuant to section 319 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32; 10 U.S.C. 801 note). (b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506H the following new item:``Sec. 506I. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.''. (a) Requirement for Submission.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate information concerning the transfer or potential transfer of individuals who are or have been detained by the United States at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (b) Information Required.--The information required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) An assessment of the sufficiency of the monitoring undertaken by each foreign country to which an individual referred to in subsection (a) has been transferred. (2) Any written or verbal agreement between the Secretary of State and the government of a foreign country that describes monitoring and security assurances related to such an individual. (3) Each Department of State cable, memorandum, or report relating to or describing the threat such an individual may or may not pose. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Covered agency.--The term ``covered agency'' means any element of the intelligence community other than an element within the Department of Defense. (2) Covered item of supply.--The term ``covered item of supply'' means an item of information technology (as that term is defined in section 11101 of title 40, United States Code) that is purchased for inclusion in a covered system, and the loss of integrity of which could result in a supply chain risk for a covered system. (3) Covered procurement.--The term ``covered procurement'' means-- (A) a source selection for a covered system or a covered item of supply; or (B) any contract action involving a contract for a covered system or a covered item of supply where such contract includes a clause establishing requirements relating to supply chain risk. (4) Covered procurement action.--The term ``covered procurement action'' means any of the following actions, if the action takes place in the course of conducting a covered procurement: (A) The exclusion of a source for the purpose of reducing supply chain risk in the acquisition of covered systems. (B) The exclusion of a source that fails to achieve an acceptable rating with regard to an evaluation factor providing for the consideration of supply chain risk in the evaluation of proposals for the award of a contract or the issuance of a task or delivery order. (C) The decision to withhold consent for a contractor to subcontract with a particular source or to direct a contractor for a covered system to exclude a particular source from consideration for a subcontract under the contract. (5) Covered system.-- (A) In general.--The term ``covered system'' means any information system (including any telecommunications system) used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency-- (i) the function, operation, or use of which-- (I) involves intelligence activities; (II) involves cryptologic activities related to national security; (III) involves command and control of military forces; (IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system; or (V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions; or (ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for information that have been specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. (B) Exception of administrative and business applications.--Subparagraph (A)(i)(V) does not include a system that is to be used for routine administrative and business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management applications). (6) Supply chain risk.--The term ``supply chain risk'' means the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of such system. (b) Authority.--Subject to subsection (c), the head of a covered agency may, in conducting intelligence and intelligence-related activities-- (1) carry out a covered procurement action; and (2) limit, notwithstanding any other provision of law, in whole or in part, the disclosure of information relating to the basis for carrying out a covered procurement action. (c) Determination and Notification.--The head of a covered agency may exercise the authority provided in subsection (b) only after-- (1) any appropriate consultation with procurement or other relevant officials of the covered agency; (2) making a determination in writing, which may be in classified form, that-- (A) use of the authority in subsection (b)(1) is necessary to protect national security by reducing supply chain risk; (B) less intrusive measures are not reasonably available to reduce such supply chain risk; and (C) in a case where the head of the covered agency plans to limit disclosure of information under subsection (b)(2), the risk to national security due to the disclosure of such information outweighs the risk due to not disclosing such information; (3) notifying the Director of National Intelligence that there is a significant supply chain risk to the covered system concerned, unless the head of the covered agency making the determination is the Director of National Intelligence; and (4) providing a notice, which may be in classified form, of the determination made under paragraph (2) to the congressional intelligence committees that includes a summary of the basis for the determination, including a discussion of less intrusive measures that were considered and why they were not reasonably available to reduce supply chain risk. (d) Savings.--The authority under this section is in addition to any other authority under any other provision of law. The authority under this section shall not be construed to alter or effect the exercise of any other provision of law. (e) Effective Date.--The requirements of this section shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to contracts that are awarded on or after such date. (f) Sunset.--The authority provided in this section shall expire on the date that section 806 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383; 10 U.S.C. 2304 note) expires. (a) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.--Section 1041(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 403-1b(b)) is amended by striking paragraphs (3) and (4). (b) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.-- Section 904(d)(1) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 402c(d)(1)) is amended by striking ``on an annual basis''. (c) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995.-- Section 809 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170b) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (b); and (2) in subsection (c), by striking ``reports referred to in subsections (a) and (b)'' and inserting ``report referred to in subsection (a)''. (d) Report on Temporary Personnel Authorizations for Critical Language Training.--Paragraph (3)(D) of section 102A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403- 1(e)), as amended by section 306 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259; 124 Stat. 2661), is amended by striking ``The'' and inserting TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on-- (1) the intelligence collection efforts of the United States that assess the threat from covered entities that are currently or have previously used public lands in the United States to further their operations; and (2) efforts to protect public lands of the United States from illegal drug grows. (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) An assessment of the intelligence collection efforts of the United States dedicated to covered entities. (2) An assessment of any problems that may reduce the overall effectiveness of United States intelligence collection and analysis to identify and protect public lands from illegal drug grows and other activities and threats of covered entities, including-- (A) intelligence collection gaps or inefficiencies; (B) information sharing practices in the intelligence community and other agencies, including Federal land management agencies; and (C) cooperation among Federal departments or agencies. (3) A strategic plan prepared by the Director of National Intelligence that describes actions the appropriate elements of the intelligence community can take to close intelligence gaps related to covered entities, and provide intelligence in support of efforts by Federal land management agencies to counter the use by covered entities of public lands for illegal purposes. (4) A description of appropriate goals, schedules, milestones, or metrics to measure the long-term effectiveness of actions implemented to carry out the plan described in paragraph (4). (c) Implementation of Strategic Plan.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence submits the report required by subsection (a), the Director shall begin implementation of the strategic plan described in subsection (b)(4). (d) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means an international drug trafficking organization or other actor involved in drug trafficking generally. (2) Federal land management agency.--The term ``Federal land management agency'' includes-- (A) the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture; (B) the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior; (C) the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior; (D) the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior; and (E) the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior. (3) Public lands.--The term ``public lands'' has the meaning given that term in section 103 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1702). For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the requirements of section 3515 of title 31, United States Code, to submit an audited financial statement shall not apply to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence if the Director of National Intelligence determines and notifies Congress that audited financial statements for such years for such Office cannot be produced on a cost-effective basis. Section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3h) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(o) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence information relating to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community including methods to contact the Inspector General. ``(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''. Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to the Chief Information Officer, Small Business Administration the following new item: ``Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.''. (a) In General.--Section 11 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403k) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by inserting ``and burial allowance'' after ``gratuities''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(c)(1) At the request of a representative of the estate of any officer or employee of the Agency (as determined in accordance with the laws of a State) who dies in a manner described in subsection (a)(1), the Director may pay to such estate a burial allowance. ``(2) A burial allowance paid under paragraph (1) may be used to cover burial expenses, including recovery, mortuary, funeral or memorial service, cremation, burial costs, and costs of transportation by common carrier to the place selected for final disposition of the deceased. ``(3) Each payment made under this subsection shall be-- ``(A) in an amount not greater than $15,000 plus the actual costs of transportation referred to in paragraph (2); and ``(B) in addition to any other benefit that may be due under any other provision of law. ``(4) The Director may annually increase the amount in paragraph (3)(A) to reflect any increase in the Consumer Price Index occurring during the preceding year. ``(5) The Director may pay the burial benefit authorized under this subsection more than once for funeral, memorial, or burial expenses stemming from a single death of an officer or employee of the Agency if the remains of such officer or employee were not recovered, were recovered after considerable delay, or were not recovered intact.''. (b) Effective Date of Authority to Increase Allowance.-- Section 11(c)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a), shall take effect on the date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this Act. Section 12 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403l(a)) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; and (B) by striking the second and third sentences and inserting the following: ``(2) Any gift accepted under this section (and any income produced by any such gift)-- ``(A) may be used only for--'' ``(i) artistic display; ``(ii) purposes relating to the general welfare, education, or recreation of employees or dependents of employees of the Agency or for similar purposes; or ``(iii) purposes relating to the welfare, education, or recreation of an individual described in paragraph (3); and ``(B) under no circumstances may such a gift (or any income produced by any such gift) be used for operational purposes. ``(3) An individual described in this paragraph is an individual who-- ``(A) is an employee or a former employee of the Agency who suffered injury or illness while employed by the Agency that-- ``(i) resulted from hostile or terrorist activities; ``(ii) occurred in connection with an intelligence activity having a significant element of risk; or ``(iii) occurred under other circumstances determined by the Director to be analogous to the circumstances described in clause (i) or (ii); ``(B) is a family member of such an employee or former employee; or ``(C) is a surviving family member of an employee of the Agency who died in circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A). ``(4) The Director may not accept any gift under this section that is expressly conditioned upon any expenditure not to be met from the gift itself or from income produced by the gift unless such expenditure has been authorized by law. ``(5) The Director may, in the Director's discretion, determine that an individual described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3) may accept a gift for the purposes described in paragraph (2)(A)(iii).''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(f) The Director, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations to carry out the authority provided in this section. Such regulations shall ensure that such authority is exercised consistent with all relevant ethical constraints and principles, including-- ``(1) the avoidance of any prohibited conflict of interest or appearance of impropriety; and ``(2) a prohibition against the acceptance of a gift from a (a) In General.--Section 104A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(g)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)-- (i) by inserting ``in the Directorate of Intelligence career service or the National Clandestine Service career service'' after ``an individual''; (ii) by inserting ``or promoted'' after ``appointed''; and (iii) by striking ``individual--'' and inserting ``individual has been certified as having a professional speaking and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such proficiency being at least level 3 on the Interagency Language Roundtable Language Skills Level or commensurate proficiency level using such other indicator of proficiency as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate.''; (B) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B); and (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``position or category of positions'' both places that term appears and inserting ``position, category of positions, or occupation''. (b) Effective Date.--Section 611(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 50 U.S.C. 403-4a note) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``or promotions'' after ``appointments''; and (2) by striking ``that is one year after the date''. (c) Report on Waivers.--Section 611(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 118 Stat. 3955) is amended-- (1) in the first sentence-- (A) by striking ``positions'' and inserting ``individual waivers''; and (B) by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; and (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``position or category of positions'' and inserting ``position, category of positions, or occupation''. (d) Report on Transfers.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and on an annual basis for each of the following 3 years, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the number of Senior Intelligence Service employees of the Agency who-- (1) were transferred during the reporting period to a Senior Intelligence Service position in the Directorate of Intelligence career service or the National Clandestine Service career service; and (2) did not meet the foreign language requirements specified in section 104A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(g)(1)) at the time of such transfer. Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(h) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall establish and maintain on the homepage of the Agency's publicly accessible website information relating to the Office of the Inspector General including methods to contact the Inspector General. ``(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related to the Office of the Inspector General.''. (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following: (1) On May 1, 2011, United States personnel killed terrorist leader Osama bin Laden during the course of a targeted strike against his secret compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. (2) Osama bin Laden was the leader of the al Qaeda terrorist organization, the most significant terrorism threat to the United States and the international community. (3) Osama bin Laden was the architect of terrorist attacks which killed nearly 3,000 civilians on September 11, 2001, the most deadly terrorist attack against our Nation, in which al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four airplanes and crashed them into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and, due to heroic efforts by civilian passengers to disrupt the terrorists, near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. (4) Osama bin Laden planned or supported numerous other deadly terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies, including the 1998 bombings of United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and against innocent civilians in countries around the world, including the 2004 attack on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain and the 2005 bombings of the mass transit system in London, England. (5) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States, under President George W. Bush, led an international coalition into Afghanistan to dismantle al Qaeda, deny them a safe haven in Afghanistan and ungoverned areas along the Pakistani border, and bring Osama bin Laden to justice. (6) President Barack Obama in 2009 committed additional forces and resources to efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan as ``the central front in our enduring struggle against terrorism and extremism''. (7) The valiant members of the United States Armed Forces have courageously and vigorously pursued al Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and around the world. (8) The anonymous, unsung heroes of the intelligence community have pursued al Qaeda and affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world with tremendous dedication, sacrifice, and professionalism. (9) The close collaboration between the Armed Forces and the intelligence community prompted the Director of National Intelligence, General James Clapper, to state, ``Never have I seen a more remarkable example of focused integration, seamless collaboration, and sheer professional magnificence as was demonstrated by the Intelligence Community in the ultimate demise of Osama bin Laden.''. (10) While the death of Osama bin Laden represents a significant blow to the al Qaeda organization and its affiliates and to terrorist organizations around the world, terrorism remains a critical threat to United States national security. (11) President Obama said, ``For over two decades, bin Laden has been al Qaeda's leader and symbol, and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our Nation's effort to defeat al Qaeda.''. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the raid that killed Osama bin Laden demonstrated the best of the intelligence communities capabilities and teamwork; (2) for years to come, Americans will look back at this event as a defining point in the history of the United States; (3) it is vitally important that the United States memorialize all the events that led to the raid so that future generations will have an official record of the events that transpired before, during, and as a result of the operation; and (4) preserving this history now will allow the United States to have an accurate account of the events while those that participated in the events are still serving in the Government. (c) Report on the Operation That Killed Osama Bin Laden.-- Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in consultation with other agencies and entities involved in the operation that killed Osama bin Laden, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a classified report that memorializes such operation including a description of the events leading up to the discovery of the location of Osama bin Laden, the planning and execution of the raid, and the results of the intelligence gained from the raid. (d) Preservation of Records.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall preserve any records, including intelligence information and assessments, used to generate the report described in subsection (c). (a) Study.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in consultation with the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall carry out a study of the personnel issues of the Office of the Inspector General. Such study shall include-- (1) identification of any barriers or disincentives to the recruitment or retention of experienced investigators within the Office of the Inspector General; and (2) a comparison of the personnel authorities of the Inspector General with personnel authorities of Inspectors General of other agencies and departments of the United States, including a comparison of the benefits available to experienced investigators within the Office of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency with similar benefits available within the offices of Inspectors General of such other agencies or departments. (b) Recommendations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees-- (1) any recommendations of the Director for legislative action based on the results of the study conducted under subsection (a); and (2) a description of any administrative actions taken by the Director based on such results. (a) Director of National Security Agency.--Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(b)'' before ``There''; and (2) by inserting before subsection (b), as so designated by paragraph (1), the following new subsection ``(a)(1) There is a Director of the National Security Agency. ``(2) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(3) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law.''. (b) Positions of Importance and Responsibility.--The President may designate the Director of the National Security Agency as a position of importance and responsibility under section 601 of title 10, United States Code. (c) Effective Date and Applicability.-- (1) In general.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (A) the date of the nomination by the President of an individual to serve as the Director of the National Security Agency, except that the individual serving as such Director as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed as such Director, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such Director; or (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of such Director by the individual performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Positions of importance and responsibility.--Subsection (b) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Authority To Transport Apprehended Persons.--Paragraph (5) of section 11(a) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended to read as follows: ``(5) Agency personnel authorized by the Director under paragraph (1) may transport an individual apprehended under the authority of this section from the premises at which the individual was apprehended, as described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), for the purpose of transferring such individual to the custody of law enforcement officials. Such transportation may be provided only to make a transfer of custody at a location within 30 miles of the premises described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).''. (b) Conforming Amendment Relating to Tort Liability.-- Paragraph (1) of section 11(d) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(D) transport an individual pursuant to subsection (a)(2).''. Section 3(4)(K) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(K)) is amended to read as follows: ``(K) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.''. Subsection (b) of section 6372 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) and notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, neither an excepted agency nor any individual employed in or under an excepted agency may be included in a leave bank program established under any of the preceding provisions of this subchapter. ``(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may authorize an individual employed by the Bureau to participate in a leave bank program administered by the Department of Justice under this subchapter if in the Director's judgment such participation will not adversely affect the protection of intelligence sources and methods.''. (a) In General.--Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 428 the following new section: (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on the training standards of the defense intelligence workforce. Such report shall include-- (1) a description of existing training, education, and professional development standards applied to personnel of defense intelligence components; and (2) an assessment of the ability to implement a certification program for personnel of the defense intelligence components based on achievement of required training, education, and professional development standards. (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Defense intelligence components.--The term ``defense intelligence components'' means-- (A) the National Security Agency; (B) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (C) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (D) the National Reconnaissance Office; (E) the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps; and (F) other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs. (2) Defense intelligence workforce.--The term ``defense intelligence workforce'' means the personnel of the defense intelligence components. Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on whether restrictions on the use of airspace are hampering the use of unmanned aerial vehicles by the Department of Homeland Security along the international border between the United States and Mexico. The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 3(6) (50 U.S.C. 401a(6)), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; (2) in section 506(b) (50 U.S.C. 415a(b)), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence.'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence.''; and (3) in section 506A(c)(2)(C) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(c)(2)(C)), by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' both places that term appears and inserting ``National Intelligence Program''. Section 351(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``the Director (or a person nominated to be Director during the pendency of such nomination) or Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence,'' after ``in such department,''; and (2) by striking ``Central Intelligence,'' and inserting ``the Central Intelligence Agency,''. The CHAIR. No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute made in order as original text shall be in order except those printed in part B of House Report 112-200 and amendments en bloc described in section 2(f) of House Resolution 392. Each amendment printed in part B of the report may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question. It shall be in order at any time for the chair of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence or his designee to offer amendments en bloc consisting of amendments printed in part B not earlier disposed of. Amendments en bloc shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for 10 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence or their designees, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question. The original proponent of an amendment included in such amendments en bloc may insert a statement in the Congressional Record immediately before disposition of the amendments en bloc. The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in part B of House Report 112-200.", u" Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mr. Harkin) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary: S. Res. 303 Resolved, SECTION 1. BASIS FOR CENSURE. (a) National Security Agency Wiretapping.--The Senate finds the following: (1) Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and in so doing provided the executive branch with clear authority to wiretap suspected terrorists inside the United States. (2) Section 201 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 states that it and the criminal wiretap law are the ``exclusive means by which electronic surveillance'' may be conducted by the United States Government, and section 109 of that Act makes it a crime to wiretap individuals without complying with this statutory authority. (3) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 both permits the Government to initiate wiretapping immediately in emergencies as long as the Government obtains approval from the court established under section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) within 72 hours of initiating the wiretap, and authorizes wiretaps without a court order otherwise required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for the first 15 days following a declaration of war by Congress. (4) The Authorization for Use of Military Force that became law on September 18, 2001 (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), did not grant the President the power to authorize wiretaps of Americans within the United States without obtaining the court orders required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. (5) The President's inherent constitutional authority does not give him the power to violate the explicit statutory prohibition on warrantless wiretaps in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. (6) George W. Bush, President of the United States, authorized the National Security Agency to wiretap Americans within the United States without obtaining the court orders required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for more than 5 years. (7) Alberto R. Gonzales, as Attorney General of the United States and as Counsel to the President, reviewed and defended the legality of the President's authorization of wiretaps by the National Security Agency of Americans within the United States without the court orders required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. (8) President George W. Bush repeatedly misled the public prior to the public disclosure of the National Security Agency warrantless surveillance program by indicating his Administration was relying on court orders to wiretap suspected terrorists inside the United States. (9) Alberto R. Gonzales misled Congress in January 2005 during the hearing on his nomination to be Attorney General of the United States by indicating that a question about whether the President has the authority to authorize warrantless wiretaps in violation of statutory prohibitions presented a ``hypothetical situation,'' even though he was fully aware that a warrantless wiretapping program had been ongoing for several years. (10) In statements about the supposed need for the National Security Agency warrantless surveillance program after the public disclosure of the program, President George W. Bush falsely implied that the program was necessary because the executive branch did not otherwise have authority to wiretap suspected terrorists inside the United States. (11) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, despite his admitted awareness that congressional critics of the program support wiretapping terrorists in accordance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, attempted to create the opposite impression by making public statements such as ``[s]ome people will argue that nothing could justify the Government being able to intercept conversations like the ones the Program targets''. (12) President George W. Bush inaccurately stated in his January 31, 2006, State of the Union address that ``[p]revious Presidents have used the same constitutional authority I have, and federal courts have approved the use of that authority.'', even though the Administration has failed to identify a single instance since the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 became law in which another President has authorized wiretaps inside the United States without complying with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and no Federal court has evaluated whether the President has the inherent authority to authorize wiretaps inside the United States without complying with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. (13) At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on February 6, 2006, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales defended the President's misleading statements in the January 31, 2006, State of the Union address. (14) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales has misled Congress and the American people repeatedly by stating that there was no serious disagreement among Government officials ``about'' or ``relate[d] to'' the National Security Agency program confirmed by the President. (15) According to testimony from former Deputy Attorney General James Comey, Alberto R. Gonzales, while serving as Counsel to the President, participated in a visit to then- Attorney General John Ashcroft in the intensive care unit of the hospital in an attempt to convince Mr. Ashcroft to overturn the decision by Mr. Comey, then serving as Acting Attorney General due to Mr. Ashcroft's illness, not to certify the legality of a classified intelligence program, in what Mr. Comey described as ``an effort to take advantage of a very sick man''. (b) Detainee and Torture Policy.--The Senate finds the following: (1) The United States is a party to the Convention Against Torture, the Geneva Conventions, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (2) Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions requires that detainees in armed conflicts other than those between nations ``shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,'' and the Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War provides additional protections for detainees who qualify as ``prisoners of war''. (3) United States law criminalizes any ``act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering'' under sections 2340 and 2340A of title 18, United States Code, and the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. 2441) and recognizes the gravity of such offenses by further providing for civil liability under the Torture Victim Protection Act and the Alien Tort Claims Act. (4) In a draft memorandum dated January 25, 2002, Alberto R. Gonzales, in his capacity as Counsel to the President, argued that the protections of the Third Geneva Convention should not be afforded to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees, and described provisions of the Convention as ``quaint'' and ``obsolete''. (5) The January 25, 2002, memorandum by then-Counsel to the President Alberto R. Gonzales cited ``reduc[ing] the threat of domestic criminal prosecution'' as a ``positive'' consequence of disavowing the Geneva Conventions' applicability, asserting that such a disavowal ``would provide a solid defense to any future prosecution'' in the event a prosecutor brought charges under the domestic War Crimes Act. (6) Secretary of State Colin Powell responded in a January 26, 2002, memorandum that such an attempt to evade the Geneva Conventions would ``reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the protections of the rule of law for our troops''. (7) Despite the warnings of the Secretary of State and in contravention of the language of the Third Geneva Convention, President George W. Bush announced on February 7, 2002, that-- (A) he did not consider the Convention to apply to al Qaeda fighters; and (B) Taliban detainees would not be entitled to ``prisoner of war'' status under the Convention, despite the fact that Article 5 of the Convention and United States Army regulations expressly require such determinations to be made by a ``competent tribunal''. (8) The Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, confirmed that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to Taliban forces and al Qaeda forces, and characterized a central legal premise by which the President sought to avoid the obligations of international law as ``erroneous''. (9) Alberto R. Gonzales, acting as Counsel to the President, solicited and accepted the August 1, 2002, Office of Legal Counsel memorandum entitled ``Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2340-2340A'', which took the untenable position that ``mere infliction of pain'' is not ``torture'' unless ``the victim . . . experiences intense pain or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will likely result.''. (10) According to the ``Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques'' (the ``Church Report''), issued on March 7, 2005, then- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002, authorized the use on Guantanamo Bay detainees of harsh interrogation techniques not listed in the Army Field Manual, including stress positions, hooding, the use of military dogs to exploit phobias, prolonged isolation, sensory deprivation, and forcing Muslim men to shave their beards. (11) According to the ``Article 15-6 Investigation of CJSOTF-AP [Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force- Arabian Peninsula] and 5th SF [Special Forces] Group Detention Operation (Formica Report)'' and Department of Defense documents released under the Freedom of Information Act, Guantanamo Bay detainees were chained to the floor, subjected to loud music, fed only bread and water, and kept for some period of time in cells measuring 4 feet by 4 feet by 20 inches. (12) The March 2004 investigative report of Major General Antonio Taguba documented ``sadistic, blatant and wanton criminal abuses'' against detainees at the Abu Ghraib detention facility, including sexual and physical abuse, the threat of torture, the forcing of detainees to perform degrading acts designed to assault their religious identity, and the use of dogs to frighten detainees. (13) According to Department of Defense documents released under the Freedom of Information Act, the United States Armed Forces held certain Iraqis as ``ghost detainees,'' who were ``not accounted for'' and were hidden from the observation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (14) Military autopsy reports and death certificates released pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act revealed that at least 39 deaths, and probably more, have occurred among detainees in United States custody overseas, approximately half of which were homicides and 7 of which appear to have been caused by ``strangulation,'' ``asphyxiation'' or fatal ``blunt force injuries''. (15) On September 6, 2006, President George W. Bush stated that he had authorized the incommunicado detention of certain suspected terrorist leaders and operatives at secret sites outside the United States under a ``separate program'' operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. (16) President George W. Bush has authorized the indefinite detention, without charge or trial, of more than 700 individuals at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on the ground that they are ``enemy combatants'' and therefore may be held until the cessation of hostilities under the laws of war. (17) Department of Justice lawyers, representing President George W. Bush and the Department of Defense in a Federal lawsuit brought on behalf of Guantanamo detainees, took the unprecedented position that the term ``enemy combatant'' could in theory justify the indefinite detention of a ``little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is [a] charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan but is really a front to finance al-Qaeda activities'' and ``a person who teaches English to the son of an al Qaeda member''. (18) After the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush rejected the claim that an alleged ``enemy combatant'' could be detained indefinitely without any meaningful opportunity to challenge the designation, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued an order on July 7, 2004, creating ``Combatant Status Review Tribunals'' (CSRTs) for the stated purpose of ``review[ing] the detainee's status as an enemy combatant''. (19) Such Order-- (A) did not allow detainees to be represented by counsel in Combatant Status Review Tribunal proceedings, but instead specified that a ``military officer'' would be assigned to ``assist[ ]'' each detainee and required such military officers to inform the detainees that ``I am neither a lawyer nor your advocate,'' and that ``[n]one of the information you provide me shall be held in confidence''; (B) allowed the detainee to be excluded from attendance during review proceedings involving ``testimony or other matters that would compromise national security if held in the presence of the detainee''; (C) allowed the decision-maker to rely on hearsay evidence and specified that ``[t]he Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence such as would apply in a court of law''; and (D) specified that ``there shall be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence''. (20) The Government has relied on the above procedures to deprive individuals of their liberty for an indefinite period of time without a meaningful opportunity to confront and rebut the evidence on which that detention is predicated. (21) President George W. Bush and the Department of Defense designated at least 2 United States citizens as ``enemy combatants,'' claimed the right to detain them indefinitely on United States soil without charge and without access to counsel, and argued that allowing meaningful judicial review of their detention would be ``constitutionally intolerable''. (22) The Supreme Court established in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that meaningful review by a neutral decisionmaker of the detention of United States citizens is constitutionally required, that ``the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a citizen's liberty . . . is very real,'' and that the Constitution mandates that a United States citizen be given a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's ``enemy combatant'' designation. (23) The administration, having consistently claimed that according United States citizens designated as ``enemy combatants'' the due process protections accorded to criminal defendants in civilian courts would jeopardize national security interests of the utmost importance, elected to pursue criminal charges against alleged ``enemy combatant'' Jose Padilla in a civilian court after holding him in military custody for 3 years. (24) The administration, having contended that alleged ``enemy combatant'' and United States citizen Yaser Esam Hamdi was so dangerous that merely allowing him to meet with counsel ``jeopardizes compelling national security interests'' because he might ``pass concealed messages through unwitting intermediaries,'' released Mr. Hamdi from custody after 3 years and allowed him to return to Saudi Arabia. (25) President George W. Bush issued ``Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,'' which authorized the creation of military tribunals to try suspected al Qaeda members and other international terrorist suspects for violations of the law of war. (26) Alberto R. Gonzales, as Counsel to the President, in a November 30, 2001, newspaper editorial, defended these military tribunals and misleadingly represented that they would have adequate procedural safeguards, by stating: ``Everyone tried before a military commission will know the charges against him, be represented by qualified counsel and be allowed to present a defense.''. (27) The military tribunals' procedural rules as outlined in Military Commission Order No. 1, issued on March 21, 2002, and as subsequently amended-- (A) permitted the accused and his civilian counsel to be excluded from any part of the proceeding that the presiding officer decided to close, and never learn what was presented during that portion of the proceeding; (B) permitted the introduction of any evidence that the presiding officer determined would have probative value to a reasonable person, thereby permitting the admission of hearsay and evidence obtained through undue coercion; and (C) restricted appellate review of the commissions to a panel appointed by the Secretary of Defense, followed by review by the Secretary of Defense and a final decision by the President, with no provision for direct appeal to the Federal courts for review by civilian judges. (28) Nearly 5 years after the military order was signed, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld struck down the military commissions as unlawful, finding that-- (A) the military commissions as constituted were not expressly authorized by any congressional act, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and the Detainee Treatment Act; (B) the military commission procedures violated the UCMJ, which mandates that rules governing military commissions be as similar to those governing courts-martial ``as practicable,'' and which affords the accused the right to be present; (C) the military commission procedures violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which is part of the ``law of war'' under UCMJ Article 21 and requires trial in ``a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples''. (29) President George W. Bush sought to prevent the Guantanamo detainees from obtaining judicial review of their indefinite confinement by claiming that the writ of habeas corpus was categorically unavailable to non-citizens held at Guantanamo Bay. (30) The Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush squarely rejected this claim, holding that the legal precedent on which the President relied ``plainly does not preclude the exercise of [statutory habeas] jurisdiction'' over the detainees' claims, and that the general presumption against extraterritorial application of a statute, cited by the President, ``certainly has no application'' with respect to detainees at Guantanamo Bay where the United States exercises ``complete jurisdiction and control''. (c) United States Attorney Firings and Executive Privilege.--The Senate finds the following: (1) At least 9 United States Attorneys were told in 2006 that they must step down under the authority of President George W. Bush, who had the final decision-making power in terminating the employment of United States Attorneys. (2) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales and subordinates under his supervision repeatedly misled Congress and attempted to block legitimate congressional oversight efforts concerning the firing of at least nine United States Attorneys. (3) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales repeatedly obscured the true scope of the firings, originally declining to cite a specific number of individuals fired in his testimony on January 18, 2007, acknowledging only seven in his USA Today op-ed published on March 6, 2007, acknowledging eight firings in his testimony on April 19, 2007, tacitly conceding there had been nine individuals fired in his testimony on May 10, 2007, and testifying on July 24, 2007, that ``there may have been others'' but he did not know the exact number. (4) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales initially characterized the firings as ``an overblown personnel matter,'' claiming that the United States Attorneys had lost his confidence and were fired for ``performance reasons'' when many of those same individuals had received only the highest performance reviews prior to their dismissal. (5) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testified before the Senate on January 18, 2007, that he would ``never, ever make a change in a United States attorney for political reasons,'' but in later testimony on April 19, 2007, and July 24, 2007, admitted that he does not know who selected each individual United States Attorney for firing or why they were included on the list of United States Attorneys to be fired. (6) Prior to their selection for firing, both former New Mexico United States Attorney David Iglesias and former Washington United States Attorney John McKay received inappropriate phone calls from Members of Congress or their staffs regarding ongoing, politically sensitive investigations and the White House received complaints about the manner in which they were conducting those investigations. (7) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testified before the Senate on January 18, 2007, that he would not fire a United States Attorney ``if it would in any way jeopardize an ongoing serious investigation,'' but later testified, as did his subordinates, that concerns about whether ongoing investigations would be jeopardized were not explored prior to the firings and were specifically ignored when some fired United States Attorneys asked for a delay in their departure dates to allow them to wrap up ongoing investigations. (8) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales publicly stated on March 13, 2007, that he was ``not involved in seeing any memos, was not involved in any discussions about what was going on'' regarding the process leading up to the firing of the United States Attorneys, but later testimony from his subordinates and documents released by the Department of Justice indicate that the Attorney General was, in fact, regularly briefed on the process and did receive at least one memo in November 2005 regarding the planned firings. (9) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales publicly stated on May 15, 2007, that Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty's participation in the firing of the United States Attorneys was of central importance to the validity of the process and to the Attorney General's decision to fire the specific individuals, but he had previously testified on April 19, 2007, that he did not discuss the process with Mr. McNulty prior to firing the United States Attorneys, and that ``looking back . . . I would have had the deputy attorney general more involved, directly involved''. (10) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testified on May 10, 2007, that, after the start of the congressional investigation into the firings, he had refrained from discussing the firings with anyone involved because he did not want to interfere with the ongoing investigations, but former White House Liaison for the Department of Justice, Monica Goodling, testified on May 23, 2007, that the Attorney General spoke with her in late March of 2007 and ``laid out . . . his general recollection . . . of some of the process regarding the replacement of the United States Attorneys.'' (11) Former White House Liaison for the Department of Justice, Monica Goodling, also testified on May 23, 2007, that she did not respond to what Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales said about his recollection because ``I did not know if it was appropriate for us to both be discussing our recollections of what had happened, and I just thought maybe we shouldn't have that conversation.'' (12) President George W. Bush has consistently stonewalled congressional attempts at oversight by refusing to turn over White House documents relating to the firing of at least 9 United States Attorneys and refusing to allow current or former White House officials to testify before Congress on this matter, based on an excessively broad and legally insufficient assertion of executive privilege. (13) President George W. Bush has asserted executive privilege in refusing even to turn over correspondence between non-Executive Branch officials and White House officials concerning the firings of at least 9 United States Attorneys, even though such communications could not reasonably be classified as falling within the privilege. (14) President George W. Bush has directed at least two staff members, former and current, to ignore congressional subpoenas altogether, ordering former Counsel to the President Harriet Miers and current Deputy Chief of Staff and Senior Adviser to the President Karl Rove not to appear at Congressional oversight hearings based on the assertion that immediate presidential advisors are ``immune from compelled Congressional testimony about matters that arose during [their] tenure,'' rather than simply instructing them to refrain from answering questions that might be covered by a proper assertion of executive privilege. (15) President George W. Bush has refused to work to find a compromise with Congress or otherwise accommodate legitimate congressional oversight efforts, disregarding the proper relationship between the executive and legislative branches and demonstrating a belief that he and his Administration are above oversight and the rule of law. (d) Misleading Statements on the USA Patriot Act.--The Senate finds the following: (1) President George W. Bush made misleading claims during the course of the Administration's 2005 campaign to reauthorize the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, by suggesting that Federal officials did not have access to the same tools to investigate terrorism as they did to investigate other crimes. (2) In 2005 the Federal Bureau of Investigation transmitted to Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales multiple reports of violations of law in connection with provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and related authorities, including unauthorized surveillance and improper collection of communications data that were serious enough to require notification of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. (3) Despite these reports, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales told Congress and the American people in the course of the Administration's 2005 campaign to reauthorize the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 that ``[t]he track record established over the past three years has demonstrated the effectiveness of the safeguards of civil liberties put in place when the Act was passed,'' that ``[t]here has not been one verified case of civil liberties abuse,'' and that ``no one has provided me with evidence that the Patriot Act is being abused or misused''. (4) The United States Department of Justice sent a 10-page letter to Congress dated November 23, 2005-- (A) stating that a November 6, 2005, Washington Post story detailing the Federal Bureau of Investigation's use of National Security Letters was a ``materially misleading portrayal'' full of ``distortions and factual errors''; (B) defending its use of National Security Letters by pointing to the Department's ``robust mechanisms for checking misuse,'' ``significant internal oversight and checks,'' and reports to Congress regarding the number of National Security Letters issued; and (C) stating that the November 6, 2005, Washington Post story was inaccurate in stating that ``The FBI now issues more than 30,000 National Security Letters a year, . . . a hundredfold increase over historic norms.''. (5) On March 9, 2007, the Inspector General for the United States Department of Justice issued a report on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's use of National Security Letters from 2003 through 2005-- (A) that the Inspector General said found ``widespread and serious misuse of the FBI's national security letter authorities'' that ``in many instances . . . violated NSL statutes, Attorney General Guidelines, or the FBI's own internal policies,'' and found that ``the FBI did not provide adequate guidance, adequate controls, or adequate training on the use of these sensitive authorities''; and (B) that indicated the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued approximately 39,000 National Security Letter requests in 2003, 56,000 National Security Letter requests in 2004, and 47,000 National Security Letter requests in 2005. (6) The United States Department of Justice sent a letter on March 9, 2007, to Congress, admitting that it had ``determined that certain statements in our November 23, 2005 letter need clarification'' in light of the Inspector General's findings and that ``the reports [The Department of Justice] provided Congress in response to statutory reporting requirements did not accurately reflect the FBI's use of NSLs''. (e) Signing Statements.--The Senate finds the following: (1) President George W. Bush has lodged more than 800 challenges to duly enacted provisions of law by issuing signing statements that indicate that the President does not believe he must comply with such provisions of law. (2) Such signing statements effectively assign to the executive branch alone the decision whether to fully comply with the laws that Congress has passed. (3) On December 30, 2005, President George W. Bush signed the Department of Defense Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, title X of which prohibits the Government from subjecting any individual ``in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location'' to ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment''. (4) President George W. Bush issued a signing statement to such Act that suggested he believed he did not have to comply with the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, stating: ``The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks.''. (5) On March 9, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which requires that the executive branch furnish reports to Congress on certain surveillance activities. (6) President George W. Bush issued a signing statement to such Act that suggested he believed he did not have to comply fully with these reporting requirements, stating: ``The executive branch shall construe the provisions of H.R. 3199 that call for furnishing information to entities outside the executive branch, such as sections 106A and 119, in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties.''. (7) On December 20, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, which protects certain classes of sealed domestic mail from being opened except in specifically defined circumstances. (8) President George W. Bush issued a signing statement to such Act that suggested he believed he did not have to comply with this provision, stating: ``The executive branch shall construe subsection 404(c) of title 39, as enacted by subsection 1010(e) of the Act, which provides for opening of an item of a class of mail otherwise sealed against inspection, in a manner consistent, to the maximum extent permissible, with the need to conduct searches in exigent circumstances, such as to protect human life and safety against hazardous materials, and the need for physical searches specifically authorized by law for foreign intelligence collection.'' (9) The American Bar Association Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine concluded that President George W. Bush's misuse of signing statements ``weaken[s] our cherished system of checks and balances and separation of powers''. SEC. 2. CENSURE BY THE SENATE. The Senate censures George W. Bush, President of the United States, and Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, and condemns their lengthy record of-- (1) undermining the rule of law and the separation of powers; (2) disregarding statutes, treaties ratified by the United States, and the Constitution; and (3) repeatedly misleading the American people.", u" Under clause 8 of rule XVIII, proposed amendments were submitted as follows: H.R. 1555 Offered By: Mr. Barr of Georgia Amendment No. 1: At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the following new section: SEC. 304. REPORT ON LEGAL STANDARDS APPLIED FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE. (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Attorney General shall jointly prepare, and the Director of the National Security Agency shall submit to Congress a report in unclassified form describing the legal standards employed by elements of the intelligence community in conducting signals intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance. (b) Matters Specifically Addressed.--The report shall specifically include a statement of each of the following legal standards: (1) The legal standards for interception of communications when such interception may result in the acquisition of information from a communication to or from United States persons. (2) The legal standards for intentional targeting of the communications to or from United States persons. (3) The legal standards for receipt from non-United States sources of information pertaining to communications to or from United States persons. (4) The legal standards for dissemination of information acquired through the interception of the communications to or from United States persons. (c) Inclusion of Legal Memoranda and Opinions.--The report under subsection (a) shall include a copy of any legal memoranda, opinions, and other related documents with respect to the conduct signals intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance by elements of the intelligence community, prepared by the Office of the General Counsel of the National Security Agency or by the Office of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. (d) Definition.--As used in this section: (1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (2) The term ``United States persons'' means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States. H.R. 1555 Offered By: Mr. Barr of Georgia Amendment No. 2: At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the following new section: SEC. 304. REPORT ON LEGAL STANDARDS APPLIED FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE. (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Attorney General shall jointly prepare, and the Director of the National Security Agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report in classified and unclassified form describing the legal standards employed by elements of the intelligence community in conducting signals intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance. (b) Matters Specifically Addressed.--The report shall specifically include a statement of each of the following legal standards: (1) The legal standards for interception of communications when such interception may result in the acquisition of information from a communication to or from United States persons. (2) The legal standards for intentional targeting of the communications to or from United States persons. (3) The legal standards for receipt from non-United States sources of information pertaining to communications to or from United States persons. (4) The legal standards for dissemination of information acquired through the interception of the communications to or from United States persons. (c) Inclusion of Legal Memoranda and Opinions.--The report under subsection (a) shall include a copy of all legal memoranda, opinions, and other related documents in unclassified, and if necessary, classified form with respect to the conduct of signals intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance by elements of the intelligence community, utilized by the Office of the General Counsel of the National Security Agency, by the Office of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, or by the Office of Intelligence Policy Review of the Department of Justice, in preparation of the report. (d) Definition.--As used in this section: (1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (2) The term ``United States persons'' has the meaning given such term under section 101(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(i)). (3) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate. H.R. 1555 Offered By: Mr. Engel Amendment No. 3: At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the following new section: SEC. 304. REPORT ON KOSOVA LIBERATION ARMY. (a) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report (in both classified and unclassified form) on the organized resistance in Kosova known as the Kosova Liberation Army. The report shall include the following: (1) A summary of the history of the Kosova Liberation Army. (2) As of the date of the enactment of this Act-- (A) the number of individuals currently participating in or supporting combat operations of the Kosova Liberation Army (fielded forces), and the number of individuals in training for such service (recruits); (B) the types, and quantity of each type, of weapon employed by the Kosova Liberation Army, the training afforded to such fielded forces in the use of such weapons, and the sufficiency of such training to conduct effective military operations; and (C) minimum additional weaponry and training required to improve substantially the efficacy of such military operations. (3) An estimate of the percentage of funding (if any) of the Kosova Liberation Army that is attributable to profits from the sale of illicit narcotics. (4) A description of the involvement (if any) of the Kosova Liberation Army in terrorist activities. (5) A description of the number of killings of noncombatant civilians (if any) carried out by the Kosova Liberation Army since its formation. (6) A description of the leadership of the Kosova Liberation Army, including an analysis of-- (A) the political philosophy and program of the leadership; and (B) the sentiment of the leadership toward the United States. (b) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--As used in this section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. H.R. 1555 Offered By: Mr. Hinchey Amendment No. 4: At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the following new section: SEC. 304. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN CHILE. (a) In General.--By not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing all activities of officers, covert agents, and employees of all elements in the intelligence community with respect to the following events in the Republic of Chile: (1) The assassination of President Salvador Allende in September 1973. (2) The accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency of the Republic of Chile. (3) Violations of human rights committed by officers or agents of former President Pinochet. (b) Documentation.--(1) The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include copies of unedited documents in the possession of any such element of the intelligence community with respect to such events. (2) Any provision of law prohibiting the dissemination of classified information shall not apply to documents referred to in paragraph (1). (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. H.R. 1555 Offered By: Mr. Ryun of Kansas Amendment No. 5: At the end, add the following new title: TITLE VI--ESTABLISHMENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AT NATIONAL LABORATORIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SEC. 601. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM. (a) Establishment at Each Laboratory.--The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, shall establish a counterintelligence program at each of the national laboratories. The counterintelligence program at each such laboratory shall have a full-time staff assigned to counterintelligence functions at that laboratory, including such personnel from other agencies as may be approved by the Director. The counterintelligence program at each such laboratory shall be under the direction of, and shall report to, the Director. (b) Prohibition on Entry on Certain Individuals.-- (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), a counterintelligence program carried out under subsection (a) shall prohibit the entrance to a national laboratory of any individual who is a citizen of a nation that is named on the sensitive countries list maintained by the Department. Such prohibition shall apply during the one-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Waiver authority.--The Director may waive the prohibition in paragraph (1) on a case-by-case basis with respect to specific individuals whose admission to a national laboratory is determined by the Secretary to be necessary for the national security of the United States. In the case of a waiver granted by the Director under this paragraph, by not later than five days after granting the waiver, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees a report describing the waiver and including such information as the Director determines appropriate. (c) Investigation of Past Security Breaches.--The Director shall require that the counterintelligence program at each laboratory include a specific plan to investigate any breaches of security discovered after the date of the enactment of this Act that occurred at that laboratory before the establishment of that program at that laboratory. (d) Required Background Checks on All Foreign Visitors.-- Before an individual who is a citizen of a foreign nation is allowed to enter a national laboratory, the Director shall require that a security clearance investigation (known as a ``background check'') be carried out on that individual. (e) Report to Congress.--The Secretary, after consultation with the Director, shall submit to the appropriate committees a report on the status of counterintelligence activities at each of the national laboratories. The report shall be submitted not earlier than the end of the six-month period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall include the recommendation of the Secretary as to whether subsection (b) should be repealed. (f) Definitions.-- For purposes of this section: (1) The term ``national laboratory'' means any of the following: (A) The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California. (B) The Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico. (C) The Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. (2) The term ``sensitive countries list'' means the list prescribed by the Secretary of Energy known as the Department of Energy List of Sensitive Countries. (3) The term ``appropriate committees'' means the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. H.R. 1555 Offered By: Mr. Sanders Amendment No. 6: At the end of title I, add the following new section: SEC. 106. LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED. (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), notwithstanding the total amount of the individual authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act, including the amounts specified in the classified schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102, there is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2000 to carry out this Act not more than the total amount authorized to be appropriated by the intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund by section 201. H.R. 1555 Offered By: Mr. Sanders Amendment No. 7: At the end of title I (page 8, after line 17), insert the following new section: SEC. 106. LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED; REPORT. (a) Limitation.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), notwithstanding the total amount of the individual authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act, including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102, there is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2000 to carry out this Act not more than the total amount authorized to be appropriated by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. (2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) does not apply to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund by section 201. (b) Report.-- (1) Study.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a detailed, comprehensive report in unclassified form on the matter described in paragraph (2). (2) Matters studied.--(A) The bombing in March 1991 by the Armed Forces of the United States during the Persian Gulf War of a weapons and nerve gas storage bunker in Khamisiyah, Iraq, and errors committed by the agency with respect to the location and contents of such bunker and the failure to disclose the proper location and contents to the Secretary of Defense. (B) Errors with respect to maps of the Aviano, Italy, area prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and used by aviators in the Armed Forces of the United States which may have resulted on February 3, 1998, in the accidental severing of a cable car device by a United States military aircraft on a training mission, which resulted in the deaths of twenty civilians. (C) Errors with respect to maps of the Belgrade, Yugoslavia, area which resulted on May 7, 1999, in the accidental bombing of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China by forces under the command of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the deaths of three civilians. H.R. 1555 Offered By: Mr. Sanders Amendment No. 8: At the bill, add the following new title: TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS SEC. 601. LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED. (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), notwithstanding the total amount of the individual authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act, including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102, there is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2000 to carry out this Act not more than the total amount authorized to be appropriated by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund by Section 201. SEC. 602. REPORT ON EFFICACY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a detailed, comprehensive report in unclassified form on the matters described in subsection (b). (b) Matters Studied.--Matters studies for the report under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) The bombing in March 1991 by the Armed Forces of the United States during the Persian Gulf War of a weapons and nerve gas storage bunker in Khamisiyah, Iraq, and errors committed by the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to the location and contents of such bunker and the failure to disclose the proper location and contents to the Secretary of Defense. (2) Errors with respect to maps of the Aviano, Italy, area prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and used by aviators in the Armed Forces of the United States which may have resulted on February 3, 1998, in the accidental severing of a cable car device by a United States military aircraft on a training mission, which resulted in the deaths of twenty civilians. (3) Errors with respect to maps prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency of the Belgrade, Yugoslavia, area which resulted on May 7, 1999, in the accidental bombing of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China by forces under the command of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the deaths of three civilians. (c) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall contain recommendations for such legislation and administrative actions as the Director determines appropriate to avoid similar errors by the Central Intelligence Agency. H.R. 1555 Offered By: Mr. Sweeney Amendment No. 9: At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the following new section: SEC. 304. PROTECTION OF IDENTITY OF RETIRED COVERT AGENTS. Section 606(4)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 426(4)(A)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``an officer or employee'' and inserting ``a present or retired officer or employee''; and (2) by striking ``a member'' and inserting ``a present or retired member''. H.R. 1555 Offered By: Mr. Sweeney Amendment No. 10: At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the following new section: SEC. 304. PROTECTION OF IDENTITY OF RETIRED COVERT AGENTS. (a) In General.--Section 606(4)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 426(4)(A)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``an officer or employee'' and inserting ``a present or retired officer or employee''; and (2) by striking ``a member'' and inserting ``a present or retired member''. (b) Imposition of Minimum Prison Sentences for Violations.--Section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``not less than five and'' after ``or imprisoned''; (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``not less than 30 months and'' after ``or imprisoned''; and (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``not less than 18 months and'' after ``or imprisoned''. H.R. 1555 Offered By: Mr. Sweeney Amendment No. 11. At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the following new section: SEC. 304. PROTECTION OF IDENTITY OF COVERT AGENTS THROUGH IMPOSITION MINIMUM PRISON SENTENCES FOR UNAUTHROIZED DISCLOSURE OF THAT IDENTITY. Section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``not less than five and'' after ``or imprisoned''; (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``not less than 30 months and'' after ``or imprisoned''; and (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``not less than 18 months and'' after ``or imprisoned''. H.R. 1555 Offered By: Mr. Thornberry Amendment No. 12. At the end of the matter proposed to be added by the amendment, add the following new section: SEC. 602. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN VISITORS TO NATIONAL LABORATORIES. (a) Background Checks on All Foreign Visitors.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act relating to counterintelligence programs for a national laboratory, before any individual who is a citizen of a foreign nation may enter a national laboratory, the Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy shall determine whether a security clearance investigation (known as ``background check'') is required to be carried out on that individual. (2) The Director shall have sufficient opportunity to review all such individuals and sufficient time to conduct background checks and other investigative checks as appropriate before entry to a national laboratory may take place. (3) The Director shall submit to the chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate by the 15th of each month a report on the foreign visitors program that includes the following information: (A) The identity of each such individual allowed to enter a national laboratory during the previous month. (B) The nature and duration of the visit to the laboratory. (C) Whether a background check was performed on that individual. (b) Additional Provisions Regarding Foreign Visitors.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act relating to counterintelligence programs for a national laboratory, the following provisions apply: (1) Moratorium.--Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Secretary of Energy may not allow the admittance to any facility of a national laboratory of any individual who is a citizen of a nation that is named on the current Department of Energy sensitive countries list. (2) Waiver authority.--The Secretary may waive the prohibition in paragraph (1) on a case-by-case basis with respect to specific individuals whose admission to a national laboratory is determined by the Secretary to be necessary for the national security of the United States. In the case of a waiver granted by the Secretary under this paragraph, by not later than five days after granting the waiver, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees a report describing the waiver and including such information as the Secretary determines appropriate. (3) Termination of moratorium.--(A) The moratorium under paragraph (1) shall cease to be in effect when the Secretary of Energy, after consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, submits to the chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a certification in writing of the following: (i) That a fully functioning counterintelligence program is implemented and operating at each national laboratory as required in this section, and that each such counterintelligence program complies with the requirements of Presidential Decision Directive number 61. (ii) That all personnel of the Department of Energy with access to classified information have been trained in appropriate security measures, including, secure computer operations. (iii) That a system has been established by which the Secretary will act promptly to address any suspected compromise of classified information. (B) If, at any time after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary determines that proper counterintelligence safeguards are not in place at the national laboratories, or if the Secretary determines that foreign visitors detract in any way from a completely functional counterintelligence program at the national laboratories, the Secretary shall suspend all foreign visits to the national laboratories in accordance with the paragraph (1). In the case of any suspension under this paragraph, the Secretary shall submit notice to the chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. H.R. 1555 Offered By: Ms. Waters Amendment No. 13: At the end, add the following new title: TITLE VI--PROHIBITION ON DRUG TRAFFICKING BY EMPLOYEES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SEC. 601. PROHIBITION ON DRUG TRAFFICKING BY EMPLOYEES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Purposes.--It is the purpose of this section-- (1) to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies and their employees and agents from participating in drug trafficking activities, including the manufacture, purchase, sale, transport, or distribution of illegal drugs; conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs; and arrangements to transport illegal drugs; and (2) to require the employees and agents of the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies to report known or suspected drug trafficking activities to the appropriate authorities. (b) Prohibition on Drug Trafficking.--No element of the intelligence community, or any employee of such an element, may knowingly encourage or participate in drug trafficking activities. (c) Mandate to Report.--Any employee of an element of the intelligence community having knowledge of facts or circumstances that reasonably indicate that any employee of such an element is involved with any drug trafficking activities, or other violations of United States drug laws, shall report such knowledge or facts to the appropriate official. (d) Definitions.--As used in this section: (1) Drug trafficking activities.-- (A) In general.--The term ``drug trafficking activities'' means the possession, distribution, manufacture, cultivation, sale, transfer, or the attempt or conspiracy to possess, distribute, manufacture, cultivate, sell or transfer illegal drugs (as those terms are applied under section 404(c) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 844(c)). (B) Inclusions.--Such term includes arrangements to allow the use of federally owned or leased vehicles, or other means of transportation, for the transport of illegal drugs. (2) Illegal drugs.--The term ``illegal drugs'' means controlled substances (as that term is defined section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)) included in schedule I or II under part B of title II of such Act. (3) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means an individual employed by an element of the intelligence community, and includes the following individuals: (A) Employees under a contract with such an element. (B) Covert agents, as that term is defined in paragraph (4) of section 606 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 426). (C) An individual acting on behalf, or with the approval, of an element of the intelligence community. (4) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term under paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a). (5) Appropriate official.--The term ``appropriate official'' means the Attorney General, the Inspector General of the element of the intelligence community (if any), or the head of such element.", u"Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the purpose of amendment and shall be considered read. The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Department of Justice. (10) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (11) The National Reconnaissance Office. (12) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (13) The Coast Guard. (14) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2005, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4548 of the One Hundred Eighth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2005 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2005 the sum of $318,395,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2006. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 310 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2005. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2005 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2006. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2005, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2005 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $29,811,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2007. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2005 the sum of $239,400,000. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. (a) Establishment of Position Within the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.--Subsection (e)(2) of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended-- (1) by striking subparagraph (G); and (2) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following new subparagraph (G): ``(G) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management.''. (b) Duties.--Section 102 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (h); and (2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new subsection (h): ``(h) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management.--(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, there shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management is the chief information officer of the intelligence community. ``(2) Subject to the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management shall-- ``(A) manage activities relating to the information technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture requirements of the intelligence community; ``(B) have procurement approval authority over all information technology items related to the enterprise architectures of all intelligence community components; ``(C) direct and manage all information technology-related procurement for the intelligence community; and ``(D) ensure that all expenditures for information technology and research and development activities are consistent with the intelligence community enterprise architecture and the strategy of the Director of Central Intelligence for such architecture. ``(3) An individual serving in the position of Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management may not, while so serving, serve as the chief information officer of any other agency or department, or component thereof, of the United States.''. (c) References.--Any reference to the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management. (a) Extension of Program.--Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (f); and (2) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively. (b) Termination of Funds Remittance Requirement.--(1) Section 2 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is further amended by striking subsection (i). (2) Section 4(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331 note) is amended by striking ``, or section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public Law 103-36; 107 Stat. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 19. (a) There is established the National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel. The panel is a standing panel of the National Security Agency. The panel shall be appointed by, and shall report directly to, the Director. ``(b) The National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel shall study and assess, and periodically advise the Director on, the research, development, and application of existing and emerging science and technology advances, advances on encryption, and other topics. ``(c) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply with respect to the National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel.''. (a) In General.--Title VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 1271), as amended by section 311(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-178; 107 Stat. 2037), is amended by adding at the end of section 810 the following new subsection: ``(c) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005, $8,000,000, to carry out the scholarship, fellowship, and grant programs under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively, of section 802(a)(1).''. (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 802(a)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1902(a)(2)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by inserting ``or from a transfer under section 810(c)'' after ``National Security Education Trust Fund''. (a) In General.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 802 of title VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 1273), as amended by section 925(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136; 117 Stat. 1578), is amended by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B), and inserting the following: ``(A) in the case of a recipient of a scholarship, as soon as practicable but in no case later than three years after the completion by the recipient of the study for which scholarship assistance was provided under the program, the recipient shall work for a period of one year-- ``(i) in a national security position that the Secretary certifies is appropriate to use the unique language and region expertise acquired by the recipient pursuant to such study in the Department of Defense, in any element of the intelligence community, in the Department of Homeland Security, or in the Department of State; or ``(ii) in such a position in any other Federal department or agency not referred to in clause (i) if the recipient demonstrates to the Secretary that no position is available in a Federal department or agency specified in clause (i); or ``(B) in the case of a recipient of a fellowship, as soon as practicable but in no case later than two years after the completion by the recipient of the study for which fellowship assistance was provided under the program, the recipient shall work for a period equal to the duration of assistance provided under the program, but in no case less than one year-- ``(i) in a position described in subparagraph (A)(i) that the Secretary certifies is appropriate to use the unique language and region expertise acquired by the recipient pursuant to such study; or ``(ii) in such a position in any other Federal department or agency not referred to in clause (i) if the recipient demonstrates to the Secretary that no position is available in a Federal department or agency specified in clause (i); and''. (b) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to carry out the amendment made by subsection (a). In prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall establish standards that recipients of scholarship and fellowship assistance under the program under such section 802 are required to demonstrate to satisfy the requirement of a good faith effort to gain employment as required under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (b)(2) of such section. (c) Applicability.--(1) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to service agreements entered into under the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall not affect the force, validity, or terms of any service agreement entered into under the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 before the date of the enactment of this Act that is in force as of that date. (a) Increase in Annual Funding.--Title VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 1271), as amended by section 311(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-178; 107 Stat. 2037) and by section 333(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2397), is amended by striking section 811 and inserting the following new section 811: (a) Scholarship Program for English Language Studies for Heritage Community Citizens of the United States.--(1) Subsection (a)(1) of section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended-- (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (C); (B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D) and inserting ``; and''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(E) awarding scholarships to students who-- ``(i) are United States citizens who-- ``(I) are native speakers (commonly referred to as heritage community residents) of a foreign language that is identified as critical to the national security interests of the United States who should be actively recruited for employment by Federal security agencies with a need for linguists; and ``(II) are not proficient at a professional level in the English language with respect to reading, writing, and interpersonal skills required to carry out the national security interests of the United States, as determined by the Secretary, Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language (a) In General.--Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended-- (1) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(i) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and Education.--(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, there shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and Education who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and Education shall carry out the following duties: ``(A) Overseeing and coordinating requirements for foreign language education and training of the intelligence community. ``(B) Establishing policy, standards, and priorities relating to such requirements. ``(C) Identifying languages that are critical to the capability of the intelligence community to carry out national security activities of the United States. ``(D) Monitoring the allocation of resources for foreign language education and training in order to ensure the requirements of the intelligence community with respect to foreign language proficiency are met.''; (2) in subsection (d)(2) by adding at the end the following: ``(E) Through the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and Education, ensuring the foreign language education and training requirements of the intelligence community are met.''; and (3) in subsection (e)(2)-- (A) by redesignating subparagraph (H) as subparagraph (I); and (B) by inserting after subparagraph (G) the following new subparagraph (H): ``(H) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Education and Language.''. (b) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date on which the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and Education is first appointed under section 102(i) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), the Assistant Director shall submit to Congress the following reports: (1) A report that identifies-- (A) skills and processes involved in learning a foreign language; and (B) characteristics and teaching techniques that are most effective in teaching foreign languages. (2)(A) A report that identifies foreign language heritage communities, particularly such communities that include speakers of languages that are critical to the national security of the United States. (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ``foreign language heritage community'' means a community of residents or citizens of the United States-- (i) who are native speakers of, or who have fluency in, a foreign language; and (ii) who should be actively recruited for employment by Federal security agencies with a need for linguists. (3) A report on-- (A) the estimated cost of establishing a program under which the heads of elements of the intelligence community agree to repay employees of the intelligence community for any student loan taken out by that employee for the study of foreign languages critical for the national security of the United States; and (B) the effectiveness of such a program in recruiting and retaining highly qualified personnel in the intelligence community. (a) In General.--Section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(i) Requirement for Foreign Language Proficiency for Certain Senior Level Positions in the Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) An individual may not be appointed to a position in the Senior Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency unless the Director of Central Intelligence determines that the individual-- ``(A) has been certified as having a professional speaking and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such proficiency being at least level 3 on the Interagency Language Roundtable Language Skills Level or commensurate proficiency level on such other indicator of proficiency as the Director determines to be appropriate; and ``(B) is able to effectively communicate the priorities of the United States and exercise influence in that foreign language. ``(2) The Director shall carry out this subsection through the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and Education.''. (b) Conforming Amendment.--Subsection (i) of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403), as added by section 611(a), is amended in paragraph (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(E) Making determinations under section 104(i).''. (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to appointments made on or after the date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this Act. (d) Report on Exceptions.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report that identifies positions within the Senior Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency that should be exempt from the requirements of section 104(i) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), and that includes the rationale for the exemption of each such position identified by the Director. (a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.) is amended-- (1) by inserting before section 1001 (50 U.S.C. 441g) the following: (a) Pilot Project.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct a pilot project to establish a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps comprised of United States citizens with advanced levels of proficiency in foreign languages who would be available upon a call of the President to perform such service or duties with respect to such foreign languages in the Federal Government as the President may specify. (b) Conduct of Project.--Taking into account the findings and recommendations contained in the report required under section 325 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2393), in conducting the pilot project under subsection (a) the Director of Central Intelligence shall-- (1) identify several foreign languages that are critical for the national security of the United States; (2) identify United States citizens with advanced levels of proficiency in those foreign languages who would be available to perform the services and duties referred to in subsection (a); and (3) implement a call for the performance of such services and duties. (c) Duration of Project.--The pilot project under subsection (a) shall be conducted for a three-year period. (d) Authority To Enter Into Contracts.--The Director of Central Intelligence may enter into contracts with appropriate agencies or entities to carry out the pilot project under subsection (a). (e) Reports.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress an initial and a final report on the pilot project conducted under subsection (a). (2) Each report required under paragraph (1) shall contain information on the operation of the pilot project, the success of the pilot project in carrying out the objectives of the establishment of a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, and recommendations for the continuation or expansion of the pilot project. (3) The final report shall be submitted not later than 6 months after the completion of the project. (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Director of Central Intelligence for each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007 in order to carry out the pilot project under subsection (a) such sums as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to section 102. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study on methods to improve the recruitment and retention of qualified foreign language instructors at the Foreign Language Center of the Defense Language Institute. In conducting the study, the Secretary shall consider, in the case of a foreign language instructor who is an alien, to expeditiously adjust the status of the alien from a temporary status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. (b) Report.--(1) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the study conducted under subsection (a), and shall include in that report recommendations for such changes in legislation and regulation as the Secretary determines to be appropriate. (2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following: (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the substitute is in order except the amendments printed in House Report 108-561. Each amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent of the amendment, shall not be subject to amendment and shall not be subject to be a demand for division of the question. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House Report 108-561.", u"Nor was this special information available to only a few. The New York Times reported it on April 21, under the headline ``Banned Techniques Yielded `High-Value information', Memo Says.'' That is a story in the New York Times which basically recounts what the Director of National Intelligence said. I would remind my distinguished colleague from Illinois that it is, in fact, the Director of National Intelligence for President Obama who has affirmed not just the need but the usefulness of the information and intelligence derived from these enhanced interrogation techniques that were approved by the legal authority for the executive branch of the Federal Government, the Office of Legal Counsel. My colleague from Illinois, Senator Durbin, argues that we need to allow prosecutors to follow the facts and the law wherever they may lead--certainly, a relatively harmless assertion; one I would generally agree with. But here, we know enough about the facts and the law to know there is no evidence that anyone acted with the intent required to prosecute under the law. I won't bore the Senate with an analysis of what the criminal law requires in this context, but I would say that the facts, as we know them, are to give our public servants the benefit of the doubt. As detailed in the Office of Legal Counsel memoranda, significant efforts were made to minimize significant harm that could arise from these techniques. Who could question the desire of both the intelligence community as well as the Department of Justice and the leaders responsible for protecting our national security--who could question the good-faith need to get information that would actually help prevent follow-on terrorist attacks? We know al-Qaida, on September 11, 2001, used crude weapons to attack our country. Yet they were able to kill 3,000 Americans, roughly. Our intelligence community and our national leadership knew al-Qaida was not satisfied with such primitive weapons but, indeed, was seeking biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. We know how important it was for our intelligence officials to get the information they needed. We know the lawyers at the Office of Legal Counsel who rendered this legal advice were doing what they thought was their responsibility in good faith. Indeed, the Members of Congress who had the responsibility to perform congressional oversight on these activities, I believe, demonstrated their good-faith desire to do what was necessary to protect our country. I believe we know enough to say these people--all of them--acted in good faith. It has been suggested the standard we apply is whether the advice fell within the range of legitimate analysis and within the range of reasonable disagreement common to legal analysis of important statutory and constitutional questions. I believe that has been demonstrated, and but for this technical objection to the amendment, I am confident we would receive an overwhelming bipartisan vote of support for this sense-of-the-Senate resolution. The distinguished Senator from Illinois, Senator Durbin, says we should allow prosecutors and the Department of Justice to decide whether to bring a case against these officials: The intelligence community, the lawyers who drafted the legal advice, and perhaps even the Members of Congress who acquiesced and facilitated these enhanced interrogation techniques following a classified briefing. But I would suggest there is no case to be brought against these individuals. Any prosecution that arises out of this interrogation program would clearly be based upon politics and not on the law. I would submit the amendment I have offered--and that I described and which I will reoffer again at an appropriate time--is a call for reasonableness and national unity. The calls for prosecution of good-faith patriots has simply gone too far. When bloggers and others--not to single out bloggers but even Members of this body--have suggested that we somehow need a truth commission and have suggested that prosecutions might be the appropriate outcome, when they are suggesting that prosecutions under these circumstances occur, then I think our political environment has changed in a dangerous way and one which will certainly chill our intelligence officials in gathering actual intelligence necessary to keep us safe and certainly discourage patriots who want to serve and who are willing to serve in Government. When policy differences become criminalized in ways that some have suggested, it is not helpful to our country. Indeed, I think it is dangerous to our national security. We know there is an unfortunate history of hysterias, panics, and mob rule from time to time that occurs, whether it is from Salem through the McCarthy era. When justice is steered by passion and politics rather than by reason and the rule of law, it is not worthy of the name ``justice.'' Once you stir up an angry mob, we know it is unpredictable where that mob might lead or who might get caught up in the mob's action. But we know already too many patriotic Americans have been targeted by the present hysteria. This amendment calls for an end to the hysteria and a return to reason, civility, national unity, and the rule of law. Dear Colleagues: Today is a difficult one for those of us who serve the country in its intelligence services. An article on the front page of The New York Times claims that the National Security Agency has been collecting information that violates the privacy and civil liberties of American citizens. The release of documents from the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) spells out in detail harsh interrogation techniques used by CIA officers on suspected al Qa'ida terrorists. As the leader of the Intelligence Community, I am trying to put these issues into perspective. We cannot undo the events of the past; we must understand them and turn this understanding to advantage as we move into the future. It is important to remember the context of these past events. All of us remember the horror of 9/11. For months afterwards we did not have a clear understanding of the enemy we were dealing with, and our every effort was focused on preventing further attacks that would kill more Americans. It was during these months that the CIA was struggling to obtain critical information from captured al Qa'ida leaders, and requested permission to use harsher interrogation methods. The OLC memos make clear that senior legal officials judged the harsher methods to be legal, and that senior policymakers authorized their use. High value information came from interrogations in which those methods were used and provided a deeper understanding of the al Qa'ida organization that was attacking this country. As the OLC memos demonstrate, from 2002 through 2006 when the use of these techniques ended, the leadership of the CIA repeatedly reported their activities both to Executive Branch policymakers and to members of Congress, and received permission to continue to use the techniques. Those methods, read on a bright, sunny, safe day in April 2009, appear graphic and disturbing. As the President has made clear, and as both CIA Director Panetta and I have stated, we will not use those techniques in the future. I like to think I would not have approved those methods in the past, but I do not fault those who made the decisions at that time, and I will absolutely defend those who carried out the interrogations within the orders they were given. Even in 2009 there are organizations plotting to kill Americans using terror tactics, and although the memories of 9/11 are becoming more distant, we in the intelligence services must stop them. One of our most effective tools in discovering groups planning to attack us are their communications, and it is the job of the NSA to intercept them. The NSA does this vital work under legislation that was passed by the Congress. The NSA actions are subject to oversight by my office and by the Justice Department under court-approved safeguards; when the intercepts are conducted against Americans, it is with individual court orders. Under these authorities the officers of the National Security Agency collect large amounts of international telecommunications, and under strict rules review and analyze some of them. These intercepts have played a vital role in many successes we have had in thwarting terrorist attacks since 9/11. On occasion. NSA has made mistakes and intercepted the wrong communications. The numbers of these mistakes are very small in terms of our overall collection efforts, but each one is investigated, Congress and the courts are notified, corrective measures are taken, and improvements are put in place to prevent reoccurrences. As a young Navy officer during the Vietnam years, I experienced public scorn for those of us who served in the Armed Forces during an unpopular war. Challenging and debating the wisdom and policies linked to wars and warfighting is important and legitimate; however, disrespect for those who serve honorably within legal guidelines is not. I remember well the pain of those of us who served our country even when the policies we were carrying out were unpopular or could be second-guessed. We in the Intelligence Community should not be subjected to similar pain. Let the debate focus on the law and our national security. Let us be thankful that we have public servants who seek to do the difficult work of protecting our country under the explicit assurance that their actions are both necessary and legal. There will almost certainly be more media articles about the actions of intelligence agencies in the past, and as we do our vital work of protecting the country we will make mistakes that will also be reported. What we must do is make it absolutely clear to the American people that our ethos is to act legally, in as transparent a manner as we can, and in a way that they would be proud of if we could tell them the full story, It is my job, and the job of our national leaders, to ensure that the work done by the Intelligence Community is appreciated and supported. You can be assured the President knows this and is supporting us. It is your responsibility to continue the difficult, often dangerous and vital work you are doing every day. Sincerely, Dennis C. Blair.", u"Mr. President, I have been to this floor on numerous occasions to aggressively support the immunity provisions of the FISA modernization bill. I cannot understate my passion for this issue. I am of the firm belief that the lawsuits facing the telecom providers constitute a grave threat to national security. The potential risks from inadvertent disclosure of classified information cannot be understated. The potential damage to our intelligence sources and methods from allowing these lawsuits to go forward is substantial. Unfortunately, the more we delay this legislation, the more likely it is that our sensitive intelligence methods will be exposed, and not just exposed to the American people but to al-Qaida and thousands of other terrorists and enemies around the world. Remember, the very point of these lawsuits is to prove plaintiffs' claims by disclosing classified information through the discovery process. Let's think about this. Do we really want any person to be able to make accusations that are utter hearsay and then be given the ability to jeopardize the intelligence community's sources and methods by demanding discovery during frivolous litigation? We simply cannot do this. We should never reveal our intelligence agencies' technical capabilities, who they work with, who they target, or what their strengths and weaknesses are. We on the Intelligence Committees have that assignment because we are expected to honor the classified nature of those matters. The reasons should be obvious to all of us. Here is an example that illustrates this point: If criminals are running drugs northbound along I-95, they may have an idea that they will encounter police checkpoints. But they need to transport the drugs, so they will balance this risk. But what if they know for sure there is a checkpoint in a specific State? What if they then find out the checkpoint is at a specific mile marker? Will they change their routes and methods? You better believe they will. They are not stupid and neither is al-Qaida. Does it really make sense for us to broadcast across the globe, over the Internet, how we work? Do we want to replace the uncertainty of how we track terrorists with established fact? Confirmations or denials of the allegations in the lawsuits will certainly reveal certain intelligence agencies' sources and methods. Even when the proceedings are in camera or ex parte, this risk is still apparent. I cannot stress this point enough: The identity of any company that may or may not have cooperated with the Government with the terrorist surveillance program is highly classified. Accusations and hearsay do not confirm any relationship. The very activities these cases seek to disclose could reveal whether a company has or hasn't assisted the Government. In addition, any verdict in the case would likely provide the same type of information, and replacing the Government for these companies in the litigation does not solve the problem. Our enemies have tough decisions to make regarding how they communicate. They cannot stay silent forever, and they have to weigh the need to communicate against the chances that their communications are intercepted. We know they are carefully watching us and following every proceeding to see how our Government collects information. If they think they see a weakness in our collection capabilities, they will certainly try to take advantage of it. Make no mistake, al-Qaida and the other terrorist organizations would benefit tremendously from learning the identity of any company that assisted the Government following the attacks of 9/11. A few of my colleagues and many in the outside media have highlighted accusations from a former telecom employee. His name is Mark Klein. Mr. Klein claims he has proof that computers diverted domestic electronic communications from a phone company directly to the NSA, the National Security Agency. In fact, his accusations play a major role in one of the lawsuits currently facing a telecom provider. It is important to note the Government chose not to classify Klein's declarations or exhibits in one of the lawsuits. The Government could have, but it didn't. So Klein's court documents are public. Due to the ongoing litigation, I do not want to speak directly to his claims, but I will highlight a statement that was made by an official representing the Government during a court proceeding in one of the lawsuits against a telecom provider. This statement was from the Assistant Attorney General on June 23, 2006, in front of Judge Vaughn Walker. Here is what was said about the decision not to classify Klein's declarations. This is the Government statement regarding Mark Klein: We have not asserted a privilege over the Klein declarations or exhibits. Mr. Klein and Marcus never had access to any of the relevant classified information here, and with all respect to them, through no fault or failure of their own, they don't know anything. I cannot understate the importance of this quote as it has never been mentioned during this debate. No further commentary on it is needed, but I think its meaning is extremely important when Senators and the public weigh the relevancy and reliability of Klein's accusations. I am particularly hopeful that three of my distinguished colleagues who have highlighted Klein's claims on this floor are aware of these statements from the Government. I hope we all realize Klein's accusations highlight only one side of the story. I also want to draw attention to another claim repeatedly made on this floor: the false declaration that the immunity provision in this bill will ``close the courthouse door.'' These claims seek to convey the false impression that the immunity provision in this bill will halt all litigation relating to the terrorist surveillance program, or TSP. This is absolutely false. There are no fewer than seven lawsuits currently pending against Government officials that are related to the TSP. The immunity provision in this bill will not--I repeat that, will not--affect any of those cases. These cases are completely unaffected by the immunity provision in this bill. Here are the cases. Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. George W. Bush; ACLU v. National Security Agency; Center for Constitutional Rights v. George W. Bush; Guzzi v. George W. Bush; Henderson v. Keith Alexander; Shubert v. George W. Bush; Tooley v. George W. Bush. Finally, it is imperative for us to understand national security is greatly dependent on the cooperation of telecom providers. We cannot do it by ourselves. Yet many foreign governments are in quite the opposite situation, one which gives them an advantage in certain electronic interceptions. Many foreign telecoms are run by the respective host government. Many others have government officials with controlling authority. These countries do not have to worry about telecom cooperation. They can simply force the telecoms to comply. We have chosen not to have that system in our great Nation. Rather, we rely on the voluntary assistance of telecommunication providers. When these companies are asked to assist the intelligence community based on a program authorized by the President and based on assurances from the highest levels of Government that the program has been determined to be lawful, they should be able to rely on these representations. For those who argue we need a compromise, let me be clear: We already have a compromise. The Government wanted more than what is represented in this bill, and they did not get it. The chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence stated the following in the Intelligence Committee report: The [Intelligence] Committee did not endorse the immunity provision lightly. It was the informed judgment of the Committee after months in which we carefully reviewed the facts in the matter. The Committee reached the conclusion that the immunity remedy was appropriate in this case after holding numerous hearings and briefings on the subject and conducting thorough examination of the letters sent by the U.S. Government to the telecommunications companies. The immunity provisions in this bill are limited in scope. Not everyone is going to be happy with them, and that is the whole point. I, for one, wanted to see more protection for companies and Government officials in this bill, but I am willing to accept the compromise, and my colleagues should be willing to do the same. We are not all getting what we want. We are getting what the public has to have--what the public needs. We have been working on legislation to modernize FISA since at least April of 2007. I am extremely proud of the bipartisan efforts that led to this bill in the Intelligence Committee where all of the investigations were made, where the intelligence was protected. We found a balance. Let's show the confidence and resolve to vote on this compromise, not back away from it. I will support cloture on the Rockefeller-Bond substitute amendment, and I urge my colleagues to do the same. In that regard, I pray that my colleagues will listen to the distinguished ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Bond, who has played a significantly proper and important role in helping to get this bill through the committee and to the Senate floor. This is a major bill of protection for our country, and I attribute much of the success of it to Senator Rockefeller, the chairman of the committee, and Senator Bond, the ranking member, both of whom have been sterling leaders on this issue. I hope it is not true that anybody in this body will support some of the amendments that may be brought to the Senate floor because we have looked at this issue frontwards, backwards, all over the place. We have examined it. We spent many months on this subject in the Intelligence Committee. That should not be ignored. It passed the Intelligence Committee 13 to 2 compared to the substitute we defeated with cloture that was 10 to 9 in the Judiciary Committee. Mr. President, I ask that we support cloture on this bill.", u"Mr. President, action on the fiscal year 2008 authorization bill for intelligence is so long overdue I do not even know how to explain it. It is over 2 years overdue. It is a very important bill. Beginning in 1978, after the two congressional intelligence committees were established, the Congress passed an annual intelligence authorization bill every year. It does not sound interesting, but it has a great deal to do with how the intelligence community operates. We passed it for 27 consecutive years. And there was no exception to that. This legislation was one of very few nonappropriations measures that Congress has always considered ``must pass.'' Yet we have failed to pass it for the last number of years, and it is a matter of consternation. The importance of our intelligence programs to our national security has always been very obvious. The importance of strong congressional oversight of the intelligence activities has been equally obvious; although it has been spottier in the recent past, it no longer is. Then in 2005 and 2006, the bills reported out of the Senate Intelligence Committee were never brought to the Senate for consideration. There were internal reasons for that. I will spare the Presiding Officer from a discussion of those matters, and it is no longer important why. But we have to do this bill. The intelligence authorization bill is the tool the Congress uses to provide direction, specific direction, and to enforce the oversight that we do. It involves many of the most sensitive national security programs conducted by the U.S. Government. The 2008 authorization bill includes provisions to improve the efficiency of the intelligence community. It is a bland statement, but it is a very important series of parts. The bill produces better intelligence. We provided flexibility and authority to the DNI. We gave him a tremendous responsibility and then did not give him enough flexibility to exercise that responsibility. We do that in this bill. We require much greater accountability from the intelligence community. That is oversight. We require greater accountability from the intelligence community and its managers. We improve the mechanisms for conducting oversight of intelligence programs and we reform intelligence program acquisition procedures. All of that is oversight. Many of the provisions were included at the request of the National Intelligence Director in this bill. I always believe in reaching out to the professionals in doing this. The creation of the DNI position was the result of the most significant reform of the intelligence community in 50 years. And the current DNI, ADM Mike McConnell, is absolutely superb. The Office of Director of National Intelligence has now existed for 2\\1/2\\ years, and we have begun identifying ways to help the DNI better coordinate the 16 elements of the intelligence community, which are scattered around the Government, some of which do a very good job and some of which do not. Now he is pulling all of this together and he is doing a good job. Starting with personnel authority, this bill uses a much more flexible approach to authorizing personnel levels. Those are very delicate. We also give the DNI the ability to exceed personnel ceilings by as much as 3 percent because he needs to have that. He is in the process of trying to figure out how to adjust all of this and work it right. He needs flexibility. It also provides additional flexibility to encourage the DNI to convert contractor positions to Government employees when appropriate. Every Member knows the real power is the power of the purse. It is the same with the DNI. And this bill changes reprogramming requirements to make it easier to address, as they say, emerging needs in critical situations, a crisis. We give him the financial flexibility to do that. He needs that flexibility, and he now will have it if we pass this bill. It authorizes the DNI to use interagency funding amongst his various agencies that he oversees to establish national intelligence centers if he so chooses. The bill also allows the DNI to fund information-sharing efforts across the intelligence community. That was the whole point of the 9/11 Commission. That is the whole point of reducing stovepipes. Finally, it repeals several unneeded and burdensome reporting requirements. Frankly, we can use up a lot of people's time on something that we no longer need. We reduce some reporting requirements without in any way compromising accountability because oversight is the whole point of this bill. As it increases the authority of the DNI, the bill also improves oversight of the intelligence community in other ways. The bill creates a strong independent inspector general in the office of the DNI. It has to be confirmed by the Senate. That is called oversight. Confirmed by the Senate. That means it has to report to the committee. Accountable to the committee. It has to tell us the truth. Confirmation allows inspectors general to do very difficult things within their own departments that maybe some of the leaders will not do. It establishes statutory inspectors general in the National Security Agency, the NRO, the NGA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. So these are all there. They are all accountable. They are all oversight tools that we want. The bill also gives the Congress more oversight of the major intelligence agencies by requiring Senate confirmation of the Directors of NSA and NRO. Right now we do not have to confirm them. If we do not confirm, that means they do not have the same relationship with the Senate. We confirm the CIA, but we do not confirm the NSA. You tell me, particularly after we passed the FISA bill yesterday, how is it possible that we would not be able to confirm the head of the National Security Agency as well under this bill? We can, which makes him accountable to us, which means he reports to us, which means we can do oversight over him much more aggressively. As we describe in our conference report: . . . of the need for NSA's authorized collection to be consistent with the protection of the civil liberties and private interests of U.S. persons. Through confirmation of the NSA Director, we can ensure that continues or starts to be so. As we increase the DNI's flexibility to manage personnel, we require an annual assessment. That sounds boring, but, no, it is not. It is very important--an annual assessment of personnel levels across the intelligence community: How are they distributed? Are they in the right place? Are people protecting their turf? The DNI is in charge of this. We want to give him all the support, and we want this all reported to us in our committee so we can watch it. We also required the inclusion of a statement that those levels are supported by adequate infrastructure, training, funding, and a review of the appropriate use of contractors, which has become a very interesting subject in these months and years. This bill also addresses an issue that has concerned the committee for a long time, the lack of accountability for failures and programmatic blunders. That is called oversight. We want accountability. We want it in front of us. We want our hands on it. The bill gives the DNI the authority to conduct accountability reviews across the intelligence community if he deems it necessary or if we request it in our committee. It is called oversight. This also improves financial management by requiring a variety of actions related to the production of auditable financial statements. That sounds pretty boring, but, no, it is not. When you get into the intelligence community, when you get to classified numbers, things of that sort, it is very important to have someone watching. That is oversight. We will have that if this bill passes. The final major theme in the bill is the reform of the acquisition process. The bill requires a vulnerability assessment of all major acquisition programs. Well, acquisition is a very large word in intelligence and a very expensive word. We have made some very big mistakes, we have not been able to correct them. But that is a discussion for another day. So we have a classified annex. Any Senator who wants to look at what is behind all of those numbers can do that very easily. I have other things I wish to talk about, particularly the Army Field Manual. But I have a whole different speech awaiting my colleagues on that later in the day. Mr. President, I yield the floor.", u"These gentlemen said: [P]roviding this liability protection is critical to the Nation's security. They confirmed that the intelligence community cannot obtain the intelligence it needs without--I repeat, without--the assistance from these carriers, companies, and other segments of the private sector. They noted: It is critical that any long-term FISA modernization legislation contain an effective liability protection provision. It should be clear from this letter that the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General of the United States could not support the bill without explicit retroactive legal protection for the carriers and other segments of the private sector. It is for these reasons that I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 6304, the FISA Amendments Act, as passed by the House, and to vote against any amendments that intend to strip out or alter the critical civil liability provision or any other section of the bill that is essential to our intelligence community. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Dear Colleagues: The FISA Amendments Act, S. 2248, provides limited and narrowly-drawn retroactive civil liability protection to those telecommunication companies that allegedly assisted the government with the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). An amendment has been offered to this Act to strike these liability protections in favor of ``substitution,'' a legal mechanism for replacing the companies in the ongoing TSP litigation with the government. The Senate Intelligence Committee conducted a comprehensive and bipartisan review of the President's TSP, including the issue of carrier liability. The Committee reviewed numerous documents, including the Department of Justice legal opinions and the letters from the government to the companies. The Committee held a number of briefings and hearings involving government and company officials. The Committee also visited the National Security Agency to see firsthand how the TSP worked. As a result of this extensive review, the Committee concluded that, irrespective of one's opinion of the President's reliance on Article II authority to justify the TSP, those companies that assisted with the TSP did so in good faith and based upon the written representations from the highest levels of government that the program was lawful. The Committee's bill, reported out on a strong, bipartisan vote of 13-2, reflects our determination that companies that cooperated with the government in good faith should be protected from time-consuming and expensive litigation. It is a matter of fundamental fairness. The Committee rejected the broad immunity proposal sought by the Administration. Our limited immunity provision only covers assistance provided from September 11th to when the TSP was put under court authorization in January of last year. It does not provide protection from criminal prosecution or extend protections to government officials. Any litigation against government officials will continue. In concluding that civil liability protection for those companies was appropriate, the Committee recognized that allowing the current litigation to continue could: (1) compromise our intelligence sources and methods through ongoing discovery and other litigation proceedings; (2) result in significant loss of business reputation or financial loss for those companies that participated in good faith; (3) jeopardize the personal safety of overseas employees of these companies if it becomes known that the companies assisted the government in fighting terrorism; (4) put taxpayers' dollars at risk for dubious legal claims; and (5) lead to reluctance by these and other companies to cooperate with legitimate requests for assistance in the future. The substitution amendment sponsored by Senators Specter and Whitehouse does not alleviate any of these concerns. Even if the companies are removed directly from the litigation, discovery would still be allowed to proceed against them. In short, the conduct of the companies would continue to be litigated, raising significant concerns that their identities or details about their assistance will be disclosed. Given the essential role that our private partners play in intelligence collection, we believe that this is simply too great a risk to our national security. We believe, therefore, that the ongoing litigation against the telecommunication companies should be brought to an immediate close and that the Intelligence Committee's bipartisan determination of good faith should stand. We urge you to support the Intelligence Committee's bill and oppose any effort to modify or strike its civil liability provision. Sincerely, John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman. Christopher S. Bond, Vice Chairman. (By Benjamin Civiletti, Dick Thornburgh and William Webster) Following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, President Bush authorized the National Security Agency to target al Qaeda communications into and out of the country. Mr. Bush concluded that this was essential for protecting the country, that using the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act would not permit the necessary speed and agility, and that he had the constitutional power to authorize such surveillance without court orders to defend the country. Since the program became public in 2006, Congress has been asserting appropriate oversight. Few of those who learned the details of the program have criticized its necessity. Instead, critics argued that if the president found FISA inadequate, he should have gone to Congress and gotten the changes necessary to allow the program to proceed under court orders. That process is now underway. The administration has brought the program under FISA, and the Senate Intelligence Committee recently reported out a bill with a strong bipartisan majority of 13-2, that would make the changes to FISA needed for the program to continue. This bill is now being considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Public disclosure of the NSA program also brought a flood of class-action lawsuits seeking to impose massive liability on phone companies for allegedly answering the government's call for help. The Intelligence Committee has reviewed the program and has concluded that the companies deserve targeted protection from these suits. The protection would extend only to activities undertaken after 9/11 until the beginning of 2007, authorized by the president to defend the country from further terrorist attack, and pursuant to written assurances from the government that the activities were both authorized by the president and legal. We agree with the committee. Dragging phone companies through protracted litigation would not only be unfair, but it would deter other companies and private citizens from responding in terrorist emergencies whenever there may be uncertainty or legal risk. The government alone cannot protect us from the threats we face today. We must have the help of all our citizens. There will be times when the lives of thousands of Americans will depend on whether corporations such as airlines or banks are willing to lend assistance. If we do not treat companies fairly when they respond to assurances from the highest levels of the government that their help is legal and essential for saving lives, then we will be radically reducing our society's capacity to defend itself. This concern is particularly acute for our nation's telecommunications companies. America's front line of defense against terrorist attack is communications intelligence. When Americans put their loved ones on planes, send their children to school, or ride through tunnels and over bridges, they are counting on the ``early warning'' system of communications intelligence for their safety. Communications technology has become so complex that our country needs the voluntary cooperation of the companies. Without it, our intelligence efforts will be gravely damaged. Whether the government has acted properly is a different question from whether a private person has acted properly in responding to the government's call for help. From its earliest days, the common law recognized that when a public official calls on a citizen to help protect the community in an emergency, the person has a duty to help and should be immune from being hauled into court unless it was clear beyond doubt that the public official was acting illegally. Because a private person cannot have all the information necessary to assess the propriety of the government's actions, he must be able to rely on official assurances about need and legality. Immunity is designed to avoid the burden of protracted litigation, because the prospect of such litigation itself is enough to deter citizens from providing critically needed assistance. As the Intelligence Committee found, the companies clearly acted in ``good faith.'' The situation is one in which immunity has traditionally been applied, and thus protection from this litigation is justified. First, the circumstances clearly showed that there was a bona fide threat to ``national security.'' We had suffered the most devastating attacks in our history, and Congress had declared the attacks ``continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat'' to the country. It would have been entirely reasonable for the companies to credit government representations that the nation faced grave and immediate threat and that their help was needed to protect American lives. Second, the bill's protections only apply if assistance was given in response to the president's personal authorization, communicated in writing along with assurances of legality. That is more than is required by FISA, which contains a safe- harbor authorizing assistance based solely on a certification by the attorney general, his designee, or a host of more junior law enforcement officials that no warrant is required. Third, the ultimate legal issue--whether the president was acting within his constitutional powers--is not the kind of question a private party can definitively determine. The companies were not in a position to say that the government was definitely wrong. Prior to FISA's 1978 enactment, numerous federal courts took it for granted that the president has constitutional power to conduct warrantless surveillance to protect the nation's security. In 2002, the FISA Court of Review, while not dealing directly with the NSA program, stated that FISA could not limit the president's constitutional powers. Given this, it cannot be said that the companies acted in bad faith in relying on the government's assurances of legality. For hundreds of years our legal system has operated under the premise that, in a public emergency, we want private citizens to respond to the government's call for help unless the citizen knows for sure that the government is acting illegally. If Congress does not act now, it would be basically saying that private citizens should only help when they are absolutely certain that all the government's actions are legal. Given the threats we face in today's world, this would be a perilous policy.", u"Mr. President, I want to take just a moment to say a few words in support of the President's intelligence program and associate myself with the comments that have been made both by the Senator from Georgia as well as the Senator from Kentucky. They focused a lot on the legal arguments, but I thought perhaps I would approach this from what is best for the security of this country and how the American people are reacting to the President's intelligence program. I will have to base my observations on town meetings I have recently held in Colorado. I had several town meetings. I think they help me better understand the issues of importance to my constituents, and I think my constituents in Colorado are a cross-section, pretty much, of the United States. Interestingly enough, the top issues facing most Coloradans at those town meetings had to do with the war in Iraq, whether we should be in the conflict or not; the Federal deficit--we had a lot of discussion about getting the debt in order, getting the deficit in order--and obviously, because we are a cold weather State, there was a lot of talk about the cost of energy and our continued reliance on foreign energy resources. The National Security Agency surveillance program was not a top issue. Indeed, it was hardly mentioned. This tells me a couple of things. First, it tells me that Coloradans are not particularly alarmed by the use of those tools that seem to be used by the President which are creating so much objection from the other side of the aisle. I think most Coloradans view this as just a commonsense thing. They know it is important to national security and we have to conduct such a program. They understand that we need to protect this country. I think they understand this Nation is at war. It is at war with terrorism. And I think they are beginning to understand, as I am beginning to understand, that this didn't start with 9/11, it started in the 1990s--maybe even as far back as 1979 when we began to have terrorist attacks on embassies and ships and planes and various symbols of prosperity in the Western World. Unfortunately, it took a devastating attack such as 9/11 for us to really begin to realize that this war is a war to the finish. In the 9/11 attack there were more people killed than at Pearl Harbor. This was a serious assault on America. It was an attack on America. We began to realize that al-Qaida is not interested in talking about peace. As a group of extremists, they are not interested in conducting diplomatic relations. They don't want to compromise. They are fanatics who only want to kill, maim, and destroy. Al-Qaida is a very sophisticated enemy that operates in dozens of countries, including the United States. They have global reach, as seen by their bombings in London, Madrid, and Jordan. This organization works clandestinely, in the shadows, and is very hard to track much less to stop. Most Americans realize that. We have been fortunate that we have not been attacked again since September 11. We all know those attacks could come at any time, but that does not make these attacks inevitable. These terrorists can be stopped. We have the tools at our disposal that we can and must use to defeat al-Qaida. The President's use of the National Security Agency program has to be one of those. Let's be clear. The President promised after September 11 that he would direct every resource at his command--whether it is diplomatic, intelligence, or military tools--to disrupt and defeat the global network of terror. Americans all over stood up and praised him for stepping forward. The media praised him for stepping forward because we all realized this was unprecedented in American history, and it could not be ignored. It had to be addressed immediately. The terrorist surveillance program is a very important tool in that effort. The program is narrowly focused. It only targets communications when one party is outside the United States and the reasonable information suggests that at least one party is a member of al-Qaida or an affiliated terrorist group. This program is not being used to listen in on communications of innocent Americans. Those people who want to put a slant against this program, they call it a domestic program. It is not a domestic spy program. It is an extension of our information gathering outside the borders of the United States. It just so happens that we have people in the United States who have aligned themselves with those terrorist groups to harm American citizens. I think most Americans understand that if they want to have a secure home, if they want to have security for their families, these individuals have to be followed and we have to do what we can to prevent these catastrophic, terrorist-driven events from occurring. The President takes full responsibility for moving forward. He even mentioned it in his State of the Union Address. But he has done it in a responsible way. He has followed the reauthorization process every 45 days to ensure that innocent Americans are not being targeted and that the program is working successfully. Republican and Democratic leaders of the Congress have been briefed on this program more than a dozen times since 2001, and no Member of Congress, Republican or Democrat, expressed any concern about this program until it was reported publicly in the press last December. Here is a problem that this brings up: so many times reports about these intelligence programs, when they come out in the press, are wrong. I have served on the Intelligence Committee. I have taken the opportunity to be briefed on these intelligence programs. But most of what shows up in the press out there is wrong. Those of us who really know the story and would respond cannot respond because in the process of response you may actually validate the fact that it is an intelligence program--which you don't want al-Qaida or the terrorists to know. And the other thing is, if you respond to those accusations that are made in those news articles that are wrong, you have to bring out the facts which just fully discloses what our intelligence program is. With full disclosure, then you tip off the terrorists as to what we are up to. I think it has been reported time and time again in the testimony before our committees that it is hurting our intelligence program. We are not gathering the information that we were gathering before because, in effect, the terrorists have simply shut down because they have realized what has happened and what our capabilities are in gathering this intelligence. At times, with disclosure of some of these intelligence programs, we have actually had Americans who are in the process of collecting information die as a result--perhaps individuals overseas who are acting on behalf of the United States. We need to protect this tool because we all know that the enemy listens. They have not stopped their intelligence gathering and would love nothing better than for us to begin a discussion about the operational aspects of these sensitive programs. Compounding this difficulty is the fact that many of the press reports, according to Attorney General Gonzales, have in almost every case--and he confirms what I just said--been misinformed, inaccurate, or just outright wrong. I support the President. I believe it is a responsible tool to use in the war against terrorism. If we do not use it, we are going to lose our ability to secure the homes of Americans. I think most Americans understand that. We must use these tools provided by law to combat our continued threat. We cannot sit and hope that terrorists will not attack us again. We should not play into the hands of the terrorists. We now see the danger in front of us. We see what must be done. We simply must go out and do it and do it in a responsible way. The President's intelligence-gathering program is effective and it is responsible to support him if we want to have security for our families and our homes. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, I am pleased to join the distinguished chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence in presenting S. 1025, the proposed Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004, which will begin on October 1, 2003. I would like to join the chairman in noting the bipartisan manner in which the committee approaches its legislative work, and congratulate him for his leadership in maintaining that tradition. The bill has two main functions. First, the bill authorizes the appropriation of funds for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the FBI, and other intelligence elements of the U.S. Government. For the first time, the intelligence component of the Department of Homeland Security is included in the annual intelligence authorization. The actual appropriation of funds, of course, must be made in separate appropriation legislation that will follow, within the parameters set by this authorization legislation. Second, the bill establishes or amends legal authority for the intelligence community or directs the preparation of reports by the Director of Central Intelligence or heads of components of the intelligence community. The classified nature of United States intelligence activities prevents us from disclosing publicly the details of our budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, nearly all our budgetary recommendations are in a classified annex. The annex is available to all Members of the Senate, either at the Intelligence Committee or S-407 in the Capitol. Ten years ago this November, I joined a majority of Senate colleagues in voting to express the sense of Congress that the aggregate amount requested, authorized, and spent for intelligence and intelligence-related activities should be disclosed to the public in an appropriate manner. The House opposed the provision. I continue to believe we should find a means, consistent with national security, of sharing with the American taxpayer information about the total amount, although not the details, of our intelligence spending. One reason is illustrated by this year's intelligence authorization report in the House. The House committee found that the U.S. intelligence community has been recovering from cutbacks in budgets, personnel, and capabilities that followed the cold war. But how can the American people know, in a timely way, not years later, when there are cutbacks? How can they make their opinions known unless the President and Congress give them basic information on the overall size of the intelligence budget? Further, in holding the intelligence community accountable for performance, citizens should know the Nation's overall investment in intelligence. We are on the threshold of important decisions about the future of the U.S. intelligence community. Last week's 911 report of the congressional intelligence committees has shed additional light on major problems of U.S. intelligence before the terrorist attacks of September 11. As it works toward its final report next year, the independent National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, building on the foundation laid by the joint inquiry, will be adding information and insights. And the Senate and House Intelligence Committees each are in the midst of extensive examinations of U.S. intelligence on Iraq. It is fair to say, I believe, that rarely before have we had as much information about the performance of U.S. intelligence. With that knowledge comes a responsibility, for the intelligence committees, Congress as a whole, the intelligence community, and the President, to complete the improvements that the facts show are required. But we do not have the luxury to wait for further reports to begin reforms. Al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations cannot be expected to take a holiday while additional studies are done, and so we must take critical initial steps now. The need for improving information sharing and the need for enhancing intelligence community analyses were high among the recommendations of the joint 911 inquiry. Last November, the Congress took a key step in improving information sharing in establishing, in the Department of Homeland Security, a Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. Last month, on the favorable recommendation of our committee, the Senate confirmed retired Marine Corps General Frank Libutti to be Under Secretary in charge of that Directorate. As set forth in the Homeland Security Act, he is to have access to law enforcement, intelligence information, and other information from Federal, State, and local agencies, and is to integrate that information to identify terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland. The President took a further and somewhat different step in integrating threat information, in ordering this past January the establishment of a Terrorist Threat Integration Center under the Director of Central Intelligence. The successful integration of terrorism threat information--including ensuring that terrorism threat matters do not fall between a crack between the Homeland Security Directorate established by Congress and the Center established by the President, is a great organizational challenge facing the intelligence community this year. Our managers' amendment calls for a comprehensive report on the operations of the Homeland Security Directorate and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The Congress should use that information as a basis for vigorous oversight and further legislation if needed. Our need to integrate information is not limited to terrorism threats. It extends across the spectrum of U.S. intelligence. To that end, section 314 directs the Director of Central Intelligence to carry out a pilot program on the advisability of permitting intelligence analysis of various elements of the intelligence community to access and analyze intelligence from the databases of other elements of the intelligence community. Our bill requires that the program include National Security Agency signals intelligence, but also authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence to extend it to other intelligence units. The program is to enhance the intelligence community's capacity for ``all source fusion'' analysis in support of its functions. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense are to assess the pilot program and report to Congress. Another provision, section 334, will start a process for Presidential review, and then congressional consideration, of policies and regulations that may impede sharing, for national and homeland security purposes, of classified information among Federal agencies, and between them and State and local governments or the private sector. To increase the number of trained intelligence analysis, section 315 directs the Director of Central Intelligence to carry out and report to Congress on a pilot program on the feasibility and advisability of preparing selected students, through a program similar to the Department of Defense's Reserve Officers' Training Corps, for employment as intelligence analysts. Greater integration in the intelligence community is an imperative that goes beyond information sharing and analysis. Another long-term objective of the bill, set forth in section 335, is to improve coordination between the Department of Defense and the intelligence community concerning strategic and budgetary planning. With the growing importance of intelligence to military operations, the Department of Defense should recognize the contribution the Director of Central Intelligence can make in the development of national military strategy. Three sections of our bill address important information security and counterintelligence issues. Section 331 addresses the danger posed by disloyal cleared insiders who have access to vulnerable computers and computer systems, as exemplified in the Brian Regan and Robert Hanssen espionage cases. The bill directs the submission of a report by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense which describes in detail what steps are being taken to eliminate these threats, including any budget requirements to address shortfalls. Section 332 calls for a report on security clearance procedures in the Federal Government. Our report notes that most publicly known instances of foreign espionage in the United States have involved persons who legitimately obtained clearances before deciding to betray our country. The committee has identified as a subject for assessment, the relative risks of disloyalty before clearance and after clearance. We need to learn from the experience of past betrayals. Accordingly, the committee is asking that a joint report of the Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense recommend how background investigations might in the future be better targeted to historically verifiable counterintelligence vulnerabilities. Section 336 addressed a further security vulnerability, namely, the extent of the dependence of the United States on computer hardware or software manufactured overseas. Our report notes that most leading suppliers of hardware and software to the United States are countries that the FBI indicates are engaged in economic espionage against us. Section 336 would direct the Director of Central Intelligence to submit a report to assist Congress in developing policies that address this new vulnerability. Finally, I would like to make an observation about our committee's future work on intelligence legislation. There are important issues identified by the joint 9/11 inquiry, including fundamental ones about the leadership of the intelligence community, that must be on our agenda for future action. The joint inquiry recommended that Congress establish a Director of National Intelligence who, in addition to being the President's principal adviser on intelligence, shall have the management, budgetary, and personnel powers needed to make the entire U.S. intelligence community operate as a coherent whole. The joint inquiry recommended that in order to ensure this leadership, Congress should require that no person may simultaneously serve as both the Director of National Intelligence and as CIA Director or as the director of any other specific intelligence agency. Earlier this year, a member of our committee, Senator Feinstein, introduced legislation on that subject. And Senator Graham has now introduced legislation, which I am privileged to cosponsor, that includes Senator Feinstein's bill as part of a comprehensive measure to implement the recommendations of the joint inquiry. Our Committee's present bill is a good downpayment on the reforms that we should be considering in the time ahead. I urge both the passage of the intelligence authorization bill as well as renewal of our commitment to work together on the continuing task of improving our intelligence community.", u" Mr. GOSS, submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 2883), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government,the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes: The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2883), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amendment, insert the following: (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2002 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The National Reconnaissance Office. (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (12) The Coast Guard. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2002, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 2883 of the One Hundred Seventh Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2002 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2002 the sum of $200,276,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the advanced research and development committee shall remain available until September 30, 2003. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 343 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2002. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2002 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until September 30, 2003. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2002, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2002 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $44,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2004. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(H) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' before ``the Department of Energy''; and (2) by inserting ``, and the Coast Guard'' before the semicolon. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2002 the sum of $212,000,000. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the United States. Section 113(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h(b) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``An employee''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) The head of an agency of an employee detailed under subsection (a) may pay a lodging allowance for the employee subject to the following conditions: ``(A) The allowance shall be the lesser of the cost of the lodging or a maximum amount payable for the lodging as established jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and-- ``(i) with respect to detailed employees of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense; and ``(ii) with respect to detailed employees of other agencies and departments, the head of such agency or department. ``(B) The detailed employee maintains a primary residence for the employee's immediate family in the local commuting area of the parent agency duty station from which the employee regularly commuted to such duty station before the detail. ``(C) The lodging is within a reasonable proximity of the host agency duty station. ``(D) The distance between the detailed employee's parent agency duty station and the host agency duty station is greater than 20 miles. ``(E) The distance between the detailed employee's primary residence and the host agency duty station is 10 miles greater than the distance between such primary residence and the employees parent duty station. ``(F) The rate of pay applicable to the detailed employee does not exceed the rate of basic pay for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule.''. Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(a) In General.--'' before ``To the extent''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsections: ``(b) Form and Contents of Certain Reports.--Any report relating to a significant anticipated intelligence activity or a significant intelligence failure that is submitted to the intelligence committees for purposes of subsection (a)(1) shall be in writing, and shall contain the following: ``(1) A concise statement of any facts pertinent to such report. ``(2) An explanation of the significance of the intelligence activity or intelligence failure covered by such report. ``(c) Standards and Procedures for Certain Reports.--The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the departments, agencies, and entities referred to in subsection (a), shall establish standards and procedures applicable to reports covered by subsection (b).''. (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report concerning whether, and to what extent, the Intelligence Community has implemented recommendations relevant to the Intelligence Community as set forth in the following: (1) The report prepared by the National Commission on Terrorism established by section 591 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277). (2) The report prepared by the United States Commission on National Security for the 21st Century, Phase III, dated February 15, 2001. (3) The second annual report of the advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction established pursuant to section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261; 50 U.S.C. 2301 note). (b) Recommendations Determined Not To Be Adopted.--In a case in which the Director determines that a recommendation described in subsection (a) has not been implemented, the report under that subsection shall include a detailed explanation of the reasons for not implementing that recommendation. Section 805 of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (title VIII of Public Law 106-120; 113 Stat. 1629; 21 U.S.C. 1904) is amended by striking subsection (f). Section 106(b)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is amended by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the following new subparagraphs: ``(C) The Director of the Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy. ``(D) The Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.''. (a) Authority of Inspector General of Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(5)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking the second sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``Upon making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the Director notice of that determination, together with the complaint or information.''; and (2) in subparagraph (D)(i), by striking ``does not transmit,'' and all that follows through ``subparagraph (B),'' and inserting ``does not find credible under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B),''. (b) Authorities of Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community.--Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b), by striking the second sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``Upon making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the head of the establishment notice of that determination, together with the complaint or information.''; and (2) in subsection (d)(1), by striking ``does not transmit,'' and all that follows through ``subsection (b),'' and inserting ``does not find credible under subsection (b) a complaint or information submitted to the Inspector General under subsection (a), or does not transmit the complaint or information to the head of the establishment in accurate form under subsection (b),''. (a) Requirement.--The Attorney General shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of Energy, Director of Central Intelligence, and heads of such other departments, agencies, and entities of the United States Government as the Attorney General considers appropriate, carry out a comprehensive review of current protections against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including-- (1) any mechanisms available under civil or criminal law, or under regulation, to detect the unauthorized disclosure of such information; and (2) any sanctions available under civil or criminal law, or under regulation, to deter and punish the unauthorized disclosure of such information. (b) Particular Considerations.--In carrying out the review required by subsection (a), the Attorney General shall consider, in particular-- (1) whether the administrative regulations and practices of the intelligence community are adequate, in light of the particular requirements of the intelligence community, to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information; and (2) whether recent developments in technology, and anticipated developments in technology, necessitate particular modifications of current protections against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information in order to further protect against the unauthorized disclosure of such information. (c) Report.--(1) Not later than May 1, 2002, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report on the review carried out under subsection (a). The report shall include the following: (A) A comprehensive description of the review, including the findings of the Attorney General as a result of the review. (B) An assessment of the efficacy and adequacy of current laws and regulations against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including whether or not modifications of such laws or regulations, or additional laws or regulations, are advisable in order to further protect against the unauthorized disclosure of such information. (C) Any recommendations for legislative or administrative action that the Attorney General considers appropriate, including a proposed draft for any such action, and a comprehensive analysis of the Constitutional and legal ramifications of any such action. (2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. Notwithstanding any provision of subtitle B of title III of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-567; 114 Stat. 2843; 22 U.S.C. 7301 et seq.), relating to the reorganization of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office, no provision of that subtitle shall be effective during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on October 1, 2002. The National Counterintelligence Strategy, and each National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment, produced under Presidential Decision Directive 75, dated December 28, 2000, entitled ``U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness--Counterintelligence for the 21st Century'', including any modification of that Strategy or any such Assessment, may only take effect if approved by the President. The Strategy, each Assessment, and any modification thereof, shall be submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. Section 504 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1534) is amended by adding after subsection (k) the following new subsection: ``(l) Not later than 3 months from the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report concerning the effect and efficacy of alien terrorist removal proceedings, including the reasons why proceedings pursuant to this section have not been used by the Attorney General in the past and the effect on the use of these proceedings after the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56).''. (a) FISA.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is amended as follows: (1) Section 101(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 1801(h)(4)) is amended by striking ``twenty-four hours'' and inserting ``72 hours''. (2) Section 105 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended-- (A) by inserting ``, if known'' in subsection (c)(1)(B) before the semicolon at the end; (B) by striking ``twenty-four hours'' in subsection (f) each place it appears and inserting ``72 hours''; (C) by transferring the subsection (h) added by section 225 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56; 115 Stat. 295) so as to appear after (rather than before) the subsection (h) redesignated by section 602(b)(2) of the Counterintelligence Reform Act of 2000 (title VI of Public Law 106-567; 114 Stat. 2851) and redesignating that subsection as so transferred as subsection (i); and (D) in the subsection transferred and redesignated by subparagraph (C), by inserting ``for electronic surveillance or physical search'' before the period at the end. (3) Section 301(4)(D) (50 U.S.C. 1821(4)(D)) is amended by striking ``24 hours'' and inserting ``72 hours''. (4) Section 304(e) (50 U.S.C. 1824(e)) is amended by striking ``24 hours'' each place it appears and inserting ``72 hours''. (5) Section 402 (50 U.S.C. 1842) is amended-- (A) in subsection (c), as amended by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 214(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act (115 Stat. 286), by inserting ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1); and (B) in subsection (f), by striking ``of a court'' and inserting ``of an order issued''. (6) Subsection (a) of section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861), as inserted by section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (115 Stat. 287), is amended by inserting ``to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or'' in paragraph (1) after ``an investigation''. (7) Section 502 (50 U.S.C. 1862), as inserted by section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (115 Stat. 288), is amended by striking ``section 402'' both places it appears and inserting ``section 501''. (8) The table of contents in the first section is amended-- (A) by inserting ``Sec.'' at the beginning of the items relating to sections 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, and 601; and (B) by striking the items relating to sections 501, 502, and 503 and inserting the following: ``Sec. 501. Access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations. ``Sec. 502. Congressional oversight.''. (b) Title 18, United States Code.--Paragraph (19) of section 2510 of title 18, United States Code, as added by section 203(b)(2)(C) of the USA PATRIOT Act (115 Stat. 280), is amended by inserting ``, for purposes of section 2517(6) of this title,'' before ``means''. (c) USA Patriot Act.--Effective as of the enactment of such Act and as if included therein as originally enacted, the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56) is amended-- (1) in section 207(b)(1) (115 Stat. 282), by striking ``105(d)(2)'' and ``1805(d)(2)'' and inserting ``105(e)(2)'' and ``1805(e)(2)'', respectively; and (2) in section 1003 (115 Stat. 392), by inserting ``of 1978'' after ``Act''. TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (a) Annual Audits.--Subsection (g)(1) of section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended-- (1) by striking ``December 31'' and inserting ``January 31''; and (2) by striking ``conduct'' and inserting ``complete''. (b) Permanent Authority.--Subsection (h) of that section is amended-- (1) by striking paragraph (1); (2) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (1) and (2), respectively; (3) in paragraph (1), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (3)'' and inserting ``paragraph (2)''; and (4) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1)''. Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (f), by striking ``September 30, 2002'' and inserting ``September 30, 2003''; and (2) in subsection (i), by striking ``or 2002'' and inserting ``2002, or 2003''. Recognizing dissatisfaction with the provisions of the guidelines of the Central Intelligence Agency (promulgated in 1995) for handling cases involving foreign assets or sources with human rights concerns and recognizing that, although there have been recent modifications to those guidelines, they do not fully address the challenges of both existing and long-term threats to United States security, the Director of Central Intelligence shall-- (1) rescind the existing guidelines for handling such cases; (2) issue new guidelines that more appropriately weigh and incentivize risks to ensure that qualified field intelligence officers can, and should, swiftly and directly gather intelligence from human sources in such a fashion as to ensure the ability to provide timely information that would allow for indications and warnings of plans and intentions of hostile actions or events; and (3) ensure that such information is shared in a broad and expeditious fashion so that, to the extent possible, actions to protect American lives and interests can be taken. Section 406(a)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-567; 114 Stat. 2849; 5 U.S.C. prec. 5941 note) is amended by striking ``one-half'' and inserting ``100 percent''. TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (a) Authority.--Section 422 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(b) Promotional Items for Recruitment Purposes.--The Secretary of Defense may use funds available for an intelligence element of the Department of Defense to purchase promotional items of nominal value for use in the recruitment of individuals for employment by that element.''. (b) Clerical Amendments.--(1) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows: (a) Authority.-- (1) In addition to funds otherwise available for such purpose, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force may each transfer or reprogram such funds as are necessary-- (A) for the enhancement of the capabilities of the Menwith Hill Station and Bad Aibling Station, including improvements of facility infrastructure and quality of life programs at those installations; and (B) at the appropriate time, for costs associated with the closure of the Bad Aibling Station. (2) The authority provided in paragraph (1) may be exercised notwithstanding any other provision of law. (b) Source of Funds.--Funds available for any of the military departments for operation and maintenance shall be available to carry out subsection (a). (c) Budget Report.--The Secretary of each military department shall ensure-- (1) that the annual budget request of that military department reflects any funds transferred or reprogrammed under this section for the preceding fiscal year; and (2) that a copy of the portion of the budget request showing each such transfer or reprogramming is transmitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (d) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section may be construed to modify or obviate existing law or practice with regard to the transfer or reprogramming of funds from the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force to the Menwith Hill Station at the Bad Aibling Station. (a) Certification Required for Immunity.--Subsection (a)(2) of section 1012 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 22 U.S.C. 2291-4) is amended by striking ``, before the interdiction occurs, has determined'' in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting ``has, during the 12-month period ending on the date of the interdiction, certified to Congress''. (b) Annual Reports.--That section is further amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection (c): ``(c) Annual Report.--(1) Not later than February 1 each year, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the assistance provided under subsection (b) during the preceding calendar year. Each report shall include for the calendar year covered by such report the following: ``(A) A list specifying each country for which a certification referred to in subsection (a)(2) was in effect for purposes of that subsection during any portion of such calendar year, including the nature of the illicit drug trafficking threat to each such country. ``(B) A detailed explanation of the procedures referred to in subsection (a)(2)(B) in effect for each country listed under subparagraph (A), including any training and other mechanisms in place to ensure adherence to such procedures. ``(C) A complete description of any assistance provided under subsection (b). ``(D) A summary description of the aircraft interception activity for which the United States Government provided any form of assistance under subsection (b). ``(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''. (a) Authority To Carry Out Training Program.--Subchapter III of chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Consultation in Preparation.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure that any report, review, study, or plan required to be prepared or conducted by a provision of this Act, including a provision of the classified Schedule of Authorizations or a classified annex to this Act, that involves the intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense shall be prepared or conducted in consultation with the Secretary of Defense or an appropriate official of the Department designated by the Secretary for that purpose. (b) Submittal.--Any report, review, study, or plan referred to in subsection (a) shall be submitted, in addition to any other committee of Congress specified for submittal in the provision concerned, to the following committees of Congress: (1) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended to read as follows: ``Sec. 11. (a)(1) The Director of the National Security Agency may authorize agency personnel within the United States to perform the same functions as special policemen of the General Services Administration perform under the first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policemen for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318) with the powers set forth in that section, except that such personnel shall perform such functions and exercise such powers-- ``(A) at the National Security Agency Headquarters complex and at any facilities and protected property which are solely under the administration and control of, or are used exclusively by, the National Security Agency; and ``(B) in the streets, sidewalks, and the open areas within the zone beginning at the outside boundary of such facilities or protected property and extending outward 500 feet. ``(2) The performance of functions and exercise of powers under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) shall be limited to those circumstances where such personnel can identify specific and articulable facts giving such personnel reason to believe that the performance of such functions and exercise of such powers is reasonable to protect against physical damage or injury, or threats of physical damage or injury, to agency installations, property, or employees. ``(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude, or limit in any way, the authority of any Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, or any other Federal police or Federal protective service. ``(4) The rules and regulations enforced by such personnel shall be the rules and regulations prescribed by the Director and shall only be applicable to the areas referred to in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1). ``(5) Not later than July 1 each year, the Director shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report that describes in detail the exercise of the authority granted by this subsection and the underlying facts supporting the exercise of such authority, during the preceding fiscal year. The Director shall make each such report available to the Inspector General of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency is authorized to establish penalties for violations of the rules or regulations prescribed by the Director under subsection (a). Such penalties shall not exceed those specified in the fourth section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) (40 U.S.C. 318c). ``(c) Agency personnel designated by the Director of the National Security Agency under subsection (a) shall be clearly identifiable as United States Government security personnel while engaged in the performance of the functions to which subsection (a) refers.''. And the Senate agree to the same. Section 101 of the conference report lists the departments, agencies, and other elements of the United States Government for whose intelligence and intelligence-related activities the Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2001. Section 101 is identical to section 101 of the House bill and section 101 of the Senate amendment, except for the addition of the Coast Guard, see section 105, infra. Section 102 of the conference report makes clear that the details of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities and applicable personnel ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 2002 are contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the Act by this section. The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The classified annex provides the details of the Schedule. Section 102 is identical to section 102 of the House bill and section 102 of the Senate amendment. Section 103 of the conference report authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in fiscal year 2002 to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the Intelligence Community under section 102 by an amount not too exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under section 102. The Director of Central Intelligence may exercise this authority only if necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions. Any exercise of this authority must be reported to the intelligence committees of the Congress. The managers emphasize that the authority conferred by section 103 is not intended to permit wholesale increases in personnel strength in any intelligence component. Rather, the section provides the Director of Central Intelligence with flexibility to adjust personnel levels temporarily for contingencies and for overages caused by an imbalance between hiring of new employees and attrition of current employees. The managers do not expect the Director of Central Intelligence to allow heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed levels set in the Schedule of Authorizations except for the satisfaction of clearly identified hiring needs that are consistent with the authorization of personnel strengths in this bill. In no case is this authority to be used to provide for positions denied by this bill. Section 103 is identical to section 103 of the House bill and section 103 of the Senate amendment. Section 105 is identical to Section 105 of the House bill. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate recedes. Section 201 is identical to Section 201 of the Senate amendment and section 201 of the House bill.", u"Mr. President, I am honored and grateful to follow that very enlightening and energetic exchange between two of the most able and respected Members of this body on a range of issues. One of them I want to address now, and I want to particularly thank the Presiding Officer for his contribution, my distinguished friend from Minnesota, who has really addressed so instructively some of the privacy concerns in various proposals in an amendment I have joined. I think his work on that issue is really reflective of the approach that has been brought to this issue of cyber security--an issue that this entire body, in my view, has a historic opportunity and also a historic obligation to address this week, deal with it now authoritatively and effectively and in a way that the Nation expects us to do it. I thank not only the Presiding Officer but a bipartisan group of colleagues, beginning with Senators Lieberman, Collins, Rockefeller, Feinstein, and Carper, who deserve our appreciation for drafting this bill and bringing it to the floor, and a number of other colleagues, including, along with the Presiding Officer, Senators Whitehouse, Mikulski, Coons, Coats, Blunt, Akaka, and Kyl. I mention this number because I think it is an important fact about the process that has brought us to this point. It really reflects the kind of collegial approach that is so important to this legislation. This legislation has undergone very significant and substantial revisions to reflect suggestions made by myself and our colleagues, and this bill will give the government and private sector an opportunity to collaborate and share information so that they can confront the ongoing, present, urgent cyber threat directly and immediately. This bill is not a top-down approach; it is voluntary in its direction to the private sector. What it says to critical industries--industries that are critical to our infrastructure--is that you determine what the best practices are, you tell us what the standards should be, and then those standards will be shared throughout the industry and overseen by a council that the Departments of Commerce and Justice and Defense and Homeland Security will be involved in implementing. And if companies comply with those standards--voluntary standards--they receive benefits that will enlist them in the program, benefits that will form incentives in the form of limited immunity in the event of an attack. If companies decline to comply, if they are not provided with sufficient incentives, in their judgment, there is no compulsion, no legal mandate that they need to do so. To use an often overused imagery, what we are talking about here is a carrot, not a stick, in solving one of the most pressing and threatening challenges our country faces today. It is the challenge of this moment, the challenge of our time. I have been in briefings, as has been the Presiding Officer and other Members of this body, with members of the intelligence community and others who have, in stark and staggering terms, presented to us the potential consequences of failing to act. Just last week, GEN Keith Alexander, the chief of the U.S. Cyber Command and the Director of the National Security Agency, said that intrusions on our essential infrastructure have increased 17-fold between 2009 and 2011 and that it is only a matter of time before physical damage will result. He has said that the loss of industrial information and intellectual property--putting aside the physical threat and taking only the economic damage--is ``the greatest transfer of wealth in history.'' We are permitting with impunity the greatest transfer of wealth in history from the United States of America to adversaries abroad, companies based overseas, at a time when every Member of this body says our priority should be jobs and protecting the economy of this country. It is an economic issue, not just a national security issue. In fact, cyber security is national security. The United States is literally under attack every day. General Alexander described 200 attacks on critical infrastructure within the past year. He alluded to them without describing them in detail. And on a scale of 1 to 10, he said our preparedness for a large-scale cyber attack--shutting down the stock exchange or a blackout on the scale comparable to the one in India within the past few days--is around a 3 on a scale of 1 to 10. That situation is unacceptable. We are, in a certain way, in a period of time now that is comparable to 1993, after the first World Trade Center bombing. Remember, in 1993 the World Trade Center--1,336 pounds of explosives were placed in a critical area of the World Trade Center, killing 6 people, injuring 1,000, fortunately, at that point, failing to bring down the building, which was the objective. That first bombing was a warning as well as a tragedy. America, even more tragically, disregarded that warning in failing to act. We are in that period now, comparable to 1993 and before 9/11, when the country could have acted and neglected to do so. We cannot repeat that failure now. We cannot disregard the day-to-day attacks, the serious intrusions that are stealing our wealth and endangering our security, our critical grid, transportation, water treatment, electricity, and financial system. The scale of damage that could be done is horrific, comparable to what 9/11 did. We have an obligation to act before that kind of damage is faced in reality by the country. We have been adequately and eloquently warned on the floor of this body, in private briefings available to Members of this body, and in the public press, to some extent. One of the frustrations I think many of us feel is that we cannot share some of the classified briefings we have received which would depict in even more graphic and dramatic terms what this Nation faces. Some of these attacks are launched by foreign countries that seek to do us harm. Some are launched by domestic criminals who simply want to steal money. Some are sophisticated and some are very crude. Former Deputy Secretary William Lynch has detailed just one attack in which a foreign computer hacker--or group of them--stole 24,000 U.S. military files in March of 2011. As others have noted on the floor as recently as a few minutes ago, in late 2011 the computers of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce were completely compromised for more than a year by hackers. Yet today the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has essentially opposed the voluntary standards-based plan to help secure our Nation against attack. In fact, how extraordinary it is that certain parts of this bill have actually combined a consensus among the business community, the privacy advocates, as well as public officials, the National Security Agency. That consensus on privacy, again, reflects a profound and extraordinary feature of this bill, which is that we are coming together as a nation to face a common problem in a way that is demanded by the times and threats we face. Shawn Henry, the Executive Assistant Director of the FBI, has said that ``the cyber threat is an existential one, meaning that a major cyber attack could potentially wipe out whole companies.'' That is the reason the business community has been involved and should support these proposals. These attacks are not only ongoing, they have been occurring for years. These criminals are infiltrating our communications, accessing our secrets, and sapping our economic health through thefts of intellectual property. Finally, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, as has been frequently quoted, said: The next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a cyber attack that cripples our power system, our grid, our security systems, our financial systems, our government systems. The panoply of harm is staggering, and we cannot wait for that harm to be a reality to this country. The consequences comparable to 9/11 are tragic to contemplate. FBI Director Mueller has said the cyber threat, which cuts across all programs, will be the No. 1 threat to our country. FBI Director Mueller speaks the truth. We must make sure our government has the tools and authority they have asked for. The NSA, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, our business community and privacy advocates are all united in feeling this threat must be confronted. We have the opportunity but we also have a historic obligation to make sure we move this bill and that it moves forward so we do not squander this opportunity. I thank the Presiding Officer and I yield the floor.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Let me describe what the information sharing title does specifically. First, title VII explicitly authorizes companies to search for cybersecurity threats on their own networks and to take appropriate actions to defend their networks against these threats. Many companies monitor and defend their own networks today, in order to protect themselves and their customers. But we have heard from numerous companies that the law in this area is unclear, and that sometimes it is less risky, from a liability perspective, to just hope attacks don't happen than to take additional steps to defend themselves. So this bill will make the law crystal clear by giving companies explicit authority to monitor and defend their own networks. Second, the bill clearly authorizes private companies to share cyber threat information with each other. There have been concerns that antitrust laws or other statutes prevent companies from cooperating on cyber defense. This bill, section 702, clearly says: ``notwithstanding any other provision of law, any private entity may disclose lawfully obtained cybersecurity threat indicators to any other private entity in accordance with this section.'' Third, the bill authorizes the government--which will largely mean, in practice, the intelligence community--to share classified information about cyber threats with appropriately cleared organizations, such as companies, outside of the government. Today, only government employees and contractors are eligible to receive security clearances and therefore gain access to national secrets. To put it another way, those with a valid ``need to know'' national security secrets are usually within the government or working for the government. That isn't true for cyber security. The companies that underpin our Nation's economy and way of life have a ``need to know'' about the nature of cyber attacks so they can better secure their systems. So under this bill, companies able to qualify to receive classified information will be certified and then be able to obtain classified information about what cyber threats to look out for. Fourth, the bill establishes a system for any private sector entity--whether a power utility, a defense contractor, a telecom company, or others--to share cyber threat information with the government. This is the piece that General Alexander--the Director of the National Security Agency and the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command--says is absolutely necessary for the protection of the United States. Here is how the provision works: The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence, would designate a federal cybersecurity exchange. This would be an office or center that already exists, and already shares and receives cyber threat information. Private companies would share cyber threat information with the exchange directly. The exchange must be a civilian entity; I expect it would be within the Department of Homeland Security. Let me stop there. Why not have this portal or exchange be in the military or the NSA? There are two reasons: First, we are talking here about the protection of the government's network--the dot.gov network--and the computer systems outside of the government. We are not talking about protecting the dot.mil network and the Department of Defense, and we are not talking about actions that the military takes overseas. Protection of the private sector--of the electrical grid or Wall Street--is simply not the military's or NSA's responsibility. Second, there is, for good reason, major concern among privacy advocates not to have private sector information, which could include Americans' banking records, or email traffic, or health care records, being shared by companies with the military or intelligence community. In drafting this bill, we heard from several Senators for whom having a military exchange was a complete non-starter. We worked with Senators Durbin, Franken, Coons, Akaka, Blumenthal, and Sanders, and others to craft this language putting a civilian entity in the lead. General Keith Alexander, the Director of the National Security Agency, also supports this model. He wrote, in his July 31 letter to Senator Reid: ``The American people must have confidence that threat information is being shared appropriately and in the most transparent way possible. That is why I support information to be shared through a civilian entity, with real-time, rule-based sharing of cyber security threat indicators with all relevant Federal partners.'' General Alexander is the top military and intelligence official on cyber saying that he supports a civilian exchange. So we have the Federal exchange. Companies will use the exchange, as a portal and information will be sent automatically and instantaneously to other parts of the government. This is what General Alexander was describing. This part is critical. We are not talking about information going to an office in the Department of Homeland Security and waiting for someone to look at it and figure out whether to share it and with whom. This is an automatic, instantaneous process. Information comes in and is automatically shared with other departments and agencies. The bill requires that procedures be put in place so that information is shared in real-time. This has to be done automatically, so that cyber defense systems can move to identify and disrupt a cyber attack as it is coming over the networks. I discussed this recently with a CEO of a high-tech company. He was concerned that information wouldn't reach the Department of Defense. I explained that our bill would provide instantaneous sharing to DOD. He said that would satisfy his concerns. So this is a major point. Having a single focal point is also more efficient for the government. It will help eliminate stovepipes because right now there are dozens of different parts of the government receiving information from the private sector about the cyber threats they are encountering, and no one agency has the responsibility to ensure the information is shared with other parts of the government. It would also make privacy and civil liberties oversight easier, as I will describe in a moment. Finally, it should save tax payers money, because it is more efficient to manage and oversee the operation of one designated cybersecurity exchange versus a half dozen or more parts of the government. Now let me describe the liability protections, because that is a critical part of title VII. Section 706 of the bill provides liability protection for the voluntary sharing of cyber threat information with the federal cybersecurity exchange. The bill reads: ``no civil or criminal cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any Federal or State court against any entity [meaning a company] acting as authorized by this title, and any such action shall be dismissed promptly for . . . the voluntary disclosure of a lawfully obtained cybersecurity threat indicator to a cybersecurity exchange.'' In other words, a company is immune from lawsuit if it shares cyber threat information with a Federal exchange. The same immunity applies to: Companies who monitor their own networks; Cybersecurity companies who share threat information with their customers; Companies that share information with a critical infrastructure owner or operator; or Companies who share threat information with other companies, as long as they also share that information with the Federal cybersecurity exchange within a reasonable time. If a company shared information in a way other than the five ways I just mentioned, it still receives a legal defense under this bill from suit if the company can make a reasonable good faith showing that the information sharing provisions permitted that sharing. Further, no civil or criminal cause of action can be brought against a company or an officer, employee, or agency of a company for the reasonable failure to act on information received through the information sharing mechanisms set up by this bill. Basically, the only way that anyone participating in the information sharing system can be held liable is if they are found to have knowingly violated a provision of the bill or acted in gross negligence. So there are very strong liability protections in this bill for anyone that shares information about cyber threats--which is completely voluntarily. In addition to narrowly defining what information can be shared with an exchange, our bill also requires the Federal government to adopt a very robust privacy and civil liberties oversight regime for information shared under this title. There are multiple layers of oversight from different parts of the executive branch, including the Department of Justice and the independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, as well as the Congress. Consider this: In October, General Alexander--the Director of the NSA--and Anthony Romero, the Executive Director of the ACLU, spoke together on a cybersecurity roundtable at the Woodrow Wilson Center. General Alexander praised title VII's approach to information sharing, and Mr. Romero said ``I think it strikes the right balance.'' It is not often that the Director of the NSA and the Executive Director of the ACLU agree on legislation. If they can, I would hope that the Senate can come together as well. The time to act is now. The cyber threat we face is real, it is serious, and it is growing. The country is vulnerable, and this legislation is essential. I urge my colleagues to support the motion to proceed and to support the bill.", u"Mr. President, we are at a watershed moment in the history of intelligence oversight, like nothing I have seen since the Church Committee. Some of the recent revelations have led to important national conversations about the scope of our Nation's intelligence gathering powers here at home, and to renewed legislative efforts to recalibrate those authorities and the related oversight regimes. The USA FREEDOM Act that Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner and I introduced last week along with more than 100 members of Congress does just that. It is important, however, to acknowledge that some of the leaks have led to needless risk to our national security and have threatened our relationships with some of our most important international partners. And all of this leads back to a 29-year-old contractor named Edward Snowden. Let me make clear once more that I do not condone the way any of these highly classified programs were disclosed. I am deeply concerned about the potential damage to our intelligence gathering capabilities, foreign relationships, and national security. I am also deeply concerned that one person could wreak this much havoc in such a short period of time. Especially in the wake of the Private Manning leaks, I do not understand how the National Security Agency could have allowed this to happen. This past weekend, Colbert King wrote in the Washington Post that this damage was, in a sense, self-inflicted. I ask unanimous consent that the King op-ed be printed in the Record. As Mr. King put it, ``I want to know how Snowden got his hands on so much of the nation's most sensitive intelligence and was able to flee the country, all within three months.'' I want to know too. We need to hold people accountable for allowing such a massive leak to occur and we need to change the way we do business to ensure that we prevent this type of breach in the future. In public and in private, I have continued to ask the leaders of the intelligence community to tell me who is being held accountable and what is being done to prevent this from happening again. Without adequate answers to these questions, the American people are rightly concerned that their private information could be swept up into a massive database, and then compromised. The NSA has acknowledged that it is collecting U.S. phone records on an unprecedented scale, and that it is also collecting massive amounts of Internet content against targets abroad, which also includes some communications of law-abiding Americans. And yet the government asks us to trust that it will keep this information safe, and that we should have faith in its internal policies and procedures. This plea comes from the same intelligence community that the FISA court found to have made substantial misrepresentations about the scope of its collection; and the same intelligence community that allowed Edward Snowden to steal such vast amounts of information. And it comes from the same intelligence community whose inspector general just wrote to tell me that he is unable at this time to conduct a communitywide review of government activities conducted under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. I ask unanimous consent that the September 23, 2013, letter from a bipartisan group of Senate Judiciary Committee members to the inspector general of the intelligence community be printed in the Record, as well as his November 5, 2013, response. The intelligence community faces a trust deficit, and I am particularly concerned that the NSA has strayed and overreached beyond its core missions. One important step toward rebuilding that trust would be for the NSA to spend less of its time collecting data on innocent Americans, and more on keeping our Nation's secrets safe and holding its own accountable. The Senate Judiciary Committee will continue its work on these issues in the next few weeks. On November 13, the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law will hold a hearing on Senator Franken's Surveillance Transparency Act, which I have cosponsored. And on November 20, I have invited back to the committee Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, NSA Director Keith Alexander, and Deputy Attorney General James Cole for another hearing to review the intelligence community's surveillance authorities. Latest NSA Spying Revelations Distract From the Real Issues What's this about governments spying on their closest allies? We called it ``the bubble.'' It was a 12-by-15-foot acoustic conference room made of clear plastic and aluminum. There were at least five inches of space between the walls of the bubble and the walls of the room in which it was located. The bubble's plastic walls, ceiling and floor allowed visual inspection for electronic listening devices, or ``bugs.'' As an extra security measure, a noise-generating machine was installed in the outer room to prevent interception of any discussions of classified information within the bubble. The outer room was secured by a combination lock, the code known only to my office. The first U.S. ``bubble'' was installed after hidden microphones were found in American diplomatic missions in Moscow, Prague and elsewhere in the 1960s. Our bubble, within a room on an upper floor of the U. S. Embassy in Bad Godesberg, West Germany, was a countermeasure against possible technical penetration by the Soviet KGB and the East German Stasi. But Eastern Bloc countries weren't the only concern. Our bubble allowed classified discussions to occur beyond the hearing of our host and ally, the-then Federal Republic of Germany, and our friends down the road in the French and British embassies. That was nearly 50 years ago. This year, in my current capacity, I was sitting in the office of an ambassador in Washington when a member of his staff alerted him to an important call. There was a phone on the ambassador's desk. But he left the room to take the call. It turns out that his prime minister was calling from overseas. The ambassador went to a secure location in the embassy where he could conduct a confidential conversation. True, he was in the capital city of his nation's closest ally. But the matter to be discussed was for the ears of his countrymen only, U. S. friendship notwithstanding. Today, as the United States has been doing for decades, close allies in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere take similar precautions even when their missions are in friendly countries. Gentlemen may know that it is bad form to read each other's mail or to eavesdrop. But in diplomacy and national security, the desire to know what another country is up to tends to overwhelm any sense of rectitude. Consequently, the European outrage over snooping among friends may be slightly overdone. That is an entirely separate matter from the National Security Agency's (NSA) vacuum-cleanerlike collection of the communication records and metadata of millions of Americans, including private citizens and, apparently, foreign citizens both here and overseas. The scope of that intelligence-collection program, disputed by Gen. Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, this week is the cause of uproar around the country and in Congress. There is still much to sort out and probably reform. The monitoring of foreign leaders' phone calls, however, is closer to the larger deed of spying on allied governments. Which takes us to an indelicate question: Why is a foreign leader, a repository of a nation's secrets, communicating by text messages and smartphone? The most junior Foreign Service officer or government civil servant entrusted with sensitive information assumes that e- mails and cellphones are susceptible to eavesdropping. What makes a head of state behave as if he or she is immune from monitoring? Which brings up another tactless question: Why haven't the security services of those foreign leaders developed countermeasures to prevent successful spying on personal communications? The danger here isn't simply that the NSA may have overstepped its bounds with respect to U.S. allies. The intelligence services of the foes of Germany, France, Spain, Brazil and the like may have the capacity to listen in on high-level conversations. The naivete of outraged foreign leaders and their vulnerability to spying are nearly--but not totally--as surprising as the scale of NSA snooping. The NSA revelations, meanwhile, should not draw attention away from the revelations' primary source: Edward Joseph Snowden. How in the world is it possible that a high school dropout with a GED, a community college student who didn't graduate, a failed Army recruit and security guard can catapult himself into a CIA information technology job, an overseas posting and subsequently a $200,000-a-year job with a company contracted to do NSA work in Hawaii, where he was able to gain access to the crown jewels of America's secrets? Whistleblower, traitor, patriot: Debate the labels all you want. The government has charged him with espionage. Take it up with Attorney General Eric Holder. I want to know how Snowden got his hands on so much of the nation's most sensitive intelligence and was able to flee the country, all within three months. Damage? Done by the U.S. government to itself. The use and implementation of Section 215 and Section 702 authorities, including the manner in which information--and in particular, information about U.S. persons--is collected, retained, analyzed and disseminated; applicable minimization procedures and other relevant procedures and guidelines, including whether they are consistent across agencies and the extent to which they protect the privacy rights of U.S. persons; any improper or illegal use of the authorities or information collected pursuant to them; and an examination of the effectiveness of the authorities as investigative and intelligence tools. We have urged appropriate oversight of these activities long before the problems with the implementation of these FISA authorities became public. We believe it is important for your office to begin this review without further delay. Please proceed to administratively perform reviews of the implementation of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of FISA, and submit the reports no later than December 31, 2014. Thank you in advance for your efforts to ensure a full accounting of the implementation of these surveillance authorities across the Intelligence Community. Sincerely, Patrick Leahy, Charles Schumer, Sheldon Whitehouse, Christopher Coons, Richard Blumenthal, Chuck Grassley, Ted Cruz, Michael S. Lee, Jeff Flake.", u"Mr. President, earlier this week we learned about the young Jordanian pilot who was horrifically burned alive in a cage at the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL. This is the same group that haunts us with images of beheadings and mass murders week after week and enslaves women into servitude. It is the same group that recently declared it is determined to ``reach America.'' My friends, we live in a world that is scary. And it is not just ISIL. It is the lone wolves who gather ammunition and equipment and carefully draft plans to attack us where we work, such as the attack we saw last year in Ottawa and last month in Paris, as well as the individual from Ohio who was planning to attack the Capitol right here in Washington, DC. It is pandemics such as Ebola. It is the criminals trying to traffic illegal drugs and human beings across our borders and through our ports of entry. It is those individuals trying to sabotage our airplanes and our trains. It is those people trying to attack our computer networks and critical infrastructure. But thanks in large part to the work of the Department of Homeland Security and its employees, Americans are safe--at least a lot safer than we otherwise would be. Our airplanes and our airports are protected 24/7. Our borders and our ports throughout our country are secure. Trafficking of illegal drugs and human beings is better controlled, and our critical infrastructure networks are better protected. For anybody who thinks it makes sense to put the Department of Homeland Security out of business, to put it on the sidelines at this point in time in this world in which we live, I ask: Have we lost our minds? I hope not. I hope not. Yet today, here in the Congress, we are locked in a political debate about whether we fund that very agency that is charged with keeping Americans safe--those who live here with us--from the Islamic State and any other number of additional threats. That is irresponsible and shameful behavior. In order for the Department of Homeland Security to officially and effectively carry out its critical role in combating the multiple and ever-changing threats our country faces, the Department needs fiscal certainty and the full support of this Congress. Throughout this week I joined nearly half of my Senate colleagues to reject the House funding bill for the Department of Homeland Security, H.R. 240, which contains riders that block the President's recent immigration actions. Many of our colleagues on both sides of the aisle have significant concerns with these amendments, and the President has promised he would veto this bill if these amendments were not stripped from it. My colleagues' insistence that we accept these House amendments is jeopardizing timely enactment of a vital and bipartisan Homeland Security funding bill and threatens to prolong the crippling budget uncertainty the Department of Homeland Security has been operating under since last year. On top of that, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, this House bill with the amendments would increase deficits over the next 10 years by a total of $7.5 billion. Instead of helping our Nation move forward with our economic recovery and our deficit reduction, this bill would move us backwards. I understand why some of our colleagues are upset about the President's immigration policies. We can and we should have a debate about those concerns. We started the process just yesterday in the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, where I serve as ranking member. Let me remind my colleagues that we wouldn't even be here having this conversation today or at that hearing yesterday if Congress had finished the job we began some 2 years ago in the Senate, right here on this floor. As most of my colleagues in this Chamber will recall, two-thirds of the Senate came together in 2013. We passed by a wide margin a comprehensive immigration reform bill. Was it perfect? No, but we took significant steps to fix our badly broken and outdated immigration system and to enhance the security of our borders. At the same time, the bill would have reduced our budget deficit by nearly $1 trillion--$1 trillion--over the next 20 years, according to the Congressional Budget Office. Let me repeat that. Comprehensive immigration reform adopted here by a two-thirds vote would reduce our deficit by nearly $1 trillion over the next 20 years. We demonstrated almost 2 years ago that we can debate our Nation's immigration policies in a thoughtful way in the Senate, and, I think, over in the House. There is no reason why we can't do it again. We need to have this debate on the Senate floor as we did last Congress. We need to have this debate in committees as we did in the last Congress. We need to have this debate in our towns and States across America as we did in the last Congress. But we should not have this debate while we are deciding the fate of the budget of the Nation's most critical national security agency, the Department of Homeland Security. I am not the only one who thinks so. All three former Department of Homeland Security Secretaries--Republicans Tom Ridge and Michael Chertoff and Democrat Janet Napolitano--wrote to the Republican leadership last week and this is what they said: We do not question your desire to have a larger debate about the Nation's immigration laws. However, we cannot emphasize enough that the DHS's responsibilities are much broader than its responsibility to oversee the federal immigration agencies and to protect our borders. . . . And funding for the entire agency should not be put in jeopardy by the debate about immigration. The Washington Post's editorial board has also weighed in. Last week, here is what they wrote: If congressional Republicans want to attack those-- Talking about immigration-- actions responsibly, with discrete legislation, they are free to try. . . . However, it is another thing to wield their frustration over immigration as a cudgel, holding hostage an entire department of government that is critical to the nation's security. That is as irresponsible as it is politically ill-advised. I could not agree more. We need to focus now on doing the job we were sent here to do--to provide the funding necessary to keep America safe in an ever more dangerous world. Once we have done that, we should engage in an urgent debate on how to amend America's immigration policies for the 21st century. If we choose instead to continue down this irresponsible path toward a shutdown of the Department of Homeland Security, we will actually put America at greater risk. Why would we do that? Why would we do that? If we allow the Department of Homeland Security to shut down, here is what is going to happen--a few things that will happen. First of all, over 50,000 TSA security screeners keeping terrorists off of airplanes are going to go without pay. We want them to do their jobs, but we are just not going to pay them for it. Over 40,000 Customs and Border Protection officers needed to keep our borders secure are going to go without pay, too. We want them to do their jobs. We are not going to pay them, either. In addition, over 13,000 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, enforcing our immigration laws and combatting human and drug trafficking, are going to go without pay too. We want them to do their jobs. We are not going to pay them, either. Essentially, a large part of our Federal homeland security personnel would be working on an IOU. Now you say: How is that fair? How is that fair? Well, it is not. Even if we avoid a shutdown but continue to keep the Department on a continuing resolution, we prevent the men and women who work there from doing their jobs as effectively and as efficiently as they can. For example, we will not be able to replace obsolete surveillance technology along the high-risk areas of our border with Mexico. Our Nation will have significantly fewer resources to respond to any future surges of unaccompanied minors along the Southwest border. Morale will continue to degrade at the Department, which already ranks dead last for morale among other major Federal agencies. This is not how we want to be treated. It is no way for us to treat the men and women who are working around the clock to keep us safe. It is also an egregious waste of money. As we have learned over the years, crisis budgeting costs taxpayers millions of dollars. This latest situation is no exception. Employee hiring and research efforts at the Department would come to a halt. The contracts for a variety of security projects would be stalled and would need to be renegotiated, in all likelihood at a higher cost to taxpayers. For example, a continuing resolution would delay a $600 million contract to build a national security cutter that the Coast Guard urgently needs--keep it from being awarded. This cutter is critical to stopping the illegal trafficking off of our shores and ports of entry, including illegal immigration and drug and human trafficking. That is just one example. As any business owner would tell us, this is not the way to run a business. It is certainly no way to run a vital national security agency of the United States. So how are we going to remedy this situation? Fortunately, we have a solution sitting right in front of us, the bill that Senators Mikulski and Shaheen have introduced. It is S. 272. It is a clean fiscal year 2015 appropriations bill, which both Democrats and Republicans agreed to just this past December, 2 months ago. This measure provides the stable full-year funding that the Department of Homeland Security and our national security need without demanding a ransom. In closing, I want to urge, as strongly as I can, my colleagues in this Chamber, in this body, to join me in doing the right thing. Support passage of this clean full-year appropriations legislation for the Department of Homeland Security. Reject the amendments approved by the House. Once we have done that, let's begin a fulsome and badly needed debate that will enable us to hammer out a thoughtful, 21st century immigration policy for America, a policy that is fair, a policy that will significantly reduce our Nation's budget deficit, and a policy that will strengthen the economic recovery in this country that is now underway. I yield the floor.", u"Let me thank the ranking member and the chairman of the full committee. As my colleagues have done, let me also acknowledge the chairman of the Crime Subcommittee, Mr. Sensenbrenner, on which I serve as the ranking member. As many have noted, let me acknowledge the work of Mr. Goodlatte and Mr. Conyers and their leadership on a very important statement on behalf of the American people. Mr. Speaker, the USA FREEDOM Act is the House's unified response to the unauthorized disclosures and subsequent publication in the media in June 2013 regarding the National Security Agency's collection from Verizon of the phone records of all of its American customers which were authorized by the FISA court pursuant to section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. You can imagine, Mr. Speaker, the public was not happy. There was justifiable concern on the part of the public and by a large percentage of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of the NSA data collection bundling, which, by orders of magnitude, exceeded anything previously authorized or contemplated, may have constituted an unwarranted invasion of privacy and a threat to the civil liberties of Americans. Mr. Speaker, I have been a decade-plus-long member of the Homeland Security Committee. I do not in any way want to infringe upon the security of this Nation, but if we allow the terrorists to terrorize us, then we are in very bad shape, and I am glad the voices of opposition were raised. To quell the growing controversy, the Director of National Intelligence declassified and released limited information about the program, but it did not, by any means, satisfy the concern raised by Americans. The DNI stated that the only type of information acquired under the court's order was telephone metadata, such as telephone numbers dialed and length of calls. That did not satisfy our concern. I am very pleased that we are here on the floor of the House putting forward something that addresses the concerns but that does not undermine the security of America. For example, I introduced the FISA court in the Sunshine Act of 2013 in response to this. Without compromising national security, it was bipartisan legislation that gave much-needed transparency to the decision orders and opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or FISA. My bill would require the Attorney General to disclose each decision. I am glad that, in this bill, we have positions and points where the Attorney General is conducting declassification review. I am also pleased that the bill before us contains an explicit prohibition and a restraint, pursuant to section 215, on the bulk collection of tangible things. We are making a difference with the USA FREEDOM Act, and it is interesting that groups as different as the R Street Institute and the Human Rights Watch are, in essence, supporting this legislation. Mr. Speaker, I believe that we can do what we need to do by passing this legislation and by then going to an amendment on section 702, which I will support. Security goes along with protection, and I believe this particular legislation does it. Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee and an original co-sponsor, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2048, the ``USA Freedom Act,'' which is stands for ``Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection, and Online Monitoring Act.'' I support the USA Freedom Act for several reasons: 1. The bill ends all bulk collection of business records under Section 215 and prohibits bulk collection under the FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace Device authority and National Security Letter authorities. 2. The USA Freedom Act strengthens the definition of ``specific selection term,'' the mechanism used to prohibit bulk collection, which prevents large-scale, indiscriminate data collection while at the same time ensuring the government can collect the information it needs to further a national security investigation. 3. The USA Freedom Act strengthens protections for civil liberties by creating a panel of experts to advise the FISA Court on matters of privacy and civil liberties, communications technology, and other technical or legal matters and also codifies important procedures for recipients of National Security Letters. 4. The bill increases transparency by requiring declassification of all significant opinions of the FISA Court and provides procedures for certified questions of law to the FISA Court of Review and the Supreme Court. 5. The USA Freedom Act requires the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to provide the public with detailed guidance about how they can use these national security authorities, and provides even more reporting by America's technology companies. 6. The USA Freedom Act contains several important national security enhancements, including closing loopholes that make it difficult for the government to track foreign terrorists and spies as they enter or leave the country. The USA Freedom Act is the House's unified response to the unauthorized disclosures and subsequent publication in the media in June 2013 regarding the National Security Agency's collection from Verizon of the phone records of all of its American customers, which was authorized by the FISA Court pursuant to Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Public reaction to the news of this massive and secret data gathering operation was swift and negative. There was justifiable concern on the part of the public and a large percentage of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of this NSA data collection operation, which exceeded by orders of magnitude anything previously authorized or contemplated, may constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy and threat to the civil liberties of American citizens. To quell the growing controversy, the Director of National Intelligence declassified and released limited information about this program. According to the DNI, the information acquired under this program did not include the content of any communications or the identity of any subscriber. The DNI stated that ``the only type of information acquired under the Court's order is telephony metadata, such as telephone numbers dialed and length of calls.'' The assurance given by the DNI, to put it mildly, was not very reassuring. In response, many Members of Congress, including the Ranking Member Conyers, and Mr. Sensenbrenner, and myself, introduced legislation in response to the disclosures to ensure that the law and the practices of the executive branch reflect the intent of Congress in passing the USA Patriot Act and subsequent amendments. For example, I introduced H.R. 2440, the ``FISA Court in the Sunshine Act of 2013,'' bipartisan legislation, that provided much needed transparency without compromising national security to the decisions, orders, and opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or ``FISA Court.'' Specifically, my bill required the Attorney General to disclose each decision, order, or opinion of a Foreign Intelligence Survellance Court (FISC), allowing Americans to know how broad of a legal authority the government is claiming under the PATRIOT ACT and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct the surveillance needed to keep Americans safe. I am pleased that these requirements are incorporated in substantial part in the USA Freedom Act, which requires the Attorney General to conduct a declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion of the FISA court that includes a significant construction or interpretation of law and to submit a report to Congress within 45 days. As I indicated, perhaps the most important reasons for supporting passage of H.R. 2048 is the bill's prohibition on domestic bulk collection, as well as its criteria for specifying the information to be collected, applies not only to Section 215 surveillance activities but also to other law enforcement communications interception authorities, such as national security letters. Finally, I strongly support the USA Freedom Act because Section 301 of the bill continues to contain protections agains ``reverse targeting,'' which became law when an earlier Jackson Lee Amendment was included in H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007. ``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the government targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to collect information on certain U.S. persons. One of the main concerns of libertarians and classical conservatives, as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, in giving expanded authority to the executive branch was the temptation of national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards to prevent it. The Jackson Lee Amendment, preserved in Section 301 of the USA Freedom Act, reduces even further any such temptation to resort to reverse targeting by making any information concerning a United States person obtained improperly inadmissible in any federal, state, or local judicial, legal, executive, or administrative proceeding. Mr. Speaker, I noted in an op-ed published way back in October 2007, that as Alexis DeTocqueville, the most astute student of American democracy, observed nearly two centuries ago, the reason democracies invariably prevail in any military conflict is because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that are indispensable to success: initiative, innovation, courage, and a love of justice. I support the USA Freedom Act because it will help keep us true to the Bill of Rights and strikes the proper balance between cherished liberties and smart security. I urge my colleagues to support the USA Freedom Act.", u"Mr. President, the Senate has confirmed four nominees to fill top leadership positions at the Justice Department officials, and today we take another step forward to put in place Attorney General Holder's leadership team. Today, the Senate turns to the nomination of David Kris to lead the National Security Division. I thank the Democratic and Republican members of the Judiciary Committee for working with me to expedite this nomination when it was in committee. Senator Feinstein chaired our Judiciary Committee hearing on his nomination on February 25. We were able to report his nomination out of the committee by a voice vote on March 5. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence worked quickly to consider and report his nomination as well. Finally, the Senate today considers his nomination to this critical national security post. The Judiciary Committee's renewed oversight efforts in the last 2 years brought into sharper focus what for years had been clear--that during the last 8 years, the Bush administration repeatedly ignored the checks and balances wisely placed on executive power by the Founders. The Bush administration chose to enhance the power of the President and to turn the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice into an apologist for White House orders--from the warrantless wiretapping of Americans to torture. Attorney General Holder has already taken steps toward restoring the rule of law. With the confirmation of David Kris to lead the National Security Division, we fill another key national security position in the Department. David Kris is a highly regarded veteran of the Department of Justice. He is former Federal prosecutor who spent 8 years as a career attorney in the criminal division at the Department, handling complex cases in Federal trial and appellate courts, including the Supreme Court. Mr. Kris was then a political appointee under both President Clinton and President Bush, serving as Associate Deputy Attorney General from 2000-2003, supervising the government's use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, representing the Justice Department at the National Security Council and in other interagency settings, briefing and testifying before Congress, and assisting the Attorney General in conducting oversight of the U.S. intelligence community. Mr. Kris understands the role the Bush administration's excesses have played in undermining the Department of Justice and the rule of law. In 2006, Mr. Kris released a 23-page legal memorandum critical of the legal rationale offered by the Bush administration, and in support of the legality of the National Security Agency's warrantless wiretapping program. Mr. Kris was an early advocate for the creation of the National Security Division he has now been confirmed to lead, leaving a lucrative practice as an in-house counsel for a major corporation to return to government service. Mr. Kris' nomination has also earned support from both sides of the aisle. Former Bush administration Solicitor General Ted Olson, who worked with Mr. Kris at the Department, describes Mr. Kris as ``a very sound lawyer,'' who ``is committed to the defense of the United States and its citizens, and respects the rule of law and civil rights.'' Former Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, who asked Mr. Kris to remain in his post during the Bush administration, writes that he asked Mr. Kris to stay after finding that ``he had a passion for national security issues but also a deep respect and appreciation for the related civil liberties concerns.'' Former Bush administration Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and former Attorneys General Janet Reno and John Ashcroft have all written in support of Mr. Kris' nomination. President Obama has reminded Americans and the world that, ``to overcome extremism, we must also be vigilant in upholding the values our troops defend--because there is no force in the world more powerful than the example of America.'' The President reminded us that ``living our values doesn't make us weaker, it makes us safer and it makes us stronger.'' David Kris understands the moral and legal obligations we have to protect the fundamental rights of all Americans and to respect the human rights of all. He knows, as do the President and the Attorney General, that we must ensure that the rule of law is restored as the guiding light for the work of the Department of Justice. I congratulate Mr. Kris and his family on his confirmation today.", u"Mr. President, I have sought recognition to introduce legislation that will mandate Supreme Court review of challenges to the warrantless wiretapping program authorized by President Bush after 9/11, commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program or TSP. While the Supreme Court generally exercises discretion as to whether it will review a case or grant ``certiorari,'' there are precedents for Congress to direct Supreme Court review on constitutional issues--including the statutes forbidding flag burning and requiring Congress to abide by Federal employment laws--and the gravity of this issue merits Congressional action. In August 2006, Judge Anna Diggs Taylor of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan issued a 43-page opinion finding the TSP unconstitutional. At the time, many applauded and many others criticized her decision, but we have yet to see appellate review on the merits. Instead, in July 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned the district court's decision on other grounds. By a 2-1 vote, in ACLU v. NSA, it declined to rule on the legality of the program, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. The Supreme Court then declined to hear the case, even though the doctrine of standing has enough flexibility, as demonstrated by the dissent in the 6th Circuit, to have enabled it to take up this fundamental clash between Congress and the President. With the Supreme Court abstaining, another lone district judge took a stand. In In re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker in the Northern District of California considered a case brought by an Islamic charity that claims to have been a subject of the surveillance program. In a 56-page opinion he held that Congress's enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, FISA, had constrained the President's inherent authority--if any--to conduct warrantless wiretapping: ``Congress appears clearly to have intended to--and did--establish the exclusive means for foreign intelligence surveillance activities to be conducted. Whatever power the executive may otherwise have had in this regard, FISA limits the power of the executive branch to conduct such activities.'' Nevertheless, this finding is preliminary. Whatever Chief Judge Walker ultimately decides, my bill will permit any party who is disaffected by a subsequent decision in the Ninth Circuit to have the case heard by the Supreme Court by eliminating discretionary review. Under my bill, the Supreme Court would also have to review appeals concerning the constitutionality or legality of: the Terrorist Surveillance Program writ large; the statutory immunity for telecommunications providers created by Title II of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008; and any other intelligence activity involving communications that was authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending at such time as the activity was approved by a Federal court. Relying on similar precedents, the bill requires the High Court to expedite its consideration of such cases. The bill, however, is limited to circumstances where the Court has not previously decided the question at issue. Thus, it does not create a permanent right of review for all similarly situated parties, but it does require the Court to take up the matter in the first instance. Congress clearly has the power to require appellate review by the Supreme Court under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, and it has exercised this prerogative. For example, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 3904 provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of decisions ``upon the constitutionality'' of the Congressional Accountability Act if the Court ``has not previously ruled on the question'' and requires the Court to ``expedite the appeal.'' Congress used nearly identical language to provide for direct appeal and expedited Supreme Court review of the constitutionality of a ban on flag burning in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 700. I propose similar action here. It is hard to conceive of a better case to have finally decided in the Supreme Court than one which challenges the legality of warrantless wiretapping--or the constitutionality of the retroactive statutory defenses passed by Congress last year. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.", u"Madam Speaker, it is with special and personal gratification that I introduce into the Congressional Record for the Nation and the people of my District, especially in my home town of New Haven, Connecticut, the enormously gratifying and important tribute that was paid to Richard Proto on May 18, 2009, by the United States National Security Agency. who died last July after a hard-fought bout with cancer, was recognized by the NSA with the naming of the ``Richard C. Proto Symposium Center'' within the NSA compound at Fort Meade, Maryland. It is only the second time the NSA has formally named one of its facilities. Richard was born and raised in the Fair Haven section of New Haven, a graduate of the city's public schools--Strong, Fair Haven, and Wilbur Cross High School--and the son of Matthew and Celeste Proto, both active in the political life of our community at the same time as my own parents. Like many of the children of immigrants--Richard's mother was born in Italy and immigrated with her parents in 1916 at six years old, and both his grandparents were immigrants from Italy as well--his parents encouraged education, broadly defined, and a commitment to public service as a way of ensuring more fairness in the Nation they now called home. Richard was educated at Fairfield University, where he received his bachelor's degree in mathematics in 1962 and at Boston College, where he received his master's degree in mathematics in 1964. He then joined the NSA. His contribution to the Nation--he served at NSA for thirty-five years; its Director of Research from 1994 to 1999--was described by the current Director of Research, Jim Schatz, in these terms during the ceremony: Richard was ``Universally regarded as one of the Agency's most visionary thinkers. He influenced NSA unmatched by anyone else in recent history . . . Nearly twenty years ago, when large scale networking was still in its infancy, Richard anticipated the emergence of cyberspace as a battleground for national defense, and committed himself to ensuring NSA was prepared. . . . [His] life was a celebration of intellectual power dedicated to the service of his country. He was an exemplary American . . . NSA and the Nation owe him a debt of gratitude.'' Senator Barbara Mikulski (Maryland), in her capacity as a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in a letter following Richard's death, wrote that ``By any definition of the words, Mr. Proto was a warfighter and a patriot. He set high standards of performance at NSA and inspired others to conform to his expectations. He dedicated his life to the security of this Nation and has left a contribution that will endure for decades.'' During his career, Richard received the Presidential Rank Award for Distinguished Service and the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal. Since his retirement in 1999, he remained as an adviser to the intelligence community, the national laboratories, and the Institute for Defense Analysis at Princeton, until his death. Richard's family was present and participated in the ceremony, including his brother, Neil Proto, also a New Haven public school graduate and now a lawyer in Washington, D.C. and a professor of public policy at Georgetown University, and his sister, Diana Proto Avino, an educator and mathematics consultant in the public school system in Clinton, Connecticut, and formerly a nationally-recognized teacher of the year. Richard had been raised in New Haven among twenty-six cousins, four of whom made the journey from Connecticut. Richard was truly a product of his community and his Italian-American heritage. He was a member of the famed 1958 Wilbur Cross team that won the New England High School basketball championship in the Boston Garden that captured the soul of our community when I was a teenager. Mr. Proto also was the founder of the Antonio Gatto Lodge of the Sons of Italy in Laurel, Maryland. I am personally gratified to recognize Richard; a wonderful American who exercised his responsibility when the duty was his; who helped ensure the safety of our men and women soldiers in the tumult of combat; who rose to the highest rank of a dedicated public servant from the neighborhoods of New Haven, and who never lost sight of his origins and their values; the son of an immigrant insistent on defining America in its highest ideals.", u"I thank the Chair, and I rise to support the managers' amendment on this piece of legislation as proposed by Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond. This is the result of a bipartisan discussion which included the Office of Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice. I commend Senator Rockefeller and Senator Bond on drafting this complicated yet critical piece of legislation. The Senate has had a healthy debate while considering the Judiciary Committee's substitute amendment. I was pleased to see a majority of the Senate reject that bill, and I hope the Senate can now move past that flawed bill rather than offering a number of amendments which contain fragments of it. There is no benefit to rehashing the same points in the Senate bill that was just handily tabled versus the Rockefeller-Bond compromise piece of legislation that came out of the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, and the Department of Justice have stated their opposition to a number of proposed amendments which were part of the failed Judiciary Committee's substitute. The DNI has made it clear he would recommend to the President that he veto this legislation if it does not contain immunity for communication carriers, and rightly so. Some Members offered amendments to strike title II from the managers' amendment or to substitute the Government as the defendant in these lawsuits. But substitution will not give the carriers protection, nor will it protect our national security. The plaintiffs can still seek documents and other evidence from them through the discovery process at trial. This risks exposing our intelligence sources and methods, and there is simply no doubt about that fact. The Government can assert the states secrets privilege, but the ongoing litigation has shown that courts reject this theory. Even the FISA Court, which operates in secret and handles classified information, is not suited to handle these cases. The FISA Court primarily reviews ex parte requests and was not meant to hear regular trials. The members of the FISA Court are sitting district court judges and have their own full dockets. The risk of unnecessarily exposing some of our most sensitive collection if litigation continues is too great. The best remedy is to provide immunity to the telecommunication providers as the managers' amendment does. Other amendments propose unnecessary additions to provisions already included in the managers' amendment. For example, the managers' amendment contains a 6-year sunset and an exclusivity provision. Yet amendments have been offered to make this legislation expire in 2 years or 4 years. Additionally, an amendment has been offered to state that absent some other expressed order from Congress, FISA and title XVIII are the exclusive means to conduct electronic surveillance. This would require Congress to pass a law authorizing the President to conduct electronic surveillance after an attack on our country. What if Congress were not able to meet, let alone agree on language authorizing electronic surveillance after an attack on our country? This amendment ignores longstanding debate regarding article I and article II powers, a debate the courts have dodged time and again. I support the bipartisan language in the managers' amendment which maintains the status quo of this important constitutional question. Finally, an amendment has been offered requiring an audit of the terrorist surveillance program. As I stated earlier in comments yesterday, the Intelligence Committee has conducted a thorough review of this program over many months, which included testimony, extensive document reviews, and even trips out to our intelligence agencies to witness how this program is operated. I understand that sometimes partisanship impedes action in Congress. But I do not recall when some of my colleagues have had such little faith in the bipartisan findings and conclusions of a committee in this body. This amendment disregards the committee's finding and asks for yet another retrospective review of this program. This is not only duplicative, but it is unnecessary. The Protect America Act expires a week from today; the threat from al-Qaida will not expire a week from today. It is now time for Congress to act and to fix FISA so our intelligence community has the tools it needs to do its job in a very professional manner and gather information necessary to protect our national security. Protecting our national security is in the interest of all Americans, and Congress should seek to ensure that our Nation is protected fully. The members of the intelligence community say the managers' amendment contains many tools they need to protect our country. I urge my colleagues to support the managers' amendment. I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"I thank Senator Bond and Senator Rockefeller and the Intelligence Committee. I serve as a member of the Judiciary Committee. I strongly opposed the bill that came out of our committee. I believed your bill, the Intelligence Committee bill, which passed 13 to 2 in a bipartisan fashion out of the Intelligence Committee, was superior to the one that passed Judiciary on a narrow party-line vote. I also grasped during that debate that one of the real differences was the Intelligence Committee members knew what was at stake. That had been your responsibility, to ensure that our intelligence community was able to function effectively. You knew how the system worked and we didn't. We allowed theoretical ideas and maybe partisan politics to interfere with a simple project which was to identify what we needed to do to fix the broken intelligence system and to do so consistent with the Constitution and liberty. You all worked on that and reached an agreement on it. We continued to have nitpicking, complaints, ideas. Everybody has a different idea how they would like to see it done. I guess that is lawyers. Maybe that is the Judiciary Committee lawyers as opposed to Intelligence Committee members. The way I would boil this issue down for the American people is this: We are not asking in this legislation that anything be done to diminish the great liberties we as Americans have come to cherish. Actually, all it is doing is facilitating historic concepts of intelligence surveillance that we have always done. Fundamentally, there is no dispute that American intelligence officers abroad can intercept such communications as they are able to intercept without any Federal court warrant or anything else of that nature because the Federal court does not have jurisdiction, one reason, in Europe or the Middle East or Pakistan or any other country. They just don't have jurisdiction there. So we have always known that our intelligence agencies are capable, authorized, and legally able to do this. In the United States, however, if somebody taps your phone--and we have had so much confusion about this--if a Government agency were to tap someone's phone, they are entitled to listen not only to the calls that are placed away from that phone to someone else, they are also entitled to listen to phone calls that come into that phone number. That is part of the legal authorization to surveil inside the United States. So the first thing you have to do is have legal authorization to surveil. Once you do, on that phone, then you can listen to the calls that come in. What we do as a matter of practicality is we mitigate if a phone call comes in on a matter unrelated to the criminal activity that is being surveilled in the United States. That is the way it is. So what I want to say is, don't think this is somehow a retrenchment of historic American protections. What we are saying is, if you have a legal authorization to intercept a telephone system in Afghanistan--and we do, our people have a right to intercept a phone conversation--it seems to me you also have a right, just as you do if you have a warrant involving a U.S. citizen, to listen to the phone calls they place into the United States. And if it is not relevant to any kind of terrorist activity, then you would mitigate against it. But if you follow what I am saying, once you have the authority, as we do, to intercept a cell phone number somewhere, something like that, if you have this activity and you intercept that and you can surveil that number, then you are able to surveil who they call. If they are calling into the United States to set up a terrorist organization to carry out a plot, then that is the kind of call you want to intercept, for heaven's sake. I just don't think we have a big issue. I am proud of the committee. They have added protections, eliminated ideas that could lead to some abuse somewhere, but you have written a bill that is worthwhile. Let me say about the people at the National Security Agency and our FBI and our other agencies that are out doing this kind of work, they follow the laws we give them. Don't think, like you see on television, on ``24'' and some of these things that people just go around and violate the law on a regular basis. I was a Federal prosecutor for 15 years. People don't put their careers on the line, throw away their careers, violating the law. So we have to have a law that allows them to lawfully do their work and not deny them the right or a legitimate power to protect America because we are putting ourselves at risk, and we should not do it. So I am frustrated, forgive me, that we are so timid about allowing the full historical surveillance capabilities our Nation is used to having at this time when we have unique threats from terrorists who have proven they have the ability to inflict thousands of deaths on Americans. Our good people are working their hearts out. Let's don't make it more difficult for them. Let's affirm what they are doing. We will continue to monitor it so it is never abused. I thank the chairman and the Intelligence Committee for their bipartisan work to serve our country by producing a bill we all can be proud of. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, I strongly support this amendment. I think it has very good delineation between how decisions are made. The FISA Court needs to be a part of this. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment. I thank the senior Senator from California for offering this amendment, and for all of her work on ensuring that we have an appropriately drafted exclusivity provision. Senator Feinstein's amendment is critical to both our work on this bill and to our oversight of the intelligence community. To understand the importance of the Feinstein amendment, we must look at both existing statutes and recent events. There is already an exclusivity provision in the United States Code. It was enacted as part of the original Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978 and placed, where it exists now, in title 18, the criminal law title of the United States Code. That provision makes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and certain criminal wiretapping provisions the ``exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral and electronic communications may be conducted.'' Although the intent of Congress is clear from this language, recent history raises concerns about the adequacy of this provision. In December of 2005, the American people and most of Congress learned for the first time that, shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2007, the President had authorized the National Security Agency to conduct certain surveillance activities within the United States. In publicly justifying the legality of this program, the White House asserted that Congress had authorized the President's program by enacting an authorization for use of military force after September 11. The authorization passed on September 14, 2001, did not mention electronic surveillance. Nor did it mention any domestic intelligence activities. Given the nature of both the authorization and the time in which it was passed, it is very unlikely that it occurred to anyone in Congress that the President might use this authorization to justify his position that the existing statute making FISA the exclusive means for conducting electronic surveillance no longer applied. I have expressed my dismay in the past about the legal arguments that the President used to justify the surveillance program. We are still working through the many problems caused by the President's decision to go forward without input from Congress or the courts. But no matter what the President should have done at the time, Congress now has an obligation to act to prevent this misuse of legislation. Having finally made the right decision in early 2007 to bring his entire program under the FISA Court, the President is no longer using the 2001 Authorization for the Use of military force as a justification to disregard FISA. But we must ensure that neither this President nor a future one resurrects the discredited argument that the 2001 authorization for the use of military force is a blank check for such lawlessness. Section 102 of the Intelligence Committee bill prevents that abuse. Section 102 enacts an exclusivity provision as a new section 112 of FISA, and lists all statutes now in effect that constitute authority for electronic surveillance. This list is a clear statement of congressional intent: Congress did not intend any other presently-existing statutes to constitute an exception to FISA. Conspicuously absent from the exclusive list is the 2001 authorization for the use of military force. The omission of the 2001 authorization from the complete list that will now be enacted in 2008 is a conclusive statement that the 2001 authorization may never again be used to circumvent FISA. Senator Feinstein's amendment takes exclusivity one important step further. It is designed to ensure that no future President interprets a statute that does not explicitly mention electronic surveillance as an exception to the FISA exclusivity requirement. This would be an absolutely incorrect interpretation of existing law. Senator Feinstein's amendment ensures that no President will again make this mistake. Senator Feinstein's amendment addresses the possible impact of future statutes by adding language to the exclusivity section that states that only an express statutory authorization for electronic surveillance will constitute an additional exclusive means for electronic surveillance. By requiring ``express statutory authorization,'' Congress anticipates that a statute will only constitute an exception to FISA if it explicitly discusses electronic surveillance. Only those statutes listed in the FISA exclusivity section of the Intelligence Committee bill currently meet that standard. The amendment therefore ensures that general statutes enacted in the future do not become the basis for exceptions to the FISA exclusivity provision. It also applies criminal and civil penalties for any electronic surveillance done outside of the list of authorized statutes. The Feinstein amendment being offered today also resolves the operational concerns raised by the Director of National Intelligence about the exclusivity provision in the Judiciary Committee's amendment to the bill. Senator Feinstein's amendment does not include the undefined term ``communications information'' and therefore does not bar the acquisition of information that is currently authorized under other statutes. Existing statutes as well as the current bill provide the intelligence community with mechanisms to obtain the intelligence the country needs in a legal manner, with the oversight of the courts. There is no need for this President, or any future President, to set aside the lawful, well-overseen procedures of FISA in favor of a secret intelligence program. Both the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees have done a significant amount of work, on a bipartisan basis, to draft a bill that allows the collection of needed intelligence while still protecting the civil liberties of U.S. persons. Senator Feinstein's amendment helps to make sure that this work will not simply be ignored by this President or any future President.", u"Mr. Speaker, pursuant to clause 2(a)1 of rule IX, I hereby notify the House of my intention to offer a resolution as a question of the privileges of the House. The form of my resolution is as follows: Whereas in an interview published by National Journal Magazine on March 7, 2008, John Brennan, a foreign policy adviser to Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL) and former CIA official who once served as head of the National Counterterrorism Center, stated, ``There is this great debate over whether or not the telecom companies should in fact be given immunity for their agreement to provide support and cooperate with the government after 9/11 . . . I do believe strongly that they should be granted that immunity, because they were told to do so by the appropriate authorities that were operating in a legal context, and so I think that's important . . . And I know people are concerned about that, but I do believe that's the right thing to do . . . I do believe the Senate version of the FISA bill addresses the issues appropriately;''; Whereas a bipartisan group of 25 state attorneys general recently wrote a letter to House of Representatives leaders in support of the Senate bill's passage, stating in part ``A bipartisan majority of the United States Senate recently approved S. 2248 . . . But until it is also passed by the House of Representatives, intelligence officials must obtain FISA warrants every time they attempt to monitor suspected terrorists in overseas countries. Passing S. 2248 would ensure our intelligence experts are once again able to conduct real-time surveillance. . . . With S. 2248 still pending in the House of Representatives, our national security is in jeopardy;''; Whereas Ret. Admiral Bobby R. Inman, former director of the National Security Agency and deputy director of the CIA told the Austin-American Statesman last month that Americans are more vulnerable without the Protect America Act and ``the only way for the country to prevent future terrorists attacks is to increase its ability to eavesdrop on their communication;''; Whereas Glenn Sulmasy, a Harvard national security expert, wrote in the February 15 edition of The Tampa Tribune that ``the global technologies of cell phones, computers, the internet, and other such means of communication--which were not, and could not have been, envisioned by the drafters of FISA in the 1970s--have changed the way information moves around the world. . . . Herein lie the gaps meant to be filled'' by the Protect America Act of 2007; Whereas in its bipartisan findings the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded in Oct. 2007 that ``electronic communication service providers acted on a good faith belief that the President's program, and their assistance, was lawful;''; Whereas 20 Senate Democrats supported final passage of S. 2248, including Senate Intelligence Chairman Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) and Kent Conrad (D-ND), Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee; Whereas on February 12, 2008, after passage of S. 2248, the Senate amended the bill H.R. 3773 with the text of S. 2248 and sent the amended bill back to the House of Representatives for its consideration; Whereas Sen. Kent Conrad (D-ND) wrote in a Feb. 28 letter to the editor of The Fargo Forum, ``The FISA law needed reform to account for modern information technology, current patterns of communication and the nature of the threats facing our country. . . . [The bipartisan Senate bill] does include strong privacy safeguards and considerable judicial oversight to ensure that our fundamental freedoms are protected. . . . Leaving [telecommunications companies] completely subject to civil litigation could cause problems in vital intelligence collection in the future;''; Whereas 21 House of Representatives Democrats expressed support for the bipartisan Senate FISA bill in a Jan. 28 letter to Speaker Pelosi stating that, ``we have it within our ability to replace the expiring Protect America Act by passing strong, bipartisan FISA modernization legislation that can be signed into law and we should do so--the consequences of not passing such a measure could place our national security at undue risk;''; Whereas in an editorial published by the Charleston Post and Courier on February 29, 2008, House of Representatives Democrat leadership was described as ``indeed causing a potentially dangerous gap in the nation's defenses'' and ``creating an unnecessary cloud of uncertainty in a critical area of intelligence operations where there should be great clarity.''; and Whereas the failure of the House of Representatives to expeditiously consider the bipartisan Senate-passed Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 has brought discredit to the House of Representatives: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the House of Representatives should immediately consider a motion to concur in the Senate amendment to the bill, H.R. 3773.", u" The Clerk read as follows: Whereas in an interview published by National Journal Magazine on March 7, 2008, John Brennan, a foreign policy adviser to Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL) and former CIA official who once served as head of the National Counterterrorism Center, stated, ``There is this great debate over whether or not the telecom companies should in fact be given immunity for their agreement to provide support and cooperate with the government after 9/11 . . . I do believe strongly that they should be granted that immunity, because they were told to do so by the appropriate authorities that were operating in a legal context, and so I think that's important . . . And I know people are concerned about that, but I do believe that's the right thing to do . . . I do believe the Senate version of the FISA bill addresses the issues appropriately;''; Whereas a bipartisan group of 25 state attorneys general recently wrote a letter to House of Representatives leaders in support of the Senate bill's passage, stating in part ``A bipartisan majority of the United States Senate recently approved S. 2248 . . . But until it is also passed by the House of Representatives, intelligence officials must obtain FISA warrants every time they attempt to monitor suspected terrorists in overseas countries. Passing S. 2248 would ensure our intelligence experts are once again able to conduct real-time surveillance. . . . With S. 2248 still pending in the House of Representatives, our national security is in jeopardy;''; Whereas Ret. Admiral Bobby R. Inman, former director of the National Security Agency and deputy director of the CIA told the Austin-American Statesman last month that Americans are more vulnerable without the Protect America Act and ``the only way for the country to prevent future terrorists attacks is to increase its ability to eavesdrop on their communication;''; Whereas Glenn Sulmasy, a Harvard national security expert, wrote in the February 15 edition of The Tampa Tribune that ``the global technologies of cell phones, computers, the internet, and other such means of communication--which were not, and could not have been, envisioned by the drafters of FISA in the 1970s--have changed the way information moves around the world. . . . Herein lie the gaps meant to be filled'' by the Protect America Act of 2007; Whereas in its bipartisan findings the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded in Oct. 2007 that ``electronic communication service providers acted on a good faith belief that the President's program, and their assistance, was lawful;''; Whereas 20 Senate Democrats supported final passage of S. 2248, including Senate Intelligence Chairman Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) and Kent Conrad (D-ND), Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee; Whereas on February 12, 2008, after passage of S. 2248, the Senate amended the bill H.R. 3773 with the text of S. 2248 and sent the amended bill back to the House of Representatives for its consideration; Whereas Sen. Kent Conrad (D-ND) wrote in a Feb. 28 letter to the editor of The Fargo Forum, ``The FISA law needed reform to account for modern information technology, current patterns of communication and the nature of the threats facing our country. . . . [The bipartisan Senate bill] does include strong privacy safeguards and considerable judicial oversight to ensure that our fundamental freedoms are protected. . . . Leaving [telecommunications companies] completely subject to civil litigation could cause problems in vital intelligence collection in the future;''; Whereas 21 House of Representatives Democrats expressed support for the bipartisan Senate FISA bill in a Jan. 28 letter to Speaker Pelosi stating that, ``we have it within our ability to replace the expiring Protect America Act by passing strong, bipartisan FISA modernization legislation that can be signed into law and we should do so--the consequences of not passing such a measure could place our national security at undue risk;''; Whereas in an editorial published by the Charleston Post and Courier on February 29, 2008, House of Representatives Democrat leadership was described as ``indeed causing a potentially dangerous gap in the nation's defenses'' and ``creating an unnecessary cloud of uncertainty in a critical area of intelligence operations where there should be great clarity.''; and Whereas the failure of the House of Representatives to expeditiously consider the bipartisan Senate-passed Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 has brought discredit to the House of Representatives: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the House of Representatives should immediately consider a motion to concur in the Senate amendment to the bill, H.R. 3773.", u"Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding and I appreciate his fine work. It's no secret that there is a lot of controversy surrounding this issue of modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and everything that surrounds our effort to successfully prosecute this war on terror. We know that sacrifices have been made. We know that sacrifices continue to be made. And we're all very committed to the civil liberties of every single American. That's why I'm convinced that we are not going to take actions which will in any way undermine the civil liberties of our fellow Americans. It is very important to note, Mr. Speaker, that as we look at this issue, there is a great deal of bipartisanship that exists. Unfortunately, it's not in this body. And I recognize that as the people's House we have a unique responsibility and we should not in any way become a rubber stamp for action taken by the other body. But I will say this. As we look at bipartisanship, it extends beyond our colleagues in the United States Senate. It does exist right here in the House, in that 21 Democrats signed a letter to the Speaker and made the specific request that we have a chance to vote on the proposal that is, in fact, the bipartisan compromise that did emerge from the Senate. We also have had a bipartisan group of attorneys general across the country who have indicated that they very much believe that we should proceed with taking the action that is embodied in that bipartisan compromise that has emerged from the Senate. And, Mr. Speaker, I think one of the most important things that we should note is not simply bipartisanship but something that clearly transcends any kind of politics or partisanship, and that is the words that come from the Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell. And when I say that he transcends partisanship, I would like to remind our colleagues that this is a man who has spent four decades of his life working in the intelligence field. He was the head of the National Security Agency for President Bill Clinton, and he now serves as the Director of National Intelligence. In testimony before the Judiciary Committee, he referred to the fact that there has been a 66 percent reduction, a two-thirds reduction in the amount of information that they need, that they should be able to glean in the intelligence area. And he has said that in his discussions and negotiations with those in the telecommunications industry that they will not be able to continue as they have in the past to help us prosecute this war if they don't have this immunity. Now, Mr. Speaker, I think that one of the things that we in this debate on the rule are saying is that, let's just allow a vote on that bipartisan compromise, the so-called Rockefeller-Bond bill that emerged from the Senate. Sixty-eight Democrats and Republicans came together and agreed on it. And we had an interesting Rules Committee meeting, Mr. Speaker, in which we simply said, okay, we're going to have a chance to vote on the measure that will emerge from the majority, but why if as my very dear friend, the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, Mr. Conyers said, he said he wanted there to be an exchange of ideas, if there's going to be an exchange of ideas, let's at least allow our colleagues to have an up-or-down vote on that bipartisan compromise which embodies the above-partisan recommendations of the Director of National Intelligence, the bipartisan recommendations of the attorneys general across the country and simply say that we should have a chance to vote on it. It's very unfortunate that this rule denies Members of the House of Representatives the opportunity to have that vote. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote down this rule. We need to defeat this rule so that we can in fact have a package that will allow us to do everything we need as we pursue our very, very important responsibility, and that is to secure our Nation.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Dear Senator Feinstein and Senator Whitehouse: This responds to your letter, dated April 29, 2008, which asked about a particular statement contained in a classified November 2001 opinion of the Department's Office of Legal Counsel addressing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The statement in question asserted that unless Congress had made clear in FlSA that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless surveillance activities in the national security area, FlSA must be construed to avoid such a reading. The statement also asserted the view in 2001 that Congress had not included such a clear statement in FlSA. As you know, and as is set forth in the Department of Justice's January 2006 white paper concerning the legal basis for the Terrorist Surveillance Program, the Department's more recent analysis is different: Congress, through the Authorization for Use of Military Force of September 18, 2001, confirmed and supplemented the President's Article II authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to prevent catastrophic attacks on the United States, and such authority confirmed by the AUMF can and must be read consistently with FlSA, which explicitly contemplates that Congress may authorize electronic surveillance by a statute other than FlSA. We understand you have been advised by the Director of National Intelligence that the statement in question, standing alone, may appropriately be treated as unclassified. We also would like to address separately the substance of the statement and provide the Department's views concerning public discussion of the statement. The general proposition (of which the November 2001 statement is a particular example) that statutes will be interpreted whenever reasonably possible not to conflict with the President's constitutional authorities is unremarkable and fully consistent with the longstanding precedents of OLC, issued under Administrations of both parties. See, e.g., Memorandum for Alan Kreczko, Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Applicability of 47 U.S.C. section 502 to Certain Broadcast Activities at 3 (Oct. 15, 1993) (``The President's authority in these areas is very broad indeed, in accordance with his paramount constitutional responsibilities for foreign relations and national security. Nothing in the text or context of [the statute] suggests that it was Congress's intent to circumscribe this authority. In the absence of a clear statement of such intent, we do not believe that a statutory provision of this generality should be interpreted so to restrict the President constitutional powers.''). The courts apply the same canon of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,530 (1988) (``[U]nless Congress has specifically provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.''). However, as you are aware from a review of the Department's relevant legal opinions concerning the NSA's warrantless surveillance activities, the 2001 statement addressing FISA does not reflect the current analysis of the Department. Rather, the Department's more recent analysis of the relation between FISA and the NSA's surveillance activities acknowledged by the President was summarized in the Department's January 19, 2006 white paper (published before those activities became the subject of FISA orders and before enactment of the Protect America Act of 2007). As that paper pointed out, ``In the specific context of the current armed conflict with al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations, Congress by statute [in the AUMF] had confirmed and supplemented the President's recognized authority under Article II of the Constitution to conduct such surveillance to prevent further catastrophic attacks on the homeland.'' Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President at 2 (Jan. 19, 2006). The Department's white paper further explained the particular relevance of the canon of constitutional avoidance to the NSA activities: ``Even if there were ambiguity about whether FlSA, read together with the AUMF, permits the President to authorize the NSA activities, the canon of constitutional avoidance requires reading these statutes to overcome any restrictions in FISA and Title III, at least as they might otherwise apply to the congressionally authorized armed conflict with al Qaeda.'' Id. at 3. Accordingly, we respectfully request that if you wish to make use of the 2001 statement in public debate, you also point out that the Department's more recent analysis of the question is reflected in the passages quoted above from the 2006 white paper. We hope that this information is helpful. If we can be of further assistance regarding this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to contact this office. Sincerely, Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General.", u"Madam Speaker, on Tuesday of this week I had the wonderful experience of participating in a very important and worthwhile exercise in civilian diplomacy. Coordinated by the Campaign for a New American Policy in Iran, Tuesday's event, called ``Time to Talk with Iran,'' brought together a bipartisan gathering of Members of Congress, citizen groups, and religious organizations calling for bilateral negotiations without preconditions between the United States and Iran to dissuade Iran from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Our message was simple: It is time to talk to Iran. In fact it is past time we talk to Iran. Because we hear the same people who supported a disastrous war of choice in Iraq now steadily beating the drum for war with Iran. We have been down this road before and Americans have learned a simple truth from five hard and bitter years in Iraq: No unjust war ever produced a just and lasting peace. It has not worked in Iraq. It will not work in Iran. We do not need another rush to unwarranted, unnecessary, and misguided military action. We need instead to launch a diplomatic surge for peace and reconciliation. That is why earlier this year I introduced H.R. 5056, the Iran Diplomatic Accountability Act of 2008, which directs the President to appoint a high-level envoy empowered to seek to conduct direct, unconditional, bilateral negotiations with Iran for the purpose of easing tensions and normalizing relations between the United States and Iran. My bill takes a common sense approach and it is one the American people understand. Six out of 10 Americans do want their president to talk to Iran's president, according to the most-recent Gallup poll. Many leading organizations active in the nuclear nonproliferation movement support this approach as indicated by the attached letter in support of diplomatic dialogue with Iran from the Friends Committee On National Legislation, FCNL. Foreign policy experts also support direct negotiations without preconditions. In fact, a group of 5 bipartisan former U.S. secretaries of state have called for the U.S. to open talks with Iran to find common ground and resolve differences on Iraq, Iran's nuclear program, and other issues. They understand that the current policy of avoiding serious negotiations with Iran until Iran suspends uranium enrichment has not worked. They understand that an offer of bilateral negotiations with a precondition is essentially no offer at all, when the precondition is the object of the negotiations. Not only is talking to Iran the most sensible approach--it is far superior to preemptive military action against Iran. We know from the misadventure in Iraq that the humanitarian, economic, political, and military consequences of military conflict with Iran would be staggering. Simply put: this Nation cannot afford these costs--especially on top of the tremendous costs of the debacle in Iraq. Finally, Madam Speaker, although many persons were responsible for planning this extraordinary exercise in civilian diplomacy, I would like to single out for special recognition Carah Ong of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation; Bill Goold, Executive Director of the Congressional Progressive Caucus; and Nicole King of my personal staff. They did a wonderful job organizing this event. It is time to talk to Iran. As the ``Time to Talk to Iran'' event this past Tuesday, all it takes to begin is one ``Hello.'' Friends Committee on Dear Member of Congress, We write to call your attention to the recent call from five former U.S. secretaries of state for the U.S. to open talks with Iran. We urge you to speak out in favor of such talks and to support legislation to encourage them. Colin Powell, Henry Kissinger, James Baker III, Madeleine Albright, and Warren Christopher all urged the U.S. to open a dialogue with Iran to find common ground and resolve differences on Iraq, Iran's nuclear program, and other issues. The administration's policy of avoiding serious negotiations with Iran until Iran suspends uranium enrichment has not worked. We agree with those in Congress and elsewhere who have argued that to offer bilateral negotiations with a precondition is no offer at all, especially when the precondition is the object of the negotiations. This position guarantees that the negotiations with the best chance of settling U.S.-Iran differences will not begin. Former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and the late former National Security Agency director William Odom wrote recently that ``Current U.S. policy toward the regime in Tehran will almost certainly result in an Iran with nuclear weapons.'' They and many other analysts have concluded) that U.S. military action against Iran would only delay an Iranian nuclear weapons program and insure their determination to acquire nuclear weapons. Extreme elements would be strengthened and the cause of reform in Iran would be set back for years to come. Military action would also increase animosity toward the U.S. in the Middle East and elsewhere. It would prompt a big spike in the price of oil and would likely lead to retaliatory actions against the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. Current U.S. policy not to seriously negotiate with Iran has failed. The absence of talks and the addition of ever more stringent economic sanctions will resolve nothing. Military action would be disastrous. The only sensible option that serves the interests of the U.S. and the nations of the Middle East is to explore the possibility of finding common ground with Iran through direct negotiations. Common ground is not hard to imagine. For starters, both countries have an interest in a stable Iraq, a Taliban-free Afghanistan, and increased oil production capacity in Iran. The U.S. need not wait to develop leverage. Please add your voice to those of the five former U.S. secretaries of state and other senior figures who are urging the U.S. to open talks with Iran. And please look for legislative opportunities to put Congress on record in support of such talks. Thank you for your consideration. Sincerely, Jim Fine, Legislative Secretary for Foreign Policy.", u" ``TITLE VIII--PROTECTION OF PERSONS ASSISTING THE GOVERNMENT (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (2) Foreign intelligence surveillance court.--The term ``Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court'' means the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)). (3) President's surveillance program and program.--The terms ``President's Surveillance Program'' and ``Program'' mean the intelligence activity involving communications that was authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007, including the program referred to by the President in a radio address on December 17, 2005 (commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program). (b) Reviews.-- (1) Requirement to conduct.--The Inspectors General of the Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, the Department of Defense, and any other element of the intelligence community that participated in the President's Surveillance Program, shall complete a comprehensive review of, with respect to the oversight authority and responsibility of each such Inspector General-- (A) all of the facts necessary to describe the establishment, implementation, product, and use of the product of the Program; (B) access to legal reviews of the Program and access to information about the Program; (C) communications with, and participation of, individuals and entities in the private sector related to the Program; (D) interaction with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and transition to court orders related to the Program; and (E) any other matters identified by any such Inspector General that would enable that Inspector General to complete a review of the Program, with respect to such Department or element. (2) Cooperation and coordination.-- (A) Cooperation.--Each Inspector General required to conduct a review under paragraph (1) shall-- (i) work in conjunction, to the extent practicable, with any other Inspector General required to conduct such a review; and (ii) utilize, to the extent practicable, and not unnecessarily duplicate or delay, such reviews or audits that have been completed or are being undertaken by any such Inspector General or by any other office of the Executive Branch related to the Program. (B) Integration of other reviews.--The Counsel of the Office of Professional Responsibility of the Department of Justice shall provide the report of any investigation conducted by such Office on matters relating to the Program, including any investigation of the process through which legal reviews of the Program were conducted and the substance of such reviews, to the Inspector General of the Department of Justice, who shall integrate the factual findings and conclusions of such investigation into its review. (C) Coordination.--The Inspectors General shall designate one of the Inspectors General required to conduct a review under paragraph (1) that is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to coordinate the conduct of the reviews and the preparation of the reports. (c) Reports.-- (1) Preliminary reports.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, the Department of Defense, and any other Inspector General required to conduct a review under subsection (b)(1), shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an interim report that describes the planned scope of such review. (2) Final report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, the Department of Defense, and any other Inspector General required to conduct a review under subsection (b)(1), shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress, in a manner consistent with national security, a comprehensive report on such reviews that includes any recommendations of any such Inspectors General within the oversight authority and responsibility of any such Inspector General with respect to the reviews. (3) Form.--A report under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The unclassified report shall not disclose the name or identity of any individual or entity of the private sector that participated in the Program or with whom there was communication about the Program, to the extent that information is classified. (d) Resources.-- (1) Expedited security clearance.--The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the investigation and adjudication of an application by an Inspector General or any appropriate staff of an Inspector General for a security clearance necessary for the conduct of the review under subsection (b)(1) is carried out as expeditiously as possible. (2) Additional personnel for the inspectors general.--An Inspector General required to conduct a review under subsection (b)(1) and submit a report under subsection (c) is authorized to hire such additional personnel as may be necessary to carry out such review and prepare such report in a prompt and timely manner. Personnel authorized to be hired under this paragraph-- (A) shall perform such duties relating to such a review as the relevant Inspector General shall direct; and (B) are in addition to any other personnel authorized by law. (3) Transfer of personnel.--The Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, or the head of any other element of the intelligence community may transfer personnel to the relevant Office of the Inspector General required to conduct a review under subsection (b)(1) and submit a report under subsection (c) and, in addition to any other personnel authorized by law, are authorized to fill any vacancy caused by such a transfer. Personnel transferred under this paragraph shall perform such duties relating to such review as the relevant Inspector General shall direct. If any provision of this Act, any amendment made by this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act, of any such amendments, and of the application of such provisions to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby. Except as provided in section 404, the amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Repeal of Protect America Act of 2007 Provisions.-- (1) Amendments to fisa.-- (A) In general.--Except as provided in section 404, sections 105A, 105B, and 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805a, 1805b, and 1805c) are repealed. (B) Technical and conforming amendments.-- (i) Table of contents.--The table of contents in the first section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C. (ii) Conforming amendments.--Except as provided in section 404, section 103(e) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is amended-- (a) Transition Procedures for Protect America Act of 2007 Provisions.-- (1) Continued effect of orders, authorizations, directives.--Except as provided in paragraph (7), notwithstanding any other provision of law, any order, authorization, or directive issued or made pursuant to section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-55; 121 Stat. 552), shall continue in effect until the expiration of such order, authorization, or directive. (2) Applicability of protect america act of 2007 to continued orders, authorizations, directives.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, any amendment made by this Act, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)-- (A) subject to paragraph (3), section 105A of such Act, as added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-55; 121 Stat. 552), shall continue to apply to any acquisition conducted pursuant to an order, authorization, or directive referred to in paragraph (1); and (B) sections 105B and 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by sections 2 and 3, respectively, of the Protect America Act of 2007, shall continue to apply with respect to an order, authorization, or directive referred to in paragraph (1) until the later of-- (i) the expiration of such order, authorization, or directive; or (ii) the date on which final judgment is entered for any petition or other litigation relating to such order, authorization, or directive. (3) Use of information.--Information acquired from an acquisition conducted pursuant to an order, authorization, or directive referred to in paragraph (1) shall be deemed to be information acquired from an electronic surveillance pursuant to title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) for purposes of section 106 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1806), except for purposes of subsection (j) of such section. (4) Protection from liability.--Subsection (l) of section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007, shall continue to apply with respect to any directives issued pursuant to such section 105B. (5) Jurisdiction of foreign intelligence surveillance court.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), section 103(e) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)), as amended by section 5(a) of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-55; 121 Stat. 556), shall continue to apply with respect to a directive issued pursuant to section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007, until the later of-- (A) the expiration of all orders, authorizations, or directives referred to in paragraph (1); or (B) the date on which final judgment is entered for any petition or other litigation relating to such order, authorization, or directive. (6) Reporting requirements.-- (A) Continued applicability.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, any amendment made by this Act, the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-55), or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), section 4 of the Protect America Act of 2007 shall continue to apply until the date that the certification described in subparagraph (B) is submitted. (B) Certification.--The certification described in this subparagraph is a certification-- (i) made by the Attorney General; (ii) submitted as part of a semi-annual report required by section 4 of the Protect America Act of 2007; (iii) that states that there will be no further acquisitions carried out under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007, after the date of such certification; and (iv) that states that the information required to be included under such section 4 relating to any acquisition conducted under such section 105B has been included in a semi-annual report required by such section 4. (7) Replacement of orders, authorizations, and directives.-- (A) In general.--If the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence seek to replace an authorization issued pursuant to section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-55), with an authorization under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by section 101(a) of this Act), the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence shall, to the extent practicable, submit to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (as such term is defined in section 701(b)(2) of such Act (as so added)) a certification prepared in accordance with subsection (g) of such section 702 and the procedures adopted in accordance with subsections (d) and (e) of such section 702 at least 30 days before the expiration of such authorization. (B) Continuation of existing orders.--If the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence seek to replace an authorization made pursuant to section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110- 55; 121 Stat. 522), by filing a certification in accordance with subparagraph (A), that authorization, and any directives issued thereunder and any order related thereto, shall remain in effect, notwithstanding the expiration provided for in subsection (a) of such section 105B, until the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (as such term is defined in section 701(b)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as so added)) issues an order with respect to that certification under section 702(i)(3) of such Act (as so added) at which time the provisions of that section and of section 702(i)(4) of such Act (as so added) shall apply. (8) Effective date.--Paragraphs (1) through (7) shall take effect as if enacted on August 5, 2007. (b) Transition Procedures for FISA Amendments Act of 2008 Provisions.-- (1) Orders in effect on december 31, 2012.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, any amendment made by this Act, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), any order, authorization, or directive issued or made under title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 101(a), shall continue in effect until the date of the expiration of such order, authorization, or directive. (2) Applicability of title vii of fisa to continued orders, authorizations, directives.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, any amendment made by this Act, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), with respect to any order, authorization, or directive referred to in paragraph (1), title VII of such Act, as amended by section 101(a), shall continue to apply until the later of-- (A) the expiration of such order, authorization, or directive; or (B) the date on which final judgment is entered for any petition or other litigation relating to such order, authorization, or directive. (3) Challenge of directives; protection from liability; use of information.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)-- (A) section 103(e) of such Act, as amended by section 403(a)(1)(B)(ii), shall continue to apply with respect to any directive issued pursuant to section 702(h) of such Act, as added by section 101(a); (B) section 702(h)(3) of such Act (as so added) shall continue to apply with respect to any directive issued pursuant to section 702(h) of such Act (as so added); (C) section 703(e) of such Act (as so added) shall continue to apply with respect to an order or request for emergency assistance under that section; (D) section 706 of such Act (as so added) shall continue to apply to an acquisition conducted under section 702 or 703 of such Act (as so added); and (E) section 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A) of title 18, United States Code, as amended by section 101(c)(1), shall continue to apply to an order issued pursuant to section 704 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 101(a). (4) Reporting requirements.-- (A) Continued applicability.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), section 601(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1871(a)), as amended by section 101(c)(2), and sections 702(l) and 707 of such Act, as added by section 101(a), shall continue to apply until the date that the certification described in subparagraph (B) is submitted. (B) Certification.--The certification described in this subparagraph is a certification-- (i) made by the Attorney General; (ii) submitted to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives; (iii) that states that there will be no further acquisitions carried out under title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 101(a), after the date of such certification; and (iv) that states that the information required to be included in a review, assessment, or report under section 601 of such Act, as amended by section 101(c), or section 702(l) or 707 of such Act, as added by section 101(a), relating to any acquisition conducted under title VII of such Act, as amended by section 101(a), has been included in a review, assessment, or report under such section 601, 702(l), or 707. (5) Transition procedures concerning the targeting of united states persons overseas.--Any authorization in effect on the date of enactment of this Act under section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333 to intentionally target a United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States shall continue in effect, and shall constitute a sufficient basis for conducting such an acquisition targeting a United States person located outside the United States until the earlier of-- (A) the date that authorization expires; or (B) the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.", u"Mr. President, today the Senate has confirmed the nomination of VADM Mike McConnell to be the next Director of National Intelligence. It is hard for me to imagine a better choice than Admiral McConnell. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence received Admiral McConnell's nomination to replace John Negroponte on January 22, 2007. He completed all the requisite paperwork and the committee held a hearing with Admiral McConnell on February 1. The committee met on February 6, and voted unanimously to report the nomination to the Senate with a favorable recommendation. I am pleased that the Senate has moved quickly to act on this recommendation. I think this swift consideration of the nomination is recognition of both the importance of this position and of the qualifications of Admiral McConnell. As my colleagues know, the position of Director of National Intelligence was created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 2004. That legislation drew on recommendations from the congressional and commission reports on the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Senate Intelligence Committee report on Iraq prewar intelligence, the Report of the Joint Inquiry by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees into the events of 9/11, and the recommendations of numerous other commissions and reviews going back 50 years. The creation of the DNI was an important step. We now have, for the first time, an individual whose primary job is to run the intelligence community as a whole. Until the creation of the DNI, the old Director of Central Intelligence wore two hats--as the head of the Intelligence Community and as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. But this structural change, while important, was only the first step to reforming intelligence. The DNI must make the 16 agencies of the intelligence community work as one toward a common goal. Director Negroponte has started the community down that path. It is going to be up to Admiral McConnell to move us further along. A quick review of his resume will show even the casual observer that Admiral McConnell is incredibly well qualified for this critical position. He retired from the Navy as Vice Admiral after 29 years of service. Most of his service during this distinguished career was as an intelligence officer. While on active duty he served as Director of Intelligence on the Joint Staff during the Persian Gulf War. This made him the principal intelligence advisor to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, GEN Colin Powell. He went on to become the Director of the National Security Agency, our Nation's largest intelligence agency. Upon retiring from the Navy, Admiral McConnell went to work for Booz Allen Hamilton where he has been a senior vice president for intelligence and national security. He also is currently chairman and chief executive officer of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, an industry group that works with the Government looking for ways to solve some of our complex intelligence problems. He has the requisite Government experience supplemented by a decade in the private sector. In his appearance before the Intelligence Committee last week I think it is fair to say that he impressed all members of the committee with his knowledge of the issues and the difficulty of the task ahead. But I was particularly encouraged by his answers to questions about the relationship with Congress. It is no secret that I have not always been happy with the level of access the intelligence committee has had to materials it needs to do its job. On some of the most important and sensitive programs in the Intelligence Community, we have been frustrated in our attempts to do oversight because we have not been able to get documents and other information critical to understanding and therefore evaluating these programs. In other cases the administration has placed burdensome and unwarranted limits on access by Senators and staff. Vice Chairman Bond and I are making a concerted bipartisan effort to deal with these questions. And we are making headway. One issue that we both raised with Admiral McConnell at his hearing has now been resolved. We also have seen movement, if not complete satisfaction, in other areas. Admiral McConnell's answers convinced me that he will be an ally in this area. It is my view that the intelligence community needs to view Congress as a partner in supporting intelligence activities that protect America and I think he will do that. I thank all of my colleagues for supporting support the confirmation of Admiral McConnell and I look forward to working with him in his new role as Director of National Intelligence.", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to lend my strong support to this bipartisan resolution supporting our men and women in uniform and opposing the President's decision to send more troops into Iraq. Last year, Congress united across party lines to say loudly and clearly, the year of 2006 must be a year of significant transition in Iraq. Rather than chart a new course, the President is proposing more of the same. His actions will only deepen America's involvement in Iraq's civil war. Instead of acknowledging the facts on the ground, instead of listening to the combatant commanders and the Iraq Study Group and instead of hearing the American people's call for change, the President has once again chosen to stick to his failed policies, and now he has raised the risk by insisting more U.S. troops head to Iraq. It has been 4 years, Mr. President. The American people have every right to expect a change of course in Iraq, and it is your responsibility to them and our men and women in uniform to stop fighting Iraq's civil war. As General Odom, the former head of the National Security Agency under President Reagan, wrote this weekend, unless Congress speaks up, and I quote, we may be doomed to 2 more years of chasing a mirage in Iraq and possibly widening the war to Iran. We cannot let that happen. Sending more U.S. troops to Iraq will not stabilize it or the region as a whole. As the latest National Intelligence Estimate makes clear, Iraq is becoming more polarized and violent, not less. Sending more American troops to Iraq without stronger Iraqi leadership will only lead to further chaos. My consistent opposition to this troop surge is built upon years of hearings in the House Armed Services Committee, congressional briefings and five trips to the region, including three to Iraq, witnessing the war firsthand and speaking with our troops and commanders on the ground. I have watched the President plead his case to the American people, trying to justify why more troops will save his failed policy; but I am consistently disappointed by the stubbornness exhibited by an administration that has failed every step of the way. I have stated from the beginning of the war that the Commander in Chief has the responsibility to define a well-articulated mission that has the support of the American people and an exit strategy to bring our troops home sooner and safer. He has neither. Top military commanders in Iraq, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group and the American people all agree that sending more troops to Iraq will not end the civil war. They understand the Iraqi Government needs to take responsibility for securing their own country, and we should immediately begin a strategic redeployment of U.S. troops in conjunction with diplomacy that forces Iraq's neighbors to step up as regional, responsible partners. If the President sidesteps the Congress, he does so at his own peril; and, sadly, it is the men and women of our Armed Forces and their families who will pay the highest price. I believe it is grossly irresponsible to send more troops to Iraq when only two thirds of our Army's up-armored Humvees in Iraq and Afghanistan have been fitted with the latest anti-IED protective kits. That is over 4,000 Humvees without the right equipment. General Pace has indicated that all armored vehicles will not be up-armored until July, well after the President's surge has occurred. This is why I am an original cosponsor of the Meehan legislation that requires the President to ask Congress for an up-or-down vote if he plans to raise troop levels in Iraq and why I am proud to support this legislation today. I will continue to challenge the President to abandon his flawed troop surge policy, and I urge my colleagues to support this important resolution. We owe it to our troops and to our conscience.", u"Madam Speaker, I thank Mr. Engel for yielding. Last Saturday in my hometown of Springfield, Massachusetts, I spent the day welcoming back 150 brave American soldiers from the 181st Engineer Battalion of the National Guard who just completed a year-long deployment in Iraq. Their mission was to provide security for their fellow servicemembers and to protect military facilities. This group included members who possessed the Bronze Star, the Combat Action Badge, and the Purple Heart. Every Member of this House and Senate has participated in ceremonies similar to this across the country. We might have our differences about the war, but we find common ground in our steadfast support for these soldiers both in Iraq, on their way to Iraq, and around the world. And that is one of the reasons I intend to vote in favor of this bipartisan resolution today. There is a reason that the framers of our constitutional system chose in Article I to establish that Congress is the first branch of the government, to oversee the Executive. One of the reasons that we are here today is because the majority at the time never asked a question of the Administration. Everything the Administration said, the Republican majority at that time in Congress went along with. I am mindful of the thousands of soldiers who have died, more than 3,200. I am mindful of the 21,000 today who have been wounded. I am mindful of those who continue to serve our country bravely and honorably, and that the burden of this war has fallen on these troops and their families. There has been very little sacrifice asked of the American people. But those who have sacrificed deserve a frank and honest debate about President Bush's policy. This is the debate we should have had 4 years ago. You cannot edit history. We know today there were no weapons of mass destruction. There was no enriched uranium from Niger. There was no connection to al Qaeda. We were not welcomed as liberators in war. And 3\\1/2\\ years later, the mission has not been accomplished. Madam Speaker, like the vast majority of the American people, I agree that the war in Iraq is going badly and getting worse. I attach great significance to the National Intelligence Estimate. The overall security situation in Iraq has deteriorated, as they have said, with 2006 being one of the deadliest years to date. The war has increased Islamic radicalism around the world and has helped to destabilize the entire Middle East. By any objective standard, Iraq has descended into something worse than a civil war, as noted by the Iraq Study Group, and our American troops are caught in the middle. And let us call it for what it is: a civil war. Yet President Bush, nearly 3 years after declaring an end to major combat operations in Iraq, is sending another 20,000 American troops into battle. And Vice President Cheney, in the face of insurmountable evidence, continues to declare that Iraq is a success. As we debate this resolution today, it is clear that support for the war is at a tipping point. Our intelligence community, speaking collectively in the recent NIE, they believe that the future of Iraq is grim. And, most significantly, our distinguished military commanders believe it is time for a new direction. General Powell, General Zinni, General Batiste, General Gregory Newbold, and others have all expressed concern about the future of Iraq. These are individuals who were involved in the planning and execution of the war; and, obviously, they do not like what they see. Even former director of the National Security Agency under President Reagan, retired Lieutenant General William Odom, acknowledged on Sunday that ``the President's policy in Iraq is based on illusions, not realities.'' I do not believe that public opinion alone should shape public policy, but no one should underestimate the intelligence of the American people. They are convinced that ``stay the course,'' as President Bush has suggested, has not succeeded. Every Member of Congress wants our soldiers to succeed in Iraq. No elected representative in this institution would ever seek to undermine our servicemen and women. But the facts are clear. The war in Iraq is the most important issue facing America today, and our constituents are entitled to know where their representatives stand on the way forward. That is why this debate, finally, is so important. Just as the debate in 2002 led us into the war with Iraq, perhaps this conversation with the American people that we are having today will begin the process of bringing our troops back home. More than 4 years ago, I came to the floor of the House with deep reservations about granting President Bush unlimited powers to authorize this invasion of a sovereign country. It is the best vote of opposition that I have offered in my 19 years in this House of Representatives", u"Mr. President, today I am introducing two censure resolutions condemning the President, Vice President, and Attorney General for their misconduct relating to the war in Iraq and for their repeated assaults on the rule of law. These censure resolutions are critical steps to hold the administration accountable for the misconduct and egregious abuses of the law that we have witnessed over the past 6\\1/2\\ years. When future generations look back at the misbehavior of this administration, they need to know that an equal branch of Government stood up and formally repudiated that misbehavior. They need to know that this administration was not allowed to violate with impunity the principles on which our Nation was founded. Some have said that censure does too little. Others protest that it goes too far. I understand the concerns of those who believe that this administration deserves worse than censure. I agree that censure is not a cure for the devastating toll this administration's actions have had on this country. But it is a step in the right direction and it most certainly is important for the historical record. Because censure does not require multiple impeachments in the House and trials in the Senate, or the support of two-thirds of Senators, it is far less cumbersome than impeachment. We can pass these resolutions without taking significant time away from our efforts to address other pressing matters. The first resolution, S. Res. 302, cosponsored by Senators Harkin and Boxer, censures the President and Vice President for their misconduct relating to the war in Iraq. It cites their misleading pre-war statements, which were not based on available intelligence, exaggerating the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and the likelihood that he had nuclear weapons, and falsely implying that he had a relationship with al Qaeda and links to 9/11. This resolution also condemns the President's appalling failure to ensure that adequate plans were in place to address the post-Saddam problems predicted by the intelligence community, and in particular his failure to ensure that sufficient troops were deployed to maintain order and secure weapons stockpiles in Iraq. The resolution censures the President for pursuing policies in Iraq that have placed unfair burdens on our brave men and women in uniform and undermined our homeland security. The resolution censures the Vice President for his misleading statements about the Iraqi insurgency being in its ``last throes.'' The Vice President's recent, belated concession that he was incorrect does not mitigate his efforts to mislead the American people on this point. The second resolution, S. Res. 303, cosponsored by Senator Harkin, censures the President and Attorney General for undermining the rule of law. The President and Attorney General have shown flagrant disregard for statutes, for treaties ratified by the United States, and for our own Constitution--all in an effort to consolidate more and more power in the executive branch. In the process, they have repeatedly misled the American people. Among the abuses of the rule of law that this censure resolution addresses are the illegal warrantless wiretapping program at the National Security Agency, the administration's interrogation policy, extreme positions taken on treatment of detainees that have been repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court, misleading statements by the President and the Attorney General on the USA PATRIOT Act, the refusal to recognize and cooperate with Congress's legitimate responsibility to conduct oversight, and the use of signing statements that further demonstrate this President does not believe he has to follow the laws that Congress writes. More than a year ago, I introduced a resolution to censure the President for breaking the law with his warrantless wiretapping program and for misleading the public and Congress before and after the program was revealed. This time, I am taking a broader approach because evidence of the administration's misconduct, misleading statements and abuses of power has only mounted since then. While I do not believe impeachment proceedings would be best for the country, I share the public's deep anger at this administration's repeated and serious wrongdoing and its refusal to acknowledge or answer for its actions. These two resolutions give Congress a way to condemn the administration's actions without taking time and energy away from the other critically important work before us. Passing these resolutions would also make clear, not only to the American people today, but also to future generations, how this President and this administration misserved the country. History will judge them, and us, by our actions, so we must formally condemn the malfeasance of this President and his administration. Censure is a measured approach that both holds this administration accountable and allows Congress to focus on ending the war in Iraq, protecting the rule of law and addressing the many other needs of the American people. I am pleased to be working with Congressman Maurice Hinchey, who is introducing companion legislation.", u"Mr. President, I rise to make note of an event that the newspapers have talked about and then passed over, but one we should pay a great deal more attention to. This has to do with the number of increasing cyber attacks that have occurred where hackers have gotten into computers and upset their ability to function. I am not talking about the kind of hackers who break into a computer to leave behind an obscene message simply to demonstrate that they could do it. These are amateurs. I am talking about attacks that appear to be state sponsored. The Nation of Estonia had its computers shut down for a period of a week, unable to perform any kind of connection with the outside world, almost as if it were a test on the part of some nation state to determine whether they could perform this kind of activity. Now we have had further demonstrations of their ability to do it in government computers. This has been going on for years. I remember, when I was connected with the Y2K issue as chairman of the Senate's committee on that problem, going over to the Pentagon and standing in the room where we watched the cyber attacks come in. The officials in the Pentagon would identify for me the countries from which they were coming. They would say: Those are attacks coming from the Philippines. Those are attacks, probing, trying to get into our computers. They come from South Korea. These are coming from whatever other country. That does not mean the attacks originated in any of those countries. It is entirely possible in today's world for someone to have a sophisticated computer attack in one nation and route the attacks through a second or even third or fourth nation as cutouts so the victim of the attack will not be able to know the original source. The recent attacks that have occurred against our Government computers clearly come from a higher level of sophistication than those I saw 3 or 4 years ago. I pursued an interest in this issue and then became consumed with other Senate business--that happens to us--and said, a few years later: I probably need to check into this to see what has happened. So I went back to the National Security Agency, I went back to the Pentagon, I made contact again with people at the CIA and said: What is going on in the world of cyberattacks and cyberterrorism? I was startled that everything had progressed two, three, four, five generations beyond what it had been just a few years before. It is a classic sword-and-shield confrontation. The attack comes--representing the sword--we create firewalls--representing the shield--and then a new sword is invented and a new shield is called for. This game has been going on now to an escalated level where now we are seeing sophisticated nation state-sponsored attacks, and they break through occasionally, and they get a little space in the newspaper and maybe a mention on the evening news, and then we go about business as usual. I am as guilty as anyone else of going about business as usual. I want to get back into this issue, dig a little deeper, and find out what is going on because eventually this will be the ultimate battlefield. Eventually, the people who wish this country ill will not come at us with tanks and aircraft carriers or cruise missiles; they will come at our computers. Our military is the most sophisticated in the world, but if you shut down their ability to communicate through satellites and by computers, our military becomes crippled and impotent. I remember when I went through basic training being told that an army has to do three things: It has to move, shoot, and communicate. Those who are mounting these cyberattacks are developing the capability to prevent us from communicating. We need to spend more time and effort looking at this issue. I have one suggestion for the executive branch. During the Clinton administration, the highest official dealing with this issue was in the White House. After President Bush became the President, that official reported to Condoleezza Rice in her role as National Security Adviser. I sat down with Condoleezza Rice to talk about this issue, to try to bring her up to date on what I thought was important. She was very polite, but I became quickly aware she knew more about this issue than I did. She was not patronizing about it, but she was up to speed and up to date on it, and I felt reassured that the White House had that level of understanding. Well, she has now gone on to other duties, and the highest official now is in the Department of Homeland Security. I am not sure that is the place where it needs to be. It may very well be that it needs to go back into the White House at the high level it held at one point in the past. I will be discussing this and other issues relating to this question in the months to come. I appreciate the opportunity of alerting my fellow Senators to this very important but often overlooked issue. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 746 provides for consideration of H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007, under a closed rule. The rule provides 90 minutes of debate. Sixty minutes will be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary. Thirty minutes will be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Speaker, with the resurgence of al Qaeda and an increasing global threat from weapons of mass destruction in places such as Iran, every single person in this body wants to ensure that our intelligence professionals have the proper resources they need to protect our Nation. As vice chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, I assure you that every one of us on that panel and others, Republican or Democrat, are working tirelessly and often together to do just that. But the government is not exempt from the rule of law, as our Constitution confers certain unalienable rights and civil liberties to each of us. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Bush administration upset that balance by ignoring the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, commonly referred to as the FISA law, establishing a secret wiretapping program and refusing to work with Congress to make the program lawful. Democratic members of the Intelligence Committee, led by the distinguished chairperson, Sylvestre Reyes, have been trying to learn about the Bush administration's FISA program for years. But the administration, which has been anything but forthcoming, has done everything it can to stop us from doing our job and helping them to do theirs better. A footnote right there, Mr. Speaker. In today's Washington Post, it is reflected as late as now, when the RESTORE Act is on the floor, the administration has agreed to give certain information to the Senate and still not to the House. When the administration finally came to Congress to modify the law, it came with the flawed proposal to allow sweeping authority to eavesdrop on Americans' communications, while doing almost nothing to protect their rights. The RESTORE Act, true to its name, restores the checks and balances on the executive branch, enhancing our security and preserving our liberty. It rejects the false statement that we must sacrifice liberty to be secure. It does not go as far as I would want it to go. It does not go as far as some people would like for it to go, but it does protect our liberty and secures this Nation. The legislation provides our intelligence community with the tools it needs to identify and disrupt terrorist attacks with speed and agility. Yet another footnote, Mr. Speaker. While we concentrate on surveillance as it pertains to wire, I would have people know that the terrorists by now have been pretty well educated about these matters and may very well be using other methodologies totally unrelated to the telephone. I remind people when it was leaked to the media that Osama bin Laden was using a certain kind of wire, he hasn't been heard from in that forum since. So let's be very cautious to not put all our eggs in the surveillance basket. There are other methodologies that might be employed that I assure you the intelligence community is mindful of and right on as it pertains to discovering them. It provides additional resources to the Department of Justice, the National Security Agency and the FISA Court to assist in auditing and streamlining the FISA application process while preventing the backlog of critical intelligence gathering. The RESTORE Act prohibits the warrantless electronic surveillance of Americans in the United States, including their medical records, homes and offices. And it requires the government to establish a recordkeeping system to track instances where information identifying U.S. citizens is disseminated. This bill preserves the role of the FISA Court as an independent check on the government to prevent it from infringing on the rights of Americans. It rejects the administration's belief that the court should be a rubber stamp. Finally, the bill sunsets in 2009. This is a critical provision because it requires the constant oversight and regular evaluation of our FISA laws, actions which were largely neglected during the last 6 years of Republican rule. Mr. Speaker, all the American people have to do is pick up a newspaper to read about what happens when this government has unfettered access to warrantless electronic surveillance. According to a letter to Congress from a company executive, Verizon alone has fielded almost 240,000 phone record requests from the FBI since 2005. Nearly 64,000 of these requests, or over one-quarter of them, were made without a warrant. This is almost 100 phone record requests per day by our government to Verizon seeking private information about our citizens, without a warrant. Realize, we are just talking about requests made to Verizon by the FBI. And these are just the requests that Verizon told Congress about this week because the Bush administration has consistently refused to answer our questions about the President's program. Even more, it doesn't factor in the hundreds of thousands of requests that were made to other phone companies during the same time that we don't know about. Mr. Speaker, if we have learned anything since the terrorist attacks of September 11, it is that the balance between security and civil liberties is not only difficult, but absolutely critical. The RESTORE Act does absolutely nothing to block or hinder the efforts of our intelligence community. And Member after Member on the other side of the aisle are going to come down here and comment that it is hampering our intelligence efforts. Quite the contrary. It enhances their ability to do their jobs effectively and ensures the integrity of their efforts. I urge my colleagues to support this rule and the underlying legislation. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Let me thank my colleague from Vermont, Senator Leahy, for yielding, and applaud him for the role he is playing on the Judiciary Committee. Mr. President, several weeks ago, I informed the citizens of Vermont that I would be voting against the confirmation of Judge Mukasey to be Attorney General, and tonight I am going to, in fact, be casting a ``no'' vote. Mr. President, there are several reasons I will vote no on Judge Mukasey. First, like many of my colleagues, I was deeply disturbed by his response to the question of waterboarding. He apparently does not know whether waterboarding is torture. Well, millions of Americans know waterboarding is torture. People all over the world know waterboarding is torture. The Geneva Conventions are quite clear about waterboarding being torture. And, frankly, I don't think it is too much to ask for us to have an Attorney General who knows waterboarding is torture. That is one reason I am voting against Judge Mukasey, but there is a second reason, and perhaps maybe an even more important reason. For the last 6 years, it is clear that we have had a President who does not understand what the Constitution of the United States is about. What this President believes, essentially, is that he can do anything he wants, at any time, against anybody in the name of fighting terrorism. And he happens to believe the war on terrorism is unending. It is going to go on indefinitely. I think it is very important that we have an Attorney General who can explain the Constitution to a President who clearly does not understand it. Unfortunately, Mr. Mukasey is not that person. In the last 6 years under President Bush, we have seen the National Security Agency start a program which allows wiretapping without first obtaining a court order, to my mind, in violation of the Constitution. We have seen personal records that have been extensively mined for data. How many millions? Who knows? Nobody in the Senate really knows. We don't have access to that information. It is massive amounts of data mining, in clear violation of the privacy rights and the laws of America under this President. We have seen the phenomenon of extraordinary rendition, which has shifted detainees to prisons in countries abroad which allow torture. We have seen the firing and the politicization of the Office of the U.S. Attorney. We have seen detainees of the United States being denied the oldest right in the Western legal system--the right to habeas corpus. We are running a prison camp in Guantanamo where prisoners have minimal legal rights, which is an international embarrassment for us as we struggle against international terrorism. And we have seen many other assaults by this President on our constitutional rights and on the laws of this country. We have a President who clearly does not understand the separation of powers; that the Congress of the United States is an equal branch of our Government; that the Judiciary is an equal branch of our Government; that the executive branch does not have all of the power. A little while ago I was on a statewide TV program in Vermont. Somebody called in and they said: When is Congress going to begin to stand up to this President? That is a good question, and I didn't have a good answer. But what I can tell you, the time is long overdue for us to begin to stand up to this President, who thinks he can veto virtually every piece of legislation we send him, who ignores the Constitution of this country--I think it is time we begin to stand up. I have heard some of my colleagues say, if we reject Mr. Mukasey, the President is not going to send us another nominee. That is the right of the President of the United States. But we have our rights as well. We have the right to demand an Attorney General who supports, strongly, the Constitution and is prepared to tell the President when he is acting against our Constitution. That is our right. It is about time we began to defend our right. I can't blame the President for taking over the rights of Congress, if Congress is not prepared to stand up and fight back. I think that time is long overdue. Mr. President, if you do not want to send us another nominee, that is your right. We have our rights as well. I will be voting against Mr. Mukasey. I hope my colleagues do as well. In conclusion, I ask unanimous consent that letters of opposition and concern from the American Civil Liberties Union, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and Common Cause be printed in the Record.", u"Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Last week was a remarkable week in the intelligence community. It was the best of times and the worst of times. First, the good news. The week began with a release of a new National Intelligence Estimate on Iran. That estimate was a careful, meaningful review of the intelligence on Iran, which many of us hope will bring about a significant change in our approach to Iran, which is still a significant concern to all of us. Then came the bad news. We ended the week with the revelation that the Central Intelligence Agency destroyed videotapes of interrogations. This is also a subject of great concern to all of us in this House. The committee had a briefing on it just yesterday, and we will continue to investigate the issue thoroughly. Both the good news and the bad news have one thing in common. They show that careful oversight of the Intelligence Community is absolutely essential and absolutely critical. The authorization process is where we do much of our oversight and it's where we can address problem areas. Madam Speaker, today, for the first time in 3 years, the House will vote on a conference report on an intelligence authorization bill. I am proud of it, and I hope my colleagues are too. This is the largest intelligence authorization in the history of our country. It is the result of 11 months of work done by our committee. The conference process was a challenge. The Senate bill and the House bill were substantially different, but we worked hard to arrive at a middle ground. In conference, we further improved the bill. The conference adopted amendments offered by Members from both Chambers and both parties. This includes an amendment by the distinguished ranking member of the intelligence committee. Madam Speaker, this is a good bill that will strengthen our intelligence community and our Nation's security. It adds significant funds to most of the Nation's satellite architecture. It reduces funding for nonperforming intelligence activities in Iraq, while robustly funding activities against al Qaeda and terrorism in Afghanistan and around the globe. I am particularly proud of the fact that it also includes funding for counterterrorism, human intelligence collection, analysis, training and languages. We have carefully tailored provisions to enhance the diversity of the intelligence community, which is a critical investment for the future of the intelligence community. In another investment for the future, we've added significant funding for advanced research and development. This will also maintain our technical edge over our adversaries. We have also provided money to repair and replace aging infrastructure and to train and equip linguists and intelligence collectors, so vital and important in the global war on terrorism. This bill promotes accountability within the intelligence community, and it puts the intelligence committee back in the business of oversight. It requires reporting to Congress on several issues of major concern to all of us, including a report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 regarding detentions and interrogations, as well as Justice Department legal opinions related to all of these activities. It includes provisions to strengthen oversight by the Inspector General in the intelligence community, including a provision establishing a confirmed communitywide Inspector General armed with essential authorities. The conference report also provides for Senate confirmation of the Directors of the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office. For agencies with such significant budgets and acquisition authority and the potential to impact American privacy rights, we think the Congress ought to have a say in their Directors through Senate confirmation. In short, Madam Speaker, the conference report is a result of a bipartisan, bicameral effort to strengthen both the intelligence community and congressional oversight. I will be proud to vote for it, and I urge all my colleagues to do the same. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 824 provides for further consideration of H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007, under a closed rule. The rule provides 60 minutes of debate. Thirty minutes will be equally divided and controlled by the chairperson and ranking Republican of the Committee on the Judiciary, and 30 minutes will be equally divided and controlled by the chairperson and ranking Republican of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The rule considers as adopted another amendment printed in the Rules Committee report. Mr. Speaker, with the resurgence of al Qaeda and an increasing global threat from weapons of mass destruction in places such as Iran, every single person in this body wants to ensure that our intelligence professionals have the proper resources they need to protect our Nation. As vice chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, I assure you that each and every one of us on that panel and others, Republican or Democrat, are working tirelessly, and often together, to do just that. But the government is not exempt from the rule of law, as the Constitution confers certain unalienable rights and civil liberties to each of us. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Bush administration upset that balance by ignoring the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act law, establishing a secret wiretapping program, and refusing to work with Congress to make the program lawful. Democratic members of the Intelligence Committee have been trying to learn about the Bush administration's FISA programs for years. But the administration, which has been anything but forthcoming, has sought to block our oversight efforts nearly every step of the way. When the administration finally came to Congress to modify the law this summer, it came with a flawed proposal to allow sweeping authority to eavesdrop on Americans' communications while doing almost nothing to protect their rights. The RESTORE Act, true to its name, restores the checks and balances on the executive branch, enhancing our security and preserving our liberty. It rejects the false statement that we must sacrifice liberty to be secure. The legislation provides our intelligence community with the tools it needs to identify and disrupt terrorist networks with speed and agility. It provides additional resources to the Department of Justice, National Security Agency, and the FISA Court to assist in auditing and streamlining the FISA application process while preventing the backlog of critical intelligence gathering. The RESTORE Act prohibits the warrantless electronic surveillance of Americans in the United States, including their medical records, homes and offices. And it requires the government to establish a record-keeping system to track instances where information identifying U.S. citizens is disseminated. This bill preserves the role of the FISA Court as an independent check of the government to prevent it from infringing on the rights of Americans. It rejects the administration's belief that the court should simply be a rubber stamp. Finally, the bill sunsets in 2009. This is a critical provision because it requires the constant oversight and regular evaluation of our FISA laws, actions which were largely neglected during the last 6 years of Republican control. In so many ways, the underlying legislation is more efficient and effective than the administration's proposal which passed in August. Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues know, last month, we came to the floor on this bill, but when it became clear that Republicans were intent on playing politics with the security of the American people, we refused to take the bait. At that time, Republicans announced that they intended to offer a motion to recommit the bill that had no substantive base, was already addressed in the bill and in current law, and was designed to delay consideration of this important intelligence tool. Their reasoning was disingenuous; their motives were absolutely political. As a result, Democrats refused to partake in their game of political theater. If the House does not pass this bill today because of Republican obstructionism, then it will be abundantly clear that the minority and the administration are willing to put politics in front of the safety of the American people. We are back today, and we will continue to come back to the House floor, however many times it takes, to give our men and women in the intelligence community the tools that they need to do their jobs and keep America safe, while also preserving our civil liberties. This is a balance that is not only difficult but absolutely critical. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the rule and ``yes'' on the underlying legislation. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Thank you, Congresswoman Blackburn, for your leadership and for providing these opportunities for us to share some of our thoughts. Our colleague, Mrs. Drake from Virginia, does such a wonderful job in recognizing our military and serving on the Armed Services Committee. Today, when I was coming into the Cannon Building, there were two gentlemen in uniform standing at the door taking some pictures, and I stopped to thank them for their service. I do that every time I see anyone in our military. I thank them for their willingness to serve. They were so pleasant and so excited. They had come home from Iraq for a few days, and they were spending some time here in Washington. One of them said that his mother came from Mt. Airy, which is in my district. They gave me their cards, and we are going to maintain e-mail correspondence. You mentioned my grandchildren. I mentioned to them that, without any prompting whatsoever, about a year-and-a-half or 2 years ago my now 6\\1/2\\-year-old granddaughter and 9-year-old grandson, at night when I heard their prayers as they were going to sleep, began praying for our military people. It really touched my heart and the heart of their parents, because we didn't tell them to do that, they did it completely on their own. I hope that all of our military folks know, as I told these two gentlemen today, that there are millions of people in this country praying for them regularly. I want to tie that into what President Bush says all the time. He believes, as I believe and I think most people in this country believe, that freedom is a gift of God and that we are blessed in this country with the most freedom of any people and the most prosperity of any people and that part of our responsibility is to help spread that freedom. I also was thinking that February is not only the month for Valentine's Day, but it is Abraham Lincoln's birthday, and pretty soon we are going to be celebrating George Washington's birthday, and Ronald Reagan's birthday was in this month. We have so much to think about in this month of what those men meant to helping to live up to the ideals of freedom and the values of this country and what they risked in their lives, particularly Washington and Lincoln but also President Reagan, who risked saying to the world the truth, as President Bush has done. I want to bring us back to talking about the fact that we are at war and that it is appalling that many of our colleagues cannot seem to understand that, as Congresswoman Drake mentioned, and a part of that war is being able to gather intelligence so that we can fight it effectively. We do want to fight that war on their turf, not on our turf, and we want to keep them from attacking us again. I have been very distressed in the last few weeks about the way the revelation about the National Security Agency's terrorist surveillance program, the hysterics that have been created from the other side of the aisle. I think that it is time that we talk about the myth that has been created about that program. The allegations about that program, that it is illegal, are a myth. It is a legal program. The reality is that the President's authority to authorize this program is firmly based in both his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief and in the authorization for the use of military force which passed Congress after 9/11. The allegations that the NSA program is a domestic eavesdropping program used to spy on innocent Americans are a myth. The reality is that this program is narrowly focused aimed only at international calls and targeted at al Qaeda and related groups. There are safeguards in place to protect the civil liberties of Americans. Allegations that the NSA activities violate the fourth amendment are a myth. The reality is this program is consistent with the Constitution's protections of civil liberties, including fourth amendment protections. There are people who want you to believe this program is targeting average Americans, but nothing could be further from the truth. We need this program to help protect us and this country and to help protect our men and women who are fighting to keep this country a free country, and we need to do everything that we can that is legal, and I am convinced that the President is doing what is legal to protect us. I think, again, that we want to call attention to the men and women who are fighting for us and remember them in our prayers constantly and thank them for the sacrifices that they are making to keep this country free.", u"Mr. President, in his radio address on December 17, 2005, President Bush disclosed that after September 11, 2001, he authorized the National Security Agency, NSA, to undertake wiretapping of American citizens to try to prevent terrorist attacks. The President argued that his actions were, in his words, ``fully consistent'' with his constitutional responsibilities. The President wrongly asserted--Mr. President, the President wrongly asserted--that his authority to order warrantless electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens on American soil is supported by his inherent Presidential powers and the joint congressional resolution that authorized the use of force after September 11. A huge swath--a huge swath--of America, including many expert legal minds, does not--I say, does not--agree with the arguments put forth by the administration. These arguments are transparently contrived, intellectually deficient, indefensible excuses being served up like tripe to silence legitimate criticism of the White House. Let me say that again. A huge swath of America, including many expert legal minds, does not agree with the arguments put forth by the administration. These arguments are transparently contrived, intellectually deficient, indefensible excuses being served up like tripe to silence legitimate criticism of the White House, a White House so infused with its own hubris that it has talked itself into believing that its inhabitants are above the law. But they are not. They are not above the law. President Bush is not above the law. No President is above the law. No United States Senator is above the law. No man is above the law. No one in the United States of America is above the law. Remember, this is a nation of laws, not of men. Yesterday, the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence jettisoned its constitutional responsibility to make certain that our laws are not being breached, and that the spirit and text of our revered Constitution remain in force. It is a sad day, indeed, to see such an important committee wilt under political pressure applied by the Vice President in partisan meetings held behind closed doors. The committee adjourned last night without considering a Democratic proposal to begin an investigation of the warrantless spying program, even though Senator Jay Rockefeller, the vice-chairman of the Intelligence Committee, had been assured that his proposal would receive a vote. I want to commend my colleague, Senator Rockefeller. He has worked hard to protect the people's liberties, to make sure that this administration, even in its most secret circles, follows the law and the Constitution. It has not been an easy task, but it is one that Senator Rockefeller has carried diligently. Like Senator Rockefeller, I will not sit idly by and allow the President's possible breaking of the law to be swept under the rug. I refuse to go quietly into the night, abdicating my responsibility as a U.S. Senator to a secretive executive branch, which refuses to brief the Congress of the United States on its clandestine spying on U.S. citizens without a warrant--an administration that believes it can, on its own, nullify constitutional provisions intended to protect the freedoms of millions of Americans for over 200 years. This travesty must not stand. The peeping and snooping and spying must be investigated. I am today announcing my intention to submit to the Congress legislation that will establish a nonpartisan, independent, 9-11-style commission to investigate and determine the legality of the President's actions. There is a critical need for a thorough investigation of all domestic surveillance programs. As I stated on Wednesday in my remarks on this subject, we, the American people--not just the NSA or the White House--have a legitimate need to know what is being done, by whom, and to whom. If there is a justifiable and valid reason to surveil a potential terrorist in the U.S., we certainly can find a way to do it legally. If there is a need to provide more efficient tools to fight terror, Congress has the responsibility to deliberate and, if warranted, to approve them. The President should ask Congress for them; not seize new powers that have never been enumerated by any U.S. court. Congress would be pleased to entertain his request, as we have in the past, by updating FISA and the PATRIOT Act, but not--I repeat, not--before a full investigation to determine if laws have been broken--an investigation which will give members a fuller understanding of just what these surveillance programs entail. A little sunshine on this process is long overdue. Congress cannot fix what the White House does not want us to fully understand. Congress needs to know if the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or any other U.S. law has been broken, and whether the constitutional rights of thousands of Americans have been violated without cause. It is essential that Congress obtain the answers to these questions, not for partisan political reasons, but because our system of checks and balances requires it. James Madison advised in Federalist 47 that: the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. The assumption of power by an unchecked executive, who arrogantly believes that he can seize the authority to spy on innocent Americans and wantonly violate the fourth amendment is the beginning of the tyranny Madison so feared. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the fourth amendment of the Constitution be printed in the Record.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Efforts to extend the USA Patriot Act cleared a major hurdle yesterday when the White House and key senators agreed to revisions that are virtually certain to secure Senate passage and likely to win House approval, congressional leaders said. The law--passed in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks and scheduled to lapse in key areas last year--makes it easier for federal agents to secretly tap phones, obtain library and bank records, and search the homes of suspected terrorists. Several Democrats said the compromise announced yesterday lacks important civil liberties safeguards, and even the Republican negotiators said they had to yield to the administration on several points. But with virtually all 55 GOP senators now on board, and Democrats joining them, the plan appears to have enough support to overcome the Senate filibuster that has thwarted a four-year renewal of the statute for months. Senators said they think the White House will be able to coax the Republican-controlled House to agree as well, even though House leaders have complained that senators' demands had weakened the measure. ``It was a bipartisan group of us that really believed we could do better . . . to protect civil liberties even as we gave law enforcement important tools to conduct terrorism investigations,'' Sen. John E. Sununu (R-N.H.) told reporters. He said that he and his fellow negotiators had to make more concessions to the administration than they wanted to, but that Congress will monitor the law's application over the coming years and perhaps revise it. Sen. Richard J. Durbin (Ill.), one of several Democrats who agreed to back the compromise yesterday, said ``it falls far short'' of the bill that was passed by the Senate last year but rejected by the House. ``But if you measure it against the original Patriot Act . . . we've made progress'' toward ``protecting basic civil liberties at a time when we are dealing with the war on terrorism,'' Durbin said. Senate Minority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) called the compromise ``a step in the right direction.'' The proposal would restrict federal agents' access to library records, one of the Patriot Act's most contentious provisions. A form of secret subpoena known as a National Security Letter could no longer be used to obtain records from libraries that function ``in their traditional capacity, including providing basic Internet access,'' Sununu and others said in a statement. But libraries that are ``Internet service providers'' would remain subject to the letters, Durbin said. The Senate proposal would no longer require National Security Letter recipients to tell the FBI the identity of their lawyers. The compromise bill also addresses ``Section 215 subpoenas,'' which are granted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court. Recipients of such subpoenas originally were forbidden to tell anyone about the action. The proposed Senate measure would allow them to challenge the ``gag order'' after one year, rather than the 90-day wait in earlier legislation. Sununu said the administration insisted on the longer waiting period. ``You now have a process to challenge the gag order,'' he said, defending the concession. ``That didn't exist before.'' Sununu said he and his allies were disappointed that the compromise does not require agents to ``show a connection to a suspected terrorist or spy'' before obtaining a Section 215 subpoena. Instead, a FISA judge would have to agree that there are reasonable grounds to believe the items being sought are relevant to an investigation into terrorism. Several liberals condemned the bill. ``I am gravely disappointed in this so-called deal,'' said Sen. Russell Feingold (D-Wis.). ``The White House agreed to only a few minor changes'' that ``do not address the major problems,'' he said, adding: ``We've come too far and fought too hard to agree to reauthorize the Patriot Act without fixing those problems.'' But Justice Department spokesman Brian Roehrkasse said the Senate compromise ``maintains the tools necessary to fight terrorism while further strengthening safeguards to protect civil liberties.'' ``We are hopeful that the Congress will now move forward to renew the Patriot Act,'' he said. In a related area yesterday, several Democrats said the administration must do more to explain and justify the domestic surveillance program conducted by the National Security Agency. ``If they came with the idea that this is going to stop an investigation on the part of the Senate intelligence committee, they were wrong,'' committee Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.) told reporters after a closed briefing by two top administration officials. ``There were certain kinds of questions which could easily have been answered but weren't. . . . Where we really wanted hard information that was important to us, that gave us the size and the scope and the reach and the depth of the program,'' he said, ``they were not forthcoming.'' Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said after the briefing: ``For the life of me, I don't understand why the administration won't say, `Sure, you have a right to look at this. We'd like to expand it.' ''", u"Mr. Speaker, March 19 will mark the 3-year anniversary of the Iraq war. For 3 years, we have heard the President respond to questions about his handling of the war in Iraq with, ``Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?'' Kind of like what Groucho Marx used to say. For 3 years, we have seen the President and his supporters celebrate milestones in Iraq as an indication that the insurgency was ``in its last throes,'' while the insurgency actually continues to grow and persist. While the administration keeps trying to spin its way out of Iraq, we keep witnessing the truth. Today, for instance, John Negroponte told the Senate Armed Services Committee, ``Even if a broad and inclusive national government emerges, there will almost certainly be a lag time before we see any dampening effect on the insurgency.'' In other words, even if we establish a functioning government and democracy, the insurgency in Iraq will persist, just the opposite of what the administration has been telling us. Mr. Speaker, it is time that the President acknowledge what we can all see with our own eyes every night, that the administration's failure to secure the peace early in Iraq has led Iraq to the brink it is in today. Had we secured not just the war, but the first days of the occupation with a plan for that occupation and actually secured the country and had not allowed the first levels of insurgency to grow, to metastasize to what we have today, we would never have what we have now. But we went in with a plan for the war with not a single idea, not an iota of anything to do on the occupation. Three years ago, brave men and women of the American Armed Forces fought brilliantly until defeating Saddam Hussein and his army. But the President failed to plan for the peace, and he failed to work quickly to establish order in Iraq and left it leaderless. In fact, many of our troops were on the sidelines as looting went rampant throughout Iraq, leading in that stage every way sequentially to what we have today. And why did it fail? Because he didn't listen to what we knew we had to do. For the past 3 years, the President has maintained that if the American leaders in Iraq needed more troops, all they had to do was ask. Just last week the President said, ``I will determine the troop levels in Iraq based on the recommendations of our commanders, not based only the politics of Washington, D.C.'' Paul Bremer, the Ambassador to Iraq, the President's top man in Iraq, called for more boots on the ground in the days following the invasion and was ignored. On page 10 of Paul Bremer's book, ``My Year in Iraq,'' Paul Bremer writes that he was alarmed by a report stating that we did not have enough troops on the ground to stabilize the country. The report said: ``The population of Iraq today is nearly 25 million. The population would require 500,000 troops on the ground to meet a standard of 20 troops per 1,000. This number is more than three times the number of foreign troops now deployed in Iraq.'' Paul Bremer writes: ``I found the conclusions persuasive and troubling. That afternoon, I had a summary of the draft copied and sent down the corridor to Don Rumsfeld. `I think you should consider this,' I said in my cover memo. I have never heard back from him about the report.'' Now, I am not here to help sell books for Paul Bremer, but the President's top man asked for more troops to succeed in Iraq and never got an answer from either the President of the United States or from the Secretary of Defense. When Secretary Don Rumsfeld completely ignores the man who is in charge of America's most important policy mission, we have a problem. A few days later, Paul Bremer got a chance to air his concerns to the President: ``There is one other important issue, Mr. President. Troop levels.'' Troop levels never increased. The troop level never got up. In Iraq, Bremer's worst fears were realized, and he writes: ``According to CENTCOM briefings in Qatar, we didn't yet have enough troops in Baghdad to secure key tactical objectives, traffic circles, bridges, power plants, banks and munition dumps, and also patrol the streets.'' We will never know for sure if more troops would have secured Baghdad in time to prevent the insurgency we see today, but we do know that the President's top man had asked for help and the President failed to respond, and the Secretary of Defense failed to respond; and today we are seeing the results of that failure. And we do know that 136,000 men and women who are there now do not have the support that they need. If you look today in the New York Times in a poll done by Mr. Zogby, the American troops don't think we have enough troops. They also don't think we should continue to stay there at the level that we are there. Retired Army Lieutenant General Bill Odom, former head of the National Security Agency, said that the invasion of Iraq ``will turn out to be the greatest single strategic disaster in U.S. foreign policy.'' Lawrence Wilkerson, former Secretary of State Colin Powell's chief of staff at the State Department, said President Bush's foreign policy was ``ruinous'' and said that ``we have courted disaster in Iraq, North Korea, and in Iran.'' Mr. Speaker, it is time for a change in policy.", u"Mr. Speaker, I do not believe that any of us in the backdrop of 9/11 have changed our attitude about the consistency and the value and the importance and the crucialness of fighting the war on terror. With not enough time to pursue that debate, let me simply say that this extension is crucial for a reasonable response to the needs of the American people to have their liberty protected. And I read very quickly a statement from ``On Liberty,'' written in 1859: ``Protection therefore against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough. There needs protection against also the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling.'' This is an important extension, and I wish it were longer because it is crucial that we investigate beyond the infringement on library records, beyond the infringement in terms of wiretapping, is the President's NSA terrorist surveillance program and the lack of use of FISA is an effective tool, and as I heard the President use the term, to be hit again, obviously striking at the fear and the hearts of Americans. None of us want to be hit again, but we do want to protect our civil liberties. This extension will allow that very effective debate, and we will get the right way to fix the PATRIOT Act and protect America. One of our Founding Fathers, John Quincy Adams, made the following statement regarding the importance of civil liberties: Individual liberty is individual power, and as the power of a community is a mass compounded of individual powers, the nation which enjoys the most freedom must necessarily be in proportion to its numbers the most powerful nation. I have in my hand a copy of chapter 1 of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, written in 1859. Selections of this chapter are quite fitting for today's proceeding: Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism. (emphasis added). We passed the PATRIOT Act in 2001 6 weeks after the terrorist attacks of September 11. While the actual bill passed by wide margins in both Chambers of Congress, I made the record clearly reflect my strong reservations about provisions that pose serious threats to fundamental freedoms and civil liberties. In my capacity as a member of the House Judiciary Committee, I joined a caucus of members in submitting letters to the administration and to the Department of Justice requesting documentation and statements that speak to the protection of individual rights in light of the potentially dangerous provisions contained within the bill. Congress included in the bill a ``sunset clause'' that provides an expiration date for over a dozen provisions on December 31, 2005 unless we act to renew them. This fact was the impetus behind several hearings held by the committee in the first session of the 109th Congress. One of the most talked about issues surrounding the PATRIOT Act is the President's authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance searches--in essence, execute an order that allows the National Security Agency, NSA, to monitor, without a warrant, the international, and sometimes domestic, telephone calls and e-mail messages of hundreds and possibly even thousands of citizens and legal residents inside the United States. I do not oppose the monitoring of telephone calls and e-mail messages when it is necessary for national security reasons. I oppose engaging in such monitoring without a warrant as the law specifies. We have a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that was established for the sole purpose of issuing such warrants when they are justified. That court should have been allowed to decide whether the telephone calls and e-mail messages of American citizens and legal residents is justified by security needs. Doing this kind of surveillance without a warrant is illegal. The day after this monitoring became public, President Bush admitted that he had authorized it but argued that he had the authority to do so. According to the President, his order was ``fully consistent with my constitutional responsibilities and authorities.'' But his constitutional duty is to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed'', article II, section 3; the law here clearly establishes well-defined procedures for eavesdropping on U.S. persons, and the fact is, President Bush ordered that those procedures not be followed. Further, from a statutory argument point of view, it is not credible that the 2001 authorization to use force provides authority for the President to ignore the requirements of FISA. It is very doubtful that the courts would sustain the President on this basis. From a constitutional standpoint, the President can try to make a case, although it is weak, that he does have constitutional authority to conduct warrantless wiretaps of American citizens in the U.S.. for national security purposes. Because the Supreme Court has never said he does not have this power, some regard it as an open question. However, passage of FISA seriously undermines this argument. In closing let me note that this 6-week extension is not enough time to resolve the important issues that surround the PATRIOT Act. Further I am very disappointed, but not surprised that the Republicans have not been willing to come to the table to meet with us in an effort to come to some middle ground.", u"Mr. President, what is past is prologue. Today, we see history repeating itself. In 1978, President Carter signed into law the ``Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,'' successfully concluding years of debate on the power of the President to conduct national security wiretapping. As a result of lengthy hearings and consultation, Congress enacted that law with broad bipartisan support. Its purpose was clear--to put a check on the power of the President to use wiretaps in the name of national security. One of the clear purposes of that law was to require the government to obtain a judicial warrant for all electronic surveillance in the United States in which communications of U.S. citizens might be intercepted. The Act established a secret court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to review wiretapping applications and guarantee that any such electronic surveillance followed the rule of law. Since 1979, the special court has approved nearly 19,000 applications and denied only 4. Last year, the Administration reached an all-time-high with the number of applications granted. In the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress established the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance could be conducted in the United States for national security purposes. One of the principal goals of the legislation was to ensure that information obtained from illegal wiretaps could not be used to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. We even made sure that there would be criminal penalties for anyone who failed to comply with these rules. The PATRIOT Act did not give the President the authority to spy on anyone without impartial judicial review--and neither did the Joint Resolution, enacted in 2001, authorizing the use of force against those responsible for the attacks of September 11th. The President seemed to agree. In 2004, in Buffalo he stated categorically that ``any time that you hear the United States talking about a wiretap, it requires a court order.'' He said that ``Nothing had changed--when we're talking about chasing down terrorists, we're talking about getting a court order before we do so.'' Now, however, the President and the administration claim they do not have to comply with the law. Just yesterday, the administration again asserted its constitutional authority to eavesdrop on any person within the United States--without judicial or legislative oversight and it claims that the Congress implicitly granted such power in the Joint Resolution of 2001. But that Joint Resolution says nothing about domestic electronic surveillance. As Justice O'Connor has said, ``A state of war is not a blank check for the president when it comes to the rights of the nation's citizens.'' The bipartisan 9/11 Commission made clear that the Executive Branch has the burden of proof to justify why a particular governmental power should be retained--and Congress has the responsibility to see that adequate guidelines and oversight are made available. The Executive Branch has failed to meet the 9/11 Commissioners' burden of proof. The American people are not convinced that these surveillance methods achieve the right balance between our national security and protection of our civil liberties. These issues go to the heart of what it means to have a free society. If President Bush can make his own rules for domestic surveillance, Big Brother has run amok. If the President believes that winning the war on terror requires new surveillance capabilities, he has a responsibility to work with Congress to make appropriate changes in existing law. He is not above the law. Congress and the American people deserve full and honest answers about the Administration's domestic electronic surveillance activities. On December 22, 2005, I asked the President to provide us with answers before the Senate Judiciary Committee began hearings on Judge Alito's nomination to the Supreme Court. We got no response. The Senate Judiciary Committee is scheduled to begin separate hearings on February 6 on the President's actions. Instead of providing us with the documents the Administration relied upon, the Justice Department continues to circulate summaries and ``white papers'' on the legal authorities it purports to have to ignore the law. It now appears that the President did so on at least thirty occasions after September 11. There is no legitimate purpose in denying access by Members of Congress to all of the legal thought and analysis that the President relied upon when he authorized these activities. Every 45 days, the President ordered these activities to be reviewed by the Attorney General, the White House Counsel and the Inspector General of the National Security Agency. That's not good enough. These are all executive branch appointees who report directly to the President. Congress spent seven years considering and enacting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It was not a hastily conceived idea. We had broad agreement that both Congressional oversight and judicial oversight were fundamental--even during emergencies or times of war, which is why we established a secret court to expedite the review of sensitive applications from the government. Now, the administration has made a unilateral decision that Congressional and judicial oversight can be discarded, in spite of what the law obviously requires. We need a thorough investigation of these activities. Congress and the American people deserve answers, and they deserve answers now.", u"Mr. President, what is past is prologue. Today, we see history repeating itself. In 1978, President Carter signed into law the ``Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,'' successfully concluding years of debate on the power of the President to conduct national security wiretapping. As a result of lengthy hearings and consultation, Congress enacted that law with broad bipartisan support. Its purpose was clear--to put a check on the power of the President to use wiretaps in the name of national security. One of the clear purposes of that law was to require the government to obtain a judicial warrant for all electronic surveillance in the United States in which communications of U.S. citizens might be intercepted. The Act established a secret court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to review wiretapping applications and guarantee that any such electronic surveillance followed the rule of law. Since 1979, the special court has approved nearly 19,000 applications and denied only 4. Last year, the Administration reached an all-time-high with the number of applications granted. In the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress established the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance could be conducted in the United States for national security purposes. One of the principal goals of the legislation was to ensure that information obtained from illegal wiretaps could not be used to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. We even made sure that there would be criminal penalties for anyone who failed to comply with these rules. The PATRIOT Act did not give the President the authority to spy on anyone without impartial judicial review--and neither did the Joint Resolution, enacted in 2001, authorizing the use of force against those responsible for the attacks of September 11th. The President seemed to agree. In 2004, in Buffalo he stated categorically that ``any time that you hear the United States talking about a wiretap, it requires a court order.'' He said that ``Nothing had changed--when we're talking about chasing down terrorists, we're talking about getting a court order before we do so.'' Now, however, the President and the administration claim they do not have to comply with the law. Just yesterday, the administration again asserted its constitutional authority to eavesdrop on any person within the United States--without judicial or legislative oversight and it claims that the Congress implicitly granted such power in the Joint Resolution of 2001. But that Joint Resolution says nothing about domestic electronic surveillance. As Justice O'Connor has said, ``A state of war is not a blank check for the president when it comes to the rights of the nation's citizens.'' The bipartisan 9/11 Commission made clear that the Executive Branch has the burden of proof to justify why a particular governmental power should be retained--and Congress has the responsibility to see that adequate guidelines and oversight are made available. The Executive Branch has failed to meet the 9/11 Commissioners' burden of proof. The American people are not convinced that these surveillance methods achieve the right balance between our national security and protection of our civil liberties. These issues go to the heart of what it means to have a free society. If President Bush can make his own rules for domestic surveillance, Big Brother has run amok. If the President believes that winning the war on terror requires new surveillance capabilities, he has a responsibility to work with Congress to make appropriate changes in existing law. He is not above the law. Congress and the American people deserve full and honest answers about the Administration's domestic electronic surveillance activities. On December 22, 2005, I asked the President to provide us with answers before the Senate Judiciary Committee began hearings on Judge Alito's nomination to the Supreme Court. We got no response. The Senate Judiciary Committee is scheduled to begin separate hearings on February 6 on the President's actions. Instead of providing us with the documents the Administration relied upon, the Justice Department continues to circulate summaries and ``white papers'' on the legal authorities it purports to have to ignore the law. It now appears that the President did so on at least thirty occasions after September 11. There is no legitimate purpose in denying access by Members of Congress to all of the legal thought and analysis that the President relied upon when he authorized these activities. Every 45 days, the President ordered these activities to be reviewed by the Attorney General, the White House Counsel and the Inspector General of the National Security Agency. That's not good enough. These are all executive branch appointees who report directly to the President. Congress spent seven years considering and enacting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It was not a hastily conceived idea. We had broad agreement that both Congressional oversight and judicial oversight were fundamental--even during emergencies or times of war, which is why we established a secret court to expedite the review of sensitive applications from the government. Now, the administration has made a unilateral decision that Congressional and judicial oversight can be discarded, in spite of what the law obviously requires. We need a thorough investigation of these activities. Congress and the American people deserve answers, and they deserve answers now. ", u"Mr. President, as we take stock during the second annual Sunshine Week, we confront the disturbing reality that the foundations of our open government are under direct assault from the first White House in modern times that is openly hostile to the public's right to know. The right to know is a cornerstone of our democracy. Without it, citizens are kept in the dark about key policy decisions that directly affect their lives. Without open government, citizens cannot make informed choices at the ballot box. Without access to public documents and a vibrant free press, officials can make decisions in the shadows, often in collusion with special interests, escaping accountability for their actions. And once eroded, these rights are hard to win back. The right to know is nourished by openness and vigorous congressional oversight of Federal agencies, but both are sorely lacking, and government effectiveness and accountability have been among the casualties. The disastrous failure to prepare for and respond to Hurricane Katrina is only the most recent example, but a glaring one. Despite misleading assertions in the storm's horrific aftermath, we now know that the White House was warned in advance that the levees could fail in a hurricane. We have belatedly seen videotapes in which President Bush was cautioned by FEMA officials of this great danger. The Freedom of Information Act, FOIA, empowers the American people to pry information from their Government that agencies would prefer to keep locked away. Americans learned more about Abu Ghraib and conditions at Guantanamo from FOIA requests than from oversight by Congress. As we celebrate FOIA's fourth decade as law, we also watch its erosion as a target of attacks such as when the administration pushed an overly broad FOIA waiver for the Department of Homeland Security's charter the single biggest rollback of FOIA in its 40-year history. It has been nearly a decade since Congress has approved major reforms to the Freedom of Information Act. Last year during Sunshine Week, Senator Cornyn and I introduced bipartisan legislation, S.394, to curtail the assault on FOIA. The Open Government Act contains more than a dozen substantive provisions, designed to strengthen FOIA and close loopholes, to help FOIA requestors obtain timely responses to their requests, to ensure that agencies have strong incentives to act on FOIA requests, and to provide FOIA officials with all of the tools they need to make sure that our government remains open and accessible. A second bill that I introduced with Senator Cornyn last year, the Faster FOIA Act, S.589, would specifically address the issue of agency delay in processing FOIA requests. We propose to establish a commission to review the persistent issue of delay and to make recommendations for reducing impediments to the efficient processing of requests. This bill was reported by the Judiciary Committee and awaits floor action. Our free press and the consciences of whistleblowers also serve the public's right to know. We would not know of the domestic spying program conducted in secret by the National Security Agency, with the full approval of the White House, unless the press had revealed it last December. The Department of Justice is stonewalling Congress's efforts to obtain facts on this program while threatening to prosecute reporters who disclosed the illegal program to the public. The Bush administration has kept vital facts secret by silencing scientists and experts. We saw it with the gagging of NASA scientist James Hansen, whose conclusions about the dangers of greenhouse gas emissions and global warming differed with administration policy. This administration also secretly let lobbyists from polluting industries write rules on mercury emissions, overriding the advice of the EPA's scientists and even drawing a harsh rebuke from EPA's inspector general. This tacit war on science--trumping scientific evidence with ideology--has also victimized women's access to the Plan B pill and cut international family planning funds which help the poorest of the poor, even though the evidence is clear that these funds reduce the numbers of abortions. This kind of secrecy produces bad policies, as we saw when the Bush administration tried to hide the true cost of its Medicare prescription drug plan from Congress and the American people. While they were twisting congressional arms for votes on the program, political leaders at Medicare told Congress the price tag was $400 billion. Medicare's own accountants projected the cost to be $500 billion to $600 billion, but one of those career staff, Richard Foster, was threatened with being fired if he told Congress the truth. We saw it again when the political leadership of the Justice Department overruled career lawyers who found that Congressman Tom DeLay's Texas redistricting plan illegally diluted Black and Hispanic voting power. Career attorneys also found that a Georgia voter-identification law would discriminate against Black voters. The Department's political leaders dismissed these findings and quietly approved both plans. We only learned of these politically motivated decisions later when the press obtained documents and made them public. In a situation that borders on the absurd, the intelligence agencies have been quietly reclassifying documents that were open for years. This program began in 1999 but has exploded under this administration, which has reclassified more than 55,000 pages. Even the Archivist of the United States said he knew ``precious little'' of the program until it was revealed by the press. The examples go on and on. The Bush administration has displayed a near-total disdain for the free press and the public's right to know. Sunshine Week invites an inventory check on tools like the Freedom of Information Act that make real the public's right to know. Attacks on these tools only erode that right. A free, open, and accountable democracy is what our forefathers fought and died for, and it is the duty of each new generation to protect this vital heritage and inheritance.", u"I appreciate that. I think you made a lot of points. I think one of the things that you mentioned is that we come down here every night. I have got to tell you, you know, you mentioned the race in which our Democratic write in candidate got more write-in votes than all of the Republicans combined, and the Democrat was in the three-way primary. It is unbelievable, because of the energy with which I think a lot of people in this country are willing to go to the polls and make some kind of changes. But I am tired of coming down here and talking about this. I will be honest with you, Mr. Speaker. I want this fixed. I want an opportunity for us to put the PAYGO rules in place, to make the tough decisions. We get paid to make these tough decisions. Let's make them. I mean, come on. You know what frustrates me? And it hit me as you pulled out the PAYGO chart. Zero Republicans voted for the PAYGO rules to be put in place. Of the millions of times we have actually tried to put them through, amendments and on the floor and motions to recommit and everything else, all of these different times that we have tried to do this, zero Republicans. But now they are having trouble passing the budget. Well, maybe if they would have put these procedures in place, these constraints in place, we wouldn't have the problems. We don't even have a budget yet. It is May. It is the middle of May. The law says you are supposed to have it by April 15. So all of this is happening. I think, Mr. Meek, as we begin to wrap up here, that everything is happening in secrecy, under the dome, on Pennsylvania Avenue, with K Street. When you look at these K Street fairy tales that you just can't believe, it is the environmental meeting, everything is done in secret. A lot of the consumer groups and conservation groups are saying you are meeting with the oil companies and the oil companies are going to write this. They say no, no, no, no, and oil executives come before the Senate. Coincidentally, the Republican Senate does not swear them in to a hearing. Unbelievable. They all say, ``We weren't there. We don't know anything about it.'' Then we find out a few weeks ago they were all there. The White House memo comes out that they were there, all done in secrecy. Look at the energy policy we have. It is atrocious. Come on. Everyone knows it doesn't work. Go to the gas pump. We don't have to explain it. Look at the war, all done in secrecy. Nobody is allowed in, not a lot of debate. The information, intelligence, everything is in secret, cherry-picking intelligence and all of this other stuff, all done in secret. Look at the end result. $9 billion lost, no exit strategy. We are not greeted as liberators. We are not able to use the oil money for reconstruction. All the promises made haven't happened. Terrible. Look at the Medicare bill. Same thing. All done in secret. The numbers were wrong that they gave to the Congress about how much it was going to cost. Then we find out today, Mr. Meek, and I hate to end on this because we don't have a lot of time to talk about it, we find out now that the National Security Agency is secretly monitoring phone calls of the American people. This is the largest database ever assembled in the world, monitoring the phone calls of American citizens. Now, give me a break. Enough of the secrecy, enough of the mismanagement, enough of the incompetence. Let's get the Democrats back in so we can implement some of these ideas that we have. Thank you, Mr. Speaker, for allowing us to be here. I would also like to thank the staff who is here who stays late with us many nights.", u"I thank the Chair. Well, when we first heard about widespread wiretapping by the administration without legal authority under the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act, the President said not to worry, just a handful of individuals, and only when they are communicating with people outside the U.S. Well, maybe not a handful. Maybe a few hundred. No, maybe 10,000 or thousands. Oops. Now it actually turns out that they are monitoring and have asked for the records of the phone calls of hundreds of millions of Americans. Over a trillion phone call records, we are told. They say they need this to protect America. What are they going to do with this mountain of data? They are going to apply a complicated mathematical algorithm to it and they are going to find some terrorists. Thus far they have raided two takeout services and one call center. That is what they have yielded from this. How about good old-fashioned intelligence with humans and police work? Let's look at the bungling that led up to 9/11. Actually the new nominee who headed the NSA who has perhaps perjured himself about these billions of monitored records, he had in his hands a communication from al Qaeda on 9/11, actually on 9/10, saying, tomorrow is zero hour. But the NSA didn't bother to translate that until after 9/11. Then we had the FBI. Now, Agent Samit said he had a communication about Moussaoui from French intelligence in August after he had been arrested by the FBI saying he was very dangerous, indoctrinated in radical Islamic fundamentalism, completely devoted to radical fundamentalism and Osama bin Laden. But his superiors didn't think that was enough to give him a warrant to open Moussaoui's computer and perhaps stop 9/11. That's why we need to monitor the phone calls of billions of phone calls made by Americans, because of the incompetence of the people running these agencies. Now, Agent Samit sent a letter to FBI headquarters accusing Moussaoui of plotting international terrorism and air piracy. This is August. August, before 9/11. Then Agent Rowley came forward and also gave us the same information. Agent Samit also asked for help from the FBI's London, Paris and Oklahoma City offices, FBI headquarters, CIA counterterrorism center, Secret Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Federal Aviation Administration, an intelligence agency not identified but presumed to be the National Security Agency headed by General Hayden who failed to translate the warning before 9/11. But we need to monitor the phone calls of law-abiding Americans, billions of them. What a wild goose chase. They want to cover up the extraordinary incompetence that allowed these stumblebums to launch a devastating attack on America by saying they are doing something now by monitoring billions of phone calls. This is absolutely outrageous. Let's go back a little further. There were two other guys involved, Nawafal Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. Now, they were tracked to the planning meeting, pretty good work, by the CIA over in Southeast Asia. That's good. Unfortunately, they didn't have listening devices, they didn't have agents go through them, they didn't know what they were planning, but they knew they were bad guys planning something. Then they lost track of them. Where did they go? Well, they traveled legally to the United States of America with visas issued by the Bush State Department, they lived openly in San Diego with listed phone numbers, but they were never visited or monitored by the FBI or anybody else, even though the CIA knew these were bad guys. But what are we going to do in response to this incompetence? Well, we'll give the people involved gold medals and great retirements. Mr. Tenet, who was heading the CIA, he got a gold medal for freedom from the President. No one has ever taken the fall for this incompetence. Now, instead, they are trying to divert us and say, what we're going to do is monitor all the telephone conversations of all Americans and apply a mathematical algorithm. So the next time we have a terrorist in hand, we won't open his computer, either, because we'll be watching the algorithms and the phone calls of law-abiding Americans. What unbelievable incompetence on the part of this administration, in addition to law-breaking. The American people are not well served by this. We need to clean up this mess and truly protect America.", u"Mr. Speaker, a few months ago, a columnist for the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain wrote a column saying that we were headed for a ``financial tsunami'' not long after the baby boomers start retiring in large numbers over the next few years. The reasons are really pretty simple. First, we are trying to do way too much for other countries. We have spent $300 billion in the last 3 years in Iraq and Afghanistan, probably over half of it is just pure foreign aid. We have every department and agency in the Federal Government doing operations overseas, spending several hundred billion a year over there. The liberal stand out here is that foreign aid was not popular so they will very possibly tell you that foreign aid is only 1\\1/2\\ percent of the budget. When we add up what all the departments and agencies are doing, it is just phenomenal how much we are spending in other countries. I heard a news report recently that said the FBI has more offices in other countries than we have in the U.S. Secondly, we have promised too much here at home in retirement and medical benefits. Thirdly, we will not reduce defense or homeland security spending even though there is waste in those departments, just like all the other departments, and there just simply is not enough money to pay for all of it. On January 26 of this year, the Congressional Budget Office said the Federal deficit for this fiscal year, which ends September 30, will be around $360 billion. Some people say it will be much higher than that, and similar amounts, $350 billion to $400 billion for each of the next 10 or 11 years. All of this comes on top of the national debt that is already $8.3 trillion and headed up very quickly. Our government, in just a few years, will not be able to pay all of the military pensions, the civil service pensions, the Social Security, the Medicare, the Medicaid, and the new prescription drug benefit. We have guaranteed 44 million private pensions through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. We will just not be able to pay all those things with money that means anything. But what we will do, we will do what governments all over the world have done in similar situations, and we will simply begin printing more money. This will cause Social Security and all those government and private pension plans to buy less each year. It doesn't work. It is like a ball headed downhill. Its starts out slow and gathers speed. When this money supply gimmick does not do enough, pensions will have to be cut. Anyone who is relying just on Social Security for his or her retirement will face tremendous financial hardship. All of this could be avoided if the Congress would become much more fiscally conservative and do it now. However, because there are too many liberal big spenders in the Congress, and because it is unpopular to say ``no'' to anyone, the Congress could not even, late last year, pass a $50 billion slowdown in spending spread over the next 5 years. The overall reduction was reduced to $39.5 billion, with the bulk of the reductions put off until the fourth and fifth years. The plan that was passed did not cut spending, it simply slowed the rate of growth, barely. But, of course, even that very meager effort at fiscal restraint could be changed by the next Congress. Now, let me go to a totally different topic, Mr. Speaker, another concern. At the end of 1994, the conservative business magazine, Forbes, carried a lengthy article about the Justice Department. It said we had quadrupled the Justice Department since 1980, and that Federal prosecutors were falling all over themselves trying to find cases to prosecute. The article said people were being prosecuted for laws they didn't even know were in existence. And then the Congress, trying to prove it was tough on crime, has expanded the Department of Justice greatly since then. In addition to all this expansion, we then passed a so-called PATRIOT Act to try to show strong opposition to terrorism. This was such a great expansion of government power and such an overreach that now approximately 400 cities and counties and seven State legislatures have passed resolutions against this act. Those who love big government love the PATRIOT Act. The Federal Government, through the super-secret National Security Agency, in addition to the CIA, FBI, and about 12 other intelligence agencies, has more than enough power and ways and means to discover and prosecute terrorists. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court, created in 1978, approved 18,742 warrants for wiretapping and physical surveillance by the end of 2004. In the 5 years from 2000 to 2004, the court received 6,650 requests from the government and approved 6,642. We will probably have another terrorist incident of some sort with or without the PATRIOT Act. We need to take reasonable precautions, but we also need to recognize that you are still hundreds of times more likely to be struck by lightning or to win a lottery than you are to be killed by a terrorist. Those in charge of all the many government programs which have sprung up to fight terrorism do not like to admit this because they want continual increases in funding. But, Mr. Speaker, we should not create some kind of a Federal police state in a huge overreaction to this threat. It is sad that conservatives, who have always been the main opponents of big government, have gone along with this huge expansion of government power just because the word ``terrorism'' is used by every government agency to get more money and power.", u"Mr. President, I rise in support of the nomination of GEN Michael Hayden to be the next Director of the CIA. I support his confirmation first because I think General Hayden's vision for the future of the CIA is right on point. He has pledged to make the collection of human intelligence a top priority--a necessary move in understanding our Nation's enemies and the threats we face. At the same time, General Hayden understands the failures of analysis prior to the Iraq war and is committed to making major changes. Only time will tell, but I am hopeful that General Hayden has what it takes to put the agency on the right path after recent collection and analytic failures. Secondly, I think General Hayden brings with him the overarching view of the entire intelligence community needed to carry out the vision and transition the CIA to deal with the new asymmetric threat posed by the terrorist world. I think this is critically important at this time. General Hayden served 6 years as the Director of the National Security Agency, the largest intelligence agency in the intelligence community. He ably led a transformation from a Cold War institution to a key component of our Nation's counterterrorism efforts. Additionally, he served as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence under Ambassador Negroponte for the past year. In this role, he oversaw the day-to-day operations of the Office of the DNI, and many of the DNI's accomplishments to date can be directly attributed to General Hayden's service. Third, I am pleased that General Hayden made a commitment to me to appoint experienced intelligence professionals to serve on his direct staff and in senior positions across the agency. I also support the administration's intention to name Stephen Kappes as the Deputy Director of the CIA. Mr. Kappes brings a wealth of experience in the clandestine service to the agency's senior leadership. Perhaps more importantly, his return to the agency has already gone a long way to assure operators that they are well represented in management and that their concerns will be met. General Hayden will come to the agency at a time of major personnel problems. But he has already taken steps to move the agency beyond the problems of the past and that is good news. There is no question that the concerns that have been raised about General Hayden are legitimate and important. Before my meeting with General Hayden and his appearance at the confirmation hearings, I was concerned that he will not be sufficiently independent of the Department of Defense. On this point, I have been reassured. General Hayden has shown his independence in the past, and has committed that if he finds his uniform to be a hindrance in any way, he will ``take it off.'' Similarly, the Intelligence Committee will need to pay close attention to intelligence activities of the Department of Defense, especially in the area of human intelligence. I have concerns that the Pentagon is going too far in this area, and I want to make sure that the CIA remains the leader and primary provider of this type of intelligence collection. My greatest concern about General Hayden is that he was not more forthcoming in his answers during the open confirmation hearing. Many members asked important questions on the NSA domestic surveillance program and on detention, interrogation and rendition policies. In my view, the public deserved more forthcoming answers than those provided by General Hayden. For example, I felt that General Hayden should have stated clearly, in full public view, whether he believes that certain interrogation techniques constitute torture. He could say yes or no without disclosing sources and methods. It is my hope that General Hayden will be more forthcoming once he is confirmed as Director of the CIA. The challenge ahead of General Hayden is daunting, but it is absolutely critical to our nation's security that he succeed. I believe General Hayden is the sound intelligence professional the CIA needs to regain its footing as the world's premier spy service and the hub of our nation's intelligence analysis and research and development capabilities. I look forward to working with him to protect the American people.", u"Mr. President, I would like to say a few words about the nomination of General Michael V. Hayden to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I regret that I was not able to vote to confirm his nomination at this time, and I would like to take a few minutes to explain my vote. As my colleagues may know, I voted to confirm General Hayden when he was nominated to be the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, DNI. I stand by that vote for two reasons. First, General Hayden is obviously qualified on paper to fill the position. Second, he was serving as Deputy to the current DNI, John Negroponte. So there was a clear line of authority. But today when the Senate voted on his nomination to be Director of the CIA, these two circumstances were significantly different. First, issues like the potentially illegal wiretapping of American citizens' phone lines by the National Security Agency--a program which General Hayden reportedly designed and ran--have come to light. And second, he will no longer be serving as a deputy but as head of one of our Nation's premier intelligence agencies--yet he is not resigning his commission as a uniformed officer. That raises the question of whether and to what degree he will be independent from decisions made at the Pentagon. Some of my colleagues have insisted that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will no longer be in the chain of command overseeing General Hayden in his position at the CIA. Certainly, there is precedent for uniformed officers serving as head of the CIA. However, when we look at this precedent we also have to realize that circumstances have changed. A not insignificant part of the reason that we invaded Iraq is because our Nation's intelligence was politicized, and because intelligence activities were manipulated to justify a predetermined conclusion--that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Much of this intelligence manipulation was performed by intelligence bureaus within the Pentagon, under the supervision of Secretary Rumsfeld, who has been steadily expanding the Pentagon's role in U.S. intelligence activities. It would seem to this Senator that given Secretary Rumsfeld's track record, concentrating intelligence in his hands would be unwise to say the least. The truth is that we don't really know how much independence General Hayden will show with respect to the Secretary of Defense. After all, he is a military officer, with an active commission. And the record is mixed with respect to predicting how the cards will fall. On one hand, there are reports that he stood up to Secretary Rumsfeld and other political appointees in the President's Cabinet on certain occasions. On the other hand, he reportedly designed and strongly supported a program to wiretap the homes of American citizens, whose legality is in question. If he was just following orders, these circumstances raise serious questions about his ability to exercise independence as Director of the CIA. If, as is widely believed, he was the driving force behind the NSA's wiretapping program, then I question his ability to balance the important need to defend our Nation from threats with the equally important need to protect constitutional rights of all Americans. I frankly think it is a shame that Congress didn't take a few more days, or even a couple of weeks, to more deeply probe these fundamental issues of security and liberty. Indeed, if this body had taken sufficient steps to get answers about the NSA's wiretapping program, and if General Hayden had considered leaving his role as an active military officer during his tenure as CIA Director, then it is possible that the concerns I mentioned might have been alleviated. I also regret the fact, however, that President Bush didn't pick somebody who was equally qualified but not tied in to controversial programs such as collecting telephone information and listening in to conversations between American citizens. Because in this time of difficulty for the CIA, we don't just need someone who is qualified, we also need someone who is credible. While the extent of General Hayden's involvement in these activities is as yet unclear, I am concerned that his role could potentially undermine his ability to carry out his duties as head of the CIA. Mr. President, despite some opposition, General Hayden was confirmed earlier this morning by the Senate. At this juncture, I can only hope that he proves my concerns to be unfounded. I wish him only the best in pursuing a goal that I know we all share--the safety and well-being of American citizens in this time of war.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H. Res 861, the global war on terrorism resolution. I am opposed to the resolution because it is terribly flawed, nonbinding, and does not provide a viable plan that protects our soldiers or serves our country. The general assumption is that the debate on the global war on terrorism, GWOT, will be a full and honest debate. In fact, the process we are engaged in represents nothing more than an exercise in rhetoric. H. Res. 861 is flawed because it does not reflect bipartisanship. Democrats were not allowed to offer our substitute or amend the Republican resolution. Further, I strenuously disagree with the language contained in the resolution. I want to strongly emphasize that the failed Republican policy in Iraq includes poor planninq that left troops without critical equipment, and provided no plan for success. The war in Iraq exemplifies gross mismanaqement, as evidenced by $9 billion that is either lost or stolen and cannot be accounted for. There has been no oversiqht of spending to date. The Republican controlled Congress has refused to oversee military conduct and the policy that contributed to the war. There has been a complete lack of accountability regarding this war. No investigating committee has ensured taxpayer dollars were legally and well spent. This administration is guilty of entering into no-bid contracts, totaling $17 billion to Halliburton alone. Let me be clear, Democrats want and demand a new direction in Iraq. We want a responsible redeployment of U.S. troops to take place immediately. We must redeploy and be ready. I disagree with the resolution premise that the U.S. will prevail in the Global War on Terrorism due to the fact that the ``terrorist adversary'' cannot be identified or quantified. The misguided perpetrators of terrorism consist of disparate and loosely confederated groups, some of whom are religious zealots that justify their terrorist actions based on their Islamic beliefs; others are mercenaries seeking to retaliate against the U.S. for our invasion of Iraq. The terrorists identified as members of AI Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden do not adhere to a traditional command and control military structure, thereby making it impossible for our military forces to engage in traditional battlefield strategies. H. Res. 861 presents the proposition that Saddam Hussein's regime supported terrorists and posed a threat to global peace. There is no documentation to support this premise. These allegations have been wholly disproved, yet supporters of the war and the architects of the resolution continue to propagate these mistruths. This is why today I reaffirm my steadfast opposition to another in a long list of resolutions that seek to delude Americans into believing that we are debating legislation that provides a clear direction to winning the so-called global war on terrorism. This resolution does not. I oppose this resolution because it does not address the fact that to date we have spent in excess of $368 billion, mainly in the form of supplemental spending bills that are off-budget and contribute mightily to the Federal deficit. The resolution does not address that our President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Agency, NSA, all provided the American public with undeniably wrong information and allegations contrived to seduce them and Members of Congress to support an act of aggression against Saddam Hussein. We engaged in a war without broad international support. America, through its actions in Iraq, reinforced the perception throughout the Middle East that the global war on terrorism is an attack on the religion of Islam, and in some measure that the interests of the U.S. related more to controlling oil in Iraq than promoting democracy. This war has united our enemies and divided our friends. I reject this resolution because it does not acknowledge that we hastily entered this war and unnecessarily placed our soldiers in harm's way, resulting in 2,500 deaths. My ongoing assessments of the situation in Iraq have caused me to conclude that it is critical for the House and our nation to develop a strategy that will ensure the redeployment of our forces from Iraq and return them home. I support my colleague Represenative Murtha and his calls for a reevaluation of our military strategy and a return of our troops as soon as practicable. As our troops redeploy, they will be ready to respond to whatever challenges our Nation may be forced to confront. Finally, I oppose H. Res. 861 because it will not deliver any tangible solutions to the quagmire that engulfs our soldiers and places them in perpetual danger. H. Res. 861 provides the appearance of substantive and honest debate. In reality, it is merely an exercise designed to appease the emotional and intellectual appetite of Americans seeking to justify what they believe and have been told is a real global war on terrorism. It is not. I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on H. Res. 861.", u"Forces who are appointed as a commissioned officer after completing At the end of subtitle B of title VI, add the following: (a) Accession Bonus Authorized.-- (1) In general.--Chapter 5 of title 37, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 20. (a) The Director may collect charges for evaluating, certifying, or validating information assurance products under the National Information Assurance Program or successor program. ``(b) The charges collected under subsection (a) shall be established through a public rulemaking process in accordance with Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-25. ``(c) Charges collected under subsection (a) shall not exceed the direct costs of the program referred to in that subsection. ``(d) The appropriation or fund bearing the cost of the service for which charges are collected under the program referred to in subsection (a) may be reimbursed, or the Director may require advance payment subject to such adjustment on completion of the work as may be agreed upon. ``(e) Amounts collected under this section shall be credited to the account or accounts from which costs associated with such amounts have been or will be incurred, to reimburse or offset the direct costs of the program referred to in subsection (a).''. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The National Guard continues to provide invaluable resources to meet national security, homeland defense, and civil emergency mission requirements. (2) Current military operations, transnational threats, and domestic emergencies will increase the use of the National Guard for both military support to civilian authorities and to execute the military strategy of the United States. (3) To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for continuing United States military operations, the Army has required Army National Guard Units to leave behind many items for use by follow-on forces. (4) The Governors of every State and 2 Territories expressed concern in February 2006 that units returning from deployment overseas without adequate equipment would have trouble carrying out their homeland security and domestic disaster duties. (5) The Department of Defense estimates that it has directed the Army National Guard to leave overseas more than 75,000 items valued at approximately $1,760,000,000 to support Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. (6) Department of Defense Directive 1225.6 requires a replacement and tracking plan be developed within 90 days for equipment of the reserve components of the Armed Forces that is transferred to the active components of the Armed Forces. (7) In October 2005, the Government Accountability Office found that the Department of Defense can only account for about 45 percent of such equipment and has not developed a plan to replace such equipment. (8) The Government Accountability Office also found that without a completed and implemented plan to replace all National Guard equipment left overseas, Army National Guard units will likely face growing equipment shortages and challenges in regaining readiness for future missions. (b) Reports on Withdrawal or Diversion of Equipment From Reserve Units for Support of Reserve Units Being Mobilized and Other Units.-- (1) In general.--Chapter 1007 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 10208 the following new section: (a) Priority.--Priority for the distribution of new and combat serviceable equipment, with associated support and test equipment for active and reserve component forces, shall be given to units scheduled for mission deployment, employment first, or both regardless of component. (b) Allocation.--In the amounts authorized to be appropriated by section 101(5) for the procurement of replacement equipment, subject to subsection (a), priority for the distribution of Army National Guard equipment described in subsection (a) may be given to States that have experienced a major disaster, as determined under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121-5206), and may require replacement equipment to respond to future emergencies/disasters only after distribution of new and combat serviceable equipment has been made in accordance with subsection (a).", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise to submit for the Record a column that appeared in The New London Day on July 9. It was written by Glenn Sulmasy, an associate professor of law at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and a noted expert on national security law. The title of the op-ed piece is ``A New Kind of Law in a New Kind of War.'' America is not at war with a traditional enemy, but a network of civilians who swear allegiance to radical Islam. Consequently, the various laws that have historically governed international conflicts do not seem to fit well with our current situation. Nevertheless, we have spent a lot of time discussing the present and future conditions of the combatants in our custody. In his column, Glenn Sulmasy offers a series of recommendations providing a framework for this important debate. He makes an especially compelling case for a National Security Court system. America's critics do little more than attack the current system. While such criticism is important, it is not always constructive. We need to think of new ways to handle the detention and adjudication of enemy combatants. In the book In Time of War, which details President Roosevelt's treatment of eight Nazi saboteurs in 1942, Pierce O'Donnell argues that our enemies ``would forcibly impose their nihilistic, totalitarian ideology on society through violence and intimidation. That is precisely why this just struggle--characterized as a war on terror--should not be tainted by compromising our historic respect for justice, constitutional liberties and international law.'' As we take steps to defend America from a terrorist threat, we cannot lose sight of the values we are defending. For this reason, I urge my colleagues to take a few minutes and read Glenn Sulmasy's column, which outlines a new kind of law for a new kind of war. Last week, in Rumsfeld vs. Hamdan, the Supreme Court decided that the military commissions for the jihadist detainees in Guantanamo Bay are not lawfully constructed. I disagree. However the realities of maintaining international support and ensuring domestic consensus on fighting the global war demands we look for alternatives for detaining and trying jihadists. Regardless of how the Court decided in Hamdan, the commissions have failed. The Court has forced the opponents of military commissions to offer legitimate solutions. The best solution available is the creation of a National Security Court system. The global war on terror has created ambiguities in both the laws of armed conflict and how best to fight this new war. The asymmetric threat of international terror, the lack of a clear national enemy, the problems with the military commissions in Guantanamo Bay, allegations of torture and the recent constitutional issues surrounding wiretap efforts of the National Security Agency all highlight the lack of an appropriate body of law to govern this new conflict. Nowhere is this ambiguity more evident than in the United States' handling of detainees. The ``enemies'' in this war are men and women who fight not for a nation but for ideology, do not wear standard military uniforms and, as doctrine, flout the laws of war. These new ``warriors'' have created extreme difficulties since they are not conventional prisoners of war (regardless what the recent ruling has asserted) and thus (with all due respect to Justice John Paul Stevens) the Geneva Conventions simply do not apply to them. Adjudicating their status and crimes has become increasingly chaotic. It initially appeared that the military tribunals (currently referred to as military commissions by the Bush Administration) would provide the appropriate venue for handling the prosecution of the detainees. But now, over four years later, there has not been a completed prosecution. More than 500 detainees remain in Guantanamo Bay and supposedly another 450 are being held in Afghanistan. As this problem grows, the U.S. needs a new approach. Our own federal courts system, the standard courts-martial system and other traditional methods, won't work. A healthy, bipartisan debate on ``what'' to do next is critical. This is a new war, one that mixes law enforcement and warfare, and does not fit neatly in either category. A national security court apparatus needs to be legislated. As Congress begins to debate (as ordered by the Supreme Court) how to handle jihadists' violations of the laws of war, policymakers must achieve both the reality and appearance of justice. Clearly, many issues need to be hammered out regarding the composition of the court. The court would be a hybrid of the military commissions and our own federal trial system. The jihadist would be afforded limited rights, including right to counsel and be detained and tried on military bases within the United States. The law would allow the death penalty. The hearings would be closed with the exception of observers from Human Rights Organizations (for example, Amnesty International, the International Red Cross and the U.N. Human Rights Watch.) The U.S. Department of Justice would provide prosecutors and administer over the program. International concern over Guantanamo is detracting from our ability to provide guidance, counsel and policy in this and other arenas. A blue-ribbon commission, created by the president with bipartisan support from Congress, should immediately be formed to address questions as to proper detention, adjudication, intelligence gathering, terrorist surveillance and other legal issues associated with the threat of international terror. The National Security Court, a natural outgrowth of the military commissions, affords an opportunity for U.S. policy makers to respond forcefully and effectively to calls for a way out of the Guantanamo issue. The Hamdan decision has pushed us in this direction. The military commissions are no longer a viable option. Rather than offering no solutions and merely attacking the existing structure, policy makers need to emerge with fresh ways to look at the proper detention and adjudication of the jihadists. It is time to regain the initiative, and reaffirm our leadership in the humane prosecution of those who would undermine the ideals of democracy.", u"Mr. President, I am happy to see that we are scheduled to confirm today the nomination of Kimberly Ann Moore, of Virginia, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit. It is about time that we get back to confirming judges, and I am glad to see that our leader is putting this issue back on the Senate's agenda. It is of utmost importance that the Senate continue to confirm President Bush's judicial nominees. Just last month, we saw what can happen when an ideologically driven activist judge attempts to create national security policy. Judge Anna Diggs Taylor, a Federal district judge in Michigan appointed by President Carter in 1979, ruled that the Terrorist Surveillance Program was unconstitutional. This program, administered by the National Security Agency, has been a critical component in ensuring the safety of millions of Americans. Despite that, Judge Diggs Taylor ruled that the program, which the Government only uses to intercept international telephone and internet communications, violates the first and fourth amendments to the Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Separation of Powers doctrine, in other words the veritable legal kitchen sink. While some on the other side of the aisle have rejoiced in this decision, this opinion has been attacked from both ends of the political spectrum. The Washington Post, in an editorial on August 18, noted that the decision is neither careful nor scholarly, and it is hard-hitting only in the sense that a bludgeon is hard-hitting. The angry rhetoric of U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor will no doubt grab headlines. But as a piece of judicial work--that is, as a guide to what the law requires and how it either restrains or permits the NSA's program--her opinion will not be helpful. Legal scholars have also criticized Judge Diggs Taylor's opinion. Let me give you just a few of these criticisms. David B. Rivkin, a former Justice Department official in Reagan's and George H.W. Bush's administrations, noted in a New York Times op-ed on August 18 that ``[i]t is an appallingly bad opinion, both from a philosophical and technical perspective, manifesting strong bias.'' Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe has written ``[i]t's altogether too easy to make disparaging remarks about the quality of the Taylor opinion, which seems almost to have been written more to poke a finger in the President's eye than to please the legal commentariat or even, alas, to impress an appellate panel . . . .'' Howard Bashman, an appellate attorney and editor of the How Appealing legal blog, wrote in the New York Times on August 19 that ``[i]t does appear that folks on all sides of the spectrum, both those who support it and those who oppose it, say the decision is not strongly grounded in legal authority.'' UCLA Law Professor Eugene Volokh wrote on his widely read blog: ``the judge's opinion . . . seems not just ill-reasoned, but rhetorically ill-conceived. . . . [B]y writing an opinion that was too much feeling and too little careful argument, the judge in this case made it less likely that the legal approach she feels so strongly about will ultimately become law.'' In contrast to Judge Anna Diggs Taylor, both of President Bush's nominees to the Supreme Court, Justices Roberts and Alito, understand that it is not the role of the judicial branch to make policy. During his confirmation hearings last year, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts said, ``I don't think you want judges who will decide cases before them under the law on what they think is good, simply good policy for America.'' He also noted, ``[T]he Court has to appreciate that the reason they have that authority is because they're interpreting the law, they're not making policy, and to the extent they go beyond their confined limits and make policy or execute the law, they lose their legitimacy, and I think that calls into question the authority they will need when it's necessary to act in the face of unconstitutional action.'' Similarly, Justice Samuel Alito remarked during his confirmation hearing that ``results-oriented jurisprudence is never justified because it is not our job to try to produce particular results. We are not policy makers and we shouldn't be implementing any sort of policy agenda or policy preferences that we have.'' Yes, Justices Roberts and Alito have it right. It is not the role of a judge to seek to replace the legislature, or the President, State legislatures, and the Governors, township supervisors, county councils with his or her own views. It is the role of a judge to apply the law and to do justice based on the facts in solving the dispute that has been presented. A court is not a place for zealous advocates to impose their will upon the American public. It is not a place for people who believe their views as judges are superior to the views of the democratically elected officials in this country--better put, that their views are better than the people's views because we are, in fact, accountable to the people we represent. It is and should continue to be a place for those public servants who seek to do justice under the law and facts of each case and a place to interpret the law, rather than make law.", u"Mr. President, next week we will be commemorating an event that none of us can forget and none of us wants to relive. We mark September 11, 2001, as a day of national tragedy. But out of the ashes rose a determination to bring the sponsors of this terrorism to justice and to reform the intelligence system that that we depend on to prevent such predatory attacks in the future. In those first weeks and months after the attacks, we were united as a nation and enjoyed the sympathy and support of the world. We went after Osama bin Ladin and the government that hosted him, with some of America's best and bravest. We assembled some of our wisest and most experienced leaders to investigate the events leading up to the attack and to recommend a path of reform. Since 2001 when I joined the Senate Intelligence Committee, I have worked to bring about intelligence reform. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 was an important milestone on this journey. Important structural changes were made to our intelligence community and barriers removed to information sharing between agencies. But where are we now? The operational failure of 9/11 was followed by an analytical failure in Iraq. The hidden agenda of the White House and the President's lack of interest in objective analysis compounded the consequences of flawed intelligence. The President did not level with the public before the war. He did not keep his eye on hunting down al-Qaida. Instead, he led us into an unnecessary and disastrous war in Iraq. Instead of providing oversight of the executive branch, congressional leadership has provided a rubberstamp. Instead of providing an independent voice, it has offered an echo chamber. Instead of helping the Senate Intelligence Committee investigate the Iraq intelligence failure, it has helped the White House push roadblocks in our path. And instead of taking care to safeguard liberty as we enhance security, it has closed its eyes on violations of the law and betrayal of our values. In spite of some strong disagreements on specific issues, the Senate Intelligence Committee has come together on a bipartisan basis to implement the reforms already adopted and advance additional reform measures. But last year, the leadership in the Senate did not allow the committee's authorization bill to be debated and voted on by the full Senate. For the first time in 28 years, the committee was blocked from carrying out its most basic function--the authorization of U.S. intelligence programs. This month, we have learned that the majority leader does not intend to bring the fiscal year 2007 intelligence authorization bill to the floor before the Senate's fall recess. Again we face the prospect of the leadership preventing the Intelligence Committee from doing its job. This is irresponsible and unacceptable. The authorizing committee should be the congressional vehicle for intelligence reform. The members of the committee spend the time needed to understand the issues. And we operate under special rules to keep our Nation's most sensitive secrets. As a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I will do my best to make sure the intelligence community is adequately and appropriately funded. But providing direction and guidance for intelligence activities is the job of the Intelligence Committee. Senator Rockefeller, the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, elaborated from the floor this week about what is at stake. The fiscal year 2007 intelligence authorization bill, passed unanimously by the committee, included provisions: to enhance or clarify the authority of the Director of National Intelligence; to encourage information sharing and access; to establish a statutory inspector general of the intelligence community; to elevate the heads of the technical intelligence agencies by requiring them to be appointed by the President with Senate advice and consent; to improve the timeliness and completeness of information provided to the committee, and; to streamline the security clearance process for National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency employees and contractors. These measures are not trivial. If enacted, they will save lives and they will save money. They will help restore congressional oversight where it is lacking. They will help prevent abuses in intelligence operations, which bring dishonor to our nation. In short, these measures are critical to our national security. They should not be casually discarded. Senator Rockefeller has repeatedly raised his concerns with the lack of congressional oversight of the warrantless surveillance program conducted by the National Security Agency. I join him in expressing those concerns from the perspective of a member whose state proudly hosts the headquarters of that invaluable agency. After a long struggle against White House foot-dragging, members of congressional intelligence committees are finally being briefed on this 5-year-old program. But as Senator Rockefeller points out, we have still not received the information necessary to adequately understand and evaluate the program. Nor have we been allowed to use the Intelligence Committee's specialized staff--such as the minority counsel and the NSA monitor--who are best qualified to help us with this task. Under these conditions, the Senate cannot evaluate the need for the warrantless surveillance program and cannot propose legislative remedies for the alleged deficiencies of the current law. These circumstances must change. Mr. President, intelligence is at the forefront in our fight against terrorism, just as it was in our long Cold War struggle against communism. Congress has a duty under the Constitution to be a critical and coequal partner in this fight. I join Senator Rockefeller in urging the leadership of the Senate to let us get on with it.", u"I certainly will. I thank the Senator from West Virginia. I know General Hayden will be a four-star general very shortly. I think that is very good news. So we will have the first Director and Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. I believe these are both excellent nominees. They will provide strong new overall management and leadership to the intelligence community as it finally adapts to post-Cold War realities. Ambassador Negroponte has served with distinction, both in Washington and around the globe. He served as United States Ambassador to four nations and to the United Nations. As Deputy National Security Adviser, Ambassador Negroponte was intimately involved in the formation and use of intelligence. He is well suited to overseeing the collection of vital intelligence needed for the United States to protect itself. Ambassador Negroponte comes to this new position without strong ties or bias to any specific intelligence agency. That is an enormous strength, and I believe he will be an honest broker and manager for the community. He has pledged that he will be a neutral and apolitical provider of intelligence to Government policymakers. Although General Hayden's nomination is not before us at this time, I wish to say I hold him in the highest regard. He is a skilled manager and an expert in the workings of our Nation's intelligence apparatus. General Hayden led a remarkable turnaround of an enormously complex and technical agency, the National Security Agency. He was first made Director of the NSA under President Clinton and has had his tour extended three times by President Bush. That is a true testament to his leadership. He has proven his ability to establish a skilled and dedicated workforce. In short, General Hayden is a strong choice to be the day-to-day manager of the intelligence community. Both men have the strength, the vision, and the determination that is necessary to be successful in their new positions. As my colleagues know, I introduced legislation to create a DNI in the 107th Congress and again in the 108th Congress. So I was pleased to see that with the support of the 9/11 Commission and the chairs and ranking members of the Intelligence and Governmental Affairs Committees, this position was finally established. As Director and Deputy Director of National Intelligence, these appointees face daunting challenges. The 15 intelligence agencies are a community in name only. The fiefdoms and turf battles--the stovepipes--between agencies may have lessened since September 11, but they continue to hinder our intelligence operations. Our technical means for collecting intelligence must be adapted to this new nonstate terrorist world and its challenges. The acquisition and development of new intelligence systems need better management. The demands for better human intelligence are well documented by reports, including the Congressional Joint Inquiry, our Intelligence Committee's Iraq study, the 9/11 Commission, and the President's own WMD Commission. Each of these reports spells out, in stark terms, the organizational, the leadership, and the capability challenges that await Director Negroponte and General Hayden. The U.S. intelligence estimates of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were, as the WMD Commission stated, ``dead wrong'' before the war. There was a lack of solid intelligence, made worse by fundamental and inexcusable lapses in tradecraft and judgment. The systematic failings will take sustained leadership and vigorous oversight to correct. Our intelligence capabilities in other crucial areas--Iran and North Korea among them--are still inadequate and unacceptable. As the war and postwar operations in Iraq show dramatically and tragically, we cannot govern effectively and cannot make informed decisions without timely and accurate intelligence. We cannot afford to fail again. The stakes are very large, indeed. Thankfully, the recent Commission and Senate reports have also made important recommendations. Both Ambassador Negroponte and General Hayden have expressed willingness to make important changes. They will take steps to integrate and bolster intelligence collection and to end ``group think'' and untested assumptions. They will use red teams and alternative analysis when intelligence conflicts. This was a substantial lacking that led to the wrong judgments made in the Iraq National Intelligence Estimate that so many of us relied upon to make our judgment on how to vote to authorize the President with use of force in Iraq. The Director also has the authority to put in place a management team and implement changes, including new mission managers and new centers, to focus attention on the most pressing problems. I believe strongly it is going to take a strong and authoritative Director of National Intelligence to put our intelligence community back on the right track. Equally important, it will take forthright and impeccably objective leaders to restore the credibility both to the American people and to the world that was destroyed by the assessments of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The legislation that created the DNI last year, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, spells out the framework for a strong DNI, but it did not fill in the details. The authorities and responsibilities that should have been made clear in law, I believe, will have to be instead established in practice. I have discussed privately and through the confirmation hearing process with Ambassador Negroponte the need for him to assert authority by taking bold action to lead and manage the intelligence community, and I will support him in doing so. I have confidence the new Director shares this vision and will take the necessary steps immediately after taking office. General Hayden, with his experience in fighting these battles as Director of NSA, will be a key adviser and ally in fulfilling this charge. The men and women who work for the 15 intelligence agencies are skilled and dedicated, but they need innovative, new tools and ways of doing business to meet our future strategic intelligence needs. I am confident that Director Negroponte and Deputy Director Hayden will work to provide these needs. I thank the President for forwarding such skilled, nonpartisan nominees, and I wholeheartedly support their confirmation. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, first, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and his extraordinary ranking member for all their work to improve the quality of the intelligence upon which our policymakers, our men and women who are on the front lines, and all of us rely. Last July, the Senate leaders assigned the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee the task of developing legislation to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The committee I am privileged to chair devoted more than 5 months to this important and complex issue that is so crucial to the safety and well-being of the American people. We successfully accomplished our assignment with the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which the President signed into law in December. During the committee's inquiry into how to fix the flaws in our Nation's intelligence capability that permitted so many dots to go unconnected for so long, one remedy emerged as being among the very highest priorities. Our intelligence community--15 disparate agencies and entities, each with its own expertise and experience--clearly needed one leader. The role of this leader has often been described as that of a CEO in business, a person with the ultimate authority over the operation and with the ultimate accountability for results. An even more succinct description was offered by former Secretary of State Powell at one of our committee's many hearings. He said what the intelligence community really needed was an empowered quarterback. The new law creates the Director of National Intelligence as that empowered quarterback, with significant authority to manage the intelligence community and to transform it into, to use President Bush's term, a single unified enterprise. I believe John Negroponte is the right person, the right leader to be that CEO, that empowered quarterback. Ambassador Negroponte is an accomplished diplomat, which is a vital credential in the international war against terrorism. Having served very recently as our Ambassador in Iraq, he knows firsthand how important the intelligence provided is. He has been an intelligence consumer. Throughout his distinguished and varied career in service to our country, he has demonstrated strong, decisive leadership skills. These skills will be invaluable in exercising the Director of National Intelligence authorities and in carrying out the intelligence community transformation called for in our legislation. The Ambassador's extensive experience in national security and foreign relations is a solid foundation for the weighty responsibilities he will have in this critical position. As the first DNI, Ambassador Negroponte will not only serve a critical role immediately, he will also establish the relationships and set the precedent for future DNIs. Thus, when I met with the Ambassador, I encouraged him to aggressively use the authorities we worked so hard to secure in the intelligence reform bill. One of those key authorities concerns the DNI's responsibility for determining the budget for the national intelligence program. He also will have significant authority to execute that budget and to transfer funds, if needed, to meet emerging threats and the greatest priorities. Today, at a hearing before the Armed Services Committee on the nomination of General Hayden to be the No. 2 person to the DNI, I raised the issue with General Hayden about the need to aggressively exercise that budget authority. The law is very clear on this point, but already we have seen some signs from the Defense Department of a potential challenge to the new DNI in exercising that authority. I think it should be very clear, through the legislative history and in our conversations today, that the DNI has a direct relationship to the heads of the National Security Agency and the other intelligence agencies that are housed within the Pentagon but serve not only the Department of Defense but all intelligence consumers. I was pleased to hear General Hayden's understanding of the extent of that authority. Ambassador Negroponte will be the first intelligence CEO to set the community's budget, to establish community-wide intelligence gathering and analytical priorities, and to employ financial, technological, and human resources where and when they are most needed, or, as Secretary Powell might have put it, he will be calling the plays. This is an unprecedented challenge and unprecedented authority, and I am convinced John Negroponte will meet this challenge in an exemplary manner. I am convinced he understands the need to exercise that authority to the full extent of the law. Ambassador Negroponte will provide our intelligence community with accomplished, experienced, dedicated, and needed leadership. I wholeheartedly urge my colleagues to approve this important nomination without any delay. Again, I commend the chairman and the ranking member for bringing this nominee so quickly to the Senate floor.", u"Pursuant to House Resolution 331, the bill is considered read for amendment. The text of H.R. 2475 is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006''. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2006 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Department of State. (8) The Department of the Treasury. (9) The Department of Energy. (10) The Department of Justice. (11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (12) The National Reconnaissance Office. (13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (14) The Coast Guard. (15) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2006, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. ____ of the One Hundred Ninth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2006 under section 102 when the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify promptly the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2006 the sum of $_____. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2007. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized __ full-time personnel as of September 30, 2006. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2006 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2007. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2006, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2006 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of National Intelligence. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2006 the sum of $_____. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.", u"Mr. President, I salute Senator John McCain. He achieved something this week which is historic. He achieved an agreement with the Bush administration on the issue of torture. That took a lot of hard work on his part. He took a 90-9 vote in the Senate with him to the White House, meeting with the President's representatives. What Senator McCain was seeking is something fundamental. He wanted to reaffirm in law the fact that the United States would still stand by its word and by its values, that we would not engage in torture even though we are in this new age of terrorism and threat to America. He said: This is less about the enemy than it is about us, who we are and what we stand for. I can recall during the debate on this issue, Senator McCain took the floor and gave one of the best speeches I have heard in this Chamber, a speech only he could give. As a former prisoner of war, a Navy pilot shot down over Vietnam, he was a victim of torture. No one else in this Chamber, fortunately, can speak to it as he spoke to it. But in speaking to it, he reminded us that torture is not American. It is not a good means of interrogating prisoners or coming up with information to make America safer. There was a lengthy debate about whether his provision would be included in the final legislation. Fortunately, the White House has agreed to include it. I was happy to cosponsor that legislation. I have been raising this issue for the last several years. I know how controversial it can be. A few months ago I had the spotlight focused on me for some comments made at this same desk. But I believe that the issue of torture is one that we have to face forthrightly. Last week I was traveling in northern Africa and visited with one of our ambassadors. He is an ambassador to one of the Muslim nations. We talked about the challenges he faces with our involvement in Iraq. He said: The controversy about our involvement in Iraq paled in comparison to the controversy in his country about America's role when it came to torture. He said: It is hard for the Muslim population and Arab populations to understand why the United States would abandon a long-term, multidecade commitment not to engage in torture once they were involved in a war involving Arabs and Muslims. He reminded me--and I didn't need to be reminded--that we issue a human rights scorecard each year from the Department of State. Some of the questions we ask of countries around the world are: have you incarcerated someone without charges? Are you holding them indefinitely? Are you torturing them? If the answers are affirmative, we give them low marks. Today, obviously, those countries are asking whether the Americans live by the same standards they are imposing on others. John McCain's leadership, along with Senator John Warner, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, resulted in an important agreement to restate the most basic and bedrock principle, that America will not engage in torture. We will not engage in cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of prisoners: First, because it is not American; second, because it invites the same treatment on our soldiers and Americans; and third, because it doesn't work. We have found time and again, if you torture a person they will say anything to make the torture stop. That doesn't give you good information to make America safe. Let me salute Senator McCain for his leadership. Mr. President, I am troubled by the reports in the New York Times and Washington Post today that this administration, since 9/11, has been engaged in a practice which I thought had been clearly prohibited in America. That is the eavesdropping on individual American citizens, those in America, by major agencies such as the National Security Agency. This all started some 30 years ago during President Nixon's administration. It was an administration which created an enemies list. If your name was on that list, be careful; J. Edgar Hoover would be looking into every aspect of your life that he could. You might be audited by the Internal Revenue Service and you would be carefully watched and monitored. We decided that wasn't a good thing for any President to do. We made it clear that if you had good reason to eavesdrop on an American in the commission of a crime, involvement in terrorist activity, that was one thing. But to say you could do it with impunity, without any legal approval, that was unacceptable. Now we find it has been done for several years and several thousand Americans have been the subject of this wiretapping and eavesdropping. Mr. President, that is a troubling development. It says that this administration has decided when it comes to basic rights of Americans, they are above the law, not accountable; they don't have to go through the courts, don't have to follow the ordinary judicial process. That is something that Congress has to stand up and fight. We have to make it clear that even in the age of terrorism, basic freedoms and liberties of Americans have to be respected. I hope that as soon as we return from this holiday break the appropriate committees will initiate investigations, determine what has occurred, whether it has gone too far. I sincerely hope, on a bipartisan basis, that my colleagues will rally to once again assert the fundamentals when it comes to the right of privacy in America. We want to be safe in America but not at the cost of our freedom. That, unfortunately, has become an issue because of these most recent disclosures.", u"Mr. Speaker, merely hours after the Bush administration was celebrating the Iraqi election as a triumph for human freedom, what did we discover courtesy of the New York Times? That our own government, through the National Security Agency, is secretly spying on the phone calls and e-mails of American citizens without a warrant or a court order. And they have been doing so for nearly 4 years at the explicit direction of the President of the United States of America himself. This is even more egregious than any of the other suspensions of civil liberties that we have seen in the last 4 years. It makes the PATRIOT Act look like it was written by the ACLU. Has anyone in the White House read the Bill of Rights and the fourth amendment about the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures? It is a part of the same Constitution that the President has sworn to preserve, protect, and defend. Mr. Speaker, I am not exaggerating when I say that sometimes I do not recognize my own country. Secret gulags in Eastern Europe, the Vice President personally lobbying Senators to give the CIA the right to torture detainees, and now this. What do I tell my grandchildren about what America stands for? Does this White House believe in any transparency or oversight for anything they do, or do they think that getting 51 percent, or 51 out of every 100 votes gives them a mandate to operate behind a veil shielded from the day-in and day-out accountability that sustains a functioning democracy? Remember, this is coming from the folks who preach about limited government. It turns out that they only want limited government as long as it would protect the wealthy and the powerful from high taxes and burdensome regulations. When it comes to privacy rights and ordinary Americans, they are in favor of the most intrusive and invasive big government imaginable. The whole thing is Orwellian, Mr. Speaker. To defeat totalitarian extremism, we are adopting extremist totalitarian tactics of our own. In defense of freedom, we are undermining freedom. The whole thing is morally incoherent. Let us remember that the war on terrorism is partly an ideological struggle. It is about winning over hearts and minds. But when we violate the very principles of freedom that we are preaching in the Middle East, what happens to our moral authority? What happens to our global credibility? Why should anyone take us seriously? Those around the world who are skeptical of American values are surely noticing that we do not honor those values ourselves. And those who hate us will hate us even more when our government's hypocrisy is exposed. And even if you do not believe this surveillance authority holds the key to victory on the war on terrorism, let us think for a minute about whom we have empowered to exercise it. The very same intelligence apparatus that has proven itself dysfunctional time and time again over recent years. After all, the President himself just got through telling us this week that the U.S. intelligence community got it wrong on the most monumental and consequential issue it has faced in decades: whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. If they blew it on something as fundamental as that, why should we have confidence that they are conducting this domestic spying operation competently, without any abuses or overreach. Mr. Speaker, is that what more than 2,100 Americans have given their lives for in Iraq, the right for a government to snoop and eavesdrop on its own people without probable cause? If we, the supposed liberators, endorse and adopt these kinds of oppressive tactics, then what was the point of toppling Saddam Hussein, especially given that he did not even have weapons of mass destruction? This disgraceful episode makes me believe more strongly than ever that we must reevaluate our entire approach to providing national security, and it should start with bringing our troops home from Iraq. Not one more American should have to die for values that our government is willing to sacrifice here at home.", u"Then there is the Jose Padilla plot in May 2002. The United States disrupted a plot that involved blowing up an apartment building in the United States using a dirty bomb or a radiation dispersal device. In mid 2004, the United States and our partners disrupted a plot that involved urban targets in the United Kingdom. These plots involved using explosives against a variety of sites. Then there was a plot in Karachi, a plot at Heathrow Airport in London, another UK plot in 2004, another Arabian Gulf shipping plot, one in the Straits of Hormuz in 2002, and a tourist site targeted by al-Qaida. In 2003 there have been at least 10 disrupted terrorist attacks as a result of the concerted efforts of our law enforcement and intelligence personnel, at least 3 on American soil since September 2001. I ask my colleagues who are blocking the vote on the renewal and reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act: What could they possibly be thinking to believe that we ought to voluntarily relinquish the tools that have in part made it possible to keep us safe and to protect Americans from these terrorist attacks? I know, Mr. President, there are others in the Chamber who want to speak on this or related issues. I want to close on one last red herring that has been raised. As the New York Times reported, the President of the United States has authorized, after counseling with the Department of Justice and various legal authorities, as well as consulting with Congress on up to 12 occasions, the use of intercepted messages from the National Security Agency as part of our ongoing counterterrorism efforts. The New York Times suggested that this was a secret way to threaten the civil liberties of Americans. The fact is, as is now being revealed, Congress was consulted at least 12 times since September 11th about the President's authorization of these interceptions of communications, interceptions which were not solely within the United States but were from known links to international terrorism in the United States and known links with international terrorism overseas. It is perhaps not a coincidence that just before the vote on cloture on the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, the New York Times released this story. Indeed, at least two Senators--I heard with my own ears--cited this article as a reason why they voted to not allow a bipartisan majority to reauthorize the PATRIOT Act. As it turns out, the author of this article had turned in a book to his publisher 3 months ago. The paper failed to reveal that the story was tied to a book release and sale by the author James Risen. The title of the book is ``State of War, the Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration.'' It is about to be published by the Free Press in the coming weeks. It is a crying shame that America's safety is endangered by the potential expiration of the PATRIOT Act in part because a newspaper has seen fit to release, on the night before the vote on the reauthorization of the Act, and as part of a marketing campaign for selling the book, something that is blatantly misrepresentative of the facts and appears to be an attempt to strike terror or perhaps paranoia into Senators and others out of some unrealistic and inaccurate concern for invasion of civil liberties. It is appropriate that Congress have hearings to look into this, but the fact is, the President and his administration have briefed high ranking Members of Congress on 12 occasions since this so-called secret program of intercepting communications between known terrorist contacts in the United States and overseas occurred. When I came to Washington to serve in the Senate almost 3 years ago, someone jokingly referred to it as a logic-free zone where perception is reality. We all got a good laugh out of that. But the hysteria over the USA PATRIOT Act and the fact that people have, in too many instances, not focused on the hard-fought attempts to balance our security with civil liberty concerns by hammering out thoughtful and useful provisions is a disservice to the American people. It is not a typical policy disagreement that we sometimes have about taxes or some other issue. This is one that has the grave potential of endangering American lives because we know the terrorist threat exists. This threat continues to this day. September 11, while it was 4 years ago, is not an isolated event, as the listing I provided details. Terrorists will, if we let our guard down, hit us again. Then I ask: Where will the blame lie? If we have failed to do everything within our power to protect the American people, we will have failed to discharge our duty in this body. I hope our colleagues who are blocking a bipartisan majority from casting a vote to reauthorize the PATRIOT Act which will prevent the expiration of these 16 provisions will reconsider their decision. It is unthinkable to me that anyone would allow these provisions to expire. I realize there are differences of opinion. I am happy to have this debate. I understand that people have conscientiously held opinions that are different than mine about the importance of this Act, but to block a bipartisan majority from having the chance to vote is incredible.", u" Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred, as follows: H.R. 4647. A bill to amend the USA PATRIOT Act to extend the sunset of certain provisions of such Act; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. FOSSELLA: H.R. 4648. A bill to prohibit assistance to Lebanon unless the Government of Lebanon extradites Mohammed Ali Hammadi to the United States; to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mrs. BIGGERT: H.R. 4649. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Education to provide assistance to local educational agencies serving homeless children and youths displaced by Hurricane Katrina, Rita, or Wilma; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mr. DUNCAN (for himself, Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas, Mr. Young of Alaska, Mr. Oberstar, Mr. Boustany, Mr. Baker, and Mr. Melancon): H.R. 4650. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Army to carry out programs and activities to enhance the safety of levees in the United States; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Mrs. LOWEY: H.R. 4651. A bill to require equitable coverage of prescription contraceptive drugs and devices, and contraceptive services under health plans; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. STUPAK: H.R. 4652. A bill to provide Medicare beneficiaries with access to prescription drugs at Federal Supply Schedule prices; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. WAXMAN: H.R. 4653. A bill to repeal a prohibition on the use of certain funds for tunneling in certain areas with respect to the Los Angeles to San Fernando Valley Metro Rail project, California; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself and Mr. Lantos): H. Con. Res. 329. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress regarding the activities of Islamist terrorist organizations in the Western Hemisphere; to the Committee on International Relations. By Mrs. TAUSCHER (for herself and Mr. Conyers): H. Con. Res. 330. Concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress that the President's 2002 order authorizing electronic surveillance of United States persons without a warrant violates existing law prohibiting such electronic surveillance, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. CONYERS (for himself, Mr. Berman, Mr. Boucher, Mr. Nadler, Mr. Scott of Virginia, Ms. Zoe Lofgren of California, Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas, Ms. Waters, Mr. Meehan, Mr. Delahunt, Mr. Wexler, Mr. Weiner, Mr. Schiff, Ms. Linda T. Sanchez of California, Mr. Van Hollen, Ms. Wasserman Schultz, Mr. Kennedy of Rhode Island, Mr. Doggett, Mr. McDermott, Mr. Filner, Mr. Markey, Ms. Schakowsky, Ms. Lee, Mrs. Tauscher, Ms. McCollum of Minnesota, Mr. Udall of New Mexico, and Mr. Holt): H. Res. 643. A resolution directing the Attorney General to submit to the House of Representatives all documents in the possession of the Attorney General relating to warrantless electronic surveillance of telephone conversations and electronic communications of persons in the United States conducted by the National Security Agency; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Ms. SLAUGHTER: H. Res. 644. A resolution requesting the President and directing the Attorney General to transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution documents in the possession of those officials relating to the authorization of electronic surveillance of citizens of the United States without court approved warrants; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. WEXLER: H. Res. 645. A resolution requesting the President and directing the Secretary of Defense to transmit to the House of Representatives all information in the possession of the President or the Secretary of Defense relating to the collection of intelligence information pertaining to persons inside the United States without obtaining court-ordered warrants authorizing the collection of such information and relating to the policy of the United States with respect to the gathering of counterterrorism intelligence within the United States; to the Committee on Armed Services.", u"Mr. President, I rise today to honor the hundreds of thousands of civilian and military employees who have chosen to dedicate their lives to public service. This week, from May 3 through May 9, we celebrate Public Service Recognition Week. Organized by the Public Employees Roundtable since 1985, this week allows us to honor those who have chosen to serve their country and to educate the public about the broad variety of services government provides. President Kennedy once said: ``Let the public service be a proud and lively career. And let every man and woman who works in any area of our Nation's government, in any branch, at any level, be able to say with pride and honor in future years: `I served the United States Government in that hour of our Nation's need.' '' Our Nation is most certainly in a time of need. Great uncertainty exists about the state of world relations, the direction our Nation is headed, and the economic welfare of our society. Unfortunately, the pride and honor associated with public service has been diminished by a lack of respect. Rather than commending the important work Federal civilian employees do side-by-side with our military employees, society too often seeks to belittle their contributions; choosing instead to characterize the civil service as a large, inflexible bureaucracy. At the Federal level, we are experiencing a disturbing trend. The ranks of bright, active, and well-trained Federal employees are slowly diminishing. Of our 1.8 million Federal civil servants, 50 percent will be eligible to retire over the next five years. At the same time, a national poll by the Partnership for Public Service found that only one in four college-educated Americans expressed significant interest in working for the Federal Government. A recent survey by the Council for Excellence in Government said that young people, while eager to find a job that will allow them to help people, are less likely to choose government jobs than work in the non-profit sector. In my view, however, if our young people understood the expertise, the sacrifice, and the dedication required to serve the public, they would be less inclined to belittle this calling and more inclined to answer it. Young people should know, for instance, that civilian employees from agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the U.S. Capitol Police and the FBI worked side by side with the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force from Indian Head, MD to respond to the discovery of ricin in the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Without the civilian Federal researchers at the Human Genome Project, we would know much less about the make-up of the human body and, more importantly, be much further away from providing cures to genetic disorders such as cystic fibrosis and sickle cell anemia. Their work--a complete description of the draft of the DNA sequence of the human genome--was completed faster than originally planned. Without the hard work done by the civilian employees at the National Security Agency, we would likely be without a few things that today we consider basic necessities, such as computers and cassette tapes. Further, the development of more advanced theories and technologies such as quantum mathematics, nanotechnology, biometrics, and semiconductors--which are quickly changing our world's technological landscape--would have been hindered or never started but for the efforts of NSA's dedicated and innovative employees. The employees at the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Building and Fire Research Laboratory are about as inconspicuous a group of researchers as exist. But without them there would be no standard coupling for fire hoses or hydrants. If you do not know why that's important, consider the devastating fire that destroyed 2,500 buildings in an 80-block area in the heart of Baltimore in 1904. Responders came from fire departments in D.C., New York, and Philadelphia to help put out the blaze. But each department's hoses had different threads, so they could not be linked to Baltimore's hydrants, making them almost useless. After the fire, the Building and Fire Research Laboratory's predecessor, the National Bureau of Standards, worked with the National Fire Prevention Association to develop national standards and codes for fire equipment, which departments still use today. Finally, thanks to scientists at the National Cancer Institute, NCI, and the Food and Drug Administration, FDA, women's chances of detecting ovarian cancer earlier and possibly recovering have increased. Working together, NCI and FDA discovered that patterns of proteins found in patients' serum may reflect the presence of ovarian cancer, even at early stages. Currently, more than 80 percent of ovarian cancer patients are diagnosed at a late clinical stage and have a 20 percent or less chance of survival. This research may increase those chances. During this Public Service Recognition Week, I urge my colleagues to take a moment to appreciate advances such as these that our Nation and society have made as a result of the hard work of Federal civil servants. When President Kennedy initially released his Peace Corps proposal, the reactions he received convinced him that ``we have, in this country, an immense reservoir of such men and women--anxious to sacrifice their energies and time and toil to the cause of world peace and human progress.'' Things have not changed. The American populace is still full of men and women who want to serve. The challenge for us, as a Congress and a Federal Government, is to convince more of those men and women that civil service is a laudable way to serve their country.", u"I thank my colleague for those assurances and look forward to working with him over the next year to make sure our information operations needs are met. Now, let me explain why I think it is so important to stand this unit up in Delaware. Delaware is uniquely situated to provide the skills needed for information assurance and financial tracking. Delaware is host to 7 of the top 10 banking institutions in the U.S. Delaware also has the highest amount of computer networking per capita of any State. In addition, major research companies like DuPont and Astra-Zeneca make their headquarters in Delaware. Last, Delaware has the highest number of scientists and engineers per capita in the U.S. All of those statistics mean that many members of Delaware's Air National Guard have civilian employment in banks or other institutions. They understand what is required to protect financial information and to track it. They are on the cutting-edge of information protection today. Their skills cannot be used by the Government, however, because banks and financial institutions are very sensitive about the employees of other banks reviewing their financial transactions. To do this type of work, a person must be a Government employee. One of the best ways to provide the benefit of these private sector skills to Government agencies fighting terror is through the National Guard. Guard personnel stay on the cutting edge of these skills because of their private sector jobs. They can then provide that knowledge to the Government, something that a civilian government employee cannot do. In 2003, the National Security Agency and the Air Intelligence Agency recognized their shortfalls in information assurance and tracking skills and started asking some of these Delaware Guardsmen and women to help them meet their requirements. NSA will have spent $945,000 between 2003 and 2004 to make use of the Delaware Air Guard's expertise. They would like to spend an additional $900,000 in 2005. AIA is spending $150,000 in 2004 on these missions. They are spending this money because a real need exists. Last year, the Senate, and then the full Congress, agreed that this mission needed support and a full-time unit. Thirty personnel were added to the Air National Guard's end-strength to create this new information operations unit. This year, we had hoped to finish the job by providing the full complement of 60 personnel needed for the mission and the $3.997 million needed to fully fund this unit. That is $2.75 million for personnel costs and $1.247 million for operations and maintenance. Unfortunately that will not be possible. Some may wonder why we sought an amendment to add the personnel and funding needed. The reason is simple. The Delaware Air National Guard is too small to move people to this mission and still do their primary tactical airlift mission. The 166th tactical airlift wing has had its C-130s fully tasked to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. When I wrote Lieutenant General James at the Guard Bureau about standing up this new unit, he replied that he thought Delaware's Guard was well-postured for the mission, but his ``end strength cap makes it challenging to resource new initiatives.'' Our amendment would have taken care of that challenge. Up to now, the personnel who have been working with NSA and AIA so far have been working three jobs. Let me say that again, three jobs. It is simply not sustainable. They cannot continue to do their regular Air Guard mission in the 166th tactical airlift wing, their civilian job, and the third job of helping NSA and AIA. With a new unit, we can provide the critical information operations skills needed to fight terrorism without harming the on-going tactical airlift mission that is supporting troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. I know end strength increases are controversial, but we need to look at the big picture. Remember, Congress agreed that a new unit was needed to do these missions last year. The facts on the ground have not changed. This is exactly the type of new mission the Air Guard should be doing. Only with the Guard can you get the commercial expertise and cutting edge knowledge needed to protect information systems and to track financial transactions. I look forward to hearing the Pentagon's thoughts about this new mission. Again, I think it's important to stress that information assurance and financial information operations are critical to the war on terrorism and to a transformed military. This is a growing area, not a shrinking one. We have looked carefully at all of our opportunities to provide the needed highly-skilled personnel to the fight. It is my belief that we can only do this if we create a unit to take advantage of the experienced and knowledgeable personnel available. No matter how patriotic people are, they cannot continue to work three jobs for years on end. Creating the new 166th information operations unit in the Delaware Air National Guard will enhance national security. It was the right thing to do last year and it's still the right thing to do. I hope that the Air Force will recognize that as we move forward in the war on terrorism.", u" The Clerk read as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Department of Energy High- End Computing Revitalization Act of 2004''. For purposes of this Act: (1) High-end computing system.--The term ``high-end computing system'' means a computing system with performance that substantially exceeds that of systems that are commonly available for advanced scientific and engineering applications. (2) Leadership system.--The term ``Leadership System'' means a high-end computing system that is among the most advanced in the world in terms of performance in solving scientific and engineering problems. (3) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)). (4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Energy. (a) In General.--The Secretary shall carry out a program of research and development (involving software and hardware) to advance high-end computing systems, and shall develop and deploy such systems for advanced scientific and engineering applications. (b) Program.--The program shall-- (1) support both individual investigators and multidisciplinary teams of investigators; (2) conduct research in multiple architectures, which may include vector, reconfigurable logic, streaming, processor- in-memory, and multithreading architectures; (3) conduct research on software for high-end computing systems, including research on algorithms, programming environments, tools, languages, and operating systems for high-end computing systems, in collaboration with architecture development efforts; (4) provide for sustained access by the research community in the United States to high-end computing systems and to Leadership Systems, including provision for technical support for users of such systems; (5) support technology transfer to the private sector and others in accordance with applicable law; and (6) ensure that the high-end computing activities of the Department of Energy are coordinated with relevant activities in industry and with other Federal agencies, including the National Science Foundation, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Institutes of Health, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Environmental Protection Agency. (c) Leadership Systems Facilities.-- (1) In general.--As part of the program carried out under this Act, the Secretary shall establish and operate Leadership Systems facilities to-- (A) conduct advanced scientific and engineering research and development using Leadership Systems; and (B) develop potential advancements in high-end computing system hardware and software. (2) Administration.--In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary shall provide access to Leadership Systems on a competitive, merit-reviewed basis to researchers in United States industry, institutions of higher education, national laboratories, and other Federal agencies. In addition to amounts otherwise made available for high- end computing, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out this Act-- (1) $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2005; (2) $55,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and (3) $60,000,000 for fiscal year 2007. In carrying out its programs on the social, economic, legal, ethical, and cultural implications of information technology, the National Science Foundation shall support research into the implications of computers (including both hardware and software) that would be capable of mimicking human abilities to learn, reason, and make decisions. (a) Amendments.--Section 23 of the National Science Foundation Authorization Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 1862n-9) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration'' each place it appears in subsections (a) and (b) and inserting ``, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Department of Energy''; (2) in subsection (b)(3), by inserting ``the Secretary of Energy,'' after ``the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,''; (3) in subsection (c)-- (A) by striking ``5'' in each of paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``4''; (B) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2); (C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4), and in that paragraph by striking ``3'' and inserting ``2''; and (D) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph: ``(3) 3 members selected by the Secretary of Energy; and''; and (4) in subsection (f), by striking ``the advisory bodies of other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Energy, which may engage in related research activities'' and inserting ``other Federal advisory committees that advise Federal agencies which engage in related research activities''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on March 15, 2005. Section 14(e) of the Metric Conversion Act of 1975 (15 U.S.C. 205l(e)) is repealed.", u"Mr. President, Senator Specter is offering the first of what I anticipate will be many amendments to alter the authority of the national intelligence director. He is arguing that the Collins-Lieberman bill does not go far enough. Later on in this debate you will hear from those who believe our bill empowers the NID too far, with too much authority in the NID. Our approach gives the national intelligence director full budget authority, including the authority to execute, reprogram, and transfer funds over the entire budgets of the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, which are all now located within the Department of Defense. Our bill also gives the NID enhanced tasking authority, the power to transfer personnel and authority over the selections of the heads of these agencies with concurrence from the Secretary of Defense. What it does not do is sever the link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense, nor does it give the NID exclusive control over these agencies. And that would be the impact of Senator Specter's amendment. He would sever the link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense, and he would give the NID exclusive control over these agencies. I think that would be a mistake. I believe our legislation strikes the right balance in the relationship that it sets forth between the NID and these agencies. I note that our approach is consistent with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. It is consistent with the recommendations of the administration. The 9/11 Commission, indeed, opposes adoption of Senator Specter's amendment. The Commission believes it would be a mistake to sever that link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense. In deciding to keep these agencies--the NSA, the NGA, and the NRO--within the Department of Defense, we were cognizant of the fact that the NSA and the NGA are designated as combat support agencies. We did not want to in any way weaken or break the bonds between these agencies and the military forces that serve in that capacity. Indeed, many current and former defense officials warned that taking such a step would be counterproductive and would risk breaking something that is working well for the military today. For example, at our hearings, Secretary Powell said: We should not break the link between these intelligence organizations and the organizations that they are supporting, especially within the military context and the direct kind of support that the NRO and similar organizations give to the warfighter. I would note that by severing that link, the Specter amendment would create some real anomalies. For example, in his proposal, he requires that every 2 years, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would submit to the national intelligence director a report on the combat readiness of these organizations. Why would a report on combat readiness go to the national intelligence director rather than to the Secretary of Defense? There are some other unanticipated consequences of the Specter amendment that illustrate how wholesale changes to the status of NGA, NRO, and the NSA might have completely unintended consequences. For example, title X, section 442(b) now provides that the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall improve means of navigating vessels of the Navy and the merchant marine by providing, under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, accurate and inexpensive nautical charts, sailing directions, books on navigation, and manuals of instructions for the use of all vessels in the United States and of navigators generally. The Specter amendment, in changing the Secretary of Defense to the national intelligence director, would make the national intelligence director responsible for a navigation mapping responsibility that has nothing to do with intelligence. That is just an example of some of the unintended consequences. Again, the approach taken by Senator Specter--and I know he has given this matter a great deal of thought--does not have the support of the 9/11 Commission. It does not have the support of the administration. It would sever the link between these combat support agencies and the Secretary of Defense. I will note that these three agencies within the Pentagon do serve customers other than the Secretary of Defense. There are other consumers, such as the CIA, for the intelligence information they produce. That is why our legislation does give the NID significant authority over these agencies, including budget authority, the ability to transfer personnel, and the ability, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, to name the heads of these agencies. That is the right balance. But to break that link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense simply, in my judgment, does not make sense. I urge opposition to the amendment.", u"SA 3754. Mr. ROBERTS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2845, to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: On page 20, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following: (d) Responsibility for Performance of Specific Functions.-- In carrying out responsibilities under this section, the National Intelligence Director shall ensure-- (1) through the National Security Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), the continued operation of an effective unified organization for the conduct of signals intelligence activities and shall ensure that the product is disseminated in a timely manner to authorized recipients; (2) through the Defense Intelligence Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), effective management of human intelligence activities (other than activities of the defense attaches, which shall remain under the direction of the Secretary of Defense) and other national intelligence collection activities performed by the Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) through the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), with appropriate representation from the intelligence community, the continued operation of an effective unified organization-- (A) for carrying out tasking of imagery collection; (B) for the coordination of imagery processing and exploitation activities; (C) for ensuring the dissemination of imagery in a timely manner to authorized recipients; and (D) notwithstanding any other provision of law and consistent with the policies, procedures, standards, and other directives of the National Intelligence Director and the Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority, for-- (i) prescribing technical architecture and standards related to imagery intelligence and geospatial information and ensuring compliance with such architecture and standards; and (ii) developing and fielding systems of common concern related to imagery intelligence and geospatial information; and (4) through the National Reconnaissance Office (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), the continued operation of an effective unified organization for the research, development, acquisition, and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to satisfy the requirements of all elements of the intelligence community. (e) National Intelligence Collection.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) ensure the efficient and effective collection of national intelligence using technical means, human sources, and other lawful techniques; (2) provide overall direction for and coordinate the collection of national intelligence through human sources by elements of the intelligence community authorized to undertake such collection; and (3) coordinate with other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government which are authorized to undertake such collection and ensure that the most effective use is made of the resources of such departments, agencies, and elements with respect to such collection, and resolve operational conflicts regarding such collection. On page 20, line 4, strike ``(d)'' and insert ``(f)''. On page 32, beginning on line 8, strike ``oversee and direct'' and all that follows through line 10 and insert ``direct and coordinate''. On page 179, strike lines 1 through 4 and insert the following: ``(b) Supervision.--(1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be under the direction, supervision, and control of the National Intelligence Director. ``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director regarding the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. On page 179, line 20, add ``and'' at the end. On page 179, strike line 21 and all that follows through page 180, line 6. On page 180, line 7, strike ``(4)'' and insert ``(3)''. On page 181, strike lines 1 through 10. On page 200, strike lines 5 through 11 and insert the following: Section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``ensure'' and inserting ``assist the Director in ensuring''; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) by striking paragraphs (1), (2), and (3); (B) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) respectively; (C) in paragraph (1), as so redesignated, by striking ``or the National Security Council)'' and inserting ``, the National Security Council, or the National Intelligence Director (when exercising the responsibilities and authorities provided under this Act, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, or any other provision of law))''; and (D) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking ``Department of Defense human intelligence activities, including''.", u"I reiterate my strong support for this bill and the balance that has been struck by the committee in the drafting of this bill. It strikes the right balance. I am pleased to be an original cosponsor. In my remarks on Monday, I mentioned I was going to be submitting an amendment concerning the relationship between the FBI foreign intelligence functions and the national intelligence director. I thank both the majority and the ranking member staff for working with my staff to work out this amendment. It will be worked out and it will be the chairman's intent to present this amendment for unanimous consent. However, I will clearly state the intent of the amendment. The FBI functions as part of the intelligence community in the gathering, analyzing, and disseminating of information about the plans, intentions, and capabilities of our foreign enemies, including, most importantly, counter-terrorists. That effort, in my view, should be under the overall supervision of the national intelligence director. Let me be clear, though, this amendment does not mean the national intelligence director should run or control operations inside the United States. When the FBI, under the operational control of the FBI director and the Attorney General, works as a foreign intelligence agency, it should do so as part of that community under the general guidance of the national intelligence director. An excellent example of this issue is now part of the extensive record of structural intelligence failure prior to the September 11 attacks, the way the intelligence community handled, or I should say mishandled, the so-called Phoenix document information and the Moussaoui information. Here we had in two different places FBI agents acquiring factual information which is of clear foreign intelligence value: that foreign individuals, associated with foreign terrorist organizations, may have been learning to fly passenger planes. At the very same time, the rest of the intelligence community had information that al-Qaida was preparing to strike against the United States and also that there had been past consideration of the use of airplanes in an attack methodology. Putting together these two disparate pieces of information is the business of an effective intelligence community. But it did not happen, in part, I believe, because the FBI part of the communication was not linked up with the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency parts of the community. The bill before the Senate goes far toward remedying this by placing the FBI foreign intelligence elements under the overall supervision of the national intelligence director. I am concerned the bill presently contains ambiguities that, if left in, will cause confusion in the future. That is because the bill incorporates, with no change, current law which defines the role of the FBI intelligence activities. However, that law is confusing, it is internally inconsistent, and I believe it is the source of many of the problems which beset the FBI as part of the intelligence community. This amendment does three basic things to fix this. I want the record to reflect that. It clarifies critical definitions in the law. It makes a small alteration in the current law to make clear that the term of art ``counterintelligence'' is a subset of foreign intelligence, not an alternative to foreign intelligence. Second, it makes clear that when the FBI is engaged in law enforcement, it is not part of the national intelligence program or under the NID supervision, but removes the word ``counterintelligence'' from this so-called carve-out language. This is critical because this language in existing law was the confusing foundation upon which much of the wall between the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community was built. This amendment creates a directorate of intelligence in the FBI. As written presently, the bill places the activities of the Office of Intelligence of the FBI clearly within the national intelligence program. This is good, but because the Office of Intelligence has no statutory basis, it could be rendered useless in the future if that office is removed or changed by a future FBI director. This amendment renames the office the Directorate of Intelligence and gives it a clear basis in law. Finally, this amendment introduces some clarifying language to ensure that the section governing ``FBI improvements'' is read to ensure that these improvements come as part of a larger, coordinated effort, led by the national intelligence director to improve the standards and practices of the entire intelligence community. It does this by ensuring that the FBI Director's improvement program is guided by the national intelligence director. And it defines a ``certified intelligence officer''--that is a term introduced for the first time in the underlying bill--to make sure that ``certification'' means meeting intelligence community standards, developed by the national intelligence director. The bottom line is that the FBI's intelligence functions must be part of a larger effort, guided by a strong leader, and linked carefully with all the other agencies and Departments in the intelligence community. There are still two parts of this amendment that are being worked out by staff. I appreciate their hard work very much and thank them. I also would like to thank the chair and the ranking member for their cooperation. I am very hopeful this amendment can later be adopted by unanimous consent. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 3718 be set aside for the present time.", u"Mr. President, I come to the floor to ask a number of questions of my colleagues who are managing the bill. I have very high regard for the chairperson, Senator Collins. I have worked with her on other matters and found that she is an extremely able and diligent Member. I admire the way she has handled this legislation. I have watched the process as it went through the committee. I am not on the committee but I watched as it was being televised. I thought it was a very professional process. I also have very high regard for the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman. I am not on the relevant committees. I am not on the Intelligence Committee. I am not on the Defense Committee. I am on the Budget Committee and the Finance Committee and deal with these issues from a budget point of view and financing point of view. With that said, I come to the floor to ask a series of questions. I want to indicate that I have with me charts that were prepared by the office of Senator Lieberman to talk about what the structure currently is and what this legislation would do to change it and to raise a number of concerns that I have about that change. First, I think we should indicate the problem we are confronting with the American intelligence community, where there is a lack of coordination and communication, which has been clearly outlined in a series of hearings and a series of reports, including the report by the 9/11 Commission, including the report by the Intelligence Committee, including the work of the very able chairman, the Senator from Maine, all that has been laid across the record very clearly. This chart from the office of Senator Lieberman shows the organization of the intelligence community as it is, with the President and the National Security Council overseeing the various agencies of Government, including the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, but has within it the National Security Agency, the National Geospacial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Military Services and Combatant Commands. The large majority of the funding of the intelligence community is in the Department of Defense. I think maybe that is too little understood by the general public. But that is fact. The large majority of the funding is not at the Central Intelligence Agency. I think people in the United States probably assume that is the case; it is not. The vast majority of the funding for intelligence operations is within the Department of Defense. Other agencies that have a significant role, of course, are the Attorney General's office, because he oversees the FBI, and the FBI has responsibility for intelligence operations within the United States. Then we have the Secretary of Homeland Security within which we have the Information, Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Director and the Coast Guard intelligence. The Secretary of State has the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Secretary of Treasury has an intelligence branch, as does the Secretary of Energy. The problem with this structure, which has been pointed out repeatedly, is that these are a series of stovepipes, basically leading only to the White House. There is nobody that is in overall coordination and direction of these various intelligence agencies. And the idea has been to have a national intelligence director that would have responsibility to coordinate and communicate with respect to these various agencies. So the proposal before us is to create a national intelligence director with these other various agencies already existing reporting to the national intelligence director, so there is someone in a position to coordinate and ultimately communicate what intelligence agencies are finding. Let me just say that I thought that what was going to happen with the national intelligence director is that funds were going to be brought together and we would not have the continuing existence of all of these other agencies. That is really what I want to ask the managers about. The concern that I have is if we have a failure of communication and coordination, especially between the FBI and the CIA, how does adding another entity, how does adding another player improve the chances for coordination and communication? Let me say that I was trained in business management. My career before I came here was to manage organizations. My experience has been the more layers, the less communication, the more inefficient the communication. When this was first outlined and I found out that the CIA is still going to exist, I must say I was taken aback. I was surprised by that. I thought the Central Intelligence Agency would become the new intelligence, with a new national intelligence director. Therefore, we wouldn't be adding another player to the mix, but we would be putting somebody in a position of authority so that we could hold them accountable. The concern I have is instead of that, we have maintained a Central Intelligence Agency and all of the other intelligence agencies we had before, and added a national intelligence director. The fundamental concern I have and the question I have is, Why has the committee concluded that this is the right way to proceed? Why wouldn't it be better by joining the function, reducing the number of players, reducing the number of boxes on the organizational chart, instead of adding a layer? I would be quick to say I think you need to have a national intelligence director, somebody who is in overall coordination and control because before we did not have that. That is really the question I came to the floor this afternoon to query the chairman and ranking member about. I would be happy to yield so they might respond.", u"Madam President, this amendment is for the purpose of bringing into realignment what I believe is the proper balance of the authorities of the new NID together with the respective Cabinet officers, each of whom has some portion of intelligence responsibilities remaining, as well as the Director of the FBI. I will read the amendment briefly so that colleagues can follow exactly what I am trying to do. The amendment says: Concurrence of NID in certain appointments recommended by Secretary of Defense. (1) In the event of a vacancy and a position referred to in paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense shall obtain the concurrence of the National Intelligence Director before recommending to the President an individual for nomination to fill such vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the Secretary may make the recommendation to the President without the concurrence of the Director, but shall include in the recommendation a statement that the Director does not concur in the recommendation. It is just to bring into balance the fact that according to my research, each of the other departments and agencies that have an intelligence role get to recommend, with the concurrence of the Cabinet officer or the head of the FBI. This is the one instance with regard to these combat agencies where it should be brought in alignment with the other methodology and procedures adopted for these important personnel selections. I draw the attention of the managers to section 117(b) of the bill before us. It gives the national intelligence director responsibility and authority to recommend appointments for several agencies that hopefully will continue to be retained within the Department of Defense: The National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. I say hopefully because we have thus far withstood the very significant amendment by the distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania, coauthored by the distinguished colleague from Kansas, Mr. Roberts, and others. The Senate addressed that and by an overwhelming majority literally rejected the taking of these three combat agencies and putting them under the direct jurisdiction of the NID. Now, that is a concept that was hard fought, decided, and as a consequence, hopefully it will remain as it is in the managers' bill. The purpose of the amendment was to dislodge the managers' section with regard to that. That was rejected by the Senate very resoundingly. I believe, therefore, it is appropriate at this time to bring into alignment with the other departments and agencies the authority for the Secretary of Defense over these three entities which remain in his department to make the recommendation to the President with the concurrence of the NID, and in those instances where there is nonconcurrence the President then would have the benefit of that diversity of viewpoints. That is the purpose of this amendment. We must remind ourselves that these are combat support agencies in the Department of Defense. Under the bill, as of this moment, the agencies remain under the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Then the interesting aspect of this, which is important to my amendment is that in the case of the NSA, this is normally a military promotion from two stars to three stars to take on this important position of the Director of NSA, and that Director of NSA also serves in the position of Deputy Commander U.S. Strategic Command for Information, Operations, Planning and Integration, a very critical warfighting post. Consequently, these are matters that the Secretary of Defense, who is accountable to the President and who has direct line In the case of the NRO, this is a civilian appointment, to direct the activities of the National Reconnaissance Office but is an appointment as the Under Secretary of the Air Force. He is dual hatted, again, an individual who serves not only in the important post of the intelligence NRO but as an Under Secretary of the Air Force in the Department of Defense. It is imperative that the Secretary of Defense have the authority to make the recommendation together with the concurrence of the NID. In the case of the NGA, this can be a military appointment similar to the NSA. One primary function of the NGA is to meet the mapping needs of our military forces. I repeat, the military forces are highly dependent upon this agency for the tactical maps that are needed wherever they are in the world today facing the challenges and the threats to our country. These three appointments, I say most respectfully to the managers, I feel ever so strongly should be initiated by the Secretary of Defense with a recommendation, and then the statute, if my amendment is adopted, will give the concurrence of the NID as an essential part of the process. Current law provides for the Secretary of Defense to recommend appointment of these individuals with the concurrence of the DCI. We have clear evidence for many years this system has worked and worked well. There are examples where the DCI nonconcurred and the Secretary revised the nomination in a manner consistent with gaining the concurrence of the Director of the CIA. The President has said he does not want anything we do in the area of intelligence reform to blur the lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability between him and the heads of the departments. I feel my amendment will meet that criterion as set forth by the President. I strongly urge my colleagues to examine the current provision, examine the practice with respect to other departments and agencies in the Government, and hopefully I will gain the support of the managers as well as of my colleagues and that this amendment will be adopted. I yield the floor.", u"Madam President, I thank my friend from Virginia, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee whom I so respect and for whom I have such a feeling of personal affection. I probably should not say this for the record, Senator Warner, but my wife probably wouldn't be happy to hear that I was opposing you. She has all too much regard for your judgment and opinions. But nonetheless, I go forward. Let me put this amendment in context. In response to the 9/11 Commission Report, Senator Frist and Senator Daschle sent it to our Governmental Affairs Committee to consider and then recommend, on the basis of that report, action to the Senate--which we have done. Senator Collins and I and the members of the committee essentially built a structure, a national intelligence director, a leader for our intelligence community where there is none now--what I called a quarterback for our intelligence team--where there is no quarterback, a general for our intelligence service. There have been two amendments put forward, in now this fifth day of debate on the bill, that went at the architecture of the structure we have recommended. One was by Senator Specter, which would have dramatically altered, gone well beyond, what we had. Senator Warner knows, because he was good enough to come and speak against the amendment; it would have had the new NID in line control of all of these intelligence agencies, including those that are housed and will continue to be housed in the Defense Department. That was overwhelmingly rejected by the Senate. Yesterday, there was a different kind of assault on the structure we are proposing from our committee in the amendment offered by the Senator from South Carolina which I believe and represent would have created in name a national intelligence coordinator but given that person no authority, no power. It would have been the status quo because it would have looked as if we had done something, but we would not have done anything. That amendment was overwhelmingly defeated. I am grateful for both of those votes. The amendment which the Senator from Virginia proposes, as in some sense the amendment the Senator from West Virginia proposed earlier today, does not knock off the structure we have proposed but alters it in ways that I fear--certainly cumulatively--would weaken the structure and not allow the national intelligence director to play the role the 9/11 Commission and our committee wants it to play. Is it a big difference? No. But one element of strengthening this position of national intelligence director is to make the influence of the director over our national intelligence agencies--the National Security Agency, which deals with signal intelligence and communications that are heard in the interest of our national security, the National Reconnaissance Organization, which puts satellites up in the air, and the National Geospatial Agency, which has all of these remarkable capacities technologically to see ground imagery and help our military and other intelligence services to do what they have to do to protect us. Here is the point: Those are national assets. Of course, they are used every day by the military, by the Department of Defense. The DOD is a very important customer, maybe the most active customer, but not the only customer of these assets--of signal intelligence, image intelligence, and human intelligence. The CIA, as Senator Collins indicated, depends on these satellites and the other systems for important intelligence. So does the State Department. So does now the Department of Homeland Security, even the We are trying to say that these national assets ought to report to the national intelligence director, and part of that is to give the director the opportunity to start the process for nominating the heads of these agencies. That is a change. Now that is done. As Senator Collins indicated, with the Secretary of Defense, we want to make a slight change. The Secretary of Defense has the right to concur or oppose. In most cases this will be worked out between the national intelligence director and the Secretary of Defense. Lord knows, they and their deputies are working out 100 decisions every day right now. But if it is not worked out, the dissent will go to the President, and ultimately the President will decide. It is a only a difference. The Secretary of Defense will begin the process of who is going to head the national agency or the NID. Ultimately, the President will decide. Why is that different under our bill for these three agencies as opposed to the head of a counterterrorism division in the FBI, or that information analysis, intelligence, and for infrastructure protection division of Homeland Security? Because these three are uniquely national assets. The NSA, NRO, and NGA serve all of the community and they ought to be under the director of the community, and he or she ought to have the first say in who fills that position. That is why this is an important part of our structure, and why I respectfully oppose the amendment, because it would weaken the structure by pulling out a couple of the boards.", u"I thank my distinguished colleague. I would like to now go to the bill and specifically draw the managers' attention to pages 6 and 7. The bill reads: The term ``National Intelligence Program''-- And that is what the distinguished manager was addressing-- (A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs, projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence community; (ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities (whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office . . . Now, therein is the problem that the Senator from Virginia has. What is the meaning of ``whether or not pertaining to national intelligence''? Because the title says this is the definition of national intelligence. (A)(i) basically gives that, and then (ii) seems to extend the definition to include programs that are not now part of the national intelligence program; that is, ``whether or not pertaining.'' I find that of considerable concern. The purpose of the amendment is to clarify that form because having had considerable experience when I worked in the Department and the years that I have been privileged to be on the Armed Services Committee--and I have to be very careful as I speak because these are so highly classified, but I will just give generally a picture of my concern. Right now, the JMIP literally contracts extensively with the Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the NGA, as it is referred to. For example, the Department of Defense puts in the JMIP budget, through the budgeting process, a block of money. It can then go and contract with these several what we call combat agencies, because they have all the assets--the technical people to do the work. So they sign the contract for a program and that program is absolutely essential to the functioning of, in many instances, the TIARA program, but in many instances the JMIP. And it is essential. The JMIP cannot function unless that particular program for which it has contracted with the NGA is fulfilled. As I read this amendment--let's call it program X--program X could be transferred under the language ``whether or not pertaining to National intelligence,'' and it goes into the NGA, and then, frankly, the NID might make a decision that, wait a minute, we have to get a very expensive overhead system and we have to go down into the various budgets of the different combat agencies and scrape up some money. So they come down and they say JMIP says they need the money, but I think we have to prioritize. We are going to take the money and we are going to put it toward the overhead system and it will not be used--for example, this is one of the main functions of the National Geospatial Agency--to make maps. As a matter of fact, when I first came to the Senate it was the old mapping agency. Now it has been combined several times through a number of job descriptions. But that could be lost. Suddenly we are controverting the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, that everything in the TIARA and the JMIP is going to be left untouched. That is the problem I see. I think we have to take a good look at this amendment because my amendment eliminates that language--that is one of the two amendments--it eliminates it in such a way that we redefine that paragraph 1. On page 6, the one I read from, strike so-and-so and put this language in, that is: The term ``National Intelligence Program''-- (ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities of the National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the date of enactment of this Act, including the Central Intelligence Agency-- And then it goes on to read: All I have done is keep in place the recommendation of the Commission. The very words I have heard the distinguished managers say on the floor a number of times--and I have it back in the previous Records, in which she has represented to this body in the course of the four or five days we have been debating that we are not touching TIARA and we are not touching the JMIP. There is my problem. I believe this fixes it. The next amendment addresses what the distinguished managers said a few minutes ago. There could come a time where it is the judgment of the NID that some of these programs should no longer be under the jurisdiction of the JMIP, and therefore my other amendment kicks in. It reads as follows: Removal From Current Programs. A program, project, or activity referred to in subsection (a) may be removed from the Joint Military Intelligence Program or the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities programs only if agreed to by the National Intelligence Director and the Secretary of Defense. So the two of them could make adjustments in the future. But right now, we have a number of programs in JMIP which are being performed by the combat agencies and I think it would not be in our best interests to dislodge those programs now. In the future, if the two heads agree, this is the statutory authority to do it. I feel very strongly about these amendments. So much so I will ask for votes on them if we are not able to--I don't say that in the way of anything other than expressing my sincerity in these amendments, but I hope you could possibly accept them. If you cannot, I feel obligated to ask for the yeas and nays.", u"Madam President, I call up this amendment with the intention of withdrawing it. We had discussions with the chairman of the committee, along with the ranking member. While we feel this is a significantly important amendment, we are still a ways from coming to an agreement relative to the substance of it. Basically, in today's intelligence community, there are 15 agencies within the Federal Government that have some jurisdiction and some involvement. Eight of those 15 agencies are located within the Department of Defense. We have our three combat support agencies--the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office--all of which have been discussed very liberally within this debate. We also have the Defense Intelligence Agency, as well as every one of the four service branches with an intelligence division. Under the current setup--and the setup that will be in place after the passage of the intelligence reform bill, as it is now on the floor--all eight of those agencies report to the Secretary of Defense and they will report in a dual capacity to the Secretary of Defense and the National Intelligence Director. Senator Nelson, who has been a very strong cohort and cosponsor of this amendment, and I strongly believe that what we need to do to improve the effectiveness and the communication in the intelligence community relevant to the Department of Defense is to combine all eight of those intelligence agencies under one combatant commander, create a new combatant commander that is at the four-star level and require all eight of these agencies to report to that one four-star general so that the Secretary of Defense and the national intelligence director have one person to go to when it comes to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence from a Department of Defense perspective. Having been involved in this for the last 4 years, both in my last 2 years on the House side and 2 years now on the Senate side, I know how complex the intelligence world is and how many overlaps there are between the civilian side and the Defense Department side and how absolutely necessary it is that we have an ongoing line of communication between the military and civilian departments and agencies that are involved in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence and the sharing of that information at different levels and across various agencies. For the Secretary of Defense to have eight people report to him and for the new National Intelligence Director to have eight people report to him, when we could have one person reporting to both of those two on issues relating to military intelligence, seems almost commonsensical that we reduce those eight down to one if we are going to provide a more efficient, a more effective intelligence line of communication. That is the substance of our amendment. While I understand there is some objection forthcoming to the inclusion of the amendment, Senator Nelson and I wanted to offer it, we want to debate it, and we want to make sure this entire body knows we are going to come back next year when we have a little different forum within which to operate to offer this amendment again as a stand-alone bill and see it to its conclusion. I close by saying that there is some objection from the Department of Defense on amendment 3710. While they are not publicly objecting, if they were asked, they would say they would rather not have a unified combatant command for intelligence because they want to have the flexibility of doing it the way they want to do it. Several years ago, we had a similar situation relative to the consolidation of special operations when this body took the lead and told the Department of Defense: We are going to create a new unified combatant command for special forces, or SOCOM; we are going to create a four-star commander and consolidate all special operations under SOCOM and that one combatant commander. The Defense Department resisted that, but today they will tell you at the Pentagon that it is one of the best things we have ever done. It was this body that initiated it. Senator Nelson and I think the same thing should apply in the area of intelligence. While I will withdraw the amendment, we both wanted to stress that a unified combatant command for military intelligence will be equally important for informing the National Intelligence Director of military intelligence requirements as it will be for assigning military intelligence capabilities to assist in fulfilling the National Intelligence Director's intelligence responsibilities. I yield to my colleague from Nebraska, Senator Nelson.", u"Madam President, I thank my colleague for the opportunity to join with him to support this bipartisan legislation which we will be working to get passed in January. As my colleague said, the new command will be a functional rather than a regional command, just like the U.S. Strategic Command in my State of Nebraska, and the U.S. Special Operations Command in Florida, the U.S. Joint Forces Command in Virginia, and U.S. Transportation Command in Illinois. As stated, the goal of this new command will be to organize the eight combat support intelligence elements within the Department of Defense under a single military commander. These elements will include bringing together what are often referred to as the alphabet agencies. Most people know them more by their initials than they do by the actual names. But it will bring together the DIA, or the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine intelligence offices. All total, these offices employ thousands with budgets in the billions. Eighty percent of all intelligence gathered by the U.S. Government is used by our armed services, and the ability to rapidly disseminate this information, as well as share the information, often means the difference between success and failure in the field. This new combatant commander will streamline the flow of information from our combat support elements to the warfighter, an important part, an important role for this agency. The responsibility of the military intelligence commander will include intelligence collection and analysis in response to requests from the national intelligence director. As we know, this past week we all heard a great deal about whether it should be a NID, national intelligence director, or a NIC, whether it should be about directing or coordinating. This commander will act as the single entry point for the NID to assign military intelligence capabilities, and will strengthen the coordination of those efforts. This will strengthen coordination between the NID and the Department of Defense because without one central contact inside DOD who can manage the military intelligence capabilities of the Department, it will be an extraordinary challenge for somebody outside DOD, such as the NID, to proficiently administer eight separate military intelligence assets. This new command will prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense and the NID recommendations and budget proposals for military intelligence forces and activities. Additionally, the commander will establish priorities for military intelligence that coincide with national priorities established by the NID and approved by the President. The commander will also ensure interoperability of intelligence sharing within the Department of Defense and within the intelligence community as a whole, as directed by the NID. The commander will answer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President, and will represent the Department of Defense in the intelligence community under the NID. I realize some of my colleagues may be asking the question whether this new position will add yet another layer to military intelligence-gathering agencies, but consider the fact that no military coordinator currently exists. So I do not see this as another layer; I view it as a necessary position that DOD has been far too long without. Perhaps if the commander for military intelligence already existed, then discovering how command was severed at Abu Ghraib might have been easier. The tragedy there likely would not have been prevented entirely, but there certainly would have been more direct lines of accountability with a combatant commander for military intelligence. This is an opportunity for us to debate the issue at this time, but the opportunity to pass it after the first of the year will be one that I think we must, in fact, take up. It will improve coordination and will not undermine the direction of the national intelligence director, but it will, in fact, help harmonize in the sharing of intelligence throughout the entire military and intelligence community. I thank my colleague from Georgia for the opportunity to participate, and I congratulate the chairman of the committee and the ranking member for doing an outstanding job in reforming our intelligence-gathering agencies' operations. It is not an easy task. We think this could be a part of it, but rather than have any effect in slowing down the operation of what we are doing today, we think we can take this up at another time.", u"(Strike the part shown in black brackets and insert the part shown in italic.) Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (1) Center.--The term ``Center'' means a High-End Software Development Center established under section 3(d). (2) High-end computing system.--The term ``high-end computing system'' means a computing system with performance that substantially exceeds that of systems that are commonly available for advanced scientific and engineering applications. (3) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)). (4) Leadership system.--The term ``Leadership System'' means a high-end computing system that is among the most advanced in the world in terms of performance in solving scientific and engineering problems. (5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Director of the Office of Science of the Department of Energy. (a) In General.--The Secretary shall-- (1) carry out a program of research and development (including development of software and hardware) to advance high-end computing systems; and (2) develop and deploy high-end computing systems for advanced scientific and engineering applications. (b) Program.--The program shall-- (1) support both individual investigators and multidisciplinary teams of investigators; (2) conduct research in multiple architectures, which may include vector, reconfigurable logic, streaming, processor- in-memory, and multithreading architectures; (3) conduct research on software for high-end computing systems, including research on algorithms, programming environments, tools, languages, and operating systems for high-end computing systems, in collaboration with architecture development efforts; (4) provide for sustained access by the research community in the United States to high-end computing systems and to Leadership Systems, including provision of technical support for users of such systems; (5) support technology transfer to the private sector and others in accordance with applicable law; and (6) ensure that the high-end computing activities of the Department of Energy are coordinated with relevant activities in industry and with other Federal agencies, including the National Science Foundation, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the National Security Agency, the National Institutes of Health, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Institutes of Standards and Technology, and the Environmental Protection Agency. (c) Leadership Systems Facilities.-- (1) In general.--As part of the program carried out under this Act, the Secretary shall establish and operate 1 or more Leadership Systems facilities to-- (A) conduct advanced scientific and engineering research and development using Leadership Systems; and (B) develop potential advancements in high-end computing system hardware and software. (2) Administration.--In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary shall provide to Leadership Systems, on a competitive, merit-reviewed basis, access to researchers in United States industry, institutions of higher education, national laboratories, and other Federal agencies. (d) High-End Software Development Center.-- (1) In general.--As part of the program carried out under this Act, the Secretary shall establish at least 1 High-End Software Development Center. (2) Duties.--A Center shall concentrate efforts to develop, test, maintain, and support optimal algorithms, programming environments, tools, languages, and operating systems for high-end computing systems. (3) Staff.--A Center shall include-- (A) a full-time research staff, to create a centralized knowledge base for high-end software development; and (B) a rotating staff of researchers from other institutions and industry to assist in coordination of research efforts and promote technology transfer to the private sector. (4) Use of expertise.--The Secretary shall use the expertise of a Center to assess research and development in high-end computing system architecture. (5) Location.--The location of a Center shall be determined by a competitive proposal process administered by the Secretary. (1) $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2005; (2) $55,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and (3) $60,000,000 for fiscal year 2007. (a) Amendments.--Section 23 of the National Science Foundation Authorization Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 1862n-9) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b), by striking ``and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration'' and inserting ``, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Department of Energy''; (2) in subsection (b)(3), by stiking ``Administration, and'' and inserting ``Administration, the Secretary of Energy,''; (3) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraphs (1) and (2), by striking ``5'' and inserting ``4''; (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end; (C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4), and in that paragraph by striking ``3'' and inserting ``2''; and (D) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following: ``(3) 3 members selected by the Secretary of Energy; and''; and (4) in subsection (f), by striking ``the advisory bodies of other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Energy, which may engage in related research activities'' and inserting ``other Federal advisory committees that advise Federal agencies that engage in related research activities''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) take effect on March 15, 2005.", u" The amendment (No. 4053) was agreed to as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: (1) Center.--The term ``Center'' means a High-End Software Development Center established under section 3(d). (2) High-end computing system.--The term ``high-end computing system'' means a computing system with performance that substantially exceeds that of systems that are commonly available for advanced scientific and engineering applications. (3) Leadership system.--The term ``Leadership System'' means a high-end computing system that is among the most advanced in the world in terms of performance in solving scientific and engineering problems. (4) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)). (5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Director of the Office of Science of the Department of Energy. (a) In General.--The Secretary shall-- (1) carry out a program of research and development (including development of software and hardware) to advance high-end computing systems; and (2) develop and deploy high-end computing systems for advanced scientific and engineering applications. (b) Program.--The program shall-- (1) support both individual investigators and multidisciplinary teams of investigators; (2) conduct research in multiple architectures, which may include vector, reconfigurable logic, streaming, processor- in-memory, and multithreading architectures; (3) conduct research on software for high-end computing systems, including research on algorithms, programming environments, tools, languages, and operating systems for high-end computing systems, in collaboration with architecture development efforts; (4) provide for sustained access by the research community in the United States to high-end computing systems and to Leadership Systems, including provision of technical support for users of such systems; (5) support technology transfer to the private sector and others in accordance with applicable law; and (6) ensure that the high-end computing activities of the Department of Energy are coordinated with relevant activities in industry and with other Federal agencies, including the National Science Foundation, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the National Security Agency, the National Institutes of Health, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Institutes of Standards and Technology, and the Environmental Protection Agency. (c) Leadership Systems Facilities.-- (1) In general.--As part of the program carried out under this Act, the Secretary shall establish and operate 1 or more Leadership Systems facilities to-- (A) conduct advanced scientific and engineering research and development using Leadership Systems; and (B) develop potential advancements in high-end computing system hardware and software. (2) Administration.--In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary shall provide to Leadership Systems, on a competitive, merit-reviewed basis, access to researchers in United States industry, institutions of higher education, national laboratories, and other Federal agencies. (d) High-End Software Development Center.-- (1) In general.--As part of the program carried out under this Act, the Secretary shall establish at least 1 High-End Software Development Center. (2) Duties.--A Center shall concentrate efforts to develop, test, maintain, and support optimal algorithms, programming environments, tools, languages, and operating systems for high-end computing systems. (3) Proposals.--In soliciting proposals for the Center, the Secretary shall encourage staffing arrangements that include both permanent staff and a rotating staff of researchers from other institutions and industry to assist in coordination of research efforts and promote technology transfer to the private sector. (4) Use of expertise.--The Secretary shall use the expertise of a Center to assess research and development in high-end computing system architecture. (5) Selection.--The selection of a Center shall be determined by a competitive proposal process administered by the Secretary. (1) $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2005; (2) $55,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and (3) $60,000,000 for fiscal year 2007. (a) Amendments.--Section 23 of the National Science Foundation Authorization Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 1862n-9) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b), by striking ``and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration'' and inserting ``, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Department of Energy''; (2) in subsection (b)(3), by striking ``Administration, and'' and inserting ``Administration, the Secretary of Energy, ''; (3) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraphs (1) and (2), by striking ``5'' and inserting ``4''; (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end; (C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4), and in that paragraph by striking ``3'' and inserting ``2''; and (D) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following: ``(3) 3 members selected by the Secretary of Energy; and (4) in subsection (f), by striking ``the advisory bodies of other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Energy, which may engage in related research activities'' and inserting ``other Federal advisory committees that advise Federal agencies that engage in related research activities''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) take effect on March 15, 2005.", u" The Clerk read as follows: Senate amendment: Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert: (1) Center.--The term ``Center'' means a High-End Software Development Center established under section 3(d). (2) High-end computing system.--The term ``high-end computing system'' means a computing system with performance that substantially exceeds that of systems that are commonly available for advanced scientific and engineering applications. (3) Leadership system.--The term ``Leadership System'' means a high-end computing system that is among the most advanced in the world in terms of performance in solving scientific and engineering problems. (4) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)). (5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Director of the Office of Science of the Department of Energy. (a) In General.--The Secretary shall-- (1) carry out a program of research and development (including development of software and hardware) to advance high-end computing systems; and (2) develop and deploy high-end computing systems for advanced scientific and engineering applications. (b) Program.--The program shall-- (1) support both individual investigators and multidisciplinary teams of investigators; (2) conduct research in multiple architectures, which may include vector, reconfigurable logic, streaming, processor- in-memory, and multithreading architectures; (3) conduct research on software for high-end computing systems, including research on algorithms, programming environments, tools, languages, and operating systems for high-end computing systems, in collaboration with architecture development efforts; (4) provide for sustained access by the research community in the United States to high-end computing systems and to Leadership Systems, including provision of technical support for users of such systems; (5) support technology transfer to the private sector and others in accordance with applicable law; and (6) ensure that the high-end computing activities of the Department of Energy are coordinated with relevant activities in industry and with other Federal agencies, including the National Science Foundation, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the National Security Agency, the National Institutes of Health, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Institutes of Standards and Technology, and the Environmental Protection Agency. (c) Leadership Systems Facilities.-- (1) In general.--As part of the program carried out under this Act, the Secretary shall establish and operate 1 or more Leadership Systems facilities to-- (A) conduct advanced scientific and engineering research and development using Leadership Systems; and (B) develop potential advancements in high-end computing system hardware and software. (2) Administration.--In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary shall provide to Leadership Systems, on a competitive, merit-reviewed basis, access to researchers in United States industry, institutions of higher education, national laboratories, and other Federal agencies. (d) High-End Software Development Center.-- (1) In general.--As part of the program carried out under this Act, the Secretary shall establish at least 1 High-End Software Development Center. (2) Duties.--A Center shall concentrate efforts to develop, test, maintain, and support optimal algorithms, programming environments, tools, languages, and operating systems for high-end computing systems. (3) Proposals.--In soliciting proposals for the Center, the Secretary shall encourage staffing arrangements that include both permanent staff and a rotating staff of researchers from other institutions and industry to assist in coordination of research efforts and promote technology transfer to the private sector. (4) Use of expertise.--The Secretary shall use the expertise of a Center to assess research and development in high-end computing system architecture. (5) Selection.--The selection of a Center shall be determined by a competitive proposal process administered by the Secretary. (1) $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2005; (2) $55,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and (3) $60,000,000 for fiscal year 2007. (a) Amendments.--Section 23 of the National Science Foundation Authorization Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 1862n-9) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b), by striking ``and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration'' and inserting ``, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Department of Energy''; (2) in subsection (b)(3), by striking ``Administration, and'' and inserting ``Administration, the Secretary of Energy, ''; (3) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraphs (1) and (2), by striking ``5'' and inserting ``4''; (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end; (C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4), and in that paragraph by striking ``3'' and inserting ``2''; and (D) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following: ``(3) 3 members selected by the Secretary of Energy; and (4) in subsection (f), by striking ``the advisory bodies of other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Energy, which may engage in related research activities'' and inserting ``other Federal advisory committees that advise Federal agencies that engage in related research activities''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) take effect on March 15, 2005.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to speak on a subject that is very much on the hearts and minds of the American people, especially in these last 18 to 20 months, and that is terrorism. Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence against civilians for the purpose of achieving a political end. Terrorism is very much on the front page of our newspapers, but it is not new to America at all. Terrorism has historical consequences, it has human consequences, and we must make sure that it has future punitive consequences as well. This week we commemorate a sad anniversary, the 30th anniversary of the terrorist slaughter of two leading diplomats of our Nation. Thirty years ago this week, a group of Palestinian-based terrorists burst into the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, and held captive a group of diplomats, including some Americans. Evidence would suggest that upon orders from the leader of what was then known as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, what is now known as the Palestinian Authority, Mr. Arafat, a decision was made by these terrorists to first torture and then execute two American diplomats. According to a National Security Agency report at the time, the murders were carried out by members of the Palestinian terrorist group known as Black September. According to a CIA report at that time, Black September was a cover term for Mr. Arafat's Fattah movement, and the murders were carried out at his orders. This has very human consequences. Two diplomats serving their country who were murdered 30 years ago need to be remembered. Cleo Noel was a native of Oklahoma. He graduated from the University of Missouri, earned his masters degrees from the University of Missouri and Harvard; and he had a distinguished career in the State Department. The other murdered diplomat was George Moore, a native of Ohio who graduated from the University of Southern California where he also earned a masters degree. Mr. Moore also had a distinguished career with the State Department, and in fact was the highest-ranking African American in the Foreign Service at the time of his murder. Terrorism must have future punitive consequences. Our Nation has been awakened to this great threat. Very recently on the 20th of February of this year the Justice Department achieved a major victory in our war on terrorism when it issued indictments for eight members of a terrorist organization known as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a group responsible for the murder of at least 100 civilians. But we must have a more systematic approach to be successful in finding and bringing to American justice those who commit these acts of terror. The murderers of Cleo Noel and George Moore have never faced American justice over these last 30 years for the terrorism that they committed. In order to give us more opportunity, more authority, to wage this war on terrorism, I have introduced the Koby Mandell Act of 2003, named after an American citizen whose life was snuffed out while outside of our country in Israel. The purpose of this legislation is to create within the Department of Justice a permanent unit that will aggressively seek out those who have committed acts of terror against American citizens, wherever they happen to be in the world, so that American citizens can enjoy the protection of our law enforcement system wherever they may travel, most particularly in cases where the host countries are unwilling or unable to properly administer justice to those who commit such acts of atrocity. This was the case in the case of our two martyred diplomats. The Government of Sudan released them very shortly after their arrest. They were turned over to what was then called the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and nothing happened: no trial, no meaningful prosecution, no punishment. The word went out that the price of an American life, the price of a life of an American diplomat, was nothing. We believe differently. We respect the value of every human life, of every person of every country. We understand our obligation and our responsibility to stand forward and protect the lives of the people who have entrusted us with the governance of this Nation. In cases where other nations are unwilling to mete out justice, we must do so. I would urge my colleagues to enlist as cosponsors of this important legislation.", u"Madam President, I take this opportunity to recognize the retirement of a friend and outstanding Air Force Officer, Major General A. Bowen Ballard. Major General Ballard's superior and exceptionally distinguished Air Force career warrants comment as the Air Force says thank you and goodbye to one of its best. Major General Ballard has served this Nation and the United States Air Force for more than 37 years. His service has been marked by increasingly demanding command and staff positions, culminating as the Mobilization Assistant to the Commander, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Throughout his military service, Major General Ballard has served with distinction and honor. It is my privilege to recognize his many significant contributions and to commend him for his outstanding service. A son of Alabama, Major General Ballard grew up in Montgomery and attended elementary and junior high school in Cloverdale. After graduating from Lanier High School, he enlisted in the Alabama Air National Guard as an intelligence specialist, while at the same time he attended the University of Alabama earning a degree in business and finance. In 1966, he was commissioned and resumed his service in Air Force Intelligence. Major General Ballard attended the Air Intelligence School at Lowry Air Force Base, CO, and from 1967 until 1974, he filled various intelligence positions with the 187th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, Alabama Air National Guard. Leaving the Alabama Air National Guard and joining the Air Force Reserve in 1974, Major General Ballard was assigned to the Air Force Intelligence Service at Fort Belvoir, VA, where he played a key role in transitioning Air Force Special Operation Forces from the Tactical Air Command to the Military Airlift Command and participated with Air Force Special Operation Forces on an international basis. Major General Ballard was involved with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States European Command for many years. During his assignment as the Mobilization Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters United States Air Force, Major General Ballard was recalled to active duty in a key position of leadership to manage the planning, directing, and establishing of policies and procedures for all USAF intelligence activities. As the Mobilization Assistant to the Director of the National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Services, Fort George G. Meade, MD, Major General Ballard's guidance and direction was critical in identifying and resolving critical issues affecting the Air Force during one of the most turbulent and demanding times in our history. Major General Ballard frequently met with the senior military leadership, to include the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and members of the Senate and Congress, effectively presenting crucial positions involving specific operational intelligence and professional military education issues. He achieved unparalleled success in charting the strategic direction and employment concepts as the Chairman of the Assistant Secretary of Defense's Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence Steering Council. Major General Ballard represented commanders of the Air University and Air Force Space Command on numerous panels, boards, and work groups, including personally leading the development of creative and innovative improvements to the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program. Major General Ballard was directly responsible for identifying, developing and implementing a significantly new direction for Reserve Intelligence roles and missions in space operations. Under his untiring leadership, the Air Force Space Command Reserve Intelligence Program transformed into a vital partner in on-orbit space collection intelligence assessments. As the Mobilization Assistant to the Commander, Air University, he assisted the commander with significant improvements to Air University schools in curricula and coursework, joint programs, faculty management, computer technology, and communications systems. As a result of his efforts, all graduates of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College now receive masters degrees in military science. Major General Ballard's leadership skills were constantly in high demand. For the Joint Chiefs, he developed the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Department of Defense Strategic Plan, providing unprecedented joint contingency support to operations in both Operation Noble Anvil and Operation Allied Force. For the combatant commanders, he applied his focus on language and distributed joint reserve component intelligence operations and implemented a flexible solution which paid significant dividends in the military theater of operations and in the global war on terrorism. Major General Ballard also established the foundation for joint cryptology reserve component support to the European and Pacific Command. The formulation and justification of cryptolgic reserve support elements blossomed into greatly improved reserve component support in intelligence operations ensuring a significant reserve augmentation force well into the 21st century. Major General Ballard has demonstrated time and time again superior performance, planning, coordinating, directing, and managing of Air Force operational intelligence programs, and Air Force Reserve intelligence mission augmentation activities. Major General Ballard's work with the Air University Integrated Program Review process resulted in significant increases in Individual Mobilization Augmentee positions to meet critical Air University mission needs. As a direct result, Air Reserve forces made significant and long-lasting contributions to successful Air University mission operations. From determining the effective and efficient use of Reserve Force personnel in war and during peacetime, to redefining roles, missions, force structure, training, morale, finance, recruiting, and retention, Major General Ballard always led from the front. We wish to extend congratulations to Major General Ballard on the occasion of his retirement. We are honored to recognize his many accomplishments and ask that our colleagues in the United States House of Representatives join in recognizing his very worthy achievements.", u"Mr. Speaker, I first want to thank my good friend, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for yielding me the time, and I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I would like to first point to the extraordinary leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and the bipartisan spirit of the unanimous consent of the entire Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in support of H.R. 2417. I rise in support of the rule providing for the consideration of that measure. It is the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. This is a modified open rule, and I believe that it is adequate for a bill that is relatively noncontroversial and was reported from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by unanimous vote, as I just said. I would like to reiterate a part of what the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has said and state to Members who wish to do so that they can go to the committee's office to examine the classified schedule of authorizations for the National Intelligence Program. This schedule includes the CIA, as well as the Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence programs within the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the FBI, and the Departments of State, Treasury, and Imaging. Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for the Tactical Intelligence and related activities and the Joint Military Intelligence program of the Department of Defense. Mr. Speaker, the Intelligence Authorization Act we consider today will provide authorizations for some of the most important national security programs in this country. This bill is the result of the committee's ongoing oversight of the intelligence community and oversight responsibilities, which include hundreds of hearings, briefings, and site visits annually. We are well aware that the global war on terrorism has focused even greater attention on the intelligence community and its mission. The men and women who serve in this community have faced many challenges in the past 21 months and, in my judgment, have responded admirably. This bill assists them in these many challenges. It fully supports the intelligence community's efforts in the war on terrorism by providing funds for analysis, analytic tools, and a unified overhead imagery architecture. Overall, the committee found the intelligence community is making progress in many areas, but noted that there is currently no one office in the executive branch that is charged with coordinating all elements of the intelligence and law enforcement communities to ensure they cooperate and coordinate their efforts. The committee also called on the Director of Central Intelligence to improve diversity in the workplace and special attention on recruitment initiatives for women and minorities. I would be terribly remiss right here if I did not mention two former members, one still alive and one who is deceased: former member Louis Stokes from Ohio, and our dear departed friend Julian Dixon, from California, both of whom spearheaded efforts to ensure greater diversity in the intelligence community. I hasten to urge that the chairman of this committee, and the now leader of the Democratic Caucus, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), and certainly the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), and the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), who served on the committee previously, have all been vigorous in their assertions that the intelligence community must do more in the area of diversity. So I will be introducing an amendment that I believe will assist the director in attaining the goals in this critical area. I do urge my colleagues to support this rule and the bill; and before reserving the balance of my time, I take a point of personal privilege to thank the fine staff of the majority and the minority for the rather extraordinary work that it takes in putting this measure together, and the many measures that come across their desks on a given day, including putting up with some of us as Members and our requests. I urge my colleagues to support the rule. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Mr. Speaker, it seems that the Federal Government is so big and bureaucratic that it cannot do anything in an economical or efficient way. In fact, we read and hear about so many examples of waste of Federal money that we too often take it for granted or shrug our shoulders about it. The San Francisco Chronicle reported recently that the Defense Department ``couldn't account for more than a trillion dollars in financial transactions, not to mention dozens of tanks, missiles and planes.'' Listen to what this story said: ``Though defense has long been notorious for waste, recent government reports suggest the Pentagon's money management woes have reached astronomical proportions. A study by the Defense Department's Inspector General found that the Pentagon couldn't properly account for more than a trillion dollars in monies spent. A GAO report found defense inventory systems so lax that the U.S. Army lost track of 56 airplanes, 32 tanks and 36 Javelin missile command launch units.'' This story, Mr. Speaker, was not based on reports from some antidefense group. It came from studies done by the Defense Department's own Inspector General and the General Accounting Office of the Congress. This comes on the heels of the Congress overwhelmingly voting for the biggest increase in defense spending ever. And now the Defense Department wants another mega-billion increase and a mega-billion supplemental appropriation, all taking place after we downsized the military by about 1 million troops and closed several bases. All of us want to support the military, but surely we cannot just sit around and allow such horrendous waste to continue. Then there is the case, Mr. Speaker, of Eric Rudolph. The FBI spent untold millions and had hundreds of agents involved over several years in this manhunt. The FBI should be embarrassed that Rudolph was finally found by a rookie local small-town police officer who had only been on the force for about 9 months. And he found him in Rudolph's home area. We give far too much of our law enforcement dollar to Federal agencies which make only a very tiny fraction of the arrests, probably less than 1 percent. What we need to do is give far more of our law enforcement money to local police and sheriff's departments. They are the officers who are fighting the real crime, the street crime that people want fought. Finally, Mr. Speaker, talk about waste, we have spent hundreds of billions, with a B, on our intelligence agencies over the last 10 or 15 years. We spend more on intelligence than all the rest of the world combined. We will vote to authorize even more spending on intelligence tomorrow. Yet during this time our intelligence agencies missed the coming down of the Berlin Wall; they missed, failed to predict, the breakup of the Soviet Union; they missed on 9/11. Worst of all, they missed or exaggerated on Iraq. Even the Weekly Standard, probably the most pro-war publication in America today said, ``The failure to discover stocks of WMD material in post-Saddam Iraq raises legitimate questions about the quality of U.S. and allied intelligence.'' Columnist Josh Marshall, writing in The Hill newspaper asked: ``Did we have bad intelligence? Did political appointees dismiss good, but less threatening intelligence? Or was damning intelligence actually cooked up for political purposes? Those are all legitimate questions. But when Congress starts trying to get at the answers, we should be open to the more complex but in its own way no less disturbing possibility that at least some of the main proponents of this war were so consumed by their goal to crush Saddam and so driven by ideology that they fooled themselves as much as anyone else.'' These are good, legitimate and very important questions. Another good question: Why did the National Security Agency find out ``about the attacks of 9/11 by watching CNN,'' as reported by intelligence expert and author James Bamford? This is an agency that we built a plush supertechnical $320 million building for a few years ago at a cost of $320 a square foot. Probably the most important question of all, why are we getting so little and so much of that for all these hundreds of billions of taxpayer money? The standard response of all Federal departments and agencies when they are criticized is that they were underfunded. If they had just been given more money, this or that problem would not have occurred. These agencies, if anything, are overfunded, far more money than any company in the private sector. Our intelligence committees are filled with good people; but no one seeks to serve, much less is appointed, to the intelligence committees unless they are strong supporters of the intelligence community. Once they are on the committee, they are heavily courted by the intelligence agencies. So it will be very difficult for a member of these committees in either body to ask the really tough questions that need to be asked. But, Mr. Speaker, I hope for the sake of our own taxpayers and for the future of national security of this Nation that someone on one of the intelligence committees will start asking the hard questions and demanding the truthful answers that our citizens deserve.", u"Mr. President, I am proud to cosponsor this amendment to make sure that competitions between civilian Defense Department employees and private companies are fair. The Department of Defense has stacked the deck against Federal employees. The administration is seeking to privatize much of the Federal workforce--to replace dedicated Federal workers with cronyism and patronage. The Kennedy amendment does not stop privatization. Yet it ensures that competitions between civilian Defense Department employees and private companies are fair. It puts Federal employees on an equal footing with private contractors. It says that you cannot win competitions for Federal jobs by denying health care benefits to your employees. It makes sure privatization does not come at the expense of health benefits for employees. Government contracts should not be won by denying health benefits to hard-working Americans. The Office of Management and Budget has issued a directive calling for bounty hunters in Federal agencies to privatize 850,000 jobs over the next 3 years. That is nearly half of the Federal workforce. To speed up the process, the Bush administration changed the rules for public/private competitions. The new rules stacked the deck against employees, and made it harder for them to compete for their own jobs. It created streamlined competitions that are not even based on cost savings. The employees cannot even submit their own lowest bid. These new rules are unfair and inefficient. They will likely end up costing more to American taxpayers. I stand up for an independent Federal workforce. We should not replace good Government jobs with bad private sector jobs. A company should not be able to win a bid because it saves money by denying health care benefits for their employees. Privatization should not come on the backs of the employees. Our economy is in trouble. Health care costs are rising--and millions of Americans lack any health insurance. Why does this administration want to make this problem even worse? Our democracy depends on a strong civil service. We need a civil service in this country that is independent, reliable, and free of cronyism and political patronage. We are trying to spread democracy to Iraq and to nurture new democracies around the world. Yet right here at home, there are some who want to get rid of a pillar of democracy--our independent Federal workforce. As a Senator from Maryland, I am so proud to serve over 100,000 Federal employees. I wish you could meet them the way I do--on the job and at the supermarket. I represent people who are Nobel Prize winners at the National Institutes of Health and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. I represent FBI agents. I represent the National Security Agency, and the faculty of the U.S. Naval Academy. I know what Federal employees do. They work hard every day. They did not get their jobs because they volunteered on someone's campaign. The civilian employees at the Defense Department work hard to support our troops and to protect our Nation. They are committed to securing the homeland, and to making sure our soldiers are ready to protect us. If we are going to contract out Defense Department work, we need to be very careful. It is a matter of national security. It is a matter of homeland security. America's military bases and facilities are all potential terrorist targets. Those who work there must be trusted and carefully screened. Yet the Department of Defense wants to get rid of trusted employees who have served our Nation for years--and replace with who knows what. What would happen if the private company changed ownership, or is bought by a foreign company? What safeguards are there to protect our military and our military infrastructure? That is why I am cosponsoring the Kennedy amendment. This amendment simply calls for civilian Defense Department employees to be treated fairly when they are competing for their own jobs. Federal employees' jobs are on the line. The independence of our Federal workforce is on the line. At the very least, the competition should be fair. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.", u"Mr. Chairman, first let me thank my good friend from Pennsylvania for yielding me this time and his generosity. In my congressional district, the Third District of Maryland, I represent 110 District of Columbia residents. They live at the Oak Hill detention center, a maximum security campus in Laurel, Maryland, approximately 30 miles from Washington. It is located on more than 600 acres of Federal land adjacent to the National Security Agency. The facility was originally constructed 50 years ago. Few renovations have been made since then, and the campus is now in a severe state of neglect and disrepair, littered with partially-boarded abandoned buildings that are frequently broken into and set afire. Roughly half the children at Oak Hill have been convicted of crimes and sentenced to a term there, and the other half are detainees awaiting trial. Their average length of stay is more than 8 months. A 2001 mayoral commission recommended closing Oak Hill and placing youth offenders in a network of residential treatment facilities, community-based group homes and other less restrictive settings. I support the commission's recommendations, including the closing of Oak Hill. Some progress has been made toward that goal, including beginning construction of a pretrial holding facility in northeast Washington that should reduce by 50 percent the number of children housed at Oak Hill. July's four-part series in the Washington Post documented a near complete breakdown of the community-based rehabilitative care system that now exists for the District's youth offenders. The District needs to develop an appropriate community-based system for its juvenile offenders. In addition, because the District of Columbia has only one residential treatment center which is plagued by alleged physical and sexual abuse, the city must send many of its children to lengthy stays out of State. Currently 400 District children are in residential treatment centers, some as far away as Arizona, at a conservative cost of $25 million a year. Mayor Williams recently acknowledged that his juvenile justice system is in a state of serious dysfunction and has pledged to take corrective measures. But he was also quoted as saying, ``There hasn't been an embrace, at the agency level, of the issue. There hasn't been the sense of urgency.'' I would tell the mayor that there is a sense of urgency for both the District of Columbia and in my district in Maryland. I recently had the opportunity to meet with the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton) and Deputy Mayor Carolyn Graham, and I subsequently visited Oak Hill. There I met with youth services administrator Gayle Turner and her staff and I toured the facility and surrounding grounds. I was impressed by the progress we were making. As a result of our initial discussions, they were moving in the right direction: toward razing the dilapidated structures that are beyond rehabilitation and toward developing proposals to make more cost-effective and more appropriate use of the land. That is why I was disappointed that both of the individuals I met with positions were terminated and no longer are there. Today's debate is about funding the District of Columbia, but this issue involves more than appropriate funding levels. This is about the best course of treatment of these children, the best way to ensure the safety of our communities and the most appropriate use of Federal land. Mr. Chairman, as the representative of the community surrounding Oak Hill, I look forward to working to help improve the state of juvenile justice services for the District of Columbia. I might also point out that the Federal land on which Oak Hill is located is a prime site for expansion of NSA and for the State of Maryland and Anne Arundel County to develop environmental, recreational and economic opportunities. I hope to continue working with the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton), with the members of the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, and with Mayor Williams and the city council to develop the right solutions for all involved.", u"Mr. President, I rise today to urge Senate passage of the conference report for the Fiscal Year 2004 Intelligence Authorization Act. On November 20 the conference report was approved by the House of Representatives. In order to quickly provide the Intelligence Community the authorities it requires in order to pay, house, and equip its personnel for our most sensitive and critical national security work, this legislation should be sent to the President without delay. The horrible terrorist attacks in Turkey underscore the urgency of our task. This conference report is good legislation with important management and budget authorities. I will review just a few of them for you. In the conference report, the Senate receded to a number of significant House provisions of interest. The most significant of these is a provision that will consolidate and organize existing intelligence-related functions in the Department of the Treasury by creating a new Office of Intelligence and Analysis. This administration-supported provision also creates a new Assistant Secretary position. Senate managers also accepted a House provision intended to foster better information-sharing among Federal, State and local government officials. The bombings in Turkey illustrate that terrorists remain capable of striking at the heart of peaceful societies. We must be prepared to meet this continuing threat. The conference report retains a Senate provision on Central Intelligence Agency Compensation Reform, with a House amendment to ensure that Congress will have an opportunity to assess the impact of such reform before it becomes permanent. The conference report provides important new personal services contracting authority to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations. This authority is intended to permit the Director to exercise greater hiring flexibility as was recommended post-9/11 in order to bring aboard certain categories of critically-needed skills more quickly. Turning to the budget, when we began to review the President's fiscal year 2004 request I became very concerned at the recent growth in intelligence funding. I am still concerned. There is clearly not enough money in future years to fully fund the intelligence programs in this year's budget request. That is the sad reality of this budget. The intelligence community is stretched thin, with far more requirements than available funds. Too many projects and activities have been started that cannot be accommodated in the top line. It does not matter what caused this problem. The problem exists. Unless the President directs a dramatic and sustained increase to the intelligence budget next year, we will have to make the hard choices ourselves. A significant issue that must be addressed by the executive branch is the manner in which cost estimates for the procurement of major intelligence community systems are conducted. The magnitude and consistency in the cost growth on recent acquisitions indicates a systemic intelligence community bias to underestimate the cost of major systems. This ``perceived affordability'' creates difficulties in the out years as the National Foreign Intelligence Program becomes burdened with content that is more costly than the budgeted funding. This underestimation of future costs has resulted in significant re-shuffling of NFIP funds to meet emerging shortfalls. In an attempt to correct this problem, the conference report contains a provision which would mandate a fundamentally more sound approach to cost estimates for major systems. The business-as-usual approach must end. There is another area I wish to mention in general terms concerning the analytical capabilities of the intelligence community. All recent after-action reports or studies of intelligence failures point to the inability of analysts to process ever-growing quantities of information. In an effort to correct this problem, the conferees agreed to move funds to programs at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the CIA to improve the community's analytic capabilities. My key objectives in formulating the conference report were to ensure our Nation's continuing effort to prosecute the war on terrorism and to ensure that the ``longer view'' about intelligence community requirements is taken into account. I believe that this conference report meets both objectives. We met those objectives because we had bipartisan cooperation when and where it counted. I wish to thank the distinguished vice chairman, Senator Rockefeller, as well as the distinguished House chairman, Representative Goss, and his ranking member, Representative Harman, for their assistance in making the conference report possible. The staff of both intelligence Committees must also be commended for their diligent work on this important legislation. There is no opposition on our side of the aisle. We have worked very hard with the House to come up with a good compromise. This bill is vitally needed on behalf of national security. A similar bill passed the Senate several weeks ago by unanimous consent. I yield to my distinguished colleague, the vice chairman, Senator Rockefeller.", u"Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 343 is an open rule providing for the consideration of H.R. 3394, the Cyber Security Research and Development Act. The rule provides 1 hour of general debate evenly divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Science. This is a fair and open rule that will provide every Member with the opportunity to offer amendments, allowing Members ample time to debate the important issues related to this legislation. Mr. Speaker, the attacks of September 11 have forced the American people and this Congress to recognize that the threat of terror is present on many fronts. To adequately protect the United States, we must address all of our security vulnerabilities. This enormous task includes securing our Nation's computer and communications infrastructure. The urgency with which we must proceed with regard to this infrastructure has already been demonstrated. In 1997, the Pentagon conducted an information warfare exercise to test the vulnerability of the U.S. information infrastructure. The exercise consisted of 35 National Security Agency computer specialists using off-the-shelf technology to attack U.S. information systems. The group of NSA specialists were able to attack and penetrate government and commercial sites. The next year, failure of the Galaxy 4 communications satellite further demonstrated the effects that a cyberattack could have on our information systems. The failure of Galaxy 4 disrupted credit card purchases, ATM transactions, 90 percent of the Nation's pagers and emergency communications. While studies have concluded that the United States is vulnerable to cyberattacks, not enough has been done to safeguard this sensitive information system. This is of grave concern for the safety of the Nation. Just this past Tuesday it was reported that since September 11 there has been a series of cyberattacks that have targeted the Pentagon, the Department of Energy, NASA and other agencies, resulting in the theft of vast quantities of national defense research. One of the groups went as far as declaring a ``cyber jihad'' against the United States. We need only look 90 miles off the coast of Florida to see the possibility of future attacks, Mr. Speaker. This past year the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency testified before the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that the Cuban regime could initiate information warfare or computer network attacks that could seriously disrupt the United States military. That regime, which is the only one of the seven states on the State Department's list of terrorist nations in our hemisphere, is believed to share information with other terrorist states such as Iran, Libya and Iraq. With its significant ties to fellow terrorist nations in the Middle East, the Cuban regime has the ability to serve as a type of forward-operating location for terror in our hemisphere. The potential for cyberwarfare is real, and the underlying legislation that we are going to address to date helps to address that threat. H.R. 3394 is a bipartisan piece of legislation designed to increase research efforts which are needed to fill the void in this critical area. The legislation will task the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Standards and Technology to coordinate a partnership with academic institutions to ensure that information systems are secure in the United States. This partnership will face the emerging threat by increasing the amount of cybersecurity research being supported by the Federal Government and by increasing the number of cybersecurity researchers in the Nation. The bill will provide $878 million over 5 years to implement new academic programs, provide grants and fellowships, providing for the common defense of our Nation's technological infrastructure. The underlying legislation, as I stated before, is a product of bipartisanship. It was reported out of the Committee on Science by voice vote. It is a very important bill that focuses on obviously a very important subject matter. As I stated before, Mr. Speaker, it is an open rule. It is a fair rule. I urge my colleagues to support both the rule and the underlying legislation. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Madam Speaker, in the past, usually during consideration of the Intelligence budget, I have risen before this body and mentioned the superb and thoroughly knowledgeable staff that resides in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, of which we are very proud. These individuals are specially selected because of their knowledge and their understanding of the intelligence world, a world that is actually very arcane and confusing to people who do not spend time in it. We do not talk a lot about these folks and they do not seek recognition. They are not that kind. They understand that much of the work must be done in secret so as not to betray the sensitive information they handle, but let me assure my colleagues and the American people that this group of dedicated people works very hard, and they dig very deeply into the operations of the Intelligence Community in order to ensure that there is oversight of intelligence activity and that our Nation is secure and the Intelligence Community is playing by the rules. I want to specifically recognize one of these dedicated people who has served the committee and our country diligently for almost 2 decades. Her name is Diane Roark, and I am sorry to say that when this body reconvenes in April Diane will no longer be on our staff. She is retiring from the House and from government service. Madam Speaker, Diane first joined the committee in April 1985, having previously served in the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and just prior to joining us, on the National Security Council, where she was Deputy Director of Intelligence Programs. Since joining the committee, Diane has excelled in the very difficult, technical areas of our oversight. She was the program monitor for the National Reconnaissance Office where she not only challenged the embedded bureaucracy and made it become more innovative in approaches to future election, but she also forced the office to restructure and reform their fiscal accountability system so that oversight was assured. Most recently, Diane has been our program manager for the National Security Agency, a vital agency for us. This agency has many, severe challenges, Madam Speaker, and if it were not for the efforts of Ms. Roark, I do believe that our committee's efforts to oversee and advocate for NAS would have been much less effective, and for that she has my personal thanks. Diane is known as a very dedicated, tough-minded program monitor who digs into the issues and forces agencies to see and understand what they sometimes miss themselves. She is also known as a very knowledgeable task master, and her arrival at an agency is often anticipated with apprehension. Those managing the community know that she is usually on the mark with her assessments and that she takes the public's trust very well to heart. Recently, one of the senior managers within the community commented on her performance by saying that our staff ``is very aggressive in their oversight and has a very serious and in-depth knowledge of our programs, sometimes a better understanding than some of the senior managers do.'' I think that this is the type of oversight capability that the American people are entitled to and should demand. I cannot think of any greater tribute for Diane than knowing that agency leaders throughout the community recognize that her instincts and assessments are sound. So, Madam Speaker, it is with some sadness that I rise today to say farewell to a public servant who has dedicated a career to ensuring our security, each and every one of us. Diane's departure is truly our loss, although I know that her younger son, Bryce, will enjoy having Mom around home more. We are going to miss her. On behalf of the committee I thank Diane for her professionalism, her dedication, her unfailing commitment to our Nation and its security. We wish her well in her future endeavors, whatever they be. Know that she has served her country well and she will be missed. Job well done.", u"Mr. President, I rise today to offer the Intelligence Community Leadership Act of 2002. This legislation creates the position of Director of National Intelligence to lead a true intelligence community and to coordinate our intelligence and anti-terrorism efforts and help assure that the sort of communication problems that prevented the various elements of our intelligence community from working together effectively before September 11 never happen again. While this bill will certainly not solve every problem within the intelligence community, I believe it to be a necessary first step towards getting our intelligence house in order. The National Security Act of 1947, which created the bulk of our cold war era national security apparatus, created both the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence, of which the CIA is but one component, as two positions occupied by one person. As Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the person in this position is the CEO of the Agency charged with collecting human intelligence, centrally analyzing all intelligence collected by the U.S. government, and conducting covert action. As head of the intelligence community, which also includes the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the intelligence-gathering elements of the FBI, as well as others, this person is responsible for coordinating a multitude of agencies and harnessing their efforts to secure the overall needs of U.S. national security. Although this structure served as well enough in the cold war, it is, in my view, far from perfect, and, put bluntly, I do not believe that giving both jobs to one person makes sense. Moreover, just as the particular needs of the superpower rivalry of the cold war drove the national security structure and apparatus put into place by the National Security Act of 1947, so, too, should the intelligence and anti-terrorism challenges that our country now faces in the post-9-11 world drive the creation of new national security structures adequate to the new challenge. The President, in proposing the creation of the Department of Homeland Security has addressed part of this challenge. But the administration's plan does not do enough to address the need to better coordinate our intelligence and anti-terrorism efforts. To start to address these problems the Intelligence Community Leadership Act of 2002 splits the current position of Director of Central Intelligence, currently held by one individual, who is tasked with running the CIA and the intelligence community as a whole, into two positions: a Director of National Intelligence, DNI, to lead the Intelligence Community and a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to run the CIA. It may appear somewhat paradoxical to argue that in order to assure closer and better coordination within and across our intelligence community the current position of the Director of Central Intelligence should be split, but this is, in fact, the case. As a practical matter, the demands of these two full time jobs on the time and attention of any person, no matter how skilled in management, are overwhelming. Indeed, running the intelligence community and running the CIA are both important enough to be full time jobs. That was true before September 11, and it is especially true after September 11. Even if one person could handle both jobs and reconcile the inherent conflicts, there would remain the perception that he or she is favoring either the community or the Agency. That is not a formula which is well-suited to lead to a seamless and fully integrated intelligence community providing optimum analytic product to national decision makers or assuring that critical intelligence missions are properly allocated and resourced. Specifically, then, this legislation would create the new position of Director of National Intelligence, DNI, a new independent head of the intelligence community with the proper and necessary authority to coordinate activities, direct priorities, and create the budget for our nation's national intelligence community. The DNI would be responsible for all of the functions now performed by the Director of Central Intelligence in his role as head of the intelligence community, a separate individual would be Director of the Nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and serving a ten-year term, the DNI would be insulated from the vagaries of politics and specifically empowered to create the national intelligence budget in conjunction with the various intelligence agencies within our government. The DNI would be able to transfer personnel and funds between intelligence agencies as necessary to carry out the core functions of the intelligence community, without the need to seek permission from individual agency heads. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, DCIA, freed from the double burden as head of the intelligence community, would then be able to concentrate on the critical missions of the CIA alone: Assure the collection of intelligence from human sources, and that intelligence is properly correlated, evaluated, and disseminated throughout the intelligence community and to decision makers. The critical policy and resource decisions of the President's proposed Department of Homeland Defense will only be as good as the intelligence which informs those decisions. Whatever the other preliminary lessons we may draw from the ongoing inquiry into the September 11 attacks, one thing is perfectly clear: we need to better coordinate our intelligence and anti-terrorism efforts. If the new Department, and the President and Members of Congress, are going to be able to get the sort of intelligence we need to both safeguard our citizens and protect American national security interests, we need to address the structural problems that exist today with our intelligence community. I believe a first step in finding a solution to this problem is relatively simple, enact legislation that would require the head of the intelligence community and the head of the CIA to be two different people. By Mr. BINGAMAN: S. 2646. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to establish the National Transportation Modeling and Analysis Program to complete an advanced transportation simulation model, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Amendment No.-- At the appropriate place, insert the following: (a) Establishment.--There is established the National Terrorism Assessment Center (in this section referred to as the ``NTAC''), to provide-- (1) the Department of Homeland Security with the authority to direct the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other officers of Federal agencies to provide the NTAC with all intelligence and information relating to threats of terrorism; and (2) the means for intelligence from all sources to be analyzed, synthesized, and disseminated to Federal, State, and local agencies as considered appropriate by the Secretary. (b) Duties of the NTAC.--The NTAC shall-- (1) direct the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other officers of Federal agencies to provide the NTAC with all intelligence and information relating to threats of terrorism; (2) synthesize and analyze information and intelligence from Federal, State, and local agencies and sources; (3) disseminate intelligence to Federal, State, and local agencies to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption, and response to terrorism; (4) refer, through the Secretary of Homeland Security, to the appropriate law enforcement or intelligence agency, intelligence and analysis requiring further investigation or action; and (5) perform other related and appropriate duties, as assigned by the Secretary. (c) Management of the NTAC.-- (1) In general.--The NTAC shall be under the operational control of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, who shall evaluate the performance of personnel assigned to the NTAC. (2) Director.-- (A) Appointment.--The NTAC Director shall be a senior officer of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security from candidates recommended by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (B) Duties.--The Director of the NTAC shall-- (i) ensure that the law enforcement, immigration, and intelligence databases information systems containing information relevant to homeland security are compatible; and (ii) with respect to the functions under this subparagraph, ensure compliance with Federal laws relating to privacy and intelligence information. (3) Deputy director.--The NTAC Deputy Director shall be a senior officer of the Central Intelligence Agency and appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security from candidates recommended by the Director of Central Intelligence. (d) Staffing of the NTAC.-- (1) In general.--The NTAC shall be staffed by analysts assigned by-- (A) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (B) the Central Intelligence Agency; (C) the National Security Agency; (D) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (E) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; (F) the National Reconnaisance Office; (G) the Department of Energy; (H) the Department of Homeland Security; (I) the Department of the Treasury; (J) the Department of Justice; (K) the Department of State; and (L) any other Federal agency, as determined by the Secretary in consultation with the President or the President's designee. (2) Additional staffing.--The Secretary may also require the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Customs Service, Coast Guard, Secret Service, Border Patrol, and other subordinate agencies to assign additional employees to the NTAC. (3) Administrative support.--Administrative support to employees assigned to the NTAC from other agencies shall be provided by such agencies. (e) Authority To Employ Personnel and Consultants.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may, without regard to the civil service laws, employ and fix the compensation of such personnel and consultants, including representatives from academia, as the Secretary considers appropriate in order to permit the Secretary to discharge the responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security. (2) Personnel security standards.--The employment of personnel and consultants under paragraph (1) shall be in accordance with such personnel security standards for access to classified information and intelligence as the Director of Central Intelligence shall establish for purposes of this subsection. (f) Tour of Duty Requirement.-- (1) Senior intelligence service.--Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 409a) is amended by inserting after section 303 the following:", u" Under clause 8 of rule XVIII, proposed amendments were submitted as follows: Amendment No. 3: At the end (page 30, after line 7), add the following new title: This title may be cited as the ``Homeland Security Information Sharing Act''. (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following: (1) The Federal Government is required by the Constitution to provide for the common defense, which includes terrorist attack. (2) The Federal Government relies on State and local personnel to protect against terrorist attack. (3) The Federal Government collects, creates, manages, and protects classified and sensitive but unclassified information to enhance homeland security. (4) Some homeland security information is needed by the State and local personnel to prevent and prepare for terrorist attack. (5) The needs of State and local personnel to have access to relevant homeland security information to combat terrorism must be reconciled with the need to preserve the protected status of such information and to protect the sources and methods used to acquire such information. (6) Granting security clearances to certain State and local personnel is one way to facilitate the sharing of information regarding specific terrorist threats among Federal, State, and local levels of government. (7) Methods exist to declassify, redact, or otherwise adapt classified information so it may be shared with State and local personnel without the need for granting additional security clearances. (8) State and local personnel have capabilities and opportunities to gather information on suspicious activities and terrorist threats not possessed by Federal agencies. (9) The Federal Government and State and local governments and agencies in other jurisdictions may benefit from such information. (10) Federal, State, and local governments and intelligence, law enforcement, and other emergency preparation and response agencies must act in partnership to maximize the benefits of information gathering and analysis to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. (11) Information systems, including the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System and the Terrorist Threat Warning System, have been established for rapid sharing of classified and sensitive but unclassified information among Federal, State, and local entities. (12) Increased efforts to share homeland security information should avoid duplicating existing information systems. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that Federal, State, and local entities should share homeland security information to the maximum extent practicable, with special emphasis on hard-to-reach urban and rural communities. (a) Procedures for Determining Extent of Sharing of Homeland Security Information.-- (1) The President shall prescribe and implement procedures under which relevant Federal agencies determine-- (A) whether, how, and to what extent homeland security information may be shared with appropriate State and local personnel, and with which such personnel it may be shared; (B) how to identify and safeguard homeland security information that is sensitive but unclassified; and (C) to the extent such information is in classified form, whether, how, and to what extent to remove classified information, as appropriate, and with which such personnel it may be shared after such information is removed. (2) The President shall ensure that such procedures apply to all agencies of the Federal Government. (3) Such procedures shall not change the substantive requirements for the classification and safeguarding of classified information. (4) Such procedures shall not change the requirements and authorities to protect sources and methods. (b) Procedures for Sharing of Homeland Security Information.-- (1) Under procedures prescribed by the President, all appropriate agencies, including the intelligence community, shall, through information sharing systems, share homeland security information with appropriate State and local personnel to the extent such information may be shared, as determined in accordance with subsection (a), together with assessments of the credibility of such information. (2) Each information sharing system through which information is shared under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) have the capability to transmit unclassified or classified information, though the procedures and recipients for each capability may differ; (B) have the capability to restrict delivery of information to specified subgroups by geographic location, type of organization, position of a recipient within an organization, or a recipient's need to know such information; (C) be configured to allow the efficient and effective sharing of information; and (D) be accessible to appropriate State and local personnel. (3) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall establish conditions on the use of information shared under paragraph (1)-- (A) to limit the redissemination of such information to ensure that such information is not used for an unauthorized purpose; (B) to ensure the security and confidentiality of such information; (C) to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of any individuals who are subjects of such information; and (D) to provide data integrity through the timely removal and destruction of obsolete or erroneous names and information. (4) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, that the information sharing system through which information is shared under such paragraph include existing information sharing systems, including, but not limited to, the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, the Regional Information Sharing System, and the Terrorist Threat Warning System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (5) Each appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the President, shall have access to each information sharing system through which information is shared under paragraph (1), and shall therefore have access to all information, as appropriate, shared under such paragraph. (6) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall ensure that appropriate State and local personnel are authorized to use such information sharing systems-- (A) to access information shared with such personnel; and (B) to share, with others who have access to such information sharing systems, the homeland security information of their own jurisdictions, which shall be marked appropriately as pertaining to potential terrorist activity. (7) Under procedures prescribed jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General, each appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the President, shall review and assess the information shared under paragraph (6) and integrate such information with existing intelligence. (c) Sharing of Classified Information and Sensitive but Unclassified Information With State and Local Personnel.-- (1) The President shall prescribe procedures under which Federal agencies may, to the extent the President considers necessary, share with appropriate State and local personnel homeland security information that remains classified or otherwise protected after the determinations prescribed under the procedures set forth in subsection (a). (2) It is the sense of Congress that such procedures may include one or more of the following means: (A) Carrying out security clearance investigations with respect to appropriate State and local personnel. (B) With respect to information that is sensitive but unclassified, entering into nondisclosure agreements with appropriate State and local personnel. (C) Increased use of information-sharing partnerships that include appropriate State and local personnel, such as the Joint Terrorism Task Forces of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces of the Department of Justice, and regional Terrorism Early Warning Groups. (d) Responsible Officials.--For each affected Federal agency, the head of such agency shall designate an official to administer this Act with respect to such agency. (e) Federal Control of Information.--Under procedures prescribed under this section, information obtained by a State or local government from a Federal agency under this section shall remain under the control of the Federal agency, and a State or local law authorizing or requiring such a government to disclose information shall not apply to such information. (f) Definitions.--As used in this section: (1) The term ``homeland security information'' means any information (other than information that includes individually identifiable information collected solely for statistical purposes) possessed by a Federal, State, or local agency that-- (A) relates to the threat of terrorist activity; (B) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity; (C) would improve the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or (D) would improve the response to a terrorist act. (2) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (3) The term ``State and local personnel'' means any of the following persons involved in prevention, preparation, or response for terrorist attack: (A) State Governors, mayors, and other locally elected officials. (B) State and local law enforcement personnel and firefighters. (C) Public health and medical professionals. (D) Regional, State, and local emergency management agency personnel, including State adjutant generals. (E) Other appropriate emergency response agency personnel. (F) Employees of private-sector entities that affect critical infrastructure, cyber, economic, or public health security, as designated by the Federal government in procedures developed pursuant to this section. (4) The term ``State'' includes the District of Columbia and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. (a) Report Required.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the congressional committees specified in subsection (b) a report on the implementation of section 603. The report shall include any recommendations for additional measures or appropriation requests, beyond the requirements of section 603, to increase the effectiveness of sharing of information between and among Federal, State, and local entities. (b) Specified Congressional Committees.--The congressional committees referred to in subsection (a) are the following committees: (1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (2) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out section 603. Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, or of guidelines jointly issued by the Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence pursuant to Rule 6,'' after ``Rule 6''; and (2) in paragraph (3)-- (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``or of a foreign government'' after ``(including personnel of a state or subdivision of a state''; (B) in subparagraph (C)(i)-- (i) in subclause (I), by inserting before the semicolon the following: ``or, upon a request by an attorney for the government, when sought by a foreign court or prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation''; (ii) in subclause (IV)-- Section 2517 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(7) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or other Federal official in carrying out official duties, who by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents or derivative evidence to a foreign investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure, and foreign investigative or law enforcement officers may use or disclose such contents or derivative evidence to the extent such use or disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of their official duties. ``(8) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or other Federal official in carrying out official duties, who by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents or derivative evidence to any appropriate Federal, State, local, or foreign government official to the extent that such contents or derivative evidence reveals a threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, for the purpose of preventing or responding to such a threat. Any official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information, and any State, local, or foreign official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only consistent with such guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly issue.''. (a) Dissemination Authorized.--Section 203(d)(1) of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT ACT) of 2001 (Public Law 107-56; 50 U.S.C. 403-5d) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Consistent with the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods, and the responsibility of the Attorney General to protect sensitive law enforcement information, it shall be lawful for information revealing a threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any appropriate Federal, State, local, or foreign government official for the purpose of preventing or responding to such a threat. Any official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information, and any State, local, or foreign official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only consistent with such guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly issue.''. (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 203(c) of that Act is amended-- (1) by striking ``section 2517(6)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (6) and (8) of section 2517 of title 18, United States Code,''; and (2) by inserting ``and (VI)'' after ``Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V)''. Section 106(k)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806) is amended by inserting after ``law enforcement officers'' the following: ``or law enforcement personnel of a State or political subdivision of a State (including the chief executive officer of that State or political subdivision who has the authority to appoint or direct the chief law enforcement officer of that State or political subdivision)''. Section 305(k)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1825) is amended by inserting after ``law enforcement officers'' the following: ``or law enforcement personnel of a State or political subdivision of a State (including the chief executive officer of that State or political subdivision who has the authority to appoint or direct the chief law enforcement officer of that State or political subdivision)''. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the amounts requested for the Defense Emergency Response Fund that are designated for the incremental costs of intelligence and intelligence-related activities for the war on terrorism may only be obligated or expended for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities specified in the letter dated July 19, 2002 of the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (b) Limitations.--The amounts referred to in subsection (a)-- (1) may only be obligated or expended for activities directly related to identifying, responding to, or protecting against acts or threatened acts of terrorism; (2) may not be obligated or expended to correct programmatic or fiscal deficiencies in major acquisition programs which have not achieved initial operational capabilities within two years of the date of the enactment of this Act; and (3) may not be obligated or expended until the end of the 10-day period that begins on the date notice is provided to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) The United States is engaged in a war against terrorism that requires the active participation of the intelligence community. (2) Certain intelligence agencies, among them the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, have announced that they will be hiring several hundred new agents to help conduct the war on terrorism. (3) Former Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency have stated that a more diverse intelligence community would be better equipped to gather and analyze information on diverse communities. (4) The Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency were authorized to establish an undergraduate training program for the purpose of recruiting and training minority operatives in 1987. (5) The Defense Intelligence Agency was authorized to establish an undergraduate training program for the purpose of recruiting and training minority operatives in 1988. (6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency was authorized to establish an undergraduate training program for the purpose of recruiting and training minority operatives in 2000. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (with respect to the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Bureau), the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency should make the creation of a more diverse workforce a priority in hiring decisions; and (2) the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of National Security Agency, the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of National Imagery and Mapping Agency should increase their minority recruitment efforts through the undergraduate training program provided for under law. Amendment No. 8: Amend section 501 to read as follows: (a) Authority.--Funds designated for intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for assistance to the Government of Colombia for counter-drug activities for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and any unobligated funds available to any element of the intelligence community for such activities for a prior fiscal year, shall be available to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and against activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)), and to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue operations. (b) Requirement for Certification.--(1) The authorities provided in subsection (a) shall not be exercised until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Congress that the provisions of paragraph (2) have been complied with. (2) In order to ensure effectiveness of United States support for such a unified campaign, prior to the exercise of the authority contained in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall report to the appropriate committees of Congress that the newly elected President of Colombia has-- (A) committed, in writing, to establish comprehensive policies to combat illicit drug cultivation, manufacturing, and trafficking (particularly with respect to providing economic opportunities that offer viable alternatives to illicit crops) and to restore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations; (B) committed, in writing, to implement significant budgetary and personnel reforms of the Colombian Armed Forces; and (C) committed, in writing, to support substantial additional Colombian financial and other resources to implement such policies and reforms, particularly to meet the country's previous commitments under ``Plan Colombia''. In this paragraph, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. (c) Termination of Authority.--The authority provided in subsection (a) shall cease to be effective if the Secretary of Defense has credible evidence that the Colombian Armed Forces are not conducting vigorous operations to restore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations. (d) Application of Certain Provisions of Law.--Sections 556, 567, and 568 of Public Law 107-115, section 8093 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, and the numerical limitations on the number of United States military personnel and United States individual civilian contractors in section 3204(b)(1) of Public Law 106-246 shall be applicable to funds made available pursuant to the authority contained in subsection (a). (e) Limitation on Participation of United States Personnel.--No United States Armed Forces personnel or United States civilian contractor employed by the United States will participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance made available under this section, except for the purpose of acting in self defense or rescuing any United States citizen to include United States Armed Forces personnel, United States civilian employees, and civilian contractors employed by the United States.", u"Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Chair. This amendment is so simple that it becomes suspicious, in a sense. All I amend here is the National Security Council so as to include the Attorney General, the future Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of the FBI in an advisory position similar to the CIA as presently included in the 1947 law. The reason for this, of course, is to get not only the responsibility of the Council fixed, but more particularly to realize now that domestic threats are far greater than any international threats. I don't believe Russia is going to attack us. I don't think China is going to attack us. I don't think Saddam, after all he has heard about us attacking him, is going to attack us, except perhaps maybe overseas but not the homeland. But homeland security must be emphasized. Let me refer immediately to that section of the 1947 act signed by President Harry Truman on July 26, 1947. I quote: The functioning of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. In other words, the function of joining all the dots is with the National Security Council. You have all these entities now, here with a new one, to take certain analyses: the Department of Homeland Security. But you still have the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency. You have intelligence sections of the State Department. They are all over the Government; Intelligence Committees within the Congress, and everything else like that. Wherein is the responsibility fixed to join the dots? Harry Truman said it best in 1947. He said: ``The buck stops here.'' So my particular amendment is to fix that responsibility, and assist the President, so there would be no misunderstanding. Incidentally, only the President of the United States can change this culture of the so-called ``need to know.'' I speak advisedly. I was in the intelligence game back in the 1950s. I was a member of the Hoover Commission. We investigated the CIA, the FBI, the Army, Navy, Air Force intelligence, the Defense Department, the Secret Service, the Q clearance, the atomic energy intelligence, and all the other functions. I will never forget, in October of 1962, I got a call from my friend who would later operate this desk as a Senator, Bobby Kennedy. Bobby said: I would like to get that report from you with respect to this Cuban missile crisis, and the background on it. I turned over my report, my particular one. I never have gotten it back. But, in any event, the glaring error that persists this minute is that there are no joining of the dots, people are not talking to each other. Intelligence has gone like economics and trade--globalization, globalization. I cannot emphasize that too much in the little bit of time that is given me. Immediately after 9/11 the CIA, the FBI, the various intelligence agencies said: Oh, this was a surprise. They could know nothing about a plane going into a building. Let me talk about terrorism and give you a dateline: The bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 by the Islamic Jihad; the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983, also by the Islamic terrorists; the Hezbollah restaurant bombing in April 1984; the Naples USO attack in April 1988; the attempted Iraqi attacks on U.S. posts on January 18 and 19 of 1991; the World Trade Center bombing in February of 1993; the attempted assassination of President Bush by Iraqi agents in April of 1993; the attack on U.S. diplomats in Pakistan in March of 1995; the Khobar Towers bombing in June of 1996; the U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998; the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in October of 2000; and the terrorist attacks on, of course, September 11. And they have not stopped. We have the car bombing outside the U.S. consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, in June of 2002. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent this document be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. President, today is National POW/MIA Recognition Day. I rise on this special day to remember and honor those brave Americans who during past armed engagements in defense of this nation or our alliances were prisoners of war and those who are still listed missing in action. As a nation, we set aside this day to further recognize the sacrifices of the restless families of these fine patriots, assuring them that we have not forgotten. In the past year, our dedicated Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines have again taken up the mantle of freedom; this time to prosecute an elusive and dangerous enemy. They have ousted an oppressive regime in Afghanistan and continue to hunt those implicated in the war on terrorism. Like generations before them, these Americans have sworn an oath to support and defend the Constitution. As a former Navy officer, I feel strongly that the United States government has a similarly strong obligation to these men and women who serve in the Armed Forces. Specifically, we must work to ensure the return of POWs and MIAs at the end of hostilities. We must not rest until all American POW/MIAs are returned and accounted for, and the many questions that have overwhelmed their families are answered. The vigorous pursuit of this commitment must continue through on-site investigations being undertaken in Indochina and through a fuller examination of records in Russia, Iraq and Southeast Asia. For in our history, we recall somberly today that while thousands died, many others endured years in starved, tortured, isolated misery before regaining their freedom. Their perseverance, integrity and heroism are shining examples of the core values on which this nation was founded and became great. A year ago, Americans were sifting through smoldering rubble at the Pentagon and at the site of the twin towers looking for their comrades in arms. Those actions have ceased, but around the world, others continue to sift through long-silent war zones to find and identify remains of the fallen and the missing. The Department of Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office has had considerable successes in the past year, but we still have much to accomplish before our responsibility to all the POWs and MIAs is fulfilled. Just this year, we have identified the remains of 46 Americans who served in the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, there are still 1,907 unaccounted Americans who served in Vietnam. Also this year, 32 Americans have been repatriated who served in the Korean War, while over 8,100 remain unaccounted for. And, through hard work and determination in the past year, the DPMO has recovered the remains of eight Americans who served in the Second World War. 78,750 Americans who served in World War II are as yet accounted. It is important to remember that this is a cooperative effort and requires commitments from all branches of our government as well as the countries where the servicemen remain missing. Negotiations in the past six years with North Korea have yielded many successes. One search operation continues even today in North Korea and a third and final operation for the year will begin on September 28, concluding October 29. According to the Department of Defense, America has had 23 operations since 1996 to locate MIA's in North Korea. These missions are all possible because of cooperation and negotiation with North Korea. Let this cooperation be an example to all of what can be accomplished when we work together. Today, I want to pay special tribute to the dedication and service of the soldiers from my home State of Indiana who are or were POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War and the Korean War. These great Americans and their families have the gratitude of this free Nation. I urge the Senate, the administration, the Departments of Defense and State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Agency to redouble their efforts to bring our soldiers home as quickly as possible. Let us all take heart from the POW/MIA flag, displayed in the Capitol rotunda, which proclaims: ``You Are Not Forgotten.'' I ask unanimous consent that the names of Indiana's missing and unaccounted from the Korea and Vietnam Wars be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. President, I have sought recognition to encourage my Senate colleagues to pass legislation on homeland security and to send it to conference. There are many more agreements, much more agreement than disagreement, and the disagreements are relatively minor. Last week, I said the Senate was dysfunctional because we had not passed a budget resolution. For the first time since the Budget Act was passed in 1974, the Congress has not passed a budget resolution. The Senate has not passed a budget resolution. Thirteen appropriations bills have not been passed. We have been on the Interior bill for weeks now and homeland security for weeks. Long speeches. Not getting to the point. Not voting. Not moving ahead with the legislation. Last week, it was an accurate characterization to say the Senate was dysfunctional. This week, the Senate has become a chamber of rancor. It is plain that President Bush did not intend to impugn anyone's patriotism. He was commenting on two provisions of the homeland security bill related to labor-management relations. Even on those matters, the differences are relatively minor. The relationship between Republicans and Democrats is better characterized by the embrace between President Bush and the majority leader at the joint session of Congress shortly after September 11, 2001. The current controversy may well be giving encouragement, aid, and comfort to Osama bin Laden, deep in some cave, and Saddam Hussein, in the bowels of some bomb shelter. However, we know who the enemies are. The enemies are the terrorists and the enemies are those who pose the risk of using weapons of mass destruction. I believe it is vital to move ahead with the homeland security bill to correct major deficiencies which have been disclosed in the intelligence agencies in the United States. We had a veritable blueprint, prior to September 11, 2001, and if we had connected all of the dots, I think the chances were good that we could have avoided September 11. The Congress of the United States and the administration have a duty, a solemn duty, to do everything in our power to prevent another terrorist attack. We lost thousands of Americans and the official word from the administration, articulated by a number of ranking executive department officials, is that there will be another terrorist attack. It is not a matter of if, it is not a matter of whether, it is a matter of where or when. I am not prepared to accept that conclusion. I believe the United States has the intelligence resources and can muster the intelligence resources to prevent another September 11. When I served as chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the 104th Congress, I introduced legislation which would have brought all of the intelligence agencies under one umbrella. There have been repeated efforts to accomplish that, not just the legislation I introduced in 1996. There is on the President's desk a plan submitted by former National Security Adviser, General Scowcroft, to accomplish a coordination of all intelligence agencies. However, it has not been done because of the turf battles between the various intelligence agencies. Those turf battles regrettably are endemic and epidemic in Washington, DC. They have to come to a conclusion. We have the mechanism now, the homeland security bill, to make those corrections. We knew prior to September 11, from the FBI Phoenix memorandum, about men taking flight training who had big pictures of Osama bin Laden. The report was disregarded. We knew prior to September 11 that there were two terrorists in Kuala Lumpur. The CIA knew about it, but did not tell the FBI or INS, and they turned out to be two of the pilots on September 11. We know from the efforts made by the Minneapolis Office of the FBI to get a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as to Zacarias Moussaoui, which would have given us a veritable blueprint of al-Qaida's intention, that certainly it would have led us to the trail and could have prevented September 11. Then we have the famous, or infamous, report coming to the National Security Agency on September 10 about an attack the very next day, which was not translated. There is much more I could comment about, but the time is limited.", u"Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me time. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this conference report, but before I get started I want to express my own personal gratitude to the leadership of this committee, and most especially to the leadership of our ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for the hard work she has done in leading the Democrats on this committee and the contributions that she has made to the committee as a whole. I believe very strongly that her leadership has worked through the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to make the world and our country a little more of hope, a little less of fear and a little better because she traveled here, and we are very grateful for her leadership and we will miss her very much. Although she has gone on to more responsibility and we expect equally great things from her there, I do want to say that we certainly are appreciative of her hard work, and we will miss her, and it has meant a tremendous amount to our country and our intelligence community. The committee worked hard to provide the resources that our military forces and our intelligence community require to prevail in the war on terrorism and to safeguard all of our other national security interests. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), my counterpart on the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle) and all of the other committee members deserve great credit for this important bipartisan authorization act. In addition, this conference report adds substantial funds to the budget of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to enable NIMA to award a contract for a major modernization program. I remain very concerned that the administration failed to budget enough funds for this effort despite the large budget increases following September 11. The capabilities that this modernization effort will provide are essential for the kind of flexible military operations on display in Afghanistan. When our bill was being debated in the House earlier this year, I indicated my concern about the Department of Defense's apparent neglect of the communications and exploitation infrastructure needed to support the large fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles that the Department intends to procure over the next several years. These drones performed magnificently in Afghanistan, but this potential will never be realized without a larger investment in the means to get the data back from the aircraft and get it exploited. I had hoped the administration would signal its intention to fix these problems, but this has not happened. Congress must address this matter next year if the administration fails to do so in the fiscal year 2004 budget request. This conference report also requires that some changes and initiatives be undertaken to correct problems with respect to the sharing of information within and between the intelligence and law enforcement communities. There is more work to be done in this area, but the direction in this conference report, if implemented faithfully, should help. We understand the importance of protecting sources and methods, but believe that this can be done within a much more expansive information-sharing paradigm. Finally, I wanted to speak to the implementation of the proposed compensation reform plan. Section 402 of the bill is similar to section 402 of the House bill. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. Section 402 delays implementation of the Central Intelligence Agency's proposed compensation reform plan until February 1, 2004. Prior to that date, the director of Central Intelligence may conduct a pilot project to assess the efficacy and fairness of a revised personnel compensation plan and report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 45 days after completion of the pilot project. Section 402 includes a sense of the Congress that an employee personnel evaluation mechanism with evaluation training for managers and employees of the CIA and the National Security Agency should be phased in first and then followed by introduction of a new compensation plan. Mr. Speaker, this was a concern that was raised by the employees that has contributed to a great deal of consternation and perhaps some problems that we might anticipate if it were implemented, and I am happy that the conference report reflects the concerns raised on this issue, and that we will first, before having an en mass, grand-scale implementation, first have the pilot program instituted so any kinks or problems can be worked out. With that, I think it is a good conference report. I think we have done good work, and I urge my colleagues to support it.", u"Mr. President, the homeland security legislation we have been debating takes on many organizational and administrative challenges, but one challenge it does not cover fully is in the area of information technology. Specifically, I am talking about departmental policies and guidelines for purchasing computer software. No doubt, effective procurement policies will be essential not just to the sound administration of the Department, but also to the successful achievement of a number of important policies identified in this legislation, including most notably, the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share data and coordinate activities to respond to or prevent terror or criminal acts. For those sharing and analyzing data electronically, the security of the software being utilized, such as database and operating system software, is critical. These software technologies are referred to by those in the industry as ``information assurance'' technology. Information assurance technology is what is needed to assure information systems operate effectively, ensure the security of the information contained in these systems, and verify the identities of those authorized to use these systems. At its most fundamental level, information assurance software, for example, includes operating systems, database, and user authentication software. It should not be a surprise to anyone here that agencies within the Federal Government that are responsible for our most sensitive information have to rely on information assurance technology. In fact, in January of 2000, the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee, an entity within the National Security Agency, proposed a policy that called on all Government agencies to purchase only those commercial-off-the-shelf, or COTS, software that had undergone an independent evaluation process that tests the security of the software. Toward that goal, the committee outlined a specific acquisition policy for those information systems critical to national security. This policy--the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policy #11, or NSTISSP #11--states that Federal agencies with information systems involved in national security can only purchase commercial information assurance software that has been independently evaluated to be secure. This sounds a bit technical, but if we take a step back and look at this proposed policy as consumers, it makes perfect sense. Today, many household items, like our dishwashers, televisions, stereos, and computers, have the now famous Underwriters Laboratory Label. This label provides consumers with the peace of mind that the products they are purchasing have met independent public safety tests. Consumers have been purchasing products with the Underwriters Laboratory ``seal of approval'' for more than a century. However, businesses large and small, and local, State, and Federal Government agencies purchase computer software with no thought given to whether or not the software has met some outside measure of security assurance. That is an extremely risky proposition. Computer software is essential to our Nation's critical infrastructures, including our railroads, airports, pipelines, utilities, and financial services. At the Government level, information technology is critical to the administration of key Federal programs, our homeland defense, and most notably, our national security. The costs of insecure, vulnerable information systems are real and sobering. Computer viruses, like Nimda and Code Red, penetrate, disrupt and disable information systems through security holes in software. Last year, according to industry estimates, these viruses inflicted $13 billion in damages on our economy and even incapacitated systems within our own Defense Department. Fortunately, information technology laboratories exist that perform functions similar to the Underwriters Laboratory. Many software companies have these independent labs evaluate their products to determine if they meet various levels of security assurance. For example, the international Common Criteria provides for security evaluations that are recognized in 15 countries, including the United States, Germany, Canada, and Great Britain. Thus, if a software product is certified under the Common Criteria, it is recognized among all participating countries. More to the point, this certification is designed to validate the security claims made by software companies, much like the Underwriters Laboratory validates the safety claims of appliance manufacturers. In his book, ``Secrets and Lies'' cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier noted that the Common Criteria is a ``giant step in the right direction.'' NSTISSP #11 is the Federal Government's way of saying that for its most sensitive national security systems, it is not enough for information technology providers to say their products are secure. Now, software providers must have independent evaluations to back up their claims. It is my understanding that the Defense Department is working to implement an information assurance acquisition policy based on NSTISSP #11. That is an important and positive step, one called for in the Defense authorization bill conference report. The reason why I am bringing this issue to the attention of my colleagues today is because I believe it is an issue that deserves the attention of the new Department of Homeland Security. After all, if the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11 proved anything, it is that our most sensitive information systems in Federal information sharing and coordination of strategies will likely take place among those law enforcement agencies within and outside of the Homeland Security Department. Information sharing and analysis also is likely to occur between our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. All of this activity requires that the Department of Homeland Security to have strong information assurance strategies, including those involving the purchase of information assurance systems in the commercial market. I see the distinguished chair of the Governmental Affairs Committee and manager of the legislation currently pending on the floor. I know this is an issue of great interest and concern to him, and I would now yield the floor to him for any comments he wishes to make.", u"Mr. Speaker, I think it is very apropos that my colleague is talking about the danger of out-of-control immigration to our country. My staff was recently looking at some of the statements that I made back in 1997 in the Congressional Record. On September 29, 1997, there was a debate about extending 245(i), which was basically a provision which suggested that if someone was in the United States illegally, instead of having them have to go back, which they traditionally have had to do, to their home country in order to change their status and then stand in line and become a legal applicant, 245(i) would have permitted them just to give $1,000 and to stay in the United States of America and to have their status adjusted here. During that debate, I stated, and I think it comes right down to the safety of the country, and we are talking about immigration policy: ``Extending 245(i) also raises serious national security questions.'' This is back in 1997. ``Unlike those who enter the United States legally, 245(i) applicants are not required to go through the same criminal checks, history checks, as they do when they go through this check in their home country when they are waiting to come to this country legally. The consular offices located in the applicant's home country, along with foreign national employees working for the State Department, are in the best position to determine if an applicant has a criminal background or is a national security risk.'' Again, this is in 1997. ``Consulates abroad are more knowledgeable, they speak the local language, they know the different criminal justice systems in the country, and they are the ones who should be screening the people before they come to the United States so that we do not have criminals and terrorists coming to the United States, not being screened, and ending up just paying $1,000 to be put in front of the line. Allowing these lawbreakers to apply for permanent status in the United States rather than having them returned to their home countries to do so circumvents a screening process that has been carefully established to protect our country's security.'' Now, that was back in September of 1997. And let us note that any one of the September 11 hijackers who was here in this country would have been eligible then to find a sponsor or to marry somebody, just with the restrictions that they wanted to tweak this 245(i), that would have permitted them to stay in this country. And the general idea of 245(i), had that been totally accepted, which was being pushed in 1997, none of those guys would have had to go home to get their status changed. Every one of the terrorists that slammed into those buildings and was involved in this conspiracy to kill thousands of Americans would have been given an avenue to stay right in this country legally. Now, when we have policies, when we have people advocating this type of policy that we are going to change the way we do things around here, and this is the policy change, and it is so evidently nonchalant about the national security of our country, something is wrong. And I would like to applaud the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Tancredo) for the leadership he is providing on this overall issue of immigration, because what we have here is immigration out of control. And an immigration policy that is out of control is bound to do great damage to our country, to our people, and to the national security of our country. Already we have seen what that means just in terms of traditional national security, and that is we have lost almost 4,000 of our citizens to a terrorist attack because we did not have proper control of our borders. We had people here in our country that should not have been here, not to mention of course the failure of the CIA, the FBI, and the National Security Agency, which of course was a failure as well, but now we are just talking about specific policies. In my State, okay, we have not lost 4,000 people to a terrorist, but we have criminals who are let loose every day in my State because we have a policy of, what? If someone is arrested and they are here illegally, that does not automatically mean that they are sent home to the country from which they come.", u"Madam President, I offer this amendment on behalf of myself as chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee and Senator Lieberman, the committee's ranking minority member. This amendment deals with the important issue of information security at the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies. The amendment is essentially the same as S. 1993, a bill reported by our committee this past April. Senator Lieberman and I introduced the original S. 1993 last November as the result of the considerable time spent by the Governmental Affairs Committee last Congress examining the state of Federal government information systems. Numerous Governmental Affairs Committee hearings and General Accounting Office reports uncovered and identified systemic failures of government information systems which highlighted our nation's vulnerability to computer attacks--from international and domestic terrorists to crime rings to everyday hackers. Report after report, agency after agency, we learned that our nation's underlying information infrastructure is riddled with vulnerabilities which represent severe security flaws and risks to our national security, public safety and personal privacy. In fact, GAO believes the problems in the government's information technology systems to be so severe that it has put government-wide information security on its list of ``high-risk'' government programs--programs which are most vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement. For example, GAO told us: That unknown and unauthorized individuals were gaining access to highly sensitive unclassified information at the Department of Defense; That weaknesses in IRS computer security controls continue to place IRS systems and taxpayer data ``at serious risk to both internal and external attack''; That ``pervasive, serious weaknesses jeopardize State Department operations''; That ``many NASA mission-critical systems face serious risks''; That flight safety is jeopardized by weak computer security practices at FAA; and That, based on the most recent review of the government's 24 largest agencies, computer security weaknesses place critical government operations, such as national defense, tax collection, law enforcement and benefit distribution, at risk. At our hearings, we learned from the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, that information warfare or cyberterrorism has the potential to deal a crippling blow to our national security if strong measures are not taken to counter it. Potential threats range from national intelligence and military organizations, terrorists, criminals, industrial competitors, hackers, and disgruntled or disloyal insiders. Director Tenet stated that several countries, including Russia and China, have government-sponsored information warfare programs with both offensive and defensive applications. These countries see information warfare as a way of leveling the playing field against a stronger military power, such as the U.S. We learned from the Director of the National Security Agency, General Minihan, that severe deficiencies exist in our ability to respond to a coordinated attack on our national infrastructure and information systems. We heard from agents of the Social Security Administration's Office of Inspector General who described how computer crimes were committed by SSA employees. This demonstrated the danger of the ``inside threat'' to agencies that do not adequately monitor and limit access to computer information by their own employees. And finally, we heard from reformed hacker, Kevin Mitnick, and learned of his ability to crack into systems without ever touching a computer. He told us that, even if we did everything else right, without strong personnel security, nothing is safe. He described how he successfully tricked the employees of a multi-national company into giving him pass codes to the company's security access devices. He said ``The human side of computer security is easily exploited and constantly overlooked.'' And, yet, even with evidence from all of these various experts on how information systems should be managed to prevent against attacks, year after year, we continue to receive reports detailing significant security breaches at Federal agencies. The one thing that came through loud and clear is that at the core of the government problems is the absence of effective management. GAO told us ``Poor security program planning and management continue to be fundamental problems . . . What needs to emerge is a coordinated and comprehensive management strategy.'' To identify potential management solutions, we asked GAO to study the management practices of organizations known for their superior security programs. When GAO looked at eight organizations--most of which were private companies--GAO found that these organizations implemented information security policies on an ongoing basis through a coordinated management framework. Agencies clearly must do more than establish programs and set management goals--agencies and the people responsible for managing information systems in those agencies must be held accountable for their actions. That is what Senator Lieberman and I intend with this amendment. The primary objective of the amendment is to address the management challenges associated with operating in the current interdependent computing environment. It will provide a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to protecting information. For example, the bill would: Vest overall government accountability within the highest levels of the Executive Branch [Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget]; Create specific management rules for agency heads, such as requiring agency-wide security programs; Require agencies to have an annual independent evaluation of their information security programs and practices; Focus on the importance of training programs and government-wide incident response handling. Our amendment reflects changes made to S. 1993 based on comments received from our colleagues in the Senate and working with the Department of Defense and others in the intelligence community, the Office of Management and Budget, the agency Inspectors General, and industry. We urge support of our amendment and believe that, through continued vigorous oversight, we will drive the Federal government to focus on improving its computer security deficiencies. I look forward to working with my colleagues to ensure that government information technology systems are secure and that the information within those systems is protected from further attacks.", u" Under clause 6 of rule XXIII, proposed amendments were submitted as follows: Amendment No. 3: In title III of the bill, add at the end the following new section: Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year ending after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit a report to the Congress that describes the level of cooperation and assistance provided to domestic Federal law enforcement agencies by the intelligence community during such fiscal year relating to the effort to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United States through the United States-Mexico border and the United States-Canada border. (a) Review of 1995 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes.--The Attorney General shall review the 1995 ``Memorandum of Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes'' between the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, Director of National Security Agency, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, Assistant Secretary of State, Intelligence and Research, and Director of Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security, Department of Energy. This review shall determine whether the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding requires: (i) Report to the Attorney General.--Whenever the Director of Central Intelligence has knowledge of facts or circumstances that reasonably indicate any former or current officers, staff employees, contract employees, assets, or other person or entity providing service to, or acting on behalf of, any agency within the intelligence community has been involved with, is involved with, or will be involved with drug trafficking or any violations of U.S. drug laws, the Director shall report such information to the Attorney General of the United States. (ii) Duty of Intelligence Employees to Report.--Each employee of any agency within the intelligence community who has knowledge of facts or circumstances that reasonably indicate any former or current officers, staff employees, contract employees, assets, or other person or entity providing service to, or acting on behalf of, any agency within the intelligence community has been involved with, is involved with, or will be involved with drug trafficking or any violations of U.S. drug laws, shall report such information to the Director of Central Intelligence. (b) Public Report.--Upon completion of review, the Attorney General shall publicly report its findings. (a) Annual Report.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit an annual report to the Members of Congress specified in subsection (d) containing the information described in subsection (b). The first such report shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and subsequent reports shall be submitted annually thereafter. Each such report shall be submitted in classified form and shall be in the detail necessary to serve as a basis for determining appropriate corrective action with respect to any transfer within the meaning of subsection (b). (b) Identification of Foreign Entities Transferring Items or Technologies.--Each report shall identify each covered entity which during the preceding 2 years transferred a controlled item to another entity for use in any of the following: (1) A missile project of concern (as determined by the Director of Central Intelligence). (2) Activities to develop, produce, stockpile, or deliver chemical or biological weapons. (3) Nuclear activities in countries that do not maintain full scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or equivalent full scope safeguards. (c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section: (1) Controlled item.--(A) The term ``controlled item'' means any of the following items (including technology): (i) Any item on the MTCR Annex. (ii) An item listed for control by the Australia Group. (iii) Any item listed for control by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. (B) Australia group.--The term ``Australia Group'' means the multilateral regime in which the United States participates that seeks to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. (C) MTCR annex.--The term ``MTCR Annex'' has the meaning given that term in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c). (D) Nuclear suppliers' group.--The term ``Nuclear Suppliers' Group'' means the multilateral arrangement in which the United States participates whose purpose is to restrict the transfers of items with relevance to the nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive applications. (2) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means a foreign person, corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or other nongovernmental organization or group or any government entity operating as a business. Such term includes any successor to any such entity. (3) Missile project.--(A) The term ``missile project'' means a project or facility for the design, development, or manufacture of a missile. (B) The term ``missile'' has the meaning given that term in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c). (d) Specified Members of Congress.--The Members of Congress referred to in this subsection are the following: (1) The chairman and ranking minority party member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. (2) The chairman and ranking minority party member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.", u"Mr. President, let me say, first of all, that I appreciate very much the majority leader calling up the missile defense bill on yesterday. At his authorization and direction, a cloture motion was filed on the motion to proceed to consider that bill when an objection was raised by the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee and the ranking Democrat, Senator Levin, on the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee that I chair. Last year, we had a series of hearings looking into the growing proliferation problem in the development of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems to deliver those weapons by countries that many in our Nation probably weren't aware were developing the sophistication in long-range missile systems that were being developed. I think yesterday the announcement in India of the detonation of a nuclear device as a test confirms once again what a dangerous environment we are in, in terms of proliferation of capabilities, of having nuclear weapons, of having missile systems that can deliver those weapons over a long range. To put that in context yesterday, Pakistan, just a few weeks ago, tested a new missile that our security analysts and our intelligence agencies weren't aware that they had--another example of how we cannot predict with any degree of certainty or accuracy how soon countries are going to develop missile systems, nuclear weapons with the capability of delivering those weapons systems over long ranges. The Pakistani missile that was tested was a 1,500-kilometer range missile--five times greater in capability than a report that was filed by the Defense Department said that Pakistan had in November of 1997. Think about that. We get an annual report from the Defense Department using the intelligence capabilities of our CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency--all of the resources that our country has, to put together this report for the Congress. And in November of 1997 they said that Pakistan had in its inventory a 300-kilometer range missile, and then in April they test a 1,500-kilometer range missile. What has happened? They have had assistance from other countries. Some say it was China who provided the technology and wherewithal to come up with this new, longer range missile. Some say it was North Korea. Pakistan says it was developed from within with their own technology, their own scientists. Whatever the reason and however this came to be, it is alarming, and now we see India reacting to that new development by testing a nuclear weapon that is twice as powerful as the atomic bomb that was used in World War II by the United States against Japan. The point is, this is a very, very dangerous situation that we see developing in that part of the world, but in other countries, too. In Iran. We have seen demonstrated in Iraq the capacity to almost put a satellite in orbit with a missile launch vehicle 10 years ago. That surprised the United States. That surprised our intelligence-gathering agencies. I am hopeful that the Senate will notice that the time has come for us to stop playing politics with missile defense and national security and work together in a bipartisan way to develop and deploy, as soon as technology permits, a national missile defense system to protect the security of the United States. We will have that vote on cloture, as the majority leader pointed out, on Wednesday--cloture on the motion to proceed to consider the bill, not on the bill itself. It will still be open for amendment. It will still be open for debate by Senators who want to discuss this issue, but I hope the Senate will invoke cloture so that we can proceed to consider the bill, to discuss the issue further, particularly in view of these developing events that confirm what a dangerous proliferation situation we find ourselves in in the world today, and we are defenseless against long-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles.", u"Mr. Speaker, as we know, India is one of the largest democracies in the world. China is the largest communist country in the world. President Clinton has taken the time to condemn the largest democracy, one of the largest democracies in the world, India, for developing or testing nuclear weapons to defend themselves against the largest communist country in the world, China. While the President condemns India, what does the President do with China? Let me quote from a couple of articles here: ``Clinton made a decision to overrule his own Secretary of State and ease the exportation of satellite technology to China in 1996. The Justice Department also is investigating whether two satellite companies, Loral and Hughes Electronics, violated the national security laws in 1996 by giving satellite technology to China that could be used for nuclear missiles.'' Remember, China, the largest communist country in the world. This is our President in his negotiations with that country. Both firms are big Democrat donors. Loral chief, Mr. Schwartz, was the Democrats' biggest single donor in 1995-96, giving more than $600,000. Let me quote from U.S. Security for Sale. That is the article. It is an essay by William Safire. U.S. Security for Sale. Essay. Washington: ``A President hungry for money to finance his reelection overruled the Pentagon; he sold to a Chinese military intelligence front the technology that defense experts argued would give Beijing the capacity to blind our spy satellites and launch a sneak attack. How soon we have forgotten Pearl Harbor. ``October 1996 must have been some tense months for the Democratic fund-raisers. The New York Times, Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times had begun to expose the Asian connection of John Huang and Indonesia's Riady family to the Clinton campaign. ``The fix was already in to sell the satellite technology to China. Clinton had switched the licensing over to Ron Brown's anything-goes Commerce Department. Johnny Chung had paid up. Commerce's Huang had delivered money big time (though one of his illegal foreign sources had already been spotted). The boss of the satellite's builder had come through as Clinton's largest contributor. ``But public outrage was absent. The FBI didn't read the papers and Reno Justice did not want to embarrass the President. And television news found no pictorial values in the Asian connection. Stealthily, the Clinton administration held back the implementation of the corrupt policy until November 5, the day the campaign ended. ``Now the reporting of Jeff Gerth and the Times' investigative team is putting the spotlight of pitiless publicity on the sellout of American security. ``We begin to see how the daughter of China's top military commander steered at least $300,000 through the Chung channel to the Democratic National Committee. (Apparently Mr. Chung skimmed off a chunk and may be spilling his guts lest he have to face his Beijing friends.) ``We begin to learn more of the February 8, 1996, visit of the arms dealer Wang Jun to the Commerce office of Ron Brown, and Wang's `coffee' meeting that day with the President, the very day that Clinton approved four Chinese launches, even as China was terrorizing Taiwan with missile tests. ``Clinton's explanation, which used to slyly suggest that China policy was not changed `solely' by contributors, has now switched to total ignorance; shucks, we didn't know the source of the money. But this President's Democratic National Committee did not know because it wanted not to know; procedures long in place to prevent the unlawful flow of foreign funds were uprooted by the money-hungry Clintonites. ``Today, 2 years after this sale of our security, comes the unforeseen chain reaction; as China strengthens its satellite missile technology, a new Indian Government reacts to the growing threat from its longtime Asian rival and joins the nuclear club. In turn, China feels pressed to supply its threatened ally, Pakistan, with weaponry Beijing promised us not to transfer. This makes Clinton the proliferation President. ``Who has helped keep this sellout of security under wraps?'' Let me just conclude by saying this. India is one of the largest democracies in the world. China is the largest communist country. And I hope every citizen of this country takes the time to read about the technology that was transferred to China through this administration. It is a critical security issue. Mr. Speaker, the remainder of the article by William Safire, is as follows: ``In the Senate, John Glenn was rewarded with a space flight by Clinton for derogating the leads to China of the Thompson committee. Fred Thompson's warnings about China's plan to penetrate this White House were then scorned by Democratic partisans; his Government Operations Committee should now swarm all over this. The House's aggressive agent of the Clinton cover-up, Henry Waxman of California, is finally ``troubled'' by the prospect of damning evidence he prevented the Burton committee from finding. At least three Democratic partisans who foolishly followed Waxman in blocking the testimony of Asian witnesses may have difficulty explaining their cover-up vote to even more troubled voters in their districts. The Gerth revelations lead to more questions: Where were the chiefs of the C.I.A. and the National Security Agency, their intelligence so dependent on satellites, on the satellite technology sale to China? Is anybody at Reno Justice reexamining testimony taken by independent counsel investigating corruption at Commerce before Ron Brown's death? Does Brown's former lawyer claim ``dead man's privilege'' on notes? Did N.S.A. tape overseas calls of suspect Commerce officials? Who induced Commerce to lobby Clinton for control of satellite technology? And the most immediate: Will homesick prosecutor Charles LaBella, beholden to Janet Reno for his political appointment in San Diego, dare to offend his patron by calling for independent counsel?''", u"Mr. President, I rise in support of the conference report accompanying the re-authorization of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act. While I support this legislation, I am disappointed that veterans programs were used to pay for a portion of this bill. Nonetheless, this bill contains significant increases in funding for Maryland's highway and transit programs. I am proud to have worked with my colleague Senator Sarbanes to make sure Maryland got its fair share of funds for its transportation needs. With billions in needed maintenance and construction in the State of Maryland, this legislation will make our highways safer and expand transit options for our citizens. It will help to ease the flow of traffic on our major highways and byways and begin the long awaited re-construction of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge. This bill provides $900 million for a new Wilson Bridge, $500 million more than the Administration proposed last year. Although this does not represent the total cost of a new bridge, it is a first step toward replacement of the bridge. Let me make it clear, I do not consider this funding to be the end. I consider this to be the beginning. In future years, I will continue the effort to secure additional funding to complete the re-building of Wilson Bridge, a critical link on the I-95 system and the only federally owned bridge in the system. Under this bill, Maryland will receive more money for its highway program than it gets now. Maryland can expect approximately $400 million per year for its highway program--almost $90 million more than it gets now. This is almost a 30 percent increase in funding that will help improve the conditions of our highway system--which is one of the most congested in the nation. The Washington area has the second longest commute time in the nation. The funds authorized in this bill should help provide some much needed relief. The bill not only provides more funds for Maryland's overall highway program, it specifically targets funds for high priority projects around the State. The bill provides $26 million to upgrade Route 113 in Worcester County, one of the most dangerous highways in the State of Maryland. Every time I visit the Eastern Shore, I am always reminded about the need to upgrade this highway. Too many Marylanders have lost their lives on this stretch of roadway. This legislation will fund the first and most critical phase of this project to make the road safer for those who use it. Another major project that has desperately needed funds has been the I-70/I-270 interchange in Frederick. It is one of the only interchanges on the interstate system that does not meet interstate standards. It has been a safety hazard for years. The lack of an adequate interchange in the area has forced trucks off the interstate and into surrounding areas. This legislation will provide funding to complete the first phase of reconstruction and relieve the local community of this burden, while improving the safety of this section of highway. For the first time, almost $10 million will be earmarked for Route 32 in Anne Arundel County in the vicinity of the National Security Agency. This highway is one of the most heavily traveled highways in the State and needs to expand capacity to accommodate the growth in the surrounding area. This legislation will also increase funding for the Appalachian Highway System. Maryland can expect to receive approximately $6 million per year for the next six years under this bill--that is enough to rebuild U.S. 220 in Allegany County. This is the number one highway priority for Western Maryland and a serious safety problem. This is $4 million per year more than Maryland receives now. Thanks to this legislation, Maryland will have the funds to upgrade this highway. Mr. President, not only does Maryland receive more highway dollars, we receive more transit dollars. Maryland will receive almost twice as much federal funds for its transit programs. The MARC system will receive an additional $185 million and the Baltimore Light Rail System will receive $125 million to double-track the system. This will continue to expand transit opportunities for Marylanders and help relieve congestion on our highways. Mr. President, I do have one major reservation to this conference report. I believe it is just plain wrong that our veterans are being asked to sacrifice their compensation for our transportation needs. I made my feelings very clear when I voted in favor of an amendment to the Budget Resolution earlier this year that called on the Congress to protect veterans benefits. As the Ranking Member of the Veterans Affairs Appropriations Subcommittee, I will look for way to ensure that these funds are replenished. Our vets, our heroes, deserve better and I will fight to correct this deep injustice. Despite my anger over the veterans offset, I will support this legislation because it is so important to improving the safety of Maryland's highways, byways and transit systems. Improving public safety and creating jobs are two of my highest priorities and this bill addresses both.", u"Without objection, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the conference report. (The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the Record of October 5, 1998.) Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to ask that my colleagues support the Conference Report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. I want to thank Chairman Young for his leadership in the Conference, and note for my colleagues that Chairman Goss was unable to chair the conference due to a serious medical condition in his family. We all wish Mrs. Goss a speedy recovery. I believe that the Conference Committee put together a solid package for consideration by the full Senate that fairly represents the intelligence priorities set forth in both the Senate and House versions of the Intelligence Authorization Act. I am pleased to report that the Conference Committee accomplished its task in a strong bipartisan manner, and I want to thank my colleague from Nebraska, Senator Kerrey, for working so closely with me to produce this legislation. I believe that the Conference Report embraces many of the key recommendations that the Senate adopted in its version of the bill. We recommended significant increases in funding for high-priority projects aimed at better positioning the Intelligence Community for the threats of the 21st Century, while at the same time reducing funds for programs and activities that were not adequately justified or redundant. The Conference Report includes key initiatives that I believe are vital for the future of our Intelligence Community. These initiatives include: bolstering advanced research and development across the Community, to facilitate, among other things, the modernization of NSA and CIA; strengthening efforts in counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-intelligence, and effective covert action; expanding the collection and exploitation of measurements and signatures intelligence, especially ballistic missile intelligence; developing reconnaissance systems based on new small satellite technologies that provide flexible, affordable collection from space with radars to detect moving targets; boosting education, recruiting, and technical training for Intelligence Community personnel; enhancing analytical capabilities; streamlining dissemination of intelligence products; and providing new tools for information operations. The conferees have provided the funds and guidance to ensure that military commanders and national policymakers continue to receive timely, accurate information on threats to our security. At the same time, we have found some critical areas within the Community that are in need of major improvements. First, the CIA's foremost mission of providing timely intelligence based on human sources (``HUMINT'') is in grave jeopardy. CIA case officers today do not have the training or the equipment needed to keep their true identities hidden, to communicate covertly with agents, or to plant sophisticated listening devices and other collection tools that will provide timely intelligence on an adversary's intentions. Second, what many see as the ``crown jewel'' of U.S. Intelligence--the National Security Agency's signals intelligence capability--likewise is in dire need of modernization. The digital and fiber optic revolutions are here-and-now, but NSA is still predominantly oriented toward cold war-era threats. The Director of NSA has recommended major changes in how NSA performs its mission--changes we endorse--but those recommendations were not adequately addressed in the President's budget. Third, promising technologies and systems for detecting missiles and other threats were short-changed in the President's budget request. Likewise, robust funding for new tools for conducting information warfare, new sensors to detect and counter proliferation, and a demonstration of radar technology on small and affordable satellites were not adequately addressed in the budget request. And fourth, the declining quality of analysis within the Intelligence Community is cause for great concern. Responding to the failure to predict the Indian nuclear tests, the Director of Central Intelligence commissioned retired Admiral David Jeremiah to review what went wrong and why. Among other findings, Admiral Jeremiah concluded that Intelligence Community analysts were complacent; they based their analyses on faulty assumptions; and engaged in wishful thinking. It is my belief that such is the state of analysis as it relates to many issues and problems, including political-military developments in China, the ballistic missile threat, and more. We can and should expect more from the Intelligence Community. And as we demand more from our Intelligence Community in a number of areas, we also demand fiscal responsibility. The Conference Report includes a number of reductions to programs that were not adequately justified or were redundant with other elements within the Intelligence Community. The Conference Report also places some fiscal restraints on programs that have historically been allowed to grow unbounded. These programs are primarily in the area of technical satellite collection, and the conferees placed a cost cap on the National Reconnaissance Office's next generation imagery satellite constellation, called the Future Imagery Architecture. I believe that this action is necessary to ensure that the program stays on a solid fiscal footing from the start, and focuses on the key performance parameters generated by the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense's Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Finally, the Conference Report includes a provision to name the CIA Headquarters Compound after President George Bush. I am happy that we were able to recognize President Bush's service to this country as both Director of Central Intelligence and as President. As DCI, Mr. Bush brought innovation to the CIA, and dramatically improved the morale within the Agency. He demonstrated leadership and integrity at a time when both were desperately needed to help restore confidence in the CIA and the other elements that make up the Intelligence Community. It is a fitting tribute that we designate CIA headquarters the George Bush Center for Intelligence. Mr. President, the Conference Committee worked closely together, in a strong bipartisan fashion, to produce a comprehensive Intelligence Authorization Act, and I urge my colleagues to support its adoption.", u"Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote for this conference report and I urge the President to sign this bill into law. This legislation is an essential part of Congress' annual duty to provide and direct the resources which safeguard the independence of the United States and the lives and livelihoods of the American people. Chairman Shelby's leadership and sustained effort throughout this year come to fruition in this excellent bill and I congratulate him. I also appreciate the vision and hard work of Chairman Goss and Ranking Member Dicks of the House Committee, together with the leadership of Chairman Young at the conference. This legislation, like the intelligence agencies it authorizes, seeks to maximize America's capabilities against today's threats while simultaneously building capability against the threats of 2010 and beyond. The Intelligence Community cannot be pulled back from its deployed status for retraining and retooling. It is operating tonight around the world, seeking to monitor every environment which could threaten America or our allies. But the Intelligence Community must also be able to master the steadily more complex technologies which will be tomorrow's threat environments. The outlines of the new century are apparent, as we see the continuing explosion of communications media, the global growth of strong encryption, and the increasing porosity of international borders, to mention just of the future that are already upon us. In response to challenges like these, the conference authorized the start or continuation of a number of new technology initiatives, including most of those the Senate supported previously. The Committee's efforts to advance intelligence technology were greatly assisted by a group of outside experts who formed a Technical Advisory Group to the Committee. They helped the Committee focus on the future of signals intelligence and the necessity for the National Security Agency to modernize itself, as well as how technology could better support human intelligence. Their contribution of time and expertise is paying off already for the country, and they deserve the thanks of all of us. Throughout the authorization process, the two intelligence committees have understood that their efforts to prepare U.S. intelligence to master the future must be bounded by budgetary realities. Most of the intelligence budget is dependent on a defense budget which, as we all know, is under severe pressure. The intelligence agencies have ambitious projects, and it is part of our job to set financial limits and time constraints and closely oversee the progress of these projects. The conferees placed a cost cap on the National Reconnaissance Office's Future Imagery Architecture for this reason. The bill also encourages competitive analysis of important and difficult intelligence topics. The Jeremiah Report which reviewed intelligence community performance following this year's Indian nuclear test and the Rumsfeld panel report on the ballistic missile threat both stress the need to use competitive analysis drawing on experts from both within and outside the government. This bill encourages that process. Analysis will grow stronger in the coming year, not only because of this legislation, but because there is now in place, under the Director of Central Intelligence, an Assistant Director for Analysis and Production. This official has not been confirmed by the Senate, although he may well be in the coming year, but he is already using the Director's authorities to make analysis in the Intelligence community more effective and efficient. He and his counterpart, the Assistant Director for Collection Management, and their supervisor, the Deputy Director for Community Management, are already by their actions validating Congress' wisdom in creating these positions. As I go to briefings and learn how these officials are marshaling resources in times of crisis, setting priorities, and identifying gaps, I am pleased with the work we did two years ago. Another aspect of the intelligence business should be praised, Mr. President, and that is the unparalleled level of cooperation between the agencies these days. The relationship between FBI and the CIA is particularly strong and it has paid off most recently in the investigation of the attacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Director Tenet and Director Freeh have overcome corporate cultures and bureaucratic impulses to forge a strong team for America and they deserve our thanks. Team-building and sound oversight both depend on the flow of information. The Senate had gone on record three times in defense of a Federal employee's right to bring classified information on wrongdoing to the appropriate committees of Congress. The House had devised a process by which such information could come to Congress while insuring the employee's privacy, making the employee's agency aware the information was going to Congress, and insuring the protection of sources and methods. The conference modified the House provision and agreed to make the information process faster. As one who has argued several times on this floor for the right of Congress to be informed, I am pleased with the conference outcome on this provision and with the work of both bodies. This legislation also recognizes the accomplishments of a great patriot, former President Bush, by naming the CIA Headquarters complex in his honor. From his initial service in World War II, President Bush has always stepped forward to do hard and sometimes dangerous work for his country. Leadership of the CIA has both characteristics. President Bush distinguished himself in that job, as in all his service, and I am pleased this legislation will honor him.", u"Mr. Chairman, Mr. Traficant has offered a similar provision in years past with a goal of ensuring that the intelligence community maximizes its purchase of American-made products. That is a goal I support. We have worked with the gentleman from Ohio on other occasions to preserve the spirit of his amendment in conference even though the committee is aware that the record of the intelligence community on the procurement of U.S. products is exemplary. We will do so again this year and we are pleased to accept the amendment. The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill shall be considered under the 5-minute rule by titles and each title shall be considered read. No amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is in order unless printed in the Congressional Record. The Clerk will designate section 1. The text of section 1 is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998''. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1? If not, the Clerk will designate title I. The text of title I is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (11) The National Reconnaissance Office. (12) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1998, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1775 of the 105th Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 1998 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1998 the sum of $147,588,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee and the Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program shall remain available until September 30, 1999. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized a total of 313 fulltime personnel as of September 30, 1998. Such personnel may be permanent employees of the Community Management Account elements or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) and the personnel authorized by subsection (b)-- (1) there is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998 such amounts, and (2) there is authorized such personnel as of September 30, 1998, The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title I? If not, the Clerk will designate title II. The text of title II is as follows: There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1998 the sum of $196,900,000. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title II? If not, the Clerk will designate title III. The text of title III is as follows: Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Subsection (e) of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall, for administrative purposes, be within the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is amended by striking ``1998'' and inserting ``1999''.", u"Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer this amendment today, which is a very simple amendment, that would require the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to jointly prepare an annual report on the intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China and, most specifically, those which are directed against or affect the interest of the United States. Some of the news reports on the fund-raising scandals that we have been reading about recently suggest that the People's Republic of China has apparently has decided to take a more aggressive approach toward influencing American politics. This is occurring at all levels of our political system, through the use of legitimate, such as through lobbying, as well as covert influence. At the same time, the Chinese are also relying heavily on the success of their economic espionage efforts to make their economy more competitive with ours. We also have concerns, that I think most Americans share, with the increasing buildup of the Chinese military operations and capabilities, and the potential that that poses a threat to our national security interests in the Pacific rim region. A China specialist at the Department of Defense recently summarized a growing threat posed by China's intelligence agencies by saying: The Ministry of State Security is an aggressive intelligence service which is coming of age in an international arena. The combination of a relatively stagnant economy and an increasingly competitive global economic environment will force China to rely more heavily on the illegal acquisition of high-technology modernization. Arms production and sales are increasingly being used to gain hard currency and expand global political influence. The MSS will be required to produce intelligence to support this assertive role in the global commercial and political environments. He went on to say: Western democracies, such as the United States, must adjust the focus of their clandestine intelligence and counterintelligence operations if they are to meet the MSS's forward posture effectively. The annual report that this amendment authorizes and requires would document significant developments involving China's Ministry of State Security, the military intelligence department of the People's Liberation Army, and other Chinese intelligence entities operating against the United States. The report is specifically intended to cover trends in the following areas: First, political, military, and economic espionage by Chinese intelligence services; second, intelligence activities designed to gain political influence, including activities undertaken or coordinated by the United Front Works Department of the Chinese Communist Party; third, efforts to gain direct or indirect influence through commercial or noncommercial intermediaries subject to control by the People's Republic of China, including enterprises controlled by the People's Liberation Army; and fourth, disinformation and press manipulation by the Government of the People's Republic of China against the United States. Various agencies from the intelligence and law enforcement communities will be tasked to provide input on Chinese intelligence activities within the United States and elsewhere. Some of the agencies being tasked to contribute to the annual report include the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, and Department of the Treasury. The classified version of the annual report will be provided to the leadership of both the House and the Senate as well as to the two intelligence oversight committees. An unclassified version will be prepared so that the American people can be provided with a general summary of the nature of the Chinese intelligence threat to the United States. My colleagues, I believe, will find this amendment to be one that is very crucial and very important, although very simple. It is not one that requires anything more than a gathering of information for us, but I think it is information that is something critical that we have and that it be prepared in these two different versions: First, the classified version for our committee's use primarily; and second, a version which can be revealed to the American public in general terms so we can keep track and the public can keep track of what the Chinese community may or may not be doing with respect to interests of the United States through its intelligence efforts. I have no more complicated issue than that to present.", u"Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. As President Dewey used to say, ``Be careful what you read in the newspapers.'' I think it is very important that we remember that my ranking member has addressed a lot of the issues that the distinguished gentleman from Vermont has just brought forward to us in previous sessions of the Congress in previous years. We are very concerned with our responsibilities to do our job of oversight to make sure that we are providing the best possible means of defense for Americans and America through the use of eyes and ears and brains around the world, our intelligence business, because despite the fact that the cold war is over, the danger to America and Americans and American interests is clearly not. Anybody who thinks it is might want to look in the newspapers about the World Trade Center bombing or they might want to look in the newspapers about the bombing in Saudi Arabia that regrettably cost the lives of some American troops and much wounding of hundreds of American troops, and on and on. Or they might want to go upstairs and take a look in the Intelligence Committee's area and of course every Member of this Congress is cordially invited to come upstairs and take a look at any time in what we are doing and what information we have as long as they are willing to comply with the accountability and responsibility that goes along with that knowledge. We think that it is very important that we have what I will call a factual analysis and we on the committee have tried to give it our best bet on what the facts are and what the analysis of the facts are. We have not done a data-free analysis. We have come to a thoughtful conclusion of where we are. I cannot overstate my opposition to across-the-board cuts, anyway, to intelligence bills, and even though I know that the gentleman from Vermont is well-intentioned, we have had this debate before, such an approach to budget cutting I do not think is good and it is indiscriminate. To make cuts by a percentage or a number grabbed out of thin air, whether it is 10 percent or 5 percent or any other percent, completely undercuts the duty of Congress to deliberate and make thoughtful decisions on behalf of our constituents in the best interests of the Nation. Remember, this is the one piece of legislation that must be authorized. We have an authorization charter on this committee that nobody else has. In our representative democracy, Members of Congress are elected to make responsible, informed spending decisions based on the close scrutiny of the costs and the benefits of specific government programs. That is what this permanent select committee has done. The select committee has analyzed and reviewed the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States to determine the benefit provided by those programs to the national security interests of the United States, and that is the bill we have in front of us today. To my colleagues who favor this amendment, let me ask, to what specific programs are they opposed? What should we cut back? Which programs should be terminated? Which intelligence targets should be dropped? Specific modifications to intelligence programs would be more appropriate than the broad brush approach that the gentleman proposes. In the gentleman's testimony to the Committee on Rules that was submitted in support of the amendment, he noted programs that he considers to be bloated wastes of taxpayers' money. In support of this 5 percent budget slashing amendment, he contends that the NRO, which we have heard about, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, NIMA, and the National Security Agency simply collect too much information to be thoroughly analyzed and used by policymaking consumers. He argues that because some information is not put to its best use, the entire intelligence community should suffer a 5 percent reduction in funding. Because the gentleman is unhappy with the overall lack of analytical capabilities of the intelligence community, which I would note is something that the committee specifically seeks to correct through this bill in a very thoughtful and deliberate and specific manner, he wants to reduce the analytical resources by an additional 5 percent. That is counterintuitive and counterproductive. If Members come up to the committee spaces and read the classified annex to the bill, they will see that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on a bipartisan basis did its job. The committee reviewed each program for its merit and its benefit to national security. The committee truly scrubbed each program to ensure the money would be well spent. We had a lot of debate about that. The committee held 7 full committee budget hearings, as I said, scores of briefings, 100 or so Member and staff briefings, and on and on. The committee thoroughly, let me repeat, the committee thoughtfully and thoroughly and with careful deliberation made appropriate adjustments to the President's intelligence budget proposal. The committee reported increases for those programs where it found the President's plan lacking, and it reduced authorization levels where appropriate and necessary. If Members have looked at the schedule of authorizations, they will see that the committee has made drastic, substantial, and real cuts, not just reductions in budget request levels but real cuts in several programs. The committee did so based on the merits of the program, not simply to achieve a percentile decrease that is altogether meaningless. These reductions were made for good government reasons. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has expired. (By unanimous consent, Mr. GOSS was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)", u"Mr. President, I do so in the context of a commission created in the 103d Congress, the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, which was established to review the whole pattern of the protection of the Nation's intelligence and defense secrets as we moved into a very different era from that from which we are clearly emerging. The present regime for protecting secrecy in our country was basically put in place in a very few days, weeks at most, in the aftermath of the declaration of war on Germany in 1917. The Espionage Act of 1917 was introduced in the first week of April, 1917, as the United States entered the First World War, and is still in place, though an amendment passed the following year known as the Sedition Act--largely a revision of section 3 of the Espionage Act--was subsequently repealed. In that same first week of April 1917, the Civil Service Commission presented to President Wilson a request for an Executive order on the question of the loyalty of Federal employees. Again, demonstrating a pattern, although one interrupted, that we see in our present situation--the arrangements put in place near the beginning of the century remain in place today. These are very considerable arrangements. Some 2,300,000 American civil servants have clearances for various levels of access to classified material. Some 850,000 persons in civilian employment in defense industries in the main are similarly cleared for classified material. The cost is very considerable, the issue is consequential. We did deal at great length with the problem of espionage in this country during the First World War. The Central Powers and the Allied Powers were very much contending for American support. It is a known fact that the German Ambassador to this country brought with him on one of his trips $150 million in Treasury bonds, the equivalent of $1 billion today, to use for just that purpose. And it had its consequences. During the 1930's, again, there were efforts of this kind from Hitler's Germany. Simultaneously, from the beginning of the establishment of the Communist Party in the United States, the Soviet Union had been involved in espionage activities, having as their most dramatic event the infiltration of the Manhattan Project. They successfully transferred to the Soviet Union the essential plans for the first atomic bomb. The Soviet Union had an atomic bomb about four years from the time that the United States did. It was almost, bolt for bolt, modeled on the original device tested at Alamogordo and the bomb that was dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. The details of this espionage effort are just emerging as the Venona transcripts are being released by the National Security Agency. We feel in our Commission that we have been something of a catalyst with regard to the Venona release, and with it we are beginning to see just how much the United States was up against and how necessary some of these measures were. We also begin to ask ourselves whether they are still necessary in the face of a very different international setting today. The Commission has a distinguished membership. I serve as Chairman; the Honorable Larry Combest, the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is Vice Chairman; the Honorable John Deutch was originally appointed when he was Deputy Secretary of Defense, and continues to serve on the Commission in his role as Director of Central Intelligence. We are finding, and I think the Senator from Connecticut will know this and will agree, that in the new world of electronic communication, the security of American encrypted messages is very much problematic, and the capacities of persons all over the world, for whatever reason, to break into the Pentagon files and intercept messages is almost difficult to comprehend for someone over the age of 30. We learned just yesterday in the New York Times that a 16-year-old British youth with a small computer in his bedroom in North London was intercepting messages from American agents in North Korea, and there are several criminal prosecutions going on in the United Kingdom of that kind. How to deal with this entirely new set of challenges is the reason for establishing such bodies as the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy--and I think that the commission proposed here to inquire into the nature of our military defense needs in the future, with a larger view than the quadrennial review--is wholly in order. I am honored to be a cosponsor of the amendment. I hope the work of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Secrecy might be of some utility to this commission, as it begins its work. I thank the sponsors, and I yield the floor.", u"I understand though that this will be modified to accommodate that problem. I have not seen the modification yet specifically, but I understand that Senator Thomas has modified his amendment to address concerns raised by the Department of Defense concerning national emergencies and that was one of the problems. I understand the amendment will provide an exemption for national security contingencies. Maybe that will solve the problem, maybe it will not, but that is a concern about the amendment, and I think the scope of it is still unclear. If enacted into law in its original version, the amendment would appear to prohibit, for instance, some other things, and I do not know whether these are covered under contingencies or not. It would appear to prohibit the CIA from contracting with NSA or DIA, the National Security Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency, for classified goods or services--for example, a spy satellite or equipment--without performing cost comparisons and benchmarks. While OMB might try to provide for such exemptions in the regulations required by the amendment, the amendment, as I understood it, provides no limitations on its comprehensive scope. I am also concerned about the amendment's references to ``enforcing any policy or any authority in any other form.'' I put that in quotes, concerned about the amendment's reference to ``enforcing any policy or any authority in any other form.'' I am not certain what this might include. It could be interpreted to cover the budget. It would seem even to cover apportionment of funds. After all, when OMB apportions funds, it conveys an authority to outlay funds. How would this impact on interagency activities? I am not sure. Maybe it would be good. Maybe it would be bad. But these terms do concern me. I do not believe we should enact into law such an overarching requirement, a very major piece of legislation, without careful consideration of its scope and necessary exemptions. The broad language of the amendment might also cover FFRDC's. Many times agencies contract with another agency such as DOE for goods or services to be provided by FFRDC, and this arrangement would seem to be covered by the amendment. I do not believe the Senate has sufficiently considered this proposal in order to subject the National Labs, the Center for Naval Analysis, and other FFRDC's with the blanket requirements of this amendment, and they would be affected by it. They could not help but be affected by it. Finally, I am concerned that there could be other situations that this amendment would needlessly burden with reporting and study requirements. There could be instances in which an agency contracts for goods or services that another agency procures from other sources, even the private sector. There are also revolving funds and many interagency reimbursable activities that would appear to be covered by the amendment. And to subject all such activities to the terms of this amendment, without certainty about the impact, concerns me very much. Again, the sponsors of the amendment may hope that OMB will provide the right exemptions for the right cases. But the text of the amendment is very, very comprehensive. Again, this is just another reason why I think we should not enact into law legislative language of such broad scope--not today, anyway. Next week, OMB's Deputy Director for Management, John Koskinen, will testify before the Governmental Affairs Committee on various OMB and other agency initiatives to increase agency reliance on the private sector. That is one of the subjects of the hearing, and to create incentives for agencies to search for more economical ways to procure goods and services. That hearing will be very informative as to this debate. It should include this amendment, and that is where I think we should consider this amendment, not here on the appropriations legislation. So I think I do not see any problem with recommending to my colleagues, with something of this broad a scope--and this is not an insignificant amendment, this is a major step in whatever direction it would be leading and is very, very far-reaching--I think, to wait 1 week until the head of OMB can give his testimony and give his opinion on this and indicate to us how this would operate at the executive branch level. It seems to me, that is not a delay that is intolerable. For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment. I think it is very far-reaching. It is not an innocuous little amendment; it is one that is very far-reaching, and after we know the scope of it better, it might be something I could well support. But I would like to have Mr. Koskinen's testimony on it and have it before the committee so we could explore, in a little bit more detail, the ramifications of this or the implications of it before we vote on it in an appropriations bill acting on the floor today. Mr. President, for all those reasons, I oppose the legislation and hope my colleagues support that position. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SANTORUM). The Senator from Wyoming.", u'Mr. Chairman, I had the honor of serving this great land back in the 1970s, including those years in which the government of our country, in an effort to institutionalize proper oversight of our intelligence agencies, enacted public laws that established the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In the intervening generation, these committees, including under the current leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss), have provided very, very essential oversight of the intelligence activities of our government. Hopefully in so doing, we have avoided any excesses that have given rise to some of the incidents in the past that have troubled our intelligence gathering capabilities and hurt the credibility of these great institutions such as the CIA. However, Mr. Chairman, the oversight with which the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and many others have worked so diligently to both implement and then preserve over the last 24 years is under attack right now, and the survivability of that oversight mechanism is threatened. I speak particularly, Mr. Chairman, of efforts by the intelligence community to deny proper information for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to conduct oversight, meaningful oversight responsibilities. For example, in recent communications between the chairman and the NSA, the general counsel of the NSA interposed what, by any stretch of the imagination, is a bogus claim of attorney/client privilege in an effort to deny the chairman and the committee members proper information with which to carry out their oversight responsibilities. In particular, the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) was seeking very important information that goes to the standards whereby the intelligence community and the agencies comprising the intelligence community gather intelligence and gather information on American citizens. One such project in particular that has recently come to light, Mr. Chairman, is a project known as Project Echelon, which has been in place for several years and which, by accounts that we have recently seen in the media, engages in the intercession of literally millions of communications involving United States citizens over satellite transmissions, involving e-mail transmissions, Internet access, as well as mobile phone communications and telephone communications. This information apparently is shared, at least in part, and coordinated, at least in part, with intelligence agencies of four other countries: the UK, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. As part of our effort here in the Congress, both on the Select Committee on Intelligence, which the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) chairs, as well as others of us, while not serving on that committee, are concerned about the privacy rights for American citizens and whether or not there are constitutional safeguards being circumvented by the manner in which the intelligence agencies are intercepting and/or receiving international communications back from foreign nations that would otherwise be prohibited by the prohibitions and the limitations on the collection of domestic intelligence. We have been trying to get information with regard to Project Echelon and others. The amendment that I propose today simply would require the intelligence community, and that is specifically the Department of Justice, the National Security Agency, and the CIA to provide to the Congress within 60 days of the enactment this Intelligence Authorization Act a report setting forth the legal basis and procedures whereby the intelligence community and the agencies comprising intelligence community gather intelligence. This will enable the intelligence community and the Committee on the Judiciary of both Houses to properly evaluate whether or not these procedures are being implemented properly according to proper legal and constitutional standards. It would be very interesting to see, Mr. Chairman, if the administration or the Senate opposes this very straightforward amendment, which simply requires a report on the legal basis for such interceptions to be furnished within 60 days to the Select Committee on Intelligence of both Houses and to the Committee on the Judiciary of both Houses. I ask Members on both sides of the aisle to support this very straightforward amendment, which not only will help guarantee the privacy rights for American citizens, but will protect the oversight responsibilities of the Congress which are now under assault by these bogus claims that the intelligence communities are making. I ask for the adoption of the amendment.', u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Conference Report to the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2008. This legislation authorizes appropriations for the conduct of intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Department of Defense; the National Security Agency; and the Drug Enforcement Administration. The legislation touches all aspects of our national security--from preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to anticipating and addressing developing threats around the world. Additionally, this legislation ensures that intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated in a manner that comports with American law, policies and values. In conference, we added a provision requiring U.S. interrogation policies employed by our intelligence community to follow those outlined in the U.S. Army Field Manual. The strength of our Nation comes not only from the might of our military, but from the power of our example. Historically, the United States has stood as a beacon for human rights and the rule of law. Unfortunately, that light has been dimmed recently as a result of the Bush Administration's gross indifference to the Geneva Convention and anti-torture regimes. The language was inserted not only to help regain our moral standing around the world, but also as a critical step toward protecting our own troops captured in the field. It is no secret that the world looks to how we treat our prisoners when determining how to treat our troops. When we practice waterboarding or when we inhumanely parade our detainees around naked before the cameras, the world sees this as the standard to apply to the treatment of American troops. According to testimony received by intelligence committees in the House and Senate, the U.S. Army Field Manual provides a detailed description of interrogation strategies that can be used to effectively elicit information from detainees while allowing the flexibility to adapt particular approaches to particular situations. Importantly, the U.S. Army Field Manual also includes a number of specific prohibitions. Acts of violence or intimidation--including physical or mental torture, or exposure to inhumane treatment--are prohibited. It also explicitly prohibits forcing a detainee to be naked; perform sexual acts; placing hoods or sacks over the head of a detainee; electric shock; burning or other forms of physical pain; waterboarding; using military working dogs; conducting mock executions; and depriving the detainee of necessary food, water, or medical care. Private security companies, funded by billions of dollars in U.S. military and State Department contracts, are performing many of the jobs handled by our troops. Some of these jobs include work assigned to the intelligence community. This conference report adds an additional level of oversight and accountability of these contractors by requiring the director of national intelligence to provide a report to Congress by April of next year, describing the services performed by contractors across the Intelligence Community. This conference report seeks to start the process of establishing a clear definition of the functions that may be appropriately performed by contractors employed by the intelligence community. It is key that the intelligence community exercises the will to identify criminal violations by contractors and puts in place procedures to respond to financial fraud or other abuses. Requiring a report of contractor activities will help policymakers determine whether intelligence contractors are performing functions that are legal or that should be performed by government employees. Passage today of this conference report will correct a three-year failure by Congress to pass an Intelligence Authorization bill. With this legislation, Congress sends to the President an intelligence package that makes new investments in human intelligence training and adds funds for sending analysts overseas while also enhancing oversight and eliminating wasteful spending. This conference report is also a significant move in the direction of reestablising our reputation abroad as a country dedicated to promoting and observing human rights. I am happy to support this conference report and I encourage my colleagues to do the same.", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. First, let me thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Putnam) for yielding me the time. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule providing for the consideration of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year First, Mr. Speaker, let me remind my colleagues that Members who wish to do so can go to the Intelligence Committee office to examine the classified schedule of authorizations for the programs and activities of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the national intelligence program. This includes authorizations for the CIA as well as the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence programs within, among other things, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the Departments of State, Treasury and Energy, and the FBI. Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for the tactical intelligence and related activities and joint military intelligence program of the Department of Defense. Today more than ever, we must make the creation of a strong and flexible intelligence apparatus one of the highest priorities of this body. The terrorist attacks of September 11, combined with the continuing threat of further attacks, underscore the importance of this legislation, and I am pleased that it has been brought to the floor before the July 4 recess. Now, Mr. Speaker, while I generally support this bill, it is not closed to improvements. As the Democrats noted in our additional views, this bill is the first authorization bill to be considered since the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 became law last December. The reforms undertaken last year, in the aftermath of two intelligence failures, created a Director of National Intelligence and dramatically reshaped the intelligence community. This authorization bill will therefore help define the authorities, priorities, and direction of the Director of National Intelligence and the entire intelligence community. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that the committee rejected the President's paltry request for counterterrorism funding and, instead, fully funded the intelligence community's needs. Fully funding counterterrorism represents bipartisanship and good public policy. Of course, this does not seem to be the first time that this administration does not heed the advice of its own intelligence experts, but I digress. Let me speak also briefly about the fact that this bill and the report accompanying it are pretty much silent on one of the most salient issues of the day, our military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The allegations of severe human rights abuses at Guantanamo Bay are at best extremely disturbing and at worst unforgivable sins of our Nation, which has always led the fight for human rights. I do not work there, so I cannot speak to the veracity of every single allegation. But I do know that Guantanamo Bay is a stealth prison, an unrecognizable blip on the radar screen of domestic and international law. Surrounded by a world of laws, treaties, norms and practices, Guantanamo is an unrecognizable entity, a small space where the law simply does not penetrate. The prisoners are in judicial limbo, with limited access to lawyers and no legal recourse to profess their guilt or innocence or to protect themselves from abuse. In fact, many of them have now been jailed for more than 3 years without even having been charged with a crime. It sounds a bit Kafkaesque to me. Requests from objective outside observers to examine the condition of the prisoners have been rebuffed time and again. The Bush administration seems to trust in only itself to determine whether the prisoners are deserving of legal protections. I am disheartened by the intelligence authorization bill's silence on this matter. The Members of this body should be greatly concerned with the utter lack of respect for the law or adherence to international agreements that characterize Guantanamo Bay. Former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once said, ``If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law.'' Congress has a responsibility to prevent Guantanamo Bay from becoming the personal prison of convenience for the Bush administration to stash people it does not want to suffer legal rights to. This body would be greatly remiss if we shucked that responsibility in favor of turning a blind eye to what very well might be the biggest terrorism recruitment tool since the attacks on September 11. Mr. Speaker, as I have said, this bill provides authorizations and appropriations for some of the most important national security programs in this country. With the adoption of the manager's amendment, which we will hear about in much greater detail presently, I look forward to supporting the bill's ultimate passage. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern), my colleague with whom I serve on the Rules Committee.", u"Mr. Chairman, the terrorist attacks on our homeland that occurred on September 11th, 2001 changed the world forever for all Americans. The collective national loss we felt on that day is no less painful today, and ranks as one of the darkest moments in our national history. In that solemn hour, our President was rightly resolved to take the fight to the terrorists and not to stop until justice prevailed and the threat was mitigated. Today, 3 years later, we are still very much engaged in the war on terror. Since the release of the 9/11 Commission report in July, the national media and many politicians have called for the immediate adoption of all the report's 41 recommendations, which is the path being taken by the other body. Mr. Chairman, I fear that we are moving too fast to implement a solution that does not match the problem. Moreover, election year politics are driving us to address the shortfalls between foreign and domestic intelligence by unwisely tinkering with the military. This could prove to have grave and unintended consequences to our troops currently in battle and our future military operations. Long before the 9/11 Commission report hit bookstores and the commissioners launched their book tours, this Republican-led Congress and the Bush Administration took many measures designed to enhance our Nation's homeland security. I feel it is important to highlight these accomplishments that clearly illustrate Congress's dedication to keep our Nation safe. At an August hearing held by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Vice-Chairman of the Commission, Lee Hamilton admitted that a lot of progress has been made in many areas, including hurting al Qaeda and inhibiting their ability to respond, while also beefing up security here at home. In fact, it has been disclosed that our security efforts have since prevented several post 9/11 terrorist incidents. Furthermore, we have already taken action through Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraq Freedom to eliminate safe havens for terrorists in foreign lands--including Al Qaeda's top sanctuary, Afghanistan. Additionally, we have made progress in blocking sources of weapons of mass destruction from terrorists, including the elimination of the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network and Libya's WMD and long-range missile programs. On a more positive note, this legislation does encompass many of the recommendations adopted by the Committees on Armed Services and Intelligence to improve intelligence operations. This measure reforms the intelligence community consistent with the framework established by the 9/11 Commission by creating a National Intelligence Director (NID) with substantial budget and personnel authority as well as a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Specifically, the NID will have expanded statutory, budgetary, and personnel powers over the National Intelligence Program (NIP). The NIP is composed of CIA, parts of the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial Agency (NGA), FBI, State, and Homeland Security. This excludes the Pentagon's joint military and tactical intelligence programs, which allows the Secretary of Defense to continue to directly support the joint and tactical requirements of military intelligence. The budget authorities given to the NID were carefully crafted to preserve the ability of the Secretary of Defense to rely on these agencies to provide the best military intelligence directly to combatant commanders, which in my view makes this superior to the other proposal adopted by the other body. Mr. Chairman, it is important to note that the 9/11 Commission did not suggest that DoD management of intelligence agencies contributed to 9/11. In fact, when testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, Mr. Hamilton suggested that the military intelligence system is not broken. As such, it is imperative that we preserve the intelligence lifeline to our troops by ensuring that more bureaucracy, distance and unnecessary obstacles do not come between our troops and strategic and tactical intelligence; an increasingly critical tool in today's battlefield. Specifically, Mr. Hamilton said, ``I think the committee has helped us in understanding the importance of tactical military intelligence. And I think some of our recommendations can be refined.'' He also added, ``I think the questions that are being asked here are helpful to us and causes me to think that we need to refine some of our thinking in this very important area, and we will try to do that.'' Mr. Chairman, there are 158,000 troops currently in theater and their combatant commanders need to know they can count on the military chain of command to quickly access critical intelligence resources. As has been said before, first do no harm. The balance maintained in this bill can be literally a matter of life and death for these brave men and women serving overseas. My support of this legislation is predicated upon my strong reservations about the measure adopted by the other body, and with the hope that the provisions of H.R. 10 that I outlined will prevail in conference.", u"Mr. Chairman, the terrorist attacks on our homeland that occurred on September 11th, 2001 changed the world forever for all Americans. The collective national loss we felt on that day is no less painful today, and ranks as one of the darkest moments in our national history. In that solemn hour, our President was rightly resolved to take the fight to the terrorists and not to stop until justice prevailed and the threat was mitigated. Today, three years later, we are still very much engaged in the war on terror. Since the release of the 9/11 Commission report in July, the national media and many politicians have called for the immediate adoption of all the report's 41 recommendations, which is the tact being taken by the other body. Mr. Chairman I fear that we are moving too fast to implement a solution that does not match the problem. Moreover, election year politics are driving us to address the shortfalls between foreign and domestic intelligence by unwisely tinkering with the military. This could prove to have grave and unintended consequences to our troops currently in battle and our future military operations. Long before the 9/11 Commission report hit bookstores and the commissioners launched their book tours, this Republican-led Congress and the Bush Administration took many measures designed to enhance our nation's homeland security. I feel it is important to highlight these accomplishments that clearly illustrates Congress' dedication to keep our nation safe. At an August hearing held by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Vice-Chairman of the Commission, Lee Hamilton admitted that a lot of progress has been made in many areas, including hurting Al Qaeda and inhibiting their ability to respond, while also beefing up security here at home. In fact, it has been disclosed that our security efforts have since prevented several post 9/11 terrorist incidents. Furthermore, we have already taken action through Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom to eliminate safe havens for terrorists in foreign lands--including Al Qaeda's top sanctuary, Afghanistan. Additionally, we have made progress in blocking sources of weapons of mass destruction from terrorists, including the elimination of the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network and Libya's WMD and long-range missile programs. On a more positive note, this legislation does encompass many of the recommendations adopted by the Committees on Armed Services and Intelligence to improve intelligence operations. This measure reforms the intelligence community consistent with the framework established by the 9/11 Commission by creating a National Intelligence Director (NID) with substantial budget and personnel authority as well as a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Specifically, the NID will have expanded statutory, budgetary, and personnel powers over the National Intelligence Program (NIP). The NIP is composed of CIA, parts of the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial Agency (NGA), FBI, State and Homeland Security. This excludes the Pentagon's joint military and tactical intelligence programs, which allows the Secretary of Defense to continue to directly support the joint and tactical requirements of military intelligence. The budget authorities given to the NID were carefully crafted to preserve the ability of the Secretary of Defense to rely on these agencies to the best military intelligence directly to combatant commanders, which in my view makes it superior to the other proposal adopted by the other body. Mr. Chairman, it is important to note that the 9/11 Commission did not suggest that DoD management of intelligence agencies contributed to 9/11. In fact, when testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, Mr. Hamilton suggested that the military intelligence support is not broken. As such, it is imperative that we preserve the intelligence lifeline to our troops by ensuring that more bureaucracy, distance and unnecessary obstacles do not come between our troops and strategic and tactical intelligence; an increasingly critical tool in today's battlefield. Specifically, Mr. Hamilton said, ``I think the committee has helped us in understanding the importance of tactical military intelligence. And I think some of our recommendations can be refined.'' He also added, ``I think the questions that are being asked here are helpful to us and causes me to think that we need to refine some of our thinking in this very important area, and we will try to do that. Mr. Chairman, there are 158,000 troops currently in theater and their combatant commanders need to know they can count on the military chain of command to quickly access critical intelligence resources. As has been said before, first do no harm. The balance maintained in this bill can be literally a matter of life and death for these brave men and women serving overseas. My support of this legislation is predicated upon my strong reservations about the measure adopted by the other body and with the hope that the provisions of H.R. 10 that I outlined will prevail in conference.", u"Mr. President, I am very pleased to support the renomination of Robert Mueller to be Director of the FBI. Director Mueller has served as Director since days immediately preceding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the wake of that tragedy, he has overseen a top-to-bottom transformation of the FBI from a domestic law enforcement agency to a national security agency and with a necessary global presence to combat terrorism. Director Mueller has led the charge to ensure that the FBI's transformation is successful. This includes upgrading the workforce from an agent-driven agency to one that includes an ever-increasing number of intelligence analysts. I applaud the hard work that has been done, and I also applaud the leadership of Director Mueller. But more work remains. Despite the recent successes, the FBI also has its share of black marks and skeletons in the closet. I have been an outspoken critic of the FBI's culture for many years because of its unwillingness to own up to mistakes. Too often, officials sought to protect the agency's reputation at the expense of the truth. My concerns are magnified by the way the FBI has treated internal whistleblowers who come forward and report fraud and abuse. But these problems are not necessarily the fault of Director Mueller, and many of these problems were in place long before he arrived. The Director has been forthright in coming before Congress and explaining these mistakes and not simply passing the buck. I appreciate his candor, and I believe the FBI is in good hands with his leadership. But I will continue, as he knows, to conduct extensive oversight of the FBI to ensure that taxpayers' dollars are spent appropriately and that the civil liberties of Americans are protected. In 1976, following the excesses of J. Edgar Hoover, Congress limited the term of the Director of the FBI to one nonrenewable 10-year term. Congress did so to prevent the accumulation of excess power by a Director as well as to provide some political independence for the FBI. Despite his knowing about Director Mueller's impending term limit and his initiating a search for a successor led by Attorney General and Vice President Biden, President Obama chose not to send the Senate a nomination for the Director of the FBI. Instead, the President decided, notwithstanding those statutory provisions, Director Mueller should continue to serve in this position for another 2 years. Presidential decisions to make transitions in other national security positions are not a special circumstance supporting the extension of the Director's term. Those personnel changes were entirely within the control of the President. However, we do live in extraordinary times and currently face unusual national security threats. Between the recent death of Osama bin Laden and with the upcoming 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, there is an increased threat of a possible terrorist attack. Against this backdrop and with a heavy heart, I agreed to support the President's request to provide a one-time exception to the 10-year term limit on the FBI directorship. With some reluctance, I joined as a cosponsor of the original S. 1103. The President recently signed into law a modified version of that bill that provides a one-time extension of the FBI Director's term. Early in the process, I said that as a requirement for my support of any legislation extending the 10-year term, regular procedure be followed. The purpose of this requirement was to set a substantial precedent against pursuing a simple process eviscerating the 10-year term limit. The process of getting to today's confirmation vote has met my early requirement. A precedent has been set that the FBI Director's term would not be routinely extended--the process of holding a hearing where the FBI Director testified, a legislative markup, and a floor vote in both the House and Senate. Further, the bill was coupled with a unanimous consent agreement requiring a vote on the renomination of Director Mueller. Taken together, this process has established a historical record that we do not take this extension lightly and that any future extensions should have to go through no less than this same process. The 10-year limit has achieved its intended purpose. Until Director Mueller, no Director subject to the limit has served the full 10-year term. The limit has been successful in reducing the power of the Director and in preserving the vital civil liberties of all Americans. It has also provided important political independence for the FBI Director. Only one Director has been fired in this period, and this did not occur for political reasons. The prohibition on reappointment has also preserved the Directors's independence by eliminating any potential that the Director will attempt to curry favor with the Presidents to be reappointed. Director Mueller has done an admirable job on some areas of reform in an agency under difficult circumstances. I strongly support Director Mueller and believe he will continue to provide steady leadership at this agency during what continue to be extraordinary times, and you can say extraordinary times going back to at least September 11, 2001, but as you look on the history of the war on terror, it probably started 25 years before that in one form or another. However, it is clear to me, as the legislation the President signed requires, that in 2 years Director Mueller will need to move on and the President will send the Senate a new nominee to fill his shoes. In the meantime, we all ought to thank Director Mueller for his willingness to serve for another 2 years in this very important position because I am sure he was already ready to move on. So the people of the United States as well as this Congress need to say thank you, Director Mueller, for being willing to serve your people again. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, the Intelligence Authorization Act is not perfect. There are some provisions that have already received a veto threat from the President that need to be amended. Thankfully, the chairman and the ranking member have worked together to submit a manager's amendment that would do just that. It is vital that this manager's amendment pass because of two provisions in particular. The first would make the Director of the National Security Agency a Senate-confirmed position. This would unnecessarily politicize one of our most critical intelligence needs. Traditionally, this position has already been indirectly subject to confirmation through the Senate's confirmation of military officers who have been promoted into the position. We can't afford to damage the management of the intelligence community in this manner. The second provision would modify the reporting requirements regarding Guantanamo detainees. This would require the Director of National Intelligence to provide State Department cables to the Intelligence Committees. While effective oversight is an essential role of Congress, we also must not interfere with the ability of the State Department to conduct effective diplomatic negotiations. Therefore, I call on my colleagues to support the manager's amendment as well as the amended version of the underlying bill. I also want to thank, with regard to the Charter School bill, Chairman Kline and Ranking Member Miller for their excellent work both on the bill as well as their manager's amendment that would improve the bill in a wide variety of ways, including prioritizing States that authorize charters to be their own School Food Authority so that they can serve healthy meals to their students, including transportation considerations to help ensure that kids have access, and that choice is made more meaningful by ensuring that families who don't have the ability to carpool or transport their kids to school also have choices within the public education system. This truly bipartisan bill and manager's amendment really exemplifies what the House can do to support good public education and improve student outcome. I agree with my colleague, Mr. Hoyer, who said that this is a start. While many of us would rather see a full reauthorization of ESEA, this is a very promising start to what will hopefully be a very productive session with regard to education, one of the most important goals of this Congress as well as absolutely necessary to improve the economy in the long run. Unfortunately, one of the amendments disallowed by the Republican majority under this rule is one that I proposed to help facilitate charter schools in obtaining Federal competitive grant funding by adding priority for States that allow charter schools to be LEAs, or Local Education Agencies. Effectively, my amendment would have reduced paperwork and overhead. If the school districts and charter schools agree, the charter schools themselves could effectively function as their own fiscal agent for Federal purposes and to compete for Federal grants. What happens now, and it works in most cases 9 out of 10 times--unfortunately it's the cases where it doesn't work out that cause the difficulty--is charter schools have to go through their LEA, their authorizing institute, or their school district in order to apply for Federal grants. What does this mean? It means there's another set of bureaucrat's eyes that have to see every proposal, another person that has to sign off. Sometimes this can lead to unnecessary delays. At worst, it can lead to missing deadlines if funding applications are submitted to districts and not turned around in enough time to meet Federal deadlines for grant funding. So it would be nice to continue to work on this with the committee, and I think that many of us would like to see charter schools recognized as LEAs for purposes of Federal funding. I am proud to say that, in my home State of Colorado, we were able to get this fixed in the last legislative session, and now charter schools are recognized as LEAs. In fact, about half of the States allow charter schools to be LEAs for Federal purposes. A key goal of the bill is to ensure charter schools have equitable funding as well. Mr. Speaker, if we defeat the previous question, I will offer an amendment to the rule to make in order an amendment by Mr. Garamendi of California, one which would give priority to eligible entities working with charter schools that plan to use materials made in America for the construction or renovation of school facilities. Once again, it would make that amendment in order and allow for a discussion and vote by the House on that amendment. Republicans blocked this germane amendment last night in the Rules Committee by a party-line vote. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of the amendment into the Record, along with extraneous material immediately prior to the vote on the previous question.", u"I yield myself such time as I may consume. Madam Chair, I first wish to announce that, subsequent to ordering the bill reported, the committee has modified the classified schedule of authorizations to the bill with respect to the level of funding of certain programs, with bipartisan agreement between myself and my ranking member, Mr. Ruppersberger. The classified annex containing the schedule of authorizations is available for review by all Members of the House, subject to the rules of the House and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, under the procedures described in my announcement to the House on Wednesday. The modified schedule of authorizations is and has been available for review to Members for the period of time required by the rules of the House. Madam Chair, I think this is an important day for the community, certainly rolling into the weekend of the 10th anniversary of that tragic event on 9/11. It is important, it is crucial, that we continue to monitor, to improve, to provide support for our intelligence services who so bravely around the world and here at home serve to protect the United States of America. The bill before us today is a vital tool for our oversight of the intelligence community's classified activities and is critical to ensuring our intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities they need to do their important work. Passing an annual intelligence bill is vital to keeping the laws governing our intelligence operations up to date. The FY12 bill sustains today's intelligence operations and provides for future capabilities while achieving significant savings. The U.S. intelligence community plays a critical role in the war on terrorism and securing the country from many other threats that we face. This bill funds all U.S. intelligence agencies, spanning 17 separate agencies, totaling roughly $80 billion. The bill's comprehensive classified annex provides detailed guidance on intelligence spending, including adjustments to costly programs. It provides oversight and authorization for critical intelligence activities, including but not limited to the global counterterrorism operations such as the one that took out Osama bin Laden; tactical intelligence support to combat units in Afghanistan and Iraq and other places; cyber defense by the National Security Agency; detecting and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the R&D, research and development, of new technology to maintain our intelligence agencies' technological edge, including work on code breaking and spy satellites. The bill also reflects our tough economic times as well, Madam Chair. After passage of the Budget Control Act, the committee revamped the bill it reported out of committee in May to double its budget savings. The bill is significantly below the President's FY12 budget request and further still below the FY11 authorized and appropriated levels. We accomplished this without impacting the mission. The savings were achieved through a whole series of joint work and effort by many to merge services and find savings that would bring efficiencies, as I said, again, Madam Chair, without impacting the mission of the intelligence services. The bill curbs unnecessary personnel growth. The cost of additional personnel would squeeze funding for high-tech investments, which is our competitive advantage in intelligence. While the bill denies most of the administration's requested personnel increases, it adds some key positions in high priority areas such as cyber defense. The bill also promotes major operating efficiencies in a number of areas, including data processing, IT, and office leases, finding over $100 million in savings. This bill also makes only ``best value'' investments and shaves $1 billion from a handful of very large-ticket hardware items and programs that the intelligence community is involved in. The bill protects investments in cutting-edge R&D and redirects $500 million of savings to invest in some game-changing technologies. The bottom line is this bipartisan bill preserves and advances national security, and it is also fiscally responsible. Secrecy is a necessary part of our country's intelligence work, so the intelligence committees must conduct strong and effective oversight on behalf of the American people. That oversight is impossible, however, without an annual Intelligence authorization bill. Madam Chair, that's why we stand before you today with a bill that I think this body can be proud of, America can be proud of, and our intelligence community can take to the bank that we're investing in their mission success. Dear Chairman Rogers: I write to confirm our mutual understanding regarding provisions in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee, specifically the preparation of Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements and a requirement that the Department of State provide information concerning individuals detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. We appreciate your agreeing to include the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the list of committees to which this information will be submitted. In order to expedite Floor consideration of this legislation, the Committee will not object to the inclusion of these two provisions and will not mark up the bill. The Committee takes this action with the mutual understanding that the Committee's jurisdiction over this, and similar legislation, is in no way diminished or altered. The Committee reserves the right to seek appointment to any House-Senate conference on this legislation, and requests your support if such a request is made. I would appreciate your including this letter in the Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation on the House Floor. Sincerely, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman. I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize and pay tribute to Colonel Peter B. Trainer on the occasion of his retirement from the United States Air Force. Colonel Trainer's professional achievements are numerous and I know he would be the first to acknowledge that none of them would have been possible without the support of his wife and family. Colonel Trainer's parents set the example of service as his father, Lt. Colonel Thomas R. Trainer, retired after a distinguished career in the Air Force. He began his distinguished career in 1982 when he received his commission through ROTC at The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina. From there, he proceeded on to numerous important assignments. After completing the Space Operations Officer Course at Lowry AFB, Colorado, he was assigned as a Satellite System Controller and later Assistant Chief, Satellite Mission Planning Branch, Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), Offutt AFB, Nebraska. In 1986, he was assigned as the Chief of Satellite Operations, Space Systems Division Los Angeles AFB, California where Colonel Trainer was responsible for all command and control activities of the launch and early orbit checkout for two DMSP satellites. Colonel Trainer was then selected for special duty as an Air Force Recruiter and served as the Chief of Operations for the 3514th Recruiting Squadron, McGuire AFB, New Jersey, where he was responsible for Air Force accessions in an area that included New York City, New Jersey and Europe. In 1993, Colonel Trainer was assigned to Headquarters, U.S. Space Command where he qualified as a Space Surveillance Center Commander in the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center. He was subsequently selected to become Chief of the Space Surveillance Section where he was a key player in the command's Space Control Mission. In 1995, Colonel Trainer transitioned to his present status as a USAF Reserve Officer where he was chosen by U.S. Space Command Director for Operations to be the first Space Command Intern to the National Signals Intelligence Committee. Col. Trainer helped to shepherd in a new era of cooperation between Space Command and the National Reconnaissance Office. His successes continued as he later served as Chief, Space Exploitation and Integration Branch at U.S. Strategic Command, where he played an integral role in bringing tactical space capabilities, including ``Blue Force Tracking'' to our combatant forces. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Colonel Trainer served as one of the watch commanders that stood up the nation's Blue Force Tracking Missions Management Center during Operation Enduring Freedom. This experience and background led to his selection as Individual Mobilization Augmentee to the Chief, Space and Missile Programs, Air Force Legislative Liaison, advocating for space and missile programs to Congress. Col. Trainer worked extensively with our colleagues on the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Sub-Committee, developing great rapport with former members, Rep. Terry Everett and Rep. Ellen Tauscher. His dedication and success in supporting numerous projects, including the unveiling of the Operational Responsive Space Concept to Congress, led to his selection as the Legislative Liaison Reservist of the Year in 2006. Perhaps the most challenging assignment was his final one as Individual Mobilization Augmentee to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, where he serves as the senior reserve officer supporting the NRO and all associated Space activities. In this position, he leads 60 total force professionals and aids the Director in the NRO's interaction with significant mission partners including the Director for National Intelligence, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Air Force Space Command, Strategic Command and other Combatant Commanders. In 2010, the Air Force Reserve recognized Col. Trainer's performance by selecting him to its Reserve Brigadier General Qualification List. Colonel Trainer has excelled throughout his distinguished career and I am honored to pay tribute to this Airman. Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join me in thanking Colonel Pete Trainer, his wife, Melanie, and their son, Nick, for their service to our country. I wish them Godspeed, and continued happiness as they start a new chapter in their lives.", u"Mr. Speaker, I submit my recent correspondence with Mr. Carter G. Phillips, managing partner for Sidley Austin LLP, regarding the firm's representation of Chinese telecom firm Huawei. As noted in the letters, the U.S. national security community has serious concerns with Huawei's connections to the People's Liberation Army and Chinese intelligence. Equally troubling is Huawei's well-documented history of supporting America's greatest adversaries--some of the most repressive and brutal regimes in modern history--including the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and the current regime in Iran. Today, through Huawei, China exports its repressive technologies to likeminded governments. An October 27, 2011, Wall Street Journal piece reported that the Chinese telecom giant Huawei ``now dominates Iran's government-controlled mobile-phone industry . . . it plays a role in enabling Iran's state security network.'' Respected national security reporter Bill Gertz also recently reported that Huawei has also been ``linked to sanctions-busting in Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the 1990s, when the company helped network Iraqi air defenses at a time when U.S. and allied jets were flying patrols to enforce a no-fly zone. The company also worked with the Taliban during its short reign in Afghanistan to install a phone system in Kabul.'' For these reasons, I also wrote to Ms. Samantha Power, the director for multilateral affairs on the National Security Council at the White House. I also submit this letter for the Record. Given Huawei's troubling activities in Iran, I urged Ms. Power, in her capacity as chair of the newly-created Atrocities Prevention Board, to consider whether the company should be sanctioned. It is inconceivable to me that a respected law firm like Sidley Austin would represent a Chinese state-directed company like Huawei, given the significant national security concerns as well as its appalling record of supporting some of the world's worst regimes. Dear Mr. Phillips: It has recently come to my attention that a lobbyist with your firm has been retained by the Chinese telecom firm Huawei to lobby Congress and the administration. Given the longstanding and serious concerns from senior officials in the U.S. intelligence and defense communities, as well as the Congress, about Huawei's connections to the Peoples' Liberation Army and the potential vulnerabilities of its telecom products, I was surprised that a firm of your caliber would agree to represent a company that is so closely connected to the Chinese government. In all my years in Washington, very rarely have I seen the leadership of defense, intelligence and civilian agencies come together in such a concerted effort to warn of a security threat from a foreign entity. When the White House, intelligence community, Defense Department and the Commerce Department all have worked to block Huawei from gaining greater access to U.S. networks, everyone should take notice. Just last month, during a hearing before the House Commerce-Justice-Science (CJS) Appropriations subcommittee, which I chair, Secretary of Commerce John Bryson noted that the ``Commerce Department has been very focused on Huawei.'' Secretary Bryson told the panel ``I think you're right in characterizing that as a considerable challenge to our country. It appears that Huawei has capabilities that we may not fully detect to divert information. It's a challenge to our country . . . we have taken some steps to not have Huawei advance yet further in our country but the reality is in the market--they are advancing further so we need to address that further.'' Also noteworthy is that shortly after Secretary Bryson's testimony before the CJS subcommittee, Australia announced that is has banned Huawei from bidding to help build a nationwide high-speed Internet network due to concern about cyber attacks traced to China. Australia's actions follow several similar moves by the U.S. government to block Huawei access to American networks. In 2009, The Washington Post reported that the National Security Agency ``called AT&T because of fears that China's intelligence agencies could insert digital trapdoors into Huawei's technology that would serve as secret listening posts in the U.S. communications network. In 2010, then- Commerce Secretary Locke called Sprint CEO Dan Hesse to raise concerns about Huawei, which ultimately resulted in Sprint choosing not to use Huawei equipment. These moves should not be surprising given Huawei's long- documented deep ties to the Chinese government and the Peoples Liberation Army. According to a 2005 report by the RAND Corporation, ``both the [Chinese] government and the military tout Huawei as a national champion,'' and ``one does not need to dig too deeply to discover that [many Chinese information technology and telecommunications firms] are the public face for, sprang from, or are significantly engaged in joint research with state research institutes under the Ministry of Information Industry, defense-industrial corporations, or the military.'' The U.S. business community also is concerned about Huawei. On April 6, The Wall Street Journal reported that ``Cisco Systems Inc. Chief Executive John Chambers identified Huawei Technologies Co. as its toughest rival, stating that the Chinese company doesn't always `play by the rules' in areas such as intellectual property protection and computer security . . . he suggested that, [unlike Huawei], Cisco is considered trustworthy by governments around the world.'' It's not just Huawei's longstanding and close connections to Chinese intelligence that is troubling. Huawei has also been a leading supplier of critical telecom services to some of the worst regimes around the world. Last year, The Wall Street Journal reported that Huawei ``now dominates Iran's government-controlled mobile-phone industry . . . it plays a role in enabling Iran's state security network.'' And given the president's April 23 executive order addressing entities that are providing Iran and Syria with technologies to repress their people, I would think representing Huawei would give you further pause. For these reasons, I urge you to reconsider your firm's relationship with Huawei. I think you would agree that Sidley Austin's reputation and integrity is worth far more than its contract with a state-directed company like Huawei. Best wishes. Sincerely,", u"I thank my friend from Delaware for the question. This is now a voluntary system and there is a lot to be said about that. I want to go back to that meeting yesterday. We had a broad bipartisan group of Senators who have been most active, but from different perspectives, on this question of cyber security legislation who met yesterday with the key cyber security officials in our government from the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, FBI, and the National Security Agency. I am going to explain why we went to the carrots and took out the sticks by saying, in general terms, these experts--not political people, these are pros who deal with cyber defense--were asked by one of the Senators: What will happen if we don't adopt this legislation or something like it this session? The cyber security professionals said to us: Our Nation will be more vulnerable to cyber attack. In other words, this legislation contains authority to share information between the government and the private sector, between two private sector companies, that can't be done now. That is critically necessary to improve our defenses. The requirement of standards being promulgated as a result of a--or resulting from a public-private collaborative operation and then offering the carrot of immunity from liability is something that doesn't exist now. All the experts say, though some of the private sector operators of critical cyber security infrastructure--we are talking, again, about the companies that run the electric grid or the telecommunications system or the entire financial system or dams that hold back water; we are not talking about ma-and-pa businesses back home--some of them are doing a pretty good job at defending that cyber infrastructure, but most of them are not doing enough. That is where the government has to come in and push them in that direction. Why did we change it from mandatory to voluntary, from sticks to carrots? Because we didn't have the votes to adopt the mandatory, which I think is necessary. Because of the urgency of the threat, as I just reflected that we heard yesterday from the professionals in this area, we said--Senator Collins and I, Senator Rockefeller, Senator Feinstein, Senator Carper--OK, we are not going to get 100 percent of what we want around here, and we understand that, so let's settle for 80 percent. Perhaps the other side will feel they got 80 percent. But what is most important is that we will get something done to protect our security. I must tell my colleagues we are at a point now in this debate, with the kind of never-ending questions about every detail, not withstanding all the compromises Senator Collins, Senator Carper and I have made and the filing of an amendment by Senator McConnell to repeal ObamaCare--we can have a position on ObamaCare, but to put it on this cyber security bill is not fair, not relevant, not constructive. I think we are coming to a moment where we are going to have to face a tough decision. I have talked to the majority leader about filing for cloture soon so we can draw this to a choice: Do our colleagues want to act to protect our cyber systems in this session or do they not? That is a tough choice, particularly if a Senator votes no, to have to explain, in light of all the evidence of the constant cyber attacks going on now and the cyber thefts of hundreds of billions of dollars from our industries and tens of thousands of jobs lost as a result to foreign countries, if the Senate is going to say, no, we don't want to take that up now. I hope and pray that is not the case. The way this is moving right now, this last week of the session before we break, I am afraid we are headed in the wrong direction, and we don't see the kind of willingness to compromise that ought to be there. We are tested again in this Chamber: Are we going to fix national problems? It is hard to do on some of the fiscal issues we have turned away from, but on this one, traditionally, when it came to our national security, we have put the special interests aside and together dealt with the national security interests. I fear at this moment, in response to my friend from Delaware, that is not the direction in which we are going. I hope I am wrong. I am, by nature, an optimist, but right now I am a pessimist. I yield the floor.", u"Madam President, the first hour will be equally divided and controlled between the two leaders or their designees, with the Republicans controlling the first half and the majority controlling the final half. Yesterday I filed cloture on the cyber security bill. As a result, the filing deadline for first-degree amendments is 1 p.m. today. We will let the Senate know about votes scheduled. We are trying to do one on Burma and the African trade bill that we have wanted to do for a long time, but Republicans have held it up to this point. But we will see what we can do to move forward on that. Madam President, last week GEN Keith Alexander, commander of the U.S. Cyber Command, was asked to rate how prepared America was to face a cyber terrorist attack on the scale of 1 to 10. Here is what he said: ``From my perspective I'd say around a 3.'' Keep in mind, 1 is totally unprepared, 10 is totally prepared. Three is what he said. One of the country's top national security experts gave us 3 out of 10, a failing grade by any standard. He went to say that the type of cyber attacks that could black out the United States for weeks or months are up seventeenfold in the last 3 years. The Nation's top security experts have said a cyber 9/11 is imminent. They say frailties in our defenses against these attacks are most urgent. They are a threat to our national security. Nothing is more important. So it was with disappointment last night that I filed cloture on legislation to reinforce our defenses against these malicious attackers. Some are countries, some are organizations, some are individuals. National security experts have been plain about the urgent need to act. They say the question is not whether to act but whether we will act in time. One need only look at the headlines in papers all over America today--all over the world today. As we speak, 600 million people in India are without electricity. It is not believed there was any terrorism involved. It is believed it relates to the unusual weather, probably based, many experts say, on global warming. They have never had such heat in India, which has put a tremendous burden on their fragile power system. This legislation we are trying to finish has been worked on for years--years--not this Congress but going into last Congress. I was pleased to hear last week that many of my colleagues were working on thoughtful amendments to improve and strengthen this measure in spite of the untoward pressure by the Chamber of Commerce to kill this legislation. Senators on both sides have worked hard to address every concern raised by the private sector about this legislation. Senators Lieberman and Collins have been exemplary. The bill that is before this body now is not nearly as strong as I would like, but that is what compromise is all about. I accept what they believed they had to do. I expected a healthy debate on this important issue. I also expected to process many relevant amendments. Unfortunately, that was not good enough for a few of my Republican colleagues. Instead of substantive amendments that deal with our Nation's cyber security, they are insisting on political show votes. Instead of substantive amendments that deal with our Nation's cyber security, they are looking at all kinds of other things. I had thought they were going to be serious about this, but they are not. The threat is clear, and protecting the computer networks that control our electric grids, water supplies, and financial systems should be above political wrangling. So I was doubly disappointed to watch a bipartisan process derailed by ideological attacks--for example, on a woman's right to choose her health care generally. As 47 million Americans were set to gain access to preventive services with no out-of-pocket costs, Republicans insisted once again on a vote to repeal these benefits. They want to roll back the clock to the days when insurance companies could discriminate against women. Why? Because they were women. They had a preexisting disability--their gender. To make matters worse they are willing to kill a bill that will protect our Nation from cyber terrorism in the process. But this is not a new tactic. You may remember, as we all do--and I was reminded of that yesterday by a question that was asked of me by the distinguished assistant leader, Senator Durbin, that reminded the entire Senate that on a surface transportation bill that put 3 million jobs at risk, their first amendment was by Senator Blunt on women's access to contraception. Still, I admit I was surprised that Senator McConnell would so brazenly drag partisan politics into a debate over a measure crucial to national security. It is today when the health care bill that we passed designates women will no longer be second-class citizens in relation to health care. So I cannot imagine a more untimely attack on women than yesterday. Yesterday Senator McConnell and I received a letter from General Alexander, who runs the National Security Agency--he is one of the top leaders there--urging us to move more quickly. Here is what he wrote, partially: The cyber threat facing the nation is real and demands immediate action. The time to act is now; we simply cannot afford further delay. We need to move forward on comprehensive legislation now. I urge you to work together to get it passed. What more do we need? What more does the Chamber of Commerce need so that they can release my Republican colleagues? I share General Alexander's concern.", u"I thank the Senator from Delaware very much. I think he crystallized the moment we are in. I mentioned that Senator Reid filed a cloture motion that will ripen tomorrow. Again, he did it in sadness, and I was sad he had to do it. This is an issue on which I had hoped we would overcome gridlock--special interest driven, ideologically driven, politically driven--but we couldn't do it, so the majority leader did exactly what he had to do, in my opinion, in the national security interest. This does two things. One, as my colleagues know and I repeat just to remind them, we have a 1 p.m. deadline when any Member of the Senate can file a first-degree amendment to this bill. That is important to do. And I want to say that the managers of the bill--Senator Collins' staff, the Republican cloakroom, my staff, the Democratic cloakroom--are going to be working on these amendments to see if we can begin to move toward a finite list so we can give some sense of certainty. Senator Reid has been very clear. He has not wanted to, to use an idiom of the Senate, fill the tree, which is to say limit amendments. He has wanted to have an open amendment process, which really ought to happen on a bill of this kind, but open for germane and relevant amendments, not amendments on repealing ObamaCare or, I say respectfully, on enacting more gun control. Those are both significant and substantial issues, but they are going to block this bill from passing if people insist on bringing them up here. So the first and positive consequence of Senator Reid's cloture motion--one we all signed--is to require that amendments people have been talking about filing have to come forward by 1 p.m., and bipartisan staffs will be working to winnow that down to a finite list. Second, if we don't have an agreement on a finite list and we cannot vitiate the cloture vote for tomorrow, then Members of the Senate--every one, in their own heart and head--will have to make the decision as to whether to vote against taking up this bill while all the nonpolitical experts on our security--GEN Keith Alexander, Director of Cyber Command within the Pentagon, head of the National Security Agency, and one of the jewels and treasures of our government protecting our security, appealed to Senators Reid and McConnell in a letter yesterday stating that this legislation is critically necessary now. This legislation will give our government and the private sector operators of critical cyber infrastructure powers they do not have now, authorities they do not have now to collaborate, to take action, to share information, to adopt what General Alexander in a wonderful phrase said is the best computer hygiene, the best cyber hygiene to protect our country. So that is the question facing Members of the Senate in the face of that kind of statement of the urgency of some form of cyber security legislation in this session from the Director of Cyber Command, an honored, distinguished veteran of our uniformed military--U.S. Army in this case. Are we going to find it hard to get 60 Members of the Senate to vote to take up this bill and debate it? I hope not. For me, it would be hard to explain--I will put it that way--why I would vote against it no matter what the controversy is. I would say to my friend from Delaware, who has been involved, that I will yield to him if he wants to make a statement, but we have been working really hard with three groups: the group who sponsored S. 3414, So this is an important day to see if we can come together. Senator Collins and I are ready and willing to meet with the sponsors of the other bills--Senator Kyl, Senator Whitehouse--to see if we can come to some kind of agreement on critical parts of this legislation and to come up with a finite list we can support. Just a final word. I wish to thank the majority leader, Senator Reid. Senator Reid has a tough job, and it is obviously battered by the political moment we are in, whenever we are in it. And of course this is a particularly political moment--partisan--because of the election season and the campaign we are in. But I have known Harry Reid for quite a while, and I have the greatest confidence and trust in him and an awful lot of affection. He is a personal friend. He got briefed about the cyber security threat more than a year ago, and he called me in and we talked about it. He said he was really worried, that we had to do something in this session of Congress to protect our security, and he has been steadfast in that belief and has refused to give up. Senator Reid filed the cloture motion to bring this to a head and hopefully to get to that finite list of amendments. And I think he is going to stretch, within the process and time, the great authority and power the majority leader has--some people say it may be the only power these days, but I think he has more because of his skills--in controlling the schedule. I think if there is a hope that we can bring a bill together and pass a cyber security bill, Senator Reid is going to give us every opportunity to do that. So I wanted to put on the record my thanks to him for his own commitment to improving the cyber security of our country because he has listened to the experts and they have convinced him. This is rising to be a greater threat to America than any other threat we face today, and that is saying a lot, but I believe it. I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor for my friend from Delaware.", u"Mr. President, later this morning we will vote on whether to invoke cloture on a major cyber security bill. In the past 3 days we have received letters from GEN Keith Alexander, who is the head of Cyber Command as well as the chief of the National Security Agency, from the Secretary of Homeland Security, and from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, urging us to act immediately on this important legislation. Let me read briefly from all three of these letters. General Alexander said the following: I am writing to express my strong support for passage of a comprehensive bipartisan cyber security bill by the Senate this week. The cyber threat facing the Nation is real and demands immediate action. The time to act is now; we simply cannot afford further delay. That is what General Alexander has told us. Secretary Napolitano wrote to us: I am writing to express my strong support for S. 3414, the Cybersecurity Act of 2012. I can think of no more pressing legislative need in our current threat environment. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, wrote the following: I am writing to add my voice to General Alexander's and urge immediate passage of comprehensive cyber security legislation. We must act now. How many more implorings do we need from our Nation's top homeland and military officials to act on what many believe to be the greatest threat that is facing our Nation? A cyber attack with catastrophic consequences is a threat to our national security, our economic prosperity and, indeed, to our very way of life. Our adversaries have the means to launch a cyber attack that would be devastating to our country. All the experts tell us, it is not a matter of if a cyber attack is going to be launched, it is when it is going to occur. So I find it incredible and indeed irresponsible that this body is unable to reach an agreement to allow us to move forward on this important legislation. It is astonishing to me that irrelevant, nongermane amendments have been filed to this important bill on both sides of the aisle. It is unacceptable that we have worked hard and have come up with a list of relevant and germane amendments, and yet we cannot seem to reach an agreement to proceed. American officials--our government officials--have already documented that our businesses are losing billions of dollars annually and millions of jobs due to cyber attacks, attacks that are happening on our government and business computers and individual computers each and every day. Yet our defenses are not there. General Alexander, who knows more about the cyber threat than any individual in this country, was asked to rank our preparedness for a large-scale cyber attack on a scale of 1 to 10. Do you know what he said? He deemed us to be at a 3. Is a 3 adequate to protect this country from what we know is coming, that is only a matter of time? There have been all sorts of suggestions for improving this bill. We have adopted many of those suggestions. Indeed, we have made major changes to make this bill more acceptable to those on my side of the aisle. And what has been our reward? To be criticized for making changes in the bill, for having Members on our side of the aisle, my side of the aisle, say, well, now it is a different bill. Well, it is a different bill because we took their suggestions, and we took the suggestions of a bipartisan group acting in good faith headed by Senator Kyl and Senator Whitehouse. There is much more I want to say on this issue. I see the chairman has arrived on the floor. I know opponents to the bill such as Senator Hutchison wish to speak and should certainly be given the right to do so. But let me say that rarely have I been so disappointed in the Senate's failure to come to grips with a threat to our country that all of these officials have warned us over and over again is urgent and must be addressed now. Not maybe in September; not probably by the end of the year; not in the next Congress, but now. ", u"Mr. President, for 4 years, we have been pushing the United States Senate to pass a bill to improve our Nation's cybersecurity. During this time, the cybersecurity threat to our country--to our way of life--has only grown. We have now seen cyber attacks against our Nation's pipelines, against our financial industry, and even against nuclear power plants. The good news is we have not yet suffered a devastating cyber attack. At this point, we are still only talking about the potential impacts. We have not yet suffered an attack that greatly disrupts our financial industry, or an attack that cripples our electric grid. But these potential outcomes are real. And it is imperative that we begin addressing the risks. Today, we have the opportunity to begin this important work by moving forward with the Cybersecurity Act of 2012. We have the opportunity to show the American people that we can rise above politics to do the job that they expect of us. National security is one of our most sacred obligations as Members of this body. If a vote on cybersecurity fails today, we will have failed to meet that obligation for the 112th Congress. I will be the first person to admit that this bill is not perfect. I have been clear that I believe a regulatory approach was the best approach to ensure that our country's most critical infrastructure addresses its cybersecurity vulnerabilities. We moved to a voluntary approach to seek a compromise. Yet it was not enough for some of our colleagues. Frankly, I do not understand why. I know the Chamber of Commerce decided that it did not like this bill. But sometimes we need to make decisions that the Chamber of Commerce is not happy with. Because it is not the Chamber's job to worry about national security. That is the job of our military. And they have been quite clear about what is needed. They have told us that they need this legislation. They have implored us to act. General Alexander, the Director of the National Security Agency, knows what is at stake. And his warnings have been dire. He has said: ``The cyber threat facing the Nation is real and demands immediate action.'' He has said: ``the time to act is now.'' General Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote me a letter earlier this year about the urgent need for comprehensive cybersecurity legislation. In the letter, he explained that our: ``adversaries will increasingly attempt to hold our Nation's core critical infrastructure at risk.'' He stated that: ``we cannot afford to leave our electricity grid and transportation system vulnerable to attack.'' Both Generals agreed that we must do something and they both pushed the Senate to adopt comprehensive cybersecurity legislation that tracks the specifics of the bill we have been debating. Despite this urgent advice from our nation's top military advisors, that we need to act and that we need to do it now, some Senators suggested in August that we needed more time to debate cybersecurity. I strongly disagreed with this notion. But now we have had another few months to think about this bill. Today, there is simply no more reason for delay. We passed a Cybersecurity bill out of the Commerce Committee in March 2010. And it passed unanimously. The Homeland Security Committee, led by Senators Lieberman and Collins, passed their cybersecurity bill by a voice vote in June 2010. The bills both went through Committees well over 2 years ago. Since that time, we have had hundreds of meetings with the private sector, interest groups, and national security experts. Senators have received multiple classified briefings about the nature of this threat. Everyone has had plenty of time to think about this issue. And we have made it quite clear that we are looking to compromise on this legislation. But to compromise you need a partner. I am hoping that our Republican colleagues are now willing to be our partners on this legislation. I hope that my colleagues will reconsider the path we are on. At some point, if we do not do anything, there will be a major cyber attack and it will do great damage to the United States. After it is over, the American people will ask, just as they asked after 9/11, what could we have done to stop this? If we do not pass this legislation, they will learn about days like this one and their disappointment in us and the United States Senate will grow. And we will deserve their disappointment. Because we have had the opportunity to act and we have failed.", u"Mr. President, first, let me thank the Senator from Texas for reserving some time for me while I was at a briefing and on my way to the floor. I will attempt to be very quick because I know our colleagues are eager to vote on this important issue. And, Mr. President, that is my point. This is a critically important issue. How many more warnings do we need to hear from the experts that we are extremely vulnerable to a cyber security attack? Cyber attacks are happening every day. Just recently there was an attack on several of our financial institutions. According to press reports, it was launched by Iranian sources. We know that Iran, Russia, and China are extremely active in probing our cyber systems, including those that control our critical infrastructure--not only our financial systems, our transportation systems, our water treatment plants, but also our electric grid. Recently we have seen what Hurricane Sandy, the superstorm, has done to States--so many States--destroying lives and property and leaving people without power for days on end. Well, multiply that many times. If it were a deliberate cyber attack that knocked out the electric grid along the entire east coast, that is what we are talking about. That is the kind of risk that calls us to act. We have heard from the experts over and over again that this vulnerability is huge and escalating. We know that the number of cyber attacks that have been reported to the Department of Homeland Security has increased by 200 percent in just the last year. And those are just the attacks that have been reported. That is just the tip of the iceberg. Undoubtedly, there are many more on our critical infrastructure that have not been reported. We know there have been attempts to probe the security of the computer systems that run some of our natural gas pipelines. This problem is very real, and it is not only a threat to our national and homeland security, it is also a threat to the economic prosperity of this country. How many more thefts of research and development, of intellectual property of businesses right here in our country that are providing good jobs for Americans do we need to endure before we act to secure our cyber systems? I have worked on the cyber security bill for years with my friend, colleague, and chairman, Joe Lieberman. We have held countless hearings. We have marked up a previous bill. It is so ironic that we are being criticized for not doing yet another markup on this bill when all of the changes reflect our attempts to address the criticisms of the opponents of this bill. We made a huge change by making this bill voluntary rather than mandatory and by providing incentives such as liability protections for businesses that voluntarily agree to adopt cyber standards. We have created a system where there would be a cooperative process between the public and the private sectors to share information and to develop the best practices so that information can be shared. In all the time I have worked on homeland security issues, I cannot think of another threat where our vulnerability is greater and where we have failed to act and have done less. This is not a Republican or a Democratic or an Independent issue. The experts, regardless of their political leanings, from the Bush administration to the current administration have urged us to act, have pleaded with us to act. General Alexander, the nonpartisan general who is the head of Cyber Command and the head of the National Security Agency, has urged this Congress over and over again to give this administration, to give our country the tools it needs to protect critical infrastructure and to help safeguard our economic edge. I urge our colleagues to listen to the wisdom of former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and former NSA chief GEN Michael Hayden from the previous administration, from President Bush's administration. They wrote the following: We carry the burden of knowing that 9/11 might have been averted with the intelligence that existed at the time. We do not want to be in the same position again when ``cyber 9/11'' hits--it is not a question of ``whether'' this will happen; it is a question of ``when.'' This time all the dots have been connected. This time we know cyber attacks are occurring each and every day. This time the warnings are loud and clear. How can we ignore these dire warnings? How? How can we fail to act on the cyber security bill, especially since the majority leader has indicated he is willing to allow for amendments, as he should, to make this process fair. Germane amendments would be allowed. I urge our colleagues to heed the warnings from the experts and to vote for cloture on the cyber security bill so we can proceed to its consideration. I do not want to be here 1 year from now saying, why did we not act? Why did we not listen to the cyber experts from the Bush administration, from the Obama administration, from GEN Keith Alexander, the premier expert in our government. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment. This amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to issue a public report within 90 days, assessing the impact of the FISA Amendments Act and its surveillance authorities on the privacy of U.S. persons. That sounds benign, but it is not. The goal of this amendment is to make information public about a very effective intelligence collection program that is currently classified. All of the information has already been made available to the Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. It is available to all Members. All they have to do is read it. It is hundreds of pages of material. Senator Wyden has raised a number of issues that all concern the potential for surveillance conducted pursuant to authorities to result in what is called ``incidental collection.'' Section 702 authorizes the executive branch to go to the FISA Court--that is a Federal court, Federal district judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court--and obtain annual approval for the certifications of the Attorney General and the DNI that identify categories of foreign targets. These are what I call a program warrant, to conduct surveillance on non-U.S. persons; in other words, individuals who are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents who are located outside the United States. It is possible there can be some incidental collection of communications of or concerning those who are U.S. persons. This potential for incidental collection does not mean the intelligence community is intentionally conducting surveillance on U.S. persons. In fact, doing so would be a violation of the law. Here is the key point to understand about incidental collection. Although the government may, under the right circumstances, be authorized to retain the communication between--as an example--known terrorists and a presumptive U.S. person or persons, including the phone number he relayed to the terrorist, the government cannot place the U.S. number on surveillance and start collecting the calls to and from the U.S. number without first obtaining an individual court order or a warrant. To do so would be to target a U.S. person, which I will explain is reverse targeting. Let me answer another common question: Can the government use section 702 to target a U.S. person? This is important. The answer is no. The law specifically prevents the use of section 702 to direct collection against U.S. persons. This prohibition is codified in 702(b), which states that the section may not be used to ``intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States'' or to ``intentionally target a United States person reasonably believed to be located inside the United States.'' Another frequent question: Is there a loophole or backdoor that allows the government to use 702 to target U.S. persons by searching incidental collection? Answer: No. The Department of Justice, the DNI's offices, the FBI, and NSA have all advised that limiting the ability of intelligence analysts to review and analyze information already in the government's possession under section 702 would make these agencies less able to respond quickly during a developing terrorist plot. In sum, review of the information already collected enables the government to protect against a terrorist attack on this Nation. Regarding the level of oversight conducted on these authorities, as of October 7, 2011, the congressional Intelligence and Judiciary Committees received over 500 pages of information from the Department of Justice that specifically relate to matters covered by the Wyden amendment. The Senate Intelligence Committee held a closed hearing in October 2011 on these issues. The senior Senator from Oregon attended. These were the issues specifically discussed. In December of 2011, the congressional Intelligence and Judiciary Committees received in excess of another 100 pages of material relating to these issues. We held another closed hearing on February 9, 2012, which the Senator from Oregon attended, where these issues were discussed. The inspectors general for the intelligence community and NSA have both provided classified and unclassified responses to letters written by the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Colorado, explaining why it is not feasible to estimate the number of people inside the United States who have had their communications collected or reviewed under the authorities granted by section 702. Finally, the DNI sent a letter in August on this issue. Here is the point. If we want to talk about oversight, all of the information exists, and it is up to Intelligence Committee of the Senate to do its oversight and Members have to go in and read the material. I believe very strongly that what this amendment aims to do is make public a program that should not be made public at this time. I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment. Finally, I request that a letter from General Alexander, head of the National Security Agency--which essentially explains remarks he made--be printed in the Record. I would also like to have the letter to the general from the Senator from Oregon printed in the Record.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Dear Senator Wyden: Thank you for your letter dated 10 October 2012 concerning issues related to the National Security Agency's (NSA's) handling of U.S. person communications. As you know, NSA takes great care to protect the civil liberties and privacy interests of U.S. persons in the conduct of its mission. Your letter requested clarity and further information with respect to my extemporaneous response to a question posed by a member of the audience following my formal presentation on cybersecurity delivered on 27 July 2012, at DEFCON 20. At the conference, a member of the audience asked me: ``Does NSA really keep a file on everyone [in the United States] and, if so, can I see mine?'' I responded: ``Absolutely not. And anybody who would tell you that we're keeping files or dossiers on the American people know[s] that's not true and let me tell you why. First, under our Agency we have a responsibility. Our job is foreign intelligence.'' I then gave a short explanation of how we execute our foreign intelligence mission and the oversight provided by all three branches of government, including Congress, before reiterating that ``the story that we have millions or hundreds of millions of dossiers on people is absolutely false.'' I referred to the fact that Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA 702), permits the targeting only of communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States. Finally, I highlighted the role served by minimization procedures to provide additional protection to incidentally collected communications of U.S. persons. First, with respect to the reference to minimization procedures, my response should be understood in the context in which it was made. I noted at the outset that NSA has a foreign intelligence mission, and my subsequent reference focused on the type of circumstance in which U.S. person information may be disseminated when this foreign intelligence requirement is not met (e.g., when there is evidence of a crime). As you are aware, the statutory requirements for minimization procedures are a matter of public record: Section 101(h)(1) of FISA requires that minimization procedures must be ``reasonably designed . . . to minimize the acquisition and retention and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting U.S. persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.'' Section 101(h)(2) of FISA requires that ``nonpublicly available information which is not foreign intelligence information shall not be disseminated in a manner that identifies any U.S. person, without such person's consent, unless such person's identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance.'' Section 101(h)(3) of FISA permits both retention and dissemination where there is ``evidence of a crime which has been, is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes.'' Section 101(h)(4) of FISA permits disclosure, dissemination, or use for any purpose or retention for 72 hours, or longer if a determination is made by the Attorney General, ``if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.'' Second, my response did not refer to or address whether it is possible to identify the number of U.S. person communications that may be lawfully but incidentally intercepted pursuant to foreign intelligence collection directed against non-U.S. persons located outside the United States as authorized under FAA 702. In your letter, you asked for unclassified answers to several questions that you feel are important to allow the public to better understand my remarks delivered at the conference. While I appreciate your desire to have responses to these questions on the public record, they directly relate to operational activities and complete answers would necessarily include classified information essential to our ability to collect foreign intelligence. Indeed, as you are aware, these very questions were recently addressed in a classified letter to you from the Director of National Intelligence dated 24 August 2012. Finally, as you are also aware, senior officials from the Administration, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Justice Department, and NSA, have testified and briefed before the relevant Congressional committees on multiple occasions over the past year. We have also conducted numerous sessions with committee staff and counsel, as well as correspondence and discussions with individual Senators and Representatives. As a result of the many briefings, hearings, and other interactions between the Intelligence Committees and the Administration, there exists a comprehensive Congressional record relating to all of NSA's foreign intelligence activities (including information relevant to the questions you pose). Again, thank you for your ongoing interest in these issues. Regardless of differences that may exist on policy issues, I cannot overstate the importance or value of ongoing Congressional interest and oversight of NSA's operations, acting on behalf of the American people. If you have further questions, please contact me personally or have your staff contact my Associate Director for Legislative Affairs, Ethan L. Bauman, at (301) 688-7246. Keith B. Alexander, General, U.S. Army Director, NSA.", u"Mr. Speaker, I have three documents to submit to the Record: one from former Representative Bob Barr, one Statement of Administration Policy, and a letter from several tech companies and others opposed to the bill. I quote, in part: Developments over the last year make CISPA's approach even more questionable than before. Former Representative Bob Barr: Congress must take the civil liberties threats created by this bill just as seriously as it takes the cyber threats the legislation purports to address. Mr. Speaker, we should not hurt the Internet to save the Internet; and this bill, in its current form, leaves the language wide open with potential abuse. Again, when we talk about bodily harm, I have learned that in a California statute that includes dog bites. Essentially, anything is included in this information without limitation with regard to how the government can use it. This is a backdoor attack on the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizures. We have criminal procedures and processes around how information can and can't be used. This is the biggest government takeover of personal information that I've seen during my time here in Congress. Again, I believe, on the balance, it harms what it purports to protect. Anyone who has read or watched any news source over the past year knows President Obama, numerous Administration officials, and many leaders in Congress agree that addressing the threat of cyber attacks is a critical national priority. Based on this threat analysis, the administration and many members of Congress continue to push for passage of cybersecurity legislation that would clarify and expand the government's powers to receive and process traffic from American computer networks. It would, however, be a mistake for Congress to rush to enact legislation that could militarize our computer networks, and pave the way for private companies to share vast quantities of sensitive and highly personal information with the government, all in the name of ``cybersecurity.'' Although a carefully-crafted ``information sharing'' program that includes robust protections for civil liberties could be an effective approach to cybersecurity, the bill about to come up for a vote in the House clearly fails this test. The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), H.R. 624, is set to be considered by the full House of Representatives later this month. Although the bill that emerged from markup by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) includes some improvements in privacy safeguards over the earlier version, CISPA's proponents have overstated the protections incorporated into the bill. As a result, members of Congress should vote against CISPA when it comes to the House floor. Last year, The Constitution Project's bipartisan Liberty and Security Committee, on which I serve, prepared a detailed report on ways that Congress could protect our nation's computer networks from cyber threats, while at the same time preserving the constitutionally-guaranteed rights of Americans. Unfortunately, the drafters of CISPA failed to incorporate the robust safeguards we recommended. Most critical, CISPA's sponsors have resisted all efforts to ensure that the new cybersecurity program would maintain civilian control of our nation's computer networks. CISPA would allow private companies, cloaked with broad immunity from legal liability, to share sensitive information such as internet records or the content of emails, with any agency in the government, including military and intelligence agencies. Sensitive personal information from private computer networks should not be shared directly with the military or the National Security Agency (NSA), the agency that gained widespread public notoriety seven years ago for its warrantless wiretapping program--hardly the agency we want to see tasked with receiving private internet traffic. Sadly, the members of HPSCI voted down an amendment that would have ensured civilian control of computer networks, by specifying that when private companies share information with the federal government, they should not provide it to the NSA or any other military agency or department. This amendment would still have permitted the NSA to share its own expertise on cyber threats with the private sector, but would have protected the information flowing into the government. A second critical flaw with CISPA is that it fails to include meaningful limits on the extent of private sensitive information that companies can send into the government. The HPSCI also voted down an amendment requiring that before sharing cyber threat information with the government, companies must ``make reasonable efforts'' to remove ``any information that can be used to identify a specific person unrelated to the cyber threat.'' A similar provision was included in last year's Senate cybersecurity bill, and witnesses at a hearing before HPSCI earlier this year testified that companies can easily strip out personally identifiably information that is not necessary to address cyber threats. Yet CISPA still lacks any such safeguard. It is true that from a privacy perspective, this version of CISPA is an improvement over last year's bill. Most notably, the bill no longer permits private information to be used for broad `national security uses'' unrelated to cybersecurity. But it clearly is not sufficient. Congress must take the civil liberties threats created by this bill just as seriously as it takes the cyber threats the legislation purports to address. CISPA does not meet this test, and members of the House should just say no.", u"Mr. President, I rise to speak on an issue that is critical to our constitutional rights and our national security. The revelation and subsequent declassification of the National Security Agency's intelligence gathering programs have shocked Americans in ways that I long ago had telegraphed. We are having a spirited and critical debate about what the right balance between privacy and security ought to be. With regards to NSA activity, I am introducing bipartisan legislation today, with several senators of both parties, designed to narrow Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, known also as the ``business records'' provision, to better balance the authorities we give the federal government while protecting our constitutional rights. More specifically, my legislation would prevent the federal government from collecting millions of law-abiding Americans' phone call records without first establishing some nexus to terrorism. We all expect the NSA to target terrorists, but the revelations in the past few weeks have made clear that the information of millions of law-abiding Americans is being swept up in the process. Let me start by saying that I continue to feel that a number of the permanent PATRIOT Act provisions should remain in place to give our intelligence community important tools to fight terrorism. But I also believe, as I stated two years ago when offering this same legislation as an amendment to the PATRIOT Act reauthorization bill, that Section 215 of this Act fails to strike the right balance between keeping us safe and protecting the privacy rights of Americans. Indeed, my concerns about this provision of the law have only grown since I was first briefed on its secret interpretation and implementation as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. From the recent leaks and information since declassified about the Section 215 collection program, we know that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has interpreted this provision of the PATRIOT Act to permit the collection of millions of Americans' phone records on a daily, ongoing basis. As a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I have repeatedly expressed concern that the interpretation of this provision of the PATRIOT Act, which allows the government to obtain ``any tangible thing'' relevant to a national security investigation, is at odds with the plain meaning of the law. This secrecy has prevented Americans from understanding how these laws are being implemented in their name. That is unacceptable. Even before the nature of the bulk phone records collection program was declassified, there was support for narrowing the language of Section 215 from many in Congress and many Americans who feel strongly about their constitutional right to privacy. In fact, the PATRIOT Act reauthorization that passed the Senate in 2005 by unanimous consent included language that would limit the government's ability to collect Americans' personal information without a demonstrated link to terrorism or espionage. While that language did not prevail in conference, it demonstrated that bipartisan agreement on reforms to Section 215 is possible. In 2011, as the Senate took up the extension of a number of expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act, I offered an amendment drawn directly from language in the 2005 Senate-passed bill to narrow the application of this provision. That amendment unfortunately did not receive a vote. But today, along with my colleague Sen. Wyden and others, I am back at it again--introducing bipartisan legislation drawn from that same language. Our bipartisan bill would narrow the PATRIOT Act Section 215 collection authority to make it consistent with what most Americans believe the law allows. While this legislation would still allow law enforcement and intelligence agencies to use the PATRIOT Act to obtain a wide range of records in the course of terrorism- and espionage-related investigations, it would require them to demonstrate that the records are in some way connected to terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities--which is not the case today. I don't think it is unreasonable to ask our law enforcement agencies to identify a terrorism or espionage investigation before collecting the private information of American citizens. Many Coloradans share my belief that we need to place common-sense limits on government investigations and link data collection to terrorist- or espionage-related activities. If we cannot assert some nexus to terrorism, then the government should keep its hands off the phone data of law-abiding Americans. Let me be very clear: our government must continue to diligently and aggressively combat terrorism. We all agree with that critically important goal. But I do not think that it is unreasonable to ask that collection of phone data be limited to investigations that are actually related to terrorism or espionage. And I do not believe that we need to sacrifice national security to strike this balance. In fact, as a member of the Intelligence Committee who has studied our surveillance programs closely, it has not been demonstrated to me that the bulk phone records collection program has provided uniquely valuable information that has stopped terrorist attacks, beyond what is available through less intrusive means. But if we are going to continue providing this authority to collect phone data from Americans' communications, let's at least limit it to require a link to terrorism or espionage. This is a commonsense step that we can take to strike a better balance between keeping our country safe and respecting constitutional rights. I thank my colleagues who have cosponsored this legislation, and ask other colleagues to give it a close look. I will continue to press for the PATRIOT Act to be reopened for debate, and when that occurs, I will push for passage of this bipartisan bill that strikes a better balance between keeping our nation safe and unduly trampling our constitutional rights.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to remind my colleagues in the House of two very important words for the American people: unfinished business. The American people, by their voices that we hear as we go back to our district, challenge us in unfinished business. Two days ago, I stood with mothers that demand action in my district, to stand with their children, their babies in strollers--these mothers who love America, who are patriots--to stand alongside of the mourning families of Sandy Hook and to read the names of the 26 who died more than 6 months ago, to ask for the passage of universal background checks; and to ask the question why the Armed Citizens Project needed to arm citizens in Houston. We know that the area that they are arming is an area where they felt intimidated--not by their government to take over, but because of crime. I look forward to meeting with those citizens to be able to address the issue of crime in their neighborhood. But we stood against the kind of arming citizens as a response to gun violence. I have no qualms of standing against that and working with my neighbors to ensure the safety of their neighborhoods, but to move forward on sensible gun legislation to prevent gun violence--unfinished business. And then the question of the National Security Agency and the phone calls and numbers of our American citizens. We in Congress must be challenged to rein that in and balance it with the need for national security, which I promote and support as a member of the Homeland Security Committee. I will be introducing legislation to assess the use of outside contractors--70 percent of Federal dollars going to that in the intelligence community--and reduce those numbers by 2014; establish more openness on the FISA court, but making sure that we don't interfere with operations and operatives that are making our country secure. And to be able to say to Mr. Snowden, I won't call you a name, but I know what you did in certain instances is wrong, and you must stand up under the laws of this Nation. Then to be able to say that, today, as we go forward on the farm bill, to be able to ask the question: Why are we taking $20 billion away from the supplemental nutrition program, from seniors, from young children, from babies, when this is a lifeline for those in the United States military who are on food stamps? I also want to say to my community that we need to get ready to enroll in health care, which is going to be a major step in making America healthy. To the small business community, this is going to help you provide your employees--your one employee, your two employees--health care. That is unfinished business. Then I want to thank the U.S. Postal Service--the letter carriers, the people who put our mail through--who help small businesses. We've got to fix this problem with the U.S. Postal Service, make sure that they're stable, financially able. The rural post offices, let's not close any more. This is the infrastructure of America. It's a job creator. And then to our students, many of them who have graduated, we have got to fix the problem of the increasing, or the major increase, in student loan interest rates that are going to burden our parents and students, 6.8 percent by July 1. Congress can do better. We need to be able to join in the legislation that I've signed on to, to be able to keep that interest rate at 3.4 percent. Unfinished business, Mr. Speaker. The American people want jobs. They don't want sequestration. They want the right kind of comprehensive immigration reform that has reasoned border security but not to criminalize those students who wanted to do nothing else but to go into the United States military, called ``DREAM children,'' who wanted to be able to serve the Nation, who wanted to work and give back to this country. Let us not go down that pathway. Let's have the kind of value-based comprehensive immigration reform and border security legislation that was passed out of the Homeland Security Committee, of which I was proud to be an original cosponsor, coming out of the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security. Unfinished business. Guns. Preventing gun violence. Reining in the issue of intelligence, balancing it with civil liberties, putting back in the supplemental nutrition some $20 billion, making sure that Americans are enrolled in health care under the Affordable Care Act, supporting the Postal Service. And, Mr. Speaker, finally, supporting our students. Unfinished business. It's time to get to work creating jobs in America.", u" Mr. WARNER (for himself, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Burr, Mr. Blunt, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Chambliss, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Kaine, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Manchin, Mr. Schatz, Mr. Udall of Colorado, Mr. Risch, Mr. King, Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Heinrich, Mr. Coats, Ms. Collins, Mr. Coburn, and Ms. Hirono) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to.: S. Res. 200 Whereas on July 26, 1908, Attorney General Charles Bonaparte ordered newly-hired Federal investigators to report to the Office of the Chief Examiner of the Department of Justice, which subsequently was renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Whereas on July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.), creating the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thereby laying the foundation for today's intelligence community; Whereas the National Security Act of 1947, which appears in title 50 of the United States Code, governs the definition, composition, responsibilities, authorities, and oversight of the intelligence community of the United States; Whereas the intelligence community is defined by section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)) to include the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs, the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Energy, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury, the elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, and other elements as may be designated; Whereas July 26, 2012, was the 65th anniversary of the signing of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.); Whereas the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) created the position of the Director of National Intelligence to serve as the head of the intelligence community and to ensure that national intelligence be timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available; Whereas Congress has previously passed joint resolutions, signed by the President, to designate Peace Officers Memorial Day on May 15, Patriot Day on September 11, and other commemorative occasions, to honor the sacrifices of law enforcement officers and of those who lost their lives on September 11, 2001; Whereas the United States has increasingly relied upon the men and women of the intelligence community to protect and defend the security of the United States in the decade since the attacks of September 11, 2001; Whereas the men and women of the intelligence community, both civilian and military, have been increasingly called upon to deploy to theaters of war in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere since September 11, 2001; Whereas numerous intelligence officers of the elements of the intelligence community have been injured or killed in the line of duty; Whereas intelligence officers of the United States are routinely called upon to accept personal hardship and sacrifice in the furtherance of their mission to protect the United States, to undertake dangerous assignments in the defense of the interests of the United States, to collect reliable information within prescribed legal authorities upon which the leaders of the United States rely in life-and-death situations, and to ``speak truth to power.'' by providing their best assessments to decision makers, regardless of political and policy considerations; Whereas the men and women of the intelligence community have on numerous occasions succeeded in preventing attacks upon the United States and allies of the United States, saving numerous innocent lives; and Whereas intelligence officers of the United States must of necessity often remain unknown and unrecognized for their substantial achievements and successes: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate-- (1) designates July 26, 2013, as ``United States Intelligence Professionals Day''; (2) acknowledges the courage, fidelity, sacrifice, and professionalism of the men and women of the intelligence community of the United States; and (3) encourages the people of the United States to observe this day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.", u"Mr. Speaker, although the legislation before us today is far from perfect, I rise in support of its passage. The Fiscal Year 2014 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397) will ensure that our brave men and women in uniform have the resources they need to keep our country safe and secure. The bill also provides funding to support the U.S. industrial base. Lastly, H.R. 2397 includes important provisions to assist our troops and their families, including a pay-raise of 1.8 percent, and strengthens the health care services available to all our service members. As a member of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, I have worked diligently this past year to ensure funding for members of the U.S. Military, preserve our military readiness, and target wasteful Pentagon programs. While I am in favor of the underlying legislation, I am deeply disappointed that nearly all of the mandated across-the-board cuts were shifted to other parts of our Federal budget, leaving the Pentagon relatively unscathed. In fact, the bill provides more funding than originally requested in the President's budget proposal, which further demonstrates the House Republicans' misplaced budget priorities. Mr. Speaker, I am serious about confronting the fiscal crisis facing America. Being an Appropriator, I take seriously my job of eliminating unnecessary spending and ineffective programs in every appropriations bill within every federal agency--including the Pentagon. This year's process was unlike past budgeting years. The House Appropriations Committee operated under the unreasonable constraints of the funding allocations imposed by House Republicans, which needlessly starve the discretionary budget. These allocations force Congress to make reckless trade-offs between adequately funding the Pentagon and providing sufficient funding for the rest of our Federal government. This is not only economically harmful, but also an irresponsible way to operate as a legislative body. The exponential growth of the Pentagon Budget since 2001 is due primarily to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now that the Iraq War has ended and as we withdraw our combat troops from Afghanistan next year, it is time to significantly reduce the size of the Pentagon budget in a responsible way. During consideration of this bill, I voted in favor of numerous common-sense amendments aimed at saving the government hundreds of billions of dollars. With my support, the House passed two separate amendments that reduced the Afghanistan Security and Afghanistan Infrastructure funds by nearly a half a billion dollars. In addition, I voted in favor of an amendment offered by Congressman Van Hollen, which reduces the Pentagon's war funding account by $3.5 billion over the next year. We also debated and voted on important amendments related to national security and civil liberties. The most notable of these being measures to curb the National Security Agency's (NSA) blanket collection of Americans' telephone records. Since the Patriot Act originally passed under former President George W. Bush, Congress has regularly reauthorized it without subjecting the NSA and other government agencies to proper oversight. This enabled the NSA to abuse two of its provisions, Sections 702 and 215, by using them to justify unwarranted surveillance of law-abiding U.S. citizens both domestically and abroad. This is simply unacceptable. Congress has an obligation to conduct strong oversight of our national security policies and when necessary, take corrective action through the legislative process That is why I welcomed the floor debate and supported the ``Amash-Conyers'' amendment, which aimed to restrict the NSA's ability to collect bulk telecommunications records pursuant to Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Furthermore, it would have imposed stricter, more robust judicial oversight of the Federal government's surveillance programs. Even though the amendment narrowly failed by a vote of 205-217, its strong bipartisan support sends a clear message to the White House that Congress is ready and willing to implement much needed reforms. It is absolutely essential that we preserve Americans' privacy and civil liberties in our efforts to keep America safe from terrorist attacks. Mr. Speaker, this bill in its totality provides adequate funding for all our military personnel and their families. Moreover, it includes several necessary reforms to help eliminate the scourge of sexual assault in the military. I was proud to work with my colleagues on the Subcommittee to fully fund the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response programs at $157 million and add an additional $25 million above the request to implement a Sexual Assault Special Victims Program. The bill also reaffirms numerous provisions that were included in the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, including those increasing penalties for sexual assault, requiring trial by court-martial for such offenses, and limiting convening authority discretion regarding court-martial findings and sentencing. Congress has a duty to take care of our men and women in uniform and as a member of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, I urge my colleagues to support the underlying legislation.", u"Madam President, I thank the men and women of our judicial branch who have stood up for this. But you know, our courts have been forced to run on fumes for far too long, and soon, they will be running on empty. I call on the House of Representatives to stop playing games with our co-equal branch of government, the judiciary. This government shutdown is having a real impact on our lives and our country. Recently, there was a terrible bus accident and tragically people were killed. Yet the NTSB cannot even go down and investigate what happened so it doesn't happen again because they are closed. There are businesses in Vermont that have invested in their business and are prepared to open--one in particular, and I will speak later about this one next week--and all they need is a certificate from the Department of Agriculture in order to open. The business is poised to open and start making money, especially during tourist season, but the Department of Agriculture is closed and they can't get the certificate. We also take for granted that our open and transparent government is a cornerstone of our democracy and a shining example of civic involvement. Even the public's right to know is compromised because of this shutdown. Every Member of Congress, regardless of political party or ideology, should be alarmed. Right now, Americans seeking help with Freedom of Information Act, FOIA, requests encounter closed for business signs at many of the Federal offices that facilitate them. The National Archives and Records Administration Office of Government Information Services--a critical office established by the Leahy-Cornyn OPEN Government Act to mediate FOIA disputes--is not operating due to the shutdown of the Federal Government. And according to several press reports, the Department of Justice has also sought stays in several important FOIA cases--including FOIA litigation seeking information about the government's use of the PATRIOT ACT to collect data on Americans' telephone calls--due to the lapse in Federal funding. This shutdown has impacted other agencies, too. The Center for Effective Government reports that the processing of FOIA requests has been suspended at the Social Security Administration, the Federal Trade Commission and the National Labor Relations Board. The National Security Agency, an agency facing a public trust deficit in light of revelations detailing its sweeping surveillance of Americans' emails and phone calls, has also ceased the processing of FOIA and Privacy Act requests. Many other Federal agencies have either taken their websites off-line or stopped updating their websites. We literally have a closed government. All of us--whether Democrat, Republican or Independent--have an interest in making certain that our government is fulfilling its responsibilities to its citizens. Yet, right now, House Republicans are choosing to debate again the nearly 4-year-old Affordable Care Act on a critical spending bill. Again, let us not forget that the act has been upheld by the Supreme Court and was a key issue in a Presidential election where the electorate in this country voted against the person who wanted to do away with it. They are forcing us to choose whether even the most fundamental parts of our government are ``essential.'' Rather than picking and choosing, we in Congress must commit ourselves to upholding all of our democratic principles and ensuring the government's ability to work for every American. The House of Representatives can end this stalemate today by taking up the Senate passed CR, sending it to the President, and reopening the government, so we can get back to the business of finding a reasonable way to balance our budget and get our fiscal house in order. It is important for that business owner in Vermont that the Department of Agriculture be open. It is important for our communities affected by criminals that our FBI remain open and fully functional. It is important to those who may have their children riding on a bus that we find out why this other bus accident happened and is it something that is going to happen again with a busload of children. But instead we have something akin to General Custer riding to Little Big Horn, claiming this is going to be victory, and I suspect that this will result in the same sort of defeat for those who seek to shut down the government for ideological reasons.", u"Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Utah. If that suits his convenience, I appreciate that courtesy very much. I will not take more than 8 or 10 minutes. The President should ask the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius, to resign her position because of the disastrous rollout of ObamaCare. Taxpayers have spent $400 million to create exchanges that--after 3\\1/2\\ years--still don't work. As a result, the White House had to announce last night that the key enforcement mechanism to their individual mandate--a $95 fine that increases every year--will be waived until the end of March of next year. That may be fine for those currently without insurance, but for the millions being forced into the exchanges and losing their current insurance, there is no relief, just higher prices, a likely lapse in insurance coverage, a broken Web site, and broken promises. We already know of 1.5 million Americans who are losing their policies because starting January 1, many insurance policies they now have will not be legal under ObamaCare, and because the exchange will not be working, they will not be able to choose another policy. This chart gives an example of what is going on. Just in three States--California, Florida, and New Jersey--there are 1.4 million insurance policies that will not be valid after January 1 because they are not legal under ObamaCare. Compare that number, 1.4 million, to the number of Americans in those three States who have reportedly applied or enrolled on the Web site for insurance, 7 or 8 percent of all the people who will lose their current policy have applied for a different policy through the exchange. That is what is going on with families across this country as people worry about health care. These are policies in the individual market. There are 19 million Americans in the individual market. We also heard on NBC News over the last couple of days that the Obama administration knew that 47 to 60 percent of the policies in the individual market would not be legally offered under ObamaCare. Yet they still said to people: ``If you like your insurance, you can keep it.'' At some point there has to be accountability. Expecting this Secretary to be able to fix what she has not been able to fix during the last 3\\1/2\\ years is unrealistic. It is throwing good money after bad. It is time for her to resign and for someone else to take charge. No private sector chief executive would escape accountability after such a poor performance. The principle of accountability is not and should not be foreign to the public sector. Admiral Hyman Rickover, father of the nuclear navy, told his submarine captains they were not only accountable for their ships, they were also accountable for the nuclear reactors on their ships. If anything went wrong with the reactor, their career in the Navy was over, the Admiral said. As a result of that dose of accountability, since the 1950s, there has never been a death as a result of a problem with a nuclear naval submarine reactor. Americans deserve that kind of accountability in the implementation of the new health care law. Instead, the Secretary appears not even to have told the President about known problems with the ObamaCare Web site in the months and days leading up to the launch. Despite repeated requests, she has refused to tell Congress or the public the reasons the ObamaCare Web site continues to fail, while insisting on more time and an undisclosed amount of money to fix it. Before the Internet, RCA knew how many records Elvis was selling every day, Ford knew how many cars they were selling every day, and McDonald's could tell us how many hamburgers they were selling each day. Yet, here we are in the advanced stages of the Internet age and, under Secretary Sebelius's leadership, the Obama administration will not tell us how many Americans have tried to sign up for ObamaCare, or how many have actually signed up, or what level of insurance they have purchased, or in what ZIP Code they live. Not only will they not tell us, they have done their best to keep us from finding out. With WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden spilling our beans every day, what is happening on the ObamaCare exchanges is the best kept secret left in Washington, DC. The National Security Agency could learn some lessons from Secretary Sebelius. Later today I will ask unanimous consent to approve a six-page bill I introduced yesterday to require the administration to answer these questions every week. Secretary Sebelius is not responsible for enacting ObamaCare, but she has been responsible for 3\\1/2\\ years for implementing it. Now many Americans have only a few weeks to purchase new insurance or be without health insurance. To expect the Secretary to correct in a few weeks what she has not been able to do in 3\\1/2\\ years is unrealistic. It is time for the President to ask the Secretary of Health and Human Services to resign. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, the National Security Agency continues its indiscriminate collection of a massive number of phone records about Americans under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. I have said over and over again that as a nation we have long needed to have the national conversation about bulk collection that is now underway, and the section 215 program should have been declassified long before it was. I wish to make very clear, as I have said before, I do not condone the way this or other highly classified programs were disclosed. I am deeply concerned about the potential damage to our intelligence-gathering capabilities, our foreign relationships, and national security. I am also deeply concerned that one person with a security clearance can wreak this much havoc. According to the New York Times, Edward Snowden accomplished his heist of extraordinarily sensitive information about NSA activities with ``inexpensive and widely available software''; in other words, software that any one of us could get. He didn't even execute a particularly sophisticated breach. He did not, apparently, face a particularly complex technological challenge while removing these sensitive documents from the NSA trove. Yet he pulled off what the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper recently called ``the most massive and most damaging theft of intelligence in our history.'' I continually ask the leaders of our intelligence community: What are you doing to stop this from happening again? I have learned that the NSA has devoted substantial resources to fixing the faults that allowed this to happen, has taken some steps to address them, and has identified a range of other actions that need to be taken. But one has to ask, especially in the wake of the Private Manning leaks, how could the NSA have allowed this to happen in the first place. I say this not to beat up on the NSA. I know we have highly dedicated, patriotic men and women working there, and I applaud them for their service to their country. But when I hear their leadership ask us to trust that they will keep our information safe and that we should have faith in its internal policies and procedures, one has to ask: Is this accurate? This is the same NSA that first told us that the section 215 program was essential to national security. They talked in speeches around the country that it thwarted dozens of plots. But then when they were asked questions in a congressional hearing specifically about it, that number went from in the fifties down to possibly one. The primary defense of the NSA's bulk collection program now appears to be the program is more of an insurance policy than anything else. But now even that new defense of the program has been called into question. The Washington Post has reported that under this program the NSA collects less than 30 percent of domestic phone records. The Wall Street Journal says the number is less than 20 percent. These estimates are consistent with the public copy of the President's Review Group report, which cautioned against placing too much value on this program as a tool to rule out a domestic connection to a terrorist plot; thus, the so-called insurance policy. The Review Group report tells us it is precisely because--although the program is unprecedented in scope--it still covers only a percentage of the total phone metadata held by service providers. It appears to this Senator that the intelligence community has defended its unprecedented, massive, and indiscriminate bulk collection by arguing that it needs the entire ``haystack'' in order for it to have an effective counterterrorism tool--and yet the American public now finds out they only have 20 to 30 percent of that so-called haystack. These revelations call even further into question the effectiveness of this program. Although the program is ongoing, some preliminary and positive changes are underway. Just last week, the Director of National Intelligence announced that the FISA Court has approved procedures under which the government will seek approval by a FISA Court judge before querying these phone records--absent a true, almost instantaneous kind of an emergency. The President has directed the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to develop alternatives to the section 215 phone records program and report back to him at the end of next month. That is progress but only some progress. It is not enough. It is not going to be enough to just reform the government's bulk phone records collection program. The program, as expensive and extensive as it is, has not proven effective. But beyond that, it is not worth the massive intrusion on the privacy of the American people--of the good, law-abiding men and women in what is supposed to be the greatest democracy on Earth. Congress should shut it down. We should enact the bipartisan, bicameral USA FREEDOM Act. Then Congress has to examine carefully--and to the extent possible publicly--the security breach that led to these revelations in the first place. The Senate Judiciary Committee has had a number of hearings on this issue. We are going to continue working on these issues at a hearing this week with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board--yet another voice concluding that the section 215 program should not continue. If the NSA is to regain the trust of the American people, it has to spend less time collecting data on innocent Americans and more time keeping our Nation's secrets safe. I yield the floor. I will suggest the absence of a quorum. Is time being divided?", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. From the founding of the American Republic, this country has been engaged in a profound debate about the limits of government. In the Federalist Papers, the Founders argued passionately for a Federal Government that would protect the American people from foreign threats. At the same time, the Founders struggled to create a structure to contain and control that government in order to protect the God-given rights of the American people. They carefully crafted the Constitution and Bill of Rights to accomplish these two different, yet complementary, goals. In essence, this debate has illuminated the exceptionality of the United States. The ceaseless effort to restrain the reach of government is in our DNA as Americans. And for 225 years, we have refused to accept the idea that in order to have national security, we must sacrifice our personal freedoms. Some, however, think these goals are in conflict with one another following last year's unauthorized disclosure of the National Security Agency's data collection programs operated under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA. Today, the House will consider legislation that once again proves that American liberty and security are not mutually exclusive. We can protect both Americans' civil liberties and our national security without compromising either one. For nearly a year, the House Judiciary Committee has studied this issue in detail. We have held multiple hearings, consulted the Obama administration, and worked across party lines to produce bipartisan legislation to ensure these programs protect our national security and our individual freedoms. This bill, the USA FREEDOM Act, was unanimously approved by both the House Judiciary Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The USA FREEDOM Act makes clear that the government cannot indiscriminately acquire Americans' call detail records and creates a new, narrowly tailored process for the collection of these records. Specifically, the USA FREEDOM Act ends bulk collection by keeping Americans' phone records in the hands of providers and requiring the government to get the permission of the court to request information from providers, using a specific selection term in their request to the court. That limits the scope of information collected. For example, the government would have to identify a specific person or account as part of any request for information or tangible things. Furthermore, the USA FREEDOM Act bans bulk collection not just for the controversial telephone metadata program, but for all of section 215 authorities, as well as NSL letters and pen register, trap and trace devices. These limitations will protect Americans' records of all types, including medical records, email records, telephone records, and firearms purchase records, among many others. At the same time, the USA FREEDOM Act ensures that the Federal Government will continue to have the tools it needs to identify and intercept terrorist attacks. The bill preserves the traditional operational use of these important authorities by the FBI and other intelligence agencies. It provides needed emergency authority to national security officials if there is an immediate national security threat, but still requires the government to obtain Court approval of an application within 7 days. The USA FREEDOM Act increases the transparency of our intelligence-gathering programs by creating an amicus curiae in the FISA Court. This amicus will be chosen from a panel of legal experts to help ensure the court adequately considers privacy concerns and the constitutional rights of Americans when reviewing the government's request for records. It also requires the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to conduct a declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion of the court that includes a significant construction or interpretation of the law and mandates that the government report the number of orders issued, modified, or denied by the court annually. Last year's national security leaks have also had a commercial and financial impact on American technology companies that have provided these records. They have experienced backlash from both American and foreign consumers and have had their competitive standing in the global marketplace damaged. In January of this year, the Justice Department entered into a settlement with several companies to permit new ways to report data concerning requests for customer information under FISA. The USA FREEDOM Act builds on upon this settlement, allowing tech companies to publicly report national security requests from the government to inform their American and foreign customers. From beginning to end, this is a carefully crafted, bipartisan bill. I would like to thank the sponsor of this legislation, Crime Subcommittee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner, full committee Ranking Member John Conyers, Intellectual Property Subcommittee Ranking Member Jerry Nadler, and Crime Subcommittee Ranking Member Bobby Scott for working together with me on this important bipartisan legislation. I also want to thank the staff of these Members for the many hours, weeks, and months of hard work they put into this effort. Furthermore, I would like to thank my staff--Caroline Lynch, the chief counsel of the Crime Subcommittee, and Sam Ramer--for their long hours and steadfast dedication to this legislation. And I might add that Sam Ramer is going to be missed by the committee as he moves on to take a new responsibility in the private sector, but he wanted to be sure that he could be present today for the completion of the passage of this legislation through the House. I thank Sam and Caroline for their long and dedicated hours put into making sure that this was a finely crafted piece of legislation. I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan legislation, and I reserve the balance of my time.", u'Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I might consume. I would like to begin by recognizing Chairman Goodlatte, Mr. Sensenbrenner, the other judiciary committee sponsors, and Leader Cantor for all their hard work and continuing to forge a compromise with the Intelligence Committee that enacts meaningful change to FISA while preserving operational capabilities. It is commendable that we have found a responsible legislative solution to address concerns about the bulk telephone metadata program so that we may move forward on other national security legislative priorities. Our obligation to protect this country should not be held hostage by the actions of a traitor or traitors who leaked classified information that puts our troops in the field at risk or those who fearmonger and spread mistruth and misinformation to further their own misguided agenda. Following the criminal disclosures of intelligence information last June, the section 215 telephone metadata program has been the subject of intense and often inaccurate criticism. The bulk telephone metadata program is legal, overseen, and effective at saving American lives. No review has found anything other than that. All three branches of government oversee this program, including Congress, the FISC, inspectors general and internal compliance and privacy and civil liberties offices in the executive branch agencies. Despite the effectiveness of the program and immense safeguards on the data, many Americans and many Members of this body still have concerns about a potential for abuse. Remember, the whole debate here has been about the potential for abuse, not that abuse had occurred. The legislation we are considering today is designed to address those concerns and reflect hundreds of hours of Member and staff work to negotiate a workable compromise. In March, the Intelligence Committee ranking member, Mr. Ruppersberger, and I introduced legislation that was designed to accomplish these main priorities. We committed to ending bulk metadata collection for communications and other types of records. We committed to providing more targeted, narrow authorities so as not to put America at risk. We committed to provide an even more robust judicial review than exists today and process for that program. We committed to providing more transparency into the FISA process and the decisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The revised USA FREEDOM Act accomplishes the same goals as well. The USA FREEDOM Act provides the meaningful change to the telephone metadata that Members of the House have been seeking. If we had the fortune of having a Commander in Chief firmly dedicated to the preservation of this program, we may have been able to protect it in its entirety. With that not being the case, and I believe this is a workable compromise that protects the core function of a counterterrorism program we know has saved lives around the world, I urge Members to support this legislation. I want to thank all of those who came together to forge something that has been certainly a difficult process along the way. At the end of the day, something important happened here: a better understanding of the threats by, I think, more Members of Congress that pose every single day to the lives of American citizens by terror groups around the world. That rise in threat level is getting worse. The matrix for that threat level is getting worse. It was important as we forged and, I think, met the concerns of so many and educated, I think, many on the misinformation that was out there, that we protect the core capability to detect if a foreign terrorist on foreign soil is making a call to the United States to further advance their goals of killing Americans. I think we accomplished that today. It is not the bill I would have written completely, but I think we protected those operational concerns and met the concerns for those who had a mistrust of that metadata being locked away with the National Security Agency. With that, I look forward to a thoughtful debate and reserve the balance of my time, Mr. Speaker.', u"Mr. President, I am joined today by Senators McCain, Rockefeller and Coburn in introducing a bill to respond to overwhelming and indisputable evidence of large scale cyber intrusions by the Government of China into the computer networks of private U.S. companies for the purpose of stealing valuable intellectual property and proprietary information. Such illegal and damaging behavior demands strong and immediate action. American companies invest hundreds of billions of dollars every year in research and development. The innovation that results from those investments drives the growth of American companies and the U.S. economy. Unfortunately, our companies are having their intellectual property stolen right out from underneath them through cyberspace. According to a 2013 Center for Strategic and International Studies study, cyber theft costs American companies $100 billion annually--a staggering amount that threatens to undermine America's global competitiveness. General Keith B. Alexander, former head of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, has called the cyber theft of U.S. intellectual property ``the greatest transfer of wealth in history.'' Monday's Department of Justice indictment of 5 Chinese military officials for computer hacking, economic espionage and other offenses directed at 6 American companies confirms what earlier U.S. Government reports have documented: the culprits of cyber theft are frequently foreign governments and China is the worst offender. The indictment alleges that the defendants, members of China's People's Liberation Army, conspired to hack into the computers of U.S. companies to steal information useful to those American companies' Chinese competitors, including state-owned enterprises. The indictments demonstrate the administration's willingness to take on cybercrime through the aggressive use of the criminal justice system. The legislation we are introducing today, a revised version of a bill we introduced last year, gives our Government another tool to impose costs on those who steal and profit from the cyber theft of American technology, trade secrets and proprietary information. Our bill would authorize the President to direct the Treasury Department to freeze the assets of any foreign person or company, including a state owned enterprise, determined to have benefitted from the theft of U.S. technology or proprietary information stolen in cyberspace. The Deter Cyber Theft Act would also require the Director of National Intelligence to compile an annual report on foreign economic and industrial espionage that includes: a list of foreign countries that engage in economic or industrial espionage in cyberspace against U.S. firms or individuals, including a priority watch list of the worst offenders; a list of U.S. technologies or proprietary information targeted by such espionage, and, to the extent possible, a list of such information that has been stolen; a list of items manufactured or produced or services or services provided using such stolen technologies or proprietary information; a list of foreign companies, including state-owned firms, that benefit from such theft; details of the espionage activities of foreign countries; and actions taken by the DNI and other Federal agencies to combat industrial or economic espionage in cyberspace. As Dennis C. Blair, former director of national intelligence and co-chair of the IP Commission report has said, ``Jawboning alone won't work. Something has to change China's calculus.'' We need to call out those who are responsible for cyber theft and empower the President to hit the thieves where it hurts most--in their wallets. If foreign governments, like the Chinese government, want to continue to deny their involvement in cyber theft despite the proof, that is one thing. We can't stop the denials. But we aren't without remedies. We can make sure that the companies that benefit from cyber theft, including state-owned companies, pay the price. Blocking these companies from doing business in the United States will send the message that we have had enough. We worked closely with the administration in developing this bill. I believe it is an important complement to their recent aggressive efforts to respond to economic espionage by members of the Chinese military. In light of the Snowden leaks, some have charged that it is inconsistent of the U.S. to criticize China's campaign to steal our intellectual property through cyberspace. Let's be clear. Attempts to equate China's actions and our own are false. The United States economy is built on the hard work and innovation of American entrepreneurs who are free to think for themselves, develop new products and deliver them to the world. China's actions, on the other hand, reveal a country that is satisfied with theft as a means of economic growth while ironically, suppressing the freedoms that encourage new ideas and innovation. The Snowden revelations are about espionage; the United States does not steal intellectual property for economic gain. I urge the speedy enactment of the Deter Cyber Theft Act. By Ms. HEITKAMP (for herself and Mr. Kaine): S. 2390. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to create a tax credit for foster families; to the Committee on Finance.", u" The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first and second times by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated: By Mr. MARKEY: S. 2433. A bill to provide assistance to Ukraine to reduce the dependence of Ukraine on imports of natural gas from the Russian Federation, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations. By Mr. FRANKEN (for himself, Mr. Kaine, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Brown, Mr. Sanders, Mr. Leahy, Ms. Heitkamp, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Udall of Colorado, Mr. Merkley, Mr. Bennet, Mrs. Hagan, Ms. Klobuchar, Mr. Schatz, Mrs. Shaheen, Mr. Udall of New Mexico, Ms. Baldwin, Mr. King, Mr. Heinrich, Mr. Coons, and Mr. Begich): S. 2434. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to ensure that working families have access to affordable health insurance coverage; to the Committee on Finance. By Mr. BEGICH: S. 2435. A bill to amend section 5542 of title 5, United States Code, to provide that any hours worked by Federal firefighters under a qualified trade-of-time arrangement shall be excluded for purposes of determinations relating to overtime pay; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. By Mr. SCOTT: S. 2436. A bill to amend title 5, United States Code, to provide that agencies may not deduct labor organization dues from the pay of Federal employees, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. By Ms. MIKULSKI: S. 2437. An original bill making appropriations for Departments of Commerce and Justice, and Science, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2015, and for other purposes; from the Committee on Appropriations; placed on the calendar. By Mrs. MURRAY: S. 2438. An original bill making appropriations for the Departments of Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2015, and for other purposes; from the Committee on Appropriations; placed on the calendar. By Mrs. McCASKILL (for herself, Mr. Coats, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Tester, and Ms. Collins): S. 2439. A bill to amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 to provide for the Inspector General of the National Security Agency to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and for other purposes; to the Select Committee on Intelligence. By Mr. UDALL of New Mexico (for himself, Mr. Barrasso, Mr. Heinrich, Mr. Hoeven, Mr. Enzi, Mr. Udall of Colorado, Mr. Heller, Mr. Walsh, Mr. Inhofe, and Ms. Heitkamp): S. 2440. A bill to expand and extend the program to improve permit coordination by the Bureau of Land Management, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. By Mr. REED (for himself, Ms. Ayotte, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Markey, and Mr. Whitehouse): S. 2441. A bill to extend the same Federal benefits to law enforcement officers serving private institutions of higher education and rail carriers that apply to law enforcement officers serving units of State and local government; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. WALSH (for himself and Mr. Tester): S. 2442. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Interior to take certain land and mineral rights on the reservation of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe of Montana and other culturally important land into trust for the benefit of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Indian Affairs. By Mr. BROWN (for himself, Ms. Ayotte, Ms. Landrieu, Mrs. Gillibrand, Ms. Baldwin, Mrs. Shaheen, and Mr. Nelson): S. 2443. A bill to direct the Attorney General to make grants to States that have in place laws that terminate the parental rights of men who father children through rape; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. BEGICH (for himself, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Thune, and Ms. Cantwell): S. 2444. A bill to authorize appropriations for the Coast Guard for fiscal years 2015 through 2016, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. By Mrs. BOXER (for herself and Mrs. Feinstein): S. 2445. A bill to provide family members and close associates of an individual who they fear is a danger to himself, herself, or others new tools to prevent gun violence; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. JOHNSON of Wisconsin: S. 2446. A bill to require the Congressional Budget Office to annually report changes in direct spending and revenue associated with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; to the Committee on the Budget. By Mr. PORTMAN: S. 2447. A bill to amend title 31, United States Code, to clarify the use of credentials by enrolled agents; to the Committee on Finance. By Mrs. HAGAN: S. 2448. A bill to protect servicemembers in higher education, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor Andrew Joon-hao Tan, a student at La Entrada Middle School in Menlo Park, California, for his First Place Award in the 2013 Making Democracy Work Student Essay Contest held by the United States Capitol Historical Society. His extraordinary essay, entitled Democracy: Cohesion Between People and Government, follows. ``What political power could ever carry on the vast multitude of lesser undertakings which the American citizens perform every day, with the assistance of the principle of association,'' wrote French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville when he visited the United States to observe American government. Tocqueville evaluates the American governance and decides that for democracy to be effective in America, citizens and organizations must actively participate in the government. After the American Revolution, representatives from each state met together to write the Constitution, an American standard for how democracy would function. Recently, however, the government has been less productive than in the past. Some have begun to question if democracy can remain an effective form of government in the current era. Democracy has the potential to be a flourishing style of government, but is predicated on the protection of individuals' rights and liberties, people's access to education and information, and actively participating citizens, all of which, they claim, are resting on shaky grounds. First and foremost, individual liberties must be guaranteed to everyone in a democracy. This provides protection to minority groups whose rights may otherwise be construed upon. Civil liberties can be encroached upon during times of national crises. A recent example of this is the Patriot Act, which was enacted after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Even though reining in civil liberties seemed appropriate for national security reasons in the immediate aftermath, there have been unintended consequences whereby our basic civil rights have been infringed. The debate over the role of the National Security Agency is currently being adjudicated in federal courts because many people feel that their fourth amendment rights are being violated. The expansion and retraction of our rights must continually be examined, and the government must provide enforcement of these rights to all citizens to create a bond of trust between the people and the government. Secondly, education should be available to all citizens, policies must be transparent, information should be widely accessible, and diverse points of views should be encouraged. When citizens in a democracy are educated, democracy functions much more effectively. Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. In other words, those who receive poor education are less likely to be politically active. Also, less educated people are more vulnerable to propaganda and false information, leaving them susceptible to vote based on the influence of others. Citizens also deserve access to uncensored information. In regimes where information is tightly controlled, citizens are restricted from developing their own opinions and this limits their capacity to fully engage in the political process. It is the government's responsibility to provide basic education and ensure freedom of the press so that citizens are engaged and empowered to play a part in a successful democracy. Finally, citizens must fulfill their civic duties in a democracy. These include voting and jury duty but can also be as simple as staying updated on current issues and obeying the law. Unfortunately, many of these simple duties are commonly overlooked. Even in the last presidential election in 2012, where there was a record voter turnout only about 60% of registered voters voted. Thus, the voice of around 40% of people was not heard in the ballot. Similarly, fulfilling civic responsibilities is necessary for democracy to work well. For example, jury duty has been difficult to implement. According to Sun Sentinel, in South Florida about two of every three people skip jury duty with or without being exempted. Jurors in South Florida have only a 41% response rate and 3,000 people must be requested to fill 1,000 jury spots because of the high rejection rate. This may be an extreme case, but the lack of commitment to civic responsibility is not unique to Florida. Complacency in civic involvement ultimately leads to erosion of democracy and make our system stale and unsustainable. The ``lesser undertakings which the American citizens perform every day'' are essential in a democracy because government cannot fulfill all the needs of citizens. In a successful democracy individual rights and liberties must be applied impartially, education and current information must be readily available, and the citizens must do their part to allow the law to be applied fairly. America has survived and struggled through adversities to become one of the longest living democracies in the world because of its strong commitment to the Constitution, impartial application of the law and unrestricted information from varying political opinions. Democracy is an active and dynamic process, and flourishes with self-examination and engagement of its citizens, but languishes with complacency. Mr. Speaker, I ask the entire House to join me today in honoring Andrew Tan, an extraordinary young man, for his deep understanding of the rights and responsibilities of citizens in our nation, and for his ability to write about it in a cogent, understandable and inspiring style. He is an inspiration to all of us and he is an eloquent statement about the youth of our nation.", u" Mr. WARNER (for himself, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Burr, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Chambliss, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. King, Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Udall of Colorado, and Mr. Kaine) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary: S. Res. 521 Whereas on July 26, 1908, Attorney General Charles Bonaparte ordered newly-hired Federal investigators to report to the Office of the Chief Examiner of the Department of Justice, which subsequently was renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Whereas on July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.), creating the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thereby laying the foundation for today's intelligence community; Whereas the National Security Act of 1947, which appears in title 50 of the United States Code, governs the definition, composition, responsibilities, authorities, and oversight of the intelligence community of the United States; Whereas the intelligence community is defined by section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)) to include the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs, the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Energy, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury, the elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, and other elements as may be designated; Whereas July 26, 2012, was the 65th anniversary of the signing of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.); Whereas the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) created the position of the Director of National Intelligence to serve as the head of the intelligence community and to ensure that national intelligence be timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available; Whereas Congress has previously passed joint resolutions, signed by the President, to designate Peace Officers Memorial Day on May 15, Patriot Day on September 11, and other commemorative occasions, to honor the sacrifices of law enforcement officers and of those who lost their lives on September 11, 2001; Whereas the United States has increasingly relied upon the men and women of the intelligence community to protect and defend the security of the United States in the decade since the attacks of September 11, 2001; Whereas the men and women of the intelligence community, both civilian and military, have been increasingly called upon to deploy to theaters of war in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere since September 11, 2001; Whereas numerous intelligence officers of the elements of the intelligence community have been injured or killed in the line of duty; Whereas intelligence officers of the United States are routinely called upon to accept personal hardship and sacrifice in the furtherance of their mission to protect the United States, to undertake dangerous assignments in the defense of the interests of the United States, to collect reliable information within prescribed legal authorities upon which the leaders of the United States rely in life-and-death situations, and to ``speak truth to power.'' by providing their best assessments to decision makers, regardless of political and policy considerations; Whereas the men and women of the intelligence community have on numerous occasions succeeded in preventing attacks upon the United States and allies of the United States, saving numerous innocent lives; and Whereas intelligence officers of the United States must of necessity often remain unknown and unrecognized for their substantial achievements and successes: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate-- (1) designates July 26, 2014, as ``United States Intelligence Professionals Day''; (2) acknowledges the courage, fidelity, sacrifice, and professionalism of the men and women of the intelligence community of the United States; and (3) encourages the people of the United States to observe this day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.", u" Mr. CARDIN (for himself and Ms. Mikulski) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to: S. Res. 24 Whereas on January 9, 2015, Bowie State University, located in Bowie, Maryland, will celebrate the founding of the university on January 9, 1865; Whereas Bowie State University is the oldest historically black institution of higher education in the State of Maryland, and 1 of the 10 oldest in the United States; Whereas in 1864 the Baltimore Association began fundraising to open and support schools for African-Americans, and established 7 schools, the second of which, known as the ``Normal School'' (referred to in this preamble as the ``School''), was the forerunner of Bowie State University; Whereas the School began by educating approximately 370 students in the African Baptist Church in the Crane's Building on the northeast corner of Calvert and Saratoga Streets in Baltimore, Maryland; Whereas in 1867 the School purchased the Friends' Meeting House at the corner of Courtland and Saratoga Streets in Baltimore, Maryland, to use for the School; Whereas during the earliest years of the School, the school received financial support from the City Council of Baltimore, the Freedmen's Bureau, several northern relief societies, and the estate of Nelson Wells; Whereas in 1893 the name of the School was changed to the ``Baltimore Colored Normal School''; Whereas in 1908 the General Assembly of Maryland approved legislation that allowed the trustees of the School to donate assets of the trustees to the State of Maryland in return for a $5,000 annual appropriation to maintain a permanent normal school for the training of black teachers; Whereas in 1908 the General Assembly of Maryland changed the name of the School to ``Baltimore Normal School No. 3''; Whereas in 1910 the State of Maryland purchased 187 acres of land formerly known as ``Jericho Farms'' to relocate the School; Whereas in September 1911 the new location of the School opened with 50 students enrolled; Whereas in 1935 the School began operating as a 4-year program for training elementary school teachers and was renamed the ``Maryland Teachers College at Bowie''; Whereas in 1954, when the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education was formed, the education program of the School was among the first to receive national accreditation and that distinction has been continuously reaffirmed; Whereas in 1963 the School began a liberal arts and teacher training program for secondary education and the institution was renamed ``Bowie State College''; Whereas in 1988 the School, which offered several master's degree programs, joined the University System of Maryland and was finally renamed ``Bowie State University''; Whereas in 1995 Bowie State University became 1 of only 6 Model Institutions for Excellence in science, engineering, and mathematics in the United States with support from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Whereas as of January 2015, Bowie State University serves approximately 5,600 students annually with challenging and rewarding academic programs and individual support to prepare attendees with the skills needed to compete and succeed in a changing world; Whereas Bowie State University was listed as 1 of ``America's Top Colleges'' by Forbes magazine from 2011 to 2013, and ranked among the top 25 historically black colleges and universities by U.S. News & World Report; Whereas Bowie State University has been recognized as a leader in training African-American professionals in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (``STEM'') fields; Whereas Bowie State University was named a National Center for Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education by the National Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security; and Whereas Bowie State University continues to be committed to enhancing academic opportunities for students at the university, many of whom may be the first in their families attending college, and producing graduates who better strengthen the entire State of Maryland and the modern technology-driven economy of the United States: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate-- (1) congratulates Bowie State University on the 150th anniversary of the founding of the university; (2) recognizes the achievements of all the administrators, professors, students, and various staff who have contributed to the success of Bowie State University; and (3) respectfully requests that the Secretary of the Senate transmit an enrolled copy of this resolution to-- (A) the president of Bowie State University; and (B) the provost and vice president for academic affairs.", u"Mr. President, almost 2 years ago, Vermonters and the American people learned for the first time the shocking details of the National Security Agency's dragnet collection program. Relying on a deeply flawed interpretation of section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the NSA has been indiscriminately sweeping up Americans' private telephone records for years. It is long past time to end this bulk collection program. Americans have made clear that they will not tolerate such intrusion into their private lives. The President has called for an end to bulk collection under section 215. The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General supported legislation last year that would have shut this program down. National security experts have testified that the program is not necessary, and the American technology industry has called for meaningful reform of this program because it has lost billions to competitors in the international marketplace due to a decline in the public's trust. Yet in the face of this overwhelming consensus, Congress has failed to act. Last year, when we had an opportunity to pass my bipartisan legislation to end this program and reform other surveillance authorities, some Members of this body chose to play political games rather than engage in constructive debate. The time for posturing and theatrics is over. It is time for Congress to answer to the American people. Today, I--along with Senator Mike Lee--introduce the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. This bipartisan bill is also being introduced in the House today by Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner, House Judiciary Committee chairman Bob Goodlatte, ranking member John Conyers, and a large bipartisan group of House Judiciary Committee members. If enacted, our bill will be the most significant reform to government surveillance authorities since the USA PATRIOT Act was passed nearly 14 years ago. Most importantly, our bill will definitively end the NSA's bulk collection program under section 215. It also guarantees unprecedented transparency about government surveillance programs, allows the FISA Court to appoint an amicus to assist it in significant cases, and brings the national security letter statutes in line with the First Amendment. The bipartisan, bicameral bill we introduce today is the product of intense and careful negotiations. It enacts strong, meaningful reforms while ensuring that the intelligence community has the tools it needs to keep this country safe. Some will say that this bill does not go far enough. I agree. But in order to secure broader support for reform legislation that can pass both the House and Senate and be signed into law, changes had to be made to the bill that I introduced last year. This new bill does not contain all the reforms that I want. It contains some provisions I believe are unnecessary but that were added to secure support from the House Intelligence Committee. But we should pass it and continue fighting for more reform. I have been in the Senate for more than 40 years--and I have learned that when there is a chance to make real progress, we have to seize it. This is not my first fight and certainly will not be my last. I have a responsibility to Vermonters and the American people to do everything I can to end the dragnet collection of their phone records under section 215. And I know for a fact that the upcoming June 1 sunset of section 215 is our best opportunity for real reform. We cannot squander it. Last year, a broad and bipartisan coalition worked together to craft reasonable and responsible legislation. Critics resorted to scare tactics. They would not even agree to debate the bill. I hope that we do not see a repeat of that ill-fated strategy again this year. The American people have had enough of delay and brinksmanship. Congress now has an opportunity to show leadership and govern responsibly. The intelligence community is deeply concerned about the possibility of a legislative standoff that could result in the expiration of section 215 altogether. The USA FREEDOM Act is a path forward that has the support of the administration, privacy groups, the technology industry--and most importantly, the American people. I urge congressional leaders to take up and swiftly pass the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015--because I will not vote for reauthorization of section 215 without meaningful reform.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Congress moves to weaken antiterror surveillance while France expands it. At least one of the gunmen who shot up a Texas free speech event on Sunday was known to the FBI as a potentially violent radical and was convicted in 2011 on a terror-related charge. The Islamic State claimed credit for this domestic attack, albeit an unproven connection. So it is strange that Congress is moving to weaken U.S. surveillance defenses against the likes of shooters Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi. Two years after the leaks from Edward Snowden's stolen dossier, a liberal-conservative coalition is close to passing a bill that would curtail the programs the National Security Agency has employed in some form for two decades. Adding to this political strangeness, France of all places is on the verge of modernizing and expanding its own surveillance capabilities for the era of burner cell phones, encrypted emails and mass online jihadist propaganda. The Patriot Act expires at the end of the month, and a fragile House-negotiated compromise on reauthorization would end NSA sweeps of telephone metadata--the date, time stamps and duration of calls. The content of those calls isn't collected without a separate warrant. The measure also includes mostly cosmetic nuisance changes such as a panel of outside amicus lawyers to advise the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that supervises and approves NSA activities. But the metadata eulogies are premature before what ought to be a sturdy debate in the Senate. Majority Leader Mitch McConnell introduced a ``clean'' extension of current law as a base bill that the chamber will open to amendments later this month. The Senate narrowly defeated a bill similar to the House measure last year, and we hope it does so again. Senators should think carefully about the value of metadata collection, and not only because the technical details of the House bill are still being parsed by security experts. In January 2014, President Obama tried to suppress the Snowden wildfire by pronouncing the end of ``bulk metadata program as it currently exists,'' via executive order. Civil libertarians rejoiced. Yet NSA transparency disclosures show the FISC court approved 170 search applications of the database in the same calendar year. Presumably the NSA continued to analyze metadata--despite pro forma White House opposition--because these details provide intelligence that is useful for uncovering plots, preventing attacks and otherwise safeguarding the country. The NSA must demonstrate to FISC judges a ``reasonable, articulable suspicion'' to gain approval for each ``selector,'' or search query. In other words, there is little invasion of privacy because the searches are narrow. The NSA isn't even using automated algorithms to reveal suspicious patterns the way that credit card companies and retailers mine consumer data every day. The NSA's 170 metadata searches involved merely 160 foreign targets and 227 known or presumed U.S. citizens. There is still no evidence that the data have been abused. The Supreme Court has held since Smith v. Maryland in 1979 that the Constitution provides no guarantee of metadata privacy. Domestic police and prosecutors in routine criminal investigations enjoy more warrantless access to metadata well beyond even the NSA status quo. The House bill pretends not to undermine intelligence collection by requiring telecom and tech companies to retain metadata business records. The NSA could then request these documents with FISC consent or unilaterally in an emergency. But assembling this information retroactively may be too slow in a true crisis--in return for little or no added privacy protection. After the hacking breaches at Sony, Target and a string of health insurers, Americans may reasonably wonder if their data are safer fragmented across many private third- party repositories. The Members of Congress who know the most about intelligence know all this, but they say that ending metadata collection is the price of blocking a political stampede that might also kill more important provisions such as Section 702 that authorizes foreign-to-foreign wiretaps. That might have been true immediately after the Snowden heist, but it may not be true after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and in Texas by Islamic State-inspired jihadists. Those shootings show that surveillance is more crucial than ever to prevent mass murder on U.S. soil by homegrown or foreign radicals. The French understand this, which is why they are widening their intelligence reach. No prevention can ever be perfect. But the House measure is a deliberate effort to know less and blind U.S. spooks to potentially relevant information. This self-imposed fog may be politically satisfying now, but deadly if there is another attack.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: One by one, several powerful Republican senators took to the floor Thursday morning to offer one of the most full- throated defenses of the National Security Agency's bulk collection of billions of U.S. phone records since Edward Snowden exposed the program nearly two years ago. The crux of their argument is unmistakable: The NSA's expansive surveillance powers need to remain intact and unchanged to keep Americans safe from potential terrorist threats--and if these powers existed before Sept. 11, 2001, they may have assisted in preventing the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But some of the talking points used by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and his allies appear to rely heavily on assertions that are either dubious in their veracity or elide important contextual details. Here is a review of some of their declarations: Claim: ``Not only have these tools kept us safe, there has not been a single incident, not one, of intentional abuse of them.''--McConnell McConnell may have been referring specifically to the phone records program here, but the NSA does not, as he implies, have a spotless record. According to a 2013 inspector general report, NSA analysts intentionally misused foreign surveillance authorities at least a dozen times in the past decade, sometimes for the purpose of spying on their romantic interests. So-called ``loveint''--short for ``love intelligence''--was revealed by the inspector general in response to a letter sent from Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley, who this year renewed a call for the Justice Department to provide an update on how it was handling its investigation into the alleged willful abuses and to ``appropriate accountability for those few who violate the trust placed in them.'' Additionally, a 2012 internal audit obtained by The Washington Post found that the NSA has violated privacy restrictions set in place for its surveillance programs thousands of times each year since 2008. The audit found that most--though not all--infractions were unintended. Claim: ``The compromise legislation rolls us back to the same thing we were doing pre-9/11.''--Senate Intelligence Chairman Richard Burr The USA Freedom Act referenced by Burr would reauthorize three key surveillance provisions under the post-9/11 Patriot Act. It would usher in several reforms related to transparency and oversight, but it would keep those authorities intact. Section 215 of the law would no longer allow for the bulk collection of U.S. phone metadata by the NSA, but the authority--created after 9/11--would still exist. Claim: ``The alternatives to the current program would not come close to offering the capabilities that now enable us to protect Americans.''--Sen. Tom Cotton Cotton's claim does not align with the stance of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and then-Attorney General Eric Holder, who sent a letter to lawmakers last year expressing their support for an earlier iteration of the Freedom Act. ``The intelligence community believes that your bill preserves essential intelligence-community capabilities; and the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence support your bill and believe that it is a reasonable compromise that enhances privacy and civil liberties and increases transparency,'' the letter read. That version of the Freedom Act is widely considered more limiting of surveillance powers than the one being debated in Congress this year. Claim: ``One alternative offered by opponents of this program is to have phone companies retain control of all call data and provide the NSA only the data responsive to searches phone companies would run on the NSA's behalf. This is not technologically feasible.''--Cotton The reliance on phone companies to retain call data already occurs, as they are the ones who turn the records over to the government in bulk. Cotton, who voted for a pared down iteration of the Freedom Act last year when he served in the House, cites an 85-page study from the National Research Council to support this assertion. But the Arkansas freshman appears to be conflating its findings, which dealt with whether software could fully replace bulk collection, with what backers of the Freedom Act are attempting to do. ``Although no software can fully replace bulk with targeted information collection, software can be developed to more effectively target collection and to control the usage of collected data,'' the report concluded. Cotton's reservations--that the new system may take longer than the old--have more to do with process than technological capabilities. Claim: ``Here's the truth. If this program had existed before 9/11, it is quite possible that we would have known that the 9/11 hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar was living in San Diego and making phone calls to an al-Qaida safehouse in Yemen. There's no guarantee we would have known. Theres no way we can go back in time and prove it, but there is a probability that we would have known and there's a probability that American lives could have been saved.''-- Sen. Marco Rubio. Rubio hedges his language several times with this claim, but the statement still omits important context. As reported by a 2013 ProPublica investigation, ``U.S. intelligence agencies knew the identity of the hijacker in question, Saudi national Khalid al-Mihdhar, long before 9/11 and had the ability find him, but they failed to do so.'' Such missed opportunities to disrupt Midhar's activities, which were being monitored by at least as early as 1999, reflect a failure of information sharing among intelligence agencies, ProPublica notes, and are described in detail in the 9/11 Commission report.", u" The appeals-court ruling on surveillance will have damaging Usually, the only relevant objections to a judicial opinion concern errors of law and fact. Not so with a federal appeals court ruling on May 7 invalidating the National Security Agency's bulk collection of telephone metadata under the USA Patriot Act. Not that the ruling by the three-judge panel of the Second Circuit in New York lacks for errors of law and fact. The panel found that when the Patriot Act, passed in the aftermath of 9/11, permitted the government to subpoena business records ``relevant'' to an authorized investigation, the statute couldn't have meant bulk telephone metadata-- consisting of every calling number, called number, and the date and length of every call. That ends up subpoenaing everything, the panel reasoned, and what is ``relevant'' is necessarily a subset of everything. In aid of this argument the panel summons not only the dictionary definition of an investigation, but also the law that relates to a grand-jury subpoena in a criminal case, which limits the government to ``relevant'' information. Yet the judicial panel failed to consider the purpose of the statute it was analyzing. The Patriot Act concerns intelligence gathering, which is forward-looking and necessarily requires a body of data from which potentially useful information about events in the planning stage may be gathered. A grand jury investigation, by contrast, is backward-looking, and requires only limited data relating to past events. A base of data from which to gather intelligence is at least arguably ``relevant'' to an authorized intelligence investigation. Equally serious an error is the panel's suggestion that many, perhaps most, members of Congress were unaware of the NSA's bulk metadata collection when they repeatedly reauthorized the statute, most recently in 2011. The judges suggest that an explanation of the program was available only in ``secure locations, for a limited time period and under a number of restrictions.'' In addition to being given briefing papers, lawmakers had available live briefings, including from the directors of the FBI and the National Intelligence office. In any event, no case until the judicial panel's ruling last week has ever held that a federal tribunal may engage in telepathic hallucination to figure out whether a statute has the force of law. The panel adds that because the program was highly classified, Congress didn't have the benefit of public debate. Which is to say, no truly authorized secret intelligence-gathering effort can exist unless we let in on the secret those from and about whom the intelligence is to be gathered. Overlooked in this exertion is the Founders' foresight about the need for secrecy--expressed in the body of the Constitution in the requirement that each legislative house publish a journal of its proceedings ``excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy.'' But isn't the misbegotten ruling by this trio of federal judges correctable on appeal? Or won't it be made moot because the Patriot Act must be reauthorized by June 1 and Congress will either enact substitute legislation, or let the statute lapse, or simply reauthorize it with full knowledge of how the program works? Here the Second Circuit's opinion is problematic in ways not immediately apparent. The judges didn't reverse the lower-court opinion upholding the NSA data-collection program and order the program stopped. Rather, the panel simply vacated that opinion and sent the case back to the lower court to decide whether it is necessary to stop the program now. By rendering its order in a non-final form, the panel made it less likely that the Supreme Court would hear the case even if asked, because the justices generally won't take up issues that arise from non- final orders. Moreover, the opinion tries to head off the argument that if Congress reauthorizes the Patriot Act in its current form, lawmakers will have endorsed the metadata program. The panel writes: ``If Congress fails to reauthorize Section 215 itself, or re-enacts Section 215 without expanding it to authorize the telephone metadata program, there will be no need for prospective relief, since the program will end.'' That is, unless Congress adopts the panel's view of what Congress has done, rather than its own view of what it has done, the program must end. Then there is the opinion's timing. The case was argued eight months ago. This opinion, or one like it, easily could have been published in time for orderly review by the Supreme Court so the justices could weigh matters arguably critical to the nation's security. Or the panel could have followed the example of the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit--which have had cases involving the NSA's surveillance program pending for months--and refrained from issuing an opinion that could have no effect other than to insert the views of judges into the deliberations of the political branches. What to do? An administration firmly committed to preserving all surveillance tools in a world that now includes al Qaeda, Islamic State and many other terror groups, would seek a quick a review by the Supreme Court. But President Obama has already stated his willingness to end bulk collection of metadata by the government. Instead, he wants to rely on a Rube Goldberg procedure that would have the data stored and searched by the telephone companies (whose computers can be penetrated and whose employees have neither the security clearance nor the training of NSA staff). The government, under Mr. Obama's plan, would be obliged to scurry to court for permission to examine the data, and then to each telephone company in turn, with no requirement that the companies retain data and thus no guarantee that it would even be there. These constitute burdens on national security with no meaningful privacy protection. The president's plan would make protecting national security more difficult. We would all have been better off if the Second Circuit panel had avoided needless complication and instead emulated the judicial modesty of their Ninth Circuit and D.C. Circuit colleagues.", u"Mr. President, I rise while my good friend from Florida is on the floor to say that I wish I could have a magic wand with which I could collapse this time. But as he knows, under Senate rules, one Member can demand for the full 30 hours, and we are in a process like that. My hope is that there will be accommodation as we go through this because I think most Members would like to resolve this. Let me say specifically to his two points that there is a substitute amendment that has the USA FREEDOM language with two additional pieces. Those two pieces are a 6-month notification to NSA by any telecom company that intends to change its retention program. As my good friend from Florida knows, in part, trying to move a bill is making sure we move a bill that can be passed and accepted by the House of Representatives. Mandatory retention right now does not meet that threshold. But I hope they will accept this requirement of notification of any change in their retention program, as well as a DNI certification at the end of whatever the transition period is. Now, there will be a first-degree and a second-degree amendment, in addition to that, made in order and germane. The first-degree amendment will be to extend the transition period to 12 months. So we would go from 6 months--not to 2 years, as my colleague from Florida and I would prefer, and not to 18 but to 12. I think that is a happy spot for us to agree upon. Then there will be a second-degree amendment to that to address some language that is in the bill that makes it mandatory on the part of the Justice Department that they get a panel of amicus individuals. What we have heard from the Justice Department and gotten a recommendation on is that that be voluntary on the part of the courts. We will second-degree that first-degree amendment with that language provided to us by the courts. I would like to tell my colleague that by tomorrow afternoon, I hope, we can have this complete and send it to the House, and by the time we go to bed tomorrow night this might all be back in place. I remind my colleagues that any law enforcement case that was in progress is not affected by the suspension of the roving or ``lone-wolf'' provisions. They are grandfathered in so those investigations can continue. But for the 48 hours we might be closed, it means they are going to delay the start of an investigation, if in fact they need those two tools. From the standpoint of the bulk data program, it means that is frozen. It can't be queried for the period of time, but it hasn't gone away. Immediately, as we reinstitute the authorities in this program, that additional data will be brought in and the process that NSA would go through to query the data would, in fact, be available to the National Security Agency only--as is current law--once a FISA Court provides the authority for them to do it. I think there are a lot of misstatements that have been made on this floor. Let me just state for my colleagues what is collected. What is metadata? It is a telephone number, it is a date, it is the time the call was made, and it is the duration of the phone call. Now, I am not sure how we have invaded anybody's privacy by getting a telephone number that is deidentified. We don't know who it belongs to, and we would never know who it belongs to until it is turned over to law enforcement to investigate because it has now been connected to a known foreign terrorist's telephone number. Stop and think about this. The CFPB--a government agency--collects financial transactions on every American. There is nobody down here trying to eliminate the CFPB. I would love to eliminate the CFPB tomorrow. But there is no outrage over it, and they collect a ton more information that is not deidentified. It is identified. Every American has a discount card for their grocery store. You go in and you get a discount every time you use it. Your grocery store collects 20 times the amount of data the NSA does--all identified with you. There is a big difference between the NSA and your grocery store: We don't sell your data at the NSA; your grocery store does. Now, I am for outrage, but let's make it equal. Let's understand we are in a society where data is transferred automatically. The fact is, No. 1, this is a program authorized by law, overseen by the Congress--House and Senate--and the executive branch at the White House. It is a program that has never had--never, never had--a privacy violation, not one, in the time it has been in place. Now, I am all for, if the American people say this is not a function we believe government should be in--and I think that is what we have heard--and we are transferring this data over to the telecom companies, where no longer are there going to be a limited number of people who can access that information. We are going to open it up to the telecom companies to search it in some way, shape or form. Whether they are trained or untrained or how exactly they are going to do it, it is going to delay the amount of time it will take us to connect a dot to another dot.", u"Mr. President, in a few short weeks an inspirational military leader will retire after serving his country proudly for over 35 years. Today I recognize and commend Air Force Lt. Gen. Noel T. ``Tom'' Jones for his exceptional leadership and service over those 35 years, most recently as the vice commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Born to Margaret and Lem Jones, General Jones was no stranger to military service. His father was an F-4 fighter pilot in the U.S. Air Force and retired after 23 years as a lieutenant colonel. His older brother, Lem Jones, Jr., served in the U.S. Army and retired as a major. The second oldest son, Ron Jones, served as an enlisted member in the U.S. Air Force for 6 years. Finally, General Jones' younger brother, James ``Rev'' Jones, recently retired as a major general after a distinguished career as an Air Force fighter pilot as well. In fact, at one point in time, all four Jones boys were serving in the military at the same time. All told, General Jones moved around to nine different States or countries before even entering college. With a calling to serve and fly like his father, General Jones was commissioned in 1980 following graduation from the U.S. Air Force Academy with a bachelor of science degree in political science. He completed undergraduate pilot training in 1981 and began a long career flying the F-16 Fighting Falcon under the call sign ``Honez.'' During his career, he served as an instructor pilot and operations officer as well as holding numerous operational command positions. An outstanding leader throughout his distinguished career, General Jones' service has spanned the country with assignments in 12 States and across the world with tours at Torrejon Air Base, Spain, Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, Baghdad, Iraq, and Ramstein Air Base, Germany. He has commanded a fighter squadron, operations group, and a fighter wing. Additionally, General Jones commanded the 332nd Expeditionary Wing at Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base, Kuwait, during Operation Iraqi Freedom and served for a year in Iraq as the director of strategic plans and assessment for U.S. Forces-Iraq. General Jones has also held staff assignments at North American Aerospace Defense Command, Air Combat Command, and the National Security Agency. Prior to his current assignment, he was the director, operational capability requirements, deputy chief of staff for operations, plans and requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. In his current capacity, General Jones serves as the vice commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, the air component to U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command. The major command is responsible for providing full-spectrum warfighting capabilities to the combatant commanders throughout the entire area of responsibility, which encompasses 104 countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East, the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, and possesses more than a quarter of the world's population and more than a quarter of the world's gross domestic product. General Jones is a command pilot with more than 3,500 flying hours, including combat sorties over Iraq in operations Southern Watch, Desert Fox and Iraqi Freedom. His military decorations include the Air Force Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, and Bronze Star Medal, among many others. Mr. President, Lt. Gen. Tom ``Honez'' Jones epitomizes the Air Force core values of integrity, service, and excellence, and has dedicated his life to serving our Nation. I am proud to say he plans to retire with the rest of the extended Jones Family in Coushatta, LA. Today I join my colleagues in honoring his admirable service to our Nation and all the airmen, sailors, soldiers, marines, and civilians, who have served alongside him. We offer our heartfelt appreciation to Tom, his wife Debbie, and their children, Tommy and Danielle, and a hearty congratulation on his retirement from the U.S. Air Force.", u"Mr. Chair, as a senior member of the Homeland Security Committee and Ranking member of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2596, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016,'' for several reasons. I opposed the rule because Section 2 of the rule permits the House leadership to continue to be postponed through the legislative day of Thursday, July 30, 2015, further consideration of the motion to reconsider the vote by the House rejecting the Senate amendment to H.R. 1314, the ``Trade Adjustment Act of 2015.'' I do not believe it is appropriate to commingle in one rule subjects as complex, critical, and disparate as international trade policy, on the one hand, and authorization of Intelligence community programs and activities, on the other. They should be considered separately, debated separately, and voted on separately. Second, I also opposed the rule because the appropriations authorized by H.R. 2596 are predicated on a continuation of the draconian funding levels set by sequestration rather than more realistic and responsible limits to be negotiated and agreed to by the House and Senate. I agree with President Obama that prior to consideration of appropriations or annual authorization bills, the House and Senate should first reach agreement on a fair and balanced budget framework that does not harm our economy or require draconian cuts to middle-class priorities. When applied to national security information gathering, sequestration is harmful because it adversely affects the ability of the intelligence community to: provide strategic warning to decision-makers across all levels of government; improve collection technologies to exploit existing and future opportunities and increase resilience; provide cutting-edge technical analysis of counterintelligence, cyber, advanced weapons, and proliferation threats; to spur IC integration; and increase intelligence capacity by investing in critical information technologies. Third, I oppose the bill because it uses funds intended for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) in a manner that is inappropriate. By ignoring the pre-negotiated terms regarding war spending, H.R. 2596 seeks to take monies budgeted for war and defense and apply them to domestic defense while neglecting other vital non-defense priorities of the American people. Specifically, the bill uses OCO funding to circumvent budget caps in defense and intelligence spending and ignores the long-term connection between national security and economic security and fails to account for vital national security functions carried out at non-defense agencies. Finally Mr. Chair, I oppose H.R. 2596 on the merits because it contains a highly objectionable ban on the use of funds to transfer any Guantanamo detainee into the United States or construct or modify facilities in the United States to house detainees transferred from Guantanamo. Also highly objectionable is the provision in the bill providing that nothing in the statute authorizing the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board should be construed to allow that Board to gain access to information the executive branch deems to be related to covert action. Mr. Chair, in this digital information age the federal government has at its disposal a wealth of resources that enable it to record, track, and monitor the daily activities of ordinary law abiding citizens. The balance between liberty and security must be respected to preserve our way of life and the values that countless generations have fought to preserve. This includes taking precautionary measures to ensure that their lives are safe from eminent danger and terrorist threats both domestically and abroad. I have long supported effective legislation that seeks to do this such as the bipartisan USA FREEDOM Act, which imposes necessary limits on the bulk collection of telecommunication metadata on U.S. citizens by American intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency. Because I have long advocated greater diversity and inclusion in government contracting and procurement, I am pleased that H.R. 2596 includes section 334, which requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit a report to Congress regarding participation in contracting opportunities by women, minorities, veterans, and small businesses awarded by elements of the intelligence community for goods, equipment, tools, and services. There are several other provisions in the bill that I support, including provisions: allowing the Department of Energy's national laboratories to compete for homeland security grants; ensuring better understanding of FBI resource allocation against domestic and foreign threats, and the role of the FBI and DNI in countering violent extremism, particularly among young people; promoting greater oversight of the Intelligence Community's relationships with certain foreign partners; and giving intelligence support to the Ukraine. But, on balance, Mr. Chair, H.R. 2596 contains more objectionable than salutary provisions, and for that reason I cannot support the bill or the rule governing the terms of floor debate.", u" Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National IntelligenceSec. 401. Accountability reviews by the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 402. Authorities for intelligence information sharing.Sec. 403. Authorities for interagency funding.Sec. 404. Location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 405. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology.Sec. 406. Title and appointment of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 407. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 408. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 409. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.Sec. 410. National Space Intelligence Office.Sec. 411. Protection of certain files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 412. Counterintelligence initiatives for the intelligence community.Sec. 413. Applicability of the Privacy Act to the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 414. Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act to advisory committees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 415. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the In this Act: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2010 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel levels (expressed as full-time equivalent positions) as of September 30, 2010, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill __ of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number of full-time equivalent positions for fiscal year 2010 authorized by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 5 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Authority for Conversion of Activities Performed by Contract Personnel.-- (1) In general.--In addition to the authority in subsection (a) and subject to paragraph (2), if the head of an element of the intelligence community makes a determination that activities currently being performed by contract personnel should be performed by employees of such element, the Director of National Intelligence, in order to reduce a comparable number of contract personnel, may authorize for that purpose employment of additional full-time equivalent personnel in such element equal to the number of full-time equivalent contract personnel performing such activities. (2) Concurrence and approval.--The authority described in paragraph (1) may not be exercised unless the Director of National Intelligence concurs with the determination described in such paragraph. (c) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in-- (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program; (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or (3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training. (d) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to the initial exercise of an authority described in subsection (a) or (b). (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2010 the sum of $786,812,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2011. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 792 full-time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2010. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available to the Director of National Intelligence under section 103 are also available to the Director for the adjustment of personnel levels within the Intelligence Community Management Account. (d) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2010 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2011. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2010, there are authorized such additional full-time equivalent personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2010 the sum of $290,900,000. Subparagraph (A) of section 235(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``receiving compensation under the Senior Intelligence Service pay schedule at the rate'' and inserting ``who is at the Senior Intelligence Service rank''. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h) and section 904(g)(2) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c(g)(2)) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, an officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces may be detailed to the staff of an element of the intelligence community funded through the National Intelligence Program from another element of the intelligence community or from another element of the United States Government on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, as jointly agreed to by the head of the receiving element and the head of the detailing element (or the designees of such officials), for a period not to exceed 3 years. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsections: ``(s) Authority To Establish Positions in Excepted Service.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence may, with the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned and in coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management-- ``(A) convert competitive service positions, and the incumbents of such positions, within an element of the intelligence community to excepted service positions as the Director of National Intelligence determines necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element; and ``(B) establish the classification and ranges of rates of basic pay for positions so converted, notwithstanding otherwise applicable laws governing the classification and rates of basic pay for such positions. ``(2)(A) At the request of the Director of National Intelligence, the head of a department or agency may establish new positions in the excepted service within an element of such department or agency that is part of the intelligence community if the Director determines that such positions are necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element. ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence may establish the classification and ranges of rates of basic pay for any position established under subparagraph (A), notwithstanding otherwise applicable laws governing the classification and rates of basic pay for such positions. ``(3) The head of the department or agency concerned is authorized to appoint individuals for service in positions converted under paragraph (1) or established under paragraph (2) without regard to the provisions of chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and to fix the compensation of such individuals within the applicable ranges of rates of basic pay established by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(4) The maximum rate of basic pay established under this subsection is the rate for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code. ``(5) Not later than 60 days prior to the date that Director of National Intelligence will convert a position under paragraph (1) or establish a position under paragraph (2), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notification of such conversion or establishment. ``(t) Pay Authority for Critical Positions.--(1) Notwithstanding any pay limitation established under any other provision of law applicable to employees in elements of the intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence may, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, grant authority to fix the rate of basic pay for 1 or more positions within the intelligence community at a rate in excess of any applicable limitation, subject to the provisions of this subsection. The exercise of authority so granted is at the discretion of the head of the department or agency employing the individual in a position covered by such authority, subject to the provisions of this subsection and any conditions established by the Director of National Intelligence when granting such authority. ``(2) Authority under this subsection may be granted or exercised only-- ``(A) with respect to a position which requires an extremely high level of expertise and is critical to successful accomplishment of an important mission; and ``(B) to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an individual exceptionally well qualified for the position. ``(3) A rate of basic pay may not be fixed under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written approval of the Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by law. ``(4) A rate of basic pay may not be fixed under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate payable for level I of the Executive Schedule under section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written approval of the President in response to a request by the Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by law. ``(5) Any grant of authority under this subsection for a position shall terminate at the discretion of the Director of National Intelligence. ``(6) The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of any grant or exercise of authority under this subsection. ``(u) Extension of Flexible Personnel Management Authorities.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in order to ensure the equitable treatment of employees across the intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence may, with the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned, or for those matters that fall under the responsibilities of the Office of Personnel Management under statute or executive order, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, authorize 1 or more elements of the intelligence community to adopt compensation authority, performance management authority, and scholarship authority that have been authorized for another element of the intelligence community if the Director of National Intelligence-- ``(A) determines that the adoption of such authority would improve the management and performance of the intelligence community; and ``(B) submits to the congressional intelligence committees, not later than 60 days before such authority is to take effect, notice of the adoption of such authority by such element or elements, including the authority to be so adopted, and an estimate of the costs associated with the adoption of such authority. ``(2) To the extent that an existing compensation authority within the intelligence community is limited to a particular category of employees or a particular situation, the authority may be adopted in another element of the intelligence community under this subsection only for employees in an equivalent category or in an equivalent situation. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `compensation authority' means authority involving basic pay (including position classification), premium pay, awards, bonuses, incentives, allowances, differentials, student loan repayments, and special payments, but does not include authorities as follows: ``(A) Authorities related to benefits such as leave, severance pay, retirement, and insurance. ``(B) Authority to grant a rank award by the President under section 4507, 4507a, or 3151(c) of title 5, United States Code, or any other provision of law. ``(C) Compensation authorities and performance management authorities provided under provisions of law relating to the Senior Executive Service.''. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 303, is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(v) Award of Rank to Members of the Senior National Intelligence Service.--The President, based on the recommendations of the Director of National Intelligence, may award ranks to members of the Senior National Intelligence Service and other intelligence community senior civilian officers not already covered by such a rank award program in a manner consistent with the provisions of section 4507 of title 5, United States Code. The award of such rank shall be made per the direction of the Director of National Intelligence and in a manner consistent with the provisions of such section 4507.''. (a) Assessment.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506A the following new section: (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) In 2009, eight years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the intelligence community continues to lack an adequate supply of personnel trained in critical foreign languages. (2) A number of elements of the intelligence community are attempting to address that lack of supply by recruiting applicants who can speak, read, and understand critical foreign languages. (3) Leaders in the intelligence community have recognized that improved recruiting practices are only a partial solution and that improved language training for current intelligence community employees is also necessary. (4) While language education and instruction provides long- term benefits for both intelligence agencies and individual employees, it has short-term costs for supervisors whose staff are absent due to language training and could provide supervisors with an incentive to resist allowing individual employees to pursue language training. (5) If the head of an element of the intelligence community was able to increase the number of personnel at that element during the period that an employee is participating in language training, that element would not have to sacrifice short-term priorities to address language training needs. (6) The Director of National Intelligence is uniquely situated to evaluate language training needs across the intelligence community and assess whether that training would be enhanced if elements of the intelligence community were given temporary additional personnel authorizations. (7) The intelligence community has a difficult time finding, training, and providing security clearances to native foreign language speakers who are able to serve as translators and it would be beneficial if all elements of the intelligence community were able to harness the capabilities of these individuals. (8) The Director of National Intelligence is uniquely situated to identify translators within the intelligence community and provide for their temporary transfer from one element of the intelligence community to another element. (b) Temporary Personnel Authorizations.-- (1) Authorized additional ftes.--In addition to the number of full-time equivalent positions authorized for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a fiscal year, there is authorized for such Office for each fiscal year an additional 100 full-time equivalent positions that may be utilized only for the purposes described in paragraph (2). (2) Purposes.--The Director of National Intelligence may use a full-time equivalent position authorized under paragraph (1) only for the purposes of providing a temporary transfer of personnel made pursuant to the authority in section 102A(e)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(e)(2)) to an element of the intelligence community to enable such element to increase its total authorized number of personnel, on a temporary basis-- (A) during a period in which a permanent employee of such element is absent to participate in critical language training; or (B) to accept a permanent employee of another element of the intelligence community to provide language-capable services a temporary basis. (c) Inapplicability of Other Law.--Subparagraph (B) of section 102A(e)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(e)(2)) shall not apply to a transfer of personnel authorizations made under this section. (d) Reporting Requirements.-- (1) Report to the director of national intelligence.--An element of the intelligence community that receives a temporary transfer of personnel authorized under subsection (b) shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence a report on such transfer that includes the length of time of the temporary transfer and which critical language need of such element was fulfilled or partially fulfilled by the transfer. (2) Annual report to congress.--The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on this section. Each such report shall include a description of-- (A) the number of transfers of personnel made by the Director pursuant to subsection (b), disaggregated by each element of the intelligence community; (B) the critical language that needs were fulfilled or partially fulfilled through the use of such transfers; and (C) the cost to carry out subsection (b). (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 318 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 441g note) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Pilot Program'' and inserting ``In General''; (2) in paragraph (1)-- (A) by striking ``pilot''; and (B) by inserting ``, acquisition, scientific, and technical, or other'' after ``analytic'' in both places that term appears; (3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``pilot''; and (4) in paragraph (3), by striking ``pilot''. (b) Elements.--Subsection (b) of section 318 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 411g note) is amended-- (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``pilot''; (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``analysts'' and inserting ``professionals''; and (3) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, acquisition, scientific, and technical, or other'' after ``analytic''. (c) Permanent Authorization.--Section 318 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 411g note) is amended by striking subsections (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g). (d) Use of Funds.--Section 318 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 411g note), as amended by subsection (c), is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(c) Use of Funds.--Funds made available for the program may be used for the following purposes: ``(1) To provide a monthly stipend for each month that the individual is pursing a course of study described in subsection (a). ``(2) To pay such individual's full tuition to permit the individual to complete such a course of study. ``(3) To provide an allowance for books and materials that such individual requires to complete such a course of study. ``(4) To pay such individual's expenses for travel as requested by an element of the intelligence community related to the program.''. (e) Conforming Amendments.-- (1) Section heading.--The section heading of section 318 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2613) is amended to read as follows: (a) Expansion of the Louis Stokes Educational Scholarship Program to Graduate Students.--Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by inserting ``and graduate'' after ``undergraduate''; and (B) by striking ``the baccalaureate'' and inserting ``a baccalaureate or graduate''; (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``or graduate'' after ``undergraduate''; (3) in subsection (e)(2), by inserting ``and graduate'' after ``undergraduate''; and (4) by adding at the end ``Such program shall be known as the Louis Stokes Educational Scholarship Program.''. (b) Authority for Participation by Individuals Who Are Not Employed by the Federal Government.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (b) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by subsection (a)(2), is further amended by striking ``civilian employees'' and inserting ``civilians who may or may not be employees''. (2) Replacement of the term ``employee''.--Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by subsection (a), is further amended-- (A) in subsection (c), by striking ``employees'' and inserting ``program participants''; (B) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (1)-- (I) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), strike ``an employee of the Agency'' and insert ``a program participant''; (II) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``employee'' and inserting ``program participant''; (III) in subparagraph (C)-- (aa) by striking ``employee'' each place that term appears and inserting ``program participant''; and (bb) by striking ``employee's'' each place that term appears and inserting ``program participant's''; and (IV) in subparagraph (D)-- (aa) by striking ``employee'' each place that term appears and inserting ``program participant''; and (bb) by striking ``employee's'' each place that term appears and inserting ``program participant's''; and (ii) in paragraph (3)(C)-- (I) by striking ``employee'' both places that term appears and inserting ``program participant''; and (II) by striking ``employee's'' and inserting ``program participant's''; and (C) in subsection (e)(1), by striking ``employee'' and inserting ``program participant''. (c) Termination of Program Participants.--Subsection (d)(1)(C) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by subsection (b)(2)(B)(i)(III), is further amended by striking ``terminated'' and all that follows and inserting ``terminated-- ``(i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the program participant; ``(ii) by the program participant voluntarily; or ``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the program participant to maintain such level of academic standing in the educational course of training as the Director of the National Security Agency shall have specified in the agreement of the program participant under this subsection; and''. (d) Authority To Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With NSA.--Subsection (e) of Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''. (e) Authority of Elements of the Intelligence Community to Establish a Stokes Educational Scholarship Program.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by sections 303 and 304, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(w) Educational Scholarship Program.--The head of a department or agency containing an element of the intelligence community may establish an undergraduate or graduate training program with respect to civilian employees and prospective civilian employees of such element similar in purpose, conditions, content, and administration to the program which the Secretary of Defense is authorized to establish under section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) for civilian employees of the National Security Agency.''. (a) Authority.--The Director may carry out, or may authorize the head of an element of the intelligence community to carry out, programs in accordance with this section for the purposes described in subsection (c). (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Director.--The term ``Director'' means ``the Director of National Intelligence''. (2) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the term in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 (a) Review.-- (1) Requirement for review.--The Director of National Intelligence shall review the programs described in paragraph (2) to determine if such programs-- (A) meet the needs of the intelligence community to prepare, recruit, and retain a skilled and diverse workforce; (B) should be combined or otherwise integrated; and (C) constitute all the education programs carried out by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community and, if not, whether other such educational programs could be combined or otherwise integrated with the programs described in paragraph (a) Vulnerability Assessments of Major Systems.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 305 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506B, as added by section 305(a), the following new section: (a) Intelligence Community Business System Transformation.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by sections 305 and 321 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506C, as added by section 321(a), the following new section: (a) Reports.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by sections 305, 321, and 322 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506D, as added by section 322(a)(1), the following new section: (a) Notification.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by sections 305, 321, 322, and 323 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506E, as added by section 323(a), the following new section: (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by sections 305, 321, 322, 323, and 324 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506F, as added by section 324(a), the following new section: Subsection (n) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(4)(A) In addition to the authority referred to in paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the head of an element of the intelligence community to exercise an acquisition authority referred to in section 3 or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)) for an acquisition by such element that is more than 50 percent funded by the National Intelligence Program. ``(B) The head of an element of the intelligence community may not exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) until-- ``(i) the head of such element (without delegation) submits to the Director of National Intelligence a written request that includes-- ``(I) a description of such authority requested to be exercised; ``(II) an explanation of the need for such authority, including an explanation of the reasons that other authorities are insufficient; and ``(III) a certification that the mission of such element would be-- ``(aa) impaired if such authority is not exercised; or ``(bb) significantly and measurably enhanced if such authority is exercised; and ``(ii) the Director of National Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or a Deputy Director of National Intelligence designated by the Director or the Principal Director issues a written authorization that includes-- ``(I) a description of the authority referred to in subparagraph (A) that is authorized to be exercised; and ``(II) a justification to support the exercise of such authority. ``(C) A request and authorization to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) may be made with respect to individual acquisitions or with respect to a specific class of acquisitions described in the request and authorization referred to in subparagraph (B). ``(D)(i) A request from a head of an element of the intelligence community located within one of the departments described in clause (ii) to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence in accordance with any procedures established by the head of such department. ``(ii) The departments described in this clause are the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury. ``(E)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community may not be authorized to utilize an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for a class of acquisitions for a period of more than 3 years, except that the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the use of such an authority for not more than 6 years. ``(ii) Each such authorizations may be extended for successive 3- or 6-year periods, in accordance with requirements of subparagraph (B). ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit-- ``(i) to the congressional intelligence committees a notification of an authorization to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) or an extension of such authorization that includes the written authorization referred to in subparagraph (B)(ii); and ``(ii) to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget a notification of an authorization to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for an acquisition or class of acquisitions that will exceed $50,000,000 annually. ``(G) Requests and authorizations to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) shall remain available within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a period of at least 6 years following the date of such request or authorization. ``(H) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to alter or otherwise limit the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency to independently exercise an authority under section 3 or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)).''. Section 501(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(a)) is amended by inserting at the end the following: ``(3) There shall be no exception to the requirements in this title to inform the congressional intelligence committees of all intelligence activities and covert actions.''. (a) Notice on Information Not Disclosed.-- (1) In general.--Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended-- (A) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and (B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following: ``(b) Notice on Information Not Disclosed.--(1) If the Director of National Intelligence or the head of a department, agency, or other entity of the United States Government does not provide information required by subsection (a) in full or to all the members of the congressional intelligence committees and requests that such information not be so provided, the Director shall, in a timely fashion, notify such committees of the determination not to provide such information in full or to all members of such committees. Such notice shall-- ``(A) be submitted in writing in a classified form; ``(B) include-- ``(i) a statement of the reasons for such determination; and ``(ii) a description that provides the main features of the intelligence activities covered by such determination; and ``(C) contain no restriction on access to such notice by all members of the committee. ``(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as authorizing less than full and current disclosure to all the members of the congressional intelligence committees of any information necessary to keep all such members fully and currently informed on all intelligence activities described in subsection (a).''. (2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (d) of such section, as redesignated by paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection, is amended by striking ``subsection (b)'' and inserting ``subsections (b) and (c)''. (b) Reports and Notice on Covert Actions.-- (1) Form and content of certain reports.--Subsection (b) of section 503 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended-- (A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; (B) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and (C) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) Any information relating to a covert action that is submitted to the congressional intelligence committees for the purposes of paragraph (1) shall be in writing and shall contain the following: ``(A) A concise statement of any facts pertinent to such covert action. ``(B) An explanation of the significance of such covert action.''. (2) Notice on information not disclosed.--Subsection (c) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(5) If the Director of National Intelligence or the head of a department, agency, or other entity of the United States Government does not provide information required by subsection (b) in full or to all the members of the congressional intelligence committees, and requests that such information not be so provided, the Director shall, in a timely fashion, notify such committees of the determination not to provide such information in full or to all members of such committees. Such notice shall-- ``(A) be submitted in writing in a classified form; ``(B) include-- ``(i) a statement of the reasons for such determination; and ``(ii) a description that provides the main features of the covert action covered by such determination; and ``(C) contain no restriction on access to such notice by all members of the committee.''. (3) Modification of nature of change of covert action triggering notice requirements.--Subsection (d) of such section is amended by striking ``significant'' the first place that term appears. (a) General Intelligence Activities.--Section 501(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.413(a)), as amended by section 331, is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(4) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees the legal authority under which the intelligence activity is or was conducted.''. (b) Actions Other Than Covert Actions.--Section 502(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)(2)) is amended by striking ``activities,'' and inserting ``activities (including the legal authority under which an intelligence activity is or was conducted),''. (c) Covert Actions.--Paragraph (1)(B) of section 503(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(b)), as redesignated by section 332 (b)(1), is amended by inserting ``(including the legal authority under which a covert action is or was conducted)'' after ``concerning covert actions''. Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting ``the congressional intelligence committees have been fully and currently informed of such activity and if'' after ``only if''; (2) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively; and (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following: ``(b) In any case in which notice to the congressional intelligence committees of an intelligence or intelligence- related activity is covered by section 502(b), or in which notice to the congressional intelligence committees on a covert action is covered by section 503(c)(5), the congressional intelligence committees shall be treated as being fully and currently informed on such activity or covert action, as the case may be, for purposes of subsection (a) if the requirements of such section 502(b) or 503(c)(5), as applicable, have been met.''. (a) In General.--Chapter 35 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 3523 the following: (a) Report Required.--Not later than December 1, 2009, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report on all measures taken by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and by each element, if any, of the intelligence community with relevant responsibilities to comply with the provisions of applicable law, international obligations, and executive orders relating to the detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence community, including the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of division A of Public Law 109-148; 119 Stat. 2739), related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-366; 120 Stat. 2600), common Article 3, the Convention Against Torture, Executive Order 13491 (74 Fed. Reg. 4893; relating to ensuring lawful interrogations), and Executive Order 13493 (74 Fed. Reg. 4901; relating to detention policy options). (b) Definitions.--In this Act: (1) Common article 3.--The term ``common Article 3'' means Article 3 of each of the Geneva Conventions. (2) Convention against torture.--The term ``Convention Against Torture'' means the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, done at New York on December 10, 1984. (3) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of National Intelligence. (4) Geneva conventions.--The term ``Geneva Conventions'' means the following: (A) The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114). (B) The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217). (C) The Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316). (D) The Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST In addition to the reports required by section 319 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-32) and on the schedule required for such reports, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report outlining the Director's assessment of the suitability for release or transfer for detainees previously released or transferred, or to be released or transferred, from the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to the United States or any other country. Each such report shall include-- (1) a description of any objection to the release or recommendation against the release of such an individual made by any element of the intelligence community that determined the potential threat posed by a particular individual warranted the individual's continued detention; (2) a detailed description of the intelligence information that led to such an objection or determination; (3) if an element of the intelligence community previously recommended against the release of such an individual and later retracted that recommendation, a detailed explanation of the reasoning for the retraction; and (4) an assessment of lessons learned from previous releases and transfers of individuals for whom the intelligence community objected or recommended against release. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to United States citizens for the service of such citizens prior to 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated company during a period when Air America or the associated company was owned or controlled by the United States Government and operated or managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Air america.--The term ``Air America'' means Air America, Incorporated. (2) Associated company.--The term ``associated company'' means any entity associated with, predecessor to, or subsidiary to Air America, including Air Asia Company Limited, CAT Incorporated, Civil Air Transport Company Limited, and the Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport during the period when such an entity was owned and controlled by the United States Government. (c) Report Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) The history of Air America and the associated companies prior to 1977, including a description of-- (A) the relationship between Air America and the associated companies and the Central Intelligence Agency or other elements of the United States Government; (B) the workforce of Air America and the associated companies; (C) the missions performed by Air America, the associated companies, and their employees for the United States; and (D) the casualties suffered by employees of Air America and the associated companies in the course of their employment. (2) A description of-- (A) the retirement benefits contracted for, or promised to, the employees of Air America and the associated companies prior to 1977; (B) the contributions made by such employees for such benefits; (C) the retirement benefits actually paid to such employees; (D) the entitlement of such employees to the payment of future retirement benefits; and (E) the likelihood that former employees of such companies will receive any future retirement benefits. (3) An assessment of the difference between-- (A) the retirement benefits that former employees of Air America and the associated companies have received or will receive by virtue of their employment with Air America and the associated companies; and (B) the retirement benefits that such employees would have received or be eligible to receive if such employment was deemed to be employment by the United States Government and their service during such employment was credited as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits. (4)(A) Any recommendations regarding the advisability of legislative action to treat such employment as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in light of the relationship between Air America and the associated companies and the United States Government and the services and sacrifices of such employees to and for the United States. (B) If legislative action is considered advisable under subparagraph (A), a proposal for such action and an assessment of its costs. (5) The opinions of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, if any, on the matters covered by the report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate. (d) Assistance of Comptroller General.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall, upon the request of the Director of National Intelligence and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information, assist the Director in the preparation of the report required by subsection (a). (e) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on-- (1) the intelligence collection efforts of the United States dedicated to assessing the threat from biological weapons from state, non-state, or rogue actors, either foreign or domestic; and (2) efforts to protect the United States biodefense knowledge and infrastructure. (b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include-- (1) an accurate assessment of the intelligence collection efforts of the United States dedicated to detecting the development or use of biological weapons by state, non-state, or rogue actors, either foreign or domestic; (2) detailed information on fiscal, human, technical, open source, and other intelligence collection resources of the United States dedicated for use against biological weapons; (3) an assessment of any problems that may reduce the overall effectiveness of United States intelligence collection and analysis to identify and protect biological weapons targets, including-- (A) intelligence collection gaps or inefficiencies; (B) inadequate information sharing practices; or (C) inadequate cooperation among agencies or departments of the United States; (4) a strategic plan prepared by the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, that provides for actions for the appropriate elements of the intelligence community to close important intelligence gaps related to biological weapons; (5) a description of appropriate goals, schedules, milestones, or metrics to measure the long-term effectiveness of actions implemented to carry out the plan described in paragraph (4); and (6) any long-term resource and human capital issues related to the collection of intelligence regarding biological weapons, including any recommendations to address shortfalls of experienced and qualified staff possessing relevant scientific, language, and technical skills. (c) Implementation of Strategic Plan.--Not later than 30 days after the date that the Director of National Intelligence submits the report required by subsection (a), the Director shall begin implementation of the strategic plan referred to in subsection (b)(4). (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Cybersecurity program.--The term ``cybersecurity program'' means a class or collection of similar cybersecurity operations of an agency or department of the United States that involves personally identifiable data that is-- (A) screened by a cybersecurity system outside of the agency or department of the United States that was the intended recipient; (B) transferred, for the purpose of cybersecurity, outside the agency or department of the United States that was the intended recipient; or (C) transferred, for the purpose of cybersecurity, to an element of the intelligence community. (2) National cyber investigative joint task force.--The term ``National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force'' means the multi-agency cyber investigation coordination organization overseen by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation known as the Nation Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force that coordinates, integrates, and provides pertinent information related to cybersecurity investigations. (3) Critical infrastructure.--The term ``critical infrastructure'' has the meaning given that term in section 1016 of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 5195c). (b) Notification of Cybersecurity Programs.-- (1) Requirement for notification.-- (A) Existing programs.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a notification for each cybersecurity program in operation on such date that includes the documentation referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (a) Annual Report on Intelligence.-- (1) Repeal.--Section 109 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404d) is repealed. (2) Table of contents amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item relating to section 109. (b) Annual and Special Reports on Intelligence Sharing With the United Nations.--Section 112 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (b); and (2) by redesignating subsections (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively. (c) Annual Report on Progress in Auditable Financial Statements.-- (1) Repeal.--Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is repealed. (2) Table of contents amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item relating to section 114A. (d) Elimination of Reporting Requirement on Financial Intelligence on Terrorist Assets.-- (1) In general.--Section 118 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404m) is amended-- (A) in the section heading, by striking ``SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON'' and inserting ``EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION REGARDING''; (B) by striking subsection (a); (C) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (a); (D) by striking subsection (c); and (E) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (b). (2) Table of contents amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item related to section 118 and inserting the following:``Sec. 118. Emergency notification regarding financial intelligence on terrorist assets.''. (e) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence Initiatives.--Section 1102(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(1)''; and (2) by striking paragraph (2). (f) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (d); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively. (g) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.-- Section 826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873 note) is repealed. (h) Biennial Report on Foreign Industrial Espionage.-- Subsection (b) of section 809 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170b) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Annual Update'' and inserting ``Biennial Report''; (2) by striking paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting the following: ``(1) Requirement to submit.--Not later than February 1, 2010 and once every two years thereafter, the President shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and congressional leadership a report updating the information referred to in subsection (a) (1) (D) not later than February 1, 2010 and every two years thereafter.''; and (3) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2). (i) Conforming Amendments.--Section 507(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b(a)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B); and (B) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) through (N) as subparagraphs (A) through (L), respectively; and (2) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraph (D). Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head of such element certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods. ``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who shall keep a record of such information. ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `element of the intelligence community' means an element of the intelligence community listed in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''. Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows: ``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and''. (a) In General.--Paragraph (3) of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B), as amended by section 353, by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (C), by adding ``and'' at the end; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(D) the making available of such funds for such activity complies with the requirements in subsection (d);''. (b) Procedures.--Such section 504 is further amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), as redesignated by section 334(2), as subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection (c): ``(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), if following a notice of intent to make funds available for a different activity under subsection (a)(3)(C) one of the congressional intelligence committees submits to the element of the intelligence community that will carry out such activity a request for additional information on such activity, such funds may not be made available for such activity under subsection (a)(3) until such date, up to 90 days after the date of such request, as specified by such congressional intelligence committee. ``(2) The President may waive the requirements of paragraph (1) and make funds available for an element of the intelligence community to carry out a different activity under subsection (a)(3) if the President submits to the congressional intelligence committees a certification providing that-- ``(A) the use of such funds for such activity is necessary to fulfill an urgent operational requirement, excluding a cost overrun on the acquisition of a major system, of an element of the intelligence community; and ``(B) such waiver is necessary so that an element of the intelligence community may carry out such activity prior to the date that funds would be made available under paragraph (a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover Intelligence Officers and Agents.-- (1) Disclosure of agent after access to information identifying agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''. (2) Disclosure of agent after access to classified information.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking ``five years'' and inserting ``10 years''. (b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of Intelligence Identities.--The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by inserting ``including an assessment of the need for any modification of this title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert agents,'' after ``measures to protect the identities of covert agents,''. (a) Finding.--Congress finds that the Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the ``9/11 Commission'') recommended that ``the overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret'' and that ``Congress should pass a separate appropriations act for intelligence, defending the broad allocation of how these tens of billions of dollars have been assigned among the varieties of intelligence work.''. (b) National Intelligence Program Budget Request.--Section 601 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 415c) is amended by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following: ``(b) Budget Request.--On the date that the President submits to Congress the budget for a fiscal year required under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the President shall disclose to the public the aggregate amount of appropriations requested for that fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program.''. Paragraph (5) of section 703(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 435 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``jurisdiction,'' and inserting ``jurisdiction or by a member of the committee of jurisdiction,''; and (2) by inserting ``, evaluate the proper classification of certain records,'' after ``certain records''. Paragraph (1) of section 102(b) of the Department of Justice and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102-395; 28 U.S.C. 533 note) is amended in the flush text following subparagraph (D) by striking ``(or, if designated by the Director, the Assistant Director, Intelligence Division) and the Attorney General (or, if designated by the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security)'' and inserting ``(or a designee of the Director who is in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director in the National Security Branch or a similar successor position) and the Attorney General (or a designee of the Attorney General who is in the National Security Division in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Attorney General or a similar successor position)''. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Covered element of the intelligence community.--The term ``covered element of the intelligence community'' means-- (A) the Central Intelligence Agency; (B) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (C) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (D) the National Reconnaissance Office; or (E) the National Security Agency. (2) Independent auditor.--The term ``independent auditor'' means an individual who-- (A)(i) is a Federal, State, or local government auditor who meets the independence standards included in generally accepted government auditing standards; or (ii) is a public accountant who meets such independence standards; and (B) is designated as an auditor by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of a covered element of the intelligence community, as appropriate. (3) Long-standing, correctable material weakness.--The term ``long-standing, correctable material weakness'' means a material weakness-- (A) that was first reported in the annual financial report of a covered element of the intelligence community for a fiscal year prior to fiscal year 2007; and (B) the correction of which is not substantially dependent on a business system that will not be implemented prior to the end of fiscal year 2010. (4) Material weakness.--The term ``material weakness'' has the meaning given that term under the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123, entitled ``Management's Responsibility for Internal Control,'' revised December 21, ", u" Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence (a) Responsibility of the Director of National Intelligence.--Subsection (b) of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in paragraph (3)-- (A) by striking ``2004,'' and inserting ``2004 (Public Law 108-458; 50 U.S.C. 403 note),''; and (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) conduct accountability reviews of elements of the intelligence community and the personnel of such elements, if appropriate.''. (b) Tasking and Other Authorities.--Subsection (f) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8) as paragraphs (8) and (9), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph: ``(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a congressional intelligence committee, conduct an accountability review of an element of the intelligence community or the personnel of such element in relation to a failure or deficiency within the intelligence community. ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and procedures for conducting an accountability review under subparagraph (A). ``(C)(i) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide the findings of an accountability review conducted under subparagraph (A) and the Director's recommendations for corrective or punitive action, if any, to the head of the applicable element of the intelligence community. Such recommendations may include a recommendation for dismissal of personnel. ``(ii) If the head of such element does not implement a recommendation made by the Director under clause (i), the head of such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notice of the determination not to implement the recommendation, including the reasons for the determination. ``(D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (a) Authorities for Interagency Funding.--Section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (F), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: ``(G) in carrying out this subsection, without regard to any other provision of law (other than this Act and the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643)), expend funds and make funds available to other departments or agencies of the United States for, and direct the development and fielding of, systems of common concern related to the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information; and ``(H) for purposes of addressing critical gaps in intelligence information sharing or access capabilities, have the authority to transfer funds appropriated for a program within the National Intelligence Program to a program funded by appropriations not within the National Intelligence Program, consistent with paragraphs (3) through (7) of subsection (d).''. (b) Authorities of Heads of Other Departments and Agencies.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of any department or agency of the United States is authorized to receive and utilize funds made available to the department or agency by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)), as amended by subsection (a), and receive and utilize any system referred to in such section that is made available to the department or agency. (c) Reports.-- (1) Requirement for reports.--Not later than February 1 of each of the fiscal years 2011 through 2014, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report detailing the distribution of funds and systems during the preceding fiscal year pursuant to subparagraph (G) or (H) of section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)), as added by subsection (a). (2) Content.--Each such report shall include-- (A) a listing of the agencies or departments to which such funds or systems were distributed; (B) a description of the purpose for which such funds or systems were distributed; and (C) a description of the expenditure of such funds, and the development, fielding, and use of such systems by the receiving agency or department. (a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by sections 303, 304, and 312, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(x) Authorities for Interagency Funding.--(1) Notwithstanding section 1346 of title 31, United States Code, or any other provision of law prohibiting the interagency financing of activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B), upon the request of the Director of National Intelligence, any element of the intelligence community may use appropriated funds to support or participate in the interagency activities of the following: ``(A) National intelligence centers established by the Director under section 119B. ``(B) Boards, commissions, councils, committees, and similar groups that are established-- ``(i) for a term of not more than 2 years; and ``(ii) by the Director. ``(2) No provision of law enacted after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 shall be construed to limit or supersede the authority in paragraph (1) unless such provision makes specific reference to the authority in that paragraph.''. (b) Reports.--Not later than February 1 of each fiscal year 2011 through 2014, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report detailing the exercise of any authority pursuant to subsection (x) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as added by subsection (a), during the preceding fiscal year. Subsection (e) of section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3) is amended to read as follows: ``(e) Location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.--The headquarters of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may be located in the Washington metropolitan region, as that term is defined in section 8301 of title 40, United States Code.''. (a) In General.--Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7); (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end; and (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following: ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for basic, applied, and advanced research to meet the technology needs of the intelligence community and to be executed by elements of the intelligence community by-- ``(A) systematically identifying, assessing, and prioritizing the most significant intelligence challenges that require technical solutions; and ``(B) examining options to enhance the responsiveness of research programs; ``(6) submit to Congress an annual report on the science and technology strategy of the Director; and''; and (2) in paragraph (3) of subsection (d)-- (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as subparagraphs (B) and (C), respectively; (B) in subparagraph (B), as so redesignated, by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate''; and (C) by inserting before subparagraph (B), as so redesignated, the following new subparagraph: ``(A) identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence community;''. (b) Sense of Congress on Supervision of the Director of Science and Technology.--It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Science and Technology of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence should report only to a member of such Office who is appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate. Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (B) by striking ``President,'' and all that follows and inserting ``President.''; (2) by striking subsection (b) and redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (b) and (c), respectively; (3) in subsection (b) (as so redesignated), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (4) in subsection (c) (as so redesignated), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'' the first place it appears. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103G the following new section: (a) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 407 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 103H, as added by section 407(a)(1), the following new section: (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting the following: ``(a) In General.-- ``(1) Establishment.--The''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403- 3(c)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (14); and (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraphs: ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. ``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center. ``(13) The Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community''. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) In General.--Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:``protection of certain files of the office of the director of national Section 1102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking paragraph (2); and (B) by striking ``(1) In'' and inserting ``In''; and (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) by striking paragraph (2); and (B) by striking ``(1) The'' and inserting ``The''. Subsection (j) of section 552a of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or''; (2) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and (3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph: ``(2) maintained by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; or''. (a) In General.--Section 4(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or''; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Annual Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall each submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on advisory committees created by each such Director. Each report shall include-- (1) a description of each such advisory committee, including the subject matter of the committee; and (2) a list of members of each such advisory committee. Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the Director's designee.''. (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), respectively; and (3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking paragraphs (3) and (4). (b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further amended-- (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''. (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except with the written permission of the Director of National Intelligence, or a designee of the Director, knowingly use the words ``Office of the Director of National Intelligence'', the initials ``ODNI'', the seal of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or any colorable imitation of such words, initials, or seal in connection with any merchandise, impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the Director of National Intelligence. (b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that any person is engaged or is about to engage in an act or practice which constitutes or will constitute conduct prohibited by subsection (a), the Attorney General may initiate a civil proceeding in a district court of the United States to enjoin such act or practice. Such court shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination of such action and may, at any time before final determination, enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other action as is warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to any person or class of persons for whose protection the action is brought. Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the protection''; and (2) by inserting before the semicolon the following: ``, and the protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate''. Section 8(d) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 U.S.C. 607(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``Notwithstanding any other provision of this section and any other provision of law, an appeal from a decision of a contracting officer of the Central Intelligence Agency relative to a contract made by that agency may be filed with whichever of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals is specified in the contract as the Board to which such an appeal may be made; and the Board so specified shall have jurisdiction to decide that appeal.''. (a) Establishment and Duties of the Position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 104A the following: Subsection (b) of section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k) is amended by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, who may delegate such authority to other appropriate officials of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (a) Appointment and Qualifications of the Inspector General.--Paragraph (1) of section 17(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)) is amended by striking the second and third sentence and inserting ``This appointment shall be made without regard to political affiliation and shall be on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigation. Such appointment shall also be made on the basis of compliance with the security standards of the Agency and prior experience in the field of foreign intelligence.''. (b) Removal of the Inspector General.--Paragraph (6) of section 17(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``immediately''; and (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of such removal.''. (c) Application of Semiannual Reporting Requirements With Respect to Review Reports.--Paragraph (1) of section 17(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by inserting ``review,'' after ``investigation,''. (d) Protection Against Reprisals.--Subparagraph (B) of section 17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(3)) is amended by inserting ``or providing such information'' after ``making such complaint''. (e) Inspector General Subpoena Power.--Subparagraph (A) of section 17(e)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(5)) is amended by inserting ``in any medium (including electronically stored information or any tangible thing)'' after ``other data''. (f) Other Administrative Authorities.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (e) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (8) as subparagraph (9); (B) in paragraph (9), as so redesignated-- (i) by striking ``Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the'' and inserting ``The''; and (ii) by adding at the end ``Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources allocated by the Director, the Inspector General has final approval of-- ``(A) the selection of internal and external candidates for employment with the Office of Inspector General; and ``(B) all other personnel decisions concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General, including selection and appointment to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all security based determinations that are not within the authority of a head of other Central Intelligence Agency offices.''; and (C) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following: ``(8) The Inspector General shall-- ``(A) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who shall report to the Inspector General; or ``(B) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and directly reporting to another Inspector General or the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on a reimbursable basis.''. (2) Construction.--Nothing in the amendment made by paragraph (1)(C) shall be construed to alter the duties and responsibilities of the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Counsel to the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency appointed pursuant to section 17(e)(8) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as added by such paragraph, shall perform the functions as such Inspector General may prescribe. Subsection (f) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``Beginning''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General shall transmit a budget estimate and request through the Director to the Director of National Intelligence that specifies for such fiscal year-- ``(A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations of the Inspector General; ``(B) the amount requested for all training requirements of the Inspector General, including a certification from the Inspector General that the amount requested is sufficient to fund all training requirements for the Office; and ``(C) the amount requested to support the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, including a justification of such amount. ``(3) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall include for such fiscal year-- ``(A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency; ``(B) the amount requested for Inspector General for training; ``(C) the amounts requested to support of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and ``(D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any, with respect to the proposal. ``(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives for each fiscal year-- ``(A) a separate statement of the budget estimate transmitted pursuant to paragraph (2); ``(B) the amount requested by the Director of National Intelligence for the Inspector General pursuant to paragraph The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall make publicly available an unclassified version of any memoranda or finished intelligence products assessing the information gained from high-value detainee reporting dated April 3, 2003, July 15, 2004, March 2, 2005, and June 1, 2005. (a) Coverage Under Inspector General Act of 1978.-- Subsection (a)(2) of section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8G) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``the Defense Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,''; (2) by inserting ``the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the National Endowment for the Humanities,''; and (3) by inserting ``the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency,'' after ``the National Labor Relations Board,''. (b) Certain Designations Under Inspector General Act of 1978.--Subsection (a) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8H) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) The Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency shall be designees of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for purposes of this section.''. (c) Power of Heads of Elements Over Investigations.-- Subsection (d) of section 8G of such Act (5 U.S.C. App. 8G) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(d)''; (2) in the second sentence of paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection, by striking ``The head'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (2), the head''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2)(A) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, may prohibit the Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community specified in subparagraph (D) from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation if the Secretary determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. ``(B) If the Secretary exercises the authority under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall submit to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E) an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of the authority not later than 7 days after the exercise of the authority. ``(C) At the same time the Secretary submits under subparagraph (B) a statement on the exercise of the authority in subparagraph (A) to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E), the Secretary shall notify the Inspector General of such element of the submittal of such statement and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such statement. The Inspector General may submit to such committees of Congress any comments on a notice or statement received by the Inspector General under this subparagraph that the Inspector General considers appropriate. ``(D) The elements of the intelligence community specified in this subparagraph are as follows: ``(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(ii) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(iii) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(iv) The National Security Agency. ``(E) The committees of Congress specified in this subparagraph are-- ``(i) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''. (a) Director of National Security Agency.--The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after the first section the following new section: ``Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law.''. (b) Director of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.-- Section 441(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.''. (c) Director of National Reconnaissance Office.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (d) Positions of Importance and Responsibility.-- (1) Designation of positions.--The President may designate any of the positions referred to in paragraph (2) as positions of importance and responsibility under section 601 of title 10, United States Code. (2) Covered positions.--The positions referred to in this paragraph are as follows: (A) The Director of the National Security Agency. (B) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (C) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (e) Effective Date and Applicability.-- (1) In general.--The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b), and subsection (c), shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (A) the date of the nomination by the President of an individual to serve in the position concerned, except that the individual serving in such position as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to such position, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of such position by the individual performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Positions of importance and responsibility.--Subsection (d) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. Section 442(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2)(A) As directed by the Director of National Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall also develop a system to facilitate the analysis, dissemination, and incorporation of likenesses, videos, and presentations produced by ground-based platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations or available as open-source information, into the National System for Geospatial Intelligence. ``(B) The authority provided by this paragraph does not include authority for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to manage tasking of handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations.''; and (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (1)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (1) and (2)''. Section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(5), by inserting ``and counterintelligence'' after ``human intelligence''; (2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and (3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following: ``(c) Expenditure of Funds by the Defense Intelligence Agency.--(1) The amounts made available to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency for human intelligence and counterintelligence activities may be expended for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, without regard to the provisions of law or regulation relating to the expenditure of Government funds, if accounted for by a certificate made by Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Each such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount certified. ``(2) Not later than December 1 of each year, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on any expenditures made during the preceding fiscal year pursuant to the authority described in paragraph (1).''. Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H)-- (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine Corps,''; and (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''. Title 14, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (4) of section 93(a), by striking ``function'' and inserting ``function, including research, development, test, or evaluation related to intelligence systems and capabilities,''; and (2) in paragraph (4) of section 662, by inserting ``intelligence systems and capabilities or'' after ``related to''. Section 5759 of title 5 of the United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``is transferred to a different geographic area with a higher cost of living'' and inserting ``is subject to a mobility agreement and is transferred to a position in a different geographical area in which there is a shortage of critical skills''; (2) in subsection (b)(2), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, including requirements for a bonus recipient's repayment of a bonus in circumstances determined by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''; (3) in subsection (c), by striking ``basic pay.'' and inserting ``annual rate of basic pay. The bonus may be paid in a lump sum of installments linked to completion of periods of service.''; (4) in subsection (d), by striking ``retention bonus'' and inserting ``bonus paid under this section''; and (5) by striking subsection (e). (a) Civil Service Retirement System.--Subsection (b) of section 8335 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the paragraph (2) enacted by section 112(a)(2) of the Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 2005 (title I of division B of Public Law 108-447; 118 Stat. 2868) is amended by striking ``2009'' and inserting ``2011''; and (2) by striking the paragraph (2) enacted by section 2005(a)(2) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3704). (b) Federal Employees' Retirement System.--Subsection (b) of section 8425 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the paragraph (2) enacted by section 112(b)(2) of the Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 2005 (title I of division B of Public Law 108-447; 118 Stat. 2868) is amended by striking ``2009'' and inserting ``2011''; and (2) by striking the paragraph (2) enacted by section 2005(b)(2) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3704). (a) Report.-- (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report describing-- (A) a long-term vision for the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau's National Security Branch; (B) a strategic plan for the National Security Branch; and (C) the progress made in advancing the capabilities of the National Security Branch. (2) Content.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include-- (A) a description of the direction, strategy, and goals for improving the intelligence capabilities of the National Security Branch; (B) a description of the intelligence and national security capabilities of the National Security Branch that will be fully functional within the 5-year period beginning on the date the report is submitted; (C) a description-- (i) of the internal reforms that were carried out at the National Security Branch during the 2-year period ending on the date the report is submitted; and (ii) of the manner in which such reforms have advanced the capabilities of the National Security Branch; (D) an assessment of the effectiveness of the National Security Branch in performing tasks that are critical to the effective functioning of the National Security Branch as an intelligence agency, including-- (i) human intelligence collection, both within and outside the parameters of an existing case file or ongoing investigation, in a manner that protects civil liberties; (ii) intelligence analysis, including the ability of the National Security Branch to produce, and provide policy- makers with, information on national security threats to the United States; (iii) management, including the ability of the National Security Branch to manage and develop human capital and implement an organizational structure that supports the Branch's objectives and strategies; (iv) integration of the National Security Branch into the intelligence community, including an ability to robustly share intelligence and effectively communicate and operate with appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal partners; (v) implementation of an infrastructure that supports the national security and intelligence missions of the National Security Branch, including proper information technology and facilities; and (vi) reformation of culture of the National Security Branch, including its integration of intelligence analysts and other professional staff into intelligence collection operations and its success in ensuring that intelligence and threat information drive its operations; and (E) performance metrics and specific annual timetables for advancing the performance of the tasks referred to in clauses (i) through (vi) of subparagraph (D) and a description of the activities being undertaken to ensure that the National Security Branch's performance on such tasks improves. (b) Annual Assessments.-- (1) Requirement for assessments.--Not later than 180 days after the date on which the report required by subsection (a)(1) is submitted, and annually thereafter for each of the following 5 years, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an assessment of the progress of the National Security Branch in performing the tasks referred to in clauses (i) through (vi) of subsection (a)(2)(D) in comparison to its performance of such tasks during previous years. (2) Considerations.--In conducting each assessment required by paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence-- (A) shall use the performance metrics and specific annual timetables for accomplishing such tasks referred to in subsection (a)(2)(E); and (B) may request the assistance of any expert that the Director considers appropriate, including an inspector general of an appropriate agency or department. (a) Reorganization of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office.-- (1) In general.--Subtitle B of title III of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-567; 22 U.S.C. 7301 et seq.) is amended by striking This title may be cited as the ``Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission Act''. In this title: (1) 2005 national intelligence strategy.--The term ``2005 National Intelligence Strategy'' means the National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America released by the Director of National Intelligence on October Congress makes the following findings: (1) Accurate, timely, and comprehensive foreign intelligence and information are critical to the national security of United States and the furtherance of the foreign policy goals of the United States. (2) It is in the national security and foreign policy interest of the United States to ensure the global deployment of personnel of the Government of the United States who are responsible for collecting and reporting foreign intelligence and information, including personnel from the intelligence community, the Department of State, and other agencies and departments of the Government of the United States, and that adequate resources are committed to effect such collection and reporting. (3) The 2005 National Intelligence Strategy and the 2006 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community identified 5 major missions of the intelligence community to support the national security requirements of the United States, the first 2 of which, defeating terrorism and preventing and countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction, are global and transnational in nature. (4) The third major mission identified by the 2005 National Intelligence Strategy and the 2006 Annual Report, bolstering the growth of democracy and sustaining peaceful democratic states, requires a global commitment of collection, reporting, and analytical capabilities. (5) The 2005 National Intelligence Strategy and the 2006 Annual Report identify as a major mission the need to ``anticipate developments of strategic concern and identify opportunities as well as vulnerabilities for decision makers''. (6) The 2006 Annual Report provides the following: (A) ``In a world in which developments in distant reaches of the globe can quickly affect American citizens and interests at home and abroad, the Intelligence Community must alert policy makers to problems before they escalate and provide insights into their causes and effects. Analysis must do more than just describe what is happening and why; it must identify a range of opportunities for (and likely consequences of) diplomatic, military, law enforcement, economic, financial, or homeland security action. To support policymakers, the Intelligence Community should develop, sustain, and maintain access to expertise on every region, every transnational security issue, and every threat to the American people.''. (B) ``We still need to re-balance, integrate, and optimize collection capabilities to meet current and future customer and analytic priorities. Collection is . . . what gives the [Intelligence Community] its `competitive advantage' in protecting the United States and its interests.''. (C) ``One challenge to improving the coverage of emerging and strategic issues across the Intelligence Community has been the diversion of resources to current crisis support . . (a) Establishment.--There is established in the legislative branch a Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission. (b) Functions.--The Commission shall-- (1) evaluate any current processes or systems for the strategic integration of the intelligence community, including the Open Source Center, and other elements of the United States Government, including the Department of State, with regard to the collection, reporting and analysis of foreign intelligence and information; (2) provide recommendations to improve or develop such processes or systems to include the development of an inter- agency strategy that identifies-- (A) the collection, reporting, and analysis requirements of the United States Government; (B) the elements of the United States Government best positioned to meet collection and reporting requirements; (C) collection and reporting missions for the intelligence community and other elements of the United States Government based on the requirements of the United States Government, comparative institutional advantages, and other relevant factors; (D) analytical capabilities needed to achieve the requirements of the United States Government; and (E) inter-agency budget and resource allocations necessary to achieve such collection, reporting, and analytical requirements; (3) evaluate the extent to which current intelligence collection, reporting, and analysis strategies are aimed at providing global coverage and anticipating future threats, challenges, and crises; (4) provide recommendations on how to incorporate into the inter-agency strategy the means to anticipate future threats, challenges, and crises, including by identifying and supporting collection, reporting, and analytical capabilities which are global in scope and which are directed at emerging, long-term, and strategic targets; (5) provide recommendations on strategies for sustaining human and budgetary resources to effect the global collection and reporting missions identified in the inter-agency strategy, including the prepositioning of collection and reporting capabilities; (6) provide recommendations for developing, clarifying, and, if necessary, bolstering current and future collection and reporting roles and capabilities of elements of the United States Government outside the intelligence community deployed overseas; (7) provide recommendations related to the role of individual country missions in contributing to the inter- agency strategy; (8) evaluate the extent to which the establishment of new embassies and out-of-embassy posts are able to contribute to expanded global coverage and increased collection and reporting and provide recommendations related to the establishment of new embassies and out-of-embassy posts; (9) provide recommendations related to the establishment of any new executive branch entity, or the expansion of the authorities of any existing executive branch entity, as needed to improve the strategic integration described in paragraph (1) and develop and oversee the implementation of the inter-agency strategy; (10) provide recommendations on any legislative changes necessary to establish any new entity or to expand the authorities of any existing entity, as described in paragraph (a) Members of the Commission.-- (1) Appointment.--The Commission shall be composed of 10 members as follows: (A) Two members appointed by the majority leader of the Senate. (B) Two members appointed by the minority leader of the Senate. (C) Two members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. (D) Two members appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives. (E) One nonvoting member appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. (F) One nonvoting member appointed by the Secretary of State. (2) Selection.-- (A) In general.--Members of the Commission shall be individuals who-- (i) are private citizens; and (ii) have-- (I) knowledge and experience in foreign information and intelligence collection, reporting, and analysis, including clandestine collection and classified analysis, diplomatic reporting and analysis, and collection of public and open source information; (II) knowledge and experience in issues related to the national security and foreign policy of the United States gained by serving as a senior official of the Department of State, a member of the Foreign Service, an employee or officer of an appropriate agency or department of the United States, or an independent organization with expertise in the field of international affairs; or (III) knowledge and experience with foreign policy decision making. (B) Diversity of experience.--The individuals appointed to the Commission should be selected with a view to establishing diversity of experience with regard to various geographic regions, functions, and issues. (3) Time of appointment.--The appointments under subsection (a) shall be made not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (4) Term of appointment.--Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. (5) Vacancies.--Any vacancy of the Commission shall not affect the powers of the Commission and shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made. (6) Chair.--The members of the Commission shall designate 1 of the voting members to serve as the chair of the Commission. (7) Quorum.--Six members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for purposes of transacting the business of the Commission. (8) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet at the call of the chair and shall meet regularly, not less than once every 3 months, during the life of the Commission. (b) Staff.-- (1) In general.--The chair of the Commission may, without regard to the civil service laws and regulations, appoint and terminate an executive director and, in consultation with the executive director, appoint and terminate such other additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to perform its duties. In addition to the executive director and 1 full-time support staff for the executive director, there shall be additional staff with relevant intelligence and foreign policy experience to help support the Commission's work. (2) Selection of the executive director.--The executive director shall be selected with the approval of a majority of the members of the Commission. (3) Compensation.-- (A) Executive director.--The executive director shall be compensated at the rate payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code. (B) Staff.--The chair of the Commission may fix the compensation of other staff of the Commission without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay for such personnel may not exceed the rate payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such title. (c) Experts and Consultants.--This Commission is authorized to procure temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants as necessary to the extent authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates not to exceed the maximum annual rate of basic pay payable under section 5376 of such title. (d) Staff and Services of Other Agencies or Department of the United States.--Upon the request of the Commission, the head of an agency or department of the United States may detail, on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to assist it in carrying out this title. The detail of any such personnel shall be without interruption or loss of civil service or Foreign Service status or privilege. (e) Security Clearance.--The appropriate agencies or departments of the United States shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the members and staff of the Commission appropriate security clearances to the extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and requirements. (a) In General.-- (1) Hearings and evidence.--The Commission may, for the purpose of carrying out this title-- (A) hold hearings, sit and act at times and places in the United States and in countries in which the United States has a diplomatic presence, take testimony, and receive evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out this title; and (B) subject to subsection (b)(1), require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents, as the Commission considers necessary. (b) Subpoenas.-- (1) Issuance.-- (A) In general.--A subpoena may be issued under this section only-- (i) by the agreement of the chair of the Commission; and (ii) by the affirmative vote of 5 members of the Commission. (B) Signature.--Subject to subparagraph (A), subpoenas issued under this section may be issued under the signature of the chair or any member designated by a majority of the Commission and may be served by any person designated by the chair or by a member designated by a majority of the Commission. (2) Enforcement.-- (A) In general.--In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under this section, the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order requiring such person to appear at any designated place to testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of that court. (B) Additional enforcement.--In the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section, the Commission may, by majority vote, certify a statement of fact constituting such failure to the appropriate United States attorney, who may bring the matter before the grand jury for its action, under the same statutory authority and procedures as if the United States attorney had received a certification under sections 102, 103, or 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192, 193, and 194). (c) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Commission may secure directly from any agency or department of the United States such information as the Commission considers necessary to carry out this title. Upon request of the chair of the Commission, the head of such agency or department shall furnish such information to the Commission, subject to applicable law. (d) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as an agency or department of the United States. (e) Administrative Support.--The Administrator of the General Services Administration shall provide to the Commission on a reimbursable basis (or, in the discretion of the Administrator, on a nonreimbursable basis) such administrative support services as the Commission may request to carry out this title. (f) Administrative Procedures.--The Commission may adopt such rules and regulations, relating to administrative procedure, as may be reasonably necessary to enable it to carry out this title. (g) Travel.-- (1) In general.--The members and staff of the Commission may, with the approval of the Commission, conduct such travel as is necessary to carry out this title. (2) Expenses.--Members of the Commission shall serve without pay but shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission. (h) Gifts.--No member of the Commission may receive a gift or benefit by reason of such member's service on the Commission. (a) In General.-- (1) Interim report.--Not later than 1 year after the members of the Commission are appointed under section 5(a), the Commission shall submit an interim report to the congressional intelligence committees setting forth the preliminary findings and recommendations of the Commission described in section 604(b). (2) Final report.--Not later than 4 months after the submission of the report required by paragraph (1), the Commission shall submit a final report setting forth the final findings and recommendations of the Commission described in section 604(b) to the following: (A) The President. (B) The Director of National Intelligence. (C) The Secretary of State. (D) The congressional intelligence committees. (E) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (F) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. (b) Individual or Dissenting Views.--Each member of the Commission may include that member's dissenting views in a report required by paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a). (c) Form of Report.--The reports required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a), including any finding or recommendation of such report, shall be submitted in both an unclassified and a classified form. The Commission shall terminate 60 days after the submission of the report required by section 607(a)(2). The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission. (a) Transfer From the National Intelligence Program.--Of the amounts available for the National Intelligence Program for fiscal year 2010, $4,000,000 shall be available for transfer to the Commission to carry out this title. (b) Availability.--The amounts made available to the Commission pursuant to subsection (a) shall remain available until the termination of the Commission. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 101-- (A) in subsection (a), by moving paragraph (7) two ems to the right; and (B) by moving subsections (b) through (p) two ems to the right; (2) in section 103, by redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (h); (3) in section 109(a)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 112.;'' and inserting ``section 112;''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the second period; (4) in section 301(1), by striking `` `United States' '' and all that follows through ``and `State' '' and inserting `` `United States', `person', `weapon of mass destruction', and `State' ''; (5) in section 304(b), by striking ``subsection (a)(3)'' and inserting ``subsection (a)(2)''; and (6) in section 502(a), by striking ``a annual'' and inserting ``an annual''. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1) of section 5(a), by striking ``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a).''; and (2) in section 17(d)(3)(B)-- (A) in clause (i), by striking ``advise'' and inserting ``advice''; and (B) by amending clause (ii) to read as follows: ``(ii) holds or held the position in the Agency, including such a position held on an acting basis, of-- ``(I) Deputy Director; ``(II) Associate Deputy Director; ``(III) Director of the National Clandestine Service; ``(IV) Director of Intelligence; ``(V) Director of Support; or ``(VI) Director of Science and Technology.''. Section 528(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Associate Director of CIA for Military Affairs'' and inserting ``Associate Director of Military Affairs, CIA''; and (2) by striking ``Associate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs'' and inserting ``Associate Director of Military Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, or any successor position''. The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 3(4)(L), by striking ``other'' the second place it appears; (2) in section 102A-- (A) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; (B) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; (ii) in paragraph (3) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; and (iii) in paragraph (5)-- (I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); and (II) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or agency involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''; (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``paragraph''; and (D) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after ``Acquisition''; (3) in section 103(b), by striking ``, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.),''; (4) in section 104A(g)(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; (5) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''; (6) in section 701(b)(1), by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; (7) in section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''; and (8) in section 1003(h)(2) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``subsection (i)(2)(B)'' and inserting ``subsection (g)(2)(B)''. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears. (b) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence.-- Such section 1403, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended-- (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National Intelligence'' after ``Director''. (c) Conforming Amendments.-- (1) In general.--The heading of such section 1403 is amended to read as follows: (a) Amendments to the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B) of section 1016(e)(10) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)), by striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and inserting ``Department of Justice''; (2) in subsection (e) of section 1071, by striking ``(1)''; and (3) in subsection (b) of section 1072, in the subsection heading by inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''. (b) Other Amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended-- (1) in section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)-- (A) in paragraph (1) of subsection (c)-- (i) by striking ``shall,'' and inserting ``shall''; and (ii) by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional culture''; (B) in paragraph (2) of subsection (e), by striking ``the National Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; and (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''; and (2) in section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and inserting ``Federal''; and (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and inserting ``specific''. (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item: ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after ``subsection (a)),''. Section 602 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 403-2b) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), in paragraph (2), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; (B) in paragraph (2)-- (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (C) in paragraph (3), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (a) Role of the Director of National Intelligence.--Section 403 of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992 (50 U.S.C. 403-2) is amended by striking ``The Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting the following: ``(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence''. (b) Definition of Intelligence Community.--Section 403 of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended-- (1) by striking ``Intelligence Community'' and insert ``intelligence community''; and (2) by striking the second sentence and inserting the following: ``(b) Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the term `intelligence community' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.", u" SA 3702. Mr. McCAIN (for himself and Mr. Lieberman) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2845, to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, and for other purposes; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: In this title, the terms ``air carrier'', ``air transportation'', ``aircraft'', ``airport'', ``cargo'', ``foreign air carrier'', and ``intrastate air transportation'' have the meanings given such terms in section 40102 of title 49, United States Code. (a) Requirement for Strategy.-- (1) Responsibilities of secretary of homeland security--.The Secretary of Homeland Security shall-- (A) develop and implement a National Strategy for Transportation Security; and (B) revise such strategy whenever necessary to improve or to maintain the currency of the strategy or whenever the Secretary otherwise considers it appropriate to do so. (2) Consultation with secretary of transportation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with the Secretary of Transportation in developing and revising the National Strategy for Transportation Security under this section. (b) Content.--The National Strategy for Transportation Security shall include the following matters: (1) An identification and evaluation of the transportation assets within the United States that, in the interests of national security, must be protected from attack or disruption by terrorist or other hostile forces, including aviation, bridge and tunnel, commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, urban mass transit, and other public transportation infrastructure assets that could be at risk of such an attack or disruption. (2) The development of the risk-based priorities, and realistic deadlines, for addressing security needs associated with those assets. (3) The most practical and cost-effective means of defending those assets against threats to their security. (4) A forward-looking strategic plan that assigns transportation security roles and missions to departments and agencies of the Federal Government (including the Armed Forces), State governments (including the Army National Guard and Air National Guard), local governments, and public utilities, and establishes mechanisms for encouraging private sector cooperation and participation in the implementation of such plan. (5) A comprehensive delineation of response and recovery responsibilities and issues regarding threatened and executed acts of terrorism within the United States. (6) A prioritization of research and development objectives that support transportation security needs, giving a higher priority to research and development directed toward protecting vital assets. (7) A budget and recommendations for appropriate levels and sources of funding to meet the objectives set forth in the strategy. (c) Submissions to Congress.-- (1) The national strategy.-- (A) Initial strategy.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit the National Strategy for Transportation Security developed under this section to Congress not later than April l, 2005. (B) Subsequent versions.--After 2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit the National Strategy for Transportation Security, including any revisions, to Congress not less frequently than April 1 of each evennumbered year. (2) Periodic progress report.-- (A) Requirement for report.--Each year, in conjunction with the submission of the budget to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to Congress an assessment of the progress made on implementing the National Strategy for Transportation Security. (B) Content.--Each progress report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following matters: (i) An assessment of the adequacy of the resources committed to meeting the objectives of the National Strategy for Transportation Security. (ii) Any recommendations for improving and implementing that strategy that the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, considers appropriate. (3) Classified material.--Any part of the National Strategy for Transportation Security that involves information that is properly classified under criteria established by Executive order shall be submitted to Congress separately in classified form. (d) Priority Status.-- (1) In general.--The National Strategy for Transportation Security shall be the governing document for Federal transportation security efforts. (2) Other plans and reports.--The National Strategy for Transportation Security shall include, as an integral part or as an appendix-- (A) the current National Maritime Transportation Security Plan under section 70103 of title 46, United States Code; (B) the report required by section 44938 of title 49, United States Code; and (C) any other transportation security plan or report that the Secretary of Homeland Security determines appropriate for inclusion. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Transportation Security Administration, as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act but in no event later than 180 days after that date, shall-- (1) implement a procedure under which the Transportation Security Administration compares information about passengers who are to be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air transportation for flights and flight segments originating in the United States with a comprehensive, consolidated database containing information about known or suspected terrorists and their associates; and (2) use the information obtained by comparing the passenger information with the information in the database to prevent known or suspected terrorists and their associates from boarding such flights or flight segments or to subject them to specific additional security scrutiny, through the use of ``no fly'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists or other means. (b) Air Carrier Cooperation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, shall by order require air carriers to provide the passenger information necessary to implement the procedure required by subsection (a). (c) Maintaining the Accuracy and Integrity of the ``No Fly'' and ``Automatic Selectee'' Lists.-- (1) Watchlist database.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall design guidelines, policies, and operating procedures for the collection, removal, and updating of data maintained, or to be maintained, in the watchlist database described in subsection (a) (1) that are designed to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the database. (2) Accuracy of entries.--In developing the ``no fly'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists under sub-section (a) (2), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a simple and timely method for correcting erroneous entries, for clarifying information known to cause false hits or misidentification errors, and for updating relevant information that is dispositive in the passenger screening process. The Secretary shall also establish a process to provide individuals whose names are confused with, or similar to, names in the database with a means of demonstrating that they are not a person named in the database. (a) Aircraft Passenger Screening at Checkpoints.-- (1) Detection of explosives.-- (A) Improvement of capabilities.--As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such action as is necessary to improve the capabilities at passenger screening checkpoints, especially at commercial airports, to detect explosives carried aboard aircraft by passengers or placed aboard aircraft by passengers. (B) Interim action.--Until measures are implemented that enable the screening of all passengers for explosives, the Secretary shall take immediate measures to require Transportation Security Administration or other screeners to screen for explosives any individual identified for additional screening before that individual may board an aircraft. (2) Implementation report.-- (A) Requirement for report.--Within 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall transmit to the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on how the Secretary intends to achieve the objectives of the actions required under paragraph (1). The report shall include an implementation schedule. (B) Classified information.--The Secretary may submit separately in classified form any information in the report under subparagraph (A) that involves information that is properly classified under criteria established by Executive order. (b) Acceleration of Research and Development on, and Deployment of, Detection of Explosives.-- (1) Required action.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall take such action as may be necessary to accelerate research and development and deployment of technology for screening aircraft passengers for explosives during or before the aircraft boarding process. (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary such sums as are necessary to carry out this subsection for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2009. (c) Improvement of Screener Job Performance.-- (1) Required action.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such action as may be necessary to improve the job performance of airport screening personnel. (2) Human factors study.--In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, conduct a human factors study in order better to understand problems in screener performance and to set attainable objectives for individual screeners and screening checkpoints. (d) Checked Baggage and Cargo.-- (1) In-line baggage screening.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such action as may be necessary to expedite the installation and use of advanced in-line baggage-screening equipment at commercial airports. (2) Cargo security.--The Secretary shall take such action as may be necessary to ensure that the Transportation Security Administration in creases and improves its efforts to screen potentially dangerous cargo. (e) Blast-Resistant Cargo and Baggage Containers.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation-- (A) shall assess the feasibility of requiring the use of blast-resistant containers for cargo and baggage on passenger aircraft to minimize the potential effects of detonation of an explosive device; and (B) may require their use on some or all flights on aircraft for which such containers are available. (2) Pilot program.--Before requiring the use of such containers on any such flights, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall conduct a pilot program to evaluate the use of currently available blast-resistant containers for cargo and baggage on passenger aircraft. In conducting the pilot program the Secretary-- (A) shall test the feasibility of using the containers by deploying them on participating air carrier flights; but (B) may not disclose to the public the number of blast- resistant containers being used in the program or publicly identify the flights on which the containers are used. (3) Assistance for participation in pilot program.-- (A) In general.--As part of the pilot program, the Secretary may provide assistance to air carriers to volunteer to test the use of blast-resistant containers for cargo and baggage on passenger aircraft. (B) Applications.--To volunteer to participate in the incentive program, an air carrier shall submit to the Secretary an application that is in such form and contains such information as the Secretary requires. (C) Types of assistance.--Assistance provided by the Secretary to air carriers that volunteer to participate in the pilot program may include the use of blast-resistant containers and financial assistance to cover increased costs to the carriers associated with the use and maintenance of the containers, including increased fuel costs. (4) Technological improvements.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in cooperation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall-- (A) support efforts to further the development and improvement of blast-resistant containers for potential use on aircraft, including designs that-- (i) will work on a variety of aircraft, including narrow body aircraft; and (ii) minimize the weight of such containers without compromising their effectiveness; and (B) explore alternative technologies for minimizing the potential effects of detonation of an explosive device on cargo and passenger aircraft. (5) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the Congress on the results of the pilot program and on progress made in developing improved containers and equivalent technologies. The report may be submitted in classified and redacted formats. (6) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security such sums as are necessary to carry out this section. Such sums shall remain available until expended. (f) Cost-Sharing.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with representatives of air carriers, airport operators, and other interested parties, shall submit to the Senate and the House of Representatives-- (1) a proposed formula for cost-sharing, for the advanced in-line baggage screening equipment required by this title, between and among the Federal Government, State and local governments, and the private sector that reflects proportionate national security benefits and private sector benefits for such enhancement; and (2) recommendations, including recommended legislation, for an equitable, feasible, and expeditious system for defraying the costs of the advanced in-line baggage screening equipment required by this title, which may be based on the formula proposed under paragraph (1). SA 3703. Mr. HOLLINGS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2845, to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SA 3704. Mr. WYDEN (for himself, Mr. Lott, Mr. Graham of Florida, Ms. Snowe, and Mr. Cornyn) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2845, to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, and for other purposes; as follows: At the end of title II, add the following: At the end of title II, add the following: Subtitle D--Classified Information This subtitle may be cited as the ``Independent National The purpose of this subtitle is to establish in the executive branch an Independent National Security Classification Board-- (1) to review the standards and procedures used in the classification system for national security information; (2) to propose and submit to Congress and the President for comment new standards and procedures to be used in the classification system for such information; (3) to establish the new standards and procedures after Congress and the President have had the opportunity to comment; and (4) to review, and make recommendations with respect to, classifications of current and new information made under the applicable classification system. (a) Establishment.--The Independent National Security Classification Board (in this subtitle referred to as the ``Board'') is established as an independent agency in the executive branch. (b) Composition.--The Board shall be composed of one member appointed by the President, one member jointly recommended by the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the Senate and appointed by the President, and one member jointly recommended by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives and appointed by the President, each by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Each member shall be knowledgeable on classification matters. (c) Term of Members.--Each member of the Board shall be appointed for a term of 5 years. A member may be reappointed for one additional 5-year term. A member whose term has expired shall continue to serve on the Board until a replacement has been appointed. (d) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the Board shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment. (e) Separate Office.--The Board shall have its own office for carrying out its activities, and shall not share office space with any element of the intelligence community or with any other department, agency, or element of the United States Government. (f) Chairman.--The Board shall select a Chairman from among its members. (g) Meetings.--The Board shall meet at the call of the Chairman. (h) Quorum.--A majority of the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number of members may hold hearings. (i) Availability of Information.--The decision-making process of the Board may be classified, but the final decisions of the Board and the reports submitted under this subtitle shall be made available to the public. (j) Initial Appointments and Meeting.-- (1) Initial appointments.--Initial appointments of members of the Board shall be made not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Initial meeting.--The Board shall hold its first meeting not later than 30 days after the date on which all members of the Board have been appointed. (k) Website.--The Board shall establish a website not later than 90 days after the date on which all members of the Board have been appointed. (a) Review of Classification System.-- (1) In general.--The Board shall conduct a thorough review of the classification system for national security information, including the policy, procedures, and practices of the system. The Board shall recommend reforms of such system to ensure-- (A) the protection of the national security of the United States; (B) the sharing of information among departments, agencies, and element of the United States Government; and (C) an open and informed public discussion of national security issues. (2) Scope of review.-- (A) Consultation.--The Board shall consult with the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives in determining the scope of its review of the classification system. (B) Review.--The Board shall submit a report describing the proposed scope of review to the President and the committees of Congress referred to in subparagraph (A) for comment. (C) Revisions.--Not later than 30 days after receiving the report under subparagraph (B)-- (i) the President shall notify the Board in writing of any revisions to such scope of review; and (ii) each committee of Congress referred to in subparagraph (A) may submit to the Board, in writing, any comments of the committee on the proposed scope of review. (b) Adoption of National Security Information Classification System.-- (1) Authority.--The Board shall prescribe the classification system for national security information, which shall apply to all departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government. (2) Findings and recommendations.--The Board shall, in accordance with the scope of review developed under subsection (a)(2), review the classification system for national security information and submit to the President and Congress its findings and recommendations for new procedures and standards to be used in such classification system. (3) Classification system.--Not later than 180 days after the date on which all members of the Board have been confirmed by the Senate, the Board shall adopt a classification system for national security information, incorporating any comments received from the President and considering any comments received from Congress. Upon the adoption of the classification system, the system shall be used for the classification of all national security information. (c) Review of Classification Decisions.-- (1) In general.--The Board shall, upon its own initiative or pursuant to a request under paragraph (3), review any classification decision made by an Executive agency with respect to national security information. (2) Access.--The Board shall have access to all documents or other materials that are classified on the basis of containing national security information. (3) Requests for review.--The Board shall review in a timely manner the existing or proposed classification of any document or other material the review of which is requested by-- (A) the head or Inspector General of an Executive agency who is an authorized holder of such document or material; or (B) the chairman or ranking member of-- (i) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, or the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; or (ii) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on International Relations, or the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (4) Recommendations.-- (A) In general.--The Board may make recommendations to the President regarding decisions to classify all or portions of documents or other material for national security purposes or to declassify all or portions of documents or other material classified for such purposes. (B) Implementation.--Upon receiving a recommendation from the Board under subparagraph (A), the President shall either-- (i) accept and implement such recommendation; or (ii) not later than 60 days after receiving the recommendation if the President does not accept and implement such recommendation, transmit in writing to Congress and have posted on the website of the Board a notification in unclassified form of the justification for the President's decision not to implement such recommendation. (5) Exemption from freedom of information act.--The Board shall not be required to make documents or materials reviewed under this subsection available to the public under section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the Freedom of Information Act). (6) Regulations.--The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out this subsection. (7) Executive agency defined.--In this section, the term ``Executive agency'' has the meaning given that term in section 105 of title 5, United States Code. (a) Hearings.--The Board may hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Board considers advisable to carry out this subtitle. (b) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Board may secure directly from any department, agency, or element of the United States Government such information as the Board considers necessary to carry out this subtitle. Upon request of the Chairman of the Board, the head of such department, agency, or element shall furnish such information to the Board. (c) Administrative Support Services.--Upon request of the Board, the Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Board, on a reimbursable basis, the administrative support necessary for the Board to carry out its duties under this subtitle. (d) Postal Services.--The Board may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government. (e) Gifts.--The Board may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property. (a) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Members, Independent National Security Classification Board.''. (b) Staff.-- (1) In general.--The Chairman of the Board may, without regard to the civil service laws and regulations, appoint and terminate an executive director and such other additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Board to perform its duties under this subtitle. The employment of an executive director shall be subject to confirmation by the Board. (2) Compensation.--The Chairman of the Board may fix the compensation of the executive director and other personnel without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay for the executive director and other personnel may not exceed the rate payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title. (c) Detail of Government Employees.--Any employee of the United States Government may be detailed to the Board without reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege. SA 3705. Ms. COLLINS (for herself, Mr. Carper, and Mr. Lieberman) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2845, to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, and for other purposes; as follows: At the end of the bill, add the following: This title may be cited as the ``Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2004''. In this title, the following definitions shall apply: (1) Insular area.--The term ``insular area'' means American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. (2) Large high-threat state fund.--The term ``Large High- Threat State Fund'' means the fund containing amounts authorized to be appropriated for States that elect to receive Federal financial assistance through a per capita share of 38.625 percent of the amount appropriated for the State Homeland Security Grant Program. (3) Local government.--The term ``local government'' has the same meaning given that term in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101). (4) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the several States of the United States and the District of Columbia. (5) State homeland security grant program.--The term ``State Homeland Security Grant Program'' means the program receiving 75 percent of the amount appropriated for the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program. (6) Threat-based homeland security grant program.--The term ``Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program'' means the program authorized under section 6. (7) Urban area security initiative grant program.--The term ``Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program'' means the program receiving 25 percent of the amount appropriated for the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program. (a) In General.--This title shall not be construed to affect any authority to award grants under any Federal grant program listed under subsection (b), which existed on September 10, 2001, to enhance traditional missions of State and local law enforcement, firefighters, ports, emergency medical services, or public health missions. (b) Programs Included.--The programs referred to in subsection (a) are the following: (1) The Firefighter Assistance Program authorized under section 33 of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229). (2) The Emergency Management Performance Grant Program and the Urban Search and Rescue Grant program authorized under-- (A) title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5195 et seq.); (B) the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-74; 113 Stat. 1047 et seq.); and (C) the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (42 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.). (4) The Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Programs authorized under part E of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3750 et seq.). (5) The Public Safety and Community Policing (COPS ON THE BEAT) Grant Program authorized under part Q of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796dd et seq.). (6) Grant programs under the Public Health Service Act regarding preparedness for bioterrorism and other public health emergencies and the Emergency Response Assistance Program authorized under section 1412 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2312). (a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 801 the following: (a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 801 the following: ``SEC. 802. INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE TO COORDINATE AND ``(a) Establishment.-- ``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and other agencies providing assistance for first responder preparedness, as identified by the President, shall establish the Interagency Committee to Coordinate and Streamline Homeland Security Grant Programs (referred to in this subtitle as the `Interagency Committee'). ``(2) Composition.--The Interagency Committee shall be composed of-- ``(A) a representative of the Department; ``(B) a representative of the Department of Health and Human Services; ``(C) a representative of the Department of Transportation; ``(D) a representative of the Department of Justice; ``(E) a representative of the Environmental Protection Agency; and ``(F) a representative of any other department or agency determined to be necessary by the President. ``(3) Responsibilities.--The Interagency Committee shall-- ``(A) report on findings to the Information Clearinghouse established under section 801(d); ``(B) consult with State and local governments and emergency response providers regarding their homeland security needs and capabilities; ``(C) advise the Secretary on the development of performance measures for homeland security grant programs and the national strategy for homeland security; ``(D) compile a list of homeland security assistance programs; ``(E) not later than 1 year after the effective date of the Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2004-- ``(i) develop a proposal to coordinate, to the maximum extent practicable, the planning, reporting, application, and other guidance documents contained in homeland security assistance programs to eliminate all redundant and duplicative requirements; and ``(ii) submit the proposal developed under clause (i) to Congress and the President. ``(b) Administration.--The Department shall provide administrative support to the Interagency Committee, which shall include-- ``(1) scheduling meetings; ``(2) preparing agenda; ``(3) maintaining minutes and records; and ``(4) producing reports. ``(c) Chairperson.--The Secretary shall designate a chairperson of the Interagency Committee. ``(d) Meetings.--The Interagency Committee shall meet-- ``(1) at the call of the Secretary; or ``(2) not less frequently than once every 1 month.''. (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents for the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 801 the following: ``(a) Establishment.-- ``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and other agencies providing assistance for first responder preparedness, as identified by the President, shall establish the Interagency Committee to Coordinate and Streamline Homeland Security Grant Programs (referred to in this subtitle as the `Interagency Committee'). ``(2) Composition.--The Interagency Committee shall be composed of-- ``(A) a representative of the Department; ``(B) a representative of the Department of Health and Human Services; ``(C) a representative of the Department of Transportation; ``(D) a representative of the Department of Justice; ``(E) a representative of the Environmental Protection Agency; and ``(F) a representative of any other department or agency determined to be necessary by the President. ``(3) Responsibilities.--The Interagency Committee shall-- ``(A) report on findings to the Information Clearinghouse established under section 801(d); ``(B) consult with State and local governments and emergency response providers regarding their homeland security needs and capabilities; ``(C) advise the Secretary on the development of performance measures for homeland security grant programs and the national strategy for homeland security; ``(D) compile a list of homeland security assistance programs; ``(E) not later than 1 year after the effective date of the Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2004-- ``(i) develop a proposal to coordinate, to the maximum extent practicable, the planning, reporting, application, and other guidance documents contained in homeland security assistance programs to eliminate all redundant and duplicative requirements; and ``(ii) submit the proposal developed under clause (i) to Congress and the President. ``(b) Administration.--The Department shall provide administrative support to the Interagency Committee, which shall include-- ``(1) scheduling meetings; ``(2) preparing agenda; ``(3) maintaining minutes and records; and ``(4) producing reports. ``(c) Chairperson.--The Secretary shall designate a chairperson of the Interagency Committee. ``(d) Meetings.--The Interagency Committee shall meet-- ``(1) at the call of the Secretary; or ``(2) not less frequently than once every 1 month.''. (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents for the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 801 the following:``Sec. 802. Interagency Committee to Coordinate and Streamline Homeland Security Grant Programs.''. (a) Director of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness.--Section 801(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 361(a)) is amended to read as follows: ``(a) Establishment.-- ``(1) In general.--There is established within the Office of the Secretary the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, which shall oversee and coordinate departmental programs for, and relationships with, State and local governments. ``(2) Executive director.--The Office established under paragraph (1) shall be headed by the Executive Director of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.''. (b) Office for Domestic Preparedness.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended-- (1) by redesignating section 430 as section 803 and transferring that section to the end of subtitle A of title VIII, as amended by section 4; and (2) in section 803, as redesignated by paragraph (1)-- (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security'' and inserting ``the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness''; (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``who shall be appointed by the President'' and all that follows and inserting ``who shall report directly to the Executive Director of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness.''; (C) in subsection (c)-- (i) in paragraph (7)-- (a) Grants Authorized.--The Secretary of Homeland Security (referred to in this section as the ``Secretary'') may award grants to States and local governments to enhance homeland security. (b) Use of Funds.-- (1) In general.--Grants awarded under subsection (a)-- (A) shall be used to address homeland security matters related to acts of terrorism or major disasters and related capacity building; and (B) shall not be used to supplant ongoing first responder expenses or general protective measures. (2) Allowable uses.--Grants awarded under subsection (a) may be used to-- (A) develop State plans or risk assessments (including the development of the homeland security plan) to respond to terrorist attacks and strengthen all hazards emergency planning and communitywide plans for responding to terrorist or all hazards emergency events that are coordinated with the capacities of applicable Federal, State, and local governments, first responders, and State and local government health agencies; (B) develop State, regional, or local mutual aid agreements; (C) purchase or upgrade equipment based on State and local needs as identified under a State homeland security plan; (D) conduct exercises to strengthen emergency preparedness of State and local first responders including law enforcement, firefighting personnel, and emergency medical service workers, and other emergency responders identified in a State homeland security plan; (E) pay for overtime expenses relating to-- (i) training activities consistent with the goals outlined in a State homeland security plan; (ii) as determined by the Secretary, activities relating to an increase in the threat level under the Homeland Security Advisory System; and (iii) any other activity relating to the State Homeland Security Strategy, and approved by the Secretary; (F) promote training regarding homeland security preparedness including-- (i) emergency preparedness responses to a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction; and (ii) training in the use of equipment, including detection, monitoring, and decontamination equipment, and personal protective gear; and (G) conduct any activity permitted under the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Grant Program. (3) Prohibited uses.-- (A) Construction.--Grants awarded under subsection (a) may not be used to construct buildings or other physical facilities, except those described in section 611 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5196) and approved by the Secretary in the homeland security plan certified under subsection (d), or to acquire land. (B) Cost sharing.--Grant funds provided under this section shall not be used for any State or local government cost sharing contribution request under this section. (c) Application.-- (1) Submission.--A State may apply for a grant under this section by submitting to the Secretary an application at such time, and in such manner, and containing such information the Secretary may reasonably require. (2) Revisions.--A State may revise a homeland security plan certified under subsection (d) at the time an application is submitted under paragraph (1) after receiving approval from the Secretary. (3) Approval.--The Secretary shall not award a grant under this section unless the application submitted by the State includes a homeland security plan meeting the requirements of subsection (d). (4) Release of funds.--The Secretary shall release grant funds to States with approved plans after the approval of an application submitted under this subsection. (d) Homeland Security Plan.-- (1) In general.--An application submitted under subsection (c) shall include a certification that the State has prepared a 3-year State homeland security plan (referred to in this subsection as the ``plan'') to respond to terrorist attacks and strengthen all hazards emergency planning that has been approved by the Secretary. (2) Contents.--The plan shall contain measurable goals and objectives that-- (A) establish a 3-year strategy to set priorities for the allocation of funding to political subdivisions based on the risk, capabilities, and needs described under paragraph (3)(C); (B) provide for interoperable communications; (C) provide for local coordination of response and recovery efforts, including procedures for effective incident command in conformance with the National Incident Management System; (D) ensure that first responders and other emergency personnel have adequate training and appropriate equipment for the threats that may occur; (E) provide for improved coordination and collaboration among police, fire, and public health authorities at State and local levels; (F) coordinate emergency response and public health plans; (G) mitigate risks to critical infrastructure that may be vulnerable to terrorist attacks; (H) promote regional coordination among contiguous local governments; (I) identify necessary protective measures by private owners of critical infrastructure; (J) promote orderly evacuation procedures when necessary; (K) ensure support from the public health community for measures needed to prevent, detect and treat bioterrorism, and radiological and chemical incidents; (L) increase the number of local jurisdictions participating in local and statewide exercises; (M) meet preparedness goals as determined by the Secretary; and (N) include a report from the relevant advisory committee established under paragraph (3)(D) that documents the areas of support, disagreement, or recommended changes to the plan before its submission to the Secretary. (3) Development process.-- (A) In general.--In preparing the plan under this section, a State shall-- (i) provide for the consideration of all homeland security needs; (ii) follow a process that is continuing, inclusive, cooperative, and comprehensive, as appropriate; and (iii) coordinate the development of the plan with the homeland security planning activities of local governments. (B) Coordination with local planning activities.--The coordination under subparagraph (A)(iii) shall contain input from local stakeholders, including-- (i) local officials, including representatives of rural, high-population, and high-threat jurisdictions; (ii) first responders and emergency response providers; and (iii) private sector companies, such as railroads and chemical manufacturers. (C) Scope of planning.--Each State preparing a plan under this section shall, in conjunction with the local stakeholders under subparagraph (B), address all the information requested by the Secretary, and complete a comprehensive assessment of-- (i) risk, including a-- (a) Annual General Accounting Office Audit and Report.-- (1) Audit.--The Comptroller General shall conduct an annual audit of the Threat Based Homeland Security Grant Program (2) Report.--The Comptroller General shall provide a report to Congress on the results of the audit conducted under paragraph (1), which includes-- (A) an analysis of whether the grant recipients allocated funding consistent with the State homeland security plan and the guidelines established by the Department of Homeland Security; and (B) the amount of funding devoted to overtime and administrative expenses. (b) Reviews of Threat-Based Homeland Security Funding.--The Secretary, through the appropriate agency, shall conduct periodic reviews of grants made through the Threat Based Homeland Security Grant Program to ensure that recipients allocate funds consistent with the guidelines established by the Department of Homeland Security. (c) Remedies for Non-Compliance.--If the Secretary determines, after reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing, that a recipient of a Threat Based Homeland Security Grant has failed to substantially comply with any regulations or guidelines issues by the Department regarding eligible expenditures, the Secretary shall-- (1) terminate any payment of grant funds scheduled to be made to the recipient; (2) reduce the amount of payment of grant finds to the recipient by an amount equal to the amount of grant funds that were not expended by the recipient in accordance with such guidelines; or (3) limit the use of grant funds received under the Threat Based Homeland Security Grant Program to programs, projects, or activities not affected by the failure to comply. (d) Duration of Penalty.--The Secretary shall apply an appropriate penalty under subsection (c) until such time as the Secretary determines that the grant recipient is in full compliance with the guidelines established by the Department of Homeland Security. (a) Reallocation of Funds.--The Director of the Office for Domestic Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security, shall allow any State to request approval to reallocate funds received pursuant to appropriations for the State Homeland Security Grant Program under Public Laws 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681 et seq.), 106-113 (113 Stat. 1501A-3 et seq.), 106-553 (114 Stat. 2762A-3 et seq.), 107-77 (115 Stat. 78 et seq.), or the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003 (Public Law 108-7), among the 4 categories of equipment, training, exercises, and planning. (b) Approval of Reallocation Requests.--The Director shall approve reallocation requests under subsection (a) in accordance with the State plan and any other relevant factors that the Secretary of Homeland Security determines to be necessary. (c) Limitation.--A waiver under this section shall not affect the obligation of a State to pass through 80 percent of the amount appropriated for equipment to units of local government. SA 3706. Mr. SPECTER (for himself, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Bond, and Mr. Wyden) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2845, to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: On page 10, line 23, strike ``a principal'' and insert ``the principal''. On page 10, line 26, strike ``and''. On page 11, strike line 1 and 2 and insert the following: (4) direct, oversee, and execute the National Intelligence Program; and (5) supervise, direct, and control the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the elements, components, and programs of the Defense Intelligence Agency (other than the defense attaches) engaged in the collection of national intelligence, with the head of each such agency, element, component, or program reporting directly to the National Intelligence Director. On page 14, line 3, strike ``issue'' and insert ``direct''. On page 14, line 13, strike ``manage and oversee'' and insert ``supervise, direct, and control''. On page 15, line 10, strike ``encourage and''. On page 16, line 5, strike ``condition of'' and insert ``requirement for''. On page 19, line 6, strike ``and''. On page 19, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following: (20) review, approve, and manage the research and development efforts of the intelligence community; (21) review, approve, and manage the acquisition programs of the National Intelligence Program, including all acquisitions of major systems by the intelligence community covered by section 506A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a-1) or described in section 162 of this Act; and On page 19, line 7, strike ``(20)'' and insert ``(22)''. On page 20, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following: (d) Responsibility for Performance of Specific Functions.-- In carrying out responsibilities under this section, the National Intelligence Director shall ensure-- (1) through the National Security Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), the continued operation of an effective unified organization for the conduct of signals intelligence activities and shall ensure that the product is disseminated in a timely manner to authorized recipients; (2) through the Defense Intelligence Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), effective management of human intelligence activities (other than activities of the defense attaches, which shall remain under the direction of the Secretary of Defense) and other national intelligence collection activities performed by the Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) through the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), with appropriate representation from the intelligence community, the continued operation of an effective unified organization-- (A) for carrying out tasking of imagery collection; (B) for the coordination of imagery processing and exploitation activities; (C) for ensuring the dissemination of imagery in a timely manner to authorized recipients; and (D) notwithstanding any other provision of law and consistent with the policies, procedures, standards, and other directives of the National Intelligence Director and the Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority, for-- (i) prescribing technical architecture and standards related to imagery intelligence and geospatial information and ensuring compliance with such architecture and standards; and (ii) developing and fielding systems of common concern related to imagery intelligence and geospatial information; and (4) through the National Reconnaissance Office (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), the continued operation of an effective unified organization for the research, development, acquisition, and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to satisfy the requirements of all elements of the intelligence community. (e) National Intelligence Collection.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) ensure the efficient and effective collection of national intelligence using technical means, human sources, and other lawful techniques; (2) provide overall direction for and coordinate the collection of national intelligence through human sources by elements of the intelligence community authorized to undertake such collection; and (3) coordinate with other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government which are authorized to undertake such collection and ensure that the most effective use is made of the resources of such departments, agencies, and elements with respect to such collection, and resolve operational conflicts regarding such collection. On page 20, line 4, strike ``(d)'' and insert ``(f)''. On page 32, beginning on line 8, strike ``oversee and direct'' and all that follows through line 10 and insert ``direct and coordinate''. On page 109, line 12, strike ``subject to paragraph (4),'' On page 109, line 13, strike ``and''. On page 109, line 19, strike the period and insert ``; and''. On page 109, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following: (D) ensure compliance with section 506A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a-1). On page 110, strike lines 4 through 19 and insert the following: (3) With respect to the acquisition of a major system (as that term is defined in section 506A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947), the National Intelligence Director may delegate a duty, responsibility, or authority under this section or any other provision of law only to the Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director or to another Deputy National Intelligence Director specified by the Director. (4) In this subsection: On page 111, line 1, strike ``whole'' and insert ``whole or in part''. On page 111, line 3, strike ``The term'' and insert ``Except for purposes of paragraph (3), the term''. On page 179, strike lines 1 through 4 and insert the following: ``(b) Supervision.--(1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be under the direction, supervision, and control of the National Intelligence Director. ``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director regarding the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. On page 179, line 20, add ``and'' at the end. On page 179, strike line 21 and all that follows through page 180, line 6. On page 180, line 7, strike ``(4)'' and insert ``(3)''. On page 181, strike lines 1 through 10. On page 196, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following: The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after the first section the following new sections: ``Sec. 2. There is a National Security Agency. ``Sec. 3. (a) The Director of the National Security Agency is the head of the National Security Agency. ``(b)(1) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be under the direction, supervision, and control of the National Intelligence Director. ``(2) The Director of the National Security Agency shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director regarding the activities of the National Security Agency.''. (a) Supervision.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall be under the direction, supervision, and control of the National Intelligence Director regarding the national intelligence collection mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency. (b) Defense Attaches.--With respect to the activities of the defense attaches, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall be under the direction, supervision, and control of the Secretary of Defense. (c) Line of Authority.--The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director with respect to any programs, operations, and elements of the Directorate for Human Intelligence and the Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection of the Defense Intelligence Agency that carry out the national intelligence collection mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency, other than those specified in subsection (b). (a) Supervision and Control by National Intelligence Director.--(1) Section 441 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new subsection (c): ``(c) Supervision.--(1) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall be under the direction, supervision, and control of the National Intelligence Director. ``(2) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall report directly to the National Intelligence regarding the activities of the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency.''. (2) Such title is further amended by striking ``Secretary of Defense'' each place it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director'': (A) Section 453(a). (B) Section 453(b)(1). (C) Section 454. (D) Section 455(b)(1), both places it appears. (E) Section 462, the first place it appears. (b) Support.--Section 444 of such title is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (c) Other Amendments.--(1) Subsection (d) of section 441 of such title is amended by striking ``The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence,'' and inserting ``The National Intelligence Director''. (2) Section 442(b) of such title is amended by striking ``Secretary of Defense'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Director, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense''. (3) Section 443(d) of such title is amended-- (A) in the subsection caption, by striking ``Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Central Intelligence Agency''; and (B) by striking ``of the Agency shall coordinate with the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (4) Section 451 of such title is amended by striking ``Secretary of Defense'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Director, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense,''. (5) Section 452(a) of such title is amended-- (A) by striking ``of the Department of Defense''; and (B) by striking ``Secretary of Defense'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Director''. (6) Section 455(b)(1) of such title is amended by striking ``Department of Defense'' and inserting ``United States Government''. (7) Section 457(a) of such title is amended by striking ``Secretary of Defense'' and inserting ``Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the National Intelligence Director,''. (8) Section 462 of such title is further amended by striking ``by the Secretary of Defense''. (a) Supervision.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be under the direction, supervision, and control of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Line of Authority.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director regarding the activities of the National Reconnaissance Office. On page 196, line 20, strike ``304.'' and insert ``308.''. On page 197, line 8, strike ``305.'' and insert ``309.''. On page 198, line 19, strike ``306.'' and insert ``310.''. On page 200, line 5, strike ``307.'' and insert ``311.''. On page 200, strike lines 9 through 11 and insert the following: (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (6) as paragraphs (3) through (7), respectively; (2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following new paragraphs: ``(1) ensure that-- ``(A) the budgets of the elements of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense relating to the tactical intelligence activities of such elements are adequate to satisfy the tactical intelligence needs of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands; and ``(B) the budgets of the elements of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense relating to the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of such elements-- ``(i) comply with the requirements and priorities specified by the Director with respect to the National Intelligence Program; and ``(ii) conform, to the maximum extent, to the guidance provided by the Director to such elements on those portions of their budgets in the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program; ``(2) ensure that the national intelligence needs of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands, are conveyed to the Director for purposes of setting requirements and priorities for national intelligence;''; (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by striking ``appropriate''; and (4) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by inserting ``and comply with the national intelligence decisions of the Director'' before the semicolon. (b) Specific Functions.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended-- (1) by striking paragraphs (1), (2), and (3); (2) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) respectively; (3) in paragraph (1), as so redesignated, by striking ``or the National Security Council)'' and inserting ``, the National Security Council, or the National Intelligence Director (when exercising the responsibilities and authorities provided under this Act, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, or any other provision of law))''; and (4) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking ``Department of Defense human intelligence activities, including''. (c) Annual Evaluation of Performance of Certain Officials.--Such section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d) Annual Evaluation of Performance of Certain Officials.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submit each year to the National Security Council, the National Intelligence Director, and the appropriate committees of Congress an evaluation of the performance and responsiveness to military intelligence requirements of the officials specified in paragraph (2). ``(2) The officials specified in this paragraph are as follows: ``(A) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. ``(B) The Director of the National Security Agency. ``(C) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(D) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(E) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. On page 200, line 12, strike ``308.'' and insert ``312.''. On page 200, line 19, strike ``309.'' and insert ``313.''. On page 201, line 11, strike ``310.'' and insert ``314.''. On page 203, between lines 8 and 9, insert the following: (a) Oversight.--(1) Chapter 8 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 193 the following new section: (a) Oversight.--(1) Chapter 8 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 193 the following new section: ``Sec. 193a. Combat support agencies of the intelligence community: oversight", u"SA 758. Mr. DASCHLE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table, as follows: On page 21, after line 20, insert the following: SA 759. Mr. NELSON of Florida proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; as follows: At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following: SA 760. Mr. COCHRAN (for himself, Mr. Reed, Mr. Chambliss, Mr. Nelson of Nebraska, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Bond, and Mr. Nelson of Florida) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: On page 40, between lines 7 and, 8 insert the following: SA 761. Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina (for himself, Mr. Miller, and Mrs. Clinton) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: On page 152 strike line 22 and all that follows through line 9 on page 153, and insert the following: (a) Age and Service Requirements.--Subsection (a) of section 12731 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(a)(1) Except as provided in subsection (c), a person is entitled, upon application, to retired pay computed under section 12739 of this title, if the person-- ``(A) satisfies one of the combinations of requirements for minimum age and minimum number of years of service (computed under section 12732 of this title) that are specified in the table in paragraph (2); ``(B) performed the last six years of qualifying service while a member of any category named in section 12732(a)(1) of this title, but not while a member of a regular component, the Fleet Reserve, or the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, except that in the case of a person who completed 20 years of service computed under section 12732 of this title before October 5, 1994, the number of years of qualifying service under this subparagraph shall be eight; and ``(C) is not entitled, under any other provision of law, to retired pay from an armed force or retainer pay as a member of the Fleet Reserve or the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. ``(a)(2) The combinations of minimum age and minimum years of service required of a person under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) for entitlement to retired pay as provided in such paragraph are as follows:``Age, iThe minimum years of service at least required for that age is: 53.................................................................34 54.................................................................32 55.................................................................30 56.................................................................28 57.................................................................26 58.................................................................24 59.................................................................22 60.............................................................20.''. SA 762. Ms. COLLINS (for herself and Mr. Voinovich) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of the bill, add the following: This title may be cited as the ``National Security Personnel System Act''. (a) In General.--(1) Subpart I of part III of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new chapter: ``For purposes of this chapter-- ``(1) the term `Director' means the Director of the Office of Personnel Management; and ``(2) the term `Secretary' means the Secretary of Defense. ``For purposes of this chapter-- ``(1) the term `Director' means the Director of the Office of Personnel Management; and ``(2) the term `Secretary' means the Secretary of Defense. ``Sec. 9902. Establishment of human resources management system ``For purposes of this chapter-- ``(1) the term `Director' means the Director of the Office of Personnel Management; and ``(2) the term `Secretary' means the Secretary of Defense. ``Sec. 9902. Establishment of human resources management system ``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, the Secretary may, in regulations prescribed jointly with the Director, establish a human resources management system for some or all of the organizational or functional units of the Department of Defense. The human resources system established under authority of this section shall be referred to as the `National Security Personnel System'. ``(b) System Requirements.--The National Security Personnel System established under subsection (a) shall-- ``(1) be flexible; ``(2) be contemporary; ``(3) not waive, modify, or otherwise affect-- ``(A) the public employment principles of merit and fitness set forth in section 2301, including the principles of hiring based on merit, fair treatment without regard to political affiliation or other nonmerit considerations, equal pay for equal work, and protection of employees against reprisal for whistleblowing; ``(B) any provision of section 2302, relating to prohibited personnel practices; ``(C)(i) any provision of law referred to in section 2302(b)(1), (8), and (9); or ``(ii) any provision of law implementing any provision of law referred to in section 2302(b) (1), (8), and (9) by-- ``(I) providing for equal employment opportunity through affirmative action; or ``(II) providing any right or remedy available to any employee or applicant for employment in the public service; ``(D) any other provision of this part (as described in subsection (c)); or ``(E) any rule or regulation prescribed under any provision of law referred to in this paragraph; ``(4) ensure that employees may organize, bargain collectively as provided for in this chapter, and participate through labor organizations of their own choosing in decisions which affect them, subject to the provisions of this chapter and any exclusion from coverage or limitation on negotiability established pursuant to law; and ``(5) not be limited by any specific law, authority, rule, or regulation prescribed under this title that is waived in regulations prescribed under this chapter. ``(c) Other Nonwaivable Provisions.--The other provisions of this part referred to in subsection (b)(3)(D) are (to the extent not otherwise specified in this title)-- ``(1) subparts A, B, E, G, and H of this part; and ``(2) chapters 41, 45, 47, 55 (except subchapter V thereof), 57, 59, 71, 72, 73, and 79, and this chapter. ``(d) Limitations Relating to Pay.--(1) Nothing in this section shall constitute authority to modify the pay of any employee who serves in an Executive Schedule position under subchapter II of chapter 53 of this title. ``(2) Except as provided for in paragraph (1), the total amount in a calendar year of allowances, differentials, bonuses, awards, or other similar cash payments paid under this title to any employee who is paid under section 5376 or 5383 of this title or under title 10 or under other comparable pay authority established for payment of Department of Defense senior executive or equivalent employees may not exceed the total annual compensation payable to the Vice President under section 104 of title 3. ``(e) Provisions To Ensure Collaboration With Employee Representatives.--(1) In order to ensure that the authority of this section is exercised in collaboration with, and in a manner that ensures the participation of, employee representatives in the planning, development, and implementation of any human resources management system or adjustments to such system under this section, the Secretary and the Director shall provide for the following: ``(A) The Secretary and the Director shall, with respect to any proposed system or adjustment-- ``(i) provide to the employee representatives representing any employees who might be affected a written description of the proposed system or adjustment (including the reasons why it is considered necessary); ``(ii) give such representatives at least 30 calendar days (unless extraordinary circumstances require earlier action) to review and make recommendations with respect to the proposal; and ``(iii) give any recommendations received from such representatives under clause (ii) full and fair consideration in deciding whether or how to proceed with the proposal. ``(B) Following receipt of recommendations, if any, from such employee representatives with respect to a proposal described in subparagraph (A), the Secretary and the Director shall accept such modifications to the proposal in response to the recommendations as they determine advisable and shall, with respect to any parts of the proposal as to which they have not accepted the recommendations-- ``(i) notify Congress of those parts of the proposal, together with the recommendations of the employee representatives; ``(ii) meet and confer for not less than 30 calendar days with the employee representatives, in order to attempt to reach agreement on whether or how to proceed with those parts of the proposal; and ``(iii) at the Secretary's option, or if requested by a majority of the employee representatives participating, use the services of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service during such meet and confer period to facilitate the process of attempting to reach agreement. ``(C)(i) Any part of the proposal as to which the representatives do not make a recommendation, or as to which the recommendations are accepted by the Secretary and the Director, may be implemented immediately. ``(ii) With respect to any parts of the proposal as to which recommendations have been made but not accepted by the Secretary and the Director, at any time after 30 calendar days have elapsed since the initiation of the congressional notification, consultation, and mediation procedures set forth in subparagraph (B), if the Secretary, in his discretion, determines that further consultation and mediation is unlikely to produce agreement, the Secretary may implement any or all of such parts (including any modifications made in response to the recommendations as the Secretary determines advisable), but only after 30 days have elapsed after notifying Congress of the decision to implement the part or parts involved (as so modified, if applicable). ``(iii) The Secretary shall notify Congress promptly of the implementation of any part of the proposal and shall furnish with such notice an explanation of the proposal, any changes made to the proposal as a result of recommendations from the employee representatives, and of the reasons why implementation is appropriate under this subparagraph. ``(D) If a proposal described in subparagraph (A) is implemented, the Secretary and the Director shall-- ``(i) develop a method for the employee representatives to participate in any further planning or development which might become necessary; and ``(ii) give the employee representatives adequate access to information to make that participation productive. ``(2) The Secretary may, at the Secretary's discretion, engage in any and all collaboration activities described in this subsection at an organizational level above the level of exclusive recognition. ``(3) In the case of any employees who are not within a unit with respect to which a labor organization is accorded exclusive recognition, the Secretary and the Director may develop procedures for representation by any appropriate organization which represents a substantial percentage of those employees or, if none, in such other manner as may be appropriate, consistent with the purposes of this subsection. ``(f) Pay-for-Performance Evaluation System.--(1) The National Security Personnel System established in accordance with this chapter shall include a pay-for-performance evaluation system to better link individual pay to performance and provide an equitable method for appraising and compensating employees. ``(2) The regulations implementing this chapter shall-- ``(A) group employees into pay bands in accordance with the type of function that such employees perform and their level of responsibility; and ``(B) establish a performance rating process, which shall include, at a minimum-- ``(i) rating periods; ``(ii) communication and feedback requirements; ``(iii) performance scoring systems; ``(iv) a system for linking performance scores to salary increases and performance incentives; ``(v) a review process; ``(vi) a process for addressing performance that fails to meet expectations; and ``(vii) a pay-out process. ``(3) For fiscal years 2004 through 2008, the overall amount allocated for compensation of the civilian employees of an organizational or functional unit of the Department of Defense that is included in the National Security Personnel System shall not be less than the amount of civilian pay that would have been allocated to such compensation under the General Schedule system, based on-- ``(A) the number and mix of employees in such organizational or functional unit prior to the conversion of such employees to the National Security Personnel System; and ``(B) adjusted for normal step increases and rates of promotion that would have been expected, had such employees remained in the General System system. ``(4) The regulations implementing the National Security Personnel System shall provide a formula for calculating the overall amount to be allocated for fiscal years after fiscal year 2008 for compensation of the civilian employees of an organizational or functional unit of the Department of Defense that is included in the National Security Personnel System. The formula shall ensure that such employees are not disadvantaged in terms of the overall amount of pay available as a result of conversion to the National Security Personnel System, while providing flexibility to accommodate changes in the function of the organization, changes in the mix of employees performing those functions, and other changed circumstances that might impact pay levels. ``(5) Funds allocated for compensation of the civilian employees of an organizational or functional unit of the Department of Defense in accordance with paragraph (3) or (4) may not be made available for any other purpose unless the Secretary of Defense determines that such action is necessary in the national interest and submits a reprogramming notification in accordance with established procedures. ``(g) Performance Management System.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop and implement for organizational and functional units included in the National Security Personnel System, a performance management system that includes-- ``(1) adherence to merit principles set forth in section 2301; ``(2) a fair, credible, and equitable system that results in meaningful distinctions in individual employee performance; ``(3) a link between the performance management system and the agency's strategic plan; ``(4) a means for ensuring employee involvement in the design and implementation of the system; ``(5) adequate training and retraining for supervisors, managers, and employees in the implementation and operation of the performance management system; ``(6) a process for ensuring ongoing performance feedback and dialogue between supervisors, managers, and employees throughout the appraisal period, and setting timetables for review; ``(7) effective transparency and accountability measures to ensure that the management of the system is fair, credible, and equitable, including appropriate independent reasonableness, reviews, internal grievance procedures, internal assessments, and employee surveys; and ``(8) a means for ensuring that adequate agency resources are allocated for the design, implementation, and administration of the performance management system. ``(h) Provisions Regarding National Level Bargaining.--(1) The National Security Personnel System implemented or modified under this chapter may include employees of the Department of Defense from any bargaining unit with respect to which a labor organization has been accorded exclusive recognition under chapter 71 of this title. ``(2) For issues impacting more than 1 bargaining unit so included under paragraph (1), the Secretary may bargain at an organizational level above the level of exclusive recognition. Any such bargaining shall-- ``(A) be binding on all subordinate bargaining units at the level of recognition and their exclusive representatives, and the Department of Defense and its subcomponents, without regard to levels of recognition; ``(B) supersede all other collective bargaining agreements, including collective bargaining agreements negotiated with an exclusive representative at the level of recognition, except as otherwise determined by the Secretary; and ``(C) not be subject to further negotiations for any purpose, including bargaining at the level of recognition, except as provided for by the Secretary. ``(3) The National Guard Bureau and the Army and Air Force National Guard are excluded from coverage under this subsection. ``(4) Any bargaining completed pursuant to this subsection with a labor organization not otherwise having national consultation rights with the Department of Defense or its subcomponents shall not create any obligation on the Department of Defense or its subcomponents to confer national consultation rights on such a labor organization. ``(i) Provisions Relating to Appellate Procedures.--(1) The Secretary shall-- ``(A) establish an appeals process that provides that employees of the Department of Defense are entitled to fair treatment in any appeals that they bring in decisions relating to their employment; and ``(B) in prescribing regulations for any such appeals process-- ``(i) ensure that employees of the Department of Defense are afforded the protections of due process; and ``(ii) toward that end, be required to consult with the Merit Systems Protection Board before issuing any such regulations. ``(2) On and after the date occurring 3 years after the date of enactment of the National Security Personnel System Act an employee of the Department of Defense-- ``(A) may not appeal any employment related decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board; and ``(B) shall make any such appeal under the appeals process established under paragraph (1). ``(j) Phase-In.--(1) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to apply the National Security Personnel System established in accordance with subsection (a) to organizational or functional units including-- ``(A) up to 120,000 civilian employees of the Department of Defense in fiscal year 2004; ``(B) up to 240,000 civilian employees of the Department of Defense in fiscal year 2005; ``(C) up to 360,000 civilian employees in the first fiscal year after the Department meets the criteria specified in paragraph (2); ``(D) up to 480,000 civilian employees in the second fiscal year after the Department meets the criteria specified in paragraph (2); and ``(E) the entire civilian workforce of the Department of Defense in the third fiscal year after the Department meets the criteria specified in paragraph (2). ``(2) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to increase the scope of the National Security Personnel System in accordance with subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E) of paragraph (1) in a fiscal year after fiscal year 2005, if the Director of the Office of Personnel Management has certified that the Department has in place-- ``(A) a performance management system that meets the criteria specified in subsection (g); and ``(B) a pay formula that meets the criteria specified in subsection (f). ``(3) Civilian employees in organizational or functional units participating in Department of Defense personnel demonstration projects shall be counted as participants in the National Security Personnel System for the purpose of the limitations established under paragraph (1). ``(k) Provisions Related to Separation and Retirement Incentives.--(1) The Secretary may establish a program within the Department of Defense under which employees may be eligible for early retirement, offered separation incentive pay to separate from service voluntarily, or both. This authority may be used to reduce the number of personnel employed by the Department of Defense or to restructure the workforce to meet mission objectives without reducing the overall number of personnel. This authority is in addition to, and notwithstanding, any other authorities established by law or regulation for such programs. ``(2)(A) The Secretary may not authorize the payment of voluntary separation incentive pay under paragraph (1) to more than 10,000 employees in any fiscal year, except that employees who receive voluntary separation incentive pay as a result of a closure or realignment of a military installation under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) shall not be included in that number. ``(B) The Secretary shall prepare a report each fiscal year setting forth the number of employees who received such pay as a result of a closure or realignment of a military base as described under subparagraph (A). ``(C) The Secretary shall submit the report under subparagraph (B) to-- ``(i) the Committee on the Armed Services and the Committee on Government Affairs of the Senate; and ``(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives. ``(3) For purposes of this section, the term `employee' means an employee of the Department of Defense, serving under an appointment without time limitation, except that such term does not include-- ``(A) a reemployed annuitant under subchapter III of chapter 83 or chapter 84 of this title, or another retirement system for employees of the Federal Government; ``(B) an employee having a disability on the basis of which such employee is or would be eligible for disability retirement under any of the retirement systems referred to in paragraph (1); or ``(C) for purposes of eligibility for separation incentives under this section, an employee who is in receipt of a decision notice of involuntary separation for misconduct or unacceptable performance. ``(4) An employee who is at least 50 years of age and has completed 20 years of service, or has at least 25 years of service, may, pursuant to regulations promulgated under this section, apply and be retired from the Department of Defense and receive benefits in accordance with chapter 83 or 84 if the employee has been employed continuously within the Department of Defense for more than 30 days before the date on which the determination to conduct a reduction or restructuring within 1 or more Department of Defense components is approved pursuant to the system established under subsection (a). ``(5)(A) Separation pay shall be paid in a lump sum or in installments and shall be equal to the lesser of-- ``(i) an amount equal to the amount the employee would be entitled to receive under section 5595(c) of this title, if the employee were entitled to payment under such section; or ``(ii) $25,000. ``(B) Separation pay shall not be a basis for payment, and shall not be included in the computation, of any other type of Government benefit. Separation pay shall not be taken into account for the purpose of determining the amount of any severance pay to which an individual may be entitled under section 5595 of this title, based on any other separation. ``(C) Separation pay, if paid in installments, shall cease to be paid upon the recipient's acceptance of employment by the Federal Government, or commencement of work under a personal services contract as described in paragraph (5). ``(6) An employee who receives separation pay under this section on the basis of a separation occurring on or after the date of the enactment of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 111) and accepts employment with the Government of the United States, or who commences work through a personal services contract with the United States within 5 years after the date of the separation on which payment of the separation pay is based, shall be required to repay the entire amount of the separation pay to the Department of Defense. If the employment is with an Executive agency (as defined by section 105 of this title) other than the Department of Defense, the Director may, at the request of the head of that agency, waive the repayment if the individual involved possesses unique abilities and is the only qualified applicant available for the position. If the employment is within the Department of Defense, the Secretary may waive the repayment if the individual involved is the only qualified applicant available for the position. If the employment is with an entity in the legislative branch, the head of the entity or the appointing official may waive the repayment if the individual involved possesses unique abilities and is the only qualified applicant available for the position. If the employment is with the judicial branch, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may waive the repayment if the individual involved possesses unique abilities and is the only qualified applicant available for the position. ``(7) Under this program, early retirement and separation pay may be offered only pursuant to regulations established by the Secretary, subject to such limitations or conditions as the Secretary may require. ``(l) Provisions Relating to Hiring.--Notwithstanding subsection (c), the Secretary may exercise any hiring flexibilities that would otherwise be available to the Secretary under section 4703(a)(1). SA 763. Mrs. HUTCHISON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; as follows: SA 764. Mr. BINGAMAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: SA 765. Mr. BINGAMAN (for himself, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Biden) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; as follows: At the end of subtitle C of title II, add the following: SA 766. Mr. NELSON of Florida (for himself, Mr. Warner, and Mr. Levin) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; as follows: At the end of subtitle B of title XXXI, add the following: SA 767. Mr. NELSON of Florida (for himself, Mr. Warner, and Mr. Levin) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; as follows: At the appropriate place in Title XXXI in the bill add the following new section: SA 768. Mr. INHOFE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: On page 25, between lines 11 and 12, and insert the following: SA 769. Mr. INHOFE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following: (a) In General.--Chapter 101 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) In General.--Chapter 101 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 2019. Range management (a) In General.--Chapter 101 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 2019. Range management ``(a) Definition of Solid Waste.--(1) The term `solid waste' as used in the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.) does not include military munitions, including unexploded ordnance, and the constituents thereof, that are or have been deposited, incident to their normal and expected use, on an operational range, and remain thereon, unless such military munitions, including unexploded ordnance, or the constituents thereof-- ``(A) are recovered, collected, and then disposed of by burial or land filling; or ``(B) have migrated off an operational range and are not addressed through a response action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.). ``(2) The military munitions, including unexploded ordnance, or constituents thereof that become a solid waste under subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) shall be subject to the provisions of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, including but not limited to sections 7002 and 7003, where applicable. ``(3) Nothing in this section affects the authority of Federal, State, interstate, or local regulatory authorities to determine when military munitions, including unexploded ordnance, or the constituents thereof, become hazardous waste for purposes of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, except for military munitions, including unexploded ordnance, or the constituents thereof, that are excluded from the definition of solid waste by this subsection. ``(b) Definition of Release.--(1) The term `release' as used in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) does not include the deposit or presence on an operational range of any military munitions, including unexploded ordnance, and the constituents thereof, that are or have been deposited thereon incident to their normal and expected use, and remain thereon. The term `release' does include the deposit off an operational range, or the migration off an operational range, of military munitions, including unexploded ordnance, or the constituents thereof. ``(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), the authority of the President under section 106(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9606(a)) to take action because there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance includes the authority to take action because of the deposit or presence on an operational range of any military munitions, including unexploded ordnance, or the constituents thereof that are or have been deposited thereon incident to their normal and expected use and remain thereon. ``(c) Definition of Constituents.--In this section, the term `constituents' means any materials originating from military munitions, including unexploded ordnance, explosive and non-explosive materials, and emission, degradation, or breakdown products of such munitions. ``(d) Change in Range Status.--Nothing in this section affects the legal requirements applicable to military munitions, including unexploded ordnance, and the constituents thereof, that have been deposited on an operational range, once the range ceases to be an operational range. ``(e) Construction.--Nothing in this section affects the authority of the Department of Defense to protect the environment, safety, and health on operational ranges.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item: SA 770. Mr. DODD submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows; Strike section 852, and insert the following: SA 771. Mr. DODD submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: On page 17, strike line 11 and insert the following: SA 772. Mr. GRASSLEY (for himself, Mr. Harkin, and Mr. Durbin) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: On page 83, between lines 5 and 6, insert the following: (a) Authority.--Chapter 433 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Authority.--Chapter 433 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Sec. 4544. Army industrial facilities: public-private partnerships for Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise SA 773. Mr. SMITH (for himself, Mr. Wyden) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: SA 774. Mr. HARKIN proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1050, to authorize for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: On page 44, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following: SA 775. Ms. MIKULSKI submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 1050, to authorize for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: SA 776. Mr. BENNETT (for himself, Mr. Reid, and Mr. Allen) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1050, to authorize for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; as follows: At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following: SA 777. Mr. VOINVICH (for himself and Mr. DeWine) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: SA 778. Mr. McCAIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: On page 155, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following: SA 778. Mr. ALLARD submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: Strike section 1035 and insert the following: (a) Consolidation of Current Provisions on Protection of Operational Files.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by transferring sections 105C and 105D to the end of title VII and redesignating such sections, as so transferred, as sections 703 and 704, respectively. (b) Protection of Operational Files of NSA.--Title VII of such Act, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Consolidation of Current Provisions on Protection of Operational Files.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by transferring sections 105C and 105D to the end of title VII and redesignating such sections, as so transferred, as sections 703 and 704, respectively. (b) Protection of Operational Files of NSA.--Title VII of such Act, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``operational files of the national security agency (a) Consolidation of Current Provisions on Protection of Operational Files.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by transferring sections 105C and 105D to the end of title VII and redesignating such sections, as so transferred, as sections 703 and 704, respectively. (b) Protection of Operational Files of NSA.--Title VII of such Act, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``operational files of the national security agency ``Sec. 705. (a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files From Search, Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) Operational files of the National Security Agency (hereafter in this section referred to as `NSA') may be exempted by the Director of NSA, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, from the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, which require publication, disclosure, search, or review in connection therewith. ``(2)(A) In this section, the term `operational files' means-- ``(i) files of the Signals Intelligence Directorate, and its successor organizations, which document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through technical systems; and ``(ii) files of the Research Associate Directorate, and its successor organizations, which document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems. ``(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated intelligence, and files that have been accessioned into NSA Archives, or its successor organizations, are not operational files. ``(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational files shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning-- ``(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 or 552a of title 5, United States Code; ``(B) any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code; or ``(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity: ``(i) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. ``(ii) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. ``(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board. ``(iv) The Department of Justice. ``(v) The Office of General Counsel of NSA. ``(vi) The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. ``(vii) The Office of the Director of NSA. ``(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) which contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files shall be subject to search and review. ``(B) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) shall not affect the exemption under paragraph (1) of the originating operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure. ``(C) The declassification of some of the information contained in exempted operational files shall not affect the status of the operational file as being exempt from search, review, publication, or disclosure. ``(D) Records from exempted operational files which have been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1), and which have been returned to exempted operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review. ``(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded except by a provision of law which is enacted after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, and which specifically cites and repeals or modifies such provisions. ``(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever any person who has requested agency records under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, alleges that NSA has withheld records improperly because of failure to comply with any provision of this section, judicial review shall be available under the terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code. ``(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows: ``(i) In any case in which information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by NSA, such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court. ``(ii) The court shall determine, to the fullest extent practicable, the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties. ``(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records are improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, NSA shall meet its burden under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission that exempted operational files likely to contain responsible records currently perform the functions set forth in paragraph (2). ``(II) The court may not order NSA to review the content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make the demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the complainant disputes NSA's showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36. ``(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NSA has improperly withheld requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall order NSA to search and review the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and such order shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to comply with this subsection. ``(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this paragraph NSA agrees to search the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint. ``(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated with the Director of Central Intelligence before submission to the court. ``(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) Not less than once every 10 years, the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions may be removed from a category of exempted files or any portion thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must approve any determination to remove such exemptions. ``(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of a particular category of files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained therein. ``(3) A complainant that alleges that NSA has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of the United States of the district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to determining the following: ``(A) Whether NSA has conducted the review required by paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 or before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the most recent review. ``(B) Whether NSA, in fact, considered the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.''. (c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 701(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431(b)) is amended by striking ``For purposes of this title'' and inserting ``In this section and section 702,''. (2) Section 702(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 432(c)) is amended by striking ``enactment of this title'' and inserting ``October 15, 1984,''. (3)(A) The title heading for title VII of such Act is amended to read as follows: (a) Consolidation of Current Provisions on Protection of Operational Files.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by transferring sections 105C and 105D to the end of title VII and redesignating such sections, as so transferred, as sections 703 and 704, respectively. (b) Protection of Operational Files of NSA.--Title VII of such Act, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``operational files of the national security agency ``Sec. 705. (a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files From Search, Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) Operational files of the National Security Agency (hereafter in this section referred to as `NSA') may be exempted by the Director of NSA, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, from the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, which require publication, disclosure, search, or review in connection therewith. ``(2)(A) In this section, the term `operational files' means-- ``(i) files of the Signals Intelligence Directorate, and its successor organizations, which document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through technical systems; and ``(ii) files of the Research Associate Directorate, and its successor organizations, which document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems. ``(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated intelligence, and files that have been accessioned into NSA Archives, or its successor organizations, are not operational files. ``(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational files shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning-- ``(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 or 552a of title 5, United States Code; ``(B) any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code; or ``(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity: ``(i) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. ``(ii) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. ``(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board. ``(iv) The Department of Justice. ``(v) The Office of General Counsel of NSA. ``(vi) The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. ``(vii) The Office of the Director of NSA. ``(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) which contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files shall be subject to search and review. ``(B) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) shall not affect the exemption under paragraph (1) of the originating operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure. ``(C) The declassification of some of the information contained in exempted operational files shall not affect the status of the operational file as being exempt from search, review, publication, or disclosure. ``(D) Records from exempted operational files which have been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1), and which have been returned to exempted operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review. ``(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded except by a provision of law which is enacted after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, and which specifically cites and repeals or modifies such provisions. ``(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever any person who has requested agency records under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, alleges that NSA has withheld records improperly because of failure to comply with any provision of this section, judicial review shall be available under the terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code. ``(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows: ``(i) In any case in which information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by NSA, such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court. ``(ii) The court shall determine, to the fullest extent practicable, the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties. ``(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records are improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, NSA shall meet its burden under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission that exempted operational files likely to contain responsible records currently perform the functions set forth in paragraph (2). ``(II) The court may not order NSA to review the content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make the demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the complainant disputes NSA's showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36. ``(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NSA has improperly withheld requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall order NSA to search and review the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and such order shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to comply with this subsection. ``(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this paragraph NSA agrees to search the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint. ``(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated with the Director of Central Intelligence before submission to the court. ``(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) Not less than once every 10 years, the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions may be removed from a category of exempted files or any portion thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must approve any determination to remove such exemptions. ``(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of a particular category of files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained therein. ``(3) A complainant that alleges that NSA has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of the United States of the district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to determining the following: ``(A) Whether NSA has conducted the review required by paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 or before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the most recent review. ``(B) Whether NSA, in fact, considered the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.''. (c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 701(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431(b)) is amended by striking ``For purposes of this title'' and inserting ``In this section and section 702,''. (2) Section 702(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 432(c)) is amended by striking ``enactment of this title'' and inserting ``October 15, 1984,''. (3)(A) The title heading for title VII of such Act is amended to read as follows: ``TITLE VII--PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES''. (a) Consolidation of Current Provisions on Protection of Operational Files.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by transferring sections 105C and 105D to the end of title VII and redesignating such sections, as so transferred, as sections 703 and 704, respectively. (b) Protection of Operational Files of NSA.--Title VII of such Act, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``operational files of the national security agency ``Sec. 705. (a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files From Search, Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) Operational files of the National Security Agency (hereafter in this section referred to as `NSA') may be exempted by the Director of NSA, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, from the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, which require publication, disclosure, search, or review in connection therewith. ``(2)(A) In this section, the term `operational files' means-- ``(i) files of the Signals Intelligence Directorate, and its successor organizations, which document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through technical systems; and ``(ii) files of the Research Associate Directorate, and its successor organizations, which document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems. ``(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated intelligence, and files that have been accessioned into NSA Archives, or its successor organizations, are not operational files. ``(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational files shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning-- ``(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 or 552a of title 5, United States Code; ``(B) any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code; or ``(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity: ``(i) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. ``(ii) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. ``(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board. ``(iv) The Department of Justice. ``(v) The Office of General Counsel of NSA. ``(vi) The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. ``(vii) The Office of the Director of NSA. ``(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) which contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files shall be subject to search and review. ``(B) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) shall not affect the exemption under paragraph (1) of the originating operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure. ``(C) The declassification of some of the information contained in exempted operational files shall not affect the status of the operational file as being exempt from search, review, publication, or disclosure. ``(D) Records from exempted operational files which have been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1), and which have been returned to exempted operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review. ``(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded except by a provision of law which is enacted after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, and which specifically cites and repeals or modifies such provisions. ``(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever any person who has requested agency records under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, alleges that NSA has withheld records improperly because of failure to comply with any provision of this section, judicial review shall be available under the terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code. ``(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows: ``(i) In any case in which information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by NSA, such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court. ``(ii) The court shall determine, to the fullest extent practicable, the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties. ``(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records are improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, NSA shall meet its burden under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission that exempted operational files likely to contain responsible records currently perform the functions set forth in paragraph (2). ``(II) The court may not order NSA to review the content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make the demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the complainant disputes NSA's showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36. ``(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NSA has improperly withheld requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall order NSA to search and review the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and such order shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to comply with this subsection. ``(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this paragraph NSA agrees to search the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint. ``(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated with the Director of Central Intelligence before submission to the court. ``(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) Not less than once every 10 years, the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions may be removed from a category of exempted files or any portion thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must approve any determination to remove such exemptions. ``(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of a particular category of files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained therein. ``(3) A complainant that alleges that NSA has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of the United States of the district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to determining the following: ``(A) Whether NSA has conducted the review required by paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 or before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the most recent review. ``(B) Whether NSA, in fact, considered the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.''. (c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 701(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431(b)) is amended by striking ``For purposes of this title'' and inserting ``In this section and section 702,''. (2) Section 702(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 432(c)) is amended by striking ``enactment of this title'' and inserting ``October 15, 1984,''. (3)(A) The title heading for title VII of such Act is amended to read as follows: ``TITLE VII--PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES''. (B) The section heading for section 701 of such Act is amended to read as follows: (a) Consolidation of Current Provisions on Protection of Operational Files.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by transferring sections 105C and 105D to the end of title VII and redesignating such sections, as so transferred, as sections 703 and 704, respectively. (b) Protection of Operational Files of NSA.--Title VII of such Act, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``operational files of the national security agency ``Sec. 705. (a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files From Search, Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) Operational files of the National Security Agency (hereafter in this section referred to as `NSA') may be exempted by the Director of NSA, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, from the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, which require publication, disclosure, search, or review in connection therewith. ``(2)(A) In this section, the term `operational files' means-- ``(i) files of the Signals Intelligence Directorate, and its successor organizations, which document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through technical systems; and ``(ii) files of the Research Associate Directorate, and its successor organizations, which document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems. ``(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated intelligence, and files that have been accessioned into NSA Archives, or its successor organizations, are not operational files. ``(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational files shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning-- ``(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 or 552a of title 5, United States Code; ``(B) any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code; or ``(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity: ``(i) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. ``(ii) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. ``(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board. ``(iv) The Department of Justice. ``(v) The Office of General Counsel of NSA. ``(vi) The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. ``(vii) The Office of the Director of NSA. ``(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) which contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files shall be subject to search and review. ``(B) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) shall not affect the exemption under paragraph (1) of the originating operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure. ``(C) The declassification of some of the information contained in exempted operational files shall not affect the status of the operational file as being exempt from search, review, publication, or disclosure. ``(D) Records from exempted operational files which have been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1), and which have been returned to exempted operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review. ``(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded except by a provision of law which is enacted after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, and which specifically cites and repeals or modifies such provisions. ``(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever any person who has requested agency records under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, alleges that NSA has withheld records improperly because of failure to comply with any provision of this section, judicial review shall be available under the terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code. ``(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows: ``(i) In any case in which information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by NSA, such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court. ``(ii) The court shall determine, to the fullest extent practicable, the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties. ``(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records are improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, NSA shall meet its burden under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission that exempted operational files likely to contain responsible records currently perform the functions set forth in paragraph (2). ``(II) The court may not order NSA to review the content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make the demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the complainant disputes NSA's showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36. ``(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NSA has improperly withheld requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall order NSA to search and review the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and such order shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to comply with this subsection. ``(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this paragraph NSA agrees to search the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint. ``(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated with the Director of Central Intelligence before submission to the court. ``(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) Not less than once every 10 years, the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions may be removed from a category of exempted files or any portion thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must approve any determination to remove such exemptions. ``(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of a particular category of files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained therein. ``(3) A complainant that alleges that NSA has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of the United States of the district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to determining the following: ``(A) Whether NSA has conducted the review required by paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 or before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the most recent review. ``(B) Whether NSA, in fact, considered the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.''. (c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 701(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431(b)) is amended by striking ``For purposes of this title'' and inserting ``In this section and section 702,''. (2) Section 702(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 432(c)) is amended by striking ``enactment of this title'' and inserting ``October 15, 1984,''. (3)(A) The title heading for title VII of such Act is amended to read as follows: ``TITLE VII--PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES''. (B) The section heading for section 701 of such Act is amended to read as follows:``protection of operational files of the central intelligence agency''. (a) Consolidation of Current Provisions on Protection of Operational Files.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by transferring sections 105C and 105D to the end of title VII and redesignating such sections, as so transferred, as sections 703 and 704, respectively. (b) Protection of Operational Files of NSA.--Title VII of such Act, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``operational files of the national security agency ``Sec. 705. (a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files From Search, Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) Operational files of the National Security Agency (hereafter in this section referred to as `NSA') may be exempted by the Director of NSA, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, from the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, which require publication, disclosure, search, or review in connection therewith. ``(2)(A) In this section, the term `operational files' means-- ``(i) files of the Signals Intelligence Directorate, and its successor organizations, which document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through technical systems; and ``(ii) files of the Research Associate Directorate, and its successor organizations, which document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems. ``(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated intelligence, and files that have been accessioned into NSA Archives, or its successor organizations, are not operational files. ``(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational files shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning-- ``(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 or 552a of title 5, United States Code; ``(B) any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code; or ``(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity: ``(i) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. ``(ii) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. ``(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board. ``(iv) The Department of Justice. ``(v) The Office of General Counsel of NSA. ``(vi) The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. ``(vii) The Office of the Director of NSA. ``(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) which contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files shall be subject to search and review. ``(B) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) shall not affect the exemption under paragraph (1) of the originating operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure. ``(C) The declassification of some of the information contained in exempted operational files shall not affect the status of the operational file as being exempt from search, review, publication, or disclosure. ``(D) Records from exempted operational files which have been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1), and which have been returned to exempted operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review. ``(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded except by a provision of law which is enacted after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, and which specifically cites and repeals or modifies such provisions. ``(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever any person who has requested agency records under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, alleges that NSA has withheld records improperly because of failure to comply with any provision of this section, judicial review shall be available under the terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code. ``(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows: ``(i) In any case in which information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by NSA, such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court. ``(ii) The court shall determine, to the fullest extent practicable, the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties. ``(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records are improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, NSA shall meet its burden under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission that exempted operational files likely to contain responsible records currently perform the functions set forth in paragraph (2). ``(II) The court may not order NSA to review the content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make the demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the complainant disputes NSA's showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36. ``(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NSA has improperly withheld requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall order NSA to search and review the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and such order shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to comply with this subsection. ``(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this paragraph NSA agrees to search the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint. ``(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated with the Director of Central Intelligence before submission to the court. ``(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) Not less than once every 10 years, the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions may be removed from a category of exempted files or any portion thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must approve any determination to remove such exemptions. ``(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of a particular category of files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained therein. ``(3) A complainant that alleges that NSA has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of the United States of the district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to determining the following: ``(A) Whether NSA has conducted the review required by paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 or before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the most recent review. ``(B) Whether NSA, in fact, considered the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.''. (c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 701(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431(b)) is amended by striking ``For purposes of this title'' and inserting ``In this section and section 702,''. (2) Section 702(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 432(c)) is amended by striking ``enactment of this title'' and inserting ``October 15, 1984,''. (3)(A) The title heading for title VII of such Act is amended to read as follows: ``TITLE VII--PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES''. (B) The section heading for section 701 of such Act is amended to read as follows:``protection of operational files of the central intelligence agency''. (C) The section heading for section 702 of such Act is amended to read as follows:", u"Mr. Speaker, today November 14, I was unavoidably detained and missed two rollcall votes numbered 479 and 480. Rollcall No. 479 was a vote on ordering the Previous Question concerning the Rule for H.R. 5063. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yea.'' Rollcall No. 480 was on passage of H. Res. 609, the ``Rule Providing for Consideration of the Armed Forced Tax Fairness Act of 2002.'' Had I been present I would have voted ``yea'' on H. Res. 609. The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 4628), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, having met after full and free conference, having agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate and agree to the same and with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amendment, insert the following: (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows: TITLE VI--NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED Subtitle B--Submittal of Reports to Intelligence Committees TITLE X--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2003 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The National Reconnaissance Office. (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (12) The Coast Guard. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2003, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on H.R. 4628 of the One Hundred Seventh Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2003 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2003 the sum of $158,254,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2004. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 322 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2003. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2003 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2004. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2003, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2003 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $34,100,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2004, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2005. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (a) Authorization.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2002 under section 101 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108) for the conduct of the intelligence activities of elements of the United States Government listed in such section are hereby increased, with respect to any such authorized amount, by the amount by which appropriations pursuant to such authorization were increased by the following: (1) The Emergency Supplemental Act, 2002 (contained in division B of Public Law 107-117), including section 304 of such Act (115 Stat. 2300). (2) The 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response To Terrorist Attacks on the United States (Public Law 107-206), for such amounts as are designated by Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(b)(2)(A)). (b) Ratification.--For purposes of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any obligation or expenditure of those amounts deemed to have been specifically authorized by the Acts referred to in subsection (a) is hereby ratified and confirmed. (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the amounts requested in the letter dated July 3, 2002, of the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, related to the Defense Emergency Response Fund and that are designated for the incremental costs of intelligence and intelligence- related activities for the war on terrorism are authorized. (b) Limitations.--The amounts referred to in subsection (a)-- (1) are authorized only for activities directly related to identifying, responding to, or protecting against acts or threatened acts of terrorism; (2) are not authorized to correct programmatic or fiscal deficiencies in major acquisition programs which will not achieve initial operational capabilities within two years of the date of the enactment of this Act; and (3) are not available until the end of the 10-day period that begins on the date written notice is provided to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. Funds appropriated for an intelligence or intelligence- related activity for fiscal year 2003 in excess of the amount specified for such activity in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act shall be deemed to be specifically authorized by Congress for purposes of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)). (a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 4628 of the One Hundred Seventh Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law. (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) Consultation in Preparation.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure that any report, review, study, or plan required to be prepared or conducted by a provision of this Act, including a provision of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) or the classified annex to this Act, that involves the intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy is prepared or conducted in consultation with the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate. (2) The Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy may carry out any consultation required by this subsection through an official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, as the case may be, designated by such Secretary for that purpose. (b) Submittal.--Any report, review, study, or plan referred to in subsection (a) shall be submitted, in addition to any other committee of Congress specified for submittal in the provision concerned, to the following committees of Congress: (1) The Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) The Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2003 the sum of $222,500,000. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the United States. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Section 552(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A) by inserting ``and except as provided in subparagraph (E),'' after ``of this subsection,''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(E) An agency, or part of an agency, that is an element of the intelligence community (as that term is defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) shall not make any record available under this paragraph to-- ``(i) any government entity, other than a State, territory, commonwealth, or district of the United States, or any subdivision thereof; or ``(ii) a representative of a government entity described in clause (i).''. (a) Establishment.--The Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the head of the intelligence community, shall establish in the intelligence community an element with the function of connecting the elements of the intelligence community engaged in the acquisition, storage, translation, or analysis of voice or data in digital form. (b) Designation.--The element established under subsection (a) shall be known as the National Virtual Translation Center. (c) Administrative Matters.--(1) The Director shall retain direct supervision and control over the element established under subsection (a). (2) The element established under subsection (a) shall connect elements of the intelligence community utilizing the most current available information technology that is applicable to the function of the element. (d) Deadline for Establishment.--The element required by subsection (a) shall be established as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, but not later than 90 days after that date. Section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (g) as subsection (h); and (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following new subsection (g): ``(g) Standards and Qualifications for Performance of Intelligence Activities.--The Director, acting as the head of the intelligence community, shall, in consultation with the heads of effected agencies, develop standards and qualifications for persons engaged in the performance of intelligence activities within the intelligence community.''. (a) In General.--Section 6339 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (b); (2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (b); and (3) by inserting after subsection (b) (as so redesignated by paragraph (2)) the following: ``(c)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of subsection (b), the head of an excepted agency may, at his sole discretion, by regulation establish a program under which an individual employed in or under such excepted agency may participate in a leave transfer program established under the provisions of this subchapter outside of this section, including provisions permitting the transfer of annual leave accrued or accumulated by such employee to, or permitting such employee to receive transferred leave from, an employee of any other agency (including another excepted agency having a program under this subsection). ``(2) To the extent practicable and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, any program established under paragraph (1) shall be consistent with the provisions of this subchapter outside of this section and with any regulations issued by the Office of Personnel Management implementing this subchapter.''. (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 6339 of such title is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) (as so redesignated by subsection (a)(2)), by striking ``under this section'' and inserting ``under this subsection''; and (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``of Personnel Management''. (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) The United States is engaged in a war against terrorism that requires the active participation of the intelligence community. (2) Certain intelligence agencies, among them the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, have announced that they will be hiring several hundred new agents to help conduct the war on terrorism. (3) Former Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency have stated that a more diverse intelligence community would be better equipped to gather and analyze information on diverse communities. (4) The Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency were authorized to establish an undergraduate training program for the purpose of recruiting and training minority operatives in 1987. (5) The Defense Intelligence Agency was authorized to establish an undergraduate training program for the purpose of recruiting and training minority operatives in 1988. (6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency was authorized to establish an undergraduate training program for the purpose of recruiting and training minority operatives in 2000. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (with respect to the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Bureau), the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency should make the creation of a more diverse workforce a priority in hiring decisions; and (2) the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency should increase their minority recruitment efforts through the undergraduate training program provided for under law. Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection: ``(c) Annual Report on Hiring and Retention of Minority Employees.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall, on an annual basis, submit to Congress a report on the employment of covered persons within each element of the intelligence community for the preceding fiscal year. ``(2) Each such report shall include disaggregated data by category of covered person from each element of the intelligence community on the following: ``(A) Of all individuals employed in the element during the fiscal year involved, the aggregate percentage of such individuals who are covered persons. ``(B) Of all individuals employed in the element during the fiscal year involved at the levels referred to in clauses (i) and (ii), the percentage of covered persons employed at such levels: ``(i) Positions at levels 1 through 15 of the General Schedule. ``(ii) Positions at levels above GS-15. ``(C) Of all individuals hired by the element involved during the fiscal year involved, the percentage of such individuals who are covered persons. ``(3) Each such report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. ``(4) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as providing for the substitution of any similar report required under another provision of law. ``(5) In this subsection, the term `covered persons' means-- ``(A) racial and ethnic minorities; ``(B) women; and ``(C) individuals with disabilities.''. (a) Report.--The Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of the National Security Education Program, shall prepare a report on the feasibility of establishing a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps comprised of individuals with advanced levels of proficiency in foreign languages who are United States citizens who would be available upon a call of the President to perform such service or duties with respect to such foreign languages in the Federal Government as the President may specify. In preparing the report, the Secretary shall consult with such organizations having expertise in training in foreign languages as the Secretary determines appropriate. (b) Matters Considered.-- (1) In general.--In conducting the study, the Secretary shall develop a proposal for the structure and operations of the Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps. The proposal shall establish requirements for performance of duties and levels of proficiency in foreign languages of the members of the Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, including maintenance of language skills and specific training required for performance of duties as a linguist of the Federal Government, and shall include recommendations on such other matters as the Secretary determines appropriate. (2) Consideration of use of defense language institute and language registries.--In developing the proposal under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consider the appropriateness of using-- (A) the Defense Language Institute to conduct testing for language skills proficiency and performance, and to provide language refresher courses; and (B) foreign language skill registries of the Department of Defense or of other agencies or departments of the United States to identify individuals with sufficient proficiency in foreign languages. (3) Consideration of the model of the reserve components of the armed forces.--In developing the proposal under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consider the provisions of title 10, United States Code, establishing and governing service in the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces, as a model for the Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps. (c) Completion of Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to Congress the report prepared under subsection (a). (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Defense $300,000 to carry out this section. (a) Program Authorized.--The National Security Act of 1947 is amended-- (1) by redesignating title X as title XI; (2) by redesignating section 1001 as section 1101; and (3) by inserting after title IX the following new title X: Section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(h) Use of Awards To Attend the Foreign Language Center of the Defense Language Institute.--(1) The Secretary shall provide for the admission of award recipients to the Foreign Language Center of the Defense Language Institute (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the `Center'). An award recipient may apply a portion of the applicable scholarship or fellowship award for instruction at the Center on a space-available basis as a Department of Defense sponsored program to defray the additive instructional costs. ``(2) Except as the Secretary determines necessary, an award recipient who receives instruction at the Center shall be subject to the same regulations with respect to attendance, discipline, discharge, and dismissal as apply to other persons attending the Center. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `award recipient' means an undergraduate student who has been awarded a scholarship under subsection (a)(1)(A) or a graduate student who has been awarded a fellowship under subsection (a)(1)(B) who-- ``(A) is in good standing; ``(B) has completed all academic study in a foreign country, as provided for under the scholarship or fellowship; and ``(C) would benefit from instruction provided at the Center.''. (a) National Flagship Language Initiative.-- (1) Expansion of grant program authority.--Subsection (a)(1) of section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended-- (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (B)(ii); (B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (C) and inserting ``; and''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(D) awarding grants to institutions of higher education to carry out activities under the National Flagship Language Initiative (described in subsection (i)).''. (2) Provisions of national flagship language initiative.-- Such section, as amended by section 332, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(i) National Flagship Language Initiative.--(1) Under the National Flagship Language Initiative, institutions of higher education shall establish, operate, or improve activities designed to train students in programs in a range of disciplines to achieve advanced levels of proficiency in those foreign languages that the Secretary identifies as being the most critical in the interests of the national security of the United States. ``(2) An undergraduate student who has been awarded a scholarship under subsection (a)(1)(A) or a graduate student who has been awarded a fellowship under subsection (a)(1)(B) may participate in the activities carried out under the National Flagship Language Initiative. ``(3) An institution of higher education that receives a grant pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(D) shall give special consideration to applicants who are employees of the Federal Government. ``(4) For purposes of this subsection, the Foreign Language Center of the Defense Language Institute and any other educational institution that provides training in foreign languages operated by the Department of Defense or an agency in the intelligence community is deemed to be an institution of higher education, and may carry out the types of activities permitted under the National Flagship Language Initiative.''. (3) Inapplicability of funding allocation rules.-- Subsection (a)(2) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following flush sentences: (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the matters described in subsection (b) with respect to the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.). (b) Covered Matters.--The matters described in this subsection are as follows: (1) Effectiveness of program.--An evaluation of the National Security Education Program, including an assessment of the effectiveness of the program in meeting its goals and an assessment of the administrative costs of the program in relation to the amounts of scholarships, fellowships, and grants awarded. (2) Conversion of funding.--An assessment of the advisability of converting funding of the National Security Education Program from funding through the National Security Education Trust Fund under section 804 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1904) to funding through appropriations. (3) Recommendations.--On any matter covered by paragraph (1) or (2), such recommendations for legislation with respect to such matter as the Secretary considers appropriate. (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (a) Establishment.--The Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the head of the intelligence community, shall establish in the Central Intelligence Agency an element responsible for conducting all-source intelligence analysis of information relating to the financial capabilities, practices, and activities of individuals, groups, and nations associated with international terrorism in their activities relating to international terrorism. (b) Designation.--The element established under subsection (a) shall be known as the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center. (c) Deadline for Establishment.--The element required by subsection (a) shall be established as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, but not later than 90 days after that date. (a) Semiannual Report.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Requirement.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence, acting as head of the Intelligence Community, shall-- (A) establish and maintain a list of individuals who are known or suspected international terrorists, and of organizations that are known or suspected international terrorist organizations; and (B) ensure that pertinent information on the list is shared with the departments, agencies, and organizations described by subsection (c). (2) The list under paragraph (1), and the mechanisms for sharing information on the list, shall be known as the ``Terrorist Identification Classification System''. (b) Administration.--(1) The Director shall prescribe requirements for the inclusion of an individual or organization on the list required by subsection (a), and for the deletion or omission from the list of an individual or organization currently on the list. (2) The Director shall ensure that the information utilized to determine the inclusion, or deletion or omission, of an individual or organization on or from the list is derived from all-source intelligence. (3) The Director shall ensure that the list is maintained in accordance with existing law and regulations governing the collection, storage, and dissemination of intelligence concerning United States persons. (c) Information Sharing.--Subject to section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6)), relating to the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director shall provide for the sharing of the list, and information on the list, with such departments and agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies, and entities of foreign governments and international organizations as the Director considers appropriate. (d) Reporting and Certification.--(1) The Director shall review on an annual basis the information provided by various departments and agencies for purposes of the list under subsection (a) in order to determine whether or not the information so provided is derived from the widest possible range of intelligence available to such departments and agencies. (2) The Director shall, as a result of each review under paragraph (1), certify whether or not the elements of the intelligence community responsible for the collection of intelligence related to the list have provided information for purposes of the list that is derived from the widest possible range of intelligence available to such department and agencies. (e) Report on Criteria for Information Sharing.--(1) Not later then March 1, 2003, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the criteria used to determine which types of information on the list required by subsection (a) are to be shared, and which types of information are not to be shared, with various departments and agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies, and entities of foreign governments and international organizations. (2) The report shall include a description of the circumstances in which the Director has determined that sharing information on the list with the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and of State and local governments, described by subsection (c) would be inappropriate due to the concerns addressed by section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, relating to the protection of sources and methods, and any instance in which the sharing of information on the list has been inappropriate in light of such concerns. (f) System Administration Requirements.--(1) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, ensure the interoperability of the Terrorist Identification Classification System with relevant information systems of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and of State and local governments, described by subsection (c). (2) The Director shall ensure that the System utilizes technologies that are effective in aiding the identification of individuals in the field. (g) Report on Status of System.--(1) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, in consultation with the Director of Homeland Security, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the status of the Terrorist Identification Classification System. The report shall contain a certification on the following: (A) Whether the System contains the intelligence information necessary to facilitate the contribution of the System to the domestic security of the United States. (B) Whether the departments and agencies having access to the System have access in a manner that permits such departments and agencies to carry out appropriately their domestic security responsibilities. (C) Whether the System is operating in a manner that maximizes its contribution to the domestic security of the United States. (D) If a certification under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) is in the negative, the modifications or enhancements of the System necessary to ensure a future certification in the positive. (2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (h) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note; 115 Stat. 1401) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``ONE-YEAR'' and inserting ``TWO-YEAR''; and (2) in the text, by striking ``October 1, 2002'' and inserting ``October 1, 2003''. (a) Method of Transliteration Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall provide for a standardized method for transliterating into the Roman alphabet personal and place names originally rendered in any language that uses an alphabet other than the Roman alphabet. (b) Use by Intelligence Community.--The Director shall ensure the use of the method established under subsection (a) in-- (1) all communications among the elements of the intelligence community; and (2) all intelligence products of the intelligence community. (a) In General.--Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(7) The term `congressional intelligence committees' means-- ``(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''. (b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) That Act is further amended by striking ``Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives'' and inserting ``congressional intelligence committees'' in each of the following provisions: (A) Section 104(d)(4) (50 U.S.C. 403-4(d)(4)). (B) Section 603(a) (50 U.S.C. 423(a)). (2) That Act is further amended by striking ``Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate'' and inserting ``congressional intelligence committees'' in each of the following provisions: (A) Section 301(j) (50 U.S.C. 409a(j)). (B) Section 801(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 435(b)(2)). (C) Section 903 (50 U.S.C. 441b). (3) That Act is further amended by striking ``intelligence committees'' and inserting ``congressional intelligence committees'' each place it appears in each of the following provisions: (A) Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 413). (B) Section 502 (50 U.S.C. 413a). (C) Section 503 (50 U.S.C. 413b). (D) Section 504(d)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(d)(2)). (4) Section 104(d)(5) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4(d)(5)) is amended by striking ``Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives'' and inserting ``congressional intelligence committees''. (5) Section 105C(a)(3)(C) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403- 5c(a)(3)(C)) is amended-- (A) by striking clauses (i) and (ii) and inserting the following new clause (i): ``(i) The congressional intelligence committees.''; and (B) by redesignating clauses (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi) as clauses (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v), respectively. (6) Section 114 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i), as amended by section 324, is amended by striking subsection (d), as so redesignated, and inserting the following new subsection (d): ``(d) Congressional Leadership Defined.--In this section, the term `congressional leadership' means the Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representatives and the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate.''. (7) Section 501(a) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 413(a)), as amended by paragraph (3) of this subsection, is further amended-- (A) by striking paragraph (2); and (B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2). (8) Section 503(c)(4) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 413b(c)(4)) is amended by striking ``intelligence committee'' and inserting ``congressional intelligence committee''. (9) Section 602(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 422(c)) is amended by striking ``the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives'' and inserting ``either congressional intelligence committee''. (10) Section 701(c)(3) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431(c)(3)) is amended by striking ``intelligence committees of the Congress'' and inserting ``congressional intelligence committees''. Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (f), by striking ``September 30, 2003'' and inserting ``September 30, 2005''; and (2) in subsection (i), by striking ``or 2003'' and inserting ``2003, 2004, or 2005''. (a) Delay on Implementation on Compensation Reform Plan.-- (1) The Director of Central Intelligence may not implement before the implementation date (described in paragraph (2)) a plan for the compensation of employees of the Central Intelligence Agency that differs from the plan in effect on October 1, 2002. (2) The implementation date referred to in paragraph (1) is February 1, 2004, or the date on which the Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the pilot project conducted under subsection (b), whichever is later. (3) It is the sense of Congress that an employee performance evaluation mechanism with evaluation training for managers and employees of the Central Intelligence Agency should be phased in before the implementation of any new compensation plan. (b) Pilot Project.--(1) The Director shall conduct a pilot project to test the efficacy and fairness of a plan for the compensation of employees of the Central Intelligence Agency that differs from the plan in effect on October 1, 2002, within any one component of the Central Intelligence Agency selected by the Director, other than a component for which a pilot project on employee compensation has been previously conducted. (2) The pilot project under paragraph (1) shall be conducted for a period of at least 1 year. (3) Not later than the date that is 45 days after the completion of the pilot project under paragraph (1), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that contains an evaluation of the project and such recommendations as the Director considers appropriate for the modification of the plans for the compensation of employees throughout the Agency which are in effect on such date. (c) Sense of Congress on Implementation of Compensation Reform Plan for the National Security Agency.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the Director of the National Security Agency should not implement before February 1, 2004, a plan for the compensation of employees of the National Security Agency that differs from the plan in effect on October 1, 2002; and (2) an employee performance evaluation mechanism with evaluation training for managers and employees of the National Security Agency should be phased in before the implementation of any new compensation plan. (d) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) Authority.--Funds designated for intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for assistance to the Government of Colombia for counterdrug activities for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and any unobligated funds available to any element of the intelligence community for such activities for a prior fiscal year, shall be available to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and against activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)), and to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue operations. (b) Requirement for Certification.--(1) The authorities provided in subsection (a) shall not be exercised until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Congress that the provisions of paragraph (2) have been complied with. (2) In order to ensure the effectiveness of United States support for such a unified campaign, prior to the exercise of the authority contained in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall report to the appropriate committees of Congress that the newly elected President of Colombia has-- (A) committed, in writing, to establish comprehensive policies to combat illicit drug cultivation, manufacturing, and trafficking (particularly with respect to providing economic opportunities that offer viable alternatives to illicit crops) and to restore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations; (B) committed, in writing, to implement significant budgetary and personnel reforms of the Colombian Armed Forces; and (C) committed, in writing, to support substantial additional Colombian financial and other resources to implement such policies and reforms, particularly to meet the country's previous commitments under ``Plan Colombia''. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 105C (50 U.S.C. 403-5c) the following new section: Section 1607 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(c) Award of Rank to Employees in Intelligence Senior Level Positions.--The President, based on the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, may award a rank referred to in section 4507a of title 5 to employees in Intelligence Senior Level positions designated under subsection (a). The award of such rank shall be made in a manner consistent with the provisions of that section.''. TITLE VI--NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED There is established in the legislative branch the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (in this title referred to as the ``Commission''). The purposes of the Commission are to-- (1) examine and report upon the facts and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, occurring at the World Trade Center in New York, New York, in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, and at the Pentagon in Virginia; (2) ascertain, evaluate, and report on the evidence developed by all relevant governmental agencies regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the attacks; (3) build upon the investigations of other entities, and avoid unnecessary duplication, by reviewing the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of-- (A) the Joint Inquiry of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives regarding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, (hereinafter in this title referred to as the ``Joint Inquiry''); and (B) other executive branch, congressional, or independent commission investigations into the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, other terrorist attacks, and terrorism generally; (4) make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the attacks, and the extent of the United States' preparedness for, and immediate response to, the attacks; and (5) investigate and report to the President and Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism. (a) Members.--The Commission shall be composed of 10 members, of whom-- (1) 1 member shall be appointed by the President, who shall serve as chairman of the Commission; (2) 1 member shall be appointed by the leader of the Senate (majority or minority leader, as the case may be) of the Democratic Party, in consultation with the leader of the House of Representatives (majority or minority leader, as the case may be) of the Democratic Party, who shall serve as vice chairman of the Commission; (3) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of the Senate leadership of the Democratic Party; (4) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of the leadership of the House of Representatives of the Republican Party; (5) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of the Senate leadership of the Republican Party; and (6) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of the leadership of the House of Representatives of the Democratic Party. (b) Qualifications; Initial Meeting.-- (1) Political party affiliation.--Not more than 5 members of the Commission shall be from the same political party. (2) Nongovernmental appointees.--An individual appointed to the Commission may not be an officer or employee of the Federal Government or any State or local government. (3) Other qualifications.--It is the sense of Congress that individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent United States citizens, with national recognition and significant depth of experience in such professions as governmental service, law enforcement, the armed services, law, public administration, intelligence gathering, commerce (including aviation matters), and foreign affairs. (4) Deadline for appointment.--All members of the Commission shall be appointed on or before December 15, 2002. (5) Initial meeting.--The Commission shall meet and begin the operations of the Commission as soon as practicable. (c) Quorum; Vacancies.--After its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the call of the chairman or a majority of its members. Six members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made. (a) In General.--The functions of the Commission are to-- (1) conduct an investigation that-- (A) investigates relevant facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, including any relevant legislation, Executive Order, regulation, plan, policy, practice, or procedure; and (B) may include relevant facts and circumstances relating to-- (i) intelligence agencies; (ii) law enforcement agencies; (iii) diplomacy; (iv) immigration, nonimmigrant visas, and border control; (v) the flow of assets to terrorist organizations; (vi) commercial aviation; (vii) the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation; and (viii) other areas of the public and private sectors determined relevant by the Commission for its inquiry; (2) identify, review, and evaluate the lessons learned from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, regarding the structure, coordination, management policies, and procedures of the Federal Government, and, if appropriate, State and local governments and nongovernmental entities, relative to detecting, preventing, and responding to such terrorist attacks; and (3) submit to the President and Congress such reports as are required by this title containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations as the Commission shall determine, including proposing organization, coordination, planning, management arrangements, procedures, rules, and regulations. (b) Relationship to Intelligence Committees' Inquiry.--When investigating facts and circumstances relating to the intelligence community, the Commission shall-- (1) first review the information compiled by, and the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of, the Joint Inquiry; and (2) after that review pursue any appropriate area of inquiry if the Commission determines that-- (A) the Joint Inquiry had not investigated that area; (B) the Joint Inquiry's investigation of that area had not been complete; or (C) new information not reviewed by the Joint Inquiry had become available with respect to that area. (a) In General.-- (1) Hearings and evidence.--The Commission or, on the authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this title-- (A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, administer such oaths; and (B) subject to paragraph (2)(A), require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents, as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or designated member may determine advisable. (2) Subpoenas.-- (A) Issuance.-- (i) In general.--A subpoena may be issued under this subsection only-- (a) In General.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission. (b) Public Meetings and Release of Public Versions of Reports.--The Commission shall-- (1) hold public hearings and meetings to the extent appropriate; and (2) release public versions of the reports required under section 610 (a) and (b). (c) Public Hearings.--Any public hearings of the Commission shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the protection of information provided to or developed for or by the Commission as required by any applicable statute, regulation, or Executive Order. (a) In General.-- (1) Appointment and compensation.--The chairman, in consultation with vice chairman, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Commission, may appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code. (2) Personnel as federal employees.-- (A) In general.--The executive director and any personnel of the Commission who are employees shall be employees under section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title. (B) Members of commission.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to apply to members of the Commission. (b) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her regular employment without interruption. (c) Consultant Services.--The Commission is authorized to procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code. (a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission may be compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission. (b) Travel Expenses.--While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code. The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the Commission members and staff appropriate security clearances to the extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and requirements, except that no person shall be provided with access to classified information under this title without the appropriate security clearances. (a) Interim Reports.--The Commission may submit to the President and Congress interim reports containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members. (b) Final Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a final report containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members. (c) Termination.-- (1) In general.--The Commission, and all the authorities of this title, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which the final report is submitted under subsection (b). (2) Administrative activities before termination.--The Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its reports and disseminating the final report. (a) Transfer From the National Foreign Intelligence Program.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act and made available in public law 107-248 (Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003) for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, not to exceed $3,000,000 shall be available for transfer to the Commission for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this title. (b) Duration of Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission under subsection (a) shall remain available until the termination of the Commission. This title may be cited as the ``Homeland Security Information Sharing Act''. (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following: (1) The Federal Government is required by the Constitution to provide for the common defense, which includes defense against terrorist attacks. (2) The Federal Government relies on State and local personnel to protect against terrorist attacks. (3) The Federal Government collects, creates, manages, and protects classified and sensitive but unclassified information to enhance homeland security. (4) Some homeland security information is needed by the State and local personnel to prevent and prepare for terrorist attacks. (5) The needs of State and local personnel to have access to relevant homeland security information to combat terrorism must be reconciled with the need to preserve the protected status of such information and to protect the sources and methods used to acquire such information. (6) Granting security clearances to certain State and local personnel is one way to facilitate the sharing of information regarding specific terrorist threats among Federal, State, and local levels of government. (7) Methods exist to declassify, redact, or otherwise adapt classified information so it may be shared with State and local personnel without the need for granting additional security clearances. (8) State and local personnel have capabilities and opportunities to gather information on suspicious activities and terrorist threats not possessed by Federal agencies. (9) The Federal Government and State and local governments and agencies in other jurisdictions may benefit from such information. (10) Federal, State, and local governments and intelligence, law enforcement, and other emergency preparation and response agencies must act in partnership to maximize the benefits of information gathering and analysis to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. (11) Information systems, including the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System and the Terrorist Threat Warning System, have been established for rapid sharing of classified and sensitive but unclassified information among Federal, State, and local entities. (12) Increased efforts to share homeland security information should avoid duplicating existing information systems. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that Federal, State, and local entities should share homeland security information to the maximum extent practicable, with special emphasis on hard-to-reach urban and rural communities. (a) Procedures for Determining Extent of Sharing of Homeland Security Information.--(1) The President shall prescribe and implement procedures under which relevant Federal agencies determine-- (A) whether, how, and to what extent homeland security information may be shared with appropriate State and local personnel, and with which such personnel it may be shared; (B) how to identify and safeguard homeland security information that is sensitive but unclassified; and (C) to the extent such information is in classified form, whether, how, and to what extent to remove classified information, as appropriate, and with which such personnel it may be shared after such information is removed. (2) The President shall ensure that such procedures apply to all agencies of the Federal Government. (3) Such procedures shall not change the substantive requirements for the classification and safeguarding of classified information. (4) Such procedures shall not change the requirements and authorities to protect sources and methods. (b) Procedures for Sharing of Homeland Security Information.--(1) Under procedures prescribed by the President, all appropriate agencies, including the intelligence community, shall, through information sharing systems, share homeland security information with appropriate State and local personnel to the extent such information may be shared, as determined in accordance with subsection (a), together with assessments of the credibility of such information. (2) Each information sharing system through which information is shared under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) have the capability to transmit unclassified or classified information, though the procedures and recipients for each capability may differ; (B) have the capability to restrict delivery of information to specified subgroups by geographic location, type of organization, position of a recipient within an organization, or a recipient's need to know such information; (C) be configured to allow the efficient and effective sharing of information; and (D) be accessible to appropriate State and local personnel. (3) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall establish conditions on the use of information shared under paragraph (1)-- (A) to limit the redissemination of such information to ensure that such information is not used for an unauthorized purpose; (B) to ensure the security and confidentiality of such information; (C) to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of any individuals who are subjects of such information; and (D) to provide data integrity through the timely removal and destruction of obsolete or erroneous names and information. (4) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, that the information sharing system through which information is shared under such paragraph include existing information sharing systems, including, but not limited to, the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, the Regional Information Sharing System, and the Terrorist Threat Warning System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (5) Each appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the President, shall have access to each information sharing system through which information is shared under paragraph (1), and shall therefore have access to all information, as appropriate, shared under such paragraph. (6) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall ensure that appropriate State and local personnel are authorized to use such information sharing systems-- (A) to access information shared with such personnel; and (B) to share, with others who have access to such information sharing systems, the homeland security information of their own jurisdictions, which shall be marked appropriately as pertaining to potential terrorist activity. (7) Under procedures prescribed jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General, each appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the President, shall review and assess the information shared under paragraph (6) and integrate such information with existing intelligence. (c) Sharing of Classified Information and Sensitive but Unclassified Information With State and Local Personnel.--(1) The President shall prescribe procedures under which Federal agencies may, to the extent the President considers necessary, share with appropriate State and local personnel homeland security information that remains classified or otherwise protected after the determinations prescribed under the procedures set forth in subsection (a). (2) It is the sense of Congress that such procedures may include one or more of the following means: (A) Carrying out security clearance investigations with respect to appropriate State and local personnel. (B) With respect to information that is sensitive but unclassified, entering into nondisclosure agreements with appropriate State and local personnel. (C) Increased use of information-sharing partnerships that include appropriate State and local personnel, such as the Joint Terrorism Task Forces of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces of the Department of Justice, and regional Terrorism Early Warning Groups. (d) Responsible Officials.--For each affected Federal agency, the head of such agency shall designate an official to administer this title with respect to such agency. (e) Federal Control of Information.--Under procedures prescribed under this section, information obtained by a State or local government from a Federal agency under this section shall remain under the control of the Federal agency, and a State or local law authorizing or requiring such a government to disclose information shall not apply to such information. (f) Definitions.--As used in this section: (1) The term ``homeland security information'' means any information (other than information that includes individually identifiable information collected solely for statistical purposes) possessed by a Federal, State, or local agency that-- (A) relates to the threat of terrorist activity; (B) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity; (C) would improve the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or (D) would improve the response to a terrorist act. (2) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (3) The term ``State and local personnel'' means any of the following persons involved in prevention, preparation, or response for terrorist attacks: (A) State Governors, mayors, and other locally elected officials. (B) State and local law enforcement personnel and firefighters. (C) Public health and medical professionals. (D) Regional, State, and local emergency management agency personnel, including State adjutant generals. (E) Other appropriate emergency response agency personnel. (F) Employees of private sector entities that affect critical infrastructure, cyber, economic, or public health security, as designated by the Federal Government in procedures developed pursuant to this section. (4) The term ``State'' includes the District of Columbia and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. (a) Report Required.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the congressional committees specified in subsection (b) a report on the implementation of section 703. The report shall include any recommendations for additional measures or appropriation requests, beyond the requirements of section 703, to increase the effectiveness of sharing of information between and among Federal, State, and local entities. (b) Specified Congressional Committees.--The congressional committees referred to in subsection (a) are the following committees: (1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (2) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate. There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out section 703. (a) Prior Enactment.--If this Act is enacted before the Homeland Security Act of 2002, then upon the date of the enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, this title shall be deemed for all purposes not to have taken effect and shall cease to be in effect. (b) Subsequent Enactment.--If the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is enacted before this Act, then this title shall not take effect. (a) Deadline.--The reports described in subsection (c) shall be submitted to Congress not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Noncompliance.--(1) If all the reports described in subsection (c) are not submitted to Congress by the date specified in subsection (a), amounts available to be obligated or expended after that date to carry out the functions or duties of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall be reduced by \\1/3\\. (2) The reduction applicable under paragraph (1) shall not apply if the Director of Central Intelligence certifies to Congress by the date referred to in subsection (a) that all reports referred to in subsection (c) have been submitted to Congress. (c) Reports Described.--The reports referred to in subsection (a) are reports mandated by law for which the Director of Central Intelligence has sole or primary responsibility to prepare, coordinate, and submit to Congress which, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, have not been submitted to Congress. Subtitle B--Submittal of Reports to Intelligence Committees (a) In General.--(1) Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 311 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 353(b)(6) of this Act, is further amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection (d): ``(d) Annual Report on Threat of Attack on the United States Using Weapons of Mass Destruction.--(1) Not later each year than the date provided in section 507, the Director shall submit to the congressional committees specified in paragraph (3) a report assessing the following: ``(A) The current threat of attack on the United States using ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. ``(B) The current threat of attack on the United States using a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon delivered by a system other than a ballistic missile or cruise missile. ``(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall be a national intelligence estimate, or have the formality of a national intelligence estimate. ``(3) The congressional committees referred to in paragraph (1) are the following: ``(A) The congressional intelligence committees. ``(B) The Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate. ``(C) The Committees on International Relations and Armed Services of the House of Representatives.''. Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 821 of this Act, is further amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection (e): ``(e) Annual Report on Covert Leases.--(1) Not later each year than the date provided in section 507, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on each covert lease of an element of the intelligence community that is in force as of the end of the preceding year. ``(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the following: ``(A) A list of each lease described by that paragraph. ``(B) For each lease-- ``(i) the cost of such lease; ``(ii) the duration of such lease; ``(iii) the purpose of such lease; and ``(iv) the directorate or office that controls such lease.''. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 114 the following new section: ``annual report on improvement of financial statements for auditing ``Sec. 114A. Not later each year than the date provided in section 507, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency shall each submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the activities being undertaken by such official to ensure that the financial statements of such agency can be audited in accordance with applicable law and requirements of the Office of Management and Budget.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 114 the following new item: (a) Annual Report.--Chapter 33 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in subsection (f), by striking ``this section'' and inserting ``subsections (a) through (e)''; (2) by redesignating subsection (g) as subsection (h); and (3) by inserting after subsection (f) the following new subsection (g): ``(g)(1) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency shall each submit to the congressional intelligence committees each year a report that sets forth the following: ``(A) The personnel and funds requested by such Inspector General for the fiscal year beginning in such year for the activities of the office of such Inspector General in such fiscal year. ``(B) The plan of such Inspector General for such activities, including the programs and activities scheduled for review by the office of such Inspector General during such fiscal year. ``(C) An assessment of the current ability of such Inspector General to hire and retain qualified personnel for the office of such Inspector General. ``(D) Any matters that such Inspector General considers appropriate regarding the independence and effectiveness of the office of such Inspector General. ``(2) The submittal date for a report under paragraph (1) each year shall be the date provided in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `congressional intelligence committees' shall have the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a).''. (a) Annual Report.--The Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress each year a report on current counterdrug intelligence matters. The report shall include the recommendations of the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group on the appropriate number of permanent staff, and of detailed personnel, for the staff of the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat. (b) Submittal Date.--The date of the submittal each year of the report required by subsection (a) shall be the date provided in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 811 of this Act. (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives; and (2) the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)). (a) Annual Report Required.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress on an annual basis a report setting forth each foreign company described in subsection (b) that raised or attempted to raise funds in the United States capital markets during the preceding year. (b) Covered Foreign Companies.--A foreign company described in this subsection is any foreign company determined by the Director to be engaged or involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons) or the means to deliver such weapons. (c) Submittal Date.--The date each year for the submittal of the report required by subsection (a) shall be the date provided in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 811 of this Act. (d) Form of Reports.--Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; (2) the Committees on Armed Services, Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Governmental Affairs, and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (3) the Committees on Armed Services, Financial Services, Government Reform, and International Relations of the House of Representatives. (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an assessment of the effect of the use of ``NOFORN'' classifications, and of other country-release policies, procedures, and classification restrictions, on intelligence-sharing relationships and coordinated intelligence operations and military operations between the United States and its allies. The report shall include an assessment of the effect of the use of such classifications, and of such policies, procedures, and restrictions, on counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committee'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) Evaluation Required.--Not later than December 31 of 2002, 2003, and 2004, the Inspector General of the Department of State shall conduct an evaluation of the policies and procedures of the Department on the protection of classified information at the Headquarters of the Department, including compliance with the directives of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCIDs) regarding the storage and handling of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) material. (b) Annual Report.--Except as provided in subsection (c), not later than February 1 of 2003, 2004, and 2005, the Inspector General shall submit to the following committees a report on the evaluation conducted under subsection (a) during the preceding year: (1) The congressional intelligence committees. (2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives. (c) Exception.--The date each year for the submittal of a report under subsection (b) may be postponed in accordance with section 507(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 811 of this Act. (d) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) Annual Report on the Detail of Intelligence Community Personnel.--Section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h) is amended by striking subsection (c). (b) Annual Report on Exercise of National Security Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Authority.--Section 301(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 409a(j)), as amended by section 353(b)(2)(A) of this Act, is further amended-- (1) by striking ``Reporting Require- ments.--'' and all that follows through ``The Director may'' and inserting ``Notification of Exercise of Authority.--The Director may''; and (2) by striking paragraph (2). (c) Annual Report on Transfers of Amounts for Acquisition of Land by the Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 5(c)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(c)(2)) is amended by striking ``an annual report on the transfers of sums described in paragraph (1).'' and inserting ``a report on the transfer of sums described in paragraph (1) each time that authority is exercised.''. (d) Annual Report on Use of CIA Personnel as Special Policemen.--Section 15(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o(a)) is amended by striking paragraph (5). (e) Annual Audit of the Central Services Program of the Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (g); and (2) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (g). (f) Annual Report on Special Police Authority for the National Security Agency.--Section 11(a)(5) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting ``through 2004'' after ``Not later than July 1 each year''. (a) Short Title.--This title may be cited as the ``Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002''. (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this title is to facilitate the enhancement of the counterintelligence activities of the United States Government by-- (1) enabling the counterintelligence community of the United States Government to fulfill better its mission of identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and countering the intelligence threats to the United States; (2) ensuring that the counterintelligence community of the United States Government acts in an efficient and effective manner; and (3) providing for the integration of all the counterintelligence activities of the United States Government. (a) Establishment.--(1) There shall be a National Counterintelligence Executive, who shall be appointed by the President. (2) It is the sense of Congress that the President should seek the views of the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and Director of Central Intelligence in selecting an individual for appointment as the Executive. (b) Mission.--The mission of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be to serve as the head of national counterintelligence for the United States Government. (c) Duties.--Subject to the direction and control of the President, the duties of the National Counterintelligence Executive are as follows: (1) To carry out the mission referred to in subsection (b). (2) To act as chairperson of the National Counterintelligence Policy Board under section 811 of the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 (title VIII of Public Law 103-359; 50 U.S.C. 402a), as amended by section 903 of this Act. (3) To act as head of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under section 904. (4) To participate as an observer on such boards, committees, and entities of the executive branch as the President considers appropriate for the discharge of the mission and functions of the Executive and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under section 904. (a) Chairperson.--Section 811 of the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 (title VII of Public Law 103-359; 50 U.S.C. 402a), as amended by section 811(b)(5)(B) of this Act, is further amended-- (1) by striking subsection (b); (2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (e); and (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b): ``(b) Chairperson.--The National Counterintelligence Executive under section 902 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 shall serve as the chairperson of the Board.''. (b) Membership.--That section is further amended by inserting after subsection (b), as amended by subsection (a)(3) of this section, the following new subsection (c): ``(c) Membership.--The membership of the National Counterintelligence Policy Board shall consist of the following: ``(1) The National Counterintelligence Executive. ``(2) Senior personnel of departments and elements of the United States Government, appointed by the head of the department or element concerned, as follows: ``(A) The Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. ``(B) The Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ``(C) The Department of State. ``(D) The Department of Energy. ``(E) The Central Intelligence Agency. ``(F) Any other department, agency, or element of the United States Government specified by the President.''. (c) Functions and Discharge of Functions.--That section is further amended by inserting after subsection (c), as amended by subsection (b) of this section, the following new subsection: ``(d) Functions and Discharge of Functions.--(1) The Board shall-- ``(A) serve as the principal mechanism for-- ``(i) developing policies and procedures for the approval of the President to govern the conduct of counterintelligence activities; and ``(ii) upon the direction of the President, resolving conflicts that arise between elements of the Government conducting such activities; and ``(B) act as an interagency working group to-- ``(i) ensure the discussion and review of matters relating to the implementation of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002; and ``(ii) provide advice to the National Counterintelligence Executive on priorities in the implementation of the National Counterintelligence Strategy produced by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under section 904(e)(2) of that Act. ``(2) The Board may, for purposes of carrying out its functions under this section, establish such interagency boards and working groups as the Board considers appropriate.''. (a) Establishment.--There shall be an Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. (b) Head of Office.--The National Counterintelligence Executive shall be the head of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. (c) Location of Office.--The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be located in the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. (d) General Counsel.--(1) There shall be in the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive a general counsel who shall serve as principal legal advisor to the National Counterintelligence Executive. (2) The general counsel shall-- (A) provide legal advice and counsel to the Executive on matters relating to functions of the Office; (B) ensure that the Office complies with all applicable laws, regulations, Executive orders, and guidelines; and (C) carry out such other duties as the Executive may specify. (e) Functions.--Subject to the direction and control of the National Counterintelligence Executive, the functions of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be as follows: (1) National threat identification and prioritization assessment.--Subject to subsection (f), in consultation with appropriate department and agencies of the United States Government, and private sector entities, to produce on an annual basis a strategic planning assessment of the counterintelligence requirements of the United States to be known as the National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment. (2) National counterintelligence strategy.--Subject to subsection (f), in consultation with appropriate department and agencies of the United States Government, and private sector entities, and based on the most current National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment under paragraph (1), to produce on an annual basis a strategy for the counterintelligence programs and activities of the United States Government to be known as the National Counterintelligence Strategy. (3) Implementation of national counterintelligence strategy.--To evaluate on an ongoing basis the implementation of the National Counterintelligence Strategy and to submit to the President periodic reports on such evaluation, including a discussion of any shortfalls in the implementation of the Strategy and recommendations for remedies for such shortfalls. (4) National counterintelligence strategic analyses.--As directed by the Director of Central Intelligence and in consultation with appropriate elements of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, to oversee and coordinate the production of strategic analyses of counterintelligence matters, including the production of counterintelligence damage assessments and assessments of lessons learned from counterintelligence activities. (5) National counterintelligence program budget.--In consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence-- (A) to coordinate the development of budgets and resource allocation plans for the counterintelligence programs and activities of the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other appropriate elements of the United States Government; (B) to ensure that the budgets and resource allocation plans developed under subparagraph (A) address the objectives and priorities for counterintelligence under the National Counterintelligence Strategy; and (C) to submit to the National Security Council periodic reports on the activities undertaken by the Office under subparagraphs (A) and (B). (6) National counterintelligence collection and targeting coordination.--To develop priorities for counterintelligence investigations and operations, and for collection of counterintelligence, for purposes of the National Counterintelligence Strategy, except that the Office may not-- (A) carry out any counterintelligence investigations or operations; or (B) establish its own contacts, or carry out its own activities, with foreign intelligence services. (7) National counterintelligence outreach, watch, and warning.-- (A) Counterintelligence vulnerability surveys.--To carry out and coordinate surveys of the vulnerability of the United States Government, and the private sector, to intelligence threats in order to identify the areas, programs, and activities that require protection from such threats. (B) Outreach.--To carry out and coordinate outreach programs and activities on counterintelligence to other elements of the United States Government, and the private sector, and to coordinate the dissemination to the public of warnings on intelligence threats to the United States. (C) Research and development.--To ensure that research and development programs and activities of the United States Government, and the private sector, direct attention to the needs of the counterintelligence community for technologies, products, and services. (D) Training and professional development.--To develop policies and standards for training and professional development of individuals engaged in counterintelligence activities and to manage the conduct of joint training exercises for such personnel. (f) Additional Requirements Regarding National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National Counterintelligence Strategy.--(1) A National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment under subsection (e)(1), and any modification of such assessment, shall not go into effect until approved by the President. (2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under subsection (e)(2), and any modification of such strategy, shall not go into effect until approved by the President. (3) The National Counterintelligence Executive shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees each National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment, or modification thereof, and each National Counterintelligence Strategy, or modification thereof, approved under this section. (4) In this subsection, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (g) Personnel.--(1) Personnel of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive may consist of personnel employed by the Office or personnel on detail from any other department, agency, or element of the Federal Government. Any such detail may be on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the election of the head of the agency detailing such personnel. (2) Notwithstanding section 104(d) or any other provision of law limiting the period of the detail of personnel on a nonreimbursable basis, the detail of an officer or employee of United States or a member of the Armed Forces under paragraph (1) on a nonreimbursable basis may be for any period in excess of one year that the National Counterintelligence Executive and the head of the department, agency, or element concerned consider appropriate. (3) The employment of personnel by the Office, including the appointment, compensation and benefits, management, and separation of such personnel, shall be governed by the provisions of law on such matters with respect to the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency, except that, for purposes of the applicability of such provisions of law to personnel of the Office, the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be treated as the head of the Office. (4) Positions in the Office shall be excepted service positions for purposes of title 5, United States Code. (h) Support.--(1) The Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and Director of Central Intelligence may each provide the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive such support as may be necessary to permit the Office to carry out its functions under this section. (2) Subject to any terms and conditions specified by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director may provide administrative and contract support to the Office as if the Office were an element of the Central Intelligence Agency. (3) Support provided under this subsection may be provided on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the election of the official providing such support. (i) Availability of Funds for Reimbursement.--The National Counterintelligence Executive may, from amounts available for the Office, transfer to a department or agency detailing personnel under subsection (g), or providing support under subsection (h), on a reimbursable basis amounts appropriate to reimburse such department or agency for the detail of such personnel or the provision of such support, as the case may be. (j) Contracts.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the National Counterintelligence Executive may enter into any contract, lease, cooperative agreement, or other transaction that the Executive considers appropriate to carry out the functions of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under this section. (2) The authority under paragraph (1) to enter into contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and other transactions shall be subject to any terms, conditions, and limitations applicable to the Central Intelligence Agency under law with respect to similar contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and other transactions. (k) Treatment of Activities Under Certain Administrative Laws.--The files of the Office shall be treated as operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency for purposes of section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent such files meet criteria under subsection (b) of that section for treatment of files as operational files of an element of the Agency. (l) Oversight by Congress.--The location of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive within the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall not be construed as affecting access by Congress, or any committee of Congress, to-- (1) any information, document, record, or paper in the possession of the Office; or (2) any personnel of the Office. (m) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as provided or specified under the National Security Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law. TITLE X--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Congress makes the following findings: (1) Research and development efforts under the purview of the intelligence community are vitally important to the national security of the United States. (2) The intelligence community must operate in a dynamic, highly-challenging environment, characterized by rapid technological growth, against a growing number of hostile, technically-sophisticated threats. Research and development programs under the purview of the intelligence community are critical to ensuring that intelligence agencies, and their personnel, are provided with important technological capabilities to detect, characterize, assess, and ultimately counter the full range of threats to the national security of the United States. (3) There is a need to review the full range of current research and development programs under the purview of the intelligence community, evaluate such programs against the scientific and technological fields judged to be of most importance, and articulate program and resource priorities for future research and development activities to ensure a unified and coherent research and development program across the entire intelligence community. (a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be known as the ``National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community'' (in this title referred to as the ``Commission''). (b) Composition.--The Commission shall be composed of 12 members, as follows: (1) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management. (2) A senior intelligence official of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as designated by the Secretary of Defense. (3) Three members appointed by the majority leader of the Senate, in consultation with the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, one from Members of the Senate and two from private life. (4) Two members appointed by the minority leader of the Senate, in consultation with the Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, one from Members of the Senate and one from private life. (5) Three members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, in consultation with the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, one from Members of the House of Representatives and two from private life. (6) Two members appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives, in consultation with the ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, one from Members of the House of Representatives and one from private life. (c) Membership.--(1) The individuals appointed from private life as members of the Commission shall be individuals who are nationally recognized for expertise, knowledge, or experience in-- (A) research and development programs; (B) technology discovery and insertion; (C) use of intelligence information by national policymakers and military leaders; or (D) the implementation, funding, or oversight of the national security policies of the United States. (2) An official who appoints members of the Commission may not appoint an individual as a member of the Commission if, in the judgment of the official, such individual possesses any personal or financial interest in the discharge of any of the duties of the Commission. (3) All members of the Commission appointed from private life shall possess an appropriate security clearance in accordance with applicable laws and regulations concerning the handling of classified information. (d) Co-Chairs.--(1) The Commission shall have two co- chairs, selected from among the members of the Commission. (2) One co-chair of the Commission shall be a member of the Democratic Party, and one co-chair shall be a member of the Republican Party. (3) The individuals who serve as the co-chairs of the Commission shall be jointly agreed upon by the President, the majority leader of the Senate, the minority leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives. (e) Appointment; Initial Meeting.--(1) Members of the Commission shall be appointed not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) The Commission shall hold its initial meeting on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (f) Meetings; Quorum; Vacancies.--(1) After its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the call of the co- chairs of the Commission. (2) Six members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for purposes of conducting business, except that two members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for purposes of receiving testimony. (3) Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made. (4) If vacancies in the Commission occur on any day after 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a quorum shall consist of a majority of the members of the Commission as of such day. (g) Actions of Commission.--(1) The Commission shall act by resolution agreed to by a majority of the members of the Commission voting and present. (2) The Commission may establish panels composed of less than the full membership of the Commission for purposes of carrying out the duties of the Commission under this title. The actions of any such panel shall be subject to the review and control of the Commission. Any findings and determinations made by such a panel shall not be considered the findings and determinations of the Commission unless approved by the Commission. (3) Any member, agent, or staff of the Commission may, if authorized by the co-chairs of the Commission, take any action which the Commission is authorized to take pursuant to this title. (h) Duties.--The duties of the Commission shall be-- (1) to conduct, until not later than the date on which the Commission submits the report under section 1007(a), the review described in subsection (i); and (2) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense a final report on the results of the review. (i) Review.--The Commission shall review the status of research and development programs and activities within the intelligence community, including-- (1) an assessment of the advisability of modifying the scope of research and development for purposes of such programs and activities; (2) a review of the particular individual research and development activities under such programs; (3) an evaluation of the current allocation of resources for research and development, including whether the allocation of such resources for that purpose should be modified; (4) an identification of the scientific and technological fields judged to be of most importance to the intelligence community; (5) an evaluation of the relationship between the research and development programs and activities of the intelligence community and the research and development programs and activities of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government; and (6) an evaluation of the relationship between the research and development programs and activities of the intelligence community and the research and development programs and activities of the private sector. (a) In General.--(1) The Commission or, on the authorization of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this title-- (A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, and administer such oaths; and (B) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents, as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or designated member considers necessary. (2) Subpoenas may be issued under subparagraph (1)(B) under the signature of the co-chairs of the Commission, and may be served by any person designated by such co-chairs. (3) The provisions of sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192-194) shall apply in the case of any failure of a witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section. (b) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts, enter into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its duties under this title. (c) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Commission may secure directly from any executive department, agency, bureau, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Government information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this title. Each such department, agency, bureau, board, commission, office, establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon request of the co-chairs of the Commission. The Commission shall handle and protect all classified information provided to it under this section in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations. (d) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide to the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, such administrative services, funds, staff, facilities, and other support services as are necessary for the performance of the Commission's duties under this title. (2) The Secretary of Defense may provide the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, with such administrative services, staff, and other support services as the Commission may request. (3) In addition to the assistance set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2), other departments and agencies of the United States may provide the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support as such departments and agencies consider advisable and as may be authorized by law. (4) The Commission shall receive the full and timely cooperation of any official, department, or agency of the United States Government whose assistance is necessary for the fulfillment of the duties of the Commission under this title, including the provision of full and current briefings and analyses. (e) Prohibition on Withholding Information.--No department or agency of the Government may withhold information from the Commission on the grounds that providing the information to the Commission would constitute the unauthorized disclosure of classified information or information relating to intelligence sources or methods. (f) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as the departments and agencies of the United States. (g) Gifts.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property in carrying out its duties under this title. (a) In General.--(1) The co-chairs of the Commission, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Commission, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its duties, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable to a person occupying a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title. (2) Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her regular employment without interruption. (3) All staff of the Commission shall possess a security clearance in accordance with applicable laws and regulations concerning the handling of classified information. (b) Consultant Services.--(1) The Commission may procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such title. (2) All experts and consultants employed by the Commission shall possess a security clearance in accordance with applicable laws and regulations concerning the handling of classified information. (a) Compensation.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Commission may be compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission under this title. (2) Members of the Commission who are officers or employees of the United States or Members of Congress shall receive no additional pay by reason of their service on the Commission. (b) Travel Expenses.--While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, members of the Commission may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703 of title 5, United States Code. (a) In General.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall assume responsibility for the handling and disposition of any information related to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission under this title. (2) Any information related to the national security of the United States that is provided to the Commission by a congressional intelligence committee may not be further provided or released without the approval of the chairman of such committee. (b) Access After Termination of Commission.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after the termination of the Commission under section 1007, only the Members and designated staff of the congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central Intelligence (and the designees of the Director), and such other officials of the executive branch as the President may designate shall have access to information related to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission. (a) Final Report.--Not later than September 1, 2003, the Commission shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense a final report as required by section 1002(h)(2). (b) Termination.--(1) The Commission, and all the authorities of this title, shall terminate at the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date on which the final report under subsection (a) is transmitted to the congressional intelligence committees. (2) The Commission may use the 120-day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purposes of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to Congress concerning the final report referred to in that paragraph and disseminating the report. Not later than 60 days after receipt of the final report under section 1007(a), the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall each submit to the congressional intelligence committees an assessment by the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, of the final report. Each assessment shall include such comments on the findings and recommendations contained in the final report as the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, considers appropriate. (a) Federal Advisory Committee Act.--The provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the activities of the Commission under this title. (b) Freedom of Information Act.--The provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the Freedom of Information Act), shall not apply to the activities, records, and proceedings of the Commission under this title. (a) Transfer From the Community Management Account.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the Intelligence Technology Innovation Center of the Community Management Account, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management shall transfer to the Director of Central Intelligence $2,000,000 for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this title. (b) Availability in General.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall make available to the Commission, from the amount transferred to the Director under subsection (a), such amounts as the Commission may require for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this title. (c) Duration of Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission under subsection (b) shall remain available until expended. SEC. 1011. DEFINITIONS. In this title: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). And the Senate agree to the same. Subtitle B--Submittal of Reports to Intelligence Committees Section 811 is similar to Section 401 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes with modifications. TITLE X--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Section 1001 is identical to Section 601 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. Sec. 1002. National Commission for review of research and development programs of the United States Intelligence Community Section 1002 is identical to Section 602 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. Sec. 1003. Powers of Commission Section 1003 is identical to Section 603 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. Sec. 1004. Staff of Commission Section 1004 is identical to Section 604 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. Sec. 1005. Compensation and travel expenses Section 1005 is identical to Section 605 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. Sec. 1006. Treatment of information relating to national security Section 1006 is identical to Section 606 of the Senate amendment. The House bill has no similar provision. The House recedes. Sec. 1007. Final report; termination Section 1007 is identical to Section 607 of the Senate amendment. The House bill has no similar provision. The House recedes. Sec. 1008. Assessments of final report Section 1008 is identical to Section 608 of the Senate amendment. The House bill has no similar provision. The House recedes. Sec. 1009. Inapplicability of certain administrative provisions Section 1009 is identical to Section 609 of the Senate amendment. The House bill has no similar provision. The House recedes. Sec. 1010. Funding Section 1010 is identical to Section 610 of the Senate amendment. The House bill has no similar provision. The House recedes. Sec. 1011. Definitions Section 1011 is identical to Section 611 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes.", u"Madam Chair, I rise today to oppose to H.R. 1560, the Protecting Cyber Network Act (PCNA). While I commend Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff for crafting a bill that improves upon the cybersecurity legislation this body has previously voted on, I cannot support it in its current form. Despite addressing many of the reservations I had when we voted on the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) last Congress, I have concerns about the ambiguous liability provisions in this legislation. While companies should have some legal protection, this bill gives liability protections to companies so long as they share or receive information ``in accordance with the Act.'' It would grant immunity to companies for simply putting forth a ``good faith'' effort when reporting security threats and sharing consumer data with the government and other companies. For example, companies would receive liability protection even if they fail to act on threat information in a timely manner. The unintended effect of these murky liability provisions is that companies would not have the same incentive to report security threats and protect their consumers' privacy. I was disappointed that Republicans did not allow a vote on two amendments offered by Rep. Richmond than would have addressed these overbroad liability provisions. Our country faces cyber-network attacks each day which threaten our national security and our economy. I strongly believe that we must take steps to protect against these cyber threats while not sacrificing our privacy and civil liberties. Should this bill pass the House, I hope that many of the loopholes can be resolved with the Senate, but as it stands today I cannot support it. The Acting CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment under the 5-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence printed in the bill. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read. The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Cyber Networks Act''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures by the Federal Government with non-Federal entities.Sec. 3. Authorizations for preventing, detecting, analyzing, and mitigating cybersecurity threats.Sec. 4. Sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures with appropriate Federal entities other than the Department of Defense or the National Security Agency.Sec. 5. Federal Government liability for violations of privacy or civil liberties.Sec. 6. Protection from liability.Sec. 7. Oversight of Government activities.Sec. 8. Report on cybersecurity threats.Sec. 9. Construction and preemption.Sec. 10. Conforming amendments.Sec. 11. Definitions. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 110 (50 U.S.C. 3045) the following new section: (a) Authorization for Private-sector Defensive Monitoring.-- (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a private entity may, for a cybersecurity purpose, monitor-- (A) an information system of such private entity; (B) an information system of a non-Federal entity or a Federal entity, upon the written authorization of such non- Federal entity or such Federal entity; and (C) information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system monitored by the private entity under this paragraph. (2) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to-- (A) authorize the monitoring of an information system, or the use of any information obtained through such monitoring, other than as provided in this Act; (B) authorize the Federal Government to conduct surveillance of any person; or (C) limit otherwise lawful activity. (b) Authorization for Operation of Defensive Measures.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a private entity may, for a cybersecurity purpose, operate a defensive measure that is operated on and is limited to-- (A) an information system of such private entity to protect the rights or property of the private entity; and (B) an information system of a non-Federal entity or a Federal entity upon written authorization of such non-Federal entity or such Federal entity for operation of such defensive measure to protect the rights or property of such private entity, such non-Federal entity, or such Federal entity. (2) Limitation.--The authority provided in paragraph (1) does not include the intentional or reckless operation of any defensive measure that destroys, renders unusable or inaccessible (in whole or in part), substantially harms, or initiates a new action, process, or procedure on an information system or information stored on, processed by, or transiting such information system not owned by-- (A) the private entity operating such defensive measure; or (B) a non-Federal entity or a Federal entity that has provided written authorization to that private entity for operation of such defensive measure on the information system or information of the entity in accordance with this subsection. (3) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be construed-- (A) to authorize the use of a defensive measure other than as provided in this subsection; or (B) to limit otherwise lawful activity. (c) Authorization for Sharing or Receiving Cyber Threat Indicators or Defensive Measures.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a non-Federal entity may, for a cybersecurity purpose and consistent with the requirement under subsection (d)(2) to remove personal information of or information identifying a specific person not directly related to a cybersecurity threat and the protection of classified information-- (A) share a lawfully obtained cyber threat indicator or defensive measure with any other non-Federal entity or an appropriate Federal entity (other than the Department of Defense or any component of the Department, including the National Security Agency); and (B) receive a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure from any other non-Federal entity or an appropriate Federal entity. (2) Lawful restriction.--A non-Federal entity receiving a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure from another non- Federal entity or a Federal entity shall comply with otherwise lawful restrictions placed on the sharing or use of such cyber threat indicator or defensive measure by the sharing non-Federal entity or Federal entity. (3) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to-- (A) authorize the sharing or receiving of a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure other than as provided in this subsection; (B) authorize the sharing or receiving of classified information by or with any person not authorized to access such classified information; (C) prohibit any Federal entity from engaging in formal or informal technical discussion regarding cyber threat indicators or defensive measures with a non-Federal entity or from providing technical assistance to address vulnerabilities or mitigate threats at the request of such an entity; (D) limit otherwise lawful activity; (E) prohibit a non-Federal entity, if authorized by applicable law or regulation other than this Act, from sharing a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure with the Department of Defense or any component of the Department, including the National Security Agency; or (F) authorize the Federal Government to conduct surveillance of any person. (d) Protection and Use of Information.-- (1) Security of information.--A non-Federal entity monitoring an information system, operating a defensive measure, or providing or receiving a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure under this section shall implement an appropriate security control to protect against unauthorized access to, or acquisition of, such cyber threat indicator or defensive measure. (2) Removal of certain personal information.--A non-Federal entity sharing a cyber threat indicator pursuant to this Act shall, prior to such sharing, take reasonable efforts to-- (A) review such cyber threat indicator to assess whether such cyber threat indicator contains any information that the non-Federal entity reasonably believes at the time of sharing to be personal information of or information identifying a specific person not directly related to a cybersecurity threat and remove such information; or (B) implement a technical capability configured to remove any information contained within such indicator that the non- Federal entity reasonably believes at the time of sharing to be personal information of or information identifying a specific person not directly related to a cybersecurity threat. (3) Use of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures by non-federal entities.--A non-Federal entity may, for a cybersecurity purpose-- (A) use a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure shared or received under this section to monitor or operate a defensive measure on-- (i) an information system of such non-Federal entity; or (ii) an information system of another non-Federal entity or a Federal entity upon the written authorization of that other non-Federal entity or that Federal entity; and (B) otherwise use, retain, and further share such cyber threat indicator or defensive measure subject to-- (i) an otherwise lawful restriction placed by the sharing non-Federal entity or Federal entity on such cyber threat indicator or defensive measure; or (ii) an otherwise applicable provision of law. (4) Use of cyber threat indicators by state, tribal, or local government.-- (A) Law enforcement use.--A State, tribal, or local government may use a cyber threat indicator shared with such State, tribal, or local government for the purposes described in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) of section 4(d)(5)(A). (B) Exemption from disclosure.--A cyber threat indicator shared with a State, tribal, or local government under this section shall be-- (i) deemed voluntarily shared information; and (ii) exempt from disclosure under any State, tribal, or local law requiring disclosure of information or records, except as otherwise required by applicable State, tribal, or local law requiring disclosure in any criminal prosecution. (e) No Right or Benefit.--The sharing of a cyber threat indicator with a non-Federal entity under this Act shall not create a right or benefit to similar information by such non- Federal entity or any other non-Federal entity. (a) Requirement for Policies and Procedures.-- (1) In general.--Section 111 of the National Security Act of 1947, as inserted by section 2 of this Act, is amended-- (A) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and (B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection: ``(b) Policies and Procedures for Sharing With the Appropriate Federal Entities Other Than the Department of Defense or the National Security Agency.-- ``(1) Establishment.--The President shall develop and submit to Congress policies and procedures relating to the receipt of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures by the Federal Government. ``(2) Requirements concerning policies and procedures.--The policies and procedures required under paragraph (1) shall-- ``(A) be developed in accordance with the privacy and civil liberties guidelines required under section 4(b) of the Protecting Cyber Networks Act; ``(B) ensure that-- ``(i) a cyber threat indicator shared by a non-Federal entity with an appropriate Federal entity (other than the Department of Defense or any component of the Department, including the National Security Agency) pursuant to section 3 of such Act is shared in real-time with all of the appropriate Federal entities (including all relevant components thereof); ``(ii) the sharing of such cyber threat indicator with appropriate Federal entities is not subject to any delay, modification, or any other action without good cause that could impede receipt by all of the appropriate Federal entities; and ``(iii) such cyber threat indicator is provided to each other Federal entity to which such cyber threat indicator is relevant; and ``(C) ensure there-- ``(i) is an audit capability; and ``(ii) are appropriate sanctions in place for officers, employees, or agents of a Federal entity who knowingly and willfully use a cyber threat indicator or defense measure shared with the Federal Government by a non-Federal entity under the Protecting Cyber Networks Act other than in accordance with this section and such Act.''. (2) Submission.--The President shall submit to Congress-- (A) not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, interim policies and procedures required under section 111(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as inserted by paragraph (1) of this section; and (B) not later than 180 days after such date, final policies and procedures required under such section 111(b)(1). (b) Privacy and Civil Liberties.-- (1) Guidelines of attorney general.--The Attorney General, in consultation with the heads of the other appropriate Federal agencies and with officers designated under section 1062 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee-1), shall develop and periodically review guidelines relating to privacy and civil liberties that govern the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of cyber threat indicators by a Federal entity obtained in accordance with this Act and the amendments made by this Act. (2) Content.--The guidelines developed and reviewed under paragraph (1) shall, consistent with the need to protect information systems from cybersecurity threats and mitigate cybersecurity threats-- (A) limit the impact on privacy and civil liberties of activities by the Federal Government under this Act, including guidelines to ensure that personal information of or information identifying specific persons is properly removed from information received, retained, used, or disseminated by a Federal entity in accordance with this Act or the amendments made by this Act; (B) limit the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of cyber threat indicators containing personal information of or information identifying specific persons, including by establishing-- (i) a process for the prompt destruction of such information that is known not to be directly related to a use for a cybersecurity purpose; (ii) specific limitations on the length of any period in which a cyber threat indicator may be retained; and (iii) a process to inform recipients that such indicators may only be used for a cybersecurity purpose; (C) include requirements to safeguard cyber threat indicators containing personal information of or identifying specific persons from unauthorized access or acquisition, including appropriate sanctions for activities by officers, employees, or agents of the Federal Government in contravention of such guidelines; (D) include procedures for notifying non-Federal entities and Federal entities if information received pursuant to this section is known or determined by a Federal entity receiving such information not to constitute a cyber threat indicator; (E) be consistent with any other applicable provisions of law and the fair information practice principles set forth in appendix A of the document entitled ``National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace'' and published by the President in April, 2011; and (F) include steps that may be needed so that dissemination of cyber threat indicators is consistent with the protection of classified information and other sensitive national security information. (3) Submission.--The Attorney General shall submit to Congress-- (A) not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, interim guidelines required under paragraph (1); and (B) not later than 180 days after such date, final guidelines required under such paragraph. (c) National Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.-- (1) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.), as amended by section 2 of this Act, is further amended-- (A) by redesignating section 119B as section 119C; and (B) by inserting after section 119A the following new section: (a) In General.--If a department or agency of the Federal Government intentionally or willfully violates the privacy and civil liberties guidelines issued by the Attorney General under section 4(b), the United States shall be liable to a person injured by such violation in an amount equal to the sum of-- (1) the actual damages sustained by the person as a result of the violation or $1,000, whichever is greater; and (2) reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this subsection in which the complainant has substantially prevailed. (b) Venue.--An action to enforce liability created under this section may be brought in the district court of the United States in-- (1) the district in which the complainant resides; (2) the district in which the principal place of business of the complainant is located; (3) the district in which the department or agency of the Federal Government that violated such privacy and civil liberties guidelines is located; or (4) the District of Columbia. (c) Statute of Limitations.--No action shall lie under this subsection unless such action is commenced not later than two years after the date of the violation of the privacy and civil liberties guidelines issued by the Attorney General under section 4(b) that is the basis for the action. (d) Exclusive Cause of Action.--A cause of action under this subsection shall be the exclusive means available to a complainant seeking a remedy for a violation by a department or agency of the Federal Government under this Act. (a) Monitoring of Information Systems.--No cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court against any private entity, and such action shall be promptly dismissed, for the monitoring of an information system and information under section 3(a) that is conducted in good faith in accordance with this Act and the amendments made by this Act. (b) Sharing or Receipt of Cyber Threat Indicators.--No cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court against any non-Federal entity, and such action shall be promptly dismissed, for the sharing or receipt of a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure under section 3(c), or a good faith failure to act based on such sharing or receipt, if such sharing or receipt is conducted in good faith in accordance with this Act and the amendments made by this Act. (c) Willful Misconduct.-- (1) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed-- (A) to require dismissal of a cause of action against a non-Federal entity (including a private entity) that has engaged in willful misconduct in the course of conducting activities authorized by this Act or the amendments made by this Act; or (B) to undermine or limit the availability of otherwise applicable common law or statutory defenses. (2) Proof of willful misconduct.--In any action claiming that subsection (a) or (b) does not apply due to willful misconduct described in paragraph (1), the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the willful misconduct by each non-Federal entity subject to such claim and that such willful misconduct proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. (3) Willful misconduct defined.--In this subsection, the term ``willful misconduct'' means an act or omission that is taken-- (A) intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; (B) knowingly without legal or factual justification; and (C) in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh the benefit. (a) Biennial Report on Implementation.-- (1) In general.--Section 111 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 2(a) and amended by section 4(a) of this Act, is further amended-- (A) by redesignating subsection (c) (as redesignated by such section 4(a)) as subsection (d); and (B) by inserting after subsection (b) (as inserted by such section 4(a)) the following new subsection: ``(c) Biennial Report on Implementation.-- ``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every two years, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the other appropriate Federal entities, shall submit to Congress a report concerning the implementation of this section and the Protecting Cyber Networks Act. ``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include the following: ``(A) An assessment of the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, and guidelines required by this section and section 4 of the Protecting Cyber Networks Act in ensuring that cyber threat indicators are shared effectively and responsibly within the Federal Government. ``(B) An assessment of whether the procedures developed under section 3 of such Act comply with the goals described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subsection (a)(1). ``(C) An assessment of whether cyber threat indicators have been properly classified and an accounting of the number of security clearances authorized by the Federal Government for the purposes of this section and such Act. ``(D) A review of the type of cyber threat indicators shared with the Federal Government under this section and such Act, including the following: ``(i) The degree to which such information may impact the privacy and civil liberties of specific persons. ``(ii) A quantitative and qualitative assessment of the impact of the sharing of such cyber threat indicators with the Federal Government on privacy and civil liberties of specific persons. ``(iii) The adequacy of any steps taken by the Federal Government to reduce such impact. ``(E) A review of actions taken by the Federal Government based on cyber threat indicators shared with the Federal Government under this section or such Act, including the appropriateness of any subsequent use or dissemination of such cyber threat indicators by a Federal entity under this section or section 4 of such Act. ``(F) A description of any significant violations of the requirements of this section or such Act by the Federal Government-- ``(i) an assessment of all reports of officers, employees, and agents of the Federal Government misusing information provided to the Federal Government under the Protecting Cyber Networks Act or this section, without regard to whether the misuse was knowing or wilful; and ``(ii) an assessment of all disciplinary actions taken against such officers, employees, and agents. ``(G) A summary of the number and type of non-Federal entities that received classified cyber threat indicators from the Federal Government under this section or such Act and an evaluation of the risks and benefits of sharing such cyber threat indicators. ``(H) An assessment of any personal information of or information identifying a specific person not directly related to a cybersecurity threat that-- ``(i) was shared by a non-Federal entity with the Federal Government under this Act in contravention of section 3(d)(2); or ``(ii) was shared within the Federal Government under this Act in contravention of the guidelines required by section 4(b). ``(3) Recommendations.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) may include such recommendations as the heads of the appropriate Federal entities may have for improvements or modifications to the authorities and processes under this section or such Act. ``(4) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. ``(5) Public availability of reports.--The Director of National Intelligence shall make publicly available the unclassified portion of each report required by paragraph (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on cybersecurity threats, including cyber attacks, theft, and data breaches. (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) An assessment of-- (A) the current intelligence sharing and cooperation relationships of the United States with other countries regarding cybersecurity threats (including cyber attacks, theft, and data breaches) directed against the United States that threaten the United States national security interests, economy, and intellectual property; and (B) the relative utility of such relationships, which elements of the intelligence community participate in such relationships, and whether and how such relationships could be improved. (2) A list and an assessment of the countries and non-state actors that are the primary threats of carrying out a cybersecurity threat (including a cyber attack, theft, or data breach) against the United States and that threaten the United States national security, economy, and intellectual property. (3) A description of the extent to which the capabilities of the United States Government to respond to or prevent cybersecurity threats (including cyber attacks, theft, or data breaches) directed against the United States private sector are degraded by a delay in the prompt notification by private entities of such threats or cyber attacks, theft, and breaches. (4) An assessment of additional technologies or capabilities that would enhance the ability of the United States to prevent and to respond to cybersecurity threats (including cyber attacks, theft, and data breaches). (5) An assessment of any technologies or practices utilized by the private sector that could be rapidly fielded to assist the intelligence community in preventing and responding to cybersecurity threats. (c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (d) Public Availability of Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall make publicly available the unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a). (e) Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 (a) Prohibition of Surveillance.--Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to authorize the Department of Defense or the National Security Agency or any other element of the intelligence community to target a person for surveillance. (b) Otherwise Lawful Disclosures.--Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to limit or prohibit-- (1) otherwise lawful disclosures of communications, records, or other information, including reporting of known or suspected criminal activity, by a non-Federal entity to any other non-Federal entity or the Federal Government; or (2) any otherwise lawful use of such disclosures by any entity of the Federal government, without regard to whether such otherwise lawful disclosures duplicate or replicate disclosures made under this Act. (c) Whistle Blower Protections.--Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to prohibit or limit the disclosure of information protected under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse, or public health or safety threats), section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress), section 1034 of title 10, United States Code (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military), or any similar provision of Federal or State law.. (d) Protection of Sources and Methods.--Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed-- (1) as creating any immunity against, or otherwise affecting, any action brought by the Federal Government, or any department or agency thereof, to enforce any law, executive order, or procedure governing the appropriate handling, disclosure, or use of classified information; (2) to affect the conduct of authorized law enforcement or intelligence activities; or (3) to modify the authority of the President or a department or agency of the Federal Government to protect and control the dissemination of classified information, intelligence sources and methods, and the national security of the United States. (e) Relationship to Other Laws.--Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to affect any requirement under any other provision of law for a non- Federal entity to provide information to the Federal Government. (f) Information Sharing Relationships.--Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed-- (1) to limit or modify an existing information-sharing relationship; (2) to prohibit a new information-sharing relationship; or (3) to require a new information-sharing relationship between any non-Federal entity and the Federal Government. (g) Preservation of Contractual Obligations and Rights.-- Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed-- (1) to amend, repeal, or supersede any current or future contractual agreement, terms of service agreement, or other contractual relationship between any non-Federal entities, or between any non-Federal entity and a Federal entity; or (2) to abrogate trade secret or intellectual property rights of any non-Federal entity or Federal entity. (h) Anti-tasking Restriction.--Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to permit the Federal Government-- (1) to require a non-Federal entity to provide information to the Federal Government; (2) to condition the sharing of a cyber threat indicator with a non-Federal entity on such non-Federal entity's provision of a cyber threat indicator to the Federal Government; or (3) to condition the award of any Federal grant, contract, or purchase on the provision of a cyber threat indicator to a Federal entity. (i) No Liability for Non-participation.--Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to subject any non-Federal entity to liability for choosing not to engage in a voluntary activiy authorized in this Act and the amendments made by this Act. (j) Use and Retention of Information.--Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to authorize, or to modify any existing authority of, a department or agency of the Federal Government to retain or use any information shared under this Act or the amendments made by this Act for any use other than permitted in this Act or the amendments made by this Act. (k) Federal Preemption.-- (1) In general.--This Act and the amendments made by this Act supersede any statute or other provision of law of a State or political subdivision of a State that restricts or otherwise expressly regulates an activity authorized under this Act or the amendments made by this Act. (2) State law enforcement.--Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to supersede any statute or other provision of law of a State or political subdivision of a State concerning the use of authorized law enforcement practices and procedures. (l) Regulatory Authority.--Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed-- (1) to authorize the promulgation of any regulations not specifically authorized by this Act or the amendments made by this Act; (2) to establish any regulatory authority not specifically established under this Act or the amendments made by this Act; or (3) to authorize regulatory actions that would duplicate or conflict with regulatory requirements, mandatory standards, Section 552(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``or'' at the end; (2) in paragraph (9), by striking ``wells.'' and inserting ``wells; or''; and (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following: ``(10) information shared with or provided to the Federal Government pursuant to the Protecting Cyber Networks Act or the amendments made by such Act.''. In this Act: (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code. (2) Appropriate federal entities.--The term ``appropriate Federal entities'' means the following: (A) The Department of Commerce. (B) The Department of Defense. (C) The Department of Energy. (D) The Department of Homeland Security. (E) The Department of Justice. (F) The Department of the Treasury. (G) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (3) Cybersecurity purpose.--The term ``cybersecurity purpose'' means the purpose of protecting (including through the use of a defensive measure) an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system from a cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability or identifying the source of a cybersecurity threat. (4) Cybersecurity threat.-- (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term ``cybersecurity threat'' means an action, not protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, on or through an information system that may result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the security, confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system. (B) Exclusion.--The term ``cybersecurity threat'' does not include any action that solely involves a violation of a consumer term of service or a consumer licensing agreement. (5) Cyber threat indicator.--The term ``cyber threat indicator'' means information or a physical object that is necessary to describe or identify-- (A) malicious reconnaissance, including anomalous patterns of communications that appear to be transmitted for the purpose of gathering technical information related to a cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability; (B) a method of defeating a security control or exploitation of a security vulnerability; (C) a security vulnerability, including anomalous activity that appears to indicate the existence of a security vulnerability; (D) a method of causing a user with legitimate access to an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system to unwittingly enable the defeat of a security control or exploitation of a security vulnerability; (E) malicious cyber command and control; (F) the actual or potential harm caused by an incident, including a description of the information exfiltrated as a result of a particular cybersecurity threat; or (G) any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if disclosure of such attribute is not otherwise prohibited by law. (6) Defensive measure.--The term ``defensive measure'' means an action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure executed on an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system that prevents or mitigates a known or suspected cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability. (7) Federal entity.--The term ``Federal entity'' means a department or agency of the United States or any component of such department or agency. (8) Information system.--The term ``information system''-- (A) has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code; and (B) includes industrial control systems, such as supervisory control and data acquisition systems, distributed control systems, and programmable logic controllers. (9) Local government.--The term ``local government'' means any borough, city, county, parish, town, township, village, or other political subdivision of a State. (10) Malicious cyber command and control.--The term ``malicious cyber command and control'' means a method for unauthorized remote identification of, access to, or use of, an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system. (11) Malicious reconnaissance.--The term ``malicious reconnaissance'' means a method for actively probing or passively monitoring an information system for the purpose of discerning security vulnerabilities of the information system, if such method is associated with a known or suspected cybersecurity threat. (12) Monitor.--The term ``monitor'' means to acquire, identify, scan, or otherwise possess information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system. (13) Non-federal entity.-- (A) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term ``non-Federal entity'' means any private entity, non-Federal government department or agency, or State, tribal, or local government (including a political subdivision, department, officer, employee, or agent thereof). (B) Inclusions.--The term ``non-Federal entity'' includes a government department or agency (including an officer, employee, or agent thereof) of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United States. (C) Exclusion.--The term ``non-Federal entity'' does not include a foreign power or known agent of a foreign power, as both terms are defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). (14) Private entity.-- (A) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term ``private entity'' means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof. (B) Inclusion.--The term ``private entity'' includes a component of a State, tribal, or local government performing electric utility services. (C) Exclusion.--The term ``private entity'' does not include a foreign power as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. The Acting CHAIR. No amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed in part A of House Report 114-88. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question. The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in part A of House Report 114-88.", u"This is the Statement of Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation for S. 3611. Total Budgetary Effects of S. 3611 for the 5-year Statutory PAYGO Scorecard: $0. Total Budgetary Effects of S. 3611 for the 10-year Statutory PAYGO Scorecard: $0. Also submitted for the Record as part of this statement is a table prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, which provides additional information on the budgetary effects of this Act. The table is as follows: Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. The bill (S. 3611), as amended, was passed, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Definitions. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National IntelligenceSec. 401. Accountability reviews by the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 402. Authorities for intelligence information sharing.Sec. 403. Location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 404. Title and appointment of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 405. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 406. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 407. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.Sec. 408. Protection of certain files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 409. Counterintelligence initiatives for the intelligence community.Sec. 410. Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act to advisory committees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 411. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the In this Act: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2010 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel levels (expressed as full-time equivalent positions) as of September 30, 2010, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill S. 3611 of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number of full-time equivalent positions for fiscal year 2010 authorized by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary for the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Authority for Conversion of Activities Performed by Contract Personnel.-- (1) In general.--In addition to the authority in subsection (a) and subject to paragraph (2), if the head of an element of the intelligence community makes a determination that activities currently being performed by contract personnel should be performed by employees of such element, the Director of National Intelligence, in order to reduce a comparable number of contract personnel, may authorize for that purpose employment of additional full-time equivalent personnel in such element equal to the number of full-time equivalent contract personnel performing such activities. (2) Concurrence and approval.--The authority described in paragraph (1) may not be exercised unless the Director of National Intelligence concurs with the determination described in such paragraph. (c) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment-- (1) in a student program, trainee program, or similar program; (2) in a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or (3) in details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training. (d) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to the initial exercise of an authority described in subsection (a) or (b). (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2010 the sum of $710,612,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2011. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 822 full-time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2010. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available to the Director of National Intelligence under section 103 are also available to the Director for the adjustment of personnel levels within the Intelligence Community Management Account. (d) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2010 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts made available for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2011. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2010, there are authorized such full-time equivalent personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation'' for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that such There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2010 the sum of $290,900,000. Subparagraph (A) of section 235(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``receiving compensation under the Senior Intelligence Service pay schedule at the rate'' and inserting ``who is at the Senior Intelligence Service rank''. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 113 the following new section: Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(s) Pay Authority for Critical Positions.--(1) Notwithstanding any pay limitation established under any other provision of law applicable to employees in elements of the intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence may, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, grant authority to the head of a department or agency to fix the rate of basic pay for one or more positions within the intelligence community at a rate in excess of any applicable limitation, subject to the provisions of this subsection. The exercise of authority so granted is at the discretion of the head of the department or agency employing the individual in a position covered by such authority, subject to the provisions of this subsection and any conditions established by the Director of National Intelligence when granting such authority. ``(2) Authority under this subsection may be granted or exercised only-- ``(A) with respect to a position that requires an extremely high level of expertise and is critical to successful accomplishment of an important mission; and ``(B) to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an individual exceptionally well qualified for the position. ``(3) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written approval of the Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by law. ``(4) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate payable for level I of the Executive Schedule under section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written approval of the President in response to a request by the Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by law. ``(5) Any grant of authority under this subsection for a position shall terminate at the discretion of the Director of National Intelligence. ``(6)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director grants authority to the head of a department or agency under this subsection. ``(B) The head of a department or agency to which the Director of National Intelligence grants authority under this subsection shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the Director of the exercise of such authority not later than 30 days after the date on which such head exercises such authority.''. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 303 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(t) Award of Rank to Members of the Senior National Intelligence Service.--(1) The President, based on the recommendation of the Director of National Intelligence, may award a rank to a member of the Senior National Intelligence Service or other intelligence community senior civilian officer not already covered by such a rank award program in the same manner in which a career appointee of an agency may be awarded a rank under section 4507 of title 5, United States Code. ``(2) The President may establish procedures to award a rank under paragraph (1) to a member of the Senior National Intelligence Service or a senior civilian officer of the intelligence community whose identity as such a member or officer is classified information (as defined in section (a) Assessment.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506A the following new section: ``annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence community ``Sec. 506B. (a) Requirement To Provide.--The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of each element of the intelligence community, prepare an annual personnel level assessment for such element that assesses the personnel levels for such element for the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the assessment is submitted. ``(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees each year at the time that the President submits to Congress the budget for a fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code. ``(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) submitted during a fiscal year shall contain the following information for the element of the intelligence community concerned: ``(1) The budget submission for personnel costs for the upcoming fiscal year. ``(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current fiscal year. ``(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such costs as compared to the personnel costs during the prior 5 fiscal years. ``(4) The number of full-time equivalent positions that is the basis for which personnel funds are requested for the upcoming fiscal year. ``(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of the number referred to in paragraph (4) as compared to the number of full-time equivalent positions of the current fiscal year. ``(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of the number referred to in paragraph (4) as compared to the number of full-time equivalent positions during the prior 5 fiscal years. ``(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of core contract personnel to be funded by the element for the upcoming fiscal year. ``(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of such costs of core contract personnel as compared to the best estimate of the costs of core contract personnel of the current fiscal year. ``(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of such number and such costs of core contract personnel as compared to the number and cost of core contract personnel during the prior 5 fiscal years. ``(10) A justification for the requested personnel and core contract personnel levels. ``(11) The best estimate of the number of intelligence collectors and analysts employed or contracted by each element of the intelligence community. ``(12) A statement by the Director of National Intelligence that, based on current and projected funding, the element concerned will have sufficient-- ``(A) internal infrastructure to support the requested personnel and core contract personnel levels; ``(B) training resources to support the requested personnel levels; and ``(C) funding to support the administrative and operational activities of the requested personnel levels.''. (b) Applicability Date.--The first assessment required to be submitted under section 506B(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees at the time that the President submits to Congress the budget for fiscal year 2012 pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code. (c) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section such Act, as amended by section 302 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506A the following new item:``Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence community.''. Section 102A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(e)) is amended by-- (1) redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and (2) inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph: ``(3)(A) In addition to the number of full-time equivalent positions authorized for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a fiscal year, there is authorized for such Office for each fiscal year an additional 100 full- time equivalent positions that may be used only for the purposes described in subparagraph (B). ``(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of National Intelligence may use a full-time equivalent position authorized under subparagraph (A) only for the purpose of providing a temporary transfer of personnel made in accordance with paragraph (2) to an element of the intelligence community to enable such element to increase the total number of personnel authorized for such element, on a temporary basis-- ``(i) during a period in which a permanent employee of such element is absent to participate in critical language training; or ``(ii) to accept a permanent employee of another element of the intelligence community to provide language-capable services. ``(C) Paragraph (2)(B) shall not apply with respect to a transfer of personnel made under subparagraph (B). ``(D) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the use of authorities under this paragraph. Each such report shall include a description of-- ``(i) the number of transfers of personnel made by the Director pursuant to subparagraph (B), disaggregated by each element of the intelligence community; ``(ii) the critical language needs that were fulfilled or partially fulfilled through the use of such transfers; and ``(iii) the cost to carry out subparagraph (B).''. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 304 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(u) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if such employment creates a conflict of interest or appearance thereof. ``(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall annually submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing all outside employment for officers and employees of elements of the intelligence community that was authorized by the head of an element of the intelligence community during the preceding calendar year. Such report shall be submitted each year on the date provided in section 507.''. (a) Permanent Authorization.--Subtitle C of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Expansion of the Louis Stokes Educational Scholarship Program to Graduate Students.--Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by inserting ``and graduate'' after ``undergraduate''; and (B) by striking ``the baccalaureate'' and inserting ``a baccalaureate or graduate''; (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``or graduate'' after ``undergraduate''; (3) in subsection (e)(2), by inserting ``and graduate'' after ``undergraduate''; and (4) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(h) The undergraduate and graduate training program established under this section shall be known as the Louis Stokes Educational Scholarship Program.''. (b) Authority for Participation by Individuals Who Are Not Employed by the United States Government.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (b) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by subsection (a)(2), is further amended by striking ``civilian employees'' and inserting ``civilians who may or may not be employees''. (2) Conforming amendments.--Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by subsection (a), is further amended-- (A) in subsection (c), by striking ``employees'' and inserting ``program participants''; and (B) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (1)-- (I) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), strike ``an employee of the Agency,'' and insert ``a program participant,''; (II) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``employee'' and inserting ``program participant''; (III) in subparagraph (C)-- (aa) by striking ``employee'' each place that term appears and inserting ``program participant''; and (bb) by striking ``employee's'' each place that term appears and inserting ``program participant's''; and (IV) in subparagraph (D)-- (aa) by striking ``employee'' each place that term appears and inserting ``program participant''; and (bb) by striking ``employee's'' each place that term appears and inserting ``program participant's''; and (ii) in paragraph (3)(C)-- (I) by striking ``employee'' both places that term appears and inserting ``program participant''; and (II) by striking ``employee's'' and inserting ``program participant's''. (c) Termination of Program Participants.--Subsection (d)(1)(C) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by subsection (b)(2)(B)(i)(III), is further amended by striking ``terminated'' and all that follows and inserting ``terminated-- ``(i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the program participant; ``(ii) by the program participant voluntarily; or ``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the program participant to maintain such level of academic standing in the educational course of training as the Director of the National Security Agency shall have specified in the agreement of the program participant under this subsection; and''. (d) Authority To Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With NSA.--Subsection (e) of Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''. (e) Authority of Elements of the Intelligence Community To Establish a Stokes Educational Scholarship Program.-- (1) Authority.--Subtitle C of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.), as amended by section 311 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Program.--Subtitle C of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.), as amended by section 312(e) of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the National Security Education Board established under section 803(a) of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1903(a)), may establish a pilot program for intensive language instruction in African languages. (b) Program.--A pilot program established under subsection (a) shall provide scholarships for programs that provide intensive language instruction-- (1) in any of the five highest priority African languages for which scholarships are not offered under the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.), as determined by the Director of National Intelligence; and (2) both in the United States and in a country in which the language is the native language of a significant portion of the population, as determined by the Director of National Intelligence. (c) Termination.--A pilot program established under subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is five years after the date on which such pilot program is established. (d) Authorization of Appropriations.-- (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000. (2) Availability.--Funds authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1) shall remain available until the termination of the pilot program in accordance with subsection (c). (a) Vulnerability Assessments of Major Systems.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 305 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506B, as added by section 305(a), the following new section: (a) Intelligence Community Business System Transformation.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 321 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506C, as added by section 321(a), the following new section: (a) Reports.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 322 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506D, as added by section 322(a)(1), the following new section: (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 323 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506E, as added by section 323(a), the following new section: (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 324 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506F, as added by section 324(a), the following new section: Subsection (n) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4)(A) In addition to the authority referred to in paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the head of an element of the intelligence community to exercise an acquisition authority referred to in section 3 or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)) for an acquisition by such element that is more than 50 percent funded under the National Intelligence Program. ``(B) The head of an element of the intelligence community may not exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) until-- ``(i) the head of such element (without delegation) submits to the Director of National Intelligence a written request that includes-- ``(I) a description of such authority requested to be exercised; ``(II) an explanation of the need for such authority, including an explanation of the reasons that other authorities are insufficient; and ``(III) a certification that the mission of such element would be-- ``(aa) impaired if such authority is not exercised; or ``(bb) significantly and measurably enhanced if such authority is exercised; and ``(ii) the Director of National Intelligence issues a written authorization that includes-- ``(I) a description of the authority referred to in subparagraph (A) that is authorized to be exercised; and ``(II) a justification to support the exercise of such authority. ``(C) A request and authorization to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) may be made with respect to an individual acquisition or with respect to a specific class of acquisitions described in the request and authorization referred to in subparagraph (B). ``(D)(i) A request from a head of an element of the intelligence community located within one of the departments described in clause (ii) to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be submitted to the Director of National Intelligence in accordance with any procedures established by the head of such department. ``(ii) The departments described in this clause are the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury. ``(E)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community may not be authorized to utilize an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for a class of acquisitions for a period of more than 3 years, except that the Director of National Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize the use of such an authority for not more than 6 years. ``(ii) Each authorization to utilize an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) may be extended in accordance with the requirements of subparagraph (B) for successive periods of not more than 3 years, except that the Director of National Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize an extension period of not more than 6 years. ``(F) Subject to clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (E), the Director of National Intelligence may only delegate the authority of the Director under subparagraphs (A) through (E) to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or a Deputy Director of National Intelligence. ``(G) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit-- ``(i) to the congressional intelligence committees a notification of an authorization to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) or an extension of such authorization that includes the written authorization referred to in subparagraph (B)(ii); and ``(ii) to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget a notification of an authorization to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for an acquisition or class of acquisitions that will exceed $50,000,000 annually. ``(H) Requests and authorizations to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) shall remain available within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a period of at least 6 years following the date of such request or authorization. ``(I) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to alter or otherwise limit the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency to independently exercise an authority under section 3 or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)).''. (a) Procedures.--Section 501(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(c)) is amended by striking ``such procedures'' and inserting ``such written procedures''. (b) Intelligence Activities.--Section 502(a)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)(2)) is amended by inserting ``(including the legal basis under which the intelligence activity is being or was conducted)'' after ``concerning intelligence activities''. (c) Covert Actions.--Section 503 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``(including the legal basis under which the covert action is being or was conducted)'' after ``concerning covert actions''; (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``in writing'' after ``be reported''; (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``committee. When'' and inserting the following: ``committee. ``(5) When''; and (C) in paragraph (5), as designated by subparagraph (B)-- (i) by inserting ``, or a notice provided under subsection (d)(1),'' after ``access to a finding''; and (ii) by inserting ``written'' before ``statement''; (3) in subsection (d)-- (A) by striking ``(d) The President'' and inserting ``(d)(1) The President''; (B) in paragraph (1), as designated by subparagraph (A), by inserting ``in writing'' after ``notified''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) In determining whether an activity constitutes a significant undertaking for purposes of paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether the activity-- ``(A) involves significant risk of loss of life; ``(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, including authorities relating to research, development, or operations; ``(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or other resources; ``(D) requires notification under section 504; ``(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing intelligence sources or methods; or ``(F) presents a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious damage to the diplomatic relations of the United States if such activity were disclosed without authorization.''; and (4) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) The President shall maintain-- ``(1) a record of the Members of Congress to whom a finding is reported under subsection (c) or notice is provided under subsection (d)(1) and the date on which each Member of Congress receives such finding or notice; and ``(2) each written statement provided under subsection (c)(5).''. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 325 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``certification of compliance with oversight requirements ``Sec. 508. The head of each element of the intelligence community shall annually submit to the congressional intelligence committees-- ``(1) a certification that, to the best of the knowledge of the head of such element-- ``(A) the head of such element is in full compliance with the requirements of this title; and ``(B) any information required to be submitted by the head of such element under this Act before the date of the submission of such certification has been properly submitted; or ``(2) if the head of such element is unable to submit a certification under paragraph (1), a statement-- ``(A) of the reasons the head of such element is unable to submit such a certification; ``(B) describing any information required to be submitted by the head of such element under this Act before the date of the submission of such statement that has not been properly submitted; and ``(C) that the head of such element will submit such information as soon as possible after the submission of such statement.''. (b) Applicability Date.--The first certification or statement required to be submitted by the head of each element of the intelligence community under section 508 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (c) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 325 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after the item related to section 507 the following new item:``Sec. 508. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.''. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than December 1, 2010, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report containing-- (1) the policies and procedures of the United States Government governing participation by an element of the intelligence community in the interrogation of individuals detained by the United States who are suspected of international terrorism with the objective, in whole or in part, of acquiring national intelligence, including such policies and procedures of each appropriate element of the intelligence community or interagency body established to carry out interrogation; (2) the policies and procedures relating to any detention by the Central Intelligence Agency of such individuals in accordance with Executive Order 13491; (3) the legal basis for the policies and procedures referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2); (4) the training and research to support the policies and procedures referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2); and (5) any action that has been taken to implement section 1004 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 2000dd- Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of-- (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on-- (1) the intelligence collection efforts of the United States dedicated to assessing the threat from biological weapons from state, nonstate, or rogue actors, either foreign or domestic; and (2) efforts to protect the biodefense knowledge and infrastructure of the United States. (b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include-- (1) an assessment of the intelligence collection efforts of the United States dedicated to detecting the development or use of biological weapons by state, nonstate, or rogue actors, either foreign or domestic; (2) information on fiscal, human, technical, open-source, and other intelligence collection resources of the United States dedicated for use to detect or protect against the threat of biological weapons; (3) an assessment of any problems that may reduce the overall effectiveness of United States intelligence collection and analysis to identify and protect biological weapons targets, including-- (A) intelligence collection gaps or inefficiencies; (B) inadequate information sharing practices; or (C) inadequate cooperation among departments or agencies of the United States; (4) a strategic plan prepared by the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, that provides for actions for the appropriate elements of the intelligence community to close important intelligence gaps related to biological weapons; (5) a description of appropriate goals, schedules, milestones, or metrics to measure the long-term effectiveness of actions implemented to carry out the plan described in paragraph (4); and (6) any long-term resource and human capital issues related to the collection of intelligence regarding biological weapons, including any recommendations to address shortfalls of experienced and qualified staff possessing relevant scientific, language, and technical skills. (c) Implementation of Strategic Plan.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence submits the report required by subsection (a), the Director shall begin implementation of the strategic plan referred to in subsection (b)(4). (a) Notification of Cybersecurity Programs.-- (1) Requirement for notification.-- (A) Existing programs.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a notification for each cybersecurity program in operation on such date that includes the documentation referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and biennially thereafter for four years, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the proficiency in foreign languages and, as appropriate, in foreign dialects, of each element of the intelligence community, including-- (1) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency and a description of the level of proficiency required; (2) an estimate of the number of such positions that such element will require during the five-year period beginning on the date of the submission of the report; (3) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by-- (A) military personnel; and (B) civilian personnel; (4) the number of applicants for positions in such element in the preceding fiscal year that indicated foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the proficiency level; (5) the number of persons hired by such element with foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language and a description of the proficiency level of such persons; (6) the number of personnel of such element currently attending foreign language training, including the provider of such training; (7) a description of the efforts of such element to recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a foreign language; (8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, advanced, and intensive foreign language training utilized by such element; (9) for each foreign language and, as appropriate, dialect of a foreign language-- (A) the number of positions of such element that require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect; (B) the number of personnel of such element that are serving in a position that requires proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; (C) the number of personnel of such element that are serving in a position that does not require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; (D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable; (E) whether the number of personnel at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the requirements of such element; (F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as linguists for such element that are not qualified as linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language Roundtable; (G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists for such element during the preceding calendar year; (H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that discontinued serving such element during the preceding calendar year; (I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by a foreign country, international organization, or other foreign entity; and (J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by contractors; (10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; (11) an identification of any critical gaps in foreign language proficiency with respect to such element and recommendations for eliminating such gaps; (12) recommendations, if any, for eliminating required reports relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer relevant; and (13) an assessment of the feasibility of employing foreign nationals lawfully present in the United States who have previously worked as translators or interpreters for the Armed Forces or another department or agency of the United States Government in Iraq or Afghanistan to meet the critical language needs of such element. (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the head of each element of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each such element to increase diversity within the intelligence community. (b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include specific implementation plans to increase diversity within each element of the intelligence community, including-- (1) specific implementation plans for each such element designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic plan of the Director of National Intelligence on equal employment opportunity and diversity; (2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates; (3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior, midgrade, senior, and management levels; (4) a description of specific diversity awareness training and education programs for senior officials and managers of each such element; and (5) a description of performance metrics to measure the success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs described in paragraphs (1) through (4). (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than February 1, 2011, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report describing the use of personal services contracts across the intelligence community, the impact of the use of such contracts on the intelligence community workforce, plans for conversion of contractor employment into United States Government employment, and the accountability mechanisms that govern the performance of such personal services contracts. (b) Content.-- (1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include-- (A) a description of any relevant regulations or guidance issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community and in effect as of February 1, 2011, relating to minimum standards required regarding the hiring, training, security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and how those standards may differ from those for United States Government employees performing substantially similar functions; (B) an identification of contracts in effect during the preceding fiscal year under which the contractor is performing substantially similar functions to a United States Government employee; (C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings achieved during the preceding fiscal year by awarding contracts for the performance of such functions referred to in subparagraph (B) instead of using full-time employees of the elements of the intelligence community to perform such functions; (D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph (a) Study.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall conduct a study on the electronic waste destruction practices of the intelligence community. Such study shall assess-- (1) the security of the electronic waste disposal practices of the intelligence community, including the potential for counterintelligence exploitation of destroyed, discarded, or recycled materials; (2) the environmental impact of such disposal practices; and (3) methods to improve the security and environmental impact of such disposal practices, including steps to prevent the forensic exploitation of electronic waste. (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a). (a) Review.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct a classification review of the records of the Agency that are relevant to the known or potential health effects suffered by veterans of Operation Desert Storm as described in the November 2008, report by the Department of Veterans Affairs Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses. (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress the results of the classification review conducted under subsection (a), including the total number of records of the Agency that are relevant. (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to Congress a review of constraints under international law and the laws of foreign nations to the assertion of enforcement jurisdiction with respect to criminal investigations of terrorism offenses under the laws of the United States conducted by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in foreign nations and using funds made available for the National Intelligence Program, including constraints identified in section 432 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall make publicly available an unclassified version of the report of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency entitled ``Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge Denial Program in Peru, 1995-2001'', dated August 25, 2008. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall submit to Congress a report summarizing intelligence related to the threat to the United States from weapons that use radiological materials, including highly dispersible substances such as cesium-137. Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the feasibility and advisability of creating a national space intelligence office to manage space-related intelligence assets and access to such assets. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the attempt to detonate an explosive device aboard Northwest Airlines flight number 253 on December 25, 2009. Such report shall describe the failures, if any, to share or analyze intelligence or other information and the measures that the intelligence community has taken or will take to prevent such failures, including-- (1) a description of the roles and responsibilities of the counterterrorism analytic components of the intelligence community in synchronizing, correlating, and analyzing all sources of intelligence related to terrorism; (2) an assessment of the technological capabilities of the United States Government to assess terrorist threats, including-- (A) a list of all databases used by counterterrorism analysts; (B) a description of the steps taken by the intelligence community to integrate all relevant terrorist databases and allow for cross-database searches; (C) a description of the steps taken by the intelligence community to correlate biographic information with terrorism- related intelligence; and (D) a description of the improvements to information technology needed to enable the United States Government to better share information; (3) any recommendations that the Director considers appropriate for legislation to improve the sharing of intelligence or information relating to terrorists; (4) a description of the steps taken by the intelligence community to train analysts on watchlisting processes and procedures; (5) a description of the manner in which watchlisting information is entered, reviewed, searched, analyzed, and acted upon by the relevant elements of the United States Government; (6) a description of the steps the intelligence community is taking to enhance the rigor and raise the standard of tradecraft of intelligence analysis related to uncovering and preventing terrorist plots; (7) a description of the processes and procedures by which the intelligence community prioritizes terrorism threat leads and the standards used by elements of the intelligence community to determine if follow-up action is appropriate; (8) a description of the steps taken to enhance record information on possible terrorists in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment; (9) an assessment of how to meet the challenge associated with exploiting the ever-increasing volume of information available to the intelligence community; and (10) a description of the steps the intelligence community has taken or will take to respond to any findings and recommendations of the congressional intelligence committees, with respect to any such failures, that have been transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence. (a) Annual Report on Intelligence.--Section 109 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404d) is repealed. (b) Annual and Special Reports on Intelligence Sharing With the United Nations.--Section 112 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (b); and (2) by redesignating subsections (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively. (c) Annual Report on Progress in Auditable Financial Statements.--Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is repealed. (d) Report on Financial Intelligence on Terrorist Assets.-- Section 118 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404m) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``semiannual'' and inserting ``annual''; (2) in subsection (a)-- (A) in the heading, by striking ``Semiannual'' and inserting ``Annual''; (B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)-- (i) by striking ``semiannual basis'' and inserting ``annual basis''; and (ii) by striking ``preceding six-month period'' and inserting ``preceding one-year period''; (C) by striking paragraph (2); and (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively; and (3) in subsection (d)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the Committee on Armed Services,'' after ``the Committee on Appropriations,''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the Committee on Armed Services,'' after ``the Committee on Appropriations,''. (e) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence Initiatives.--Section 1102(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(1)''; and (2) by striking paragraph (2). (f) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (d); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively. (g) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.-- Section 826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 21 U.S.C. 873 note) is repealed. (h) Biennial Report on Foreign Industrial Espionage.-- Subsection (b) of section 809 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170b) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Annual Update'' and inserting ``Biennial Report''; (2) by striking paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting the following new paragraph: ``(1) Requirement to submit.--Not later than February 1, 2011, and once every two years thereafter, the President shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and congressional leadership a report updating the information referred to in subsection (a)(1)D).''; and (3) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2). (i) Table of Contents Amendments.-- (1) National security act of 1947.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 332 of this Act, is further amended-- (A) by striking the item relating to section 109; (B) by striking the item relating to section 114A; and (C) by striking the item relating to section 118 and inserting the following new item:``Sec. 118. Annual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.''. (2) Intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 2003.-- The table of contents in the first section of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2383) is amended by striking the item relating to section 826. Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the classified annex to this Act is hereby incorporated into this Act and is hereby made a requirement in law. Section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) by striking subparagraphs (A), (B), and (G); (ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (C), (D), (E), (F), (H), (I), and (N) as subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), and (G), respectively; and (iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: ``(H) The annual report on outside employment of employees of elements of the intelligence community required by section 102A(u)(2). ``(I) The annual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets required by section 118.''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraphs (C) and (D); and (2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (6). Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head of such element certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods. ``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who shall keep a record of such information. ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''. Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows: ``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and''. (a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover Intelligence Officers and Agents.-- (1) Disclosure of agent after access to information identifying agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''. (2) Disclosure of agent after access to classified information.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking ``five years'' and inserting ``10 years''. (b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of Intelligence Identities.--The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by inserting ``including an assessment of the need, if any, for modification of this title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert agents,'' after ``measures to protect the identities of covert agents,''. Section 601 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 415c) is amended to read as follows: Paragraph (5) of section 703(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 435 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``jurisdiction,'' and inserting ``jurisdiction or by a member of the committee of jurisdiction,''; and (2) by inserting ``, to evaluate the proper classification of certain records,'' after ``certain records''. Paragraph (1) of section 102(b) of the Department of Justice and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102-395; 28 U.S.C. 533 note) is amended in the flush text following subparagraph (D) by striking ``(or, if designated by the Director, the Assistant Director, Intelligence Division) and the Attorney General (or, if designated by the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security)'' and inserting ``(or a designee of the Director who is in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director in the National Security Branch or a similar successor position) and the Attorney General (or a designee of the Attorney General who is in the National Security Division in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Attorney General or a similar successor position)''. (a) Reports Relating to Security Clearances.-- (1) Quadrennial audit; security clearance determinations.-- (A) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 325 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506G, as added by section 325(a), the following new section: (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Covered element of the intelligence community.--The term ``covered element of the intelligence community'' means-- (A) the Central Intelligence Agency; (B) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (C) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (D) the National Reconnaissance Office; or (E) the National Security Agency. (2) Independent auditor.--The term ``independent auditor'' means an individual who-- (A)(i) is a Federal, State, or local government auditor who meets the independence standards included in generally accepted government auditing standards; or (ii) is a public accountant who meets such independence standards; and (B) is designated as an auditor by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of a covered element of the intelligence community, as appropriate. (3) Independent review.--The term ``independent review'' means an audit, attestation, or examination conducted by an independent auditor in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. (4) Long-standing, correctable material weakness.--The term ``long-standing, correctable material weakness'' means a material weakness-- (A) that was first reported in the annual financial report of a covered element of the intelligence community for a fiscal year prior to fiscal year 2007; and (B) the correction of which is not substantially dependent on a business system that will not be implemented prior to the end of fiscal year 2010. (5) Material weakness.--The term ``material weakness'' has the meaning given that term under the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123, entitled ``Management's Responsibility for Internal Control,'' revised December 21, Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall-- (1) conduct a review of the status of the auditability compliance of each element of the intelligence community; and (2) develop a plan and schedule to achieve a full, unqualified audit of each element of the intelligence community not later than September 30, 2013. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence Subsection (f) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8) as paragraphs (8) and (9), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph: ``(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a congressional intelligence committee, conduct an accountability review of an element of the intelligence community or the personnel of such element in relation to a failure or deficiency within the intelligence community. ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and procedures for conducting an accountability review under subparagraph (A). ``(C)(i) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide the findings of an accountability review conducted under subparagraph (A) and the Director's recommendations for corrective or punitive action, if any, to the head of the applicable element of the intelligence community. Such recommendations may include a recommendation for dismissal of personnel. ``(ii) If the head of such element does not implement a recommendation made by the Director under clause (i), the head of such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notice of the determination not to implement the recommendation, including the reasons for the determination. ``(D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not be construed to limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (a) Authorities for Interagency Funding.--Section 102A(d)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(d)(2)) is amended by striking ``Program to another such program.'' and inserting ``Program-- ``(A) to another such program; ``(B) to other departments or agencies of the United States Government for the development and fielding of systems of common concern related to the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information; or ``(C) to a program funded by appropriations not within the National Intelligence Program to address critical gaps in intelligence information sharing or access capabilities.''. (b) Authorities of Heads of Other Departments and Agencies.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of any department or agency of the United States is authorized to receive and utilize funds made available to the department or agency by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 102A(d)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(d)(2)), as amended by subsection (a), and receive and utilize any system referred to in such Subsection (e) of section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3) is amended to read as follows: ``(e) Location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.--The headquarters of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may be located in the Washington metropolitan region, as that term is defined in section 8301 of title 40, United States Code.''. Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (B) by striking ``President,'' and all that follows and inserting ``President.''; (2) by striking subsection (b) and redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (b) and (c), respectively; (3) in subsection (b) (as so redesignated), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (4) in subsection (c) (as so redesignated), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' before ``may not''. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 348 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 103G the following new section: (a) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 405 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 103H, as added by section 405(a)(1), the following new section: (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting ``(1) The''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) The head of the National Counter Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(3) The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403- 3(c)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (14); and (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraphs: ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. ``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center. ``(13) The Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.''. (a) In General.--Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:``protection of certain files of the office of the director of national Section 1102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking paragraph (2); and (B) by striking ``(1) In'' and inserting ``In''; and (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) by striking paragraph (2); and (B) by striking ``(1) The'' and inserting ``The''. (a) In General.--Section 4(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or''; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, if the Director of National Intelligence determines that for reasons of national security such advisory committee cannot comply with the requirements of this Act.''. (b) Annual Report.-- (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall each submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on advisory committees created by each such Director. Each report shall include-- (A) a description of each such advisory committee, including the subject matter of the committee; and (B) a list of members of each such advisory committee. (2) Report on reasons for odni exclusion of advisory committee from faca.--Each report submitted by the Director of National Intelligence in accordance with paragraph (1) shall include the reasons for a determination by the Director under section 4(b)(3) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.), as added by subsection (a) of this section, that an advisory committee cannot comply with the requirements of such Act. Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the Director's designee.''. (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), respectively; and (3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking paragraphs (3) and (4). (b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further amended-- (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''. (a) Prohibition.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the report submitted to Congress under section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote the use of energy efficient computer servers in the United States'' (Public Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the plan developed under subsection (a). (2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The Director of National Intelligence may provide support for any review conducted by a department or agency of the United States Government of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations or Export Administration Regulations, including a review of technologies and goods on the United States Munitions List and Commerce Control List that may warrant controls that are different or additional to the controls such technologies and goods are subject to at the time of such review. Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the protection''; and (2) by inserting before the semicolon the following: ``, and the protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate''. Section 8(d) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 U.S.C. 607(d)) is amended by adding at the end ``Notwithstanding any other provision of this section and any other provision of law, an appeal from a decision of a contracting officer of the Central Intelligence Agency relative to a contract made by that Agency may be filed with whichever of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals is specified by such contracting officer as the Board to which such an appeal may be made and such Board shall have jurisdiction to decide that appeal.''. (a) Establishment and Duties of Deputy Director of the CIA.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 406 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 104A the following new section: Subsection (b) of section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k) is amended by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, who may delegate such authority to other appropriate officials of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (a) Appointment and Qualifications of the Inspector General.--Paragraph (1) of section 17(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)) is amended by striking the second and third sentences and inserting ``This appointment shall be made without regard to political affiliation and shall be on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigation. Such appointment shall also be made on the basis of compliance with the security standards of the Agency and prior experience in the field of foreign intelligence.''. (b) Removal of the Inspector General.--Paragraph (6) of section 17(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``immediately''; and (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of such removal. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other than transfer or removal.''. (c) Application of Semiannual Reporting Requirements With Respect To Review Reports.--Paragraph (1) of section 17(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by inserting ``review,'' after ``investigation,''. (d) Protection Against Reprisals.--Subparagraph (B) of section 17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(3)) is amended by inserting ``or providing such information'' after ``making such complaint''. (e) Inspector General Subpoena Power.--Subparagraph (A) of section 17(e)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(5)) is amended by inserting ``in any medium (including electronically stored information or any tangible thing)'' after ``other data''. (f) Other Administrative Authorities.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (e) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q), as amended by subsections (d) and (e) of this section, is further amended-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (8) as subparagraph (9); (B) in paragraph (9), as so redesignated-- (i) by striking ``Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the'' and inserting ``The''; and (ii) by adding at the end the following: ``Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources allocated by the Director, the Inspector General has final approval of-- ``(A) the selection of internal and external candidates for employment with the Office of Inspector General; and ``(B) all other personnel decisions concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General, including selection and appointment to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all security-based determinations that are not within the authority of a head of other Central Intelligence Agency offices.''; and (C) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new paragraph: ``(8)(A) The Inspector General shall-- ``(i) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who shall report to the Inspector General; or ``(ii) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and directly reporting to another Inspector General or the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on a reimbursable basis. ``(B) The counsel appointed or obtained under subparagraph (A) shall perform such functions as the Inspector General may prescribe.''. (2) Construction.--Nothing in the amendment made by paragraph (1)(C) shall be construed to alter the duties and responsibilities of the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Subsection (f) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``Beginning''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General shall transmit a budget estimate and request through the Director to the Director of National Intelligence that specifies for such fiscal year-- ``(A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations of the Inspector General; ``(B) the amount requested for all training requirements of the Inspector General, including a certification from the Inspector General that the amount requested is sufficient to fund all training requirements for the Office; and ``(C) the amount requested to support the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, including a justification for such amount. ``(3) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall include for such fiscal year-- ``(A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency; ``(B) the amount requested for Inspector General training; ``(C) the amount requested to support the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and ``(D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any, with respect to such proposed budget. ``(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives for each fiscal year-- ``(A) a separate statement of the budget estimate transmitted pursuant to paragraph (2); ``(B) the amount requested by the Director of National Intelligence for the Inspector General pursuant to paragraph The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall make publicly available an unclassified version of any memoranda or finished intelligence products assessing the-- (1) information gained from high-value detainee reporting; and (2) dated April 3, 2003, July 15, 2004, March 2, 2005, and June 1, 2005. (a) Coverage Under Inspector General Act of 1978.-- Subsection (a)(2) of section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``the Defense Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,''; (2) by inserting ``the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the National Endowment for the Humanities,''; and (3) by inserting ``the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency,'' after ``the National Labor Relations Board,''. (b) Certain Designations Under Inspector General Act of 1978.--Subsection (a) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) The Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency shall be designees of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for purposes of this section.''. (c) Power of Heads of Elements Over Investigations.-- Subsection (d) of section 8G of such Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(d)''; (2) in the second sentence of paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection, by striking ``The head'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (2), the head''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2)(A) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, may prohibit the inspector general of an element of the intelligence community specified in subparagraph (D) from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation if the Secretary determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. ``(B) If the Secretary exercises the authority under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall submit to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E) an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority not later than 7 days after the exercise of such authority. ``(C) At the same time the Secretary submits under subparagraph (B) a statement on the exercise of the authority in subparagraph (A) to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E), the Secretary shall notify the inspector general of such element of the submittal of such statement and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide such inspector general with a copy of such statement. Such inspector general may submit to such committees of Congress any comments on a notice or statement received by the inspector general under this subparagraph that the inspector general considers appropriate. ``(D) The elements of the intelligence community specified in this subparagraph are as follows: ``(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(ii) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(iii) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(iv) The National Security Agency. ``(E) The committees of Congress specified in this subparagraph are-- ``(i) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''. Section 442(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2)(A) As directed by the Director of National Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall develop a system to facilitate the analysis, dissemination, and incorporation of likenesses, videos, and presentations produced by ground-based platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations or available as open-source information, into the National System for Geospatial Intelligence. ``(B) The authority provided by this paragraph does not include authority for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to manage tasking of handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations.''; and (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (1)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (1) and (2)''. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after the first section the following new section: ``Sec. 2. There is a Director of Compliance of the National Security Agency, who shall be appointed by the Director of the National Security Agency and who shall be responsible for the programs of compliance over mission activities of the National Security Agency.''. Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H)-- (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine Corps,''; and (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''. Title 14, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (4) of section 93(a), by striking ``function'' and inserting ``function, including research, development, test, or evaluation related to intelligence systems and capabilities,''; and (2) in paragraph (4) of section 662, by inserting ``intelligence systems and capabilities or'' after ``related to''. Section 5759 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``is transferred to a different geographic area with a higher cost of living'' and inserting ``is subject to a mobility agreement and is transferred to a position in a different geographical area in which there is a shortage of critical skills''; (2) in subsection (b)(2), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, including requirements for a bonus recipient's repayment of a bonus in circumstances determined by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''; (3) in subsection (c), by striking ``basic pay.'' and inserting ``annual rate of basic pay. The bonus may be paid in a lump sum or installments linked to completion of periods of service.''; and (4) in subsection (d), by striking ``retention bonus'' and inserting ``bonus paid under this section''. (a) Civil Service Retirement System.--Subsection (b) of section 8335 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the paragraph (2) enacted by section 112(a)(2) of the Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 2005 (title I of division B of Public Law 108-447; 118 Stat. 2868), by striking ``2009'' and inserting ``2011''; and (2) by striking the paragraph (2) enacted by section 2005(a)(2) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3704). (b) Federal Employees' Retirement System.--Subsection (b) of section 8425 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the paragraph (2) enacted by section 112(b)(2) of the Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 2005 (title I of division B of Public Law 108-447; 118 Stat. 2868), by striking ``2009'' and inserting ``2011''; and (2) by striking the paragraph (2) enacted by section 2005(b)(2) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3704). (a) Report.-- (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report describing-- (A) a long-term vision for the intelligence capabilities of the National Security Branch of the Bureau; (B) a strategic plan for the National Security Branch; and (C) the progress made in advancing the capabilities of the National Security Branch. (2) Content.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include-- (A) a description of the direction, strategy, and goals for improving the intelligence capabilities of the National Security Branch; (B) a description of the intelligence and national security capabilities of the National Security Branch that will be fully functional within the five-year period beginning on the date on which the report is submitted; (C) a description-- (i) of the internal reforms that were carried out at the National Security Branch during the two-year period ending on the date on which the report is submitted; and (ii) of the manner in which such reforms have advanced the capabilities of the National Security Branch; (D) an assessment of the effectiveness of the National Security Branch in performing tasks that are critical to the effective functioning of the National Security Branch as an intelligence agency, including-- (i) human intelligence collection, both within and outside the parameters of an existing case file or ongoing investigation, in a manner that protects civil liberties; (ii) intelligence analysis, including the ability of the National Security Branch to produce, and provide policymakers with, information on national security threats to the United States; (iii) management, including the ability of the National Security Branch to manage and develop human capital and implement an organizational structure that supports the objectives and strategies of the Branch; (iv) integration of the National Security Branch into the intelligence community, including an ability to robustly share intelligence and effectively communicate and operate with appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal partners; (v) implementation of an infrastructure that supports the national security and intelligence missions of the National Security Branch, including proper information technology and facilities; and (vi) reformation of the culture of the National Security Branch, including the integration by the Branch of intelligence analysts and other professional staff into intelligence collection operations and the success of the National Security Branch in ensuring that intelligence and threat information drive the operations of the Branch; (E) performance metrics and specific annual timetables for advancing the performance of the tasks referred to in clauses (i) through (vi) of subparagraph (D) and a description of the activities being undertaken to ensure that the performance of the National Security Branch in carrying out such tasks improves; and (F) an assessment of the effectiveness of the field office supervisory term limit policy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that requires the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau after a specific term of years. (b) Annual Assessments.-- (1) Requirement for assessments.--Not later than 180 days after the date on which the report required by subsection (a)(1) is submitted, and annually thereafter for five years, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives an assessment of the performance of the National Security Branch in carrying out the tasks referred to in clauses (i) through (vi) of subsection (a)(2)(D) in comparison to such performance during previous years. (2) Considerations.--In conducting each assessment required by paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence-- (A) shall use the performance metrics and specific annual timetables for carrying out such tasks referred to in subsection (a)(2)(E); and (B) may request the assistance of any expert that the Director considers appropriate, including an inspector general of an appropriate department or agency. (a) Reorganization of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office.-- (1) In general.--Subtitle B of title III of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-567; 22 U.S.C. 7301 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 321, 322, 323, and 324, and inserting the following new sections: This title may be cited as the ``Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission Act''. In this title: (1) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission established in section 603(a). (2) Foreign intelligence; intelligence.--The terms ``foreign intelligence'' and ``intelligence'' have the meaning given those terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a). (3) Information.--The term ``information'' includes information of relevance to the foreign policy of the United States collected and conveyed through diplomatic reporting and other reporting by personnel of the United States Government who are not employed by an element of the intelligence community, including public and open-source information. (a) Establishment.--There is established in the legislative branch a Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission. (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Commission is to evaluate systems and processes at the strategic, interagency level and provide recommendations accordingly, and not to seek to duplicate the functions of the Director of National Intelligence. (c) Functions.--The Commission shall-- (1) evaluate the current processes or systems for the strategic integration of the intelligence community, including the Open Source Center, and other elements of the United States Government, including the Department of State, with regard to the collection, reporting, and analysis of foreign intelligence and information; (2) provide recommendations to improve or develop such processes or systems to integrate the intelligence community with other elements of the United States Government, potentially including the development of an interagency strategy that identifies-- (A) the collection, reporting, and analysis requirements of the United States Government; (B) the elements of the United States Government best positioned to meet collection and reporting requirements, with regard to missions, comparative institutional advantages, and any other relevant factors; and (C) interagency budget and resource allocations necessary to achieve such collection, reporting, and analytical requirements; (3) evaluate the extent to which current intelligence collection, reporting, and analysis strategies are intended to provide global coverage and anticipate future threats, challenges, and crises; (4) provide recommendations on how to incorporate into the interagency strategy the means to anticipate future threats, challenges, and crises, including by identifying and supporting collection, reporting, and analytical capabilities that are global in scope and directed at emerging, long-term, and strategic targets; (5) provide recommendations on strategies for sustaining human and budgetary resources to effect the global collection and reporting missions identified in the interagency strategy, including the prepositioning of collection and reporting capabilities; (6) provide recommendations for developing, clarifying, and, if necessary, bolstering current and future collection and reporting roles and capabilities of elements of the United States Government that are not elements of the intelligence community deployed in foreign countries; (7) provide recommendations related to the role of individual country missions in contributing to the interagency strategy; (8) evaluate the extent to which the establishment of new embassies and out-of-embassy posts are able to contribute to expanded global coverage and increased collection and reporting and provide recommendations related to the establishment of new embassies and out-of-embassy posts; (9) provide recommendations on executive or legislative changes necessary to establish any new executive branch entity or to expand the authorities of any existing executive branch entity, as needed to improve the strategic integration referred to in paragraph (1) and develop and oversee the implementation of any interagency strategy; (10) provide recommendations on processes for developing and presenting to Congress budget requests for each relevant element of the United States Government that reflect the allocations identified in the interagency strategy and for congressional oversight of the development and implementation of the strategy; and (11) provide recommendations on any institutional reforms related to the collection and reporting roles of individual elements of the United States Government outside the intelligence community, as well as any budgetary, legislative, or other changes needed to achieve such reforms. (a) Members of the Commission.-- (1) Appointment.--The Commission shall be composed of 10 members as follows: (A) Two members appointed by the majority leader of the Senate. (B) Two members appointed by the minority leader of the Senate. (C) Two members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. (D) Two members appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives. (E) One nonvoting member appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. (F) One nonvoting member appointed by the Secretary of State. (2) Selection.-- (A) In general.--Members of the Commission shall be individuals who-- (i) are not officers or employees of the United States Government or any State or local government; and (ii) have knowledge and experience-- (I) in foreign information and intelligence collection, reporting, and analysis, including clandestine collection and classified analysis (such as experience in the intelligence community), diplomatic reporting and analysis, and collection of public and open-source information; (II) in issues related to the national security and foreign policy of the United States gained by serving as a senior official of the Department of State, a member of the Foreign Service, an employee or officer of an appropriate department or agency of the United States, or an independent organization with expertise in the field of international affairs; or (III) with foreign policy decision-making. (B) Diversity of experience.--The individuals appointed to the Commission should be selected with a view to establishing diversity of experience with regard to various geographic regions, functions, and issues. (3) Consultation.--The Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of State shall consult among themselves prior to the appointment of the members of the Commission in order to achieve, to the maximum extent possible, fair and equitable representation of various points of view with respect to the matters to be considered by the Commission in accordance with this title. (4) Time of appointment.--The appointments under subsection (a) shall be made-- (A) after the date on which funds are first appropriated for the Commission pursuant to section 609; and (B) not later than 60 days after such date. (5) Term of appointment.--Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. (6) Vacancies.--Any vacancy of the Commission shall not affect the powers of the Commission and shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made. (7) Chair.--The voting members of the Commission shall designate one of the voting members to serve as the chair of the Commission. (8) Quorum.--Five voting members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for purposes of transacting the business of the Commission. (9) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet at the call of the chair and shall meet regularly, not less than once every 3 months, during the life of the Commission. (b) Staff.-- (1) In general.--The chair of the Commission may, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service and chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, appoint and terminate an executive director and, in consultation with the executive director, appoint and terminate such other additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to perform its duties. In addition to the executive director and one full-time support staff for the executive director, there shall be additional staff with relevant intelligence and foreign policy experience to support the work of the Commission. (2) Selection of the executive director.--The executive director shall be selected with the approval of a majority of the voting members of the Commission. (3) Compensation.-- (A) Executive director.--The executive director shall be compensated at the maximum annual rate payable for an employee of a standing committee of the Senate under section 105(e) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1968 (2 U.S.C. 61-1(e)), as adjusted by any order of the President pro tempore of the Senate. (B) Staff.--The chair of the Commission may fix the compensation of other personnel of the Commission without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay for such personnel may not exceed the maximum annual rate payable for an employee of a standing committee of the Senate under section 105(e) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1968 (2 U.S.C. 61-1(e)), as adjusted by any order of the President pro tempore of the Senate. (c) Experts and Consultants.--The Commission is authorized to procure temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants as necessary to the extent authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic pay payable under section 5376 of such title. (d) Staff and Services of Other Agencies or Departments of the United States.--Upon the request of the Commission, the head of a department or agency of the United States may detail, on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to assist the Commission in carrying out this title. The detail of any such personnel shall be without interruption or loss of civil service or Foreign Service status or privilege. (e) Security Clearance.--The appropriate departments or agencies of the United States shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the members and staff of the Commission appropriate security clearances to the extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and requirements. (f) Reports Under Ethics in Government Act of 1978.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for purposes of title I of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.), each member and staff of the Commission-- (1) shall be deemed to be an officer or employee of the Congress (as defined in section 109(13) of such title); and (2) shall file any report required to be filed by such member or such staff (including by virtue of the application of paragraph (1)) under title I of the Ethics in Government (a) Hearings and Evidence.--The Commission may hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out this title. (b) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Commission may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States such information as the Commission considers necessary to carry out this title. Upon request of the chair of the Commission, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission, subject to applicable law. (c) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as a department or agency of the United States. (d) Administrative Support.--The Administrator of the General Services Administration shall provide to the Commission on a reimbursable basis (or, in the discretion of the Administrator, on a nonreimbursable basis) such administrative support services as the Commission may request to carry out this title. (e) Administrative Procedures.--The Commission may adopt such rules and regulations, relating to administrative procedure, as may be reasonably necessary to enable the Commission to carry out this title. (f) Travel.-- (1) In general.--The members and staff of the Commission may, with the approval of the Commission, conduct such travel as is necessary to carry out this title. (2) Expenses.--Members of the Commission shall serve without pay but shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission. (g) Gifts.--No member or staff of the Commission may receive a gift or benefit by reason of the service of such member or staff to the Commission. (a) In General.-- (1) Interim report.--Not later than 300 days after the date on which all members of the Commission are appointed under section 604(a), the Commission shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an interim report setting forth the preliminary evaluations and recommendations of the Commission described in section 603(c). (2) Final report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the submission of the report required by paragraph (1), the Commission shall submit a final report setting forth the final evaluations and recommendations of the Commission described in section 603(c) to each of the following: (A) The President. (B) The Director of National Intelligence. (C) The Secretary of State. (D) The congressional intelligence committees. (E) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (F) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. (b) Individual or Dissenting Views.--Each member of the Commission may include that member's individual or dissenting views in a report required by paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a). (c) Form of Report.--The reports required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a), including any finding or recommendation of such report, shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) In General.--The Commission shall terminate on the date that is 60 days after the date of the submission of the report required by section 606(a)(2). (b) Transfer of Records.--Upon the termination of the Commission under subsection (a), all records, files, documents, and other materials in the possession, custody, or control of the Commission shall be transferred to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and deemed to be records of such Committee. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission. (a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this title. (b) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission pursuant to subsection (a) shall remain available until expended. (a) Extension.-- (1) In general.--Effective on the date on which funds are first appropriated pursuant to subsection (b)(1) and subject to paragraph (3), subsection (a) of section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by striking ``September 1, 2004,'' and inserting ``one year after the date on which all members of the Commission are appointed pursuant to section 701(a)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,''. (2) Applicability of amendment.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of such section 1007. (3) Commission membership.--The membership of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community established under subsection (a) of section 1002 of such Act (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) (referred to in this section as the ``Commission'') shall be considered vacant and new members shall be appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as amended by subparagraph (B). (4) Clarification of duties.--Section 1002(i) of such Act is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``including--'' and inserting ``including advanced research and development programs and activities. Such review shall include--''. (b) Funding.-- (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section. (2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended. (3) Repeal of existing funding authority.--Section 1010 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is repealed. (c) Technical Amendments.-- (1) Director of central intelligence.--The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'' in the following provisions: (A) Section 1002(h)(2). (B) Section 1003(d)(1). (C) Section 1006(a)(1). (D) Section 1006(b). (E) Section 1007(a). (F) Section 1008. (2) Deputy director of central intelligence for community management.--Paragraph (1) of section 1002(b) of such Act is amended by striking ``The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management.'' and inserting ``The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.''. The Director of National Intelligence is authorized to conduct, at the request of one of the congressional intelligence committees and in accordance with procedures established by that committee, a classification review of materials in the possession of that committee that-- (1) are not less than 25 years old; and (2) were created, or provided to that committee, by an entity in the executive branch. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 101-- (A) in subsection (a), by moving paragraph (7) two ems to the right; and (B) by moving subsections (b) through (p) two ems to the right; (2) in section 103, by redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (h); (3) in section 109(a)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 112.;'' and inserting ``section 112;''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the second period; (4) in section 301(1), by striking `` `United States' '' and all that follows through ``and `State' '' and inserting `` `United States', `person', `weapon of mass destruction', and `State' ''; (5) in section 304(b), by striking ``subsection (a)(3)'' and inserting ``subsection (a)(2)''; and (6) in section 502(a), by striking ``a annual'' and inserting ``an annual''. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1) of section 5(a), by striking ``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a).''; and (2) in section 17(d)(3)(B)-- (A) in clause (i), by striking ``advise'' and inserting ``advice''; and (B) by amending clause (ii) to read as follows: ``(ii) holds or held the position in the Agency, including such a position held on an acting basis, of-- ``(I) Deputy Director; ``(II) Associate Deputy Director; ``(III) Director of the National Clandestine Service; ``(IV) Director of Intelligence; ``(V) Director of Support; or ``(VI) Director of Science and Technology.''. Section 528(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Associate Director of CIA for Military Affairs'' and inserting ``Associate Director of Military Affairs, CIA''; and (2) by striking ``Associate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs'' and inserting ``Associate Director of Military Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, or any successor position''. The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 3(4)(L), by striking ``other'' the second place it appears; (2) in section 102A-- (A) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; (B) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; (ii) in paragraph (3) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; and (iii) in paragraph (5)-- (I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); and (II) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or agency involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''; (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``paragraph''; and (D) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after ``Acquisition''; (3) in section 103(b), by striking ``, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.),''; (4) in section 104A(g)(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; (5) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''; (6) in section 701(b)(1), by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; (7) in section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''; and (8) in section 1003(h)(2) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``subsection (i)(2)(B)'' and inserting ``subsection (g)(2)(B)''. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears. (b) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence.-- Such section 1403, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended-- (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National Intelligence'' after ``Director''. (c) Future-Years Defense Program.--Subsection (c) of such section 1403, as amended by subsection (b), is further amended by striking ``multiyear defense program submitted pursuant to section 114a of title 10, United States Code'' and inserting ``future-years defense program submitted pursuant to section 221 of title 10, United States Code''. (d) Conforming Amendments.-- (1) In general.--The heading of such section 1403 is amended to read as follows: (a) Amendments to the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B) of section 1016(e)(10) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)), by striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and inserting ``Department of Justice''; (2) in subsection (e) of section 1071, by striking ``(1)''; and (3) in subsection (b) of section 1072, in the subsection heading by inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''. (b) Other Amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended-- (1) in section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)-- (A) in paragraph (1) of subsection (c)-- (i) by striking ``shall,'' and inserting ``shall''; and (ii) by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional culture''; (B) in paragraph (2) of subsection (e), by striking ``the National Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; and (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''; and (2) in section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and inserting ``Federal''; and (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and inserting ``specific''. (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item: ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after ``subsection (a)),''. Section 602 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 403-2b) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), in paragraph (2), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; (B) in paragraph (2)-- (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (C) in paragraph (3), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (a) Role of the Director of National Intelligence.--Section 403 of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992 (50 U.S.C. 403-2) is amended by striking ``The Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting the following: ``(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence''. (b) Definition of Intelligence Community.--Section 403 of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended-- (1) by striking ``Intelligence Community'' and insert ``intelligence community''; and (2) by striking the second sentence and inserting the following: ``(b) Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the term `intelligence community' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.", u"Mr. President, I rise to oppose the vote to invoke cloture on the FISA bill. I have no choice but to vote against cloture in order to preserve the rights of my colleagues to have their amendments to this landmark legislation considered. It has been a very weird process. The FISA legislation before the Senate has been taken, in effect, hostage. In a transparent attempt to score political points off of national security issues, the White House has decided, once again, that scaring the American people with unfounded and manipulative claims is in order. The President's decision to use the FISA bill in a game of chicken represents a new low, even by Washington standards. The administration's practice of placing politics above national security when it serves the poll-driven agenda of its advisers has become an addiction in this White House. Even when the Senate is on the verge of producing much needed national security legislation that the President supports and wants, the addictive political cravings that have coursed through the administration's body for the past 7 years kick in once again. As is often the case, addictions produce behavior that is both irrational, and in this case more, unfortunately, self-destructive. In this case, the White House has misguidedly calculated that it is worth jeopardizing passage of a bill which they support, which strengthens the collection of foreign intelligence, in order to obtain a short-term political objective. The White House is gambling with the safety of Americans and the continued cooperation of companies that we rely on to aid in our efforts to protect our country. It is time for the Senate to take a stand and reject these reprehensible tactics. The Senate Intelligence Committee took enormous care to craft legislation that would give our intelligence community greater latitude to conduct surveillance of foreign targets while not compromising the constitutional and statutory protections afforded to Americans both here and overseas. Senator Kit Bond and I worked extremely closely on that, as we did, as I will explain, with many others. This was a painstaking process. It went over many months, but it ultimately produced this balanced legislation that the vice chairman and the committee and I sought. It is a solid bill. And I believe with some limited changes it can be a better bill; limited changes, I might add, that will in no way impede or in any way intrude into the collection of the intelligence we need. Every step of the way during the process of producing this bill gave me great satisfaction. We worked in a consultive way with the administration. These discussions have always been in good faith. We have talked as professionals, trying to work out a hard problem to which most people do not pay a lot of attention but which has enormous consequences for our country, and we have done it in good faith, the very good faith that the actions of the White House now threaten to unravel. From when the Intelligence Committee called on the administration to propose a FISA modernization bill last spring--the vice chairman and I did that--to the many committee hearings that followed, to section-by-section, line-by-line, word-by-word consultations too numerous to count that we had with the lawyers and intelligence experts in the Justice Department, from the National Security Agency, from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to outside experts, we have worked in good faith with the administration to achieve, against, frankly, considerable odds, the unthinkable, to wit: a bipartisan bill dealing with the issues of profound complexity that has the endorsement of not only the President but also of the intelligence community professionals who will be the ones who carry out this surveillance. They want this bill. The committee included in its FISA bill a narrowly crafted provision that would provide immunity for telecommunications companies that participated in the President's warrantless surveillance program after September 11 and until the program was placed under court authorization last January. We rejected the administration's proposed open-ended language in defining very tailored immunity language. We rejected their open-ended language to extend immunity to Government officials. That was taken out. So if there was wrongdoing somewhere, do not make the assumption automatically, without thinking this thing through deeply, that it came from a private sector entity as opposed to public officials. I realize this is a controversial matter with many of my colleagues, particularly on my side of the aisle, but I reject the games that are being played on both sides: by those Senators who are prepared to filibuster the bill due to their opposition to narrow immunity, and the administration's wishes to prevent the Senate from considering any alternative amendments to the immunity provision. We should debate the liability issue fully, and the Senate should be allowed to consider alternative amendments. And I say this, and I think the vice chairman would agree with me, out of an abundance of confidence that the committee position will ultimately be sustained by the Senate in the end. The majority leader has made prompt passage of the FISA bill the top priority for the Senate. He pushed off other subjects so that it could be conferenced with the House and eventually be placed on the President's desk for his signature. If allowed, the Senate can complete action on the FISA bill in a matter of a few days. Unlike many bills the Senate considers where the number of amendments that can be disposed of can approach or exceed 100 or 150 or 175, passage of the FISA bill will probably involve relatively modest numbers of amendments and a very manageable number of amendments. I estimate that number would be somewhere in the 12-to-15 amendment range, probably fewer. Some of these amendments I would support as needed as improvements to the bill of the committee, the Intelligence Committee. Many I would oppose because of my concern that it would undo the careful balance we achieved in the underlying Committee bill. This is a stitched piece of work between collection of intelligence for the national security and the rights and privacy of individuals. I will oppose anything that undoes that balance. The amendments that are likely to pass with a majority vote, at least in my view, such as the Feinstein exclusivity and Cardin sunset amendments, are further refinements of provisions already in the Intelligence Committee bill, and they in no way bear on the collection of intelligence authorities sought and provided by our bill. Those that would undercut these authorities to be able to do collection, I am confident, would go down to defeat. But the Republican leadership, under orders from the White House, objected to these amendments being considered and voted on, and the bill passed before the February 1 expiration of the temporary and flawed Protect America Act passed last August. So that is where we are going to be unless we can resolve this in the Senate, which we could do by the end of the week. Why? Why has the White House used obstructionist tactics to prevent the Senate from passing a FISA bill that it wants, that it has declared acceptable? The President says he wants the Intelligence Committee bill passed as soon as possible. He said as recently as last Friday that he understands there may be some limited number of changes that will be needed to make the bill stronger. Others, including Minority Leader McConnell and Vice Chairman Bond, also have acknowledged the reality that amendments will have to be brought up and voted on before the Senate can pass the bill. That is, after all, the way of the Senate. Why, then, are they preventing the Senate from voting on the limited number of amendments before us and passing the bill, a bill that they want? Why? A bill that has everything to do with the future of our country, our national security, and a bill which we will not soon come to again if we don't achieve success in the coming days. The majority leader has repeatedly offered the proposal to extend the February 1 expiration date in the current stopgap law 30 days to allow sufficient time to complete our work on the legislation. But each time this 30-day extension consent request was sought, it was killed by the Republican leadership under orders from the White House. Why in the world would a temporary extension be objectionable to a President who is on record as saying he doesn't want the current law to expire without a more lasting FISA modernization bill in place? Yet, in one of the most astounding ``Alice in Wonderland'' moments I have ever witnessed in my time in the Senate, the White House announced last week that the President would veto a 30-day extension of the current foreign collection authorities passed by Congress. So let's recap. The President wants the FISA bill passed by the Senate, but he has sent the decree down to the Republican leadership that they are to prevent its prompt passage. Well, prompt passage we have to have. The President does not want the current 6-month Protect America Act to expire this Friday. He does not want that to happen. But he has stated he will veto any extension and thereby ensure that it will expire. What more evidence is needed to demonstrate the irrational and self-destructive political addiction that drives this White House? Doesn't drive the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I guarantee that. Under the tortured logic of protecting America against terrorism, the White House has decided to exercise, frankly, its own form of political terrorism and has taken the FISA bill hostage. From the beginning, the administration has demonstrated a deep-seated contempt for the role of Congress in authorizing and monitoring intelligence activities. Whether it is the National Security Agency's warrantless surveillance program or the Central Intelligence Agency's secret detention and interrogation program, the White House for over 5 years walled off the Congress and the courts from conducting the sort of meaningful oversight and checks and balances that are essential to making sure our intelligence programs are on sound legal operational footing. To make matters worse, the administration has successfully used objections and delaying tactics over the past 3 years to keep the intelligence authorization bill from being passed and signed into law. It is this flawed policy of Executive Branch unilateralism that has created the mess we are now dealing with. There is no possible way I can overstate the importance of this bill. But it is hard to explain. Everybody can grasp on to the immunity issue, leap to one side or the other, often without sufficient thought. But the bill as a whole, meshed together as a whole like an Appalachian quilt, is a thing of beauty, can be improved, and should be passed. Nevertheless, I urge my colleagues to oppose the Republican cloture motion on the FISA bill so that we can reassert something called the role of Congress that we must play on these and other important national security matters. Oversight is what we do. We don't write a lot of bills in the Intelligence Committee, but we do oversight. But it is not welcome in the current atmosphere. I urge my colleagues to oppose the Republican cloture motion so that we can consider on their merits the limited, manageable number of amendments to the bill and, in the process, push bipartisan FISA reform across the finish line. I know Vice Chairman Bond and others are ready to get back to business and start disposing of amendments. I feel confident that he and I, as managers of this bill, will work closely, as we have in the committee, to ensure that we do no unintended harm to this bill in the matters of collection of intelligence or any other unbalancing of this Appalachian craftwork. There is still time for the Senate to work its way on the FISA bill and pass it before the week's end. I hope we do so. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, first let me thank my colleagues for their patience. We are trying to get through a series of amendments on the FISA legislation. The amendment I am offering is one that was approved by the Judiciary Committee, one that I think is very important to this legislation moving forward, and one which would establish a 4-year sunset for congressional review. I am proud that my cosponsors of this amendment include Senator Leahy, Senator Rockefeller, Senator Mikulski, and Senator Salazar, and I thank the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Rockefeller, for his leadership and for his help in regard to the amendment I am bringing forward. I wish to go back a little in time to when the original FISA statute was passed. During that period of time, we had recently come out of Watergate. There were certainly indications of warrantless surveillance done on Americans because of their disagreement with the administration in power, there were indications of warrantless surveillance of individuals because they happened to disagree with U.S. policy in Vietnam, and there was genuine concern that we had not balanced properly the Government's need to obtain information in order to keep us safe and the protections of the civil liberties of the people who live in our own country. So we tried to enact a statute that would provide balance in 1978. There was the Church committee report, and in 1978 Congress passed the FISA statute. I want to start by quoting from one of our colleagues, Senator Kennedy, and what he said in 1978 about the original passage of the FISA statute--the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. He said: The complexity of the problem must not be underestimated. Electronic surveillance can be a useful tool for the government's gathering of certain kinds of information; yet, if abused, it can also constitute a particularly indiscriminate and penetrating invasion of the privacy of our citizens. My objective over the past 6 years has been to reach some kind of fair balance that will protect the security of the United States without infringing on our citizens' human liberties and rights. The Attorney General at that time for the Carter administration was Griffin Bell. Attorney General Bell said: I believe this bill is remarkable not only in the way it has been developed, but also in the fact that for the first time in our society the clandestine intelligence activities of our government shall be subject to the regulation and receive the positive authority of a public law for all to inspect. President Carter stated it very well in announcing this bill when he said that ``one of the most difficult tasks in a free society like our own is the correlation between adequate intelligence to guarantee our Nation's security on the one hand, and the preservation of basic human rights on the other.'' It is a very delicate balance to strike, but one which is necessary in our society, and a balance which cannot be achieved by sacrificing either our Nation's security or our civil liberties. A lot has happened since 1978 when that law was passed. We know that technology has changed and the law has been amended over its life, but we still have the same problem: how to balance our need to get information, which is important for the protection of our Nation, and the civil liberties of our citizens. I am proud to represent the people of Maryland. I am proud of the work done by NSA--the National Security Agency--which is located in Maryland. I have visited the National Security Agency on many occasions. These men and women, dedicated to a mission of protecting our country by getting lawful information which is important to preserve the security of America, do their job with great distinction and great dedication to our country. But we have seen in recent years the difficulty in complying with the FISA statute. Information obtained from foreign sources, because some communications come through America with the new technologies and the way in which communications are now handled today, is different than it was back in the 1970s. So we need to pass this statute. I think everyone here is prepared and understands the need for us to modernize the FISA statute, but we have to get it right. Let me mention one debate that has been taking place on this floor that the chairman and the Republican leader on the Intelligence Committee have talked frequently about, as has the leadership on the Judiciary Committee, and that is the minimization rules. We think we have it right now, but we are still concerned about the minimization rules. It is interesting to go back in history and look at what the Senate Judiciary Committee said in 1978 about the concerns of Americans being caught in the web but not being the main focus of our target for surveillance. The Senate Judiciary Committee observed: Also formidable, although incalculable, is the chilling effect which warrantless electronic surveillance may have on the constitutional rights of those who were not targets of surveillance, but who perceived themselves, whether reasonably or unreasonably, as potential targets. Our Bill of Rights is concerned not only with direct infringements on constitutional rights, but also with Government activities which effectively inhibit exercise of these rights. The exercise of political freedom depends in large measure on citizens' understanding that they will be able to be publicly active and dissent from official policy within lawful limits, without having to sacrifice the expectation of privacy that they rightfully hold. Warrantless electronic surveillance can violate that understanding and impair that public confidence so necessary to an uninhibited political life. That is what we are concerned about here. We want to make sure we get this right, and we know that over time we have seen abuses of the statute. We are now concerned about what happens when an American is targeted. They didn't think about that before, about someone traveling abroad. I congratulate the committee for bringing forward a bill that does protect Americans who are traveling abroad and are a target of surveillance by requiring cause be shown. That is how it should be. I am very concerned about the debate we are having in this body concerning the exclusivity in the statute we are going to pass. There has been a long history of debate as to how much article II power the President has in regard to warrantless surveillance. This is not a new subject. But I must tell you, I think this administration took that issue to a new level. I believe the courts agree that the President went too far. So it is our responsibility to try to get this right so that we have the rule of law behind what the administration does, rather than trying to use article II power, which in fact can very easily be abused. There is another issue I want to comment on briefly--and I will come back to the sunset provisions as to why I think the 4 years is so particularly important in this legislation--and that is the immunity issue and the retroactive immunity. Retroactive immunity concerns me. I would hope it would concern every Member of the Senate. It concerns me not just as it affects the telephone companies in their cooperation with this administration--because there has been clear evidence that they operated under the authority that the administration had this power and that they were helping their country--but what concerns me about granting them retroactive immunity is the impact it will have on the courts' oversight of the abuse of privacy by the administration or private companies. We need the courts actively involved here. We don't get this right all the time, and certainly the administration doesn't get it right all the time. We need the courts involved in these issues. If we grant retroactive immunity, we are saying we reserve the right to take away the third branch of Government--the judicial branch of Government--for making determinations as to whether an individual's right of privacy is violated. I don't think that is something we want as a legacy of this Congress. That is why many of us are concerned about using retroactive immunity. There are other options that are out there. I see my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania, Senator Specter, is here. He has a proposal that I think would take care of the concerns of the telephone companies yet protect the integrity of the courts. I congratulate him for that recommendation, and I think he has now refined it to the point that I hope it will garner the type of support necessary for approval by this body. Senator Feinstein has a proposal that, rather than just giving immunity, would at least have the courts make the determination as to whether the telephone companies are entitled to this relief; whether they acted in good faith. So at least we have the courts involved in this decision rather than taking away their authority. I think either of those recommendations would be a major improvement over giving retroactive immunity to telecommunication companies. But let me get to the specifics of the amendment I have offered, which is the 4-year sunset on the provisions. Again I am pleased to be joined by several of our colleagues. It is interesting to point out that sunsets have been part of the FISA statute for a long time. When the USA PATRIOT Act was passed, it contained a 4-year sunset. Now why did we put a 4-year sunset in? We were worried about whether we got it all right. This is something that required the continued attention of the Congress and the administration. In fact, we reauthorized it with significant changes and then put in another 3-year sunset, in this case for one of the most controversial provisions. So this is something we have done in the past. The Protect America Act is a major departure from the PATRIOT Act. It was passed hurriedly, and no one denies that. It was passed hurriedly last August, and we weren't comfortable with what we did. The proof is the bill now before us is a much better bill. Thank goodness we had the sunset. The committee recognized the need for a sunset because they put a 6-year sunset in. Why do I think it is so important to change that 6 years to 4 years? Let me tell you why: I think it is in our national interest that the next administration taking office in January of 2009 be focused on this issue, this vital issue of getting the intelligence information that is critical to protect the safety of the people of this Nation but also to protect the civil liberties of Americans. I think it is vital that the next administration look at those opinions that came out of the Attorney General's Office and the White House and give a fresh look to it and try to figure out if there is not even a better way to accomplish both the collection of information and the protection of civil liberties. If we continue the 6-year sunset, there will be no requirement for the next administration to take a look at this statute. With a 4-year sunset, it will come under the watch of the next administration. It is very interesting that one of my colleagues talked about the opportunity to review documents, and I believe the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee would agree with me--from the fact that we had a sunset on the bill we passed in August, we got a lot more attention from the administration on getting material. They brought a lot of material into our office so we could review it. They cooperated with us because they knew we had to act. If we include a 6-year sunset, there will be no requirement for the next administration to engage Congress on this issue. I want the next administration to engage Congress on this issue. We have seen the change in technology since we passed this bill in 1976, and technology is changing more rapidly than ever before. We do not know the next way in which terrorists are going to be using it in order to try to circumvent our detection as well as our laws. We do not know that. So it is important for us to stay engaged so that we can have the most effective tools in place, not using the article II power of the President but having Congress engaged and making sure we have the statutes correct. It is another reason I think it is very important to have a 4-year sunset. I know I am not telling you something you do not already know, but the FISA statute gives the administration extraordinary powers and very sensitive powers as it relates to the privacy of people here in America and an issue on which we have to make sure we protect the rights of our citizens. So for all of those reasons, we want to stay engaged on this subject. Again, I want to emphasize this is not a question of no sunset versus a 6-year sunset. I understand the administration wants no sunset. I can understand that. The President probably would want no Congress. But the Framers of our Constitution understood the importance of the legislative branch of Government. It is rated as No. 1, article I. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. It is an amendment that is offered in good faith. I would encourage my colleagues to support the amendment. I reserve the reminder of my time.", u"Mr. President, I say to the Presiding Officer that far and away the most contentious issue in this FISA debate is whether private companies that assisted the Government in implementing the President's warrantless surveillance program should be provided liability protection. Three amendments will be offered that relate directly to this issue. First, Senators Dodd and Feingold have an amendment that would strike all of title II of the underlying bill--that is, S. 2248--on liability protection as reported by the Intelligence Committee. Second, Senator Specter will offer an amendment--I think at 3:30--that provides for a different remedy; namely, the substitution of the U.S. Government itself for the carriers in the lawsuits that have been filed against the carriers. Third, Senator Feinstein has prepared an amendment that would keep the basic structure of title II--to wit, liability immunity--but would have the courts, rather than the Congress, determine whether carriers relied in good faith on the representation made to them by the executive branch of our National Government. I will address the particulars of each amendment as it is offered, but first I would like to describe the background behind the Intelligence Committee's approach to this whole issue of immunity. Critics have suggested that providing liability protection for telecommunications companies is akin to congressional endorsement of the President's warrantless surveillance program. I understand the passion stirred by this issue. Rather than consulting with Congress or the courts, the President created a secret surveillance program--no question about that--based on very dubious legal reasoning. That was unnecessary, that was unwise, that would, therefore, cause passions and suspicions. But anger over the President's program should not prevent us as a deliberative body from addressing the real problems the President has created. Because of the lawsuits over the program and the damage to the telecommunications companies' reputations, companies that were once willing to help the Government, based on assurances of legality from the highest levels of Government, may now be questioning that assistance. Let's reflect on that for a moment. These are corporations. They have no names at the present time. They have to make money. The Government comes to them, as they have in the past on much smaller matters, and with the authority of the President saying, this is in the national interest; with the legal advice of the Attorney General saying, this is legal; and then the Director of the National Security Agency sending out letters that say, we require you, we compel you, we request to you--or other words--that you cooperate with us. People say: Well, they cooperated. Of course they cooperated right after 9/11. I think anybody who is in the intelligence business understands what I am saying. There is no difference between the day after 9/11 and this day in terms of the threat to our country or those who are planning, plotting to do us harm. The fact that no attacks have happened does not excuse the sense of relaxation on the whole subject--perhaps the congressional sense of relaxation on the whole subject. We need to continue this intelligence collection. What is it, I am wondering, that the telecommunications companies get from this? What prestige? What large amount of money? What praise? What do they get from this? Do they get good public relations? No. They get 40 lawsuits, most of which are not based on anything to do with the TSP program. In other words, they are picked out of newspapers. People are dissatisfied, and class action suits arise. So maybe they have been sued $10 billion. Maybe they have been sued $40 billion. We will not speculate on that at the present time. But in that they are corporations and in that they have no reward at all for doing this service for their country--which we call patriotism, and then cast that aside because that must mask some evil intent--they go ahead and they do it. Then, since they are corporations, their shareholders get extremely unhappy about it, which could be happening at the present time, and then they decide that maybe they will be less willing to do this. Several have done that. Several at the beginning did that. Now, corporations are in business also to make a profit. The corporations that are involved in this are doing nothing but losing prestige, losing reputation, have angry shareholders. And I ask myself, what is it they get out of doing this, because people, particularly on my side of the aisle, are sometimes inclined to be suspicious of corporations, that they have some kind of a purpose behind all of this. Nothing could be further from the truth. They are losing. They are being criticized. They are being sued. It is costly. It takes away from their energy to carry out their other missions. It is not a situation in which a whole bunch of people are sitting around in these corporate headquarters discussing this, because only a very few people are allowed to know, and they have criminal sanctions against them if they tell anybody, should they have received any of these instructions from the Government. So we are not talking about people here trying to undo the safety of the United States or to gain some kind of advantage for themselves. If this intelligence collection stops, I say to the Presiding Officer, we will be in a very sorry situation. I do not know how to say that more sincerely, more deeply felt, more based upon exhaustive study, including numerous meetings in committee with these folks and other meetings outside. So they have been told it is legal, and by the National Security Agency Director they have been required, compelled, and in other words, some of which are quite strong, to do it. So they do start to do it, and they are paying one heck of a price for it. What price are we paying? We are paying no price because they are still doing it. What price might we pay should they stop--because they are corporations, and they are responsible to their shareholders--if they should stop this type of activity? The price we would pay would be overwhelming. Without the cooperation and assistance of private companies--not compliance forced by a court but true cooperation--this country's law enforcement and intelligence agencies cannot obtain the information they need to protect this country. It is a fairly heavy statement to make. I chair the committee. I am not naive on these matters. I make that statement again. Without the cooperation and assistance of private companies, this country's law enforcement and intelligence agencies cannot obtain the information they need to protect this country. Making the question of liability protection a proxy for disagreement with the President's program is, therefore, shortsighted, in this Senator's view, ignoring the reality that the Nation and future Presidents will depend on the assistance of these same companies for years to come. In analyzing the question of liability protection, the Intelligence Committee sought to weigh these very real concerns about future intelligence collection against the possible outcome of lawsuits. We discussed it at length. Understanding this issue requires some background on the lawsuits that have been filed. Currently, providers are subject to approximately, as I indicated, 40 civil lawsuits, some of which are class actions, which seek billions of dollars of damages--and I have given you a range--for privacy violations based on the companies' alleged provision of assistance and information to the intelligence community. The suits are based--many of them--on media reports about all sorts of intelligence activities. Many of them are not limited to the warrantless surveillance program disclosed by the President. That is ironic, but it is a heavy burden for the companies. If suits are brought that have nothing to do with the warrantless surveillance program disclosed by the President, they are out of order. But, as I will proceed to explain, the companies can never explain to a court that they are out of order. Although these suits involve different types of legal claims that are in varying stages of litigation, they share a common reality: that the Government has refused to publicly reveal the classified documents and information that would allow them to proceed. The current fight in the courts is, therefore, not about whether damages should be awarded, whether the underlying program is legal or even whether any company participated in the President's program in good faith. Instead, the parties are fighting about access to classified information about the President's program. I have not heard that much discussed in this Chamber. This litigation could continue for years without a court ever addressing the underlying issues about the legality of the program. We seek wrongdoing whether, as some say, it is in the corporate boardroom or, as others would say--as I would say--in the halls of Government. I stress the point: No court is likely to resolve the question of whether the President or any private company violated the law in the near future. Some of my colleagues have argued that without these lawsuits, the public will never learn the details about the President's program. But litigation is highly unlikely to tell the story of what happened with the President's program. Too many of these facts dealing with intelligence sources and methods remain appropriately classified, and the executive branch is highly unlikely to agree to declassify additional information if it could affect the ongoing litigation. Thus, the litigation is unlikely to result in a ruling in the near future about the legality of the conduct of the President nor any private company, nor, for that matter, the public disclosure of any additional information about the President's program. Instead, it is possible the cases, as I indicated, will continue for years as the courts debate whether information must be disclosed. In the meantime, however, as I mentioned, the litigation poses a serious risk to U.S. intelligence collection. That is my job and that is the job of the committee I chair and the job of the chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the House. We are not about being courts, we are about trying to balance civil liberties as best as we can with the ability of this country to collect an entirely different kind of intelligence that we were so busy doing recently in the Cold War era. Without the assistance of telecommunications providers, our intelligence community simply cannot obtain the intelligence it needs. Is that a serious statement? Do Members of the Senate concern themselves with that? Is this just me, this Senator, standing up making a statement trying to win some votes? Or is there the possibility it could be true? If there is a possibility--and I think it is a probability it is true--then I don't understand why people can be confused on this subject because I think the choices are clear. Allowing companies to be dragged through the court system because of their alleged cooperation with the Government encourages them not to cooperate with any request, even those that are clearly legal without court compulsion. It also sends a message to all private companies: cooperate with the U.S. Government at your peril. Is that a bit of an overstatement? In the corporate boardrooms around this country, my guess is that is the discussion. Very few corporations have the capacity to help the Government in the way telecommunications companies do. Discouraging private sector cooperation with the Federal Government is not, in the feeling of this Senator, the right long-term result for either the intelligence community or the American people. Many have argued that providers who act unlawfully should be held accountable. I totally agree that all Americans, including corporate citizens, must follow the law and be held accountable for their failures. Companies that deliberately seek to evade privacy laws or legal restrictions on electronic surveillance can and should be subject to civil suit, but that is not the issue here, I would say to the Presiding Officer. That is not the issue. The Intelligence Committee spent a lot of time, as I have indicated, this year looking into what happened over the past 6 years. Before deciding to provide liability protection for the companies, the Intelligence Committee heard testimony from relevant witnesses and carefully reviewed the written communications provided to participants in the program. Participants were sent letters, all of which stated the relevant activities had been authorized by the President and all but one--and that was done by the legal counsel to the President--of which stated the activities had been determined to be lawful by the Attorney General of the United States. Shouldn't private companies be entitled to rely on the written representations of the highest levels of Government officials that their cooperation is necessary and has been determined to be lawful? Can you argue that if they get those notifications from the NSA Director and it has been approved by the Attorney General and has been declared essential for the national interest by the President, should they instead say: Oh, well, we don't care about that. That is not our business. We are not going to do that. And isn't it reasonable to assume that a U.S. citizen who has been told the Attorney General has found their cooperation to be lawful is acting in good faith? If they have been through this process and they proceed to act on it, why is it so easy to stipulate they are not acting in good faith? How does one show that? How does one imagine that? I have been through this, this whole question of what the companies get from it, and it is the thing that bothers me so much. They get nothing but grief. They get suits. They get costs. They get a diminished reputation. They begin to pull away. Their shareholders lose confidence. Do they get money? No. They get nothing. So why would they want to continue to cooperate would be my question. The answer to these questions are at the heart of the Intelligence Committee's determination that it is essential that Congress protect private companies that assisted the Government after the terrorist acts of 9/11. Mr. President, I will complete this part of my presentation and yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Mr. President, as the debate over the FISA legislation comes to a conclusion, and as a member of the Intelligence Committee for 7\\1/2\\ years, I would like to comment once again on why I support this bill. Let there be no doubt: 7 years after 9/11, our country continues to face serious threats. There are some who seek to do us grave harm. So there is no more important need than obtaining accurate, actionable intelligence to help prevent such an attack. At the same time, there have to be strong safeguards to ensure that the Government does not infringe on Americans' constitutional rights. I believe this bill strikes an appropriate balance. It protects Americans and their privacy rights. This legislation is certainly better than the Protect America Act in that regard and makes improvements over the 1978 FISA law. This bill provides for repeated court review of surveillance done for intelligence purposes. It ends, once and for all, the practice of warrantless surveillance. It protects Americans' constitutional rights both at home and abroad. It provides the Government flexibility to protect our Nation. It makes it crystal clear that FISA is the law of the land--and that this law must be obeyed. For more than 5 years, President Bush ran a warrantless surveillance program--called the terrorist surveillance program--outside of the law. The administration did not have to do this. This specific program could have been carried out under FISA--and I believe it should have been. With this bill, we codify and clarify that this limited, intelligence program will be carried out under the law. This legislation allows the Government to collect information from members of specific terrorist groups or specific foreign powers. It is focused on collecting the content of communications from specific people. If those people are Americans, a warrant is required. Period. So today, we are faced with three options: No. 1. We can pass this bill. It is comprehensive and improves protections for U.S. persons and updates the FISA law to meet today's national security challenges; or No. 2. We can extend the Protect America Act. This bill was a stop-gap measure passed last August for a 6-month temporary period to provide time to develop this legislation. It was meant to be temporary, and it should be only temporary. No. 3. We can do nothing. If we do not pass legislation before mid-August, America will essentially be laid bare--unable to gather the critical intelligence that we need. We will lose the ability to collect information on calls into and out of the United States from specific terrorist groups. The fact is, like it or not, the collection of signals intelligence is indispensable if we are to prevent another attack on our homeland. Given these three options, I think the choice is clear. The legislation is a significant improvement over the Protect America Act and over the 1978 FISA legislation. Let me indicate certain substantial improvements: This bill ends warrantless surveillance. Except in rare emergency cases, all surveillance has to be conducted pursuant to a court order. The FISA Court reviews the Government's procedures and applications before surveillance happens. This bill strengthens the court's review. Not only must the FISA Court approve any surveillance before it is started, this court is given more discretion, with a higher standard of review, over the Government's proposals. The Protect America Act limited the court to a rubberstamp review. This bill changes that. This bill requires that surveillance be subject to court-approved minimization. In 1978, Congress said that the Government could carry out surveillance on U.S. persons under a court warrant but required the Government to minimize the amount of information on those Americans who get included in the intelligence reporting. In practice, this actually means that the National Security Agency only includes information about a U.S. person that is strictly necessary to convey the intelligence. Most of the time, the person's name is not included in the report. That is the minimization process. If an American's communication is incidentally caught up in electronic surveillance while the Government is targeting someone else, minimization protects that person's private information. Now, the Protect America Act did not provide for court review over this minimization process at all. But this bill requires the court in advance to approve the Government's minimization procedures prior to commencing with any minimization program. That is good. That is the third improvement. This bill prohibits reverse targeting. There is an explicit ban on reverse targeting. Now, what is reverse targeting? That is the concern that the National Security Agency could get around the warrant requirement. If the NSA wanted to get my communications but did not want to go to the FISA Court, they might try to figure out who I am talking with and collect the content of their calls to get to me. This bill says you cannot do that. You cannot reverse target. It is prohibited. This was a concern with the Protect America Act, and it is fixed in this bill. This bill goes further than any legislation before it in protecting U.S. person privacy rights outside of the United States. It requires the executive branch to get a warrant anytime it seeks to direct surveillance of collected content from a U.S. person anywhere in the world. Previously, no warrant was required for content collection outside the United States. Finally, there are numerous requirements in the bill for various review of the surveillance activities by agency heads and by inspectors general. The FISA Court and the Congress will be kept fully informed on the operations of this program in the future. Finally, exclusivity. Mr. President, I have spoken multiple times on this floor about the importance of FISA's exclusivity provisions. Before 1978, there was no check on the President's ability to conduct electronic surveillance. However, in 1978, Congress passed FISA, intending it to be the only way. Congress intended that FISA would be the only way--the exclusive means--to conduct surveillance on U.S. persons in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. President Carter acknowledged that when he signed the bill. Nonetheless, this administration took the position that FISA was not exclusive. First it stated that FISA didn't apply to these particular surveillance activities. Then it said that Congress gave it authority through the Authorization for the Use of Military Force in Afghanistan. Then it said that the President couldn't be bound by an act of Congress because he had his own authority under the Constitution. I reject all of these arguments. And now a Federal court has addressed the subject of exclusivity head-on. On July 2, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California delivered a decision in a case brought against the U.S. Government for its surveillance. Judge Walker wrote: Congress appears clearly to have intended to--and did-- establish the exclusive means for foreign intelligence surveillance activities to be conducted. Whatever power the executive may otherwise have had in this regard, FISA limits the power of the executive branch to conduct such activities and it limits the executive branch's authority to assert the state secrets privilege in response to challenges to the legality of its foreign intelligence surveillance activities. (M:06-cv-01791-VRW, p. 23) These are powerful words in the opinion. So it is not just clear legislative intent, it is the current judicial position that FISA was and is exclusive. Yet, before the recess, it was asserted on the floor that the President has authority under article II of the Constitution to go around FISA. He does not, in my view. Moreover, they claim that the exclusivity language in the bill acknowledges the President's constitutional authority to conduct electronic surveillance outside of FISA. It does not. As the author of this language, let me state emphatically that the clear intent of the language is to bind the Executive to this law. Now, certain Senators are contending that this exclusivity language would allow the President to go outside of FISA. Let me be clear: this provision is not intended to, nor does it, provide or recognize any new authority to conduct electronic surveillance in contravention of FISA. It was drafted very carefully with input and agreement from people from both sides of the Intelligence Committee and the Judiciary Committee, the Department of Justice, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The only way the President can move outside of FISA will be with another specific statute, passed by both Houses and signed by the President. In summary, the exclusivity language in this bill absolutely does not recognize the President's claimed ``Article II'' authorities to conduct surveillance in contravention of FISA or any other law. The bottom line is that FISA has always been the exclusive means to conduct electronic surveillance, and it continues to be the exclusive means. And no President, now or in the future, has the authority to move outside the law. Finally, Mr. President, I want to set straight who in Congress was notified about the program and when. Some are saying that the Congress was briefed. This is not true. Eight Members of the House and Senate were briefed on the program around the time of its inception, shortly after September 11, 2001: the House and Senate leadership and the chairmen and ranking members of the Intelligence Committees. The 13 rank-and-file members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who by law are to be kept ``fully and currently informed'' of intelligence activities, were not briefed until well after the program was publicly disclosed in the New York Times in December 2005--4 years later. I want to make this crystal clear. The chairman and the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee--which shares jurisdiction over FISA--were not briefed until a significant period of time after the full membership of the Intelligence Committee was notified. Finally, I want to say a few words about immunity. Let me be clear, this particular immunity language is not ideal. I would have approached this issue differently. When the legislation was before the Senate in February, I moved an amendment to require that the FISA Court conduct a review of whether the telecommunications companies acted lawfully and in good faith. Unfortunately, my amendment was not adopted, but I continue to believe it is the appropriate standard. I have cosponsored an amendment by Senator Bingaman that would stay action on all pending lawsuits until 90 days after Congress receives a report, required elsewhere in this bill, by the relevant inspectors general on the President's surveillance program. That would give Congress a chance to decide on immunity based on a third-party review. If lawmakers took no action within 90 days, the provisions would go into effect. I have spent a great deal of time reviewing this matter. I have read the legal opinions written by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice. I have read the written requests to telecommunications companies. I have spoken to officials inside and outside the Government, including several meetings with the companies alleged to have participated in the program. The companies were told after 9/11 that their assistance was needed to protect against further terrorist acts. This actually happened within weeks of 9/11. I think we can all understand and remember what the situation was in the 3 weeks following 9/11. The companies were told the surveillance program was authorized and that it was legal. I am one who believes it is right for the public and the private sector to support the Government at a time of need. When it is a matter of national security, it is all the more important. I think the lion's share of the fault rests with the administration, not with the companies. It was the administration who refused to go to the FISA Court to seek warrants. They could have gone to the FISA Court to seek these warrants on a program basis, and they have done so subsequently. So I am pleased this bill includes independent reviews of the administration's actions to be conducted by the inspectors general of the relevant departments. This bill does provide a limited measure of court review. It is not as robust as my amendment would have provided, but it does provide an opportunity for the plaintiffs to be heard in court, and it provides an opportunity for the court to review these request documents. Mr. President, this is not a perfect bill. It is the product of compromise designed to make sure that it provides the needed intelligence capabilities and the needed privacy protections. I think the bill strikes that balance and that the Nation will be made more secure because of it.", u"Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Vermont for his characteristic kindness and courtesy. I thank the distinguished Senator who has been alone in opposing this act in the beginning, at a time when I wish I had voted as he did. In June 2004, 10 peace activists outside of Halliburton, Inc., in Houston gathered to protest the company's war profiteering. They wore paper hats and were handing out peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, calling attention to Halliburton's overcharging on a food contract for American troops in Iraq. Unbeknownst to them, they were being watched. U.S. Army personnel at the top secret Counterintelligence Field Activity, or CIFA, saw the protest as a potential threat to national security. CIFA was created 3 years ago by the Defense Department. Its official role is forced protection; that is, tracking threat and terrorist plots against military installations and personnel inside the United States. In 2003, then Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz authorized a fact-gathering operation code named TALON, which stands for Threat and Local Observation Notice, which would collect raw information about suspicious incidents and feed it to CIFA. In the case of the ``peanut butter'' demonstration, the Army wrote a report on the activity and stored it where? In its files. Newsweek magazine has reported that some TALON reports may have contained information on U.S. citizens that has been retained in Pentagon files. A senior Pentagon official has admitted that the names of these U.S. citizens could number in the thousands. Is this where we are heading? Is this where we are heading in this land of the free? Are secret Government programs that spy on American citizens proliferating? The question is not, is Big Brother watching? The question is, how many big brothers have we? Ever since the New York Times revealed that President George W. Bush has personally authorized surveillance of American citizens without obtaining a warrant, I have become increasingly concerned about dangers to the people's liberty. I believe that both current law and the Constitution may have been violated, not just once, not twice, but many times, and in ways that the Congress and the American people may never know because of this White House and its penchant for control and secrecy. We cannot continue to claim we are a nation of laws and not of men if our laws, and indeed even the Constitution of the United States itself, may be summarily breached because of some determination of expediency or because the President says, ``Trust me.'' The Fourth Amendment reads clearly: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The Congress has already granted the executive branch rather extraordinary authority with changes in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that allow the Government 72 hours after surveillance has begun to apply for a warrant. If this surveillance program is what the President says it is, a program to eavesdrop upon known terrorists in other countries who are conversing with Americans, then there should be no difficulty in obtaining a warrant within 72 hours. One might be tempted to suspect that the real reason the President authorized warrantless surveillance is because there is no need to have to bother with the inconveniences of probable cause. Without probable cause as a condition of spying on American citizens, the National Security Agency could, and can, under this President's direction, spy on anyone, and for any reason. How do you like that? How about that? We have only the President's word, his ``trust me,'' to protect the privacy of the law-abiding citizens of this country. One must be especially wary of an administration that seems to feel that what it judges to be a good end always justifies any means. It is, in fact, not only illegal under our system, but it is morally reprehensible to spy on citizens without probable cause of wrongdoing. When such practices are sanctioned by our own President, what is the message we are sending to other countries that the United States is trying to convince to adopt our system? It must be painfully obvious that a President who can spy on any citizen is very unlike the model of democracy the administration is trying to sell abroad. In the name of ``fighting terror,'' are we to sacrifice every freedom to a President's demand? How far are we to go? Can a President order warrantless, house-to-house searches of a neighborhood where he suspects a terrorist may be hiding? Can he impose new restrictions on what can be printed, what can be broadcast, what can be uttered privately because of some perceived threat--perceived by him--to national security? Laughable thoughts? I think not. This administration has so traumatized the people of this Nation, and many in the Congress, that some will swallow whole whatever rubbish that is spewed from this White House, as long as it is in some tenuous way connected to the so-called war on terror. And the phrase ``war on terror,'' while catchy, certainly is a misnomer. Terror is a tactic used by all manner of violent organizations to achieve their goal. This has been around since time began and will likely be with us until the last day of planet Earth. We were attacked by bin Laden and by his organization, al-Qaida. If anything, what we are engaged in should more properly be called a war on the al-Qaida network. But that is too limiting for an administration that loves power as much as this one. A war on the al-Qaida network might conceivably be over someday. A war on the al-Qaida network might have achievable, measurable objectives, and it would be less able to be used as a rationale for almost any Government action. It would be harder to periodically traumatize the U.S. public, thereby justifying a reason for stamping ``secret'' on far too many Government programs and activities. Why hasn't Congress been thoroughly briefed on the President's secret eavesdropping program, or on other secret domestic monitoring programs run by the Pentagon or other Government entities? Is it because keeping official secrets prevents annoying congressional oversight? Revealing this program in its entirety to too many Members of Congress could certainly have unmasked its probable illegality at a much earlier date, and may have allowed Members of Congress to pry information out of the White House that the Senate Judiciary Committee could not pry out of Attorney General Gonzales, who seemed generally confused about for whom he works--the public or his old boss, the President. Attorney General Gonzales refused to divulge whether purely domestic communications have also been caught up in this warrantless surveillance, and he refused to assure the Senate Judiciary Committee and the American public that the administration has not deliberately tapped Americans' telephone calls and computers or searched their homes without warrants. Nor would he reveal whether even a single arrest has resulted from the program. What about the first amendment? What about the chilling effect that warrantless eavesdropping is already having on those law-abiding American citizens who may not support the war in Iraq, or who may simply communicate with friends or relatives overseas? Eventually, the feeling that no conversation is private will cause perfectly innocent people to think carefully before they candidly express opinions or even say something in jest. Already we have heard suggestions that freedom of the press should be subject to new restrictions. Who among us can feel comfortable knowing that the National Security Agency has been operating with an expansive view of its role since 2001, forwarding wholesale information from foreign intelligence communication intercepts involving American citizens, including the names of individuals to the FBI, in a departure from past practices, and tapping some of the country's main telecommunication arteries in order to trace and analyze information? The administration could have come to Congress to address any aspects of the FISA law in the revised PATRIOT Act which the administration proposed, but they did not, probably because they wished the completely unfettered power to do whatever they pleased, the laws and the Constitution be damned. I plead with the American public to tune in to what is happening in this country. Please forget the political party with which you may usually be associated and, instead, think about the right of due process, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a private life. Forget the now tired political spin that if one does not support warrantless spying, then one may be less than patriotic. Focus on what is happening to truth in this country and then read President Bush's statement to a Buffalo, NY, audience on April 24, 2004: Any time you hear the United States Government talking about wiretap, it requires--a wiretap requires a court order. Nothing has changed, by the way. When we are talking about chasing down terrorists, we are talking about getting a court order before we do so. That statement is false, and the President knew it was false when he made it because he had authorized the Government to wiretap without a court order shortly after the 2001 attacks. This President, in my judgment, may have broken the law and most certainly has violated the spirit of the Constitution and the public trust. Yet I hear strange comments coming from some Members of Congress to the effect that, well, if the President has broken the law, let's just change the law. That is tantamount to saying that whatever the President does is legal, and the last time we heard that claim was from the White House of Richard M. Nixon. Congress must rise to the occasion and demand answers to the serious questions surrounding warrantless spying. And Congress must stop being spooked by false charges that unless it goes along in blind obedience with every outrageous violation of the separation of powers, it is soft on terrorism. Perhaps we can take courage from the American Bar Association which, on Monday, February 13, denounced President Bush's warrantless surveillance and expressed the view that he had exceeded his constitutional powers. There is a need for a thorough investigation of all of our domestic spying programs. We have to know what is being done by whom and to whom. We need to know if the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act has been breached and if the Constitutional rights of thousands of Americans have been violated without cause. The question is: Can the Congress, under control of the President's political party, conduct the type of thorough, far-ranging investigation which is necessary. It is absolutely essential that Congress try because it is vital to at least attempt the proper restoration of the checks and balances. Unfortunately, in a Congressional election year, the effort will most likely be seriously hampered by politics. In fact, today's Washington Post reports that an all-out White House lobbying campaign has dramatically slowed the congressional probe of NSA spying and may kill it. I want to know how many Americans have been spied upon. Yes, I want to know how it is determined which individuals are monitored and who makes such determinations. Yes, I want to know if the telecommunications industry is involved in a massive screening of the domestic telephone calls of ordinary Americans like you and me. I want to know if the U.S. Post Office is involved. I want to know, and the American people deserve to know, if the law has been broken and the Constitution has been breached. Historian Lord Acton once observed that: Everything secret degenerates, even the administration of justice; nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and publicity. The culture of secrecy, which has deepened since the attacks on September 11, has presented this Nation with an awful dilemma. In order to protect this open society, are we to believe that measures must be taken that in insidious and unconstitutional ways close it down? I believe that the answer must be an emphatic ``no.'' I yield the floor. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Mr. President, before the Presidents Day recess, I spoke about recent egregious examples of domestic surveillance by the executive branch, and I announced my intention to introduce legislation to establish a commission to investigate the instances of warrantless wiretapping and spying on U.S. citizens by the National Security Agency and other departments of Government. I am not the lone voice raising questions about the legality of this program and its effect on the rights of law-abiding American citizens. I am only one--only one--in a growing chorus--a growing chorus--of concerned individuals. Since the New York Times broke the story of the NSA's wiretapping program, many in this Chamber on both sides of the aisle have questioned the legality of the warrantless wiretapping and have called for investigations into possible violations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as well as other transgressions against the spirit or the letter of our revered Constitution. Many of our country's foremost constitutional scholars and professors of law have expressed their categorical opposition to the NSA's program, citing possible violations of both the Constitution and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. They agree that ``the program appears on its face''--on its face--``to violate existing law.'' These concerns have, of course, been dismissed by the same branch of Government that hatched the domestic spying program. Did you hear that? I will say it again. These concerns have been dismissed by the same branch of Government that hatched the domestic spying program. But this stonewalling--yes, that is stonewalling--this stonewalling is only part of the story. Important questions about NSA's program have been answered with strained and tenuous justifications or claims of the dire need for secrecy and, as a result, Congress's access to information has been severely--severely, severely--curtailed, by whom? By whom? Guess what, by the administration; by the administration. There are some things we do know. We know that top officials in the Department of Justice who were concerned about questions of legality and lack of oversight of the program refused to endorse continued use of the NSA's wiretapping. That isn't all. We also know because of these concerns this secret program was suspended. Do you get that? This secret program was suspended temporarily due to questions about its legality. What most Americans don't know is that FBI agents complained about the utility of the wiretapping program. Voluminous amounts of information and records that were gleaned from this secret eavesdropping program were sent from the National Security Agency to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and FBI officials repeatedly complained that they were being drowned by a river of useless information that diverted their resources from pursuing important counterterrorism work. Such complaints raise the question of whether the domestic wiretapping program may have backfired by sending our top counterterrorism agencies on wild-goose chases, thus making our country less secure instead of making our country more secure. We know that one member of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Judge James Robertson, resigned--yes, resigned--4 days after the New York Times first detailed the NSA's warrantless--warrantless--domestic surveillance. We know that only the chief judge of the FISA Court, the secret court charged with approving requests to conduct domestic surveillance, had any knowledge of this clandestine wiretapping program. The other judges, who are sworn to strict secrecy, learned of the program just as many of our citizens did--through reports in the press. Yes, thank God for a free press. We know that although most of the judges of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court were kept in the dark about the program, at least one of the judges was tipped off by an attorney within the Department of Justice that some of the information being presented to the court to secure warrants was improperly obtained, meaning the Government had apparently circumvented a court-ordered screening process to eliminate tainted evidence. We know that in a February 28 letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter, Attorney General Gonzales admitted that the Justice Department's legal justification for the wiretaps has ``evolved over time.'' What does that mean? Does it mean that there actually was no legal basis for the NSA to spy on American citizens when it first began the surveillance? Does it mean the Department had to gin up some legal basis for the spying once the program became public? Does it mean the administration's reliance on the use-of-force resolution to justify its snooping was simply a ploy--just a ploy--an ``after the fact'' face-saving device meant to give the administration cover for having violated the civil liberties of Americans? We know that earlier this week, 18 Members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to President Bush requesting that he appoint a special counsel to investigate the NSA's warrantless surveillance of our citizens. In their letter, the House Members noted that with no clear information coming from the administration, they and all of America have been forced to rely primarily on press reports to determine the scope of the NSA's activities. With so many questions unanswered by the administration, it is absolutely imperative that there be an objective investigation of this program and any violations of law that may have occurred. We are in a supercharged political year--we know that, you know that, everybody knows that--an election year for one-third of the Senate, including this Senator from West Virginia, and for the entire House of Representatives. And the Senate Intelligence Committee as of today has refused to initiate a serious investigation into this matter. But an investigation has to go forward. The efficacy of our laws and our Constitution is at stake. That is why I am proposing legislation to establish a nonpartisan commission to review and investigate domestic surveillance in America, along with serious allegations of abuse. In this way, we will be sure to safeguard our first and fourth amendment rights as enumerated in this Constitution, as well as evaluate the actual effectiveness of such programs in combating terrorist threats. James Madison wrote in his essay, ``Political Reflections,'' that ``[t]he fetters''--the fetters, f-e-t-t-e-r-s--``[t]he fetters imposed on liberty at home have ever been forged out of the weapons provided for defense against real, pretended, or imaginary dangers from abroad. No one is suggesting that the threat of terrorist attacks is anything but a real threat, and one that must be of the Congress's utmost priority. But the suggestion that the American people would be safer in their homes if they just forego their constitutionally protected rights is a deliberately deceptive assertion that may forge the fetters that bind law-abiding citizens. Make no mistake about it: It is these ill-conceived strictures that may ultimately destroy precious liberties. In fact, it is because our forefathers were fearful of re-creating the same tyrannous form of government from which many of them had fled, that the Bill of Rights--the Bill of Rights, those first 10 amendments--the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution to better secure for all time--all time--the freedom from oppression that ever looms from an overly powerful executive. Get that. Get that. Let me say that again. It was because our forefathers, thank God, were fearful of re-creating the same tyrannous, the same tyrannical form of government from which many of them had fled that the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution to better secure, for all time, the freedom from oppression that ever looms from an overly powerful executive. And you better believe it. You better believe it. Hear me. Hear me now. I will always speak out against an all-powerful executive, under either party. In a climate of fear, liberties have been sacrificed time and again under the guise of keeping the Nation from harm. Fear. Yes, fear is a powerful tool for manipulation; useful for easing the American people out of their liberties and into submission. Fear. When the public is confronted with a situation, real or imagined, that inspires fear, the public rightfully look to their leaders--look to their leaders, Mr. President--for protection from foreboding consequences. The claim of wartime necessity always strengthens the hands of a President. Let me say that again. The claim of wartime necessity always strengthens a President, any President, Republican or Democrat. And often facts are sealed from the prying eyes of Congress by a purported need for secrecy. But Senators, and that includes this Senator from West Virginia, Senators have a sworn duty--a sworn duty, a sworn duty--sworn right up there at that desk with their hand on the Bible--the holy Bible, the holy Bible, the holy Bible--with their hand on the Bible to check executive power. We have to be on guard every moment of every day. The executive branch, whether it be Democratic or Republican, is always reaching--always reaching, always reaching--always grabbing more power, more power, more power, and we have to be on guard. We have a sworn duty to check executive power and, as long as I live, I am going to stand for the checking of the executive power; I don't care whether it is a Democrat or Republican in the White House or an Independent. It makes no difference. We have a sworn duty. We swear. We put our hand on the Bible before God and man, and we swear to check executive power at all times--at all times--in times of crisis or otherwise. Each of us here, and there are 100 here, and each of this 100, 100 Senators, we are each bound to defend the Constitution and each bound to defend the liberties that the Constitution gives to all Americans, at all times, in times of peace and in times of war. History has shown us many times that a climate of fear can take a hefty toll on our freedoms. That is your freedoms. That is your freedoms. That is your freedoms. Worse still are liberties surrendered in vain, resulting in little added security. There is no doubt that constitutional freedoms will never be abolished in one fell swoop--never--for the American people cherish their freedoms, and they would not tolerate such a loss if they could perceive it; if they could see it coming, if they could hear it, if they could feel it, if they could perceive it. But the erosion of freedom rarely comes as an all-out frontal assault; rather, it is gradual, noxious, creeping, cloaked in secrecy and glossed over by reassurances of greater security. The American people are a people born of sacrifice, and the sacrifices that the American people are willing to endure speak well of the tenacity and the strength that makes the United States of America what it is. Some may be tempted to accept on blind faith the administration's--any administration's, any administration's--promise of increased security, and they may see it as a duty to capitulate their rights for that flimsy promise. May we all pause to reflect on the hard-won liberties--the hard-won liberties--for which earlier generations fought and died. Remember Nathan Hale. He died. He regretted that he had but one life to give, to lose, one life to lose for his country. Remember Patrick Henry: ``Give me liberty or give me death,'' he said. John Paul Jones: ``We have only begun to fight.'' So may we all pause to reflect, as we have just done, on the hard-won liberties for which earlier generations fought and died before we easily accept convincing rhetoric. Rhetoric is cheap. Talk is cheap. To suggest that innocent Americans surrender rights to preserve freedom is a false choice. It is also a slippery slope, one that is fraught with ever more secrecy and the certainty of egregious abuses of our Bill of Rights and of our laws over time. By Ms. CANTWELL (for herself, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Lautenberg, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Lieberman, Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Menendez, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Dodd, and Mr. Kerry): S. 2364. A bill to provide lasting protection for inventoried roadless areas within the National Forest System; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.", u"I have known this fine officer for some time. I worked with him, and I'm very pleased that the President of the United States has asked the Senate for its advice and consent on this important nomination. Mr. President, our Nation is at war on two main battlefields--Iraq and Afghanistan. The national security apparatus of our country centers around the White House, the National, Security Council there, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security and, most importantly, the new organization headed by John Negroponte, our national intelligence community. It is imperative that this Nation receive as early as possible the replacement for Porter Goss to take over his position with the Central Intelligence Agency, and I hope that the hearings, which I believe will be scheduled, subject to Chairman Robert's views, early next week. Early next week there will be a very thorough investigation of this officer, and we, the Senate as a body, can conform General Hayden and move forward. This Senator, the Senator from Virginia, will give him the strongest support and as an ex officio member of the Intelligence Committee, I will participate in those hearings. Before turning to General Hayden, though, I would like to say a few words about Porter Goss. Mr. President, I am privileged to know this fine public servant who, presumably, is going to step down here shortly and conclude, perhaps, maybe not, maybe another assignment some day, but he certainly has had a distinguished public record of service. He was at the CIA himself, and served thereafter in the Congress. That is when I first came to know him. The Presiding Officer may recall that there was a time here, a dozen or so years ago, when, I remember, our good friend, Senator Moynihan from New York, said, it is time to re-examine the CIA, and possibly abolish it. Well, I and others came to the forefront and did what we could to begin to put that debate into balance. And we successfully put in a bill, and Porter Goss in the other body put in a similar bill, to establish a commission to review the origins of the CIA, and see how it was an integral part of our intelligence system. The late Les Aspen, the former Secretary of Defense, was the first chairman of that commission. He had an untimely death, and was succeed in that position by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, at that time also having finished his work in the Department of Defense. The Commission did an excellent job. I just point that out as a reference in history of how hard Porter Goss has fought throughout his career to preserve the integrity and the viability of the Central Intelligence Agency. Now, we do not know, many of us, all the facts regarding this transition of positions. I personally hope to visit with Mr. Goss, and will do so prior to the hearings, so that I can understand his perspective more fully. But he did a lot of valuable work at that agency, notably he began to restore the focus of the agency to its principle function as it was established some 50 years ago, and that is the collection of human intelligence. So I say to Porter Goss, well done. And I say to General Hayden, you fill the shoes of a very able man, but you have a challenge of your own. Now, there are several issues that have been brought up by the general's nomination, and I would like to address those issues. First, there is a question of surveillance. As the head of the NSA, the National Security Agency, General Hayden was in the business of collecting electronic signals from around the world, from emissions abroad. We will go into that very thoroughly during the course of the hearings. I think that debate I appropriate. But I wish to point out that a very important debate has proceeded on that issue on the Senate floor. It will continue for some time. And that is a debate over the legal ramifications, in other words, what are the origins of the power of the President to have directed this type of collection? I do believe that you can separate the collection, really, into two parts. One, the value of the collected intelligence from abroad as a contribution to our overall security. We have established now, here in the Senate, a larger committee that is looking into that, and I am confident that there will be a unanimous view that the collection of this intelligence, thus far, has been an important contribution to this Nation's effort in the war on terrorism. The other question, equally important, is the question of legality. Now, let me make it clear. In my visit with General Hayden yesterday, I said to him, ``You're not a lawyer.'' He said, ``No, I'm not a lawyer . . . I, General Hayden, when instructed to initiate this program, carefully assessed all variety of legal opinions, and it was clear by those contributing the legal opinions, the Attorney General, the White House Counsel, and others, that I had the authority to do so. As a non-lawyer, I accepted their opinions, like all of us do every day in life, I accepted the opinions of our counsel, whether it be in private or public life.'' So I believe that the Intelligence committee, as it sorts that out, will eventually find that, while we may not resolve--and I doubt in the context of this nomination we will in fact resolve--the very important questions of the legalities of this program, we will decide that General Hayden acted in accordance with prudence, and was guided by appropriate counsel. So I believe that that issue will not be an impediment to his nomination. Next is a question of the fact that this distinguished officer has risen through the ranks to become a four-star general. I have been privileged, I say with a sense of humility, to work with the uniformed people of this country for close to a half a century, in one way or another. I had a very modest military career of my own, but particularly when I was Secretary of the Navy, I had the opportunity work with and assess the biographies and the careers of many officers with worked their way from the lowest ranks up to four-star ranked general and flag rank in the Navy and Marine Corps. Now, I certainly say to the people of this country, that an individual who can withstand all of the rigor, all of the competition, to come from the very bottom to the very top is one who has been screened and thoroughly reviewed by many peer groups. And how proud this officer is to have succeeded to have gained four-star rank. I do not personally have any trouble with his retaining that rank in this capacity, if confirmed by the Senate to lead the CIA. The question is raised, though, legitimately. It should be a civilian running our intelligence. But my distinguished colleagues, I say to you, it is a civilian that runs the intelligence community: John Negroponte. He is now the top individual in charge of this magnificent intelligence system that this country has. Yesterday, I visited with Secretary Rumsfeld on this issue on several occasions by phone, and he spoke publicly to the issue, as well. He endorses General Hayden. He said, General Hayden will report directly to John Negroponte, the head of the overall intelligence community. And in no way does Secretary Rumsfeld feel that the fact that General Hayden continues to wear this uniform should there be any impediment in the chain of command, or in the responsibilities or the direction that this officer will give to his responsibilities. So, again, I believe that issue will be resolved in the committee hearings. In the work of the Intelligence Committee to review the credentials, the integrity, the character of this individual, I am confident that he will meet the highest standards of the office which he aspires to take over at the direction of the President. So that will be behind us. Finally, I would like to say a little bit about the Central Intelligence Agency itself. It is in Virginia, and I am privileged, as a current Virginia Senator, as have my predecessors, to give a little special attention, to that Agency. When the new structure of the intelligence community was devised here on the floor, I was active in the debate, and I think, if I can say with some modesty, helped to preserve more and more of the functions of that agency which I felt should remain in that agency, and the CIA has survived that legislation, I believe, quite well. There is still more to be done in finally convincing various persons, distinguished individuals in that Agency, that this is the way it is under the law, and this is the way we have got to conduct our business in the future. General Hayden can do that. He did it at NSA. He made a transformation of the thought process over there, and likewise he can do it here. But it is interesting: who would be his deputy? Well, we don't know entirely for sure, but I would like to read part of a column in today's Washington Post by David Ignatius. I happen to know him. His father, coincidentally, was Secretary of the Navy just before the late Senator Chafee and joined that Secretariat. And he is an author of some distinction. He points out that the current thinking, and I believe it to be correct, is that the transition in the CIA would be painful for General Hayden, I read from his article, but he's got a good choice for the second person in Mr. Stephen Kappes. And it is interesting about Mr. Kappes' career. I would like to read just a part of the column. At the core of the intelligence puzzle is the CIA, whose very name is outdated. It is no longer the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinating the work of the community. That's the DNI's job now. In a sensible reorganization, the CIA should refocus on the specific mission for which it was created more than 50 years ago--gathering HUMINT, which is intelligence jargon for the secrets between someone's ears. The days when the CIA could be all things to all intelligence consumers are over. Today's CIA should be a truly secret intelligence service in which the job of analysts is to target operations. The all-source analysis that creates finished intelligence should be managed by the Making this transition at the CIA will be painful, and Hayden is a good choice for the necessary surgery. As a feisty military officer, he's paradoxically the right person to fend off poaching by the Pentagon. By his own admission, Hayden doesn't know much about the CIA's operational work, but he does know how to modernize a big, hidebound bureaucracy. He did that at the National Security Agency--helping the wiretappers adapt to a new world of e-mail, fiber-optic cables and wireless phones. He made enemies at the NSA, but he was a successful change agent. Hayden will have the ideal partner in Stephen Kappes, who is slated to be deputy director. Kappes is something of a legend at the agency: a charismatic ex-Marine who knows how to lead from the front. He punched all the tickets--fixing a broken Iranian operations group that had lost a string of agents, serving as chief of station in Moscow and as head of counterintelligence, and visiting Moammar Gaddafi and persuading him to give up his nuclear weapons program. Kappes' pitch to the Libyan leader is said to have been blunt, and irresistible: ``You are the drowning man and I am the lifeguard.'' And on it goes. It points out very carefully that in the eyes of the professionals at the Agency, this gentleman, Mr. Kappes, is a man of impeccable credential, one who resigned from the Agency rather than fire his deputy, and that is to his everlasting credit. So I believe the morale at the Agency will be raised, Mr. President. It is a magnificent group of professionals. Our Nation should take pride in the quality of persons who fortunately are selected to serve in the CIA for generations. And I am proud and humbled to have a voice in representing so many of the officers at the CIA, who are my constituents. But I do so in knowing that this Agency is essential to our intelligence operations. This new leadership team of General Hayden and Mr. Kappes will take over and provide the strong direction that is needed to even strengthen the Agency, and to the extent that there has been any diminution in morale, I am confident this team will raise in a very short period of time. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the full column from David Ignatius, and an excerpt from the official biography of General Hayden. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:", u" There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the `` Trade Agreement Assessment Act''. By Mr. AKAKA (for himself and Mr. Lautenberg): S. 3968. A bill to affirm the authority of the Comptroller General to audit and evaluate the programs, activities, and financial transactions of the intelligence community, and for other purposes; to the Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. President, I rise to introduce ``The Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2006,'' with Senator Lautenberg which would reaffirm the Comptroller General of the United States and head of the Government Accountability Office's, GAO, authority to audit the financial transactions and evaluate the programs and activities of the intelligence community (IC). Representative Bennie Thompson, ranking member of the House Homeland Security Committee, is introducing similar legislation. The bill Senator Lautenberg and I offer today is in keeping with legislation introduced in 1987 by Senator John Glenn, the former chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, to ensure more effective oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal. The need for greater oversight and availability of information to appropriate congressional committees is not new. What is new is that Congress does not have the luxury of failure in this era of terrorism. Failure brings terrible consequence. Since 9/11, effective oversight is needed now more than ever for two very basic reasons: First, intelligence reforms have spawned new agencies with new intelligence functions demanding even more inter-agency cooperation. The Congress needs to ensure that these agencies have the assets, resources, and capability to do their job in protecting our national security. However, now the Congress cannot do its job properly, in part, because its key investigative arm, the Government Accountability Office, is not given adequate access to the intelligence community, led by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Moreover, intelligence oversight is no longer the sole purview of the Senate and House intelligence committees. Other committees have jurisdiction over such departments as Homeland Security, State, Defense, Justice, Energy, and even Treasury and Commerce, which, in this war on terrorism, have intelligence collection and sharing responsibilities. Nor is the information necessary for these committees to exercise their oversight responsibilities restricted to the two intelligence committees as their organizing resolutions make clear. Unfortunately, the intelligence community stonewalls the GAO when committees of jurisdiction request that GAO investigate problems despite the clear responsibility of Congress to ensure that these agencies are operating effectively to protect America. This is not always the case. Some agencies recognize the valuable contribution that GAO makes in improving the quality of our intelligence. As Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., then Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), observed in testimony before the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, on October 29, 1975: ``Another feature of congressional review is that since 1955 resident auditors of the General Accounting Office have been assigned at the Agency to perform on-site audits. Additional GAO auditors were cleared for access in 1973, and GAO, in addition to this audit, is initiating a classified review of our automatic data processing functions.'' Not surprisingly, this outpost of the GAO still exists at the NSA. Second, and equally important, is the inability of Congress to ensure that unfettered intelligence collection does not trample civil liberties. New technologies and new personal information data bases threaten our individual right to a secure private life, free from unlawful government invasion. The Congress must ensure that private information being collected by the intelligence community is not misused and is secure. Over 30 years ago, Senator Charles Percy urged Congress to ``act now to gain control over the Government's dangerously proliferating police, investigative, and intelligence activities.'' He noted that ``we find ourselves threatened by the specter of a `watchdog' Government, breeding a nation of snoopers.'' The privacy concerns expressed by our former colleague have become vastly more complicated. As I have noted, the institutional landscape has become littered with new intelligence agencies with ever-increasing demands and responsibilities on law enforcement at every level of government since the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. They have the legitimate mission to protect the country against potential threats. Congress' role is to ensure that their mission remains legitimate. The intelligence community today consists of 19 different agencies or components: the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Department of Defense; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Departments of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force; Department of State; Department of Treasury; Department of Energy; Department of Justice; Federal Bureau of Investigation; National Reconnaissance Office; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; Coast Guard; Department of Homeland Security, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. I ask unanimous consent that a memorandum prepared by the Congressional Research Service, entitled ``Congressional Intelligence Oversight,'' be included in the Record. As both House Rule 48 and Senate Resolution 400 establishing the intelligence oversight committees state, ``Nothing in this [charter] shall be construed as amending, limiting, or otherwise changing the authority of any standing committee of the [House/Senate] to obtain full and prompt access to the product of the intelligence activities of any department or agency of the Government relevant to a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee.'' Despite this clear and unambiguous statement, the ability of non-intelligence committees to obtain information, no matter how vital to improving the security of our Nation, has been restricted by the various elements of the intelligence community. Two recent incidents have made this situation disturbingly clear. At a hearing entitled ``Access Delayed: Fixing the Security Clearance Process, Part II,'' before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia on which I serve as Ranking Member, on November 9, 2005, GAO was asked about steps it would take to ensure that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Office of Management and Budget, and the intelligence community met the goals and objectives outlined in the OPM security clearance strategic plan. Fixing the security clearance process, which is on GAO's high-risk list, is essential to our national security. But as GAO observed in a written response to a question raised by Senator Voinovich, ``while we have the authority to do such work, we lack the cooperation we need to get our job done in that area.'' The intelligence community is blocking GAO's work in this essential area. A similar case arose in response to a GAO investigation for the Senate Homeland Security Committee and the House Government Reform Committee on how agencies are sharing terrorism-related and sensitive but unclassified information. The report, entitled ``Information Sharing, the Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information'' (GAO-06-385), was released in March 2006. At a time when Congress is criticized by members of the 9-11 Commission for failing to implement its recommendations, we should remember that improving terrorism information sharing among agencies was one of the critical recommendations of the 9-11 Commission. Moreover, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 mandated the sharing of terrorism information through the creation of an Information Sharing Environment. Yet, when asked by GAO for comments on the GAO report, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence refused, stating that ``the review of intelligence activities is beyond GAO's purview.'' However, as a Congressional Research Service memorandum entitled ``Overview of `Classified' and `Sensitive but Unclassified' Information,'' concludes, ``it appears that pseudo-classification markings have, in some instances, had the effect of deterring information sharing for homeland security.'' I ask unanimous consent that the memo be printed in the Record following my remarks. Unfortunately I have more examples, that predate the post 9-11 reforms. Indeed, in July 2001, in testimony entitled ``Central Intelligence Agency, Observations on GAO Access to Information on CIA Programs and Activities'' (GAO-01-975T) before the House Committee on Government Reform, the GAO noted, as a practical matter, ``our access is generally limited to obtaining information on threat assessments when the CIA does not perceives [sic] our audits as oversight of its activities.'' I ask consent that this testimony also be printed following my remarks. It is inconceivable that the GAO--the audit arm of the U.S. Congress--has been unable to conduct evaluations of the CIA for over 40 years. If the GAO had been able to conduct basic auditing functions of the CIA, perhaps some of the problems that were so clearly exposed following the terrorist attacks in September 2001 would have been resolved. And yet, it is extraordinary that five years after 9-11 the same problems persist. Once more I refer to Senator Glenn's bill S. 1458, the ``General Accounting Office-Central Intelligence Agency Audit Act of 1987.'' On its introduction he said, ``in the long run, I believe carefully controlled GAO audits of CIA will lower the probability of future abuses of power, boost the credibility of CIA management, increase the essential public support the Agency's mission deserves, assist the Congress in conducting meaningful oversight, and in no way compromise the CIA mission.'' Unfortunately, S. 1458 did not become law, and nearly 20 years later, the CIA's apparent management challenges led to the creation of the Director of National Intelligence with the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. If Senator Glenn's proposal made in 1987 had been accepted, perhaps, again, some of the problems that became apparent with our intelligence agencies following 9-11 might never have occurred. I want to be clear that my legislation does not detract from the authority of the intelligence committees. In fact, the language makes explicit that the Comptroller General may conduct an audit or evaluation of intelligence sources and methods or covert actions only upon the request of the intelligence committees or at the request of the congressional majority or minority leaders. The measure also prescribes for the security of the information collected by the Comptroller General. However, my bill reaffirms the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct audits and evaluations--other than those relating to sources and methods, or covert actions--relating to the management and administration of elements of the intelligence community in areas such as strategic planning, financial management, information technology, human capital, knowledge management, information sharing, and change management for other relevant committees of the Congress. Attached is a detailed description of the legislation. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no objection the materials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: There being no objection the materials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Congressional Research Service, This memorandum examines the intelligence oversight structure established by Congress in the 1970s, including the creation of the congressional select intelligence committees by the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively. It also looks at the intelligence oversight role that Congress reserved for congressional committees other than the intelligence committees; examines certain existing statutory procedures that govern how the executive branch is to keep the congressional intelligence committees informed of U.S. intelligence activities; and looks at the circumstances under which the two intelligence committees are expected to keep congressional standing committees, as well as both chambers, informed of intelligence activities. If I can be of further assistance, please call at 707-7739.", u"Mr. President, I am glad we are having this conversation. I think it shows that there is some room for dialogue and, I hope, for progress to be made on this issue. I think it is unfortunate some of these statements made earlier today by the President suggesting that those who did not share his point of view on this issue were somehow not as sensitive to the threat of terrorism. I can assure the President and all listening to this debate there is sensitivity to that threat of terrorism on both sides of the aisle by people who were on both sides of that cloture vote on the PATRIOT Act. What is at issue are some fundamental questions about our constitutional rights, our freedoms, and liberties in America. Each of us, when we assume the responsibility of Senator, swears to uphold the Constitution. There are so many important elements within that Constitution, but one might argue that the Bill of Rights is the most important because it is a guarantee of our individual rights and freedoms. So when we initially enacted the PATRIOT Act in the fear that was gripping this country after 9/11, there was a concern that perhaps we had gone too far; perhaps we had given the Government more authority over our privacy, more authority over our freedom, than was necessary. In the bipartisan wisdom of those who wrote the act, we promised that 4 years afterwards we would revisit it and see if, in fact, it needed to be changed in any respect. That is what this debate is all about. There may be some today who argue we should do away with the PATRIOT Act, but I cannot say who they might be. The only Senator who voted against it is supporting the reform that passed the Senate Judiciary Committee, so it is clear that he was prepared to vote for a PATRIOT Act with some modifications. The Senator from Idaho, Mr. Craig, and I have been the lead cosponsors of the SAFE Act which, as he accurately described, was an attempt to modify the PATRIOT Act, not to abolish it, but to modify it, in certain respects, so as to protect our basic freedoms and liberties. We were happy at the end of the debate in the Senate when the bill came forward in the Judiciary Committee on a unanimous, bipartisan vote, which I hasten to add is a rare thing in the Judiciary Committee, if not the Senate. A unanimous, bipartisan vote on this measure brought it to the floor where it was enacted by a voice vote since there was no objection to it on the Senate floor. That is an amazing testimony to the fine work of the Senator from Pennsylvania as chairman of the committee and all the Members who compromised to reach that point. It is worth noting for the record when that occurred. It occurred in July. It was in July that we finished our work on this and sent it over to the House of Representatives, understanding we were backing up against the deadline of December 31. It was not until November 9 of this year that the House appointed their conferees. They waited 3 months or more before they appointed conferees and sat down to seriously debate this issue. Then a few weeks later, even with Thanksgiving intervening, they produced this conference report. So if it is a matter of timing, it does not take that long to try to work out differences. That is why those of us who are proposing a 3-month extension believe it is entirely appropriate and possible that we would reach an agreement in that short period of time. I would like to spend a moment reflecting on the substance of this debate. We have talked about the Senate procedure and timing and what words were spoken by Members and what they meant, but it is important to get down to the substance of the issue to understand that what we are talking about are some fairly fundamental issues. The first is the question of Section 215. That is a section that will allow the Government to obtain medical records, financial records, library records and other sensitive personal information simply by showing, under the current PATRIOT Act, that the information might be relevant to an authorized investigation. That is as low a standard as I can imagine, and it basically means that the Government, without proof of any wrongdoing on the part of any individual or group of individuals, could secure a great deal of private personal information and cull through it simply by saying it may be relevant to an authorized investigation. When we passed the Senate bill reauthorizing the PATRIOT Act, we said that it really should be a higher standard, not an impossible standard but a higher standard; that the person whose records are being sought has at least some connection to the kind of conduct we are trying to guard against. That is not a huge leap in terms of our legal standard in America. It is consistent with what we call due process. The second concern with Section 215 is an equally important one. Assume that one is the custodian administrator of records, either at a business or at a hospital, and they receive a notice under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, the Federal Government wants all of their records in their hospital on hundreds, if not thousands, of patients, and they believe that is an unwarranted intrusion into the privacy of their clients; what can one do if they believe the Government has gone too far? Currently, under the PATRIOT Act, they are precluded from even arguing their case in court, arguing that the Government has gone too far. And section 215 has an automatic permanent gag that prevents any person from speaking out, even if he believes his rights have been violated. In my mind, that is a fundamental attack on a very basic freedom in America. So when we wrote the revision of the PATRIOT Act in the Senate, which all of the Senators voted for, Democrats and Republicans, we said we would give a person the right to go to court and to ask that this gag order be lifted so that they could argue the merits of the Government's activities. Those are two critical issues when it comes to the rights of the freedoms of Americans. To argue that they are inconsequential, that they are not worthy of fight, is to ignore our basic responsibility. Many of us who are arguing to extend the PATRIOT Act also want to include in it some very fundamental protections of the rights of Americans. That is what this debate is about. It is not about who can get the upper hand on the political debate on a day-to-day basis. I think most Americans are weary of that. I am. What we are trying to do is extend the PATRIOT Act for 90 days past December 31 and work out these differences, significant differences but differences we can address and address successfully. It is interesting to note that this debate about the PATRIOT Act, which is going on on the floor of the Senate and in the President's press conference, is occurring at a moment in time which is freighted with significance in terms of the activities of this Government in relation to the privacy and the personal rights of its citizens. It was disclosed in the New York Times and Washington Post and other major papers last week that for several years now our Government has been eavesdropping on American citizens through the National Security Agency. This, to me, is a dramatic departure from the basic rules and process we followed for over 30 years in America, where we have said that if you want to listen in on the conversation of my neighbor or someone in my family, you need to have a legal right to do so and that legal right will be established by going to court to establish why it is necessary for you to listen in on that conversation; to establish, for example, probable cause that a crime has been committed or probable cause or evidence that someone has engaged in unlawful activities. That is the American standard. It appears now, from what the President has said, that this administration for several years has rejected that standard. The President has assumed the power to eavesdrop on the conversations of innocent Americans on the possibility that they will come up with some evidence of wrongdoing. This is not only illegal, it borders if not crosses the border into a violation of criminal law. It is extremely significant. In this holiday season with all the other things we are thinking about personally, with the rush of Congress to adjourn and go home and be with our families, I don't know if we are reflecting on the significance of what we have learned in the last several days. To think that any President of the United States believes he has the power as Commander in Chief to basically avoid, ignore, or violate the laws of the land is a significant charge. I am encouraged that Senator Specter, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, a member of the President's own party, from Pennsylvania, has promised us a thorough investigation when we return in January as to what has been occurring in terms of the National Security Agency and this eavesdropping. But I raise this because our entire discussion of the PATRIOT Act is in the context of this consideration: Simply stated, have we gone too far in violating the basic rights and liberties and freedoms of Americans in our pursuit for security and safety? Can we strike a balance and be safe as a nation without endangering our basic freedoms and liberties? I think this question of eavesdropping on hundreds if not thousands of innocent Americans raises that question foursquare. But I also believe the extension of the PATRIOT Act does as well. When the Democratic leader of the Senate comes before the body twice today, as he did last week, and asks for an extension of time so the PATRIOT Act will still be in force, can still be used for 90 days while we work out these significant questions, it is a good-faith offer. For his critics--whether in the executive branch or legislative branch--to suggest that he wants to do away with the PATRIOT Act or he is insensitive to the terrorist threat is not a fair characterization of his position nor the position of many of us. We believe the PATRIOT Act is important, but we believe some modifications will make it an act that is more consistent with our constitutional rights. I hope the Republican leadership in the Senate will reconsider their position. I hope they will allow us to extend the PATRIOT Act for 90 days. We can go home for the holidays and return in January, which the Senate Judiciary Committee is going to do, anyway, and get down to business, rolling up our sleeves to work out this conference committee. Let's make sure the PATRIOT Act is not only reenacted but in a fashion that is consistent with our basic freedoms.", u"Mr. President, according to the Book of Mark, Jesus asked this question: ``For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?'' Mark 8:36. I would ask the President of the United States a similar question--what good is it to expand the power of the President, if in the process you erode the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution? Last week, we learnd--from a New York Times report and then from President Bush himself--that since September 11, 2001, the President of the United States has authorized the National Security Agency to conduct electronic surveillance of American citizens on American soil without resort to the procedures of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Today we learn, contrary to assurances by administration officials, that the NSA has also conducted warrantless surveillance of purely domestic phone calls because of the technical difficulties of determining the physical location of a particular telephone. There is still much that we do not know about this secret program and much that we do not know about the purported legal basis for it. In briefing the press on Tuesday, the Attorney General noted that people criticizing the administration are proffering opinions based on ``very limited information,'' and that such critics ``probably don't have the information about our legal analysis.'' But we do know this: for the past 4 years, the Bush administration has aggressively sought to expand the power of the President beyond recognition. In the face of this campaign, a Republican Congress has largely stood idle, reluctant to exercise its constitutional duty of oversight. The Framers provided for a system of checks and balances in the Constitution for one simple reason: to protect against abuse of power by any branch of government in order to protect our personal freedoms. In its zeal to expand the power of the President, the Bush administration's actions have threatened the fabric of the Constitution. These are hardly the actions of a self-described conservative who professes to want to reduce the power of the National Government. It would be one thing if the President's actions to expand Presidential power reflected sound judgment and wisdom. But again and again, the President's overreaching in the name of security has been profoundly misguided, and has undermined support for the war against al-Qaida at home and abroad; in his decision to create special military tribunals for al-Qaida suspects held in Guantanamo Bay, a system that has yet to produce a complete trial, in his decision to authorize secret prisons abroad holding terrorist suspects--including, apparently, using facilities once operated by Soviet Intelligence agencies; in his decision to play fast and loose with time-tested standards against torture; and now in his decision to unilaterally authorize secret wiretaps of Americans without a court order. Without more information from the Executive, it is difficult to judge the legality of the President's secret spying program. I call on the Attorney General, therefore, to provide the necessary information by promptly releasing the legal opinions governing this program--so that the Congress and the American people can assess the propriety of the President's actions. And I call on the Director of National Intelligence to promptly provide full and complete briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on the scope and operation of this program. What is clear today is that the President of the United States decided to create a new system outside the framework of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978--a framework that Congress designed to be comprehensive for electronic surveillance of foreign powers and agents of foreign powers. It is this framework on which I will focus my remarks today. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, was enacted in 1978 after a 3-year effort to do so. As stated in the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the purpose of the law was to provide regulation for ``all electronic surveillance conducted within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes'' in order to provide a check against abuses that had been revealed by the investigation of the Church Committee. The bill was a bipartisan product; in the Senate, the original version introduced in 1977 that served as the basis of the 1978 law was sponsored by Senators across the ideological spectrum--including Birch Bayh, Ted Kennedy, Mac Mathias, James Eastland, and Strom Thurmond. The Senate ultimately adopted the bill on April 20, 1978, by a strong, bipartisan vote of 95 to 1. At the time the bill was approved in the Senate, I stated that it ``was a reaffirmation of the principle that it is possible to protect national security and at the same time the Bill of Rights.'' I was also a member of the conference committee that produced the final version of the law that was enacted with broad support in October 1978. Here is what we did in 1978. FISA was designed to govern our collection of ``foreign intelligence.'' Typically, in the criminal context, search warrants can only be issued if the Government can demonstrate to a neutral judge that probable cause exists to believe a crime has been committed. Under FISA, surveillance orders are issued so long as probable cause exists that someone is an ``agent of a foreign power.'' That term has been expanded in the last year to even include a lone wolf terrorist; in other words, someone not affiliated with a known terrorist organization. Not only is the standard different under FISA, but the FISA process is done in secret, with a special court known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. This is a court made up of Federal judges who sit on U.S. district courts. I should parenthetically note that we learned today that one of the 11 judges on this court just resigned in reaction to President Bush's unilateral domestic spying program. When we wrote FISA, we knew there could be times when the President would have to act quickly. We knew there would be times when probable cause would have to be demonstrated to the FISA court after the surveillance began. We contemplated emergencies and wrote the law so that it could deal with them. First, we addressed emergency situations in section 105(f) of the act, which provides that if the Attorney General reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists--and that his investigators need to target a wiretap against an agent before an application can be made to the FISA Court--he may do so for 72 hours. The original act provided for only a 24-hour emergency period, but Congress expanded that period to 72 hours in December 2001--after the attacks on 9/11. Similarly, in enacting the Patriot Act in 2001, Congress provided other changes to FISA. It is therefore difficult to accept the contention of the Attorney General that Congress has been unwilling to help the President meet the challenges we now face. The law is clear on the steps the Attorney General needs to take to wiretap suspects without first obtaining a warrant: he must tell a FISA Court judge at the time of the authorization that he has taken such emergency measures, and he has to apply for post-hoc approval as soon as is practicable but not later than 72 hours after the surveillance has commenced. We envisioned another emergency that could authorize warrantless intelligence searches: a declaration of war. Section 111 lets the Attorney General authorize electronic surveillance without a court order to acquire foreign intelligence information for up to 15 calendar days following a declaration of war by Congress. Although the ``Authorization for the Use of Military Force'' approved just after 9/11 was not, technically speaking, a declaration of war, it was the constitutional equivalent under the war clause to permit the use of force in Afghanistan, and the President would have been justified to exercise these extraordinary surveillance powers in the first 2 weeks after enactment of the joint resolution. It is also important to note that FISA, on its own terms, set up a comprehensive and exclusive system for domestic wiretapping. Section 2511(2)(f) of Title 18, United States Code, states that FISA, when combined with wiretap authority for domestic criminal investigations, is the ``exclusive means by which . . . the interception of domestic wire, oral and electronic communications may be conducted.'' That is why George Will recently had this to say about the administration's tortured legal reasoning, ``The President's authorization of domestic surveillance by the National Security Agency contravened a statute's clear language.'' It is also worth looking at how the FISA system has operated throughout its 27 years of existence. I would submit that it has served us well. To those who would say it is too restrictive on our ability to gain intelligence, I would respond that the FISA Court has only rejected 5 applications out of approximately 19,000. To those who would say that the system is too lenient, I would respond that the important piece of the equation with FISA is that it has some independent review of the executive branch--in this instance, by an independent Article III judge. And yet, even with a history of a FISA court that approves the overwhelming majority of applications, and even with the two emergency exceptions, there are some who still argue that the administration needs additional flexibility. For example, there are some who would say that FISA wouldn't allow us to tap the phone numbers found in the cell phone of a top al-Qaida target. With all due respect, a phone number found in a top al-Qaida operative's cell phone would seem to me to comfortably satisfy the ``probable cause'' standard outlined above. And if there were an urgent need to tap these phone numbers promptly--as I am sure there would be--no one has explained why this couldn't be done under the 72-hour emergency exception. Rather, we have the disturbing spectacle of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, General Hayden, complaining that ``FISA involves marshaling arguments . . . FISA involves looping paperwork around.'' Exactly right. FISA isn't a high hurdle--but it does require the executive branch to justify the extraordinary surveillance of American citizens to a judicial officer. Isn't this the rule of law that we are fighting to defend? And when FISA has needed updating over its 27-year existence, Congress has, time and time again, stepped up to the plate. When we first enacted FISA, its scope was limited to wiretapping and other electronic eavesdropping. It has since been amended to authorize pen/trap orders and business record orders; in reaction to the Zacarias Moussaoui case, Congress created the so-called ``lone wolf'' provision; after 9/11, we extended the emergency period from 24 to 72 hours; and the list goes on and on. If additional changes need to be made to FISA, this Senator stands ready and willing to engage in that exercise. The alternative is the course on which the President has embarked, directly contravening a specific statute and relying on a dangerously expansive view of his Commander in Chief authority--a view that would potentially expose thousands of Americans who make a phone call abroad to surveillance of this sort. This is a course that we tried to avoid when we drafted the FISA Act in the first place. As I said in 1978 when FISA was originally passed, ``it is not necessary to compromise civil liberties in the name of national security.'' I hope the lessons from 1978 and the real story about what FISA allows can inform the debate going on today. This debate is just beginning. Congress must stand up to this Presidential overreaching, examine what occurred, and provide corrective action. Senator Specter, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, has promised to hold hearings on this matter. I commend him for that. But we will need the full cooperation of the Executive in this undertaking, and the administration can start by coming clean with the full legal reasoning for the President's domestic spying program. There will be much more to say--and learn--in the second session of the 109th Congress. The executive branch's program must be subjected to close scrutiny by this Congress to ensure that in pursuit of terrorists or suspected terrorists, we are not sacrificing essential freedoms that we hold dear.", u"Mr. President, yesterday, March 11, 2004, was a solemn day. Two and a half years ago to the day, 19 terrorists hijacked four airliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in rural Pennsylvania. It is fitting that we pause today to remember the nearly 3,000 innocent people who lost their lives that day. It is also fitting that we take a moment to remember the responsibilities that we undertook in the aftermath of those horrible events. We in public office undertook a particularly important obligation, as we vowed to take action to prevent terrorist attacks of that magnitude from happening again. In his speech delivered before a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush put it this way: ``Americans are asking, How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command--every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war--to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network. Unfortunately, we have not met that commitment. We now know that the terrorist attacks of September 11 were the result of a sophisticated plot that developed over many months and required coordination among a number of individuals. If our national intelligence agencies had been better organized and more focused on the problem of international terrorism, this tragedy would have been avoided. Incredibly, it is now 30 months later, and the basic problems in our national intelligence community that contributed to our vulnerability on 9/11 have not yet been seriously considered, much less resolved. These problems are not a mystery, they are known weaknesses that simply have yet to be fixed. If we in the Congress do not take action to remedy these weaknesses, we will not be able to avoid accountability for the next attack. A series of independent commissions and the Joint Inquiry conducted by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees in 2002 have identified a variety of issues that we must address. They fall into four categories: One, setting priority targets for intelligence collection and analysis. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet declared war on al-Qaida in 1998, but few in the CIA--and almost no one in the other agencies that make up our Intelligence Community--responded to his clarion call. Our national intelligence agencies continued to focus on states, such as Russia, China, Iran and Iraq. Despite Mr. Tenet's call for action, Osama bin Laden al-Qaida was not even near the top of our intelligence priority list on September 11, 2001. It was not until September 12 that they moved to the top of the list. Part of the problem was that our intelligence community had no formal process for regularly reviewing and updating intelligence priorities to ensure that they accurately reflected the current security environment. Furthermore, it does not appear that the heads of other intelligence agencies looked to the Director of Central Intelligence for leadership and priority-setting. Even though George Tenet may have realized that non-state actors like al-Qaida needed more attention, the importance of these groups was not clear to other members of the intelligence community. The head of the National Security Agency, our Nation's electronic eavesdropping agency, was asked if he knew about Mr. Tenet's declaration of war with al-Qaida. The director of the NSA said that yes, he was aware of Mr. Tenet's statement, but he did not think it applied to him or his organization. Two, providing strong new leadership for the intelligence community. Examples like this make it clear that we need to provide strong new leadership for the intelligence community.9/11 exposed historic tensions within the Intelligence Community, and between intelligence agencies and law enforcement. We need to empower a Cabinet-level official with the authority to end bureaucratic in-fighting and competition for resources, as well as ensuring the sharing of information among all of those charged with protecting our homeland security--including first responders at the State and local level. In many ways, our national intelligence community has resembled, and still resembles, a collection of independently operating actors, rather than a unified team that works together on counterterrorism and other missions. Before 9/11, there were a number of barriers that prevented information from being shared among various agencies, and while many formal barriers have been removed, many informal ones remain in place. Our joint, bipartisan congressional inquiry revealed that in the months before the September 11 attacks, our national intelligence agencies collected pieces of information that, taken as a whole, could have been used to disrupt al-Qaida's hijacking plot. Unforunately, this information was not shared with all of the right people, and helpful actions were not taken. The CIA was aware that two terrorists associated with al-Qaida had obtained visas for travel to the United States, but it did not share this information with border protection agencies, or with the FBI, which could have kept an eye on these men once they were in the country. The FBI was aware that a man arrested in Minnesota might have been planning a suicide hijacking, but it did not share this information with the Federal Aviation Administration, which could have increased security precautions on domestic flights. Better information sharing between the FBI and CIA, as well as other intelligence agencies, could have increased the intelligence community's overall awareness of terrorist activities. And better information sharing between the intelligence community and all the various agencies who contribute to our homeland security could have helped these agencies move to an appropriate level of alertness. We have an obligation to make sure that better information sharing takes place, and the consequences of failure could be very high. Three, setting priorities for limited resources. A Cabinet-level official with authority over intelligence could also set priorities for limited intelligence resources. The Intelligence Community did not adapt quickly enough after the end of the Cold War, during which we had come to rely more on satellites than on human assets--spies. There was no collective sense of importance within the Intelligence Community, including the Department of Defense, and as a result, investments in research and development--which were once a priority--suffered slippage. Nearly all intelligence agencies faced significant staff shortages prior to 9/11, and this had a serious impact on their effectiveness. At the Central Intelligence Agency, for example, many critical counterterrorism personnel were required to work long hours without relief. This obviously made these personnel less effective, and had a very negative effect on their morale. Other intelligence agencies, such as the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, faced similar staffing problems. In particular, these agencies lacked sufficient numbers of analysts and language specialists to support agents working in the field. When agency directors tried to create solutions to these personnel problems, they were often unable to implement them. The lack of clear counterterrorism priorities made it difficult for managers to reassign personnel from other areas. Moving money was almost as difficult as moving people, since intelligence community managers have limited budget authority. Incredibly, these problems are still with us today. While all of our intelligence agencies have increased in hiring and training of counterterrorism personnel, many of them continue to face resource and personnel problems. Even relatively small shifts of resources still must go through a lengthy approval process, and it is not always possible to assign enough people to important areas. Prior to 2001, many CIA officials knew that more agents were needed in Afghanistan, but they were unable to move resources away from other priorities. By giving our intelligence agencies more budget flexibility, we can empower them to address problems further in advance, and begin thinking about solutions, instead of waiting for a crisis to occur before taking any action. Long term planning is also constrained by the process we use for funding our intelligence agencies. Instead of providing them with a sustained, stable source of funding, we insist on giving them relatively small budget allocations, and then increasing this through the use of supplemental appropriations bills. Counterterrorism programs have relied heavily on these supplemental appropriations for several years, and this continues today in spite of repeated claims that we have increased our focus on counterterrorism. If we wish to get the most out of our investment in counterterrorism, we must make it possible for Intelligence Community directors and managers to engage in long term planning, rather than simply jumping from one crisis to the next. Of course, increased flexibility must be accompanied by increased oversight. As hard as it is for most Americans to believe, the Intelligence Community has only a vague idea of how much money it spends on counterterrorism. Most agencies do not regularly examine how much they spend on counterterrorism, and those that do use inconsistent accounting methods--and often base their data on rough estimates. If we do not know how much we are spending on counterterrorism priorities, it will obviously be very hard for us to see if our investment is being spent wisely. A cost-benefit analysis from an independent agency would be very helpful in this regard, but so far there have been no serious efforts to undertake such an effort. Four, establishing a competent domestic counterterrorism capability. Finally, we must begin establishing a competent domestic counterterrorism capability. The FBI has looked at its intelligence-gathering role through the prism of a law-enforcement agency. If asked how many suspected terrorists or terrorist sympathizers are estimated to live in any given major American city, the FBI would respond with the number of open investigative files its field office had there. Americans have to decide what we expect of our domestic intelligence-gathering capability--and how much intrusion into our personal lives we are willing to accept. Then we must make a choice: Can we accomplish our goal with an agency that has a mixed law-enforcement and intelligence-gathering mission, or should we create a separate domestic intelligence-gathering unit such as Great Britain's MI5? For the immediate future, our national security interests are best served by acting to make the FBI as effective as it can be. However, we must also consider our other options and decide if we can do better. The FBI continues to perform its intelligence mission in a commendable fashion, but detecting and disrupting terrorist plots before they can be executed requires a very different approach than apprehending perpetrators of crimes that have already taken place. If we look around the world, we can see that there are many different models for domestic intelligence gathering, and many different models for domestic law enforcement. Here in America we must decide what sort of institution best fit our needs and circumstances, and as these circumstances change, we should not be afraid to make our institutions change as well. This must first begin with a debate over the best possible structure for our domestic intelligence and law enforcement programs. I am sorry to say this debate has not yet taken place. The problems that I have discussed today need to be fixed as soon as possible. Ignoring them will not make them go away. Old habits, differences in agency culture, and bureaucratic inertia are not acceptable excuses for procrastination and delay. If we do not address them quickly and effectively, we will be blind to emerging threats, and we will leave ourselves vulnerable to future attacks. On the other hand, if we can repair these weaknesses then we can give the hard-working men and women of our Intelligence Community the tools they need to help prevent such attacks from taking place. As we reflect on the horrific events that stunned our Nation two and a half years ago, and pay tribute to those who lost their lives, we must recommit ourselves to our responsibility to do everything we can to prevent such events from happening again. If there is another terrorist attack in our country, the American people will look to their elected leaders and ask us what we learned from September 11, and how that information was used to protect them. We must be able to tell both those who lived--and those who died--that we did everything we could.", u"Madam President, on September 12, 2001, I came to the floor of the Senate to suggest to my colleagues that the magnitude of what had happened to the United States of America in the terrorist attack required an independent analysis and establishment of a national commission of inquiry. I am proud to have led this effort, but it was not either my creation or principally my idea. In New Jersey, a week after the terror of September 11, I began to hear from the widows and the families--simple Americans who believe in their country, pay their taxes, and felt secure behind our borders, recognizing that the United States is the most awesome military power ever assembled on the face of the earth. Intelligence and law enforcement services are larger here than in every other nation combined. Just 24 hours before, 19 men with $250,000 had delivered the most devastating attack on these United States in our history. Their inquiry of me as their Senator was simply: What do we tell our children? What are we to believe about our country and our Government that we were unable to defend our most vulnerable citizens; that thousands had been left dead and thousands were orphaned and lives will never be the same again? I did not have any answers to their questions, so I brought their questions to my colleagues. It has been a long struggle to bring this commission to this point. I am more grateful than I can explain that Senator Lieberman and Senator McCain have taken this effort to the point of legislation and possible adoption. No one seeks to cast blame. No one seeks to unfairly lay responsibility upon those who may not deserve it. But something is wrong--370 days have passed, after thousands of lives were lost in a complete and total breakdown of the security of the United States of America, and I am unaware that one individual has been transferred, demoted, held responsible, fired, noted, or criticized. It cannot be that the security of the United States was breached, thousands of lives were lost, and every agency performed perfectly, everybody did their job, all 1 million Federal employees performed as expected. Madam President, I cannot give that explanation to the hundreds of widows or orphans and parents and brothers and sisters in the State of New Jersey who have survived and dealt with the unimaginable. I do not simply hope that this commission is adopted, but that, on a bipartisan basis, Members of this Senate send an unequivocal message that this Government is accountable, its agencies are accountable, and the American people will get answers. It is not that I have come to the floor with a suggestion that is somehow a compromise with our tradition or unusual in our practice. This commission will respond, exactly as every other generation of Americans has responded in every other crisis of similar or lesser proportions. This Congress demanded an answer from a commission about the reasons of the causes of the Civil War. They were still collecting bodies in the North Atlantic and this Senate went to New York and met in midtown Manhattan to get answers for how the Titanic could have sunk. The Depression was still ongoing when we demanded a commission for its reasons. And 11 days after Pearl Harbor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, before the U.S. even counterattacked, wanted the American people to know how their Armed Forces had let them down. He would not allow American sons and daughters to die in a war until their parents knew what happened to our military, our preparedness, so their parents would know that their lives were in good hands. Lyndon Johnson did no less after the Kennedy assassination, and President Reagan did no less after the Challenger accident. None of these reports were perfect. It was always a painful experience. None of us ever want to admit that anyone in our Government, anyone in the service of our country did not perform perfectly. The truth is that terrible things happen even when people do perform well, and that may be the conclusion of this commission, as it has been with others. I don't know. But the truth is, no Member of the Senate knows either. Unless this commission is established, we will never know. The simple truth is the Senate might reject this commission, the President may fail to sign it, or the House of Representatives may fail to adopt it. But that does not mean that there will not be a commission. Sometimes justice is so overwhelming, a cause so obvious and powerful that you can delay it, but you cannot stop it. Defeat this commission today and it will be voted on next year or the next year--even if it is 10 years, even if it is 20 years. No event of this magnitude can happen in a country, inflicting this much pain, this much change in a society, without the accountability of its Government. Either the widows and the widowers and the parents of these victims will get this commission or their children will. Either the Members of the Senate will establish this commission or our successors will. But make no mistake about it, there will be answers. Something very wrong happened. Somebody has to provide answers. First, we were told that a commission was impossible because it would interfere with the war in Afghanistan. What an extraordinary notion: A nation with a $2 trillion budget, a quarter of a billion people, a million men under arms and confronting al-Qaida in Afghanistan prohibited us from using resources or personnel to conduct an investigation--an extraordinary notion, considering that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was willing to undertake an investigation while fighting the Germans and the Japanese with sufficient resources. Then we were told this was better done in the Intelligence Committee--possibly a good explanation if the only issues of failures were in the intelligence community. What about immigration? How about the FAA? How about law enforcement? How about the coordination of policies to save the lives of those firefighters or police officers? How about 100 other Government agencies? This may be a CIA issue, but it is not only a CIA issue. Still the belief was this could be done in the Intelligence Committee. Only now the bipartisan leadership of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Shelby and Senator Graham, report to us that they cannot get cooperation from the necessary Government agencies to even conduct their limited review in this narrow focus. How dare they. How dare anyone withhold information or cooperation from this Senate or the families of the victims who have demanded answers? How dare anyone. Are there those in this Government who believe their principal loyalty is to their agency, the reputation of their bureau, someone in the bureaucracy rather than the people of the United States of America? Does it mean so much to be an agent of the CIA, an employee of the FBI, or the National Security Agency? Is that so important that you would withhold information from the American people in a search for justice for the United States of America? I have served in institutions, and I believe in institutional loyalty, but that means nothing compared to loyalty to the United States of America. Yet we have the spectacle of the bipartisan leadership of our Intelligence Committee claiming they cannot get cooperation from the bureaucracy itself. There are issues so large in this debate that they can only be settled by an overwhelming vote for this commission. It is about the accountability of the Government itself to the people. It is about many things, but most fundamentally it is that: Can the people of the country hold their Government and its agencies accountable? I do not know. For one of the first times in my life, I am not sure the bureaucracy or its components in the intelligence or law enforcement agencies genuinely can be monitored and controlled by the Congress of the United States. But we are going to find out because that is what this commission is about, more than anything else. One year has passed. Billions of dollars have now been appropriated to deal with terrorism and homeland security. The Congress has been asked for the most sweeping reorganization of the Government in American history. There is not a Member of this Senate who in good conscience either cast these votes or can cast votes in the future without knowing the results of this inquiry. Spend $10 billion, $20 billion, $30 billion. On what basis is the money spent? Is there a Member of the Senate who knows which agencies failed, which should be improved, which should be expanded, which should be curtailed, what new activities would make a difference? What is the sum of our knowledge of what happened on September 11? I do not know. More importantly, neither do the other 99 Members of the Senate, and they will never know until we know what happened, why, who failed and who succeeded, who met their responsibilities, and who did not. Does this reorganization, the underlying legislation before the Senate, make sense for the country? Mr. President, I am going to be asked to vote upon that issue and, in good conscience, I cannot tell you. On what basis is this reorganization done? Because we have learned which agencies did not perform? It is no different than the financial recommendations. There is not a Member of the Senate who knows which agencies were not in control, which were, which met their responsibilities, how a chain of command might have been different. Some day we will know but not without this commission. What we are learning about the failures of intelligence and law enforcement since September 11 is shocking. Naming a national commission dealing with the realities of what happened is going to be a painful national experience. We now know that the CIA had advised the FBI of the names of a hundred terrorists and to watch for their entry into the United States. They failed. We now know as early as 1998 intelligence agencies received information about Bin Laden planning an attack involving aircraft in New York and Washington. We now know, as late as July 2001, the National Security Agency reported 33 communications involving a possible and imminent terrorist attack. We now know the U.S. Government was put on notice by foreign intelligence agencies and our own of the possibility of such attack. This will be a painful national experience--painful for the country, painful for the families. But this problem is not going away. Time will not heal it. The distance between ourselves and the events will not lessen the intensity of the need or the demand for the inquiry. I want nothing but the truth for the families, the communities in my State of New Jersey which have suffered so badly, and mostly for my country. The U.S. Government failed our people. It does not mean that we are not a good people or that this is not a great Government, but good and great governments learn by experiences and their failures. We can be a better country better able to protect our people with a more accountable Government, with intelligence and law enforcement agencies that understand their responsibilities and their needs based on this process. It will be a painful process of growth, but it will happen. We will learn how it is that the FBI, given all these warnings, could not have had people who were possibly trained in Arabic translation, how piles of documents may have accumulated having never been analyzed. We will learn how information about flight schools and the possible warnings of the ill intent of its students never came to proper attention. We will learn how over the course of years a conspiracy was built, signals were received, but we were unable to see the dimensions of a plot that would so change our country. Put aside your loyalties to institutions. Put aside your commitment to individuals. This is not about the bureaucracy. We have passed the point of being able to preserve the reputations of agencies that failed our country. It is no longer about them. It is about the accountability of the United States Government. Whoever is found at fault, whoever is found to have performed their duties, it is time to face the truth. This is the issue that will never go away. This is the one part of the Government, the formation of an independent commission on September 11, 2001, that will happen no matter what we do, no matter how we vote, or whatever is said. It is as inevitable as tomorrow morning's sunrise because the cause is so powerful, so just and so necessary. Give those few widows, parents, and children the one thing they have been demanding. Writing them checks will not change it. Laying wreaths will not change it. Prayers will not change it. They are asking for an answer. They want an answer, and so do other Americans. And I intend to get it for them. I intend to get that answer. I hope it is today. I yield the floor.", u"Madam President, I have sought recognition to comment on the bill generally, and to discuss three amendments which I have filed. I believe it is vitally important that the Senate conclude action on homeland security at the earliest possible date. And I believe, regrettably, but importantly, that we should accept the bill which was passed by the House of Representatives because if we do not, we will not have a bill this year. The House has passed a homeland security bill and has given notice that it intends to depart. This has left the Senate with the choice of take it or leave it. I believe that the national interest and the public welfare requires that we take it, even though I believe we would have a much better bill if it were to be amended in certain respects. I have filed three amendments which I think would vastly improve the House bill. If these amendments are offered and accepted, then there will have to be a conference. The prospects for having a conference, with the House of Representatives having departed, is remote, and the likelihood of passing this bill this year would be virtually nonexistent. It is with reluctance that I say these amendments will not be offered, but these are amendments which I intend to pursue next year. In coming to this conclusion not to offer these amendments, I have done so at the request of President Bush who is very anxious that this legislation be enacted and sent to his desk so that the country may proceed to reorganize the Government to provide for homeland security. Earlier today, I talked to President Bush, I talked to Vice President Cheney, and I talked to Governor Ridge about these three amendments. The President urged me not to offer these amendments so that this legislation could be passed. The President stated that he would be willing to sit down and discuss the concerns I have and the amendments I have proposed, with a view to possible action on them next year. He is obviously not committing to accept these amendments until he has had a chance to review them, but did say there would be full review by the President. The President said that. And the Vice President also said he would review the matters. I talked at length to Governor Ridge, to whom I have talked on many occasions. These are amendments which I have had an opportunity to discuss with the President in the past, in meetings in the White House. As soon as the homeland security bill was introduced, he brought in a number of Members who were interested. I have had a chance to discuss the amendments with him at several leadership meetings, and when he traveled to Pennsylvania recently to campaign, I had a chance to discuss the matter with him. One of the amendments I have filed, denominated amendment No. 4920, provides that the Secretary of Homeland Defense, subject to the disapproval of the President, would have the authority to direct the agencies to provide intelligence information, analysis of intelligence information, and such other intelligence-related information as the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis determines necessary. This language is important because it would empower the Secretary of Homeland Defense to ``direct.'' That is very different from asking. My experience as chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the 104th Congress convinced me about the turf battles which go on among the various intelligence agencies. Those turf battles are endemic and epidemic. In chairing the Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Department of Justice Oversight, I have seen the same turf battles going on in the FBI and know of the turf battles which have gone on in other intelligence agencies. I believe that had all of the dots been put on a big screen prior to September 11 of 2001, 9/11 could have been prevented. We knew the FBI had an extensive report coming out of Phoenix about a suspicious individual taking flight training. The man had a big picture of Osama bin Laden in his apartment. That FBI memorandum was buried, and never reached appropriate personnel at headquarters. We know the Central Intelligence Agency had information on two al-Qaida men in Kuala Lumpur. That information was not transmitted to the FBI or the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Those al-Qaida terrorists got into the United States and piloted one of the suicide bombers on 9/11. We know the computer of Zacharias Moussaoui had a tremendous amount of useful information in his possession which was not obtained because the FBI did not use the proper standard applying for a search warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. We know that a Pakistani al-Qaida member by the name of Murad had stated in 1995 that al-Qaida planned to have airplanes loaded with explosives fly into the CIA. We know the National Security Agency had a warning on September 10, 2001, about something to happen the next day, and it was not translated until September 12. I believe there was a veritable blueprint, had all of these dots been on the same screen and put together. When FBI Director Mueller came to testify before the Judiciary Committee in early June of this year and was questioned about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and I saw the entire picture, I stated at that hearing that I thought there was a veritable blueprint. I do not agree with CIA Director George Tenet that another 9/11 is imminent. The CIA Director testified to that at a public hearing before the Intelligence Committee a few weeks ago. Perhaps it is an effort to inoculate the CIA so that if there is an attack, somebody can say: Well, after all, we are not surprised. But I do not believe in the defeatist attitude that we have to sustain another attack. I believe our intelligence services are capable, if they are under one unified direction and they have one screen and put all of the dots on one board, that we have an excellent chance of preventing another September 11. While it is important to have antidotes for anthrax and to deal with smallpox and to deal with the problems of bacteriological warfare or chemical warfare, that if we are attacked, most of the damage will already have occurred. So a very sharp focus of our attention should be to prevent another 9/11. To accomplish that, I believe the current bill is not the best of the bills. It does bring all of the analysis agencies under one umbrella, but it does not give the Secretary of Homeland Defense the authority to direct them. If the Secretary of Homeland Defense does not have the authority to direct the head of the CIA or to direct the head of the FBI or to direct the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency or to direct the head of the National Security Agency or the other intelligence agencies, then we are likely to have the same old turf battles which we have had up until now. That is why I believe this amendment, which I had wanted to offer and have discussed on this floor on many occasions, would vastly improve this bill. But we all know that the better is often the enemy of the good. I believe it is of sufficient importance to move this bill ahead now that I am prepared to wait until next year and to accept the offer the President has made--and the Vice President and Governor Ridge--to sit down and go over the concerns I have expressed and these amendments, if we can get administration support on these amendments. There has been enormous controversy on the issue of labor-management relations. This was the subject of extensive debate when this bill was on the floor from September 3 until October 4. This Senator engaged in extensive discussions with Senator Lieberman, the manager of the bill for the Democrats, and Senator Thompson, the manager of the bill for the Republicans, as to what the Nelson-Chafee-Breaux amendment meant. That amendment had incorporated the essence of what Representative Connie Morella had put in with two paragraphs, and the issue was whether or not those two paragraphs were in place of, or in addition to, the paragraphs of existing law. The paragraphs of existing law, under section 7103 of title 5, provide that there can be a national security waiver of collective bargaining, that the President can make a determination to deny collective bargaining coverage for national security reasons. When the colloquy was entered into with the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, he agreed that the two paragraphs of the Nelson amendment were in addition to and not in place of existing law, and these two additional paragraphs made it a little more difficult for the President to exercise the national security waiver; but still the national security waiver could have been exercised and there could have been harmony with the employees had that change been made. Then, with respect to the provisions for personnel flexibility, the amendment I have submitted as No. 4921 would have taken the format for denying collective bargaining coverage with the national security determination and added the additional two paragraphs which, again, would have provided for harmony, meeting the concerns that had been expressed by governmental employees. It is my hope that we will yet have an opportunity next year, in consultation with the President, the Vice President, and Governor Ridge, to have consideration of this amendment and have the law changed next year. In addition, I have filed amendment No. 4936, which contains provisions for a Presidential override but has, as a compensating factor, provisions for the utilization of the Federal Services Impasse Panel, and that again would bring harmony with the concerns and objections that have been raised by Federal employees. So, in essence, what I am proposing to do is not to offer these amendments, Nos. 4920, 4921, and 4936; but I do believe they are important amendments, and I intend to press them in the 108th Congress. To repeat, I have discussed these issues directly with the President, who asked that I not put these amendments forward in the interest of expediting passage of this bill and avoiding a possibility of having a Senate bill different from the House bill, which would then require a conference and, most probably, preclude the enactment of legislation on homeland security this year. There will be a number of amendments offered. There are already amendments that are pending, and some of them, frankly, I agree with. But I believe that the better is the enemy of the good here, and it is very much in the national interest for national security that this Senate move ahead and pass a bill. I do not like the fact that the House enacts passage of a bill, sends it here, and then leaves town, which is just an example of legislative blackmail. But that is where we are. It is not an unusual occurrence. Although we had a full month to debate these issues and to vote on them, that never occurred, notwithstanding the fact that this Senator and others were on the floor. And I made these arguments about the necessity for a Secretary of Homeland Defense to have the authority to direct, and I made the arguments that when you added the two paragraphs of the so-called Morella amendment to the existing language, the President's national security waiver remained intact. At this point, that is all history. Now we are faced with the alternatives of either accepting the House bill and moving on and getting this Department established, so that we can make our maximum effort to protect the American people, or to offer amendments and try to get them passed and improve the bill, which will lead to the conclusion of no legislation this year. So, with great reluctance, I have acceded to the requests of the administration. I will not offer these amendments. I exhort and urge my colleagues not to change the bill, no matter how good their amendments may be, but to take this bill; and if there are matters that ought to be changed, let's work on them next year. Before we leave town--hopefully this week, but in any event not later than next week--let's put the legislation in a posture where it can be sent to the President, be signed and become law, to do our utmost to protect the American people and to secure our homeland from another terrorist attack. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise to pay tribute to notable accomplishments by Asian Pacific Americans as Asian Pacific American Heritage Month is commemorated here in the Nation's Capital and in other cities nationwide. The annual celebration of this month of meaningful observance stems back to 1978, and is now carried on under Public Law 102-450, which permanently designated the month of May upon finding that ``Asian and Pacific Americans have contributed significantly to the development of the arts, sciences, government, military, commerce, and education in the United States.'' Comprising nearly 10 million, or 3.7 percent of the U.S. population, Asian Pacific Americans rank among the highest in our educational institutions, hold high political office and log advances in entrepreneurship. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 1994, nearly 90 percent of Asian Pacific Islander men and 80 percent of Asian pacific Islander women aged 25 years and older had at least a high school diploma. In addition, an estimated 46 percent of men and 37 percent of women had at least a bachelor's degree. Median income of Asian and Pacific Islander households in 1995 was $40,614. Business ownership figures show that the number of businesses owned by Asian and Pacific Islanders increased 56 percent between 1987 and 1992, from 386,291 to 603,439. Asian Pacific American visibility in government is also on the rise. My State of Hawaii boasts the first Filipino-American Governor, Benjamin Cayetano. Chinese-American Gary Locke succeeded in his bid for Governor of Washington State in last year's elections. In addition, there are 23 State Senators in Colorado, Hawaii and Oregon, and 40 State Representatives in Arizona, California, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New York, and Washington State. The membership of this body includes five Asian Pacific Americans, as well as two in the Senate, Senators Daniel Akaka and Daniel Inouye. Of particular note are Asian Pacific Americans who, through singular dedication to the greatness of our Federal Government, have thrived and risen to positions of prominence in Federal departments and agencies. The following is a list of top-ranking Asian Pacific Americans in the 14 Federal Departments: Agriculture: Lon Hatamiya, Administrator of Agricultural Marketing Service, and Jeremy Wu, Deputy Director, Office of Civil Rights, Departmental Administration. Commerce: Hoyt Zia, Chief Counsel, Bureau of Export Administration. Defense: Fred Pang, Asst Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy. Education: Terry Dozier, Special Advisor to the Secretary (on teacher issues). Energy: Dr. Sun Chun, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, and Thomas T. Tamura, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Human Resources. Health & Human Services: Dennis Hayaski, Director, Office of Civil Rights. Housing & Urban Development: Robert Santos, Secretary's Representative in Seattle. Interior: Danny Aranza, Deputy Director, Office of Insular Affairs. Justice: Michael Yamaguchi, U.S. Attorney, Northern California, and Rose Ochi, Director of Community Relations Service. Labor: Donna Onodera, Regional Director, Workers' Compensation Division. State: William H. Itoh, Ambassador to Thailand. Transportation: Dharmendra K. Sharma (Mr.), Administrator, Research & Special Programs Administration. Treasury: Valerie Lau, Inspector General. Veterans' Affairs: H. David Burge, Jr., Director, National Ctr for Veterans Analysis and Statistics. To acknowledge the achievements of Asian Pacific Americans in our Federal agencies, I requested a list of the 10 top-ranking Asian Pacific Americans in each agency, and these are the reported listings: U.S. Department of Commerce: Betty L. Barker, Deputy Director, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Tong S. Chung, Director, Advocacy Center, International Trade Administration; Gurmukh S. Gill, Director, Office of Business and Industrial Analysis; George Mu, Commercial Officer, Career Minister, U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service; Jin F. Ng, Deputy Group Director, Patent and Trademark Office; Sumiye Okubo, Director, Office of International Macroeconomic Analysis; Nancy L. Patton, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Asia and the Pacific; Potarazu K. Rao, Senior Scientist for Environmental Satellite, Data, & Information Service; Usha S. Varanasi, Science and Research Director, Northwest Region; and Hoyt H. Zia (top ranking), Chief Counsel, Bureau of Export Administration. Office of the Secretary of Defense: Frederick F.Y. Pang (top ranking), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy; Belkis W. Leong-Hong, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of Plans and Resources, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense of Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence; Austin K. Yamada, Director, Special Advisory Staff, Ofc of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Deputy for Policy Support; and Julita Aviles, Associate Director for Policy Division, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Defense Intelligence Agency: John K. Kiehm, Chief, Office of Logistics Services, Defense HUMINT Service DHM. Defense Special Weapons Agency: Joan M. Pierre, Director for Electronics & Systems. Department of Defense Education Activity: Vernon M. H. Chang, Associate Director for Management Services. National Security Agency: Ronald D. Lee, General Counsel, National Security Agency. Department of the Army: Lieutenant General Eric Ken Shinseki, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans; Brigadier General Edward Soriano, Director, Office of Personnel Management, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Dr. Jagdish Chandra, Director, Mathematical & Computer Sciences Division, U.S. Army Research Office; Kisuk Cheung, Chief of Military Engineering, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Military Programs Directorate; Dr. Bhupendra P. Doctor, Director, Division of Biochemistry; William K. Takakoshi, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army, Office of the Secretary of the Army; and Dr. Renu Virmani, Chairperson, Department of Cardiovascular Pathology, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. Department of the Navy: Dr. Kia Ling Ngai, Senior Theoretical Solid State Physicist, Naval Research Laboratory; and Dr. Bhakta B. Rath, Associate Director, Materials Science and Component Technology, Naval Research Laboratory. Department of the Air Force: Dr. C. I. Chang, Director of Aerospace & Materials Sciences, Air Force Office of Scientific Research; and Allen M. Murashige, Chief Scientist, Directorate of Command and Control; and Dr. Joseph H. Shang, Senior Scientist. Members of Education Department-related Commissions and Boards: Rajen Anand, National Committee on Foreign Medical Education & Accreditation; Paul Antony, National Committee on Foreign Medical Education & Accreditation; Jose Evangelista, National Committee on Foreign Medical Education & Accreditation; Kenji Hakuta, National Educational Research Policy & Priorities Board; Mitsugi Nakashima, National Assessment Governing Board; Lynne Waihee, National Institute for Literacy Advisory Board; and Grace Yuan, Civil Rights Reviewing Authority. Department Staff/Personnel: Therese Knecht Dozier (top ranking), Special Advisor to the Secretary (on teaching); Natarajan K. Gounder, Senior Computer Specialist; Dr. Edward K. Fujimoto, Deputy Director of Communications, Office of Public Affairs; Jeanette Lim, Senior Executive Service; M. Theresa San Agustin, Research Associate, Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services; Ricky Takai, Senior Executive Service; Melvin DeGuzman, Computer Specialist, Office of the Chief Financial Officer; Thomas Hibino, Equal Opportunity Specialist--Supervisor; Samuel Peng, Statistician; and Sharif Shakrani, Statistician. Political Appointees: Dennis W. Hayashi (top ranking) Director, Office for Civil Rights; Irene Bueno, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislation (Congressional Liaison); Deborah Chang, Director of Legislation, Health Care Financing Administration; Regina Lee, Deputy Director, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Administration for Children and Families; and Jennifer Chang, Acting Director of Intergovernmental Affairs, Administration for Children and Families. Career Senior Executive Service: Evelyn S. Ohki, Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health, Disease Prevention and Health Promotion; Kathleen A. Buto, Associate Administrator for Policy, Health Care Financing Administration; Eva T. Jun, Director, Office of Computer and Communication Services, Bureau of Data Management and Strategy, Health Care Financing Administration; Lillian T. Yin, Director, Division of Reproductive, Abdominal, Ear, Nose and Throat and Radiological Devices, Office of Device Evaluation, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and Drug Administration; and Philip S. Chen, Jr., Associate Director for Intramural Affairs, National Institutes of Health. US Department of Housing and Urban Development: Roberta Ando, Chief, Asset Management Branch; Thomas Azumbrado, Chief, Production Branch; John Chin, Supervisory Systems Accountant; Tzylai Chong, Special Project Officer; Min Li Chung, Systems Accountant; Virginia Der, Budget Analysis; Ronaldo Dizon, Supervisory Computer Specialist; Cornelio Galdones, Supervisory Computer Specialist; David Hashimoto, Supervisory Equal Opportunity Specialist; Carl Kao, Attorney Advisor General; Lily Lee, Housing Program Officer; Robert Leong, Attorney Advisor General; Patrick Liao, Director Single Family Division; Eliza Lo, Supervisory Contract Specialist; Lawrence Mcghee, Management Analysis; Satinder Munjal, General Engineer; Dung Nguyen, Executive Assistant; Nita Nigam, Budget Analysis; Jim Park, Executive Assistant; Sandra Pavolka, Supervisory Equal Opportunity Specialist; Alfredo Santos, Computer Specialist; Robert Santos (top ranking), Secretary's Representative in Seattle; Tsou Liang Tang, Structural Engineer; Bam Viloria, Supervisory Attorney Advisor General; and Pamela Walsh, Program Manager. US Department of Treasury: Valerie J. Lau (top ranked), Inspector General; Jacqueline J. Wong, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy); Harry T. Manaka, National Director, Collection Field Operations, Internal Revenue Service; Deborah Melody Chew Nolan, Deputy Assistant Commissioner (International), Internal Revenue Service; Helen H. Bolton, Special Assistant to the Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service; Robert D. Ahnee, District Director, Northern California District, Internal Revenue Service; Delora Ng Jee, Deputy Comptroller for Large Case Supervision, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; and James D. Kamihachi, Senior Deputy Comptroller, Economic and Policy Analysis, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Paul M. Igasaki, Vice Chairman; Sallie T. Hsieh, Director of Information Resources Management; Raj K. Gupta, General Attorney (Civil Rights); Mark Wong, Policy Analyst; Kenneth W. Chu, Supervisory Attorney Examiner (Civil Rights); Daniel K. Chang, Computer Scientist; John C. Chang, Supervisory Computer Specialist; Indu Kundra, Program Analyst; and Wallace Lew, Attorney Advisor (Civil Rights). US General Accounting Office: Judy A. England-Jospeh, Director of Housing and Community Development Issues; Thomas J. Schulz, San Francisco Regional Manager Designee; Kwai-Cheung Chan, Director of Special Studies and Evaluations; Allen Li, Associate Director of Defense Acquisition; and Helen H. Hsing, Director of Congressional Relations. US Office of Personnel Management: Dory E. Zamani, Supervisory Financial Management Specialist; Wesley H. Shimamura, Supervisory Personnel Management Specialist; Deborah A. Kendall, Special Assistant, Congressional Relations; Linda M. Watson, Personnel Staff Specialist; James J. Tsugawa, Personnel Management Specialist; Lina A. Savkar, Employee Development Specialist; Phong V. Ngo, Program Analyst; Teresa Chi Chao Yang Huang, Computer Systems Analyst; James Hong, Supervisory Personnel Staffing Specialist; Jeri T. Hara, Personnel Management Specialist; Jaime P. Espiritu, Computer Systems Analyst; May S. Eng, Statistician, Survey; Esterlita De Leon Cueto, Systems Accountant; Sherman M. Chin, Personnel Management Specialist; and Susai Anthony, Computer Programmer Analyst. Social Security Administration: Glennalee Donnelly, Senior Executive Service, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Office of Programs and Policy; Tina Sung, Senior Executive Service, On Assignment to the National Performance Review; Leslie S. Chin, Division Director, Office of Systems; Dinesh Kumar, Executive Assistant to the Associate Commission for Telecommunications and Systems Operations; Yuan Jye Liu, Supervisory Computer Specialist, Office of Hearings an Appeals; Donna Y. Mukogawa, Assistant Regional Commissioner for Processing Center Operations, Chicago, Illinois; Chih Yuan D. Wang, Computer Specialist, Office of the Commissioner; Seung H. An Actuary, Office of the Actuary; Lyman Goon, General Attorney, Office of the General Counsel; Gordon C. Gonzalez, Field Office Manager, Pasadena, Texas; Alan W. Heim, Field Office Manager, Anchorage, Alaska; Li Ming Koo, Senior Computer Systems Specialist, Office of Hearings and Appeals; Kenneth M. Lew, Supervisory Criminal Investigator, Office of the Inspector General; Jane Y. Lim, Field Office Manager, Parsippany, New Jersey; Sze Jui Lui, Medical Officer, Office of Human Resources; Martin W. Long, General Attorney, Office of the Regional Chief Counsel, Dallas; Maynard K. Malabey, Supervisory Management Analyst, Office of Operations; Thomas J. McCullough, Field Office Manager, Sarasota, Florida; Gloria L. Tong, Program Analyst, Office of the Commissioner; Yen T. Tra, Senior Computer Systems Specialist, Office of Hearings and Appeals; Jack H. Trudel, Supervisory Auditor, Office of the Inspector General, Richmond, California; Wanda H. Waldman, Field Office Manager, Santa Ana, California; Mitchi A. Weger. Field Office Manager, San Antonio, Texas; and Mark E. Young, Field Office Manager, Bremerton, Washington. US Agency for International Development: Kumar Krishna, Program Analyst; Carla Montemayor Royalty, Administrative Officer; Gloria Steele, Program Analyst Officer; Rodney S. Azama, International Trade Specialist; Paula Y. Bagasao, Senior Advisor; Dirk W. Dikjerman, Support Program Officer; and Kiertisak Toh, Foreign Affairs Officer. My warmest congratulations to all of these individuals, and other Asian Pacific American Federal employees not listed, for their labor and accomplishments. As Chair of the Congressional Asian Pacific Caucus, I am pleased to commend the Asian Pacific American community for all it has attained in the past year. We are a growing part of this diverse nation and will only continue to increase the number of successes we are able to celebrate. I would like to extend to all a happy Asian Pacific American Heritage Month.", u"Madam President, consider these ominous words: To the loved ones of the victims who are here in this room . . . to those who are watching on television, your government failed you. Those who you entrusted with protecting you failed you. And I failed you. We tried hard, but that doesn't matter, because we failed. Those are not my words. They contain a sentiment I hope none of us ever has to convey to the American people. Those are the words of Richard Clarke, the senior White House official who was in charge of counterterrorism efforts in the previous administration when the September 11 terrorist attacks occurred. Mr. Clarke's testimony before the 9/11 Commission was apologetic, remorseful and tragic because he knew, he knew like no one else, our government had failed, failed to act on repeated warnings. This failure led to 9/11 and the largest loss of life on American soil at the hands of a foreign enemy since December 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor. Today, the national alarm security bells are ringing once again. This time, however, the enemy is not in a terrorist training camp learning how to make an explosive device or commandeer an aircraft. The enemy is not trying to sneak its way into the United States. The enemy we face does not need to hijack an airplane in order to wreck the American economy and to cause widespread loss of life. The only tool this enemy needs is a computer and access to the Internet. The threat our Nation faces from a cyber attack will soon equal or surpass the threat from any terrorism that has consumed our attention so much since September 11. That is not my assessment. That is the assessment of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert Mueller. In fact, he is not alone. There is an overwhelming bipartisan consensus among officials in the intelligence, defense, and national security community that America is incredibly vulnerable to a cyber attack that can be launched at any moment from anywhere in the world. Michael Hayden, the former Director of the National Security Agency, Michael Chertoff, the former Secretary of Homeland Security who served under President George W. Bush, agreed. They and many other officials have joined the current Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, the current Director of the National Security Agency, GEN Keith Alexander, and others in warnings as follows: The cyber threat is imminent to America. It poses as serious a challenge to our national security as the introduction of nuclear weapons in the global debate 60 years ago. The experts are sounding the alarm, telling us to take action now to prevent a catastrophic cyber attack that could cripple our Nation's economy, cause widespread loss of life, sadly send our economy into free fall. When the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 comes up for a vote, the Senate will have an opportunity to take action on this critical bill that will enhance our national security. In light of these warnings from the experts, the least we can do in the Senate is to vote to open the debate on this critically important bill. I wish to thank its sponsors: Senator Lieberman, the chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Collins, the ranking member, Senator Feinstein of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Rockefeller on the Commerce Committee. They have put a lot of time and effort into this important piece of legislation. They have worked together on a bipartisan basis. They have listened to a wide range of comments, including a few I have offered, and I am pleased the revised Cybersecurity Act of 2012 incorporates many suggestions. It will help make America safe by enhancing our Nation's ability to prevent, mitigate, and rapidly respond to cyber attacks. The bill contains important provisions for securing our Nation's critical infrastructure. Every day, without thinking about it, we rely on powerplants, pipelines, electric power grids, water treatment facilities, transportation systems, and financial networks to work, to live, to travel, to do so many things we take for granted. All those critical systems are increasingly vulnerable to cyber attack from our enemies. Last year, there was a 400-percent increase in cyber attacks reported by the owners of critical infrastructure, according to the Department of Homeland Security. That increase does not even account for the many attacks that went unreported. We do not think twice about it, but this infrastructure is the backbone of America's economy and our way of life. This bill has provisions that will help minimize our vulnerability and shore up our defenses. The bill also includes a new framework for voluntary information sharing so government agencies and private companies can improve their mutual understanding of cyber threats and vulnerabilities and develop good practices to keep us safe. I thought it was worth doing a few months ago to call together a dozen major corporations in Chicago and across Illinois that I thought, with the advice of some people who were experts, might be vulnerable to cyber attack. I asked those experts in a closed setting, outside the press, what Congress could do to help them secure their infrastructure at their business and networks from cyber attacks. The answer from each and every one of them was the same: We need to be able to share information on cyber threats with the government and other private entities. We need to receive information from them in order to know what they have done to effectively prevent and mitigate attacks. Estimates are that 85 percent of America's critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector. Since we depend so much on the private sector for our critical infrastructure, the lines of communication between government and the private sector must be open. If we share best practices, the result could be to make us a secure nation. Let me say as well, I have the highest regard for my friend and colleague Senator John McCain of Arizona. Senator McCain's life story is a story of patriotism and commitment to America. He understands the military far better than I ever will, having served and spent so many years working on the House Armed Services Committee. But I take exception to one of his statements earlier, at least what I consider to be the message of that statement, about how we have to be extremely careful in how we engage the private sector in keeping America safe from cyber attack. I believe we should be open, transparent, and we should be respectful of the important resources and capacity of the private sector. But I think back 70 years now to what happened in London, when there was a blitzkrieg, and the decision was made by the British Government to appeal to every business, every home, every family, every individual to turn out the lights, because if the lights were on, those bombers from Germany knew where the targets could be found. It was a national effort to protect a nation. Should it have been a voluntary effort? Should we have had a big town meeting and said: Some of you can leave your lights on if you like, if you think it might be an inconvenience. There comes a moment when it comes to national defense when we need to appeal to a higher level in protecting America. My experience has been that the private sector is right there. They are as anxious to protect this country as anyone. They are as anxious to protect individuals, families, even their own businesses. So this notion that somehow we are adversarial in protecting America with the private sector I do not think is the case. In fact, Senator Collins is here representing the other side of the aisle. I know it is not the case. She and I have worked together. I have been very respectful of the efforts she and Senator Lieberman put into rewriting the rules for our intelligence community. They did it in a thoughtful and balanced way. This bill does too. Are there amendments we might take? Of course. This is not perfect. No product of legislation is. But I have to say I believe the private sector will be our ally, our friend, our partner in making America safe. This should not be a fight to the finish as to whether it is government or the private sector which will prevail. Ultimately, America has to prevail. Let me say a word about one part of this bill that I played a small role in addressing. Even through the threat in cyberspace is new and emerging, it calls to the forefront a familiar attention which we witnessed in Washington; on the one hand a mutually shared goal of protecting our country, on the other hand an important obligation to safeguard constitutionally protected rights to privacy and civil liberties. It is this tension that led us to a conversation about some provisions and trying to find the right balance. The Cybersecurity Act of 2012 is not perfect, but it effectively strikes that balance between national security and individual liberty. The bill will enhance our national security and still do it in a way that is far superior to some of the alternatives that will be offered on the floor. CISPA, the cybersecurity act that was passed by the House of We joined together with some colleagues: Senators Coons, Blumenthal, Sanders, and Akaka. We asked the sponsors of the legislation to work with us and they did. The revised bill now requires that the government cybersecurity exchange, to which private companies can send threat indicators, must be operated by civilian agencies. I think that is smart. The cybersecurity threat indicator could be a sensitive, personal communication, such as an e-mail from a spouse or private message on a social media site. As a result of our efforts, no longer can personal communications be indiscriminately sent directly to the NSA or CIA. The people who work at these agencies are fine, dedicated public servants, but these agencies are often shrouded in secrecy. I learned that as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. To have the appropriate oversight, we ask that the first line of review be with a civilian agency subject to congressional oversight. This does not mean our intelligence and defense agencies will never be able to apply their experience and expertise to analyze and mitigate cyber threats. They should not be the first recipients, but the bill requires--and I think it is entirely appropriate--relevant cyber threat information can be shared by these agencies in real time. Waste no time doing it. Send it to the agencies if there is any perceived threat to America's security. The revised bill no longer provides immunity for companies that violate the privacy rights of Americans in a knowing, intentional, or grossly negligent way--not simple negligence but things that go over that line dramatically. I can support providing immunity for companies to share cybersecurity threats with the government, as long as they take adequate precautions and follow commonsense rules established in the bill. The revised bill enables law enforcement entities to receive information about cyber crimes from cybersecurity exchanges without first going to court to obtain a warrant. To ensure these exchanges are not used to circumvent the Constitution and they do not create a perpetual warrantless wiretap, the bill requires law enforcement to only use information from the exchanges to stop cyber crimes, prevent imminent death or bodily harm to adults or prevent exploitation of minors. The revised bill now requires that the rules for how the government will use and protect the private information it receives must be in place before companies begin sending information to the new cybersecurity exchanges. That makes sense. To be sure that government agencies follow the rules for using and protecting private information, the revised bill gives individuals the authority to hold the government accountable for privacy violations. To ensure transparency and accountability, the revised bill requires recurring, independent oversight by the inspector general and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. These are commonsense reforms. Senator Lieberman spoke to the Democratic Senate caucus luncheon the other day and addressed these directly. He said he took these changes to those who were in charge of our cybersecurity and said to them: Give me an honest, candid assessment. If you think this ties our hands in protecting America, tell me right now. They reviewed them carefully, debated them, and came back and said: No, these are things we can live with and work with. That is the kind of approval we are looking for from those who have this awesome responsibility. So as a result, this bill will have my support, because I think it keeps America safe from a threat which many Americans don't even know about but could literally take or change our lives in a heartbeat. It also has the support of many progressive groups from the left and center and right. It is an indication to me we have struck the right balance. I thank those who helped us reach this point. As with any piece of substantial legislation, there is going to be disagreement. Senator McCain expressed some areas of concern. That is what debate and amendments are all about. Let's move this bill forward this afternoon. Let's entertain relevant, germane amendments. Let's take this as seriously as the threat is serious to the United States. That, to me, is the right way to go. Again, I thank Senator Collins personally and all the others who made this bill a reality in bringing it to the floor for our consideration. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. Chair, I rise to describe the intent of Congress with regard to H. AMDT. 124 to H.R. 2217, the ``Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2014''. My amendment reads as follows: ``None of the funds made available by this Act may be used in contravention of the First, Second, or Fourth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.'' The intent of Congress is to prohibit the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from contravening First, Second, or Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. Congress intends to prohibit DHS from cooperating with any public or private entity, organization, or agency of any kind to violate those constitutional rights, including, but not limited to, those agencies that are within the DHS structure: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Secret Service, Transportation Security Administration, Federal Protective Service; in addition, those agencies that are signatory partners of the National Response Plan: Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of the Interior, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, Department of State, Department of Transportation, Department of the Treasury, Department of Veterans Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Communications Commission, General Services Administration, National Aeronautic and Space Administration, National Transportation Safety Board, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management, Small Business Administration, Social Security Administration, Tennessee Valley Authority, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Postal Service, American Red Cross, Corporation for National and Community Service, and National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. In addition, Congress intends to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency in this non-exclusive list of prohibited agencies. Congress intends there be a cognizable informational privacy interest, derived from, but not limited to, the Fourth and First Amendments and Due Process rights, held by individuals in data that records, observes, catalogs and/or monitors persons' lawful acts, transactions, associations, beliefs and/or communications. Congress intends that racial, religious, gender, language, and national origin profiling be deemed unconstitutional. Congress intends that the collection of multiple individual points of data about a person, as well as the aggregation and storage of such data, creates an intimate mosaic about a person's actions and psychology of such a significantly intrusive nature as to violate fundamental privacy interests. The intent of this legislation is to prevent the Department of Homeland Security from collecting, storing, procuring, or using any information generated by a citizen of the United States while located in the United States, including telephone records, internet records, and physical location information, without probable cause of a terrorism or other criminal offense related to action or conduct by that citizen, or without the consent of that citizen. The intent of Congress is to protect the interest in informational privacy. This interest is especially significant where information and data collected by the government relates to First Amendment protected activities. The contravention of these rights and interests creates an injury of constitutional and other dimensions and also threatens the underpinnings of a constitutional democracy. The intent of Congress with this legislation is to place an absolute prohibition on any DHS involvement of any type or to any degree with any surveillance of Americans without specificity or without probable cause, such as the National Security Agency's recently revealed surveillance program. This prohibition includes any communication, cooperation, funding, assistance, or other association with another organization, agency, company, or other entity of any kind that has any involvement of any kind with such programs. The intent of Congress is for any private company engaged in surveillance or data collection on Americans, or serving in a role supportive of such efforts in any manner or to any degree, to be ineligible for any contracts or other payment from DHS. For example, due to its role in the NSA spying on Americans, Booz Allen Hamilton is ineligible. Congress intends to prohibit the ``Threat Management Division'' of the DHS, or any other department, office, or any other entity within DHS, from including reports on ``Peaceful Activist Demonstrations,'' or reports on any other constitutionally-protected speech activities. Congress recognizes that monitoring and documenting constitutionally protected speech activity by law enforcement and intelligence agencies including DHS result in a chilling effect on speech and a violation of fundamental privacy interests, and should be prohibited under all circumstances. The intent of Congress with this bill is to reinforce the nation's proud history of petition and protest, and Congress intends to encourage this essential form of democratic participation, by eliminating any surveillance or documentation of such legal activity by DHS or other law enforcement agencies. This prohibition is urgently needed, as redacted documents released pursuant to a FOIA request by the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund (PCJF) show that the DHS ``Threat Management Division'' directed Regional Intelligence Analysts to provide a ``Daily Intelligence Briefing'' which includes a category of reporting on ``Peaceful Activist Demonstrations,'' alongside their reports on ``Domestic Terrorist Activity.'' The documents also showed involvement of the DHS National Operations Center (NOC) in monitoring peaceful, lawful protest activities. The NOC is, according to the DHS, ``the primary national-level hub for domestic situational awareness, common operational pictures, information fusion, information sharing, communications, and coordination pertaining to the prevention of terrorist attacks and domestic incident management. The NOC is the primary conduit for the White House Situation Room and DHS Leadership for domestic situational awareness and facilitates information sharing and operational coordination with other federal, state, local, tribal, non-governmental operation centers and the private sector.'' DHS improperly and unconstitutionally conducted surveillance of peaceful, constitutionally-protected protests in cities that include, among others: Asheville, Atlanta, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Denver, El Paso, Fort Lauderdale, Houston, Jacksonville, Jersey City, Kansas City, Lansing, Lincoln, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, Niagara Falls, New York City, Oakland, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland, OR, and Salt Lake City, San Diego, Seattle, Tampa, Washington, D.C. The intent of Congress with the DHS appropriations bill is to prohibit the Department of Homeland Security from using the designation of an event as one of ``national significance'' or as a ``National Special Security Event'' (NSSE) to infringe on the constitutional right to protest peacefully and engage in nonviolent civil disobedience on the nearest publicly-owned, publicly-accessible, or private land (where the owner has not formally requested that protesters be removed) surrounding such an event. The intent of Congress with this legislation is strictly to prohibit the Department of Homeland Security, or any other agency or entity with which the DHS is directly or indirectly cooperating, including the Secret Service, or that DHS is directly or indirectly funding, from using an NSSE designation as a basis to require protesters to be in a location that is not within view of those individuals or entities that are the target of the public expression and efforts at redress, or to place persons inside a penned-in area or ``protest pit,'' as such a location deprives the people of the United States of their ability and right to communicate a message to their intended audience, and also deprives persons of their associational rights to interact with demonstrations and join them without obstruction. Further, it could contribute to a larger divide between the political and economic establishment and the general public that is antithetical to the proper functioning of a democratic system. Even if an event is not designated as an NSSE, the intent of Congress is for the principles expressed above to be applicable to any constitutionally-protected protest or other expressive activity. In the past, these events have included not only presidential inaugurations and meetings of foreign dignitaries, but also the Super Bowl, the funerals of Ronald Reagan and Gerald Ford, most State of the Union addresses and the 2008 Democratic and Republican National Conventions, among many other events not traditionally deemed to be requiring such a major precautionary designation. The intent of Congress is to mandate that the DHS be authorized only to conduct searches, including searches of electronics on citizen or non-citizen travelers entering or exiting the United States, under a reasonable suspicion standard articulated by courts under the Fourth Amendment. Congress also strongly intends to reject and condemn DHS assertions that ``intuition and hunch'' are a sufficient basis for its agents to conduct searches of electronics at U.S. borders or ports of entry. Congress specifically intends to reject a February 2013 DHS report concluding that ``imposing a requirement that officers have reasonable suspicion in order to conduct a border search of an electronic device would be operationally harmful without concomitant civil rights/civil liberties benefits.'' Congress intends to express its condemnation of any search that is the result of a mere ``intuition'' or ``hunch,'' of the 6,500 persons that DHS data indicate had their electronic devices searched along the U.S. border between 2008 and 2010. Furthermore, Congress finds that the use of ``intuition and hunch'' as a basis for searches is a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore that appropriated funds under this bill are prohibited from being used in this manner. With this bill, the intent of Congress is to demand the modernization of standards relating to Americans entering the U.S. with computers, thumb drives, smartphones, cameras and other electronic devices, as these devices hold vast amounts of information regarding owners about who they are and how they conduct business. Much of the law on searches along the border was established before these technological advances dramatically altered the amount of personal information one could be carrying on himself or herself as he or she enters the U.S., and Congress intends for this amendment to modernize these standards to reflect current realities and expectations of privacy. Until these standards are modernized, Congress intends for border enforcement to search these devices only upon a reasonable suspicion that the holder of such a device is directly and personally bearing evidence of terrorism or other criminal activity. The intent of Congress with this bill is to place an absolute prohibition on any DHS involvement related to all legally-protected activities of organized labor. This includes any communication, cooperation, funding, assistance, or other association with another organization for the purpose of targeting legally-protected union activity, or acting as a provider of surveillance and intelligence information to corporate entities that may be the target of lawful labor grievance and labor protest activity. Examples of what Congress has hereby prohibited can be seen in documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, which show that the DHS communicated with the Pentagon's Northern Command regarding November 2, 2011 port protests involving ILWU workers. Another document obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by the PCJF shows that the Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC), described by the federal government as ``a strategic partnership between the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and the private sector,'' discussed the protests at the West Coast ports to ``raise awareness concerning this type of criminal [sic] activity.'' The document contains a ``handling notice'' that the information is ``meant for use primarily within the corporate security community. Such messages shall not be released in either written or oral form to the media, the general public or other personnel . . .''", u"Mr. President, today I wish to recognize Michael Leiter, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center and a good friend of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This is Mike's last week and I want to thank him for his service and wish him the very best in the next steps in his career. Director Leiter has been at the National Counterterrorism Center, or NCTC, for most of its existence. He was the principal deputy director from February 2007 to November of that year when he became the acting director. President Bush nominated him to be the Director on March 31, 2008, and he was confirmed by the Senate on June 10, 2008. Mike has served in both the Bush and Obama administrations which speaks to his bipartisan and professional approach to the Nation's security, and the support that he has earned from the Congress and within the executive branch. His leadership at the NCTC has brought stability and continuity to our Nation's counterterrorism efforts, and he should take pride in the fact that under his tenure, there have been no successful attacks against the United States homeland by foreign terrorists. In this threat environment, that is an impressive accomplishment indeed. As is often the nature of the intelligence business, much of the successes of the National Counterterrorism Center go unrecognized. Terrorists plotting and carrying out attacks are captured through good intelligence and law enforcement work, and through strong cooperation with allies and partners around the world. Often, terrorist plots fail to proceed because of the barriers to recruit, travel, raise funds, get training, or gain access to destructive materials that have been erected through the efforts of the United States and other nations. Even in counterterrorism victories that become known, such as the cases of Najibullah Zazi in the United States or the identification of Usama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, the National Counterterrorism Center's important--sometimes absolutely critical role--is often not well known. So I am pleased today to be able to recognize Mike Leiter for his work in keeping our Nation safe for the past 4\\1/2\\ years. As a member, and now as chair of the Intelligence Committee, I have come to rely on Mike's analysis and judgment. He has been willing to admit that at times our counterterrorism policies or practices haven't been what they should be. He has appeared regularly before the committee and has been very accessible for the committee's staff as well. In addition to the regularly scheduled meetings we hold, I have received secure calls from Mike often, apprising me on new threats and the status of investigations. He is, without fail, available to provide updates and assessments, and I appreciate the importance he has placed on keeping the committee, and me personally, fully informed. Director Leiter has also worked tirelessly to achieve the goals set out for the National Counterterrorism Center in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The NCTC was established to bring together information and officers from across the intelligence community and from other parts of the government involved in the spectrum of counterterrorism, including counter-radicalization, detection, and prevention of attacks. Even after the experiences of 9/11 and the findings of the 9/11 Commission, it was a difficult and enormously frustrating challenge to truly integrate the Nation's counterterrorism efforts. It speaks to Director Leiter's energy and dedication that he was, eventually, able to bring together analysts from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and military services to share the threat streams that each one collected and assessed. The result has been the ability to better connect the intelligence information that points to suspicious activity, to develop the case when a terrorist or a terror plot is identified, and to take coordinated action to disrupt that plot. The NCTC now produces, on a daily basis, its own counterterrorism analysis that provides Intelligence Community-wide assessments and warning. Analysts at the NCTC are among the finest we have, and Director Leiter has fostered a productive environment through analytical roundtables and weekly forums in which analysts share information, provide briefings, and develop improved analytic tradecraft. In fact, I recently learned that as the CIA was developing its assessment that Usama bin Laden was in the Abbottabad compound, it turned to NCTC analysts to ``red-team'' the intelligence case and give their assessments. And Director Leiter was involved in the briefings and discussions with the President that led to the decision to carry out the operation. Director Leiter has demonstrated leadership in hard times, as well. After the failed terrorist attack on a Detroit-bound airliner on December 25, 2009, investigations uncovered significant failures and shortcomings in our counterterrorism efforts. The Senate Intelligence Committee's review found 14 specific ``points of failure'' across the government that enabled Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to come so close to carrying out a major attack. While several of our conclusions and recommendations fell to other agencies, Director Leiter moved quickly to implement the changes that we and others suggested. Since early 2010, the NCTC has vastly improved its methods for screening counterterrorism data and watchlisting individuals who pose a threat to our Nation. In response to the finding that no agency in the government was ensuring that all terrorist leads were pursued, Mike implemented ``Pursuit Groups'' at NCTC, teams of highly skilled analysts who sift through massive amounts of data to identify disparate pieces of intelligence and find linkages that identify terrorists, their plans, and their networks before they reach the point of plot execution. In addition to his service at the National Counterterrorism Center, Mr. Leiter helped establish the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as its deputy chief of staff, having previously served as the deputy general counsel and assistant director of the very well-regarded WMD Commission led by Senator Chuck Robb and Judge Laurence Silberman. From 2002 to 2005, he was an assistant U.S. attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia, one of the most active jurisdictions for national security cases. He clerked for Justice Stephen Breyer and for Chief Judge Michael Boudin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Most people do not know that Mike was also a naval aviator, flying EA-6B Prowlers with action in operations in the former Yugoslavia and in Iraq. In short, he has served the Nation in a wide variety of capacities over the past 20 years I thank Mike for his exemplary service in keeping this Nation safe and for his very positive relationship with the Intelligence Committee as we have carried out our oversight duties. I expect that this will not be Mike's last service to the Nation, and I wish him all the best.", u"Mr. President, I rise in strong support of this resolution and offer my congratulations to the men and women responsible for developing the intelligence and carrying out the operation that led to the death of Osama bin Laden on Sunday, May 1. This is perhaps the most important, and certainly the most stunning, intelligence operation I have seen in my 10 years on the Intelligence Committee. I wanted to congratulate, first and foremost, President Obama. As he stated in his Sunday night address to the Nation, he directed Leon Panetta shortly after taking office to ``make the killing or capture of bin Ladin the top priority of our war against al-Qaida.'' When the effort to collect and analyze intelligence on this compound in Abbottabad bore fruit, President Obama made a courageous and very gutsy decision to order the strike, even though the intelligence community could not assure him with certainty that bin Ladin was there. At the operational level, the hunt for bin Laden and the read on his compound has shown the greatly improved collaboration and cooperation across the intelligence community and, of course, the Department of Defense. The CIA has received and well deserved the lion's share of the credit. The agency collected the human intelligence and carried out other missions that found and characterized the Abbottabad compound, and CIA analysts took the lead in analyzing and reanalyzing that information. The CIA's Counterterrorism Center has a banner on the wall that reads, ``Today is September 12, 2001.'' It has been nearly 10 years, but their perseverance and dedication has truly paid off. I also want to recognize the efforts of the National Security Agency which provided signals intelligence and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency which conducted the imagery analysis on the compound. It was truly a team effort. I also commend and give thanks to the Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC, the team that flew to the compound under cover of night and conducted the raid. It was not a picture perfect operation, and changes to the plan were necessary as the lead helicopter was forced to land unexpectedly. But the highly trained and skilled members of the Navy SEAL team adjusted, reached their target, and they killed Osama bin Laden without taking any casualties themselves. I was first briefed on the compound and the possibility that it housed Osama bin Laden in the beginning of last December along with Senator Kit Bond who was vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee at that time. Since then, the current vice chairman, Senator Saxby Chambliss, and I have been regularly briefed and updated on the intelligence. I thank Director Panetta and his team for keeping the Intelligence Committee leadership informed. As one who is regularly critical of our government's inability to keep secrets, it is very reassuring that this highly sensitive and sensational intelligence was kept under wraps for months. There is no doubt that Sunday's operation gives rise to a number of questions. Among the most important of them are, one, what did Pakistan know about bin Laden's presence and this compound in the up to 6 years he was there? It has to be pointed out that this compound was eight times bigger than any home in the vicinity. It was just a quarter of a mile away from another home. It was a mile away from a major military academy. It had razor wire on the top of very large walls, and it was very large in itself. Trash was not picked up, it was burned. No one really came in and out except the two couriers who went about delivering messages from a distance from the compound. It should have been an issue of curiosity, and neighbors surely would have been interested in who lived there. Why is it so big? What is going on there? But there was virtually no reaction. The second point is, what does bin Laden's death mean for al-Qaida and for the affiliate groups and lone wolves he has inspired and led? As the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I will be looking for answers to those questions and get more of the details of the operation itself. Tomorrow morning, in a joint classified hearing with the Armed Services Committee, we will be looking into these and other issues. But this resolution is about commending the men and women of our intelligence community and the U.S. military for their dedication and years of work that led to 40 minutes of incredible success. It should also recognize the fact that since 9/11, intelligence has been streamlined, stove pipes have been taken down, and analysts have greatly improved in their trade craft. As a matter of fact, the intelligence having to do with this one facility was red-teamed once, red-teamed twice, and red-teamed at least a third time. The red-teaming process gives the ability of our analysts to debunk the intelligence, to try to indicate what might be a lapse, an ``inconclusion,'' a false judgment. It is a very valuable process. This resolution also recognizes the measure of justice now delivered to those who mourn and remember the thousands of men, women, and children claimed as victims on 9/11 and in the other attacks carried out by al-Qaida under Osama bin Laden both here and around the world. This will not end terror as we know it today, but it surely is a monumental step to be able to put an end to the man who championed the cause, the man who provided the inspiration, the man who raised the money, and the man who was purely and simply the major leader. Osama bin Laden is no more, and the time is upon us. I hope the world will be listening to try to consider a better path, to move away from acts of terror, move away from the killing of innocent men, women and children, and become part of the councils of government, whatever they may be, across the world, to debate, to discuss, to vote, and to put forward principled policies. I very much appreciate the efforts of the majority leader and the Republican leader in bringing this resolution to the floor, and I urge its adoption. I notice my distinguished vice chairman on the Senate floor. I particularly want to thank him, Senator Chambliss, for all of the cooperation we have been able to effect together. You truly have been wonderful. It has been a great joy for me to work with you, and I only wish I could give you a glass of California wine to salute this very special day. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, first of all, I was going to interrupt and ask a question, but I simply conferred with Senator McConnell--and I will state and the Record can reflect the fact--that I believe Senator McConnell asked the question of where he would be released if he were acquitted. I don't believe he asserted that he would be released in the United States. I just wanted to clear that up. Obviously, we can check the transcript and determine it. I think that was his intent because of the question that Robert Gibbs had posed. At least that is my understanding of it. We can resolve that. But I would like to say a couple of other things. First of all, it is important to have this debate. The Senate had a debate some weeks ago, and it is true 90 Senators voted against funding a program to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. Six Senators voted in favor of moving forward with that. I appreciate the Senator from Illinois staunchly defending the lonely six, but they represented also a minority of American public opinion, which has said, by 2 to 1, according to the USA Gallop poll, that it is against closing the Guantanamo prison, and by 3 to 1 they do not want the prisoners released in the United States. Both sides have engaged in a little bit of rhetoric. For example, I would respectfully request my colleague from Illinois go back over what he said a moment ago and perhaps come back tomorrow and think about rephrasing it. I don't think it is fair to characterize the position of the Senator from Kentucky as being fearful of trying people in the United States; fearful, for example, that terrorists--or afraid of giving terrorists rights and so on. I don't think that is the issue. I think what is the issue is the question of whether, as a general rule, it is better to keep prisoners in Guantanamo prison than to put them somewhere else. I, for one, don't fear trying some of these people who are appropriately charged and tried in Federal court in the United States. But I would also say it is loaded with problems and headaches, and I think my colleague from Illinois would have to acknowledge that the trials that have occurred here have produced some real problems. These are hard cases to try in the United States. You start with the proposition that there are huge security concerns. Now, it can be done. There will be huge security concerns with this alleged terrorist from Tanzania, and it will cost a lot of money in the place where he is tried. It will pose very difficult questions for the judge, for the people within the courtroom, the parties to the case, the lawyers in the case. There are evidentiary questions and other questions that are illustrated by the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was tried in Alexandria. I think we can all acknowledge the government would certainly say that was a huge problem for them because it was difficult to use evidence in the case that had been acquired through confidential or classified methods. The case was ping-ponged back and forth several times between the District Court and the court of appeals. It was a difficult, hard thing to do. Then there are the situations where cases have been tried in American courts and classified information has inadvertently--and in some cases not inadvertently--been released, gotten into the hands of terrorists. Let me just cite a few of these, and not to make the case that it is impossible or a terrible idea but also to refute the notion that it is a piece of cake. It is not. It is really hard. If you could avoid doing this, I think the better practice would be to try to do so. But on an occasional basis, when we have a good Federal charge, we have the evidence that can back it up, and we think we can get a conviction, there is nothing wrong in those few selected cases with doing it. But we can't say all 240 of the terrorists at Guantanamo qualify for that. Very few of them do, as the President said in his remarks. Let me note some of these cases. The famous trial of Ramzi Yousef. Here is a statement by Michael Mukasey, the former Attorney General. This is a quotation from the Wall Street Journal, again, during the trial of Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing: Apparently, an innocuous bit of testimony . . . about delivery of a cell phone battery was enough to tip off terrorists still at large that one of their communication links had been compromised. That link, which in fact had been monitored by the government and had provided enormously invaluable intelligence, was immediately shut down, and further information lost. I am not going to read the entire quotations but just some headlines. I mentioned the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui. That was a case also in which sensitive material was inadvertently leaked. Here is the headline from a CNBC story: The Government Went To The Judge And Said, ``Oops, We Gave Moussaoui Some Documents He Shouldn't Have.'' . . . Documents That The Government Says Should Have Been Classified. There is a whole story about how that happened. The East Africa Embassy bombing trials, which occurred after 2001, September 26 is the Star-Ledger story. The cost of disclosing information unwisely became clear after the New York trials of bin Laden associates for the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa. Some of the evidence indicated that the National Security Agency, the U.S. foreign eavesdropping organization, had intercepted cell phone conversations. Shortly thereafter, bin Laden's organization stopped using cell phones to discuss sensitive operational details, U.S. intelligence sources said. There is another story about the same thing, with a headline in the New York Times. There is another quotation about the trial of the blind sheik, a story we are all familiar with, of Michael Mukasey, the former Attorney General, saying this in the Wall Street Journal: In the course of prosecuting Omar Abdel Rahman . . . the government was compelled--as in all cases that charge conspiracy--to turn over a list of unindicted coconspirators to the defendants. Within ten days, a copy of that list reached bin Laden in Khartoum. There are other cases. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have these articles printed in the Record.", u"Mr. President, I rise to speak on the nomination of Harold Koh whom the President has nominated to be legal advisor to the State Department. This is a relatively obscure but very important position at the State Department. The legal advisor operates frequently behind the scenes but on such important issues as international relations, national security, and in other areas. One area that is very important is that the legal advisor is often the last word at the State Department on questions regarding treaty interpretation; that is, international agreements between countries. The legal advisor often gives legal advice to the Secretary of State and the President of the United States during important negotiations with other nations. We also know from experience that the legal advisor can be a very important voice in diplomatic circles, especially if he or she views America's obligations to other nations and multilateral organizations in a particular way, particularly if they have strong views. Professor Koh has an impressive academic resume and professional background. He is an accomplished lawyer and a scholar in the field of international law. Nevertheless, I do not believe that Professor Koh is the right person for this job. I believe that many of his writings, his speeches, and other statements are in tension with some very core democratic values in this country. I believe that his legal advice on transnational law, if taken to heart, could undermine America's sovereignty or security and our national interests. I urge my colleagues not to take my word for this but look for themselves at Professor Koh's record and consider whether he is the right person to be advising Secretary Clinton and other diplomats at the State Department on legal issues pertaining to our relationship with other nations and such key issues. I mention this notion of transnational jurisprudence, which is a little arcane, but I will explain what it is all about. Professor Koh has been an advocate for transnational jurisprudence, which is the idea that Federal judges should look at cases and controversies as opportunities to change U.S. law and to make it look more like international or other foreign law. I am not saying that all foreign law is bad, but our Founders acknowledged that when we take the oath of office here, we pledge to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of America, not some unsigned, unratified international treaty or an expansive notion of international common law which Professor Koh embraces and advocates. We know Americans don't have a monopoly on virtue and wisdom and certainly we can benefit from exchanging ideas with other democratic countries. But Professor Koh's notion that it is appropriate and proper for a Federal judge to look at foreign law in deciding what the Constitution of the United States means, and what the laws of the United States require, to me, is at complete tension with this idea that we will uphold American values and the American Constitution and American laws passed by our elected officials. We do not appropriately ask Federal judges to look at unratified treaties, some notion of international common law and, certainly, the laws of other countries in interpreting our laws in the United States. Professor Koh seems to have a different view. He said Federal judges should use their power to ``vertically enforce'' or ``domesticate'' American law with international norms and foreign law. He has argued that Federal judges should help ``build the bridge between the international and domestic law through a number of interpretive techniques.'' Where will these ``interpretive techniques'' lead us? Evan Thomas and Stuart Taylor asked that question in Newsweek magazine earlier this year. They answered based on their investigation: Were Koh's writings to become policy, judges might have the power to use debatable interpretations of treaties and ``customary international law'' to override a wide array of federal and state laws affecting matters as disparate as the redistribution of wealth and prostitution. Transnational jurisprudence is not the only controversial view professor Koh holds. Again, as a law professor and dean of Yale Law School, I understand law professors advocating cutting edge and, indeed, provocative legal interpretations. But to say this is appropriate not in the classroom as a teaching exercise but, rather, important for Federal judges to do in the exercise of their article III powers is an entirely different notion altogether. In 2002, Professor Koh gave a lecture titled ``A World Drowning in Guns,'' in which he argued for a ``global gun control regime.'' In 2007, he argued that foreign prisoners of war held by the U.S. Armed Forces anywhere in the world--not just enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay--are entitled to the same rights as American citizens under habeas corpus law as applied by our Federal courts. Perhaps most timely, Professor Koh appears to draw a moral equivalence between the Iran regime's political suppression and human rights abuses, on the one hand, and America's counterterrorism policies on the other hand. Professor Koh has written: [U.S.] criticism of Iranian ``security forces [who] monitor the social activities of citizens, entered homes and offices, monitored telephone conversations, and opened mail without court authorization'' is hard to square with our own National Security Agency's sustained program of secret, unreviewed, warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens and residents. Furthermore, the United States cannot stand on strong footing attacking Iran for ``illegal detentions'' when similar charges can be and have been lodged against our own government. The U.S. policies that Professor Koh is criticizing were authorized by the Congress in a bipartisan fashion, and each of us is accountable to our constituents for the decisions we make. It is offensive to compare the policies of the U.S. Government with those of a theocratic dictatorship that responds to criticism with brutal violence against its own people. We have heard enough moral equivalence regarding Iran over the last week and a half. We have heard enough apologies for the actions of the United States--and enough soft-peddling of the brutal suppression by the Iranian regime of their own people. We don't need another voice in the administration whose first instinct is to blame America--and whose long-term objective is to transform this country into something it is not. For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote no on the cloture motion on this nomination. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Mr. President, at the end of this week, Americans may find themselves at greater risk of a terrorist attack when the Protect America Act expires on February 1. On that date, we will be forced to revert to the antiquated 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, to monitor the communications of suspected terrorists, unless this Congress moves quickly to make permanent changes to that law. It is therefore critical for Congress to enact permanent modernizations to FISA so that our intelligence officials will have every tool they need to monitor the communications of terrorists who seek to destroy the United States. The consequences of allowing the Protect America Act to lapse could be deadly. The PAA was passed last August to modernize FISA so that the statute could do in practice what it was always intended to do--govern certain foreign intelligence surveillance activities directed at persons in the United States, without inadvertently burdening those activities directed at persons overseas. FISA, however, has not kept up with technological advances that have been made since 1978. As a result, prior to the PAA, intelligence officers were often forced to obtain a court order before beginning surveillance against a terrorist or other foreign target located in another country. This unnecessary and burdensome requirement caused U.S. intelligence agencies to lose about two-thirds of their ability to collect communications intelligence against al-Qaida. Thankfully, the Protect America Act helped to close the inexcusable gap that left this country blind to the plans our enemies were making against us. As Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell said, the PAA has ``allowed us to obtain significant insight into terrorist planning.'' To allow such a vital antiterror tool to lapse at this time would be the ultimate dereliction of duty. The United States must remain vigilant against a terror threat that is real and constant. The National Intelligence Estimate on ``The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland,'' released just 6 months ago, concluded that this country will face a ``persistent and evolving'' terrorist threat over the next 3 years, particularly from Islamic terrorist groups and cells like al-Qaida. No person in America is unfamiliar with the capabilities and determination of such terrorist groups, and Americans trust us to make the right decisions to protect them and their children. Without making permanent changes to FISA to ensure the fast and effective intercept of foreign intelligence information, little else we do will matter. Retroactive immunity is in the best interest of this Nation's security and must be included in FISA modernization, as it was in the Intelligence Committee bill. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush authorized the National Security Agency to intercept international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al-Qaida or related terrorist organizations. The administration's obvious and stated purpose of this authorization was to ``establish an early warning system to detect and prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States.'' Therefore, the administration made requests for telecom companies to cooperate with its intelligence activities. The companies complied with the government's request for help, relying on written assurance from the executive branch that their actions were both necessary and legal. Now these companies face multibillion dollar lawsuits challenging their actions. Such lawsuits not only create potentially staggering liability for the companies, they also create the risk that sensitive details about our intelligence sources and methods will be revealed through discovery. Moreover, failing to protect those who cooperate with the Government to thwart terrorist activity will undermine the willingness of others to cooperate in the future. A powerful op-ed authored last October by former Attorneys General Benjamin Civiletti, Dick Thornburgh, and William Webster, said it best: The government alone cannot protect us from the threats we face today. We must have the help of all our citizens. There will be times when the lives of thousands of Americans will depend on whether corporations such as airlines or banks are willing to lend assistance. If we do not treat companies fairly when they respond to assurances from the highest levels of the government that their help is legal and essential for saving lives, then we will be radically reducing our society's capacity to defend itself. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee voted 13 to 2 to include retroactive immunity in its bill. This overwhelming vote came after the committee reviewed the classified documents on which these companies relied. The committee ultimately concluded that the Government ``cannot obtain the intelligence it needs without assistance from [telecommunications] companies.'' Protecting the corporate good citizens who answered the call to assist our intelligence community during a time of great danger to this country is the right thing to do. Anything short of full immunity for those companies that, at the Government's request, on the written assurance that such action had been authorized by the President and deemed lawful, would undermine the security of the United States is simply unacceptable. The carefully crafted, bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee bill protects privacy interests without undermining our intelligence community's ability to do its vitally important job. The bill was approved by a vote of 13 to 2 after careful consideration of complicated issues and classified documents. It will allow our intelligence professionals to continue collecting foreign intelligence against foreign targets located outside the United States without requiring prior court approval. This is consistent with the intent of the legislators who enacted FISA in 1978 and represents no change in the way that the NSA has always conducted foreign surveillance. In so doing, the bill will also continue to protect the civil liberties of Americans in this country, surveillance of whom has always required prior court approval. Nothing we are considering in the Senate today would alter that. In the event that communication from a U.S. person is inadvertently intercepted, the intelligence community uses ``minimization procedures'' to suppress the data. The result is that the communication is never used or shared. These procedures have been used effectively for 30 years and will remain in place after permanent FISA changes are enacted. Enacting permanent modernizations to FISA is one of the most important duties the Senate will undertake this year. We have known for 6 months that the Protect America Act would expire on February 1 and have no excuse for not getting this done correctly before that date. The stakes in this debate could not be higher. Although the details can be complicated, the basic issue is pretty simple. As Andy McCarthy said in a recent piece for the National Review Online, ``Osama bin Laden doesn't need to apply to a sharia court before blowing up an American embassy; the president shouldn't need to apply to a federal court to try to stop him.'' Unfortunately, I was unable to make it back to town in time for the two cloture votes that were held yesterday. Had I been here, I would have voted for cloture on Rockefeller amendment No. 3911, the Intelligence Committee's FISA bill, and against cloture on Reid amendment No. 3918, to temporarily extend the Protect America Act. I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"I rise today to express concerns about the FISA Amendments Act S. 2248 before us. This morning, the Senate lost an opportunity to strengthen this bill. And, unfortunately, without those critical provisions, I will have to oppose the bill before us. I thank the Senator from Connecticut for his leadership in fighting against this bill. I know he will be back on this issue at every opportunity. Mr. President, I rise to join this debate. I have been, over many years, interested and involved in privacy rights issues in a variety of capacities. Certainly, the residents of my state care passionately about their rights to privacy. This administration has done a lot to blur the line between foreign intelligence gathering and spying on U.S. citizens. Now, the legislation before us today could have been improved to better protect the rights of U.S. citizens by passing amendments proposed by my colleague Senator Feingold, but we turned those down. Instead what has been a delicate balance in the United States to protect the rights of privacy of U.S. citizens and national security is going to be further eroded. Congress has limited powers and so does the President. The President does not and should not have unchecked power in this or any other area. It would be contrary to our American values and our system of government, which has endured for more than 231 years. When strengthening national security, we must also safeguard civil liberties and the privacy rights of American citizens. I cannot support a bill that fails to strike this critical balance, as the original Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) did. We didn't allow the government to have unchecked unlimited authority then, and we shouldn't allow it now. There have been times in the past when both Democratic and Republican administrations lost sight of the need to protect U.S. citizens' privacy rights. We all want to protect the United States, but how good is this approach if the end result is that everyone thinks that there is a back door to our computer operating systems, a back door to our telecommunication systems? Who will want to do business in the United States if they think there are no secure systems, only systems to which the U.S. government will have access? Communications over the Internet, regardless of country of origin or country of destination, know no national boundaries, and travel by the most efficient route. If the Act as currently drafted goes forward, it may lead to an international reexamination of how the Internet should operate. FISA has been a very important part of our checks and balances. In our country, a Senator cannot pick or choose what laws they follow and neither should the President nor telecommunication companies. Congress should not be providing blanket immunity for telecommunications companies that cooperated with the Administration's warrantless wiretapping programs. We don't know precisely what those companies did or the full extent of what they did. I believe the Federal courts should be allowed to rule on the legality of the companies' conduct. Congress should not move to preempt judicial decisions. Special procedures can be put in place that could allow such cases to move ahead without revealing classified information or damaging U.S. national security. Specifically, I want to touch on the lawsuit the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed against a large telecom company, accusing it of violating FISA, on behalf of a class of its customers. If retroactive immunity is granted to telecom providers, the lawsuit will be dismissed, and the public will never get an opportunity of getting even a glimpse of what happened. The issue of the Federal Government and telecoms possibly violating FISA came to light in part as a result of the actions of a brave whistleblower. According to media reports and internal AT&T documents provided by this whistleblower, Mark Klein, the telecom company allegedly splits off a copy of all of the Internet traffic transported over fiber-optic cables running though its San Francisco office and diverts it all--e-mails, IMs, web browsing, everything--to a secure room under the control of the National Security Agency that contains sophisticated data-mining equipment capable of monitoring all the communications' content in real-time. What appears to have happened is a major change in how electronic surveillance is conducted in this country. Surveillance used to be particularized--investigators would pick a target and then intercept the communications of that target. But now, it appears the Administration is using advances in technology to move to a wholesale surveillance regime, where everything is intercepted and then investigators sift through the hay to pick their targets. In other words, the Administration is seizing millions of Americans' communications--billions of phone calls and e-mails and more--in a 21st century high-tech equivalent of the King's general warrants that our Founders fought a revolution to avoid. The Electronic Frontier Foundation wants a court to be able to decide whether this new mode of surveillance is or can ever be legal, under FISA or the fourth amendment. Letting the courts decide that question is critical to checks and balances, critical to ensuring that Congress' privacy laws are followed and the fourth amendment respected, and critical to preventing abuses of power. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to allow this case to move forward. I urge them to allow the Federal courts to rule on the legality of the companies' conduct. These are the issues, I believe, that must be reviewed by the courts. I think passing this legislation really preempts what is critical judicial review and undermines the fundamental principle of checks and balances in our system. I know these are challenging times. But we have to remember our Constitution and to remember what is effective policy. Everybody in America wants to be safer and we want to use technology to protect our national security. But, technology can be used in a way that protects privacy rights. This all goes back to checks and balances. Instead of rushing to dismantle them, Congress needs to maintain and strengthen these checks and balances in order to prevent abuses of power. This model has worked for our country. I encourage my colleagues to make sure we remember the fourth amendment and we remember our citizens' rights to privacy as well in considering this legislation, which I hope the Senate will turn down this afternoon.", u"Mr. President, while we are waiting here for some of the determination of a time agreement with regards to the consideration of the conference report, I want to go ahead and lend my support and acknowledge to the rest of the Senate that this is a bill that is very necessary to pass. Because, what this bill does, by authorizing the activities of the intelligence community, it continues to make the oversight function of the Congress--in particular, the Senate and the House Intelligence Committees--poignant and relevant to a community that is not accustomed to having oversight. Our committee leadership, chairman and vice chairman, Senators Rockefeller and Bond, as we say in the South, they have cracked the whip with the intelligence community to get them to realize that this is a constitutional government of shared powers; that the executive branch doesn't just run the show--particularly on something as sensitive as the collection of intelligence. Rather, it needs to be done within the law, and one of the ways of ensuring that is through the sharing of powers between two different branches of Government who have checks and balances upon each other. We in the legislative branch oversee the activities of the executive branch--in this case, all of the intelligence community and their activities, which are absolutely essential to the protection of our country. This conference report is a very important bipartisan document, which increases the accountability in the intelligence community, and it authorizes dozens of critical intelligence programs to keep us safe every day. The conference report includes a new, strong inspector general in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Inspectors general are increasingly important in the intelligence community, where billions of dollars are spent outside of public view. Our committee, as well as the American public, has to rely on the inspector general as an important part of the oversight of the intelligence community. As we look back, several years ago, we completely reorganized the intelligence community. A Director of National Intelligence was set up to integrate the disparate elements of the intelligence community. But there is a lot more that needs to be done, and a strong inspector general at the DNI is another step in the right direction. The conference report also includes a provision that makes the Director of the NRO--the National Reconnaissance Office--and the NSA--the National Security Agency--subject to Senate confirmation. Now, why is that important? That is important because, again, it is part of the checks and balances of the separate branches of Government. Both of these agencies, outside of the public view because of the top-secret nature of this work, oversee large programs that cost vast amounts of money, and not every program has been a success. So by having the confirmations of the Directors of the NRO and the NSA come to the Senate, it improves that accountability and responsiveness to the legislative branch of Government. The authorization bill also requires an assessment of the vulnerability of the intelligence community's major acquisition programs. We have to assess that the program is going to stay on track and that it is not going off the rails with regard to cost. We are talking about billions of dollars on some of these programs. By keeping them on track, by knowing what to anticipate, it is much easier to plan ahead. This bill also provides an annual reporting system which will help us keep in focus, curbing these cost overruns and these schedule delays. If you don't do that, things are going to get out of control. As the intelligence community continues to be more and more sophisticated because of the technical means it employs, it is more and more important that our oversight tools be in place and effective. Now, that is enough alone to pass this bill, but we have an area of disagreement coming up. We are expecting the minority to offer a point of order that would remove a provision in the conference report. This provision requires the Army Field Manual to be used as the standard for interrogation methods. This Army Field Manual was released over a year ago. It specifically prohibits cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. There are eight techniques in the Army Field Manual that are specifically prohibited from being used in conjunction with intelligence interrogations: forcing the detainee to be naked, perform sexual acts, or pose in a sexual manner; placing hoods or sacks over the head of a detainee; using duct tape on the eyes; applying beatings, electric shock, burns, or other forms of physical pain. The fourth is waterboarding. That is prohibited. The fifth is using military working dogs. The sixth is inducing hypothermia or heat energy. The seventh is conducting a mock execution. The eighth is depriving the detainee of necessary food, water, and medical care. Now, haven't I just described what America is all about? Is that not the standard by which we, as the leader of the world, have to announce to the world what we believe in and how we are going to conduct ourselves, and that is how we are going to conduct ourselves not only among our own people and how we treat them but how we are going to treat others? The manual provides that three interrogation techniques may only be used with higher level approval. The good cop-bad cop interrogation tactic; the false flag tactic, where a detainee is made to believe he is being held by another country; or separation, by which the detainee is separated so he can't coordinate with other detainees on his story--those techniques can be used, but it has to be approved at a higher level. Mr. President, there is something that is going to worry everybody, and it has worried this Senator personally and as a member of the Intelligence Committee. What if all of this doesn't work and the country is in imminent peril? Well, along with the standards we are going to set, which I hope we are going to pass into law--these standards in the Army Field Manual which will state clearly what the standards are for our country and how we are going to conduct ourselves--there is always the constitutional authority under article As Commander in Chief, the President can act when the country is in immediate peril. And if he so chooses, as Commander in Chief, to authorize activities other than what the Army Field Manual allows, then the President would be accountable directly to the American people under the circumstances with which he invoked that article II authority as Commander in Chief. What we are saying today does not relate to the President's article II power. We are setting statutory power. It is important that we tell the rest of the world the standards of how we interrogate detainees. We are putting these standards into law and we will ensure that these techniques are in compliance with the humane treatment that we would expect and hope our Americans would also receive. I think there should be no confusion. We have an obligation to set these standards into law. If that dire emergency ever occurred in the future, the President has his own authority under article II of the Constitution. But that is not the question here today before us. The question is: What do we set as the standard of interrogation, and that has to be that there is no torture allowed under this statutory law. Therefore, when the point of order is raised that would take the Army Field Manual standards for interrogation techniques out of the conference report, I urge the Senators not to take this provision out of this important intelligence reauthorization bill. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to continued war funding for Iraq. I voted against the war and have never wavered in my opposition to the Administration's misguided policies in Iraq. It has been a long and painful 5 year journey for the people of our country since the Administration acted preemptively and unilaterally to invade and occupy Iraq. Military leaders, the best minds in foreign and economic policy, and the vast majority of the American people have been resoundingly clear: The Administration's war-without-end policy is not a strategy for success. As retired General William Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency under President Reagan and member of the National Security Council under President Carter stated, ``Getting out of Iraq is the pre-condition for creating new strategic options.'' I cannot support war funding without a clear exit strategy in sight. It is bad for our troops, our country, and our standing in the world. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of today's second amendment that includes a clear path out of Iraq, a plan that my constituents and the vast majority of Americans are demanding. More than 5 years ago the President proclaimed ``Mission Accomplished'' in Iraq. Paradoxically, he insists on a permanent U.S. presence there. And what exactly has this Administration ``accomplished'' in Iraq? More than 4,000 U.S. soldiers have been killed and almost 30,000 injured; tens of thousands Iraqi civilian deaths; an emboldened Iran and new threats from Al Qaeda in the region; $519 billion taxpayer dollars spent and a future expenditure of some $3 trillion; a hobbled Iraqi government unable to provide clean water, medical care, jobs for its people, or pass critical oil sharing legislation; a U.S. military on the verge of collapse and unable to press vigorously the critical fight in Afghanistan or respond to other crises in the world; and still no exit strategy. With no end game in sight, the Administration and its supporters in Congress are complicit in a continuation of a failed policy which they insist on extending with a blank check policy to accompany it. The President owes it to our brave men and women in Iraq and their families, he owes it to the American people, and he owes it to the citizens of Iraq not to leave this mess for the next President to finish. This bill establishes a clear path out of Iraq. The language requires the Administration to begin redeployment 30 days after enactment and requires Secretary Gates to submit to Congress within 90 days a report detailing plans to reduce and redeploy troops from Iraq. It prohibits sending troops to Iraq that are not assessed as ``fully mission capable'' of performing their assigned mission, and outlaws the presence of a permanent U.S. base there. Additionally, this provision requires the Iraqi government to match every U.S. dollar spent for training and infrastructure construction and repair. Finally, it prohibits the intelligence community from subjecting detainees to interrogation techniques not authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual. This will essentially abolish the use of water torture and begin to restore America's standing in the world community. As a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence it is vital that we extend the ban on torture to the Intelligence agencies. The President has said he will veto any ban on torture, clearly demonstrating his desire to reserve for himself the right to subject detainees to these horrendous techniques. Congress has an obligation to make it clear that the American people do not believe in torture and will not allow it to continue. This amendment sets a decisive course out of Iraq and begins to shift responsibilities to the Iraqi government. I urge my colleagues to heed the demands of the American people and support this strategy. Mr. Speaker, I'm very pleased that the Appropriations Committee included two important provisions in today's third amendment. First, it includes critical funding for Iraqi Christians and second, it modernizes and improves the G.I. bill. I'm pleased that the amendment contains $10 million for vulnerable Iraqi minorities, including Christians. The needs of Assyrians in Iraq could not be greater. A report produced by the Department of State on U.S. assistance to the Nineveh Plains in Iraq concluded that Christian minorities have experienced serious human rights abuses in the Nineveh Plains. The report also states that the region has absorbed a significant number of Christian internally displaced persons (IDPs) moving from the south, placing an economic burden in the area. They are fleeing because they are being threatened and murdered in their home communities. Their priests are being executed, their churches burned, and their nuns threatened. In February of this year, Archbishop Paulos Rahho was abducted and murdered in Mosul. While Assyrians only represented 5 percent of the total Iraqi population before the war, according to the United Nations today they comprise as much as 40 percent of the growing Iraqi refugees who have fled for their lives to Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. These families desperately need security, housing, jobs, schools and the chance to live in a sustainable community where they can openly practice their faith. This funding is essential to their survival. Also included in this amendment is a modernization of the G.I. bill. The G.I. bill has been heralded as one of the most successful government programs in the history of our Nation. It gave millions of G.I.s the chance to go to college, many of whom were the first to receive a college education in their families. But the G.I. bill is over 54 years old and has not kept up with rising tuition costs. According to a recent Department of Veterans Affairs (V.A.) survey, 18 percent of the veterans recently back from tours of duty are unemployed. Of those employed since leaving the military, 25 percent earn less than $21,840 a year. The survey also demonstrated that only 48.4 percent of the respondents took advantage of the G.I. bill and concluded that receiving the benefits of the current G.I. bill was not a strong predictor of successful employment outcomes. This survey clearly demonstrates the need for this new G.I. bill. The amendment provides veterans with a maximum educational benefit equal to the highest tuition rate of a public college or university in their State, as well as a monthly stipend for housing. It also establishes a new program in which private educational institutions would make financial contributions toward veterans' tuition, and the federal government would match those contributions. When our veterans return from the battlefield, they should have every opportunity to enter the classroom and ultimately the civilian workforce. Our Nation needs these brave men and women to contribute to the growth and health of our economy and this new G.I. bill accomplishes this. From development funding for Iraqi Christians to the creation of a new G.I. bill, this amendment addresses specific urgent needs for our Nation and world. The amendment is well crafted and I urge my colleagues to support its passage.", u"SA 5387. Mr. BOND submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 3001, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of division C, add the following: In this title: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2009 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 3311 and, subject to section 3313, the authorized personnel levels as of September 30, 2009, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 3311, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill ________ of the One Hundred Tenth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2009 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 3312(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 5 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Transition to Full-Time Equivalency.-- (1) Treatment for fiscal year 2009.--For fiscal year 2009, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each element of the intelligence community, may treat the personnel ceilings authorized under the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 3312(a) as full-time equivalents. (2) Consideration.--In exercising the authority described in paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence may consider the circumstances under which civilian employees are employed and accounted for at each element of the intelligence community in-- (A) a student program, trainee program, or similar program; (B) reserve corps or equivalent status as a reemployed annuitant or other employee; (C) a joint duty rotational assignment; or (D) other full-time or part-time status. (3) Notification to congress.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing of-- (A) the policies for implementing the authorities described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and (B) the number of all civilian personnel employed by, or anticipated to be employed by, each element of the intelligence community during fiscal year 2009 accounted for-- (i) by position; (ii) by full-time equivalency; or (iii) by any other method. (4) Treatment for fiscal year 2010.--The Director of National Intelligence shall express the personnel levels for all civilian employees for each element of the intelligence community in the congressional budget justifications submitted for fiscal year 2010 as full-time equivalent positions. (c) Authority for Conversion of Activities Performed by Contractors.-- (1) In general.--In addition to the authority in subsection (a) and subject to paragraph (2), if the head of an element of the intelligence community makes a determination that activities currently being performed by contractor employees should be performed by employees of such element, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize for that purpose employment of additional full-time equivalent personnel in such element equal to the number of full-time equivalent contractor employees performing such activities. (2) Concurrence and approval.--The authority described in paragraph (1) may not be exercised unless the Director of National Intelligence concurs with the determination described in such paragraph and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget approves such determination. (d) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a) or (b). (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2009 the sum of $696,742,000. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 944 full-time or full- time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2009. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Construction of Authorities.--The Director of National Intelligence may use the authorities described in subsections (a) and (c) of section 3313 for the adjustment of personnel levels within the Intelligence Community Management Account. (d) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2009 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 3312(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2010. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2009, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 3312(a). There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2009 the sum of $279,200,000.", u"Mr. President, I rise to introduce ``The Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2007,'' with Senator Lautenberg. This legislation reaffirms the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States and head of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to audit the financial transactions and evaluate the programs and activities of the intelligence community (IC). Our bill is identical to S. 3968, introduced in the last Congress by Senator Lautenberg and myself, and to H.R. 6252, introduced in the House by Representative Bennie Thompson. The need for more effective oversight and accountability of our intelligence community has never been greater. In the war against terrorism, intelligence agencies are both the spear and the shield: the first line of our attack and of our defense. Failure can bear terrible consequences. Congress has two responsibilities: the first is to ensure that our intelligence community is performing its mission effectively, and the second is to ensure that in performing its mission, the intelligence community is not violating the constitutional rights of individual Americans. Yet the ability of Congress to ensure that the intelligence community has sufficient resources and capability of performing its mission has never been more in question. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created a new institutional landscape littered by new intelligence agencies with ever increasing demands and responsibilities. These new agencies became members of an already populated club of organizations performing intelligence related functions. The intelligence community today consists of 19 different agencies or components: the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Department of Defense; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Departments of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force; Department of State; Department of Treasury; Department of Energy; Department of Justice; Federal Bureau of Investigation; National Reconnaissance Office; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; Coast Guard; Department of Homeland Security, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. Congress too has increased its oversight responsibilities. Committees other than the intelligence committees of the House and Senate have jurisdiction over such departments as Homeland Security, State, Defense, Justice, Energy, Treasury, and Commerce. But all of these ``non-intelligence'' committees are restricted in their ability to conduct effective oversight of intelligence function of the agencies under their jurisdiction because, unfortunately, the intelligence community stonewalls the Government Accountability Office (GAO) when committees of jurisdiction request that GAO investigate problems. This is happening despite the clear responsibility of Congress to ensure that these agencies are operating effectively to protect America. It is inconceivable that the GAO--the audit arm of the U.S. Congress--has been unable to conduct evaluations of the CIA for over 40 years. If the GAO had been able to conduct basic auditing functions of the CIA, perhaps some of the problems that were so clearly exposed following the terrorist attacks in September 2001 would have been resolved. And yet, it is extraordinary that five years after 9-11, the same problems persist. Two recent incidents have made this situation disturbingly clear. At a hearing entitled, ``Access Delayed: Fixing the Security Clearance Process, Part II,'' before my Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, on November 9, 2005, GAO was asked about steps it would take to ensure that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Office of Management and Budget, and the intelligence community met the goals and objectives outlined in the OPM security clearance strategic plan. Fixing the security clearance process, which is on GAO's high-risk list, is essential to our national security. But as GAO observed in a written response to a question raised by Senator Voinovich, ``while we have the authority to do such work, we lack the cooperation we need to get our job done in that area.'' A similar case arose in response to a GAO investigation for the Senate Homeland Security Committee and the House Government Reform Committee on how agencies are sharing terrorism-related and sensitive but unclassified information. The report, entitled ``Information Sharing, the Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information'' (GAO-06-385), was released in March 2006. At a time when Congress is criticized by members of the 9-11 Commission for failing to implement its recommendations, we should remember that improving terrorism information sharing among agencies was one of the critical recommendations of the Commission. Moreover, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 mandated the sharing of terrorism information through the creation of an Information Sharing Environment. Yet, when asked by GAO for comments on the GAO report, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence refused, stating that ``the review of intelligence activities is beyond GAO's purview.'' A Congressional Research Service memorandum entitled, ``Overview of `Classified' and `Sensitive but Unclassified' Information,'' concludes, ``it appears that pseudo-classification markings have, in some instances, had the effect of deterring information sharing for homeland security.'' Unfortunately I have more examples that predate the post 9-11 reforms. Indeed, in July 2001, in testimony, entitled ``Central Intelligence Agency, Observations on GAO Access to Information on CIA Programs and Activities'' (GAO-01-975T) before the House Committee on Government Reform, the GAO noted, as a practical manner, ``our access is generally limited to obtaining information on threat assessments when the CIA does not perceives [sic] our audits as oversight of its activities.'' The bill I introduce today does not detract from the authority of the intelligence committees. In fact, the language makes explicit that the Comptroller General may conduct an audit or evaluation of intelligence sources and methods or covert actions only upon the request of the intelligence committees or at the request of the congressional majority or minority leaders. The measure also prescribes for the security of the information collected by the Comptroller General. As both House Rule 48 and Senate Resolution 400 establishing the intelligence oversight committees state, ``Nothing in this [charter] shall be construed as amending, limiting, or otherwise changing the authority of any standing committee of the, House/Senate, to obtain full and prompt access to the product of the intelligence activities of any department or agency of the Government relevant to a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee.'' Despite this clear and unambiguous statement, the ability of non-intelligence committees to obtain information, no matter how vital to improving the security of our nation, has been restricted by the various elements of the intelligence community. My bill reaffirms the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct audits and evaluations--other than those relating to sources and methods, or covert actions--relating to the management and administration of elements of the intelligence community in areas such as strategic planning, financial management, information technology, human capital, knowledge management, information sharing, and change management for other relevant committees of the Congress. As I mentioned earlier in my statement, Congress also has the responsibility of ensuring that unfettered intelligence collection does not trample civil liberties. New technologies and new personal information data bases threaten our individual right to a secure private life, free from unlawful government invasion. We must ensure that private information collected by the intelligence community is not misused and is secure. Intelligence agencies have a legitimate mission to protect the country against potential threats. However, Congress' role is to ensure that their mission remains legitimate. Attached is a detailed description of the legislation that I ask unanimous consent be printed in the Record. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation I am introducing be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule and the underlying legislation. I have to say, as I listen to my good friend from New York (Mrs. Maloney), who has worked long and hard on this, it didn't take a year for us to pass this measure through the House of Representatives; it passed, as the gentlewoman said, by a vote of 421-0 in the last Congress, and that was in response to the DPW deal, which obviously raised a number of concerns from a number of people in this institution. Mr. Speaker, this is a Republican bill, which, as the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Financial Services pointed out in the Rules Committee last night, enjoys strong bipartisan support, and it enjoys the kind of support that motherhood and apple pie enjoy. There is no controversy to this bill whatsoever. And I am very proud of the fact, as the gentlewoman from New York said, that we are now, by passing an open rule for the second time in the 110th Congress, doubling the record that we had in the 109th Congress when it came to open rules. But the true test will come when we are dealing with a controversial issue that does not enjoy strong bipartisan support. That is where this Madisonian vision of a clash of ideas is very important, Mr. Speaker. And so I hope very much that as we bring measures, both of which in the 110th Congress were passed by unanimous votes in the 109th Congress, to the floor, and we are very proud of the fact that they are being considered on an open rule, I hope very much that we will do everything that we possibly can to ensure that debates like the one that we had 2 weeks ago on the issue of Iraq are considered under a process that will allow maybe a chance for the minority to consider a substitute, or a process that would, again, bring that clash of ideas, because it is very clear there was complete agreement on the fuels bill that we dealt with 2 weeks ago under an open rule, extraordinarily strong bipartisan support. There is complete agreement on the goal of CFIUS reform. Yes, we know that 12 amendments were filed by seven Members last night that will be considered here on the House floor under this open amendment process, but at the end of the day, Republicans and Democrats will come together in support of this. The true test, Mr. Speaker, will be whether or not we take up a measure where there is strong, vigorous disagreement on the part of our Members. But I will say that we need to recognize that the two most important issues that we face as Members of this institution are the issues of, first and foremost, our national security; and, second, ensuring that we create economic opportunity for all Americans and maintain the strong, bold, dynamic growth that we have in our economy. This measure that we are addressing today actually addresses both issues, Mr. Speaker. It will strengthen the process by which our national security stakeholders in the administration, from the Defense Department to the National Security Agency, review and investigate foreign investors in the U.S. economy. It focuses in particular on those companies that are controlled by foreign governments or are based in countries that support terrorism. These are commonsense reforms that again enjoy strong bipartisan support that will provide an adequate level of scrutiny to ensure that no investment poses a national security threat to our interests. However, it also ensures a process that, while thorough, is not prohibitive. This legislation is a reflection of the need for a review process that does not close us off to the vital foreign investment that is a major source of our economic strength. I again praise the distinguished Chair of the Committee on Financial Services who last night in the Rules Committee talked about the importance of foreign direct investment. FDI is very important to us, and if we look at our economic growth, there is a strong, strong reliance that we have had. Because economic security underpins national security, it is absolutely imperative that we work to ensure that our economy remains the world's best place to invest and do business. Mr. Speaker, let me provide some numbers that not everyone is familiar with. Foreign companies currently employ 5.3 million Americans here in the United States. We just got the report of this Toyota plant that is going to be opening in Tupelo, Mississippi. It is important to note that those foreign investors who employ 5.3 million Americans actually pay wage rates that are 50 percent higher than the average wage paid here in the United States. Companies like Toyota, Siemens, Novartis come to the United States in order to tap into our powerful market, innovative environment and superior workforce. In the process, they generate greater economic activity, create high-paying jobs and improve our standard of living. And we have enjoyed these benefits, Mr. Speaker, because of the openness, strength and dynamism of the U.S. economy. As we debate the need for national security reforms to our review process, we must recognize that to close off our economy to the world's investors would be to close ourselves off to the prosperity and opportunities that we have long enjoyed as the world's best investment. We cannot lose sight of the fact that we have prospered not in spite of, but because of our Nation's openness. I believe that this bill charts a smart path that preserves both national security and our ability to attract investment and grow our economy. My colleagues, as I said, all agree with me. We have been through this process before, as I said, in the 109th Congress. The bill that was passed in the last Congress was sponsored by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt), the distinguished minority whip, and this legislation which is virtually identical to the bill we are considering today, was considered by an overwhelming unanimous bipartisan vote. Personally, I would very much like to see these good, well-crafted utterly noncontroversial bills where they belong, and that is on the suspension calendar where we passed it quickly and expeditiously in the last Congress. But the fact of the matter is we are where we are, Mr. Speaker. It is important for us to recognize our priorities of national security, number one; and, number two, our economic strength and making sure that we expand that economic growth. I urge support of this rule and the underlying legislation.", u"Mr. President, first, I see the distinguished chairman of the committee and the vice chairman of the committee on the floor. I commend both of them for their excellent work on this legislation. I particularly wish to commend Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond for the bipartisan approach the two of them have brought to tackling these important issues in this session of the Senate. It is extremely important that intelligence is conducted in a bipartisan fashion and the chairman and vice chairman have set a model in terms of approaching these issues in that fashion. In the 1970s, Members of Congress realized there was not nearly enough oversight of our Nation's spy agencies, and this lack of oversight led to a number of serious abuses. In response to the abuses, the Senate created the Select Committee on Intelligence, on which I am proud to serve. Each year, for 29 straight years, our committee has produced an intelligence authorization bill, and this annual legislation has given Congress a means by which to exercise oversight of the classified intelligence budget and provide guidance to the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and various other important intelligence agencies. In 2005 and 2006, regrettably, the Congress failed to pass the Intelligence authorization legislation. In my view, this is inexcusable. At a time when Americans were questioning our intelligence agencies' ability to keep them safe, the Congress failed to provide the necessary support. At a time when the intelligence community was undergoing major reorganization, Congress failed to provide sufficient guidance. At a time when our allies and our own citizens were raising serious questions about our detention policies, the Congress failed to conduct oversight. At a time when Americans were opening their morning papers and reading about the aggressive new forms of Government surveillance, such as the President's warrantless wiretapping program, the Congress failed to demand accountability. The committee did report Intelligence authorization bills for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, but they were blocked repeatedly by anonymous holds. Regrettably, the previous leadership failed to make passing this legislation a top priority. The new leadership of the Senate has decided that ensuring national security and protecting Americans' rights and values is a major concern and, as a result, we are now dealing with this year's Intelligence Authorization Act, and it comes, in my view, to a great extent because of the cooperation of Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, who has also assisted me in a number of critical areas throughout this session of the Senate, for which I am very appreciative. This legislation contains a number of important provisions which I am proud to have worked on with my colleagues on the committee. It clarifies many of the authorities of the Director of National Intelligence, establishes a new national space intelligence center, and creates a strong independent inspector general for the intelligence community. It strengthens congressional oversight by clarifying the President's responsibility to keep the Congress informed of all intelligence activities. In addition, it contains three amendments that I offered and that I believe are going to improve the functioning of our intelligence agencies. The first of these amendments would make public the total amount of the national intelligence budget. In my view, it is ridiculous to suggest that Osama bin Laden is going to gain some sort of advantage from knowing that the national intelligence budget is one specific number or another. But declassifying this number would increase, in my view, transparency and public accountability. It would increase public accountability without sacrificing the national security needs of this country and also permit a more informed debate about funding for defense and national security. The second of these amendments which I offered with the distinguished chairman of the committee, Senator Rockefeller, would increase resources to support the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States. After investigating the proposed takeover of the management of several United States ports by Dubai Ports World, I became convinced that the process for approving these foreign purchases did not include sufficient due diligence. There ought to be more room in this process for input from the intelligence community, and these additional resources that have come about as a result of this amendment I developed with Chairman Rockefeller would support that. The last of these amendments would maximize the criminal penalty for knowingly and intentionally disclosing the identity of a covert agent. Like many Americans, I was shocked and disappointed to learn that members of the administration exposed the identity of an undercover CIA officer for partisan political purposes. Undercover officers perform a vital and demanding service for the Nation, and the very nature of their work prevents them from receiving public praise or recognition. Deliberately exposing an undercover officer for any reason, in my view, is unacceptable, and to do it for a political purpose is simply reprehensible. This provision will send a message to men and women of the CIA and other human intelligence services that the Congress values them and their work and takes any threat to them or to their identity very seriously. I also note that the version of this legislation that was reported by the Intelligence Committee also creates a new exemption to the Privacy Act. In the additional views to the committee report, Senator Feingold and I expressed our view that the impact of this provision had not been considered carefully enough. I am pleased the managers' amendment prepared by Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond removes this provision and, in my view, that is going to make our conference with the House of Representatives easier. In sum, I am pleased with the work--the bipartisan work--our committee put into this legislation, and I hope the Senate will support cloture this afternoon. This is extremely important legislation. It ought to be passed on a bipartisan basis. It should not be subject to a filibuster. Congress has surrendered its national security responsibilities for too long and too often, and it is time for the Congress to stand up and do its job. Chairman Rockefeller and Senator Bond have made it possible for the Senate Intelligence Committee to bring this legislation before the Senate. I am very hopeful this legislation will move forward today and that the Senate will support cloture. Mr. President, I yield the floor.", u" Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2007 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Department of State. (8) The Department of the Treasury. (9) The Department of Energy. (10) The Department of Justice. (11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (12) The National Reconnaissance Office. (13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (14) The Coast Guard. (15) The Department of Homeland Security. (16) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2007, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill S. 372 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress and in the Classified Annex to such report as incorporated in this Act under section 103. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Status of Classified Annex.--The Classified Annex prepared by the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate to accompany its report on the bill S. 372 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress and transmitted to the President is hereby incorporated into this Act. (b) Construction With Other Provisions of Division.--Unless otherwise specifically stated, the amounts specified in the Classified Annex are not in addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated by other provisions of this Act. (c) Limitation on Use of Funds.--Funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization contained in this Act that are made available for a program, project, or activity referred to in the Classified Annex may only be expended for such program, project, or activity in accordance with such terms, conditions, limitations, restrictions, and requirements as are set out for that program, project, or activity in the Classified Annex. (d) Distribution of Classified Annex.--The President shall provide for appropriate distribution of the Classified Annex, or of appropriate portions of the annex, within the executive branch of the Government. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2007 under section 102 when the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2007 the sum of $648,952,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2008. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 1,575 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2007. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2007 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2008. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2007, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2007 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of National Intelligence. (a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill ___ of the One Hundred Tenth Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law. (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) Amounts Requested Each Fiscal Year.--The President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2007 the aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. (b) Amounts Authorized and Appropriated Each Fiscal Year.-- Congress shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2006 the aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, by Congress for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:", u" Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2007 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Department of State. (8) The Department of the Treasury. (9) The Department of Energy. (10) The Department of Justice. (11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (12) The National Reconnaissance Office. (13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (14) The Coast Guard. (15) The Department of Homeland Security. (16) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2007, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill S. 372 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress and in the Classified Annex to such report as incorporated in this Act under section 103. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Status of Classified Annex.--The Classified Annex prepared by the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate to accompany its report on the bill S. 372 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress and transmitted to the President is hereby incorporated into this Act. (b) Construction With Other Provisions of Division.--Unless otherwise specifically stated, the amounts specified in the Classified Annex are not in addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated by other provisions of this Act. (c) Limitation on Use of Funds.--Funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization contained in this Act that are made available for a program, project, or activity referred to in the Classified Annex may only be expended for such program, project, or activity in accordance with such terms, conditions, limitations, restrictions, and requirements as are set out for that program, project, or activity in the Classified Annex. (d) Distribution of Classified Annex.--The President shall provide for appropriate distribution of the Classified Annex, or of appropriate portions of the annex, within the executive branch of the Government. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2007 under section 102 when the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2007 the sum of $648,952,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2008. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 1,575 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2007. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2007 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2008. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2007, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2007 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of National Intelligence. (a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill ___ of the One Hundred Tenth Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law. (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:", u"Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. There probably is no Member in this body who has a greater concern about civil rights and civil liberties than this Member. It is a cause I have worked on for all of my years in this body, and it is one that goes to the very heart of the protections provided under the Constitution and our Bill of Rights. I am equally sensitive to the need to protect our Nation from terrorism and terrorists. I have chaired recently three classified briefings on this matter in the last week and have spent the last period of time seeking to forge common ground on this issue. That is why we are here today, to ensure that our government has the tools it needs to respond to the threat of terrorism, while at the same time respecting our citizens' right to privacy. That is why the bill before us permits the Attorney General to apply to the FISA court to obtain a basket of warrants for the surveillance aimed outside of the United States. That is why we provide an emergency exception. That is why we specify that foreign-to-foreign communications do not require a court order. These are all changes to current law that will help our Nation respond to the threat of terrorism. At the same time, however, the legislation is respectful of our civil liberties. That is why we sunset the bill in 4 months, to see if this stop gap approach is working, how it is working, and allow us to gather further information. That is why we require that the court approve international surveillance procedures. That is why we insist on periodic audits. None of these safeguards exist under the current law, and all will serve to protect our precious rights and liberties. The bill before us today responds to each and every concern raised by the distinguished Director of National Intelligence in our negotiations. In particular, yesterday he asked us to make three changes: expanding the bill to cover foreign intelligence; allowing the administration to approve guidelines for recurring communications; and allowing additional foreign targets to be added to the warrant by the court. I was concerned that some of these changes may have gone too far, but in the spirit of accommodation we made all three changes. Sometimes people simply don't want to accept ``yes'' for an answer. I urge every Member in this body to support this important and balanced measure. Madam Speaker, I include for the Record today's New York Times editorial entitled ``Stampeding Congress, Again.'' Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not feel bound by the law or the Constitution when it comes to the war on terror. It cannot even be trusted to properly use the enhanced powers it was legally granted after the attacks. Yet, once again, President Bush has been trying to stampede Congress into a completely unnecessary expansion of his power to spy on Americans. And, hard as it is to believe, Congressional Republicans seem bent on collaborating, while Democrats (who can still be cowed by the White House's with- us-or-against-us baiting) aren't doing enough to stop it. The fight is over the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which requires the government to obtain a warrant before eavesdropping on electronic communications that involve someone in the United States. The test is whether there is probably cause to believe that the person being communicated with is an agent of a foreign power or a terrorist. Mr. Bush decided after 9/11 that he was no longer going to obey that law. He authorized the National Security Agency to intercept international telephone calls and e-mail messages of Americans and other residents of this country without a court order. He told the public nothing and Congress next to nothing about what he was doing, until The Times disclosed the spying in December 2005. Ever since, the White House has tried to pressure Congress into legalizing Mr. Bush's rogue operation. Most recently, it seized on a secret court ruling that spotlighted a technical way in which the 1978 law has not kept pace with the Internet era. The government may freely monitor communications when both parties are outside the United States, but must get a warrant aimed at a specific person for communications that originate or end in his country. The Los Angeles Times reported yesterday that the court that issues such warrants recently ruled that the law also requires that the government seek such an individualized warrant for purely foreign communications that, nevertheless, move through American data networks. Instead of asking Congress to address this anachronism, as it should, the White House sought to use it to destroy the 1978 spying law. It proposed giving the attorney general carte blanche to order eavesdropping on any international telephone calls or e-mail messages if he decided on his own that there was a ``reasonable belief'' that the target of the surveillance was outside the United States. The attorney general's decision would not be subject to court approval or any supervision. The White House, of course, insisted that Congress must do this right away, before the August recess that begins on Monday--the same false urgency it used to manipulate Congress into passing the Patriot Act without reading it and approving the appalling Military Commissions Act of 2006. Senator Jay Rockefeller, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, offered a sensible alternative law, as did his fellow Democrat, Senator Russ Feingold. In either case, the attorney general would be able to get a broad warrant to intercept foreign communications routed through American networks for a limited period. Then, he would have to justify the spying in court. This fix would have an expiration date so Congress could then dispassionately consider what permanent changes might be needed to FISA. Congress was debating this issue yesterday, and the final outcome was unclear. But there are very clear lines that must not be crossed. First, all electronic surveillance of communication that originates or ends in the United States must be subject to approval and review by the FISA court under the 1978 law. (That court, by the way, has rejected only one warrant in the last two years.) Second, any measure Congress approves now must have a firm expiration date. Closed-door-meetings under the pressure of a looming vacation are no place for such serious business. The administration and its Republican supporters in Congress argue that American intelligence is blinded by FISA and have seized on neatly timed warnings of heightened terrorist activity to scare everyone. It is vital for Americans, especially law-makers, to resist that argument. It is pure propaganda. This is not, and has never been, a debate over whether the United States should conduct effective surveillance of terrorists and their supporters. It is over whether we are a nation ruled by law, or the whims of men in power. Mr. Bush faced that choice and made the wrong one. Congress must not follow him off the cliff. I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Mr. President, on Monday, the Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the administration's electronic surveillance program and we dealt solely with the issues of law as to whether the resolution to authorize the use of force on September 14 provided authority in contradistinction to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which flatly prohibits any kind of electronic surveillance without a court order. Then we got into the issue of the President's inherent powers under article II. It is difficult to define those powers without knowing more about the program and we do not know about the program. It was beyond the scope of our hearing, but it is something that may be taken up by the Intelligence Committee. But I made a suggestion to the administration in a letter, in which I wrote to Attorney General Gonzales and put in the Record at our Judiciary Committee hearing, that the administration ought to submit this program to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. They have the expertise and they are trustworthy. It is a regrettable fact of life in Washington that there are leaks from the Congress and there are leaks from the administration, but the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has been able to maintain its secrecy. The Attorney General said the administration was disinclined to do that. In response to the letter, he wrote, a written response, he said that they would exercise all of their options. I am now in the process of drafting legislation which would call upon the Congress to exercise our article I powers under the Constitution to make it more of a matter for congressional oversight, but respecting the constitutional powers of the President under article I. The Congress has very substantial authority. The President has powers under article II; the Congress has very substantial powers under article I. In section 8, there are a series of provisions which deal with congressional authority on military operations. One which hits it right on the head is to make rules for the Government and regulations of the land and naval forces. That would comprehend what is being done now on the electronic surveillance program. The thrust of the legislative proposal I am drafting and have talked to a number of my colleagues about, with some affirmative responses, is to require the administration to take the program to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. I think that they ought to do it on their own because I think that there are many questions which have been raised by both the Republicans and Democrats. We want to be secure and we want the military, the administration and the President to have all the tools that they need to fight terrorism, but we also want to maintain our civil liberties. If that unease would be solved by having the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court tell the administration that it is constitutional, if they say that it is unconstitutional, then there ought to be a modification of it so what the administration is doing is constitutional. This comes squarely within the often-cited concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure case about the President's authority being at its utmost when Congress backs him, on middle ground when Congress has not spoken, and weakest when Congress has acted oppositely in the field, which I think Congress has done under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act because the President's congressional authority then is whatever he has minus whatever Congress has that is taken away from him. As Justice Jackson said, what is involved is the equilibrium of the constitutional system. That is a very weighty concept--the equilibrium of the constitutional system. The legislation I am preparing will set criteria for what ought to be done to establish what the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court should apply in determining whether the administration's program is constitutional. The standard of probable cause ought to be the one which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court should apply now--not the criminal standard, but the one for gathering intelligence. Then they ought to weigh and balance the nature of the threat, the scope of the program, how many people are being intercepted, what is being done with the information, what is being done on minimization--which is the phrase that the information is not useful in terms of deleting it or getting rid of it--how successful the program has been, if any projected terrorist threats have been thwarted, and all factors relating to the specifics on the program--its reasons, its rationale for existence and precisely what is being undertaken, its success--and that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ought to look to this, essentially, prospectively. The court does not have punitive powers, and I do not believe that it is of matter, except to work from this day forward as to what is being done. No one doubts--or at least I do not doubt--the good faith of the President, the Attorney General, and the administration on what they have done here. But as I said in the hearing, I said to Attorney General Gonzales, the administration may be right but, on the other hand, they may be wrong. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ought to take a look at the program, make a determination from this day forward whether it is constitutional, and if it is constitutional, then they ought to, under the statute, report back to Congress with their determination as to whether it is constitutional. The court ought to further make a determination as to whether it ought to be modified in some way which would be consistent with what the administration wants to accomplish but still be constitutional and not an unreasonable invasion of privacy. The President has represented that his program is reevaluated every 45 days. That is in terms of the evaluation of the continuing threat and what ought to be done. I think a 45-day evaluation period would be in order here as well. This question is one which is not going to go away. We had, yesterday, the comment by a Republican Member of the House of Representatives in the Intelligence Committee who chairs the subcommittee that oversees the National Security Agency. There are quite a number of people on both sides of the aisle who have expressed concerns regarding this program. It is my judgment that having it reviewed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court would accomplish all of the objectives, would maintain the secrecy of the program, would allow the President to continue it when there has been the determination by a court--that is how we determine probable cause on search warrants, on arrest warrants, on the activities, the traditional way of putting the magistrate, the judicial official between the Government and the individual whose privacy rights are being involved. I yield the floor.", u"I thank Congressman Gohmert so much for your comments and for your participation. What we are doing is the Official Truth Squad. The Official Truth Squad is primarily a group of freshmen Congressmen and women frustrated by the tone in Washington, frustrated by the animosity and doing our doggonedest to raise the level of discussion, raise the level of the rhetoric, be a little more positive, and put out the word that, yes, there are individuals in Congress who love this Nation, who believe that it is the finest Nation on the face of the Earth and are proud of the work that we are doing and trying to correct the record sometimes, bringing truth to light. To that end, I think it is important that we sometimes highlight statements by people who may have a certain forum or a certain podium that simply is untrue, because it is important that somebody stand up and say, no, that is not the case; and I refer now to comments that were made just this past Sunday by former Vice President Al Gore. He was visiting Saudi Arabia and he was talking to an audience there, and oftentimes when he talks sometimes there is a bit of hyperbole, but this is not hyperbole. These are flat-out lies. This is just not the truth. What he said was that the U.S. government has committed ``terrible abuses'' against Arabs after the September 11, 2001, attacks. He went on to say that the United States ``indiscriminately rounded up'' and held in ``unforgivable conditions.'' Now, I ask you, Mr. Speaker, where is the evidence for that? I ask you, where is the evidence for that? That is as unconscionable and irresponsible a comment as I have ever heard uttered. I ask the Democratic leadership, are you supportive of these comments? Is that what you believe? The silence from the other side really is, again, a disservice to the debate. It does a disservice to the Nation, frankly. So I call on my colleagues to stand up and be counted on this. If you got the evidence, then let us show it. But to make those kind of comments, especially overseas, there used to be some protocol or some common courtesy that former members of the executive branch, especially when traveling overseas, would not criticize a sitting President or the United States. Well, those common courtesies are long since gone. Again, that is kind of what the Official Truth Squad is all about, raise the level of the rhetoric and hopefully be able to bring some truth to light. I have a few minutes left, and I wanted to talk about the National Security Agency and the domestic terrorism surveillance. When I talk with constituents back home in Georgia and I ask them and I ask big groups, tell me if you were running the country and you knew that there were certain cell phones or certain telephones of communication devices that were owned or utilized by terrorists, international terrorists, and you knew that, and you knew when one of those individuals was going to make a call into the United States, would you want to know who they were talking to? Would you want to know what number they were calling? I have not gotten a single person yet to tell me that they would not want to know that. Not one. The American people know the truth about this program, this domestic terrorist surveillance program. They know that what this government is doing is protecting them. It is protecting them. So much so that when the discussion initially occurred about this program, the Members on the other side, many Members of the other side stood up and just shouted it down, just said awful things about the individuals performing it, awful things about its being in place. Then they heard from their constituents. Most districts, it is 65, 75, 80 percent of folks at home who believe this type of program is appropriate. We are not talking about listening to American calls. We are talking about, appropriately so, to calls from known terrorists, outside the United States into the United States. I would suggest to the House, Mr. Speaker, I would suggest to the American people that if we were not doing that, if we were not doing that, we would be irresponsible. Well, the Members on the other side of the aisle certainly got that information at home. Because this past Sunday on Meet the Press Mr. Russert had the sitting ranking member of the House of Representatives on the Intelligence Committee, Representative Harman, and former Senator Daschle, who was the minority leader in the Senate when this program began, and asked them some very specific questions. One of the questions he asked was, Senator Daschle, were you briefed? He was talking about this program. Senator Daschle's response, it goes into long details, but, yes, we were briefed. We were briefed. As the President said, if he wanted to break the law, why did he come to Congress and tell him what he was doing? So the truth is that this is an appropriate program. The truth is Congress knew about it in the appropriate ways. Representative Harman was asked, do you support the program? And she says, I still support the program. This is the thing they are arguing so much about and complaining so much about. Senator Daschle, should the President stop this program? Senator Daschle replies, no, absolutely not. Mr. Russert asked Representative Harman, do you think the program should be stopped? Representative Harman, no, I think the program should go on. So, Mr. Speaker, truth is an important thing to talk about when we are discussing about matters of public policy. As Congressman Gohmert and others have mentioned, I am a physician. I am an orthopedic surgeon. I practiced for nearly 20 years in the Atlanta area, and I know if you do not listen to the right results of tests, if you do not investigate, if you do not get the right information, if you do not get the truth, you cannot make the right diagnosis. And the same is true in public policy. If you are not talking about things in a truthful manner, if you are not putting out information that is accurate, then there is no way that you can reach the right solution. Mr. Speaker, I am proud of the leadership that the Speaker is providing. I am proud of the leadership the Republican leadership is providing about the area and the issue of national security. Because this is not a Republican issue, it is not a Democrat issue, it is an American issue, and it may be the most important thing that we have to do as Members of the House of Representatives. So my hope and prayer truly is that all Members of the House and the Senate will work together in this most solemn, solemn of challenges and tasks that we have and ensure the protection of our Nation.", u"Mr. President I rise to discuss the nomination of Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to the Supreme Court to the United States. After closely and carefully studying his record and recent testimony before the Judiciary Committee, I have decided to vote against Judge Alito's confirmation to the Supreme Court of United States. Of course, it is vital that any lifetime appointee to the highest court in the Nation possess the breadth of experience and character necessary to review the most significant, complex, and far-reaching legal questions of our time. But that is not enough. I see disappointing and clear evidence in Judge Alito's long record, rulings, and statements of dangerously skewing the balance and relationship between our branches of Government. I do not expect any nominee to the Supreme Court to predict and promise with certainty how he or she will rule in any and all future cases. But I do expect nominees to make clear that they would protect the most basic rights of individuals and the fundamental structure and foundations of our democracy. Yet I cannot be sure that Judge Alito would do either. Indeed, I question whether he would show due respect for the authority of Congress or apply a necessary check to the reach of the executive. Serving as that check has long been one of the Court's most solemn obligations. Today, that role is more important than ever. We have seen evidence of a National Security Agency's eavesdropping program operating in question of a legal framework and without due oversight. We are seeing literally, in wartime, a President reach without probable cause or warrant at the expense of individual rights and the most basic protections of the Constitution. Yet it is a question whether Judge Alito would adequately control that reach. Judge Alito has a record of concern when it comes to placing and consolidating the rights of the government over the rights of the individual. Consider, for example, how Judge Alito would give virtually unfettered authority to the police to trample on the clear privacy protections given to every American as demonstrated in his 2004 dissent in Doe v. Groody. In this case he would have upheld the strip search of a 10-year-old girl and her mother, despite the fact that they were not suspected of any crime nor named in any search warrant. When asked at his hearing about this case, and his minority opinion, Judge Alito repeatedly sought to portray it as ``a rather technical issue,'' a question of whether the police affidavit should be incorporated into the warrant itself, and suggested that the police were operating under time pressure. These claims are inconsistent with the facts, as made clear by Judge Alito's colleague, then-Judge Michael Chertoff, now Secretary of Homeland Security. According to Judge Chertoff, the approach advocated by Alito in Groody ``might indeed transform the judicial officer into little more than the cliche `rubber stamp.''' The American people deserve a Supreme Court Justice who understands how important privacy rights are to all Americans, even the most vulnerable. They deserve more than just a rubber stamp. History shows that our courts have often stood up to Presidential overreaching during wartime: protecting the right of habeas corpus during the Civil War; forbidding the president from authorizing domestic warrantless wiretaps during the Cold War; and in the War on Terror by an 8-to-1 margin, the Supreme Court held that the President cannot indefinitely detain American citizens without allowing them to challenge their detentions before a neutral decisionmaker, another power this administration had claimed. Worse still, in areas where precedent is sparse or dated--such as the war on terror and the executive's power to carry it out--Judge Alito's record and testimony suggests that he is far more likely to defer to the ideological ambitions of our President than the protection and rights of our citizens. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with an aggressive executive, especially at times of great peril. An aggressive executive, however, also requires a strong and functional Congress, the responsive voice of the people. I have questions, however, if Judge Alito's rulings will narrowly define the law and therefore threaten the authority and ability of Congress to govern effectively and affirmatively. Writing in Chittister v. Department of Community & Economic Development, Judge Alito wrote that parts of the Family and Medical Leave Act, FMLA, which allow employees to leave when they or family members are seriously ill, were not applicable against the States. When passing the legislation Congress had identified the importance of both men and women in caring for young children and family members with serious health conditions. Congress also pointed to the burden that family caretaking imposes on women. But Judge Alito denied those findings. He saw no ``existence, much less the prevalence, in public employment of personal sick leave practices that amounted to intentional gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.'' This view essentially deflated Congress's ability to defend civil rights. He wrote: ``Even if there were relevant findings or evidence, the FMLA provisions at issue here would not be congruent or proportional. Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, which the FMLA is said to enforce, the FMLA does much more than require nondiscriminatory sick leave practices; it creates a substantive entitlement to leave. This is `disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act.''' The Supreme Court later rejected Alito's position on the FMLA. Ultimately, the Commerce clause is about understanding Congress's power to protect our families and its ability to respond to threats that immediately affect those families. In February, for example, the Court is scheduled to hear arguments on the scope of the commerce clause in two critical cases that could restrict the geographic jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act to one percent of its current coverage. In my State, we know how fragile our precious natural resources can be. The Pacific Northwest is blessed with incredible beauty. But habitat loss and other pressures threaten some of my State's most iconic species, salmon that spawn our great rivers and birds that depend on old growth forests. We also know that how we treat those resources and that wildlife speaks to our priorities as a people and a nation. How do we value our communities and ensure their safety? How do we honor an individual's freedom and his or her rights? While I do not expect any judicial nominee to prejudge future cases, I do expect all nominees to make their positions clear on protecting the most basic rights of individuals and the fundamental structure and foundations of our democracy. In the end, I cannot be sure that Judge Alito would do either. As I mentioned earlier, I believe that Judge Alito has a record of concern when it comes to placing and consolidating the rights of the government over the rights of the individual, and he has not provided the answers to adequately reassure the people of our Nation. I must conclude that he would neither show due respect for the authority of Congress nor apply a necessary check to the reach of the executive. With great respect for the institution, I cannot vote to confirm Judge Alito to the Supreme Court of the United States.", u"Madam Speaker, H.R. 5020, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, deals with one of the most important aspects of our national security: our ability to gather and analyze intelligence effectively so that our policies are based on fact, not fantasy or obsessive desire, so that our Federal law enforcement agencies can defend us from the threat of attack, and so that our allies can rely on our resources for timely, coordinated operations in defense of freedom abroad. I want to commend Chairman Hoekstra and Ranking Member Harman and members of the Intelligence Committee for authorizing 100 percent of the funding required for our counterterrorism operations. Regrettably, President Bush only included 78 percent of this funding in his budget request; so I thank the committee for correcting this dangerous shortfall. The Intelligence Authorization Act traditionally receives strong bipartisan support and will likely receive that same support this year. But despite its many attributes, this bill could have and should have been better. This bill could have and should have required a dedicated funding line for the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. When Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in December 2004 in response to the findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission report, it created this board to serve as a civil liberties watchdog on the potential erosion of the basic constitutional rights of the American people in a post-9/11 world. Now, 15 months later, we find our concerns about basic civil rights to have been well founded, but the oversight board is barely up and running. The President did not nominate the members of the board for 9 months. The Senate took 5 months to confirm the chair and vice chair. And, once again, the President's budget failed to include a single penny for the board's operation in fiscal year 2007. This could have and should have been fixed in committee. Congressmen Hastings, Reyes, and Holt offered an amendment to provide $3 million in dedicated funding for the oversight board, an amendment that should have had bipartisan support. But the majority chose to reject this funding and abandon their promise to the American people to safeguard their most basic freedoms and rights. And last night in the Rules Committee, the Republican leadership compounded this mistake by denying Congressman Reyes the right to offer this same amendment for debate on the House floor. And then we have the issue of the National Security Agency's spying on U.S. citizens. In committee, Representative Eshoo offered a carefully crafted amendment to withhold 20 percent of the NSA's budget until the executive branch provided the Intelligence Committee with the total cost of its surveillance program. That is all: just inform the committee of this one number. The Eshoo amendment was not looking for more operational details. It was not passing judgment on whether the NSA's domestic spying program is legal or not, even though that is a controversial matter in this House. All it was looking for is how many of our tax dollars are being spent on this surveillance program. This is a question that should concern every single Member of this body on both sides of the aisle. But with just one exception, the Republican majority found it too much to ask and rejected the Eshoo amendment. Yesterday in the Rules Committee, the Republican leadership went even further. The Republican Rules Committee denied Representatives Schiff, Flake, Harman, and Inglis the right to offer their bipartisan amendment for debate. This amendment would have required a classified disclosure to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, the two committees with jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities over the NSA and the FISA process, on which U.S. citizens have been the subject of NSA electronic surveillance, and what criteria was used to target them. Such a classified report would allow Congress to understand the program and whether any current laws need to be amended to grant the President the authority he needs to carry out this program more effectively or make any changes to safeguard against abuse. In short, these two committees need this information in order to do their jobs, in order to carry out their oversight responsibilities. This bipartisan amendment should have received bipartisan support from the Rules Committee, but it did not; not from the Republican majority on this Rules Committee and certainly not from the Republican leadership of this House. It is outrageous, Madam Speaker. Many of us believe that when the President authorized the NSA surveillance of Americans, he broke the law, plain and simple. And when the Attorney General says that Congress somehow granted the authority for this program after September 11, he is just wrong. We are talking about the most basic fundamental civil liberties that protect the American people, and the Republican leadership will not even let us debate it. What are they afraid of? I would ask my Republican friends to re-read their Constitution. Congress was not designed to be a rubber stamp for the President. Congress was not designed to protect Members from difficult votes on controversial issues. Congress was not designed to protect the President's political rear end. But under this leadership that is exactly what Congress has become. If my friends on the other side of the aisle believe that this President should have the ability to spy on Americans without a warrant and without going to the FISA court, then they should write that bill and bring it to the floor. They should at least show that level of respect for this House and for this Constitution. I am willing to bet that the majority of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle believe that what the President is doing is wrong. But either way, the very least we could do is have a debate and a vote. Madam Speaker, 25 amendments were brought to the Rules Committee last night. They dealt with issues ranging from how the NSA carries out surveillance of American citizens to how the Intelligence Committee and other relevant committees are briefed about weapons of mass destruction or the situations in Iran, North Korea, Iraq, and other hot spots. They dealt with how information is classified or reclassified, how national security whistle-blowers are protected or punished, and whether and how the amount of funds requested and appropriated for various intelligence-related activities are reported to Congress. These are not trivial matters, Madam Speaker. Yet only five amendments, five amendments, Madam Speaker, plus the manager's amendment, were made in order under this highly restrictive rule. Why is the Republican leadership so afraid to debate these issues? Why is it so afraid to debate, period? After nearly 4 months of a lackluster Congress, are we suddenly on some tight time clock so there is no time to debate matters affecting national security? Do we need to get out of town by Thursday afternoon? I am happy to stay in town on Friday if it means we can get a full debate on the Intelligence Authorization Act. I am tired of restrictive rules. I am tired of stifling debate. I am tired of ignoring or running away from the big issues. I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this restrictive rule and to support an open debate on important issues facing our national security and intelligence agencies. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the nomination of Gen. Michael Hayden as the next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I have known Gen. Hayden for years and believe he is the most qualified candidate in the country for this critical position. To further illustrate this point, I would like to call your attention to a recent editorial by retired Gen. Charles Boyd that appeared in the Wall Street Journal on May 11 which makes a convincing case for the Hayden nomination. Mr. Speaker, Gen. Boyd served 35 years in the Air Force. As a combat pilot in Vietnam, he was shot down on his 105th mission and survived 2,488 days as a prisoner of war. The only POW from that war to achieve the four-star rank, General Boyd's final military assignment was as deputy commander in chief of U.S. forces in Europe. Prior to this assignment, Gen. Boyd was the commander of Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, in my congressional district. With that, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to place in the Record a copy of Gen. Boyd's editorial. Our political disagreements are often obtuse for the simple reason that it is difficult to discern motives. Do disputants put the interests of the country ahead of partisan and personal concerns? Moreover, disagreements about intelligence issues are doubly hard to parse, since--despite leaks and rampant gossip--most of what goes on inside the Central Intelligence Agency remains opaque even to high-paid journalists and other Washington sophisticates. And so, amid partisan positioning and an imposing ignorance, is the scene set for the already dismaying dispute over the president's nomination of Michael Hayden to be CIA director. The arguments (to use a generous term) being made against Gen. Hayden are so without merit or even serious content that one cannot help but suspect partisan stratagems at work. Of these, three are most common. First, the contention that Michael Hayden is a kind of intelligence technocrat, knowledgeable only in signal intelligence, is pure canard. A liberal-arts man, Gen. Hayden has a masters degree in history, and was the broad-based senior intelligence official for the Air Force and the U.S. European Command before entering the technical domain of the National Security Agency. He worked on the National Security Council staff, in the U.N. Command and U.S. Forces Korea, and in these positions was a senior level consumer of intelligence as well as an earlier producer of it. Those who make such accusations do not know him or, more broadly, what they are talking about. Some complain, secondly, that Gen. Hayden was somehow complicit in the domestic eavesdropping undertaken by the NSA at the president's direction. Gen. Hayden's sin in this case seems to stem from his calm and rational defense of an embattled president's heretofore secret program. No legal infractions attended anyone's behavior in what was, and remains, a policy response to a clear and present threat. Moreover, if Gen. Hayden had objected--having been assured by the attorney general, the Department of Justice, the White House counsel and the NSA general counsel that the program was legal--his position would have been unprofessional and ill-advised. Third, there is the objection that Gen. Hayden is, well, a general--a military man--as if that automatically disqualifies him for the job. Since the National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA, four military officers have held the director's job--plus two more who directed the postwar predecessor to the CIA. So there is ample precedent for Gen. Hayden's nomination. But the complaint here is not so much about precedent as the presumption that Gen. Hayden would docilely do the bidding of the bureaucratic imperium represented by the present secretary of defense. To believe this is to ignore his professional history. Gen. Hayden was the only high-ranking active-duty general to testify against Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's desires as the National Intelligence Directorate was debated by Congress in 2004. He did so, he believed, in the interests of a more rational template for oversight, and control of those intelligence agencies now under the Defense Department whose customers are multidepartmental. Gen. Hayden was a man of convictions with the courage to defend them when he was a lieutenant colonel, and has lost neither of those characteristics as he ascended into the senior ranks of his profession. Most important, the best guarantee against coercion of the CIA director by any cabinet-level official--or president--may be stated in one word: professionalism. And Michael Hayden, as I have observed for nearly 20 years, is a professional par excellence. Those who wish to harm the president seem intent on using Gen. Hayden as a bank shot into the Oval Office. This is a great shame, and stands to be an important missed opportunity, for the confirmation process--were it to focus truly on the national interest--could do a great deal of good at this time of tumult in the intelligence community. There has been, for a long time, a tendency on the part of some presidents to select CIA directors who were amateurs in the craft. Their political or ideological leanings have sometimes been a more important factor in their appointment than their knowledge and capabilities in the arcane world of intelligence. With those chosen for such reasons comes a weakened ability to resist pressure to marshal intelligence in ways tailored to support the policy objectives of a president: pressure to give the president what he wants rather than what he needs. It is fair, I believe, to claim that the intelligence failures of recent years were a long time in the making, and that they were failures not so much of the institution but of a flawed intelligence leadership selection process. ``Amateur'' is not, by definition, a swear word; we have had, on occasion, some very talented non-professional directors of Central Intelligence. But there is no substitute for the professional knowledge and ethos at the top that legitimate and protect the intelligence function from a host of political pressures and insinuations. Gen. Hayden's confirmation hearings should, first of all, result in his confirmation. But beyond that, the hearings could do the country an important service if they were to consider a more thoroughgoing reform--modeling the key intelligence positions in the U.S. government on that of the chairman of the Federal Reserve, or of the Joint Chiefs, whose term does not run parallel to that of the president, and whose professional credentials are critical elements in his selection. More than anything else the Congress can do, such a reform would help restore the professionalism that is crucial to the intelligence function in a democracy. That would be no bank shot, but a slam-dunk for national security.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to repealing the estate tax. It is fiscally irresponsible and would drive higher an already swelling deficit. Repealing the estate tax lacks rigidity that is desperately needed to reduce the national deficit and balance the budget. On the heels of passing consecutive tax cuts for the wealthy, repealing the estate tax would grant further tax relief to the most affluent in our country while the poor and the working class continue to struggle to make ends meet. Contrarily, estate tax repeal would save the estate of Vice President Dick Cheney between $13 million and $61 million. It would save the estate of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld between $32 million and $101 million. The estate of retired Exxon Mobil chairman Lee Raymond would save a comfortable $164 million. Additionally, tax relief for the wealthy does not materialize in gains for the poorest in America. I urge my colleague in the Senate, Jon Kyl, to abandon the pursuit of legislation that would permanently repeal the estate tax for the wealthiest Americans. If adopted, Sen. Kyl's bill would plunge the government into another trillion dollars into the red during the first decade (2011-2021) that the legislation would be in effect. As boomers are retiring from the market place, Congress should mount a concerted effort to preserve Social Security and Medicare rather than giving tax cuts to the wealthy who are not demanding them. Health care needs are not being met by employers and a growing number of Americans are without adequate access to vital care. Repealing the estate tax will not bring these services and other needs to the most disadvantaged in our nation. Repealing the estate tax is misguided public policy. Democrats and Republicans should focus on strengthening education, Social Security, Medicare and restoring discipline to budget spending. Mr. Speaker, I would like to introduce an op-ed article written by Harold Meyerson, titled ``Estate Tax Lunacy'' in the Washington Post on May 31, 2006. Spring has given way to summer's full-furnace heat in Washington, apparently taking with it any scintilla of sense that Congress may yet possess. In the House, Republicans who could not even raise an eyebrow at reports that the National Security Agency has been conducting warrantless wiretaps of Americans became instant civil libertarians when the FBI conducted a search of a congressman's office. The Senate, meanwhile, is scheduled next week to take up legislation by Arizona Republican Jon Kyl that would permanently repeal the estate tax on the wealthiest Americans. If enacted, Kyl's bill would plunge the government another trillion dollars into the red during the first decade (2011-2021) that it would be in effect. Behind the scenes, the action has been on the Democratic side in the Senate, as the party's leadership has sought to dissuade Montana's Max Baucus, ranking Democrat on the Finance Committee, from forging a halfway-house compromise with Kyl that would deplete revenue by only $500 billion to $600 billion during that decade. The Republicans would need Baucus to bring roughly a half-dozen Democrats along with him to reach the magic number of 60 votes required to overcome any filibuster that the vast majority of Democrats would mount to block any such measure. Even a paltry $500 billion, of course, is a lot of money to drain from public coffers just when boomers are going onto Social Security and Medicare and the number of employers providing health insurance, if present trends continue, might have dropped to a virtuous handful. To cover those and other needs, Congress will either plunge us deeper into debt or increase some other levies--payroll taxes, say--that will come out of the pockets of the 99 percent of Americans whom the estate tax doesn't touch. A decades-long campaign by right-wing activists (brilliantly documented by Yale professors Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro in their book ``Death by a Thousand Cuts'') has convinced many Americans that the estate tax poses a threat to countless hardworking families. That was always nonsense, and under the estate tax revisions that almost all Democrats support--raising the threshold for eligibility to $3.5 million for an individual and $7 million for a couple--it becomes more nonsensical still. Under the $3.5 million exemption, the number of family-owned small businesses required to pay any taxes in the year 2000 would have been just 94, according to a study by the Congressional Budget Office. The number of family farms that would have had to sell any assets to pay that tax would have been 13. On the other hand, an estate tax repeal would save the estate of Vice President Cheney between $13 million and $61 million, according to the publicly available data on his net worth. It would save the estate of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld between $32 million and $101 million. The estate of retired Exxon Mobil chairman Lee Raymond would pocket a cozy $164 million. As for the late Sam Walton's kids, whose company already makes taxpayers foot the bill for the medical expenses of thousands of its employees, the cost to the government for not taxing their estates would run into the multiple billions. The Baucus split-the-difference measure wouldn't repeal the estate tax, but it would still cut the tax rates on the estates of the super-rich by 15 percent. The Montana senator spent much of last week trying to line up a handful of his Senate Democratic colleagues to support his proposal, in the hope of being able to announce an unshakable 60 votes favoring this folly when the debate begins next week. Why any Democrat would back such a measure, however, is a deep mystery. From the policy standpoint, it would make it vastly more difficult both to shore up programs that Democrats believe need shoring up--better educating the nation's children, for one--and to get the nation's fiscal house in order. Politically, backing the measure is even wackier. The Democrats are running this year as the party of comparative fiscal sanity and greater economic equity and security. Baucus's compromise would undermine all those premises. Republicans might very well attack Democratic senators up for reelection this year for failing to repeal this hideous death tax, as they call it, but any Democratic senator who can't rebut that charge in what is shaping up as a very Democratic year should probably be in another line of work. Last Friday Baucus's staffers assured the Democratic Senate leadership's staff that their boss would back off his compromise campaign. Still, given Baucus's penchant for mischief (it was largely he who rounded up enough Democratic votes to enact Medicare Part D and its Big Pharma giveaway), those assurances have met with some skepticism on Capitol Hill. The Democrats' capacity to undermine themselves has not vanished with the final days of spring.", u"Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oregon for allowing me to go first as chairman of the committee. Senator Wyden is a very valued member of the committee with very strong and independent views but has always contributed in a bipartisan way on behalf of our national security. Good evening, Mr. President. The hour is a little late. Actually, the night is young, but I am not. Nevertheless, I am going to try to be pertinent on a matter that is of real importance, and that is, in fact, the nomination and hopefully what we expect to be the confirmation of GEN Michael V. Hayden to serve as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. As chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, I rise tonight and associate myself with the remarks made by Senator Hatch, who is another very valued member of the committee, in strong support of the nomination of General Hayden to be the next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He is eminently qualified for this position. He is a distinguished public servant, as has been noted, who has given more than 35 years of service to his country. Senator Hatch referred to our hearings both open and closed that we held last week. It was my goal as chairman to ensure that every Senator had enough time to ask any question they wanted or to express any concern they had on their mind in regards to this nomination and the qualifications of this man. I think we accomplished that. We gave every Senator 20 minutes and then another 20 minutes, and then in a regular order, additional time. I might add, Senator Wyden certainly took advantage of that. After over 8 hours, the general, the chairman, and other members of the committee finally concluded. I think it was a good hearing. I think it was a good open hearing and a good closed hearing. General Hayden certainly distinguished himself, and he showed the committee that he will be an outstanding choice for CIA Director. General Hayden entered active duty, in terms of background, with the U.S. Air Force in 1969 after earning both his bachelor's and master's degree from Duquesne University in his hometown of Pittsburgh. He has had a lengthy and diverse career. He has served as Commander of the Air Intelligence Agency and as Director of the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center. He has been assigned to senior staff positions at the Pentagon, at the headquarters of the U.S. European Command, the National Security Council, and at the U.S. Embassy in the People's Republic of Bulgaria. General Hayden has also served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for the United Nations Command and U.S. Forces in Korea and, more importantly, he has served most recently at the highest levels of the intelligence community. From 1999 to 2005, General Hayden was Director of the National Security Agency. Finally, in April of last year, following intelligence reform and a great deal of committee action in regards to the Intelligence Committee to determine the accuracy of our 2002 NIE, National Intelligence Estimate, and then we went through intelligence reform, we had the 9/11 Commission, we had the WMD Commission appointed by the President, he was unanimously confirmed by this body to serve in his current position as the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. He had that kind of background, had that kind of expertise, had that kind of experience. Given his experience at NSA and the Office of the Director of Intelligence, I don't think there is any question General Hayden is well known to the Intelligence Committee. He has briefed us many times. I don't know of anybody in any hearing or briefing who has done any better. It is because of his qualifications and my experience working with him that I support his nomination. This nomination comes before the Senate at a very crucial time. We are a nation fighting a war in which the intelligence community is on the front lines. The CIA is an integral and very vital part of the intelligence community. We need strong leadership in order to protect our national security. When General Hayden takes the helm at the Agency, he is going to find a number of issues that will demand his attention. These are the same issues that we touched on and asked the general to respond to during his confirmation hearings. First, he must continue to improve the Agency's ability to provide public policymakers with high-quality analytic products. The Senate Intelligence Committee's July 2004 report on intelligence related to Iraq's WMD programs did conclude that the agencies of the intelligence community did not explain to policymakers the uncertainties behind their Iraq WMD assessments. Analysts must also observe what I refer to as the golden rule of intelligence analysis, and we asked this specifically of the general: Tell me what you know, tell me what you don't know, tell me what you think and, most importantly, make sure that we understand the difference. It will be up to General Hayden to ensure that the CIA analysts adhere to this rule in the future. Second, General Hayden must improve the CIA's ability to collect what we call humane intelligence. He can begin by ensuring that the Agency is more aggressive in its efforts to penetrate hard targets and in the use of very innovative collection platforms. Third, General Hayden, it seems to me, must improve information access--not information sharing, information access. There is a big difference. We on the Intelligence Committee will look to the general to ensure that appropriately cleared analysts community-wide, with a need to know and the proper training have access to the CIA's intelligence information in its earliest form, while at the same time protecting sensitive sources and methods. No doubt the general will face a number of significant tasks, but based on his record as a manager, his qualifications, and his demonstrated leadership, I believe he is the right choice to lead the CIA. The Senate should expeditiously confirm him and let him get to work over at Langley. Mr. President, I strongly support the nominee, and I urge my colleagues to do the same. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, there are five criteria I use to evaluate all executive branch nominees: competence, integrity, commitment to the core mission of the department, commitment to the Constitution, and independence. Based on what I know about General Hayden after working closely with him for more than 5 years, and based on his testimony last week, I will support his nomination to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA. I have no question about his competence or personal integrity and expect him to remain an independent voice, committed to the Constitution not just with words but with deeds. My confidence in General Hayden should not be interpreted as confidence in this administration. I have flashing yellow lights about the Bush administration's willingness to politicize this important intelligence agency. I am also concerned that this administration sometimes pays lip service to the law of the land, as we have seen with recent revelations about the warrantless surveillance program. In more than 35 years as military intelligence officer, General Hayden has clearly demonstrated his competence, both in his work as Director of the National Security Agency, NSA, and as Deputy Director of National Intelligence. He led NSA at a critical time in the Agency's history, as the United States took the offensive against those who had attacked us. He inherited an agency that needed to be transformed: from its Cold War orientation, from analogue to digital, from concentrating on the Soviet threat to looking at multiple threats and nonstate actors. He accomplished this transformation at breathtaking speed. As Deputy Director of National Intelligence, General Hayden helped stand-up a brand new intelligence organization, recruiting a top-notch team, breaking down ``stove pipes'' between agencies, and helping to unify the entire intelligence community. I have known and worked closely with General Hayden since 1999, when he came to NSA. I have no question about his personal integrity. He has always been a candid reformer. But recent revelations about the warrantless surveillance program have raised serious questions: questions about the integrity of surveillance programs that may have side-stepped the law; questions about a decision at the highest level to keep most members of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee in the dark about these programs; and questions about whether a candid reformer has become a cheerleader for this administration. I discussed my concerns with Hayden during the confirmation hearing, and he promised to ``speak truth to power.'' I take him at his word, but the proof will be in his deeds. I have no question about General Hayden's commitment to the mission of the intelligence community. He has worked in almost every aspect of collecting and analyzing intelligence. But his expertise is technical intelligence, known as signals intelligence, SIGINT, and the CIA is our Nation's lead agency for human intelligence, HUMINT. These two disciplines have very different challenges, different technology, and different cultures. Many have asked if a SIGINT expert is the right choice to lead a HUMINT agency. General Hayden addressed this question in our hearing. He believes his long career in intelligence has prepared him for this challenge. He has a plan to improve HUMINT tradecraft and develop common standards among all HUMINT agencies, including the Defense Intelligence Agency. He will also invest in research and development of the cutting-edge technology our men and women at the CIA need to accomplish their mission. General Hayden has promised to focus our human intelligence activities on understanding tomorrow's threats, not just responding to today's headlines. I believe he will bring to the CIA the same leadership, passion for reform, and respect for our intelligence workers that he brought to the NSA. He will be a strong advocate for the CIA as it struggles to redefine itself. I have two flashing yellow lights about this nomination. First, I have serious questions about the Bush administration's commitment to protecting the Constitution. Second, I believe that we need a CIA Director who will be independent. I believe General Hayden is committed to protecting the Constitution while he works to protect our country from terrorists. But I am concerned that others in this administration pay lip service to the law of the land. We all take an oath when we take office. We swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. We don't swear to a President or to a party. We know there are real threats, predators, actors who want to kill Americans. And we know that some of the tools that keep us safe must remain secret. Which is why our commitment to the Constitution is more important than ever. We can not protect the American people and ignore their Constitution when nobody's looking. Support for the Constitution must be more than lip service. We need a real commitment to put the Constitution first. The Framers gave Congress the responsibility for oversight over the President's policies. We must be informed about significant intelligence activities, as the law requires, so we can exercise our responsibility to protect the Constitution as we protect our Nation from the threats we face. I am very concerned about the independence of the CIA. We need an independent voice at the CIA, someone who is willing to speak truth to power to whomever is President and also to the congressional oversight committees. The last few years have been difficult ones for the CIA, in part because American people have lost confidence in its leaders. The Agency has had too many ``yes'' men, too few independent voices. I asked General Hayden how he would avoid another Powell, when our distinguished Secretary of State was sent to the United Nations with wrong information, because CIA analysis had become too politicized. General Hayden said that his job at the CIA will be to let intelligence analysts do what comes naturally: provide unvarnished intelligence analysts, independent of political concerns. He said, ``My job is to keep anything from getting in the way'' of their work. He promised to consider implementing a dissent channel to allow intelligence workers an avenue for expressing their concerns without leaking classified information to the press. In conclusion, Mr. President, I believe General Hayden is qualified to lead the CIA, and I will vote for his confirmation. But I have serious concerns about how the Bush administration has politicized this important intelligence agency. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence must keep a close eye on the CIA as it struggles to redefine itself and its role in our reformed intelligence community.", u"Mr. President, the Senate today considers the nomination of GEN Michael Hayden to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I support General Hayden's confirmation. He is the right person to lead the CIA out of a period of turmoil and controversy. Without question General Hayden has the necessary credentials. He is a career Air Force intelligence officer who led the National Security Agency for longer than anyone in the history of that agency. When he took over the NSA it was no longer at the cutting edge of information technology as it had been during the Cold War. Not everything he tried worked but he led the agency's turnaround. We no longer worry, as we did in 1999, that the NSA is on the verge of going deaf. General Hayden left the NSA a year ago to become the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence--the number two job in the new organization created by Congress to modernize the intelligence community. He has helped Director John Negroponte start the process of building a cohesive community from the 16 disparate intelligence agencies. Now he will have a chance to continue working on that integration as the Director of the agency that is the lynchpin for U.S. intelligence, the CIA. While his qualifications are obvious, General Hayden's selection is not without controversy. As Director of the NSA he designed and implemented a warrantless surveillance program, authorized by the President, to intercept communications inside the United States. The goal of this program is to find terrorists, something every Member of this body supports. But the program's questionable legal underpinnings and the decision to keep it hidden from most Members of Congress have raised questions about General Hayden's judgment and independence. I wrote Director Negroponte in February expressing my view that General Hayden's role in the public defense of the NSA program was inappropriate for an intelligence official. I reiterated that concern directly to General Hayden in a letter to him prior to his confirmation hearing last week. Officials of the intelligence community must avoid even the appearance of politicization. General Hayden addressed this issue in his hearing and responded privately to my letter. After carefully considering his answers and his response, I am convinced that he believes the NSA program is legal. I also believe his public appearances were in large part his effort to defend the men and women of the NSA. I still believe his participation in the White House public relations campaign was inappropriate, but I believe his explanation is sincere. I raise this issue because it gets to the heart of what I think will be General Hayden's challenge at the CIA--rebuilding the agency's credibility and reestablishing its independence. The CIA was established in 1947 to be an independent source of intelligence for the President and other senior policymakers. We have no less a need for that independence now than we did then. The Government, both the executive branch and the Congress, must have intelligence that is timely, objective, and independent of political considerations. This is not just a goal; it is the standard set in law. Unfortunately, over the past few years we have witnessed a pattern of cynical manipulation of intelligence for political purposes. This politicization has damaged the credibility of the intelligence community and undermined America's efforts to deal with critical national security challenges. General Hayden must take steps to assert his and the CIA's independence. The situation in the period prior to the Iraq war must never be repeated. Administration officials accepted without question any nugget of intelligence, no matter how poorly sourced, if it supported the decision to go to war with Iraq. In areas where the intelligence did not support the administration's preconceived view, such as alleged Iraqi ties to al-Qaida and the 9/11 attacks, the administration badgered the intelligence community to find a link, ignored the intelligence that showed there was none, and set up a rogue intelligence operation at the Defense Department to aggressively push the alleged connection. But perhaps the most blatant abuse of the intelligence process was and continues to be the leaking and selective declassification of intelligence information to support particular policy goals. Many of my colleagues have decried the unauthorized disclosures that regularly appear in the press. I join them in condemning these damaging leaks. But it is important to understand that most disclosures of intelligence information are generated by executive branch officials pushing a particular policy, and not by the rank-and-file employees of the intelligence agencies. This has been the pattern of the current administration, particularly related to Iraq. Based on his past performance I am sure that General Hayden will stand up to blatant attempts to influence intelligence judgments. I also believe he has the character to speak out when he believes the intelligence process is being misused by senior policymakers. General Hayden also will need to regain the trust of the Congress. The administration's repeated refusal to allow effective oversight of some of the most important intelligence programs has endangered critical intelligence capabilities and alienated the Intelligence Committees when their support is most needed. Signals intelligence and intelligence obtained from detainees are critical elements of our efforts to detect and stop terrorists. But the administration's ill-advised attempts to shield these programs from oversight have created suspicion and undermined public support for our counterterrorism efforts. Sustaining these kinds of intelligence programs over the long term requires the Congress to be a full partner from the beginning. Our mutual goal should be to ensure that critical intelligence programs receive the attention and support they need to be effective. Some have questioned the wisdom of a military officer serving in this position. While I want to make sure that General Hayden is outside of the military chain of command, I am convinced that General Hayden's military experience will enable him to successfully manage the important and sometimes difficult relationship between the CIA and the Department of Defense. As CIA Director he also will be the national manager of human intelligence collection activities across all agencies, including the Defense Department. This function is essential to ensuring effective coordination of our sensitive intelligence operations overseas. We cannot afford the creation of redundant capabilities or any confusion as to who is in charge of these delicate operations. General Hayden will take over the helm of the CIA at a time of rapid expansion of the workforce and following a period of dramatic decline in employee morale. Under his predecessor's tenure the CIA lost many of its most experienced and talented officers. He will need to move quickly to convince the current workforce that the days of political litmus tests are over and experienced professionals will be in charge rather than political cronies. I cannot overstate the importance of the job General Hayden is undertaking. The CIA and our other intelligence agencies are the front line of our defense. The CIA must find better ways to penetrate targets such as Iran and North Korea while continuing to adapt to the ever changing tactics of the international terrorist movement. The Senate Intelligence Committee's 2004 review of Iraq intelligence exposed some glaring problems in the collection and analysis of intelligence. The CIA has been undergoing its own internal review and has begun integrating the lessons it has learned. It will be General Hayden's job to see that the CIA embraces the reforms needed to deal with the challenges of the 21st century. I am confident he is the right person for the task. ", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of House Resolution 861, expressing our continued dedication to the global war on terror and the brave men and women serving on the front lines in that war. Alongside their counterparts from across the world, they have worked on our behalf to confront terrorist elements and foster freedom in the name of peace and stability. I want to focus my remarks on the extraordinary efforts of the Bush administration to improve our Nation's intelligence-gathering capabilities and prevent future terrorist attacks. Armed with the new tools Congress provided in the Use of Force Resolution, the USA PATRIOT Act, and other intelligence laws, our military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities have scored many successes in the last 4 years. Their efforts to track terrorist networks and decipher their plans have broken up sinister plots here at home and around the world. An FBI supervisor has confirmed that the PATRIOT Act led to the breakup of an al Qaeda cell in suburban Buffalo, NY. And just a few days ago, months of painstaking information gathering by U.S., Iraqi, Jordanian, and other sources resulted in the killing of the terrorist mastermind Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. For all the well-earned kudos that have been heaped upon the military and intelligence communities for their successful mission against Zarqawi, most of their successes aren't widely known and can't be publicly broadcast. The intelligence community can't take credit for them for fear of giving away secrets about their modes and methods of gathering this valuable information. Which is why the revelation in the media last year of the National Security Agency's terrorist surveillance program was an outrageous breach of national security. This leak--timed to coincide with Congress's debate on reauthorizing the USA PATRIOT Act--let al Qaeda and other terrorist groups know that the NSA had been intercepting the international communications of individuals with links to their groups. Then-CIA Director Porter Goss confirmed before the Senate Intelligence Committee that the damage caused by the leak has been ``very severe,'' leading to the loss or disruption of some sources and methods--not to mention the damage caused to our relationships with our intelligence counterparts in other countries. This program has provided valuable intelligence on terrorist activities. CIA Director Michael Hayden, who oversaw this program at the NSA, stated ``unequivocally'' that we have obtained information through the terrorist surveillance program that would not otherwise have been available. It's also consistent with Congress's direction that the President use ``all necessary and appropriate force'' against nations, groups, and individuals found to be responsible for the 9/11 attacks. We have tracked and intercepted calls in cases where we have reason to believe that at least one party in the conversation is a member of al Qaeda. The program is also fully compliant with existing law, and has been reviewed by the Justice Department and White House counsel roughly every 45 days. Congress has been briefed regularly on its provisions, consistent with the National Security Act of 1947. Chairman Pete Hoekstra has confirmed that congressional leadership, along with the leaders of the two intelligence committees, had numerous opportunities to express concerns about the program. Sadly, rather than giving the administration credit for working to gather intelligence and ``connect the dots,'' the outrage of some in this Congress has been directed not at those who leaked information about the program, but at the NSA and the White House. Unbelievably, four of our colleagues in the other body even introduced a resolution to censure the President over this program--a program that, had it been in place before 9/11, could have led the NSA to locate and identify two of the 9/11 hijackers who settled in San Diego in 2000. It's simply irresponsible to claim that this program is outside the administration's authority, since leaders of both parties have had every opportunity to express misgivings over the last 4\\1/2\\ years. Frankly, it smacks of political grandstanding that criticisms were raised only after the program's existence was leaked to the New York Times. Some have tried to minimize the significance of this leak, saying that terrorists obviously know that we're spying on them. But the truth is that terrorist cells need to communicate, and they'll keep using methods of communication that they know to work--and stop using methods that have been compromised. You can guarantee they'll move on to other modes of communication, now that details of the terrorist surveillance program have been publicized. It also defies logic to suggest that the privacy of communications with known terrorists is constitutionally protected. Just like in every military conflict our Nation has fought, the interception of enemy communications has been a fundamental part of the war on terror. The day after Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt authorized the interception of all communications into and out of the United States. That act was necessary and lawful--as is this more focused interception of al Qaeda communications, given the nature of the enemy we face. Future al Qaeda attacks on our homeland are likely to be conducted by operatives who are already here. Identifying and tracking them is a sizable challenge, and it's preposterous to suggest that our intelligence professionals will cast such a wide net that they threaten the privacy of ordinary American citizens in doing this work. They don't want useless information that takes them off the trail of criminals and terrorists; they have neither the time nor the resources to waste. They're constantly working against the clock to counter terrorists and terrorist sympathizers who are preparing to attack when and where they can. As a special agent of the FBI, I conducted wiretaps. They're wrapped in layers of legal protections and never done without probable cause. The NSA's actions simply give intelligence services the same wiretap authorities that have been available to those fighting organized crime and drug lords. Americans not in contact with al Qaeda can be assured that their rights have not been violated. Even as we debate this legislation, terrorist groups are plotting to kill Americans. If the NSA tracks a call from a known terrorist in Afghanistan to a phone number somewhere in the U.S., it's in our best interest to know who's on the other end of that call and what they're talking about. This is no time to let our guard down or publicize details of our clandestine intelligence work. The fact that we have not had a major terrorist attack in this Nation since 9/11 is no accident. The focused efforts of our intelligence officials have helped detect and prevent attacks, and we as a nation are safer as a result. They deserve our gratitude, as do all of our service men and women serving on our behalf on all fronts in the global war on terror.", u"Thank you very much. Mr. President, once again I rise with great pride to support the amendment offered by the Senator from New York, Mrs. Clinton, as she has so often in the past stood for the fact that funding to fight terrorists and to be ready for any kind of major disaster should be based on risk. In other words, money should go to where there is the greatest risk. The Senator from New York has been a longstanding advocate of this from September 12 to standing here today. I support this amendment, as I, too, have done in the past. I am so frustrated with the Department of Homeland Security. It can't get its act together. It can't get the job done. It makes poor decisions on allocation, and it is saturated with waste and fraud. The last straw was when I opened the paper and saw that the Department of Homeland Security was slashing funds for high-threat urban areas. The money was leaving the Capital region and New York to go to States such as Nebraska. I respect the people of Nebraska. If they are in danger, I want them protected. I don't know about the threats of Montana and Minnesota, but I sure do know about the threats in Maryland. We are part of the Capital region, the home of the President of the United States, the home of the Congress of the United States, the home of the Cabinet that runs Government, the home of the Supreme Court, and the FBI. In the Capital region we have the Pentagon, we have the Central Intelligence Agency. In Maryland, we have three intelligence agencies gathering technical information--and they say we are not a high threat? On September 11, we lost 60 Marylanders at the Pentagon, mostly African American, mostly who worked in the clerical positions. And we said a grateful nation would never forget. Just like the other Marylanders who died at the World Trade Center, we said a grateful nation would never forget. And the way that we are never going to forget is to make sure it doesn't happen again--to protect against attacks and, second, that we were going to do whatever we could to be able to be ready and respond to any of these attacks. When we saw that smoke here at the Capitol that day, it just wasn't on television. I was so proud of the fact that it was Maryland first responders who were first on the scene because they work together in the Capital region. Rescue One out of Chevy Chase, MD, dashed across the Potomac to be first on site at the Pentagon. They were worried in northern Virginia because they didn't know what else would happen. I visited that site. Again, on a bipartisan basis, I and Olympia Snowe toured the site together. We saw the rubble of the Pentagon. We saw them working to save lives. We saw how they had worked together in the Capital region. Obviously, Homeland Security, its agencies, and its database doesn't get it. They don't get it. They do not get the fact that the 9/11 Commission recognized the threats facing our urban areas and said target the resources at the areas of greatest need. The Senate recognized the threat facing the Capital region when they worked with Senators Warner, Allen, Sarbanes, and myself to establish an Office of the National Capital Region so we could coordinate in the most effective way. It enabled the Capital region and also New York and other major areas to receive extra resources. However, the Department of Homeland Security that gave us the Katrina aftermath ignored Congress and ignored the Commission, and they slashed the resources for New York and the Capital region by 40 percent. They said we had gotten money. Oh. Right. They said: Our database shows you don't deserve it. Thank God for the Department of Homeland Security's IG. There they go again over there at Homeland Security. They can't get it right. Their own inspector general said the Department's ability to assess risk is seriously flawed. Guess what. They count an insect zoo and a bourbon festival as critical infrastructure. When you listen to the fact that an insect zoo ranks up there with the Supreme Court, doesn't that bug you? Earlier this year, the Department of Homeland Security failed to list the Statue of Liberty and the Empire State Building. They do not know the difference between a bourbon festival and the Statue of Liberty. They don't seem to know the difference. This is the data that the Department of Homeland Security used to allocate the funding for Homeland Security grants. There were in the State of Indiana over 8,000 assets listed, and in New York over 5,000. Just come with me down the Baltimore-Washington corridor as you pass these agencies that are helping people. There are the threats. We have high-threat targets because of what they do in national security, such as the National Security Agency. We have threats of the heart, like the National Institutes of Health. Can you imagine the blow to research if something happened to NIH? Then come with me over there to Calvert Cliffs where we have a nuclear power plant, and then come up along the bay and see the U.S. Naval Academy. How does that rank? That is Maryland. Then, of course, there is New York. We all know that New York showed up on every single list. I commend the Senator from New York for offering this amendment. I believe that as we have organizational reform for Homeland Security, as the Collins' amendment did, and the Clinton amendment made such a strong point, we should have resource funding reform, and the heart and soul of that is the resource funding should follow risk. The Department of Homeland Security along with FEMA should be operating on a risk-based strategy with confident professional people who have to learn the difference between an insect zoo, the Supreme Court, and the White House. If they can't get that straight and they didn't know how to build lessons, and they say: Don't worry ``Brownie,'' you are doing a good job, there they go again. I am fed up with it. If I could vote one more time to dissolve the Department of Homeland Security, I would. I can't quite do that. But what I can do is make sure that the right resources go to the areas with the greatest risk. Baltimore would benefit. The Capital region would benefit. New York would benefit. But it is not about money. It is about saving lives and saving people. I want to enthusiastically support the Clinton amendment and know that we are here to try to do this, to save lives, to save communities, and to protect the United States of America. If they do not know how to be the Department of Homeland Security, let us in Congress be the ones who understand it and properly fund it. In conclusion, I thank the Senator from New Hampshire because under his leadership the Commerce-Justice Subcommittee was the first committee to hold comprehensive hearings on terrorism. He remembers the questions and who was in charge. Obviously, you can see that the Department of Homeland Security is not. I support the Clinton amendment and am happy to be a cosponsor.", u"Mr. President, I join Vice Chairman Rockefeller in calling for the Senate to take up and pass the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. As has been said already, this legislation is the primary way in which the Congress directs the Nation's 16 intelligence agencies. In writing this legislation, the Committee worked closely with the Director of National Intelligence, or DNI, to identify new authorities needed to protect our national security. The bill authorizes a pilot program to allow intelligence agencies to better share information that could help uncover and thwart a terrorist; empowers the DNI to build information-sharing systems across the Federal Government; and creates a strong inspector general for the intelligence community. The bill also requires the intelligence community to explain how it is complying with the Detainee Treatment Act and provide Congress with information on any ``alleged clandestine detention facilities'' that it may be operating and continues the process of intelligence reform begun in 2004. It is not surprising that the creation of the DNI and major organizational changes across the Government's national security apparatus left some things undone. This Intelligence authorization bill makes a number of small but useful changes to allow the DNI and the Nation's 16 intelligence agencies to operate on a day-to-day basis more effectively. These are a few of the important provisions in this legislation. But here I would like to focus on language in the bill that was adopted on a bipartisan basis at committee. The provisions, sections 304 and 307 of the bill, ensure that the congressional Intelligence Committees are fully informed of all intelligence activities. The National Security Act of 1947 requires the President to ``ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States. . .''. Even more than other committees, the Intelligence Committee relies on the executive branch to provide it with information. Without full and timely notification of intelligence programs, problems, and plans, the committee cannot judge whether agencies have adhered to the law, nor can we judge whether changes in authorities or resources are needed to better protect national security. It was, in fact, Congress's lack of regular oversight that led to the creation of the Senate Intelligence Committee in 1976. Following the Church Committee's report on Executive abuses, the Senate established the Committee to ``provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States.'' Thirty years after the Senate Intelligence Committee was created, however, it is not living up to its charge. Members of the committee are not provided with sufficient information on intelligence programs and activities to legislate or oversee to intelligence community. Provisions in the stalled legislation--the Intelligence authorization bill--would fix this problem. A good example of how the system fails to work is the so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program, which was publicly revealed last December but which had not previously been briefed to the committees. According to the White House, this National Security Agency program was too sensitive to be briefed to the 15 Senators on the committee--the 15 Senators hand-selected by the majority and minority leaders for this assignment. Instead, the President and Vice President decided to inform only 8 of the 535 Members of Congress: the party leadership in both houses and the leadership of the two intelligence committees. The National Security Act does provide for limited briefings to these eight Members of Congress but only for especially sensitive covert actions. The NSA program is not a covert action. The administration also points to statute saying that it must take ``due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters. . .'' The 1980 Senate report accompanying this ``due regard'' provision explained this provision more directly--and makes clear that it does not allow the administration to restrict information from the committee indefinitely as was done with the Terrorist Surveillance Program. The report recognized ``that in extremely rare circumstances a need to preserve essential secrecy may result in a decision not to impart certain sensitive aspects of operations or collection programs to the oversight committees in order to protect extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods.'' The ``due regard'' language that the administration cites was intended, at most, to limit briefings on the most sensitive aspects of operations, in extremely rare circumstances. It was also expected that withholding this sensitive information would be a temporary measure. This language was not intended to conceal the existence of entire programs from all committee members. So in effect, the White House has broadly interpreted the National Security Act to void meeting its responsibility to inform Congress. This Intelligence authorization bill's changes to the National Security Act close the loopholes but, in fact, are far more generous to the executive branch than many would like. The bill acknowledges that there are times when not all Members have to be ``fully and currently'' briefed on all intelligence matters. However, in those cases, it requires that all committee members receive a summary of the intelligence collection or covert action in question. This arrangement would allow the intelligence agencies to protect the most sensitive details of sources and methods, but crucially, it would allow the full committee to assess the legality, costs and benefits, and advisability of an intelligence operation. The authorization bill also changes a definition in the National Security Act to make clear that the requirement to keep the committees ``fully and currently informed'' means that all Members will be kept informed. Congress has allowed the intelligence community to brief only the chairman and vice chairman on too many programs for too long. I do not need to remind my colleagues that full committees, not a single Democrat and Republican, vote to authorize programs and funding. All Members must be informed if they are to perform their Constitutional duties. The pending authorization bill would make one additional change to what it means for an intelligence activity to be authorized by Congress. Stemming from the wiretapping abuses in the 1970s and because of the special challenges to conducting oversight of classified programs, the National Security Act prohibits the use of appropriated funds for any intelligence activities unless they are authorized by Congress. The pending bill would specify that an activity can only be ``authorized'' if the members of the authorizing committees have been fully briefed on it--or given a summary in the especially sensitive cases I described before. ", u"Mr. President, I state at the outset that the vote we are about to take is not about John Bolton. The vote we are about to take is about taking a stand--about the Senate taking a stand. The vote is about whether the Senate will allow the President to dictate to a coequal branch of Government how we, the Senate, are to fulfill our constitutional responsibility under the advice and consent clause. It is that basic. I believe it is totally unacceptable for the President of the United States, Democrat or Republican--and both have tried--to dictate to the Senate how he, the President, thinks we should proceed. The fact that the President of the United States in this case says he does not believe the information we seek is relevant to our fulfilling our constitutional responsibility is somewhat presumptuous, to say the least. I am aware--as we all are on both sides of the aisle--of the sometimes admirable but most times excessive obsession with secrecy on the part of this administration. But notwithstanding that, we should not forfeit our responsibility in order to accommodate that obsession. I do not hold John Bolton accountable for this administration's arrogance. John Bolton was gentleman enough to come see me. At the request of the Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain, who contacted me, I said I would be willing to sit with John Bolton last week and speak with him about what we were seeking and why we were seeking it. I did that. As a matter of fact, one of my colleagues, the Senator from Connecticut--although it wasn't his idea, and I caught him on the way to have dinner with his brother--was kind enough to come and sit with me and listen to John Bolton. I believe Mr. Bolton would be prepared to give us this information. Whether that is true is, quite frankly, irrelevant, because the fact is we both told Mr. Bolton this dispute about the documents is not about him. I say to my colleague from Indiana, this is above his pay grade. He indicated under oath in our committee hearing that he was willing to let all of this information come forward. So I actually went to the extent of sitting with Mr. Bolton and suggesting how, as it related to a matter on which I have been the lead horse--on Syria--we could accommodate an even further narrowing and detailing of the information we are seeking and why. Last month, after the Senate stood up for itself and rejected cloture on the Bolton nomination, the Democratic leader and I both promised publicly--and today I pledge again--that once the administration provides the information we have requested and information that no one thus far has suggested we are not entitled to--we will agree to vote up or down on the Bolton nomination. At the outset, it should be emphasized that these are not--and I emphasize ``not''--new requests made at the 11th hour to attempt to derail a vote. Nobody is moving goalposts anywhere except closer, not further away. The committee made these requests, the same two requests, back in April. First, we requested materials relating to testimony on Syria and weapons of mass destruction prepared by Mr. Bolton and/or his staff in the summer and fall of 2003. We already know from senior CIA officials that Mr. Bolton sought to stretch the intelligence that was available on Syria's WMD program well beyond what the intelligence would support. We think the documents we are seeking will bolster the case that he repeatedly sought to exaggerate intelligence data. Some who are listening might say: Why is that important? Remember the context in the summer of 2003. In the summer of 2003, there were assertions being made in various press accounts and by some ``outside'' experts and some positing the possibility that those weapons of mass destruction that turned out not to exist in Iraq had been smuggled into Syria and that Syria had its own robust weapons of mass destruction program. Remember, people were speculating about ``who is next?'' Newspaper headlines and sub-headlines: Is Syria next? Syria was at the top of the list--not the only one on the list. There was speculation, as I said, that the weapons of mass destruction we could not find in Iraq had been smuggled into Syria. We know, at that same time, the CIA says Mr. Bolton was trying to stretch--stretch--the intelligence case against Syria on weapons of mass destruction. The Syrian documents may also raise questions as to whether Mr. Bolton, when he raised his hand and swore to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, in fact may not have done that because he told the Foreign Relations Committee that he was not in any way personally involved in preparing that testimony. The documents we seek would determine whether that was true or not. It may be true, but the documents will tell us. Second, we have requested access to 10 National Security Agency intercepts. That means conversations picked up between a foreigner and an American, where they may have relevance to an intelligence inquiry and where the name of the foreigner is always listed, but it says speaking to ``an American,'' or an American representing an American entity. Mr. Bolton acknowledged, under oath, that he had sought--which is not unusual in the sense that it has never happened, but it is noteworthy--he sought the identities of the Americans listed in 10 different intercepts. When I asked him why he did that, he said intellectual curiosity and for context. It is not a surprise to say--and I am not revealing anything confidential; I have not seen those intercepts--that there have been assertions made by some to Members of the Senate and the staff members of the Senate that Mr. Bolton was seeking the names of these individuals for purposes of his intramural fights that were going on within the administration about the direction of American foreign policy. These requests resulted in Mr. Bolton being given the names of 19 different individuals. Nineteen identities of Americans or American companies were on those intercepts. Mr. Bolton's staff has seen some of these intercepts, but not a single Senator has seen the identities of any of these Americans listed on the intercepts. I might note, parenthetically, we suggested--I was reluctant to do it, but I agreed with the leader of my committee--that we would yield that responsibility to the chairman and vice chair of the Intelligence Committee. Later, the majority leader, in a genuine effort to try to resolve this issue, asked me what was needed. I said he should ask for the names--not the chairman--he should ask for the names. He said he did, and he said they would not give him the names either. It has been alleged, as I said, that Mr. Bolton has been spying on rivals within the bureaucracy, both inferior and superior to him. While I doubt this, as I said publicly before, we have a duty to be sure that he did not misuse this data. The administration has argued that the Syrian testimony material is not relevant to our inquiry. I simply leave it by saying that is an outrageous assertion. The administration may not decide what the Senate needs in reviewing a nomination unless it claims Executive privilege or a constitutional prohibition of a violation of separation of power. As my grandfather and later my mother would say: Who died and left them boss? No rationale has been given for the testimony. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President: How much time have I consumed?", u"Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit the following article in regard to the Obey amendment alleging that the Bush Administration and Congress are deliberately mislead on a variety of issues. ``There is no evidence that Saddam Hussein was connected in any way to al Qaeda.'' So declared CNN Anchor Carol Costello in an interview yesterday with Representative Robin Hayes (no relation) from North Carolina. Hayes politely challenged her claim. ``Ma'am, I'm sorry, but you're mistaken. There's evidence everywhere. We get access to it. Unfortunately, others don't.'' CNN played the exchange throughout the day. At one point, anchor Daryn Kagan even seemed to correct Rep. Hayes after replaying the clip. ``And according to the record, the 9/11 Commission in its final report found no connection between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.'' The CNN claims are wrong. Not a matter of nuance. Not a matter of interpretation. Just plain incorrect. They are so mistaken, in fact, that viewers should demand an on-air correction. But such claims are, sadly, representative of the broad media misunderstanding of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. Richard Cohen, columnist for the Washington Post, regularly chides the Bush administration for presenting what he calls fabricated or ``fictive'' links between Iraq and al Qaeda. The editor of the Los Angeles Times scolded the Bush administration for perpetuating the ``myth'' of such links. ``Sixty Minutes'' anchor Lesley Stahl put it bluntly: ``There was no connection.'' Conveniently, such analyses ignore statements like this one from Thomas Kean, chairman of the 9/11 Commission. ``There was no question in our minds that there was a relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.'' Hard to believe reporters just missed it--he made the comments at the press conference held to release the commission's final report. And that report detailed several ``friendly contacts'' between Iraq and al Qaeda, and concluded only that there was no proof of Iraqi involvement in al Qaeda terrorist attacks against American interests. Details, details. There have been several recent developments. One month ago, Jordan's King Abdullah explained to the Arabic-language newspaper al Hayat that his government had tried before the Iraq war to extradite Abu Musab al Zarqawi from Iraq. ``We had information that he entered Iraq from a neighboring country, where he lived and what he was doing. We informed the Iraqi authorities about all this detailed information we had, but they didn't respond.'' He added: ``Since Zarqawi entered Iraq before the fall of the former regime we have been trying to have him deported back to Jordan for trial, but our efforts were in vain.'' One week later, former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi told the same newspaper that the new Iraqi government is in possession of documents showing that Ayman al Zawahiri, bin Laden's top deputy, and Zarqawi both entered Iraq in September 1999. (If the documents are authentic, they suggest that Zarqawi may have plotted the Jordanian Millennium attacks from Iraq.) Beyond what people are saying about the Iraq-al Qaeda connection, there is the evidence. In 1992 the Iraqi Intelligence services compiled a list of its assets. On page 14 of the document, marked ``Top Secret'' and dated March 28, 1992, is the name of Osama bin Laden, who is reported to have a ``good relationship'' with the Iraqi intelligence section in Syria. The Defense Intelligence Agency has possession of the document and has assessed that it is accurate. In 1993, Saddam Hussein and bin Laden reached an ``understanding'' that Islamic radicals would refrain from attacking the Iraqi regime in exchange for unspecified assistance, including weapons development. This understanding, which was included in the Clinton administration's indictment of bin Laden in the spring of 1998, has been corroborated by numerous Iraqis and al Qaeda terrorists now in U.S. custody. In 1994, Faruq Hijazi, then deputy director of Iraqi Intelligence, met face- to-face with bin Laden. Bin Laden requested anti-ship limpet mines and training camps in Iraq. Hijazi has detailed the meeting in a custodial interview with U.S. interrogators. In 1995, according to internal Iraqi intelligence documents first reported by the New York Times on June 25, 2004, a ``former director of operations for Iraqi Intelligence Directorate 4 met with Mr. bin Laden on Feb. 19.'' When bin Laden left Sudan in 1996, the document states, Iraqi intelligence sough ``other channels through which to handle the relationship, in light of his current location.'' That same year, Hussein agreed to a request from bin Laden to broadcast anti-Saudi propaganda on Iraqi state television. In 1997, al Qaeda sent an emissary with the nom de guerre Abdullah al Iraqi to Iraq for training on weapons of mass destruction. Colin Powell cited this evidence in his presentation at the UN on February 5, 2003. The Senate Intelligence Committee has concluded that Powell's presentation on Iraq and terrorism was ``reasonable.'' In 1998, according to documents unearthed in Iraq's Intelligence headquarters in April 2003, al Qaeda sent a ``trusted confidante'' of bin Laden to Baghdad for 16 days of meetings beginning March 5. Iraqi intelligence paid for his stay in Room 414 of the Mansur al Melia hotel and expressed hope that the envoy would serve as the liaison between Iraqi intelligence and bin Laden. The DIA has assessed those documents as authentic. In 1999, a CIA Counterterrorism Center analysis reported on April 13 that four intelligence reports indicate Saddam Hussein has given bin Laden a standing offer of safe haven in Iraq. The CTC report is included in the Senate Intelligence Committee's review on prewar intelligence. In 2000, Saudi Arabia went on kingdom-wide alert after learning that Iraq had agreed to help al Qaeda attack U.S. and British interests on the peninsula. In 2001, satellite images show large numbers of al Qaeda terrorists displaced after the war in Afghanistan relocating to camps in northern Iraq financed, in part, by the Hussein regime. In 2002, a report from the National Security Agency in October reveals that Iraq agreed to provide safe haven, financing and weapons to al Qaeda members relocating in northern Iraq. In 2003, on February 14, the Philippine government ousted Hisham Hussein, the second secretary of the Iraqi embassy in Manila, for his involvement in al Qaeda- related terrorist activities. Andrea Domingo, head of Immigration for the Philippine government, told reporters that ``studying the movements and activities'' of Iraqi intelligence assets in the country, including radical Islamists, revealed an ``established network'' of terrorists headed by Hussein. Can CNN stand by its claim that ``there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein was connected in any way to al Qaeda?'' The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey).", u"Mr. Speaker, last week, America reached a tragic milestone in Iraq, the 2,000th American died. As of today, nearly 2,030 Americans have been killed in Iraq and a little over 200 in Afghanistan. In fact, October was the deadliest month in Iraq since January. I say this not to exploit the grief felt by those families who have lost loved ones. Rather, I raise this grim milestone because it should give us, all of us, pause. Two-and-one-half years after President Bush stood on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln and declared ``mission accomplished,'' the brave men and women of our Armed Forces are still fighting and dying in Iraq, worse today than during the actual hostilities, and there is no end in sight. There is not a time to debate how we got into Iraq. There is a place for that. What is more important now is resolving the issues and the sense of how we have gotten into this quagmire and bring our men and women home to their families. It is time the administration finally leveled with the American people and presented us with a viable strategy towards success and victory. It is time that the President finally surrounded himself with competent leaders who can get the job done, rather than cronies and political operatives interested in advancing a political agenda. Before the war, General Shinseki said it would take several hundred thousand troops to secure Iraq. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said his estimate was widely off the mark and General Shinseki was let go. Lawrence Lindsey predicted the war would cost hundreds of billions of dollars. In fact, many ridiculed his estimate and said again he was widely off the mark, that oil revenues would pay for the reconstruction. His predictions were ignored; and $400 billion later, the tab keeps rising. Some say it will finally cost nearly $1 trillion, this war. Dick Cheney famously predicted that we would be greeted as liberators. Let me say, if Iraq treats liberators like this, they have a funny way of greeting liberators. Weeks after the invasion of Iraq, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld fought against increasing the troop levels in Iraq. In fact, months before the war, he was still debating whether we needed less than 100,000 troops, when those in the Armed Forces were saying we needed 200,000-plus to win that war. When the looting broke out in Iraq right after the invasion, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld replied ``stuff happens.'' Later he said during the looting, ``freedom is untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things.'' That was the Secretary of Defense. That sense of freedom has led to the situation we have today because we did not create order in that society in Iraq and a sense of who was in control. In fact, the Defense Secretary has been flat wrong on countless occasions, both before hostilities and after the hostilities. I have lost track of the number of times he has told us that the insurgency was in its ``last throes.'' On March 30, 2003, regarding the fabled weapons of mass destruction, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld again: ``We know where they are. They are in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad.'' He has misled us on the number of Iraqis trained to conduct police and military operations. In September of 2003 he said 55,000 Iraqis have been trained. Earlier this year, he told us three battalions were operational. About a month ago, in front of the Senate, we were told that there was only one operational Iraqi battalion. Imagine that: Mr. Speaker, $450 billion, a little over 2,000 American lives, over 10,000 Americans wounded, and one operational Iraqi battalion to show for that, and two elections. The truth is that the administration's plan for their invasion was brilliantly planned, but they have failed to plan for the occupation, costing American lives, our treasury, and our reputation, and all because of the incompetency of this administration. Today we are left with a quagmire that has created terrorists and threatens to destabilize the region. Let me read you what some of the experts in the Republican national security apparatus have said. Retired Army Lieutenant General Odom, former head of the National Security Agency, said the invasion of Iraq ``will turn out to be the greatest strategic disaster in U.S. history.'' Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to the first President Bush said: ``You have to know when to stop using force. You encourage democracy over time, with assistance, and aid, the traditional way. Not how the neocons in this administration do it.'' Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell's former chief of staff in the State Department, called President Bush's foreign policy ``ruinous'' and said that ``we have courted disaster in Iraq, in North Korea, in Iran.'' The people I just quoted are not exactly the board of moveon.org or the Democratic Party. These are the pillars and the heads of the national security apparatus of the Republican Party. These experts are saying that it is time for a new direction with new priorities when it comes to Iraq. We have to get it right in Iraq, but the current path the President has us on is not the path to success; and it is not simply, as he says, the choice between doing more of the same and getting the same results or merely pulling out. Mr. Speaker, $400 billion and one Iraqi battalion. Some are estimating, as I said, the cost of this war will get closer to $1 trillion. It is time for the President to level with the American people and show us a path to success. We need a performance-based Iraqi strategy. How many police will we be reduced to this quarter? How many police will be reduced next quarter? How many Army members will be produced this quarter, the next quarter, and for the next 2 years, every quarter this administration has to have a performance-based policy on police training, on Army training, on civil society development, on reconstruction, and on the political front so we can finally, in the President's words, stand down. But having given them free rein for nearly 2\\1/2\\ years and we have one battalion operationally ready to show for it, they have abused the trust of the American people. We need to internationalize our operations in Iraq. We need to convince the world that a stable Iraq is in everyone's interests, and we need to refocus on stopping terrorism. Mr. Speaker after 2\\1/2\\ years and more than 2,000 American lives, it is time we adopted a different strategy, a strategy for victory that will reunite American families and provide Iraq a stable society. It is time the President stopped campaigning and began to lead on the issue of Iraq.", u"Mr. President, more than 50 years ago, Justice Robert Jackson said: With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations. I am deeply troubled by recent revelations that the President of the United States has apparently personally authorized spying on the private phone conversations of Americans without court approval, as is required by law. The President's decision to ignore the law Congress wrote and bypass the special court we created raises profound concerns that deserve our immediate attention. Yesterday, I joined several of my colleagues in requesting a joint inquiry into the President's actions by the Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. Checks and balances are the bedrock of our system of government. In 1978, when Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to permit the Government to seek court orders to tap the phones of people in the United States, Congress put in the law a check--the FISA Court--on the executive branch's authority. Since 1979 the FISA Court has approved nearly 19,000 applications for FISA wiretaps. The Court has rejected only a handful. Last year, at a speech in Buffalo, NY, the President explicitly cited the need for a court order as a reason why Americans should have confidence that their civil liberties are being protected. He said: Any time you hear the United States government talking about wiretap, it requires--a wiretap requires a court order. Nothing has changed, by the way. When we're talking about chasing down terrorists, we're talking about getting a court order before we do so. It's important for our fellow citizens to understand . . . constitutional guarantees are in place when it comes to doing what is necessary to protect our homeland, because we value the Constitution. But now the President acknowledges that 4 years ago, he authorized wiretaps on Americans without court review. Now he asserts that he has the authority--without court approval--to order the wiretaps himself and we now know that the Government was conducting warrantless wiretaps when the President made the statement in Buffalo. If the court isn't consulted, where is the check on executive power? The President has said that he consults with executive branch lawyers and has briefed Congressional leaders about the domestic spying program. But to suggest that consulting with executive branch lawyers is a check on Executive Branch authority demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the concept of checks and balances. And notifying a few members of Congress--if that is in fact what the administration did--is not the check provided by law. That check is the court. In the conference report that accompanied the FISA law, Congress made the Supreme Court the only body that could authorize electronic surveillance by the executive branch not explicitly authorized by the FISA law. The conference report said: The conferees agree that the establishment by this act of exclusive means by which the President may conduct electronic surveillance does not foreclose a different decision by the Supreme Court . . . Executive Order 12333, issued by President Reagan in 1981, recognizes FISA as the governing law for foreign intelligence wiretaps. It provides that: Electronic surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, shall be conducted in accordance with that Act, as well as this Order. And, under FISA itself, a person is actually guilty of a crime if he engages in electronic surveillance except as authorized by statute. A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally--(1) engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute. The President has not provided any legal opinion that supports his claim of authority. On Monday, the President said that the targets of the spying are ``those that are known al Qaeda ties and/or affiliates.'' But the FISA law says that wiretap orders may be issued by the court if there is probable cause to believe that the target of the wiretap is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. If the targets of the spying have known al Qaeda ties, why didn't he get a FISA court order? The President has also tried to justify the warrantless spying by saying ``Sometimes we have to move very, very quickly.'' That is true. In some cases we do have to move quickly. But the FISA law addresses such occasions. It explicitly allows the Attorney General, to issue emergency wiretap orders without first obtaining court approval. His wiretap application need only be filed with the FISA court within 72 hours after surveillance is authorized. The President claims that he has authority under the Constitution to authorize wiretaps without court approval as required by law. Yet he refuses to provide any legal opinions justifying that view. The Attorney General is quoted in the Washington Post as saying ``This is not a backdoor approach . . . We believe Congress has authorized this kind of surveillance'' and he points to the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed by Congress in September 2001 as a source of Congressional authorization. That Resolution states: That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. The assertion that ``necessary and appropriate force'' includes the authority to wiretap American citizens in the United States, is, on its face, without merit. And again, the President has not provided any legal opinion that would support that interpretation. The Attorney General undermined his own statement that the Congress authorized warrantless wiretaps by telling the Post that the President had contemplated asking Congress to pass legislation granting him that authority but decided against it because it ``would be difficult, if not impossible'' to pass. Taken together, the two statements of the Attorney General make no sense. He asserts both that Congress authorized the wiretapping and that it never would. The Attorney General is trying to have it both ways. We need some straight answers. So, why wasn't the FISA law followed? Just this morning, the Washington Post reported that General Michael Hayden the head of the National Security Agency--the agency the President has charged with carrying out the spying--suggested that getting retroactive court approval is inefficient because it ``involves marshaling arguments'' and ``looping paperwork around.'' I would remind General Hayden--and the President for that matter--of something else Justice Jackson said. He said: The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. Just as troubling as General Hayden's reason for bypassing FISA is the Post's report that the decision to tap a phone without a warrant ``requires only the approval of a shift supervisor.'' That is outrageous. We don't let shift supervisors at the airport decide to stop screening passengers for explosives. And we shouldn't let shift supervisors at the NSA decide whether to abide by the law or not. The President says that this is a different era and a different type of war. And he is right. But this is the same country, with the same Constitution, and the same system of checks and balances that have served us so well for more than 200 years. And even Presidents are not above the law.", u" There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``High-End Computing Revitalization Act of 2004''. Congress finds that-- (1) high-end computing is a critical component of the scientific advances, defense capabilities, and commercial competitiveness of the United States in the 21st century; (2) with the deployment of the Earth System Simulator in Japan, the United States no longer has a clear lead in high- end computing worldwide; (3)(A) promising new architectures should be developed that increase memory and network bandwidth, minimize latency, and coordinate the architectures' various components to maximize application performance; and (B) it is recognized that different architectures may be better suited to different applications; (4)(A) software that improves efficiency on and accessibility to high-end systems should be developed; and (B) this development effort should include research in optimal algorithms, programming environments, tools, languages, and operating systems for high-end computing, in collaboration with architecture development efforts; (5) without government support, market forces are unlikely to drive sufficient innovation in high-end computing, because the private sector would not capture the full value of its innovations on a short enough time frame; and (6) having played an important role in the development of high-end computing, networking, and information technology, the Department of Energy, and the research programs of the Office of Science of the Department, are particularly In this Act: (1) High-end computing system.-- (A) In general.--The term ``high-end computing system'' means a computing system with performance that substantially exceeds commonly available systems. (B) Inclusions.--The term ``high-end computing system'' includes a system described in subparagraph (A) that is based on a variety of architectures, including vector, reconfigurable logic, streaming, processor-in-memory, and multithreading architectures. (2) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)). (3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Director of the Office of Science of the Department of Energy. (4) Ultrascale scientific computing capability.--The term ``ultrascale scientific computing capability'' means a computing capability supporting open scientific research in the United States that is at least 100 times such computing capability in existence on the date of enactment of this Act. (a) In General.--In addition to any other authority provided by law, the Secretary shall carry out a program of research and development (involving software and hardware) to advance high-end computing systems. (b) Duties.--In carrying out the program, the Secretary shall-- (1) support both individual investigators and multidisciplinary teams of investigators; (2) conduct research in multiple architectures, including vector, reconfigurable logic, streaming, processor-in-memory, and multithreading architectures; (3) conduct research in software development on optimal algorithms, programming environments, tools, languages, and operating systems for high-end computing systems, in collaboration with architecture development efforts; (4) in accordance with subsection (c), develop, plan, construct, acquire, or operate equipment or facilities for the use of investigators conducting research and development on an ultrascale scientific computing capability; (5) support technology transfer to the private sector and others in accordance with applicable law; and (6) ensure that the program is coordinated with relevant activities in industry and other Federal agencies, including the National Nuclear Security Administration, the National Science Foundation, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the National Security Agency. (c) Ultrascale Scientific Computing Capability.-- (1) In general.--As part of the program carried out under this Act, the Secretary shall develop, plan, construct, acquire, or operate a coordinated set of facilities for investigators to develop an ultrascale scientific computing capability for-- (A) scientific research and development using high-end computing systems; and (B) developing potential advancements in high-end computing system architecture and software. (2) Administration.--In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary shall-- (A) support multiple high-end computing system architectures; and (B) conduct research on the basis of proposals (including proposals that are submitted by industry, institutions of higher education, national laboratories, or any Federal agency) for research on problems that would particularly benefit from large computing power, even as the reliability of new hardware and software components are being evaluated. (d) High-End Software Development Center.-- (1) In general.--As part of the program carried out under this Act, the Secretary shall develop, plan, construct, acquire, or operate at least 1 High-End Software Development Center. (2) Duties.--A Center shall concentrate efforts to develop, test, maintain, and support optimal algorithms, programming environments, tools, languages, and operating systems for high-end computing systems. (3) Staff.--A Center shall include-- (A) a regular research staff, to create a centralized knowledge-base for high-end software development; and (B) a rotating staff of researchers from other institutions and industry to assist in the coordination of research efforts and promote technology transfer to the private sector. (4) Use of expertise.--The Secretary shall use the expertise of a Center to assess research and development in high-end computing system architecture. (5) Location.--The location of a Center shall be determined by a competitive proposal process administered by the Secretary. (e) Peer Review.--Each grant, contract, cooperative agreement, and financial assistance awarded under this section shall be made only after independent peer review. (f) Classified Research or Facilities.--No funds under this section may be used to directly support classified research or facilities. (a) In General.--In addition to amounts made available for high-end computing systems under other provisions of law, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out this Act-- (1) $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2005; (2) $155,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; (3) $160,000,000 for fiscal year 2007; (4) $165,000,000 for fiscal year 2008; and (5) $170,000,000 for fiscal year 2009. (b) Ultrascale Scientific Computing Capability.--Of the funds made available under subsection (a), $100,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year to carry out section 4(c). (c) High-End Software Development Center.--Of the funds made available under subsection (a), $10,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year to carry out section 4(d).", u"Mr. President, I acknowledge and thank the leadership of the other side for their cooperation in working through this particular situation. This amendment will require the President to give Congress a copy of the December 2001 Scowcroft Commission report on intelligence reform. A classified annex could be provided is necessary, although some of those who have seen the report say that it contains very little that would be harmful to National security. What is harmful to our security is the continuing refusal by the Bush administration to make the report public. As my colleagues know, General Brent Scowcroft had a distinguished military career and served as the National Security Adviser to the first President Bush. Because of his broad experience with intelligence and his widely respected intellect and insights, the current President Bush appointed him as chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In National Security Presidential Directive 5, in May 2001, President Bush ordered a review of U.S. intelligence to ensure that U.S. intelligence capabilities are well designed to deal with that wide range of critical challenges facing the Nation. General Scowcroft was named to lead a commission to provide recommendations on intelligence reform as a result of that directive. However, the report of the Scowcroft Commission, which was submitted 3 months after 9/11, continues to be classified, despite repeated requests from the Congress to release it. On July 21 this year an article by Shaun Waterman of United Press International, discussing the Scowcroft recommendations was published. As the article stated: Scowcroft's report, which remains classified, proposed giving the existing CIA Director budget, administrative and hire/fire control over the three largest and most expensive agencies, according to former Office of Management and Budget National Security Chief Richard Stubbings. The National Security Agency, which intercepts phone calls, faxes, emails and the like; the National Reconnaissance Office, which designs, builds and maintains spy satellites; and the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, which analyzes spy satellite photos, would all be taken out of the Pentagon's control and transferred--along with parts of the FBI--to the control of a modified director post. That is the end of that report. Obviously these reformed submitted in December 2001, are very similar to the reforms proposed by the 9/11 Commission in the summer of 2004. In fact, similar proposals on intelligence reform have been made for almost 50 years. In 1955, a commission led by Herbert Hoover recommended splitting off CIA management duties so that the Director of Central Intelligence could focus on coordinating the entire intelligence community. In 1976, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence led by Frank Church recommended giving the Director control over intelligence budgets and relieving him of day-to-day CIA management responsibilities. in 1976, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford recommended establishing a National intelligence director. In 1985, Admiral Stansfield Turner recommended establishing a National intelligence director to oversee the entire intelligence community, with the CIA Director managing only the CIA. Despite these and other recommendations, needed intelligence reforms were never enacted. The 9/11 Commissioners were given a copy of the Scowcroft recommendations as background for their work, and the final report from the Commission drew significantly from his recommendations. Governor Thomas Kean, Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, made this point clearly at a Senate Select Intelligence Committee hearing last Tuesday. He said: And a number of the recommendations we've made have synthesized things from people like Scowcroft and a number of others who have made similar recommendations. And those recommendations have not been implemented. Clearly, before we act on intelligence reform later this month, Congress should have benefit of General Scowcroft's recommendations as well. Congress faces a major task in reorganizing the intelligence community, at this time when the threats against our Nation are new and different. We must have the best information, advice and wisdom on this challenge, including a copy of the Scowcroft Commission report. General Scowcroft, I am told, will be talking to Members of the Senate Intelligence Committee this week in closed session about the report. But the meeting is for committee members only, is classified, and is off-the-record. I understand that none of the committee members will be permitted to read the report. Frankly, that is ridiculous. Every Member of Congress has an interest in being well-informed before voting on intelligence reform. Every American has an interest too. The 9/11 Commission's report and its 41 recommendations are not classified, and General Scowcroft's should not be classified either. Congress should not be forced to rely on sketchy press reports for information on an issue with such important consequences for our National security and our ability too fight the al-Qaida terrorists. It is irresponsible for the administration to keep Congress in the dark. We hope to complete action on legislation to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations before we adjourn. Given the enormous stakes for our Nation, it is unconscionable that the President has not already made an unclassified copy of the Scowcroft report available to us. There is bipartisan support for release of the Scowcroft Commission report and recommendations. In July, the Democratic leader asked the President to declassify the report. During an August 16 Senate Armed Services Committees hearing on the 9/11 Commission recommendations, Senator Warner, our distinguished Chairman, indicated that the Congress should have the report. He said: For the record, the Scowcroft Commission report has not been released by the White House. So there has been some public discussion of its major points, so we're going to look into seeing whether or not we can have greater access to it. Senator Roberts, the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, also seeks the Scowcroft Commission report. At the same hearing, he said: I just had a talk with Brent Scowcroft last Thursday, and even at my age, I begged him on hands and knee to release the report to the Intelligence Committee and to the Armed Services Committee. At our August 17 hearing, Senator Roberts said he agreed that ``it would be very helpful'' if the Scowcroft recommendations were released. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has also indicated that he can't see any reason why the Scowcroft Report should not be declassified. When he testified in the Senate Armed Services Committee last month, he said: I've been briefed on the Scowcroft Commission report. I don't see any reason why there shouldn't be a process going through and see what portion of it can be declassified. I don't know who classified it in the first place. It wasn't the Department of Defense, to my knowledge. . . . Why does the administration refuse to declassify the report and make it available to Congress? Why would the administration knowingly put the Congress in the position of acting on an intelligence reform proposal with enormous consequences for our National security, without having an unclassified copy of this crucial report? The obvious reason is that the administration is desperate to avoid embarrassment about the President's mishandling of intelligence reform. The Scowcroft report and recommendations are nearly 3 years old. They were submitted to President Bush in December 2001--just 3 months after the devastating attacks on September 11. Now, finally, we are about to enact long-overdue reforms to enable our intelligence community to deal more effectively with terrorist threats and other threats to our security. The President needs to come clean. He should release a declassified copy of the report to the Congress so we can act responsibly on intelligence reform. The American people can decide for themselves whether the President has dragged his feet on intelligence reform for nearly 3 years, despite his current rhetoric about the need for change. I urge the President to declassify the Scowcroft Commission report immediately, and that is what my amendment would do.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Washington.--Today, the Senate Intelligence Committee is expected to release its report on the prewar intelligence on Iraq. The document is likely to make clear that America's intelligence network, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, badly needs repair. The Senate report will also show that America's intelligence shortcomings aren't going to be addressed simply by changing C.I.A. directors. As the report should make clear, our spy services both failed to do a thorough enough job watching Iraq's weapons programs and played down evidence that challenged the prevailing assumptions that the programs were active. In addition, analysts did not critically evaluate their sources of information; instead, they marshaled the available evidence to paint the picture that policymakers wanted to see. And how will President Bush and his administration respond to these findings? It's unlikely that they will do much of anything. After all, every independent panel that examined American post-cold-war intelligence--including President Bush's own Scowcroft commission--recognized that fundamental structural changes were needed in our intelligence services. Yet, the White House has remained steadfastly passive as critical problems have gone unaddressed. Meanwhile, administration loyalists have argued repeatedly that structural change is not needed to improve the community's performance, providing a politically comfortable rationale for the White House's inaction. In theory, the argument against radical reform might seem plausible. The director of Central Intelligence today has sufficient authority on paper to address many of the issues that will be identified in the Senate report, like the failure of collectors and analysts to share information about sources. But in practice, the C.I.A. has had a hard time breaking free from its culture of mediocrity. During my years in government at the C.I.A. and elsewhere, I was repeatedly told that the problems now publicly identified in the Senate report were going to be fixed. I remember years of discussion about the desirability of ``co-locating'' analysts and operations officers working on the same target--seeing to it that they had the equal access to information about their sources. But in the end, nothing was done to change old ways of doing business, setting the stage for the Iraq fiasco. The story, it seems, hasn't changed much. In February, for example, Jami Miscik, the agency's deputy director of intelligence, told C.I.A. analysts in a speech that the problems with information-sharing would be fixed within 30 days. It's July, and nothing has happened. Clearly, structural reform needs to go beyond the creation of a freestanding intelligence ``czar'' who would oversee the entire American spy network. We need to develop a model of ``jointness'' for the intelligence community, analogous to what the Goldwater-Nichols Act did for the uniformed military 18 years ago. That legislation made the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the principal military adviser to the president. It also mandated cross-service commands, defined regionally and functionally, as the operational chains of command for American military forces. This change produced real improvement in military performance. Before Goldwater-Nichols, too many modern military missions were characterized by disaster: the botched attempt to rescue hostages in Iran, the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the operational problems that plagued the invasion of Grenada. Since Goldwater-Nichols required the armed services to collaborate, we have seen the successes of Panama, Operation Desert Storm and the outstanding battlefield performance of our forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. This model should be applied to American intelligence. This means moving away from the current organizational structure, defined primarily along disciplinary and agency lines. (The C.I.A.'s directorate of intelligence, for example, is responsible for all-source analysis; the directorate of operations is responsible for human intelligence collection; the National Security Agency is responsible for communications intelligence. Turf is sacred.) Instead, we should organize and deploy our resources against high-priority targets, including terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, China and problem states in the Middle East. Focused on a particular target, each group would draw on people and resources from across the intelligence community. These new target-based centers would report to a new national intelligence director, not to heads of individual agencies. Existing agencies would function primarily as providers of personnel and resources, much as the individual military services function in relation to the combatant commands. Certainly, there have been some tentative steps toward collaboration. The Counterterrorist Center and the Weapons Intelligence, Proliferation and Arms Control Center, both of which report to the director of Central Intelligence, reflect some of the logic of such cooperation. While the counterterrorist center wasn't inclusive enough to bring together information that might have stopped the 9/11 attacks, at least its analysts and operators are focused, in an integrated way, on their target. Still, it is clear that our intelligence agencies cannot move toward partnership on their own. The post-9/11 battles among the counterterrorist center, the new Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the F.B.I., and the Department of Homeland Security over primacy in assessing the terrorist threat strongly suggest that we have regressed in the effort to integrate. For its part, the arms control center was not independent enough of C.I.A. views to avoid being led toward a flawed analysis of the Iraqi arsenal. It is going to require strong presidential and Congressional leadership to achieve genuine reform. Thoughtful members on both sides of the aisle in both houses of Congress are already working on serious reform proposals, though nobody has yet had the courage to devise a Goldwater- Nichols Act for our spy agencies. In this context, the Bush administration's lack of initiative is inexplicable and unconscionable. There are those who argue that intelligence reform should not be taken up during a political season. They are wrong. This kind of reform can take place only in a political moment. We need a thorough discussion of the issue in the context of the current presidential campaign so that whoever is inaugurated in January has a mandate to break organizational pottery in order to save American lives.", u"Mr. President, I want to take this opportunity as the Senate resumes this afternoon's debate to rise in very strong support of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. I am proud to join with Senator Collins and Senator Joe Lieberman as a cosponsor of this bill. It is an excellent bill, and I want to support my two colleagues, Senators Collins and Lieberman, for working so hard and to go at it in a way that is not only bipartisan but nonpartisan following the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. I am excited about this bill because I think it reforms our intelligence to be able to make sure that we prevent any more 9/11s affecting the United States; that we reform the intelligence so that we never go to war again on dubious information; that we make the highest and best use of the talent in our intelligence agencies, and that they have the framework to be able to protect the Nation, as well as be able to speak truth to power. Mr. President, I am no stranger to reform. I am on the Intelligence Committee. I came on the committee before 9/11 to be an advocate for reform, particularly in the area of signals intelligence. As I worked on the committee and served on the joint inquiry about what occurred on 9/11, I became deeply committed to other issues related to reform: to have a national intelligence director, to create an inspector general, to mandate alternative or red team analysis, to always make sure that we policymakers have the best information, and that our troops and our homeland security officials get the best intelligence they need to be able to protect the Nation. Following the 9/11 Commission report, but also with the wonderful work of Senators Collins and Lieberman, we now have intelligence legislation that will give us a single empowered leader for our intelligence community, a strong inspector general, and a definite alternative analysis to make sure that all views are heard. This reform is broad, deep, and also authentic. I think that is what the Nation wants of us. Mr. President, 3,000 people died on September 11. They died at the World Trade Center, they died at the Pentagon, and they died on a field in Pennsylvania. At least 60 Marylanders died. We remember that they came from all walks of life. We must remember those we lost that day. The way we honor their memory is to take actions to do everything we can to prevent it from ever happening again. That is what the families have asked us to do. That is what the Nation has asked us to do. I am so pleased that we will act on this legislation before we recess. We need to do this, and we need to do this now. In joining the Intelligence Committee, and also after those terrible acts, like many others, I asked what could we have done to prevent the September 11 attacks on our country? Also, why did we think that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction? What kind of information does the President need before he sends troops into harm's way? What kinds of information do we need--we, the Members of Congress--to be able to provide the right response to a President's request? We reviewed a lot of this information, and now we know we have the kind of reform in this legislation that will help us. The 9/11 Commission built on the 9/11 joint inquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. We did that in a classified way. Then, the 9/11 Commission was organized, and I am happy to say I voted for it. The Commission could bring into the sunshine what many of us knew privately because it was classified. We knew about missed opportunities, insufficient or unreliable information, the failure to share information, the shortcomings of watch lists. The legislation that we have before us will move the priorities forward for intelligence reform. First of all, it gives the intelligence community one leader with authority, responsibility, and financial control. In Washington, if you cannot control people or you cannot control budgets, you cannot control the agency. Second, it provides for diversity of opinion in the analysis. It requires independent analysis. It also provides a framework for red teaming or a devil's advocate so that, again, the policymakers get the best information. It also strengthens information sharing. It provides the support to speak truth to power. And it also provides a unity of effort in the global war on terrorism. All of this is done with a delicate balance of protecting privacy and civil liberties. I salute my colleagues. While they were doing their homework this summer with the 9/11 report, I was doing mine--built on the experience that I had both as a member of the Intelligence Committee and the joint inquiry to investigate what went wrong on 9/11. I continued my homework over the summer. I read the riveting report of the 9/11 Commission. I attended hearings in the Intelligence Committee and Governmental Affairs. I consulted with officials of the FBI and others in homeland security in my State. I met with the Director of the National Security Agency. Having done that, I now conclude that this is the best legislation. We are at a turning point. This is a new century. It poses new threats to the Nation. Therefore, it requires a new framework to serve the Nation. That is what I believe this legislation will do. So I say to my colleagues that one of the best actions we can take now, in order to serve the Nation, is stand up for our troops, protect the homeland, and pass the Collins-Lieberman legislation, which I truly believe brings about the reform of the national intelligence community. I also salute the work of Senator Harry Reid and Senator Mitch McConnell, who were working on how we need to reform ourselves in Congress to be able to provide the best oversight of the intelligence community so we can have the best intelligence, yet the highest value for our dollar, and at the same time protect the Nation, finding the balance to protect our civil liberties. I believe the task force report saying the Senate needs to reform itself internally will come after this legislation. I think we have done a great job working on a bipartisan basis. I remember that fateful evening of 9/11 and that day when we gathered on the Capitol steps. America had lived through a lot. We didn't know what was yet to come. But joining with our House colleagues, we in the Senate, with our leadership, joined hands and sang ``God Bless America.'' We were not a Democratic Party. We were not a Republican Party. We were the red, white, and blue party, and that is what we need to be here today. We need to join hands, pass the reforms necessary to protect the Nation, and to truly ask God to bless the United States of America. Mr. President, I yield the floor.", u"Mr. Speaker, on February 5 of this year, a legendary American naval hero passed away in Bethesda, Maryland. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer epitomized the finest qualities of dedication and national service. His distinguished naval career spanned 41 years, including service as a naval aviator, as one of the first pilots off the ground during the attack on Pearl Harbor, as a decorated hero of numerous combat missions in the Southwest Pacific and the Battle of Midway, as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, as commander of NATO's U.S. Atlantic Command and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, becoming the only officer in the Navy's history to command both our Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, as Chief of Naval Operations, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as a tireless advocate for American veterans. Admiral Moorer was instrumental in establishing the United States Navy Memorial on Pennsylvania Avenue. In numerous appearances before Congressional Committees, Admiral Moorer provided valuable testimony on a variety of national security concerns. Capping this extraordinary career, Admiral Moorer made his final appearance on Capitol Hill on October 22, 2003, as Chairman of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the 1967 attack on the USS Liberty. It is a privilege for me to introduce the Findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry Into the Israeli Attack on the USS Liberty into the Congressional Record. Findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry Into the Israeli We, the undersigned, having undertaken an independent investigation of Israel's attack on the USS Liberty, including eyewitness testimony from surviving crewmembers, a review of naval and other official records, an examination of official statements by the Israeli and American governments, a study of the conclusions of all previous official inquiries, and a consideration of important new evidence and recent statements from individuals having direct knowledge of the attack or the cover up, hereby find the following: 1. That on June 8, 1967, after eight hours of aerial surveillance, Israel launched a two-hour air and naval attack against the USS Liberty, the world's most sophisticated intelligence ship, inflicting 34 dead and 172 wounded American servicemen (a casualty rate of seventy percent, in a crew of 294); 2. That the Israeli air attack lasted approximately 25 minutes, during which time unmarked Israeli aircraft dropped napalm canisters on the Liberty's bridge, and fired 30mm cannons and rockets into our ship, causing 821 holes, more than 100 of which were rocket-size; survivors estimate 30 or more sorties were flown over the ship by a minimum of 12 attacking Israeli planes which were jamming all five American emergency radio channels; 3. That the torpedo boat attack involved not only the firing of torpedoes, but the machine-gunning of the Liberty's firefighters and stretcher-bearers as they struggled to save their ship and crew; the Israeli torpedo boats later returned to machine-gun at close range three of the Liberty's life rafts that had been lowered into the water by survivors to rescue the most seriously wounded; 4. That there is compelling evidence that Israel's attack was a deliberate attempt to destroy an American ship and kill her entire crew; evidence of such intent is supported by statements from Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Undersecretary of State George Ball, former CIA director Richard Helms, former NSA directors Lieutenant General William Odom, USA (Ret.), Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, USN (Ret.), and Marshal Carter; former NSA deputy directors Oliver Kirby and Major General John Morrison, USAF (Ret.); and former Ambassador Dwight Porter, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon in 1967; 5. That in attacking the USS Liberty, Israel committed acts of murder against American servicemen and an act of war against the United States; 6. That fearing conflict with Israel, the White House deliberately prevented the U.S. Navy from coming to the defense of the Liberty by recalling Sixth Fleet military rescue support while the ship was under attack; evidence of the recall of rescue aircraft is supported by statements of Captain Joe Tully, Commanding Officer of the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga, and Rear Admiral Lawrence Geis, the Sixth Fleet carrier division commander, at the time of the attack; never before in American naval history has a rescue mission been cancelled when an American ship was under attack; 7. That although the Liberty was saved from almost certain destruction through the heroic efforts of the ship's Captain, William L. McGonagle (MOH), and his brave crew, surviving crewmembers were later threatened with ``court-martial, imprisonment or worse'' if they exposed the truth; and were abandoned by their own government; 8. That due to the influence of Israel's powerful supporters in the United States, the White House deliberately covered up the facts of this attack from the American people; 9. That due to continuing pressure by the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, this attack remains the only serious naval incident that has never been thoroughly investigated by Congress; to this day, no surviving crewmember has been permitted to officially and publicly testify about the attack; 10. That there has been an official cover-up without precedent in American naval history; the existence of such a cover-up is now supported by statements of Rear Admiral Merlin Staring, USN (Ret.), former Judge Advocate General of the Navy; and Captain Ward Boston, USN, (Ret.), the chief counsel to the Navy's 1967 Court of Inquiry of the Liberty attack; 11. That the truth about Israel's attack and subsequent White House cover-up continues to be officially concealed from the American people to the present day and is a national disgrace; 12. That a danger to our national security exists whenever our elected officials are willing to subordinate American interests to those of any foreign nation, and specifically are unwilling to challenge Israel's interests when they conflict with American interests; this policy, evidenced by the failure to defend the USS Liberty and the subsequent official cover-up of the Israeli attack, endangers the safety of Americans and the security of the United States. Whereupon, we, the undersigned, in order to fulfill our duty to the brave crew of the USS Liberty and to all Americans who are asked to serve in our Armed Forces, hereby call upon the Department of the Navy, the Congress of the United States and the American people to immediately take the following actions: First, That a new Court of Inquiry be convened by the Department of the Navy, operating with Congressional oversight, to take public testimony from surviving crewmembers; and to thoroughly investigate the circumstances of the attack on the USS Liberty, with full cooperation from the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence services, and to determine Israel's possible motive in launching said attack on a U.S. naval vessel; Second, That every appropriate committee of the Congress of the United States investigate the actions of the White House and Defense Department that prevented the rescue of the USS Liberty, thereafter threatened her surviving officers and men if they exposed the truth, and covered up the true circumstances of the attack from the American people; and Third, That the eighth day of June of every year be proclaimed to be hereafter known as USS Liberty Remembrance Day, in order to commemorate the Liberty's heroic crew; and to educate the American people of the danger to our national security inherent in any passionate attachment of our elected officials for any foreign nation.", u"I thank the distinguished chair of the committee and I begin by congratulating her on her accession to the Chairmanship. Her distinguished career began as a staffer for the Committee on Governmental Affairs. Senator Collins is now the chairwoman--a very significant advance. I have sought recognition to support the nomination of Governor Tom Ridge to be Secretary of Homeland Security. Tom Ridge embodies the classic American success story. He was born in very modest circumstances--an occupant of public housing as a youngster; Harvard educated, he served as an enlisted man in the Vietnam war, and was honored with medals for his distinguished service. With outstanding academic credentials from Dickinson Law School, Governor Ridge became an experienced assistant district attorney--which, I might add, is a very important developmental office. Sometimes I am asked what office I consider more important, being district attorney of Philadelphia or being a U.S. Senator. I am quick to respond that, for me, the most important office was assistant district attorney, with the development of trial skills, analysis, and organization. Tom Ridge was an outstanding prosecuting attorney. He came to the Congress of the United States in 1982. I have worked closely with Governor Ridge for the past 20 years plus. He was an outstanding two-term Governor in Pennsylvania, enjoying great popularity and great success. Shortly after September 11, 2001, when Governor Ridge received a call from his former gubernatorial colleague--now President Bush--to take on the job as Presidential Adviser of Homeland Security, Governor Ridge responded as a great patriot, taking on the very difficult job of coordinating the affairs on homeland security. With the Department scheduled to come into existence on January 25, it is very important that we move ahead promptly with his confirmation. It is my expectation that the vote will be overwhelming, if not unanimous. We had a hearing last Friday in the Governmental Affairs Committee. Rules were waived to send the matter to the floor at an early date. I am pleased to see that the majority leader has listed the issue for resolution today. It is my hope that Governor Ridge will find, in this new position, the ability in our Federal Government to put all of the so-called dots on the board at the same time. It is my judgment that the Secretary of Homeland Security needs a somewhat broader authority than the position has at the present time institutionally. I had filed an amendment to the homeland security bill which would give the Secretary the authority to direct all of the intelligence agencies--the CIA, the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and all other agencies--so that the analytical aspects of the work would be under one umbrella: Let the CIA conduct their work worldwide, let the FBI undertake their traditional role, and let the Defense Intelligence Agency undertake its regular duties as all of the intelligence agencies continue functioning operationally. But when it comes to analysis, it is my view that all ought to be under one umbrella. Governor Ridge testified that there is excellent coordination among the intelligence agencies at the present time. He testified last Friday candidly, but he couldn't say what had happened before he came to the scene. I commented in my discussion with Governor Ridge during his confirmation proceedings that he cannot say what would happen after he left, that it is not a matter of personalities. The relationship between Governor Ridge and President Bush, which is a very close relationship, enhances Governor Ridge's ability to gather information from the other intelligence agencies. But institutionally, we have to be prepared for the day when the relationships might not be that close. We are a government of laws, not a government of men; a government of relationships defined by statute, and not depending upon personal relationships. It is my view that had all of the so-called dots been on the same board prior to September 11, September 11 could have been avoided. We now know about the famous FBI Phoenix report from the summer of 2001 which was lost in the FBI bureaucracy. We now know more about the effort of the Minneapolis field office of the FBI to secure a warrant for Zacarias Moussaoui under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The wrong standard was applied. They were looking for 15 percent--more probable than not when the case law is that there has to be suspicion only founded on the totality of the facts. We know the CIA had information about two men in Kuala Lumpur which was not conveyed to the Immigration and Naturalization Service or the FBI. Those men got into the United States and were on two of the suicide bomber planes on 9/11. We know the National Security Agency received a report on September 10 that something was to happen the next day. It wasn't translated until September 12. So if all of these so-called dots had been on the board, I think the acts of 9/11 could have been prevented. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency testified last fall that another attack would occur. I do not believe we have to concede that. I do not believe we have to await another attack. I believe our fundamental job is to prevent an attack. We do have intelligence agencies where improvements have been made, and we need the cooperation among all of the intelligence agencies to put all of these so-called dots on the same board. It is my hope that Governor Ridge will ultimately have that authority. As I said at the hearing on Friday, I intend to offer that amendment and pursue it through the legislative process in committee and to bring it to the floor of the Senate. The issue of labor relations was also a matter discussed at the hearing. There is no doubt about the President's need for a national security waiver. But it is my view that that is a Presidential judgment and a Presidential decision and that, to the extent possible, the traditional labor-management laws of the United States ought to be followed unless there is a real national security interest as determined by the President in light of our very difficult war against terrorism and against al-Qaida. I am pleased to see a man of Governor Ridge's competency coming to this position. The toughest job is to stop calling him Governor Ridge and to start calling him Secretary Ridge. But we are going to start that tomorrow as he takes on perhaps as tough a job as there is in Washington, DC, today. I don't think I have to urge my colleagues to support this nomination. I think the vote will be overwhelming, if not unanimous. I want to add my voice in support of Governor Ridge because I have known him a long time and have firsthand experience as to his competency, and to express my concerns about the operation of the Department as we move ahead on this very vital war against terrorism. I thank the chairwoman and yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, my amendment will prevent the arbitrary privatization of almost a million Federal workers. It prevents agencies from establishing or applying or enforcing any numerical goal, target, or quota for the contracting out of Federal jobs either by public-private competitions or by directly converting jobs to the private sector. I want to be very clear, I am not against privatization, but I believe the privatization should be based on thoughtful criteria, not arbitrary numerical quotas. This administration has stated, in another arena, they are absolutely against quotas. So am I. But they seem to use quotas when it is convenient. I do not understand why OMB wants to use quotas to get rid of Federal employees. Let's not use quotas at all, whether it is to get into college or to get rid of Federal workers. Right now, many people are thinking about how to reform the Federal workforce. Excellent thinking. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker and Senator Voinovich--leaders in this area--have put a lot of work into this issue. What they are saying, loud and clear, is, we need to be able to recruit the best, we need to be able to retain the best, we need to be able to maintain the integrity of the civil service system and make sure it never lapses into cronyism or political patronage. I am for their approach. Why am I offering this amendment? And why would that go against the thinking I have just talked about? Because the Office of Management and Budget has issued a directive calling for bounty hunters in Federal agencies to get rid of 850,000 jobs over the next 3 years. That is nearly half of the Federal workforce. No agency would be immune from these cuts. And, more importantly, there is no criteria for the cuts. Managers will be forced to meet arbitrary targets, sometimes against their will or even their better judgment--without careful criteria, without rationale, without guidelines; and without considering: Would privatization of these jobs affect national security? Is it cost-effective for the taxpayer? What is its impact on the mission of each agency? And what would arbitrary, cavalier, swashbuckling privatization mean? I think it is a dangerous trend with our Federal employees. Look at the Customs Service. Recently, they were made part of the Homeland Security Department. Their top priority should be protecting our borders and our ports, like stopping the millennium bomber. They should be searching for terrorists instead of wasting their time searching for private companies to do part of their job. Next let's look at DOD. We may be going to war. Yet the Army would have to contract out as many as 200,000 jobs. Transferring these jobs to the private sector could seriously erode morale and readiness. While the military is fighting a war against terrorism, and maybe even a war in Iraq, let's not have a war within the Pentagon over who gets to keep their job. Who are the kinds of people I am talking about? I am thinking about a secretary at the FBI in the Baltimore field office who has worked there for close to 50 years. During the terrible sniper case that gripped our whole Capital region, the FBI was on the job with our local law enforcement, along with the BATF, and it was the people in the back office keeping the agency support. What are we going to say to that secretary who has worked with field officers, who has helped keep the FBI going for over 48 years and went to the same high school I went to and, by the way, Congresswoman Pelosi? Hello. Thank you very much. You are part of a quota. You are going to be replaced by a Kelly Girl. There is nothing wrong with Kelly Girls, but there is nothing wrong with a dedicated secretary who stuck with the FBI for 50 years so they could be effective and out there on the job protecting us. So I am not seeking an end to privatization, but I think we should follow the FAIR Act. I think we should follow OMB's A-76 circular on these kinds of things. Privatization is a code word to go after Federal employees. I do not know why OMB wants to do this. There is even a question of whether it will save money. First of all, we have now the smallest Federal workforce since the 1960s. Also, at the same time, we know, from Federal managers themselves, that they are really nervous about this OMB directive because they think it will, first, undermine morale; and, second, there is no clear criteria. And instead of doing the job, they now have to justify the job. I do not know why we are so prickly, hostile to our Federal employees. Who are the Federal employees? They are the Customs inspectors, they are the nurses at our VA hospitals, and they are the people at Social Security who make sure the seniors get their checks on time. I am a Senator from Maryland, and I am really proud of it. I represent over 100,000 Federal employees. I wish you could meet them the way I do: on the job, at supermarkets. I represent people who are Nobel Prize winners at the National Institutes of Health and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. I represent people who work for the Coast Guard who are out there protecting our coast. I represent FBI agents. I represent the National Security Agency, the faculty at the United States Naval Academy that is getting our next generation of leaders ready. They work hard every day to guard our borders, protect our homes, get America ready for the future. Workers in the FDA are protecting our food supply and making sure our pharmaceuticals are safe. They are also the Federal employees in other parts of America, the ones who died at the World Trade Center. How about the ones who died at the Pentagon? How about the ones who lost their lives in Oklahoma City? They were protecting our Nation. They were protecting our communities. We said a grateful Nation will never forget. Well, let's not forget them when it comes to pushing out their colleagues from the Federal workforce. I know what Federal employees do. They work hard. They think for themselves first as citizens of the United States and second as workers at missions-driven agencies. Let me just close by saying this. We need to have a civil service in this country. And we need to have a civil service that is reliable and has integrity and is independent. We have gone from an age of patronage politics to an age of partisan politics. I believe the American people want us to be in an age of performance politics. That means keeping a civil service. Do not fool around with the civil service. Don't just contract it out and reward your pals through cronyism or a new form of patronage. I fought a political machine to get into politics, and I will fight a political machine that will try to destroy the civil service of the United States. Let's keep a strong nonpolitical Federal workforce. Let's get rid of the quotas for the OMB circular, and let's take a rational approach maintaining the civil service but privatizing those jobs that are appropriate. I yield the floor and reserve time that I might need for rebuttal.", u"I am glad to see the legislation on homeland security on the floor. This is historic legislation. As the distinguished Senator from Connecticut has said, this is maybe the most important bill that will come out of his committee during his tenure. It is my hope we can move through the bill, go to conference, and have legislation on the President's desk which the President can accept. One of the key points at issue is the way the analysis of intelligence is going to be structured, and it is my hope that we will be able to take a step at this time on reforms which have long been in the making. When I chaired the Intelligence Committee in the 104th Congress, I proposed legislation which would have brought under one umbrella the CIA and all of the intelligence agencies. There is on the President's desk now a similar proposal. It would be acceptable to this Senator to have that umbrella control really anywhere, but the turf wars which are well-known to be endemic and epidemic in this city have prevented that kind of umbrella or overview. The proposal which I think is indispensable is not to change the operation of the CIA or the FBI or the Defense Intelligence Agency or National Security, but when it comes to analysis, to bring it all together so that the analysts are under one umbrella. I believe that had there been an umbrella prior to September 11, 2001, there is a good chance that 9/11 could have been prevented. We know by hindsight about the FBI report out of Phoenix, and about the young man who had Osama bin Laden's picture on his wall while studying flight training, as well as other indicia of connections to Osama bin Laden. We know about the application for a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of Zacarias Moussaoui, which would have yielded very substantial information about his connections to al-Qaeda. We know about the two at Kuala Lumpur, known to the CIA, but not communicated to the FBI or Immigration and Naturalization Service in a timely way. We know of the information from the National Security Agency on September 10, a threat, that was not translated until September 12. There are other factors at issue here where we could have connected the dots, as the metaphor is used. This bill is a very substantial undertaking. I discussed the matter on a number of occasions with the distinguished Senator from Tennessee who raises a valid consideration that this bill may be going too far in the sense that it takes in a great deal of territory. It does that. However, the question is, When will it be done, if not now? The business of consolidating Federal agencies is a Herculean task facing all sorts of obstacles, and it is only the event of 9/11 and the threat of another 9/11 which is a motivating factor to make these enormous changes. Earlier today I heard the Senator from Tennessee say next year would be time enough to study the intelligence agencies. There is one big problem with that: The Senator from Tennessee will not be here next year. We need to take advantage of his skill this year. Perhaps almost as important as the skill of the Senator from Tennessee is the momentum which we have. I have offered to give him some tips on his new job. I saw a headline in the paper the other day, ``Senator Thompson Demoted to District Attorney.'' First of all, I do not know that it is a demotion because I have held that position. However, that is what the headline said, Senator Thompson demoted. I was surfing on Sunday. It is hard to surf and not see Senator Thompson or Senator Lieberman, or both of them. Senator Thompson was in a heated exchange with former Secretary Eagleburger, and then the program was interrupted for some entertainment. I thought Secretary Eagleburger and Senator Thompson were entertaining. They put on a portion of this television show. I wonder how many ex-district attorneys in the Senate turned down that television contract before Senator Thompson got it? At any rate, Senator Thompson was sitting behind a big desk in a dimly lit room and two assistant district attorneys approach him. I could not get the gist of it entirely, but I guess the thrust of it was someone in the room was in favor of legalizing drugs. The comment was made: What about our war on drugs? This District Attorney Thompson said: We have to have a war on something in Congress for people to be elected. It seemed a little cynical for him to turn on his colleagues even before he is on his new payroll. I trust the Ethics Committee would not let him be on the payroll yet, although he is doing those shows. Back to a serious vein, this is the time to do it. I talked to Governor Ridge after a meeting he had with the President today. I have supplied him with language and I sent a copy of it to Senator Lieberman and a copy to Senator Thompson. The President wants to be sure that the President has the authority to continue to work with the CIA as he always has. Absolutely, he should have that authority. He does have that authority. There is nothing we can do in legislation that would change it. The change in the language was made to have the analysis groups under one umbrella, subject to the President's direction to the contrary. An earlier draft stated the reverse, that the President can direct all of these intelligence agencies to coordinate. You cannot wait for the President to make a direction. He is too busy to do it. The generalization has to be that they will be working together under one umbrella, and they will be coordinating the analysis, but this must be made explicit in statute. If the President wants to change that, of course he can. I do not think he needs that authority in the statute, but I am pleased to eliminate any question about it. It is my hope we can find some common ground on that question. Washington, DC, has a way of having matters slide if we do not strike while the iron is hot. It is hard to get anything done in Washington, DC, while the iron is hot. However, when it cools off, it is extraordinarily difficult. It has been a long time and many efforts have been made to bring these agencies together. It is a limited juncture to call on the analytical sections to be under one umbrella. Homeland security will do a lot in response to another 9/11, but if that happens, it is really a very sad situation. Ninety-nine percent of our effort needs to be made to prevent it. If we have to respond to another 9/11, we are in deep trouble. Maybe something even more serious may occur--not that 9/11 was not serious enough, but it may involve weapons of mass destruction. Who knows what it may involve. We have a very heavy responsibility to do everything we can to prevent it. When we look at what was known before, with the dots there, and the possibility of putting them together, that is what we have to work toward. I have worked a lot with the principals on this issue. I had the opportunity to serve on the Governmental Affairs Committee. I know the work of Senator Thompson, who was chairman, and Senator Lieberman, who is now chairman. We have structured this to accommodate all of the competing interests. I think it will probably be a long day before Senator Lieberman will make an ex parte invitation for me to speak again. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, we have had a good discussion on this motion to proceed. I thank Senator Byrd for doing what he has done. I will say publicly what I told him privately before the recess: I thought he was doing all of us a favor by slowing us down a little bit. There was an awful lot of talk about we must get this done by September 11 for symbolic reasons, and symbolism is important. But it is not nearly as important as it is to get this right. We will not get it right forever. We will be dealing with it probably for some time to come. But it is important to get it as right as we can. I think it is very important that we take the time necessary to do that. We can disagree as to how long is enough time. But I do think we can all agree that in retrospect, we were kind of headed toward a stampede there for a little while where we wanted to get something passed so we could say we got something passed. That receives short-term benefits maybe to us but it doesn't do much in terms of long-term benefits to the country. I think we are where we need to be now. We have come back. We have had a chance to digest this, discuss it, debate it in a public forum, and now to discuss it here on the floor. Senator Byrd made some very interesting and valid points about things that we need to consider. He, I think rightfully, pointed out that the NSA creation was probably the model that not only the President is going by, but the model that we all can have in terms of importance and in terms of how long it takes to put these things together. It took a good while to put the National Security Agency together. I believe it took 6 months between the time the bill was introduced and the time that it was passed. I point out that it was after a war. I do think probably Congress had a little more leisure during those days than we have. It was 2 years after the war. Of course, we are just beginning our endeavor. We don't have quite the leisure that perhaps the Congress did at that time. We have been considering the overall concept one way or another, formally or informally, for some time. The Gilmore Commission came in December of 2000 with a recommendation for a Homeland Security Department. The Hart-Rudman Commission came out in February, I believe, of last year, with a recommendation. We didn't pay enough attention to it soon enough. But it was out there. It was discussed and considered at that time. Congress, from time to time, has certainly considered many of the component problems that have led to this bill. For example, the problems with the INS are certainly no secret. We have been dealing with that. We have been dealing with other problems the Government has. I suggest the time is ripe, and there is no reason now for us not to address this issue after we have had a full-fledged discussion. I think the analogy to the Transportation Security Administration that was referred to and that was referred to in the newspaper today is a good one. I think it shows the difficulty that we have when we establish an agency that is having to recreate itself on the one hand and do the job on the other simultaneously. That is a very good point. What we are doing here in terms of the Department of Homeland Security is TSA enlarged in many respects. That leads me to perhaps a slightly different conclusion. That leads me to the conclusion that what we need to do to avoid that problem is to give the people who are in charge and have the responsibility for making sure this works the tools they can use to make it work. We had a civil service organization system, and we had a management system, the paradigm for which was established many years ago. We live in a different world now. That is what the President is talking about when he is talking about managerial flexibility and having the tools with which to manage this thing. If you talk to corporate leaders who have undergone transitions that are much less complicated than what we are doing, they talk about how difficult it is and how important it is to have the right kind of culture but also to have the managerial talent, the managerial wherewithal and flexibility to address those thousands of problems and difficulties that you are going to have in trying to pull all these factors together. These corporate managers don't even have Congress to answer to or deal with or worry about. Certainly, when it comes to Government, Congress cannot deal with each of these issues. We have to either trust our leadership to the point of giving them some managerial flexibility or not. I think that is what we are doing here. That is what this is all about. It is not a major grant of new power; it is a granting of power by Congress after thorough deliberation to better manage what Congress is establishing within the discretion of Congress, and having the annual appropriations process, among other hearings and considerations, in which to evaluate what is going on. I think we have to give that kind of authority if we are going to place on these people the kinds of responsibilities that we are placing on them. There has been a concern expressed about personal liberties. Democracy always has to--especially a democracy under attack--balance the national security of the country with the personal liberties that we hold so dear. I think we have done a pretty good job of that. Some of the things that the administration has done have been somewhat controversial. They are not really reflected in this bill. This bill really doesn't deal with any of those things. But I do think it is appropriate to point out that in other times President Lincoln instituted habeas corpus. President Roosevelt had internments, and things of that nature. Other Presidents have taken rather severe action when they deemed it necessary in times of war and in times of national security. We are not even approaching things of that nature. And we are not really even approaching the subject matter in this bill. So I respectfully suggest that there is no danger here of giving the President too much power. The danger, quite frankly, is that we are establishing a new Department that is complex, multifaceted, and is going to be difficult to organize without giving the President some authority that several other Government agencies already have, that the Congress has already given them. We will have an opportunity to discuss this later when appropriate amendments come up. But in the area of national security, and in the area of flexibility with regard to some of these agencies, what the President is basically asking for is the same authority that prior Presidents have had in the national security area, and the same authority for this new Department that other Department heads already have. So I do not think we need to concern ourselves overly about that. But I will say that it is refreshing to stand on this floor, to sit and listen to someone such as Senator Byrd talk about first principles, talk about the basic function of government, talk about the things the forefathers concerned themselves with, and the things we should concern ourselves with as we go forward with this bill. But I suggest that it is time we go forward. I yield the floor.", u"I am sorry the Senator from Nevada will not be here to hear my presentation, but there are 97 other Senators who could come. Counting the Presiding Officer and myself and the Senator from Nevada, that leaves 97 others. That is probably more people than are watching on C-SPAN 2, as a matter of fact, Madam President. The pending amendment seeks to speak to the provisions of the bill relating to a National Office for Combating Terrorism, and I believe the thrust of the provisions for this national office are well founded as a coordinating mechanism. But after discussing the matter in some detail with the author of the bill, the distinguished senior Senator from Florida, and considering the views of the President, who does not want to have a confirmed officer in the West Wing but is looking for an adviser, as former Governor Ridge who is now his adviser, as Dr. Condoleezza Rice is the National Security Adviser--it seems to me there are strong reasons for us to avoid this legislation to have a Secretary of Homeland Security who will be confirmed and then have a Director for the National Office for Combating Terrorism, because all of these duties, in my opinion, can be handled by the Secretary of Homeland Security. So the objectives which the senior Senator from Florida seeks to accomplish can be accomplished without adding this additional office. I know the President does not want another officer confirmed by the Senate. He didn't want one in the first place, and didn't want a Department of Homeland Security, but now has acceded. Senator Lieberman and I introduced the legislation for a Department of Homeland Security and a Secretary of Homeland Security last October, and eventually the President acceded to that necessity, and there is now a bill on the floor. But as I look over the responsibilities which the senior Senator from Florida has assigned to the Director of the National Office for Combating Terrorism, it is my view that these duties can be handled by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The responsibilities which are set out in section 201(c): To develop national objectives and policies for combating terrorism. I think that is an appropriate function for the Secretary. To direct . . . [the] assessment of terrorist threats and vulnerabilities to those threats . . . . Again, I think that is something that can be handled by the Secretary. To coordinate . . . the implementation . . . of the Strategy by agencies with responsibilities for combating terrorism . . . . Again, I think that is something the Secretary can do. To work with agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to address vulnerabilities identified by the Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection within the Department. Again, that is something which the Secretary can handle. To coordinate, with the advice of the Secretary, the development of a comprehensive annual budget for the programs and activities under the Strategy, including the budgets of the military departments and agencies within the National Foreign Intelligence Program relating to international terrorism . . . . That can be handled by the Secretary. In fact, this provision calls for coordination with the Secretary. The provision does exclude military programs, projects or activities relating to force protection. This is a controversial item, as to whether there ought to be somebody with budget authority. I think it is a good idea. Right now there is diverse budget authority with a larger share of it on the intelligence agencies coming out of the Department of Defense. I believe it would be very useful to have that centralized. When I chaired the Intelligence Committee in the 104th Congress, I proposed legislation which would have brought all of the intelligence agencies under one umbrella, the Central Intelligence Agency. Now I think there is an opportunity to do that with the new Department of Homeland Security since we are taking a fresh look at this area. I know there are objections to giving budget authority to anyone on an overall basis, but it would be my hope that this provision would stay--but it would stay under the dominion of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The other responsibilities of the Director of the National Office for Combating Terrorism are: To exercise funding authority for Federal terrorism prevention and response agencies . . . . Stated simply, all of the functions of the Director of the National Office for Combating Terrorism, in my view, can be handled by the Secretary of Homeland Security. I think those objectives are sound. It is my hope that we will legislate here to put under the umbrella of the Secretary of Homeland Security the necessary authority to protect against terrorists. It is my judgment that had all of the dots been under one umbrella, there would have been a veritable blueprint for what happened on September 11 and that September 11 might well have been prevented. This is the time, with the new Department of Homeland Security to be established, that we have a chance to implement what so many people have proposed. My idea to bring all of the intelligence agencies under one umbrella in the legislation, which I proposed in the 104th Congress when I chaired the Intelligence Committee, is an idea which has been proposed by many. At the moment, there is on the President's desk a comprehensive proposal to accomplish just that. But the reality is that the turf wars involving the various agencies are so fierce that this is never accomplished. Now we have a chance to do it. Had the one umbrella been present to identify the FBI Phoenix memorandum--where there was a flight student with a big picture of Osama bin Laden and indicators of potential terrorist activity--had that, combined with the two men identified, who were later hijackers on September 11, in Kuala Lumpur where the CIA never told the FBI or the INS--had that been added to the records--the National Security Agency got it on September 10; it wasn't translated as a threat that something would happen the next day, perhaps later, until the 12th--especially with the information which could have been obtained, had a warrant been issued for the computer of Zacarias Moussaoui and for the search of his premises--there was a virtual treasure trove of information linking Moussaoui to al-Qaida. We have learned a very different lesson from 9/11. Now is the time for the Congress to change it. We simply have to override the various Federal agencies that are fighting for their turf. The stakes now are too serious. We have an enormous responsibility in the Congress to do everything we can to see to it that there is no recurrence of 9/11. We have action to be taken if there is a biological attack. We have worked on various antidotes for various biological weapons--smallpox and anthrax. But if we have to respond, it is a 99 percent loss. What we have to do is prevent it. The intelligence agencies that want to maintain their own sovereignty just ought to change that attitude. The legislation which has been proposed would put all of these analysis sections under the Secretary of Homeland Security. That is what ought to be done. That can be done in this bill. There was a meeting on July 31 with the President, Governor Ridge, and Members of Congress, where we talked about these ideas. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of this letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my statement.", u"Mr. President, a little more than a year ago, the terrible events of September 11 forced the awakening and mobilization of a critical resource in this country. In response to that tremendous tragedy, America's technology innovators, skilled workers in all walks of life, have stepped forward to help America address the numerous threats our enemies pose. One of these threats is cybersecurity. As computer networks have become increasingly central to this Nation's infrastructure and businesses, that the importance of securing our information and information technologies has grown. Today I wish to draw the Senate's attention to emerging technologies for dealing with these new threats. I also want to discuss how this country can maximize a uniquely American resource: that is, the skilled innovation of our tech sector. Technology workers and managers from my home State of Oregon have inspired me with their technical skills and their passion to put their talents to work serving America. The Portland area is home to one of the Nation's largest concentration of cybersecurity vendors in the country. Portland now boasts a remarkable cluster of small and large companies actively working to make America's portion of cyberspace a safer place. Just a few examples: Tripwire is the world leader in data integrity assurance, providing software that establishes the foundation for IT security and reliability. Tripwire is used to protect some of the world's most sensitive data, and that includes some of the most important systems right here in Washington. Digimarc provides digitally watermarked drivers licenses for 37 States, and supplies official identification documents for governments around the world. Its technology enables authentication with a greater level of assurance than has historically been possible. Swan Island Networks is building software platforms that enable secure communications of sensitive information to trusted users across organizational boundaries. It is helping Federal and local agencies and first responders to communicate effectively to audiences inside and outside the firewall. Intel Corporation, which has its largest base of employment in Oregon, is leading the National Emergency Messaging Systems initiative from the Portland area. Intel is helping local, State and Federal officials respond to emergencies. WireX has won international recognition for its Immunix Network Security Solutions. The company was founded by a grant from DARPA in 1998. Galois Connections designs and develops high confidence software for critical and demanding applications. Its clientele includes the National Security Agency. Kryptiq builds secure email systems that are built to preserve privacy, as well as the integrity of documents. Oregon is home to many, many more, including Flatrock, Infotects, Network Associates, Rulespace, TechTracker and True Disk. Some of these companies have persevered and become successful selling products and services that government is using to defend its infrastructure. Many others have developed products, launched companies, and knocked on doors in Washington, trying to find an entry point. Their efforts must be sustained and encouraged. There are numerous ways to provide that encouragement, and not all of them originate in Washington. It is vital to look at what is working on the local level and nurture it there. It is time to lower the speedbumps. Straighten the curves. Shorten the straightaways. Bring our technological talent quickly to the front lines of this new kind of war. In Oregon, a coalition of these cybersecurity companies has come together in the wake of 9/11. The Oregon Regional Alliance for Information and Network Security, or Oregon RAINS, is banding together to offer products and services America needs now. These companies are working together to find new ways of navigating the Federal bureaucracy to get their products on the ground. In my view, the Federal Government should do all it can to be responsive to organizations like Oregon RAINS. Currently, our sluggish bureaucracy often discriminates against small, young and distant vendors. America's enemies won't be defeated solely by the ideas of huge corporations or entrenched government contractors. This country needs the help of smaller, nimble players who are long on passion and talent, but short on expertise about dealing with their Federal Government. It is essential to eliminate the roadblocks American innovators face. A 20-person company in Beaverton, OR shouldn't have to devote precious resources to hiring lobbyists, making multiple trips to see different people in different agencies, and pursuing expensive and, frankly, frequently obsolete certifications. Earlier this year I was proud to author the Science and Technology Emergency Mobilization Act, along with my colleague Senator Allen, and to see it passed by this Senate. That legislation mandated the creation of a clearinghouse, or single entry point, for technology innovators offering new products for the war on terrorism. I am gratified to see that concept echoed in the Homeland Security legislation sponsored by Senator Lieberman. My legislation, as well as Senator Lieberman's homeland security bill, also directs the executive branch to establish a national test bed to evaluate new technologies. In my view, this national test bed could eventually serve as a model for regional test beds. If that little company in Beaverton, OR, could run pilot programs in its backyard, the company could more easily answer questions, deal with challenges and monitor results. Regional efforts to test new technologies would also increase our likelihood of finding unexpected solutions in unexpected places. Some technology or technique that we couldn't have foreseen might pop up and help us win this war. The beauty of American innovation is that it could just as easily come from a suburban basement, a sparsely furnished loft, or a coalition of small companies as it could from the business-as-usual landscape. There are other ways the Federal Government can be a better partner to small technology innovators like those in my home State. Accelerating research and public-private technology partnerships through Federal grants. Deepening our cyber-security bench by funding IT education and channeling bright students into those areas. Raising awareness in the general public so that everyone sees the importance of securing this country's infrastructure. I can assure you that in my home state alone there are a plethora of skilled software engineers and managers who are eager to see their technologies deployed to serve America. The Federal Government needs to partner with them and help them help their neighbors. American lives are at stake. ", u"Mr. President, it is my hope that the Senate will complete action on the pending homeland security legislation, that we will go to conference with the House of Representatives, and that this bill will be passed, signed into law by the President, before we adjourn because, in my judgment, the most important business the Congress has is to legislate is on homeland security and to do our utmost to prevent a recurrence of 9/11. The intelligence communities have advised that there will be another terrorist attack. It is not a matter of whether or if, but it is a matter of when. I am not prepared to accept that. I believe another terrorist attack can be prevented. I believe had all of the so-called dots been put together before September 11, 2001, that there was a good chance that terrorist attack could have been prevented. I say that because there were very important leads which were never coalesced, analyzed, or brought together. I refer to the FBI report out of Phoenix, in July of 2000, about a man taking flight training, had a big picture of Osama bin Laden, very suspicious. That report never got to the upper echelons of the FBI. We had the CIA tracking two members of al-Qaida in Kuala Lumpur. They turned out to be hijackers, two of the pilots involved in September 11. But the CIA never told the FBI or never told INS, and they gained admittance to the country and were part of the suicide bombers. Then there is the famous, or perhaps infamous, national security agency report on September 10 that something dire was about to happen the very next day. It wasn't translated until September 12. Further, the very important effort by the Minneapolis branch of the FBI to get a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act for Zacarias Moussaoui, who was supposed to have been the 20th member of the hijackers and suicide bombers, was never pursued properly because the FBI used the wrong standard. We know from the 13-page single-spaced letter written by Special Agent Colleen Rowley that the U.S. Attorney's office in Minneapolis was applying the wrong standard--a 75 to 80 percent probability--and that Agent Colleen Rowley thought it was a standard of more probable than not, which would have been 51 percent. The appropriate legal standard, as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States in Gates v. Illinois, in an opinion by then Justice Rehnquist, was that probable cause is established on the totality of the circumstances based on suspicion. Had the Zacarias Moussaoui matter been integrated, there was a great deal of information available in Moussaoui's computer which was not acquired. The Intelligence Committee hearings have disclosed that in the past two weeks. All of these dots were on the screen, and even more. Had they been brought together, then there is a possibility that 9-11 may have been prevented. At least they would have been on inquiry. I believe this was a veritable blueprint. I believe we have a very heavy duty to see that this legislation is enacted and all of the intelligence agencies are brought under one umbrella. I tried to do that in 1996 when I chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee. I wanted to bring them all under the CIA. I think it is not really critical under which umbrella, but under one umbrella. Now we have the chance to accomplish that with homeland security. We have two provisions under the Labor-Management Act that are, so far, providing a controversy that has held the measure from going further. It is my suggestion these two provisions are not too far apart. The law, as set forth in 5 United States Code 7103 says: The President may issue an order excluding any agency or subdivision thereof from coverage under this chapter [which is collective bargaining] if the President determines that (a) the agency or subdivision has a primary function, intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work, and the provisions of this chapter cannot be applied to that agency or subdivision in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations. That is the existing law which the President does not want changed, and there has been an effort by labor to what is called ``shore up'' those provisions of collective bargaining by this language in the Nelson-Chafee-Breaux amendment: The President could not use his authority without showing that (1) the mission and responsibilities of the agency or subdivision materially change, and (2) a majority of such employees within such agency or subdivision have as their primary duty, intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative work directly related to terrorism investigation. Now, there was a question on my mind as to whether the language of the Nelson amendment was in addition to or in substitution for the existing language on collective bargaining. We had an extensive discussion among Senator Lieberman, Senator Thompson, Senator Breaux, myself, and Senator Nelson was on the floor. At that time, the drafters of the amendment said it was not in substitution for, but in addition to. Well, the main concern the President has expressed is he is concerned his authority under the provisions relating to national security would be taken away. But the drafters of the amendment tell us that is not what is intended because the language is ``in addition to'' and not ``in place of.'' If you look at the specifics of the existing language about intelligence, counterintelligence, investigation, and the language of the amendment, the duties, primary duty, intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative work, they are not too far apart. I think we can reach an accommodation there. The other provision that has provided the controversy is the issue of the President wanting flexibility, and the provisions of the Gramm-Miller amendment have picked up the language of the House bill, which would give the President flexibility on these six categories: Performance appraisal, classification, pay rates and systems, labor-management relations, adverse actions, and appeals. The amendment provided by Senator Nelson and Senator Breaux would give the President four of those six. It would give the President, No. 1, performance appraisal; No. 2, classification; 3, pay rates and systems; 4, adverse actions. But that would be subject to review by the Federal Services Impasses Panel, a seven-appointee panel, all of whose appointees are the President's. It seems to me we are very close here. I voted against cloture on the Lieberman bill because we do not have in the bill, as it is presently drafted, an adequate provision as to the directorate to have all of the intelligence agencies under one umbrella, and an adequate provision giving the Secretary of Homeland Defense direction to coordinate all of those agencies, to put all those dots on one screen, to have the best likelihood of preventing another 9-11. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the amendment I have already filed and have ready to propose be printed at the conclusion of my statement today.", u"The issue of homeland security, I believe, is one of great urgency. I believe that September 11, 2001, could have been prevented had we had all of the so-called dots on the board about warnings which had been received. I do not agree with CIA Director George Tenet that another September 11 is imminent. CIA Director Tenet made that statement about a month ago. We had a lot of warning signals about 9/11. There was an FBI report in July of 2001 about a suspicious man taking flight training in Phoenix, that he had a big picture of Osama bin Laden in his apartment, which never got to headquarters. That warning was mired in FBI bureaucracy. There was information that two al-Qaida members from Kuala Lumpur were planning to come to the United States; that it was known to the CIA but never told to the FBI or the INS, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. They came in unimpeded and were two of the pilots on the suicide missions on September 11. Then there was the effort by the Minneapolis office of the FBI to secure a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act for Zacarias Moussaoui which had the wrong standard. Had the FBI gotten into Moussaoui's computer, there was a treasure trove of information about potential attack. Then there was the warning to the National Security Agency on September 10 about something to happen the next day. It was not translated until September 12, but it was too late. Then an al-Qaida man named Murak confessed in 1996 of plans by al-Qaida to fly a plane loaded with explosives into the CIA headquarters. We already had the attack on the Trade Center in 1993. Osama bin Laden was under indictment for killing Americans in Mogadishu in 1993, and under indictment for the Embassy bombings in Africa in 1998. Osama bin Laden was on record as declaring a worldwide jihad against the United States. We had a lot of warnings, and had all of those dots been put on the board, I think there was a veritable blueprint and I said as much when FBI Director Mueller came to testify before the Judiciary Committee last June. We had the homeland security bill on the floor for a full month. We started debating it on September 3. We did not finish until October 1, and it was never ever passed. When President Bush came to Pennsylvania back in late October, I urged the President to call a special session of Congress to pass homeland security. It seems to me that is our job. The President is emphatic that the first thing he does every day is to review the intelligence briefings. There is grave concern that there could be another attack. I am glad that the President is insistent that Congress pass homeland security before we go out of this lame duck session. While it is important to pass homeland security, it is important that it be enacted with the appropriate provisions. One provision that I have discussed at some length is to have the Secretary be able to direct the intelligence agencies which will all be under one umbrella. The idea to have the intelligence agencies under one umbrella, I think, has been generally agreed upon. This is not a new idea; it has been proposed for a long time. I was chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee in 1995 and 1996. I saw the turf wars between the CIA and the FBI, the NSA and Defense Intelligence, et cetera. Legislation was introduced by this Senator to bring everything under one umbrella of the Central Intelligence Agency, and that legislation has languished. Mine was not the only idea; it has been proposed by others over the years. The turf battles have precluded it. Now, with an Office of Homeland Security, we have a chance to get it under one umbrella. It is vital the Secretary be able to direct these analytical departments to work together. Otherwise, the turf battles will go on. I am not saying the CIA Director should lose control over his agents around the world or the FBI Director should lose control over FBI agents in the United States or abroad, or any other Department should lose control over their agents. But when you pull the analysis and bring all the analysts under one umbrella, there is the point that there has to be direction so all the dots are placed on one screen. The language is very simple. It is: On behalf of the Secretary, subject to disapproval by the President, to direct the agencies described under subsection (f)(2) to provide intelligence information, analysis of intelligence information, and such other intelligence- regulated information, as the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis determines necessary. That is the operative language. The other parts of the bill contain an enumeration of all of the agencies which will be under one umbrella for analysis. There has been considerable argument and disagreement over labor-management provisions. This has been discussed at some length by this Senator and others in colloquies. Part of the controversy arose because of initial confusion as to whether the two paragraphs added by the amendment by Senator Nelson of Nebraska--that is the other Senator Nelson, Mr. President; may the Record show that Senator Bill Nelson is presiding at the moment--whether they were in addition to or in place of. And if they were in place of, that would have eliminated the President's national security waiver which is indispensable and should not be eliminated. In colloquy with Senator Lieberman, it was agreed to that these provisions would be in addition to. So that asked that collective bargaining in current law would stand, which provides in subsection A: (A) the agency or subdivision has a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative or national security work, and (B) the provisions of this chapter cannot be applied to that agency or subdivision in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations. Then the Nelson amendment would have added the language: (1) the mission and responsibilities of the agency or subdivision materially change; and (2) a majority of such employees within such agency or subdivision have--as their primary duty--intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative work directly related to terrorism investigation. I believe that language would be satisfactory to all parties. Then with respect to the flexibility which the President has sought as to the other five chapters, that format would be followed so that, in essence, where we have intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative work, there would be the flexibility for a national security waiver as determined by the President. Now I have just come from a meeting with Republican leadership with the President, and there has been work over the past weekend on this issue. As yet, we do not know precisely what provisions have been agreed to. It is my hope that the language which I had suggested in September and which has been before all of the Senators who were working on the final analysis, plus this language, will be incorporated in the final bill. I will be in touch with the officials in the administration yet this afternoon to try to see to it that these provisions which are agreeable to all sides--both labor and management, to solve the labor-management controversy--can be made part of the bill, and that the language which would give the Secretary the authority to direct the analysis sections will also be included in the bill. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the language giving the Secretary of Homeland Defense authority to direct the analytical agencies be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks along with the language both as to collective bargaining and the flexibility in the other five divisions of labor-management.", u"Mr. President, it is only after long and careful consideration, as well as assurances from leadership I and several of my colleagues have secured which I will detail in a moment, that I have determined that I will not support the Daschle-Lieberman amendment before us today. This is not a decision I have come to lightly. I am deeply troubled by a number of eleventh-hour additions to this major piece of legislation, in the dead of night, as we face adjournment. This is not the legislative process at its finest. Even as we speak, unprecedented challenges face our national security. Counterterrorism officials report that the level of intelligence ``chatter'', or information, being picked up from al-Qaida by the CIA, FBI, and National Security Agency is approaching the volume seen in the weeks before September 11, promoting the FBI's recent warning of ``spectacular'' attacks. That is why the President needs this new Department, and must have the opportunity to begin its organization as soon as possible in order to respond to this national imperative and to secure American soil to the best of his ability. Yet, here we are, with the House regrettably having adjourned having sent to us a Homeland Security bill encumbered with stealth provisions that have prompted considerable and justifiable alarm, particularly the clarification of vaccine manufacturer liabilities, the criteria by which colleges and universities will be chosen to undertake work on behalf of the new Department, and the waiver allowing the use of inverted domestic corporations as contractors for the purposes of homeland security. As to the vaccine program, some argue that the measure included in the legislation is necessary in order to help ensure the continued viability of the industry, especially at a time when vaccination against a host of potential biological attacks has become all the more critical. Others have serious concerns about the impact of this provision on pending litigation. I'm also extremely concerned about the loophole that was opened in the bill's provision banning homeland security related contracts with inverted corporations. It may be one thing to say that exceptions can be made should our security requirements demand we deal with an inverted corporation because there simply is no other option. It is quite another to actually require Federal contracts to be awarded on the basis of the lowest bid regardless of where the company is incorporated, thereby rewarding the very companies that moved offshore for the purpose of avoiding Federal taxation. What kind of message does that send? What kind of precedent does it set when just 5 months ago in the Finance Committee we were working to crack down on the most egregious corporate inversions? And finally, the under-the-radar provision concerning college and university work mandated extremely selective and narrow criteria that effectively excluded the vast majority of institutions of higher learning in America. The measure offered the new Secretary no discretion, but rather was tailored to apply to only a handful of colleges and universities. Why shouldn't the University of Maine be able to contribute to the cause if the Secretary believes that specific security needs match with a specific expertise they may possess? The only reason I will not be supporting efforts to remove these provisions from this legislation via the Daschle-Lieberman amendment is because I have been able to obtain assurances from the Republican Leader, the Speaker of the House, the Majority Leader-elect of the House and the Administration that these objectionable measures will be addressed with alacrity upon our immediate return in January, through the first available appropriations vehicle in the 108th Congress. All of these parties have been in close communications on this matter. And let me say it is a credit to Leader Lott that he worked swiftly and decisively to address the concerns I and others raised, as well as to secure the necessary assurances from House leadership. I appreciate that our Republican leader came to the floor to speak to our concerns, agreeing there are items in the bill that cannot stand as they are and pledging they will be redressed. And I applaud the leader's initiative to form a committee to remedy the most troublesome provisions I have outlined, and as a member of that committee I look forward to achieving that goal so that we can right these wrongs as part of the first order of business we conduct in January. As a result of these assurances, we can move forward toward completion on this bill that can no longer wait. After 6 month of deliberation, at this sustained period of ``Code Yellow'' elevated alert status, the time has come for the perpetuity of purpose ensured by statutory status for a new Department of Homeland Security. A Department responsible for safeguarding our homeland defense must not be dependent solely on the relationship between a particular President and his or her Homeland Security director. Rather, it must be run as efficiently and effectively as possible under the leadership of a permanent, cabinet level official. That is the only way to achieve the kind of ``continuity of urgency'' the security of our homeland demands. The fact of the matter is, we cannot afford a descent into complacency when it comes to this life-or-death obligation to protect the American people. Under a new cabinet-level department, responsibility would rest with a Secretary of Homeland Security--a position created under law--who would manage the vital day-to-day functioning of the new department. Critically, this person would have their own budget, while they work closely with the Administration to develop and implement policy. The bottom line is, I support the creation of the Department of Homeland Security--the largest re-organization of our Government since WWII--because it will centralize our efforts to prevent and respond to any future terrorist attack. Currently, at least 22 agencies and departments play a direct role in homeland security, encompassing over 170,000 people. This legislation consolidates these various responsibilities into one Department which will oversee border security, critical infrastructure protection, and emergency preparedness and response. Every day we wait is another day that we risk having to look back and wonder, what if we had acted sooner? For this reason, along with the commitment I have personally received from the Leader that we will address the issues of vaccine liability, inverted corporations, and university contracts next year, I will oppose the Daschle-Lieberman amendment.", u"Mr. Speaker, two days ago, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which I am honored to chairman, held a hearing entitled ``The Putin Path: Are Human Rights in Retreat?'' I was pleased to be joined on the dais by my colleagues on the Commission, Co-Chairman Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Senator Tim Hutchinson, Ranking House Member Representative Steny Hoyer, and Representative Matt Salmon. As part of the hearing, the Commission had also planned to feature a video-conference with Moscow-based Radio Liberty journalist Andrei Babitsky. As Members are aware, Mr. Babitsky was arrested by Russian authorities for allegedly ``participating in an armed formation,'' as a result of his reporting from besieged Grozny last year. Subsequently, as a civilian, Babitsky was ``exchanged'' to Chechen forces in return for certain captured Russian military personnel, and is not permitted to leave Moscow. Unfortunately, technical problems precluded the possibility of the videoconference, but Mr. Babitsky provided a written statement for the hearing record. Mr. Babitsky was recently awarded the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's prize for journalism, and as head of the U.S. Delegation to the OSCE PA, I hope that he will be able to attend the award ceremony at the Assembly's annual meeting in Bucharest this July. Tuesday's hearing was one of a series of hearings the Commission has held to examine human rights issues in the States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The mandate of the Commission is to monitor and encourage compliance with the provisions of the Helsinki Accords and successive documents of the OSCE. As I have noted on previous occasions, Russia is no longer the dictatorial, closed society that it was during the Soviet period, and certainly there are countries around the world where human rights are in much more perilous straits. I have yet to hear of a working church in Russia being destroyed by bulldozers and wrecking cranes, as was the case last November in Turkmenistan. And we know that in China religious believers of many faiths are thrown in jail for simply desiring to worship without government interference. Indeed, under the administration of President Yeltsin, human rights activists were able to achieve significant gains in making respect for human rights, if not a standard, at least a consideration in public policy. There is growing concern, however, that Russia's development in the area of human rights is taking a turn for the worse under recently-elected President Vladimir Putin. The testimony of Igor Malashenko, First Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of Media-Most and President of NTV, summarized how their offices were the target of the infamous raid by government agents on May 11 last. Mr. Malashenko described how the agents carted away documents, tapes, computer discs and equipment, and subsequently issued ``contradictory and unsatisfactory justifications'' for this raid. Moreover, he provided extensive information on several other less-publicized examples of violence and intimidation toward media outlets and journalists throughout Russia. General William Odom, former director of the National Security Agency, and a man of exceptional expertise in things Soviet and Russian, noted that Russia is a ``weak state'' and suffers from a lack of institutions capable of providing the level of civil society and economic development that we had hoped would follow after the collapse of the Soviet Union. General Odom also suggested that the United States should not treat Russia as a major power, or think that much of Russia's internal problems can be solved by ``ventriloquism'' from the West. Professor Georgi Derluguian of Northwestern University asserted that President Putin is the product of the KGB network that survived the collapse of the Soviet Union. In order to seek a distraction from the Chechen quagmire, suggested Professor Derluguian, Putin will most likely launch a massive anti-crime campaign. I would note that when Yuri Andropov and his KGB began to assume power in the twilight of the Brezhnev regime, part of the crackdown on political dissent at that time was under the guise of cracking down on corruption. Ms. Rachel Denber, Deputy Director for Europe and Central Asia at Human Rights Watch, testified that in Grozny, ``the graffiti on the walls reads `Welcome to Hell Part Two.' The bombing campaign has turned many parts of Chechnya into a wasteland even the most experienced war reporters we, have spoken to told us they have never seen anything in their careers like the destruction of the capital Grozny.'' Ms. Denber also described summary executions of civilians, including the death of three generations of one family shot to death in the yard of their own home. One of the brighter aspects of civil society under President Yeltsin was the expansion of NGO activity. However, Professor Sarah Mendelson of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy and Law at Tufts University noted that there is in Russia today ``an atmosphere that is hostile to civil rights activists, and in fact, anyone with opinions that differ from the Kremlin's. While ``the treatment of Andrei Babitsky in January and February was shocking and disturbing, and the FSB raid on MediaMost in May was brazen,'' she testified, this is ``part of a larger pattern of harassment that has grown steadily worse over the last year and a half.'' In this connection, I would like to point out another proposal made by Professor Mendelson in her testimony. She suggested that President Clinton, while in Moscow next month at the Summit with President Putin, should meet with activists who are promoting human rights and democracy in Russia today. This gesture, she notes, ``would send a signal not only to those in Russia who care about democracy but to those in Russia who do not.'' I believe this idea is right on target. In fact, Mr. Hoyer and I have written to the President noting that this year is the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Accords. We have encouraged the President to meet with the surviving veterans of the Soviet-era human rights struggle, and with their contemporary colleagues, in both Moscow and in Kyiv, where the President plans to meet with President Kuchma following his Moscow visit. I hope that President Clinton will take this advice, as I believe such a gesture would give new impetus to the struggle for human rights and democracy in two pivotal nations of the international community. In closing, I would call attention to a resolution to be introduced by our colleague Mr. Lantos and House International Affairs Committee Chairman Ben Gilman, regarding the issue of free media in Russia. I am pleased to join as an original cosponsor of this resolution, which among other provisions, calls upon the President, the Secretary of State, and other officials and agencies of the United States Government to emphasize to Russian government officials our concern and preoccupation that official pressures against the independent media are incompatible with democratic norms. I am pleased to co-sponsor this resolution, I hope my colleagues will join us, and I hope that President Clinton will heed this call when he meets with President Putin in Moscow next month.", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Let me begin by complimenting the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), our chairman, for his hard work and his dedication, as reflected in this conference report, to meeting the needs of the men and women who produce the intelligence on which policy makers and military commanders rely. As adopted by the House, the intelligence authorization was one-tenth of one percent above the President's request. This conference report is below the House bill and two-tenths of one percent below the request. The primary reason for the reduction is that some of the items authorized in the House bill were funded several months ago in a supplemental appropriations measure. The conference report, as did the supplemental appropriation bill, supports the transformation initiative that the Director of the National Security Agency, General Michael Hayden, has begun to implement. It is critical to the security of the United States that NSA be modernized. General Hayden has developed a plan, which the committee generally supports. The modernization of NSA will not succeed, however, without the sustained, visible support of the most senior leaders of the Department of Defense and the intelligence community. To date, in terms of resource allocation, I have not seen evidence that the rebuilding of NSA is a top priority of the executive branch. I hope that this changes next year. One of the shortcomings in the intelligence community, in my view, is that there is too much emphasis on collection and not enough on making sure that which is collected can be used. If it were possible to collect only important information, this imbalance would be inconsequential. Our national technical means, however, collect volumes of information that must be analyzed to identify what is important, put in a usable form, and sent to those who need it. Last year, Congress made clear its expectation that the new Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) would be an adequate balance between collection activities and TPED or tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination activities. Congress was clear in the description of the consequences that would flow from an executive branch decision not to make TPED investments sufficient to utilize fully the collection capabilities of FIA. As the classified annex to this conference report makes clear, the resolve of Congress on this issue has not changed. The conference agreement amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the criminal code in ways that deserve some comment. Among other things, the FISA amendments make clear that, in making a probable cause determination that a target was an agent of a foreign power, the court may consider past activities of the target. I am advised that the target's past activities have regularly been part of a probable cause determination. In this respect, the amendment represents a codification of current practice. There have been suggestions that the amendment is needed to ensure that information once excluded from the probable cause determination merely because it was dated will now be considered. I believe that this is an incorrect interpretation of both the current practice and the effect of the amendment. Those facts which are relevant to determining the probability that a target is currently an agent of a foreign power should be considered. Those facts that are irrelevant, regardless of whether they are fresh or stale, should not be considered. Section 304 makes the unauthorized disclosure of properly classified information acquired by a person who has, or had, authorized access to the information a felony, subject to 3 years imprisonment, when the disclosure is made willingly and knowingly to a person known not to have authorized access. I disapprove of the practice by which some individuals entrusted with access to classified information leak that information to unauthorized recipients, including members of the media. I share the frustration of those who open their daily newspapers only to see in print some of the most sensitive information in our government's possession. I have, however, grave concerns about the reach and the scope of section 304. There are currently a variety of statutory and administrative prohibitions on the authorized disclosure of classified information. The fact that more leakers are not punished is not, and I stress is not, the result of too few prohibitions, it is the result of the great difficulty inherent in identifying the leakers. Section 304 adds another prohibition, unwisely in my judgment. It will not make it easier to identify the source of a leak. Before our conference began, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and I received a letter from the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary urging the rejection of this provision. In their letter the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) noted that by making all leaks subject to criminal penalties the provision ``has profound First Amendment implications and goes to the very heart of the ability of the public to remain informed about matters of critical public interest which often relate to governmental misdeeds.'' In conference, I offered an amendment to narrow the definition of classified information under section 304 to make sure that only leaks of information of substantial sensitivity would be punished under this provision. Other leaks would continue to be punishable under other statutes or administrative procedures. Although my amendment was approved by the House conferees, the Senate rejected it. I hope that in the next Congress the Committee on the Judiciary, in whose jurisdiction the issues raised by section 304 properly reside, will carefully examine the provision. Last year's intelligence authorization act established a commission to examine the judicial review questions raised by the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. The commission was given one year from the date of enactment to review the current judicial, regulatory, and administrative authorities under which the United States blocks assets of foreign persons, and to provide a detailed constitutional examination and evaluation of remedies available to United States persons affected by the blocking of assets of foreign persons. I had hoped that the commission might have completed its work in less than a year because of the great importance I attach to the resolution of the due process concerns raised by the drug kingpin legislation. Although it now appears the commission will need all of the time allocated, I look forward to its report and hope that it is dispositive of these concerns. In closing, Mr. Speaker, I want to advise the House that two of our very constructive and important Members have served their eight year terms on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), conclude their terms of service this year. I want to thank them for their many contributions to the committee's work over the past eight years. Their enthusiasm, insight, and perspective will be sorely missed. I urge the adoption of the conference report. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Mr. Speaker, I very much appreciate my colleague, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, I have a magnificent speech that has been prepared carefully for this discussion today. I am not going to refer to the speech, but rather submit it. In the meantime, Mr. Speaker, I want to express my deep appreciation to my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), with whom it has been my privilege to work for many, many years in the State legislature as well as here. He has done a fantastic job, in my view, providing the kind of balance that we need that makes the work of this committee such a nonpartisan piece of work. In turn, before coming to the committee, it had not been my privilege to know well the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is a person of fabulous background, but very unique experience in this subject area. He comes to our committee at a most important time in our history. The leadership he has provided for us is very important to the security interests of this country, at home and abroad, but especially of significance to those who care about freedom in the world. The men and women who make up the personnel base of our intelligence community overall are fabulous people. They do wonderful work on our behalf. Most of it gets very, very little attention. From time to time, we have a problem where someone crosses the line, usually stupidly, sometimes overtly, and the work of the agency does come to public view. It ofttimes is of great disservice to this country. It is important, very important, that we secure those personnel who want to make sure that the work of the agencies take place as reflected in the direction of the law passed by the Congress. I very much wanted to focus upon the comments of my colleague, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr). Let me say that whistle-blowers are protected within this bill and within the law. So long as they come forward with matters that are security matters about which they are concerned and they disclose them to people who are cleared to receive such information, they can carry forward their conscience and their responsibility as they would see fit. There is no restriction there, and the law is very careful about that. I understand that lawyers, about presuming that only lawyers have these answers, but the committee has worked very carefully with the work done by the Senate, and I am comfortable with that work, as of that moment. The work of this bill is very, very critical work. Because of some of these questions that are being raised, the votes today may be very important. I urge the Members of the body to realize how significant the work of this committee is and how important it is that they give it their full support, as well as their attention. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to testify that this is a very fine piece of work done by both bodies, carried forward in a most positive way by the leadership of both the ranking member and the chairman. Mr. Speaker, this is my last year on the committee, and I want to express to our Chairman and to Mr. Dixon my sincerest thanks for their dedication in ensuring this nation has the intelligence capabilities critical to protecting our freedoms. It's not often thought of in these terms, but intelligence truly is our first line of defense, and the close, personal, working relationship Chairman Goss and Mr. Dixon have, has made our jobs all the easier. I want to thank you both, and I believe this entire body owes you a great deal of gratitude. Mr. Speaker, every year those of us who serve on the Intelligence Committee stand before this body to discuss the Intelligence Authorization bill. Because of very real national security issues, we cannot discuss the sensitive details of the bill. We simply have to ask our colleagues to ``trust us'' as we vote on the classified aspects of our intelligence agencies and activities. Mr. Speaker, let me assure you, and, most importantly, the American people, that each member of the committee takes that responsibility very seriously. The issues and debates we take up in committee about our intelligence programs are based solely on national security interests. Partisian politics is not a function in the conduct of committee business. This has earned the Intelligence Committee the trust that is required. Mr. Speaker, while the Members deserve much for their efforts to oversee our Nation's intelligence organizations, I would be remiss in not making mention of the superb committee staff. The staff deals with some of the most difficult issues facing our country. They do tough work, in a tough environment, and we ask much of them. I thank each member of the Intelligence Committee staff for the support they provide, and more importantly, for what they do for America. Mr. Speaker, a quick word about our magnificent intelligence community. It is a community of professionals who work in the background and who don't get much credit, if any, for successfully accomplishing the difficult tasks they are asked to carry out. The men and women of the intelligence community often bear the full brunt of public criticism for the rare, but inevitable intelligence shortfall--after all ``perfect knowledge'' is a noble, but usually unobtainable, goal. So it is important that we, who know the details of the good work of this community, take every opportunity to thank them for their heroism publically. We can't, for example, publically acknowledge the Central Intelligence Agency for an operation that might stop a planned terrorist attack, or the National Security Agency for providing the piece of information that might allow military commanders to locate critical targets, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency for providing the proof that a foreign nation is developing weapons of mass destruction, or the FBI for locating and removing a Russian listening device in the State Department conference room. These and the other intelligence organizations and the analysts who make sense of the myriad information stand watch for all Americans day in and day out. I thank them for the jobs they do, for the professionals that they are, and for the sacrifices they make every single day. Finally, Mr. Speaker, I urge support for this conference report. Indeed it provides the intelligence community with the resources it needs to carry out its mission, and it ensures that the American military forces deployed around the world have the best information resources we can provide them. That is not to say that I think we have done enough. The world is not a safe place. There are truly bad actors in the world and, in fact, we may be living in a more dangerous and unstable world today than we faced during the cold war: This past week's events in the former Yugoslavia are example; the increase in terrorism--as, tragically, we saw again this morning in the Persian Gulf; the proliferation of inexpensive weapons of mass destruction that puts unbelievable destructive power in the hands of small nations and non-nation groups; the number of countries with nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them is increasing. These threats present tough information challenges for our intelligence community; challenges that must be met. We have to make sure our intelligence organizations are given the proper resources to successful operate in this dangerous world. This conference report provides adequate resources that should be seen as a down payment on keeping our intelligence community capable and viable in this dangerous world. But to protect our national security, we must resolve to invest more in our ``intelligence first line of defense.'' I urge my colleagues to vote with me in support of this conference report.", u"Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by commending the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) on the efforts he has made to ensure that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence operates in a bipartisan manner. While the unanimous vote reporting this legislation is an indication of the success of his efforts, those of us who serve on the committee know that on a daily basis, on matters large and small, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) ensures that the views of the Democrats are solicited and considered. The bill as reported, in the aggregate, is less than one percent more than requested by the administration. Although the committee recommends slightly more for certain programs, like those managed by the National Security Agency, and slightly less for others, like those managed by the National Reconnaissance Office, the fact remains that the total authorized for intelligence in this bill is not significantly different than that sought by the President. This result reflects budgetary realities, but it also reflects a judgment about what the intelligence agencies can effectively and efficiently spend next year. Investments in the kind of intelligent capabilities the Nation will need in the years to come requires a steady commitment over time of resources. This legislation, as has been the case in the past, should be seen as an installment in that effort, not as its end. H.R. 1555 provides a substantial amount of money for intelligence and intelligence-related activities. How much, even in the aggregate, is classified. I believe that no harm to the national security would be caused by making the aggregate budget request, the aggregate authorization, or the aggregate appropriations public. The arguments for retaining the classification of these amounts, which focus on the utility of the aggregate information to the average American are irrelevant to security considerations, and the arguments which deal with the utility of the information to foreign governments are, in my judgment, not persuasive. I have in the past supported amendments to make certain budget information public, and I will do so again when presented with an opportunity. I believe the Director of Central Intelligence was right in October of 1997 and March of 1998 when he disclosed the appropriated amounts for intelligence. I hope he will reconsider his current position with respect to additional annual disclosures. Regrettably, publicity about intelligence activities normally centers on problems rather than successes. Problems, however, need to be acknowledged and corrected. I want to mention my concerns in two areas, although these concerns do not affect my support for this bill. Both concerns involve the People's Republic of China. The counterintelligence shortcomings at the Department of Energy's national laboratories have over the past 20 years or so provided valuable information to the PRC and may, more recently, have allowed the PRC access to extremely sensitive information about our nuclear weapons. The bill contains significant increases in funding for counterintelligence activities at the Department of Energy requested by the President, including additional amounts sought by the President for computer security. The bill also contains additional, more modest amounts for analytic activities related to the PRC. There may be more that needs to be done to make sure that the national labs are secure, either initiatives recommended by the Cox Committee or other proposals. I believe that we have ample time before we go to conference on this bill to consider these matters in a deliberative way and endorse those which make sense and which will not produce unintended consequences of greater harm than the problems they seek to correct. I do not believe we know enough today about what more should be done beyond those steps already taken or proposed by the President and Secretary Richardson. The accidental bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade at this point defies understanding. To be of use to policymakers and military commanders intelligence needs to be reliable. The intelligence which confused a military target with the embassy most certainly failed to meet that essential standard. Explanations which, in some cases, seem more like excuses have been offered, but it is clear that a serious mistake was made. We need to be sure we know why and take corrective action expeditiously. The responsibility for congressional oversight of intelligence extends beyond the drafting of the authorization bill. It must vigorously review the manner in which the activities authorized each year are managed. We need to be able to assure the public that a degree of care commensurate with the importance of, and risks associated with, these activities is constantly present. Determining the cause of problems once they are identified is essential to the provision of that type of assurance. I look forward to working with our chairman, as I have in the past, to provide this kind of oversight. In closing, I want to mention a matter concerning the committee's access to information. I am disturbed by the fact that the intelligence agencies that are funded by the national foreign intelligence program budget pursue a large number of programs and activities requiring special access which are not systematically reported to the Select Committee on Intelligence or the Committee on Appropriations. I do not mean to suggest that the intelligence community refuses to brief the committee on individual programs or activities. Rather, I mean that there appear to be many special access programs, and the executive branch does not rigorously ensure that each of them is routinely reported to Congress. The Committee on Armed Services faced a similar situation in the Defense Department's handling of special access programs, and years ago required in law that the Department provide Congress with a written report on every program that the Secretary of Defense decided was important and sensitive enough to warrant special handling. My impression is that this reporting system works very well and that we may need similar legislation for the intelligence community. I intend to examine this matter in more detail in the coming months and may even decide to pursue it further in the conference committee. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1555 will, in my judgment, enhance the ability of the intelligence community to respond to the national security challenges we face now and which we will face in the future. I urge its adoption by the House. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule by title, and each title shall be considered read. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order unless printed in the Congressional Record and pro forma amendments for the purpose of debate. The chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to not less than 5 minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any postponed question that immediately follows another vote by electronic device without intervening business, provided that the time for voting by electronic device in the first in any series of questions shall not be less than 15 minutes. The Clerk will designate section 1. The text of section 1 is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1? If not, the Clerk will designate title I. The text of title I is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2000 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The National Reconnaissance Office. (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2000, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1555 of the One Hundred Sixth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the Executive Branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2000 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2000 the sum of $193,572,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available until September (a) Authorization.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1999 under section 101 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-272) for the conduct of the intelligence activities of elements of the United States Government listed in such section are hereby increased, with respect to any such authorized amount, by the amount by which appropriations pursuant to such authorization were increased by an emergency supplemental appropriation in a supplemental appropriations Act for fiscal year 1999 that is enacted after May 1, 1999, for such amounts as are designated by Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(b)(2)(A)). (b) Ratification.--For purposes of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any obligation or expenditure of those amounts deemed to have been specifically authorized by Congress in the Act referred to in subsection (a) is hereby ratified and confirmed. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title I? If not, the Clerk will designate title II. The text of title II is as follows: There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2000 the sum of $209,100,000. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title II? If not, the Clerk will designate title III. The text of title III is as follows: Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the United States. The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title III?", u"Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill on behalf of myself as chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee and Senator Lieberman, the Committee's ranking minority member, on an issue of great importance to our committee and the nation--the security of Federal government computer systems. Over the last decade, the Federal Government, like most private-sector organizations, has become enormously dependent on interconnected computer systems, including the Internet, to support its operations and account for its assets. This explosion in interconnectivity has resulted in many benefits. In particular, it has increased productivity, made enormous amounts of useful information instantly available to millions of people, and contributed to the economic boom of the 1990s. However, the factors that generate these benefits--widely accessible data and instantaneous communication--also increase the risks that information will be misused, possibly to commit fraud or other crimes, or that sensitive information will be in appropriately disclosed. In addition, our government's, as well as our nation's, dependence on this computer support makes it susceptible to devastating disruptions in critical services, as well as in computer-based safety and financial controls. Such disruptions could be caused by sabotage, natural disasters, or widespread system faults, as illustrated by the Y2K date conversion concerns. The Governmental Affairs Committee spent considerable time during the last Congress on this issue with a specific emphasis on information security and cyberterrorism. We uncovered and identified failures of information security affecting our international security and vulnerability to domestic and international terrorism. We highlighted our nation's vulnerability to computer attacks--from international and domestic terrorists to crime rings to everyday hackers. We directed GAO to prepare a ``best practices'' guide on computer security for Federal agencies to use, and we asked GAO to study computer security vulnerabilities at several Federal agencies including the Internal Revenue Service, the State Department, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Social Security Administration, and the Veterans' Administration. As a result of its work, GAO identified many specific weaknesses in agency controls and concluded that the underlying cause was inadequate security program planning and management. In particular, agencies were addressing identified weaknesses on a piecemeal basis rather than proactively addressing systemic causes that diminished security effectiveness throughout the agency. That is not to say that nothing is being done. Many in the executive branch recognize that action is needed to improve Federal information security, and several efforts have been initiated. For example, in May 1998, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 directed the National Security Council to lead a variety of efforts intended to improve critical infrastructure protection, including protection of Federal agency information infrastructures, and required major agencies to develop plans to protect their own critical computer-based systems. But despite a flurry of activity in this area and a number of statutes already on the books which deal with the issues, we have concluded that a more complete and meaningful statutory foundation for improvement is needed. The primary objective of this legislation is to update existing information security statutory requirements to address the management challenges associated with operating in the current interconnected computing environment. We begin where the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 left off. These laws, and the computer Security Act of 1987, provided the basic framework for managing information security. This legislation which we introduce today will update and clarify existing requirements and responsibilities of Federal agencies in dealing with information security. The Government Information Security Act: Strengthens the Office of Management and Budget's information security duties, consistent with its existing responsibilities under the Paperwork Reduction Act; Establishes Federal agency accountability for information security as needed to cost-effectively protect the assets and operations of the agency by creating a set of management requirements derived from GAO ``Best Practices'' audit work; Requires agencies to have an annual independent evaluation of their information security programs and practices to assess compliance with authorized requirements and to test effectiveness of information security control techniques; Provides for the application of a unified and logical set of governmentwide controls by including national security systems within the application of the legislation; and Focuses on the importance of training programs and governmentwide incident handling. We recognize that these aren't the only things that need to be done. Some have suggested we provide specific standards in the legislation. Others have recommended we establish a new position of a National Chief Information Officer. These and, no doubt, many other proposals will be considered as we debate this important issue. But this legislation is intended as a good first step to better define roles among Federal agencies in order to develop a fully secure government. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the bill we are introducing be printed in the Record. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Government Information Security Act of 1999''. Chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by inserting at the end the following: ``The purposes of this subchapter are to-- ``(1) provide a comprehensive framework for establishing and ensuring the effectiveness of controls over information resources that support Federal operations and assets; ``(2)(A) recognize the highly networked nature of the Federal computing environment including the need for Federal Government interoperability and, in the implementation of improved security management measures, assure that opportunities for interoperability are not adversely affected; and ``(B) provide effective governmentwide management and oversight of the related information security risks, including coordination of information security efforts throughout the civilian, national security, and law enforcement communities; ``(3) provide for development and maintenance of minimum controls required to protect Federal information and information systems; and ``(4) provide a mechanism for improved oversight of Federal agency information security programs. (a) Department of Commerce.--The Secretary of Commerce, through the National Institute of Standards and Technology and with technical assistance from the National Security Agency, shall-- (1) develop, issue, review, and update standards and guidance for the security of information in Federal computer systems, including development of methods and techniques for security systems and validation programs; (2) develop, issue, review, and update guidelines for training in computer security awareness and accepted computer security practices, with assistance from the Office of Personnel Management; (3) provide agencies with guidance for security planning to assist in the development of applications and system security plans for such agencies; (4) provide guidance and assistance to agencies concerning cost-effective controls when interconnecting with other systems; and (5) evaluate information technologies to assess security vulnerabilities and alert Federal agencies of such vulnerabilities. (b) Department of Justice.--The Department of Justice shall review and update guidance to agencies on-- (1) legal remedies regarding security incidents and ways to report to and work with law enforcement agencies concerning such incidents; and (2) permitted uses of security techniques and technologies. (c) General Services Administration.--The General Services Administration shall-- (1) review and update General Services Administration guidance to agencies on addressing security considerations when acquiring information technology; and (2) assist agencies in the acquisition of cost-effective security products, services, and incident response capabilities. (d) Office of Personnel Management.--The Office of Personnel Management shall-- (1) review and update Office of Personnel Management regulations concerning computer security training for Federal civilian employees; and (2) assist the Department of Commerce in updating and maintaining guidelines for training in computer security awareness and computer security best practices. (a) In General.--Chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the table of sections-- (A) by inserting after the chapter heading the following: (2) by inserting before section 3501 the following: This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act.", u"Mr. President, later on this afternoon the Senate Intelligence Committee is going to vote out the nomination of Matt Olsen to be the next Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. I rise today in support of the nomination of Matthew Olsen to be the next Director of NCTC. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, we did a lot of self-examination as a government and, putting it simply, realized that pieces of intelligence that should have been connected had not been or, in other words, the dots had not been connected. Congress understood we could not afford another lapse like 9/11, so it created the National Counterterrorism Center to analyze and integrate counterterrorism information across the government. While we have not suffered another 9/11, our record is not perfect. From the Christmas Day bombing attempt, to Fort Hood, Times Square, and the New York subway plot, the threats to our homeland are very real. At the same time, changing political landscapes and challenges from adverse nations require constant attention. In this environment, it is essential for NCTC to perform its mission beyond reproach. After the Christmas Day near-bombing aboard flight 253, the Senate Intelligence Committee conducted a review to determine where the intelligence community could have done a better job of anticipating this attempted attack. Unfortunately, the committee's review showed that NCTC had not lived up to its statutory responsibilities. The then-Director, Mike Leiter, to his credit, took criticism in a very positive way and made the right kinds of changes at NCTC to move us in the right direction. While I am encouraged by the progress NCTC has made since then to repair those shortcomings, there is much work that still needs to be done. I believe Matt Olsen has the right background to take the helm of this important intelligence center at this very critical point in our history. He is no stranger either to the Senate Intelligence Committee or to the serious threats that face our Nation. Members and staff have worked with him on several high-profile issues over the last few years. As a Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division, he was responsible for ensuring that our intelligence professionals had all the legal authority they needed from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in order to continue this country's safety. Let me just say this was no easy task and the stakes were high, especially given the political wrangling over FISA and the USA PATRIOT Act in recent years. Matt spent countless hours briefing our staff and other committees on many highly sensitive FISA issues. In large part because of his willingness to stick to the facts and not play political games, he has earned the respect of Members on both sides of the political aisle. For the last year, Matt has served in a very professional way as the General Counsel for the National Security Agency, a position that has also put him in close contact, again, with the Intelligence Committees. GEN Keith Alexander, who heads up NSA, provided a letter of support for Matt's nomination. I have also spoken personally with General Alexander about Matt. I have a great deal of respect for the general, and it speaks volumes to me that he has such high, unequivocal praise for Matt, both as a leader and as a person. Matt's other job--not an enviable one--which brought him in close contact with the committee was his service as the Executive Director of the Guantanamo Review Task Force. I have had numerous conversations with Matt about some of the recommendations made by the task force on transferring what I believe continue to be potentially dangerous detainees. I appreciate that the task force was following a deadline set by Executive order to close Guantanamo Bay. But I believe we have accepted too great a risk to our national security by transferring many of these detainees to other host countries. The recidivism rate continues to climb. It is today somewhere in the range of 26 percent. We have no reason to expect it will stop climbing anytime soon. Our first obligation must always be to ensure the safety of the American people, not to transfer dangerous detainees to meet an arbitrary political deadline. Of particular concern to me are the transfers of a number of Yemeni detainees during 2009, when the intelligence community was already warning about the dangerous security situation in Yemen. Of course, we all know that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula makes its home in Yemen and that several former GITMO detainees now hold high positions in AQAP. AQAP was directly responsible for the Christmas Day bombing attempt, and their efforts will continue to inflict harm on our Nation. Matt acknowledges the difficulties presented by the Yemeni transfers, and he has acknowledged that the task force did not get every recommendation right, just as the previous administration did not get every recommendation right. He also shares my personal view that Guantanamo should remain open so that we are not transferring any more detainees as the recidivism rate continues to grow. I appreciate the many conversations and briefings he has had with my staff on those transfer issues. I appreciate his willingness to continue to discuss these issues and the need for a long-term detention policy even after taking on his new position as NCTC Director. Ironically, in his new position, he will be responsible for tracking former detainees, including detainees whose transfer the task force may have recommended who slipped into their old ways, before they can strike us again. It was in this capacity that Matt had an issue with a colleague, and I have vetted this with Matt and with most of those who were in the room on the occasion the issue arose. While better judgment could have been used, the issue is now behind us. I have impressed upon Matt that if he is confirmed as the Director of NCTC, his credibility must be unquestionable. He has confirmed to me that he will always communicate with Members of Congress fully and openly without political censorship. He also is committed to being totally open and will have an ongoing dialog with members of the respective House and Senate Intelligence Committees. My good friend Senator Kent Conrad, who is actually the home Senator for Matt since he is originally from North Dakota, spoke extensively about Matt's reputation and commitment to public service during his confirmation hearing. Many intelligence professionals on both sides of the political lines wrote letters of recommendation on Matt's behalf. I believe Matt when he tells me he is committed to working closely with Congress and the Intelligence Committees to do the job needed to keep this country safe. I will be supporting his nomination when it comes to the floor, and I look forward to working with him.", u"Mr. Speaker, I am proud to rise today to honor Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer, Military Intelligence Corps, for his twenty-five years of service as a field intelligence operative aid more than three decades of service to the nation in both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Col. Shaffer's extensive career started in January 1981, while still in high school, when he enlisted in the Ohio Army National Guard. He went on to graduate from Wright State University in 1986. And this year, 2011, Col. Shaffer was chosen as their College of Liberal Arts Alumnus of the Year. Col. Shaffer's storied career has been distinguished by his willingness and ability to work at the cutting edge of our nation's intelligence community. He has successfully endeavored to adapt new technology and use these capabilities to ensure the protection of the American people. It is likely that most of Lt. Col. Shaffer's work will never be fully recognized--but I can assure you it is appreciated by me and the American people. During his initial years of service, he deployed to Germany during REFORGER 85 to conduct anti-terrorism operations against the Red Army Faction, RAF, and other German based terrorism groups. He was also assigned to the Army's New York City Resident Office during a critical period when foreign terrorists were targeting the United States. In 1988 he attended training at ``The Farm'' where he graduated first in his class of the Military Operations Training Course, MOTC, at Camp Perry, VA. He was promoted to Captain in 1990 and was brought to active duty by the Army for the first Gulf War in 1991 where he worked to develop a key classified program named STARWATCHER B. After the conclusion of the first Gulf War, he was appointed to serve as the chief of the Army's global clandestine HUMINT collection program, and ran specific the Special Access Program, SAP, operation, unclassified nickname: CAROLINA MORNING, which netted highly significant information that was critical to the national leadership during the 1990s. He was the senior HUMINT advisor to the J2/Senior Intelligence Officer of Joint Interagency Task Force East, JIATF-E. JIATF-E conducted counter-drug operations in the Transit Zone between Columbia and the United States southern border. During this tour he was successful in integrating highly specialized hybrid technology/human intelligence operations to obtain high value intelligence information to support the operational forces. In 1995, Tony transitioned to Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, as part of the consolidation of all Service, Army, Navy, Air Force, and USMC, controlled HUMINT into the Department of Defense. He created and directed Task Force STRATUS IVY--a one-of-a-kind special mission task force that harnessed the skills of officers from the National Security Agency, NSA, Army Intelligence and Defense Intelligence Agency that conducted direct support to Department of Defense, Special Operations Command and other non-DoD agencies. After his promotion to Major, due to his highly sought after skills, he was assigned to serve at both the HUMINT Support Element, HSE, at both Special Operations Command, SOCOM, and the Joint Special Operations Command, JSOC. He also served as a team leader of classified element that provided direct support to the Director of Operations of Defense HUMINT Service, DHS. During this period of his career he participated in multiple highly classified operations--the most notable, a project known as ABLE DANGER--the controversial counterterrorism operation that was designed to detect, degrade and counter Al Qaeda capabilities that was successful in detecting Al Qaeda cells operating within the United States before the 9/11 attacks. He had two peacetime overseas deployments--the first to Thailand where he was attached to the III Marine Expeditionary Force, MEF, to attend Exercise COBRA GOLD 1991; the second to New Zealand with attachment to the New Zealand Defense Force for Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration in mid 2001. Just after the 9/11 attacks, in December 2001, he was returned to active duty for a 30-month period, during which he commanded a DIA operating base and had two successful combat tours to Afghanistan. He commanded Field Operating Base, FOB, Alpha, a joint DIA/CIA brigade equivalent unit conducting classified collection and special operations support regarding terrorists just after the 9/11 attacks. During his two undercover combat tours in Afghanistan, he participated in the search for senior Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan and is credited for helping to break the back of the Taliban's first attempt to return to power in Afghanistan. Col. Shaffer received the Bronze Star Medal, BSM, for performance as an Operations Officer of the HUMINT Support Detachment in Afghanistan supporting CJTF 180 and CJFT 121. After promotion to lieutenant colonel in 2005, he was attached to Navy's premier counterterrorism think-tank, DEEP BLUE at the Pentagon where he worked on key situational awareness and counterterrorism technology and tools. In 2005 to 2006, Tony worked with the U.S. Congress and testified on multiple issues that relate to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and intelligence failures. In 2006 he was assigned to and commanded the Special Troops Battalion, STB, of the 9th Theater Support Command, Ft. Belvoir, VA. He was then, in 2007, selected to serve as the G6/Senior Information Officer, Anti-Terrorism Officer and Public Affairs Officer of the 94th Division, Force Sustainment, Ft Lee, VA--the 94th Division was re-activated in 2008 and was one of Gen George Patton's key divisions that participated in the Battle of the Bulge, Ardennes, in 1944-45. He remained with the 94th Division until he reached his mandatory retirement date, MRD, in July of 2011. He continues to serve this great nation through his work at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies where, as a Senior Fellow, he continues to influence national defense strategy and policy through research and advocacy of critical national security issues. Over these three decades Lt. Col. Shaffer has served with distinction and unmatched willingness to conduct high risk operations, while always recognizing the ethical and moral responsibly of his office. Lt. Col. Shaffer's keen operational judgment and dynamic leadership has contributed substantially to the development of critical national level intelligence capabilities--many of which remain in operation today. His influence over national defense and security is indelible and significant--his service has constantly worked to identify threats and then develop capability to protect the American people. He consistently worked to influence national intelligence policy and capabilities to insure the security of the American people and has done so in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. Army. On behalf of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, I would like to recognize Col. Shaffer's outstanding accomplishments, courageous attitude and past and present devotion to this nation. I wish to congratulate him, his wife Rina, and sons Alexander and Ryan on the completion of long and distinguished career. ", u"Mr. President, I do rise today to introduce with the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee Senator Lieberman, as well as Senator Rockefeller and Senator Feinstein, the Cyber Security Act of 2012. As always, it has been a great pleasure to work with my friend and colleague from Connecticut on what I believe is the most important initiative we have come together on since perhaps our 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. I am also delighted that three Senate chairmen who have significant jurisdiction in this area--Senators Lieberman, Rockefeller, and Feinstein--have come together. We have all worked very hard on this bill. I also want to commend the staff of our committee, which has worked extraordinarily hard over several years to produce this bill. Our legislation would provide the Federal Government and the private sector with the tools necessary to protect our most critical infrastructure from growing cyber threats. Earlier this month, FBI Director Robert Mueller warned that the cyber threat will soon equal or surpass the threat from terrorism. He argued that we should be addressing the cyber threat with the same intensity we have applied to the terrorist threat. Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper made the point even more strongly. He described the cyber threat as: A profound threat to this country, to its future, its economy and its very being. These warnings are the latest in a chorus of warnings from current and former officials. Last November, the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, warned that malicious cyber attacks threaten a growing number of the systems with which we interact each and every day--the electric grid, our water treatment plants, and key financial systems. Similarly, GEN Keith Alexander, commander of U.S. Cyber Command, and director of the National Security Agency, has warned that the cyber vulnerabilities we face are extraordinary and characterized by ``a disturbing trend from exploitation to disruption to destruction. `` As Senator Lieberman has pointed out, the threat is not only to our national security but also to our economic well-being. A study by the company, Norton, last year calculated the cost of global cyber crime at $114 billion annually. When combined with the value of time that victims lost due to cyber crime, this figure grows to $388 billion globally, which Norton described as ``significantly more'' than the global black market in marijuana, cocaine, and heroin combined. In an op-ed last month titled, ``China's Cyber Thievery Is National Policy--And Must Be Challenged,'' former DNI Mike McConnell, former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, and former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn noted the ability of cyberterrorists to cripple our critical infrastructure, and they sounded an even more urgent alarm about the threat of economic cyber espionage. Citing an October 2011 report to Congress by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, they warned of the catastrophic impact that cyber espionage--particularly that pursued by China--could have on our economy and our competitiveness. They estimated that the cost easily means billions of dollars and millions of jobs. This threat is all the more menacing because it is being pursued by a global competitor seeking to steal the research and development of American firms to undermine our economic leadership. The evidence of our cyber security vulnerability is overwhelming and compels us to act. As the chairman mentioned, since 2005, our Homeland Security Committee has held nine hearings on the cyber threat. In 2010, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Carper, and I introduced our cyber security bill, which was reported by the committee later that same year. Since last year, we have been working with Chairman Rockefeller to merge our bill with legislation he has championed which was reported by the Commerce Committee. Lately, after incorporating changes based on the feedback of our colleagues, the private sector, and the administration, we have produced a new version which we introduced today. Some of our colleagues have urged us to focus very narrowly on the Federal Information Security Management Act, as well as on Federal research and development, and improved information sharing. We do need to address those issues, and our bill does address those important issues. Again, as did Senator Lieberman, I commend Senator Feinstein for her contributions in the area of improved information sharing, and Senator Carper for the work he has done on the Federal Information Security Management Act. But the fact remains that with 85 percent of our Nation's critical infrastructure owned by the private sector, government also has a critical role in ensuring that the most vital parts of that critical infrastructure--those whose disruption could result in truly catastrophic consequences, such as mass casualties or mass evacuations--meet reasonable, risk-based performance standards. In an editorial this week, the Washington Post concurred, writing that: Our critical systems have remained unprotected. To accept the status quo would be an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security. The Post got it exactly right. Some of our colleagues are skeptical about the need for any new regulations. There is no one who has worked harder than I have to oppose regulations that would unnecessarily burden our economy and cost us jobs. But we need to distinguish between regulations that hurt our economy and are not necessary and hinder our international competitiveness versus regulations that are necessary for our national security and that promote rather than hinder our economic prosperity, those that strengthen our economy and our Nation. The fact is the risk-based performance requirements in our bill are targeted carefully. They only apply to specific systems and assets--not entire companies--that, if damaged, could reasonably be expected to result in mass casualties, huge evacuations, catastrophic economic damages, or a severe degradation of our national security. In other words, we are talking about truly catastrophic impacts. Moreover, the owners of critical infrastructure, not the government, would select and implement the cyber security measures the owners determine to be best suited to satisfy the risk-based cyber security performance requirements. Our new bill would also require the Secretary of Homeland Security to select from among existing industry practices and standards or choose performance requirements proposed by the private sector--lots of collaboration and consultation. Only if none of these mitigates the risks identified through this public-private collaboration could the Secretary propose something different. That is extremely unlikely to happen. The bill prohibits the regulation of the design and development of commercial IT products. It would require that existing requirements and current regulators be used wherever possible. The bill would allow Federal officials to waive the bill's requirements when existing regulations or security measures are already sufficiently robust. As with our earlier versions of this bill, companies in substantial compliance with the performance requirements at the time of a cyber incident would receive liability protection from any punitive damages associated with an incident, giving them an incentive to comply. The fact remains that improving cyber security is absolutely essential. We cannot afford to wait for a cyber 9/11 before taking action. The warnings could not be clearer about the vulnerabilities and the threat to our systems. Every single day nation states, terrorist groups, cyber criminals, and hackers probe our systems both in the public and the private sectors, and they have been successful over and over in their intrusions. We don't want to look back after a catastrophic cyber event and say: Why didn't we act? How could we have ignored all of these warnings? So I would encourage our colleagues to continue to work with us and to come together and enact this vitally needed legislation. Mr. President, I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, I rise to talk about a bill that was introduced this morning. The bill is the Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education, Information, and Technology This is a very important piece of legislation because we know that cyber attacks are a threat to our country and we need to strengthen our laws to ensure we are protecting our assets, our communication systems, and all of the infrastructure that is run by communications systems. We are working as a group. Senators McCain, Chambliss, Grassley, Murkowski, Coats, Burr, and Johnson are original cosponsors. All of us are the ranking members on the relevant committees that must deal with cybersecurity. Senator McCain, the lead sponsor, is, of course, the Armed Services ranking member. I am the ranking member of Commerce, Senator Chambliss of Intelligence, Senator Grassley certainly of Judiciary, and Senator Murkowski of Energy. It is very important that our relevant committees have come together with our ranking members, and we hope very much to gain support from the Democratic side as well on a bill that we think can get through all of Congress and be signed by the President because the parts of our bill that will strengthen our cybersecurity in this country are, I think, accepted by those who have expertise in this area. For instance, our bill will help prevent the spread of cyber attacks from network to network and across the Internet by removing barriers to sharing information about threats, attacks, and strategies for improvement of defenses. We remove these barriers through addressing the antitrust laws that would allow companies that are sharing information not to be threatened with antitrust suits, because this is a security issue, it is not a competitive issue. Secondly, we want to have liability protection for those who disclose cyber threat information with their peers. These are things that would be in everyone's interest for us to do, and we do need to address them in legislation. The liability and antitrust protections are available to all companies that would share information, not just those that share with the government but when they can talk to each other, to understand each other's systems. Further, the SECURE IT Act would require that Federal contractors providing electronic communication or cybersecurity services to Federal agencies share cyber threat information related to those contracts. Of course, when they have contracts with the government, that information is going to be very important so we would require the sharing of information about threats that might jeopardize the system's security. In addition, the government will develop procedures for the timely sharing of classified, declassified, and unclassified information to ensure that information needed to secure networks is fully accessible to trusted parties. We are concerned that there are other bills out there that will add another new bureaucracy, another layer of regulation that is not necessary and brings in another agency that would overlay the security agencies that already have systems in place. It would also allow the regulatory bodies for certain areas of interest to handle the cybersecurity rather than another overlay of a new department. I think so many people in our country who are in business feel they are overwhelmed with duplicative regulations and different agencies they have to report to. We want to streamline whom they have to report to and try to use existing structures and existing regulatory authorities to deal with each individual company or industry so that we don't have to give them yet another new bureaucracy that would then have regulations, if they are deemed to be critical infrastructure. That is when it becomes the regulatory threat. We believe the private sector is more aware of individual security needs and better equipped than the Department of Homeland Security to secure its own networks, working with its own regulators. According to the Office of Management and Budget, the government itself has had great difficulty in preventing attacks on Federal systems. So we do require that the reporting of Federal contractors go to the Federal security agencies, but we don't think the Federal agencies being in charge of everything is necessarily an improvement. We want to make sure the Federal Information Security Management Act, which is the law, is actually updated so that the new forms of cyber threats are accommodated in FISMA, the Federal Information Security Management Act, and to strengthen that with the updates. The legislation also updates the Criminal Code to address cyber crimes, strengthening penalties, improving the Department of Justice's ability to prosecute this kind of criminal who would take down whole systems of our government. Our bill will prioritize cybersecurity research and development so we can harness innovation to protect our country and our private industries from cyber attacks. I am very pleased that we have been able to introduce this legislation as an alternative to some of the other bills that have come out. I believe that if we can go forward with negotiating, perhaps we can come to an accommodation with the bills that have been introduced with other sponsors. But we don't think the bills that have been introduced address our concerns and we want to ensure that we do not have another big Federal bureaucracy, that we do not overlay the regulators who already have expertise in this area with new regulators whom we have to train and deal with. We think the defense agencies--the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the CIA, DHS--all of those with their cybersecurity assets already in place are the better place to put the strength, not reinventing the wheel but better utilizing the systems we already have. I think it is time for our Senate to address cyber security. I think we have good proposals out there; perhaps we can take the best of those. I think this is the right approach, and Senators McCain, Chambliss, Grassley, and Murkowski were key to drafting this legislation that I think will get the support of all of the stakeholders, as well as the House of Representatives, to actually pass a bill to improve our systems and take it to the President for signature.", u"Madam President, I am glad we could get that straight. Let me first thank all of our colleagues who are here to pay honor to the senior Senator from Maryland, Senator Mikulski. This is March Madness in basketball. Sweet 16 is starting. We are very proud in Maryland of our Lady Terps. They are in the Sweet 16. But I want you to know that we are all getting our fantasy teams, and I want Senator Mikulski on my fantasy basketball team because she is a true leader, she understands the importance of working together, and she is a winner. We are proud of her roots in Maryland. She is the great-granddaughter of Polish immigrants who owned a bakery. She began her public service in high school, where she helped deliver groceries to seniors who were locked in their apartments and she helped the homebound seniors get the food they needed. She went to the University of Maryland School of Social Work because she wanted to be a social worker. She wanted to help other people. She knew that she was good at that and she could make a difference in people's lives. She worked for Catholic Charities and dealt with children at risk and helping seniors with Medicare. As you have heard from several of my colleagues already, she gained her reputation by taking on a highway that was scheduled to be built that would have gone through Canton and Fells Point, disrupting a neighborhood in Baltimore. This was a 16-lane highway. It was considered to be a done deal; it was going to happen. The powers that be said we are going to have a highway coming through downtown Baltimore. The powers to be did not know Barbara Mikulski. That highway never happened. Senator Mikulski stopped that highway from being built. She then went on to serve in the Baltimore City Council with great distinction. Then in 1976 she was elected to the Congress for the Third Congressional District, a seat that was vacated by our esteemed colleague Paul Sarbanes, who then came into the Senate, and Barbara Mikulski followed in the great tradition of Senator Paul Sarbanes. In 1986, when Senator ``Mac'' Mathias's seat became vacant, Senator Barbara Mikulski was elected to the Senate. She has many firsts: The first female Democrat elected in her own right to serve the United States Senate. At the time she was elected to the Senate, she was only one of two female Senators. Today, we have 17 female Senators in the Senate in large part because of Senator Barbara Mikulski. I know the Presiding Officer was part of that expansion. You will hear how Senator Mikulski was not only a role model and an inspiration but an incredible help to get more women elected to the Senate. Last year we joined in this body to celebrate Senator Mikulski becoming the longest serving woman in the history of the Senate, surpassing Margaret Chase Smith from the State of Maine. Then on this past Saturday, on St. Patrick's Day, she became the longest serving woman in the history of the Congress, replacing Edith Nourse Rogers from Massachusetts who served, as the majority leader pointed out, from 1925 to 1960. Marylanders understand longevity records. We are very proud of Cal Ripken and the record he held in baseball. Senator Mikulski's, like Cal Ripken's, legacy is what she has done in office to make a difference, not the length of her service. She is a fierce and effective advocate for so many causes. We have heard about her accomplishments in education and health care, what she has done to advance sensible health care to improve quality for the people of this country. That was her mission in the Affordable Care Act, to make sure that we had the delivery systems in place that would deliver quality health care, and Senator Mikulski's leadership was critical in that regard. She has been a leader in women's health care issues. I will never forget her reminder to all of us in the caucus: Don't forget women's health care issues when you bring that bill to the floor. And we didn't. We put that in under Senator Mikulski's leadership. We talked about breast cancer and cervical cancer screenings. Senator Mikulski has been in the leadership on all those issues. We in Maryland are proud to be where the National Institutes of Health is headquartered. Its growth in large measure has been the result of Senator Barbara Mikulski. We are proud of HOPE VI and housing. Senator Mikulski has been in the forefront of that program, making it possible for many people in our community to have decent, affordable, and safe housing. Senator Mikulski has been critically important to America's space program. I have been with her many times at Goddard and seen firsthand the results of her advocacy and what it has meant. The Hubble space telescope is another legacy of which Senator Mikulski can be rightly proud. We in Maryland are also proud to house NSA, the National Security Agency, with its new mission with the cyber command located in Maryland. Senator Mikulski, as Senator Feinstein pointed out, has been one of the real leaders on national security issues. We can't issue press releases on this. She is a member of the intelligence committee. She works behind closed doors to keep us safe. But we all know that she is one of the key leaders in this Nation on national security issues. We know about pay equity and the Lilly Ledbetter law, the first bill signed by President Obama. It was Senator Mikulski's leadership that got that bill to the President's desk, recognizing that we are still not where we need to be on gender pay equity in America. In our region, the Chesapeake Bay is center to our way of life and our economy. Senator Mikulski has been one of the real champions on water quality and the Chesapeake Bay. She understands the respect for State and local government, that we have to work together as a team. I know the Governor of Maryland, Governor O'Malley, would agree with me that there is no better friend to the people of Maryland working with the State than Senator Barbara Mikulski, getting the Federal Government on the same page as the State and local governments to get things done for the people of Maryland. That is true with what she has been able to do for all of us working across the Nation. I think the Baltimore Sun put it best when it said: There is nobody more feisty, more willing to take on big business, big government, or anyone when it is time to look out for the interests of her constituents. I think all of us would agree. On a personal note, I thank Senator Mikulski for her friendship, I thank her for being my buddy and my adviser. Whether she is with Presidents or Kings or the patrons at Jimmy's Restaurant in Fells Point, you get the same common sense, the same down-to-earth person--you get Senator Barb. We are so proud of her. Thank you, Senator Barb, for what you have done to make this Nation a better place to live. Thank you for being such a role model for young people, especially young women, to get involved, to make a difference. Thank you on behalf of my two granddaughters. Their future is much brighter, their opportunities are much greater because of you, Senator Barb. Congratulations. Your colleagues here want to express our love and respect and admiration for your incredible service.", u"Mr. President, our bill also allows for a true collaborative effort. The reason we are not supporting the bill that is on the floor today is because we believe it does not do the priorities that we can pass, and it does increase the mandates and the regulatory overkill, in our opinion, that will keep our companies from being able to move forward on an expedited basis to start protecting our systems. A priority of mine throughout this process has been that we help the private sector combat cyber attacks by breaking down the barriers to sharing information. If we could take that one step, we would be a long way toward ensuring that we are increasing the security of all Americans. The bill before us will actually undermine current information sharing between the government and the private sector. That bill's information-sharing title is a step backward because it slows the transfer of critical information to our intelligence agencies, and there is not sufficient protection from antitrust. In addition, there is no consensus in the Senate to grant the Department of Homeland Security broad new authority to impose burdensome regulations on the private sector. While I am pleased our colleagues who are cosponsoring the bill that is before us have made an effort to move away from direct regulation of our Nation's systems, it has a long way to go. While their bill allows the private sector to propose standards that are described as voluntary, the bill actually empowers Federal agencies to make these voluntary standards mandatory. If an agency does not make the standards mandatory, it would have to report to Congress why it had failed to do so. That is a pretty big incentive for mandates to start being put on with regulations that will be required. I believe there is a way forward. If the Senate takes the well- The key to reaching consensus has five parts: The cybersecurity standards must be developed by the private sector and must be truly voluntary. The relationship between government and the private sector in this area must be cooperative, not adversarial and not regulatory. The National Institute for Standards and Technology should be the convening authority for the private sector standard-setting process. The government can have a role in ensuring the standards are sufficient, and it should, but it can't establish a regulatory regime that will lengthen and hamper the efforts to open information sharing. Companies--and here is the incentive for the companies to do exactly what we are asking them to do--companies that adopt the voluntary standards must receive robust and straightforward protections from liability as well as necessary antitrust and Freedom of Information Act exemptions. If a company is going to turn over its proprietary information to the government, it must be protected from freedom of information requests from the government that then would take its private proprietary information public. As in the SECURE IT Act, the information-sharing title must be strong and encourage the private sector to share information, and it must encourage the government to share with the private sector. It cannot cut out those with the most expertise in the area, meaning the national security agencies should not have to be subservient to the Department of Homeland Security. In addition, a 5-year sunset would allow Congress to revisit the act and make needed changes. FISA has certainly shown that with a sunset, it allows the flexibility to adapt to new issues that arise and stay current in its processes to deal with cybersecurity. We believe a 5-year sunset would be the right amount of time to get this going, set things in place, see what works, and see what needs to be adjusted. I am hopeful my colleagues and I can come to a compromise on this critical issue. We want a strong cybersecurity bill. We want one that can pass both Houses. The five points I have laid out could get us to a bill that will significantly take the steps to improve our Nation's cybersecurity. I wish to read a couple of excerpts from the Heritage Foundation's views of the bill that is before us today: Cybersecurity legislation will likely be taken up by the Senate tomorrow. This was written yesterday. Regrettably, the idea that we just need to do something about cybersecurity seems to be trumping the view that we need to do it right. The Cybersecurity Act of 2012, authored by Senators Lieberman and Collins, seeks to solve our cybersecurity ills but only threatens to make the situation worse. The ``voluntary'' nature of the CSA's standards is also questionable. Any voluntary standard is one step away from mandatory, and Senator Lieberman has already indicated that if the standards aren't voluntarily used, he would push to make them mandatory. Even more concerning, section 103(g) of the CSA gives current regulators the power to make these ``voluntary'' standards mandatory. It specifically authorizes that action. If a regulator doesn't mandate the standards, the regulatory agency will have to report to Congress why it didn't do so. Again, there is strong encouragement to just make the standards mandatory and avoid a congressional inquisition. Finally, the Heritage Foundation goes on to say: Finally, the sharing and analysis of cybersecurity threat information was weakened by confining cybersecurity information exchanges to civilian organizations. Though in an ideal world the Department of Homeland Security would have the capability to lead our cybersecurity efforts, it currently lacks those capabilities and needs to lean on more capable organizations such as the National Security Agency. The recent changes, however, give DHS more responsibility than it is likely able to handle. So we will certainly move forward with the understanding that we will have the ability to offer amendments and try to make this a workable bill. It is certain that because the committee was not able to mark up the bill, we have to have the amendments to try to perfect it. I would very much like to take the first step forward in cybersecurity, which is why, assuming we have the right to amend, I will support going to the legislation so that we can start the amendment process next week. I think the people who are cosponsors of my legislation, along with Senator McCain, Senator Chambliss, Senator Grassley, Senator Burr, Senator Murkowski, Senator Coats, and Senator Johnson, want to make sure we do this right. As the Heritage Foundation has so aptly said, we don't want a big, new regulatory scheme that is not going to be successful in our efforts to improve the cybersecurity safeguards in our system. We are the ranking members of all but one of the relevant committees. We know this area. We deal with the agencies that deal with cybersecurity and all of the national security in our country. We know what can work, we know what we have a chance to pass, and we know how to take the first step forward without another big regulatory overreach, as we have seen happen in the last 3\\1/2\\ years in this administration. We hope to work with the majority, with the Lieberman-Collins bill, and come up with something that everyone will feel is the right step forward. We would like to have a bill that will get a large number of votes rather than a very lopsided vote against it. I appreciate very much that we are now beginning to discuss this. I am appreciative that we have had several meetings with all of the sides that have been put forward as having concerns with the bill that is on the floor as well as its sponsors. I hope we can keep working toward a solution that will protect America and do it in the right way. Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.", u"Madam President, first let me thank the Senator from Delaware for his graciousness. In light of the fact that there are so many people who are waiting to speak, I will be brief. But I want to talk about the legislation that is before us, the cyber security bill. This bill represents the Senate's best chance this year to pass urgently needed cyber security legislation. Why do I say it is urgent? Virtually every national and homeland security expert, from President Bush's administration including President Obama's administration, has warned us repeatedly that a cyber attack is coming and it is an attack that is going to be aimed at our critical infrastructure. For us to let disagreements over exactly how to counter this threat prevent the passage of this bill would be a tragedy and could lead to a tragedy. This is serious. Yesterday we had a meeting with the FBI, with the Department of Homeland Security, with GEN Keith Alexander, who is the head of cyber command, and the head of the National Security Agency. They were unanimous in warning us that Congress must act and must act now. Every single day nation states, terrorist groups, hacktivists, persistent hackers, transnational criminal gangs, are probing our cyber defenses. Intrusions are rampant. As one expert told me, there are really only two kinds of large companies in this country: those that know they have been hacked and those that do not know they have been hacked. It is so important that we act. I must say we are working very hard to try to accommodate the concerns that have been raised by some of our colleagues and by some in the business community. We, therefore, have altered our bill in a significant way. Another charge I have heard thrown loosely around here is that somehow there has not been enough study; somehow there is not enough process; somehow we need more hearings. Our homeland security committee alone has had 10 hearings on cyber security--10 hearings. The Senate, as a whole, has had 25 hearings and numerous classified briefings. How many more briefings, hearings, and reports do we need? The head of the FBI, Robert Mueller, has told us that in his judgment the threat of a cyber attack will soon exceed the threat of a terrorist attack. Of course, they may be combined. It may be a terrorist group using cyber tools to launch an attack on this country. There is a Web site video that shows an arm of al-Qaida which encourages cyber attacks and talks about how easy it would be to conduct it. Senator Lieberman and I, along with our three principal cosponsors: Senator Feinstein, Senator Rockefeller, and Senator Carper, have made significant changes in our bill to respond to concerns that have been raised. Most notably we have gone from having a mandatory framework to a voluntary approach to enhance the security of our most critical infrastructure. The underlying concept of this approach, which was suggested in a very constructive way by our colleagues Senator Kyl and Senator Whitehouse, is to encourage owners of our most critical infrastructure to enhance their cyber security by providing them with various incentives, the most important of which is liability protections. We have also made changes to improve the privacy protections and the information-sharing title of our bill. The bill establishes a multiagency council, the National Cyber Security Council, to respond to concerns that too much power was being given to the Department of Homeland Security. So now we have an interagency body that includes the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, represented by the FBI, the Department of Commerce, the intelligence community--undoubtedly it would be the Director of the National Intelligence Office--and appropriate sector-specific Federal agencies, such as FERC, if we are talking about how best to protect our electric grid. The council would work in partnership with the private sector and would conduct risk assessments to identify our Nation's most critical cyber infrastructure. What do we mean by that? We hear that term. What exactly is critical cyber infrastructure? It is that which, if damaged, could result in mass casualties, mass evacuations, catastrophic economic damage to our country or severe harm to our national security. Don't we want to safeguard critical national assets that if damaged would cause numerous deaths, people to flee their homes, their communities, a disaster for our economy, or a severe blow to our national security? I can't believe there is even any discussion about the need for us to have robust systems to protect us against mass casualties, a devastating blow to our economy, and catastrophic consequences. That is a high bar in our bill for defining what is critical cyber infrastructure. It isn't every business in this country. Those who are implying that it is and that this is sweeping are not accurately reading the bill. We would be irresponsible if we did not act when the warnings are so loud and are coming from so many respected sources. We have had the Aspen Institute Group on Cyber Security Issues endorse our bill and urge us to go toward its consideration. That is chaired by President Bush's Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and by a renowned expert on the other side of the aisle, former Congresswoman Jane Harman. It also includes people such as Paul Wolfowitz, not exactly a liberal activist the last time I checked, but certainly one who commands great respect for his knowledge in this area. I am amazed we are letting the clock tick down when we know it is not a matter of if there is going to be a cyber attack on this country, it is a matter of when. Let me very briefly address another issue. Is there some opposition among the business community to this bill? Yes, there is. But there is also a great deal of support from the business community. We have, for example, a letter from the NDIA, which represents 1,750 defense firms. We have letters of endorsement from Sysco, Oracle, the Silicon Valley Leadership Group, the Business Software Alliance, from Semantec, EMC Corporation, the Center for a New American Security, endorsements from individuals in the previous administration such as General Hayden, Mike McConnell, and Asa Hutchinson. There are many supporters for this bill. It is not surprising because they know how important it is that we act.", u"Again, I thank our friend from Rhode Island for the extraordinarily constructive role he has played--unusual here, unfortunately--in bringing the group of eight Members, four Democrats and four Republicans, together. Senator Whitehouse, along with Senator Kyl of Arizona, created a bridge that really invited Senators Collins, Feinstein, Rockefeller, Carper, and me to come halfway across to change our bill from mandatory to voluntary. So my answers to the Senator's two questions are yes and yes. We are a lot closer than we were really just a month ago--a matter of weeks ago. There is a remaining difference, and it is real. But considering where we have come from, if we show a willingness to compromise--and again, as I have said over and over, not a compromise of principle--that acknowledges that if everybody in the Senate insists on getting 100 percent of what they want on a bill, nobody is going to get anything because nothing is going to pass. So we have come back from our 100 percent quite a lot, and we are still open to ideas that will enable us to achieve what we need to achieve here in improving our cyber security, which means changing where we are now. That is why, as my friend from Rhode Island knows, we are going to keep meeting today with the other leading sponsors of the bill and with the peacemakers in between to see if we can find common ground and avoid what I think could be a very disappointing cloture vote--a very divisive, very destructive cloture vote--tomorrow. The second point is a very important one; that is, the House has acted, but it has only acted with regard to information sharing. This is important, but it is only half the job. The information sharing, in brief, says that private companies that operate critical infrastructure can share with other private companies if they are attacked or as they begin to defend themselves so they mutually can strengthen each other. They can also share with the government, and the government, particularly through the Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Agency, can help the private sector strengthen itself. Those kinds of communications, which are critical and would seem natural, don't happen now in too many cases because the private sector is anxious about liability that it might incur. Even the public sector is limited in how much it can reach out or help. So it is important that the House has addressed that part of it. I will say--and not just parenthetically--that there has been very significant concern of a lot of Americans and a quite remarkable coalition of groups--remarkable in the sense that it is right to left, along the ideological spectrum--about the personal privacy rights of the American people, that they not be compromised as a result of this information sharing. Those privacy advocacy groups are not happy with the House information-sharing bill. I am pleased they have praised what we have tried to do as a result of negotiations with colleagues in this Chamber who are concerned about privacy. The point Senator Whitehouse makes is so true, but that is only half the job. Everybody who cares about cyber security has said it. There was, I must say, an encouraging, inspiring, for us, editorial in the New York Times today, supporting essentially S. 3414, the underlying bill, and crying out to us to take action and not get dragged down into gridlock by special interest thinking. But here is a statistic that jumped out at me. I saw it once before, but we have not heard it in this debate. In a Times editorial today entitled ``Cybersecurity at Risk,'' this sentence: ``Last year, a survey of more than 9,000 executives in more than 130 countries by the PricewaterhouseCoopers consulting firm found that only 13 percent of those polled had taken adequate defensive action against cyberthreats.'' That is worldwide. But I can tell you from what I know, the number in our country is not much better. That is why we need this set of standards, best practices, computer hygiene--no longer mandatory but we create an incentive. It is as if a company chooses to go into what my friend from Rhode Island has quite vividly described as Fort Cyber Security. We are going to build Fort Cyber Security of the best practices to defend cyber security, and we are going to leave it to the companies that operate critical infrastructure totally on their own whether they want to go into Fort Cyber Security. If they do, they will have some significant immunity from liability in the case of a major attack. My answer to the Senator's questions are yes and yes. I just want to come back to something the Senator said at the outset of his remarks. I never know how much this argument weighs on Senators' minds, but once again it is being made here, which is this bill has received no hearings; it is not ready for action. Good God. I went back and looked at the Record. I attended my first hearing on cyber security held in what was then the Governmental Affairs Committee--it is now the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee--chaired then by Senator Fred Thompson in 1998, 14 years ago. I can tell my colleague that in recent years, Senator Collins and I have held 10 hearings on the subject of cyber security. That is only in our committee. That is not counting judiciary, intelligence, commerce--I think foreign relations may have held some hearings on it too. In fact, we held a hearing just earlier this year, I believe it was March, on cyber security and the legislation that we knew we were going to bring forward. This has been heard. I wish to say this too. I mentioned Senator Reid's commitment to doing something about cyber security. Last year--I am trying to think, but I cannot remember a time on another bill where I saw this happen--Senator Reid asked the Republican leader, Senator McConnell, to join him in calling in the Democratic chairs and the ranking Republican members of all the relevant committees, relevant to cyber security that we just talked about, and made an appeal that we work together to bring one bill which he would then, as he has done before when a subject covers more than one committee, blend into a single bill and bring to the floor under majority leader's authority pursuant to rule XIV of the Senate rules, which he has done today. So there has not been a specific hearing on this bill, but Lord knows there have been a lot of hearings and this bill has been vetted and negotiated not only with many Members of the Senate but by our committee and all the other committees--by stakeholders, private stakeholders, by some of the very businesses and business organizations that now seem to be the main block to moving forward on the bill. I probably responded to my friend at greater length than I might have or perhaps more than he expected, but his questions were right on target, and I thank him for giving me the opportunity.", u"Madam President, I rise this afternoon in support of the bipartisan Cybersecurity Act of 2012, and I wish to share my concerns about the very real cyber threat facing our country. Most importantly, I rise to urge all my colleagues to move forward to the passage of this pending cyber security bill for the good of our national security. Top experts and respected members of both political parties have told us that time is wasting; we must debate and pass this critically important piece of legislation. Cyber security policy is an issue with which I am deeply involved, given my seats on the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee. Moreover, Colorado's military and defense communities play a prominent role in defending our country, the United States, against cyber attacks. The Air Force Space Command, located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, is responsible for protecting American space-based assets from network intrusions. The U.S. Northern Command, also located at Peterson Air Force Base, recently established a Joint Cyber Center to help provide on-demand cyber consequence response to civil authorities. Multiple defense and technology industry companies based in Colorado also contribute hardware, software, and expertise to the effort to keep our networks and infrastructure secure. Our Federal labs also conduct critical research into cyber security, most notably the National Institute of Standards and Technology, otherwise known as NIST, which is located in Boulder. They play a key role in helping establish cyber security standards. The threats posed by cyber attacks have long been recognized, but we in the Congress have yet to act upon these threats in a comprehensive way. It is as if we see the danger in front of us, but yet we cannot find the courage to face it. But Congress cannot afford to wait for a 9/11-sized attack in order to act. Waiting for a catastrophic act--something military and intelligence leaders and a bipartisan collection of national security experts are warning us against--is the exact opposite of leadership and the exact opposite of what our constituents expect us to do. This debate, to me, has seemingly, unfortunately, unraveled into an antiquated argument about the public sector versus the private sector. We cannot let old ways of thinking bog us down. This is a threat that can only be addressed by both the public and private sectors working together. The private sector owns 85 percent of our Nation's critical infrastructure, which is itself heavily dependent on computer networks. A successful attack on our critical infrastructure could result in disabled power grids, refineries, and nuclear plants, disrupted rail systems and air traffic control and telecommunications networks. A successful attack could bring commerce to a halt, our financial markets to their knees. It could also escalate into a war in cyber space or even a shooting war. To defend against these serious threats, particularly those that involve national security, there needs to be an exchange of information between the public and the private sectors. Of course, allowing the government and industry to share information must be done with sufficient safeguards, so any legislation authorizing such sharing needs to strike a balance between privacy and civil liberties protections. I believe the bill's authors have achieved such a balance. I recognize it is often difficult to find consensus on how to defend our Nation from security threats. Sometimes that is because we cannot agree on the nature of our vulnerabilities and in what priority to address them. Unfortunately, sometimes Congress is too polarized to act until after a crisis occurs. But in the case of cyber security, we already know our Nation's computer networks are increasingly vulnerable. There is widespread agreement about the severity of the threat. Just last month, Defense Secretary Panetta testified before Congress that cyber attacks could ``virtually paralyze this country.'' The threat is not impending, it is here. We already know many of the steps we need to take to mitigate or prevent these attacks. The only issue getting in the way is politics. Frankly, Coloradans are tired of this. They want us to reason together and solve our most vexing national challenges. The Cybersecurity Act of 2012 is not overly intrusive. It has been scaled back to a voluntary system of industry-driven security standards for critical infrastructure. The bill's authors have offered a further amendment to address some of the remaining concerns of the bill's opponents. As much as the bill's authors have compromised and worked with groups and businesses from across the policy spectrum, one would think they would get more in return from the Republicans than a demand to vote on the repeal of health care reform. But that is where the debate stands, and it is not a proud moment for our Chamber. The cyber security bill before us may not be perfect. In fact, I have offered three amendments that I believe make this an even stronger bill. The first would require the administration to provide a detailed plan on how it would develop a highly trained, robust Federal cyber security workforce. A stronger Federal workforce will not only better protect government assets, but these individuals will go on to fill critical roles protecting cyber assets in the private sector. My second amendment would establish permanent faculty positions to train the next generation of military cyber leaders at the U.S. Air Force Academy. My third amendment would require the assessment of the costs and benefits of building a strategic stockpile of extra high voltage transformers. We do not produce these highly specialized pieces of equipment domestically, and it would take months to replace transformers damaged by a physical or cyber attack. I hope my colleagues will join me in passing these commonsense amendments aimed at improving our national security. This cyber security bill is over 3 years in the making. I find it ironic some argue the process has been rushed and we need more time. But I believe this bill is long overdue and we simply cannot afford not to act. As the head of U.S. Cyber Command and the Director of the National Security Agency, General Alexander, wrote in a letter to Congress this week, ``The cyber threat facing the Nation is real and demands immediate action.'' This is coming from the national security official who knows more than anyone about the cyber threats facing our country. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I take his cautions and advice very seriously. The rest of us should as well. As I close, I urge all of us, let's put aside partisan ploys and partisan differences. Let's work together to amend and pass this vitally important cyber security bill. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, one aspect of cybersecurity threats from foreign nations relates directly to America's global competitiveness. If American entrepreneurs are known for one thing, it is innovation. That innovation costs money. American companies invest billions and billions of dollars every year on research and development to create products that are the best in the world. Companies in my State alone invest $16 billion a year in research and development. When these investments succeed American companies are often the leaders in their industries at home and in overseas markets, offering technologies that are not available elsewhere. This is a huge competitive value and one that we must protect. But too many U.S. companies of all sizes are being robbed of their intellectual property, the engine of their businesses, and the American economy is being undermined through cyber theft. Often the culprits are foreign governments. To make matters worse, these governments share the stolen technology with companies that compete with the very U.S. companies that developed the technology in the first place. General Keith B. Alexander, head of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, recently called the theft of intellectual property from U.S. entities through cyberspace ``the greatest transfer of wealth in history.'' He estimated that such theft costs U.S. companies and institutions hundreds of billions of dollars. It is outrageous that American trade secrets are being stolen and used to compete against us. So who is responsible? As far back as 2011, the National Counterintelligence Executive said in its annual report to Congress that ``Chinese actors are the world's most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage. U.S. private sector firms and cybersecurity specialists have reported an onslaught of computer network intrusions that have originated in China.'' In March of this year, Mandiant, a company that investigates private sector cyber security breaches, published a report describing how a cyber-espionage unit of the Chinese People's Liberation Army raided the computers of at least 141 different organizations, stealing ``technology blueprints, proprietary manufacturing processes, test results, business plans, pricing documents, [and] partnership agreements.'' According to Mandiant, the industries targeted by the PLA ``match industries that China has identified as strategic to their growth.'' Mandiant's report exposed PLA cyber theft aimed at the information technology, transportation, aerospace, satellites and telecommunications, and high end electronics industries, to name just a few. U.S. government reports also point to China. Just last week the U.S. Trade Representative issued its ``Special 301'' report reviewing the global state of intellectual property rights, IPR. USTR stated that ``Obtaining effective enforcement of IPR in China remains a central challenge, as it has been for many years.'' The report continued ``This situation has been made worse by cyber theft, as information suggests that actors located in China have been engaged in sophisticated, targeted efforts to steal [intellectual property] from U.S. corporate systems.'' Also last week, an article in Bloomberg described cyber espionage conducted by the Chinese People's Liberation Army against QinetiQ, a defense contractor. The article said the PLA operation ``jeopardized the [victim] company's sensitive technology involving drones, satellites, the U.S. Army's combat helicopter fleet, and military robotics, both already-deployed systems and those still in development.'' The report stated that the Chinese ``hackers had burrowed into almost every corner of QinetiQ's U.S. operations, including production facilities and engineering labs in St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Long Beach, Mississippi, Huntsville, Alabama and Albuquerque, New Mexico, where QinetiQ engineers work on satellite-based espionage, among other projects.'' It is time that we fought back to protect American businesses and American innovation. We need to call out those who are responsible for cyber theft and empower the President to hit the thieves where it hurts most--in their wallets. Today, I am introducing a bill along with Senators McCain, Coburn and Rockefeller that calls on the Director of National Intelligence, DNI, to develop a list of foreign countries that engage in economic or industrial espionage in cyberspace with respect to U.S. trade secrets or proprietary information. We have done something similar under the Special 301 process for intellectual property rights infringements in foreign countries. Specifically, our legislation requires the DNI to publish an annual report listing foreign countries that engage in, facilitate, support or tolerate economic and industrial espionage targeting U.S. trade secrets or proprietary information through cyberspace. That report would identify: A watch list of foreign countries that engage in economic or industrial espionage in cyberspace with respect to trade secrets or proprietary information owned by United States persons; it would identify a priority watch list of foreign countries that are the most egregious offenders; U.S. technologies targeted for economic or industrial espionage in cyberspace and U.S. technologies that have been stolen, to the extent that is known; articles manufactured or produced or services provided, without permission from the rights holder, using such stolen technologies or proprietary information; foreign companies, including state owned enterprises, that benefit from stolen technologies or proprietary information; details of the economic or industrial espionage engaged in by foreign countries; and actions taken by DNI and other Federal agencies and progress made to decrease foreign economic or industrial espionage in cyberspace against United States persons. Creating a ``name and shame'' list, as this report would do, will shine a spotlight on those who are stealing U.S. technologies. But we need more than a report, we need action. Our bill provides for more than a report. In order to enforce compliance with laws protecting U.S. patents, copyrights, and other intellectual property and protection of the Department of Defense supply chain, our legislation requires the President to block imports of products if they: contain stolen U.S. technology or proprietary information, or are produced by a state-owned enterprise of a country on the priority watch list and are the same as or similar to products made using the stolen or targeted U.S. technology or proprietary information identified in the report, or are made by a company identified in the report as having benefitted from the stolen U.S. technology or proprietary information. Blocking imports of products that either incorporate intellectual property stolen from U.S. companies or are from companies otherwise that benefit from cyber theft will send the message that we have had enough. If foreign governments--like the Chinese government--want to continue to deny their involvement in cyber theft despite the proof, that's one thing. We can't stop the denials on the face of facts. But we aren't without remedies. We can prevent the companies that benefit from the theft--including State-owned companies from getting away with the benefits of that theft. Maybe once they understand that complicity will cost them access to the U.S. market, they will press their governments to stop or refuse to benefit at least. We will hit them where it hurts with this legislation and we aim to get results. We have stood by for far too long while our intellectual property and proprietary information is plundered in cyberspace and in turn used to undercut the very companies that developed it. It is now time to act. Our legislation will give our Government powerful tools to fight back against these crimes and protect the investments and property of U.S. companies and institutions. I urge my colleagues to work to enact this very important legislation as quickly as possible. We have no time to lose. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.", u"I want to talk about the much ballyhooed oversight. Every year, there is a report to the Judiciary Committee, an annual report, on section 215. This year, the report was eight sentences--less than a full page. To think that the Congress has substantial oversight of this program is simply incorrect. I cannot match Mr. Sensenbrenner's brilliant remarks; but I do agree that when we wrote the PATRIOT Act relevance had a meaning. Madam Chair, I submit for the Record a letter to Mr. Sensenbrenner from the Department of Justice, which basically says, because 300 inquiries were made, the records of every single American became relevant. That's a joke. U.S. Department of Justice, Dear Representative Sensenbrenner: This responds to your letter to the Attorney General date June 6, 2013, regarding the ``business records'' provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1861, enacted as section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. As you know, on June 5, 2013, the media reported the unauthorized disclosure of a classified judicial order issued under this provision that has been used to support a sensitive intelligence collection program. Under this program, which has been briefed to Congress and repeatedly authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtains authorization to collect telephony metadata, including the telephone numbers dialed and the date, time and duration of calls, from certain telecommunications service providers. The National Security Agency (NSA), in turn, archives and analyzes this information under carefully controlled circumstances and provides leads to the FBI or others in the Intelligence Community for counterterrorism purposes. Aspects of this program remain classified, and there are limits to what can be said about it in an unclassified letter. Department of Justice and Intelligence Community staff are available to provide you a briefing on the program at your request. In your letter, you asked whether this intelligence collection program is consistent with the requirements of section 215 and the limits of that authority. Under section 215, the Director of the FBI may apply to the FISC for an order directing the production of any tangible things, including business records, for investigations to protect against international terrorism. To issue such an order, the FISC must determine that (1) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation, other than a threat assessment; (2) the investigation is being conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333; and (3) if a U.S. person is the subject of the investigation, the investigation is not being conducted solely upon the basis of First Amendment protected activities. In addition, the FISC may only require the production of items that can be obtained with a grand jury subpoena or any other court order directing the production of records or tangible things. Finally, the program must, of course, comport with the Constitution. The telephony metadata program satisfies each of these requirements. The lawfulness of the telephony metadata collection program has repeatedly been affirmed by the FISC. In the years since its inception, multiple FISC judges have granted 90-day extensions of the program after concluding that it meets all applicable legal requirements. Of particular significance to your question is the relevance to an authorized international terrorism investigation of the telephony metadata collected through this program. First, it is critical to understand the program in the context of the restrictions imposed by the court. Those restrictions strictly limit the extent to which the data is reviewed by the government. In particular, the FISC allows the data to be queried for intelligence purposes only when there is reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts, that a particular query term, such as a telephone number, is associated with a specific foreign terrorist organization that was previously identified to and approved by the court. NSA has reported that in 2012, fewer than 300 unique identifiers were used to query the data after meeting this standard. This means that only a very small fraction of the records is ever reviewed by any person, and only specially cleared counterterrorism personnel specifically trained in the court-approved procedures can access the records to conduct queries. The information generated in response to these limited queries is not only relevant to authorized investigations of international terrorism, but may be especially significant in helping the government identify and disrupt terrorist plots. The large volume of telephony metadata is relevant to FBI investigations into specific foreign terrorist organizations because the intelligence tools that NSA uses to identify the existence of potential terrorist communications within the data require collecting and storing large volumes of the metadata to enable later analysis. If not collected and held by NSA, the metadata may not continue to be available for the period that NSA has deemed necessary for national security purposes because it need not be retained by telecommunications service providers. Moreover, unless the data is aggregated by NSA, it may not be possible to identify telephony metadata records that cross different telecommunications networks. The bulk collection of telephony metadata--i.e. the collection of a large volume and high percentage of information about unrelated communications--is therefore necessary to identify the much smaller subset of terrorist- related telephony metadata records contained within the data. It also allows NSA to make connections related to terrorist activities over time and can assist counterterrorism personnel to discover whether known or suspected terrorists have been in contact with other persons who may be engaged in terrorist activities, including persons and activities inside the United States. Because the telephony metadata must be available in bulk to allow NSA to identify the records of terrorist communications, there are ``reasonable grounds to believe'' that the data is relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism, as section 215 requires, even though most of the records in the dataset are not associated with terrorist activity. The program is consistent with the Constitution as well as with the statute. As noted above, the only type of information acquired under the program is telephony metadata, not the content of any communications, not the identity, address or financial information of any party to the communication, and not geolocational information. Under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to this kind of information that individuals have already provided to third- party businesses, and such information therefore is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 ", u"Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding and wish to express my appreciation to Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Young and Ranking Member Visclosky for their skillful leadership in shepherding H.R. 2397, the Defense Appropriations Act for FY2014, to the floor. This body has no greater obligation than to ensure that our men and women in uniform, and those civilians who support them, have the resources needed to keep our country safe. I want to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for crafting a bill that keeps faith with our obligation to those who risk their lives to protect our freedoms. Madam Chair, let me also express my appreciation to my friend and colleague, Congressman Amash, and to Congressman Conyers, the gentleman from Michigan and the Ranking Member of Judiciary Committee, for their good and hard work in fashioning the bipartisan amendment before us. Their work on the Amash-Conyers amendment is an example of what can be accomplished when members put aside partisanship and work across the aisle in an effort to come up with workable solutions to serious problems. Madam Chair, the Amash-Conyers Amendment to H.R. 2397 prohibits the use of appropriated funds execute any order issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) that does not include the following sentence: This Order limits the collection of any tangible things (including telephone numbers dialed, telephone numbers of incoming calls, and the duration of calls) that may be authorized to be collected pursuant to this Order to those tangible things that pertain to a person who is the subject of an investigation described in 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861). The Amash-Conyers Amendment was prompted by the recent unauthorized disclosures regarding the National Security Agency's collection from Verizon of the phone records of all of its American customers, which was authorized by the FISA Court pursuant to Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Public reaction to the news of this massive and secret data gathering operation was swift and negative. There was justifiable concern on the part of the public and a large percentage of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of this NSA data collection operation, which exceeded by orders of magnitude anything previously authorized or contemplated, may constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy and threat to the civil liberties of American citizens. To quell the growing controversy, the Director of National Intelligence declassified and released limited information about this program. According to the DNI, the program does not allow the Government to listen in on anyone's phone calls. Nor does the information acquired include the content of any communications or the identity of any subscriber. The DNI stated that ``the only type of information acquired under the Court's order is telephony metadata, such as telephone numbers dialed and length of calls.'' The DNI stated that the data collection was ``broad in scope because more narrow collection would limit our ability to screen for and identify terrorism-related communications. Acquiring this information allows us to make connections related to terrorist activities over time.'' As a senior member of the Judiciary Committee, I have long been committed to safeguarding and protecting the constitutional rights and civil liberties of all Americans. Indeed, in 2001 I voted against the Patriot Act on the House floor because I was concerned that it did not contain sufficient protections to safeguard civil liberties, after it was rewritten from the bipartisan committee product that had strong civil liberties' protections. I am also a charter member of the Homeland Security Committee, which is charged with the indispenable role of providing direction, guidance, and oversight to the Department of Homeland Security so that it fulfills its mission of keeping the homeland safe. So I am very familiar and sensitive to the inherent tensions between liberty and security. I believe the questions raised by supporters of the Amash/Conyers Amendment about the NSA metadata program are legitimate, particularly the question whether there are sufficient protections for Americans' civil liberties. On the other hand, I am concerned that the amendment would also have the effect of precluding the use of section 501 to obtain an individual order for any business record (not just telephone data) about a person associated with someone who is the subject of an authorized investigation because of the defunding. Madam Chair, striking the appropriate balance between the competing interests of national security and civil liberties requires thoughtful and careful deliberation. I believe that decisions of this scope and moment should be made in the regular legislative process where they are first vetted by the committees of jurisdiction which have the resources and expertise to examine the issues carefully, debate them fully, and to compile a legislative record that will enable the House to render a wise and informed judgment. Because a funds limitation provision on an appropriations bill is poorly suited for this purpose, I do not support the Amash/Conyers Amendment. In contrast, I support and am an original co-sponsor of H.R. 2399, the ``Limiting Internet and Blanket Electronic Review of Telecommunications and Email Act of 2013'' (``LIBERT-E'' Act''), introduced by Congressmen Conyers and Amash and look forward to working with them and Chairman Goodlatte to ensure that this legislation is considered under regular order by the Judiciary Committee. Similarly, I look forward to working with my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee to hold hearings, markup, and report favorably to the House H.R. 2440, the ``FISA Court in the Sunshine Act of 2013,'' bipartisan legislation I introduced last month that will bring much needed transparency without compromising national security to the decisions, orders, and opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or ``FISA Court.'' Specifically, my legislation, which is the House counterpart to bipartisan companion bill introduced in the Senate: requires the Attorney General to disclose each decision, order, or opinion of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), allowing Americans to know how broad of a legal authority the government is claiming under the PATRIOT ACT and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct the surveillance needed to keep Americans safe; addresses national security concerns by providing that if a decision of the FISA Court cannot be declassified without undermining national security interest, then the Attorney General shall disclose a summary of the opinion; provides that if the Attorney General determines that even a summary of opinion would endanger national security interests, the Attorney General shall to provide a report to Congress describing the process to be implemented to declassify FISA Court opinions; and requires the Attorney General to provide an estimate of the number of opinions that will be declassified and the number that are expected to be withheld because of national security concerns. Madam Chair, it is critically important that legislation adopted by the House strike the proper balance between national security interests and protection of civil rights and liberties and the public's right to know. My legislation H.R. 2440, the ``FISA Court in the Sunshine Act of 2013,'' strikes the proper balance. More important, by considering this legislation in regular order instead of during the truncated and expedited proceeding that is a funding limitation amendment to an appropriations bill, the danger of making an incorrect decision can be avoided and the likelihood of reaching an informed and carefully calibrated decision that will enjoy the support of a majority of the Congress and the public will be increased substantially. For these reasons, Madam Chair, I must reluctantly oppose the Amash-Conyers Amendment and urge my colleagues to do likewise.", u" Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred, as follows: By Mr. PAULSEN (for himself, Mr. Lance, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Kline): H.R. 3119. A bill to prohibit enrollment under Health Care Exchange plans until privacy protections are certified as being in place, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. CUMMINGS (for himself and Ms. Schakowsky): H.R. 3120. A bill to improve access to oral health care for vulnerable and underserved populations; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, the Judiciary, Natural Resources, Veterans' Affairs, and Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. ROE of Tennessee (for himself, Mr. Scalise, Mrs. Blackburn, Mrs. Ellmers, Mr. Fleming, Mr. Gosar, Mr. Price of Georgia, Mr. Rokita, Mr. Flores, Mr. Pearce, Mrs. Hartzler, Mr. Walberg, Mr. Culberson, Mr. Wenstrup, Mr. Mulvaney, Mr. Ross, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Palazzo, Mr. LaMalfa, Mr. McKinley, Mr. Stockman, Mr. Bucshon, Mr. Cotton, Mr. Jordan, and Mr. Salmon): H.R. 3121. A bill to repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and related reconciliation provisions, to promote patient-centered health care, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Education and the Workforce, the Judiciary, Natural Resources, House Administration, Appropriations, and Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. BRALEY of Iowa: H.R. 3122. A bill to amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to promote student physical heath and well-being, nutrition, and fitness, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mr. CARSON of Indiana (for himself, Mr. Cartwright, Ms. Edwards, Ms. Lee of California, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Meeks, Ms. Norton, and Mr. Rangel): H.R. 3123. A bill to ensure prompt access to Supplemental Security Income, Social Security disability, and Medicaid benefits for persons released from certain public institutions; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. DANNY K. DAVIS of Illinois: H.R. 3124. A bill to amend part E of title IV of the Social Security Act to extend the adoption incentive payments program to incentive payments for foster child exits to reunification, adoption, and guardianship, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. ENYART: H.R. 3125. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Air Force to make competitive grants to support research and development, education, and training to produce a bio-based aviation fuel for use by the Air Force and to provide an initial infusion of funds for the grant program; to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Appropriations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. FINCHER: H.R. 3126. A bill to amend the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to prohibit a government subsidy for the purchase of a health plan by a Member of Congress; to the Committee on House Administration. By Mr. MAFFEI: H.R. 3127. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a credit to small employers for certain newly hired employees, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Small Business, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Ms. MATSUI: H.R. 3128. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide additional penalties applicable to psychiatric hospitals and units that fail to comply with Medicare discharge planning process requirements; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. MOORE: H.R. 3129. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent the full exclusion applicable to qualified small business stock; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD: H.R. 3130. A bill to establish humane practices for the repatriation of aliens at the border, establish effective standards for the treatment of certain aliens in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Homeland Security, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. SABLAN (for himself, Ms. Gabbard, Ms. Hanabusa, Mr. Ben Ray Lujan of New Mexico, Ms. Bordallo, Mr. Dingell, Mr. Grijalva, Ms. Norton, Mr. David Scott of Georgia, Mr. Conyers, Ms. Speier, Mr. Lewis, Ms. Jackson Lee, Mr. Honda, and Mr. Holt): H.R. 3131. A bill to authorize studies of certain areas for possible inclusion in the National Park System, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Natural Resources. By Mr. TERRY: H.R. 3132. A bill to ensure orderly conduct of Nuclear Regulatory Commission actions; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. ADERHOLT: H. Con. Res. 56. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that a certain lock and dam should be known and designated as the ``Donald G. Waldon Lock and Dam''; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Mr. BECERRA: H. Res. 349. A resolution electing a Member to a certain standing committee of the House of Representatives; considered and agreed to. By Mr. ROKITA: H. Res. 350. A resolution establishing a select committee to investigate and report on the surveillance operations of the National Security Agency; to the Committee on Rules.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Washington.--In the view of America's spy services, the next potential threat from Russia may not come from a nefarious cyberweapon or secrets gleaned from the files of Edward J. Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor now in Moscow. Instead, this menace may come in the form of a seemingly innocuous dome-topped antenna perched atop an electronics- packed building surrounded by a security fence somewhere in the United States. In recent months, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon have been quietly waging a campaign to stop the State Department from allowing Roscosmos, the Russian space agency, to build about half a dozen of these structures, known as monitor stations, on United States soil, several American officials said. They fear that these structures could help Russia spy on the United States and improve the precision of Russian weaponry, the officials said. These monitor stations, the Russians contend, would significantly improve the accuracy and reliability of Moscow's version of the Global Positioning System, the American satellite network that steers guided missiles to their targets and thirsty smartphone users to the nearest Starbucks. ``They don't want to be reliant on the American system and believe that their systems, like GPS, will spawn other industries and applications,'' said a former senior official in the State Department's Office of Space and Advanced Technology. ``They feel as though they are losing a technological edge to us in an important market. Look at everything GPS has done on things like your phone and the movement of planes and ships.'' The Russian effort is part of a larger global race by several countries--including China and European Union nations--to perfect their own global positioning systems and challenge the dominance of the American GPS. For the State Department, permitting Russia to build the stations would help mend the Obama administration's relationship with the government of President Vladimir V. Putin, now at a nadir because of Moscow's granting asylum to Mr. Snowden and its backing of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria. But the C.I.A. and other American spy agencies, as well as the Pentagon, suspect that the monitor stations would give the Russians a foothold on American territory that would sharpen the accuracy of Moscow's satellite-steered weapons. The stations, they believe, could also give the Russians an opening to snoop on the United States within its borders. The squabble is serious enough that administration officials have delayed a final decision until the Russians provide more information and until the American agencies sort out their differences, State Department and White House officials said. Russia's efforts have also stirred concerns on Capitol Hill, where members of the intelligence and armed services committees view Moscow's global positioning network--known as Glonass, for Global Navigation Satellite System--with deep suspicion and are demanding answers from the administration. ``I would like to understand why the United States would be interested in enabling a GPS competitor, like Russian Glonass, when the world's reliance on GPS is a clear advantage to the United States on multiple levels,'' said Representative Mike D. Rogers, Republican of Alabama, the chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee. Mr. Rogers last week asked the Pentagon to provide an assessment of the proposal's impact on national security. The request was made in a letter sent to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, Secretary of State John Kerry and the director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper, Jr. The monitor stations have been a high priority of Mr. Putin for several years as a means to improve Glonass not only to benefit the Russian military and civilian sectors but also to compete globally with GPS. Earlier this year, Russia positioned a station in Brazil, and agreements with Spain, Indonesia and Australia are expected soon, according to Russian news reports. The United States has stations around the world, but none in Russia. Russian and American negotiators last met on April 25 to weigh ``general requirements for possible Glonass monitoring stations in U.S. territory and the scope of planned future discussions,'' said a State Department spokeswoman, Marie Harf, who said no final decision had been made. Ms. Harf and other administration officials declined to provide additional information. The C.I.A. declined to comment. The Russian government offered few details about the program. In a statement, a spokesman for the Russian Embassy in Washington, Yevgeniy Khorishko, said that the stations were deployed ``only to ensure calibration and precision of signals for the Glonass system.'' Mr. Khorishko referred all questions to Roscosmos, which did not respond to a request for comment last week. Although the Cold War is long over, the Russians do not want to rely on the American GPS infrastructure because they remain suspicious of the United States' military capabilities, security analysts say. That is why they have insisted on pressing ahead with their own system despite the high costs. Accepting the dominance of GPS, Russians fear, would give the United States some serious strategic advantages militarily. In Russians' worst fears, analysts said, Americans could potentially manipulate signals and send erroneous information to Russian armed forces. Monitor stations are essential to maintaining the accuracy of a global positioning system, according to Bradford W. Parkinson, a professor emeritus of aeronautics and astronautics at Stanford University, who was the original chief architect of GPS. As a satellite's orbit slowly diverges from its earlier prediction, these small deviations are measured by the reference stations on the ground and sent to a central control station for updating, he said. That prediction is sent to the satellite every 12 hours for subsequent broadcast to users. Having monitor stations all around the earth yields improved accuracy over having them only in one hemisphere. Washington and Moscow have been discussing for nearly a decade how and when to cooperate on civilian satellite-based navigation signals, particularly to ensure that the systems do not interfere with each other. Indeed, many smartphones and other consumer navigation systems sold in the United States today use data from both countries' satellites. In May 2012, Moscow requested that the United States allow the ground-monitoring stations on American soil. American technical and diplomatic officials have met several times to discuss the issue and have asked Russian officials for more information, said Ms. Harf, the State Department spokeswoman. In the meantime, C.I.A. analysts reviewed the proposal and concluded in a classified report this fall that allowing the Russian monitor stations here would raise counterintelligence and other security issues. The State Department does not think that is a strong argument, said an administration official. ``It doesn't see them as a threat.''", u"Mr. President, I rise today with my colleagues, Senator Blunt, Senator Blumenthal, and soon to be joining us Senator Graham, to speak about our Cybersecurity Public Awareness Act of 2013. It is now broadly accepted in this body that the cyber threat posed by criminals, foreign intelligence, and military services, and even terrorists, is enormous and unrelenting. But useful information about cyber attacks and cyber risks still is not consistently available to consumers, to businesses or to policymakers. The legislation the four of us have introduced, the Cybersecurity Public Awareness Act, is an important first step toward fixing this problem. Senator Blunt has earned a reputation for working with colleagues on both sides of the aisle, particularly on issues of national security. I was very glad to have the opportunity to work with him last year as part of a bipartisan group of Senators seeking a sensible middle ground on cyber security legislation. He has brought his keen understanding of national security issues to bear on this important problem, as well as his expertise on public and private collaboration. So I thank the good Senator from Missouri for the opportunity to work together. Likewise, Senator Graham, as my colleagues know, has a long track record of bipartisan legislative accomplishments and a passion for issues of national security. On our Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, where together we are the chair and ranking member, Senator Graham has been a worthy partner in our work to improve America's cyber readiness, including our readiness against economic espionage and trade secret threat. I thank Senator Graham for his continuing leadership and partnership as we introduce this bill to improve public awareness of the cyber threats facing our country. I am pleased also to be joined by my colleague Senator Blumenthal. We were attorneys general together. We serve on the Judiciary Committee together. We are northeasterners together. I know he brings to this Chamber a deep understanding of the tools at the disposal of law enforcement, as well as the challenges of adapting to a swiftly evolving threat. Americans' privacy is routinely violated by criminals who steal credit card information and Social Security numbers or even spy on us through the webcams of our personal computers. Bank accounts and businesses, local governments and individuals have been emptied overnight. Sensitive government networks have been compromised. The networks that run our critical infrastructure, the basics we depend on for heat, for communications, for commerce, have been compromised, raising the prospect of a cyber attack that could bring down a portion of the electric grid or disrupt our financial system. Even our Nation's long-term economic competitiveness is at risk. General Keith Alexander, the head of the National Security Agency and Cyber Command, has said, for example, that the theft of trade secrets through cyber hacks has put us on the losing end of the largest illicit transfer of wealth in history. Yet most Americans are still unaware of the full extent of this threat. Why? Cyber threat information is often classified when it is gathered by the government or is held as proprietary when collected by a company that has been attacked. As a result, Americans are left in the dark about the frequency, extent, and intensity of these attacks. Raising awareness of cyber threats is an important element of Congress's work to improve our Nation's cyber security. The Cybersecurity Public Awareness Act of 2013 takes up that challenge. Building on legislation I previously introduced with Senator John Kyl, it will increase public awareness of the cyber threats against our Nation and do so in a matter that protects classified, business-sensitive, and proprietary information. The bill addresses several different elements of the cyber security awareness gap. It enhances public awareness of attacks on Federal networks by requiring that the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense report to Congress on cyber incidents in the ``.gov'' and ``.mil'' domains. As we work to protect the American people from cyber attacks, we must first understand the nature of attacks on our own systems and what we can do to ensure that those attacks are not successful. The bill tasks the Department of Justice and the FBI to report to Congress on their investigations and prosecutions of cyber intrusions, computer or network compromise, or other forms of illegal hacking. Those reports also must detail the resources they devote to fighting cyber crime and any legal impediments they find that frustrate prosecutions of cyber criminals. It is not enough just to try to stop hackers when they are coming after us; we must also identify and prosecute the people responsible for cyber crimes wherever they may be. In addition, the bill requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to report to Congress on the corporate reporting of cyber risks and cyber incidents in the financial statements of publicly traded companies. The purpose of this requirement is to make sure American businesses are adequately informing their shareholders of any material information shareholders should know relating to cyber security. Last, the bill requires the Department of Homeland Security to report to Congress on the vulnerabilities to cyber threats in each critical infrastructure sector: the electric grid, the gas and oil markets, the banking sector, and others. When it comes to protecting our critical infrastructure from cyber attacks, there is no margin of error. Failure in this area could mean a blackout in a major American city or a serious disruption of the banking system on which our economy depends. That is why we must fully understand the threats to these sectors and do what we can to stop them. These are ways in which the Cybersecurity Public Awareness Act will help to better inform the American people about the nature of the cyber threats we face and help us in Congress make the informed decisions about how to better protect against these threats. We have more work to do to improve our Nation's cyber security, but a key first step is to ensure that members of the public, businesses, shareholders, policymakers, and other cyber security stakeholders have an appropriate awareness of cyber vulnerabilities, threats, and opportunities. I look forward to working with Senator Blunt, with Senator Graham, and with Senator Blumenthal to get this bill passed into law, and I thank them each for their helpful cooperation and their insight. I yield the floor.", u' Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred, as follows: By Mr. LUETKEMEYER: H.R. 4521. A bill to modify exemptions for small creditors and mortgage loan servicers, to require a study of appropriate capital requirements for mortgage servicing assets for nonsystemic banking institutions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. VAN HOLLEN (for himself, Mr. Blumenauer, Ms. Esty, Mr. Himes, Mr. Connolly, Ms. Norton, Ms. Slaughter, and Mr. Langevin): H.R. 4522. A bill to establish the Green Bank to assist in the financing of qualified clean energy projects and qualified energy efficiency projects; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. FARENTHOLD: H.R. 4523. A bill to amend the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 with respect to the identification of high priority corridors on the National Highway System, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Ms. TITUS (for herself and Mr. Moran): H.R. 4524. A bill to amend the Animal Welfare Act to require that covered persons develop and implement emergency contingency plans; to the Committee on Agriculture. By Mr. MORAN (for himself, Mr. Jones, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Ms. Chu, Mr. Schiff, and Mr. Cardenas): H.R. 4525. A bill to amend the Animal Welfare Act to restrict the use of exotic and non-domesticated animals in traveling circuses and exhibitions; to the Committee on Agriculture. By Mr. RUSH (for himself, Mr. Whitfield, and Mr. Johnson of Ohio): H.R. 4526. A bill to require the Secretary of Energy to establish and carry out a comprehensive program to improve education and training for energy-related jobs; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mr. MICHAUD (for himself and Ms. Pingree of Maine): H.R. 4527. A bill to remove a use restriction on land formerly a part of Acadia National Park that was transferred to the town of Tremont, Maine, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Natural Resources. By Mr. LIPINSKI: H.R. 4528. A bill to require a report and briefing to Congress explaining the procurement and inspection process for armored vehicles to transport civilian employees of the Department of Defense; to the Committee on Armed Services. By Mr. PRICE of North Carolina: H.R. 4529. A bill to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to require personal disclosure statements in all third-party communications advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, to require the disclosure of identifying information within paid communications made through the Internet, to apply disclosure requirements to prerecorded telephone calls, and for other purposes; to the Committee on House Administration. By Mr. BURGESS (for himself and Mr. Huelskamp): H.R. 4530. A bill to require the Secretary of State to offer rewards of up to $5,000,000 for information regarding the attacks on the United States diplomatic mission at Benghazi, Libya, that began on September 11, 2012; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. By Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas (for himself, Mr. Brady of Texas, Mr. Paulsen, Mr. Tiberi, Mr. Boustany, Mr. Kelly of Pennsylvania, Mr. Marchant, Mr. Griffin of Arkansas, Ms. Jenkins, Mr. Gerlach, Mrs. Black, Mr. Reichert, Mr. Schock, Mr. Roskam, and Mr. Renacci): H.R. 4531. A bill to prohibit the provision of performance awards to employees of the Internal Revenue Service who owe back taxes; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mrs. BEATTY (for herself and Mr. Stivers): H.R. 4532. A bill to amend the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to specify when bank holding companies may be subject to certain enhanced supervision; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. COOPER (for himself, Mr. Smith of Texas, and Mr. Himes): H.R. 4533. A bill to amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 to provide for the Inspector General of the National Security Agency to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. CRAMER: H.R. 4534. A bill to amend the Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention Act to require background checks before foster care placements are ordered in tribal court proceedings, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Natural Resources. By Mr. McALLISTER: H.R. 4535. A bill to provide for the conveyance of National Forest System land in the State of Louisiana; to the Committee on Agriculture. By Mr. PETERS of California: H.R. 4536. A bill to improve energy savings by the Department of Defense, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. RANGEL: H.R. 4537. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude from gross income amounts received for personal injuries or sickness resulting from service as a qualified public safety employee; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. SENSENBRENNER (for himself, Mr. Larsen of Washington, Mr. Young of Alaska, and Ms. McCollum): H.R. 4538. A bill to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to establish a United States Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. By Mr. AL GREEN of Texas (for himself, Mrs. Christensen, Ms. Lee of California, and Ms. Roybal- Allard): H. Res. 560. A resolution promoting minority health awareness and supporting the goals and ideals of National Minority Health Month in April 2014, which include bringing attention to the health disparities faced by minority populations of the United States, such as American Indians, Alaska Natives, Asian Americans, African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Native Hawaiians or other Pacific Islanders; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. By Mr. HASTINGS of Florida (for himself, Ms. Jenkins, and Ms. Wilson of Florida): H. Res. 561. A resolution marking the 60th anniversary of the United States Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of Education; to the Committee on the Judiciary.', u"Thank you so very much. Mr. Speaker, let me indicate that there are many reasons to be concerned about the rule. I am certainly concerned that we are not able to debate a very important issue dealing with Afghanistan. Having spent almost a decade-plus in dealing with provision 215 under the PATRIOT Act and in helping to construct the Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet Collection, and Online Monitoring Act, it is imperative that we move the USA FREEDOM Act forward. For example, I introduced H.R. 2440, the FISA Court in the Sunshine Act of 2013. Specifically, my bill would require the Attorney General to expose the FISA Court, allowing Americans to know the broad, illegal authority it had, even having an advocate for the American people in sections 402 and 604. This is in the bill. In addition, I strongly support this act because section 301 of the bill continues the prohibition against reverse targeting, which is an amendment that I had in the RESTORE Act; then, of course, it goes forward with ensuring that this megadata--this bulk collection--does not occur. I am grateful that the Jackson Lee-Wilson-Lee amendment that deals with Boko Haram is in this national defense bill because we have to stop the tragedy that is going on, but more importantly, the devastation of Boko Haram. Finally, I would have wanted the amendment that deals with the contracting out of our intelligence services. I believe it is too extensive. I believe that my amendment would have been effective in determining how much we use outside contractors. This is a rule that is, unfortunately, without a lot of point to it. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H. Res. 590, the rule governing debate on H.R. 3361, the ``USA Freedom Act,'' and amendment to H.R. 4435, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year Regarding H.R. 3361, I support the rule and am a co-sponsor of the the underlying bill, the USA Freedom Act, which stands for ``Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection, and Online Monitoring Act.'' The USA Freedom Act is the House's unified response to the unauthorized disclosures and subsequent publication in the media in June 2013 regarding the National Security Agency's collection from Verizon of the phone records of all of its American customers, which was authorized by the FISA Court pursuant to Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Public reaction to the news of this massive and secret data gathering operation was swift and negative. There was justifiable concern on the part of the public and a large percentage of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of this NSA data collection operation, which exceeded by orders of magnitude anything previously authorized or contemplated, may constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy and threat to the civil liberties of American citizens. In response, many Members of Congress, including the Ranking Member Conyers, and Mr. Sensenbrenner, and myself, introduced legislation in response to the disclosures to ensure that the law and the practices of the executive branch reflect the intent of Congress in passing the USA Patriot Act and subsequent amendments. For example, I introduced H.R. 2440, the ``FISA Court in the Sunshine Act of 2013,'' bipartisan legislation, that much needed transparency without compromising national security to the decisions, orders, and opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or ``FISA Court.'' Specifically, my bill would require the Attorney General to disclose each decision, order, or opinion of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), allowing Americans to know how broad of a legal authority the government is claiming under the PATRIOT ACT and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct the surveillance needed to keep Americans safe. I am pleased that these requirements are incorporated in substantial part as Sections 402 and 604 of the USA Freedom Act, which requires the Attorney General to conduct a declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion of the FISA court that includes a significant construction or interpretation of law and to submit a report to Congress within 45 days. Significantly, the USA Freedom Act contains an explicit prohibition on bulk collection of tangible things pursuant to Section 215 authority. Instead, the USA Freedom Act provides that Section 215 may only be used where a specific selection term is provided as the basis for the production of tangible things. Finally, I strongly support the USA Freedom Act because Section 301 of the bill continues the prohibition against ``reverse targeting,'' which became law when an earlier Jackson Lee Amendment was included in H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007. ``Reverse targeting'' is the practice where the government targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to collect information on certain U.S. persons. The Jackson Lee Amendment, codified in Section 301 of the USA Freedom Act, reduces even further any such temptation to resort to reverse targeting by requiring the Administration to obtain a regular, individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the surveillance is a person in the United States. I support the the USA Freedom Act because it will help keep us true to the Bill of Rights and strikes the proper balance between liberty and security. I urge my colleagues to support the rule and the underlying USA Freedom Act. Finally, I am pleased that the rule also makes in order the Jackson Lee-Wilson-Lee Amendment to H.R. 4435, the National Defense Authorization Act for This amendment makes three important contributions to the bill: 1. First, it strongly condemns the ongoing violence and the systematic gross human rights violations against the people of Nigeria carried out by the militant organization Boko Haram, especially the kidnapping of the more than 200 young schoolgirls kidnapped from the Chibok School by Boko Haram; 2. Second, it expresses support for the people of Nigeria who wish to live in a peaceful, economically prosperous, and democratic Nigeria; and 3. Third, it requires that not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment, the Secretary of Defense shall report to Congress on the nature and extent of the crimes against humanity committed by Boko Haram in Nigeria.", u"Mr. President, I believe in markets and I believe in transparency, and that is what I wish to speak about today. I think markets generally are the best allocators of goods and services, but in order for markets to work, people who purchase--consumers--need information. I wish to address one small piece of a very important market today. I serve on the Budget Committee of this body and as such I have had an opportunity to look at not only the current budget but projections of future budgets. I think it is important to emphasize that virtually all the growth--all the growth--in future Federal budgets is attributable to health care--all the growth. It is not Pell grants, it is not national parks, it is not national defense, it is not the National Security Agency; it is all in health care. There are several ways we can control those costs. One way which has been suggested is to simply shift those costs off to other people--to the States, to the elderly, to other citizens--and say it is not the Federal Government's problem; it is someone else's problem. I would suggest that is not the answer. We need to be focused on the issue of health care costs generally, for everyone--for the Federal Government as a consumer, as it is in Medicare and Medicaid, but also for all of us as health care consumers across the country. The standard response around here to growing health care costs is to cut programs, cut recipients, reduce payments to States, or reduce payments to providers. That does nothing about the fundamental issue. I can tell my colleagues that none of these steps has anything to do with reducing the demand for services or the costs of those services. We have to spend the money we have more responsibly. There have been discussions recently about repealing the medical device tax which was passed as part of the Affordable Care Act. The theory, by the way, was that the Affordable Care Act would produce, as it has, millions of new customers for the private insurance industry as well as for all of those who participate in the health care system, including those who manufacture medical devices. The Affordable Care Act has produced new customers. And the theory, as I understand it, because I wasn't here when the bill was originally passed, was the industry--the businesses that will profit by the production of new customers through new people gaining insurance who never had it before--was that part of that would be paid back to support the overall system. That was the idea of the tax on medical devices. I realize the medical device tax is a controversial tax and that strong arguments can be made that it should be modified or reduced. But the repeal of the medical device tax would cost the government $29 billion over the next 10 years. That is money, as we all know, that has to be replaced somewhere else. So I think that is a consideration that has to be taken into account as we discuss this matter which is under consideration as part of the tax extenders package. As I looked into this issue and thought about the medical device industry, I was surprised to find it is very difficult to find out the price of an implantable medical device. One of the reasons is that the hospitals, which are the purchasers of these devices, are often prevented by agreements with the medical device company from revealing the price they pay. In other words, there is no transparency about the prices of these devices which find their way into the cost of everybody's health care. Imagine for a moment going to buy a new car and there is no advertising about the prices of the cars. We couldn't go on the Internet and determine the prices of the cars. We couldn't compare the prices of the cars from one dealer to the other. But we go in and somebody behind a closed door says, OK, the price is $20,200, and we are not allowed to tell anybody the price we are paying for this car, and we have to sign an agreement that we are keeping that price secret. Imagine that system, and imagine for a moment what would happen to the price of cars. I don't think it is gross speculation to assume that the price would go up, because there is no transparency. I have filed amendment No. 3802 to H.R. 3474, which is the tax extenders bill that is pending. It simply says that when a medical device is being sold, the manufacturer cannot impose a secrecy provision on the hospitals that purchase these devices, and they also have to report median prices to the Secretary of Health and Human Services on a regular basis. In 2012, the GAO did a report on Medicare and one of the pieces of the report was titled ``Lack of Price Transparency May Hamper Hospitals' Ability to Be Prudent Purchasers of Implantable Medical Devices''--a long title, but the conclusion is contained in the title: ``may hamper hospitals' ability to be prudent purchasers.'' Well, if hospitals can't be prudent purchasers, we who are paying the bills, quite often through Medicare and Medicaid, are not able to get the best prices. Who pays? All of us pay. This amendment would prohibit medical device manufacturers from requiring hospitals and buyers to sign purchasing agreements that contain confidentiality clauses that would restrict them from revealing the prices paid for medical devices to third parties. In addition, as I mentioned, the amendment would require these manufacturers to submit the average and median sales prices of covered devices to the Secretary of Health and Human Services on a quarterly basis. In 2007, my good friend Senator Grassley from Iowa sponsored a bipartisan bill to create a process of reporting this kind of price data to HHS, and I believe it is time to do just that. To the extent that prices of implantable medical devices, which are very expensive generally, are not disclosed, the ability of hospitals to bring price information to bear in negotiations and decisions is clearly limited. I believe if we are going to talk about repealing a medical device tax, we should also talk about calling upon the industry to provide to consumers and policymakers greater transparency in order to better control costs. In a world of limited resources, we have to spend the money we have most wisely. It is very difficult to spend money wisely if prices and comparative prices and prices of the various components of the health care system are essentially kept secret. This is a simple amendment. It is simply based upon the fundamental idea that markets work, but they only work when consumers--in this case, hospitals--have the information necessary to make good purchasing decisions. I think markets, as I said at the beginning, are the best way to allocate goods and services, but that information is necessary for markets to work, and that is the purpose of this amendment. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all time between now and 12 noon during quorum calls be equally divided.", u"Madam President, I strongly support the bicameral, bipartisan Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, WIOA. This long over-due reauthorization will help Americans to develop the skills necessary to participate in today's global economy. I would be remiss if I did not commend the leaders of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee--especially Senators Harkin, Alexander, Murray, and Isakson--for their hard work on crafting this important jobs bill which will benefit job seekers and their families, employers, and the economy. Their House counterparts--Representatives John Kline, George Miller, Virginia Foxx, and Ruben Hinojosa of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce--also deserve our praise and thanks. Congress passed the Workforce Investment Act, WIA, in 1998. It expired in 2003, but Congress has relied on annual appropriations bills to extend WIA's authorization 1 year at a time. These appropriations bills often have made modest policy changes. Some of the policy changes have been retained in subsequent years but continuity isn't guaranteed. This patchwork approach to improving our workforce education and development system is far from ideal, especially as the labor market changes rapidly in response to the global economy. As our Nation continues the long, arduous climb out of the worst recession since the Great Depression, effective education and workforce development opportunities are vital to sustaining a building and sustaining a vibrant middle class. The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act will allow local workforce investment boards to create a system which prepares workers for the 21st-century labor market and helps employers find the skilled labor needed to compete and create good jobs here in the United States. Let me provide a report on the workforce development progress we have made in Maryland. The Workforce Investment Network for Maryland is comprised of Maryland's 12 workforce investment area/workforce investment boards. The network reports assisting more than 216,000 Marylanders with job placement assessment, job search workshops, resume preparation, and myriad other services from July 2012 to June 2013. Nearly 16,000 job seekers completed job training programs, with several thousand receiving nationally recognized certificates and credentials. Through an aggressive outreach process, the Workforce Investment Network for Maryland engaged more than 7,700 businesses and was able to match nearly 44,000 jobs seekers with employers. In Maryland, our local workforce investment boards know how to respond to the needs of the local community. The field of cyber security is projected to grow by 41 percent over the next 8 years, and jobs in this expanding field pay a median hourly wage of $38 per hour. Maryland is a hotbed of activity in the cyber security field since it is home to the U.S. Cyber Command, the National Security Agency, the Defense Information Systems Agency, the Navy Fleet Cyber Command, and hundreds of Federal contractors and private technology companies. In an effort to address the lack skilled cyber security workers and increase the number of qualified workers in the pipeline, a three-way partnership--the Pathways to Cybersecurity Careers Consortium--was created to bring together the efforts of six workforce development agencies, three community colleges, and the local business community. The partnership, led by Anne Arundel Workforce Development Corporation, was awarded a $4.9 million community-based job training grant to create the Pathways to Cyber Security Program. The grant was intended to assist 1,000 new, dislocated, underemployed, recently separated veterans, and incumbent workers in obtaining cyber security certifications identified as critical industry shortages by regional businesses and government agencies. I am proud to report that nearly 1,150 workers have received training in the program, 755 program participants have received cyber security certifications, and 721 program graduates have been hired by an employer or improved their skills with an existing employer. Some of the graduates of the cyber security programs have begun to work with a number of Federal agencies in my home State. As I have traveled across Maryland, I have seen firsthand the positive effect of effective programs in action. This past March, I had the opportunity to visit students at Chesapeake College's Continuing Education & Workforce Training Culinary Arts Program. The students in the culinary arts program learn the principles of food preparation, obtain a nationally recognized safe food handling certificate, and finish the program ready to enter the workforce in local area hotels and restaurants. Having tasted a number of dishes the students prepared, I can tell you their training is going well. I was impressed by the dedication and enthusiasm of the students. One of them travels more than 2 hours by bus, one way, to attend class each day. I am confident these men and women will continue to hone their skills and enhance their employment prospects. Our Nation's at-risk youth present special challenges we must overcome. Aaron Sierak, a resident of Aberdeen, MD, dropped out of high school during his junior year. After he became discouraged about his future and expressed a desire to change, he learned about the Reconnecting Youth dropout recovery program run by the Harford County Public Schools in partnership with the Susquehanna Workforce Network. The Susquehanna Workforce Network helped Aaron obtain his GED, enroll in Harford Community College, and obtain a Pell grant to help cover the cost of his first year of tuition. Aaron now plans to obtain an associate's degree and registered nursing certification so he can find work in a high-demand--and rewarding--occupation. The Workplace Innovation and Opportunity Act improves upon the existing youth services that helped put Aaron back on a path to economic mobility and a middle-class livelihood. WIOA places a priority on out-of-school youth by requiring that 75 percent of youth services funding at the State and local level be targeted to career pathways for youth, dropout recovery efforts, and education and training programs that lead to the attainment of a high school diploma and a recognized postsecondary credential. The Workplace Innovation and Opportunity Act is bipartisan, bicameral legislation that will improve our workforce development system and help put Americans back to work, preparing workers for the 21st-century workforce and helping businesses find the skilled employees they need to compete and create even more domestic jobs. WIOA creates a streamlined workforce development system by eliminating 15 existing duplicative programs. It applies a single set of outcome metrics to every Federal workforce program under the act. It creates smaller, nimbler, and more strategic State and local workforce development boards. It integrates intake, case management, and reporting systems and strengthens program evaluations. And it eliminates the ``sequence of services.'' Finally, WIOA empowers local boards to tailor services to their region's employment and workforce needs with on-the-job, incumbent worker, and customized training and pay-for-performance contracts. According to the Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, by 2022 the supply of United States workers with postsecondary education--including 6.8 million workers with bachelor's degrees and 4.3 million workers with a postsecondary vocational certificate, some college credits, or an associate's degree--will fall short of the demand for workers with those credentials by 11 million. This mismatch will impede our economic growth and harm our international competitiveness. It also represents a huge lost opportunity for millions of hard-working Americans and their families. To maintain our position as the world's economic leader, we need to educate and train our workers to fill the skilled jobs of the knowledge-based economy. And the workforce development system needs to pivot from short-term crisis intervention to long-term human capital development. WIOA does that, and the substitute amendment the Senate has passed demonstrates that here in Congress, we can come together to work on legislation that will boost the economic recovery and help all Americans.", u" Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred, as follows: By Ms. KELLY of Illinois: H.R. 5093. A bill to direct the Federal Trade Commission to prescribe rules prohibiting the marketing of firearms to children, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. MILLER of Florida: H.R. 5094. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to recoup certain bonuses or awards paid to employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. CICILLINE (for himself and Mr. Rigell): H.R. 5095. A bill to mandate all Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner of the House of Representatives to complete annual ethics training conducted by the Committee on Ethics; to the Committee on House Administration. By Mr. PRICE of North Carolina: H.R. 5096. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to clarify and expand Federal criminal jurisdiction over Federal contractors and employees outside the United States, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. BOUSTANY: H.R. 5097. A bill to direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to allow certain veterans to participate in the Patient-Centered Community Care program; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. DAINES: H.R. 5098. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to temporarily exempt from the employer health insurance mandate certain Medicare and Medicaid providers; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. GRAYSON: H.R. 5099. A bill to amend the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act to remove the National Security Agency from the list of the entities consulted during the development of information systems standards and guidelines; to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. By Mr. PRICE of North Carolina (for himself and Mr. Petri): H.R. 5100. A bill to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to require institutions of higher education to report revenue generated by each sports team, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Ms. HAHN (for herself, Mr. Poe of Texas, Mr. Richmond, Mr. Lowenthal, Mr. Gene Green of Texas, Mr. Nolan, Mr. Rush, and Ms. Fudge): H.R. 5101. A bill to establish a National Freight Network Trust Fund to improve the performance of the national freight network, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. LEWIS: H.R. 5102. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to repeal the requirement for employer disclosure of information on health care coverage of employees who are Medicare beneficiaries, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. ROHRABACHER (for himself and Mr. Ryan of Ohio): H.R. 5103. A bill to impose sanctions on Chinese state- owned enterprises and any person who is a member of the board of directors, an executive officer, or a senior official of a Chinese state-owned enterprise for benefitting from cyber and economic espionage against the United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. ROSS (for himself, Mr. Himes, Mr. Delaney, Mr. Duffy, Mr. Cleaver, and Mrs. Wagner): H.R. 5104. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to carry out a demonstration program to enter into budget-neutral, performance-based contracts for energy and water conservation improvements for multifamily residential units; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. TERRY (for himself, Mrs. Black, Mr. Broun of Georgia, Mr. Lance, Mrs. Ellmers, Mr. Westmoreland, Mr. Graves of Georgia, and Mr. Smith of Nebraska): H.R. 5105. A bill to direct the Attorney General to report to Congress on the numbers of aliens unlawfully present in the United States who appear and fail to appear before immigration judges for proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. THOMPSON of California (for himself, Ms. Bass, Mr. Becerra, Mr. Bera of California, Ms. Brownley of California, Mr. Calvert, Mr. Campbell, Mrs. Capps, Mr. Cardenas, Ms. Chu, Mr. Cook, Mr. Costa, Mrs. Davis of California, Mr. Denham, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Farr, Mr. Garamendi, Ms. Hahn, Mr. Honda, Mr. Huffman, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Issa, Mr. LaMalfa, Ms. Lee of California, Ms. Lofgren, Mr. Lowenthal, Ms. Matsui, Mr. McCarthy of California, Mr. McClintock, Mr. McKeon, Mr. McNerney, Mrs. Negrete McLeod, Mr. Gary G. Miller of California, Mr. George Miller of California, Mrs. Napolitano, Mr. Nunes, Ms. Pelosi, Mr. Peters of California, Mr. Rohrabacher, Ms. Roybal-Allard, Mr. Royce, Mr. Ruiz, Mr. Schiff, Ms. Linda T. Sanchez of California, Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California, Mr. Sherman, Ms. Speier, Mr. Swalwell of California, Mr. Takano, Mr. Valadao, Mr. Vargas, Ms. Waters, and Mr. Waxman): H.R. 5106. A bill to designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 100 Admiral Callaghan Lane in Vallejo, California, as the ``Philmore Graham Post Office Building''; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. By Mr. DEUTCH (for himself, Ms. Edwards, Mr. McGovern, Mr. Larson of Connecticut, Mr. Rangel, Mr. George Miller of California, Ms. Kaptur, Ms. Slaughter, Mr. McDermott, Ms. DeLauro, Ms. Norton, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Ms. Lee of California, Mr. Holt, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Thompson of California, Mr. Honda, Mr. Larsen of Washington, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Ryan of Ohio, Mr. Van Hollen, Ms. Moore, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. Welch, Mr. Nolan, Mr. Ben Ray Lujan of New Mexico, Mr. Schrader, Mr. Tonko, Mr. Cicilline, Ms. DelBene, Ms. Titus, Ms. Brownley of California, Mr. Heck of Washington, Mr. Kilmer, Ms. Michelle Lujan Grisham of New Mexico, Mr. Swalwell of California, Mr. Payne, Ms. Kuster, Mr. Doggett, Mr. Pascrell, Mr. Grayson, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Blumenauer, Mr. Gene Green of Texas, Mr. Fattah, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Huffman, Mr. Himes, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Pocan, Mr. Garamendi, Mr. DeFazio, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Price of North Carolina, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Mr. Brady of Pennsylvania, Mr. Farr, Ms. Clark of Massachusetts, Mr. Israel, Mr. Serrano, Ms. Speier, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Butterfield, Mr. Doyle, Mr. Capuano, Mr. Bishop of New York, Mr. Kennedy, Ms. Gabbard, Ms. Lofgren, Ms. Matsui, Ms. Hahn, Mr. Langevin, Ms. Jackson Lee, Ms. Sewell of Alabama, Mr. Foster, Ms. Pelosi, Mr. Pallone, Mr. Meeks, Ms. Fudge, Mr. Richmond, Mr. Ellison, Ms. Waters, and Mr. Engel): H.J. Res. 119. A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to contributions and expenditures intended to affect elections; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. FATTAH (for himself, Mr. Turner, Mr. McGovern, Mr. Barletta, Mr. Brady of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Gibson): H. Res. 668. A resolution supporting the goals and ideals of the Community Development Block Grant program; to the Committee on Financial Services.", u" The text of the bill is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``NIST Reauthorization Act of (a) Fiscal Year 2014.-- (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Commerce $850,000,000 for the National Institute of Standards and Technology for fiscal year 2014. (2) Specific allocations.--Of the amount authorized by paragraph (1)-- (A) $651,000,000 shall be for scientific and technical research and services laboratory activities; (B) $56,000,000 shall be for the construction and maintenance of facilities; and (C) $143,000,000 shall be for industrial technology services activities, of which $128,000,000 shall be for the Manufacturing Extension Partnership program under sections 25 and 26 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278k and 278l). (b) Fiscal Year 2015.-- (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Commerce $855,800,000 for the National Institute of Standards and Technology for fiscal year 2015. (2) Specific allocations.--Of the amount authorized by paragraph (1)-- (A) $670,500,000 shall be for scientific and technical research and services laboratory activities; (B) $55,300,000 shall be for the construction and maintenance of facilities; and (C) $130,000,000 shall be for industrial technology services activities, of which $130,000,000 shall be for the Manufacturing Extension Partnership program under sections 25 and 26 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278k and 278l). Section 2 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 272) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``authorized to take'' and inserting ``authorized to serve as the President's principal adviser on standards policy pertaining to the Nation's technological competitiveness and innovation ability and to take''; (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``compare standards'' and all that follows through ``Federal Government'' and inserting ``facilitate standards-related information sharing and cooperation between Federal agencies''; and (C) in paragraph (13), by striking ``Federal, State, and local'' and all that follows through ``private sector'' and inserting ``technical standards activities and conformity assessment activities of Federal, State, and local governments with private sector''; and (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (21), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; (B) by redesignating paragraph (22) as paragraph (24); and (C) by inserting after paragraph (21) the following: ``(22) participate in and support scientific and technical conferences; ``(23) perform pre-competitive measurement science and technology research in partnership with institutions of higher education and industry to promote United States industrial competitiveness; and''. Section 10 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking ``15 members'' and inserting ``not fewer than 11 members''; (B) by striking ``at least 10'' and inserting ``at least two-thirds''; and (C) by adding at the end the following: ``The Committee may consult with the National Research Council in making recommendations regarding general policy for the Institute.''; and (2) in subsection (h)(1), by striking ``, including the Program established under section 28,''. Section 15 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278e) is amended-- (1) by striking ``of the Government; and'' and inserting ``of the Government;''; and (2) by striking ``United States Code.'' and inserting ``United States Code; and (i) for the protection of Institute buildings and other plant facilities, equipment, and property, and of employees, associates, visitors, or other persons located therein or associated therewith, notwithstanding any other provision of law.''. The National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 271 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 18, 19, and 19A and inserting the following: Section 23(d) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278i(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``The 3-year programmatic planning document shall also describe how the Director is addressing recommendations from the Visiting Committee on Advanced Technology established under section 10.''. (a) National Academy of Sciences Review.--Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall enter into a contract with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a single, comprehensive review of the Institute's laboratory programs. The review shall-- (1) assess the technical merits and scientific caliber of the research conducted at the laboratories; (2) examine the strengths and weaknesses of the 2010 laboratory reorganization on the Institute's ability to fulfill its mission; (3) evaluate how cross-cutting research and development activities are planned, coordinated, and executed across the laboratories; and (4) assess how the laboratories are engaging industry, including the incorporation of industry need, into the research goals and objectives of the Institute. (b) Additional Assessments.--Section 24 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278j) is amended to read as follows: Section 25 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278k) is amended to read as follows: (a) Enterprise Integration Standardization and Implementation Activities Report.--Section 3 of the Enterprise Integration Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 278g-5) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (c); and (2) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively. (b) TIP Reports.--Section 28 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278n) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (g); and (2) in subsection (k), by striking paragraph (5). Section 8(a) of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3706(a)) is amended by striking ``The total amount of any such grant or cooperative agreement may Section 20(c)(1) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3(c)(1)) is amended by striking ``the National Security Agency,''.", u"Mr. President, today my colleague Senator Leahy, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, introduced legislation that would amend the PATRIOT Act. This new legislation reflects a bicameral and bipartisan compromise that ends the bulk data collection practices currently being used. It also gives our intelligence officials specific rules to follow so they can keep the operational capabilities necessary to protect the United States from a terrorist attack without compromising the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. I thank Senator Leahy for his work, and I am grateful for his partnership. This important step is necessary for restoring Americans' privacy rights which were taken by a well-intended but overreaching Federal Government in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The expanded authority given to the National Security Agency through executive action and the PATRIOT Act was intended to prevent another attack on America. While I was not a Member of Congress on 9/11, I shared the horror all Nevadans felt watching the murder of thousands of innocent Americans, and the profound sadness as buildings in New York and Washington, DC, sat smoldering. I understand as well as anyone here the reason behind the actions our Nation's leaders took to ensure that another attack on America never materialized, and why our leaders felt that no limits should be imposed. No matter what the cost, Americans had to be protected against another attack. Viewing the situation from that lens, it is easy to understand how the Fourth Amendment was brushed aside as the Senate expanded law enforcement surveillance capabilities with just one dissenting vote. The Federal Bureau of Investigation then used section 215 of the PATRIOT Act to expand the scope of surveillance far beyond even what some of the authors believed they were authorizing. The FBI argued that section 215 provided authority to collect phone data of law-abiding citizens without their knowledge. Specifically, they could use the business records provision to force phone companies to turn over millions of telephone calls when there is a reasonable ground or relevance to believe that the information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation of international terrorism. As a result, we now have a bulk collection program in existence where telephone companies hand over millions of records to the NSA as part of a massive pre-collection database. As someone who voted against the PATRIOT Act time and time again, I believe such data collection practices are a massive intrusion of our privacy, which is why I partnered with the senior Senator from Vermont to end these programs. Our legislation tightens the definitions of ``specific selection term'' for section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and FISA pen register trap-and-trace devices so that the information requested is limited to specifically identifying a person, account, address, or a personal device. With this legislation, bulk collection will be eliminated and the records will stay with the telephone companies. The massive information grabs from the Federal Government based on geography or email service will no longer be permissible. And of the information that is collected, the legislation imposes new restrictions on its use and retention. These reforms will help shift the balance of privacy away from the Federal Government and back to the American people. I am proud that this bill also includes the Franken-Heller Surveillance Transparency Act of 2013. I was pleased to join Senator Franken on this legislation because, at the very least, Americans deserve to know the number of people whose information is housed by the NSA. For the first time in American history, the government is forced to disclose to the American people roughly how many of them have had their communications collected. Our provision calls for reports by the Director of National Intelligence detailing the requests for information authorized under the PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act. The reports would specify the total number of people whose information has been collected under these programs and how many people living in the United States have had their information collected. They would also permit the intelligence community to report on how many Americans actually had their information looked at by the NSA or any other intelligence agencies. Furthermore, these provisions would allow telephone and Internet companies to tell consumers basic information regarding FISA court orders they receive and the number of users whose information is turned over. The principles outlined in this bill to increase transparency for Americans and private companies would clear up a tremendous amount of confusion that exists within the programs. And our private companies need the added disclosure. The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation estimates that American cloud computing companies could lose $22 billion to $35 billion in the next 3 years because of concerns about their involvement with surveillance programs. The analytics firm Forrester put potential losses much higher, at $180 billion. I want to be clear: I share the concerns of all Americans that we must protect ourselves against threats to the homeland. I believe terrorism is very real and the United States is the target of those looking to undermine the freedoms we hold as the core of our national identity. If the bulk collection programs in existence were bearing so much information to protect the homeland, it would change my opinion on the need for the USA Freedom Act. However, the bulk collection program has simply not provided the tangible results that justify a privacy intrusion of this level. We know this because on October 2, 2013, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Leahy, asked NSA Director Keith Alexander the following question: At our last hearing, deputy director Inglis stated that there's only really one example of a case where, but for the use of Section 215 bulk phone records collection, terrorist activity was stopped. Was Mr. Inglis right? To which Director Alexander responded: He's right. I believe he said two, Chairman. Congress has authorized the collection of millions of law-abiding citizens' telephone metadata for years and it has only solved two ongoing FBI investigations. Of those two investigations, the NSA has publicly identified one. In fact, that case could have easily been handled by obtaining a warrant and going to the telephone company. It is the case of an individual in San Diego who was convicted of sending $8,500 to Somalia in support of al-Shabaab, the terrorist organization claiming responsibility for the Kenyan mall attack. The American phone records allowed the NSA to determine that a U.S. phone was used to contact an individual associated with this terrorist organization. I am appreciative that the NSA was able to apprehend this individual, but it does not provide overwhelming evidence that this program is necessary. The Obama administration has come to the same conclusion and so has the intelligence community. The operational capabilities the intelligence community relies on to conduct their mission to keep us safe will not be impacted by the USA FREEDOM Act. If it were, the Intelligence Community and the administration would not have brokered this compromise legislation. Ending the bulk collection programs and giving Americans more transparency so they can determine for themselves whether they believe these programs should exist is an obligation we have to all of our constituents. We have a bill introduced today that would give our law enforcement authorities the tools they need to keep us safe and also stay true to the Fourth Amendment. I encourage my colleagues to support these important reforms and I hope it can quickly be considered by this Chamber.", u"Mr. President, somebody asked me a little while ago, shouldn't we be voting on the mishmash on Homeland Security that the House of Representatives sent over because of the immigration matters in it. I reminded them that the Senate in the last Congress voted by a 2-to-1 margin, on a bipartisan comprehensive immigration bill which we sent to the House of Representatives and the Speaker refused to bring the bill up. It probably would have passed. Had it passed, it would have been signed into law and President Obama would not have issued any Executive orders. There would be no need to. We had everything from border security, which Republicans and Democrats voted for, to minors and the DREAMers, which Republicans and Democrats voted for. In fact, we had hundreds of hours of hearings and markups. We had around 140 amendments that were brought up, and I would call for one Republican amendment and one Democratic amendment. We went back and forth day after day, night after night. We did 140 or 141 amendments. All but one of them passed by a bipartisan vote. We then had dozens of amendments on the floor, all of which passed with bipartisan votes. The final bill got 68 votes. We have done the work on immigration. Let's not play games and endanger the needed funding for the Department of Homeland Security at a time when we face all kinds of dangers in this country. Let's not close down Department of Homeland Security on a made-up mission of doing something for immigration. We passed an immigration bill. They could take out the draft of that old bill, vote it up, and vote it down. Sixty-eight Senators, Republicans and Democrats alike, voted for it. Let's bring up something similar. Let's have a real debate. Let's have amendments. Let's go to immigration. Then in the meantime, let's pass the Department of Homeland Security bill. Millions upon millions of taxpayer dollars are being wasted even today as they prepare for a shutdown, not knowing whether these tactics are going to close down the Department, that major part of our government, or not. They have to spend the money. That is money wasted, to say nothing about the job that's not being done. I refer to my speech about Groundhog Day because we have seen this one. Our friends across the way in the Capitol closed down the government before. In just 2 days, unless Congress acts, the doors at the Department of Homeland Security, one of the country's primary national security agencies, will shutter. Unless we act, 30,000 workers will be furloughed without pay. Another 130,000 will be asked to work in defense of our nation's security, without pay. This is another needless, made-in-Washington crisis. We find ourselves here today because of the House's initial failure to act for more than a year and a half on bipartisan legislation that the Senate passed to help fix our broken immigration system. The House's inaction forced the President to do what he could through the executive authorities available to him. Those actions are welcomed. But they are not permanent, legislative fixes. Now, because Republicans in the House are angry that the President acted where they would not, they are threatening the functions of the very agency that helps protect our borders, our airspace, our waterways, and our communities. Every State in this country will be affected by a shutdown of the Department of Homeland Security. In the midst of a fiercely cold winter, when the Northeast has been devastated by life-threatening storms, we put at risk important recovery resources available through FEMA. We put at risk counterterrorism efforts and analysis of critical intelligence, as we continue to mount and improve our national security in the face of unprecedented violent threats from enemies overseas. It is appalling that in the face of reports that terrorists want to target such domestic sites as the Mall of America, some in Congress are playing petty politics with the vital operations of the Department of Homeland Security. A short-term continuing resolution will not solve this problem. A continuing resolution for the Department of Homeland Security recognizes neither the evolving threats to our Nation's security, nor the continuing stresses on our immigration system. A continuing resolution for the Department will tear immigrant families apart, rather than support keeping them together. A continuing resolution will not support an increase of $400 million for the Department. It will freeze FEMA resources at their current levels. And let's remember one key fact that I do not hear these reckless voices in Congress acknowledging: The funding bill we should be considering--the Shaheen-Mikulski bill--already is a compromise bill. It is far from perfect. For example, I strongly oppose the new funding for family detention. Incarcerating women and children fleeing violence runs contrary to our long history as a nation that offers refuge to those most in need. Nonetheless I am prepared to support the bill, because it will help State and local communities with disaster recovery, with law enforcement activities, and will support our national security and counterterrorism efforts. The Shaheen-Mikulski bill is the product of bipartisan negotiations between Republicans and Democrats in both the Senate and the House. But for the President's executive actions in November, it would have been included in the omnibus spending bill that was signed into law last year. Now we are on the brink of a potential shutdown of the Department of Homeland Security. This is a fabricated crisis. The solution is simple. The Senate should approve the Shaheen-Mikulski bill, send it to the House, and end this stalemate. The House should promptly consider the bipartisan, comprehensive immigration legislation approved overwhelmingly by the Senate in 2013. If there is another debate to be had about fixing our immigration system, let's have that debate. But let's stop holding the operations of one of the Nation's key national security agency captive, while asking tens of thousands of hardworking Americans--including more than 2,500 Vermonters--to either work without pay or take an unpaid leave of absence. This is not the way to run a country. Unlike in so many other questions facing our country, the solution to this contrived disaster is easy. Members of Congress just need to have the courage to act. I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Yes. I thank my friend from Kentucky and ask him if he would yield for a question without losing his right to the floor. I want to start out by prefacing this for a few minutes, from my limited experience--just over the past a little over 2 years, and I am on the Intelligence Committee now--by saying there is simply no question that our Nation's intelligence professionals are incredibly dedicated, patriotic men and women who make real sacrifices to keep our country safe and free and, in that, they should be able to do their job, secure in the knowledge that their agencies have the confidence of the American people. And Congress--those of us here--needs to preserve the ability of those agencies to collect information that is truly necessary to guard against real threats to our national security. The Framers of the Constitution, as my colleague from Kentucky knows, declared that government officials had no power--no power--to seize the records of individual Americans without evidence of wrongdoing. And it was so important that they literally enshrined and embedded this principle in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. In my view, the bulk collection of Americans' private telephone records by the NSA in this program clearly violates the spirit--if not the letter--of the intentions of the Framers here. Just 6 months after my first Senate intelligence briefing, former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden leaked documents that exposed the NSA's massive collection of Americans' cell phone and Internet data. And as my friend from Kentucky said, not just a few Americans but literally millions of innocent Americans were caught up in what is effectively a dragnet program. It was made clear to the public that the government had convinced the FISA Court to accept a sweeping reinterpretation of section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which ignited, in my view, a very necessary and long overdue public conversation about the trade-offs made by our government between protecting our Nation and respecting our constitutional liberties. I think well-intentioned leaders had, during the previous decade, come down decidedly on the side of national security with a willingness to sacrifice privacy protections in the process. And what became obvious was that because of our continued lack of knowledge of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, some within our government believed we still needed to collect every scrap of information available in order to ensure that, should we ever need it, we could query this information and track down U.S.-based threats. In doing so, the government ended up collecting billions of call data records, linked in case after case after case not to terrorists but to innocent Americans. Wisconsin Republican Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner, who I served with in the House of Representatives, who was one of the authors of the original underlying legislation--the PATRIOT Act itself--said a couple of years ago: ``The PATRIOT Act never would have passed . . . had there been any inclination at all that it would have authorized bulk collections.'' As this debate increasingly moved to the public sphere, I joined my colleagues on the Select Committee on Intelligence--Senator Wyden, who was just here on the floor a few minutes ago, and former Senator Mark Udall--in pressing the NSA and the Director of National Intelligence for some clear examples in which the bulk information collected under this metadata program, under section 215, was uniquely responsible for the capture of a terrorist or the thwarting of a terrorist plot. They could not provide any--not a single solitary example--nor could they make a case for why the government had to hold the data itself and why for so long. Thankfully, a review panel set up by President Obama agreed with us and recommended that the government end its bulk collection of telephone metadata. I will admit, however--and my friend from Kentucky has brought this up on several occasions already--that I am incredibly disappointed that the President hasn't simply used his existing authority to unilaterally roll back some of the unnecessary blanket metadata collection. Some have claimed this inaction is evidence that the President secretly supports maintaining the current program as is. That, however, is nonsense. The President has asked Congress to give him additional authorities so that he can carry out the program in an effective manner, and the USA Freedom Act seeks to do just that. The Republican-led House of Representatives last week passed that bill--the USA Freedom Act--by a vote of 338 to 88, with large majorities from both parties. At a time when everyone believes we agree on nothing, large majorities of Republicans and Democrats supported that piece of legislation. Further, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that the NSA is violating the law by collecting millions of Americans' phone records is even more proof that we have gone too far and need to recalibrate and, in my view, refocus our efforts. Why on Earth, I would ask, would we extend a law that this court has found to be illegal? Given the overwhelming evidence that the current bulk collection program is not only unnecessary but also illegal, I think we have reached a critical turning point, and I want to thank my colleague from Kentucky for coming to the floor to force us all to have this conversation. We have kicked the can down the road too many times on this particular issue, and I believe it is time to finally end the bulk collection of these phone records and instead focus more narrowly on the records of actual terrorists. Americans value their independence. I know this is especially true in my home State of New Mexico. They cherish their right to privacy that is guaranteed by our Constitution. But some of our colleagues still think it is OK for the government to collect and hold millions of private records from innocent citizens and to search those records at will. The majority leader is asking us to act quickly to reauthorize. I believe it would be a grave mistake to reauthorize the existing PATRIOT Act, and I join my colleagues in blocking any extension of the law that does not include major reforms, including an end to bulk collection. I think we can and we must balance government's need to keep our Nation safe with its sacred duty to protect our constitutionally guaranteed liberties. And I guess this brings me to my question for the Senator from Kentucky. How on Earth can you possibly square what the Fourth Amendment says, in terms of our papers and our ability to control our own effects without a warrant, with the government's bulk collection of phone records of law-abiding American citizens?", u" The text of the amendment, as modified, is as follows: Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Reyes: Page 9, line 21, strike ``$672,812,000'' and insert Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for four years, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the proficiency in foreign languages and, as appropriate, in foreign dialects, of each element of the intelligence community, including-- (1) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency and the level of proficiency required; (2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each element will require during the five-year period beginning on the date of the submission of the report; (3) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by-- (A) military personnel; and (B) civilian personnel; (4) the number of applicants for positions in such element in the preceding fiscal year that indicated foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the proficiency level; (5) the number of persons hired by such element with foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language and proficiency level; (6) the number of personnel of such element currently attending foreign language training, including the provider of such training; (7) a description of the efforts of such element to recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a foreign language; (8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, advanced, and intensive foreign language training; (9) for each foreign language and, as appropriate, dialect of a foreign language-- (A) the number of positions of such element that require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect; (B) the number of personnel of such element that are serving in a position that requires proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; (C) the number of personnel of such element that are serving in a position that does not require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; (D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable; (E) whether the number of personnel at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the requirements of such element; (F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as linguists for such element that are not qualified as linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language Roundtable; (G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists for such element during the preceding calendar year; (H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that discontinued serving such element during the preceding calendar year; (I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by an ally of the United States; and (J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by contractors; (10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; (11) an identification of any critical gaps in foreign language proficiency with respect to such element and recommendations for eliminating such gaps; (12) recommendations for eliminating required reports relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer relevant; and (13) an assessment of the feasibility of employing foreign nationals lawfully present in the United States who have previously worked as translators or interpreters for the Armed Forces or another department or agency of the Federal Government in Iraq or Afghanistan to meet the critical language needs of such element. Page 45, beginning on line 18, strike ``one of the congressional intelligence committees'' and insert ``a committee of Congress with jurisdiction over such program or activity''. Page 46, beginning on line 8, strike ``the congressional intelligence committees'' and insert ``each committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the program or activity that is the subject of the analysis, evaluation, or investigation for which the Director restricts access to information under such paragraph''. Page 46, line 13, strike ``report'' and insert ``statement''. Page 46, line 16, strike ``report'' and insert ``statement''. Page 46, beginning on line 17, strike ``the congressional intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Comptroller General has notice under paragraph (3)'' and insert ``each committee of Congress to which the Director of National Intelligence submits a statement under paragraph (2) any comments on the statement''. Page 46, line 21, strike the closing quotation mark and the final period. Page 46, after line 21, insert the following: ``(c) Confidentiality.--(1) The Comptroller General shall maintain the same level of confidentiality for information made available for an analysis, evaluation, or investigation referred to in subsection (a) as is required of the head of the element of the intelligence community from which such information is obtained. Officers and employees of the Government Accountability Office are subject to the same statutory penalties for unauthorized disclosure or use of such information as officers or employees of the element of the intelligence community that provided the Comptroller General or officers and employees of the Government Accountability Office with access to such information. ``(2) The Comptroller General shall establish procedures to protect from unauthorized disclosure all classified and other sensitive information furnished to the Comptroller General or any representative of the Comptroller General for conducting an analysis, evaluation, or investigation referred to in subsection (a). ``(3) Before initiating an analysis, evaluation, or investigation referred to in subsection (a), the Comptroller General shall provide the Director of National Intelligence and the head of each relevant element of the intelligence community with the name of each officer and employee of the Government Accountability Office who has obtained appropriate security clearance and to whom, upon proper identification, records and information of the element of the intelligence community shall be made available in conducting such analysis, evaluation, or investigation.''. Page 48, line 15, strike ``Biannual'' and insert ``Biennial''. Page 48, line 19, strike ``biannually'' and insert ``biennially''. Page 62, line 14, strike ``NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE'' and insert ``REPORT''. Page 62, beginning on line 18, strike ``National Intelligence Estimate or National Intelligence Assessment'' and insert ``report''. Page 62, strike line 20 and insert the following: ``supply chain and global provision of services to determine whether such supply chain and such services pose''. Page 62, line 21, strike ``counterfeit''. Page 62, line 22, strike ``defective'' and insert ``counterfeit, defective,''. Page 62, line 23, insert ``or services that may be managed, controlled, or manipulated by a foreign government or a criminal organization'' after ``organization''. Page 63, beginning on line 5, strike ``counterfeit''. Page 63, line 6, strike ``defective'' and insert ``counterfeit, defective,''. Page 63, line 8, insert ``or services that may be managed, controlled, or manipulated by a foreign government or a criminal organization'' after ``organization''. Page 63, at the end of line 8 insert the following: ``Such review shall include an examination of the threat posed by State-controlled and State-invested enterprises and the extent to which the actions and activities of such enterprises may be controlled, coerced, or influenced by a foreign government.''. Strike section 353 (Page 67, line 20 and all that follows through line 25 on page 68). Page 69, beginning on line 5, strike ``Federal Bureau of Investigation'' and insert ``Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Secretary of State,''. Insert after section 354 (Page 69, after line 15) the following new sections: Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall submit to Congress a report containing-- (1) a description of the strategy of the Federal Government for balancing the intelligence collection needs of the United States with the interest of the United States in prosecuting terrorist suspects; and (2) a description of the policy of the Federal Government with respect to the questioning, detention, trial, transfer, release, or other disposition of suspected terrorists. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the dissemination of critical counterterrorism information from the intelligence community to local law enforcement agencies, including recommendations for improving the means of communication of such information to local law enforcement agencies. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the intelligence capabilities of State and local law enforcement agencies. Such report shall include-- (1) an assessment of the ability of State and local law enforcement agencies to analyze and fuse intelligence community products with locally gathered information; (2) a description of existing procedures of the intelligence community to share with State and local law enforcement agencies the tactics, techniques, and procedures for intelligence collection, data management, and analysis learned from global counterinsurgency and counterterror operations; (3) a description of current intelligence analysis training provided by elements of the intelligence community to State and local law enforcement agencies; (4) an assessment of the need for a formal intelligence training center to teach State and local law enforcement agencies methods of intelligence collection and analysis; and (5) an assessment of the efficiently of co-locating such an intelligence training center with an existing intelligence community or military intelligence training center. (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to Congress a report containing an analysis of the problem of over-classification of intelligence and ways to address such over-classification, including an analysis of the importance of protecting sources and methods while providing law enforcement and the public with as much access to information as possible. (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall submit to Congress a report summarizing intelligence related to the threat to the United States from weapons that use radiological materials, including highly dispersible substances such as cesium-137. (a) In General.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the following: (1) A description of any information in the possession of the intelligence community with respect to the following events in the Republic of Argentina: (A) The accession to power by the military of the Republic of Argentina in 1976. (B) Violations of human rights committed by officers or agents of the Argentine military and security forces during counterinsurgency or counterterror operations, including by the State Intelligence Secretariat (Secretaria de Inteligencia del Estado), Military Intelligence Detachment 141 (Destacamento de Inteligencia Militar 141 in Cordoba), Military Intelligence Detachment 121 (Destacamento Militar 121 in Rosario), Army Intelligence Battalion 601, the Army Reunion Center (Reunion Central del Ejercito), and the Army First Corps in Buenos Aires. (C) Operation Condor and Argentina's role in cross-border counterinsurgency or counterterror operations with Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, or Uruguay. (2) Information on abductions, torture, disappearances, and executions by security forces and other forms of repression, including the fate of Argentine children born in captivity, that took place at detention centers, including the following: (A) The Argentine Navy Mechanical School (Escuela Mecanica de la Armada). (B) Automotores Orletti. (C) Operaciones Tacticas 18. (D) La Perla. (E) Campo de Mayo. (F) Institutos Militares. (3) An appendix of declassified records reviewed and used for the report submitted under this subsection. (4) A descriptive index of information referred to in paragraph (1) or (2) that is classified, including the identity of each document that is classified, the reason for continuing the classification of such document, and an explanation of how the release of the document would damage the national security interests of the United States. (b) Review of Classified Documents.--Not later than two years after the date on which the report required under subsection (a) is submitted, the Director of National Intelligence shall review information referred to in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) that is classified to determine if any of such information should be declassified. (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency shall submit to Congress a report on the strategy of the National Security Agency with respect to securing networks of the Department of Defense within the intelligence community. Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the feasibility and advisability of creating a national space intelligence office to manage space-related intelligence assets and access to such assets. (a) Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a plan to secure the networks of the intelligence community. Such plan shall include strategies for-- (1) securing the networks of the intelligence community from unauthorized remote access, intrusion, or insider tampering; (2) recruiting, retaining, and training a highly-qualified cybersecurity intelligence community workforce and include-- (A) an assessment of the capabilities of such workforce; (B) an examination of issues of recruiting, retention, and the professional development of such workforce, including the possibility of providing retention bonuses or other forms of compensation; (C) an assessment of the benefits of outreach and training with both private industry and academic institutions with respect to such workforce; and (D) an assessment of the impact of the establishment of the Department of Defense Cyber Command on personnel and authorities of the intelligence community; (3) making the intelligence community workforce and the public aware of cybersecurity best practices and principles; (4) coordinating the intelligence community response to a cybersecurity incident; (5) collaborating with industry and academia to improve cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, the defense industrial base, and financial networks; (6) addressing such other matters as the President considers necessary to secure the cyberinfrastructure of the intelligence community; and (7) reviewing procurement laws and classification issues to determine how to allow for greater information sharing on specific cyber threats and attacks between private industry and the intelligence community. (b) Updates.--Not later than 90 days after the date on which the plan referred to in subsection (a) is submitted to Congress, and every 90 days thereafter until the President submits the certification referred to in subsection (c), the President shall report to Congress on the status of the implementation of such plan and the progress towards the objectives of such plan. (c) Certification.--The President may submit to Congress a certification that the objectives of the plan referred to in subsection (a) have been achieved. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report assessing the threat posed by the missile arsenal of Iran to allies and interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf. (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a study on the best practices of foreign governments (including the intelligence services of such governments) to combat violent domestic extremism. (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a). Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to Congress a report on the best practices or impediments to information sharing in the Federal Bureau of Investigation-New York Police Department Joint Terrorism Task Force, including ways in which the combining of Federal, State, and local law enforcement resources can result in the effective utilization of such resources. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress and the President a report describing the improvements to information technology needed to enable elements of the Federal Government that are not part of the intelligence community to better share information with elements of the intelligence community. Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report in unclassified form describing the future threats to describing the future threats to the national security of the United States from continued and increased dependence of the United States on oil sources from foreign nations. Page 70, strike lines 1 through 7. Page 74, line 16, strike ``includes'' and insert ``means''. Page 75, line 24, strike the closing quotation mark and the final period. Page 75, after line 24, insert the following: ``(D) Terrorist screening purpose.--The term `terrorist screening purpose' means-- ``(i) the collection, analysis, dissemination, and use of terrorist identity information to determine threats to the national security of the United States from a terrorist or terrorism; and ``(ii) the use of such information for risk assessment, inspection, and credentialing.''. Page 86, line 11, strike ``the congressional defense committees'' and insert ``Congress''. Page 87, line 17, strike ``the''. At the end of subtitle E of title III (Page 88, after line 18), add the following new section: (a) Finding.--Congress finds that suspected terrorists have attempted to enter the United States through the international land and maritime border of the United States and Canada. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the intelligence community should devote sufficient resources, including technological and human resources, to identifying and thwarting potential threats at the international land and maritime border of the United States and Canada; and (2) the intelligence community should work closely with the Government of Canada to identify and apprehend suspected terrorists before such terrorists enter the United States. Page 96, line 14, insert after the period the following: ``Nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit a personnel action with respect to the Inspector General otherwise authorized by law, other than transfer or removal.''. At the end of subtitle A of title IV (Page 116, after line 6), add the following new section: The Director of National Intelligence may provide support for any review conducted by a department or agency of the Federal Government of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations or Export Administration Regulations, including a review of technologies and goods on the United States Munitions List and Commerce Control List that may warrant controls that are different or additional to the controls such technologies and goods are subject to at the time of such review. Strike section 411 (Page 116, line 9 and all that follows through line 2 on page 118) and insert the following new section: Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(4)-- (A) by striking ``(4) If'' and inserting ``(4)(A) If''; and (B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) The Director may waive the requirement to submit the statement required under subparagraph (A) within seven days of prohibiting an audit, inspection, or investigation under paragraph (3) if such audit, inspection, or investigation is related to a covert action program. If the Director waives such requirement in accordance with this subparagraph, the Director shall submit the statement required under subparagraph (A) as soon as practicable, along with an explanation of the reasons for delaying the submission of such statement.''; (2) in subsection (d)(1)-- (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) and (F) as subsections (F) and (G), respectively; and (B) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new subparagraph: ``(E) a list of the covert actions for which the Inspector General has not completed an audit within the preceding three-year period;''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(h) Covert Action Defined.--In this section, the term `covert action' has the meaning given the term in section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(e)).''. Strike section 426 (Page 128, line 21 and all that follows through line 15 on page 129). Strike section 427 (Page 129, lines 16 through 25). Strike section 502 (Page 133, line 1 and all that follow through line 10 on page 134). At the end of subtitle A of title V (Page 135, after line 12), add the following new section: (a) Establishment.--There is established a cybersecurity task force (in this section referred to as the ``Task Force''). (b) Membership.-- (1) In general.--The Task Force shall consist of the following members: (A) One member appointed by the Attorney General. (B) One member appointed by the Director of the National Security Agency. (C) One member appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. (D) One member appointed by the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator. (E) One member appointed by the head of any other agency or department that is designated by the Attorney General to appoint a member to the Task Force. (2) Chair.--The member of the Task Force appointed pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) shall serve as the Chair of the Task Force. (c) Study.--The Task Force shall conduct a study of existing tools and provisions of law used by the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to protect the cybersecurity of the United States. (d) Report.-- (1) Initial.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a report containing guidelines or legislative recommendations to improve the capabilities of the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to protect the cybersecurity of the United States. Such report shall include guidelines or legislative recommendations on-- (A) improving the ability of the intelligence community to detect hostile actions and attribute attacks to specific parties; (B) the need for data retention requirements to assist the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies; (C) improving the ability of the intelligence community to anticipate nontraditional targets of foreign intelligence services; and (D) the adequacy of existing criminal statutes to successfully deter cyber attacks, including statutes criminalizing the facilitation of criminal acts, the scope of laws for which a cyber crime constitutes a predicate offense, trespassing statutes, data breach notification requirements, and victim restitution statutes. (2) Subsequent.--Not later than one year after the date on which the initial report is submitted under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for two years, the Task Force shall submit to Congress an update of the report required under paragraph (1). (e) Termination.--The Task Force shall terminate on the date that is 60 days after the date on which the last update The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings will now resume on those amendments printed in House Report 111-419 on which further proceedings were postponed, in the following order: Amendment No. 1, as modified, by Mr. Reyes of Texas. Amendment No. 3 by Mr. Hastings of Florida. Amendment No. 12 by Mr. Schauer of Michigan. The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote after the first vote in this series. The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote on the amendment, as modified, offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote. The Clerk will redesignate the amendment. The Clerk redesignated the amendment. The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.", u"Mr. President, I would like to share some thoughts on the FISA legislation. It is critically important, and we need to pass the Intelligence Committee bill. I will first say, in response to my able colleague from Illinois, that General Hayden's comments in which he indicated three people had been subjected to waterboard torture are something we ought to think about. First, I am glad, as he said and has been repeated, waterboarding was only used three times early on after 9/11 against some of the most dangerous people we have ever dealt with. As a result of the debate and discussion about that, we had an amendment on the floor of the Senate, which Senator Kennedy offered to the Military Commissions Act in 2006, to prohibit waterboarding. It failed 46 to 53. We have a statute that does prohibit torture--Congress passed it overwhelmingly and it was supported by Senators Kennedy, Leahy, Biden, and others--that defined torture as infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering. I am glad we are no longer utilizing waterboarding. I hope we never have to do it again. I just want to say to my colleagues, be careful how you portray the United States around the world. Mr. Goldsmith, who has been quoted here and previously testified before our committee, has written a book. He said this war on terror has been the most lawyered war in the history of the Republic. Lawyers have been involved in everything. Great care has been given to ensure the law was followed. To compare waterboarding of 3 individuals to what was done to American prisoners by the Japanese in World War II is just unthinkable. To date, not a single prisoner whom we have captured in the War on Terror has died, to my knowledge, in American custody--maybe or one or two from some disease, but certainly not from abuse. I just finished reading the book ``Hells Guest'' by Mr. Glenn Frazier from Alabama, a Bataan Death March survivor. About 90 percent of those prisoners died. They starved to death. They were beaten on a regular basis and abused in the most horrible way. To even compare what was done to American soldiers wearing a uniform lawfully being a combatant to what has been done to a few people without any physical or permanent injuries is not fair. It is part of a rhetoric designed for political consumption at home that has embarrassed our country around the world and led decent people around the world to believe our military is out of control and we are systematically abusing and torturing prisoners when it is not so. We ought to be ashamed of ourselves to go on again and again about it. We continue to be confused. Our country faces very real dangers. Terrorists are determined to damage this country. It is not just talk. We know it is true. They have done it before. They have attacked us around the world. They attacked us repeatedly before 9/11, and they desire to destroy our country. Our administration made a decision after 9/11 that we could not treat these kinds of military attacks, designed to destroy our country by organized foreign forces, as normal law enforcement. I was a former Federal prosecutor. In a criminal prosecution, you try to catch people after they have committed the crime. But these acts are so horrible that the nature of them is such that they are acts of warfare and not crimes, and they need to be treated in that fashion. We remain somewhat confused about it. So the old policy meant you would investigate after the crime was committed. It was basically a stated or implicit policy of the Clinton administration. We cannot return to that kind of strategy. One of the most important legal powers and authorities we have to defend America is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It has played a key role in preventing subsequent attacks on U.S. soil for the last 6 years. We are dealing with very real, very imminent threats, and we must continue to assist the fabulous military and intelligence personnel who are working this very moment long hours to protect our Nation. I have visited our National Security Agency and met with the people who gather the intelligence under this act. They love America. These are not people who are trying to harm our country and deny us our liberties. They are sterling individuals who carefully follow the rules we give them. They follow the rules. They say they cannot continue effectively to do their job unless we pass this legislation. They cannot continue to do what they need to do. The terrorists waging war against our country do not fight according to the rules of warfare, international law, moral standards, or basic humanity. They have even, in recent days, apparently used mentally ill women as suicide bombers, setting off bombs that have resulted in the deaths of other people, as well as the poor people who had the bombs strapped to them. So, historically, we have provided the protections of the Geneva Conventions only to those whose conduct falls within the rules of war, those who fight under a flag of a nation, who wear uniforms against other organized military units. However, under a twisted rationale, predicated on the belief by some that we are not fighting a real war, we have given more rights to these individuals, who flatly reject any rule of war, than we have provided to legitimate prisoners of war who have followed the rules of war. We have done that in a number of different instances--it is sort of amazing to me--including providing them with habeas corpus relief to go to Federal court. These are not traditional prisoners of war, but prisoners who are unlawful enemy combatants. So we have endangered, sometimes I really believe, not only our troops, who put themselves in harm's way--and are in harm's way right now--to carry out the policies we gave them, but innocent Americans here at home. We have to keep this threat in the forefront of our minds. These are individuals dead set on the destruction of our country at any cost. There is nothing they will not do. Let me state that the FISA law should be made permanent. It should not merely be extended with another sunset provision. It is a fallacious argument to claim we cannot revisit a law unless there is some sunset when it ends. As Members of this Congress, it is incumbent upon us to continually review legislation we pass to ensure that the laws are accomplishing the goals set forth and that no unintended consequences occur. There is no sound reason to pass critical legislation such as the Protect America Act and slap an expiration date on it. Fighting the war on terror is a long-term enterprise that requires long-term institutional changes. As the Vice President said in a recent speech: The challenge to the country has not expired over the last six months. It won't expire any time soon, and we should not write laws that pretend otherwise. The Intelligence Committee bill is a collaborative, bipartisan compromise that was crafted in consultation with members of the Intelligence Committee, the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Justice, and the intelligence community after months of negotiation and review of highly sensitive information, most of which was classified, secret, about the current surveillance procedures and how they were being used by the Government to obtain critical national security information. We cannot overstress that the committee most intimately involved with this process and the electronic measures being utilized voted their bill out by an overwhelmingly bipartisan 13-to-2 vote. Remember, it has been over 6 years 4 months since the terrible attacks of September 11, and we may be most thankful that not one attack has been carried out on our soil since that day. As we move further from that dreadful day, I fear our memories have begun to fade. Otherwise, there is no sound justification for doing anything other than reauthorizing the Protect America Act, which would allow the intelligence community to simply continue, uninterrupted, their work which has been protecting this Nation and can continue to protect it in the future. After the intelligence Committee passed a bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee, of which I am a member, got involved and produced a partisan bill. We already voted to table the partisan Judiciary substitute, and we debating the bipartisan Intelligence Committee bill. Let me point out, however, something that happened in the Judiciary Committee. The bill produced by the committee was given very little process during one committee meeting where 10 Democratic amendments were accepted along a strict party-line vote, and the bill itself, ultimately, was voted out with only Democratic support. No Republican voted for it. It was a purely partisan bill. Strikingly, the one vote that garnered bipartisan consideration was against an amendment that was offered by Senator Feingold to strip the retroactive liability protections found in section 2 of the Intelligence bill. We had a discussion and vote on whether the liability protections to keep the companies that helped us and responded to Government requests--whether they should be sued for doing so--should be stripped from the bill. We voted in the Judiciary Committee, 12 to 7, to follow the recommendation of the Intelligence Committee bill that they passed 13 to 2, and keep the limited liability protections. So it was a 12-to-7 vote to defeat the Feingold amendment that would have removed those liability protections. Directly after that vote, however--it was curious how it all happened--but directly after that vote, Chairman Leahy moved to report only Title I of the Judiciary substitute bill out of Committee. When that passed, that effectively stripped the liability protection provisions the committee had just voted to keep. The point is that the Democratic-controlled Judiciary Committee, when voting directly on removing retroactive liability, voted 12 to 7 to keep it. But by the time we passed out the Judiciary Committee's version of the bill, we had taken it out. I'm not sure people fully understand how that occurred, but it certainly was an odd thing that it passed out of committee without liability protection, when we specifically voted to keep that language in the overall bill. Now, the main area of disagreement is over this important question that will be coming up, I understand, in the amendment offered by Senator Dodd, amendment No. 3907--and a Specter-Whitehouse amendment that will allow substitution--which will, in effect, allow litigation to continue against telecom companies that responded to the requests of the Attorney General of the United States, certified by the President. So our disagreement is whether we should provide these good corporate citizens who cooperated with a formal written request by the Attorney General of the United States, certified by the duly-elected President of the United States, to provide information for a surveillance program implemented shortly after the attacks on September 11--and at that point in time, we did not know how many terrorist cells there were in the country and what plans they may have had. Now, the nature of the program is highly classified, but after an uproar of complaints, the procedures were studied carefully by Congress, and we reacted by giving approval to the program in passing the Protect America Act overwhelmingly last August. I did not want to be too lighthearted about it, but I remember all the brouhaha that this program was somehow wrong and had to be eliminated, and people made all these unsubstantiated allegations. But after we went in great depth, we found, as Mr. Goldsmith said, that the lawyers have been on top of this since day one. It was a carefully constructed program. A court opinion issues last spring caused us to not be able to continue the way it was being done, and the Intelligence community asked us for legislation so it could continue. The Congress passed the Protect America Act this summer, but it was a short-term bill that lasted only 6 months. All I would want to say is, nobody apologized to President Bush or the Attorney General of the United States or the people at the National Security Agency for all the bad things they said about them. After having studied what they did, we concluded it is constitutional and legal and proper and necessary, and we actually passed a law to authorize it to continue. But still, there have been over 30 lawsuits now filed against telecom providers for their alleged participation in the terrorist surveillance program--30 lawsuits. Analysis of these lawsuits leads only to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are substituting speculation and a fevered brow for fact and are ignoring the dangerous consequences these lawsuits can have on our national security. I do not know who is actually filing these lawsuits. I will just say this, parenthetically: Last October, before the last election, Lancet magazine produced a report--a medical magazine in England--that said 500,000 to 700,000 Iraqis were killed by the American military in Iraq. And ABC, CBS, and our Democratic colleagues all raised cane that, unbelievably, we would kill this many people. After the election was over--and by the way, the guy who wrote the report said he wanted to be sure it came out before the election--we learned some things about it. In a fabulous article in the National Journal, an unbiased magazine, they detailed the fraudulence of that article, and pointed out that even an antiwar group said, at most, it was 50,000, not 500,000 or 700,000. And where did they find out the money for the Lancet article came from? George Soros, and the MoveOn.Org crowd. The ``blame America first'' crowd. Well, I don't know who is actually funding these lawsuits. We ought to ask some questions about it. Certainly there is no indication that anybody's liberties have been impacted adversely. If these suits are allowed to continue, we face a number of problems. The sources and methods relied on by our intelligence community to conduct surveillance are highly classified, and if these lawsuits are allowed to proceed, even allowing for the Government to be substituted for the telecom companies, we run the risk of exposing the things our enemies really want: classified national security information. Make no mistake, if forced to defend themselves against lawsuits brought about because they cooperated with a government request certified to be legal, companies will certainly hesitate or refuse outright to cooperate in the future. Even where substitution by the Government is an option, we would be putting national security decisions in the hands of corporate counsels in the future whose duties--and their first responsibilities--extend to the stockholders of their company, and not the national security. If we ask a company to help us, do we want all the lawyers in that company to say: Wait a minute. The last time we worked with you government we got sued, and we are going to review all of this because some court may hold this--or George Soros may fund some lawsuit and tie us up in court. We don't think we want to help. I think they would naturally take that tack in the future to resist cooperation. During floor debate in December, the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee, our Democratic colleague Senator Rockefeller, said this. This is what he said about the matter: Our collective judgment-- and he is talking about the Intel Committee members-- Our collective judgment on the Intelligence Committee is that the burden of the debate about the President's authority should not fall on the telecommunications companies-- In other words, the debate about whether the President had authority to do this shouldn't fall on the telecommunications counsels-- because they responded to the representations by Government officials at the highest levels that the program had been authorized by the President and determined to be lawful and received requests, compulsions to carry it out. Companies participated at great risk of exposure and financial ruin for one reason, and one reason only: in order to help identify terrorists and prevent follow-on terrorist attacks. They should not be penalized for their willingness to heed the call during a time of national emergency. Senator Rockefeller said that. The ranking member of the Judiciary Committee who favors substitution has stated this, flat out: The telephone companies have acted as good citizens. Certainly they have. In many instances, the Government must seek assistance from the private sector and private individuals to help protect our national security and even local security in our communities. In order for this practice to continue, we must allow them to rely on assurances that the assistance they provide is not only legal but essential to protect our national security without fear that they will have their names dragged through the mud by protracted litigation initiated by the ``blame America first'' crowd which subscribes to wild theories about Government conspiracies to deny people their liberty. They are forgetting the safety of America, and they are ignoring sound legal precedent. Some in this body sincerely believe that liability protection is not needed if these companies did nothing wrong, they say. Well, this is faulty reasoning since either allowing the lawsuits to proceed or substituting the Government will still force them to be a party to lawsuits that run the risk of exposing national security information or doing irreversible financial and reputational damage to companies innocent of any wrongdoing. We are putting these companies in harm's way when they, bound by a sense of patriotism and civic responsibility, participate in a government program that was certified to be legal by the Attorney General of the United States and the President of the United States. If the Government is substituted--in accordance with one of the theories that has been offered--in the place of a particular company, it will most certainly assert the state secrets privilege, leaving, in effect, the company virtually impotent when it comes to mounting a defense and showing what their legitimate actions were. Due to the nature of this state secrets privilege, a company will be forbidden from making their case and will be left without the ability to even confirm or deny their participation in the program. We should applaud the actions of these citizens, not stab them in the back by suing them for their actions. To refresh everyone's memory, the Intelligence Committee, after months of negotiation in highly classified settings, rejected an amendment to strip liability protection from the bill for these companies by a vote of 12 to 3. It then passed the bill out in toto by a bipartisan vote of 13 to 2, protecting these companies from lawsuits. The Judiciary Committee, on the other hand, had one markup after less than 2 weeks of reviewing the Intelligence Committee's legislation, and rejected an amendment specifically that would have denied liability protection by a vote of 12 to 7. So we voted not to allow them to be sued either. Furthermore, the Judiciary Committee rejected an amendment to allow the Government to be substituted for the plaintiffs by a vote of 13 to 5. We rejected substitution too, although the liability protections were ultimately removed from the bill the Judiciary Committee passed. Even if the Government is substituted, plaintiffs in litigation will seek discovery, they will file depositions and ask for interrogatories and motions to produce. They will seek trade secrets and highly classified technologies. Companies would still face many litigation burdens. They would be--we would be subjecting them to harm, not only from consumer backlash, but their international business partners will be pressured around the world. Under the limited liability protections incorporated in the Intel bill, plaintiffs seeking to question the Government will have their day in court as it only protects good corporate citizens from civil suit. So the liability protections in this bill do not preclude lawsuits against the Federal Government from going forward. In fact, there are at least seven lawsuits currently pending against the Government that will proceed against the Government or Government officials. This was accepted by the Intelligence Committee. Some wanted to say you couldn't sue the Government for these activities also, but the Intel Committee reached an agreement, an overwhelmingly bipartisan agreement, that would allow those lawsuits to proceed. The companies that helped the Government did so to help protect us from further attack, and valuable information has been gathered with their help. I have been out to the National Security Agency. I have talked with the people. I know they scrupulously follow the rules we give them, and I know they have gained great, valuable information through this program, and I know they lost very valuable information when the program had to be stopped. This information has saved undoubtedly countless American lives by enabling our intelligence community to thwart attacks. Some have said this amounts to amnesty, but that couldn't be further from the truth. Amnesty is an act of forgiveness for criminal offenses, such as granting citizenship to people who broke the law to come into our country illegally. The companies were operating under a certification of legality in a time of national danger doing what they could as Americans to follow the law and prevent future attacks. At no point during their participation were their actions illegal. For Heaven's sake. To grant liability protection is to adhere to that great Anglo-American legal tradition for hundreds of years that when called upon by a law officer, with apparent legal authority, wearing a uniform, out on the street, a citizen is not to be held legally liable if, in responding to the officer, the officer was wrong. That is all we are talking about. That is a fundamental, historical, legal principle. The only question--the legal question has always been simply this: whether the citizen was responding to a legitimate request by a government law officer, a police officer to chase a bad guy. Was the citizen acting reasonably in believing this was a legitimate law enforcement request and he was helping by being a good citizen. That is the test. If he participated knowingly with somebody acting illegally, then that citizen could be liable. Certainly certification by the Attorney General and the President of the United States in written documents suffices as a legitimate request. The bottom line is, we do not need to pass legislation that panders to the extreme interest groups in America who find fault in everything our people do, our law enforcement and intelligence officers, and that fosters a fundamental mistrust of those officials who are working daily to serve all of us. The burden should not fall on the shoulders of good corporate citizens who are acting patriotically to help save lives and protect our country. I urge my colleagues to vote to support the Intel Committee bill, a carefully crafted, carefully studied, bipartisan bill. I also urge my colleagues to support the liability protections in the Intelligence Committee legislation and a vote against any amendments that attempt to strip these provisions or in any way alter the carefully structured, limited provisions of the bill. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.", u"``statement of exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and ``Sec. 112. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the procedures of chapters 119, 121, and 206 of title 18, United States Code, and this Act shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and the interception of domestic wire, oral, or electronic communications may be conducted. ``(b) Only an express statutory authorization for electronic surveillance or the interception of domestic wire, oral, or electronic communications, other than as an amendment to this Act or chapters 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States Code, shall constitute an additional exclusive means for the purpose of subsection (a).''. (b) Offense.--Section 109(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809(a)) is amended by striking ``authorized by statute'' each place it appears in such section and inserting ``authorized by this Act, chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States Code, or any express statutory authorization that is an additional exclusive means for conducting electronic surveillance under section 112.''; and (c) Conforming Amendments.-- (1) Title 18, united states code.--Section 2511(2)(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(iii) If a certification under subparagraph (ii)(B) for assistance to obtain foreign intelligence information is based on statutory authority, the certification shall identify the specific statutory provision, and shall certify that the statutory requirements have been met.''; and (2) Table of contents.--The table of contents in the first section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 111 the following new item: (a) Inclusion of Certain Orders in Semiannual Reports of Attorney General.--Subsection (a)(5) of section 601 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1871) is amended by striking ``(not including orders)'' and inserting ``, orders,''. (b) Reports by Attorney General on Certain Other Orders.-- Such section 601 is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(c) Submissions to Congress.--The Attorney General shall submit to the committees of Congress referred to in subsection (a)-- ``(1) a copy of any decision, order, or opinion issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that includes significant construction or interpretation of any provision of this Act, and any pleadings, applications, or memoranda of law associated with such decision, order, or opinion, not later than 45 days after such decision, order, or opinion is issued; and ``(2) a copy of any such decision, order, or opinion, and any pleadings, applications, or memoranda of law associated with such decision, order, or opinion, that was issued during the 5-year period ending on the date of the enactment of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and not previously submitted in a report under subsection (a). ``(d) Protection of National Security.--The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, may authorize redactions of materials described in subsection (c) that are provided to the committees of Congress referred to in subsection (a), if such redactions are necessary to protect the national security of the United States and are limited to sensitive sources and methods information or the identities of targets.''. (c) Definitions.--Such section 601, as amended by subsections (a) and (b), is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(e) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) Foreign intelligence surveillance court.--The term `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court' means the court established by section 103(a). ``(2) Foreign intelligence surveillance court of review.-- The term `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review' means the court established by section 103(b).''. Section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking paragraphs (2) and (11); (B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (10) as paragraphs (2) through (9), respectively; (C) in paragraph (5), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, by striking ``detailed''; (D) in paragraph (7), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, by striking ``statement of'' and inserting ``summary statement of''; (E) in paragraph (8), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, by adding ``and'' at the end; and (F) in paragraph (9), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, by striking ``; and'' and inserting a period; (2) by striking subsection (b); (3) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as subsections (b) through (d), respectively; and (4) in paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (3) of this subsection, by striking ``or the Director of National Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence, or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. Section 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking paragraph (1); and (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as paragraphs (1) through (4), respectively; (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``(a)(3)'' and inserting ``(a)(2)''; (3) in subsection (c)(1)-- (A) in subparagraph (D), by adding ``and'' at the end; (B) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a period; and (C) by striking subparagraph (F); (4) by striking subsection (d); (5) by redesignating subsections (e) through (i) as subsections (d) through (h), respectively; (6) by amending subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (5) of this section, to read as follows: ``(e)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the Attorney General may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance if the Attorney General-- ``(A) reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; ``(B) reasonably determines that the factual basis for the issuance of an order under this title to approve such electronic surveillance exists; ``(C) informs, either personally or through a designee, a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 at the time of such authorization that the decision has been made to employ emergency electronic surveillance; and ``(D) makes an application in accordance with this title to a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 as soon as practicable, but not later than 7 days after the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance. ``(2) If the Attorney General authorizes the emergency employment of electronic surveillance under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall require that the minimization procedures required by this title for the issuance of a judicial order be followed. ``(3) In the absence of a judicial order approving such electronic surveillance, the surveillance shall terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the application for the order is denied, or after the expiration of 7 days from the time of authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is earliest. ``(4) A denial of the application made under this subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 103. ``(5) In the event that such application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the electronic surveillance is terminated and no order is issued approving the surveillance, no information obtained or evidence derived from such surveillance shall be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United States person acquired from such surveillance shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. ``(6) The Attorney General shall assess compliance with the requirements of paragraph (5).''; and (7) by adding at the end the following: ``(i) In any case in which the Government makes an application to a judge under this title to conduct electronic surveillance involving communications and the judge grants such application, upon the request of the applicant, the judge shall also authorize the installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices, and direct the disclosure of the information set forth in section 402(d)(2).''. Subsection (i) of section 106 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (8 U.S.C. 1806) is amended by striking ``radio communication'' and inserting ``communication''. (a) Applications.--Section 303 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1823) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking paragraph (2); (B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (9) as paragraphs (2) through (8), respectively; (C) in paragraph (2), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, by striking ``detailed''; and (D) in paragraph (3)(C), as redesignated by subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, by inserting ``or is about to be'' before ``owned''; and (2) in subsection (d)(1)(A), by striking ``or the Director of National Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence, or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (b) Orders.--Section 304 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking paragraph (1); and (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as paragraphs (1) through (4), respectively; and (2) by amending subsection (e) to read as follows: ``(e)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the Attorney General may authorize the emergency employment of a physical search if the Attorney General-- ``(A) reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of a physical search to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such physical search can with due diligence be obtained; ``(B) reasonably determines that the factual basis for issuance of an order under this title to approve such physical search exists; ``(C) informs, either personally or through a designee, a judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court at the time of such authorization that the decision has been made to employ an emergency physical search; and ``(D) makes an application in accordance with this title to a judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as soon as practicable, but not more than 7 days after the Attorney General authorizes such physical search. ``(2) If the Attorney General authorizes the emergency employment of a physical search under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall require that the minimization procedures required by this title for the issuance of a judicial order be followed. ``(3) In the absence of a judicial order approving such physical search, the physical search shall terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the application for the order is denied, or after the expiration of 7 days from the time of authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is earliest. ``(4) A denial of the application made under this subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 103. ``(5)(A) In the event that such application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the physical search is terminated and no order is issued approving the physical search, no information obtained or evidence derived from such physical search shall be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United States person acquired from such physical search shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. ``(B) The Attorney General shall assess compliance with the requirements of subparagraph (A).''. (c) Conforming Amendments.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 304(a)(4), as redesignated by subsection (b) of this section, by striking ``303(a)(7)(E)'' and inserting ``303(a)(6)(E)''; and (2) in section 305(k)(2), by striking ``303(a)(7)'' and inserting ``303(a)(6)''. Section 403 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1843) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``48 hours'' and inserting ``7 days''; and (2) in subsection (c)(1)(C), by striking ``48 hours'' and inserting ``7 days''. (a) Designation of Judges.--Subsection (a) of section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by inserting ``at least'' before ``seven of the United States judicial circuits''. (b) En Banc Authority.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by subsection (a) of this section, is further amended-- (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; and (B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2)(A) The court established under this subsection, on its own initiative or upon the request of the Government in any proceeding or a party under section 501(f) or paragraph (4) or (5) of section 703(h), may hold a hearing or rehearing, en banc, when ordered by a majority of the judges that constitute such court upon a determination that-- ``(i) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or ``(ii) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance. ``(B) Any authority granted by this Act to a judge of the court established under this subsection may be exercised by the court en banc. When exercising such authority, the court en banc shall comply with any requirements of this Act on the exercise of such authority. ``(C) For purposes of this paragraph, the court en banc shall consist of all judges who constitute the court established under this subsection.''. (2) Conforming amendments.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is further amended-- (A) in subsection (a) of section 103, as amended by this subsection, by inserting ``(except when sitting en banc under paragraph (2))'' after ``no judge designated under this subsection''; and (B) in section 302(c) (50 U.S.C. 1822(c)), by inserting ``(except when sitting en banc)'' after ``except that no judge''. (c) Stay or Modification During an Appeal.--Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and (2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection: ``(f)(1) A judge of the court established under subsection (a), the court established under subsection (b) or a judge of that court, or the Supreme Court of the United States or a justice of that court, may, in accordance with the rules of their respective courts, enter a stay of an order or an order modifying an order of the court established under subsection (a) or the court established under subsection (b) entered under any title of this Act, while the court established under subsection (a) conducts a rehearing, while an appeal is pending to the court established under subsection (b), or while a petition of certiorari is pending in the Supreme Court of the United States, or during the pendency of any review by that court. ``(2) The authority described in paragraph (1) shall apply to an order entered under any provision of this Act.''. (d) Authority of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.-- Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803), as amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(i) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to reduce or contravene the inherent authority of the court established by subsection (a) to determine or enforce compliance with an order or a rule of such court or with a procedure approved by such court.''. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (2) Foreign intelligence surveillance court.--The term ``Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court'' means the court established by section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)). (3) President's surveillance program and program.--The terms ``President's Surveillance Program'' and ``Program'' mean the intelligence activity involving communications that was authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007, including the program referred to by the President in a radio address on December 17, 2005 (commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program). (b) Reviews.-- (1) Requirement to conduct.--The Inspectors General of the Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, and any other element of the intelligence community that participated in the President's Surveillance Program shall complete a comprehensive review of, with respect to the oversight authority and responsibility of each such Inspector General-- (A) all of the facts necessary to describe the establishment, implementation, product, and use of the product of the Program; (B) the procedures and substance of, and access to, the legal reviews of the Program; (C) communications with and participation of individuals and entities in the private sector related to the Program; (D) interaction with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and transition to court orders related to the Program; and (E) any other matters identified by any such Inspector General that would enable that Inspector General to complete a review of the Program, with respect to such Department or element. (2) Cooperation and coordination.-- (A) Cooperation.--Each Inspector General required to conduct a review under paragraph (1) shall-- (i) work in conjunction, to the extent practicable, with any other Inspector General required to conduct such a review; and (ii) utilize, to the extent practicable, and not unnecessarily duplicate or delay such reviews or audits that have been completed or are being undertaken by any such Inspector General or by any other office of the Executive Branch related to the Program. (B) Coordination.--The Inspectors General shall designate one of the Inspectors General required to conduct a review under paragraph (1) that is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to coordinate the conduct of the reviews and the preparation of the reports. (c) Reports.-- (1) Preliminary reports.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, and any other Inspector General required to conduct a review under subsection (b)(1) shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an interim report that describes the planned scope of such review. (2) Final report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, and any other Inspector General required to conduct a review under subsection (b)(1) shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the Commission established under section 301(a) a comprehensive report on such reviews that includes any recommendations of any such Inspectors General within the oversight authority and responsibility of any such Inspector General. (3) Form.--A report submitted under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The unclassified report shall not disclose the name or identity of any individual or entity of the private sector that participated in the Program or with whom there was communication about the Program, to the extent that information is classified. (d) Resources.-- (1) Expedited security clearance.--The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the investigation and adjudication of an application by an Inspector General or any appropriate staff of an Inspector General for a security clearance necessary for the conduct of the review under subsection (b)(1) is carried out as expeditiously as possible. (2) Additional personnel for the inspectors general.--An Inspector General required to conduct a review under subsection (b)(1) and submit a report under subsection (c) is authorized to hire such additional personnel as may be necessary to carry out such review and prepare such report in a prompt and timely manner. Personnel authorized to be hired under this paragraph-- (A) shall perform such duties relating to such a review as the relevant Inspector General shall direct; and (B) are in addition to any other personnel authorized by law. (a) Definitions.-- (1) Foreign power.--Subsection (a) of section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(a)) is amended-- (A) in paragraph (5), by striking ``persons; or'' and inserting ``persons;''; (B) in paragraph (6), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(7) an entity not substantially composed of United States persons that is engaged in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.''. (2) Agent of a foreign power.--Subsection (b)(1) of such section 101 is amended-- (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'' at the end; and (B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(D) engages in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or activities in preparation therefor; or''. (3) Foreign intelligence information.--Subsection (e)(1)(B) of such section 101 is amended by striking ``sabotage or international terrorism'' and inserting ``sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction''. (4) Weapon of mass destruction.--Such section 101 is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(p) `Weapon of mass destruction' means-- ``(1) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas device that is intended or has the capability to cause a mass casualty incident; ``(2) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of persons through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; ``(3) any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector (as such terms are defined in section 178 of title 18, United States Code) that is designed, intended, or has the capability of causing death, illness, or serious bodily injury to a significant number of persons; or ``(4) any weapon that is designed, intended, or has the capability of releasing radiation or radioactivity causing death, illness, or serious bodily injury to a significant number of persons.''. (b) Use of Information.-- (1) In general.--Section 106(k)(1)(B) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806(k)(1)(B)) is amended by striking ``sabotage or international terrorism'' and inserting ``sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction''. (2) Physical searches.--Section 305(k)(1)(B) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1825(k)(1)(B)) is amended by striking ``sabotage or international terrorism'' and inserting ``sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction''. (c) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 301(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1821(1)) is amended by inserting ``weapon of mass destruction ,'' after ``person,''. (a) In General.--Section 109 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e) Statute of Limitations.--No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense under this section unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted not later than 10 years after the commission of the offense.''. (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to any offense committed before the date of the enactment of this Act if the statute of limitations applicable to that offense has not run as of such date. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by adding after title VII the following:", u" Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence In this Act: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2009 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2009, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 5959 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (c) Earmarks.-- (1) In general.--Nothing in the classified Schedule of Authorizations, the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 5959 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress, or the classified annex to this Act, shall be construed to authorize or require the expenditure of funds for an earmarked purpose. (2) Earmarked purpose defined.--In this subsection, the term ``earmarked purpose'' means a provision or report language included primarily at the request of a Member, Delegate, Resident Commissioner of the House of Representatives or a Senator providing, authorizing, or recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for a contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or other expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a specific State, locality, or Congressional district, other than through a statutory or administrative formula-driven or competitive award process. (a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2009 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such element. (b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a). (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2009 the sum of $648,842,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2010. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 772 full-time or full- time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2009. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available to the Director of National Intelligence under section 103 are also available to the Director for the adjustment of personnel levels within the Intelligence Community Management Account. (d) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2009 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2010. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2009, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). (a) In General.--Not more than 25 percent of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the National Intelligence Program for covert actions may be obligated or expended until the date on which each member of the congressional intelligence committees has been fully and currently briefed on all authorizations for covert actions in effect on April 24, 2008. (b) Covert Action Defined.--In this section, the term ``covert action'' has the meaning given the term in section 503(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(e)). None of the funds authorized to be appropriated in this Act may be used to implement the program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation requiring the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau after such supervisor serves in a management position for 5 years (commonly known as the ``5 and out'' program). There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2009 the sum of $279,200,000. Subparagraph (A) of section 235(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``receiving compensation under the Senior Intelligence Service pay schedule at the rate'' and inserting ``who is at the Senior Intelligence Service rank''. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h) and section 904(g)(2) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c(g)(2)) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any fiscal year after fiscal year 2008 an officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces may be detailed to the staff of an element of the intelligence community funded through the Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, as jointly agreed to by the Director of National Intelligence and the head of the detailing element (or the designees of such officials), for a period not to exceed 2 years. (a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that the elements of the intelligence community adopt a multi- level security clearance approach in order to enable the intelligence community to make more effective and efficient use of persons proficient in foreign languages or with cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter expertise that is critical to national security.''. (b) Implementation.--The Director of National Intelligence shall issue guidelines to the intelligence community on the implementation of subsection (s) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director''; (2) in paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection, by striking ``may only delegate'' and all that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority in subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the intelligence community.''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such senior officials of such element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''. (b) Submission of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe and submit to the congressional intelligence committees the guidelines referred to in paragraph (2) of section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a). (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506A the following new section: (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the use of personal services contracts across the intelligence community, the impact of such contractors on the intelligence community workforce, plans for conversion of contractor employment into government employment, and the accountability mechanisms that govern the performance of such contractors. (b) Content.-- (1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include-- (A) a description of any relevant regulations or guidance issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community relating to minimum standards required regarding the hiring, training, security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and how those standards may differ from those for government employees performing substantially similar functions; (B) an identification of contracts where the contractor is performing a substantially similar functions to a government employee; (C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings achieved by awarding contracts for the performance of such functions referred to in subparagraph (B) instead of using full-time employees of the elements of the intelligence community to perform such functions; (D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph (2); (E) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the number of personnel working under such contracts, related to the performance of activities described in paragraph (2); (F) a comparison of the compensation of contract employees and government employees performing substantially similar functions; (G) an analysis of the attrition of government personnel for contractor positions that provide substantially similar functions; (H) a description of positions that will be converted from contractor employment to government employment; (I) an analysis of the oversight and accountability mechanisms applicable to personal services contracts awarded for intelligence activities by each element of the intelligence community during fiscal years 2006 and 2007; (J) an analysis of procedures in use in the intelligence community for conducting oversight of contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel; and (K) an identification of best practices for oversight and accountability mechanisms applicable to personal services contracts. (2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are the following: (A) Intelligence collection. (B) Intelligence analysis. (C) Covert actions, including rendition, detention, and interrogation activities. (a) Prohibition on Pay for Performance Until Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the head of an element of the intelligence community may not implement a plan that provides compensation to personnel of that element of the intelligence community based on performance until the date that is 45 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence submits a report for that element under subsection (b). (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on performance-based compensation for each element of the intelligence community, including, with respect to each such element-- (1) a description of a proposed employee advisory group to advise management on the implementation and management of a pay for performance system in that element, including the scope of responsibility of the group and the plan for the element for ensuring diversity in the selection of members of the advisory group; (2) a certification that all managers who will participate in setting performance standards and pay pool administration have been trained on the implementing guidance of the system and the criteria upon which the certification is granted; and (3) a description of an external appeals mechanism for employees who wish to appeal pay decisions to someone outside the management chain of the element employing such employee. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each element to increase diversity within the intelligence community. (b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include specific implementation plans to increase diversity within each element of the intelligence community, including-- (1) specific implementation plans for each such element designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic plan of the Director of National Intelligence on equal employment opportunity and diversity; (2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates; (3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior, midgrade, senior, and management levels; (4) a description of specific diversity awareness training and education programs for senior officials and managers of each such element; and (5) a description of performance metrics to measure the success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs described in paragraphs (1) through (4). (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows: ``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and''. (a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover Intelligence Officers and Agents.-- (1) Disclosure of agent after access to information identifying agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''. (2) Disclosure of agent after access to classified information.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking ``five years'' and inserting ``10 years''. (b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of Intelligence Identities.--The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by inserting ``including an assessment of the need for any modification of this title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert agents,'' after ``measures to protect the identities of covert agents,''. Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head of such element certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods. ``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who shall keep a record of such information. ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''. (a) Report Required.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report on all measures taken by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and by each element, if any, of the intelligence community with relevant responsibilities to comply with the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of division A of Public Law 109-148; 119 Stat. 2739) and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-366; 120 Stat. 2600). (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) A description of the detention or interrogation methods, if any, that have been determined to comply with section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 2739; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd) and section 6 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (120 Stat. 2632; 18 U.S.C. 2441 note) (including the amendments made by such section 6), and, with respect to each such method-- (A) an identification of the official making such determination; and (B) a statement of the basis for such determination. (2) A description of the detention or interrogation methods, if any, the use of which has been discontinued pursuant to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or the Military Commission Act of 2006, and, with respect to each such method-- (A) an identification of the official making the determination to discontinue such method; and (B) a statement of the basis for such determination. (3) A description of any actions that have been taken to implement section 1004 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 2740; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd-1), and, with respect to each such action-- (A) an identification of the official taking such action; and (B) a statement of the basis for such action. (4) Any other matters that the Director considers necessary to fully and currently inform the congressional intelligence committees about the implementation of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. (5) An appendix containing-- (A) all guidelines for the application of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to the detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence community; and (B) all legal justifications of the Department of Justice, including any office thereof, about the meaning or application of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 with respect to the detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence community. (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form. (d) Submission to the Congressional Armed Services Committees.--To the extent that the report required by subsection (a) addresses an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense, that portion of the report, and any associated material that is necessary to make that portion understandable, shall also be submitted by the Director of National Intelligence to the congressional armed services committees. (e) Congressional Armed Services Committee Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional armed services committees'' means-- (1) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the classified annex to this Act is hereby incorporated into this Act and is hereby made a requirement in law. (a) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence Initiatives.--Section 1102(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(1)''; and (2) by striking paragraph (2). (b) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (d); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively. (c) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.-- Section 826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873 note) is repealed. (d) Conforming Amendments.--Section 507(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b(a)(2)) is amended by striking subparagraph (D). (a) National Security Agency.--Subsection (e) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''. (b) Other Elements of the Intelligence Community.-- (1) In general.--The National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 441m) the following new section: Not later than February 1, 2009, the President shall submit to Congress a report on options for creating an advisory panel comprised of representatives of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the private sector to make policy and procedural recommendations for-- (1) information security for the Federal Government; (2) critical infrastructure; (3) the authorities, roles, responsibilities of the intelligence community, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Defense for purposes of supporting the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative as described in National Security Policy Directive 54/Homeland Security Policy Directive 23 entitled ``Cybersecurity Policy'' signed by the President on January 8, 2008; and (4) other matters related to paragraphs (1) through (3) as the President considers appropriate.", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining portion of my time. I am fascinated by my colleagues' arguments on the other side. We did have a Rules Committee hearing on this matter, and there are four members of the Rules Committee on the minority, none of whom raised any of the issues that we have heard here today on the floor; understanding full well that Mr. Flake comes now and says that we should have a special session. I also know that here on the floor I offered to Mr. Flake an opportunity, by unanimous consent, to offer any amendment he may have, and he didn't have an amendment at that time. I assume his argument is that we would need to be in what he says a ``secret session.'' But one thing I do know, being one of the few Members that does serve on the Rules Committee and on the Intelligence Committee, and that is that everyone knew the funding level of the issue that is being discussed. Mr. Flake may not have, but I can assure you that the remaining Members on the Intelligence Committee knew that the mark was included in our draft and the Community Management Account making that minority staff certainly aware at the time between the chairman and Mr. Hoekstra. Now, today more than ever, we must make the creation of a strong and flexible intelligence apparatus one of the highest, highest priorities of this body. The terrorist attacks of September 11, combined with the continuing threat of further attacks, underscore the importance of this legislation. When the American people elected Democrats to the majority, they sent a very clear message that ``business as usual'' is no longer accepted. They said to all of us, Republican and Democrat alike, that there are problems in the way we operate, and we need to change how we do business. We must, in my opinion, congratulate our intelligence community for its successes, but we also must hold them accountable for their failures. Rubber-stamping the administration's every action is not acceptable. Democrats are working every day, as are Republicans, to make America a safer place for all. I genuinely urge my colleagues to support this measure. I heard arguments about the climate change requirements put forward for there to be a national intelligence estimate in that regard. And there are arguments against it. I do not quite understand those arguments. We made it clear that much of the information is collectable by analysts at this time and that it would help prevent future terrorist developments. And the way the argument has been couched on the minority is as if this largest ever intelligence budget, largest in the history of the Congress, is not doing everything that is needed to be done because someone requested that there be a national intelligence estimate with reference to climate change. One day, some people in this body are going to get their head out of the sand and understand that something is changing in this climate of ours, in this world and that we all owe it as much as we can afford to make sure that we pass on a safe environment to all our children. With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the rule. I urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question. The material previously referred to by Mr. Hastings of Washington is as follows: At the end of the resolution, add the following: Sec. 3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this resolution, the amendment printed in section 4 shall be in order as though printed as the last amendment in the report of the Committee on Rules if offered by Representative Wilson of New Mexico or a designee. That amendment shall be debatable for 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent. Sec. 4. The amendment referred to in section 3 is as follows: At the end of the bill, add the following new title: This title may be cited as the ``Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act''. (a) Agent of a Foreign Power.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; or'' and inserting ``;''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) is reasonably expected to possess, control, transmit, or receive foreign intelligence information while such person is in the United States, provided that the official making the certification required by section 104(a)(7) deems such foreign intelligence information to be significant; or''. (b) Electronic Surveillance.--Subsection (f) of such section is amended to read as follows: ``(f) `Electronic surveillance' means-- ``(1) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device for acquiring information by intentionally directing surveillance at a particular known person who is reasonably believed to be in the United States under circumstances in which that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes; or ``(2) the intentional acquisition of the contents of any communication under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, if both the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located within the United States.''. (c) Minimization Procedures.--Subsection (h) of such section is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``importance;'' and inserting ``importance; and''; (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' and inserting ``.''; and (3) by striking paragraph (4). (d) Wire Communication and Surveillance Device.--Subsection (l) of such section is amended to read as follows: ``(l) `Surveillance device' is a device that allows surveillance by the Federal Government, but excludes any device that extracts or analyzes information from data that has already been acquired by the Federal Government by lawful means.''. (e) Contents.--Subsection (n) of such section is amended to read as follows: ``(n) `Contents', when used with respect to a communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.''. (a) In General.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended by striking section 102 and inserting the following: ``AUTHORIZATION FOR ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ``Sec. 102A. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other law, the President, acting through the Attorney General may, for periods of up to one year, authorize the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States if the Attorney General certifies in writing under oath that-- ``(1) the acquisition does not constitute electronic surveillance; ``(2) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign intelligence information from or with the assistance of a wire or electronic communications service provider, custodian, or other person (including any officer, employee, agent, or other specified person of such service provider, custodian, or other person) who has access to wire or electronic communications, either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store such communications; ``(3) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information; and ``(4) the proposed minimization procedures with respect to such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h). ``(b) Specific Place Not Required.--A certification under subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific facilities, places, premises, or property at which the acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be directed. ``(c) Submission of Certification.--The Attorney General shall immediately transmit under seal to the court established under section 103(a) a copy of a certification made under subsection (a). Such certification shall be maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice of the United States and the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, and shall remain sealed unless the certification is necessary to determine the legality of the acquisition under section 102B. ``(d) Minimization Procedures.--An acquisition under this section may be conducted only in accordance with the certification of the Attorney General and the minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall assess compliance with such procedures and shall report such assessments to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate under section 108(a). Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) Applications for a court order under this title are authorized if the President has, by written authorization, empowered the Attorney General to approve applications to the court having jurisdiction under this section, and a judge to whom an application is made may, notwithstanding any other law, grant an order, in conformity with section 105, approving electronic surveillance of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information.''. Section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (6), by striking ``detailed description'' and inserting ``summary description''; (B) in paragraph (7)-- (i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``or officials designated'' and all that follows through ``consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``designated by the President to authorize electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes''; (ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``techniques;'' and inserting ``techniques; and''; (iii) by striking subparagraph (D); and (iv) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (D); (C) in paragraph (8), by striking ``a statement of the means'' and inserting ``a summary statement of the means''; (D) in paragraph (9)-- (i) by striking ``a statement'' and inserting ``a summary statement''; and (ii) by striking ``application;'' and inserting ``application; and''; (E) in paragraph (10), by striking ``thereafter; and'' and inserting ``thereafter.''; and (F) by striking paragraph (11). (2) by striking subsection (b); (3) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as subsections (b) through (d), respectively; and (4) in paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (3), by striking ``or the Director of National Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence, or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. Section 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking paragraph (1); and (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as paragraphs (1) through (4), respectively; (2) in subsection (c)(1)-- (A) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``surveillance;'' and inserting ``surveillance; and''; (B) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``approved; and'' and inserting ``approved.''; and (C) by striking subparagraph (F); (3) by striking subsection (d); (4) by redesignating subsections (e) through (i) as subsections (d) through (h), respectively; (5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (4), by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows: ``(2) Extensions of an order issued under this title may be granted on the same basis as an original order upon an application for an extension and new findings made in the same manner as required for an original order and may be for a period not to exceed one year.''; (6) in subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (4), to read as follows: ``(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the Attorney General may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance if the Attorney General-- ``(1) determines that an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; ``(2) determines that the factual basis for issuance of an order under this title to approve such electronic surveillance exists; ``(3) informs a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 at the time of such authorization that the decision has been made to employ emergency electronic surveillance; and ``(4) makes an application in accordance with this title to a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 as soon as practicable, but not more than 168 hours after the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance. Section 106(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806(i)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``radio communication'' and inserting ``communication''; and (2) by striking ``contents indicates'' and inserting ``contents contain significant foreign intelligence information or indicate''. (a) Electronic Surveillance Under FISA.--Section 108 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1808) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and inserting ``; and''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(D) the authority under which the electronic surveillance is conducted.''; and (2) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following: ``(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General additionally shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on electronic surveillance conducted without a court order.''. (b) Intelligence Activities.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 501 (50 U.S.C. 413)-- (A) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and (B) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection: ``(f) The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the committee for which the person is Chair, may inform-- ``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual members of such committee, and ``(2) any essential staff of such committee, (a) Electronic Surveillance.--Section 105(d) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)), as redesignated by section 606(4), is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) An order issued under this section shall remain in force during the authorized period of surveillance notwithstanding the absence of the target from the United States, unless the Government files a motion to extinguish the order and the court grants the motion.''. (b) Physical Search.--Section 304(d) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) An order issued under this section shall remain in force during the authorized period of surveillance notwithstanding the absence of the target from the United States, unless the Government files a motion to extinguish the order and the court grants the motion.''. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and in addition to the immunities, privileges, and defenses provided by any other provision of law, no action, claim, or proceeding shall lie or be maintained in any court, and no penalty, sanction, or other form of remedy or relief shall be imposed by any court or any other body, against any person for an activity arising from or relating to the provision to an element of the intelligence community of any information (including records or other information pertaining to a customer), facilities, or assistance during the period of time beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, in connection with any alleged communications intelligence program that the Attorney General or a designee of the Attorney General certifies, in a manner consistent with the protection of State secrets, is, was, or would be intended to protect the United States from a terrorist attack. This section shall apply to all actions, claims, or proceedings pending on or after the effective date of this Act. (b) Jurisdiction.--Any action, claim, or proceeding described in subsection (a) that is brought in a State court shall be deemed to arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States and shall be removable pursuant to section 1441 of title 28, United States Code. (c) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (2) Person.--The term ``person'' has the meaning given the term in section 2510(6) of title 18, United States Code. (a) Report.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until December 31, 2012, the Director of the National Security Agency, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on the effectiveness and use of minimization procedures applied to information concerning United States persons acquired during the course of a communications activity conducted by the National Security Agency. (b) Requirements.--A report submitted under subsection (a) shall include-- (1) a description of the implementation, during the course of communications intelligence activities conducted by the National Security Agency, of procedures established to minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of nonpublicly available information concerning United States persons; (2) the number of significant violations, if any, of such minimization procedures during the 18 months following the effective date of this Act; and (3) summary descriptions of such violations. (c) Retention of Information.--Information concerning United States persons shall not be retained solely for the purpose of complying with the reporting requirements of this section. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended-- (1) by adding at the end of title I the following new section: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended-- (1) in section 105(a)(4), as redesignated by section ", u"``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES ``Sec. 105D. (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not later than 7 days after an application is submitted under section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e), the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-- ``(1) in the case of an application-- ``(A) a copy of the application, including the certification made under section 105B(b)(1); and ``(B) a description of the primary purpose of the acquisition for which the application is submitted; and ``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order, including the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E). ``(b) Regular Audits.-- ``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a) the results of such audit, including, for each order authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under section 105B-- ``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such order that were later determined to be located in the United States; ``(B) the number of persons located in the United States whose communications have been acquired under such order; ``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated containing information on a United States person that was collected under such order; and ``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose communications were acquired under such order. ``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a report containing the results of such audit. ``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the previous period. Each report submitted under this section shall include a description of any incidents of non- compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e), including incidents of non-compliance by-- ``(1) an element of the intelligence community with procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(i); ``(2) an element of the intelligence community with minimization procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(ii); ``(3) an element of the intelligence community with guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and ``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance under such order. ``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing the number of emergency authorizations of acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization under such section. ``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' means-- ``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; ``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.''. Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) In any case where the court established under subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any orders related to such matter.''. (a) Authority for Additional Judges.--Section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; (2) in paragraph (1) (as so designated)-- (A) by striking ``11'' and inserting ``15''; and (B) by inserting ``at least'' before ``seven of the United States judicial circuits''; and (3) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (3) and indenting such paragraph, as so designated, two ems from the left margin. (b) Consideration of Emergency Applications.--Such section is further amended by inserting after paragraph (1) (as designated by subsection (a)(1)) the following new paragraph: ``(2) A judge of the court shall make a determination to approve, deny, or modify an application submitted pursuant to section 105(f), section 304(e), or section 403 not later than 24 hours after the receipt of such application by the court.''. (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information. (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.-- Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific statutory authorization shall be the only exception to subsection (a). (a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of communications conducted without a court order on or after September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance Program referred to by the President in a radio address on December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers, and court orders. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report containing the results of such audit, including all documents acquired pursuant to conducting such audit. (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the investigation and adjudication of an application by the Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as possible. (a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track of-- (1) the instances where the identity of a United States person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) that collected the communications to other departments or agencies of the United States; and (2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed. (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created under subsection (a), including the number of instances referred to in paragraph (1). (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated the Department of Justice, for the activities of the Office of the Inspector General, the appropriate elements of the National Security Division, and the National Security Agency such sums as may be necessary to meet the personnel and information technology demands to ensure the timely and efficient processing of-- (1) applications and other submissions to the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)); (2) the audit and reporting requirements under-- (A) section 105D of such Act; and (B) section 10; and (3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements under section 11. (b) Additional Personnel for Preparation and Consideration of Applications for Orders Approving Electronic Surveillance and Physical Search.-- (1) National security division of the department of justice.-- (A) Additional personnel.--The National Security Division of the Department of Justice is hereby authorized such additional personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation, modification, and review of applications under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders under that Act for foreign intelligence purposes. (B) Assignment.--The Attorney General shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among appropriate offices of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the Intelligence Community in preparing applications described in that paragraph and conduct prompt and effective oversight of the activities of such agencies under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders. (2) Director of national intelligence.-- (A) Additional legal and other personnel.--The Director of National Intelligence is hereby authorized such additional legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation of applications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders under that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. (B) Assignment.--The Director of National Intelligence shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))), including the field offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the intelligence community in preparing applications described in that paragraph. (3) Additional legal and other personnel for foreign intelligence surveillance court.--There is hereby authorized for the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) such additional staff personnel as may be necessary to facilitate the prompt and timely consideration by that court of applications under such Act for orders under such Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Personnel authorized by this paragraph shall perform such duties relating to the consideration of such applications as that court shall direct. (4) Supplement not supplant.--The personnel authorized by this section are in addition to any other personnel authorized by law. (a) System Required.--The Attorney General shall, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, develop and implement a secure, classified document management system that permits the prompt preparation, modification, and review by appropriate personnel of the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, and other applicable elements of the United States Government of applications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) before their submission to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. (b) Scope of System.--The document management system required by subsection (a) shall-- (1) permit and facilitate the prompt submittal of applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; and (2) permit and facilitate the prompt transmittal of rulings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to personnel submitting applications described in paragraph (1), and provide for the secure electronic storage and retrieval of all such applications and related matters with the court and for their secure transmission to the National Archives and Records Administration. The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Attorney General-- (1) develop regulations to establish procedures for conducting and seeking approval of electronic surveillance, physical search, and the installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices on an emergency basis, and for preparing and properly submitting and receiving applications and orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; and (2) prescribe related training on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and related legal matters for the personnel of the applicable agencies of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))). As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, but not later than seven days after such date, the President shall fully inform each member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on the following: (1) The Terrorist Surveillance Program of the National Security Agency. (2) Any program in existence from September 11, 2001, until the effective date of this Act that involves, whether in part or in whole, the electronic surveillance of United States persons in the United States for foreign intelligence or other purposes, and which is conducted by any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government, or by any entity at the direction of a department, agency, or other element of the United States Government, without fully complying with the procedures set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) or chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States Code. (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the following new items:``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States persons outside the United States.``Sec. 105B. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States.``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States.``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside of the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States.''. (b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''. (c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America Act of 2007.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public Law 110-55) are hereby repealed. (a) Sunset of New Provisions.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), effective on December 31, 2009-- (A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) are hereby repealed; and (B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D. (2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any authorization or order issued under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization or order. (b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.-- (1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of enactment, whichever is earlier. (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law 110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations, including-- (A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be located in the United States; (B) the number of persons located in the United States whose communications have been acquired under such section; (C) the number of reports disseminated containing information on a United States person that was collected under such section; (D) the number of applications submitted for approval of electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and (E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with an authorization under such section, including incidents of non-compliance by-- (i) an element of the intelligence community with procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section; (ii) an element of the intelligence community with minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of such section; and (iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section. (3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection, the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (a) Authorization Under Section 102.--Section 102(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1802(a)) is amended by striking ``furnishing such aid'' and inserting ``furnishing such aid and shall provide such carrier with a certification stating that the electronic surveillance is authorized under this section and that all requirements of this section have been met''. (b) Authorization Under Section 105.--Section 105(c)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; and'' and inserting ``;''; (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``aid.'' and inserting ``aid; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(E) that the applicant provide such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person with a certification stating that the electronic surveillance is authorized under this section (a) In General.--Section 109 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e) Statute of Limitations.--No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense under this section unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted not later than 10 years after the commission of the offense.''. (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to any offense committed before the date of the enactment of this Act if the statute of limitations applicable to that offense has not run as of such date. Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to prevent lawfully conducted surveillance of or grant any rights to an alien not lawfully permitted to be in or remain in the United States.", u"Mr. President, I am troubled by the FISA bill that has come to the Senate floor. Since I introduced the original FISA legislation over 30 years ago, I have worked to amend the FISA law many times, and I believe that this bill is not faithful to the traditional balance that FISA has struck. This bill gives the executive branch vast new authorities to spy on Americans, without adequate guidance or oversight. Americans deserve better. I voted ``yes'' on the motion to proceed to consideration of this bill because I believe this legislation is too important to hold up any longer. The House has already passed a new FISA bill, and the Senate needs to do the same. But let me be clear, the Senate should reject the bill that we have before us. We need to pass the Judiciary Committee version instead. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is one of our landmark statutes. For nearly three decades, it has regulated Government surveillance in a way that protects both our national security and our civil liberties and prevents the Government from abusing its powers. It is because FISA enhances both security and liberty that it has won such broad support over the years from Presidents, Members of Congress, and the public alike. It is important to remember that before this administration, no administration had ever resisted FISA, much less systematically violated it. When the administration finally came to Congress to amend FISA after its warrantless wiretapping program was exposed, it did so not in the spirit of partnership, but to bully us into obeying its wishes. The Protect America Act was negotiated in secret at the last minute. The administration issued dire threats that failure to enact a bill before the August recess could lead to disaster. Few, if any, knew what the language would actually do. The result of this flawed process was flawed legislation, which virtually everyone now acknowledges must be substantially revised. I commend the members of the Intelligence Committee for their diligent efforts to put together a new bill. They have taken their duties seriously, and they have made some notable improvements over the Protect America Act. But their bill is deeply flawed, and I am strongly opposed to enacting it in its current form. This bill fails to protect Americans' constitutional rights and fundamental freedoms. There are many problems with the bill. It redefines ``electronic surveillance,'' a key term in FISA, in a way that is unnecessary and may have unintended consequences. Court review occurs only after the fact, with no consequences if the court rejects the Government's targeting or minimization procedures. It is not as clear as it should be that FISA and the criminal wiretap law are the sole legal means by which the Government may conduct electronic surveillance. Its sunset provision is December 31, 2013. For legislation as complicated, important, and controversial as this, Congress should reevaluate it much sooner. The bill purports to eliminate the ``reverse targeting'' of Americans, but does not actually contain language to do so. For instance, it has nothing analogous to the House bill's provision on reverse targeting, which prohibits use of the authorities if ``a significant purpose'' is targeting someone in the United States. It does not fully close the loophole left open by the Protect America Act, allowing warrantless interception of purely domestic communications. It does not require an independent review and report on the administration's warrantless eavesdropping program. Only through such a process will we ever learn what happened and achieve accountability and closure on this episode. Add it all up, and the takeaway is clear: This bill is inconsistent with the way FISA was meant to work, and it is inconsistent with the way FISA has always worked. The Judiciary Committee's FISA bill shows that there is a better way. The Judiciary Committee's version is faithful to the traditional FISA balance. It shares the same basic structure, but it addresses all of the problems I listed above. The Judiciary bill was negotiated in public, which allowed outside groups and experts to give critical feedback. It was also negotiated later in time than the Intelligence bill, meaning we had the benefit of reviewing their work. Like the Intelligence Committee's bill, the Judiciary Committee's version also gives the executive branch greater authority to conduct electronic surveillance than it has ever had before. Make no mistake, it too is a major grant of power to the intelligence community. But unlike the Intelligence Committee's bill, the Judiciary Committee's version sets some reasonable limits that protect innocent Americans from being spied on by their Government without any justification whatever. No one should lose sight of how important title I of FISA is. The rules governing electronic surveillance affect every American. They are the only thing that stands between the freedom of Americans to make a phone call, send an e-mail, and search the Internet, and the ability of the Government to listen in on that call, read that e-mail, review that Google search. In our ``information age,'' title I of FISA provides Americans a fundamental bulwark against Government tyranny and abuse. If we enact the title I that is now before us, we will undermine that bulwark. Unfortunately, the exact same thing would be true if we enact the Intelligence Committee's title II. The Nation was shocked to learn earlier this month that the CIA had destroyed videotapes showing employees using severe interrogation techniques. The willful destruction of these tapes by the CIA obviously raises serious questions involving obstruction of justice. But this is not the only coverup that the administration has been involved in lately. President Bush has been demanding that Congress grant retroactive immunity to telecommunications companies that cooperated with the administration's illegal surveillance program. He wants us to pretend that this whole episode never happened. I oppose granting any form of retroactive immunity to these companies, and I urge my colleagues to support the amendment to strike title II from the FISA bill. Amnesty for telecommunication companies may help the administration conceal its illegal spying, but it will not serve our national security, and it will further undermine the rule of law. Let's not forget why we are even talking about this issue. At some point in 2001, the Bush administration began a massive program of warrantless spying. New reports suggest that the administration began its warrantless spying even before 9/11. The administration never told Congress what it was doing. In clear violation of the FISA law and in complete disdain for the fourth amendment, it also never told the FISA Court what it was doing. Because the Bush administration secretly ignored the law, we still do not know how deeply this program invaded the privacy of millions of innocent Americans. The push for immunity by this administration is a push to avoid all accountability for a wiretapping program that was a massive violation of the law. FISA has been in force for 29 years. It was designed from the beginning to allow flexibility in pursuing our enemies. It was enacted with strong bipartisan support in 1978, and it has been amended on a bipartisan basis some 30 times since then. It has enhanced Americans' security and safeguarded our liberty. Every previous administration has complied with FISA. But the Bush administration apparently decided that FISA was an inconvenience. With the help of certain phone companies, it secretly spied on Americans for years, without any court orders or oversight. There is still a great deal we don't know about this secret spying, but what we do know is alarming. Numerous reports indicate that it covered not only international communications, but also Americans' purely local calls with their friends, neighbors, and loved ones. A lawsuit in California has produced evidence that at the Government's request, AT&T installed a supercomputer in a San Francisco facility that copied every communication by its customers, and turned them over to the National Security Agency. Think about that. The National Security Agency of the Bush administration may have been intercepting the phone calls and e-mails of millions of ordinary Americans for years. The surveillance was so flagrantly illegal that even lawyers in the administration tried to fight it. Nearly 30 Justice Department employees threatened to resign over it. The head of the Office of Legal Counsel, Jack Goldsmith, testified that it was ``the biggest legal mess I had ever encountered.'' Mr. Goldsmith himself acknowledged that ``top officials in the administration dealt with FISA the way they dealt with other laws they didn't like: they blew through them in secret based on flimsy legal opinions that they guarded closely so no one could question the legal basis of the operations.'' Think about that as well. The President's own head of the Office of . Legal Counsel states that the administration's policy has been to ``blow through'' laws it doesn't like, in secret, so that its actions cannot be challenged. The Bush White House has repeatedly failed to understand that our Government is a government of laws, and not of men. The administration's secret spying program has taken a heavy toll on our country. Its failure to follow the law has made it more difficult for prosecutors to put terrorists behind bars; for intelligence professionals to avoid civil and criminal lawsuits; and for the public to trust its Government. In the name of making us safer, the administration's reckless disregard for the law has made us less safe, and countless Americans fear their rights have been endangered. That sorry record demands accountability, not immunity. Here is another fact that no one should lose sight of. From the very beginning, telecommunications companies have always had immunity under FISA when they comply with lawful surveillance requests. In fact, the Senate Judiciary Committee worked closely with AT&T, and the company played a major role in drafting FISA's immunity provisions in the 1970s. To be completely protected from any liability whatever, all a company needs under FISA is a court order or an appropriate certification from the Attorney General. That is it. Just get one of those two documents, and you are off the hook. So in this debate, let us be clear that we are not talking about protecting companies that complied with lawful surveillance requests. We are talking about protecting companies that complied with surveillance requests that they knew were illegal. Immunity for the phone companies would be bad policy on many levels. First, it is premature even to be talking about this subject. Even though the President is demanding immunity for companies that may have broken the law, he will not tell all Members of Congress which companies broke the law, how they broke the law, or why they broke the law. He is asking us to legislate in the dark. Immunity for the telecoms for warrantless wiretapping violates the basic structure and purpose of FISA. The industry helped draft FISA, and they perform a major role under it. Here is how this system was explained in the House Intelligence Committee report on the original legislation: Requiring the court order or certification to be presented [to the carrier] before the assistance is rendered serves two purposes. It places an additional obstacle in the path of unauthorized surveillance activity, and, coupled with the provision relieving the third party from liability if the order or certification is complied with, it provides full protection to such third parties. If phone companies can ignore these requirements, this system of checks and balances collapses. That is exactly what happened here. The telecoms are supposed to provide an essential safeguard for protecting Americans' private information. Because Congress and the courts usually don't know about wiretapping activities, this role of the telecoms is crucial. Immunity for the telecoms undermines the basic design of our surveillance laws. Instead of undermining those laws, we should apply them in a court of law to discover and punish illegal activities. The administration has used the scare tactic of claiming that lawsuits will jeopardize national security by leaking sensitive information. That argument ignores the fact that the media have already exposed the existence of its warrantless surveillance program and the role of some telecoms in assisting this program. In addition, it would be foolish to assume that the terrorists don't already know that we are trying to intercept their phone calls and e-mails. The administration's argument also ignores the numerous safeguards used by courts to protect sensitive information. No one is advocating that the NSA disclose its specific methods or targets in open court. Even if someone did seek such disclosure, the Federal courts have procedures that have protected Government secrets for generations. The administration has also suggested that allowing these lawsuits to proceed might jeopardize national security by deterring phone companies from future cooperation with surveillance requests. This too is sheer nonsense. Under FISA, companies already have absolute immunity for any lawful cooperation. Future companies will be deterred only from cooperating with illegal surveillance requests, which is the whole point of the law. We do not want this shameful episode to happen again. The phone companies will suffer only the same harm that befalls any company that violates the law. The administration contends that the telecoms may be bankrupted if the lawsuits continue. In other words, the administration is telling us these companies may have engaged in lawbreaking on a scale so massive they could not afford the penalty if they are brought to justice. But massive law breaking is an argument against immunity, not for it. If the concern is the companies' financial health, the answer is not to throw out the rule of law but to legislate reasonable remedies, such as damage caps. Immunity for the telecoms would also violate basic principles of fairness and justice. The administration repeatedly claims immunity is ``a matter of basic fairness'' because the companies were doing their patriotic duty. That is a strange conception of fairness. Telecom companies have clear duties under the law. They also have highly sophisticated lawyers who deal with these issues all the time. If a company violated its clear duties and conducted illegal spying, fairness demands it face the consequences. It is precisely because fairness and justice are so important to the American system of government that we ask an independent branch--the judiciary--to resolve such legal disputes. There is nothing fair or just about Congress stepping into ongoing lawsuits to decree victory for one side and deny injured parties their day in court. Frankly--frankly--the whole ``patriotic duty'' argument we have been hearing from the White House is hard to take seriously. If the allegations against the telecoms are true, then we are not talking about ambiguous points of law. As a Federal judge remarked in one of the leading cases: AT&T cannot seriously contend that a reasonable entity in its position could have believed that the alleged domestic dragnet was legal. We are not talking about what happened in the frantic weeks and months immediately following 9/11. We are talking about alleged violations of Americans' rights that went on for 5 years--5 years--in total secrecy, on a scale that has never been approached in our history. If the telecoms had followed the law instead of the Bush administration, the administration could have come to Congress and obtained any needed changes in the law. In a democracy, it is the job of the legislature to amend laws to fit new circumstances. It is not the job of the legislature to rubberstamp illegal conduct by the Executive. Some of the telecoms might have been doing what they thought was good for the country. Some of them might simply have been doing what they thought would preserve their lucrative Government contracts. We simply do not know. But either way, it is not the role of the telecommunications companies to decide which laws to follow and which to ignore. FISA is a law that was carefully developed over many years to give the executive branch the flexibility it needs, while protecting the rights of Americans. It is the companies' legal duty--and their patriotic duty--to follow that law. Nothing could be more dangerous for Americans' privacy and liberty than to weaken that law, which is precisely what retroactive immunity is meant to do. Yesterday's newspapers disclosed that in December of 2000, the National Security Agency sent the Bush administration a report asserting that the Agency must become a ``powerful, permanent presence'' on America's communications network--a ``powerful, permanent presence'' on America's communications network. Under this administration, that is exactly what the NSA has become. If the phone companies simply do the NSA's bidding in violation of the law, they create a world in which Americans can never feel confident that their e-mails and phone calls are not being tapped by the Government. Finally, amnesty would stamp a congressional seal of approval on the administration's warrantless spying. If Congress immunizes the telecoms for past violations of the law, it will send the message Congress approves what the administration did. We would be aiding and abetting the President in his illegal actions, his contempt for the rule of law, and his attempt to hide his lawbreaking from the American people. Voting for amnesty would be a vote for silence, secrecy, and illegality. There would be no accountability, no justice, no lessons learned. The damage will not stop there. The telecommunications companies are not the only private entity enlisted by this administration in its lawbreaking. Think about Blackwater and its brutal actions in Iraq, or the airlines that have flown CIA captives to be tortured in foreign countries. These companies may also be summoned to court one day to justify their actions. When that day comes, the administration may call yet again for retroactive immunity, claiming the companies were only doing their patriotic duty as ``partners'' in fighting terrorism. The debate we are having now about telecom amnesty is not likely to be the last round in the administration's attempt to immunize its private partners. It is only the opening round. In America, we should be striving to make more entities subject to the rule of law, not fewer. Giving in to the administration now will start us down a path to a very dark place. Think about what we have been hearing from the White House in this debate. The President has said American lives will be sacrificed if Congress does not change FISA. But he has also said he will veto any FISA bill that does not grant retroactive immunity--no immunity, no FISA bill. So if we take the President at his word, he is willing to let Americans die to protect the phone companies. The President's insistence on immunity as a precondition for any FISA reform is yet another example of disrespect for honest dialog and the rule of law. It is painfully clear what the President's request for retroactive immunity is about. It is a self-serving attempt to avoid legal and political accountability and keep the American people in the dark about this whole shameful episode. Similar to the CIA's destruction of videotapes showing potentially criminal conduct, it is a desperate attempt to erase the past. The Senate should see this request for what it is and reject it. We should pass this amendment to strike title II from the FISA bill. Our focus should be on protecting national security, our fundamental liberties, and the rule of law, not protecting phone companies that knew they were breaking the law. I am second to no one in wanting to make sure our intelligence agencies have all the flexibility and authority they need to pursue the terrorists. We need to pass a FISA bill that will keep America strong and protect our liberty. The bill reported by the Judiciary Committee will do that.", u"OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS ``Sec. 105E. The contents of communications collected under section 105B or section 105C, and intelligence reports based on such contents, shall not be disclosed or disseminated with information that identifies a United States person unless an officer or employee of the Federal Government whose rate of basic pay is not less than the minimum rate payable under section 5382 of title 5, United States Code (relating to rates of pay for the Senior Executive Service) determines that the identity of the United States person is necessary to-- ``(1) understand the foreign intelligence collected under section 105B or 105C or assess the importance of such intelligence; and ``(2) protect the national security of the United States, the citizens, employees, or officers of the United States, or the members of the United States Armed Forces.''. Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) In any case where the court established under subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any orders related to such matter.''. (a) Authority for Additional Judges.--Section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; (2) in paragraph (1) (as so designated)-- (A) by striking ``11'' and inserting ``15''; and (B) by inserting ``at least'' before ``seven of the United States judicial circuits''; and (3) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (3) and indenting such paragraph, as so designated two ems from the left margin. (b) Consideration of Emergency Applications.--Such section is further amended by inserting after paragraph (1) (as designated by subsection (a)(1)) the following new paragraph: ``(2) A judge of the court shall make a determination to approve, deny, or modify an application submitted pursuant to section 105(f), section 304(e), or section 403 not later than 24 hours after the receipt of such application by the court.''. (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information. (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.-- Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific statutory authorization shall be the only exception to subsection (a). Sections 111, 309, and 404 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811, 1829, and 1844) are amended by striking ``Congress'' and inserting ``Congress or an authorization for the use of military force described in section 2(c)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541(c)(2)) if such authorization contains a specific authorization for foreign intelligence collection under this section, or if the Congress is unable to convene because of an attack upon the United States.''. (a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of communications conducted without a court order on or after September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance Program referred to by the President in a radio address on December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers, and court orders. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report containing the results of such audit, including all documents acquired pursuant to conducting such audit. (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the investigation and adjudication of an application by the Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as possible. (a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track of-- (1) the instances where the identity of a United States person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) that collected the communications to other departments or agencies of the United States; and (2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed. (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created under subsection (a), including the number of instances referred to in paragraph (1). (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Justice, for the activities of the Office of the Inspector General and the appropriate elements of the National Security Division, and to the National Security Agency such sums as may be necessary to meet the personnel and information technology demands to ensure the timely and efficient processing of-- (1) applications and other submissions to the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)); (2) the audit and reporting requirements under-- (A) section 105D of such Act; and (B) section 10; and (3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements under section 8. (b) Additional Personnel for Preparation and Consideration of Applications for Orders Approving Electronic Surveillance and Physical Search.-- (1) National security division of the department of justice.-- (A) Additional personnel.--The National Security Division of the Department of Justice is hereby authorized such additional personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation, modification, and review of applications under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders under that Act for foreign intelligence purposes. (B) Assignment.--The Attorney General shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among appropriate offices of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the Intelligence Community in preparing applications described in that paragraph and conduct prompt and effective oversight of the activities of such agencies under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders. (2) Director of national intelligence.-- (A) Additional legal and other personnel.--The Director of National Intelligence is hereby authorized such additional legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation of applications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders under that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. (B) Assignment.--The Director of National Intelligence shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))), including the field offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the intelligence community in preparing applications described in that paragraph. (3) Additional legal and other personnel for foreign intelligence surveillance court.--There is hereby authorized for the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) such additional staff personnel as may be necessary to facilitate the prompt and timely consideration by that court of applications under such Act for orders under such Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Personnel authorized by this paragraph shall perform such duties relating to the consideration of such applications as that court shall direct. (4) Supplement not supplant.--The personnel authorized by this section are in addition to any other personnel authorized by law. (a) System Required.--The Attorney General shall, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, develop and implement a secure, classified document management system that permits the prompt preparation, modification, and review by appropriate personnel of the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, and other applicable elements of the United States Government of applications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) before their submission to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. (b) Scope of System.--The document management system required by subsection (a) shall-- (1) permit and facilitate the prompt submittal of applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; and (2) permit and facilitate the prompt transmittal of rulings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to personnel submitting applications described in paragraph (1), and provide for the secure electronic storage and retrieval of all such applications and related matters with the court and for their secure transmission to the National Archives and Records Administration. The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Attorney General-- (1) develop regulations to establish procedures for conducting and seeking approval of electronic surveillance, physical search, and the installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices on an emergency basis, and for preparing and properly submitting and receiving applications and orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; and (2) prescribe related training on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and related legal matters for the personnel of the applicable agencies of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))). As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, but not later than seven days after such date, the President shall fully inform each member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on the following: (1) The Terrorist Surveillance Program of the National Security Agency. (2) Any program in existence from September 11, 2001, until the effective date of this Act that involves, whether in part or in whole, the electronic surveillance of United States persons in the United States for foreign intelligence or other purposes, and which is conducted by any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government, or by any entity at the direction of a department, agency, or other element of the United States Government, without fully complying with the procedures set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) or chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States Code. (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the following new items:``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States persons outside the United States.``Sec. 105B. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States.``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States.``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside of the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States.''. (b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''. (c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America Act of 2007.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public Law 110-55) are hereby repealed. (a) Sunset of New Provisions.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), effective on December 31, 2009-- (A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) are hereby repealed; and (B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D. (2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any authorization or order issued under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization or order. (b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.-- (1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of enactment, whichever is earlier. (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law 110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations, including-- (A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be located in the United States; (B) the number of persons located in the United States whose communications have been acquired under such section; (C) the number of reports disseminated containing information on a United States person that was collected under such section; (D) the number of applications submitted for approval of electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and (E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with an authorization under such section, including incidents of non-compliance by-- (i) an element of the intelligence community with procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section; (ii) an element of the intelligence community with minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of such section; and (iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section. (3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection, the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (a) Authorization Under Section 102.--Section 102(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1802(a)) is amended by striking ``furnishing such aid'' and inserting ``furnishing such aid and shall provide such carrier with a certification stating that the electronic surveillance is authorized under this section and that all requirements of this section have been met''. (b) Authorization Under Section 105.--Section 105(c)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; and'' and inserting ``;''; (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``aid.'' and inserting ``aid; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(E) that the applicant provide such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person with a certification stating that the electronic surveillance is authorized under this section and that all requirements of this section have been met.''. (a) In General.--Section 109 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: (e) Statute of Limitations.--No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense under this section unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted not later than 10 years after the commission of the offense.''. (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to any offense committed before the date of the enactment of this Act if the statute of limitations applicable to that offense has not run as of such date. This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to prohibit surveillance of, or grant any rights to, an alien not permitted to be in or remain in the United States. This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to prohibit the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) from conducting lawful surveillance that is necessary to-- (1) prevent Osama Bin Laden, al Qaeda, or any other terrorist or terrorist organization from attacking the United States, any United States person, or any ally of the United States; (2) ensure the safety and security of members of the United States Armed Forces or any other officer or employee of the Federal Government involved in protecting the national security of the United States; or (3) protect the United States, any United States person, or any ally of the United States from threats posed by weapons of mass destruction or other threats to national security.", u"Mr. President, the disturbing thing to this particular Senator--incidently, Senators are always disturbed--but in all candor, the best way to recognize 9/11 of last year is to make certain that a 9/11 does not occur again and that we correct the intelligence failure that brought about 9/11. With respect to actually assuring us that a 9/11 would never occur again, we had that debate last Thursday relative to securing the cockpit of airplanes. We are depending on the White House to weigh in now with their particular view. In my view, once that cockpit door is secured, never to be opened in flight, a 9/11 could never happen again. I speak advisedly. In the month of September of last year, I had the privilege of meeting with the chief pilot of El Al, the Israeli airline. That is the one airline in the world--particularly, of course, in the Mideast, where you have suicidal terrorists--that would be subject to a hijacking and people taking over the plane and running it into a building. They determined years ago the only way to prevent a hijacking was to not give responsibility to the pilots for law and order on the flight itself--namely, a pistol and so forth to overpower any kind of attempted hijacking. Instead, they wanted the pilots to assume the responsibility that the plane would never go into a building or never be hijacked or taken to another country. Over the last 30 years they have shown this is the right rule: Once the door has been secured, it has never opened in flight. I can hear the chief pilot of El Al. He said: Senator, I can tell you here and now, if they are assaulting my wife in the cabin, I do not open that door. I go straight to the ground, and law enforcement meets me. And whoever is causing the trouble is off to jail. As a result, they have not had a hijacking in 30 years. Yes, they have attacked the ticket counter of El Al in Los Angeles. But terrorists don't even hardly make an attempt to hijack an El Al plane because they know that, yes, they could cause trouble with the passengers but not with the crew, not with the plane itself. There is no way to take it over. Let me embellish on that thought because we had a debate with respect to arming pilots with pistols. Many pilots wanted Congress to allow pistols in the cockpit. The House has passed that, and the Senate on last Thursday voted for that overwhelmingly. What should be understood is, you have to remove the responsibility from that pilot. In other words, let's assume you have that pistol on the pilots as they walk to and fro; that is another danger. And as they get in transatlantic flights, that is another forbidden practice--those kinds of things need to be considered. But more particularly, if a flight attendant is crying out: They are choking me, they are killing me, open the door. In my opinion, once that door is cracked open, the pilot with the pistol might get off a shot or two. But as we saw on 9/11, there are now teams of suicide terrorists, five-member teams willing to sacrifice one, two, or three people. The pilot might be able to kill three of them, but the other highjackers would still be coming into that cockpit. They would take over that plane once that door is cracked, with pistols, machine guns, whatever else they have up there. So it has to be categorical and clearly understood. People have criticized me for saying this, but as I come into Reagan National Airport and see the sign, ``Welcome to Reagan National, Washington, DC,'' I would rather have a reflective sign saying, in Arabic: ``Try to hijack, go to jail.'' People will say: Why are you saying that in Arabic? I use Arabic numerals regularly. I invaded Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Incidentally, I have the highest esteem for the country of Tunisia because I traveled there not too long ago, and they have some 65 percent literacy and 80 percent home ownership. And the Foreign Minister told me, when I asked: How in the world did you ever do this? He said: The secret is to let the women vote. He said: As soon as we allowed women to vote in Tunisia, they wanted better schools for the children. They wanted nice homes for their families. In World War II, I was one of the first in the African campaign with Colonel Anderson and the 178th Field Artillery. I wasn't in the frontline unit. I am not trying to fudge on his bravery. But we went into Tunisia. Now you can go into the city of Tunis itself and what was the Dust Bowl during the war, looks like a golf course. They have turned the country around. But the fact is, it was Muslim extremists who overtook the barracks in Lebanon, and who blew up barracks in Saudi Arabia. They blew up our Embassy in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. They blew up our Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. They blew up the USS Cole. Almost nine years ago they tried to blow up the World Trade Centers. All of those were Islamic teams that came and caused the blowing up. So I am justified in saying this. I want those who are blowing us up to understand: try to hijack and go to jail. As I relate all these particular incidents, I come right to the point of my amendment in the second degree to Senator Thompson. I was working, and my staff was working with Senator Thompson's staff, to see if it was acceptable to him. He is not with us this afternoon, but we will be glad to talk to him tomorrow and on Thursday because he and I have the same intent. I think we have to fix the responsibility. There is none better in the history of the United States of America than old Harry Truman. He said: The buck stops here. He put that little sign on his desk. That has been the trouble. I don't fault President Bush. He didn't know anything before 9/11. He was not properly informed. And having not been properly informed, he could do nothing to have prevented it. So it is not my role this afternoon, on the floor of the Senate, to find fault with the President himself. But I think we have to fix that responsibility for national security with him. In 1947, and later, as a Presidential directive, and then later in statutory language, the National Security Council was instituted. It says: ``the function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.'' The problem is the make-up of the National Security Council. On it are the Vice President, Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. It has been in bed some with the Secretary of Treasury. But there are some others, like the Attorney General who should be included. The Attorney General has oversight of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and we know that terrorism is financed by drugs. He has the Border Patrol and the Immigration Service under him. He has all of these entities. He would be the chief Cabinet officer as of this minute for security, unless you get that Secretary of Homeland Security. But it still is going to be his professional teams that ensure security and provide the domestic intelligence that the Council needs. So that homeland security intelligence, wherever you have it--if you have it at a Bureau or an office of homeland security in the White House, or a Department of Homeland Security with a particular assimilating and analytical role of intelligence, or as a department in Congress itself--wherever you have it, you still are going to have to take whatever analysis, whatever finding, and fuse it at the National Security Council level. If you were President of the United States, or I were President of the United States, I would only have one particular briefing, one report on my desk. Every hour the President gets them now with respect to political intelligence. He knows what the polls show in Nebraska and what the trends are in South Carolina. He has political polls on November given to him every hour just about. So they are constantly taking that. I want intelligence polls taken and reported to the President of the United States and fused at the National Security Council. The National Security Council has that responsibility. The particular Department of Homeland Security does not amend that particular statute. In fact, we could pass a Department of Homeland Security in the next 10 minutes and you could have a 9/11, because the very things that went wrong on 9/11 would go wrong again. The very Departments that failed, starting with the CIA is not included in the new Department. The Central Intelligence Agency knew about all of these things I have related. An article in this week's Newsweek says that they knew they had persons who roomed with the suicidal terrorists of 9/11 who commandeered the planes themselves. We know of attempts made to run a plane into the Eiffel Tower. We know from the Philippines incident that the CIA knew they had planned to run a plane into the CIA building. You can go down the litany--all of this was known before 9/11. The CIA didn't even correlate it, didn't pay attention to it, and certainly didn't pass it on and give it in the briefings to the National Security Council. I can hear Condoleezza Rice, the Director of the National Security Council, saying, ``We never got anything specific.'' I want to be sure they get something specific. The Department of Homeland Security bill, now being debated on the floor of the Senate, could pass and you would not have any of the Departments included that failed on last September 11. The CIA failed. The FBI had reports from the field that something is wrong. The field teams said people were coming in and getting flight training, and we ought to be looking into it. It didn't get past the second level. You have Coleen Rowley, from Minneapolis, saying in her memo that they could be flying a plane into the World Trade Towers. We knew the World Trade Towers were vulnerable. They had already attacked them in 1993. Here was a memo again that they didn't pay any attention to. She came all the way to Washington and talked to the folks in the FBI. Nothing was done. We know, of course, the National Security Agency had something that said ``Tomorrow is zero hour.'' That was in Arabic. People tell me that I will hurt somebody's feelings if I put up a sign in Arabic that reads: try to hijack and go to jail. They say that is typecasting, profiling. Well, I mean to profile. I want it understood. That is exactly what occurred--in Arabic, ``Tomorrow is zero hour.'' They got that on September 10 of last year, but they didn't translate it at the National Security Agency until September 12--after the tragedy. Here we have everyone running up and down saying we are going to make sure 9/11 never happens again. Not with this bill. You might tinker around with what we already have on course. Incidentally, of the 170,000 proposed staff for this Department, we already have 110,000 of them together in one Department--the Transportation Department. We had a hearing this morning with Admiral Loy of the Transportation Security Administration. It is a blessing we have him, because he knows what he is doing. He is moving and working. He has the airports, the authority, Republicans and Democrats--everybody pulling together. He solved the biggest problem we have had with respect to airline security. But he has the seaport security, the rail security, and Amtrak--the rail stations, the tunnels, and everything else of that kind; they are all in one Department. We haven't been waiting. If you had just the homeland security bill and it had an up-or-down vote this minute, without any amendments, I would have to vote against it. I don't want to mislead my constituents and say that I have voted for homeland security, because I know with that bill I have not voted for homeland security; I haven't done anything about the intelligence failures of 9/11 of last year. So, Mr. President, that is the attempt of my particular amendment--to get the National Security Council beefed up. By beefing up, I mean the President did put out an order in February after he took office last year. You ought to see that particular order. It has included in various forms of the Council, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Peace Corps, and everybody else. It was so inclusive as to really confuse rather than fix a responsibility, that the buck stops here. I want to make it absolutely certain that this particular National Security Council needs to be beefed up, irrespective of whether we pass a Department of Homeland Security, irrespective of whether they put an Office of Homeland Security in the White House, as is presently constituted with Governor Ridge, or whether they call it a bureau--and I certainly would go along with Senator Thompson with respect to the matter of confirmation. I know if I were President, I would not want my staff subject to the confirmation and to have to respond to the Congress. You elected me the President, you have given me the responsibility, and the buck stops here. My Chief of Staff, head of my Security Council, and everything else like that, are my choice, and I have my team, and I don't have to worry about the politics over in the legislative branch as to confirmation and being responsible to subpoenas coming over. We cannot subpoena the Director of the National Security Council. We should not be able to just subpoena willy-nilly. They can say we just have to plead executive privilege. Be that as it may, I think the distinguished Senator from Tennessee is off on the right track. He wants to make sure we don't have all this bureaucracy; in other words, if you are going to have a Department collecting intelligence, you have the CIA collecting intelligence, you have the National Security Council collecting intelligence, and you have got domestic intelligence collected by the FBI. You have the office in the White House trying to correlate and work with it, but even that correlation has to be fused with international threats, with foreign policy. There is only one place, and that is the National Security Council, as the Congress has already determined and as determined by none other than President Truman himself back in 1947, ``The buck stops here.'' I do not want to have another buck stop in an office here and a department here and another agency there and a CIA agent and a defense intelligence agent over here. We have intelligence coming out of our ears. The reason this is not understood is we do not have an independent Presidential commission investigating 9/11. I was moved the other evening when we heard former Vice President Mondale emphasize the need for that particular initiative. I joined in that some months back, and I did so advisedly. The reason I do it is when you have the House and the Senate investigate intelligence, you have a political split. It is 50 Republican and 50 Democratic. Having served for 8 years on the Intelligence Committee I can tell you that we had categorical sworn testimony to a certain effect, that was known by the White House, and we had it on two occasions to verify it, but we never could make that public because of 50 percent being Republican. They just did not want it to surface because it was critical. Incidentally, that same Intelligence Committee staff is not subject to a polygraph. I want to emphasize that for the simple reason that one cannot get a job with the Secret Service unless they are polygraphed. They cannot get a job with the Central Intelligence Agency unless they are polygraphed. They cannot get a job with the FBI unless they are polygraphed. More particularly, they cannot get a job out there as a Capitol policeman unless they take a lie detector test. I was told that certain information was not revealed to me by the CIA, as a member of the committee, because my staff--not my personal staff but the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee--had not had the proper clearance. I will never forget I had a constituent who was arrested in another country, and I was trying to get him out of that arrest. I had to struggle to do it. The country involved said he was an agent of the CIA or had gotten briefings from the CIA. They categorically denied it. It was a year and a half to 2 years later, I went into one country and talked with the station agent. He said: Oh, Senator, you are from South Carolina. I said: I certainly am. How is that? He said: Well, I debriefed so and so. He was one of the best we ever had. That is how I found out about the lie saying that they never knew anything about him. I served on the Hoover Commission in 1954 under GEN Mark Clark and President Herbert Hoover investigating the intelligence activities of the United States of America. It was the Joe McCarthy days. We went into the CIA, the CID, the Army, Navy, air intelligence, Secret Service, Q clearance, and the Atomic Energy Commission, and all the rest of the intelligence divisions. I have a slight background in intelligence. There is a lack of coordination. In addition to having the buck stop here, you have to have that coordination, and only the President of the United States can get that coordination. He has to get those involved on the Council. I have talked to Director Mueller of the FBI because I oversee his appropriation. He says he has gotten CIA fellows over there. But then I hear reports that they are not always exchanging the information. That information exchange and getting it all to the one Commander in Chief to make a decision as to whether or not we have intelligence, for example, with respect to a need to invade Iraq, that has to be centralized, not at the Department of Homeland Security, not at an Office of Homeland Security, but fused at the level of the National Security Council, reporting directly to the President of the United States. I have included in this amendment, in an advisory capacity to the Council, the Director of the FBI--as is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He is also in an advisory capacity. But that one summary intelligence report that is put on the President's desk early every morning has to have the fused intelligence of domestic as well as foreign intelligence. There is this idea now that we can beef up and fix that responsibility. I am very much concerned, as I have tried to point out with respect to this particular amendment--I am in step with the distinguished Senator from Tennessee. He is trying to avoid further bureaucracy and further politics with respect to confirmation. You never have the Director of the National Security Council confirmed or the chief of staff. The Presiding Officer of the Senate or this particular Senator would never have our chief of staff or administrative AA assistant confirmed by the Senate. That is just more bureaucracy. I agree with Senator Thompson on that. But it still does not fix that responsibility of the buck stopping there and that has to be at the National Security Council level with the President of the United States, and nowhere else. There has to be one place in case we ever have anything that is even like 9/11, instead of people running around finger pointing, saying: This Department said, no, but the CIA did not do it, but the FBI, well, the National Security Agency guy, no, we did not find out from defense intelligence. They knew. They should have told. We have intelligence, tens of billions of dollars according to what I read in the newspapers. We have all kinds of entities running around with intelligence. Here we are going around and saying we are going to avoid a 9/11 by the institution of a Department of Homeland Security. So this particular Senator has been working in that field. Namely, we passed 100 to 0, all Republicans and all Democrats, airport security. We got together and we reported out of the Commerce Committee, and it passed the Senate 100 to 0, all Republicans and all Democrats, seaport security. It is hung up over in the House with respect to the conference. I have at the desk rail security in an Amtrak bill by a vote of, I think it was, 20 to 3 out of the committee. So I have been working in this field. I sat down last fall with the new Director of the FBI, Bob Mueller. We gave him $750 million. We said: Straighten out your computers, get those all working, reorganize your department, institute domestic intelligence. We never wanted to do that. We shied away from domestic intelligence. With the McCarthy days and the witch hunts, the un-American activities and all, we do not want to go down that road. But the terrorism war requires an intelligence effort at the domestic level. Fine, you can have a Department--we have it going right now, to tell the truth, and we are trying to reorganize it under a new Secretary. According to GAO, it is going to take 5 to 6 years to get it organized right, so we are going to have to depend on what we have. I have been working in that particular field and just got through with a hearing this morning with the new Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration in the Department of Transportation, and I think we are on course. But we are behind the curve with respect to seaport security. We are behind the curve with respect to rail security, with respect to actual intelligence security and correlating it. This bill absolutely leaves out all of the failures of last year, 9/11, and includes therein all of the good operative entities; namely, that there was nothing wrong with the Coast Guard that would be included in the new Department, there was nothing wrong with FEMA or the agriculture office that would be included in the new Department. As they said in the Navy during World War II: When in danger, when in doubt, run in circles, scream and shout. We are running around here. We have a Department going, and it is supposed to govern. I voted for homeland security. You did not. This bill could pass in the next 10 minutes and it would not correct the failings of September 11. My amendment to the Thompson amendment would fix that responsibility at the National Security Council, so the buck would stop there. The President of the United States would have to know what is going on. If he could not find out, this President would get rid of him. I yield the floor.", u"I ask unanimous consent that the Chair lay before the Senate a message from the House of Represenatives on S. 858 entitled, ``An Act to Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1998 for Intelligence and Intelligence-related Activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.'' The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the House of Representatives: Resolved, That the bill from the Senate (S. 858) entitled ``An Act to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes'', do pass with the following amendment: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998''. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (11) The National Reconnaissance Office. (12) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1998, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1775 of the 105th Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 1998 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1998 the sum of $147,588,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee and the Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program shall remain available until September 30, 1999. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized a total of 313 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1998. Such personnel may be permanent employees of the Community Management Account elements or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) and the personnel authorized by subsection (b)-- (1) there is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998 such amounts, and (2) there is authorized such personnel as of September 30, 1998, There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1998 the sum of $196,900,000. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Subsection (e) of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall, for administrative purposes, be within the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is amended by striking ``1998'' and inserting ``1999''. No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be expended by an entity unless the entity agrees that in expending the assistance the entity will comply with sections 2 through 4 of the Act of March 3, 1933 (41 U.S.C. 10a-10c, popularly known as the ``Buy American Act''). (a) Purchase of American-Made Equipment and Products.--In the case of any equipment or products that may be authorized to be purchased with financial assistance provided under this Act, it is the sense of the Congress that entities receiving such assistance should, in expending the assistance, purchase only American-made equipment and products. (b) Notice to Recipients of Assistance.--In providing financial assistance under this Act, the head of the appropriate element of the Intelligence Community shall provide to each recipient of the assistance a notice describing the statement made in subsection (a) by the Congress. If it has been finally determined by a court or Federal agency that any person intentionally affixed a fraudulent label bearing a ``Made in America'' inscription, or any inscription with the same meaning, to any product sold in or shipped to the United States that was not made in the United States, such person shall be ineligible to receive any contract or subcontract made with funds provided pursuant to this Act, pursuant to the debarment, suspension, and ineligibility procedures described in sections 9.400 through 9.409 of title 48, Code of Federal Regulations. (a) Report to Congress.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, jointly, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, including the National Security Agency, and the Departments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, and State, shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China, directed against or affecting the interests of the United States. (b) Delivery of Report.--The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, jointly, shall transmit classified and unclassified versions of the report to the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Chairman and Vice- Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (c) Contents of Report.--Each report under subsection (a) shall include information concerning the following: (1) Political, military, and economic espionage. (2) Intelligence activities designed to gain political influence, including activities undertaken or coordinated by the United Front Works Department of the Chinese Communist Party. (3) Efforts to gain direct or indirect influence through commercial or noncommercial intermediaries subject to control by the People's Republic of China, including enterprises controlled by the People's Liberation Army. (4) Disinformation and press manipulation by the People's Republic of China with respect to the United States, including activities undertaken or coordinated by the United Front Works Department of the Chinese Communist Party. The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct a review to determine what knowledge the Central Intelligence Agency had about the presence or use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf Theater during the course of the Persian Gulf War. The Inspector General shall submit a report of his findings to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, no later than August 15, 1998 in both classified and unclassified form. The unclassified form shall also be made available to the public. TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (a) In General.--Section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (a) through (f) as paragraphs (1) through (6), respectively; (2) by inserting ``(a)'' after ``Sec. 5.''; (3) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (5), as so redesignated; (4) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6), as so redesignated, and inserting ``; and''; (5) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph: ``(7) Notwithstanding section 1341(a)(1) of title 31, United States Code, enter into multiyear leases for up to 15 years that are not otherwise authorized pursuant to section 8 of this Act.''; and (6) by inserting at the end the following new subsection: ``(b)(1) The authority to enter into a multiyear lease under subsection (a)(7) shall be subject to appropriations provided in advance for (A) the entire lease, or (B) the first 12 months of the lease and the Government's estimated termination liability. ``(2) In the case of any such lease entered into under clause (B) of paragraph (1)-- ``(A) such lease shall include a clause that provides that the contract shall be terminated if budget authority (as defined by section 3(2) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(2))) is not provided specifically for that project in an appropriations Act in advance of an obligation of funds in respect thereto; ``(B) notwithstanding section 1552 of title 31, United States Code, amounts obligated for paying termination costs in respect of such lease shall remain available until the costs associated with termination of such lease are paid; ``(C) funds available for termination liability shall remain available to satisfy rental obligations in respect of such lease in subsequent fiscal years in the event such lease is not terminated early, but only to the extent those funds are in excess of the amount of termination liability in that subsequent year; and ``(D) annual funds made available in any fiscal year may be used to make payments on such lease for a maximum of 12 months beginning any time during the fiscal year.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies with respect to multiyear leases entered into pursuant to section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended by subsection (a), on or after October 1, 1997. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Subsection (a) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o(a)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; (2) by striking ``powers only within Agency installations,'' and all that follows through the end, and inserting the following: ``powers-- ``(A) within the Agency Headquarters Compound and the property controlled and occupied by the Federal Highway Administration located immediately adjacent to such Compound and in the streets, sidewalks, and the open areas within the zone beginning at the outside boundary of such Compound and property and extending outward 500 feet; and ``(B) within any other Agency installation and in the streets, sidewalks, and open areas within the zone beginning at the outside boundary of any such installation and extending outward 500 feet.''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) The performance of functions and exercise of powers under paragraph (1) shall be limited to those circumstances where such personnel can identify specific and articulable facts giving such personnel reason to believe that their performance of such functions and exercise of such powers is reasonable to protect against physical attack or threats of attack upon the Agency installations, property, or employees. ``(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude, or limit in any way, the authority of any Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency or of any other Federal police or Federal protective service. ``(4) The rules and regulations enforced by such personnel shall be the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director and shall only be applicable to the areas referred to in paragraph (1). ``(5) On December 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the Director shall submit a report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that describes in detail the exercise of the authority granted by this subsection, and the underlying facts supporting the exercise of such authority, during the preceding fiscal year. The Director shall make such report available to the Inspector General of the Agency.''. TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (a) Authority for New Bachelor's Degree.--Section 2161 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: (a) Extension, Reorganization, and Consolidation of Authorities.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Effective October 1, 1997, section 506(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-93; 109 Stat. 974) is amended by striking out ``fiscal years 1996 and 1997'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``fiscal years 1998 and 1999''. TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNITY PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS (a) Program Execution Coordination.--The Secretary of a military department or the head of a defense agency may not obligate or expend funds for any information security program of that military department without the concurrence of the Director of the National Security Agency. (b) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on October 1, 1997. All amounts appropriated for any fiscal year for intelligence information data broadcast systems may be obligated or expended by an intelligence element of the Department of Defense only with the concurrence of the official in the Department of Defense designated as the executive agent of the Integrated Broadcast Service. (a) Transfer of Functions.--Effective October 1, 1997, the functions described in subsection (b) with respect to the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle are transferred to the Secretary of the Air Force. (b) Functions To Be Transferred.--Subsection (a) applies to those functions performed as of June 1, 1997, by the organization within the Department of Defense known as the Unmanned Aerial Joint Program Office with respect to the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. (c) Transfer of Funds.--Effective October 1, 1997, all unexpended funds appropriated for the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle that are within the Defense-Wide Program Element number 0305205D are transferred to Air Force Program Element number 0305154F. (a) Requirement for Minimum Number of Aircraft.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure-- (1) that not less than 11 U-2 reconnaissance aircraft are equipped with RAS-1 sensor suites; and (2) that each such aircraft that is so equipped is maintained in a manner necessary to counter available threat technologies until the aircraft is retired or until a successor sensor suite is developed and fielded. (b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) takes effect on October 1, 1997. (a) In General.--The congressional budget justification books for any element of the intelligence community submitted to Congress in support of the budget of the President for any fiscal year shall include, at a minimum, the following: (1) For each program for which appropriations are requested for that element of the intelligence community in that budget-- (A) specification of the program, including the program element number for the program; (B) the specific dollar amount requested for the program; (C) the appropriation account within which funding for the program is placed; (D) the budget line item that applies to the program; (E) specification of whether the program is a research and development program or otherwise involves research and development; (F) identification of the total cost for the program; and (G) information relating to all direct and associated costs in each appropriations account for the program. (2) A detailed accounting of all reprogramming or reallocation actions and the status of those actions at the time of submission of those materials. (3) Information relating to any unallocated cuts or taxes. (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section: (1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a). (2) The term ``congressional budget justification books'' means the budget justification materials submitted to Congress for any fiscal year in support of the budget for that fiscal year for any element of the intelligence community (as contained in the budget of the President submitted to Congress for that fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code). (c) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to fiscal year 1999. (a) Contracts.--The Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office, may not modify, amend, or alter a JSAF program contract without coordinating with the Secretary of any other military department that would be affected by the modification, amendment, or alteration. (b) New Developments Affecting Operational Military Requirements.--(1) The Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office, may not enter into a contract described in paragraph (2) without coordinating with the Secretary of the military department concerned. (2) Paragraph (1) applies to a contract for development relating to a JSAF program that may directly affect the operational requirements of one of the Armed Forces (other than the Air Force) for the satisfaction of intelligence requirements. (c) JSAF Program Defined.--For purposes of this section, the term ``JSAF program'' means a program within the Joint Signals Intelligence Avionics Family of programs administered by the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office. (d) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on October 1, 1997. Not later than October 1, 1999, the Secretary of Defense shall-- (1) discontinue the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (a program within the Joint Military Intelligence Program); and (2) close the organization within the Department of Defense known as the Defense Space Program Office (the management office for that program). (a) Termination of Office.--The organization within the Department of Defense known as the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office is terminated. No funds available for the Department of Defense may be used for the operation of that Office after the date specified in subsection (d). (b) Transfer of Functions.--(1) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), the Secretary of Defense shall transfer to the Defense Intelligence Agency those functions performed on the day before the date of the enactment this Act by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office that are specified in paragraph (2). (2) The functions transferred by the Secretary to the Defense Intelligence Agency under paragraph (1) shall include functions of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office relating to its responsibilities for management oversight and coordination of defense airborne reconnaissance capabilities (other than any responsibilities for acquisition of systems). (3) The Secretary shall determine which specific functions are appropriate for transfer under paragraph (1). In making that determination, the Secretary shall ensure that responsibility for individual airborne reconnaissance programs with respect to program management, for research, development, test, and evaluation, for acquisition, and for operations and related line management remain with the respective Secretaries of the military departments. (4) Any function transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency under this subsection is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. (c) Report.--(1) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the committees named in paragraph (2) a report containing the Secretary's plan for terminating the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office and transferring the functions of that office. (2) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are-- (A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives. (d) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect at the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.", u" The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Reyes: Page 9, line 21, strike ``$672,812,000'' and insert Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for four years, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the proficiency in foreign languages and, as appropriate, in foreign dialects, of each element of the intelligence community, including-- (1) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency and the level of proficiency required; (2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each element will require during the five-year period beginning on the date of the submission of the report; (3) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by-- (A) military personnel; and (B) civilian personnel; (4) the number of applicants for positions in such element in the preceding fiscal year that indicated foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the proficiency level; (5) the number of persons hired by such element with foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language and proficiency level; (6) the number of personnel of such element currently attending foreign language training, including the provider of such training; (7) a description of the efforts of such element to recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a foreign language; (8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, advanced, and intensive foreign language training; (9) for each foreign language and, as appropriate, dialect of a foreign language-- (A) the number of positions of such element that require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect; (B) the number of personnel of such element that are serving in a position that requires proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; (C) the number of personnel of such element that are serving in a position that does not require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; (D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable; (E) whether the number of personnel at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the requirements of such element; (F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as linguists for such element that are not qualified as linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language Roundtable; (G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists for such element during the preceding calendar year; (H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that discontinued serving such element during the preceding calendar year; (I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by an ally of the United States; and (J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by contractors; (10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; (11) an identification of any critical gaps in foreign language proficiency with respect to such element and recommendations for eliminating such gaps; (12) recommendations for eliminating required reports relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer relevant; and (13) an assessment of the feasibility of employing foreign nationals lawfully present in the United States who have previously worked as translators or interpreters for the Armed Forces or another department or agency of the Federal Government in Iraq or Afghanistan to meet the critical language needs of such element. Page 45, beginning on line 18, strike ``one of the congressional intelligence committees'' and insert ``a committee of Congress with jurisdiction over such program or activity''. Page 46, beginning on line 8, strike ``the congressional intelligence committees'' and insert ``each committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the program or activity that is the subject of the analysis, evaluation, or investigation for which the Director restricts access to information under such paragraph''. Page 46, line 13, strike ``report'' and insert ``statement''. Page 46, line 16, strike ``report'' and insert ``statement''. Page 46, beginning on line 17, strike ``the congressional intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Comptroller General has notice under paragraph (3)'' and insert ``each committee of Congress to which the Director of National Intelligence submits a statement under paragraph (2) any comments on the statement''. Page 46, line 21, strike the closing quotation mark and the final period. Page 46, after line 21, insert the following: ``(c) Confidentiality.--(1) The Comptroller General shall maintain the same level of confidentiality for information made available for an analysis, evaluation, or investigation referred to in subsection (a) as is required of the head of the element of the intelligence community from which such information is obtained. Officers and employees of the Government Accountability Office are subject to the same statutory penalties for unauthorized disclosure or use of such information as officers or employees of the element of the intelligence community that provided the Comptroller General or officers and employees of the Government Accountability Office with access to such information. ``(2) The Comptroller General shall establish procedures to protect from unauthorized disclosure all classified and other sensitive information furnished to the Comptroller General or any representative of the Comptroller General for conducting an analysis, evaluation, or investigation referred to in subsection (a). ``(3) Before initiating an analysis, evaluation, or investigation referred to in subsection (a), the Comptroller General shall provide the Director of National Intelligence and the head of each relevant element of the intelligence community with the name of each officer and employee of the Government Accountability Office who has obtained appropriate security clearance and to whom, upon proper identification, records and information of the element of the intelligence community shall be made available in conducting such analysis, evaluation, or investigation.''. Page 48, line 15, strike ``Biannual'' and insert ``Biennial''. Page 48, line 19, strike ``biannually'' and insert ``biennially''. Page 62, line 14, strike ``NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE'' and insert ``REPORT''. Page 62, beginning on line 18, strike ``National Intelligence Estimate or National Intelligence Assessment'' and insert ``report''. Page 62, strike line 20 and insert the following: ``supply chain and global provision of services to determine whether such supply chain and such services pose''. Page 62, line 21, strike ``counterfeit''. Page 62, line 22, strike ``defective'' and insert ``counterfeit, defective,''. Page 62, line 23, insert ``or services that may be managed, controlled, or manipulated by a foreign government or a criminal organization'' after ``organization''. Page 63, beginning on line 5, strike ``counterfeit''. Page 63, line 6, strike ``defective'' and insert ``counterfeit, defective,''. Page 63, line 8, insert ``or services that may be managed, controlled, or manipulated by a foreign government or a criminal organization'' after ``organization''. Page 63, at the end of line 8 insert the following: ``Such review shall include an examination of the threat posed by State-controlled and State-invested enterprises and the extent to which the actions and activities of such enterprises may be controlled, coerced, or influenced by a foreign government.''. Strike section 353 (Page 67, line 20 and all that follows through line 25 on page 68). Page 69, beginning on line 5, strike ``Federal Bureau of Investigation'' and insert ``Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Secretary of State,''. Insert after section 354 (Page 69, after line 15) the following new sections: Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall submit to Congress a report containing-- (1) a description of the strategy of the Federal Government for balancing the intelligence collection needs of the United States with the interest of the United States in prosecuting terrorist suspects; and (2) a description of the policy of the Federal Government with respect to the questioning, detention, trial, transfer, release, or other disposition of suspected terrorists. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the dissemination of critical counterterrorism information from the intelligence community to local law enforcement agencies, including recommendations for improving the means of communication of such information to local law enforcement agencies. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the intelligence capabilities of State and local law enforcement agencies. Such report shall include-- (1) an assessment of the ability of State and local law enforcement agencies to analyze and fuse intelligence community products with locally gathered information; (2) a description of existing procedures of the intelligence community to share with State and local law enforcement agencies the tactics, techniques, and procedures for intelligence collection, data management, and analysis learned from global counterinsurgency and counterterror operations; (3) a description of current intelligence analysis training provided by elements of the intelligence community to State and local law enforcement agencies; (4) an assessment of the need for a formal intelligence training center to teach State and local law enforcement agencies methods of intelligence collection and analysis; and (5) an assessment of the efficiently of co-locating such an intelligence training center with an existing intelligence community or military intelligence training center. (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to Congress a report containing an analysis of the problem of over-classification of intelligence and ways to address such over-classification, including an analysis of the importance of protecting sources and methods while providing law enforcement and the public with as much access to information as possible. (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall submit to Congress a report summarizing intelligence related to the threat to the United States from weapons that use radiological materials, including highly dispersible substances such as cesium-137. (a) In General.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the following: (1) A description of any information in the possession of the intelligence community with respect to the following events in the Republic of Argentina: (A) The accession to power by the military of the Republic of Argentina in 1976. (B) Violations of human rights committed by officers or agents of the Argentine military and security forces during counterinsurgency or counterterror operations, including by the State Intelligence Secretariat (Secretaria de Inteligencia del Estado), Military Intelligence Detachment 141 (Destacamento de Inteligencia Militar 141 in Cordoba), Military Intelligence Detachment 121 (Destacamento Militar 121 in Rosario), Army Intelligence Battalion 601, the Army Reunion Center (Reunion Central del Ejercito), and the Army First Corps in Buenos Aires. (C) Operation Condor and Argentina's role in cross-border counterinsurgency or counterterror operations with Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, or Uruguay. (2) Information on abductions, torture, disappearances, and executions by security forces and other forms of repression, including the fate of Argentine children born in captivity, that took place at detention centers, including the following: (A) The Argentine Navy Mechanical School (Escuela Mecanica de la Armada). (B) Automotores Orletti. (C) Operaciones Tacticas 18. (D) La Perla. (E) Campo de Mayo. (F) Institutos Militares. (3) An appendix of declassified records reviewed and used for the report submitted under this subsection. (4) A descriptive index of information referred to in paragraph (1) or (2) that is classified, including the identity of each document that is classified, the reason for continuing the classification of such document, and an explanation of how the release of the document would damage the national security interests of the United States. (b) Review of Classified Documents.--Not later than two years after the date on which the report required under subsection (a) is submitted, the Director of National Intelligence shall review information referred to in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) that is classified to determine if any of such information should be declassified. (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency shall submit to Congress a report on the strategy of the National Security Agency with respect to securing networks of the Department of Defense within the intelligence community. Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the feasibility and advisability of creating a national space intelligence office to manage space-related intelligence assets and access to such assets. (a) Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a plan to secure the networks of the intelligence community. Such plan shall include strategies for-- (1) securing the networks of the intelligence community from unauthorized remote access, intrusion, or insider tampering; (2) recruiting, retaining, and training a highly-qualified cybersecurity intelligence community workforce and include-- (A) an assessment of the capabilities of such workforce; (B) an examination of issues of recruiting, retention, and the professional development of such workforce, including the possibility of providing retention bonuses or other forms of compensation; (C) an assessment of the benefits of outreach and training with both private industry and academic institutions with respect to such workforce; and (D) an assessment of the impact of the establishment of the Department of Defense Cyber Command on personnel and authorities of the intelligence community; (3) making the intelligence community workforce and the public aware of cybersecurity best practices and principles; (4) coordinating the intelligence community response to a cybersecurity incident; (5) collaborating with industry and academia to improve cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, the defense industrial base, and financial networks; (6) addressing such other matters as the President considers necessary to secure the cyberinfrastructure of the intelligence community; and (7) reviewing procurement laws and classification issues to determine how to allow for greater information sharing on specific cyber threats and attacks between private industry and the intelligence community. (b) Updates.--Not later than 90 days after the date on which the plan referred to in subsection (a) is submitted to Congress, and every 90 days thereafter until the President submits the certification referred to in subsection (c), the President shall report to Congress on the status of the implementation of such plan and the progress towards the objectives of such plan. (c) Certification.--The President may submit to Congress a certification that the objectives of the plan referred to in subsection (a) have been achieved. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report assessing the threat posed by the missile arsenal of Iran to allies and interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf. (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a study on the best practices of foreign governments (including the intelligence services of such governments) to combat violent domestic extremism. (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a). Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to Congress a report on the best practices or impediments to information sharing in the Federal Bureau of Investigation-New York Police Department Joint Terrorism Task Force, including ways in which the combining of Federal, State, and local law enforcement resources can result in the effective utilization of such resources. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress and the President a report describing the improvements to information technology needed to enable elements of the Federal Government that are not part of the intelligence community to better share information with elements of the intelligence community. Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report in unclassified form describing the future threats to describing the future threats to the national security of the United States from continued and increased dependence of the United States on oil sources from foreign nations. Page 70, strike lines 1 through 7. Page 74, line 16, strike ``includes'' and insert ``means''. Page 75, line 24, strike the closing quotation mark and the final period. Page 75, after line 24, insert the following: ``(D) Terrorist screening purpose.--The term `terrorist screening purpose' means-- ``(i) the collection, analysis, dissemination, and use of terrorist identity information to determine threats to the national security of the United States from a terrorist or terrorism; and ``(ii) the use of such information for risk assessment, inspection, and credentialing.''. Page 86, line 11, strike ``the congressional defense committees'' and insert ``Congress''. Page 87, line 17, strike ``the''. At the end of subtitle E of title III (Page 88, after line 18), add the following new section: (a) Finding.--Congress finds that suspected terrorists have attempted to enter the United States through the international land and maritime border of the United States and Canada. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the intelligence community should devote sufficient resources, including technological and human resources, to identifying and thwarting potential threats at the international land and maritime border of the United States and Canada; and (2) the intelligence community should work closely with the Government of Canada to identify and apprehend suspected terrorists before such terrorists enter the United States. Page 96, line 14, insert after the period the following: ``Nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit a personnel action with respect to the Inspector General otherwise authorized by law, other than transfer or removal.''. At the end of subtitle A of title IV (Page 116, after line 6), add the following new section: The Director of National Intelligence may provide support for any review conducted by a department or agency of the Federal Government of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations or Export Administration Regulations, including a review of technologies and goods on the United States Munitions List and Commerce Control List that may warrant controls that are different or additional to the controls such technologies and goods are subject to at the time of such review. Strike section 411 (Page 116, line 9 and all that follows through line 2 on page 118) and insert the following new section: Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(4)-- (A) by striking ``(4) If'' and inserting ``(4)(A) If''; and (B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) The Director may waive the requirement to submit the statement required under subparagraph (A) within seven days of prohibiting an audit, inspection, or investigation under paragraph (3) if such audit, inspection, or investigation is related to a covert action program. If the Director waives such requirement in accordance with this subparagraph, the Director shall submit the statement required under subparagraph (A) as soon as practicable, along with an explanation of the reasons for delaying the submission of such statement.''; (2) in subsection (d)(1)-- (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) and (F) as subsections (F) and (G), respectively; and (B) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new subparagraph: ``(E) a list of the covert actions for which the Inspector General has not completed an audit within the preceding three-year period;''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(h) Covert Action Defined.--In this section, the term `covert action' has the meaning given the term in section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(e)).''. Strike section 426 (Page 128, line 21 and all that follows through line 15 on page 129). Strike section 427 (Page 129, lines 16 through 25). Strike section 502 (Page 133, line 1 and all that follow through line 10 on page 134). At the end of subtitle A of title V (Page 135, after line 12), add the following new section: (a) Establishment.--There is established a cybersecurity task force (in this section referred to as the ``Task Force''). (b) Membership.-- (1) In general.--The Task Force shall consist of the following members: (A) One member appointed by the Attorney General. (B) One member appointed by the Director of the National Security Agency. (C) One member appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. (D) One member appointed by the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator. (E) One member appointed by the head of any other agency or department that is designated by the Attorney General to appoint a member to the Task Force. (2) Chair.--The member of the Task Force appointed pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) shall serve as the Chair of the Task Force. (c) Study.--The Task Force shall conduct a study of existing tools and provisions of law used by the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to protect the cybersecurity of the United States. (d) Report.-- (1) Initial.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a report containing guidelines or legislative recommendations to improve the capabilities of the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to protect the cybersecurity of the United States. Such report shall include guidelines or legislative recommendations on-- (A) improving the ability of the intelligence community to detect hostile actions and attribute attacks to specific parties; (B) the need for data retention requirements to assist the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies; (C) improving the ability of the intelligence community to anticipate nontraditional targets of foreign intelligence services; and (D) the adequacy of existing criminal statutes to successfully deter cyber attacks, including statutes criminalizing the facilitation of criminal acts, the scope of laws for which a cyber crime constitutes a predicate offense, trespassing statutes, data breach notification requirements, and victim restitution statutes. (2) Subsequent.--Not later than one year after the date on which the initial report is submitted under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for two years, the Task Force shall submit to Congress an update of the report required under paragraph (1). (e) Termination.--The Task Force shall terminate on the date that is 60 days after the date on which the last update (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Interrogations Prohibition Act of The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and a Member opposed each will control 10 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.", u" Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence (a) Consultation.--The Director of National Intelligence shall consult with the heads of the Federal land management agencies on the appropriate actions the intelligence community can take to assist such agencies in responding to the threat from covered entities that are currently or have previously used public lands in the United States to further the operations of such entities. (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report on the results of the consultation under subsection (a). Such report shall include-- (1) an assessment of the intelligence community collection efforts dedicated to covered entities, including any collection gaps or inefficiencies; and (2) an assessment of the ability of the intelligence community to assist Federal land management agencies in identifying and protecting public lands from illegal drug grows and other activities and threats of covered entities, including through the sharing of intelligence information. (c) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means an international drug trafficking organization or other actor involved in drug trafficking generally. (2) Federal land management agency.--The term ``Federal land management agency'' includes-- (A) the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture; (B) the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior; (C) the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior; (D) the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior; and (E) the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior. (3) Public lands.--The term ``public lands'' means land under the management of a Federal land management agency. For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the requirements of section 3515 of title 31, United States Code, to submit an audited financial statement shall not apply to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence if the Director of National Intelligence determines and notifies Congress that audited financial statements for such years for such Office cannot be produced on a cost-effective basis. Section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3h) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(o) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence information relating to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community including methods to contact the Inspector General. ``(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''. Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to the Chief Information Officer, Small Business Administration the following new item: ``Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.''. Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection: ``(e) Temporary Filling of Vacancies.--With respect to filling temporarily a vacancy in an office within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (other than that of the Director of National Intelligence), section 3345(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, may be applied-- ``(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by substituting `an element of the intelligence community, as that term is defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)),' for `such Executive agency'; and ``(2) in subparagraph (A), by substituting `the intelligence community' for `such agency'.''. Section 12 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403l(a)) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; and (B) by striking the second and third sentences and inserting the following: ``(2) Any gift accepted under this section (and any income produced by any such gift)-- ``(A) may be used only for--'' ``(i) artistic display; ``(ii) purposes relating to the general welfare, education, or recreation of employees or dependents of employees of the Agency or for similar purposes; or ``(iii) purposes relating to the welfare, education, or recreation of an individual described in paragraph (3); and ``(B) under no circumstances may such a gift (or any income produced by any such gift) be used for operational purposes. ``(3) An individual described in this paragraph is an individual who-- ``(A) is an employee or a former employee of the Agency who suffered injury or illness while employed by the Agency that-- ``(i) resulted from hostile or terrorist activities; ``(ii) occurred in connection with an intelligence activity having a significant element of risk; or ``(iii) occurred under other circumstances determined by the Director to be analogous to the circumstances described in clause (i) or (ii); ``(B) is a family member of such an employee or former employee; or ``(C) is a surviving family member of an employee of the Agency who died in circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A). ``(4) The Director may not accept any gift under this section that is expressly conditioned upon any expenditure not to be met from the gift itself or from income produced by the gift unless such expenditure has been authorized by law. ``(5) The Director may, in the Director's discretion, determine that an individual described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3) may accept a gift for the purposes described in paragraph (2)(A)(iii).''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(f) The Director, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations to carry out the authority provided in this section. Such regulations shall ensure that such authority is exercised consistent with all relevant ethical constraints and principles, including-- ``(1) the avoidance of any prohibited conflict of interest or appearance of impropriety; and ``(2) a prohibition against the acceptance of a gift from a (a) In General.--Section 104A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(g)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)-- (i) by inserting ``in the Directorate of Intelligence career service or the National Clandestine Service career service'' after ``an individual''; (ii) by inserting ``or promoted'' after ``appointed''; and (iii) by striking ``individual--'' and inserting ``individual has been certified as having a professional speaking and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such proficiency being at least level 3 on the Interagency Language Roundtable Language Skills Level or commensurate proficiency level using such other indicator of proficiency as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate.''; (B) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B); and (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``position or category of positions'' both places that term appears and inserting ``position, category of positions, or occupation''. (b) Effective Date.--Section 611(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 50 U.S.C. 403-4a note) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``or promotions'' after ``appointments''; and (2) by striking ``that is one year after the date''. (c) Report on Waivers.--Section 611(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 118 Stat. 3955) is amended-- (1) in the first sentence-- (A) by striking ``positions'' and inserting ``individual waivers''; and (B) by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; and (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``position or category of positions'' and inserting ``position, category of positions, or occupation''. (d) Report on Transfers.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and on an annual basis for each of the following 3 years, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the number of Senior Intelligence Service employees of the Agency who-- (1) were transferred during the reporting period to a Senior Intelligence Service position in the Directorate of Intelligence career service or the National Clandestine Service career service; and (2) did not meet the foreign language requirements specified in section 104A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(g)(1)) at the time of such transfer. Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(h) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall establish and maintain on the homepage of the Agency's publicly accessible website information relating to the Office of the Inspector General including methods to contact the Inspector General. ``(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related to the Office of the Inspector General.''. (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) On May 1, 2011, United States personnel killed terrorist leader Osama bin Laden during the course of a targeted strike against his secret compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. (2) Osama bin Laden was the leader of the al Qaeda terrorist organization, the most significant terrorism threat to the United States and the international community. (3) Osama bin Laden was the architect of terrorist attacks which killed nearly 3,000 civilians on September 11, 2001, the most deadly terrorist attack against our Nation, in which al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four airplanes and crashed them into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and, due to heroic efforts by civilian passengers to disrupt the terrorists, near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. (4) Osama bin Laden planned or supported numerous other deadly terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies, including the 1998 bombings of United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and against innocent civilians in countries around the world, including the 2004 attack on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain and the 2005 bombings of the mass transit system in London, England. (5) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States, under President George W. Bush, led an international coalition into Afghanistan to dismantle al Qaeda, deny them a safe haven in Afghanistan and ungoverned areas along the Pakistani border, and bring Osama bin Laden to justice. (6) President Barack Obama in 2009 committed additional forces and resources to efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan as ``the central front in our enduring struggle against terrorism and extremism''. (7) The valiant members of the United States Armed Forces have courageously and vigorously pursued al Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and around the world. (8) The anonymous, unsung heroes of the intelligence community have pursued al Qaeda and affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world with tremendous dedication, sacrifice, and professionalism. (9) The close collaboration between the Armed Forces and the intelligence community prompted the Director of National Intelligence, General James Clapper, to state, ``Never have I seen a more remarkable example of focused integration, seamless collaboration, and sheer professional magnificence as was demonstrated by the Intelligence Community in the ultimate demise of Osama bin Laden.''. (10) While the death of Osama bin Laden represents a significant blow to the al Qaeda organization and its affiliates and to terrorist organizations around the world, terrorism remains a critical threat to United States national security. (11) President Obama said, ``For over two decades, bin Laden has been al Qaeda's leader and symbol, and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our Nation's effort to defeat al Qaeda.''. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the raid that killed Osama bin Laden demonstrated the best of the intelligence community's capabilities and teamwork; (2) for years to come, Americans will look back at this event as a defining point in the history of the United States; (3) it is vitally important that the United States memorialize all the events that led to the raid so that future generations will have an official record of the events that transpired before, during, and as a result of the operation; and (4) preserving this history now will allow the United States to have an accurate account of the events while those that participated in the events are still serving in the Government. (c) Report on the Operation That Killed Osama Bin Laden.-- Not later than 90 days after the completion of the report being prepared by the Center for the Study of Intelligence that documents the history of and lessons learned from the raid that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit such report to the congressional intelligence committees. (d) Preservation of Records.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall preserve any records, including intelligence information and assessments, used to generate the report described in subsection (c). (a) Study.--The Inspector General of the Office of Personnel Management, in consultation with the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall carry out a study of the personnel authorities and available personnel benefits of the Office of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. Such study shall include-- (1) identification of any barriers or disincentives to the recruitment or retention of experienced investigators within the Office of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (2) a comparison of the personnel authorities of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency with personnel authorities of Inspectors General of other agencies and departments of the United States, including a comparison of the benefits available to experienced investigators within the Office of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency with similar benefits available within the offices of Inspectors General of such other agencies or departments. (b) Recommendations.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Office of Personnel Management shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives-- (1) a report on the results of the study conducted under subsection (a); and (2) any recommendations for legislative action based on such results. (c) Funding.--Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall transfer to the Inspector General of the Office of Personnel Management such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section. (a) Authority To Transport Apprehended Persons.--Paragraph (5) of section 11(a) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended to read as follows: ``(5) Agency personnel authorized by the Director under paragraph (1) may transport an individual apprehended under the authority of this section from the premises at which the individual was apprehended, as described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), for the purpose of transferring such individual to the custody of law enforcement officials. Such transportation may be provided only to make a transfer of custody at a location within 30 miles of the premises described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).''. (b) Conforming Amendment Relating to Tort Liability.-- Paragraph (1) of section 11(d) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(D) transport an individual pursuant to subsection (a)(2).''. Section 3(4)(K) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(K)) is amended to read as follows: ``(K) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.''. Subsection (b) of section 6372 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) and notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, neither an excepted agency nor any individual employed in or under an excepted agency may be included in a leave bank program established under any of the preceding provisions of this subchapter. ``(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may authorize an individual employed by the Bureau to participate in a leave bank program administered by the Department of Justice under this subchapter if in the Director's judgment such participation will not adversely affect the protection of intelligence sources and methods.''. (a) In General.--Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 428 the following new section: (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on the training standards of the defense intelligence workforce. Such report shall include-- (1) a description of existing training, education, and professional development standards applied to personnel of defense intelligence components; and (2) an assessment of the ability to implement a certification program for personnel of the defense intelligence components based on achievement of required training, education, and professional development standards. (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Defense intelligence components.--The term ``defense intelligence components'' means-- (A) the National Security Agency; (B) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (C) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (D) the National Reconnaissance Office; (E) the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps; and (F) other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs. (2) Defense intelligence workforce.--The term ``defense intelligence workforce'' means the personnel of the defense intelligence components. Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on whether restrictions on the use of airspace are hampering the use of unmanned aerial vehicles by the Department of Homeland Security along the international border between the United States and Mexico. It is the sense of Congress that ten years after the terrorist attacks upon the United States on September 11, 2001, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, should continue to integrate and utilize fusion centers to enlist all of the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security capabilities of the United States in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution to prevent acts of terrorism against the United States. (a) Strategy.-- (1) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall establish a coordinated strategy utilizing all available personnel and assets for intelligence collection and analysis to identify and counter network activity and operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan relating to the development and use of improvised explosive devices. (2) Contents.--The strategy established under paragraph (1) shall identify-- (A) the networks that design improvised explosive devices, provide training on improvised explosive device assembly and employment, and smuggle improvised explosive device components into Afghanistan; (B) the persons and organizations not directly affiliated with insurgents in Afghanistan who knowingly enable the movement of commercial products and material used in improvised explosive device construction from factories and vendors in Pakistan into Afghanistan; (C) the financiers, financial networks, institutions, and funding streams that provide resources to the insurgency in Afghanistan; and (D) the links to military, intelligence services, and government officials who are complicit in allowing the insurgent networks in Afghanistan to operate. (b) Report and Implementation.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall-- (1) submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report containing the strategy established under subsection (a); and (2) implement such strategy. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the nation's railway transportation (including subway transit) network is broad and technically complex, requiring robust communication between private sector stakeholders and the intelligence community to identify, monitor, and respond to threats; (2) the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis maintains a constructive relationship with other Federal agencies, state and local governments, and private entities to safeguard our railways; and (3) railway transportation security (including subway transit security) should continue to be prioritized in the critical infrastructure threat assessment developed by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and included in threat assessment budgets of the intelligence community. The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 3(6) (50 U.S.C. 401a(6)), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; (2) in section 506(b) (50 U.S.C. 415a(b)), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence.'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence.''; and (3) in section 506A(c)(2)(C) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(c)(2)(C), by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' both places that term appears and inserting ``National Intelligence Program''. Section 351(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``the Director (or a person nominated to be Director during the pendency of such nomination) or Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence,'' after ``in such department,''; and (2) by striking ``Central Intelligence,'' and inserting ``the Central Intelligence Agency,''. The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation'' for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that such ", u"Pursuant to House Resolution 827 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community, terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and international cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes, with Mr. Nethercutt (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, all time for general debate had expired. In lieu of the amendments printed in the bill, it shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of the Rules Committee print dated October 4, 2004. That amendment shall be considered read. The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: This Act may be cited as the ``9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act''. The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Subtitle A--Establishment of National Intelligence Director Subtitle E--Improvement of Education for the Intelligence Community Subtitle B--Stop Terrorist and Military Hoaxes Act of 2004 Subtitle C--Reform of Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations Subtitle E--Provisions Relating to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan Subtitle G--Additional Protections of United States Aviation System Subtitle A--Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders Chapter 2--Federal Bureau of Investigation Revitalization This title may be cited as the ``National Security Intelligence Improvement Act of 2004''. Subtitle A--Establishment of National Intelligence Director (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 102 through 104 and inserting the following new sections: Paragraph (5) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as follows: ``(5) The terms `national intelligence' and `intelligence related to national security' refer to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside the United States, that-- ``(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by the President, to more than one United States Government agency; and ``(B) that involves-- ``(i) threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; ``(ii) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or ``(iii) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security.''. (a) Development of Procedures.--The National Intelligence Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall develop joint procedures to be used by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to improve the coordination and deconfliction of operations that involve elements of both the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency consistent with national security and the protection of human intelligence sources and methods. Those procedures shall, at a minimum, provide the following: (1) Methods by which the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense can improve communication and coordination in the planning, execution, and sustainment of operations, including, as a minimum-- (A) information exchange between senior officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and senior officers and officials of the Department of Defense when planning for such an operation commences by either organization; and (B) exchange of information between the Secretary and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to ensure that senior operational officials in both the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have knowledge of the existence of the ongoing operations of the other. (2) When appropriate, in cases where the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are conducting separate missions in the same geographical area, mutual agreement on the tactical and strategic objectives for the region and a clear delineation of operational responsibilities to prevent conflict and duplication of effort. (b) Implementation Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Act, the National Intelligence Director shall submit to the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101 of title 10, United States Code) and the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(7))) a report describing the procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) and the status of the implementation of those procedures. Section 106 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is amended by striking all after the heading and inserting the following: ``(a) Recommendation of NID in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an individual for nomination to fill the vacancy. ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: ``(A) The Deputy National Intelligence Director. ``(B) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. ``(b) Concurrence of NID in Appointments to Positions in the Intelligence Community.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the National Intelligence Director before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency concerned may not fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be). In the case in which the National Intelligence Director does not concur in such a recommendation, the Director and the head of the department or agency concerned may advise the President directly of the intention to withhold concurrence or to make a recommendation, as the case may be. ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: ``(A) The Director of the National Security Agency. ``(B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. ``(C) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(c) Consultation With National Intelligence Director in Certain Positions.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall consult with the National Intelligence Director before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy. ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: ``(A) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(B) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. ``(C) The Director of the Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy. ``(D) The Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy. ``(E) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. ``(F) The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or successor. ``(G) The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. ``(H) The Deputy Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence. (a) Initial Appointment of the National Intelligence Director.--Notwithstanding section 102(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 1011(a), the individual serving as the Director of Central Intelligence on the date immediately preceding the date of the enactment of this Act may, at the discretion of the President, become the initial National Intelligence Director. (b) General References.--(1) Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the National Intelligence Director. (2) Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (3) Any reference to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in the Deputy Director's capacity as deputy to the head of the intelligence community in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Deputy National Intelligence Director. (4) Any reference to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community Management and Resources. (a) Executive Schedule Level I.--Section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding the end the following new item: ``National Intelligence Director.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new items: ``Deputy National Intelligence Director. ``Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.''. (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The effective use of information, from all available sources, is essential to the fight against terror and the protection of our homeland. (2) The United States Government has access to a vast amount of information, including not only traditional intelligence but also other government databases, such as those containing customs or immigration information. (3) In the period preceding September 11, 2001, there were instances of potentially helpful information that was available but that no person knew to ask for; information that was distributed only in compartmented channels, and information that was requested but could not be shared. (4) The current system, in which each intelligence agency has its own security practices, requires a demonstrated ``need to know'' before sharing. (5) The National Intelligence Director should pursue setting an executable government-wide security mode policy of ``right-to-share,'' one based on a proven blend of both integrity and access control models and supported by applicable law. No single agency can create a meaningful government-wide information sharing system on its own. (b) Establishment of Information Sharing Environment.--The President shall establish a secure information sharing environment (ISE) for the sharing of intelligence and related information in a manner consistent with national security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties. The information sharing environment (ISE) shall be based on clearly defined and consistently applied policies and procedures, and valid investigative, analytical, and operational requirements. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Civil Liberties Protection Officer.--(1) Within the Office of the National Intelligence Director, there is a Civil Liberties Protection Officer who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (2) The Civil Liberties Protection Officer shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The Civil Liberties Protection Officer shall-- (1) ensure that the protection of civil liberties and privacy is appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures developed for and implemented by the Office of the National Intelligence Director and the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; (2) oversee compliance by the Office and the National Intelligence Director with requirements under the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines relating to civil liberties and privacy; (3) review and assess complaints and other information indicating possible abuses of civil liberties and privacy in the administration of the programs and operations of the Office and the National Intelligence Director and, as appropriate, investigate any such complaint or information; (4) ensure that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information; (5) ensure that personal information contained in a system of records subject to section 552a of title 5, United States Code (popularly referred to as the `Privacy Act'), is handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in that section; (6) conduct privacy impact assessments when appropriate or as required by law; and (7) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the National Intelligence Director or specified by law. (c) Use of Agency Inspectors General.--When appropriate, the Civil Liberties Protection Officer may refer complaints to the Office of Inspector General having responsibility for the affected element of the department or agency of the intelligence community to conduct an investigation under paragraph (3) of subsection (b). (a) Establishment.--(1) There is hereby established a Joint Intelligence Community Council. (b) Functions.--(1) The Joint Intelligence Community Council shall provide advice to the National Intelligence Director as appropriate. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall consult with the Joint Intelligence Community Council in developing guidance for the development of the annual National Intelligence Program budget. (c) Membership.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council shall consist of the following: (1) The National Intelligence Director, who shall chair the Council. (2) The Secretary of State. (3) The Secretary of the Treasury. (4) The Secretary of Defense. (5) The Attorney General. (6) The Secretary of Energy. (7) The Secretary of Homeland Security. (8) Such other officials of the executive branch as the President may designate. It is a sense of Congress that-- (1) the human intelligence officers of the intelligence community have performed admirably and honorably in the face of great personal dangers; (2) during an extended period of unprecedented investment and improvements in technical collection means, the human intelligence capabilities of the United States have not received the necessary and commensurate priorities; (3) human intelligence is becoming an increasingly important capability to provide information on the asymmetric threats to the national security of the United States; (4) the continued development and improvement of a robust and empowered and flexible human intelligence work force is critical to identifying, understanding, and countering the plans and intentions of the adversaries of the United States; and (5) an increased emphasis on, and resources applied to, enhancing the depth and breadth of human intelligence capabilities of the United States intelligence community must be among the top priorities of the National Intelligence Director. Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall submit to Congress a report on existing human intelligence (HUMINT) capacity which shall include a plan to implement changes, as necessary, to accelerate improvements to, and increase the capacity of, HUMINT across the intelligence community. Subtitle E--Improvement of Education for the Intelligence Community (a) In General.--(1) Subsection (b)(2) of section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended to read as follows: ``(2) will meet the requirements for obligated service described in subsection (j); and''. (2) Such section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(j) Requirements for Obligated Service in the Government.--(1) Each recipient of a scholarship or a fellowship under the program shall work in a specified national security position. In this subsection, the term `specified national security position' means a position of a department or agency of the United States that the Secretary certifies is appropriate to use the unique language and region expertise acquired by the recipient pursuant to the study for which scholarship or fellowship assistance (as the case may be) was provided under the program. ``(2) Each such recipient shall commence work in a specified national security position as soon as practicable but in no case later than two years after the completion by the recipient of the study for which scholarship or fellowship assistance (as the case may be) was provided under the program. ``(3) Each such recipient shall work in a specified national security position for a period specified by the Secretary, which period shall include-- ``(A) in the case of a recipient of a scholarship, one year of service for each year, or portion thereof, for which such scholarship assistance was provided, and ``(B) in the case of a recipient of a fellowship, not less than one nor more than three years for each year, or portion thereof, for which such fellowship assistance was provided. ``(4) Recipients shall seek specified national security positions as follows: ``(A) In the Department of Defense or in any element of the intelligence community. ``(B) In the Department of State or in the Department of Homeland Security, if the recipient demonstrates to the Secretary that no position is available in the Department of Defense or in any element of the intelligence community. ``(C) In any other Federal department or agency not referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B), if the recipient demonstrates to the Secretary that no position is available in a Federal department or agency specified in such paragraphs.''. (b) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to carry out subsection (j) of section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991, as added by subsection (a). In prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall establish standards that recipients of scholarship and fellowship assistance under the program under section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 are required to demonstrate in order to satisfy the requirement of a good faith effort to gain employment as required under such subsection. (c) Applicability.--(1) The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to service agreements entered into under the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) The amendments made by subsection (a) shall not affect the force, validity, or terms of any service agreement entered into under the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 before the date of the enactment of this Act that is in force as of that date. (a) Increase in Annual Authorization of Appropriations.-- (1) Title VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 1271), as amended by section 311(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-178; 107 Stat. 2037) and by section 333(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2397), is amended in subsection (a) of section 811 by striking ``there is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000,'' and inserting ``there is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of fiscal years 2003 and 2004, $10,000,000, and for fiscal year 2005 and each subsequent fiscal year, $12,000,000,''. (2) Subsection (b) of such section is amended by inserting ``for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 only'' after ``authorization of appropriations under subsection (a)''. (b) Requirement for Employment Agreements.--(1) Section 802(i) of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(5)(A) In the case of an undergraduate or graduate student that participates in training in programs under paragraph (1), the student shall enter into an agreement described in subsection (b), other than such a student who has entered into such an agreement pursuant to subparagraph (A)(ii) or (B)(ii) of section 802(a)(1). ``(B) In the case of an employee of an agency or department of the Federal Government that participates in training in programs under paragraph (1), the employee shall agree in writing-- ``(i) to continue in the service of the agency or department of the Federal Government employing the employee for the period of such training; ``(ii) to continue in the service of such agency or department employing the employee following completion of such training for a period of two years for each year, or part of the year, of such training; ``(iii) to reimburse the United States for the total cost of such training (excluding the employee's pay and allowances) provided to the employee if, before the completion by the employee of the training, the employment of the employee by the agency or department is terminated due to misconduct by the employee or by the employee voluntarily; and ``(iv) to reimburse the United States if, after completing such training, the employment of the employee by the agency or department is terminated either by the agency or department due to misconduct by the employee or by the employee voluntarily, before the completion by the employee of the period of service required in clause (ii), in an amount that bears the same ratio to the total cost of the training (excluding the employee's pay and allowances) provided to the employee as the unserved portion of such period of service bears to the total period of service under clause (ii). ``(C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the obligation to reimburse the United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A) is for all purposes a debt owing the United States. ``(D) The head of an element of the intelligence community may release an employee, in whole or in part, from the obligation to reimburse the United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A) when, in the discretion of the head of the element, the head of the element determines that equity or the interests of the United States so require.''. (2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply to training that begins on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (c) Increase in the Number of Participating Educational Institutions.--The Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as the Secretary determines will increase the number of qualified educational institutions that receive grants under the National Flagship Language Initiative to establish, operate, or improve activities designed to train students in programs in a range of disciplines to achieve advanced levels of proficiency in those foreign languages that the Secretary identifies as being the most critical in the interests of the national security of the United States. (d) Clarification of Authority to Support Studies Abroad.-- Educational institutions that receive grants under the National Flagship Language Initiative may support students who pursue total immersion foreign language studies overseas of foreign languages that are critical to the national security of the United States. (a) Scholarship Program for English Language Studies for Heritage Community Citizens of the United States.--(1) Subsection (a)(1) of section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended-- (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (C); (B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D) and inserting ``; and''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(E) awarding scholarships to students who-- ``(i) are United States citizens who-- (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that there should be within the Office of the National Intelligence Director a senior official responsible to assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the Director's responsibilities for establishing policies and procedure for foreign language education and training of the intelligence community. The duties of such official should include the following: (1) Overseeing and coordinating requirements for foreign language education and training of the intelligence community. (2) Establishing policy, standards, and priorities relating to such requirements. (3) Identifying languages that are critical to the capability of the intelligence community to carry out national security activities of the United States. (4) Monitoring the allocation of resources for foreign language education and training in order to ensure the requirements of the intelligence community with respect to foreign language proficiency are met. (b) Reports.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall submit to Congress the following reports: (1) A report that identifies-- (A) skills and processes involved in learning a foreign language; and (B) characteristics and teaching techniques that are most effective in teaching foreign languages. (2)(A) A report that identifies foreign language heritage communities, particularly such communities that include speakers of languages that are critical to the national security of the United States. (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ``foreign language heritage community'' means a community of residents or citizens of the United States-- (i) who are native speakers of, or who have fluency in, a foreign language; and (ii) who should be actively recruited for employment by Federal security agencies with a need for linguists. (3) A report on-- (A) the estimated cost of establishing a program under which the heads of elements of the intelligence community agree to repay employees of the intelligence community for any student loan taken out by that employee for the study of foreign languages critical for the national security of the United States; and (B) the effectiveness of such a program in recruiting and retaining highly qualified personnel in the intelligence community. (a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.) is amended-- (1) by inserting before section 1001 (50 U.S.C. 441g) the following: (a) Pilot Project.--The National Intelligence Director shall conduct a pilot project to establish a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps comprised of United States citizens with advanced levels of proficiency in foreign languages who would be available upon a call of the President to perform such service or duties with respect to such foreign languages in the Federal Government as the President may specify. (b) Conduct of Project.--Taking into account the findings and recommendations contained in the report required under section 325 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2393), in conducting the pilot project under subsection (a) the National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) identify several foreign languages that are critical for the national security of the United States; (2) identify United States citizens with advanced levels of proficiency in those foreign languages who would be available to perform the services and duties referred to in subsection (a); and (3) implement a call for the performance of such services and duties. (c) Duration of Project.--The pilot project under subsection (a) shall be conducted for a three-year period. (d) Authority To Enter Into Contracts.--The National Intelligence Director may enter into contracts with appropriate agencies or entities to carry out the pilot project under subsection (a). (e) Reports.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall submit to Congress an initial and a final report on the pilot project conducted under subsection (a). (2) Each report required under paragraph (1) shall contain information on the operation of the pilot project, the success of the pilot project in carrying out the objectives of the establishment of a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, and recommendations for the continuation or expansion of the pilot project. (3) The final report shall be submitted not later than 6 months after the completion of the project. (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the National Intelligence Director such sums as are necessary for each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007 in order to carry out the pilot project under subsection (a). (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 1021(a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study on methods to improve the recruitment and retention of qualified foreign language instructors at the Foreign Language Center of the Defense Language Institute. In conducting the study, the Secretary shall consider, in the case of a foreign language instructor who is an alien, to expeditiously adjust the status of the alien from a temporary status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. (b) Report.--(1) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the study conducted under subsection (a), and shall include in that report recommendations for such changes in legislation and regulation as the Secretary determines to be appropriate. (2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following: (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (a) Extension of Program.--Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (f); and (2) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively. (b) Termination of Funds Remittance Requirement.--(1) Section 2 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is further amended by striking subsection (i). (2) Section 4(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331 note) is amended by striking ``, or section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public Law 103-36; 107 Stat. 104)''. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 19. (a) There is established the National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel. The panel is a standing panel of the National Security Agency. The panel shall be appointed by, and shall report directly to, the Director. ``(b) The National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel shall study and assess, and periodically advise the Director on, the research, development, and application of existing and emerging science and technology advances, advances on encryption, and other topics. ``(c) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply with respect to the National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel.''. The National Intelligence Director, in cooperation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, should seek to ensure that each service laboratory of the Department of Defense and each national laboratory of the Department of Energy may, acting through the relevant Secretary and in a manner consistent with the missions and commitments of the laboratory-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in all aspects of technical intelligence, including research, applied sciences, analysis, technology evaluation and assessment, and any other aspect that the relevant Secretary considers appropriate; and (2) make available to the intelligence community, on a community-wide basis-- (A) the analysis and production services of the service and national laboratories, in a manner that maximizes the capacity and services of such laboratories; and (B) the facilities and human resources of the service and national laboratories, in a manner that improves the technological capabilities of the intelligence community. (a) Requirement for Prompt Translation and Transmission.-- The National Intelligence Director shall develop and transmit to the appropriate agencies guidelines to ensure that all suspected terrorist communications, including transmissions, are translated and delivered in a manner consistent with timelines contained in regulations of the Federal Bureau of Investigations to the extent practicable. (b) Prevention of Deletion of Terrorist Communications.-- The National Intelligence Director shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that terrorist communications are not deleted or discarded before those communications are translated. (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director'': (A) Section 3(5)(B) (50 U.S.C. 401a(5)(B)). (B) Section 101(h)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(2)(A)). (C) Section 101(h)(5) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(5)). (D) Section 101(i)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(i)(2)(A)). (E) Section 101(j) (50 U.S.C. 402(j)). (F) Section 105(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)). (G) Section 105(b)(6)(A) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(b)(6)(A)). (H) Section 105B(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(1)). (I) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), the first place it appears. (J) Section 110(b) (50 U.S.C. 404e(b)). (K) Section 110(c) (50 U.S.C. 404e(c)). (L) Section 112(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(a)(1)). (M) Section 112(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)). (N) Section 113(b)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 404h(b)(2)(A)). (O) Section 114(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(a)(1)). (P) Section 114(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(b)(1)). (R) Section 115(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404j(a)(1)). (S) Section 115(b) (50 U.S.C. 404j(b)). (T) Section 115(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404j(c)(1)(B)). (U) Section 116(a) (50 U.S.C. 404k(a)). (V) Section 117(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404l(a)(1)). (W) Section 303(a) (50 U.S.C. 405(a)), both places it appears. (X) Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C. 413(d)). (Y) Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)). (Z) Section 502(c) (50 U.S.C. 413a(c)). (AA) Section 503(b) (50 U.S.C. 413b(b)). (BB) Section 504(a)(3)(C) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(C)). (CC) Section 504(d)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(d)(2)). (DD) Section 506A(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(a)(1)). (EE) Section 603(a) (50 U.S.C. 423(a)). (FF) Section 702(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(1)). (GG) Section 702(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(6)(B)(viii)). (HH) Section 702(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(b)(1)), both places it appears. (II) Section 703(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(a)(1)). (JJ) Section 703(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 432a(a)(6)(B)(viii)). (KK) Section 703(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(b)(1)), both places it appears. (LL) Section 704(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432b(a)(1)). (MM) Section 704(f)(2)(H) (50 U.S.C. 432b(f)(2)(H)). (NN) Section 704(g)(1)) (50 U.S.C. 432b(g)(1)), both places it appears. (OO) Section 1001(a) (50 U.S.C. 441g(a)). (PP) Section 1102(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(a)(1)). (QQ) Section 1102(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)(1)). (RR) Section 1102(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(c)(1)). (SS) Section 1102(d) (50 U.S.C. 442a(d)). (2) That Act is further amended by striking ``of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following provisions: (A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)). (B) Section 105B(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(2)). (C) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), the second place it appears. (3) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director'' each place it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director'': (A) Section 114(c) (50 U.S.C. 404i(c)). (B) Section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)). (C) Section 1001(b) (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)). (C) Section 1001(c) (50 U.S.C. 441g(c)), the first place it appears. (D) Section 1001(d)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 441g(d)(1)(B)). (E) Section 1001(e) (50 U.S.C. 441g(e)), the first place it appears. (4) Section 114A of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency'' (5) Section 504(a)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (6) Section 701 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``Operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency may be exempted by the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with the coordination of the National Intelligence Director, may exempt operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency''; and (B) in subsection (g)(1), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Director''. (7) The heading for section 114 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended to read as follows: (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) Section 101(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402(j)) is amended by striking ``Deputy Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Deputy National Intelligence Director''. (2) Section 112(d)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of this Act'' and inserting ``section 102A(g) of this Act''. (3) Section 116(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended by striking ``to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director may delegate such authority to the Deputy Director for Operations'' and inserting ``to the Deputy National Intelligence Director, or with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (4) Section 506A(b)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''. (5) Section 701(c)(3) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431(c)(3)) is amended by striking ``Office of the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''. (6) Section 1001(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)) is amended by striking ``Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''. (b) Central Intelligence Act of 1949.--Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting ``section 102A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947''. (c) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended by striking ``paragraph (6) of section 103(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) that the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``section 102A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(1)) that the National Intelligence Director''. (d) Intelligence Authorization Acts.-- (1) Public law 107-306.--(A) Section 343(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 404n-2(c)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3((c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 102A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(1))''. (B) Section 904 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (i) in subsection (c), by striking ``Office of the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''; and (ii) in subsection (l), by striking ``Office of the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''. (2) Public law 108-177.--Section 317 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 403-3 note) is amended-- (A) in subsection (g), by striking ``Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production'' and inserting ``Deputy National Intelligence Director''; and (B) in subsection (h)(2)(C), by striking ``Assistant Director'' and inserting ``Deputy National Intelligence Director''. Paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as follows: ``(4) The term `intelligence community' includes the following: ``(A) The Office of the National Intelligence Director. ``(B) The Central Intelligence Agency. ``(C) The National Security Agency. ``(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(F) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs. ``(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy. ``(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. ``(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. ``(K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard. ``(L) Such other elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the National Intelligence Director and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.''. (a) Redesignation.--Paragraph (6) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended by striking ``Foreign''. (b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 506(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a(a)) is amended by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Program''. (2) Section 17(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(f)) is amended by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Program''. (c) Heading Amendment.--The heading of section 506 of that Act is amended by striking ``foreign''. (a) Appointment of Certain Intelligence Officials.--Section 106 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is repealed. (b) Collection Tasking Authority.--Section 111 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404f) is repealed. The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended-- (1) by striking the items relating to sections 102 through 104 and inserting the following new items: Section 1 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively; and (2) by striking paragraph (2), as so redesignated, and inserting the following new paragraph (2): ``(2) `Director' means the Director of the Central Section 17(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(a)(1)) is amended by inserting before the semicolon at the end the following: ``and to programs and operations of the Office of the National Intelligence Director''. (a) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of Intelligence Community.--Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the National Intelligence Director. (b) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of CIA.--Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (c) Community Management Staff.--Any reference to the Community Management Staff in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the staff of the Office of the National Intelligence Director. (a) Political Service of Personnel.--Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subclause (XII), by striking ``or'' at the end; and (2) by inserting after subclause (XIII) the following new subclause: ``(XIV) the Office of the National Intelligence Director; or''. (b) Deletion of Information About Foreign Gifts.--Section 7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)''; (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking ``the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) In transmitting such listings for the Office of the National Intelligence Director, the National Intelligence Director may delete the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources.''. (c) Exemption from Financial Disclosures.--Section 105(a)(1) of the Ethics in Government Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by inserting ``the Office of the National Intelligence Director,'' before ``the Central Intelligence Agency''. (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of the National Intelligence Director the staff of the Community Management Staff as of the date of the enactment of this Act, including all functions and activities discharged by the Community Management Staff as of that date. (b) Administration.--The National Intelligence Director shall administer the Community Management Staff after the date of the enactment of this Act as a component of the Office of the National Intelligence Director under section 103(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 1011(a). (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the National Counterterrorism Center the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), including all functions and activities discharged by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Administration.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall administer the Terrorist Threat Integration Center after the date of the enactment of this Act as a component of the Directorate of Intelligence of the National Counterterrorism Center under section 119(i) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 1021(a). (a) Termination.--The positions within the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in subsection (b) are hereby abolished. (b) Covered Positions.--The positions within the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in this subsection are as follows: (1) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection. (2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. (3) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration. (a) Submission of Plan.--The President shall transmit to Congress a plan for the implementation of this title and the amendments made by this title. The plan shall address, at a minimum, the following: (1) The transfer of personnel, assets, and obligations to the National Intelligence Director pursuant to this title. (2) Any consolidation, reorganization, or streamlining of activities transferred to the National Intelligence Director pursuant to this title. (3) The establishment of offices within the Office of the National Intelligence Director to implement the duties and responsibilities of the National Intelligence Director as described in this title. (4) Specification of any proposed disposition of property, facilities, contracts, records, and other assets and obligations to be transferred to the National Intelligence Director. (5) Recommendations for additional legislative or administrative action as the Director considers appropriate. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the permanent location for the headquarters for the Office of the National Intelligence Director, should be at a location other than the George Bush Center for Intelligence in Langley, Virginia. Upon the request of the National Intelligence Director, the head of any executive agency may, on a reimbursable basis, provide services or detail personnel to the National Intelligence Director. (a) In General.--Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, this title and the amendments made by this title shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Specific Effective Dates.--(1)(A) Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall first appoint individuals to positions within the Office of the National Intelligence Director. (B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to the Deputy National Intelligence Director. (2) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress the implementation plan required under section 1904. (3) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations, policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines required under section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 1011(a). (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study of the promotion selection rates, and the selection rates for attendance at professional military education schools, of intelligence officers of the Armed Forces, particularly in comparison to the rates for other officers of the same Armed Force who are in the same grade and competitive category. (b) Report.--The Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report providing the Secretary's findings resulting from the study under subsection (a) and the Secretary's recommendations (if any) for such changes in law as the Secretary considers needed to ensure that intelligence officers, as a group, are selected for promotion, and for attendance at professional military education schools, at rates not less than the rates for all line (or the equivalent) officers of the same Armed Force (both in the zone and below the zone) in the same grade. The report shall be submitted not later than April 1, 2005. (a) In General.--Section 101(b)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(b)(1)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(C) engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor; or''. (b) Sunset.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall be subject to the sunset provision in section 224 of Public Law 107-56 (115 Stat. 295), including the exception provided in subsection (b) of such section 224. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Stop Terrorist and Military Hoaxes Act of 2004''. (a) Prohibition on Hoaxes.--Chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1037 the following: (a) Enhanced Penalty.--Section 1001(a) and the third undesignated paragraph of section 1505 of title 18, United States Code, are amended by striking ``be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both'' and inserting ``be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the matter relates to international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both''. (b) Sentencing Guidelines.--Not later than 30 days of the enactment of this section, the United States Sentencing Commission shall amend the Sentencing Guidelines to provide for an increased offense level for an offense under sections 1001(a) and 1505 of title 18, United States Code, if the offense involves a matter relating to international or domestic terrorism, as defined in section 2331 of such title. Section 1958 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``facility in'' and inserting ``facility of''; and (2) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``or foreign'' after ``interstate''. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Enhancement Act of 2004''. Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding after section 2339C the following new section: (a) Additions to Offense of Providing Material Support to Terrorists.--Section 2339A(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by designating the first sentence as paragraph (1); (2) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (3); (3) by inserting after paragraph (1) as so designated by this subsection the following: ``(2) (A) Whoever in a circumstance described in subparagraph (B) provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, an act of international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment or escape from the commission of any such act, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished as provided under paragraph (1) for an offense under that paragraph. ``(B) The circumstances referred to in subparagraph (A) are any of the following: ``(i) The offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce. ``(ii) The act of terrorism is an act of international or domestic terrorism that violates the criminal law of the United States. ``(iii) The act of terrorism is an act of domestic terrorism that appears to be intended to influence the policy, or affect the conduct, of the Government of the United States or a foreign government. ``(iv) An offender, acting within the United States or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is a national of the United States (as defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act , or a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the United States, and the act of terrorism is an act of international terrorism that appears to be intended to influence the policy, or affect the conduct, of the Government of the United States or a foreign government. ``(v) An offender, acting within the United States, is an alien, and the act of terrorism is an act of international terrorism that appears to be intended to influence the policy, or affect the conduct, of the Government of the United States or a foreign government. ``(vi) An offender, acting outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is an alien and the act of terrorism is an act of international terrorism that appears to be intended to influence the policy of, or affect the conduct of, the Government of the United States. ``(vii) An offender aids or abets any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph in committing an offense under this paragraph or conspires with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph to commit an offense under this paragraph.''; and (4) by inserting ``act or'' after ``underlying''. (b) Definitions.--Section 2339A(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking ``In this'' and inserting ``(1) In this''; (2) by inserting ``any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including'' after ``means''; (3) by inserting ``(one or more individuals who may be or include oneself)'' after ``personnel''; (4) by inserting ``and'' before ``transportation''; (5) by striking ``and other physical assets''; and (6) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) As used in this subsection, the term `training' means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge, and the term `expert advice or assistance' means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.''. (c) Addition to Offense of Providing Material Support to Terrorist Organizations.--Section 2339B(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking ``, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,'' and inserting ``in a circumstance described in paragraph (2)'' ; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989.''. (d) Federal Authority.--Section 2339B(d) of title 18 is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``There''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) The circumstances referred to in paragraph (1) are any of the following: ``(A) An offender is a national of the United States (as defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)) or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. ``(B) An offender is a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the United States. ``(C) After the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United States. ``(D) The offense occurs in whole or in part within the United States. ``(E) The offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce. ``(F) An offender aids or abets any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph in committing an offense under subsection (a) or conspires with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph to commit an offense under subsection (a).''. (e) Definition.--Paragraph (4) of section 2339B(g) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(4) the term `material support or resources' has the same meaning given that term in section 2339A;''. (f) Additional Provisions.--Section 2339B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(h) Provision of Personnel.--No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term `personnel' unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with one or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under that terrorist organization's direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization's direction and control. ``(i) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed or applied so as to abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.''. (a) Financing Terrorism.--Section 2339c(c)(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking ``, resources, or funds'' and inserting ``or resources, or any funds or proceeds of such funds''; (2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``were provided'' and inserting ``are to be provided, or knowing that the support or resources were provided,''; and (3) in subparagraph (B)-- (A) by striking ``or any proceeds of such funds''; and (B) by striking ``were provided or collected'' and inserting ``are to be provided or collected, or knowing that the funds were provided or collected,''. (b) Definitions.--Section 2339c(e) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (12); (2) by redesignating paragraph (13) as paragraph (14); and (3) by inserting after paragraph (12) the following: ``(13) the term `material support or resources' has the same meaning given that term in section 2339B(g)(4) of this title; and''. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act of 2004''. (a) Expansion of Jurisdictional Bases and Scope.--Section 2332a of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) so that paragraph (2) of subsection (a) reads as follows: ``(2) against any person or property within the United States, and ``(A) the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce is used in furtherance of the offense; ``(B) such property is used in interstate or foreign commerce or in an activity that affects interstate or foreign commerce; ``(C) any perpetrator travels in or causes another to travel in interstate or foreign commerce in furtherance of the offense; or ``(D) the offense, or the results of the offense, affect interstate or foreign commerce, or, in the case of a threat, attempt, or conspiracy, would have affected interstate or foreign commerce;''; (2) in paragraph (3) of subsection (a), by striking the comma at the end and inserting ``; or''; (3) in subsection (a), by adding the following at the end: ``(4) against any property within the United States that is owned, leased, or used by a foreign government,''; (4) at the end of subsection (c)(1), by striking``and''; (5) in subsection (c)(2), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (6) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following: ``(3) the term `property' includes all real and personal property.''. (b) Restoration of the Coverage of Chemical Weapons.-- Section 2332a of title 18, United States Code, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended-- (1) in the section heading, by striking ``certain''; (2) in subsection (a), by striking ``(other than a chemical weapon as that term is defined in section 229F)''; and (3) in subsection (b), by striking ``(other than a chemical weapon (as that term is defined in section 229F))''. (c) Expansion of Categories of Restricted Persons Subject to Prohibitions Relating to Select Agents.--Section 175b(d)(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (G) by-- (A) inserting ``(i)'' after ``(G)''; (B) inserting ``, or (ii) acts for or on behalf of, or operates subject to the direction or control of, a government or official of a country described in this subparagraph'' after ``terrorism''; and (C) striking ``or'' after the semicolon. (2) in subparagraph (H) by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(I) is a member of, acts for or on behalf of, or operates subject to the direction or control of, a terrorist organization as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)).''. (d) Conforming Amendment to Regulations.-- (1) Section 175b(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``as a select agent in Appendix A'' and all that follows and inserting the following: ``as a non- overlap or overlap select biological agent or toxin in sections 73.4 and 73.5 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, pursuant to section 351A of the Public Health Service Act, and is not excluded under sections 73.4 and 73.5 or exempted under section 73.6 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations.''. (2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect at the same time that sections 73.4, 73.5, and 73.6 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, become effective. (e) Enhancing Prosecution of Weapons of Mass Destruction Offenses.--Section 1961(1)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``sections 175-178 (relating to biological weapons), sections 229-229F (relating to chemical weapons), section 831 (relating to nuclear materials),''. (a) Section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)) is amended by striking ``in the production of any special nuclear material'' and inserting ``or participate in the development or production of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon''. (b) Title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 39, by inserting after the item relating to section 831 the following:``832. Participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats to the United States.''; (2) by inserting after section 831 the following: Subsection (d) of section 310 of title 31, United States Code, is amended---- (1) by striking ``appropriations.--There are authorized'' and inserting ``Appropriations.-- ``(1) In general.--There are authorized''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) Authorization for funding key technological improvements in mission-critical fincen systems.--There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 the following amounts, which are authorized to remain available until expended: ``(A) BSA direct.--For technological improvements to provide authorized law enforcement and financial regulatory agencies with Web-based access to FinCEN data, to fully develop and implement the highly secure network required under section 362 of Public Law 107-56 to expedite the filing of, and reduce the filing costs for, financial institution reports, including suspicious activity reports, collected by FinCEN under chapter 53 and related provisions of law, and enable FinCEN to immediately alert financial institutions about suspicious activities that warrant immediate and enhanced scrutiny, and to provide and upgrade advanced information-sharing technologies to materially improve the Government's ability to exploit the information in the FinCEN databanks, $16,500,000. ``(B) Advanced analytical technologies.--To provide advanced analytical tools needed to ensure that the data collected by FinCEN under chapter 53 and related provisions of law are utilized fully and appropriately in safeguarding financial institutions and supporting the war on terrorism, $5,000,000. ``(C) Data networking modernization.--To improve the telecommunications infrastructure to support the improved capabilities of the FinCEN systems, $3,000,000. ``(D) Enhanced compliance capability.--To improve the effectiveness of the Office of Compliance in FinCEN, $3,000,000. ``(E) Detection and prevention of financial crimes and terrorism.--To provide development of, and training in the use of, technology to detect and prevent financial crimes and terrorism within and without the United States, $8,000,000.''. (a) Program.--Section 5341(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking ``and 2003,'' and inserting ``2003, and 2005,''. (b) Reauthorization of Appropriations.--Section 5355 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: This subchapter may be cited as the ``Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Antiterrorism Technical Corrections Act of 2004''. (a) The heading of title III of Public Law 107-56 is amended to read as follows: ``TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND FINANCIAL (b) The table of contents of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking the item relating to title III and inserting the following new item: ``TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND FINANCIAL (c) Section 302 of Public Law 107-56 is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(4), by striking the comma after ``movement of criminal funds''; (2) in subsection (b)(7), by inserting ``or types of accounts'' after ``classes of international transactions''; and (3) in subsection (b)(10), by striking ``subchapters II and III'' and inserting ``subchapter II''. (d) Section 303(a) of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking ``Anti-Terrorist Financing Act'' and inserting ``Financial Antiterrorism Act''. (e) The heading for section 311 of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking ``or international transactions'' and inserting ``international transactions, or types of accounts''. (f) Section 314 of Public Law 107-56 is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) by inserting a comma after ``organizations engaged in''; and (B) by inserting a comma after ``credible evidence of engaging in''; (2) in paragraph (2)(A)-- (A) by striking ``and'' after ``nongovernmental organizations,''; and (B) by inserting a comma after ``unwittingly involved in such finances''; (3) in paragraph (3)(A)-- (A) by striking ``to monitor accounts of'' and inserting ``monitor accounts of,''; and (B) by striking the comma after ``organizations identified''; and (4) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting ``financial'' after ``size, and nature of the''. (g) Section 321 of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking ``5312(2)'' and inserting ``5312(a)(2)''. (h) Section 325 of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking ``as amended by section 202 of this title,'' and inserting ``as amended by section 352,''. (i) Subsections (a)(2) and (b)(2) of section 327 of Public Law 107-56 are each amended by inserting a period after ``December 31, 2001'' and striking all that follows through the period at the end of each such subsection. (j) Section 356(c)(4) of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking ``or business or other grantor trust'' and inserting ``, business trust, or other grantor trust''. (k) Section 358(e) of Public Law 107-56 is amended-- (1) by striking ``Section 123(a)'' and inserting ``That portion of section 123(a)''; (2) by striking ``is amended to read'' and inserting ``that precedes paragraph (1) of such section is amended to read''; and (3) by striking ``.'.'' at the end of such section and inserting ``--' ''. (l) Section 360 of Public Law 107-56 is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``the'' after ``utilization of the funds of''; and (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``at such institutions'' and inserting ``at such institution''. (m) Section 362(a)(1) of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking ``subchapter II or III'' and inserting ``subchapter II''. (n) Section 365 of Public Law 107--56 is amended -- (1) by redesignating the 2nd of the 2 subsections designated as subsection (c) (relating to a clerical amendment) as subsection (d); and (2) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (e). (o) Section 365(d) of Public Law 107-56 (as so redesignated by subsection (n) of this section) is amended by striking ``section 5332 (as added by section 112 of this title)'' and inserting ``section 5330''. (a) Section 310(c) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking ``the Network'' each place such term appears and inserting ``FinCEN''. (b) Section 5312(a)(3)(C) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking ``sections 5333 and 5316'' and inserting ``sections 5316 and 5331''. (c) Section 5318(i) of title 31, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting a comma after ``foreign political figure'' the 2nd place such term appears; and (2) in the heading of paragraph (4), by striking ``Definition'' and inserting ``Definitions''. (d) Section 5318(k)(1)(B) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking ``section 5318A(f)(1)(B)'' and inserting ``section 5318A(e)(1)(B)''. (e) The heading for section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: Title III of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking section 303 (31 U.S.C. 5311 note). The amendments made by this subchapter to Public Law 107- 56, the United States Code, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and any other provision of law shall take effect as if such amendments had been included in Public Law 107-56, as of the date of the enactment of such Public Law, and no amendment made by such Public Law that is inconsistent with an amendment made by this subchapter shall be deemed to have taken effect. (a) Production of Documents.--Section 5114(a) of title 31, United States Code (relating to engraving and printing currency and security documents), is amended-- (1) by striking ``(a) The Secretary of the Treasury'' and inserting: ``(a) Authority to Engrave and Print.-- ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of the Treasury''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) Engraving and printing for other governments.--The Secretary of the Treasury may produce currency, postage stamps, and other security documents for foreign governments if-- ``(A) the Secretary of the Treasury determines that such production will not interfere with engraving and printing needs of the United States; and ``(B) the Secretary of State determines that such production would be consistent with the foreign policy of the United States. ``(3) Procurement guidelines.--Articles, material, and supplies procured for use in the production of currency, postage stamps, and other security documents for foreign governments pursuant to paragraph (2) shall be treated in the same manner as articles, material, and supplies procured for public use within the United States for purposes of title III of the Act of March 3, 1933 (41 U.S.C. 10a et seq.; commonly referred to as the Buy American Act).''. (b) Reimbursement.--Section 5143 of title 31, United States Code (relating to payment for services of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing), is amended-- (1) in the first sentence, by inserting ``or to a foreign government under section 5114'' after ``agency''; (2) in the second sentence, by inserting ``and other'' after ``including administrative''; and (3) in the last sentence, by inserting ``, and the Secretary shall take such action, in coordination with the Secretary of State, as may be appropriate to ensure prompt payment by a foreign government of any invoice or statement of account submitted by the Secretary with respect to services rendered under section 5114'' before the period at the end. (a) In General.--Section 474(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the paragraph beginning ``Whoever has in his control, custody, or possession any plate'' the following: `` Whoever, with intent to defraud, has in his custody, control, or possession any material that can be used to make, alter, forge or counterfeit any obligations and other securities of the United States or any part of such securities and obligations, except under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury; or''. (b) Foreign Obligations and Securities.--Section 481 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the paragraph beginning ``Whoever, with intent to defraud'' the following: `` Whoever, with intent to defraud, has in his custody, control, or possession any material that can be used to make, alter, forge or counterfeit any obligation or other security of any foreign government, bank or corporation; or''. (c) Counterfeit Acts.--Section 470 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``or 474'' and inserting ``474, or 474A''. (d) Materials Used in Counterfeiting.--Section 474A(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``any essentially identical'' and inserting ``any thing or material made after or in the similitude of any''. Section 5318 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(n) Reporting of Cross-Border Transmittal of Funds.-- ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (3), the Secretary shall prescribe regulations requiring such financial institutions as the Secretary determines to be appropriate to report to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network certain cross-border electronic transmittals of funds relevant to efforts of the Secretary against money laundering and terrorist financing. ``(2) Form and manner of reports.--In prescribing the regulations required under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall determine the appropriate form, manner, content and frequency of filing of the required reports. ``(3) Feasibility report.--Before prescribing the regulations required under paragraph (1), and as soon as is practicable after the date of enactment of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, the Secretary shall delegate to the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group established by the Secretary the task of producing a report for the Secretary and the Congress that-- ``(A) identifies the information in cross-border electronic transmittals of funds that is relevant to efforts against money laundering and terrorist financing; ``(B) makes recommendations regarding the appropriate form, manner, content and frequency of filing of the required reports; and ``(C) identifies the technology necessary for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to receive, keep, exploit and disseminate information from reports of cross-border electronic transmittals of funds to law enforcement and other entities engaged in efforts against money laundering and terrorist financing. The report shall be submitted to the Secretary and the Congress no later than the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date of enactment of such Act. ``(4) Regulations.-- ``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the regulations required by paragraph (1) shall be prescribed in final form by the Secretary, in consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the end of the 3-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. ``(B) Technological feasibility.--No regulations shall be prescribed under this subsection before the Secretary certifies to the Congress that the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has the technological systems in place to effectively and efficiently receive, keep, exploit, and disseminate information from reports of cross-border electronic transmittals of funds to law enforcement and other entities engaged in efforts against money laundering and terrorist financing. ``(5) Recordkeeping.--No financial institution required to submit reports on certain cross-border electronic transmittals of funds to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network under this subsection shall be subject to the recordkeeping requirement under section 21(b)(3) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act with respect to such transmittals of funds.''. (a) Depository Institutions and Depository Institution Holding Companies.--Section 10 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1820) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(k) Post-Employment Limitations on Leading Bank Examiners.-- ``(1) In general.--In the case of any person who-- ``(A) was an officer or employee (including any special Government employee) of a Federal banking agency or a Federal reserve bank; and ``(B) served 2 or more months during the final 18 months of such person's employment with such agency or entity as the examiner-in-charge (or a functionally equivalent position) of a depository institution or depository institution holding company with dedicated, overall, continuous, and ongoing responsibility for the examination (or inspection) and supervision of that depository institution or depository institution holding company, such person may not hold any office, position, or employment at any such depository institution or depository institution holding company, become a controlling shareholder in, a consultant for, a joint-venture partner with, or an independent contractor for (including as attorney, appraiser, or accountant) any such depository institution or holding company, or any other company that controls such depository institution, or otherwise participate in the conduct of the affairs of any such depository institution or holding company, during the 1-year period beginning on the date such person ceases to be an officer or employee (including any special Government employee) of the Federal banking agency or Federal reserve bank. ``(2) Violators subject to industry-wide prohibition orders.-- ``(A) In general.--In addition to any other penalty which may apply, whenever a Federal banking agency determines that a person subject to paragraph (1) has violated the prohibition in such paragraph by becoming associated with any insured depository institution, depository institution holding company, or other company for which such agency serves as the appropriate Federal banking agency, the agency shall serve a written notice or order, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of section 8(e)(4) for written notices or orders under paragraphs (1) or (2) of section 8(e), upon such person of the agency's intention to-- ``(i) remove such person from office in any capacity described in paragraph (1) for a period of 5 years; and ``(ii) prohibit any further participation by such person, in any manner, in the conduct of the affairs of any insured depository institution, depository institution holding company, or other company that controls an insured depository institution for a period of 5 years. ``(B) Scope of prohibition order.--Any person subject to an order issued under this subsection shall be subject to paragraphs (6) and (7) of section 8(e) in the same manner and to the same extent as a person subject to an order issued under such section and subsections (i) and (j) of section 8 and any other provision of this Act applicable to orders issued under subsection (e) shall apply with respect to such order. ``(3) Regulations.-- ``(A) In general.--The Federal banking agencies shall prescribe regulations to implement this subsection, to determine which persons are referred to in paragraph (1)(B) taking into account-- ``(i) the manner in which examiners and other persons who participate in the regulation, examination, or monitoring of depository institutions or depository institution holding companies are distributed among such institutions or companies by such agency, including the number of examiners and other persons assigned to each institution or holding company, the depth and structure of any group so assigned within such distribution, and the factors giving rise to that distribution; ``(ii) the number of institutions or companies each such examiner or other person is so involved with in any given period of assignment; ``(iii) the period of time for which each such examiner or other person is assigned to an institution or company, or a group of institutions or companies, before reassignment; ``(iv) the size of the institutions or holding companies for which each such person is responsible and the amount of time devoted to each such institution or holding company during each examination period; and ``(v) such other factors as the agency determines to be appropriate. ``(B) Determination of applicability.--The regulations prescribed or orders issued under this subparagraph by an appropriate Federal banking agency shall include a process, initiated by application or otherwise, for determining whether any person who ceases to be, or intends to cease to be, an examiner of insured depository institutions or depository institution holding companies for or on behalf of such agency is subject to the limitations of this subsection with respect to any particular insured depository institution or depository institution holding company. ``(C) Consultation.--The Federal banking agencies shall consult with each other for the purpose of assuring that the rules and regulations issued by the agencies under subparagraph (A) are, to the extent possible, consistent, comparable, and practicable, taking into account any differences in the supervisory programs utilized by the agencies for the supervision of depository institutions and depository institution holding companies. ``(4) Waiver.--A Federal banking agency may waive, on a case-by-case basis, the restrictions imposed by this subsection if-- ``(A) the head of the agency certifies in writing that the grant of such waiver would not be inconsistent with the public interest; and ``(B) the waiver is provided in advance before the person becomes affiliated in any way with the depository institution, depository institution holding company, or other company. ``(5) Definitions and rules of construction.--For purposes of this subsection, the following definitions and rules shall apply: ``(A) Depository institution.--The term `depository institution' includes an uninsured branch or agency of a foreign bank if such branch or agency is located in any State. ``(B) Depository institution holding company.--The term `depository institution holding company' includes any foreign bank or company described in section 8(a) of the International Banking Act of 1978. ``(C) Head of the agency.--The term `the head of the agency' means-- ``(i) the Comptroller of the Currency, in the case of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; ``(ii) the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in the case of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; ``(iii) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, in the case of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and ``(iv) the Director, in the case of the Office of Thrift Supervision. ``(D) Rule of construction for consultants and independent contractors.--A person shall be deemed to act as a consultant or independent contractor (including as an attorney, appraiser, or accountant) for a depository institution, depository holding company, or other company only if such person directly works on matters for, or on behalf of, such depository institution, depository holding company, or other company. ``(E) Appropriate agency for certain other companies.--The term `appropriate Federal banking agency' means, with respect to a company that is not a depository institution or depository institution holding company, the Federal banking agency on whose behalf the person described in paragraph (1) performed the functions described in paragraph (1)(B), as implemented by regulations prescribed under paragraph (3).''. (b) Credit Unions.--Section 206 of the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1786) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(w) Post-Employment Limitations on Examiners.-- ``(1) Regulations required.--The Board shall consult with the Federal banking agencies and prescribe regulations imposing the same limitations on persons employed by or on behalf of the Board as leading examiners of, or functionally equivalent positions with respect to, credit unions as are applicable under section 10(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, taking into account all the requirements and factors described in paragraphs (3) and (4) of such section. ``(2) Enforcement.--The Board shall issue orders under subsection (g) with respect to any person who violates any regulation prescribed pursuant to paragraph (1) to-- ``(A) remove such person from office in any capacity with respect to a credit union; and ``(B) prohibit any further participation by such person, in any manner, in the conduct of the affairs of any credit union for a period of 5 years. ``(3) Scope of prohibition order.--Any person subject to an order issued under this subsection shall be subject to paragraphs (5) and (7) of subsection (g) in the same manner and to the same extent as a person subject to an order issued under such subsection and subsection (l) and any other provision of this Act applicable to orders issued under subsection (g) shall apply with respect to such order.''. (c) Study of Examiner Hiring and Retention.-- (1) Study required.--The Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the National Credit Union Administration Board, acting through the Financial Institutions Examination Council, shall conduct a study of efforts and proposals for-- (A) retaining the services of experienced and highly qualified examiners and supervisors already employed by such agencies; and (B) continuing to attract such examiners and supervisors on an-ongoing basis to the extent necessary to fulfill the agencies' obligations to maintain the safety and soundness of the Nation's depository institutions. (2) Report.--Before the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the agencies conducting the study under paragraph (1) shall submit a report containing the findings and conclusions of such agencies with respect to such study, together with such recommendations for administrative or legislative changes as the agencies determine to be appropriate. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Criminal History Access (a) In General.--Section 534 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(f)(1) Under rules prescribed by the Attorney General, the Attorney General shall, within 60 days after the date of enactment, initiate a 180-day pilot program to establish and maintain a system for providing to an employer criminal history information that-- ``(A) is in the possession of the Attorney General; and ``(B) is requested by an employer as part of an employee criminal history investigation that has been authorized by the State where the employee works or where the employer has their principal place of business; in order to ensure that a prospective employee is suitable for certain employment positions. ``(2) The Attorney General shall require that an employer seeking criminal history information of an employee request such information and submit fingerprints or other biometric identifiers as approved by the Attorney General to provide a positive and reliable identification of such prospective employee. ``(3) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may require an employer to pay a reasonable fee for such information. ``(4) Upon receipt of fingerprints or other biometric identifiers, the Attorney General shall conduct an Integrated Fingerprint Identification System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (IAFIS) check and provide the results of such check to the requester. ``(5) As used in this subsection, ``(A) the term `criminal history information' and `criminal history records' includes---- ``(i) an identifying description of the individual to whom it pertains; ``(ii) notations of arrests, detentions, indictments, or other formal criminal charges pertaining to such individual; and ``(iii) any disposition to a notation revealed in subparagraph (B), including acquittal, sentencing, correctional supervision, or release. ``(B) the term `Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (IAFIS)' means the national depository for fingerprint, biometric, and criminal history information, through which fingerprints are processed electronically. ``(6) Nothing in this subsection shall preclude the Attorney General from authorizing or requiring criminal history record checks on individuals employed or seeking employment in positions vital to the Nation's critical infrastructure or key resources as those terms are defined in section 1016(e) of Public Law 107-56 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)) and section 2(9) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(9)), if pursuant to a law or executive order.''. (b) Report to Congress.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the conclusion of the pilot program, the Attorney General shall report to the appropriate committees of Congress regarding all statutory requirements for criminal history record checks that are required to be conducted by the Department of Justice or any of its components. (2) Identification of information.--The Attorney General shall identify the number of records requested, including the type of information requested, usage of different terms and definitions regarding criminal history information, and the variation in fees charged for such information and who pays such fees. (3) Recommendations.--The Attorney General shall make recommendations for consolidating the existing procedures into a unified procedure consistent with that provided in section 534(f) of title 28, United States Code, as amended by this subtitle. In making the recommendations to Congress, the Attorney General shall consider-- (A) the effectiveness of utilizing commercially available databases as a supplement to IAFIS criminal history information checks; (B) the effectiveness of utilizing State databases as a supplement to IAFIS criminal history information checks; (C) any feasibility studies by the Department of Justice of the FBI's resources and structure to establish a system to provide criminal history information; and (D) privacy rights and other employee protections to include employee consent, access to the records used if employment was denied, an appeal mechanism, and penalties for misuse of the information. Public law 108-21 is amended-- (1) in section 108(a)(2)(A) by striking ``an 18 month'' and inserting ``a 30-month''; and (2) in section 108(a)(3)(A) by striking ``an 18-month'' and inserting ``a 30-month''. (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2004''. (b) Findings.--Congress finds that-- (1) employment of private security officers in the United States is growing rapidly; (2) private security officers function as an adjunct to, but not a replacement for, public law enforcement by helping to reduce and prevent crime; (3) such private security officers protect individuals, property, and proprietary information, and provide protection to such diverse operations as banks, hospitals, research and development centers, manufacturing facilities, defense and aerospace contractors, high technology businesses, nuclear power plants, chemical companies, oil and gas refineries, airports, communication facilities and operations, office complexes, schools, residential properties, apartment complexes, gated communities, and others; (4) sworn law enforcement officers provide significant services to the citizens of the United States in its public areas, and are supplemented by private security officers; (5) the threat of additional terrorist attacks requires cooperation between public and private sectors and demands professional, reliable, and responsible security officers for the protection of people, facilities, and institutions; (6) the trend in the Nation toward growth in such security services has accelerated rapidly; (7) such growth makes available more public sector law enforcement officers to combat serious and violent crimes, including terrorism; (8) the American public deserves the employment of qualified, well-trained private security personnel as an adjunct to sworn law enforcement officers; and (9) private security officers and applicants for private security officer positions should be thoroughly screen and trained. (c) Definitions.--In this Act: (1) Employee.--The term ``employee'' includes both a current employee and an applicant for employment as a private security officer. (2) Authorized employer.--The term ``authorized employer'' means any person that-- (A) employs private security officers; and (B) is authorized by regulations promulgated by the Attorney General to request a criminal history record information search of an employee through a State identification bureau pursuant to this section. (3) Private security officer.--The term ``private security officer'-- (A) means an individual other than an employee of a Federal, State, or local government, whose primary duty is to perform security services, full- or part-time, for consideration, whether armed or unarmed and in uniform or plain clothes (except for services excluded from coverage under this Act if the Attorney General determines by regulation that such exclusion would serve the public interest); but (B) does not include-- (i) employees whose duties are primarily internal audit or credit functions; (ii) employees of electronic security system companies acting as technicians or monitors; or (iii) employees whose duties primarily involve the secure movement of prisoners. (4) Security services.--The term ``security services'' means acts to protect people or property as defined by regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. (5) State identification bureau.--The term ``State identification bureau'' means the State entity designated by the Attorney General for the submission and receipt of criminal history record information. (d) Criminal History Record Information Search.-- (1) In general.-- (A) Submission of fingerprints.--An authorized employer may submit to the State identification bureau of a participating State, fingerprints or other means of positive identification, as determined by the Attorney General, of an employee of such employer for purposes of a criminal history record information search pursuant to this Act. (B) Employee rights.-- (i) Permission.--An authorized employer shall obtain written consent from an employee to submit to the State identification bureau of a participating State the request to search the criminal history record information of the employee under this Act. (ii) Access.--An authorized employer shall provide to the employee confidential access to any information relating to the employee received by the authorized employer pursuant to this Act. (C) Providing information to the state identification bureau.--Upon receipt of a request for a criminal history record information search from an authorized employer pursuant to this Act, submitted through the State identification bureau of a participating State, the Attorney General shall-- (i) search the appropriate records of the Criminal Justice Information Services Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and (ii) promptly provide any resulting identification and criminal history record information to the submitting State identification bureau requesting the information. (D) Use of information.-- (i) In general.--Upon receipt of the criminal history record information from the Attorney General by the State identification bureau, the information shall be used only as provided in clause (ii). (ii) Terms.--In the case of-- Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall establish a task force to examine the establishment of a national clearinghouse to process IAFIS criminal history record requests received directly from employers providing private security guard services with respect to critical infrastructure (as defined in section 1016(e) of Public Law 107-56 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e))) and other private security guard services. Members of this task force shall include representatives of the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with representatives of the security guard industry. Not later than 90 days after the establishment of the task force, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report outlining how the national clearinghouse shall be established, and specifying a date certain (within one year of the enactment of this Act) by which the national clearinghouse will begin operations. The clearinghouse described in section 2145 shall only process criminal history record requests pertaining to employees or prospective employees of the private security guard service making the request pursuant to that section. (a) Use of Biometric Technology.--Section 44903(h) of title 49, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (4)(E) by striking ``may provide for'' and inserting ``shall issue, not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of paragraph (5), guidance for''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(5) Use of biometric technology in airport access control systems.--In issuing guidance under paragraph (4)(E), the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), in consultation with the Attorney General, representatives of the aviation industry, the biometrics industry, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, shall establish, at a minimum-- ``(A) comprehensive technical and operational system requirements and performance standards for the use of biometrics in airport access control systems (including airport perimeter access control systems) to ensure that the biometric systems are effective, reliable, and secure; ``(B) a list of products and vendors that meet such requirements and standards; ``(C) procedures for implementing biometric systems-- ``(i) to ensure that individuals do not use an assumed identity to enroll in a biometric system; and ``(ii) to resolve failures to enroll, false matches, and false non-matches; and ``(D) best practices for incorporating biometric technology into airport access control systems in the most effective manner, including a process to best utilize existing airport access control systems, facilities, and equipment and existing data networks connecting airports. ``(6) Use of biometric technology for law enforcement officer travel.-- ``(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this paragraph, the Assistant Secretary in consultation with the Attorney General shall-- ``(i) establish a law enforcement officer travel credential that incorporates biometrics and is uniform across all Federal, State, and local government law enforcement agencies; ``(ii) establish a process by which the travel credential will be used to verify the identity of a Federal, State, or local government law enforcement officer seeking to carry a weapon on board an aircraft, without unnecessarily disclosing to the public that the individual is a law enforcement officer; ``(iii) establish procedures-- Section 44904 of title 49, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (e); and (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following: ``(c) Transportation Security Strategic Planning.-- ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall prepare and update, as needed, a transportation sector specific plan and transportation modal security plans in accordance with this section. ``(2) Contents.--At a minimum, the modal security plan for aviation prepared under paragraph (1) shall-- ``(A) set risk-based priorities for defending aviation assets; ``(B) select the most practical and cost-effective methods for defending aviation assets; ``(C) assign roles and missions to Federal, State, regional, and local authorities and to stakeholders; ``(D) establish a damage mitigation and recovery plan for the aviation system in the event of a terrorist attack; and ``(E) include a threat matrix document that outlines each threat to the United States civil aviation system and the corresponding layers of security in place to address such threat. ``(3) Reports.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the subsection and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report containing the plans prepared under paragraph (1), including any updates to the plans. The report may be submitted in a classified format. ``(d) Operational Criteria.--Not later than 90 days after the date of submission of the report under subsection (c)(3), the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration) shall issue operational criteria to protect airport infrastructure and operations against the threats identified in the plans prepared under subsection (c)(1) and shall approve best practices guidelines for airport assets.''. (a) In General.--Section 44903(j)(2) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(C) Next generation airline passenger prescreening.-- ``(i) Commencement of testing.--Not later than November 1, 2004, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), or the designee of the Assistant Secretary, shall commence testing of a next generation passenger prescreening system that will allow the Department of Homeland Security to assume the performance of comparing passenger name records to the automatic selectee and no fly lists, utilizing all appropriate records in the consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist maintained by the Federal Government. ``(ii) Assumption of function.--Not later than 180 days after completion of testing under clause (i), the Assistant Secretary, or the designee of the Assistant Secretary, shall assume the performance of the passenger prescreening function of comparing passenger name records to the automatic selectee and no fly lists and utilize all appropriate records in the consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist maintained by the Federal Government in performing that function. ``(iii) Requirements.--In assuming performance of the function under clause (i), the Assistant Secretary shall-- (a) Nonmetallic Weapons and Explosives.--In order to improve security, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration) shall give priority to developing, testing, improving, and deploying technology at screening checkpoints at airports that will detect nonmetallic weapons and explosives on the person of individuals, in their clothing, or in their carry-on baggage or personal property and shall ensure that the equipment alone, or as part of an integrated system, can detect under realistic operating conditions the types of nonmetallic weapons and explosives that terrorists would likely try to smuggle aboard an air carrier aircraft. (b) Strategic Plan for Deployment and Use of Explosive Detection Equipment at Airport Screening Checkpoints.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic plan to promote the optimal utilization and deployment of explosive detection systems at airports to screen individuals and their carry-on baggage or personal property, including walk-through explosive detection portals, document scanners, shoe scanners, and any other explosive detection equipment for use at a screening checkpoint. The plan may be transmitted in a classified format. (2) Contents.--The strategic plan shall include descriptions of the operational applications of explosive detection equipment at airport screening checkpoints, a deployment schedule and quantities of equipment needed to implement the plan, and funding needs for implementation of the plan, including a financing plan that provides for leveraging non-Federal funding. (a) In General.--Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration) shall carry out a pilot program to evaluate the use of blast- resistant containers for cargo and baggage on passenger aircraft to minimize the potential effects of detonation of an explosive device. (b) Incentives for Participation in Pilot Program.-- (1) In general.--As part of the pilot program, the Assistant Secretary shall provide incentives to air carriers to volunteer to test the use of blast-resistant containers for cargo and baggage on passenger aircraft. (2) Applications.--To volunteer to participate in the incentive program, an air carrier shall submit to the Assistant Secretary an application that is in such form and contains such information as the Assistant Secretary requires. (3) Types of assistance.--Assistance provided by the Assistant Secretary to air carriers that volunteer to participate in the pilot program shall include the use of blast-resistant containers and financial assistance to cover increased costs to the carriers associated with the use and maintenance of the containers, including increased fuel costs. (c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall submit to appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the pilot program. (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000. Such sums shall remain available until expended. The Transportation Security Administration shall develop technology to better identify, track, and screen air cargo. Section 44940 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(i) Checkpoint Screening Security Fund.-- ``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the Department of Homeland Security a fund to be known as the `Checkpoint Screening Security Fund'. ``(2) Deposits.--In each of fiscal years 2005 and 2006, after amounts are made available under section 44923(h), the next $30,000,000 derived from fees received under subsection (a)(1) shall be available to be deposited in the Fund. ``(3) Fees.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall impose the fee authorized by subsection (a)(1) so as to collect at least $30,000,000 in each of fiscal years 2005 and 2006 for deposit into the Fund. ``(4) Availability of amounts.--Amounts in the Fund shall be available for the purchase, deployment, and installation of equipment to improve the ability of security screening personnel at screening checkpoints to detect explosives.''. (a) Pilot Program.--The Transportation Security Administration shall develop, not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and conduct a pilot program to test, integrate, and deploy next generation security checkpoint screening technology at not less than 5 airports in the United States. (b) Human Factor Studies.--The Administration shall conduct human factors studies to improve screener performance as part of the pilot program under subsection (a). (a) Civil Penalty.--Section 46301(a) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(6) Penalty for failure to secure flight deck door.--Any person holding a part 119 certificate under part of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, is liable to the Government for a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each violation, by the pilot in command of an aircraft owned or operated by such person, of any Federal regulation that requires that the flight deck door be closed and locked when the aircraft is being operated.''. (b) Technical Corrections.-- (1) Compromise and setoff for false information.--Section 46302(b)(1) of such title is amended by striking ``Secretary of Transportation'' and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security and, for a violation relating to section 46504, the Secretary of Transportation,''. (2) Carrying a weapon.--Section 46303 of such title is amended-- (A) in subsection (b)(1) by striking ``Secretary of Transportation'' and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''; and (B) in subsection (c)(2) by striking ``Under Secretary of Transportation for Security'' and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''. (3) Administrative imposition of penalties.--Section 46301(d) of such title is amended-- (A) in the first sentence of paragraph (2) by striking ``46302, 46303,'' and inserting ``46302 (for a violation relating to section 46504),''; (B) in the second sentence of paragraph (2)-- (i) by striking ``Under Secretary of Transportation for Security'' and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''; and (ii) by striking ``44909)'' and inserting ``44909), 46302 (except for a violation relating to section 46504), 46303,''; (C) in each of paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) by striking ``Under Secretary or'' and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security or''; and (D) in paragraph (4)(A) by moving clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) 2 ems to the left. The Director of the Federal Air Marshal Service of the Department of Homeland Security shall continue to develop operational initiatives to protect the anonymity of Federal air marshals. (a) The Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Director of Federal Air Marshal Service of the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), shall make available appropriate in-flight counterterrorism and weapons handling procedures and tactics training to Federal law enforcement officers who fly while on duty. (b) The Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Director of Federal Air Marshal Service of the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), shall ensure that Transportation Security Administration screeners and Federal Air Marshals receive training in identifying fraudulent identification documents, including fraudulent or expired Visas and Passports. Such training shall also be made available to other Federal law enforcement agencies and local law enforcement agencies located in border states. (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration) shall implement a pilot program to allow pilots participating in the Federal flight deck officer program to transport their firearms on their persons. The Assistant Secretary may prescribe any training, equipment, or procedures including procedures for reporting of missing, lost or stolen firearms, that the Assistant Secretary determines necessary to ensure safety and maximize weapon retention. (b) Review.--Not later than 1 year after the date of initiation of the pilot program, the Assistant Secretary shall conduct a review of the safety record of the pilot program and transmit a report on the results of the review to the appropriate congressional committees. (c) Option.--If the Assistant Secretary as part of the review under subsection (b) determines that the safety level obtained under the pilot program is comparable to the safety level determined under existing methods of pilots carrying firearms on aircraft, the Assistant Secretary shall allow all pilots participating in the Federal flight deck officer program the option of carrying their firearm on their person subject to such requirements as the Assistant Secretary determines appropriate. The Transportation Security Administration shall expedite implementation of the registered traveler program. (a) Study.--The Transportation Security Administration, in consultation with the Federal Aviation Administration, shall conduct a study to determine the viability of providing devices or methods, including wireless methods, to enable a flight crew to discreetly notify the pilot in the case of a security breach or safety issue occurring in the cabin. (b) Matters to Be Considered.--In conducting the study, the Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration shall consider technology that is readily available and can be quickly integrated and customized for use aboard aircraft for flight crew communication. (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Transportation Security Administration shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the study. Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration) shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the costs and benefits associated with the use of secondary flight deck barriers and whether the use of such barriers should be mandated for all air carriers. The Assistant Secretary may transmit the report in a classified format. Section 48301(a) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by striking ``and 2005'' and inserting ``2005, and 2006''. (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), in consultation with airport operators and law enforcement authorities, shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committee a report on airport perimeter security. The report may be submitted in a classified format. (b) Contents.--The report shall include-- (1) an examination of the feasibility of access control technologies and procedures, including the use of biometrics and other methods of positively identifying individuals prior to entry into secure areas of airports, and provide best practices for enhanced perimeter access control techniques; and (2) an assessment of the feasibility of physically screening all individuals prior to entry into secure areas of an airport and additional methods for strengthening the background vetting process for all individuals credentialed to gain access to secure areas of airports. In this title, the following definitions apply: (1) Appropriate congressional committee.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate. (2) Air carrier.--The term ``air carrier'' has the meaning such term has under section 40102 of title 49, United States Code. (3) Secure area of an airport.--The term ``secure area of an airport'' means the sterile area and the Secure Identification Display Area of an airport (as such terms are defined in section 1540.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor regulation to such section). (a) Rule Amendments.--Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended-- (1) in paragraph (3)-- (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``or state subdivision or of an Indian tribe'' and inserting ``, state subdivision, Indian tribe, or foreign government''; (B) in subparagraph (D)-- (i) by inserting after the first sentence the following: ``An attorney for the government may also disclose any grand- jury matter involving a threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, to any appropriate Federal, State, state subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign government official for the purpose of preventing or responding to such a threat.''; and (ii) in clause (i)-- (a) Findings.--The Congress finds as follows: (1) The interoperable electronic data system know as the ``Chimera system'', and required to be developed and implemented by section 202(a)(2) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 1722(a)(2)), has not in any way been implemented. (2) Little progress has been made since the enactment of such Act with regard to establishing a process to connect existing trusted systems operated independently by the respective intelligence agencies. (3) It is advisable, therefore, to assign such responsibility to the National Intelligence Director. (4) The National Intelligence Director should, pursuant to the amendments made by subsection (c), begin systems planning immediately upon assuming office to deliver an interim system not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and to deliver the fully functional Chimera system not later than September 11, 2007. (5) Both the interim system, and the fully functional Chimera system, should be designed so that intelligence officers, Federal law enforcement agencies (as defined in section 2 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1701)), operational counter- terror support center personnel, consular officers, and Department of Homeland Security enforcement officers have access to them. (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are as follows: (1) To provide the National Intelligence Director with the necessary authority and resources to establish both an interim data system and, subsequently, a fully functional Chimera system, to collect and share intelligence and operational information with the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (2) To require the National Intelligence Director to establish a state-of-the-art Chimera system with both biometric identification and linguistic capabilities satisfying the best technology standards. (3) To ensure that the National Intelligence Center will have a fully functional capability, not later than September 11, 2007, for interoperable data and intelligence exchange with the agencies of the intelligence community (as so defined). (c) Amendments.-- (1) In general.--Title II of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 1721 et seq.) is amended-- (A) in section 202(a)-- (i) by amending paragraphs (1) and (2) to read as follows: ``(1) Interim interoperable intelligence data exchange system.--Not later than 1 year after assuming office, the National Intelligence Director shall establish an interim interoperable intelligence data exchange system that will connect the data systems operated independently by the entities in the intelligence community and by the National Counterterrorism Center, so as to permit automated data exchange among all of these entities. Immediately upon assuming office, the National Intelligence Director shall begin the plans necessary to establish such interim system. ``(2) Chimera system.--Not later than September 11, 2007, the National Intelligence Director shall establish a fully functional interoperable law enforcement and intelligence electronic data system within the National Counterterrorism Center to provide immediate access to information in databases of Federal law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community that is necessary to identify terrorists, and organizations and individuals that support terrorism. The system established under this paragraph shall referred to as the `Chimera system'. ''; (ii) in paragraph (3)-- (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States and to meet the intelligence needs of the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Federal Bureau of Investigation has made significant progress in improving its intelligence capabilities. (2) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must further enhance and fully institutionalize its ability to prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist threats to our homeland, our people, our allies, and our interests. (3) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must collect, process, share, and disseminate, to the greatest extent permitted by applicable law, to the President, the Vice President, and other officials in the Executive Branch, all terrorism information and other information necessary to safeguard our people and advance our national and homeland security interests. (4) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must move towards full and seamless coordination and cooperation with all other elements of the Intelligence Community, including full participation in, and support to, the National Counterterrorism Center. (5) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must strengthen its pivotal role in coordination and cooperation with Federal, State, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies to ensure the necessary sharing of information for counterterrorism and criminal law enforcement purposes. (6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must perform its vital intelligence functions in a manner consistent with both with national intelligence priorities and respect for privacy and other civil liberties under the Constitution and laws of the United States. (b) Improvement of Intelligence Capabilities.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall establish a comprehensive intelligence program for-- (1) intelligence analysis, including recruitment and hiring of analysts, analyst training, priorities and status for analysis, and analysis performance measures; (2) intelligence production, including product standards, production priorities, information sharing and dissemination, and customer satisfaction measures; (3) production of intelligence that is responsive to national intelligence requirements and priorities, including measures of the degree to which each FBI headquarters and field component is collecting and providing such intelligence; (4) intelligence sources, including source validation, new source development, and performance measures; (5) field intelligence operations, including staffing and infrastructure, management processes, priorities, and performance measures; (6) full and seamless coordination and cooperation with the other components of the Intelligence Community, consistent with their responsibilities; and (7) sharing of FBI intelligence and information across Federal, state, and local governments, with the private sector, and with foreign partners as provided by law or by guidelines of the Attorney General. (c) Intelligence Directorate.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall establish an Intelligence Directorate within the FBI. The Intelligence Directorate shall have the authority to manage and direct the intelligence operations of all FBI headquarters and field components. The Intelligence Directorate shall have responsibility for all components and functions of the FBI necessary for-- (1) oversight of FBI field intelligence operations; (2) FBI human source development and management; (3) FBI collection against nationally-determined intelligence requirements; (4) language services; (5) strategic analysis; (6) intelligence program and budget management; and (7) the intelligence workforce. (d) National Security Workforce.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall establish a specialized, integrated intelligence cadre composed of Special Agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists in a manner which creates and sustains within the FBI a workforce with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of the FBI. The Director shall-- (1) ensure that these FBI employees may make their career, including promotion to the most senior positions in the FBI, within this career track; (2) establish intelligence cadre requirements for-- (A) training; (B) career development and certification; (C) recruitment, hiring, and selection; (D) integrating field intelligence teams; and (E) senior level field management; (3) establish intelligence officer certification requirements, including requirements for training courses and assignments to other intelligence, national security, or homeland security components of the Executive branch, in order to advance to senior operational management positions in the FBI; (4) ensure that the FBI's recruitment and training program enhances its ability to attract individuals with educational and professional backgrounds in intelligence, international relations, language, technology, and other skills relevant to the intelligence mission of the FBI; (5) ensure that all Special Agents and analysts employed by the FBI after the date of the enactment of this Act shall receive basic training in both criminal justice matters and intelligence matters; (6) ensure that all Special Agents employed by the FBI after the date of the enactment of this Act, to the maximum extent practicable, be given an opportunity to undergo, during their early service with the FBI, meaningful assignments in criminal justice matters and in intelligence matters; (7) ensure that, to the maximum extent practical, Special Agents who specialize in intelligence are afforded the opportunity to work on intelligence matters over the remainder of their career with the FBI; and (8) ensure that, to the maximum extent practical, analysts are afforded FBI training and career opportunities commensurate with the training and career opportunities afforded analysts in other elements of the intelligence community. (e) Field Office Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall take appropriate actions to ensure the integration of analysis, Special Agents, linguists, and surveillance personnel in FBI field intelligence components and to provide effective leadership and infrastructure to support FBI field intelligence components. The Director shall-- (1) ensure that each FBI field office has an official at the level of Assistant Special Agent in Charge or higher with responsibility for the FBI field intelligence component; and (2) to the extent practicable, provide for such expansion of special compartmented information facilities in FBI field offices as is necessary to ensure the discharge by the field intelligence components of the national security and criminal intelligence mission of the FBI. (g) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, modify the budget structure of the FBI in order to organize the budget according to its four main programs as follows: (1) Intelligence. (2) Counterterrorism and counterintelligence. (3) Criminal enterprise/Federal crimes. (4) Criminal justice services. (h) Reports.-- (1)(A) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every twelve months thereafter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to Congress a report on the progress made as of the date of such report in carrying out the requirements of this section. (B) The Director shall include in the first report required by subparagraph (A) an estimate of the resources required to complete the expansion of special compartmented information facilities to carry out the intelligence mission of FBI field intelligence components. (2) In each annual report required by paragraph (1)(A) the director shall include-- (A) a report on the progress made by each FBI field office during the period covered by such review in addressing FBI and national intelligence priorities; (B) a report assessing the qualifications, status, and roles of analysts at FBI headquarters and in FBI field offices; and (C) a report on the progress of the FBI in implementing information-sharing principles. (3) A report required by this subsection shall be submitted-- (A) to each committee of Congress that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of such report; and (B) in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) In General.--Section 1701 of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796dd) is amended-- (1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows: ``(a) Grant Authorization.--The Attorney General shall carry out a single grant program under which the Attorney General makes grants to States, units of local government, Indian tribal governments, other public and private entities, and multi-jurisdictional or regional consortia for the purposes described in subsection (b).''; (2) by striking subsections (b) and (c); (3) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (b), and in that subsection-- (A) by striking ``Additional Grant Projects.--Grants made under subsection (a) may include programs, projects, and other activities to--'' and inserting ``Uses of Grant Amounts.--The purposes for which grants made under subsection (a) may be made are--''; (B) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (12) as paragraphs (6) through (17), respectively; (C) by inserting before paragraph (5) (as so redesignated) the following new paragraphs: ``(1) rehire law enforcement officers who have been laid off as a result of State and local budget reductions for deployment in community-oriented policing; ``(2) hire and train new, additional career law enforcement officers for deployment in community-oriented policing across the Nation; ``(3) procure equipment, technology, or support systems, or pay overtime, to increase the number of officers deployed in community-oriented policing; ``(4) improve security at schools and on school grounds in the jurisdiction of the grantee through-- ``(A) placement and use of metal detectors, locks, lighting, and other deterrent measures; ``(B) security assessments; ``(C) security training of personnel and students; ``(D) coordination with local law enforcement; and ``(E) any other measure that, in the determination of the Attorney General, may provide a significant improvement in security; ``(5) pay for officers hired to perform intelligence, anti- terror, or homeland security duties exclusively;''; and (D) by amending paragraph (9) (as so redesignated) to read as follows: ``(8) develop new technologies, including interoperable communications technologies, modernized criminal record technology, and forensic technology, to assist State and local law enforcement agencies in reorienting the emphasis of their activities from reacting to crime to preventing crime and to train law enforcement officers to use such technologies;''; (4) by redesignating subsections (e) through (k) as subsections (c) through (i), respectively; (5) in subsection (c) (as so redesignated) by striking ``subsection (i)'' and inserting ``subsection (g)''; and (6) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(j) Matching Funds for School Security Grants.-- Notwithstanding subsection (i), in the case of a grant under subsection (a) for the purposes described in subsection (b)(4)-- ``(1) the portion of the costs of a program provided by that grant may not exceed 50 percent; ``(2) any funds appropriated by Congress for the activities of any agency of an Indian tribal government or the Bureau of Indian Affairs performing law enforcement functions on any Indian lands may be used to provide the non-Federal share of a matching requirement funded under this subsection; and ``(3) the Attorney General may provide, in the guidelines implementing this section, for the requirement of paragraph (1) to be waived or altered in the case of a recipient with a financial need for such a waiver or alteration.''. (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 1702 of title I of such Act (42 U.S.C. 3796dd-1) is amended in subsection (d)(2) by striking ``section 1701(d)'' and inserting ``section 1701(b)''. (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--Section 1001(a)(11) of title I of such Act (42 U.S.C. 3793(a)(11)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A) by striking clause (i) and all that follows through the period at the end and inserting the following: ``(i) $1,007,624,000 for fiscal year 2005; ``(ii) $1,027,176,000 for fiscal year 2006; and ``(iii) $1,047,119,000 for fiscal year 2007.''; and (2) in subparagraph (B)-- (A) by striking ``section 1701(f)'' and inserting ``section 1701(d)''; and (B) by striking the third sentence. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Badge Security Enhancement Act of 2004'' . Section 716 of title 18, United States Code, is amended in subsection (b)-- (1) by striking paragraphs (2) and (4); and (2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2). (a) In General.-- (1) In general.--Section 215(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1185(b)) is amended to read as follows: ``(b)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless the citizen bears a valid United States passport. ``(2) Subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, the President may waive the application of paragraph (1) in the case of a citizen departing the United States to, or entering the United States from, foreign contiguous territory. ``(3) The President, if waiving the application of paragraph (1) pursuant to paragraph (2), shall require citizens departing the United States to, or entering the United States from, foreign contiguous territory to bear a document (or combination of documents) designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security under paragraph (4). ``(4) The Secretary of Homeland Security-- ``(A) shall designate documents that are sufficient to denote identity and citizenship in the United States such that they may be used, either individually or in conjunction with another document, to establish that the bearer is a citizen or national of the United States for purposes of lawfully departing from or entering the United States; and ``(B) shall publish a list of those documents in the Federal Register. ``(5) A document or documents may not be designated under paragraph (4) unless the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that the document or documents adequately identifies or identify the bearer as a citizen of the United States. If a single document is designated, it must be a document that may not be issued to an alien. In no event may a combination of documents be accepted for this purpose unless the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that at least one of those documents could not be issued to an alien.''. (2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on October 1, 2006. (b) Interim Rule.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security-- (A) shall designate documents that are sufficient to denote identity and citizenship in the United States such that they may be used, either individually or in conjunction with another document, to establish that the bearer is a citizen or national of the United States for purposes of lawfully departing from or entering the United States; and (B) shall publish a list of those documents in the Federal Register. (2) Limitation on presidential authority.--Beginning on the date that is 90 days after the publication described in paragraph (1)(B), the President, notwithstanding section 215(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1185(b)), may not exercise the President's authority under such section so as to permit any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States from any country other than foreign contiguous territory, unless the citizen bears a document (or combination of documents) designated under paragraph (1)(A). (3) Criteria for designation.--A document or documents may not be designated under paragraph (1)(A) unless the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that the document or documents adequately identifies or identify the bearer as a citizen of the United States. If a single document is designated, it must be a document that may not be issued to an alien (as defined in section 101(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(3))). In no event may a combination of documents be accepted for this purpose unless the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that at least one of those documents could not be issued to an alien (as so defined). (4) Effective date.--This subsection shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall cease to be effective on September 30, 2006. (a) In General.--Section 212(d)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.1182(d)(4)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Attorney General'' and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''; (2) by striking ``on the basis of reciprocity'' and all that follows through ``or (C)''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``Either or both of the requirements of such paragraph may also be waived by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State, acting jointly and on the basis of reciprocity, with respect to nationals of foreign contiguous territory or of adjacent islands, but only if such nationals are required, in order to be admitted into the United States, to be in possession of identification deemed by the Secretary of Homeland Security to be secure.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on December 31, 2006. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010, shall increase by not less than 2,000 the number of positions for full-time active-duty border patrol agents within the Department of Homeland Security above the number of such positions for which funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal year. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010, shall increase by not less than 800 the number of positions for full-time active-duty investigators within the Department of Homeland Security investigating violations of immigration laws (as defined in section 101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(17)) above the number of such positions for which funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal year. At least half of these additional investigators shall be designated to investigate potential violations of section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C 1324a). Each State shall be allotted at least 3 of these additional investigators. Section 211 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1181) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(d) For purposes of establishing identity to any Federal employee, an alien present in the United States may present any document issued by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security under the authority of one of the immigration laws (as defined in section 101(a)(17)), a domestically issued document that the Secretary of Homeland Security designates as reliable for this purpose and that cannot be issued to an alien unlawfully present in the United States, or an unexpired, lawfully issued foreign passport as determined by the Secretary of State. Subject to the limitations and exceptions in the immigration laws (as so defined), no other document may be presented for such purposes.''. Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)) is amended by striking clauses (i) through (iii) and inserting the following: ``(i) In general.--If an immigration officer determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph (F)) who is arriving in the United States, or who has not been admitted or paroled into the United States and has not been physically present in the United States continuously for the 5-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility under this paragraph, is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), the officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review, unless the alien indicates an intention to apply for asylum under section 208 or a fear of persecution and the officer determines that the alien has been physically present in the United States for less than 1 year. ``(ii) Claims for asylum.--If an immigration officer determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph (F)) who is arriving in the United States, or who has not been admitted or paroled into the United States and has not been physically present in the United States continuously for the 5-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility under this paragraph, is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), and the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 208 or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer under subparagraph (B) if the officer determines that the alien has been physically present in the United States for less than 1 year.''. (a) Conditions for Granting Asylum.--Section 208(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1158(b)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``The Attorney General'' and inserting the following: ``(A) Eligibility.--The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(B) Burden of proof.-- ``(i) In general.--The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the applicant is a refugee, within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A). ``(ii) Special rule.--The applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be the central motive for persecuting the applicant if the applicant claims that the applicant has been or would be subjected to persecution because the applicant-- (a) Limitation on Review.--Section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``There shall be no means of judicial review (including review pursuant to section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title) of a revocation under this subsection, and no court shall have jurisdiction to consider any claim challenging the validity of such a revocation.''. (b) Classes of Deportable Aliens.--Section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B)) is amended by striking ``United States is'' and inserting the following: ``United States, or whose nonimmigrant visa (or other documentation authorizing admission into the United States as a nonimmigrant) has been revoked under section 221(i), is''. (c) Revocation of Petitions.--Section 205 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1155) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Attorney General'' and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''; and (2) by striking the final two sentences. (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to revocations under sections 205 and 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act made before, on, or after such date. (a) In General.--Section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (2)-- (i) in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), by inserting ``(statutory and nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title'' after ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law''; and (ii) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) Judicial review of certain legal claims.--Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as precluding consideration by the circuit courts of appeals of constitutional claims or pure questions of law raised upon petitions for review filed in accordance with this section. Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory and nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or, except as provided in subsection (e), any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, such petitions for review shall be the sole and exclusive means of raising any and all claims with respect to orders of removal entered or issued under any provision of this Act.''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(4) Claims under the united nations convention.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory and nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, a petition for review by the circuit courts of appeals filed in accordance with this section is the sole and exclusive means of judicial review of claims arising under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. ``(5) Exclusive means of review.--The judicial review specified in this subsection shall be the sole and exclusive means for review by any court of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this Act. For purposes of this title, in every provision that limits or eliminates judicial review or jurisdiction to review, the terms `judicial review' and `jurisdiction to review' include habeas corpus review pursuant to section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and review pursuant to any other provision of law.''; (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting ``pursuant to subsection (f)'' after ``unless''; and (B) in paragraph (9), by adding at the end the following: ``Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to hear any cause or claim subject to these consolidation provisions.''; (3) in subsection (f)(2), by inserting ``or stay, by temporary or permanent order, including stays pending judicial review,'' after ``no court shall enjoin''; and (4) in subsection (g), by inserting ``(statutory and nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title'' after ``notwithstanding any other provision of law''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect upon the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to cases in which the final administrative removal order was issued before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act. (c) Transfer of Cases.--If an alien's case, brought under section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, and challenging a final administrative removal order, is pending in a district court on the date of the enactment of this Act, then the district court shall transfer the case (or part of the case that challenges the removal order) to the court of appeals for the circuit in which a petition for review could have been properly filed under section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252), as amended by this Act. The court of appeals shall treat the transferred case as if it had been brought pursuant to a petition for review under such section 242. CHAPTER 2--DEPORTATION OF TERRORISTS AND SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM (a) In General.--Section 241(b)(3)(B) (8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)) is amended-- (1) in clause (iii), by striking ``or''; (2) in clause (iv), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; or''; (3) by inserting after clause (iv) the following: ``(v) the alien is described in subclause (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (VI) of section 212(a)(3)(B)(i) or section 237(a)(4)(B), unless, in the case only of an alien described in section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV), the Secretary of Homeland Security determines, in the Secretary's discretion, that there are not reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the United States.''; and (4) by striking the last sentence. (b) Exceptions.--Section 208(b)(2)(A)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(v)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``inadmissible under'' each place such term appears and inserting ``described in''; and (2) by striking ``removable under''. (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to-- (1) removal proceedings instituted before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act; and (2) acts and conditions constituting a ground for inadmissibility or removal occurring or existing before, on, or after such date. (a) Regulations.-- (1) Revision deadline.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall revise the regulations prescribed by the Secretary to implement the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, done at New York on December 10, 1984. (2) Exclusion of certain aliens.--The revision-- (A) shall exclude from the protection of such regulations aliens described in section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)) (as amended by this title), including rendering such aliens ineligible for withholding or deferral of removal under the Convention; and (B) shall ensure that the revised regulations operate so as to-- (i) allow for the reopening of determinations made under the regulations before the effective date of the revision; and (ii) apply to acts and conditions constituting a ground for ineligibility for the protection of such regulations, as revised, regardless of when such acts or conditions occurred. (3) Burden of proof.--The revision shall also ensure that the burden of proof is on the applicant for withholding or deferral of removal under the Convention to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal. (b) Judicial Review.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review the regulations adopted to implement this section, and nothing in this section shall be construed as providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under the Convention or this section, except as part of the review of a final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252). (a) In General.--Section 241(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1231(b)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) in each of subparagraphs (A) and (B), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``unless, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, removing the alien to such country would be prejudicial to the United States.''; and (B) by amending subparagraph (C) to read as follows: ``(C) Alternative countries.--If the alien is not removed to a country designated in subparagraph (A) or (B), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall remove the alien to-- ``(i) the country of which the alien is a citizen, subject, or national, where the alien was born, or where the alien has a residence, unless the country physically prevents the alien from entering the country upon the alien's removal there; or ``(ii) any country whose government will accept the alien into that country.''; and (2) in paragraph (2)-- (A) by striking ``Attorney General'' each place such term appears and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''; (B) by amending subparagraph (D) to read as follows: ``(D) Alternative countries.--If the alien is not removed to a country designated under subparagraph (A)(i), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall remove the alien to a country of which the alien is a subject, national, or citizen, or where the alien has a residence, unless-- ``(i) such country physically prevents the alien from entering the country upon the alien's removal there; or ``(ii) in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, removing the alien to the country would be prejudicial to the United States.''; and (C) by amending subparagraph (E)(vii) to read as follows: ``(vii) Any country whose government will accept the alien into that country.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any deportation, exclusion, or removal on or after such date pursuant to any deportation, exclusion, or removal order, regardless of whether such order is administratively final before, on, or after such date. (a) Criminal Penalties.--Section 274(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(4) In the case of a person who has brought aliens into the United States in violation of this subsection, the sentence otherwise provided for may be increased by up to 10 years if-- ``(A) the offense was part of an ongoing commercial organization or enterprise; ``(B) aliens were transported in groups of 10 or more; ``(C) aliens were transported in a manner that endangered their lives; or ``(D) the aliens presented a life-threatening health risk to people in the United States.''. (b) Outreach Program.--Section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324), as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(f) Outreach Program.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation as appropriate with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, shall develop and implement an outreach program to educate the public in the United States and abroad about the penalties for bringing in and harboring aliens in violation of this section. In this chapter, the following definitions apply: (1) Driver's license.--The term ``driver's license'' means a motor vehicle operator's license, as defined in section 30301 of title 49, United States Code. (2) Identification card.--The term ``identification card'' means a personal identification card, as defined in section 1028(d) of title 18, United States Code, issued by a State. (3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Homeland Security. (4) State.--The term ``State'' means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United States. (a) Minimum Standards for Federal Use.-- (1) In general.--Beginning 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, a Federal agency may not accept, for any official purpose, a driver's license or identification card issued by a State to any person unless the State is meeting the requirements of this section. (2) State certifications.--The Secretary shall determine whether a State is meeting the requirements of this section based on certifications made by the State to the Secretary. Such certifications shall be made at such times and in such manner as the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, may prescribe by regulation. (b) Minimum Document Requirements.--To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall include, at a minimum, the following information and features on each driver's license and identification card issued to a person by the State: (1) The person's full legal name. (2) The person's date of birth. (3) The person's gender. (4) The person's driver license or identification card number. (5) A digital photograph of the person. (6) The person's address of principal residence. (7) The person's signature. (8) Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for fraudulent purposes. (9) A common machine-readable technology, with defined minimum data elements. (c) Minimum Issuance Standards.-- (1) In general.--To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall require, at a minimum, presentation and verification of the following information before issuing a driver's license or identification card to a person: (A) A photo identity document, except that a non-photo identity document is acceptable if it includes both the person's full legal name and date of birth. (B) Documentation showing the person's date of birth. (C) Proof of the person's social security account number or verification that the person is not eligible for a social security account number. (D) Documentation showing the person's name and address of principal residence. (2) Special requirements.-- (A) In general.--To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall comply with the minimum standards of this paragraph. (B) Evidence of legal status.--A State shall require, before issuing a driver's license or identification card to a person, valid documentary evidence that the person-- (i) is a citizen of the United States; (ii) is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent or temporary residence in the United States; (iii) has conditional permanent resident status in the United States; (iv) has a valid, unexpired nonimmigrant visa or nonimmigrant visa status for entry into the United States; (v) has a pending or approved application for asylum in the United States; (vi) has entered into the United States in refugee status; (vii) has a pending or approved application for temporary protected status in the United States; (viii) has approved deferred action status; or (ix) has a pending application for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States or conditional permanent resident status in the United States. (C) Temporary drivers' licenses and identification cards.-- (i) In general.--If a person presents evidence under any of clauses (iv) through (ix) of subparagraph (B), the State may only issue a temporary driver's license or temporary identification card to the person. (ii) Expiration date.--A temporary driver's license or temporary identification card issued pursuant to this subparagraph shall be valid only during the period of time of the applicant's authorized stay in the United States or if there is no definite end to the period of authorized stay a period of one year. (iii) Display of expiration date.--A temporary driver's license or temporary identification card issued pursuant to this subparagraph shall clearly indicate that it is temporary and shall state the date on which it expires. (iv) Renewal.--A temporary driver's license or temporary identification card issued pursuant to this subparagraph may be renewed only upon presentation of valid documentary evidence that the status by which the applicant qualified for the temporary driver's license or temporary identification card has been extended by the Secretary of Homeland Security. (3) Applications for renewal, duplication, or reissuance.-- (A) Presumption.--For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2), a State shall presume that any driver's license or identification card for which an application has been made for renewal, duplication, or reissuance has been issued in accordance with the provisions of such paragraphs if, at the time the application is made, the driver's license or identification card has not expired or been canceled, suspended, or revoked. (B) Limitation.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a renewal, duplication, or reissuance if the State is notified by a local, State, or Federal government agency that the person seeking such renewal, duplication, or reissuance is neither a citizen of the United States nor legally in the United States. (4) Verification of documents.--To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall implement the following procedures: (A) Before issuing a driver's license or identification card to a person, the State shall verify, with the issuing agency, the issuance, validity, and completeness of each document required to be presented by the person under paragraph (1) or (2). (B) The State shall not accept any foreign document, other than an official passport, to satisfy a requirement of paragraph (1) or (2). (C) Not later than September 11, 2005, the State shall enter into a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of Homeland Security to routinely utilize the automated system known as Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements, as provided for by section 404 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 3009-664), to verify the legal presence status of a person, other than a United States citizen, applying for a driver's license or identification card. (d) Other Requirements.--To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall adopt the following practices in the issuance of drivers' licenses and identification cards: (1) Employ technology to capture digital images of identity source documents so that the images can be retained in electronic storage in a transferable format. (2) Retain paper copies of source documents for a minimum of 7 years or images of source documents presented for a minimum of 10 years. (3) Subject each person applying for a driver's license or identification card to mandatory facial image capture. (4) Establish an effective procedure to confirm or verify a renewing applicant's information. (5) Confirm with the Social Security Administration a social security account number presented by a person using the full social security account number. In the event that a social security account number is already registered to or associated with another person to which any State has issued a driver's license or identification card, the State shall resolve the discrepancy and take appropriate action. (6) Refuse to issue a driver's license or identification card to a person holding a driver's license issued by another State without confirmation that the person is terminating or has terminated the driver's license. (7) Ensure the physical security of locations where drivers' licenses and identification cards are produced and the security of document materials and papers from which drivers' licenses and identification cards are produced. (8) Subject all persons authorized to manufacture or produce drivers' licenses and identification cards to appropriate security clearance requirements. (9) Establish fraudulent document recognition training programs for appropriate employees engaged in the issuance of drivers' licenses and identification cards. (a) In General.--To be eligible to receive any grant or other type of financial assistance made available under this subtitle, a State shall participate in the interstate compact regarding sharing of driver license data, known as the ``Driver License Agreement'', in order to provide electronic access by a State to information contained in the motor vehicle databases of all other States. (b) Requirements for Information.--A State motor vehicle database shall contain, at a minimum, the following information: (1) All data fields printed on drivers' licenses and identification cards issued by the State. (2) Motor vehicle drivers' histories, including motor vehicle violations, suspensions, and points on licenses. Section 1028(a)(8) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``false authentication features'' and inserting ``false or actual authentication features''. (a) In General.--The Secretary may make grants to a State to assist the State in conforming to the minimum standards set forth in this chapter. (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary to carry out this chapter. (a) Participation of Secretary of Transportation and States.--All authority to issue regulations, certify standards, and issue grants under this chapter shall be carried out by the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the States. (b) Extensions of Deadlines.--The Secretary may grant to a State an extension of time to meet the requirements of section 3052(a)(1) if the State provides adequate justification for noncompliance. (a) Applicability of Definitions.--Except as otherwise specifically provided, the definitions contained in section 3051 apply to this chapter. (b) Other Definitions.--In this chapter, the following definitions apply: (1) Birth certificate.--The term ``birth certificate'' means a certificate of birth-- (A) for an individual (regardless of where born)-- (i) who is a citizen or national of the United States at birth; and (ii) whose birth is registered in the United States; and (B) that-- (i) is issued by a Federal, State, or local government agency or authorized custodian of record and produced from birth records maintained by such agency or custodian of record; or (ii) is an authenticated copy, issued by a Federal, State, or local government agency or authorized custodian of record, of an original certificate of birth issued by such agency or custodian of record. (2) Registrant.--The term ``registrant'' means, with respect to a birth certificate, the person whose birth is registered on the certificate. (3) State.--The term ``State'' shall have the meaning given such term in section 3051; except that New York City shall be treated as a State separate from New York. The minimum standards in this chapter applicable to birth certificates issued by a State shall also apply to birth certificates issued by a local government in the State. It shall be the responsibility of the State to ensure that local governments in the State comply with the minimum standards. (a) Minimum Standards for Federal Use.-- (1) In general.--Beginning 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, a Federal agency may not accept, for any official purpose, a birth certificate issued by a State to any person unless the State is meeting the requirements of this section. (2) State certifications.--The Secretary shall determine whether a State is meeting the requirements of this section based on certifications made by the State to the Secretary. Such certifications shall be made at such times and in such manner as the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, may prescribe by regulation. (b) Minimum Document Standards.--To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall include, on each birth certificate issued to a person by the State, the use of safety paper, the seal of the issuing custodian of record, and such other features as the Secretary may determine necessary to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, and otherwise duplicating the birth certificate for fraudulent purposes. The Secretary may not require a single design to which birth certificates issued by all States must conform. (c) Minimum Issuance Standards.-- (1) In general.--To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall require and verify the following information from the requestor before issuing an authenticated copy of a birth certificate: (A) The name on the birth certificate. (B) The date and location of the birth. (C) The mother's maiden name. (D) Substantial proof of the requestor's identity. (2) Issuance to persons not named on birth certificate.--To meet the requirements of this section, in the case of a request by a person who is not named on the birth certificate, a State must require the presentation of legal authorization to request the birth certificate before issuance. (3) Issuance to family members.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the States, shall establish minimum standards for issuance of a birth certificate to specific family members, their authorized representatives, and others who demonstrate that the certificate is needed for the protection of the requestor's personal or property rights. (4) Waivers.--A State may waive the requirements set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (c)(1) in exceptional circumstances, such as the incapacitation of the registrant. (5) Applications by electronic means.--To meet the requirements of this section, for applications by electronic means, through the mail or by phone or fax, a State shall employ third party verification, or equivalent verification, of the identity of the requestor. (6) Verification of documents.--To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall verify the documents used to provide proof of identity of the requestor. (d) Other Requirements.--To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall adopt, at a minimum, the following practices in the issuance and administration of birth certificates: (1) Establish and implement minimum building security standards for State and local vital record offices. (2) Restrict public access to birth certificates and information gathered in the issuance process to ensure that access is restricted to entities with which the State has a binding privacy protection agreement. (3) Subject all persons with access to vital records to appropriate security clearance requirements. (4) Establish fraudulent document recognition training programs for appropriate employees engaged in the issuance process. (5) Establish and implement internal operating system standards for paper and for electronic systems. (6) Establish a central database that can provide interoperative data exchange with other States and with Federal agencies, subject to privacy restrictions and confirmation of the authority and identity of the requestor. (7) Ensure that birth and death records are matched in a comprehensive and timely manner, and that all electronic birth records and paper birth certificates of decedents are marked ``deceased''. (8) Cooperate with the Secretary in the implementation of electronic verification of vital events under section 3065. In consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Commissioner of Social Security, the Secretary shall take the following actions: (1) Work with the States to establish a common data set and common data exchange protocol for electronic birth registration systems and death registration systems. (2) Coordinate requirements for such systems to align with a national model. (3) Ensure that fraud prevention is built into the design of electronic vital registration systems in the collection of vital event data, the issuance of birth certificates, and the exchange of data among government agencies. (4) Ensure that electronic systems for issuing birth certificates, in the form of printed abstracts of birth records or digitized images, employ a common format of the certified copy, so that those requiring such documents can quickly confirm their validity. (5) Establish uniform field requirements for State birth registries. (6) Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, establish a process with the Department of Defense that will result in the sharing of data, with the States and the Social Security Administration, regarding deaths of United States military personnel and the birth and death of their dependents. (7) Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, establish a process with the Department of State to improve registration, notification, and the sharing of data with the States and the Social Security Administration, regarding births and deaths of United States citizens abroad. (8) Not later than 3 years after the date of establishment of databases provided for under this section, require States to record and retain electronic records of pertinent identification information collected from requestors who are not the registrants. (9) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, submit to Congress, a report on whether there is a need for Federal laws to address penalties for fraud and misuse of vital records and whether violations are sufficiently enforced. (a) Lead Agency.--The Secretary shall lead the implementation of electronic verification of a person's birth and death. (b) Regulations.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary shall issue regulations to establish a means by which authorized Federal and State agency users with a single interface will be able to generate an electronic query to any participating vital records jurisdiction throughout the Nation to verify the contents of a paper birth certificate. Pursuant to the regulations, an electronic response from the participating vital records jurisdiction as to whether there is a birth record in their database that matches the paper birth certificate will be returned to the user, along with an indication if the matching birth record has been flagged ``deceased''. The regulations shall take effect not later than 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) In General.--The Secretary may make grants to a State to assist the State in conforming to the minimum standards set forth in this chapter. (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary to carry out this chapter. (a) Participation With Federal Agencies and States.--All authority to issue regulations, certify standards, and issue grants under this chapter shall be carried out by the Secretary, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Health and Human Services and in consultation with State vital statistics offices and appropriate Federal agencies. (b) Extensions of Deadlines.--The Secretary may grant to a State an extension of time to meet the requirements of section 3063(a)(1) if the State provides adequate justification for noncompliance. (a) In General.--Section 205(c)(2)(C)(vi) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(C)(vi)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(I)'' after ``(vi)''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subclause: ``(II) Any State or political subdivision thereof (and any person acting as an agent of such an agency or instrumentality), in the administration of any driver's license or motor vehicle registration law within its jurisdiction, may not display a social security account number issued by the Commissioner of Social Security (or any derivative of such number) on any driver's license or motor vehicle registration or any other document issued by such State or political subdivision to an individual for purposes of identification of such individual or include on any such license, registration, or other document a magnetic strip, bar code, or other means of communication which conveys such number (or derivative thereof).''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to licenses, registrations, and other documents issued or reissued after 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Applications for Social Security Account Numbers.-- Section 205(c)(2)(B)(ii) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(B)(ii)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(I)'' after ``(ii)''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subclause: ``(II) With respect to an application for a social security account number for an individual, other than for purposes of enumeration at birth, the Commissioner shall require independent verification of any birth record provided by the applicant in support of the application. The Commissioner may provide by regulation for reasonable exceptions from the requirement for independent verification under this subclause in any case in which the Commissioner determines there is minimal opportunity for fraud.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to applications filed after 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (c) Study Regarding Applications for Replacement Social Security Cards.-- (1) In general.--As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security shall undertake a study to test the feasibility and cost effectiveness of verifying all identification documents submitted by an applicant for a replacement social security card. As part of such study, the Commissioner shall determine the feasibility of, and the costs associated with, the development of appropriate electronic processes for third party verification of any such identification documents which are issued by agencies and instrumentalities of the Federal Government and of the States (and political subdivisions thereof). (2) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner shall report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate regarding the results of the study undertaken under paragraph (1). Such report shall contain such recommendations for legislative changes as the Commissioner considers necessary to implement needed improvements in the process for verifying identification documents submitted by applicants for replacement social security cards. (a) Improvement of Application Process.-- (1) In general.--As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security shall undertake to make improvements to the enumeration at birth program for the issuance of social security account numbers to newborns. Such improvements shall be designed to prevent-- (A) the assignment of social security account numbers to unnamed children; (B) the issuance of more than 1 social security account number to the same child; and (C) other opportunities for fraudulently obtaining a social security account number. (2) Report to the congress.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner shall transmit to each House of the Congress a report specifying in detail the extent to which the improvements required under paragraph (1) have been made. (b) Study Regarding Process for Enumeration at Birth.-- (1) In general.--As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security shall undertake a study to determine the most efficient options for ensuring the integrity of the process for enumeration at birth. Such study shall include an examination of available methods for reconciling hospital birth records with birth registrations submitted to agencies of States and political subdivisions thereof and with information provided to the Commissioner as part of the process for enumeration at birth. (2) Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner shall report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate regarding the results of the study undertaken under paragraph (1). Such report shall contain such recommendations for legislative changes as the Commissioner considers necessary to implement needed improvements in the process for enumeration at birth. (a) In General.--As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security shall undertake a study to-- (1) determine the best method of requiring and obtaining photographic identification of applicants for old-age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits under title II of the Social Security Act, for a social security account number, or for a replacement social security card, and of providing for reasonable exceptions to any requirement for photographic identification of such applicants that may be necessary to promote efficient and effective administration of such title, and (2) evaluate the benefits and costs of instituting such a requirement for photographic identification, including the degree to which the security and integrity of the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program would be enhanced. (b) Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner shall report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate regarding the results of the study undertaken under subsection (a). Such report shall contain such recommendations for legislative changes as the Commissioner considers necessary relating to requirements for photographic identification of applicants described in subsection (a). (a) In General.--Section 205(c)(2)(G) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(G)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``The Commissioner shall restrict the issuance of multiple replacement social security cards to any individual to 3 per year and to 10 for the life of the individual, except in any case in which the Commissioner determines there is minimal opportunity for fraud.''. (b) Regulations and Effective Date.--The Commissioner of Social Security shall issue regulations under the amendment made by subsection (a) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act. Systems controls developed by the Commissioner pursuant to such amendment shall take effect upon the earlier of the issuance of such regulations or the end of such 1-year period. (a) In General.--As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall undertake a study to examine the best method of modifying the social security account number assigned to individuals who-- (1) are not citizens of the United States, (2) have not been admitted for permanent residence, and (3) are not authorized by the Secretary of Homeland Security to work in the United States, or are so authorized subject to one or more restrictions, so as to include an indication of such lack of authorization to work or such restrictions on such an authorization. (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner shall report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate regarding the results of the study undertaken under this section. Such report shall include the Commissioner's recommendations of feasible options for modifying the social security account number in the manner described in subsection (a). (a) In General.--Not later than May 31, 2005, the Comptroller General of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Homeland Security each shall submit to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the results of a separate study on the subjects described in subsection (c). (b) Study.--The study submitted by the Secretary of State under subsection (a) shall be completed by the Office of Visa and Passport Control of the Department of State, in coordination with the appropriate officials of the Department of Homeland Security. (c) Contents.--The studies described in subsection (a) shall examine the feasibility, cost, potential benefits, and relative importance to the objectives of tracking suspected terrorists' travel, and apprehending suspected terrorists, of each of the following: (1) Requiring nationals of all countries to present machine-readable, tamper-resistant passports that incorporate biometric and document authentication identifiers. (2) Creation of a database containing information on the lifetime travel history of each foreign national or United States citizen who might seek to enter the United States or another country at any time, in order that border and visa issuance officials may ascertain the travel history of a prospective entrant by means other than a passport. (d) Incentives.--The studies described in subsection (a) shall also make recommendations on incentives that might be offered to encourage foreign nations to participate in the initiatives described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (c). (a) In General.--Section 235A(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1225(a)(4)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``October 31, 2000,'' and inserting ``January 1, 2008,''; (2) by striking ``5 additional'' and inserting ``at least 15 and up to 25 additional''; (3) by striking ``number of aliens'' and inserting ``number of inadmissible aliens, especially aliens who are potential terrorists,''; (4) by striking ``who are inadmissible to the United States.'' and inserting a period; and (5) by striking ``Attorney General'' each place such term appears and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''. (b) Report.--Not later than June 30, 2006, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall report to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on the progress being made in implementing the amendments made by subsection (a). (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out the amendments made by subsection (a)-- (1) $24,000,000 for fiscal year 2005; (2) $48,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and (3) $97,000,000 for fiscal year 2007. (a) In General.--Section 235A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1225(b)) is amended-- (1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``and Immigration Security Initiative'' after ``Program''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``Beginning not later than December 31, 2006, the number of airports selected for an assignment under this subsection shall be at least 50.''. (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out the amendments made by subsection (a)-- (1) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2005; (2) $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and (3) $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2007. (a) Increased Number of Consular Officers.--The Secretary of State, in each of fiscal years 2006 through 2009, may increase by 150 the number of positions for consular officers above the number of such positions for which funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal year. (b) Limitation on Use of Foreign Nationals for Nonimmigrant Visa Screening.--Section 222(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1202(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``All nonimmigrant visa applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular officer.''. (c) Training for Consular Officers in Detection of Fraudulent Documents.--Section 305(a) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 1734(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``As part of the consular training provided to such officers by the Secretary of State, such officers shall also receive training in detecting fraudulent documents and general document forensics and shall be required as part of such training to work with immigration officers conducting inspections of applicants for admission into the United States at ports of entry.''. (d) Assignment of Anti-Fraud Specialists.-- (1) Survey regarding document fraud.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall conduct a survey of each diplomatic and consular post at which visas are issued to assess the extent to which fraudulent documents are presented by visa applicants to consular officers at such posts. (2) Placement of specialist.--Not later than July 31, 2005, the Secretary shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, identify 100 of such posts that experience the greatest frequency of presentation of fraudulent documents by visa applicants. The Secretary shall place in each such post at least one full-time anti-fraud specialist employed by the Department of State to assist the consular officers at each such post in the detection of such fraud. Section 1028 of title 18, United States Code, relating to penalties for fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents and information, is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(1)(A)(i), by striking ``issued by or under the authority of the United States'' and inserting the following: ``as described in subsection (d)''; (2) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``three years'' and inserting ``six years''; (3) in subsection (b)(3), by striking ``20 years'' and inserting ``25 years''; (4) in subsection (b)(4), by striking ``25 years'' and inserting ``30 years''; and (5) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting after ``United States'' the following: ``Government, a State, political subdivision of a State, a foreign government, political subdivision of a foreign government, an international governmental or an international quasi-governmental organization,''. Section 1015 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking the dash at the end of subsection (f) and inserting ``; or''; and (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following: ``(g) Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or claim that he is a citizen of the United States in order to enter into, or remain in, the United States--''. (a) Limitation.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of State shall ensure, subject to subsection (b), that the Antiterrorism Assistance Training (ATA) program of the Department of State (or any successor or related program) under chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa et seq.) (or other relevant provisions of law) is carried out primarily to provide training to host nation security services for the specific purpose of ensuring the physical security and safety of United States Government facilities and personnel abroad (as well as foreign dignitaries and training related to the protection of such dignitaries), including security detail training and offenses related to passport or visa fraud. (b) Exception.--The limitation contained in subsection (a) shall not apply, and the Secretary of State may expand the ATA program to include other types of antiterrorism assistance training, if the Secretary first obtains the approval of the Attorney General and provides written notification of such proposed expansion to the appropriate congressional committees. (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (1) the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate. (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) International terrorists travel across international borders to raise funds, recruit members, train for operations, escape capture, communicate, and plan and carry out attacks. (2) The international terrorists who planned and carried out the attack on the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, the attack on the embassies of the United States in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998, the attack on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000, and the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, traveled across international borders to plan and carry out these attacks. (3) The international terrorists who planned other attacks on the United States, including the plot to bomb New York City landmarks in 1993, the plot to bomb the New York City subway in 1997, and the millennium plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on December 31, 1999, traveled across international borders to plan and carry out these attacks. (4) Many of the international terrorists who planned and carried out large-scale attacks against foreign targets, including the attack in Bali, Indonesia, on October 11, 2002, and the attack in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004, traveled across international borders to plan and carry out these attacks. (5) Throughout the 1990s, international terrorists, including those involved in the attack on the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, the plot to bomb New York City landmarks in 1993, and the millennium plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on December 31, 1999, traveled on fraudulent passports and often had more than one passport. (6) Two of the September 11, 2001, hijackers were carrying passports that had been manipulated in a fraudulent manner and several other hijackers whose passports did not survive the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were likely to have carried passports that were similarly manipulated. (7) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, (commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission), stated that ``Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their money.''. (b) International Agreements to Track and Curtail Terrorist Travel.-- (1) International agreement on lost, stolen, or falsified documents.--The President shall lead efforts to track and curtail the travel of terrorists by supporting the drafting, adoption, and implementation of international agreements, and by supporting the expansion of existing international agreements, to track and stop international travel by terrorists and other criminals through the use of lost, stolen, or falsified documents to augment existing United Nations and other international anti-terrorism efforts. (2) Contents of international agreement.--The President shall seek, in the appropriate fora, the drafting, adoption, and implementation of an effective international agreement requiring-- (A) the establishment of a system to share information on lost, stolen, and fraudulent passports and other travel documents for the purposes of preventing the undetected travel of persons using such passports and other travel documents that were obtained improperly; (B) the establishment and implementation of a real-time verification system of passports and other travel documents with issuing authorities; (C) the assumption of an obligation by countries that are parties to the agreement to share with officials at ports of entry in any such country information relating to lost, stolen, and fraudulent passports and other travel documents; (D) the assumption of an obligation by countries that are parties to the agreement-- (i) to criminalize-- (a) Findings.--Congress finds that-- (1) the current lack of a single convention for translating Arabic names enabled some of the 19 hijackers of aircraft used in the terrorist attacks against the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001, to vary the spelling of their names to defeat name-based terrorist watchlist systems and to make more difficult any potential efforts to locate them; and (2) although the development and utilization of terrorist watchlist systems using biometric identifiers will be helpful, the full development and utilization of such systems will take several years, and name-based terrorist watchlist systems will always be useful. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the President should seek to enter into an international agreement to modernize and improve standards for the translation of names into the Roman alphabet in order to ensure one common spelling for such names for international travel documents and name-based watchlist systems. (a) Finding.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the Congress finds that completing a biometric entry and exit data system as expeditiously as possible is an essential investment in efforts to protect the United States by preventing the entry of terrorists. (b) Plan and Report.-- (1) Development of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop a plan to accelerate the full implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data system required by applicable sections of-- (A) the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-208); (B) the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-205); (C) the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (Public Law 106- 396); (D) the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173); and (E) the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56). (2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report to Congress on the plan developed under paragraph (1), which shall contain-- (A) a description of the current functionality of the entry and exit data system, including-- (i) a listing of ports of entry with biometric entry data systems in use and whether such screening systems are located at primary or secondary inspection areas; (ii) a listing of ports of entry with biometric exit data systems in use; (iii) a listing of databases and data systems with which the automated entry and exit data system are interoperable; (iv) a description of-- (a) Declaration of United States Policy.--Congress declares that it shall be the policy of the United States to-- (1) make combating terrorist travel and those who assist them a priority for the United States counterterrorism policy; and (2) ensure that the information relating to individuals who help facilitate terrorist travel by creating false passports, visas, documents used to obtain such travel documents, and other documents are fully shared within the United States Government and, to the extent possible, with and from foreign governments, in order to initiate United States and foreign prosecutions of such individuals. (b) Amendment.--Section 1(e)(2) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(e)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(C) Additional duties relating to terrorist travel.--In addition to the principal duties of the Coordinator described in subparagraph (B), the Coordinator shall analyze methods used by terrorists to travel internationally, develop policies with respect to curtailing terrorist travel, and coordinate such policies with the appropriate bureaus and other entities of the Department of State, other United States Government agencies, the Human Trafficking and Smuggling Center, and foreign governments.''. (a) Establishment.--There is established within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the Department of State an Office of Visa and Passport Security (in this section referred to as the ``Office''). (b) Head of Office.-- (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of the Office shall be an individual who shall have the rank and status of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security (in this section referred to as the ``Deputy Assistant Secretary''). (2) Recruitment.--The Under Secretary of State for Management shall chose the Deputy Assistant Secretary from among individuals who are Diplomatic Security Agents. (3) Qualifications.--The Diplomatic Security Agent chosen to serve as the Deputy Assistant Secretary shall have expertise and experience in investigating and prosecuting visa and passport fraud. (c) Duties.-- (1) Preparation of strategic plan.-- (A) In general.--The Deputy Assistant Secretary, in coordination with the appropriate officials of the Department of Homeland Security, shall ensure the preparation of a strategic plan to target and disrupt individuals and organizations at home and in foreign countries that are involved in the fraudulent production, distribution, use, or other similar activity-- (i) of a United States visa or United States passport; (ii) of documents intended to help fraudulently procure a United States visa or United States passport, or other documents intended to gain unlawful entry into the United States; or (iii) of passports and visas issued by foreign countries intended to gain unlawful entry into the United States. (B) Emphasis.--Such plan shall-- (i) focus particular emphasis on individuals and organizations that may have links to domestic terrorist organizations or foreign terrorist organizations (as such term is defined in Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189)); (ii) require the development of a strategic training course under the Antiterrorism Assistance Training (ATA) program of the Department of State (or any successor or related program) under chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa et seq.) (or other relevant provisions of law) to train participants in the identification of fraudulent documents and the forensic detection of such documents which may be used to obtain unlawful entry into the United States; and (iii) determine the benefits and costs of providing technical assistance to foreign governments to ensure the security of passports, visas, and related documents and to investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals who facilitate travel by the creation of false passports and visas, documents to obtain such passports and visas, and other types of travel documents. (2) Duties of office.--The Office shall have the following duties: (A) Analysis of methods.--Analyze methods used by terrorists to travel internationally, particularly the use of false or altered travel documents to illegally enter foreign countries and the United States, and advise the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Secretary of Homeland Security on recommended changes to the visa issuance process that could combat such methods, including the introduction of new technologies into such process. (B) Identification of individuals and documents.--Identify, in cooperation with the Human Trafficking and Smuggling Center, individuals who facilitate travel by the creation of false passports and visas, documents used to obtain such passports and visas, and other types of travel documents, and ensure that the appropriate agency is notified for further investigation and prosecution or, in the case of such individuals abroad for which no further investigation or prosecution is initiated, ensure that all appropriate information is shared with foreign governments in order to facilitate investigation, arrest, and prosecution of such individuals. (C) Identification of foreign countries needing assistance.--Identify foreign countries that need technical assistance, such as law reform, administrative reform, prosecutorial training, or assistance to police and other investigative services, to ensure passport, visa, and related document security and to investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals who facilitate travel by the creation of false passports and visas, documents used to obtain such passports and visas, and other types of travel documents. (D) Inspection of applications.--Randomly inspect visa and passport applications for accuracy, efficiency, and fraud, especially at high terrorist threat posts, in order to prevent a recurrence of the issuance of visas to those who submit incomplete, fraudulent, or otherwise irregular or incomplete applications. (3) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Deputy Assistant Secretary shall submit to Congress a report containing-- (A) a description of the strategic plan prepared under paragraph (1); and (B) an evaluation of the feasibility of establishing civil service positions in field offices of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to investigate visa and passport fraud, including an evaluation of whether to allow diplomatic security agents to convert to civil service officers to fill such positions. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a mechanism to-- (1) ensure the coordination and dissemination of terrorist travel intelligence and operational information among the appropriate agencies within the Department of Homeland Security, including the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard, and other agencies as directed by the Secretary; and (2) ensure the sharing of terrorist travel intelligence and operational information with the Department of State, the National Counterterrorism Center, and other appropriate Federal agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, shall establish a program to-- (1) analyze and utilize information and intelligence regarding terrorist travel tactics, patterns, trends, and practices; and (2) disseminate that information to all front-line Department of Homeland Security personnel who are at ports of entry or between ports of entry, to immigration benefits offices, and, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to appropriate individuals at United States embassies and consulates. (a) Review, Evaluation, and Revision of Existing Training Programs.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall-- (1) review and evaluate the training currently provided to Department of Homeland Security personnel and, in consultation with the Secretary of State, relevant Department of State personnel with respect to travel and identity documents, and techniques, patterns, and trends associated with terrorist travel; and (2) develop and implement a revised training program for border, immigration, and consular officials in order to teach such officials how to effectively detect, intercept, and disrupt terrorist travel. (b) Required Topics of Revised Programs.--The training program developed under subsection (a)(2) shall include training in the following areas: (1) Methods for identifying fraudulent and genuine travel documents. (2) Methods for detecting terrorist indicators on travel documents and other relevant identity documents. (3) Recognizing travel patterns, tactics, and behaviors exhibited by terrorists. (4) Effectively utilizing information contained in databases and data systems available to the Department of Homeland Security. (5) Other topics determined to be appropriate by the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the Secretary of State or the National Intelligence Director. (a) Plan Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the Congress a plan to ensure that the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State acquire and deploy, to all consulates, ports of entry, and immigration benefits offices, technologies that facilitate document authentication and the detection of potential terrorist indicators on travel documents. (b) Interoperability Requirement.--To the extent possible, technologies to be acquired and deployed under the plan shall be compatible with current systems used by the Department of Homeland Security to detect and identify fraudulent documents and genuine documents. (c) Passport Screening.--The plan shall address the feasibility of using such technologies to screen passports submitted for identification purposes to a United States consular, border, or immigration official. (a) National Maritime Transportation Security Plan.-- Section 70103(a) of the 46, United States Code, is amended by striking ``The Secretary'' and inserting ``Not later than December 31, 2004, the Secretary''. (b) Facility and Vessel Vulnerability Assessments.--Section 70102(b)(1) of the 46, United States Code, is amended by striking ``, the Secretary'' and inserting ``and by not later than December 31, 2004, the Secretary''. (c) Transportation Security Card Regulations.--Section 70105(a) of the 46, United States Code, is amended by striking ``The Secretary'' and inserting ``Not later than December 31, 2004, the Secretary''. It is the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States-- (1) to identify and prioritize foreign countries that are or that could be used as terrorist sanctuaries; (2) to assess current United States resources being provided to such foreign countries; (3) to develop and implement a coordinated strategy to prevent terrorists from using such foreign countries as sanctuaries; and (4) to work in bilateral and multilateral fora to prevent foreign countries from being used as terrorist sanctuaries. (a) Initial Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a report that describes a strategy for addressing and, where possible, eliminating terrorist sanctuaries. (2) Content.--The report required under this subsection shall include the following: (A) A list that prioritizes each actual and potential terrorist sanctuary and a description of activities in the actual and potential sanctuaries. (B) An outline of strategies for preventing the use of, disrupting, or ending the use of such sanctuaries. (C) A detailed description of efforts, including an assessment of successes and setbacks, by the United States to work with other countries in bilateral and multilateral fora to address or eliminate each actual or potential terrorist sanctuary and disrupt or eliminate the security provided to terrorists by each such sanctuary. (D) A description of long-term goals and actions designed to reduce the conditions that allow the formation of terrorist sanctuaries. (b) Subsequent Reports.-- (1) Requirement of reports.--Section 140(a)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(a)(1)) is amended-- (A) by striking ``(1)'' and inserting ``(1)(A)''; (B) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) as clauses (i) through (iii), respectively; (C) in subparagraph (A)(iii) (as redesignated), by adding ``and'' at the end; and (D) by adding at the end the following: ``(B) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country whose territory is being used or could potentially be used as a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist organizations;''. (2) Provisions to be included in report.--Section 140(b) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2656f(b)) is amended-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (a)(1)(A)''; and (ii) by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); (C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following: ``(2) with respect to subsection (a)(1)(B)-- ``(A) the extent of knowledge by the government of the country with respect to terrorist activities in the territory of the country; and ``(B) the actions by the country-- ``(i) to eliminate each terrorist sanctuary in the territory of the country; ``(ii) to cooperate with United States antiterrorism efforts; and ``(iii) to prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and through the territory of the country;''; (D) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (3) (as redesignated) and inserting a semicolon; and (E) by inserting after paragraph (3) (as redesignated) the following: ``(4) a strategy for addressing and, where possible, eliminating terrorist sanctuaries that shall include-- ``(A) a description of actual and potential terrorist sanctuaries, together with an assessment of the priorities of addressing and eliminating such sanctuaries; ``(B) an outline of strategies for disrupting or eliminating the security provided to terrorists by such sanctuaries; ``(C) a description of efforts by the United States to work with other countries in bilateral and multilateral fora to address or eliminate actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and disrupt or eliminate the security provided to terrorists by such sanctuaries; and ``(D) a description of long-term goals and actions designed to reduce the conditions that allow the formation of terrorist sanctuaries; ``(5) an update of the information contained in the report required to be transmitted to Congress pursuant to section 4002(a)(2) of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act; ``(6) to the extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar year; and ``(7) an analysis, as appropriate, relating to trends in international terrorism, including changes in technology used, methods and targets of attacks, demographic information on terrorists, and other appropriate information.''. (3) Definitions.--Section 140(d) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)) is amended-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and (C) by adding at the end the following: ``(4) the term `territory' and `territory of the country' means the land, waters, and airspace of the country; and ``(5) the term `terrorist sanctuary' or `sanctuary' means an area in the territory of a country that is used by a terrorist group with the express or implied consent of the government of the country-- ``(A) to carry out terrorist activities, including training, fundraising, financing, recruitment, and education activities; or ``(B) to provide transit through the country.''. (4) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) apply with respect to the report required to be transmitted under section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, by April 30, 2006, and by April 30 of each subsequent year. (a) Amendments.--Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); and (B) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following: ``(B) Any part of the territory of the country is being used as a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist organizations.''; (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``paragraph (1)(A)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1)''; (3) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); (4) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following: ``(5) A determination made by the Secretary of State under paragraph (1)(B) may not be rescinded unless the President submits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate before the proposed rescission would take effect a report certifying that the government of the country concerned -- ``(A) is taking concrete, verifiable steps to eliminate each terrorist sanctuary in the territory of the country; ``(B) is cooperating with United States antiterrorism efforts; and ``(C) is taking all appropriate actions to prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and through the territory of the country.''; and (5) by inserting after paragraph (6) (as redesignated) the following: ``(7) In this subsection-- ``(A) the term `territory of the country' means the land, waters, and airspace of the country; and ``(B) the term `terrorist sanctuary' or `sanctuary' means an area in the territory of a country that is used by a terrorist group with the express or implied consent of the government of the country-- ``(i) to carry out terrorist activities, including training, fundraising, financing, recruitment, and education activities; or ``(ii) to provide transit through the country.''. (b) Implementation.--The President shall implement the amendments made by subsection (a) by exercising the authorities the President has under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). (a) Requirement.--Not later than December 31, 2004, the Secretary of State shall appoint individuals to the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board to fill all vacancies in the membership of the Board that exist on the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Consultation.--Appointments to the Board under subsection (a) shall be made in consultation with the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (a) Review.-- (1) In general.--The Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security shall instruct the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board (in this section referred to as the ``Advisory Board'') to carry out a review of existing policies of the United States relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the control of strategic weapons. (2) Components.--The review required under this subsection shall contain at a minimum the following: (A) An identification of all major deficiencies in existing United States policies relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the control of strategic weapons. (B) Proposals that contain a range of options that if implemented would adequately address any significant threat deriving from the deficiencies in existing United States policies described in subparagraph (A). (b) Reports.-- (1) Interim report.--Not later than June 15, 2005, the Advisory Board shall prepare and submit to the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security an interim report that contains the initial results of the review carried out pursuant to subsection (a). (2) Final report.--Not later than December 1, 2005, the Advisory Board shall prepare and submit to the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, a final report that contains the comprehensive results of the review carried out pursuant to subsection (a). (c) Experts and Consultants.-- In carrying out this section, the Advisory Board may procure temporary and intermittent services of experts and consultants, including experts and consultants from nongovernmental organizations, under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code. (d) Funding and Other Resources.--The Secretary of State shall provide to the Advisory Board an appropriate amount of funding and other resources to enable the Advisory Board to carry out this section. Section 1(e)(2) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(e)(2)), as amended by section 3091(b), is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(D) Additional duties relating to international agreements to interdict acts of international terrorism.-- ``(i) In general.--In addition to the principal duties of the Coordinator described in subparagraph (B), the Coordinator, in consultation with relevant United States Government agencies, shall seek to negotiate on a bilateral basis international agreements under which parties to an agreement work in partnership to address and interdict acts of international terrorism. ``(ii) Terms of international agreement.--It is the sense of Congress that-- It is the sense of Congress that the President should pursue by all appropriate diplomatic means with countries that are participating in the Coalition to fight terrorism the development of an effective approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists. The effective approach referred to in this section may, as appropriate, draw on Article 3 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva on August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316). (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with all appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an annual assessment of the impact of public diplomacy efforts on target audiences. Each assessment shall review the United States public diplomacy strategy worldwide and by region, including an examination of the allocation of resources and an evaluation and assessment of the progress in, and barriers to, achieving the goals set forth under previous plans submitted under this section. Not later than March 15 of every year, the Secretary shall submit the assessment required by this subsection. (b) Further Action.-- On the basis of such review, the Secretary, in coordination with all appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit, as part of the annual budget submission, a public diplomacy strategy plan which specifies goals, agency responsibilities, and necessary resources and mechanisms for achieving such goals during the next fiscal year. The plan may be submitted in classified form. (a) Statement of Policy.--It should be the policy of the United States: (1) The Foreign Service should recruit individuals with expertise and professional experience in public diplomacy. (2) United States chiefs of mission should have a prominent role in the formulation of public diplomacy strategies for the countries and regions to which they are assigned and should be accountable for the operation and success of public diplomacy efforts at their posts. (3) Initial and subsequent training of Foreign Service officers should be enhanced to include information and training on public diplomacy and the tools and technology of mass communication. (b) Personnel.-- (1) Qualifications.--In the recruitment, training, and assignment of members of the Foreign Service, the Secretary of State shall emphasize the importance of public diplomacy and applicable skills and techniques. The Secretary shall consider the priority recruitment into the Foreign Service, at middle-level entry, of individuals with expertise and professional experience in public diplomacy, mass communications, or journalism. The Secretary shall give special consideration to individuals with language facility and experience in particular countries and regions. (2) Languages of special interest.--The Secretary of State shall seek to increase the number of Foreign Service officers proficient in languages spoken in predominantly Muslim countries. Such increase shall be accomplished through the recruitment of new officers and incentives for officers in service. (a) Declaration of Policy.--Congress declares that the United States should commit to a long-term and sustainable investment in promoting engagement with people of all levels of society in countries with predominantly Muslim populations, particularly with youth and those who influence youth. Such an investment should make use of the talents and resources in the private sector and should include programs to increase the number of people who can be exposed to the United States and its fundamental ideas and values in order to dispel misconceptions. Such programs should include youth exchange programs, young ambassadors programs, international visitor programs, academic and cultural exchange programs, American Corner programs, library programs, journalist exchange programs, sister city programs, and other programs related to people-to-people diplomacy. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States should significantly increase its investment in the people-to-people programs described in subsection (a). (a) In General.--Section 603(b) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4003(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentences: ``The precepts for such selection boards shall also consider whether the member of the Service or the member of the Senior Foreign Service, as the case may be, has served in at least one position in which the primary responsibility of such member was related to public diplomacy. A member may not be promoted into or within the Senior Foreign Service if such member has not served in at least one such position.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on January 1, 2009. It is the purpose of this chapter to strengthen United States leadership and effectiveness at international organizations and multilateral institutions. (a) In General.--The President, acting through the Secretary of State and the relevant United States chiefs of mission, shall-- (1) continue to strongly support and seek to expand the work of the democracy caucus at the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Human Rights Commission; and (2) seek to establish a democracy caucus at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and at other broad-based international organizations. (b) Purposes of the Caucus.--A democracy caucus at an international organization should-- (1) forge common positions, including, as appropriate, at the ministerial level, on matters of concern before the organization and work within and across regional lines to promote agreed positions; (2) work to revise an increasingly outmoded system of membership selection, regional voting, and decision making; and (3) establish a rotational leadership agreement to provide member countries an opportunity, for a set period of time, to serve as the designated president of the caucus, responsible (a) United States Policy.--The President, acting through the Secretary of State, the relevant United States chiefs of mission, and, where appropriate, the Secretary of the Treasury, shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to-- (1) where appropriate, reform the criteria for leadership and, in appropriate cases, for membership, at all United Nations bodies and at other international organizations and multilateral institutions to which the United States is a member so as to exclude countries that violate the principles of the specific organization; (2) make it a policy of the United Nations and other international organizations and multilateral institutions of which the United States is a member that a member country may not stand in nomination for membership or in nomination or in rotation for a leadership position in such bodies if the member country is subject to sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council; and (3) work to ensure that no member country stand in nomination for membership, or in nomination or in rotation for a leadership position in such organizations, or for membership on the United Nations Security Council, if the member country is subject to a determination under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)), section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)). (b) Report to Congress.--Not later than 15 days after a country subject to a determination under one or more of the provisions of law specified in subsection (a)(3) is selected for membership or a leadership post in an international organization of which the United States is a member or for membership on the United Nations Security Council, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on any steps taken pursuant to subsection (a)(3). (a) Training Programs.--Section 708 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4028) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(c) Training in Multilateral Diplomacy.-- ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish a series of training courses for officers of the Service, including appropriate chiefs of mission, on the conduct of diplomacy at international organizations and other multilateral institutions and at broad-based multilateral negotiations of international instruments. ``(2) Particular programs.--The Secretary shall ensure that the training described in paragraph (1) is provided at various stages of the career of members of the service. In particular, the Secretary shall ensure that after January 1, 2006-- ``(A) officers of the Service receive training on the conduct of diplomacy at international organizations and other multilateral institutions and at broad-based multilateral negotiations of international instruments as part of their training upon entry into the Service; and ``(B) officers of the Service, including chiefs of mission, who are assigned to United States missions representing the United States to international organizations and other multilateral institutions or who are assigned in Washington, D.C., to positions that have as their primary responsibility formulation of policy towards such organizations and institutions or towards participation in broad-based multilateral negotiations of international instruments, receive specialized training in the areas described in paragraph (1) prior to beginning of service for such assignment or, if receiving such training at that time is not practical, within the first year of beginning such assignment.''. (b) Training for Civil Service Employees.--The Secretary shall ensure that employees of the Department of State who are members of the civil service and who are assigned to positions described in section 708(c) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (as amended by subsection (a)) receive training described in such section. (c) Conforming Amendments.--Section 708 of such Act is further amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``(a) The'' and inserting ``(a) Training on Human Rights.--The''; and (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``(b) The'' and inserting ``(b) Training on Refugee Law and Religious Persecution.--The''. (a) Establishment of Office.--The Secretary of State is authorized to establish, within the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, an Office on Multilateral Negotiations to be headed by a Special Representative for Multilateral Negotiations (in this section referred to as the ``Special Representative''). (b) Appointment.--The Special Representative shall be appointed by the President and shall have the rank of Ambassador-at-Large. At the discretion of the President another official at the Department may serve as the Special Representative. (c) Staffing.--The Special Representative shall have a staff of Foreign Service and civil service officers skilled in multilateral diplomacy. (d) Duties.--The Special Representative shall have the following responsibilities: (1) In general.--The primary responsibility of the Special Representative shall be to assist in the organization of, and preparation for, United States participation in multilateral negotiations, including advocacy efforts undertaken by the Department of State and other United States Government agencies. (2) Consultations.--The Special Representative shall consult with Congress, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector on matters affecting multilateral negotiations. (3) Advisory role.--The Special Representative shall advise the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs and, as appropriate, the Secretary of State, regarding advocacy at international organizations, multilateral institutions, and negotiations, and shall make recommendations regarding-- (A) effective strategies (and tactics) to achieve United States policy objectives at multilateral negotiations; (B) the need for and timing of high level intervention by the President, the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of State, and other United States officials to secure support from key foreign government officials for United States positions at such organizations, institutions, and negotiations; and (C) the composition of United States delegations to multilateral negotiations. (4) Annual diplomatic missions of multilateral issues.--The Special Representative, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, shall organize annual diplomatic missions to appropriate foreign countries to conduct consultations between principal officers responsible for advising the Secretary of State on international organizations and high-level representatives of the governments of such foreign countries to promote the United States agenda at the United Nations General Assembly and other key international fora (such as the United Nations Human Rights Commission). (5) Leadership and membership of international organizations.--The Special Representative, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs, shall direct the efforts of the United States to reform the criteria for leadership of and membership in international organizations as described in section 4033. (6) Participation in multilateral negotiations.--The Secretary of State may direct the Special Representative to serve as a member of a United States delegation to any multilateral negotiation. (7) Coordination with the department of the treasury.-- (A) Coordination and consultation.--The Special Representative shall coordinate and consult with the relevant staff at the Department of the Treasury in order to prepare recommendations for the Secretary of State regarding multilateral negotiations involving international financial institutions and other multilateral financial policymaking bodies. (B) Negotiating authority clarified.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Treasury shall remain the lead representative and lead negotiator for the United States within the international financial institutions and other multilateral financial policymaking bodies. (C) Definitions.--In this paragraph: (i) International financial institutions.--The term ``international financial institutions'' has the meaning given in section 1701(c)(2) of the International Financial Institutions Act. (ii) Other multilateral financial policymaking bodies.--The term ``other multilateral financial policymaking bodies'' means-- (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) During the 2003-2004 school year, the Office of Overseas Schools of the Department of State is financially assisting 189 elementary and secondary schools in foreign countries. (2) American-sponsored elementary and secondary schools are located in more than 20 countries with significant Muslim populations in the Near East, Africa, South Asia, Central Asia, and East Asia. (3) American-sponsored elementary and secondary schools provide an American-style education in English, with curricula that typically include an emphasis on the development of critical thinking and analytical skills. (b) Purpose.--The United States has an interest in increasing the level of financial support provided to American-sponsored elementary and secondary schools in predominantly Muslim countries, in order to-- (1) increase the number of students in such countries who attend such schools; (2) increase the number of young people who may thereby gain at any early age an appreciation for the culture, society, and history of the United States; and (3) increase the number of young people who may thereby improve their proficiency in the English language. (c) Pilot Program Authorized.--The Secretary of State, acting through the Director of the Office of Overseas Schools of the Department of State, may conduct a pilot program to make grants to American-sponsored elementary and secondary schools in predominantly Muslim countries for the purpose of providing full or partial merit-based scholarships to students from lower- and middle-income families of such countries to attend such schools. (d) Determination of Eligible Students.--For purposes of expending grant funds, an American-sponsored elementary and secondary school that receives a grant under subsection (c) is authorized to establish criteria to be implemented by such school to determine what constitutes lower- and middle-income families in the country (or region of the country, if regional variations in income levels in the country are significant) in which such school is located. (e) Restriction on Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated to the Secretary of State pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in subsection (h) shall be used for the sole purpose of making grants under this section, and may not be used for the administration of the Office of Overseas Schools of the Department of State or for any other activity of the Office. (f) Voluntary Participation.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to require participation in the pilot program by an American-sponsored elementary or secondary school in a predominantly Muslim country. (g) Report.--Not later than April 15, 2006, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the pilot program. The report shall assess the success of the program, examine any obstacles encountered in its implementation, and address whether it should be continued, and if so, provide recommendations to increase its effectiveness. (h) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007 to carry out this section. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are fundamental human rights. (2) The United States has a national interest in promoting these freedoms by supporting free media abroad, which is essential to the development of free and democratic societies consistent with our own. (3) Free media is undermined, endangered, or nonexistent in many repressive and transitional societies around the world, including in Eurasia, Africa, and the Middle East. (4) Individuals lacking access to a plurality of free media are vulnerable to misinformation and propaganda and are potentially more likely to adopt anti-American views. (5) Foreign governments have a responsibility to actively and publicly discourage and rebut unprofessional and unethical media while respecting journalistic integrity and editorial independence. (b) Statements of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States, acting through the Secretary of State, to-- (1) ensure that the promotion of press freedoms and free media worldwide is a priority of United States foreign policy and an integral component of United States public diplomacy; (2) respect the journalistic integrity and editorial independence of free media worldwide; and (3) ensure that widely accepted standards for professional and ethical journalistic and editorial practices are employed when assessing international media. (c) Grants to Private Sector Group to Establish Media Network.-- (1) In general.--Grants made available to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) pursuant to paragraph (3) shall be used by NED to provide funding to a private sector group to establish and manage a free and independent media network in accordance with paragraph (2). (2) Purpose.--The purpose of the network shall be to provide an effective forum to convene a broad range of individuals, organizations, and governmental participants involved in journalistic activities and the development of free and independent media to-- (A) fund a clearinghouse to collect and share information concerning international media development and training; (B) improve research in the field of media assistance and program evaluation to better inform decisions regarding funding and program design for government and private donors; (C) explore the most appropriate use of existing means to more effectively encourage the involvement of the private sector in the field of media assistance; and (D) identify effective methods for the development of a free and independent media in societies in transition. (3) Funding.--For grants made by the Department of State to NED as authorized by the National Endowment for Democracy Act (Pub. L. 98-164, 97 Stat. 1039), there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007 to carry out this section. (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) Biased or false media coverage of the United States and its allies is a significant factor encouraging terrorist acts against the people of the United States. (2) Public diplomacy efforts designed to encourage an accurate understanding of the people of the United States and the policies of the United States are unlikely to succeed if foreign publics are subjected to unrelenting biased or false local media coverage of the United States. (3) Where freedom of the press exists in foreign countries the United States can combat biased or false media coverage by responding in the foreign media or by communicating directly to foreign publics in such countries. (4) Foreign governments which encourage biased or false media coverage of the United States bear a significant degree of responsibility for creating a climate within which terrorism can flourish. Such governments are responsible for encouraging biased or false media coverage if they-- (A) issue direct or indirect instructions to the media to publish biased or false information regarding the United States; (B) make deliberately biased or false charges expecting that such charges will be disseminated; or (C) so severely constrain the ability of the media to express criticism of any such government that one of the few means of political expression available is criticism of the United States. (b) Statements of Policy.-- (1) Foreign governments.--It shall be the policy of the United States to regard foreign governments as knowingly engaged in unfriendly acts toward the United States if such governments-- (A) instruct their state-owned or influenced media to include content that is anti-American or prejudicial to the foreign and security policies of the United States; or (B) make deliberately false charges regarding the United States or permit false or biased charges against the United States to be made while constraining normal political discourse. (2) Seeking media access; responding to false charges.--It shall be the policy of the United States to-- (A) seek access to the media in foreign countries on terms no less favorable than those afforded any other foreign entity or on terms available to the foreign country in the United States; and (B) combat biased or false media coverage in foreign countries of the United States and its allies by responding in the foreign media or by communicating directly to foreign publics. (c) Responsibilities Regarding Biased or False Media Coverage.-- (1) Secretary of state.--The Secretary of State shall instruct chiefs of mission to report on and combat biased or false media coverage originating in or received in foreign countries to which such chiefs are posted. Based on such reports and other information available to the Secretary, the Secretary shall prioritize efforts to combat such media coverage, giving special attention to audiences where fostering popular opposition to terrorism is most important and such media coverage is most prevalent. (2) Chiefs of mission.--Chiefs of mission shall have the following responsibilities: (A) Chiefs of mission shall give strong priority to combatting biased or false media reports in foreign countries to which such chiefs are posted regarding the United States. (B) Chiefs of mission posted to foreign countries in which freedom of the press exists shall inform the governments of such countries of the policies of the United States regarding biased or false media coverage of the United States, and shall make strong efforts to persuade such governments to change policies that encourage such media coverage. (d) Reports.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and at least annually thereafter until January 1, 2015, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report regarding the major themes of biased or false media coverage of the United States in foreign countries, the actions taken to persuade foreign governments to change policies that encourage such media coverage (and the results of such actions), and any other actions taken to combat such media coverage in foreign countries. (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the strategy of the United States to expand its outreach to foreign Muslim audiences through broadcast media. (b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a) shall contain the following: (1) An assessment of the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the public diplomacy activities of the Department of State with respect to outreach to foreign Muslim audiences through broadcast media. (2) An outline of recommended actions that the United States should take to more regularly and comprehensively present a United States point of view through indigenous broadcast media in countries with sizeable Muslim populations, including increasing appearances by United States Government officials, experts, and citizens. (3) An assessment of potential incentives for, and costs associated with, encouraging United States broadcasters to dub or subtitle into Arabic and other relevant languages their news and public affairs programs broadcast in Muslim countries in order to present those programs to a much broader Muslim audience than is currently reached. (4) An assessment of providing a training program in media and press affairs for members of the Foreign Service. As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall take such actions as are necessary to consolidate within the Harry S. Truman Building all offices of the Department of State that are responsible for the conduct of public diplomacy, including the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States-- (1) should work with the Community of Democracies to discuss, develop, and refine policies and assistance programs to support and promote political, economic, judicial, educational, and social reforms in Muslim countries; (2) should, as part of that effort, secure support to require countries seeking membership in the Community of Democracies to be in full compliance with the Community's criteria for participation, as established by the Community's Convening Group, should work to ensure that the criteria are part of a legally binding document, and should urge other donor countries to use compliance with the criteria as a basis for determining diplomatic and economic relations (including assistance programs) with such participating countries; and (3) should seek support for international contributions to the Community of Democracies and should seek authority for the Community's Convening Group to oversee adherence and compliance of participating countries with the criteria. (b) Middle East Partnership Initiative and Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative.--Amounts made available to carry out the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative may be made available to the Community of Democracies in order to strengthen and expand its work with Muslim countries. (c) Report.--The Secretary of State shall include in the annual report entitled ``Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record'' a description of efforts by the Community of Democracies to support and promote political, economic, judicial, educational, and social reforms in Muslim countries and the extent to which such countries meet the criteria for participation in the Community of Democracies. Subtitle C--Reform of Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (a) Period of Designation.--Section 219(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A)-- (A) by striking ``Subject to paragraphs (5) and (6), a'' and inserting ``A''; and (B) by striking ``for a period of 2 years beginning on the effective date of the designation under paragraph (2)(B)'' and inserting ``until revoked under paragraph (5) or (6) or set aside pursuant to subsection (c)''; (2) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following: ``(B) Review of designation upon petition.-- ``(i) In general.--The Secretary shall review the designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the procedures set forth in clauses (iii) and (iv) if the designated organization files a petition for revocation within the petition period described in clause (ii). ``(ii) Petition period.--For purposes of clause (i)-- (a) Inclusion in Reports.--Section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) by inserting ``any terrorist group known to have obtained or developed, or to have attempted to obtain or develop, weapons of mass destruction,'' after ``during the preceding five years,''; and (B) by inserting ``any group designated by the Secretary as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189),'' after ``Export Administration Act of 1979,''; (2) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(iii), by striking ``and'' at the end; (3) in subsection (b)(1)(C)-- (A) by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v); and (B) by inserting after clause (iii) the following new clause: ``(iv) providing weapons of mass destruction, or assistance in obtaining or developing such weapons, to terrorists or terrorist groups; and''; and (4) in subsection (b)(3) (as redesignated by section 4002(b)(2)(B) of this Act)-- (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E) as (D), (E), and (F), respectively; and (B) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new subparagraph: ``(C) efforts by those groups to obtain or develop weapons of mass destruction;''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply beginning with the first report under section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f), submitted more than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004''. (a) Findings.--Congress finds that-- (1) the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States criticized the provision of United States assistance to Afghanistan for being too inflexible; and (2) the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-327; 22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.) contains provisions that provide for flexibility in the provision of assistance for Afghanistan and are not subject to the requirements of typical foreign assistance programs and provide for the designation of a coordinator to oversee United States assistance for Afghanistan. (b) Designation of Coordinator.--Section 104(a) of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7514(a)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``is strongly urged to'' and inserting ``shall''. (c) Other Matters.--Section 104 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7514) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(c) Program Plan.--The coordinator designated under subsection (a) shall annually submit to the Committees on International Relations and Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate the Administration's plan for assistance to Afghanistan together with a description of such assistance in prior years. ``(d) Coordination With International Community.--The coordinator designated under subsection (a) shall work with the international community and the Government of Afghanistan to ensure that assistance to Afghanistan is implemented in a coherent, consistent, and efficient manner to prevent duplication and waste. The coordinator designated under subsection (a) shall work through the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Executive Directors at the international financial institutions in order to effectuate these responsibilities within the international financial institutions. The term `international financial institution' has the meaning given in section 1701(c)(2) of the International Financial Institutions Act.''. (a) Assistance to Promote Economic, Political and Social Development.-- (1) Declaration of policy.--Congress reaffirms the authorities contained in title I of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.; relating to economic and democratic development assistance for Afghanistan). (2) Provision of assistance.--Section 103(a) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7513(a)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``section 512 of Public Law 107-115 or any other similar'' and inserting ``any other''. (b) Declarations of Policy.--Congress makes the following declarations: (1) The United States reaffirms the support that it and other countries expressed for the report entitled ``Securing Afghanistan's Future'' in their Berlin Declaration of April 2004. The United States should help enable the growth needed to create an economically sustainable Afghanistan capable of the poverty reduction and social development foreseen in the report. (2) The United States supports the parliamentary elections to be held in Afghanistan by April 2005 and will help ensure that such elections are not undermined by warlords or narcotics traffickers. (3)(A) The United States continues to urge North Atlantic Treaty Organization members and other friendly countries to make much greater military contributions toward securing the peace in Afghanistan. (B) The United States should continue to lead in the security domain by, among other things, providing logistical support to facilitate those contributions. (C) In coordination with the Government of Afghanistan, the United States should urge others, and act itself, to increase efforts to promote disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts, to enhance counternarcotics activities, to expand deployments of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and to increase training of Afghanistan's National Army and its police and border security forces. (c) Long-Term Strategy.-- (1) Strategy.--Title III of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7551 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: Section 103(a)(5)(A) of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7513(a)(5)(A)) is amended-- (1) in clause (v), to read as follows: ``(v) support for the activities of the Government of Afghanistan to develop modern legal codes and court rules, to provide for the creation of legal assistance programs, and other initiatives to promote the rule of law in Afghanistan;''; (2) in clause (xii), to read as follows: ``(xii) support for the effective administration of justice at the national, regional, and local levels, including programs to improve penal institutions and the rehabilitation of prisoners, to establish a responsible and community-based police force, and to rehabilitate or construct courthouses and detention facilities;''; and (3) in clause (xiii), by striking ``and'' at the end; (4) in clause (xiv), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (5) by adding at the end the following: ``(xv) assistance for the protection of Afghanistan's culture, history, and national identity, including with the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's museums and sites of cultural significance.''. Section 108 of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7518) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(c) Monitoring of Assistance for Afghanistan.-- ``(1) Report.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the obligations and expenditures of United States assistance for Afghanistan from all United States Government agencies. The first report under this paragraph shall be submitted not later than January 15, 2005, and subsequent reports shall be submitted every six months thereafter and may be included in the report required by section 206(c)(2) of this Act. ``(2) Submission of information for report.--The head of each United States Government agency referred to in paragraph (1) shall provide on a timely basis to the Secretary of State such information as the Secretary may reasonably require to allow the Secretary to prepare and submit the report required by such paragraph.''. (a) Disarmament of Private Militias.--Section 103 of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7513) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(d) United States Policy Relating to Disarmament of Private Militias.-- ``(1) In general.--It shall be the policy of the United States to take immediate steps to provide active support for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armed soldiers, particularly child soldiers, in Afghanistan, in close consultation with the President of Afghanistan. ``(2) Report.--The report required by section 206(c)(2) of this Act shall include a description of the progress to implement paragraph (1).''. (b) International Peacekeeping and Security Operations.-- Section 103 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7513(d)), as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(e) United States Policy Relating to International Peacekeeping and Security Operations.--It shall be the policy of the United States to make every effort to support the expansion of international peacekeeping and security operations in Afghanistan in order to-- ``(1) increase the area in which security is provided and undertake vital tasks related to promoting security, such as disarming warlords, militias, and irregulars, and disrupting opium production; and ``(2) safeguard highways in order to allow the free flow of commerce and to allow material assistance to the people of Afghanistan, and aid personnel in Afghanistan, to move more freely.''. Section 206(d)(1) of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7536(d)(1)) is amended to read as follows: ``(1) Efforts to expand international peacekeeping and security operations in afghanistan.-- ``(A) Efforts.--The President shall encourage, and, as authorized by law, enable other countries to actively participate in expanded international peacekeeping and security operations in Afghanistan, especially through the provision of military personnel for extended periods of time. ``(B) Reports.--The President shall prepare and transmit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on efforts carried out pursuant to subparagraph (A). The first report under this subparagraph shall be transmitted not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004 and subsequent reports shall be transmitted every six months thereafter and may be included in the report required by subsection (c)(2).''. (a) Counternarcotics Efforts.--The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.) is amended-- (1) by redesignating-- (A) title III as title IV; and (B) sections 301 through 305 as sections 401 through 405, respectively; and (2) by inserting after title II the following: (a) Technical Amendment.--Section 103(a)(7)(A)(xii) of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7513(a)(7)(A)(xii)) is amended by striking ``National'' and inserting ``Afghan Independent''. (b) Reporting Requirement.--Section 206(c)(2) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7536(c)(2)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking ``2007'' and inserting ``2012''. Section 620D of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2374; relating to prohibition on assistance to Afghanistan) is hereby repealed. Subtitle E--Provisions Relating to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia should include a more robust dialogue between the people and Government of the United States and the people and Government of Saudi Arabia in order to provide for a reevaluation of, and improvements to, the relationship by both sides. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.-- Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a strategy for collaboration with the people and Government of Saudi Arabia on subjects of mutual interest and importance to the United States. (2) Contents.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall include the following provisions: (A) A framework for security cooperation in the fight against terrorism, with special reference to combating terrorist financing and an examination of the origins of modern terrorism. (B) A framework for political and economic reform in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East. (C) An examination of steps that should be taken to reverse the trend toward extremism in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries and throughout the Middle East. (D) A framework for promoting greater tolerance and respect for cultural and religious diversity in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East. (3) Form.--The strategy required by this subsection may contain a classified annex. (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States should, over a long-term period, help to ensure a promising, stable, and secure future for Pakistan, and should in particular provide assistance to encourage and enable Pakistan-- (1) to continue and improve upon its commitment to combating extremists; (2) to seek to resolve any outstanding difficulties with its neighbors and other countries in its region; (3) to continue to make efforts to fully control its territory and borders; (4) to progress towards becoming a more effective and participatory democracy; (5) to participate more vigorously in the global marketplace and to continue to modernize its economy; (6) to take all necessary steps to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction; (7) to continue to reform its education system; and (8) to, in other ways, implement a general strategy of moderation. (b) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a detailed proposed strategy for the future, long- term, engagement of the United States with Pakistan. The strategy required by this subsection may contain a classified annex. (1) in section 1(b)-- (A) in the heading, by striking ``Fiscal Year 2004'' and inserting ``Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006''; and (B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``2004'' and inserting ``2005 or 2006''; (2) in section 3(2), by striking ``and 2004,'' and inserting ``2004, 2005, and 2006''; and (3) in section 6, by striking ``2004'' and inserting ``2006''. (a) Availability of Treaties and International Agreements.--Section 112a of title 1, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(d) The Secretary of State shall cause to be published in slip form or otherwise made publicly available through the Internet website of the Department of State each treaty or international agreement proposed to be published in the compilation entitled `United States Treaties and Other International Agreements' not later than 180 days after the date on which the treaty or agreement enters into force.''. (b) Transmission to Congress.--Section 112b(a) of title 1, United States Code (commonly referred to as the ``Case- Zablocki Act''), is amended-- (1) in the first sentence, by striking ``has entered into force'' and inserting ``has been signed or entered into force''; and (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``Committee on Foreign Affairs'' and inserting ``Committee on International Relations''. (c) Report.--Section 112b of title 1, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections (e) and (f), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following: ``(d)(1) The Secretary of State shall submit to Congress on an annual basis a report that contains an index of all international agreements (including oral agreements), listed by country, date, title, and summary of each such agreement (including a description of the duration of activities under the agreement and the agreement itself), that the United States-- ``(A) has signed, proclaimed, or with reference to which any other final formality has been executed, or that has been extended or otherwise modified, during the preceding calendar year; and ``(B) has not been published, or is not proposed to be published, in the compilation entitled `United States Treaties and Other International Agreements'. ``(2) The report described in paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form.''. (d) Determination of International Agreement.--Subsection (e) of section 112b of title 1, United States Code, (as redesignated) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(e) The Secretary of State'' and inserting ``(e)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of State''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(2)(A) An arrangement shall constitute an international agreement within the meaning of this section (other than subsection (c) of this section) irrespective of the duration of activities under the arrangement or the arrangement itself. ``(B) Arrangements that constitute an international agreement within the meaning of this section (other than subsection (c) of this section) include, but are not limited to, the following: ``(i) A bilateral or multilateral counterterrorism agreement. ``(ii) A bilateral agreement with a country that is subject to a determination under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)), section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).''. (e) Enforcement of Requirements.--Section 139(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 is amended to read as follows: ``(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect 60 days after the date of the enactment of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act and shall apply during fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007.''. Subtitle G--Additional Protections of United States Aviation System The President is encouraged to pursue aggressively international agreements with foreign governments to allow the maximum deployment of Federal air marshals and Federal flight deck officers on international flights. Section 44917 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(d) Training for Foreign Law Enforcement Personnel.-- ``(1) In general.--The Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement of the Department of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Secretary of State, may direct the Federal Air Marshal Service to provide appropriate air marshal training to law enforcement personnel of foreign countries. ``(2) Watchlist screening.--The Federal Air Marshal Service may only provide appropriate air marshal training to law enforcement personnel of foreign countries after comparing the identifying information and records of law enforcement personnel of foreign countries against appropriate records in the consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlists of the Federal Government. ``(3) Fees.--The Assistant Secretary shall establish reasonable fees and charges to pay expenses incurred in carrying out this subsection. Funds collected under this subsection shall be credited to the account in the Treasury from which the expenses were incurred and shall be available to the Assistant Secretary for purposes for which amounts in such account are available.''. (a) United States Policy on Nonproliferation and Export Control.-- (1) To limit availability and transfer of manpads.--The President shall pursue, on an urgent basis, further strong international diplomatic and cooperative efforts, including bilateral and multilateral treaties, in the appropriate forum to limit the availability, transfer, and proliferation of MANPADSs worldwide. (2) To limit the proliferation of manpads.--The President is encouraged to seek to enter into agreements with the governments of foreign countries that, at a minimum, would-- (A) prohibit the entry into force of a MANPADS manufacturing license agreement and MANPADS co-production agreement, other than the entry into force of a manufacturing license or co-production agreement with a country that is party to such an agreement; (B) prohibit, except pursuant to transfers between governments, the export of a MANPADS, including any component, part, accessory, or attachment thereof, without an individual validated license; and (C) prohibit the reexport or retransfer of a MANPADS, including any component, part, accessory, or attachment thereof, to a third person, organization, or government unless the written consent of the government that approved the original export or transfer is first obtained. (3) To achieve destruction of manpads.--The President should continue to pursue further strong international diplomatic and cooperative efforts, including bilateral and multilateral treaties, in the appropriate forum to assure the destruction of excess, obsolete, and illicit stocks of MANPADSs worldwide. (4) Reporting and briefing requirement.-- (A) President's report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a detailed description of the status of diplomatic efforts under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) and of efforts by the appropriate United States agencies to comply with the recommendations of the General Accounting Office set forth in its report GAO-04-519, entitled ``Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems''. (B) Annual briefings.--Annually after the date of submission of the report under subparagraph (A) and until completion of the diplomatic and compliance efforts referred to in subparagraph (A), the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on the status of such efforts. (b) FAA Airworthiness Certification of Missile Defense Systems for Commercial Aircraft.-- (1) In general.--As soon as practicable, but not later than the date of completion of Phase II of the Department of Homeland Security's counter-man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) development and demonstration program, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall establish a process for conducting airworthiness and safety certification of missile defense systems for commercial aircraft certified as effective and functional by the Department of Homeland Security. The process shall require a certification by the Administrator that such systems can be safely integrated into aircraft systems and ensure airworthiness and aircraft system integrity. (2) Certification acceptance.--Under the process, the Administrator shall accept the certification of the Department of Homeland Security that a missile defense system is effective and functional to defend commercial aircraft against MANPADSs. (3) Expeditious certification.--Under the process, the Administrator shall expedite the airworthiness and safety certification of missile defense systems for commercial aircraft certified by the Department of Homeland Security. (4) Reports.--Not later than 90 days after the first airworthiness and safety certification for a missile defense system for commercial aircraft is issued by the Administrator, and annually thereafter until December 31, 2008, the Federal Aviation Administration shall transmit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report that contains a detailed description of each airworthiness and safety certification issued for a missile defense system for commercial aircraft. (c) Programs to Reduce MANPADS.-- (1) In general.--The President is encouraged to pursue strong programs to reduce the number of MANPADSs worldwide so that fewer MANPADSs will be available for trade, proliferation, and sale. (2) Reporting and briefing requirements.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a detailed description of the status of the programs being pursued under subsection (a). Annually thereafter until the programs are no longer needed, the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on the status of programs. (3) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section. (d) MANPADS Vulnerability Assessments Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall transmit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report describing the Department of Homeland Security's plans to secure airports and the aircraft arriving and departing from airports against MANPADSs attacks. (2) Matters to be addressed.--The Secretary's report shall address, at a minimum, the following: (A) The status of the Department's efforts to conduct MANPADSs vulnerability assessments at United States airports at which the Department is conducting assessments. (B) How intelligence is shared between the United States intelligence agencies and Federal, State, and local law enforcement to address the MANPADS threat and potential ways to improve such intelligence sharing. (C) Contingency plans that the Department has developed in the event that it receives intelligence indicating a high threat of a MANPADS attack on aircraft at or near United States airports. (D) The feasibility and effectiveness of implementing public education and neighborhood watch programs in areas surrounding United States airports in cases in which intelligence reports indicate there is a high risk of MANPADS attacks on aircraft. (E) Any other issues that the Secretary deems relevant. (3) Format.--The report required by this subsection may be submitted in a classified format. (e) Definitions.--In this section, the following definitions apply: (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on International Relations, and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives; and (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate. (2) MANPADS.--The term ``MANPADS'' means-- (A) a surface-to-air missile system designed to be man- portable and carried and fired by a single individual; and (B) any other surface-to-air missile system designed to be operated and fired by more than one individual acting as a crew and portable by several individuals. (a) Findings.--The Congress finds as follows: (1) The global war on terrorism and cutting off terrorist financing is a policy priority for the United States and its partners, working bilaterally and multilaterally through the United Nations (UN), the UN Security Council and its Committees, such as the 1267 and 1373 Committees, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and various international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the regional multilateral development banks, and other multilateral fora. (2) The Secretary of the Treasury has engaged the international financial community in the global fight against terrorist financing. Specifically, the Department of the Treasury helped redirect the focus of the Financial Action Task Force on the new threat posed by terrorist financing to the international financial system, resulting in the establishment of the FATF's Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing as the international standard on combating terrorist financing. The Secretary of the Treasury has engaged the Group of Seven and the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers to develop action plans to curb the financing of terror. In addition, other economic and regional fora, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, the Western Hemisphere Financial Ministers, have been used to marshal political will and actions in support of countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) standards. (3) FATF's Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and the Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing are the recognized global standards for fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF has engaged in an assessment process for jurisdictions based on their compliance with these standards. (4) In March 2004, the IMF and IBRD Boards agreed to make permanent a pilot program of collaboration with the FATF to assess global compliance with the FATF Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and the Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. As a result, anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) assessments are now a regular part of their Financial Sector Assessment Progam (FSAP) and Offshore Financial Center assessments, which provide for a comprehensive analysis of the strength of a jurisdiction's financial system. These reviews assess potential systemic vulnerabilities, consider sectoral development needs and priorities, and review the state of implementation of and compliance with key financial codes and regulatory standards, among them the AML and CFT standards. (5) To date, 70 FSAPs have been conducted, with over 24 of those incorporating AML and CFT assessments. The international financial institutions (IFIs), the FATF, and the FATF-style regional bodies together are expected to assess AML and CFT regimes in up to 40 countries or jurisdictions per year. This will help countries and jurisdictions identify deficiencies in their AML and CFT regimes and help focus technical assistance (TA) efforts. (6) TA programs from the United States and other nations, coordinated with the Department of State and other departments and agencies, are playing an important role in helping countries and jurisdictions address shortcomings in their AML and CFT regimes and bringing their regimes into conformity with international standards. Training is coordinated within the United States Government, which leverages multilateral organizations and bodies and international financial institutions to internationalize the conveyance of technical assistance. (7) In fulfilling its duties in advancing incorporation of AML and CFT standards into the IFIs as part of the IFIs' work on protecting the integrity of the international monetary system, the Department of the Treasury, under the guidance of the Secretary of the Treasury, has effectively brought together all of the key United States Government agencies. In particular, United States Government agencies continue to work together to foster broad support for this important undertaking in various multilateral fora, and United States Government agencies recognize the need for close coordination and communication within our own government. (b) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury should continue to promote the dissemination of international AML and CFT standards, and to press for full implementation of the FATF 40 + 8 Recommendations by all countries in order to curb financial risks and hinder terrorist financing around the globe. (a) Reporting Requirements.--Section 1503(a) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262o- 2(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(15) Work with the International Monetary Fund to-- ``(A) foster strong global anti-money laundering (AML) and combat the financing of terrorism (CFT) regimes; ``(B) ensure that country performance under the Financial Action Task Force anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards is effectively and comprehensively monitored; ``(C) ensure note is taken of AML and CFT issues in Article IV reports, International Monetary Fund programs, and other regular reviews of country progress; ``(D) ensure that effective AML and CFT regimes are considered to be indispensable elements of sound financial systems; and ``(E) emphasize the importance of sound AML and CFT regimes to global growth and development.''. (b) Testimony.--Section 1705(b) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 262r-4(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2); (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (3) and inserting ``; and'' and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(4) the status of implementation of international anti- money laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards by the International Monetary Fund, the multilateral development banks, and other multilateral financial policymaking bodies.''. The Secretary of the Treasury, or the designee of the Secretary as the lead United States Government official to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), shall continue to convene the interagency United States Government FATF working group. This group, which includes representatives from all relevant federal agencies, shall meet at least once a year to advise the Secretary on policies to be pursued by the United States regarding the development of common international AML and CFT standards, to assess the adequacy and implementation of such standards, and to recommend to the Secretary improved or new standards as necessary. In this subtitle: (1) International financial institutions.--The term ``international financial institutions'' has the meaning given in section 1701(c)(2) of the International Financial Institutions Act. (2) Financial Action Task Force.--The term ``Financial Action Task Force'' means the international policy-making and standard-setting body dedicated to combating money laundering and terrorist financing that was created by the Group of Seven in 1989. Subtitle A--Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders This subtitle may be cited as the ``Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders Act of 2004''. The Congress finds the following: (1) In order to achieve its objective of minimizing the damage, and assisting in the recovery, from terrorist attacks, the Department of Homeland Security must play a leading role in assisting communities to reach the level of preparedness they need to respond to a terrorist attack. (2) First responder funding is not reaching the men and women of our Nation's first response teams quickly enough, and sometimes not at all. (3) To reform the current bureaucratic process so that homeland security dollars reach the first responders who need it most, it is necessary to clarify and consolidate the authority and procedures of the Department of Homeland Security that support first responders. (4) Ensuring adequate resources for the new national mission of homeland security, without degrading the ability to address effectively other types of major disasters and emergencies, requires a discrete and separate grant making process for homeland security funds for first response to terrorist acts, on the one hand, and for first responder programs designed to meet pre-September 11 priorities, on the other. (5) While a discrete homeland security grant making process is necessary to ensure proper focus on the unique aspects of terrorism prevention, preparedness, and response, it is essential that State and local strategies for utilizing such grants be integrated, to the greatest extent practicable, with existing State and local emergency management plans. (6) Homeland security grants to first responders must be based on the best intelligence concerning the capabilities and intentions of our terrorist enemies, and that intelligence must be used to target resources to the Nation's greatest threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. (7) The Nation's first response capabilities will be improved by sharing resources, training, planning, personnel, and equipment among neighboring jurisdictions through mutual aid agreements and regional cooperation. Such regional cooperation should be supported, where appropriate, through direct grants from the Department of Homeland Security. (8) An essential prerequisite to achieving the Nation's homeland security objectives for first responders is the establishment of well-defined national goals for terrorism preparedness. These goals should delineate the essential capabilities that every jurisdiction in the United States should possess or to which it should have access. (9) A national determination of essential capabilities is needed to identify levels of State and local government terrorism preparedness, to determine the nature and extent of State and local first responder needs, to identify the human and financial resources required to fulfill them, and to direct funding to meet those needs and to measure preparedness levels on a national scale. (10) To facilitate progress in achieving, maintaining, and enhancing essential capabilities for State and local first responders, the Department of Homeland Security should seek to allocate homeland security funding for first responders to meet nationwide needs. (11) Private sector resources and citizen volunteers can perform critical functions in assisting in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks, and should be integrated into State and local planning efforts to ensure that their capabilities and roles are understood, so as to provide enhanced State and local operational capability and surge capacity. (12) Public-private partnerships, such as the partnerships between the Business Executives for National Security and the States of New Jersey and Georgia, can be useful to identify and coordinate private sector support for State and local first responders. Such models should be expanded to cover all States and territories. (13) An important aspect of essential capabilities is measurability, so that it is possible to determine how prepared a State or local government is now, and what additional steps it needs to take, in order to respond to acts of terrorism. (14) The Department of Homeland Security should establish, publish, and regularly update national voluntary consensus standards for both equipment and training, in cooperation with both public and private sector standard setting organizations, to assist State and local governments in obtaining the equipment and training to attain the essential capabilities for first response to acts of terrorism, and to ensure that first responder funds are spent wisely. (a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 361 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 1(b) in the table of contents by adding at the end the following: Section 102(f) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 112(f)) is amended by striking ``and'' after the semicolon at the end of paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end of paragraph (7) and inserting ``; and'', and by adding at the end the following: ``(8) coordinating industry efforts, with respect to functions of the Department of Homeland Security, to identify private sector resources and capabilities that could be effective in supplementing Federal, State, and local government agency efforts to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack.''. This subtitle supersedes section 1014 of Public Law 107-56. (a) Finding.--The Congress finds that-- (1) many emergency response providers (as defined under section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as amended by this Act) working in the same jurisdiction or in different jurisdictions cannot effectively and efficiently communicate with one another; and (2) their inability to do so threatens the public's safety and may result in unnecessary loss of lives and property. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that interoperable emergency communications systems and radios should continue to be deployed as soon as practicable for use by the emergency response provider community, and that upgraded and new digital communications systems and new digital radios must meet prevailing national, voluntary consensus standards for interoperability. (a) Finding.--The Congress finds that Citizen Corps councils help to enhance local citizen participation in terrorism preparedness by coordinating multiple Citizen Corps programs, developing community action plans, assessing possible threats, and identifying local resources. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that individual Citizen Corps councils should seek to enhance the preparedness and response capabilities of all organizations participating in the councils, including by providing funding to as many of their participating organizations as practicable to promote local terrorism preparedness programs. (a) Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies and representatives of providers and participants in the telecommunications industry, shall conduct a study to determine whether it is cost-effective, efficient, and feasible to establish and implement an emergency telephonic alert notification system that will-- (1) alert persons in the United States of imminent or current hazardous events caused by acts of terrorism; and (2) provide information to individuals regarding appropriate measures that may be undertaken to alleviate or minimize threats to their safety and welfare posed by such events. (b) Technologies to Consider.--In conducting the study, the Secretary shall consider the use of the telephone, wireless communications, and other existing communications networks to provide such notification. (c) Report.--Not later than 9 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Congress a report regarding the conclusions of the study. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that there is effective and ongoing coordination of Federal efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism and other major disasters and emergencies among the divisions of the Department of Homeland Security, including the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response and the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. (a) Reorganization Plans.--Section 903(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(2) the abolition of all or a part of the functions of an agency;''. (b) Repeal of Limitations.--Section 905 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: (a) Amendment.--Section 878 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 458) is amended to read as follows: (a) In General.--Subtitle E of title VIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 411 and following) is amended by adding at the end the following: (a) Findings.--The House of Representatives finds that-- (1) the House of Representatives created a Select Committee on Homeland Security at the start of the 108th Congress to provide for vigorous congressional oversight for the implementation and operation of the Department of Homeland Security; (2) the House of Representatives also charged the Select Committee on Homeland Security with undertaking a thorough and complete study of the operation and implementation of the rules of the House, including the rule governing committee jurisdiction, with respect to the issue of homeland security and to make its recommendations to the Committee on Rules; (3) on February 11, 2003, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives created a new Subcommittee on Homeland Security with jurisdiction over the Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard, and other entities within the Department of Homeland Security to help address the integration of the Department of Homeland Security's 22 legacy agencies; and (4) during the 108th Congress, the House of Representatives has taken several steps to help ensure its continuity in the event of a terrorist attack, including-- (A) adopting H.R. 2844, the Continuity of Representation Act, a bill to require States to hold expedited special elections to fill vacancies in the House of Representatives not later than 45 days after the vacancy is announced by the Speaker in extraordinary circumstances; (B) granting authority for joint-leadership recalls from a period of adjournment to an alternate place; (C) allowing for anticipatory consent with the Senate to assemble in an alternate place; (D) establishing the requirement that the Speaker submit to the Clerk a list of Members in the order in which each shall act as Speaker pro tempore in the case of a vacancy in the Office of Speaker (including physical inability of the Speaker to discharge his duties) until the election of a Speaker or a Speaker pro tempore, exercising such authorities of the Speaker as may be necessary and appropriate to that end; (E) granting authority for the Speaker to declare an emergency recess of the House subject to the call of the Chair when notified of an imminent threat to the safety of the House; (F) granting authority for the Speaker, during any recess or adjournment of not more than three days, in consultation with the Minority Leader, to postpone the time for reconvening or to reconvene before the time previously appointed solely to declare the House in recess, in each case within the constitutional three-day limit; (G) establishing the authority for the Speaker to convene the House in an alternate place within the seat of Government; and (H) codifying the long-standing practice that the death, resignation, expulsion, disqualification, or removal of a Member results in an adjustment of the quorum of the House, which the Speaker shall announce to the House and which shall not be subject to appeal. (b) Sense of the House.--It is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Committee on Rules should act upon the recommendations provided by the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and other committees of existing jurisdiction, regarding the jurisdiction over proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials and other matters relating to homeland security prior to or at the start of the 109th Congress. (a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 USC 121 et. seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(a) In General.--There shall be in the Department an Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity, who shall be appointed by the President. ``(b) Responsibilities.--The Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity shall assist the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection in discharging the responsibilities of the Under Secretary under this subtitle. ``(c) Authority Over the National Communications System.-- The Assistant Secretary shall have primary authority within the Department over the National Communications System.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 202 the following: Chapter 113 of title 40, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in section 11302(b), by inserting ``security,'' after ``use,''; (2) in section 11302(c), by inserting ``, including information security risks,'' after ``risks'' both places it appears; (3) in section 11312(b)(1), by striking ``information technology investments'' and inserting ``investments in information technology (including information security needs)''; and (4) in section 11315(b)(2), by inserting ``, secure,'' after ``sound''. (a) Definition of National Security Position.--For purposes of this section, the term ``national security position'' shall include-- (1) those positions that involve activities of the United States Government that are concerned with the protection of the Nation from foreign aggression, terrorism, or espionage, including development of defense plans or policies, intelligence or counterintelligence activities, and related activities concerned with the preservation of military strength of the United States and protection of the homeland; and (2) positions that require regular use of, or access to, classified information. (b) Publication in the Federal Register.--Not later than 60 days after the effective date of this section, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall publish in the Federal Register a list of offices that constitute national security positions under section (a) for which Senate confirmation is required by law, and the Director shall revise such list from time to time as appropriate. (c) Presidential Appointments.--(1) With respect to appointment of individuals to offices identified under section (b) and listed in sections 5315 or 5316 of title 5, United States Code, which shall arise after the publication of the list required by section (b), and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the advice and consent of the Senate shall not be required, but rather such appointment shall be made by the President alone. (2) With respect to appointment of individuals to offices identified under section (b) and listed in sections 5313 or 5314 of title 5, United States Code, which shall arise after the publication of the list required by section (b), and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the advice and consent of the Senate shall be required, except that if 30 legislative days shall have expired from the date on which a nomination is submitted to the Senate without a confirmation vote occurring in the Senate, such appointment shall be made by the President alone. (3) For the purposes of this subsection, the term ``legislative day'' means a day on which the Senate is in session. Subsections (a) and (b) of section 3349a of title 5, United States Code, are amended to read as follows: ``(a) As used in this section-- ``(1) the term `inauguration day' means the date on which any person swears or affirms the oath of office as President; and ``(2) the term `specified national security position' shall mean not more than 20 positions requiring Senate confirmation, not to include more than 3 heads of Executive Departments, which are designated by the President on or after an inauguration day as positions for which the duties involve substantial responsibility for national security. ``(b) With respect to any vacancy that exists during the 60-day period beginning on an inauguration day, except where the person swearing or affirming the oath of office was the President on the date preceding the date of swearing or affirming such oath of office, the 210-day period under section 3346 or 3348 shall be deemed to begin on the later of the date occurring-- ``(1) 90 days after such transitional inauguration day; or ``(2) 90 days after the date on which the vacancy occurs. ``(c) With respect to any vacancy in any specified national security position that exists during the 60-day period beginning on an inauguration day, the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 3345(a)(3) shall not apply.''. (a) In General.--The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by inserting before title IV the following: (a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``agency'' means an Executive agency, as defined under section 105 of title 5, United States Code. (b) Reduction Plan.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the head of each agency shall submit a Presidential appointment reduction plan to-- (A) the President; (B) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and (C) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives. (2) Content.--The plan under this subsection shall provide for the reduction of-- (A) the number of positions within that agency that require an appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and (B) the number of levels of such positions within that agency. (a) Section 5043.-- (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the amendments made by section 5043 shall take effect on January 1 of the year following the year in which occurs the date of enactment of this Act. (2) Later date.--If this Act is enacted on or after July 1 of a year, the amendments made by section 301 shall take effect on July 1 of the following year. (b) Section 5044.--Section 5044 shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act. (a) Civil Service Retirement System.--Section 8335(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking ``(b)'' and inserting ``(b)(1)''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) In the case of employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the second sentence of paragraph (1) shall be applied by substituting `65 years of age' for `60 years of age'. The authority to grant exemptions in accordance with the preceding sentence shall cease to be available after December 31, 2009.''. (b) Federal Employees' Retirement System.--Section 8425(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking ``(b)'' and inserting ``(b)(1)''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) In the case of employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the second sentence of paragraph (1) shall be applied by substituting `65 years of age' for `60 years of age'. The authority to grant exemptions in accordance with the preceding sentence shall cease to be available after December 31, 2009.''. (a) In General.--Subchapter IV of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: (a) In General.--Chapter 35 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SUBCHAPTER VII--RETENTION OF RETIRED SPECIALIZED EMPLOYEES AT THE ``(a) Establishment.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may provide for the establishment and training of a Federal Bureau of Investigation Reserve Service (hereinafter in this section referred to as the `FBI Reserve Service') for temporary reemployment of employees in the Bureau during periods of emergency, as determined by the Director. ``(b) Membership.--Membership in the FBI Reserve Service shall be limited to individuals who previously served as full-time employees of the Bureau. ``(c) Annuitants.--If an individual receiving an annuity from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund on the basis of such individual's service becomes temporarily reemployed pursuant to this section, such annuity shall not be discontinued thereby. An individual so reemployed shall not be considered an employee for the purposes of chapter 83 or 84. ``(d) No Impact on Bureau Personnel Ceiling.--FBI Reserve Service members reemployed on a temporary basis pursuant to this section shall not count against any personnel ceiling applicable to the Bureau. ``(e) Expenses.--The Director may provide members of the FBI Reserve Service transportation and per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions of this title, for the purpose of participating in any training that relates to service as a member of the FBI Reserve Service. ``(f) Limitation on Membership.--Membership of the FBI Reserve Service is not to exceed 500 members at any given time. ``(g) Limitation on Duration of Service.--An individual may not be reemployed under this section for more than 180 days in connection with any particular emergency unless, in the judgment of the Director, the public interest so requires.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 35 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SUBCHAPTER VII--RETENTION OF RETIRED SPECIALIZED EMPLOYEES AT THE Section 5377(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (E); (2) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (F) and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following: ``(G) a position at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the primary duties and responsibilities of which relate to intelligence functions (as determined by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation).''. The President shall, within 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, submit to Congress a report that-- (1) evaluates the hiring policies of the Federal Government with respect to its foreign language needs and the war on terrorism, including an analysis of the personnel requirements at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and all other Federal agencies the President identifies as having responsibilities in the war on terrorism; (2) describes with respect to each agency identified under paragraph (1) the Federal Government's current workforce capabilities with respect to its foreign language needs and the war on terrorism; (3) summarizes for each agency identified under paragraph (1) any shortfall in the Federal Government's workforce capabilities relative to its foreign language needs with respect to the war on terrorism; and (4) provides a specific plan to eliminate any shortfalls identified under paragraph (3) and a cost estimate, by agency, for eliminating those shortfalls. In this subtitle: (1) The term ``Director'' means the National Intelligence Director. (2) The term ``agency'' means-- (A) an executive agency, as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code; (B) a military department, as defined in section 102 of title 5, United States Code; and (C) elements of the intelligence community, as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (3) The term ``authorized investigative agency'' means an agency authorized by law, regulation or direction of the Director to conduct a counterintelligence investigation or investigation of persons who are proposed for access to classified information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such information. (4) The term ``authorized adjudicative agency'' means an agency authorized by law, regulation or direction of the Director to determine eligibility for access to classified information in accordance with Executive Order 12968. (5) The term ``highly sensitive program'' means-- (A) a government program designated as a Special Access Program (as defined by section 4.1(h) of Executive Order 12958); and (B) a government program that applies restrictions required for-- (i) Restricted Data (as defined by section 11 y. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(y)); or (ii) other information commonly referred to as ``Sensitive Compartmented Information''. (6) The term ``current investigation file'' means, with respect to a security clearance, a file on an investigation or adjudication that has been conducted during-- (A) the 5-year period beginning on the date the security clearance was granted, in the case of a Top Secret Clearance, or the date access was granted to a highly sensitive program; (B) the 10-year period beginning on the date the security clearance was granted in the case of a Secret Clearance; and (C) the 15-year period beginning on the date the security clearance was granted in the case of a Confidential Clearance. (7) The term ``personnel security investigation'' means any investigation required for the purpose of determining the eligibility of any military, civilian, or government contractor personnel to access classified information. (8) The term ``periodic reinvestigations'' means-- (A) investigations conducted for the purpose of updating a previously completed background investigation-- (i) every five years in the case of a Top Secret Clearance or access to a highly sensitive program; (ii) every 10 years in the case of a Secret Clearance; and (iii) every 15 years in the case of a Confidential Clearance; (B) on-going investigations to identify personnel security risks as they develop, pursuant to section 5075(c). (9) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services, Judiciary, and Government Reform of the House of Representatives; and (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services, Judiciary, and Governmental Affairs of the Senate. The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community Management and Resources shall have responsibility for the following: (1) Directing day-to-day oversight of investigations and adjudications for personnel security clearances and highly sensitive programs throughout the Federal Government. (2) Developing and implementing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of security clearances and determinations for access to highly sensitive programs, including the standardization of security questionnaires, financial disclosure requirements for security clearance applicants, and polygraph policies and procedures. (3) Serving as the final authority to designate an authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency pursuant to section 5074(d). (4) Ensuring reciprocal recognition of access to classified information among agencies, including acting as the final authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes involving the reciprocity of security clearances and access to highly sensitive programs. (5) Ensuring, to the maximum extent practicable, that sufficient resources are available in each agency to achieve clearance and investigative program goals. (6) Reviewing and coordinating the development of tools and techniques for enhancing the conduct of investigations and granting of clearances. (a) Requirement for Reciprocity.--(1) All security clearance background investigations and determinations completed by an authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency shall be accepted by all agencies. (2) All security clearance background investigations initiated by an authorized investigative agency shall be transferable to any other authorized investigative agency. (b) Prohibition on Establishing Additional.--(1) An authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency may not establish additional investigative or adjudicative requirements (other than requirements for the conduct of a polygraph examination) that exceed requirements specified in Executive Orders establishing security requirements for access to classified information. (2) Notwithstanding the paragraph (1), the Director may establish additional requirements as needed for national security purposes. (c) Prohibition on Duplicative Investigations.--An authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency may not conduct an investigation for purposes of determining whether to grant a security clearance to an individual where a current investigation or clearance of equal level already exists or has been granted by another authorized adjudicative agency. (a) Establishment.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, in cooperation with the Director, shall establish, and begin operating and maintaining, an integrated, secure, national database into which appropriate data relevant to the granting, denial, or revocation of a security clearance or access pertaining to military, civilian, or government contractor personnel shall be entered from all authorized investigative and adjudicative agencies. (b) Integration.--The national database established under subsection (a) shall function to integrate information from existing Federal clearance tracking systems from other authorized investigative and adjudicative agencies into a single consolidated database. (c) Requirement to Check Database.--Each authorized investigative or adjudicative agency shall check the national database established under subsection (a) to determine whether an individual the agency has identified as requiring a security clearance has already been granted or denied a security clearance, or has had a security clearance revoked, by any other authorized investigative or adjudicative agency. (d) Certification of Authorized Investigative Agencies or Authorized Adjudicative Agencies.--The Director shall evaluate the extent to which an agency is submitting information to, and requesting information from, the national database established under subsection (a) as part of a determination of whether to certify the agency as an authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency. (e) Exclusion of Certain Intelligence Operatives.--The Director may authorize an agency to withhold information about certain individuals from the database established under subsection (a) if the Director determines it is necessary for national security purposes. (f) Compliance.--The Director shall establish a review procedure by which agencies can seek review of actions required under section 5073. (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2005 and each subsequent fiscal year for the implementation, maintenance and operation of the database established in subsection (a). (a) Investigations.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, each authorized investigative agency that conducts personnel security clearance investigations shall use, to the maximum extent practicable, available information technology and databases to expedite investigative processes and to verify standard information submitted as part of an application for a security clearance. (b) Interim Clearance.--If the application of an applicant for an interim clearance has been processed using the technology under subsection (a), the interim clearances for the applicant at the secret, top secret, and special access program levels may be granted before the completion of the appropriate investigation. Any request to process an interim clearance shall be given priority, and the authority granting the interim clearance shall ensure that final adjudication on the application is made within 90 days after the initial clearance is granted. (c) On-Going Monitoring of Individuals With Security Clearances.--(1) Authorized investigative agencies and authorized adjudicative agencies shall establish procedures for the regular, ongoing verification of personnel with security clearances in effect for continued access to classified information. Such procedures shall include the use of available technology to detect, on a regularly recurring basis, any issues of concern that may arise involving such personnel and such access. (2) Such regularly recurring verification may be used as a basis for terminating a security clearance or access and shall be used in periodic reinvestigations to address emerging threats and adverse events associated with individuals with security clearances in effect to the maximum extent practicable. (3) If the Director certifies that the national security of the United States is not harmed by the discontinuation of periodic reinvestigations, the regularly recurring verification under this section may replace periodic reinvestigations. (a) 60-Day Period for Determination on Clearances.--Each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a determination on an application for a personnel security clearance within 60 days after the date of receipt of the completed application for a security clearance by an authorized investigative agency. The 60-day period shall include-- (1) a period of not longer than 40 days to complete the investigative phase of the clearance review; and (2) a period of not longer than 20 days to complete the adjudicative phase of the clearance review. (b) Effective Date and Phase-in.-- (1) Effective date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Phase-in.--During the period beginning on a date not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on the date on which subsection (a) takes effect as specified in paragraph (1), each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a determination on an application for a personnel security clearance pursuant to this title within 120 days after the date of receipt of the application for a security clearance by an authorized investigative agency. The 120-day period shall include-- (A) a period of not longer than 90 days to complete the investigative phase of the clearance review; and (B) a period of not longer than 30 days to complete the adjudicative phase of the clearance review. (a) Candidates for National Security Positions.--(1) The President-elect shall submit to the Director the names of candidates for high-level national security positions, for positions at the level of under secretary of executive departments and above, as soon as possible after the date of the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President under section 1 or 2 of title 3, United States Code. (2) The Director shall be responsible for the expeditious completion of the background investigations necessary to provide appropriate security clearances to the individuals who are candidates described under paragraph (1) before the date of the inauguration of the President-elect as President and the inauguration of the Vice-President-elect as Vice President. (b) Security Clearances for Transition Team Members.--(1) In this section, the term ``major party'' has the meaning provided under section 9002(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. (2) Each major party candidate for President, except a candidate who is the incumbent President, shall submit, before the date of the general presidential election, requests for security clearances for prospective transition team members who will have a need for access to classified information to carry out their responsibilities as members of the President-elect's transition team. (3) Necessary background investigations and eligibility determinations to permit appropriate prospective transition team members to have access to classified information shall be completed, to the fullest extent practicable, by the day after the date of the general presidential election. Not later than February 15, 2006, and annually thereafter through 2016, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the progress made during the preceding year toward meeting the requirements specified in this Act. The report shall include-- (1) the periods of time required by the authorized investigative agencies and authorized adjudicative agencies during the year covered by the report for conducting investigations, adjudicating cases, and granting clearances, from date of submission to ultimate disposition and notification to the subject and the subject's employer; (2) a discussion of any impediments to the smooth and timely functioning of the implementation of this title; and (3) such other information or recommendations as the Deputy Director deems appropriate. Subtitle G--Emergency Financial Preparedness Subsection (d) of section 306 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``or employee'' after ``another officer''. (a) Congressional Finding.--The Congress finds that the Secretary of the Treasury-- (1) has successfully communicated and coordinated with the private-sector financial services industry about counter- terrorist financing activities and preparedness; (2) has successfully reached out to State and local governments and regional public-private partnerships, such as ChicagoFIRST, that protect employees and critical infrastructure by enhancing communication and coordinating plans for disaster preparedness and business continuity; and (3) has set an example for the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agency partners, whose active participation is vital to the overall success of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2). (b) Further Education and Preparation Efforts.--It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and other Federal agency partners, should-- (1) furnish sufficient personnel and technological and financial resources to foster the formation of public-private sector coalitions, similar to ChicagoFIRST, that, in collaboration with the Department of Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, and other Federal agency partners, would educate consumers and employees of the financial services industry about domestic counter-terrorist financing activities, including-- (A) how the public and private sector organizations involved in counter-terrorist financing activities can help to combat terrorism and simultaneously protect and preserve the lives and civil liberties of consumers and employees of the financial services industry; and (B) how consumers and employees of the financial services industry can assist the public and private sector organizations involved in counter-terrorist financing activities; and (2) submit annual reports to the Congress on Federal efforts, in conjunction with public-private sector coalitions, to educate consumers and employees of the financial services industry about domestic counter-terrorist financing activities. This chapter may be cited as the ``Emergency Securities Response Act of 2004''. (a) Extension of Authority.--Paragraph (2) of section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l(k)(2)) is amended to read as follows: ``(2) Emergency.--(A) The Commission, in an emergency, may by order summarily take such action to alter, supplement, suspend, or impose requirements or restrictions with respect to any matter or action subject to regulation by the Commission or a self-regulatory organization under the securities laws, as the Commission determines is necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors-- ``(i) to maintain or restore fair and orderly securities markets (other than markets in exempted securities); ``(ii) to ensure prompt, accurate, and safe clearance and settlement of transactions in securities (other than exempted securities); or ``(iii) to reduce, eliminate, or prevent the substantial disruption by the emergency of (I) securities markets (other than markets in exempted securities), investment companies, or any other significant portion or segment of such markets, or (II) the transmission or processing of securities transactions (other than transactions in exempted securities). ``(B) An order of the Commission under this paragraph (2) shall continue in effect for the period specified by the Commission, and may be extended. Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Commission's action may not continue in effect for more than 30 business days, including extensions. ``(C) An order of the Commission under this paragraph (2) may be extended to continue in effect for more than 30 business days if, at the time of the extension, the Commission finds that the emergency still exists and determines that the continuation of the order beyond 30 business days is necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors to attain an objective described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A). In no event shall an order of the Commission under this paragraph (2) continue in effect for more than 90 calendar days. ``(D) If the actions described in subparagraph (A) involve a security futures product, the Commission shall consult with and consider the views of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. In exercising its authority under this paragraph, the Commission shall not be required to comply with the provisions of section 553 of title 5, United States Code, or with the provisions of section 19(c) of this title. ``(E) Notwithstanding the exclusion of exempted securities (and markets therein) from the Commission's authority under subparagraph (A), the Commission may use such authority to take action to alter, supplement, suspend, or impose requirements or restrictions with respect to clearing agencies for transactions in such exempted securities. In taking any action under this subparagraph, the Commission shall consult with and consider the views of the Secretary of the Treasury.''. (b) Consultation; Definition of Emergency.--Section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l(k)) is further amended by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following: ``(6) Consultation.--Prior to taking any action described in paragraph (1)(B), the Commission shall consult with and consider the views of the Secretary of the Treasury, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, unless such consultation is impracticable in light of the emergency. ``(7) Definitions.-- ``(A) Emergency.--For purposes of this subsection, the term `emergency' means-- ``(i) a major market disturbance characterized by or constituting-- Section 15C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-5) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(h) Emergency Authority.--The Secretary may by order take any action with respect to a matter or action subject to regulation by the Secretary under this section, or the rules of the Secretary thereunder, involving a government security or a market therein (or significant portion or segment of that market), that the Commission may take under section 12(k)(2) of this title with respect to transactions in securities (other than exempted securities) or a market therein (or significant portion or segment of that market).''. (a) Report Required.--Not later than April 30, 2006, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Securities and Exchange Commission shall prepare and submit to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate a joint report on the efforts of the private sector to implement the Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System. (b) Contents of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) shall-- (1) examine the efforts to date of covered private sector financial services firms to implement enhanced business continuity plans; (2) examine the extent to which the implementation of business continuity plans has been done in a geographically dispersed manner, including an analysis of the extent to which such firms have located their main and backup facilities in separate electrical networks, in different watersheds, in independent transportation systems, and using separate telecommunications centers; (3) examine the need to cover more financial services entities than those covered by the Interagency Paper; and (4) recommend legislative and regulatory changes that will-- (A) expedite the effective implementation of the Interagency Paper by all covered financial services entities; and (B) maximize the effective implementation of business continuity planning by all participants in the financial services industry. (c) Confidentiality.--Any information provided to the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Securities and Exchange Commission for the purposes of the preparation and submission of the report required by subsection (a) shall be treated as privileged and confidential. For purposes of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, this subsection shall be considered a statute described in subsection (b)(3)(B) of such section 552. (d) Definition.--The Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System is the interagency paper prepared by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Securities and Exchange Commission that was announced It is the sense of the Congress that the insurance industry and credit-rating agencies, where relevant, should carefully consider a company's compliance with standards for private sector disaster and emergency preparedness in assessing insurability and creditworthiness, to ensure that private sector investment in disaster and emergency preparedness is appropriately encouraged. Before the end of the 6-month period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate containing-- (1) information on the efforts the Department of the Treasury has made to encourage the formation of public/ private partnerships to protect critical financial infrastructure and the type of support that the Department has provided to these partnerships; and (2) recommendations for administrative or legislative action regarding these partnerships as the Secretary may determine to be appropriate. (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Federal Agency Protection of Privacy Act of 2004''. (b) In General.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding after section 553 the following new section: (a) In General.--There shall be within each Federal agency with law enforcement or anti-terrorism functions a chief privacy officer, who shall have primary responsibility within that agency for privacy policy. The agency chief privacy officer shall be designated by the head of the agency. (b) Responsibilities.--The responsibilities of each agency chief privacy officer shall include-- (1) ensuring that the use of technologies sustains, and does not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personally identifiable information; (2) ensuring that personally identifiable information contained in systems of records is handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in section 552a of title 5, United States Code; (3) evaluating legislative and regulatory proposals involving collection, use, and disclosure of personally identifiable information by the Federal Government; (4) conducting a privacy impact assessment of proposed rules of the agency on the privacy of personally identifiable information, including the type of personally identifiable information collected and the number of people affected; (5) preparing and submitting a report to Congress on an annual basis on activities of the agency that affect privacy, including complaints of privacy violations, implementation of section 552a of title 5, United States Code, internal controls, and other relevant matters; (6) ensuring that the agency protects personally identifiable information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide-- (A) integrity, which means guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity; (B) confidentially, which means preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information; (C) availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of that information; and (D) authentication, which means utilizing digital credentials to assure the identity of users and validate their access; and (7) advising the head of the agency and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget on information security and privacy issues pertaining to Federal Government information systems. This chapter may be cited as the ``Mutual Aid and Litigation Management Authorization Act of 2004''. (a) Authorization to Enter Into Agreements.-- (1) In general.--The authorized representative of a State, locality, or the Federal Government may enter into an interstate mutual aid agreement or a mutual aid agreement with the Federal Government on behalf of the State, locality, or Federal Government under which, at the request of any party to the agreement, the other party to the agreement may-- (A) provide law enforcement, fire, rescue, emergency health and medical services, transportation, communications, public works and engineering, mass care, and resource support in an emergency or public service event occurring in the jurisdiction of the requesting party; (B) provide other services to prepare for, mitigate, manage, respond to, or recover from an emergency or public service event occurring in the jurisdiction of the requesting party; and (C) participate in training events occurring in the jurisdiction of the requesting party. (b) Liability and Actions at Law.-- (1) Liability.--A responding party or its officers or employees shall be liable on account of any act or omission occurring while providing assistance or participating in a training event in the jurisdiction of a requesting party under a mutual aid agreement (including any act or omission arising from the maintenance or use of any equipment, facilities, or supplies in connection therewith), but only to the extent permitted under and in accordance with the laws and procedures of the State of the responding party and subject to any litigation management agreement entered into pursuant to section 5103. (2) Jurisdiction of courts.-- (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B) and any litigation management agreement entered into pursuant to section 5103, any action brought against a responding party or its officers or employees on account of an act or omission described in subsection (b)(1) may be brought only under the laws and procedures of the State of the responding party and only in the State courts or United States District Courts located therein. (B) United states as party.--If the United States is the party against whom an action described in paragraph (1) is brought, the action may be brought only in a United States District Court. (c) Workers' Compensation and Death Benefits.-- (1) Payment of benefits.--A responding party shall provide for the payment of workers' compensation and death benefits with respect to officers or employees of the party who sustain injuries or are killed while providing assistance or participating in a training event under a mutual aid agreement in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or death were sustained within the jurisdiction of the responding party. (2) Liability for benefits.--No party shall be liable under the law of any State other than its own (or, in the case of the Federal Government, under any law other than Federal law) for the payment of workers' compensation and death benefits with respect to injured officers or employees of the party who sustain injuries or are killed while providing assistance or participating in a training event under a mutual aid agreement. (d) Licenses and Permits.--Whenever any person holds a license, certificate, or other permit issued by any responding party evidencing the meeting of qualifications for professional, mechanical, or other skills, such person will be deemed licensed, certified, or permitted by the requesting party to provide assistance involving such skill under a mutual aid agreement. (e) Scope.--Except to the extent provided in this section, the rights and responsibilities of the parties to a mutual aid agreement shall be as described in the mutual aid agreement. (f) Effect on Other Agreements.--Nothing in this section precludes any party from entering into supplementary mutual aid agreements with fewer than all the parties, or with another, or affects any other agreements already in force among any parties to such an agreement, including the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) under Public Law 104-321. (g) Federal Government.--Nothing in this section may be construed to limit any other expressed or implied authority of any entity of the Federal Government to enter into mutual aid agreements. (h) Consistency With State Law.--A party may enter into a mutual aid agreement under this chapter only insofar as the agreement is in accord with State law. (a) Authorization to Enter Into Litigation Management Agreements.--The authorized representative of a State or locality may enter into a litigation management agreement on behalf of the State or locality. Such litigation management agreements may provide that all claims against such Emergency Response Providers arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism when Emergency Response Providers from more than 1 State have acted in defense against, in response to, or recovery from such act shall be governed by the following provisions. (b) Federal Cause of Action.-- (1) In general.--There shall exist a Federal cause of action for claims against Emergency Response Providers arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism when Emergency Response Providers from more than 1 State have acted in defense against, in response to, or recovery from such act. As determined by the parties to a litigation management agreement, the substantive law for decision in any such action shall be-- (A) derived from the law, including choice of law principles, of the State in which such acts of terrorism occurred, unless such law is inconsistent with or preempted by Federal law; or (B) derived from the choice of law principles agreed to by the parties to a litigation management agreement as described in the litigation management agreement, unless such principles are inconsistent with or preempted by Federal law. (2) Jurisdiction.--Such appropriate district court of the United States shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions for any claim against Emergency Response Providers for loss of property, personal injury, or death arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism when Emergency Response Providers from more than 1 State have acted in defense against, in response to, or recovery from an act of terrorism. (3) Special rules.--In an action brought for damages that is governed by a litigation management agreement, the following provisions apply: (A) Punitive damages.--No punitive damages intended to punish or deter, exemplary damages, or other damages not intended to compensate a plaintiff for actual losses may be awarded, nor shall any party be liable for interest prior to the judgment. (B) Collateral sources.--Any recovery by a plaintiff in an action governed by a litigation management agreement shall be reduced by the amount of collateral source compensation, if any, that the plaintiff has received or is entitled to receive as a result of such acts of terrorism. (4) Exclusions.--Nothing in this section shall in any way limit the ability of any person to seek any form of recovery from any person, government, or other entity that-- (A) attempts to commit, knowingly participates in, aids and abets, or commits any act of terrorism, or any criminal act related to or resulting from such act of terrorism; or (B) participates in a conspiracy to commit any such act of terrorism or any such criminal act. (a) No Abrogation of Other Immunities.--Nothing in this chapter shall abrogate any constitutional, statutory, or common law immunities that any party may have. (b) Exception for Certain Federal Law Enforcement Activities.--A mutual aid agreement or a litigation management agreement may not apply to law enforcement security operations at special events of national significance under section 3056(e) of title 18, United States Code, or to other law enforcement functions of the United States Secret Service. (c) Secret Service.--Section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) The Secret Service shall be maintained as a distinct entity within the Department of Homeland Security and shall not be merged with any other department function. All personnel and operational elements of the United States Secret Service shall report to the Director of the Secret Service, who shall report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security without being required to report through any other official of the Department.''. For purposes of this chapter, the following definitions apply: (1) Authorized representative.--The term ``authorized representative'' means-- (A) in the case of the Federal Government, any individual designated by the President with respect to the executive branch, the Chief Justice of the United States with respect to the judicial branch, or the President pro Tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives with respect to the Congress, or their designees, to enter into a mutual aid agreement; (B) in the case of a locality, the official designated by law to declare an emergency in and for the locality, or the official's designee; (C) in the case of a State, the Governor or the Governor's designee. (2) Emergency.--The term ``emergency'' means a major disaster or emergency declared by the President, or a State of Emergency declared by an authorized representative of a State or locality, in response to which assistance may be provided under a mutual aid agreement. (3) Emergency response provider.--The term ``Emergency Response Provider'' means any party to a litigation management agreement that meets the definition of ``emergency response providers'' under section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as amended by this Act, except that the term does not include any Federal personnel, agency, or authority. (4) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means, with respect to a party to a mutual aid agreement, the employees of the party, including its agents or authorized volunteers, who are committed to provide assistance under the agreement. (5) Litigation management agreement.--The term ``litigation management agreement'' means an agreement entered into pursuant to the authority granted under section 5103. (6) Locality.--The term ``locality'' means a county, city, or town. (7) Mutual aid agreement.--The term ``mutual aid agreement'' means an agreement entered into pursuant to the authority granted under section 5102. (8) Public service event.--The term ``public service event'' means any undeclared emergency, incident, or situation in preparation for or response to which assistance may be provided under a mutual aid agreement. (9) Requesting party.--The term ``requesting party'' means, with respect to a mutual aid agreement, the party in whose jurisdiction assistance is provided, or a training event is held, under the agreement. (10) Responding party.--The term ``responding party'' means, with respect to a mutual aid agreement, the party providing assistance, or participating in a training event, under the agreement, but does not include the requesting party. (11) State.--The term ``State'' includes each of the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United States, and any political subdivision of any such place. (12) Terrorism.--The term ``terrorism'' means any activity that meets the definition of ``terrorism'' under section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as amended by this Act. (13) Training event.--The term ``training event'' means an emergency and public service event-related exercise, test, or other activity using equipment and personnel to prepare for or simulate performance of any aspect of the giving or receiving of assistance during emergencies or public service events, but does not include an actual emergency or public service event. (a) Coordination of Public Safety Interoperable Communications Programs.-- (1) Program.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, shall establish a program to enhance public safety interoperable communications at all levels of government. Such program shall-- (A) establish a comprehensive national approach to achieving public safety interoperable communications; (B) coordinate with other Federal agencies in carrying out subparagraph (A); (C) develop, in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies and State and local authorities, appropriate minimum capabilities for communications interoperability for Federal, State, and local public safety agencies; (D) accelerate, in consultation with other Federal agencies, including the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the private sector, and nationally recognized standards organizations as appropriate, the development of national voluntary consensus standards for public safety interoperable communications; (E) encourage the development and implementation of flexible and open architectures incorporating, where possible, technologies that currently are commercially available, with appropriate levels of security, for short- term and long-term solutions to public safety communications interoperability; (F) assist other Federal agencies in identifying priorities for research, development, and testing and evaluation with regard to public safety interoperable communications; (G) identify priorities within the Department of Homeland Security for research, development, and testing and evaluation with regard to public safety interoperable communications; (H) establish coordinated guidance for Federal grant programs for public safety interoperable communications; (I) provide technical assistance to State and local public safety agencies regarding planning, acquisition strategies, interoperability architectures, training, and other functions necessary to achieve public safety communications interoperability; (J) develop and disseminate best practices to improve public safety communications interoperability; and (K) develop appropriate performance measures and milestones to systematically measure the Nation's progress towards achieving public safety communications interoperability, including the development of national voluntary consensus standards. (2) Office for interoperability and compatibility.-- (A) Establishment of office.--The Secretary may establish an Office for Interoperability and Compatibility to carry out this subsection. (B) Functions.--If the Secretary establishes such office, the Secretary shall, through such office-- (i) carry out Department of Homeland Security responsibilities and authorities relating to the SAFECOM Program; and (ii) carry out subsection (c) (relating to rapid interoperable communications capabilities for high risk jurisdictions). (3) Applicability of federal advisory committee act.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to advisory groups established and maintained by the Secretary for purposes of carrying out this subsection. (b) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall report to the Congress on Department of Homeland Security plans for accelerating the development of national voluntary consensus standards for public safety interoperable communications, a schedule of milestones for such development, and achievements of such development. (c) Rapid Interoperable Communications Capabilities for High Risk Jurisdictions.--The Secretary, in consultation with other relevant Federal, State, and local government agencies, shall provide technical, training, and other assistance as appropriate to support the rapid establishment of consistent, secure, and effective interoperable communications capabilities for emergency response providers in jurisdictions determined by the Secretary to be at consistently high levels of risk of terrorist attack. (d) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Interoperable communications.--The term ``interoperable communications'' means the ability of emergency response providers and relevant Federal, State, and local government agencies to communicate with each other as necessary, through a dedicated public safety network utilizing information technology systems and radio communications systems, and to exchange voice, data, or video with one another on demand, in real time, as necessary. (2) Emergency response providers.--The term ``emergency response providers'' has the meaning that term has under section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as amended by this Act. (e) Clarification of Responsibility for Interoperable Communications.-- (1) Under secretary for emergency preparedness and response.--Section 502(7) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 312(7)) is amended-- (A) by striking ``developing comprehensive programs for developing interoperative communications technology, and''; and (B) by striking ``such'' and inserting ``interoperable communications''. (2) Office for domestic preparedness.--Section 430(c) of such Act (6 U.S.C. 238(c)) is amended-- (A) in paragraph (7) by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; (B) in paragraph (8) by striking the period and inserting ``; and''; and (C) by adding at the end the following: ``(9) helping to ensure the acquisition of interoperable communication technology by State and local governments and emergency response providers.''. (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that-- (1) in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, the President directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop an incident command system to be known as the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and directed all Federal agencies to make the adoption of NIMS a condition for the receipt of Federal emergency preparedness assistance by States, territories, tribes, and local governments beginning in fiscal year 2005; (2) in March 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security established NIMS, which provides a unified structural framework for Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local governments to ensure coordination of command, operations, planning, logistics, finance, and administration during emergencies involving multiple jurisdictions or agencies; and (3) the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States strongly supports the adoption of NIMS by emergency response agencies nationwide, and the decision by the President to condition Federal emergency preparedness assistance upon the adoption of NIMS. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that all levels of government should adopt NIMS, and that the regular use of and training in NIMS by States, territories, tribes, and local governments should be a condition for receiving Federal preparedness assistance. It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should regularly assess the adequacy of United States Northern Command's plans and strategies with a view to ensuring that the United States Northern Command is prepared to respond effectively to all military and paramilitary threats within the United States. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute is in order except those printed in House Report 108-751. Each amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Nethercutt). It is now in order to consider Amendment No. 1 printed in House report 108-751.", u" There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Select Committee on Intelligence, with amendments, as follows: [Strike the parts shown in black brackets and insert the part shown in italic.] (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2004 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The National Reconnaissance Office. (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (12) The Coast Guard. (13) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2004, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill ____ of the One Hundred Eighth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2004 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2004 the sum of $198,390,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2005. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 310 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2004. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2004 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2005. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2004, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2004 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $37,090,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2005, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill ____ of the One Hundred Eighth Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law. (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) Consultation in Preparation.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure that any report, review, study, or plan required to be prepared or conducted by a provision of this Act, including a provision of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) or the classified annex to this Act, that involves the intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy is prepared or conducted in consultation with the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate. (2) The Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy may carry out any consultation required by this subsection through an official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, as the case may be, designated by such Secretary for that purpose. (b) Submittal.--Any report, review, study, or plan referred to in subsection (a) shall be submitted, in addition to any other committee of Congress specified for submittal in the provision concerned, to the following committees of Congress: (1) The Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) The Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2004 the sum of $226,400,000. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (A); (2) by striking subparagraph (B); and (3) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (B). (a) Increase of Thresholds for Notice.--Subsection (a) of section 602 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 U.S.C. 403- 2b(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``$750,000'' each place it appears and inserting ``$5,000,000''; and (2) by striking ``$500,000'' each place it appears and inserting ``$1,000,000''. (b) Notice and Wait Requirements for Emergency Projects.-- Subsection (b)(2) of that section is amended-- (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as clauses (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively; (2) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2) Report.--''; (3) by striking ``21-day period'' and inserting ``7-day period''; and (4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), a project referred to in paragraph (1) may begin on the date the notification is received by the appropriate committees of Congress under that paragraph if the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine that-- ``(i) an emergency exists with respect to the national security or the protection of health, safety, or environmental quality; and ``(ii) any delay in the commencement of the project would harm any or all of those interests.''. (a) Authority.--Funds designated for intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for assistance to the Government of Colombia for counterdrug activities for fiscal year 2004, and any unobligated funds available to any element of the intelligence community for such activities for a prior fiscal year, shall be available-- (1) to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and against activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)); and (2) to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue operations. (b) Termination of Authority.--The authority provided in subsection (a) shall cease to be effective if the Secretary of Defense has credible evidence that the Colombian Armed Forces are not conducting vigorous operations to restore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations. (c) Application of Certain Provisions of Law.--Sections 556, 567, and 568 of Public Law 107-115, section 8093 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, and the numerical limitations on the number of United States military personnel and United States individual civilian contractors in section 3204(b)(1) of Public Law 106-246 shall be applicable to funds made available pursuant to the authority contained in subsection (a). (d) Limitation on Participation of United States Personnel.--No United States Armed Forces personnel or United States civilian contractor employed by the United States will participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance made available under this section, except for the purpose of acting in self defense or rescuing any United States citizen to include United States Armed Forces personnel, United States civilian employees, and civilian contractors employed by the United States. (a) In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of permitting intelligence analysts of various elements of the intelligence community to access and analyze intelligence from the databases of other elements of the intelligence community in order to achieve the objectives set forth in subsection (c). (b) Covered Intelligence.--The intelligence to be analyzed under the pilot program under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) Signals intelligence of the National Security Agency. (2) Such intelligence of other elements of the intelligence community as the Director shall select for purposes of the pilot program. (c) Objectives.--The objectives set forth in this subsection are as follows: (1) To enhance the capacity of the intelligence community to undertake so-called ``all source fusion'' analysis in support of the intelligence and intelligence-related missions of the intelligence community. (2) To reduce, to the extent practicable, the amount of intelligence collected by the intelligence community that is not assessed, or reviewed, by intelligence analysts. (3) To reduce the burdens imposed on analytical personnel of the elements of the intelligence community by current practices regarding the sharing of intelligence among elements of the intelligence community. (d) Commencement.--The Director shall commence the pilot program under subsection (a) not later than December 31, 2003. (e) Various Mechanisms Required.--In carrying out the pilot program under subsection (a), the Director shall develop and utilize various mechanisms to facilitate the access to, and the analysis of, intelligence in the databases of the intelligence community by intelligence analysts of other elements of the intelligence community, including the use of so-called ``detailees in place''. (f) Security.--(1) In carrying out the pilot program under subsection (a), the Director shall take appropriate actions to protect against the disclosure and unauthorized use of intelligence in the databases of the elements of the intelligence community which may endanger sources and methods which (as determined by the Director) warrant protection. (2) The actions taken under paragraph (1) shall include the provision of training on the accessing and handling of information in the databases of various elements of the intelligence community and the establishment of limitations on access to information in such databases to United States persons. (g) Assessment.--Not later than February 1, 2004, after the commencement under subsection (d) of the pilot program under subsection (a), the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production shall jointly carry out an assessment of the progress of the pilot program in meeting the objectives set forth in subsection (c). (h) Report.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the assessment carried out under subsection (g). (2) The report shall include-- (A) a description of the pilot program under subsection (a); (B) the findings of the Under Secretary and Assistant Director as a result of the assessment; (C) any recommendations regarding the pilot program that the Under Secretary and the Assistant Director jointly consider appropriate in light of the assessment; and (D) any recommendations that the Director and Secretary consider appropriate for purposes of the report. (i) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (a) Pilot Program Required.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of providing for the preparation of selected students for availability for employment as intelligence analysts for the intelligence and intelligence- related activities of the United States through a training program similar to the Reserve Officers' Training Corps programs of the Department of Defense. (2) The pilot program shall be known as the Intelligence Community Analyst Training Program. (b) Elements.--In carrying out the pilot program under subsection (a), the Director shall establish and maintain one or more cadres of students who-- (1) participate in such training as intelligence analysts as the Director considers appropriate; and (2) upon completion of such training, are available for employment as intelligence analysts under such terms and conditions as the Director considers appropriate. (c) Duration.--The Director shall carry out the pilot program under subsection (a) during fiscal years 2004 through 2006. (d) Limitation on Number of Members During Fiscal Year 2004.--The total number of individuals participating in the pilot program under subsection (a) during fiscal year 2004 may not exceed 150 students. (e) Responsibility.--The Director shall carry out the pilot program under subsection (a) through the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. (f) Reports.--(1) Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to Congress a preliminary report on the pilot program under subsection (a), including a description of the pilot program and the authorities to be utilized in carrying out the pilot program. (2) Not later than one year after the commencement of the pilot program, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the pilot program. The report shall include-- (A) a description of the activities under the pilot program, including the number of individuals who participated in the pilot program and the training provided such individuals under the pilot program; (B) an assessment of the effectiveness of the pilot program in meeting the purpose of the pilot program; and (C) any recommendations for additional legislative or administrative action that the Director considers appropriate in light of the pilot program. (g) Funding.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act, $8,000,000 shall be available in fiscal year 2004 to carry out this section. Section 1007(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2442; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by striking ``September 1, 2003,'' and inserting ``September 1, 2004,''. (a) Clarification.--Section 224 of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 (Public Law 107-56; 115 Stat. 295) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(c) Effect of Sunset.--Effective on December 31, 2005, each provision of law the amendment of which is sunset by subsection (a) shall be revived so as to be in effect as such provision of law was in effect on October 25, 2001.''. (b) Modification.--Subsection (a) of that section is amended by inserting ``204,'' after ``203(c),''. (a) Report Required.--The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the risks to the national security of the United States of the current computer security practices of the elements of the intelligence community and of the Department of Defense. (b) Assessments.--The report under subsection (a) shall include an assessment of the following: (1) The vulnerability of the computers and computer systems of the elements of the intelligence community, and of the Department of Defense, to various threats from foreign governments, international terrorist organizations, and organized crime, including information warfare (IW), Information Operations (IO), Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), and Computer Network Attack (CNA). (2) The risks of providing users of local area networks (LANs) or wide-area networks (WANs) of computers that include classified information with capabilities for electronic mail, upload and download, or removable storage media without also deploying comprehensive computer firewalls, accountability procedures, or other appropriate security controls. (3) Any other matters that the Director and the Secretary jointly consider appropriate for purposes of the report. (c) Information on Access to Networks.--The report under subsection (a) shall also include information as follows: (1) An estimate of the number of access points on each classified computer or computer system of an element of the intelligence community or the Department of Defense that permit unsupervised uploading or downloading of classified information, set forth by level of classification. (2) An estimate of the number of individuals utilizing such computers or computer systems who have access to input-output devices on such computers or computer systems. (3) A description of the policies and procedures governing the security of the access points referred to in paragraph (1), and an assessment of the adequacy of such policies and procedures. (4) An assessment of viability of utilizing other technologies (including so-called ``thin client servers'') to achieve enhanced security of such computers and computer systems through more rigorous control of access to such computers and computer systems. (d) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall also include such recommendations for modifications or improvements of the current computer security practices of the elements of the intelligence community, and of the Department of Defense, as the Director and the Secretary jointly consider appropriate as a result of the assessments under subsection (b) and the information under subsection (c). (e) Submittal Date.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than February 15, 2004. (f) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, at the election of the Director. (g) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (2) The term ``elements of the intelligence community'' means the elements of the intelligence community set forth in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (a) Report Required.--The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the utility and effectiveness of the current security background investigations and security clearance procedures of the Federal Government in meeting the purposes of such investigations and procedures. (b) Particular Report Matters.--In preparing the report, the Director and the Secretary shall address in particular the following: (1) A comparison of the costs and benefits of conducting background investigations for Secret clearance with the costs and benefits of conducting full field background investigations. (2) The standards governing the revocation of security clearances. (c) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall include such recommendations for modifications or improvements of the current security background investigations or security clearance procedures of the Federal Government as the Director and the Secretary jointly consider appropriate as a result of the preparation of the report under that subsection. (d) Submittal Date.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than February 15, 2004. (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (a) Report Required.--The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on means of improving the detail or transfer of civilian intelligence personnel between and among the various elements of the intelligence community for the purpose of enhancing the flexibility and effectiveness of the intelligence community in responding to changes in requirements for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. (b) Report Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall-- (1) set forth a variety of proposals on means of improving the detail or transfer of civilian intelligence personnel as described in that subsection; (2) identify the proposal or proposals determined by the heads of the elements of the intelligence community to be most likely to meet the purpose described in that subsection; and (3) include such recommendations for such legislative or administrative action as the heads of the elements of the intelligence community consider appropriate to implement the proposal or proposals identified under paragraph (2). (c) Submittal Date.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than February 15, 2004. (d) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (2) The term ``elements of the intelligence community'' means the elements of the intelligence community set forth in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (3) The term ``heads of the elements of the intelligence community'' includes the Secretary of Defense with respect to each element of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense or the military departments. (a) Report.--Not later than four months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that-- (1) identifies impediments in current policy and regulations to the sharing of classified information horizontally across and among Federal departments and agencies, and between Federal departments and agencies and vertically to and from agencies of State and local governments and the private sector, for national security purposes, including homeland security; (2) proposes appropriate modifications of policy, law, and regulations to eliminate such impediments in order to facilitate such sharing of classified information for homeland security purposes, including homeland security; and (3) outlines a plan of action (including appropriate milestones and funding) to establish the Terrorist Threat Integration Center as called for in the Information on the State of the Union given by the President to Congress under section 3 of Article II of the Constitution of the United States in 2003. (b) Considerations.--In preparing the report under subsection (a), the President shall-- (1) consider the extent to which the reliance on a document-based approach to the protection of classified information impedes the sharing of classified information; and (2) consider the extent to which the utilization of a database-based approach, or other electronic approach, to the protection of classified information might facilitate the sharing of classified information. (c) Coordination With Other Information Sharing Activities.--In preparing the report under subsection (a), the President shall, to the maximum extent practicable, take into account actions being undertaken under the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act (subtitle I of title VIII of Public Law 107-296; 116 Stat. 2252; 6 U.S.C. 481 et seq.). (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (a) Report.--Not later than February 15, 2004, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses progress in the following: (1) The development by the Department of Defense and the intelligence community of a comprehensive and uniform analytical capability to assess the utility and advisability of various sensor and platform architectures and capabilities for the collection of intelligence. (2) The improvement of coordination between the Department and the intelligence community on strategic and budgetary planning. (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form. (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (a) Report.--Not later than February 15, 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the extent of United States dependence on computer hardware or software that is manufactured overseas. (b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall address the following: (1) The extent to which the United States currently depends on computer hardware or software that is manufactured overseas. (2) The extent to which United States dependence on such computer hardware or software is increasing. (3) The vulnerabilities of the national security and economy of the United States as a result of United States dependence on such computer hardware or software. (4) Any other matters relating to United States dependence on such computer hardware or software that the Director considers appropriate. (c) Consultation With Private Sector.--In preparing the report under subsection (a), the Director may consult, and is encouraged to consult, with appropriate persons and entities in the computer hardware or software industry and with other appropriate persons and entities in the private sector. (d) Form.--(1) The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (2) The report may be in the form of a National Intelligence Estimate. (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the intelligence lessons learned as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom. (b) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall include such recommendations on means of improving training, equipment, operations, coordination, and collection of or for intelligence as the Director considers appropriate. (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form. (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (a) Preliminary Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the cessation of hostilities in Iraq (as determined by the President), the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a preliminary report on all information obtained by the Department of Defense and the intelligence community on the conventional weapons and ammunition obtained by Iraq in violation of applicable resolutions of the United Nations Security Council adopted since the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990. (b) Final Report.--(1) Not later than 270 days after the date of the cessation of hostilities in Iraq (as so determined), the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a final report on the information described in subsection (a). (2) The final report under paragraph (1) shall include such updates of the preliminary report under subsection (a) as the Director considers appropriate. (c) Elements.--Each report under this section shall set forth, to the extent practicable, with respect to each shipment of weapons or ammunition addressed in such report the following: (1) The country of origin. (2) Any country of transshipment. (d) Form.--Each report under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (a) Annual Evaluation of Performance and Responsiveness of Intelligence Community.--Section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5) is amended by striking subsection (d). (b) Periodic and Special Reports on Disclosure of Intelligence Information to United Nations.--Section 112 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (b); and (2) by redesignating subsections (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively. (c) Annual Report on Intelligence Community Cooperation With Counterdrug Activities.--Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (a); and (2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as subsections (a) through (e), respectively. (d) Annual Report on Russian Nuclear Facilities and Forces.--Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by subsection (c) of this section, is further amended-- (1) by striking subsection (a); and (2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (e) as subsections (a) through (d), respectively. (e) Annual Report on Covert Leases.--Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by this section, is further amended-- (1) by striking subsection (c); and (2) by striking subsection (d). (f) Annual Report on Protection of Covert Agents.--Section 603 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423) is repealed. (g) Annual Report on Certain Foreign Companies Involved in Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.--Section 827 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2430; 50 U.S.C. 404n-3) is repealed. (h) Annual Report on Intelligence Activities of People's Republic of China.--Section 308 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-107; 111 Stat. 2253; 50 U.S.C. 402a note) is repealed. (i) Annual Report on Coordination of Counterintelligence Matters With FBI.--Section 811(c) of the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 (title VIII of Public Law 103-359; 50 U.S.C. 402a(c)) is amended-- (1) by striking paragraph (6); and (2) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8) as paragraphs (6) and (7), respectively. (j) Reports on Decisions Not To Prosecute Violations of Classified Information Procedures Act.--Section 13 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (a) and (b); and (2) by striking ``(c)''. (k) Report on Postemployment Assistance for Terminated Intelligence Employees.--Section 1611 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking subsection (e). (l) Annual Report on Activities of FBI Personnel Outside the United States.--Section 540C of title 18, United States Code, is repealed. (m) Annual Report on Exceptions to Consumer Disclosure Requirements for National Security Investigations.--Section 604(b)(4) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681b(b)(4)) is amended-- (1) by striking subparagraphs (D) and (E); and (2) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (D). (n) Conforming Amendments.--Section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) by striking subparagraphs (A), (C), (D), (G), (I), (J), and (L); and (ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (E), (F), (H), (K), (M), and (N) as subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), and (G), respectively; and (iii) in subparagraph (E), as so redesignated, by striking ``section 114(c)'' and inserting ``section 114(a)''; and (B) in paragraph (2)-- (i) by striking subparagraphs (A), (E), and (F); (ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (D), and (G) as subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively; and (iii) in subparagraph (A), as so redesignated, by striking ``section 114(d)'' and inserting ``section 114(b)''; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) by striking paragraph (1) and (3); and (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) as paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), respectively. (o) Clerical Amendments.-- (1) National security act of 1947.--The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item relating to section 603. (2) Title 18, united states code.--The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 33 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 540C. (p) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take effect on December 31, 2003. Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``TWO-YEAR'' before ``SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION''; and (2) in the text, by striking ``ending on October 1, 2003'' and inserting ``ending on the date that is 60 days after the appropriate congressional committees of jurisdiction (as defined in section 324(d) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 7304(d)) are notified jointly by the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (or the Director's designee) that the operational framework for the office has been terminated''. (a) Clarification of Aliens Authorized To Distribute Explosive Materials.--Section 842(d)(7) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (B)-- (A) by inserting ``or'' at the end of clause (i); and (B) by striking clauses (iii) and (iv); and (3) by adding the following new subparagraphs: ``(C) is a member of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or other friendly foreign military force, as determined by the Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, who is present in the United States under military orders for training or other military purpose authorized by the United States and the shipping, transporting, possession, or receipt of explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized military purpose; or ``(D) is lawfully present in the United States in cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence, and the shipment, transportation, receipt, or possession of the explosive materials is in furtherance of such cooperation;''. (b) Clarification of Aliens Authorized To Possess or Receive Explosive Materials.--Section 842(i)(5) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (B)-- (A) by inserting ``or'' at the end of clause (i); and (B) by striking clauses (iii) and (iv); and (3) by adding the following new subparagraphs: ``(C) is a member of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or other friendly foreign military force, as determined by the Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, who is present in the United States under military orders for training or other military purpose authorized by the United States and the shipping, transporting, possession, or receipt of explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized military purpose; or ``(D) is lawfully present in the United States in cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence, and the shipment, transportation, receipt, or possession of the explosive materials is in furtherance of such cooperation;''. Section 313(e)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1424(e)(4)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``when Department of Defense activities are relevant to the determination'' after ``Secretary of Defense''; and (2) by inserting ``and the Secretary of Homeland Security'' after ``Attorney General''. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 1101(1) (12 U.S.C. 3401(1)), by inserting ``, except as provided in section 1114,'' before ``means any office''; and (2) in section 1114 (12 U.S.C. 3414), by adding at the end the following: ``(c) For purposes of this section, the term `financial institution' has the same meaning as in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code, except that, for purposes of this section, such term shall include only such a financial institution any part of which is located inside any State or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the United States Virgin Islands.''. (a) Workshops for Coordination of Research.--The National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall jointly sponsor not less than two workshops on the coordination of Federal Government research on the use of behavioral, psychological, and physiological assessments of individuals in the conduct of security evaluations. (b) Deadline for Completion of Activities.--The activities of the workshops sponsored under subsection (a) shall be completed not later than March 1, 2004. (c) Purposes.--The purposes of the workshops sponsored under subsection (a) are as follows: (1) To provide a forum for cataloging and coordinating Federally-funded research activities relating to the development of new techniques in the behavioral, psychological, or physiological assessment of individuals to be used in security evaluations. (2) To develop a research agenda for the Federal Government on behavioral, psychological, and physiological assessments of individuals, including an identification of the research most likely to advance the understanding of the use of such assessments of individuals in security evaluations. (3) To distinguish between short-term and long-term areas of research on behavioral, psychological, and physiological assessments of individuals in order maximize the utility of short-term and long-term research on such assessments. (4) To identify the Federal agencies best suited to support research on behavioral, psychological, and physiological assessments of individuals. (5) To develop recommendations for coordinating future Federally-funded research for the development, improvement, or enhancement of security evaluations. (d) Advisory Group.--(1) In order to assist the National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy in carrying out the activities of the workshops sponsored under subsection (a), there is hereby established an interagency advisory group with respect to such workshops. (2) The advisory group shall be composed of the following: (A) A representative of the Social, Behavioral, and Economic Directorate of the National Science Foundation. (B) A representative of the Office of Science, and Technology Policy. (C) The Secretary of Defense, or a designee of the Secretary. (D) The Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary. (E) The Attorney General, or a designee of the Attorney General. (F) The Secretary of Energy, or a designee of the Secretary. (G) The Secretary of Homeland Security, or a designee of the Secretary. (H) The Director of Central Intelligence, or a designee of the Director. (I) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a designee of the Director. (J) The National Counterintelligence Executive, or a designee of the National Counterintelligence Executive. (K) Any other official assigned to the advisory group by the President for purposes of this section. (3) The members of the advisory group under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) shall jointly head the advisory group. (4) The advisory group shall provide the Foundation and the Office such information, advice, and assistance with respect to the workshops sponsored under subsection (a) as the advisory group considers appropriate. (5) The advisory group shall not be treated as an advisory committee for purposes of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). (e) Report.--Not later than March 1, 2004, the National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall jointly submit Congress a report on the results of activities of the workshops sponsored under subsection (a), including the findings and recommendations of the Foundation and the Office as a result of such activities. (f) Funding.--(1) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by section 104(a), $500,000 shall be available to the National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy to carry out this section. (2) The amount authorized to be appropriated by paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended. (a) National Security Act of 1947.--Subsection (c)(1) of section 112 of the National Security Act of 1947, as redesignated by section 339(b) of this Act, is further amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6)'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7)''. (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''. (2) Section 15 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``special policemen of the General Services Administration perform under the first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318),'' and inserting ``officers and agents of the Department of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United States Code,''; and (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``the fourth section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) of this section (40 U.S.C. 318c)'' and inserting ``section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code''. (c) National Security Agency Act of 1959.--Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``special policemen of the General Services Administration perform under the first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318)'' and inserting ``officers and agents of the Department of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United States Code,''; and (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``the fourth section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) (40 U.S.C. 318c)'' and inserting ``section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code''. (d) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.-- Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''; and (2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 103(c)(6)'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7)''. (e) Public Law 107-173.--Section 201(c)(3)(F) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173; 116 Stat. 548; 8 U.S.C. 1721(c)(3)(F)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''. Section 4(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403e(b)(5)) is amended inserting ``, other than regulations under paragraph (1),'' after ``Regulations''. Section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Agency personnel designated by the Director under subsection (a), or designated by the Director under section 5(a)(4) to carry firearms for the protection of current or former Agency personnel and their immediate families, defectors and their immediate families, and other persons in the United States under Agency auspices, shall be considered for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office or employment when such Agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include the use of force, to-- ``(A) protect an individual in the presence of such Agency personnel from a crime of violence; ``(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or ``(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such Agency personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of violence in the presence of such Agency personnel. ``(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the Attorney General under section 2679(d)(1) of title 28, United States Code. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United States Code.''. Section 21(f)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u(f)(2)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Director'' and inserting ``The Director''; and (2) by striking subparagraph (B). Section 3535(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added by section 1001(b)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), and section 3545(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added by section 301(b)(1) of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347), are each amended by inserting ``or any other law'' after ``1978''. [(a) Consolidation of Current Provisions on Protection of Operational Files.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by transferring sections 105C and 105D to the end of title VII and redesignating such sections, as so transferred, as sections 703 and 704, respectively. [(b) Protection of Operational Files of NSA.--Title VII of such Act, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Consolidation of Current Provisions on Protection of Operational Files.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by transferring sections 105C and 105D to the end of title VII and redesignating such sections, as so transferred, as sections 703 and 704, respectively. (b) Protection of Operational Files of NSA.--Title VII of such Act, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: [Section 2195 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: [``(d)(1) The Director of the National Security Agency may provide affordable living quarters to a student in the Student Educational Employment Program or similar program (as prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management) while the student is employed at the laboratory of the Agency. [``(2) Notwithstanding section 5911(c) of title 5, living quarters may be provided under paragraph (1) without charge, or at rates or charges specified in regulations prescribed by the Director.''.] Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, agency personnel designated by the Director of the National Security Agency under subsection (a) shall be considered for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office or employment when such agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include the use of force, to-- ``(A) protect an individual in the presence of such agency personnel from a crime of violence; ``(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or ``(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such agency personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of violence in the presence of such agency personnel. ``(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the Attorney General under section 2679(d)(1) of title 28, United States Code. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United States Code.''.", u"``annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence community ``Sec. 506B. (a) Requirement To Provide.--The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of each element of the intelligence community, prepare an annual personnel level assessment for such element that assesses the personnel levels for such element for the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the assessment is submitted. ``(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees each year at the time that the President submits to Congress the budget for a fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code. ``(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) submitted during a fiscal year shall contain the following information for the element of the intelligence community concerned: ``(1) The budget submission for personnel costs for the upcoming fiscal year. ``(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current fiscal year. ``(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such costs as compared to the personnel costs during the prior 5 fiscal years. ``(4) The number of full-time equivalent positions that is the basis for which personnel funds are requested for the upcoming fiscal year. ``(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of the number referred to in paragraph (4) as compared to the number of full-time equivalent positions of the current fiscal year. ``(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of the number referred to in paragraph (4) as compared to the number of full-time equivalent positions during the prior 5 fiscal years. ``(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of core contract personnel to be funded by the element for the upcoming fiscal year. ``(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of such costs of core contract personnel as compared to the best estimate of the costs of core contract personnel of the current fiscal year. ``(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of such number and such costs of core contract personnel as compared to the number and cost of core contract personnel during the prior 5 fiscal years. ``(10) A justification for the requested personnel and core contract personnel levels. ``(11) The best estimate of the number of intelligence collectors and analysts employed or contracted by each element of the intelligence community. ``(12) A statement by the Director of National Intelligence that, based on current and projected funding, the element concerned will have sufficient-- ``(A) internal infrastructure to support the requested personnel and core contract personnel levels; ``(B) training resources to support the requested personnel levels; and ``(C) funding to support the administrative and operational activities of the requested personnel levels.''. (b) Applicability Date.--The first assessment required to be submitted under section 506B(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees at the time that the President submits to Congress the budget for fiscal year 2012 pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code. (c) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of such Act, as amended by section 302 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506A the following new item:``Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence community.''. Section 102A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(e)) is amended by-- (1) redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and (2) inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph: ``(3)(A) In addition to the number of full-time equivalent positions authorized for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a fiscal year, there is authorized for such Office for each fiscal year an additional 100 full- time equivalent positions that may be used only for the purposes described in subparagraph (B). ``(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of National Intelligence may use a full-time equivalent position authorized under subparagraph (A) only for the purpose of providing a temporary transfer of personnel made in accordance with paragraph (2) to an element of the intelligence community to enable such element to increase the total number of personnel authorized for such element, on a temporary basis-- ``(i) during a period in which a permanent employee of such element is absent to participate in critical language training; or ``(ii) to accept a permanent employee of another element of the intelligence community to provide language-capable services. ``(C) Paragraph (2)(B) shall not apply with respect to a transfer of personnel made under subparagraph (B). ``(D) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the use of authorities under this paragraph. Each such report shall include a description of-- ``(i) the number of transfers of personnel made by the Director pursuant to subparagraph (B), disaggregated by each element of the intelligence community; ``(ii) the critical language needs that were fulfilled or partially fulfilled through the use of such transfers; and ``(iii) the cost to carry out subparagraph (B).''. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 304 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(u) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if such employment creates a conflict of interest or appearance thereof. ``(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall annually submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing all outside employment for officers and employees of elements of the intelligence community that was authorized by the head of an element of the intelligence community during the preceding calendar year. Such report shall be submitted each year on the date provided in section 507.''. (a) Permanent Authorization.--Subtitle C of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Expansion of the Louis Stokes Educational Scholarship Program to Graduate Students.--Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by inserting ``and graduate'' after ``undergraduate''; and (B) by striking ``the baccalaureate'' and inserting ``a baccalaureate or graduate''; (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``or graduate'' after ``undergraduate''; (3) in subsection (e)(2), by inserting ``and graduate'' after ``undergraduate''; and (4) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(h) The undergraduate and graduate training program established under this section shall be known as the Louis Stokes Educational Scholarship Program.''. (b) Authority for Participation by Individuals Who Are Not Employed by the United States Government.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (b) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by subsection (a)(2), is further amended by striking ``civilian employees'' and inserting ``civilians who may or may not be employees''. (2) Conforming amendments.--Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by subsection (a), is further amended-- (A) in subsection (c), by striking ``employees'' and inserting ``program participants''; and (B) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (1)-- (I) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), strike ``an employee of the Agency,'' and insert ``a program participant,''; (II) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``employee'' and inserting ``program participant''; (III) in subparagraph (C)-- (aa) by striking ``employee'' each place that term appears and inserting ``program participant''; and (bb) by striking ``employee's'' each place that term appears and inserting ``program participant's''; and (IV) in subparagraph (D)-- (aa) by striking ``employee'' each place that term appears and inserting ``program participant''; and (bb) by striking ``employee's'' each place that term appears and inserting ``program participant's''; and (ii) in paragraph (3)(C)-- (I) by striking ``employee'' both places that term appears and inserting ``program participant''; and (II) by striking ``employee's'' and inserting ``program participant's''. (c) Termination of Program Participants.--Subsection (d)(1)(C) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by subsection (b)(2)(B)(i)(III), is further amended by striking ``terminated'' and all that follows and inserting ``terminated-- ``(i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the program participant; ``(ii) by the program participant voluntarily; or ``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the program participant to maintain such level of academic standing in the educational course of training as the Director of the National Security Agency shall have specified in the agreement of the program participant under this subsection; and''. (d) Authority To Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With NSA.--Subsection (e) of Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''. (e) Authority of Elements of the Intelligence Community To Establish a Stokes Educational Scholarship Program.-- (1) Authority.--Subtitle C of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.), as amended by section 311 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Program.--Subtitle C of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.), as amended by section 312(e) of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the National Security Education Board established under section 803(a) of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1903(a)), may establish a pilot program for intensive language instruction in African languages. (b) Program.--A pilot program established under subsection (a) shall provide scholarships for programs that provide intensive language instruction-- (1) in any of the five highest priority African languages for which scholarships are not offered under the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.), as determined by the Director of National Intelligence; and (2) both in the United States and in a country in which the language is the native language of a significant portion of the population, as determined by the Director of National Intelligence. (c) Termination.--A pilot program established under subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is five years after the date on which such pilot program is established. (d) Authorization of Appropriations.-- (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000. (2) Availability.--Funds authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1) shall remain available until the termination of the pilot program in accordance with subsection (c). (a) Vulnerability Assessments of Major Systems.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 305 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506B, as added by section 305(a), the following new section: (a) Intelligence Community Business System Transformation.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 321 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506C, as added by section 321(a), the following new section: (a) Reports.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 322 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506D, as added by section 322(a)(1), the following new section: (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 323 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506E, as added by section 323(a), the following new section: (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 324 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506F, as added by section 324(a), the following new section: Subsection (n) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4)(A) In addition to the authority referred to in paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the head of an element of the intelligence community to exercise an acquisition authority referred to in section 3 or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)) for an acquisition by such element that is more than 50 percent funded under the National Intelligence Program. ``(B) The head of an element of the intelligence community may not exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) until-- ``(i) the head of such element (without delegation) submits to the Director of National Intelligence a written request that includes-- ``(I) a description of such authority requested to be exercised; ``(II) an explanation of the need for such authority, including an explanation of the reasons that other authorities are insufficient; and ``(III) a certification that the mission of such element would be-- ``(aa) impaired if such authority is not exercised; or ``(bb) significantly and measurably enhanced if such authority is exercised; and ``(ii) the Director of National Intelligence issues a written authorization that includes-- ``(I) a description of the authority referred to in subparagraph (A) that is authorized to be exercised; and ``(II) a justification to support the exercise of such authority. ``(C) A request and authorization to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) may be made with respect to an individual acquisition or with respect to a specific class of acquisitions described in the request and authorization referred to in subparagraph (B). ``(D)(i) A request from a head of an element of the intelligence community located within one of the departments described in clause (ii) to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be submitted to the Director of National Intelligence in accordance with any procedures established by the head of such department. ``(ii) The departments described in this clause are the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury. ``(E)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community may not be authorized to utilize an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for a class of acquisitions for a period of more than 3 years, except that the Director of National Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize the use of such an authority for not more than 6 years. ``(ii) Each authorization to utilize an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) may be extended in accordance with the requirements of subparagraph (B) for successive periods of not more than 3 years, except that the Director of National Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize an extension period of not more than 6 years. ``(F) Subject to clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (E), the Director of National Intelligence may only delegate the authority of the Director under subparagraphs (A) through (E) to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or a Deputy Director of National Intelligence. ``(G) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit-- ``(i) to the congressional intelligence committees a notification of an authorization to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) or an extension of such authorization that includes the written authorization referred to in subparagraph (B)(ii); and ``(ii) to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget a notification of an authorization to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for an acquisition or class of acquisitions that will exceed $50,000,000 annually. ``(H) Requests and authorizations to exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) shall remain available within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a period of at least 6 years following the date of such request or authorization. ``(I) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to alter or otherwise limit the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency to independently exercise an authority under section 3 or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)).''. (a) Procedures.--Section 501(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(c)) is amended by striking ``such procedures'' and inserting ``such written procedures''. (b) Intelligence Activities.--Section 502(a)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)(2)) is amended by inserting ``(including the legal basis under which the intelligence activity is being or was conducted)'' after ``concerning intelligence activities''. (c) Covert Actions.--Section 503 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``(including the legal basis under which the covert action is being or was conducted)'' after ``concerning covert actions''; (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``in writing'' after ``be reported''; (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``committee. When'' and inserting the following: ``committee. ``(5)(A) When''; and (C) in paragraph (5), as designated by subparagraph (B)-- (i) in subparagraph (A), as so designated-- (I) by inserting ``, or a notification provided under subsection (d)(1),'' after ``access to a finding''; (II) by inserting ``written'' before ``statement''; and (ii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) Not later than 180 days after a statement of reasons is submitted in accordance with subparagraph (A) or this subparagraph, the President shall ensure that-- ``(i) all members of the congressional intelligence committees are provided access to the finding or notification; or ``(ii) a statement of reasons that it is essential to continue to limit access to such finding or such notification to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States is submitted to the Members of Congress specified in paragraph (2).''; (3) in subsection (d)-- (A) by striking ``(d) The President'' and inserting ``(d)(1) The President''; (B) in paragraph (1), as designated by subparagraph (A), by inserting ``in writing'' after ``notified''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) In determining whether an activity constitutes a significant undertaking for purposes of paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether the activity-- ``(A) involves significant risk of loss of life; ``(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, including authorities relating to research, development, or operations; ``(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or other resources; ``(D) requires notification under section 504; ``(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing intelligence sources or methods; or ``(F) presents a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious damage to the diplomatic relations of the United States if such activity were disclosed without authorization.''; and (4) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g)(1) In any case where access to a finding reported under subsection (c) or notification provided under subsection (d)(1) is not made available to all members of a congressional intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2), the President shall notify all members of such committee that such finding or such notification has been provided only to the members specified in subsection (c)(2). ``(2) In any case where access to a finding reported under subsection (c) or notification provided under subsection (d)(1) is not made available to all members of a congressional intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2), the President shall provide to all members of such committee a general description regarding the finding or notification, as applicable, consistent with the reasons for not yet fully informing all members of such committee. ``(3) The President shall maintain-- ``(A) a record of the members of Congress to whom a finding is reported under subsection (c) or notification is provided under subsection (d)(1) and the date on which each member of Congress receives such finding or notification; and ``(B) each written statement provided under subsection (c)(5).''. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 325 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``certification of compliance with oversight requirements ``Sec. 508. The head of each element of the intelligence community shall annually submit to the congressional intelligence committees-- ``(1) a certification that, to the best of the knowledge of the head of such element-- ``(A) the head of such element is in full compliance with the requirements of this title; and ``(B) any information required to be submitted by the head of such element under this Act before the date of the submission of such certification has been properly submitted; or ``(2) if the head of such element is unable to submit a certification under paragraph (1), a statement-- ``(A) of the reasons the head of such element is unable to submit such a certification; ``(B) describing any information required to be submitted by the head of such element under this Act before the date of the submission of such statement that has not been properly submitted; and ``(C) that the head of such element will submit such information as soon as possible after the submission of such statement.''. (b) Applicability Date.--The first certification or statement required to be submitted by the head of each element of the intelligence community under section 508 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (c) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 325 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after the item related to section 507 the following new item:``Sec. 508. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.''. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than December 1, 2010, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report containing-- (1) the policies and procedures of the United States Government governing participation by an element of the intelligence community in the interrogation of individuals detained by the United States who are suspected of international terrorism with the objective, in whole or in part, of acquiring national intelligence, including such policies and procedures of each appropriate element of the intelligence community or interagency body established to carry out interrogations; (2) the policies and procedures relating to any detention by the Central Intelligence Agency of such individuals in accordance with Executive Order 13491; (3) the legal basis for the policies and procedures referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2); (4) the training and research to support the policies and procedures referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2); and (5) any action that has been taken to implement section 1004 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 2000dd- Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of-- (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on-- (1) the intelligence collection efforts of the United States dedicated to assessing the threat from biological weapons from state, nonstate, or rogue actors, either foreign or domestic; and (2) efforts to protect the biodefense knowledge and infrastructure of the United States. (b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include-- (1) an assessment of the intelligence collection efforts of the United States dedicated to detecting the development or use of biological weapons by state, nonstate, or rogue actors, either foreign or domestic; (2) information on fiscal, human, technical, open-source, and other intelligence collection resources of the United States dedicated for use to detect or protect against the threat of biological weapons; (3) an assessment of any problems that may reduce the overall effectiveness of United States intelligence collection and analysis to identify and protect biological weapons targets, including-- (A) intelligence collection gaps or inefficiencies; (B) inadequate information sharing practices; or (C) inadequate cooperation among departments or agencies of the United States; (4) a strategic plan prepared by the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, that provides for actions for the appropriate elements of the intelligence community to close important intelligence gaps related to biological weapons; (5) a description of appropriate goals, schedules, milestones, or metrics to measure the long-term effectiveness of actions implemented to carry out the plan described in paragraph (4); and (6) any long-term resource and human capital issues related to the collection of intelligence regarding biological weapons, including any recommendations to address shortfalls of experienced and qualified staff possessing relevant scientific, language, and technical skills. (c) Implementation of Strategic Plan.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence submits the report required by subsection (a), the Director shall begin implementation of the strategic plan referred to in subsection (b)(4). (a) Notification of Cybersecurity Programs.-- (1) Requirement for notification.-- (A) Existing programs.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a notification for each cybersecurity program in operation on such date that includes the documentation referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and biennially thereafter for four years, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the proficiency in foreign languages and, as appropriate, in foreign dialects, of each element of the intelligence community, including-- (1) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency and a description of the level of proficiency required; (2) an estimate of the number of such positions that such element will require during the five-year period beginning on the date of the submission of the report; (3) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by-- (A) military personnel; and (B) civilian personnel; (4) the number of applicants for positions in such element in the preceding fiscal year that indicated foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the proficiency level; (5) the number of persons hired by such element with foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language and a description of the proficiency level of such persons; (6) the number of personnel of such element currently attending foreign language training, including the provider of such training; (7) a description of the efforts of such element to recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a foreign language; (8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, advanced, and intensive foreign language training utilized by such element; (9) for each foreign language and, as appropriate, dialect of a foreign language-- (A) the number of positions of such element that require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect; (B) the number of personnel of such element that are serving in a position that requires proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; (C) the number of personnel of such element that are serving in a position that does not require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; (D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable; (E) whether the number of personnel at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the requirements of such element; (F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as linguists for such element that are not qualified as linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language Roundtable; (G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists for such element during the preceding calendar year; (H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that discontinued serving such element during the preceding calendar year; (I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by a foreign country, international organization, or other foreign entity; and (J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by contractors; (10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; (11) an identification of any critical gaps in foreign language proficiency with respect to such element and recommendations for eliminating such gaps; (12) recommendations, if any, for eliminating required reports relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer relevant; and (13) an assessment of the feasibility of employing foreign nationals lawfully present in the United States who have previously worked as translators or interpreters for the Armed Forces or another department or agency of the United States Government in Iraq or Afghanistan to meet the critical language needs of such element. (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the head of each element of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each such element to increase diversity within the intelligence community. (b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include specific implementation plans to increase diversity within each element of the intelligence community, including-- (1) specific implementation plans for each such element designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic plan of the Director of National Intelligence on equal employment opportunity and diversity; (2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates; (3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior, midgrade, senior, and management levels; (4) a description of specific diversity awareness training and education programs for senior officials and managers of each such element; and (5) a description of performance metrics to measure the success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs described in paragraphs (1) through (4). (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than February 1, 2011, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report describing the use of personal services contracts across the intelligence community, the impact of the use of such contracts on the intelligence community workforce, plans for conversion of contractor employment into United States Government employment, and the accountability mechanisms that govern the performance of such personal services contracts. (b) Content.-- (1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include-- (A) a description of any relevant regulations or guidance issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community and in effect as of February 1, 2011, relating to minimum standards required regarding the hiring, training, security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and how those standards may differ from those for United States Government employees performing substantially similar functions; (B) an identification of contracts in effect during the preceding fiscal year under which the contractor is performing substantially similar functions to a United States Government employee; (C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings achieved during the preceding fiscal year by awarding contracts for the performance of such functions referred to in subparagraph (B) instead of using full-time employees of the elements of the intelligence community to perform such functions; (D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph (a) Study.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall conduct a study on the electronic waste destruction practices of the intelligence community. Such study shall assess-- (1) the security of the electronic waste disposal practices of the intelligence community, including the potential for counterintelligence exploitation of destroyed, discarded, or recycled materials; (2) the environmental impact of such disposal practices; and (3) methods to improve the security and environmental impact of such disposal practices, including steps to prevent the forensic exploitation of electronic waste. (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a). (a) Review.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct a classification review of the records of the Agency that are relevant to the known or potential health effects suffered by veterans of Operation Desert Storm as described in the November 2008, report by the Department of Veterans Affairs Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses. (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress the results of the classification review conducted under subsection (a), including the total number of records of the Agency that are relevant. (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to Congress a review of constraints under international law and the laws of foreign nations to the assertion of enforcement jurisdiction with respect to criminal investigations of terrorism offenses under the laws of the United States conducted by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in foreign nations and using funds made available for the National Intelligence Program, including constraints identified in section 432 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall make publicly available an unclassified version of the report of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency entitled ``Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge Denial Program in Peru, 1995-2001'', dated August 25, 2008. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall submit to Congress a report summarizing intelligence related to the threat to the United States from weapons that use radiological materials, including highly dispersible substances such as cesium-137. Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the feasibility and advisability of creating a national space intelligence office to manage space-related intelligence assets and access to such assets. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the attempt to detonate an explosive device aboard Northwest Airlines flight number 253 on December 25, 2009. Such report shall describe the failures, if any, to share or analyze intelligence or other information and the measures that the intelligence community has taken or will take to prevent such failures, including-- (1) a description of the roles and responsibilities of the counterterrorism analytic components of the intelligence community in synchronizing, correlating, and analyzing all sources of intelligence related to terrorism; (2) an assessment of the technological capabilities of the United States Government to assess terrorist threats, including-- (A) a list of all databases used by counterterrorism analysts; (B) a description of the steps taken by the intelligence community to integrate all relevant terrorist databases and allow for cross-database searches; (C) a description of the steps taken by the intelligence community to correlate biographic information with terrorism- related intelligence; and (D) a description of the improvements to information technology needed to enable the United States Government to better share information; (3) any recommendations that the Director considers appropriate for legislation to improve the sharing of intelligence or information relating to terrorists; (4) a description of the steps taken by the intelligence community to train analysts on watchlisting processes and procedures; (5) a description of the manner in which watchlisting information is entered, reviewed, searched, analyzed, and acted upon by the relevant elements of the United States Government; (6) a description of the steps the intelligence community is taking to enhance the rigor and raise the standard of tradecraft of intelligence analysis related to uncovering and preventing terrorist plots; (7) a description of the processes and procedures by which the intelligence community prioritizes terrorism threat leads and the standards used by elements of the intelligence community to determine if follow-up action is appropriate; (8) a description of the steps taken to enhance record information on possible terrorists in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment; (9) an assessment of how to meet the challenge associated with exploiting the ever-increasing volume of information available to the intelligence community; and (10) a description of the steps the intelligence community has taken or will take to respond to any findings and recommendations of the congressional intelligence committees, with respect to any such failures, that have been transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence. (a) Annual Report on Intelligence.--Section 109 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404d) is repealed. (b) Annual and Special Reports on Intelligence Sharing With the United Nations.--Section 112 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (b); and (2) by redesignating subsections (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively. (c) Annual Report on Progress in Auditable Financial Statements.--Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is repealed. (d) Report on Financial Intelligence on Terrorist Assets.-- Section 118 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404m) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``semiannual'' and inserting ``annual''; (2) in subsection (a)-- (A) in the heading, by striking ``Semiannual'' and inserting ``Annual''; (B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)-- (i) by striking ``semiannual basis'' and inserting ``annual basis''; and (ii) by striking ``preceding six-month period'' and inserting ``preceding one-year period''; (C) by striking paragraph (2); and (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively; and (3) in subsection (d)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the Committee on Armed Services,'' after ``the Committee on Appropriations,''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the Committee on Armed Services,'' after ``the Committee on Appropriations,''. (e) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence Initiatives.--Section 1102(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(1)''; and (2) by striking paragraph (2). (f) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (d); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively. (g) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.-- Section 826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 21 U.S.C. 873 note) is repealed. (h) Biennial Report on Foreign Industrial Espionage.-- Subsection (b) of section 809 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170b) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Annual Update'' and inserting ``Biennial Report''; (2) by striking paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting the following new paragraph: ``(1) Requirement to submit.--Not later than February 1, 2011, and once every two years thereafter, the President shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and congressional leadership a report updating the information referred to in subsection (a)(1)D).''; and (3) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2). (i) Table of Contents Amendments.-- (1) National security act of 1947.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 332 of this Act, is further amended-- (A) by striking the item relating to section 109; (B) by striking the item relating to section 114A; and (C) by striking the item relating to section 118 and inserting the following new item:``Sec. 118. Annual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.''. (2) Intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 2003.-- The table of contents in the first section of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2383) is amended by striking the item relating to section 826. (a) DNI Directive Governing Access.-- (1) Requirement for directive.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Comptroller General of the United States, shall issue a written directive governing the access of the Comptroller General to information in the possession of an element of the intelligence community. (2) Amendment to directive.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Comptroller General, may issue an amendment to the directive issued under paragraph (1) at any time the Director determines such an amendment is appropriate. (3) Relationship to other laws.--The directive issued under paragraph (1) and any amendment to such directive issued under paragraph (2) shall be consistent with the provisions of-- (A) chapter 7 of title 31, United States Code; and (B) the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). (b) Confidentiality of Information.-- (1) Requirement for confidentiality.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall ensure that the level of confidentiality of information made available to the Comptroller General pursuant to the directive issued under subsection (a)(1) or an amendment to such directive issued under subsection (a)(2) is not less than the level of confidentiality of such information required of the head of the element of the intelligence community from which such information was obtained. (2) Penalties for unauthorized disclosure.--An officer or employee of the Government Accountability Office shall be subject to the same statutory penalties for unauthorized disclosure or use of such information as an officer or employee of the element of the intelligence community from which such information was obtained. (c) Submission to Congress.-- (1) Submission of directive.--The directive issued under subsection (a)(1) shall be submitted to Congress by the Director of National Intelligence, together with any comments of the Comptroller General of the United States, no later than May 1, 2011. (2) Submission of amendment.--Any amendment to such directive issued under subsection (a)(2) shall be submitted to Congress by the Director, together with any comments of the Comptroller General. (d) Effective Date.--The directive issued under subsection (a)(1) and any amendment to such directive issued under subsection (a)(2) shall take effect 60 days after the date such directive or amendment is submitted to Congress under subsection (c), unless the Director determines that for reasons of national security the directive or amendment should take effect sooner. Section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) by striking subparagraphs (A), (B), and (G); (ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (C), (D), (E), (F), (H), (I), and (N) as subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), and (G), respectively; and (iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: ``(H) The annual report on outside employment of employees of elements of the intelligence community required by section 102A(u)(2). ``(I) The annual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets required by section 118.''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraphs (C) and (D); and (2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (6). Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head of such element certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods. ``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who shall keep a record of such information. ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''. Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows: ``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and''. (a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover Intelligence Officers and Agents.-- (1) Disclosure of agent after access to information identifying agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''. (2) Disclosure of agent after access to classified information.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking ``five years'' and inserting ``10 years''. (b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of Intelligence Identities.--The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by inserting ``including an assessment of the need, if any, for modification of this title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert agents,'' after ``measures to protect the identities of covert agents,''. Section 601 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 415c) is amended to read as follows: Paragraph (5) of section 703(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 435 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``jurisdiction,'' and inserting ``jurisdiction or by a member of the committee of jurisdiction,''; and (2) by inserting ``, to evaluate the proper classification of certain records,'' after ``certain records''. Paragraph (1) of section 102(b) of the Department of Justice and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102-395; 28 U.S.C. 533 note) is amended in the flush text following subparagraph (D) by striking ``(or, if designated by the Director, the Assistant Director, Intelligence Division) and the Attorney General (or, if designated by the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security)'' and inserting ``(or a designee of the Director who is in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director in the National Security Branch or a similar successor position) and the Attorney General (or a designee of the Attorney General who is in the National Security Division in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Attorney General or a similar successor position)''. (a) Reports Relating to Security Clearances.-- (1) Quadrennial audit; security clearance determinations.-- (A) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 325 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506G, as added by section 325(a), the following new section: (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Covered element of the intelligence community.--The term ``covered element of the intelligence community'' means-- (A) the Central Intelligence Agency; (B) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (C) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (D) the National Reconnaissance Office; or (E) the National Security Agency. (2) Independent auditor.--The term ``independent auditor'' means an individual who-- (A)(i) is a Federal, State, or local government auditor who meets the independence standards included in generally accepted government auditing standards; or (ii) is a public accountant who meets such independence standards; and (B) is designated as an auditor by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of a covered element of the intelligence community, as appropriate. (3) Independent review.--The term ``independent review'' means an audit, attestation, or examination conducted by an independent auditor in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. (4) Long-standing, correctable material weakness.--The term ``long-standing, correctable material weakness'' means a material weakness-- (A) that was first reported in the annual financial report of a covered element of the intelligence community for a fiscal year prior to fiscal year 2007; and (B) the correction of which is not substantially dependent on a business system that was not implemented prior to the end of fiscal year 2010. (5) Material weakness.--The term ``material weakness'' has the meaning given that term under the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123, entitled ``Management's Responsibility for Internal Control,'' revised December 21, Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall-- (1) conduct a review of the status of the auditability compliance of each element of the intelligence community; and (2) develop a plan and schedule to achieve a full, unqualified audit of each element of the intelligence community not later than September 30, 2013.", u" Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence Subsection (f) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8) as paragraphs (8) and (9), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph: ``(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a congressional intelligence committee, conduct an accountability review of an element of the intelligence community or the personnel of such element in relation to a failure or deficiency within the intelligence community. ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and procedures for conducting an accountability review under subparagraph (A). ``(C)(i) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide the findings of an accountability review conducted under subparagraph (A) and the Director's recommendations for corrective or punitive action, if any, to the head of the applicable element of the intelligence community. Such recommendations may include a recommendation for dismissal of personnel. ``(ii) If the head of such element does not implement a recommendation made by the Director under clause (i), the head of such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notice of the determination not to implement the recommendation, including the reasons for the determination. ``(D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not be construed to limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (a) Authorities for Interagency Funding.--Section 102A(d)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(d)(2)) is amended by striking ``Program to another such program.'' and inserting ``Program-- ``(A) to another such program; ``(B) to other departments or agencies of the United States Government for the development and fielding of systems of common concern related to the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information; or ``(C) to a program funded by appropriations not within the National Intelligence Program to address critical gaps in intelligence information sharing or access capabilities.''. (b) Authorities of Heads of Other Departments and Agencies.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of any department or agency of the United States is authorized to receive and utilize funds made available to the department or agency by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 102A(d)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(d)(2)), as amended by subsection (a), and receive and utilize any system referred to in such Subsection (e) of section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3) is amended to read as follows: ``(e) Location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.--The headquarters of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may be located in the Washington metropolitan region, as that term is defined in section 8301 of title 40, United States Code.''. Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (B) by striking ``President,'' and all that follows and inserting ``President.''; (2) by striking subsection (b) and redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (b) and (c), respectively; (3) in subsection (b) (as so redesignated), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (4) in subsection (c) (as so redesignated), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' before ``may not''. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 347 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 103G the following new section: (a) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 405 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 103H, as added by section 405(a)(1), the following new section: (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting ``(1) The''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) The head of the National Counter Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(3) The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403- 3(c)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (14); and (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraphs: ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. ``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center. ``(13) The Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.''. (a) In General.--Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:``protection of certain files of the office of the director of national Section 1102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking paragraph (2); and (B) by striking ``(1) In'' and inserting ``In''; and (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) by striking paragraph (2); and (B) by striking ``(1) The'' and inserting ``The''. (a) In General.--Section 4(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or''; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, if the Director of National Intelligence determines that for reasons of national security such advisory committee cannot comply with the requirements of this Act.''. (b) Annual Report.-- (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall each submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on advisory committees created by each such Director. Each report shall include-- (A) a description of each such advisory committee, including the subject matter of the committee; and (B) a list of members of each such advisory committee. (2) Report on reasons for odni exclusion of advisory committee from faca.--Each report submitted by the Director of National Intelligence in accordance with paragraph (1) shall include the reasons for a determination by the Director under section 4(b)(3) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.), as added by subsection (a) of this section, that an advisory committee cannot comply with the requirements of such Act. Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the Director's designee.''. (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), respectively; and (3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking paragraphs (3) and (4). (b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further amended-- (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''. (a) Prohibition.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the report submitted to Congress under section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote the use of energy efficient computer servers in the United States'' (Public Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the plan developed under subsection (a). (2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The Director of National Intelligence may provide support for any review conducted by a department or agency of the United States Government of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations or Export Administration Regulations, including a review of technologies and goods on the United States Munitions List and Commerce Control List that may warrant controls that are different or additional to the controls such technologies and goods are subject to at the time of such review. Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the protection''; and (2) by inserting before the semicolon the following: ``, and the protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate''. Section 8(d) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 U.S.C. 607(d)) is amended by adding at the end ``Notwithstanding any other provision of this section and any other provision of law, an appeal from a decision of a contracting officer of the Central Intelligence Agency relative to a contract made by that Agency may be filed with whichever of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals is specified by such contracting officer as the Board to which such an appeal may be made and such Board shall have jurisdiction to decide that appeal.''. (a) Establishment and Duties of Deputy Director of the CIA.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 406 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 104A the following new section: Subsection (b) of section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k) is amended by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, who may delegate such authority to other appropriate officials of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (a) Appointment and Qualifications of the Inspector General.--Paragraph (1) of section 17(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)) is amended by striking the second and third sentences and inserting ``This appointment shall be made without regard to political affiliation and shall be on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigation. Such appointment shall also be made on the basis of compliance with the security standards of the Agency and prior experience in the field of foreign intelligence.''. (b) Removal of the Inspector General.--Paragraph (6) of section 17(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``immediately''; and (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of such removal. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other than transfer or removal.''. (c) Application of Semiannual Reporting Requirements With Respect To Review Reports.--Paragraph (1) of section 17(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by inserting ``review,'' after ``investigation,''. (d) Protection Against Reprisals.--Subparagraph (B) of section 17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(3)) is amended by inserting ``or providing such information'' after ``making such complaint''. (e) Inspector General Subpoena Power.--Subparagraph (A) of section 17(e)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(5)) is amended by inserting ``in any medium (including electronically stored information or any tangible thing)'' after ``other data''. (f) Other Administrative Authorities.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (e) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q), as amended by subsections (d) and (e) of this section, is further amended-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (8) as subparagraph (9); (B) in paragraph (9), as so redesignated-- (i) by striking ``Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the'' and inserting ``The''; and (ii) by adding at the end the following: ``Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources allocated by the Director, the Inspector General has final approval of-- ``(A) the selection of internal and external candidates for employment with the Office of Inspector General; and ``(B) all other personnel decisions concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General, including selection and appointment to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all security-based determinations that are not within the authority of a head of other Central Intelligence Agency offices.''; and (C) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new paragraph: ``(8)(A) The Inspector General shall-- ``(i) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who shall report to the Inspector General; or ``(ii) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and directly reporting to another Inspector General or the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on a reimbursable basis. ``(B) The counsel appointed or obtained under subparagraph (A) shall perform such functions as the Inspector General may prescribe.''. (2) Construction.--Nothing in the amendment made by paragraph (1)(C) shall be construed to alter the duties and responsibilities of the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Subsection (f) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``Beginning''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General shall transmit a budget estimate and request through the Director to the Director of National Intelligence that specifies for such fiscal year-- ``(A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations of the Inspector General; ``(B) the amount requested for all training requirements of the Inspector General, including a certification from the Inspector General that the amount requested is sufficient to fund all training requirements for the Office; and ``(C) the amount requested to support the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, including a justification for such amount. ``(3) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall include for such fiscal year-- ``(A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency; ``(B) the amount requested for Inspector General training; ``(C) the amount requested to support the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and ``(D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any, with respect to such proposed budget. ``(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives for each fiscal year-- ``(A) a separate statement of the budget estimate transmitted pursuant to paragraph (2); ``(B) the amount requested by the Director of National Intelligence for the Inspector General pursuant to paragraph The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall make publicly available an unclassified version of any memoranda or finished intelligence products assessing the-- (1) information gained from high-value detainee reporting; and (2) dated April 3, 2003, July 15, 2004, March 2, 2005, and June 1, 2005. (a) Coverage Under Inspector General Act of 1978.-- Subsection (a)(2) of section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``the Defense Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,''; (2) by inserting ``the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the National Endowment for the Humanities,''; and (3) by inserting ``the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency,'' after ``the National Labor Relations Board,''. (b) Certain Designations Under Inspector General Act of 1978.--Subsection (a) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) The Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency shall be designees of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for purposes of this section.''. (c) Power of Heads of Elements Over Investigations.-- Subsection (d) of section 8G of such Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(d)''; (2) in the second sentence of paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection, by striking ``The head'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (2), the head''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2)(A) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, may prohibit the inspector general of an element of the intelligence community specified in subparagraph (D) from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation if the Secretary determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. ``(B) If the Secretary exercises the authority under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall submit to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E) an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority not later than 7 days after the exercise of such authority. ``(C) At the same time the Secretary submits under subparagraph (B) a statement on the exercise of the authority in subparagraph (A) to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E), the Secretary shall notify the inspector general of such element of the submittal of such statement and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide such inspector general with a copy of such statement. Such inspector general may submit to such committees of Congress any comments on a notice or statement received by the inspector general under this subparagraph that the inspector general considers appropriate. ``(D) The elements of the intelligence community specified in this subparagraph are as follows: ``(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(ii) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(iii) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(iv) The National Security Agency. ``(E) The committees of Congress specified in this subparagraph are-- ``(i) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''. Section 442(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2)(A) As directed by the Director of National Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall develop a system to facilitate the analysis, dissemination, and incorporation of likenesses, videos, and presentations produced by ground-based platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations or available as open-source information, into the National System for Geospatial Intelligence. ``(B) The authority provided by this paragraph does not include authority for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to manage tasking of handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations.''; and (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (1)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (1) and (2)''. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after the first section the following new section: ``Sec. 2. There is a Director of Compliance of the National Security Agency, who shall be appointed by the Director of the National Security Agency and who shall be responsible for the programs of compliance over mission activities of the National Security Agency.''. Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H)-- (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine Corps,''; and (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''. Title 14, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (4) of section 93(a), by striking ``function'' and inserting ``function, including research, development, test, or evaluation related to intelligence systems and capabilities,''; and (2) in paragraph (4) of section 662, by inserting ``intelligence systems and capabilities or'' after ``related to''. Section 5759 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``is transferred to a different geographic area with a higher cost of living'' and inserting ``is subject to a mobility agreement and is transferred to a position in a different geographical area in which there is a shortage of critical skills''; (2) in subsection (b)(2), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, including requirements for a bonus recipient's repayment of a bonus in circumstances determined by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''; (3) in subsection (c), by striking ``basic pay.'' and inserting ``annual rate of basic pay. The bonus may be paid in a lump sum or installments linked to completion of periods of service.''; and (4) in subsection (d), by striking ``retention bonus'' and inserting ``bonus paid under this section''. (a) Civil Service Retirement System.--Subsection (b) of section 8335 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the paragraph (2) enacted by section 112(a)(2) of the Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 2005 (title I of division B of Public Law 108-447; 118 Stat. 2868), by striking ``2009'' and inserting ``2011''; and (2) by striking the paragraph (2) enacted by section 2005(a)(2) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3704). (b) Federal Employees' Retirement System.--Subsection (b) of section 8425 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the paragraph (2) enacted by section 112(b)(2) of the Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 2005 (title I of division B of Public Law 108-447; 118 Stat. 2868), by striking ``2009'' and inserting ``2011''; and (2) by striking the paragraph (2) enacted by section 2005(b)(2) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3704). (a) Report.-- (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report describing-- (A) a long-term vision for the intelligence capabilities of the National Security Branch of the Bureau; (B) a strategic plan for the National Security Branch; and (C) the progress made in advancing the capabilities of the National Security Branch. (2) Content.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include-- (A) a description of the direction, strategy, and goals for improving the intelligence capabilities of the National Security Branch; (B) a description of the intelligence and national security capabilities of the National Security Branch that will be fully functional within the five-year period beginning on the date on which the report is submitted; (C) a description-- (i) of the internal reforms that were carried out at the National Security Branch during the two-year period ending on the date on which the report is submitted; and (ii) of the manner in which such reforms have advanced the capabilities of the National Security Branch; (D) an assessment of the effectiveness of the National Security Branch in performing tasks that are critical to the effective functioning of the National Security Branch as an intelligence agency, including-- (i) human intelligence collection, both within and outside the parameters of an existing case file or ongoing investigation, in a manner that protects civil liberties; (ii) intelligence analysis, including the ability of the National Security Branch to produce, and provide policymakers with, information on national security threats to the United States; (iii) management, including the ability of the National Security Branch to manage and develop human capital and implement an organizational structure that supports the objectives and strategies of the Branch; (iv) integration of the National Security Branch into the intelligence community, including an ability to robustly share intelligence and effectively communicate and operate with appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal partners; (v) implementation of an infrastructure that supports the national security and intelligence missions of the National Security Branch, including proper information technology and facilities; and (vi) reformation of the culture of the National Security Branch, including the integration by the Branch of intelligence analysts and other professional staff into intelligence collection operations and the success of the National Security Branch in ensuring that intelligence and threat information drive the operations of the Branch; (E) performance metrics and specific annual timetables for advancing the performance of the tasks referred to in clauses (i) through (vi) of subparagraph (D) and a description of the activities being undertaken to ensure that the performance of the National Security Branch in carrying out such tasks improves; and (F) an assessment of the effectiveness of the field office supervisory term limit policy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that requires the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau after a specific term of years. (b) Annual Assessments.-- (1) Requirement for assessments.--Not later than 180 days after the date on which the report required by subsection (a)(1) is submitted, and annually thereafter for five years, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives an assessment of the performance of the National Security Branch in carrying out the tasks referred to in clauses (i) through (vi) of subsection (a)(2)(D) in comparison to such performance during previous years. (2) Considerations.--In conducting each assessment required by paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence-- (A) shall use the performance metrics and specific annual timetables for carrying out such tasks referred to in subsection (a)(2)(E); and (B) may request the assistance of any expert that the Director considers appropriate, including an inspector general of an appropriate department or agency. (a) Reorganization of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office.-- (1) In general.--Subtitle B of title III of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-567; 22 U.S.C. 7301 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 321, 322, 323, and 324, and inserting the following new sections: This title may be cited as the ``Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission Act''. In this title: (1) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission established in section 603(a). (2) Foreign intelligence; intelligence.--The terms ``foreign intelligence'' and ``intelligence'' have the meaning given those terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a). (3) Information.--The term ``information'' includes information of relevance to the foreign policy of the United States collected and conveyed through diplomatic reporting and other reporting by personnel of the United States Government who are not employed by an element of the intelligence community, including public and open-source information. (a) Establishment.--There is established in the legislative branch a Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission. (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Commission is to evaluate systems and processes at the strategic, interagency level and provide recommendations accordingly, and not to seek to duplicate the functions of the Director of National Intelligence. (c) Functions.--The Commission shall-- (1) evaluate the current processes or systems for the strategic integration of the intelligence community, including the Open Source Center, and other elements of the United States Government, including the Department of State, with regard to the collection, reporting, and analysis of foreign intelligence and information; (2) provide recommendations to improve or develop such processes or systems to integrate the intelligence community with other elements of the United States Government, potentially including the development of an interagency strategy that identifies-- (A) the collection, reporting, and analysis requirements of the United States Government; (B) the elements of the United States Government best positioned to meet collection and reporting requirements, with regard to missions, comparative institutional advantages, and any other relevant factors; and (C) interagency budget and resource allocations necessary to achieve such collection, reporting, and analytical requirements; (3) evaluate the extent to which current intelligence collection, reporting, and analysis strategies are intended to provide global coverage and anticipate future threats, challenges, and crises; (4) provide recommendations on how to incorporate into the interagency strategy the means to anticipate future threats, challenges, and crises, including by identifying and supporting collection, reporting, and analytical capabilities that are global in scope and directed at emerging, long-term, and strategic targets; (5) provide recommendations on strategies for sustaining human and budgetary resources to effect the global collection and reporting missions identified in the interagency strategy, including the prepositioning of collection and reporting capabilities; (6) provide recommendations for developing, clarifying, and, if necessary, bolstering current and future collection and reporting roles and capabilities of elements of the United States Government that are not elements of the intelligence community deployed in foreign countries; (7) provide recommendations related to the role of individual country missions in contributing to the interagency strategy; (8) evaluate the extent to which the establishment of new embassies and out-of-embassy posts are able to contribute to expanded global coverage and increased collection and reporting and provide recommendations related to the establishment of new embassies and out-of-embassy posts; (9) provide recommendations on executive or legislative changes necessary to establish any new executive branch entity or to expand the authorities of any existing executive branch entity, as needed to improve the strategic integration referred to in paragraph (1) and develop and oversee the implementation of any interagency strategy; (10) provide recommendations on processes for developing and presenting to Congress budget requests for each relevant element of the United States Government that reflect the allocations identified in the interagency strategy and for congressional oversight of the development and implementation of the strategy; and (11) provide recommendations on any institutional reforms related to the collection and reporting roles of individual elements of the United States Government outside the intelligence community, as well as any budgetary, legislative, or other changes needed to achieve such reforms. (a) Members of the Commission.-- (1) Appointment.--The Commission shall be composed of 10 members as follows: (A) Two members appointed by the majority leader of the Senate. (B) Two members appointed by the minority leader of the Senate. (C) Two members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. (D) Two members appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives. (E) One nonvoting member appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. (F) One nonvoting member appointed by the Secretary of State. (2) Selection.-- (A) In general.--Members of the Commission shall be individuals who-- (i) are not officers or employees of the United States Government or any State or local government; and (ii) have knowledge and experience-- (I) in foreign information and intelligence collection, reporting, and analysis, including clandestine collection and classified analysis (such as experience in the intelligence community), diplomatic reporting and analysis, and collection of public and open-source information; (II) in issues related to the national security and foreign policy of the United States gained by serving as a senior official of the Department of State, a member of the Foreign Service, an employee or officer of an appropriate department or agency of the United States, or an independent organization with expertise in the field of international affairs; or (III) with foreign policy decision-making. (B) Diversity of experience.--The individuals appointed to the Commission should be selected with a view to establishing diversity of experience with regard to various geographic regions, functions, and issues. (3) Consultation.--The Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of State shall consult among themselves prior to the appointment of the members of the Commission in order to achieve, to the maximum extent possible, fair and equitable representation of various points of view with respect to the matters to be considered by the Commission in accordance with this title. (4) Time of appointment.--The appointments under subsection (a) shall be made-- (A) after the date on which funds are first appropriated for the Commission pursuant to section 609; and (B) not later than 60 days after such date. (5) Term of appointment.--Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. (6) Vacancies.--Any vacancy of the Commission shall not affect the powers of the Commission and shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made. (7) Chair.--The voting members of the Commission shall designate one of the voting members to serve as the chair of the Commission. (8) Quorum.--Five voting members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for purposes of transacting the business of the Commission. (9) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet at the call of the chair and shall meet regularly, not less than once every 3 months, during the life of the Commission. (b) Staff.-- (1) In general.--The chair of the Commission may, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service and chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, appoint and terminate an executive director and, in consultation with the executive director, appoint and terminate such other additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to perform its duties. In addition to the executive director and one full-time support staff for the executive director, there shall be additional staff with relevant intelligence and foreign policy experience to support the work of the Commission. (2) Selection of the executive director.--The executive director shall be selected with the approval of a majority of the voting members of the Commission. (3) Compensation.-- (A) Executive director.--The executive director shall be compensated at the maximum annual rate payable for an employee of a standing committee of the Senate under section 105(e) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1968 (2 U.S.C. 61-1(e)), as adjusted by any order of the President pro tempore of the Senate. (B) Staff.--The chair of the Commission may fix the compensation of other personnel of the Commission without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay for such personnel may not exceed the maximum annual rate payable for an employee of a standing committee of the Senate under section 105(e) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1968 (2 U.S.C. 61-1(e)), as adjusted by any order of the President pro tempore of the Senate. (c) Experts and Consultants.--The Commission is authorized to procure temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants as necessary to the extent authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic pay payable under section 5376 of such title. (d) Staff and Services of Other Agencies or Departments of the United States.--Upon the request of the Commission, the head of a department or agency of the United States may detail, on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to assist the Commission in carrying out this title. The detail of any such personnel shall be without interruption or loss of civil service or Foreign Service status or privilege. (e) Security Clearance.--The appropriate departments or agencies of the United States shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the members and staff of the Commission appropriate security clearances to the extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and requirements. (f) Reports Under Ethics in Government Act of 1978.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for purposes of title I of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.), each member and staff of the Commission-- (1) shall be deemed to be an officer or employee of the Congress (as defined in section 109(13) of such title); and (2) shall file any report required to be filed by such member or such staff (including by virtue of the application of paragraph (1)) under title I of the Ethics in Government (a) Hearings and Evidence.--The Commission may hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out this title. (b) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Commission may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States such information as the Commission considers necessary to carry out this title. Upon request of the chair of the Commission, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission, subject to applicable law. (c) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as a department or agency of the United States. (d) Administrative Support.--The Administrator of the General Services Administration shall provide to the Commission on a reimbursable basis (or, in the discretion of the Administrator, on a nonreimbursable basis) such administrative support services as the Commission may request to carry out this title. (e) Administrative Procedures.--The Commission may adopt such rules and regulations, relating to administrative procedure, as may be reasonably necessary to enable the Commission to carry out this title. (f) Travel.-- (1) In general.--The members and staff of the Commission may, with the approval of the Commission, conduct such travel as is necessary to carry out this title. (2) Expenses.--Members of the Commission shall serve without pay but shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission. (g) Gifts.--No member or staff of the Commission may receive a gift or benefit by reason of the service of such member or staff to the Commission. (a) In General.-- (1) Interim report.--Not later than 300 days after the date on which all members of the Commission are appointed under section 604(a), the Commission shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an interim report setting forth the preliminary evaluations and recommendations of the Commission described in section 603(c). (2) Final report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the submission of the report required by paragraph (1), the Commission shall submit a final report setting forth the final evaluations and recommendations of the Commission described in section 603(c) to each of the following: (A) The President. (B) The Director of National Intelligence. (C) The Secretary of State. (D) The congressional intelligence committees. (E) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (F) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. (b) Individual or Dissenting Views.--Each member of the Commission may include that member's individual or dissenting views in a report required by paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a). (c) Form of Report.--The reports required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a), including any finding or recommendation of such report, shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) In General.--The Commission shall terminate on the date that is 60 days after the date of the submission of the report required by section 606(a)(2). (b) Transfer of Records.--Upon the termination of the Commission under subsection (a), all records, files, documents, and other materials in the possession, custody, or control of the Commission shall be transferred to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and deemed to be records of such Committee. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission. (a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this title. (b) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission pursuant to subsection (a) shall remain available until expended. (a) Extension.-- (1) In general.--Effective on the date on which funds are first appropriated pursuant to subsection (b)(1) and subject to paragraph (3), subsection (a) of section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by striking ``September 1, 2004,'' and inserting ``one year after the date on which all members of the Commission are appointed pursuant to section 701(a)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,''. (2) Applicability of amendment.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of such section 1007. (3) Commission membership.--The membership of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community established under subsection (a) of section 1002 of such Act (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) (referred to in this section as the ``Commission'') shall be considered vacant and new members shall be appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as amended by this section. (4) Clarification of duties.--Section 1002(i) of such Act is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``including--'' and inserting ``including advanced research and development programs and activities. Such review shall include--''. (b) Funding.-- (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section. (2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended. (3) Repeal of existing funding authority.--Section 1010 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is repealed. (c) Technical Amendments.-- (1) Director of central intelligence.--The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'' in the following provisions: (A) Section 1002(h)(2). (B) Section 1003(d)(1). (C) Section 1006(a)(1). (D) Section 1006(b). (E) Section 1007(a). (F) Section 1008. (2) Deputy director of central intelligence for community management.--Paragraph (1) of section 1002(b) of such Act is amended by striking ``The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management.'' and inserting ``The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.''. The Director of National Intelligence is authorized to conduct, at the request of one of the congressional intelligence committees and in accordance with procedures established by that committee, a classification review of materials in the possession of that committee that-- (1) are not less than 25 years old; and (2) were created, or provided to that committee, by an entity in the executive branch. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 101-- (A) in subsection (a), by moving paragraph (7) two ems to the right; and (B) by moving subsections (b) through (p) two ems to the right; (2) in section 103, by redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (h); (3) in section 109(a)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 112.;'' and inserting ``section 112;''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the second period; (4) in section 301(1), by striking `` `United States' '' and all that follows through ``and `State' '' and inserting `` `United States', `person', `weapon of mass destruction', and `State' ''; (5) in section 304(b), by striking ``subsection (a)(3)'' and inserting ``subsection (a)(2)''; and (6) in section 502(a), by striking ``a annual'' and inserting ``an annual''. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1) of section 5(a), by striking ``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a).''; and (2) in section 17(d)(3)(B)-- (A) in clause (i), by striking ``advise'' and inserting ``advice''; and (B) by amending clause (ii) to read as follows: ``(ii) holds or held the position in the Agency, including such a position held on an acting basis, of-- ``(I) Deputy Director; ``(II) Associate Deputy Director; ``(III) Director of the National Clandestine Service; ``(IV) Director of Intelligence; ``(V) Director of Support; or ``(VI) Director of Science and Technology.''. Section 528(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Associate Director of CIA for Military Affairs'' and inserting ``Associate Director of Military Affairs, CIA''; and (2) by striking ``Associate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs'' and inserting ``Associate Director of Military Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, or any successor position''. The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 3(4)(L), by striking ``other'' the second place it appears; (2) in section 102A-- (A) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; (B) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; (ii) in paragraph (3) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; and (iii) in paragraph (5)-- (I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); and (II) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or agency involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''; (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``paragraph''; and (D) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after ``Acquisition''; (3) in section 103(b), by striking ``, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.),''; (4) in section 104A(g)(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; (5) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''; (6) in section 701(b)(1), by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; (7) in section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''; and (8) in section 1003(h)(2) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``subsection (i)(2)(B)'' and inserting ``subsection (g)(2)(B)''. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears. (b) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence.-- Such section 1403, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended-- (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National Intelligence'' after ``Director''. (c) Future-Years Defense Program.--Subsection (c) of such section 1403, as amended by subsection (b), is further amended by striking ``multiyear defense program submitted pursuant to section 114a of title 10, United States Code'' and inserting ``future-years defense program submitted pursuant to section 221 of title 10, United States Code''. (d) Conforming Amendments.-- (1) In general.--The heading of such section 1403 is amended to read as follows: (a) Amendments to the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B) of section 1016(e)(10) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)), by striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and inserting ``Department of Justice''; (2) in subsection (e) of section 1071, by striking ``(1)''; and (3) in subsection (b) of section 1072, in the subsection heading by inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''. (b) Other Amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended-- (1) in section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)-- (A) in paragraph (1) of subsection (c)-- (i) by striking ``shall,'' and inserting ``shall''; and (ii) by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional culture''; (B) in paragraph (2) of subsection (e), by striking ``the National Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; and (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''; and (2) in section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and inserting ``Federal''; and (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and inserting ``specific''. (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item: ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after ``subsection (a)),''. Section 602 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 403-2b) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), in paragraph (2), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; (B) in paragraph (2)-- (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (C) in paragraph (3), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (a) Role of the Director of National Intelligence.--Section 403 of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992 (50 U.S.C. 403-2) is amended by striking ``The Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting the following: ``(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence''. (b) Definition of Intelligence Community.--Section 403 of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended-- (1) by striking ``Intelligence Community'' and inserting ``intelligence community''; and (2) by striking the second sentence and inserting the following: ``(b) Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the term `intelligence community' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.", u"I thank the President. I apologize to the President for having to sit there at this late hour. It wasn't my doing. But I did want to speak on this issue. It is one of major importance, and one about which I have not spoken on the Senate floor previously. So I beg the indulgence of the Chair at this late hour. Mr. President, on May 3, I introduced a resolution in the Senate that offered a clear break from our current counterproductive course in Iraq allowing our Armed Forces to return to their focus to defeating the terrorists who attacked us on September 11, 2001. The resolution would do three things. First, it states that the United States should not maintain a permanent military presence or military bases in Iraq. Second, it states that the United States should not attempt to control Iraq's oil. And, third, it states that the United States Armed Forces should be redeployed from Iraq as soon as practicable after the completion of Iraq's constitution-making process, or December 31 of 2006, whichever comes first. My resolution is identical to the resolution introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Mike Thompson of California with at least six Republican cosponsors. As far as I know, it is the only Iraqi resolution introduced that has bipartisan support. So I introduced the same measure here in the Senate. I continue to believe that only this resolution offers a clear, unambiguous, principled stand--a stand that can produce the results that we all want. Only when the Iraqi Government faces a firm timetable for U.S. redeployment will it have the incentive to resolve its internal differences and stand on its own two feet. And only when our government faces a firm timetable will it make urgent policy changes necessary to right our course in Iraq. President Bush has it exactly backwards. He said that our Army will stand down only as the Iraqi Army stands up. The truth is that the Iraqi Army and government will stand up only when it is clear that the American military is committed to standing down by a date certain. My resolution is a clear, unambiguous statement of our intention to move beyond the strategic blunder of Iraq which has distracted us from the fight against those who attacked us on September 11. Only such a clear break will allow us to recommit our military and intelligence resources to the unfinished task of crushing al-Qaida and capturing or killing Osama bin Laden. We need this new decisive direction because President Bush is unwilling to change his current policies in Iraq which are manifestly a failure. Let us be clear. Staying the course effectively means stay forever. It means to stay and pay and stay and pay and stay and pay. Already we have paid with more than 2,500 dead and more than 18,000 wounded. We will continue to pay a terrible price in terms of lives and treasure, not only to the end of President Bush's term but well into the term of his successor and beyond. And for what? For a failed approach in Iraq that in the judgment of a large majority of national security experts is damaging America's national security and making us less safe. Because I believe we need a new direction, I will vote for both the Levin-Reed amendment and the Kerry-Feingold-Boxer amendment. I commend my friend and my colleague, Senator Kerry, for his leadership on this issue. I was here this evening listening to him. I listened to his colloquy with the Senator from Virginia. I think it is clear that Senator Kerry is on the right course. Also, Senator Levin, I believe is also on the right course. So I will support both, and I do so because I believe that both are better than what we have now. But I also want to be clear that neither one is going to pass. We know that. So we shouldn't agonize over which one we can support. It doesn't matter what we do; it won't become law. So why are we doing this? We are doing it because we must put pressure on the President. We do it because we need to speak for the American people who are way ahead of us, way ahead of the President, way ahead of the White House, and way ahead of the Congress on this issue. They know what we are doing in Iraq--costing $7 billion a month, $9 million an hour, 2,500 dead, 18,000 maimed and injured--they know it is wrong. They know we have been misled into this war. My position is simply that anything we can do to give voice to the American people that will hopefully pull the President back to a more rational, reasonable and sane policy, anything that will do that I will support. I realize that some, including the President's top political adviser, are eager to politicize this issue in an election year. They can't wait to frame this as a debate between those who support our troops and those who want to retreat, between those who want to fight and those who want to surrender. This is outrageous, and it is false. It is the same inflammatory demagoguery that tore our country apart during the Vietnam war. Just as we were misled into the Vietnam war, so we were in Iraq. All you have to think is weapons of mass destruction equals the Tonkin Gulf. Weapons of mass destruction is to Iraq what the Tonkin Gulf was to Vietnam. Both misled us into a drastic, terrible war. Just as the Nixon administration was bent and misused intelligence to fit a preconceived belief on Vietnam, so would President Bush in Iraq. Just as we heard the arguments in the early 1970s about Vietnam, that we have to fight the Communists there or we will be fighting them here, now we hear that we have to fight the terrorists in Iraq before we fight them here. Just as we said in Vietnam we will have to support the government because it is a free government elected by 80 percent of the people, so now we hear the same thing about Iraq and terrorists. The echoes are resounding about what we hear from this administration and their policies for Iraq and what we heard for Vietnam. Let us be clear about what I think this debate is really about. It is about charting a smarter, more focused offensive against the terrorists who attacked us on September 11. It is about acknowledging that Iraq did not attack us on September 11, but that our invasion and occupation of Iraq has been a costly distraction from our fight against those who did attack us. It is about giving the government in Iraq incentives to get its act together; to overcome sectarian divisions and stand up a viable, self-sustaining army. This debate is about acknowledging that staying the course is no virtue if the course we are on is demonstrably wrong. Indeed, it is about acknowledging that staying the course means stay and pay. Stay and pay. It means that our Armed Forces will continue to stay and pay dearly with more than 20,000 already killed, maimed, and wounded. For our beleaguered taxpayers, it means stay and pay more of their hard-earned tax dollars and the debt that is being piled on for our children and grandchildren to pay--$350 billion already on Iraq and counting. The men and women of our Armed Forces deserve better than this. Instead of putting bumper-stickers on our cars saying ``support our troops,'' let us actually support our troops. Let us give them some hope for a way forward from the current stalemate and quagmire. They have brilliantly completed the task they were sent to Iraq to accomplish. Saddam Hussein's dictatorship has been deposed. We are certain that Iraq does not possess weapons of mass destruction--and never did. And the Iraqi people have a constitution and a democratically elected government. To our troops goes great credit. They have achieved these things despite a series of disastrous decisions by their civilian leaders here in Washington. President Bush himself has acclaimed the installation of a permanent Iraqi Government as a historic ``turning point.'' So the question is, why aren't our troops returning? Why are we still in Iraq with no commitment whatsoever even to a graduated redeployment? Why has President Bush stated that we will be in Iraq at least through the end of his administration and into his successor's administration? Why are we building what appears to be permanent military bases? Why are we in the process of building a gigantic new United States embassy in Baghdad that will span 104 acres, the size of nearly 80 football fields? What message does it send when the House Republican leadership 2 weeks ago insisted on stripping from the emergency supplemental appropriations bill Senate-passed language asserting that we will not build permanent bases or attempt to control Iraq's oil? We passed that in the Senate. The House Republicans took it out. What message does that send to the insurgents and al-Qaida and the terrorists who would do us harm? None of these things give the impression that the United States plans on winding down our military and civilian presence or relinquishing our grip on Iraq. To the contrary, it is easy to see how ordinary Iraqis as well as people across the world view this as the behavior of a conquering power that has no intention of leaving. Unfortunately, this perception creates continuing resentment. It feeds anti-Americanism. It continues to give powerful fuel to the insurgency, both in terms of motivation and recruitment, and it puts our American Armed Forces at greater risk. It has now been more than 3 years since President Bush's speech on the flight deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln. On that occasion, with a giant banner behind him a claiming ``Mission Accomplished,'' President Bush said triumphantly, ``Major combat operations in Iraq have ended.'' But today, 133,000 troops remain on the ground. President Bush again and again has signaled that the U.S. military presence in Iraq is open-ended and of indefinite duration. This has given rise to suspicions that the United States has long-term designs on Iraq and its oil and deprives the Iraq Government of the incentives to resolve its internal divisions and stand on its own feet. With the war in Iraq now in its fourth year, it is clear that the present course is not a strategy for success. It is a strategy for continued stalemate and stagnation. As I said, stay the course means stay and pay. Stay and pay. One-third of a trillion dollars we have spent so far and counting. Indeed, I fear that stay the course also means stay forever--and this sends exactly the wrong signal. It stokes the insurgents who believe that the U.S wants a permanent military presence in Iraq. Don't think for a second that they do not know and they aren't putting out the word that the Republican leadership in the House 2 weeks ago stripped the language out of the Senate bill which stated that we were not going to have permanent bases and we will not control their oil. Don't think for a minute that they haven't broadcast that, that they aren't using that as a recruiting tool. Of course they are. When President Bush says it will be through his administration and into his successor's administration before we decide what to do in Iraq, that is a powerful recruiting tool for the insurgents and the terrorists. Our open-ended commitment to stay in Iraq as long as it takes has had the effect of taking away any incentive for the Iraqi Government to resolve its internal division and get its act together. Parliamentary elections were held way back in early December. Has Baghdad descended into vicious sectarian violence? It took the Iraqis nearly 7 months to chose a prime minister and to fill all the ministries. Now, as the Iraqis face a deadline for U.S redeployment, there is no way they would have squandered 6 months before forming a government, nor would the Iraqis be dragging their feet in standing up a viable, self-sustaining army and police force. I just heard the Senator from Alabama quoting a general. A lot of generals have been quoted around here. I guess I can quote a general too. How about General Casey, our commander in Iraq, who told the Senate last September. He said: Increased coalition presence feeds the notion of occupation, contributes to the dependency of Iraqi security forces on the coalition [and] extends the amount of time that it will take for Iraqi security forces to become self- reliant. Last September, General George Casey said that. BG Donald Alston, the chief U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, put it this way: I think the more accurate way to approach this right now is to concede that . . . this insurgency is not going to be settled . . . through military options or military operations. It is going to be settled in the political process. Nor, I must add, is there a military solution to most of the critical problems confronting Iraq--sectarian strife, out-of-control crime, rampant corruption, widespread unemployment, chronic shortages of electricity and water and gasoline, and on and on. There is not a military solution to that; it is a political solution. The Iraqi people also believe that a redeployment of U.S. forces would give a boost to the political process. According to a recent poll conducted by the University of Maryland, more than 80 percent of Iraqis want U.S. forces to leave Iraq. When asked what the impact of a withdrawal of U.S. troops would be, large majorities of Iraqis believe that insurgent attacks will decrease, sectarian violence will decline, and the sectarian factions in Parliament will be more willing to cooperate. That is what a majority of Iraqis believe. Yet somehow this administration believes differently. We all hope the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders are sincere in their stated desire to avoid an all-out civil war. Prime Minister Maliki has formed a national unity Cabinet. As I said, President Bush has hailed this new Government as a turning point. We hope that is the case. But whether or not Mr. Maliki is willing or able to make good on his pledges, it is certainly time for a turning point in U.S. policy in Iraq. The coming months must be a period of transition to full Iraqi sovereignty. It is time to hand off security responsibilities to the Iraqi Army and police, to redeploy most of our U.S. Armed Forces from Iraq by the end of this year. This strategic redeployment must involve converting our vast military presence on the ground in Iraq to a quick reaction force, staged in countries bordering Iraq, countries that share our interest in a stable Iraq and that view our military presence in the region as a stabilizing force. This substantial over-the-horizon force would be used to strike at al-Qaida and its affiliates whether in Iraq or elsewhere. These forces would be able to respond in a timely manner, as they did 2 weeks ago in targeting and killing Al-Zarqawi. I would expect, as our troops withdraw from Iraq, this would free up U.S. forces to combat the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Other troops would be available to send to the emerging terrorist threats in countries such as Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, which threaten to become major breeding grounds for terrorists. The harsh fact is that the Iraq war has led to a decline in the overall readiness of U.S. ground forces. It has decimated our capacity to put large numbers of boots on the ground were we to face an emergency elsewhere, such as on the Korean peninsula. At a Senate hearing last year, GEN Richard A. Cody, Army vice chief of staff, said: What keeps me awake at night is what will this all- volunteer force look like in 2007? He stated this in the context of a discussion about whether we could sustain the operational tempo of deployments at the rate we have had since the beginning of the Iraq war. For all the military superiority we displayed in the invasion of March 2003, 3 years later, a guerilla conflict is grinding away at our military manpower and equipment. We need to redeploy from Iraq in order to reset and reequip the force--ground forces in particular--so they are prepared for a more focused campaign against the terrorists who attacked us and continue to threaten us. At the same time we are redeploying our Armed Forces, we need to foster sustained diplomatic engagement, working with Middle Eastern nations to facilitate rival Iraqi factions in reaching a political settlement. Iraq's neighbors have a profound stake in this stability, but they currently have no incentive to get involved. Once it is clear that the United States is leaving, those nations will be highly motivated to facilitate a coming together of the factions within Iraq. Some say that U.S. forces in Iraq are the only thing that stands between the Sunnis, Shiites, the Kurds, and all-out civil war. I disagree. It is the ongoing presence of U.S. forces and the prospect that we will be in Iraq as a babysitter for years to come that has delayed progress on the political front. It is the ongoing presence of U.S forces and statements by this President that we will be there for as long as it takes, it is actions such as were taken by the House Republicans in stripping that language out we put in that said we are not going to have permanent bases, we are not going to control the world, it is those actions which have delayed progress on the political front and have given the insurgents the narrative, the story, the recruiting tool they need. Our presence in Iraq is a propaganda victory and recruiting tool for the insurgency in Iraq and for Islamic extremists around the world. The insurgents and jihadists are threatened by the overwhelming perception in the Arab world that the U.S. military is an occupying force, that we are building what appears to be permanent bases, that our continuing presence in Iraq is all about controlling oil. Meanwhile, let's be clear on what continuing our current policy of stay and pay will entail. The Congressional Research Service reports that we are now spending $6.4 billion a month in Iraq, up sharply from last year. That is $9 million an hour every hour of every day. And we are doing so at a time when our budget, the budget put through by the Republicans who control the Congress, is slashing funds for education, cancer research, health care, other essential needs at home. The budget this year will mean we have 1,100 fewer research grants from the National Institutes of Health than we had 3 years ago. That is the path we are on. We have spent a grand total of about $350 billion in Iraq. As I have said, more than 2,500 troops have been killed, 18,000 wounded. More than 8,500 of the troops are wounded so seriously they were listed as wounded in action, not to return to duty. Are we going to stay and pay for another 3 years, spending another $300 billion, sacrificing more American troops, with more killed, more maimed and injured for life? Is that what we mean by supporting the troops? Is that what we mean, to stay more, with more killed, more maimed? Why in the world would we want to stay on a course that is so clearly counterproductive, so clearly a failure? Last week, the Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy Magazine released the results of their survey of more than 100 of America's top terrorism and national security experts from across the ideological spectrum. The results show fewer than 2 in 10 believe the United States is winning the war on terror; 87 percent believe the war in Iraq has had a negative impact on our national security. So 87 percent of the top 100 national security experts around America say Iraq has had a negative impact on our national security. Last Thursday, the Department of Defense issued a highly partisan ``debate prep book,'' designed to help Republicans defend the war in Iraq. Likewise, the President and Vice President are staying the course with their endless happy-talk about progress in Iraq, about how democracy is on the march. But the facts on the ground tell a different story. I believe we should base our policy choices not on happy talk but on facts on the ground. Clearly, by preemptively attacking Iraq, we have committed a major strategic error in the larger war against the terrorists who attacked us. Simply put, we took our eyes off the ball. We deferred our military and intelligence resources away from Afghanistan, away from the hunt for bin Laden. The consequences were plain to see. It is no coincidence today the Taliban has powerfully resurfaced in southern Afghanistan despite President Bush's claim on September 27, 2004, that ``the Taliban no longer is in existence.'' Say again? As fighting in Afghanistan has intensified over the past 3 months, the United States has conducted 340 airstrikes in Afghanistan, more than twice as many as the 160 airstrikes carried out in the war in Iraq during the same period. Meanwhile, while we have been distracted in Iraq, al-Qaida-like Islamic fighters have retained control of the Somalia capital of Mogadishu and have dealt a major blow to our counterterrorism efforts in the horn of Africa. Nor is it a coincidence that Osama bin Laden is still at large, still directing al-Qaida operations, still encouraging jihadists around the world. Nearly 5 years ago, before a joint session of Congress, President Bush pledged he would ``bring Bin Laden to justice or bring justice to bin Laden.'' That was 5 years ago. President Bush has done neither. Instead, he allowed bin Laden to escape and has gotten the U.S. military bogged down in a civil war in Iraq--a huge strategic gift not only to bin Laden but also to Iran. Not only has our open-ended Iraqi entanglement taken the heat off the terrorists who attacked us on September 11, it has given them a propaganda victory and, as I said, a major recruiting tool. The sooner we acknowledge the strategic blunder and take steps to reverse it and the sooner we redeploy our military and strategic assets to confront our real enemies, the better off we will be. The resolution I introduced setting a firm timetable for redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq is about accelerating the emergence of Iraq as an independent nation willing to stand on its own feet. But it is also about the unity and security of the American people. This misbegotten, misguided, mismanaged war is dividing our Nation. I already mentioned how the President's top political strategist is planning to inflame passions in the war on Iraq in the months between now and the election. Again, I state, it is eerie, eerie how defenders of the Iraq policy, of our policy in Iraq are sounding exactly like defenders of Nixon's policies in Vietnam. It is eerie how the defenders of Bush's policies in Iraq are sounding like the defenders of Nixon's policies in Vietnam in the early 1970s. Back in 1972, Nixon and his defenders were saying that we were winning the war, that we must stay the course. And guess what. They were saying we must not cut and run, that we must prop up the ``democratic government'' in Saigon, which was, of course, elected, as you know, by 80 percent of the people, and on and on and on. I can remember a time when I sat in a room with a group of Congressmen in Saigon, listening to then-President Thieu tell us that we must stay in Vietnam and fight the communists there or we would be fighting them in the Philippines and in Japan and on our doorstep. What do we hear now? We have to fight them over in Iraq or we will be fighting them here. Eerie, as I said. Eerie. Quite frankly, I say today President Bush is saying almost the exact same things that Richard Nixon said, and he has no more credibility than Richard Nixon did. Likewise, back in 1972, President Nixon and his supporters were arguing that withdrawal would undermine U.S. credibility in the world. But as LTG William Odom, Director of the National Security Agency under President Reagan, states in a current issue of Foreign Policy magazine--I want to quote him-- A rapid reversal of our current course in Iraq would improve U.S. credibility around the world. I am going to repeat that. LTG William Odom, Director of the National Security Agency under President Reagan, in the current issue of Foreign Policy magazine, said: A rapid reversal of our current course in Iraq would improve U.S. credibility around the world. General Odom went on to say: [I]nvading Iraq was not in the interests of the United States. It was in the interests of Iran and al Qaeda. For Iran, it avenged a grudge against Saddam [and left Iran as the strongest power in the Persian Gulf]. For al Qaeda, it made it easier to kill Americans. That is not me. That is LTG William Odom, Director of the National Security Agency under President Reagan. Beyond dividing our country, our endless, open-ended presence in Iraq has distracted our Government from urgent priorities, as I have said, in health care, education, law enforcement, and even a smarter approach to the very real terrorist threats of today and tomorrow. The men and women of our Armed Forces have sacrificed greatly. I don't know why it is that because they have sacrificed so greatly--and the fact is, the Commander in Chief told them what to do, and they did it. So what. So to honor them, to honor what they have done in Iraq, we stay longer? We sacrifice more of our young people? We have more who are maimed for life? To honor them, we drain the Treasury of more of our dollars from taxpayers? Is that what it means to support our troops? I don't think so. I do not believe so. I believe to support our troops is to do exactly what LTG William Odom said: A rapid reversal of our current course in Iraq. It is time to allow the political process to go forward in Iraq. It is time to give Iraqi politicians greater incentive to bridge their differences and take responsibility for their country's future. It is time to bring home as many troops as possible, consistent with force protection requirements. It is time to redeploy as many as necessary to successfully pursue and crush bin Laden and al-Qaida and to protect our vital interests around the world. President Bush tells us to be patient. He says Iraq will become a flourishing democracy that will spread the flame of freedom across the entire Middle East. But, with due respect to President Bush and to Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, they have been consistently wrong--disastrously wrong--in all their predictions with regard to Iraq. Before the invasion, Vice President Cheney said that Iraq had ``reconstituted nuclear weapons.'' Secretary Rumsfeld said he knew exactly where Saddam was storing his weapons of mass destruction. And, as I noted 3 long years ago, President Bush said that major combat operations were over, mission accomplished. Many of President Bush's people assured us that the war would be self-financed thanks to Iraq's oil--Paul Wolfowitz. Vice President Cheney said, more than a year ago, that the insurgency was ``in its last throes.'' Just yesterday, at the National Press Club, Vice President Cheney defended and repeated his claim that the insurgency is in its last throes. I guess if you repeat something often enough--will people believe it? Listen to what Abraham Lincoln once said: You can fool some of the people all the time. You can fool all the people some of the time. But you can't fool all the people all the time. Mr. Cheney, you may have fooled some people. The American people are not buying it any longer. I could go on and on with this litany of false assertions--prediction after prediction that turned out to be 100 percent wrong. There are those who say: But if we leave, there may be civil war in Iraq. As I have stated, I think the longer we stay, there will be more sectarian strife, more insurgency. But to be honest, I can't tell for sure what the likely outcome will be. How can anyone tell what the likely outcome will be, when we can't trust what the administration is telling us, when we can't trust, any longer, the intelligence as it is being given to us by the administration? We can't tell for sure. So at this point, President Bush has not only spent his political capital, I think he has squandered the last shred of credibility when it comes to Iraq. Specifically, as I said, with regard to America's departure from Iraq, I think the President has it backwards. He says our Army will stand down only as the Iraqi Army stands up. The truth is that the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Government will stand up--make the hard political decisions--only when it is clear that the American military is committed to standing down by the end of this year. So I repeat, I will vote in favor of both the Levin-Reed amendment and the Kerry-Feingold amendment. As I said, anything is better than what we have now, even though I think both could go further in setting a clear, decisive new direction. I stand by my conviction--and the wording in my resolution, the same as was introduced in the House by Representative Mike Thompson, with at least five if not six Republican cosponsors--that it is time to set a firm timetable for redeploying our troops from Iraq and redoubling our fight against those who attacked us on September 11. Only this new course will produce the results we all want, both on the ground in Iraq and in the campaign against al-Qaida and rebuilding, reconstituting our forces and rebuilding and reuniting the people of our country. Mr. President, I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, I support the Hollings-Stevens amendment, numbered 3795. My amendment strikes and replaces the underlying bill with language creating a national intelligence coordinator, or NIC. Important work since September 11th of the 9/11 Commission, numerous Senate committees and others has convinced all of us that we must enact intelligence reform. I am impressed by the efforts of my friends Senators Collins and Lieberman, and others, who have used their considerable skills to implement most of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. But I worry that the Senate is moving ahead with enormous restructuring, when we could address the main problem more immediately. 9/11 was clearly an intelligence failure, and we must act now to fix the most glaring problem--the lack of an intelligence coordinator. My amendment fixes this most obvious, most severe problem with our intelligence structure by creating a national intelligence coordinator, or NIC. It will be the NIC's responsibility to sift through the work of all of our intelligence entities, both foreign, domestic and military and keep the President abreast of the intelligence community's findings in a coordinated, complete way. As it exists, the intelligence community's communications with the President cannot help but be haphazard. The President needs to have the huge volumes of intelligence information coordinated by someone he trusts, so he can make informed policy judgments. Thus, my amendment allows the President to select an intelligence coordinator as a member of the National Security Council, not subject to Senate approval. Just as President Bush has Karl Rove, whom he trusts and who coordinates the political intelligence throughout this Administration, the President needs a Karl Rove for national security intelligence. This NIC will need sufficient staff and resources. So my amendment assigns to the NIC in his or her role as coordinator of intelligence activities, the staff and resources currently assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence, or DCI, that is now employed in the performance of his role as coordinator of the intelligence community, which he is not doing. Many of the dozens of provisions in Collins-Lieberman would likely improve our system of intelligence. The Senate should study each of these provisions carefully, and enact the best of these provisions after such consideration. My amendment fixes the main problem in the meantime--the lack of a coordinator. Collins-Lieberman creates a National Intelligence Director, or NID, and gives that person considerable power over budgets and personnel. The NID will control a new national counterterrorism center, and generally manage the intelligence community. The bill is problematic because the NID will wield unheard of influence over work of the intelligence entities, before that work even gets done. This is groupthink--personnel from 15 agencies work to get the Director the answers they know he wants. Personnel will neglect intelligence that takes them in directions they know the NID opposes. Reform should encourage more creativity, not less; more diversity within the intelligence community, not less. These agencies each do different things well--we need to take advantage of differentiation, not squelch it under the NID. The national intelligence coordinator created by my amendment is unlikely to lead to this problem of Groupthink. The NIC will not control personnel and budget decisions. He will not have the power to fire people in other agencies that he disagrees with, or promote only people who share his worldview. He will not be able to manipulate policy direction of intelligence agencies and centers we may create. The NIC will coordinate, not meddle in the work itself. The 9/11 Commission decided that part of the reason the 9/11 plot was successful is the lack of creativity in our intelligence community. Stopping complicated terror plots before they happen requires flourishing intelligence diversity, and Collins-Lieberman will undermine diversity by concentrating intelligence output in one manager--the NID. We don't need a Director of Intelligence. We need a coordinator. We need to change the NID to NIC, the ``D'' to ``C''. I would like to address concerns I have with the underlying bill related to Defense. In deciding what to do with the Department of Defense's control over most intelligence dollars, Collins-Lieberman splits the baby. The bill transfers control over the budgets and some personnel decisions of the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, from the Secretary of Defense to the NID without transferring control of the agencies themselves to the NID. The NID will develop and present the President with an annual budget request for these and other intelligence programs. It is unclear whether the Secretary of Defense or the NID will control the actual payroll. Under Collins-Lieberman, ``tactical'' military intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Agency will remain under the DOD. But the bill does not define ``tactical.'' Obviously, DOD will seek to define that term broadly, and the NID will seek to define it narrowly. I understand Senator Feinstein may offer an amendment that would define ``tactical'' and provide some clarity, but even if that amendment is enacted, the battle will be waged over how to interpret the Feinstein definition of ``tactical.'' My friends Senators Specter, Roberts, Shelby, DeWine, Bond, Wyden, Bayh and others already think the NID should have even more control over agencies currently within the DOD than the Collins-Lieberman bill would allow, but their amendment failed. In short, there is confusion over what Collins-Lieberman transfers from the DOD to the NID and what it does not transfer. There is confusion over what ought to be placed underneath the NID, and what stays with the DOD. There is confusion over how budget, personnel and other types of authority can be bifurcated and trifurcated. This is a time for clarity, not confusion. The NID will also receive the appropriation for these and other intelligence programs, and in Collins-Lieberman the NID can transfer funds from one office to another as the Director sees fit. If the underlying bill is enacted as it is currently written, I forecast open warfare between the Secretary of Defense and the NID. Especially during a time of war, DOD will insist on funding defense/military-related intelligence work its way. This kind of turf war is bad for the country, and we should not enact intelligence that we can see is likely to pit the Secretary of Defense against the NID. If this painful transition needs to occur, we should at least consider waiting until after combat operations in Iraq have ended. I am also concerned about some potential problems with the underlying bill's blurring of domestic and foreign intelligence. While I support the concept of fusing foreign and domestic intelligence, because that is what modern investigating and technology requires, this is a very sensitive and tricky area. Our Nation's history of domestic covert governmental operations shows the need to be careful here. Collins-Lieberman places the FBI's domestic counterterrorism activities and those of the CIA and DOD under the NID. But it does not address problems with locating domestic covert operations outside the FBI. The NID would have the power to ask the CIA or DOD to engage in such covert domestic operations. Our current governmental arrangements keep the CIA from participating in domestic intelligence activities, yet none of this would apply to the NID. Who is to say that the NID will not begin using the CIA to conduct extensive covert domestic activities? This new role for the CIA may actually be appropriate, but we have to be careful to draw rules for CIA domestic conduct that respect our Bill of Rights and other basic traditions. Using agencies other than the FBI for these domestic tasks also removes the Attorney General from its supervisory function. The Department of Justice is qualified to make difficult Bill of Rights judgments, but these other agencies may not be. These other agencies may not even be inclined to exercise restraint when they are investigating Americans. We could ruin cases against suspected domestic terrorists, because our intelligence operatives do not conduct their investigations according to constitutional requirements, and the cases get thrown out. And unless the stovepipes we hear so much about are eradicated immediately under this bill, which seems unrealistic, we may even have multiple agencies conducting duplicate investigations against American citizens, trampling all over each other and the law. Collins-Lieberman also enacts the largest ever surveillance intelligence network, which can be data-mined by personnel in various levels of government. Senator Stevens and others point out that we do not even have the technology to meld all this intelligence in one database. While coordinating information among agencies is laudable, it is unclear that Collins-Lieberman addresses dangerous side effects of a new network database. Collins-Lieberman directs the White House to violate privacy protections, but of the three branches, the executive branch has the least incentive to balance individual rights concerns. Congress never held any hearings to address the civil liberties problems with such a network, or with turning over to the White House power to write privacy guidelines. Administration guidelines and a civil liberties board, contained in the bill, are not as likely to strike the correct balance over privacy issues as Congressional oversight and public debate would. At the very least, we need committee hearings to consider the consequences to our civil liberties of enacting a national network database. At this time I would like to say a few words about this underlying bill's possible impact on a couple of our intelligence agencies. Because of the bill's considerable scope, I will only raise a few of the potential problems with the bill's agency reforms. The bill hampers the FBI Director's ability to manage the FBI. The bill creates conflicting reporting requirements for the FBI's Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence, making her responsible to the FBI Director and the NID. She will support not only the FBI's counterterrorism and counterintelligence programs, under the NID, but also the FBI's criminal and cyber missions, which are not under the NID. The bill provides no clear way to separate FBI criminal investigations from its intelligence work. I would not want to be the Executive Assistant Director of Intelligence under this structure--with dueling bosses and duplicative reporting requirements. Also, will the National Security Council's role be weakened by the creation of a separate board chaired by the NID? Will the NID be allowed to deny the Secretary of State and other cabinet-level Secretaries personnel decision-making over their own subordinates? I understand Collins-Lieberman will give the NID authority over analysis. Where does this leave CIA analysts? The bill does not address what the new role for CIA analysts will be. Have these matters been worked out, or even discussed in a public forum? I have focused on several agencies I am particularly acquainted with through my experience on the Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations Subcommittee. I am sure my colleagues are raising similar problems with reforming the agencies under their Committees' jurisdictions, and I encourage them to come forward and help us understand these important issues. Mr. President, I'd like to say a few words about policy too. This administration is extremely reticent to spend money in Afghanistan, and it was trying to funnel to Iraq funds Congress allocated for Afghanistan long before the President started the Iraq war. Collins-Lieberman empowers the NID to transfer funds and personnel directed by Congress from one agency to another. For example, this body may substantially increase U.S. assistance to Afghanistan--I understand Senators McCain and Lieberman have advocated just such an increase. If we add funds for Afghanistan onto this bill, the NID could scrap the funds for Afghanistan and transfer them to fund a new operation in Syria or Iran. The NID would have a responsibility to inform Congress that he had moved this money, but these funds would be moved nonetheless. It is Congress's duty to allocate such funds. Empowering the NID to override Congress's funding priorities is bound to lead the NID to undermine Congress's powers, and instead use shift funds allocated by Congress to advance the administration's agenda. As we consider this bill under great political pressure and with the election looming, we have considerable analogous precedent to reference. Recent hasty Congressional enactments of Homeland Security legislation and the Patriot Act show the need for more measured action. Collins-Lieberman is thrown together in a matter of weeks. Surely most of us agree that at least some of its provisions are problematic. Much of the conversation I have heard on the floor this week sounds more like campaigning than legislating. The White House identifies problems throughout Collins-Lieberman--will the House version appeal more to the White House? A hastily thrown together conference resolving differences in the House and Senate versions will not be conducive to finding and fixing these inevitable problems. My friend Senator Stevens says, ``Do no harm''. Whatever comes back from conference will have a tremendous head of steam behind it. By acting too fast on Collins-Lieberman, the Senate may get stuck with House provisions in a conference report that are unpalatable. Once reform is enacted, fixing missteps is extremely difficult. Experiences of homeland security legislation, passed right before an election, and the Patriot Act, prove that hasty restructuring results in confusion, mistakes and paralysis. I conclude by asking my colleagues to support my amendment. Let's act now and enact my amendment, which fixes the main problem of the lack of a coordinator, and then let's continue to act as we learn. Let's sift through the litany of approaches being advanced by my colleagues in the underlying bill, and the rival approaches being advocated by others both within this body and outside it. My amendment starts us on the right track to improving our intelligence structure, and it avoids the potential to start us on the wrong track. I appreciate the outstanding work Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman have done and thank them for that. They met over the break in August and worked around the clock to produce a product so we could get something done before we leave in time for the elections in November. However, in those pressures of time, they have come out with a product that needs many more hearings, more deliberation, and more consideration. In essence, they have a national intelligence director who directs and manages. Immediately that raised the red flag for this particular Senator. When I say ``raised the red flag for this particular Senator,'' let me tell of an experience. It was 50 years ago we had the Hoover Commission Task Force investigating the intelligence activities of this Nation. We had the McCarthy days, McCarthy charging there were Communist spies and agents within the State Department, within the Defense Department, within the executive branch, and everywhere throughout the Government. President Eisenhower appointed the Doolittle Commission and they came out with what was considered generally in the Congress as a whitewash. The White House and Congress got together and agreed efforts should be conducted to reorganize the executive branch, thus, President Hoover's commission came to be. A task force was headed by General Mark Clark. I served as one of those members of the task force investigating the CIA, the FBI, the Army, Navy, air intelligence, Secret Service, Q clearance, atomic energy intelligence, and on down the list. We spent some 2 years. After hearings and consideration of the generally speaking minute intelligence information at that time--I say ``minute'' for the simple reason that the intelligence information now correlated by the various entities and departments and agencies is like drinking water out of a fire hydrant. You have much, much greater volume. But even then we found the need for a coordinator. I can see Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency. Director Dulles of the CIA said, I have my hands full trying to get the work done properly of the CIA, much less as the head of intelligence activities in the Government, namely the coordinator of all intelligence, the centralizer of all intelligence. That is why it was called the Central Intelligence Agency. He said, I have too much work to do. What we need is one single intelligence coordinator to coordinate all of it--my work, the FBI, Defense Department, military. In those days all we had was foreign intelligence and military to bother with. We did not have terrorism threats and counterterrorism within the continental limits. Now we have heaped upon the responsibilities of the intelligence community all kinds of duties that need further deliberation and estimation because, as I say, the director of the national intelligence, when they said ``direct,'' when they said ``manage,'' I said heavens above, here is a flaw of September 11 intelligence. It was directed. It was managed. Everyone knows that now after the hearings. The Vice President had his own little cabal in that Department of Defense. They had met with the head of the Defense Advisory Council, Richard Perle, and Scooter Libby and that group. They had submitted to the country of Israel in 1996--Benjamin Netanyahu was coming in as Prime Minister, and they submitted at that time that Saddam ought to be replaced with the Hashemite rule and they wanted to democratize Iraq back in 1996. When Netanyahu refused doing that, they came back and organized themselves into the Project for the New American Century and they have been pressing forward ever since. So when you direct and when you manage intelligence, you have a flawed product. We need coordination. You need to take the best of the best from the CIA, from the FBI, from the National Security Agency, from the National Reconnaissance Organization, and all these other entities and coordinate into a product to give to the President. Suppose you were President in the next 10 minutes and you heard about a terrorist threat, not only foreign but domestic. What you would want in line, you would want a Karl Rove on intelligence. Now, the President has a Karl Rove on political intelligence. Karl Rove can tell you for any section of the country what is going on in any particular State. He has pollsters. He can give a consummate judgment or alternative to the President to make a judgment. That is fine business. We have that without legislation. We need just that in security intelligence--not only foreign, not only domestic, not only military, but all three--security intelligence coordinator. So when I say the national intelligence director directing and managing, I am saying, here is a flaw of September 11. You know the group-think policy of the President. If you are directing and managing intelligence, what you do is go immediately and give that intelligence to the folks making the Presidential policy and you develop a group-think and a flawed product. We do not want, necessarily, a director, certainly with all the duties that this particular director is burdened with but, rather, we want a coordinator. He should be or she should be in the National Security Council, appointed by the President, without confirmation by the Senate. You have to have your own person in there. And you have to not have him or her running over to several committees in the Senate and several committees in the House testifying about this management, this direction, this decision, this or that policy. He will have his hands full just with what the President wants. Necessarily, we transfer those coordination responsibilities from the CIA over to this national intelligence coordinator. This is a short, two-page amendment by Senator Stevens, Senator Inouye, Senator Cochran, and myself. This was worked out this afternoon. I was trying to listen to the debate, and the more I listened, the more it impressed me that we needed much more deliberate work and consideration, and not the crunch of a national election to get all of us out of town and do something. So we are trying to respond to that edict of ``don't just stand there, do something.'' I am afraid we are going to enact the ``Alka Seltzer'' intelligence bill: I don't believe we passed the whole thing. Look what it does. It directs and manages, but what intelligence is under the Department of Defense and what intelligence is under the national intelligence director. I searched and I found conflicts throughout the particular Collins-Lieberman measure, especially during a time of war. I can tell you, you are going to find all kinds of conflicts there. There are conflicts going on right now with the war in Iraq and the Secretary of Defense saying he is not going to stand for it. The national intelligence director has the defense intelligence budget, but then the secretary of intelligence has the defense intelligence function and responsibility. And the Secretary of Defense does not have budget control over what he has responsibility. And then there is the ``ying'' and the ``yang'' of defense intelligence versus tactical intelligence. And I have listened to some, the distinguished Senator from California and others, on what they consider tactical intelligence. On civil liberties, there are real grave concerns there because there is within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that investigates crimes and protects civil liberties, a culture, a paradigm, and a discipline. The Justice Department has developed that over the years of different FBI Directors. Now, with respect to the national intelligence director, he can direct covert activity to be taken on by the FBI with none of that discipline and none of those checks and balances. You have heard the distinguished Senator from Alaska with respect to the national intelligence director's transfer of funds, not only the reporting of funds. I can tell you now that will never happen where you can transfer funds because the Appropriations Committee has that responsibility. I can go down the different disclosure of funds and various other things. What I want to emphasize is that I am not trying to disparage any of the wonderful work being done by our Governmental Operations Committee. They have a product out here now that we can develop and work upon and iron out the differences. But it should not be under the pressure that we are in and having passed ipso facto the Collins-Lieberman bill. You would not satisfy the problem of 9/11, and that is coordination. You need the President's man or woman in that National Security Council, auditing, gaining, and getting. And mind you me, don't worry about getting it, now that you have a coordinator sitting there with the President. For example, that Arizona flight school information that did not get through the FBI to the coordinator, because they did not have one, is excused. That Minnesota terrorist who did not want to land the plane, all he wanted to do was fly it into a building; that came to the CIA but did not get to the White House. Known terrorists came into the country, passed the Immigration department, and the Naturalization Service. That did not get to the Director. But mind you me, if you have a coordinator, and the information of that importance does not get through to that coordinator, the opposite is going to be true. Rather than the old days when you held within your particular department or agency your intelligence and your information, and you did not tell the FBI, and the FBI did not tell the CIA, here you are going to try to regurgitate and spit up and throw out and report to that coordinator. Because if he does not get it at the White House level, heads are going to roll. So we have changed the culture and discipline by having one coordinator. That is all you need. We can go home and know that the job is done. The FBI is working. The CIA is working. The National Security Agency now knows not to wait until tomorrow to translate their go signal. As they went into the World Trade Towers, they were a day late in translating documents. We can go home and know that the President is equipped with a coordinator. And immediately, if I am running the CIA or FBI, I am going to start getting my information out rather than hiding it. That is the real difficulty: The dots were there, but the dots were not joined. With the Collins-Lieberman bill what you are instituting and legislating into law is the flaw of 9/11. You have a director of intelligence. You have a manager of intelligence. And that is how they got into the World Trade towers and into the Pentagon. It was managed. I can see the President on October 7, 2002, in Cincinnati. ``Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait until the smoking gun is a mushroom cloud,'' he said. Seven days later I voted for the authority to go to the war when the President asked--I did not sit on the Intelligence Committee. When my Commander in Chief says: ``Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait until the smoking gun is a mushroom cloud,'' I voted aye. Then I found out there weren't no smoking guns, there were no mushroom clouds, there were no facilities, there were no weapons, there were no terrorist threats. But that is another argument. I am trying to get something done where we in good conscience can protect our national security, protect us against domestic terrorism. And we can fix this bill. Now, let me add one little thing. I don't know whether Senator Stevens, my dear colleague, or Senator Inouye or Senator Cochran wants to talk. But I would agree, I don't need, unless I am questioned, another 10 minutes. And I know they have amendments of their own. So I would agree to a time limit on either side if the distinguished managers of the bill are trying to get to a vote.", u" SENATE RESOLUTION 403--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALLAB SHOULD BE TRIED BY A MILITARY TRIBUNAL RATHER THAN BY A CIVILIAN COURT Mr. VITTER (for himself, Mr. Cornyn, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Chambliss, Mr. Ensign, and Mr. Wicker) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary: S. Res. 403 Whereas Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian citizen, attempted to blow up a transcontinental airliner, Northwest Airlines Flight 253, over Detroit, Michigan, on Christmas Day 2009; Whereas Abdulmutallab boarded Flight 253 in Amsterdam using an unrevoked United States visa after having traveled from Yemen, purchasing his ticket with cash, and checking no luggage; Whereas prior to the attack on Flight 253, Abdulmutallab's father, a prominent Nigerian banker, warned officials at the United States Embassy in Nigeria that his son was being influenced by Islamic extremists in Yemen; Whereas United States intelligence officials learned, based on intercepted al Qaeda communications from Yemen in November 2009, that a man named ``Umar Farouk'' had volunteered for an upcoming terrorist attack and had been in contact with Anwar al-Awlaki, the same Yemen-based radical cleric who sent more than a dozen e-mail messages to the Fort Hood shooter, Nidal Malik Hasan; Whereas in November 2009, the National Security Agency also intercepted a phone conversation involving al Qaeda operatives in Yemen discussing an unnamed Nigerian man; Whereas in December 2009, intelligence officials learned that al Qaeda operatives in Yemen were looking for ``ways to move people to the West'' and specifically mentioning the Christmas Day date; Whereas the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had issued finished intelligence regarding Abdulmutallab by Christmas Day 2009, which both the CIA and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) had access to, but did not disseminate more broadly within the intelligence community due to the absence of a photograph of Abdulmutallab, despite the fact that other counterterrorism groups already possessed such a photograph; Whereas the intelligence agencies for the United Kingdom revoked Abdulmutallab's British visa because of a fraudulent visa application; Whereas after Abdulmutallab was apprehended by United States Customs agents and local police following his failed attack on Flight 253, he spoke freely about receiving training from members of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and stated that other jihadists would follow him; Whereas local agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) interrogated Abdulmutallab for 50 minutes, during which time Abdulmutallab disclosed information concerning his training in Yemen and the operation of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; Whereas after 50 minutes, the FBI stopped its interrogation of Abdulmutallab, agreeing to continue the interrogation after he received medical attention for the burns on his legs and groin caused by the failed bomb he had sewn in his underwear; Whereas before the FBI agents resumed the interrogation, Attorney General Eric Holder made the decision to extend the rights required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) to Abdulmutallab and to treat him as a common criminal rather than an unprivileged enemy belligerent who would be subject to military law; Whereas the FBI agents, following the decision of Attorney General Holder, read Abdulmutallab his Miranda rights, including his right to a lawyer and his right to remain silent, at which point Abdulmutallab stopped divulging information and remained silent; Whereas information concerning Yemeni terror networks, terrorist training operations, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are of the utmost value to the United States in its ongoing war against international terrorism; Whereas Attorney General Holder made the decision to extend Miranda rights to Abdulmutallab without consulting the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, the NCTC Director, Michael Leiter, the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, or the FBI Director, Robert Mueller; Whereas Attorney General Holder did not consult the High- Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG), which, according to Director Blair, ``was created exactly for th[e] purpose'' of making ``a decision on whether . . . a certain person who's detained should be treated as . . . a case for federal prosecution''; Whereas despite the fact that President Barack Obama created the HIG for the specific purpose of interrogating high-value detainees in order to obtain intelligence, the HIG was not yet operational by Christmas Day 2009; Whereas given the evidence against Abdulmutallab and the numerous witnesses onboard Flight 253 who saw him attempt to detonate an explosive device, it was not necessary to secure testimony admissible in civilian court by providing Miranda rights to Abdulmutallab; Whereas even if testimony that would be admissible in a civilian court was believed to be necessary, Abdulmutallab qualified for an exception to the requirements under Miranda that permits law enforcement officers to interrogate individuals with possible knowledge of an impending terrorist attack; Whereas despite the fact that the United States is at war with al Qaeda and deeply concerned about the operation of Islamic terrorist networks in the Arabian Peninsula and in Yemen, a country that continues to harbor the terrorists who attacked the U.S.S. Cole, Attorney General Holder, under the guidance of President Obama, subsequently ordered that Abdulmutallab be prosecuted on criminal charges in a United States civilian court rather than in a military tribunal; Whereas under the international law of armed conflict, the United States has the authority to detain enemies who have engaged in combatant actions until the end of hostilities; Whereas on September 18, 2001, the Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the use of military force (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), stating that ``the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons''; Whereas following extensive debate and numerous hearings on the topic, both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the Military Commissions Act of 2009, which became law on October 28, 2009 (title XVIII of Public Law 111-84); and Whereas pursuant to the President's authority under the United States Constitution as the Nation's Commander-in- Chief, as well as the Congressional authorization for the use of military force under Public Law 107-40, the President has both the authority and the responsibility to detain Abdulmutallab and other foreign terrorists and prosecute them through a military tribunal for their terrorist actions on behalf of al Qaeda: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that-- (1) foreign terrorists who are enemies of the United States should not be afforded the same rights under the Constitution as United States citizens; (2) the most important duty of the Attorney General is to protect the United States from its terrorist enemies; (3) the decision by Attorney General Holder to truncate Abdulmutallab's interrogation after only 50 minutes cost the United States Government untold intelligence and has made America less safe; (4) Attorney General Holder should not provide Abdulmutallab with a civilian trial, nor should he have ordered that Abdulmutallab be advised of his right to remain silent; (5) to the extent possible, foreign terrorist enemy combatants should be tried in military tribunals rather than in civilian courts; (6) to the extent that foreign terrorists are prosecuted in civilian courts, they should be thoroughly interrogated for information necessary to protect the United States before they are provided with a lawyer and informed of their right to remain silent; and (7) at a minimum, the Attorney General should consult with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the Secretary of Defense, congressional leaders, or the President before unilaterally deciding to terminate the interrogation of a key intelligence source and provide a terrorist enemy with the same rights as those that are guaranteed under the Constitution for United States citizens.", u"Mr. Chairman, I will just take this opportunity to thank both the Democrat and Republican staff members who helped us prepare this bill. For the first time since I have served on the committee, we had both Democrat and Republican staff briefed in a bipartisan way at the same table, all Members in the room. And we think that that improved the value of this product tremendously, something we are hoping to continue. So my hat is off to all of the staff. We hire professionals from the community, from all walks of life as well to provide us the expertise that we need to provide the proper oversight for the intelligence community. And I do believe, in this great spirit of bipartisanship with Mr. Ruppersberger, that this will give the tools to those 17 agencies who work in secrecy on behalf of the United States the things that they need to accomplish their mission and to keep this great country safe. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered read. The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Definitions. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National IntelligenceSec. 401. Schedule and requirements for the National Counterintelligence Strategy.Sec. 402. Insider threat detection program. In this Act: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2011 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and the authorized personnel levels (expressed as full-time equivalent positions) as of September 30, 2011, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 754 of the One Hundred Twelfth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2011 the sum of $660,732,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2012. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 787 full-time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2011. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2011 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts made available for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2012. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2011, there are authorized such full-time equivalent personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2011 the sum of $292,000,000. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. (a) In General.--Section 113A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h-1) is amended to read as follows: TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence Section 904(d)(2) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 402c(d)(2)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Subject'' and inserting the following: ``(A) Requirement to produce.--Subject''; (2) by striking ``on an annual basis''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(B) Revision and requirement.--The National Counterintelligence Strategy shall be revised or updated at least once every three years and shall be aligned with the strategy and policies of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (a) Initial Operating Capability.--Not later than October 1, 2012, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish an initial operating capability for an effective automated insider threat detection program for the information resources in each element of the intelligence community in order to detect unauthorized access to, or use or transmission of, classified intelligence. (b) Full Operating Capability.--Not later than October 1, 2013, the Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the program described in subsection (a) has reached full operating capability. (c) Report.--Not later than December 1, 2011, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the resources required to implement the insider threat detection program referred to in subsection (a) and any other issues related to such implementation the Director considers appropriate to include in the report. (d) Information Resources Defined.--In this section, the term ``information resources'' means networks, systems, workstations, servers, routers, applications, databases, websites, online collaboration environments, and any other information resources in an element of the intelligence community designated by the Director of National Intelligence. Section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(5), by inserting ``and counterintelligence'' after ``human intelligence''; (2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and (3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following: ``(c) Expenditure of Funds by the Defense Intelligence Agency.--(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may expend amounts made available to the Director for human intelligence and counterintelligence activities for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, without regard to the provisions of law or regulation relating to the expenditure of Government funds. ``(2) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not expend more than five percent of the amounts made available to the Director for human intelligence and counterintelligence activities for a fiscal year for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature in accordance with paragraph (1) during such fiscal year unless-- ``(A) the Director notifies the congressional intelligence committees of the intent to expend the amounts; and ``(B) 30 days have elapsed from the date on which the Director notifies the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with subparagraph (A). ``(3) For each expenditure referred to in paragraph (1), the Director shall certify that such expenditure was made for an object of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature. ``(4) Not later than December 31 of each year, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on any expenditures made during the preceding fiscal year in accordance with paragraph (1).''. (a) In General.--Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 428 the following new section: The CHAIR. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order except those printed in House Report 112-75. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question. The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House Report 112-75.", u"Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of this special order. I would like to discuss the importance of America returning to the rule of law and respect for our Constitution in the immediate aftermath of the Bush-Cheney legacy. Madam Speaker, I thank you for the opportunity to address this issue. Since 2001, the Bush Administration's policies impacting civil liberties have raised grave constitutional and legal concerns. After the myriad hearings and investigations last year, there is much we do not know about the Bush Administration. Last week, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee released a report, entitled ``Reining in the Imperial Presidency: Lessons and Recommendations Relating to the Presidency of George W. Bush.'' This document contained nearly 500 pages. The report detailed numerous examples of these abuses by the administration from allegations of torture and inhumane treatment, extraordinary rendition, and warrantless domestic surveillance to the U.S. Attorney scandals. The report also contained over 45 pages of recommendations designed to restore our Constitution's traditional system of checks and balances. Chief among these recommendations are: (1) The continuation of congressional oversight; (2) independent criminal probes by the incoming Justice Department; and; (3) the creation of a blue ribbon commission to fully investigate the Bush Administration's activities. My office will work to put some of these into law. These included recommendation number 17 on pages 280 to 281, regarding the President, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Security Agency should implement policies to ensure that there is no ``reverse targeting'' used under authorities created by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Specifically, I have long championed the inclusion of language that would prohibit ``reverse targeting.'' Indeed, I worked on specific language that was included in an early version of the FISA Act, the RESTORE Act, which was added during the markup made a constructive contribution to the RESTORE Act by laying down a clear, objective criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce in preventing reverse targeting. ``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the Government targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to collect information on certain U.S. persons. One of the major concerns that libertarians and classical conservatives, as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, have is that there is an understandable temptation of national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting that may be difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards to prevent it. My amendment reduces even further any such temptation to resort to reverse targeting by requiring the administration to obtain a regular, individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the surveillance is a person in the United States. The amendment achieves this objective by requiring the administration to obtain a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person reasonably believed to be located in the United States.'' The current language in the bill provides that a warrant be obtained only when the Government ``seeks to conduct electronic surveillance'' of a person reasonably believed to be located in the United States. It was far from clear how the operative language ``seeks to'' is to be interpreted. In contrast, the language used in my amendment, ``significant purpose,'' is a term of art that has long been a staple of FISA jurisprudence and thus is well known and readily applied by the agencies, legal practitioners, and the FISA Court. Thus, the Jackson-Lee Amendment provides a clearer, more objective, criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce to prevent the practice of reverse targeting without a warrant, which all of us can agree should not be permitted. I am also pleased that the chairman has accepted my recommendation for the President to end abuses of Presidential signing statements. I have re-introduced a bill to address this issue in the 111th Congress. In an earlier Congress, I introduced the ``Congressional Lawmaking Authority Protection Act'' or CLAP Act of 2006, which: (1) prohibited the expenditure of appropriated funds to distribute, disseminate, or publish Presidential signing statements that contradict or are inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Congress in enacting the laws; and (2) bars consideration of any signing statement by any court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial body when construing or applying any law enacted by Congress. I am proud to say that the chairman was one of the original co-sponsors of my bill. In the 110th Congress, I introduced another bill substantially in the same form in the current Congress, except that the new bill, H.R. 264, makes clear that the limitations of the law do not apply to Presidential signing statements that are consistent with congressional intent. This is not a hard test to administer. As the late Justice Potter Stewart said about obscenity: ``it may be hard to define, but you know it when you see it.'' I have now reintroduced this bill in the 111th Congress. Notwithstanding that we have a new President, my bill is still relevant. If there be any question whether the Congress has the power to ban the use of appropriated funds to publish or distribute signing statements, the answer is simple: regardless of whether it is wise to do so, if no one seriously can question Congress's constitutional authority to terminate the Executive's use of appropriated funds to wage military operations, a fortiori, Congress has the constitutional authority to withhold from the President funds needed to distribute a signing statement that undermines the separation of powers. The problem with presidential signing statements is that their use fosters abuse and misuse. Presidential signing statements seek to alter Congress's primacy in the legislative process by giving a President's intention in signing the bill equal or greater standing to Congress's intention in enacting it. This would be a radical, indeed revolutionary, change to our system of separated powers and checks and balances. Bill signing statements eliminate the need for a President ever to exercise the veto since he or she could just reinterpret the bill he signs so as to make it unobjectionable to him. Such actions deprive Congress of the chance to consider the President's objections, override his veto, and in the process make it clear that the President's position is rejected by an overwhelming majority of the people's representatives. Since few Presidents wish to suffer a humiliation so complete and public they have strong incentive to work closely with the Congress and are amenable to negotiation and compromise. This is precisely the type of competitive cooperation the Constitution contemplates and which bill signing statements threaten. Again, I thank the Chairman for including these two very important ideas in his very thorough and thoughtful report. There is much work to be done by the Members of Congress to fix the mistakes that were made during the prior administration so that the proper foundation can be laid for a succesful President Obama and his administration. It is my hope that we can wipe the slate clean from the Bush Administration and start afresh for the current administration. I agree that we must investigate the U.S. Attorney firings to determine what precisely happened. We need to determine why these firings occurred. Moreover, the incoming administration should limit the ability of Executive Branch officials to prevent victims of terrorism from recovering for their losses. The President should seek to resolve a dispute between victims of torture and the government of Iraq committed during the Gulf War. Because of the myriad of problems that we have seen at the Department of Justice, I recommend that the Department of Justice should issue guidelines to require transparency and uniformity of corporate deferred and non-prosecution agreements. These are agreements between the Federal Government and individual corporations in which the Government agrees to not prosecute or defer criminal prosecution in exchange for the corporation agreeing to specific actions such as changes in corporate policies and payment of monetary penalties. We should also consider whether we should consider legislation concerning the exercise of clemency involving government officials. This is important so that we can truly learn what happened during the Bush Administration. We should also enact changes in statutes and rules to strengthen protection for Executive Branch whistleblowers, Congress's contempt powers, and the incoming administration should establish procedures for asserting executive privilege. There are a myriad of laws that we must enact to set this Nation on the right track. We must roll up our sleeves and get ready to work with the new administration to restore the rule of law to America and its position of respect on the world stage.", u"Mr. President, I rise to speak, once again, on the nomination of Harold Koh, whom the President has nominated to be Legal Adviser for the State Department. To put this in context, as the Senator from Massachusetts has addressed, the Legal Adviser is a very important job at the State Department. He is responsible for providing guidance on important legal questions, including treaty interpretation and other international obligations of the United States. He gives the Secretary of State legal advice during negotiations with other nations. So the Legal Adviser can be a very influential voice in diplomatic circles, especially if he or she has particularly strong views on America's obligations to other nations and multilateral organizations. Based on my review of Dean Koh's record, I don't believe he is the right man for this job. His views are in tension with what I believe are core Democratic values, in that he would subjugate America's sovereignty to the opinions of the so-called international common law, including treaty obligations that the Senate has never ratified. Indeed, they are not obligations, but he nevertheless would impose them on the United States. When the Senator from Massachusetts says he believes the U.S. Constitution is primary, I would have felt much better if he had said it was the exclusive source of American law, together with the laws that we ourselves pass as representatives of the people; not just a consideration but the consideration when it comes to determining the obligations and rights of America's citizens, rather than subjecting those to international opinion and vague international norms which I heard the Senator refer to. It is true Professor Koh is an advocate of what he calls transnational jurisprudence. He believes Federal judges--these are U.S. judges--should use their power to ``vertically enforce'' or ``domesticate'' American law with international norms and foreign law. As I mentioned, this means judges using treaties and ``customary international law'' to override a wide variety of American laws, whether they be State or Federal. Of course, we understand treaties that have been ratified by the Senate are the law of the land, but Professor Koh believes that even treaties that the United States has not ratified can be evidence of customary international law and given legal effect as such. The Legal Adviser to the State Department has an important role, as I mentioned, in drafting, negotiating, and enforcing treaties. That is why it is so crucial he understands that no treaty has the force of law in the United States until it has been ratified, pursuant to the Constitution, by the Senate. Do we want a top legal advisor at the State Department who believes that norms that he and other international scholars make should become the law, even if they are rejected or not otherwise embraced by the Congress? That can't be within the mainstream. That is outside the mainstream; indeed, I believe a radical view of our obligations in the international community. In 2002, Professor Koh delivered a lecture on the matter of gun control. He argued for a ``global gun control regime.'' I don't know exactly what he means by that, but if he means that the second amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution of an individual American citizen to keep and bear arms are somehow affected by global gun control regimes, then I disagree with him very strongly. Our rights as Americans depend on the American Constitution and American law, not on some global gun control regime or unratified treaties because of some legal theory of customary international law. On the matter of habeas corpus rights for terrorists, in 2007, Professor Koh argued that foreign detainees held by the U.S. Armed Forces anywhere in the world--not just enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay--are entitled to habeas corpus review in U.S. Federal courts. Those are the rights reserved to American citizens under our Constitution and laws, not to foreign terrorists detained by our military in farflung battlefields around the world. If Professor Koh were correct--and he is not--this would mean that even foreign enemy combatants captured on the battlefield fighting against our troops in Afghanistan and held at Bagram Air Force Base would be able to sue in the U.S. courts seeking their release. On this issue, fortunately, Dean Koh's radical views are not shared by the Obama administration, which filed a brief recently arguing that habeas corpus relief doesn't extend to detainees held at Bagram Air Force base in Afghanistan. Do we want a top legal adviser in the State Department working to grant terrorists and enemy combatants even more rights than they have now? There is the issue of military commissions, something Congress has spoken on at some length after lengthy debate. Professor Koh's views of military commissions also deserve our attention. Military commissions, it turns out, have been authorized since the beginning of this country--by George Washington during the Revolutionary War, by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, and by Franklin Roosevelt during World War II. Yes, military commissions have been authorized both by our 43rd and 44th President of the United States in the context of the war on terror. President Obama has said that ``military commissions . . . are an appropriate venue for trying detainees for violations of the laws of war.'' I agree with him. Of course, military commissions, as I alluded to a moment ago, have had bipartisan support and have been authorized by the Congress. But somehow Professor Koh takes a more radical view. He believes military commissions would ``create the impression of kangaroo courts.'' He said they ``provide ad hoc justice.'' He said they do not and cannot provide ``credible justice.'' Do we want the top legal adviser at the State Department undermining both the will of Congress and the President regarding the time-tested practice of military commissions during wartime? Again, here is another example of Professor Koh's views that are radical views--certainly outside of the legal mainstream. Senators should also take a look at Professor Koh's views on suing or prosecuting lawyers for providing professional legal advice in the service of their country. My position is clear: Government lawyers--and I don't care whether they are working in a Democratic administration or a Republican one--should not be prosecuted or sued for doing their jobs in good faith. They should not be punished for giving their best legal advice under difficult and novel situations, even if it turns out that some lawyer somewhere later disagrees with that advice. As dean of the Yale Law School, Professor Koh has enabled and empowered the leftwing attempt to sue one of its own alumni, John Yoo, who worked at the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush administration. The Yale Law School's Lowenstein International Human Rights Law Clinic has filed suit against John Yoo for the legal advice he provided to policymakers during his service on behalf of the American people. I wonder if Professor Koh is willing to hold himself to the same standard and agree that individuals can sue him for his official acts if he is confirmed as Legal Adviser to the State Department--if later on lawyers, and perhaps prosecutors, disagree with that legal advice and say it was wrong. Suppose Professor Koh gives legal advice that certain GTMO detainees should be released. If they return to the battlefield, as many have, and end up killing Americans, or our allies, should the victims' families be allowed to hold Professor Koh legally responsible in a court of law? Or suppose Professor Koh gives legal advice that authorizes military actions in Afghanistan or Pakistan. If those operations result in collateral damage, or civilian casualties, would the victims have standing in Federal Court to sue Professor Koh? Do we want a top Legal Adviser at the State Department who is so compromised by the fear of being sued or prosecuted that he could not be trusted to give honest, good-faith legal advice to the Secretary of State or the President of the United States? Perhaps most timely, given the civil unrest in Iran--and the Senator from Massachusetts was critical of the fact that I quoted a 2007 writing of Professor Koh, but it is true from this writing, and I will read it in a moment--Professor Koh appears to draw a moral equivalence between Iran's regime's political suppression and human rights abuses, on one hand, and America's counterterrorism policies on the other. In 2007 he wrote: The United States cannot stand on strong footing attacking Iran for ``illegal detention'' when similar charges can be and have been lodged against our own government. He goes on to say that U.S. Government criticism of Iranian ``security forces who monitored the social activities of citizens, entered homes and offices, monitored telephone conversations, and opened mail without court authorization,'' was ``hard to square'' with our own National Security Agency's surveillance programs. Do we want to confirm a top Legal Adviser at the State Department who can't see the difference between counterterrorism policies approved by the Federal courts and the Congress and the brutal repression practiced by a theocratic regime? We have heard enough moral equivalence about Iran over the last week, and we have heard enough apologies for the actions of the United States, and enough soft-peddling of the actions of the Iranian theocracy, which is a brutal police state. We don't need another voice in the administration whose first instinct is to blame America and whose long-term objective is to transform this country into something it is not. For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to oppose the nomination of Harold Koh as the top Legal Adviser to the State Department. I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.", u"I wish to share some of the thoughts in that article with my colleagues. First, regarding the Intelligence Committee's carefully crafted and limited liability protections, the three public servants said: We agree with the committee. Dragging phone companies through protracted litigation would not only be unfair, but it would deter other companies and private citizens from responding in terrorist emergencies whenever there may be uncertainty or legal risk. Our committee has heard testimony that without such protections, some companies believe they can no longer cooperate and assist our Government because they would risk hundreds of millions of dollars of their shareholders' money in protracted lawsuits. They have a fiduciary responsibility, those companies, to their shareholders. That is intrinsic in all of our corporate structures. Second, the boards of directors of these companies have a fundamental obligation to those shareholders. On this issue, the three public servants wrote: The government alone cannot protect us from the threats we face today. We must have the help of all of our citizens. There will be times when the lives of thousands of Americans will depend on whether corporations such as airlines and banks are willing to lend assistance. If we do not treat them fairly when they respond to assurances from the highest levels of the government that their help is legal and essential for saving lives, then we will be radically reducing our society's capacity to defend itself. Moreover, I believe that companies which assisted the Government will not be treated fairly by the provision being offered by my Judiciary Committee colleagues to substitute the Government in currently pending lawsuits. I strongly believe the substitution proposal is not an acceptable alternative to the Intelligence Committee's bill. Additionally, if lawsuits are allowed to proceed, companies will still be forced to participate and provide evidence. The continuing damage in terms of business reputation and stock valuation even if the Government ultimately prevails, will surely be extremely harmful to the companies. Further, the Government being substituted as the defendant in a trial opens up evidentiary problems regarding sources and methods which, if exposed, would hinder the ability of the intelligence community to intercept terrorist communications and those of our other enemies. Finally, the last point I would like to raise relates to the right of individuals to file suit. Let me be clear--individuals who believe that the Government violated their civil liberties can pursue legal action against the Government--the Intelligence Committee's bill does nothing to limit that legal recourse. This issue is underscored by the final quote I would like to share with you by Messrs. Civiletti, Thornburg, and Webster: Whether the government has acted properly is a different question from whether a private person has acted properly in responding to the government's call for help. From its earliest days, the common law recognized that when a public official calls on a citizen to help protect the community in an emergency, the person has a duty to help and should be immune from being hauled into court unless it was clear beyond doubt that the public official was acting illegally. Because a private person cannot have all the information necessary to assess the propriety of the government's actions, he must be able to rely on officials assurances about need and legality. Immunity is designed to avoid the burden of protracted litigation, because the prospect of such litigation itself is enough to deter citizens from providing critically needed assistance. Madam President--I agree with these distinguished gentlemen. Bottom line, companies who participate in this program do so voluntarily to help America preserve its freedom and security. And that security will ensure for the very safety--both individually and collectively--of its citizens. In closing, I would like to state that I have long supported the idea of ``an all-volunteer force'' for our military and I believe ``an all-volunteer force'' of citizens and businesses who do their part to protect our great Nation from harm is equally important. Without this retroactive liability provision, I believe companies will no longer voluntarily participate. This will result in a degradation of America's ability to protect its citizens. It is for these reasons that I urge my colleagues to support the Rockefeller-Bond substitute amendment to grant the men and women of the intelligence community the tools they need to protect our country. (By Benjamin Civiletti, Dick Thornburgh and William Webster) Following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, President Bush authorized the National Security Agency to target al Qaeda communications into and out of the country. Mr. Bush concluded that this was essential for protecting the country, that using the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act would not permit the necessary speed and agility, and that he had the constitutional power to authorize such surveillance without court orders to defend the country. Since the program became public in 2006, Congress has been asserting appropriate oversight. Few of those who learned the details of the program have criticized its necessity. Instead, critics argued that if the president found FISA inadequate, he should have gone to Congress and gotten the changes necessary to allow the program to proceed under court orders. That process is now underway. The administration has brought the program under FISA, and the Senate Intelligence Committee recently reported out a bill with a strong bipartisan majority of 13-2, that would make the changes to FISA needed for the program to continue. This bill is now being considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Public disclosure of the NSA program also brought a flood of class-action lawsuits seeking to impose massive liability on phone companies for allegedly answering the government's call for help. The Intelligence Committee has reviewed the program and has concluded that the companies deserve targeted protection from these suits. The protection would extend only to activities undertaken after 9/11 until the beginning of 2007, authorized by the president to defend the country from further terrorist attack, and pursuant to written assurances from the government that the activities were both authorized by the president and legal. We agree with the committee. Dragging phone companies through protracted litigation would not only be unfair, but it would deter other companies and private citizens from responding in terrorist emergencies whenever there may be uncertainty or legal risk. The government alone cannot protect us from the threats we face today. We must have the help of all our citizens. There will be times when the lives of thousands of Americans will depend on whether corporations such as airlines or banks are willing to lend assistance. If we do not treat companies fairly when they respond to assurances from the highest levels of the government that their help is legal and essential for saving lives, then we will be radically reducing our society's capacity to defend itself. This concern is particularly acute for our nation's telecommunications companies. America's front line of defense against terrorist attack is communications intelligence. When Americans put their loved ones on planes, send their children to school, or ride through tunnels and over bridges, they are counting on the ``early warning'' system of communications intelligence for their safety. Communications technology has become so complex that our country needs the voluntary cooperation of the companies. Without it, our intelligence efforts will be gravely damaged. Whether the government has acted properly is a different question from whether a private person has acted properly in responding to the government's call for help. From its earliest days, the common law recognized that when a public official calls on a citizen to help protect the community in an emergency, the person has a duty to help and should be immune from being hauled into court unless it was clear beyond doubt that the public official was acting illegally. Because a private person cannot have all the information necessary to assess the propriety of the government's actions, he must be able to rely on official assurances about need and legality. Immunity is designed to avoid the burden of protracted litigation, because the prospect of such litigation itself is enough to deter citizens from providing critically needed assistance. As the Intelligence Committee found, the companies clearly acted in ``good faith.'' The situation is one in which immunity has traditionally been applied, and thus protection from this litigation is justified. First, the circumstances clearly showed that there was a bona fide threat to ``national security.'' We had suffered the most devastating attacks in our history, and Congress had declared the attacks ``continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat'' to the country. It would have been entirely reasonable for the companies to credit government representations that the nation faced grave and immediate threat and that their help was needed to protect American lives. Second, the bill's protections only apply if assistance was given in response to the president's personal authorization, communicated in writing along with assurances of legality. That is more than is required by FISA, which contains a safe- harbor authorizing assistance based solely on a certification by the attorney general, his designee, or a host of more junior law enforcement officials that no warrant is required. Third, the ultimate legal issue--whether the president was acting within his constitutional powers--is not the kind of question a private party can definitively determine. The companies were not in a position to say that the government was definitely wrong. Prior to FISA's 1978 enactment, numerous federal courts took it for granted that the president has constitutional power to conduct warrantless surveillance to protect the nation's security. In 2002, the FISA Court of Review, while not dealing directly with the NSA program, stated that FISA could not limit the president's constitutional powers. Given this, it cannot be said that the companies acted in bad faith in relying on the government's assurances of legality. For hundreds of years our legal system has operated under the premise that, in a public emergency, we want private citizens to respond to the government's call for help unless the citizen knows for sure that the government is acting illegally. If Congress does not act now, it would be basically saying that private citizens should only help when they are absolutely certain that all the government's actions are legal. Given the threats we face in today's world, this would be a perilous policy.", u"Mr. President, I rise to speak briefly about one of the issues that has been debated over these 2 days, which is the reauthorization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This bill, which passed the Senate in a bipartisan way, is now sitting in the House. This bill is critical to our national security. I know there are some who will argue that the bill represents a threat in some way to American civil liberties. From my standpoint, nothing is more important to me than protecting the rights of Americans under the terms of our Constitution. One of the terms of our Constitution is that the Federal Government has the responsibility to protect the American citizens and America from attacks by enemies. That is what we swear an oath to, by the way, when we take this job, to protect and defend this Nation. We know for a fact that the forces of Islamic fundamentalists, which are led by fanatical individuals, have committed themselves to attacking our Nation, destroying our culture, and killing Americans. We have already seen their actions take place in the 1990s when they attacked the warship USS Cole, when they attacked our Embassies in Africa, and, of course, on 9/11. We also know for a fact that our best weapon of self-defense in this war is to be on the offense, to find them before they can harm us. That is one of the reasons we are in Iraq and in Afghanistan. The great advantage we have in this war is the sophistication of our Nation. Obviously, the greatest advantage we have is we have the cause of right on our side--freedom, democracy, and liberty. But the great tactical advantage we have is the sophistication of our Nation and our capacity to use that sophistication in the area of our military and in the area of our intelligence gathering to defeat these people before they attack us. At the essence of this, at the center of this is the ability to gather effective intelligence. We cannot stop someone who wants to attack us if we wait until they commit the act. This is not like a criminal situation where somebody goes out and robs a bank and then we go and find them. This is a situation where people want to use every weapon at their disposal, and if they get a weapon of mass destruction, they will use it to try to kill hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands of innocent civilians, and Americans specifically, in order to carry out their perverse purpose of promoting what they see as their Islamic faith, as they interpret it. We cannot be so naive as to believe these people are not out there and intending to pursue these courses of action when they have made it absolutely clear that is what they intend to do, when they have said innumerable times that is what they intend to do, and when they have actually done it by attacking us on 9/11. To stop them, we have to find them before they can harm us. And the way we find them is we use, in part, our great advantage in the area of tracking them through electronic surveillance. And that is what the FISA bill is all about--giving the legal tools necessary to totally dedicated American citizens who man agencies, such as the National Security Agency, the Defense Department, the CIA, the State Department, and the FBI--to give those individuals who are totally dedicated to finding the people who want to attack us the tools necessary to do that, and to do that in a way that protects Americans' rights and civil liberties. This law does accomplish exactly that. No American can have their calls intercepted or overheard intentionally unless there has been a court review of that decision and a court order approving that action. This law is directed not at Americans, it is directed at foreigners--not Americans--whose purpose it is to do us harm, and they do not have the same rights as Americans. They should not. Their purpose is to destroy America. Why would we give them American rights? Yet for some reason the House of Representatives refuses to act on this critical issue in the area of giving our people who work for us, who work for the American people, and who are trying to protect America, the tools they need to accomplish that. It makes no sense to me at all. Some argue the force behind denying this right and these authorities to the people who have responsibility to monitor these foreign activities and foreign individuals, these Islamic fundamentalists who wish to do us harm, the terrorists, the people who wish to limit that right wish to do so because they want to give the trial lawyers more capacity to bring lawsuits against the telephone companies, which are, obviously, an integral part of any electronic monitoring that is going to go on. I think that is unfortunate if that is the case. We have asked these various groups, these corporations--remember, they are made up of American citizens. An American corporation is nothing more than a group of American citizens who have gotten together. Most of these corporations are pension funds which involve pensions of people who work at day-to-day jobs. Most Americans have some interest in stock through their pension funds, and these stocks are the companies that, basically, we are talking about, the telephone companies, in many instances. These companies are being asked, and have been enlisted, and have been asked in the past to participate in protecting America. When the Government does something such as that, I think the Government also has a responsibility to say to those companies and their stockholders and their employees, many of whom are Americans, many of whom are working Americans, obviously, the ones who work for them and the stockholders who have pension funds who invest in them, that they should have protection from lawsuits which are basically inappropriately pursued because these companies are doing the bidding of the American Government as we try to protect the American people. For some reason, the desire to energize those lawsuits has held up the ability to give the tools necessary to our intelligence community to pursue surveillance of very evil people who intend to do us harm. It would be a great tragedy and a terrible outcome of this situation if America is attacked and that attack could have been thwarted or muted if we had the intelligence which would have been able to be gathered by electronic surveillance which would be made available through the authorities of FISA. It would be a true tragedy. I cannot imagine the recrimination that would occur in this country from the American people were we to be attacked and then discover that the information which might have thwarted that attack was unable to be obtained because the law which gave people the authority to pursue that type of information through electronic surveillance was being held up in the House of Representatives because the trial lawyers want a cause of action against the telephone companies. It is incomprehensible to me that we have gotten to this point in the process of trying to develop our defense as a nation against people who clearly exist and who have expressed their intent so clearly and who have executed on that intent, as was shown on 9/11. I cannot imagine that when a bill passes the Senate which has bipartisan support--this is not a partisan issue. It should not be a partisan issue. It has bipartisan support. It came out of the Senate, and it has been worked out between the leaders of the key committees in the Senate in a way that protects American civil liberties--that such a bill which gives the authority to those we ask to protect us, the authority they need to pursue the course of action they see is appropriate in electronic surveillance, that such a bill would be stopped in the House of Representatives out of what appears to be a tangential question of lawsuits--tangential in the sense that nothing is more critical to this whole exercise than protecting Americans from attack. I join my colleagues who have risen over the last couple of days to express their frustration with the failure of the House of Representatives to act in this area. We need the House to act on the Senate bill, pass it, send it down to the President, and have it signed so that the people who we ask to protect us through electronic surveillance of terrorists who do not have the rights of Americans and who are not American, so that electronic surveillance can continue. Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"I also want to recognize Senator Bond, the Senator from Missouri. He spoke before Senator Martinez. I thought he gave a very meaningful talk about the importance of FISA, along with Senator Martinez. He has a personal interest in what happens, not only as a Senator from the State of Missouri, but he has a son who serves in Iraq. So he gets a firsthand report, and I know he spends a lot of time studying it. He certainly has become one of the more knowledgeable people in the Senate as far as intelligence matters are concerned. I think it behooves all of us to listen to his presentation and the message he is sending. I rise today to discuss S. 2634 in light of the current situation regarding the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The bill we are discussing calls upon the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Homeland Security, along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Director of National Intelligence, to jointly submit to Congress a report setting forth the global strategy of the United States to combat and defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates. I can't imagine that this proposal would have any effect--given, for instance, that the Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell has been calling for an extension of the Protect America Act, and the House refuses to listen. Director McConnell feels an extension is necessary to combat and defeat terrorists, including all al-Qaida, but that proposal doesn't seem to matter much. As we all know, the existing authorities provided by the Protect America Act expired nearly 2 weeks ago. On February 16, the House Democratic leadership allowed these provisions to expire without a vote. So for the last 2 weeks, our intelligence community has lost out on opportunities to gather intelligence and to continue to keep our Nation safe. As a majority of Senators know, the recently passed Senate version of FISA is a solid, workable, bipartisan bill that would greatly enhance the protection of this country. In addition, it would increase civil liberty protections and the protections of the privacy rights of Americans. The Senate passed FISA modernization with bipartisan support. Since then, the House has failed to take up the provisions. What is most distressing, and quite frankly the most insulting factor in this situation, is that within the same week the House chose not to take up and make permanent essential provisions from the Protect America Act, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform found time to conduct a hearing on steroids in professional baseball that amounted to nothing more than a media circus. It is for reasons such as these that Congress has some of the lowest approval ratings in history. To top it off, the House promptly adjourned for a week of recess as the FISA provisions expired. If nothing else, this action--or more correctly inaction--presents the appearance that House leadership is prioritizing media-friendly events above the hard work of keeping our Nation safe and providing our intelligence agencies with the tools they need. FISA in its current form is not sufficient to fight the war on terror. This issue, as much as any issue brought before Congress, needs to be clarified in a timely fashion. Time is most certainly not on our side, and continued delays in the passage of this bill will simply prolong our existing vulnerabilities. Director of Intelligence Mike McConnell and Attorney General Michael Mukasey wrote on February 22 that: We have lost intelligence information this past week as a direct result of uncertainty created by Congress's failure to act. Mr. President, is this a comment we simply want to disregard? Are House Democrats under the impression the DNI and Attorney General are bluffing? These claims need to be taken seriously, and political posturing simply will not suffice at this point. Our intelligence community must act quickly in order to be successful. As lives literally depend on their expeditious decisions, it is not in our best interests to deprive our intelligence community of the ability to collect necessary foreign intelligence information. Having the ability to collect and obtain correct information at the right time is of critical importance to our struggle against radical Islamic terrorists who have grown increasingly brazen in their tactics. Additionally, our enemies have become more adept to changes in technology. The world moves quickly, and we have no choice but to keep up with the changes if we are to keep our country safe. The absence of a legislative framework creates an ambiguous environment that presents our enemies with opportunities to exploit our weakened defenses. Nearly 2 weeks later, these provisions are still surrounded with uncertainty, as the House has failed to act on the bipartisan legislation put forth by the Senate. The information that has been lost in the last weeks is lost forever. We will never know what happened and, hopefully, we will never learn what we missed during this time the hard way. If we think the enemy is not watching the actions of Congress, we are simply fooling ourselves. Simply put, this is too critical an issue to be playing politics. We are only hurting ourselves and insulting the men and women of our military and intelligence community who risk their lives every day while gathering and acquiring certain intelligence data, if we are going to waste their efforts by bogging down the collection of critical information. We know full well we must do a better job of connecting the dots in our enemies' communications, and the challenge is only increased with the Internet, cell phones, and other forms of communication. We don't need to unnecessarily place Americans in greater danger. To needlessly fail to detect a terrorist plot is one of the most egregious disservices that our Government could commit. The fact is, we are not on the same playing field as our enemies. As Americans, we have higher standards. We abide by laws and protocols which our enemies do not follow. Protecting the civil liberties of Americans has always been one of the cornerstones of our democracy. However, a balance must be struck between protecting civil liberties and protecting our citizens from foreign threats. I believe this balance has been struck through the Senate bill. The legislation strikes this necessary balance. In changing times, revision of our surveillance laws needs to occur. In the time between the court ruling requiring the Government to obtain FISA Court orders for foreign surveillance and passage of the Protect America Act, collection of foreign intelligence information decreased by 66 percent. We cannot ignore that fact. We are not making our Nation safer if our intelligence-gathering capabilities are functioning at one-third of their capacity. As such, Congress addressed these concerns through the Protect America Act. But now we have essentially taken a step back, and that is inexcusable. As it stands today, there currently exists a legal uncertainty for the telecommunications companies assisting us in this critical task of gathering intelligence. This simply makes it more difficult to collect the vital information needed to keep Americans safe. I cannot emphasize enough how paramount it is to have the assistance of private telecommunications carriers to carry out intelligence gathering. The Senate bill provides protective immunity to those carriers whose cooperation will be needed in the future. It also provides retroactive immunity to private carriers from civil lawsuits arising out of their alleged cooperation with the National Security Agency in their terrorist surveillance program between September 1, 2001, and January 17, 2007. Also, this immunity does not extend to Government officials or to any criminal proceedings that may arise in the future out of the terrorist surveillance program. Thus far the House version does not offer immunity to the telecommunications companies. I hate to even allude to the fact that failure to offer this immunity stands to benefit only two groups--terrorists who exploit our system and trial lawyers who file class action suits--but I feel I must. Mr. President, the U.S. Government owes these patriotic companies and their executives protections based on the good-faith effort they made in working with our intelligence community, assisting in their efforts to discover and thwart attacks against our Nation. The Senate Intelligence committee found and stated in its report that, without retroactive immunity, the private sector might be unwilling to cooperate with lawful Government requests in the future, resulting in what the committee calls ``a possible reduction in intelligence.'' This is simply unacceptable for the safety of our Nation. Because the companies stepped up to help their country in a time of war, they have been the subject of over 40 lawsuits, and counting. It doesn't take an accountant to realize these claims and the litigation involved could end up costing hundreds of billions of dollars. These companies could end up in bankruptcy, and the trial lawyers will continue to get richer. The bottom line is the FISA temporary provisions need to be reauthorized as soon as possible. The temporary provisions expired on February 16, almost 2 weeks ago, and since then leaders in the intelligence community have stated that we have lost important information as a result of Congress's failure to act. It is unacceptable and irresponsible to ignore the needs of our intelligence community at this stage of the legislative process. The House owes it to America to accept the Senate bill or expeditiously work out changes in a conference so we can provide the protection the American people deserve and demand. I see my colleague from the State of New Mexico is prepared to make his comments. I publicly thank him for his service over the years. He is a great leader. I appreciate what he has done for America. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise to pay tribute to Lieutenant General William E. Odom, a great American and a true patriot. General Odom passed away last Friday at the age of 75 after a lifetime of service to the Nation. General Odom was a soldier and a scholar. He was a teacher and the author of seven books on history and international relations. He served Presidents of both parties. He was one of our Nation's top experts on military intelligence. He was a great visionary. And he was among the first to correctly and courageously warn that invading Iraq would be folly. I am proud to say that he was a friend. He generously shared his insight and counsel with me, and I found what he told and shared to be invaluable. General Odom was born in Tennessee and graduated from West Point. He received a Ph.D. from Columbia University and became a leading author on the Soviet Union. After teaching at West Point and Columbia, he served in the Carter administration as assistant to the President for national security affairs. Neither a Democrat nor a Republican, he also served in the Reagan administration as director of the National Security Agency. After retiring from the military, he became a professor at Yale University and a senior fellow with the Hudson Institute. General Odom was a patriot in every sense of the word. He served in Vietnam, and his family has continued to serve. His son was wounded in Iraq. But General Odom also understood that true patriotism meant disagreeing with your government's actions when you think they are wrong. He opposed the invasion and occupation of Iraq long before it began when it was not the popular thing to do and long before most of the rest of the country opposed it. His boss in the Carter administration, Mr. Brzezinksi, had this to say of his early opposition to the invasion, ``Among senior military people, (Odom) was probably the first to consider the war in Iraq a misbegotten adventure. He believed that we're just stoking hostility to the United States in that region and developing an opposition that cannot be defeated by military means.'' In September of 2006, I and several of my colleagues in the House invited General Odom to speak at one of a series of ad hoc Congressional hearings and forums hosted by the Progressive Caucus on Iraq. General Odom described how al Qaeda's recruitment efforts had been seriously weakened by our efforts in Afghanistan, but he said that al Qaeda's recruitments soared after the invasion of Iraq. General Odom said, to (Osama bin Laden), the invasion must have been manna from heaven, probably saving his organization.'' I can't think of any more powerful argument against the invasion and continued occupation of Iraq than what he said. General Odom did not just oppose the administration's policy. He offered a real alternative that could both end the conflict in Iraq and lay the foundation for regional peace. He said, ``No effective new strategy can be devised for the United States until it begins withdrawing its forces from Iraq. Withdrawal is the pre-condition for winning support from countries in Europe that have stood aside, and, other major powers including India, China, Japan, and Russia. It will also shock and change attitudes in Iran, Syria, and other countries on Iraq's borders making them more likely to take seriously new U.S. approaches to restoring regional stability.'' Everyone who knew General Odom knew that he was a tireless worker and a straight shooter. He continued to oppose war virtually up until the day that he died. Just 3 days before he passed away, an op-ed article he co-authored on Iran appeared in the Washington Post. The article opposed the drumbeat of war against Iran and offered a policy of diplomacy that can stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. I hope every Member of this House will read that article. General William Odom was a military man who worked hard for peace. If we had listened to him about Iraq in 2002, we could have saved tens of thousands of lives. I hope we will listen to his words now, because they can save many more lives in the future. General Odom was a great inspiration while he was alive, and I know that he will continue to inspire us in the days ahead. Current U.S. policy toward the regime in Tehran will almost certainly result in an Iran with nuclear weapons. The seemingly clever combination of the use of ``sticks'' and ``carrots,'' including the frequent official hints of an American military option ``remaining on the table,'' simply intensifies Iran's desire to have its own nuclear arsenal. Alas, such a heavy-handed ``sticks'' and ``carrots'' policy may work with donkeys but not with serious countries. The United States would have a better chance of success if the White House abandoned its threats of military action and its calls for regime change. Consider countries that could have quickly become nuclear weapon states had they been treated similarly. Brazil, Argentina and South Africa had nuclear weapons programs but gave them up, each for different reasons. Had the United States threatened to change their regimes if they would not, probably none would have complied. But when ``sticks'' and ``carrots'' failed to prevent India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States rapidly accommodated both, preferring good relations with them to hostile ones. What does this suggest to leaders in Iran? To look at the issue another way, imagine if China, a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a country that has deliberately not engaged in a nuclear arms race with Russia or the United States, threatened to change the American regime if it did not begin a steady destruction of its nuclear arsenal. The threat would have an arguable legal basis, because all treaty signatories promised long ago to reduce their arsenals, eventually to zero. The American reaction, of course, would be explosive public opposition to such a demand. U.S. leaders might even mimic the fantasy rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad regarding the use of nuclear weapons. A successful approach to Iran has to accommodate its security interests and ours. Neither a U.S. air attack on Iranian nuclear facilities nor a less effective Israeli one could do more than merely set back Iran's nuclear program. In either case, the United States would be held accountable and would have to pay the price resulting from likely Iranian reactions. These would almost certainly involve destabilizing the Middle East, as well as Afghanistan, and serious efforts to disrupt the flow of oil, at the very least generating a massive increase in its already high cost. The turmoil in the Middle East resulting from a preemptive attack on Iran would hurt America and eventually Israel, too. Given Iran's stated goals--a nuclear power capability but not nuclear weapons, as well as an alleged desire to discuss broader U.S.-Iranian security issues--a realistic policy would exploit this opening to see what it might yield. The United States could indicate that it is prepared to negotiate, either on the basis of no preconditions by either side (though retaining the right to terminate the negotiations if Iran remains unyielding but begins to enrich its uranium beyond levels allowed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty); or to negotiate on the basis of an Iranian willingness to suspend enrichment in return for simultaneous U.S. suspension of major economic and financial sanctions. Such a broader and more flexible approach would increase the prospects of an international arrangement being devised to accommodate Iran's desire for an autonomous nuclear energy program while minimizing the possibility that it could be rapidly transformed into a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, there is no credible reason to assume that the traditional policy of strategic deterrence, which worked so well in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and with China and which has helped to stabilize India-Pakistan hostility, would not work in the case of Iran. The widely propagated notion of a suicidal Iran detonating its very first nuclear weapon against Israel is more the product of paranoia or demagogy than of serious strategic calculus. It cannot be the basis for U.S. policy, and it should not be for Israel's, either. An additional longer-range benefit of such a dramatically different diplomatic approach is that it could help bring Iran back into its traditional role of strategic cooperation with the United States in stabilizing the Gulf region. Eventually, Iran could even return to its long-standing and geopolitically natural pre-1979 policy of cooperative relations with Israel. One should note also in this connection Iranian hostility toward al-Qaeda, lately intensified by al-Qaeda's Web-based campaign urging a U.S.- Iranian war, which could both weaken what al-Qaeda views as Iran's apostate Shiite regime and bog America down in a prolonged regional conflict. Last but not least, consider that American sanctions have been deliberately obstructing Iran's efforts to increase its oil and natural gas outputs. That has contributed to the rising cost of energy. An eventual American-Iranian accommodation would significantly increase the flow of Iranian energy to the world market. Americans doubtless would prefer to pay less for filling their gas tanks than having to pay much more to finance a wider conflict in the Persian Gulf.", u"Article XXIV.--SPYING ON AMERICAN CITIZENS, WITHOUT A COURT-ORDERED WARRANT, IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT In his conduct while President of the United States, George W. Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath to faithfully execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution ``to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,'' has both personally and acting through his agents and subordinates, knowingly violated the fourth Amendment to the Constitution and the Foreign Intelligence Service Act of 1978 (FISA) by authorizing warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens to wit: (1) The President was aware of the FISA Law requiring a court order for any wiretap as evidenced by the following: (A) ``Now, by the way, any time you hear the United States government talking about wiretap, it requires--a wiretap requires a court order. Nothing has changed, by the way. When we're talking about chasing down terrorists, we're talking about getting a court order before we do so.'' White House Press conference on April 20, 2004. [White House Transcript] (B) ``Law enforcement officers need a federal judge's permission to wiretap a foreign terrorist's phone, or to track his calls, or to search his property. Officers must meet strict standards to use any of the tools we're talking about.'' President Bush's speech in Baltimore Maryland on July 20th 2005. [White House Transcript] (2) The President repeatedly ordered the NSA to place wiretaps on American citizens without requesting a warrant from FISA as evidenced by the following: (A) ``Months after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without the court-approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying, according to government officials.'' New York Times article by James Risen and Eric Lichtblau on December 12, 2005. [NYTimes] (B) The President admits to authorizing the program by stating ``I have reauthorized this program more than 30 times since the September the 11th attacks, and I intend to do so for as long as our nation faces a continuing threat from al Qaeda and related groups. The NSA's activities under this authorization are thoroughly reviewed by the Justice Department and NSA's top legal officials, including NSA's general counsel and inspector general. Leaders in Congress have been briefed more than a dozen times on this authorization and the activities conducted under it.'' Radio Address from the White House on December 17, 2005. [White House Transcript] (C) In a December 19th 2005 press conference the President publicly admitted to using a combination of surveillance techniques including some with permission from the FISA courts and some without permission from FISA. Reporter: It was, why did you skip the basic safeguards of asking courts for permission for the intercepts? The President: . . . We use FISA still--you're referring to the FISA court in your question--of course, we use FISAs. But FISA is for long-term monitoring. What is needed in order to protect the American people is the ability to move quickly to detect. Now, having suggested this idea, I then, obviously, went to the question, is it legal to do so? I am--I swore to uphold the laws. Do I have the legal authority to do this? And the answer is, absolutely. As I mentioned in my remarks, the legal authority is derived from the Constitution, as well as the authorization of force by the United States Congress.'' [White House Transcript] (D) Mike McConnel, the Director of National Intelligence, in a letter to to Senator Arlen Specter, acknowledged that Bush's Executive Order in 2001 authorized a series of secret surveillance activities and included undisclosed activities beyond the warrantless surveillance of e-mails and phone calls that Bush confirmed in December 2005. ``NSA Spying Part of Broader Effort'' by Dan Eggen, Washington Post, 8/1/07. (3) The President ordered the surveillance to be conducted in a way that would spy upon private communications between American citizens located within the United States borders as evidenced by the following: (A) Mark Klein, a retired AT&T communications technician, submitted an affidavit in support of the Electronic Frontier Foundation's FF's lawsuit against AT&T. He testified that in 2003 he connected a ``splitter'' that sent a copy of Internet traffic and phone calls to a secure room that was operated by the NSA in the San Francisco office of AT&T. He heard from a co-worker that similar rooms were being constructed in other cities, including Seattle, San Jose, Los Angeles and San Diego. From ``Whistle-Blower Outs NSA Spy Room,'' Wired News, 4/7/06 [Wired] [EFF Case] (4) The President asserted an inherent authority to conduct electronic surveillance based on the Constitution and the ``Authorization to use Military Force in Iraq'' (AUMF) that was not legally valid as evidenced by the following: (A) In a December 19th, 2005 Press Briefing General Alberto Gonzales admitted that the surveillance authorized by the President was not only done without FISA warrants, but that the nature of the surveillance was so far removed from what FISA can approve that FISA could not even be amended to allow it. Gonzales stated ``We have had discussions with Congress in the past--certain members of Congress--as to whether or not FISA could be amended to allow us to adequately deal with this kind of threat, and we were advised that that would be difficult, if not impossible.''. (B) The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states ``The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'' (C) ``The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 unambiguously limits warrantless domestic electronic surveillance, even in a congressionally declared war, to the first 15 days of that war; criminalizes any such electronic surveillance not authorized by statute; and expressly establishes FISA and two chapters of the federal criminal code, governing wiretaps for intelligence purposes and for criminal investigation, respectively, as the ``exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.'' 50 U.S.C. 1811, 1809, 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(f).'' Letter from Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Tribe to John Conyers on 1/6/06. (D) In a December 19th, 2005 Press Briefing Attorney General Alberto Gonzales stated ``Our position is, is that the authorization to use force, which was passed by the Congress in the days following September 11th, constitutes that other authorization, that other statute by Congress, to engage in this kind of signals intelligence.'' (E) The ``Authorization to use Military Force in Iraq'' does not give any explicit authorization related to electronic surveillance. [HJRes114] (F) ``From the foregoing analysis, it appears unlikely that a court would hold that Congress has expressly or impliedly authorized the NSA electronic surveillance operations here under discussion, and it would likewise appear that, to the extent that those surveillances fall within the definition of ``electronic surveillance'' within the meaning of FISA or any activity regulated under Title III, Congress intended to cover the entire field with these statutes.'' From the ``Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information'' by the Congressional Research Service on January 5, 2006. (G) ``The inescapable conclusion is that the AUMF did not implicitly authorize what the FISA expressly prohibited. It follows that the presidential program of surveillance at issue here is a violation of the separation of powers--as grave an abuse of executive authority as I can recall ever having studied.'' Letter from Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Tribe to John Conyers on 1/6/06. (H) On August 17, 2006 Judge Anna Diggs Taylor of the United States District Court in Detroit, in ACLU v. NSA, ruled that the ``NSA program to wiretap the international communications of some Americans without a court warrant violated the Constitution. . . . Judge Taylor ruled that the program violated both the Fourth Amendment and a 1978 law that requires warrants from a secret court for intelligence wiretaps involving people in the United States. She rejected the administration's repeated assertions that a 2001 Congressional authorization and the president's constitutional authority allowed the program.'' From a New York Times article ``Judge Finds Wiretap Actions Violate the Law'' 8/18/06 and the Memorandum Opinion. (I) In July 2007, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case, ruling the plaintiffs had no standing to sue because, given the secretive nature of the surveillance, they could not state with certainty that they have been wiretapped by the NSA. This ruling did not address the legality of the surveillance so Judge Taylor's decision is the only ruling on that issue. [ACLU Legal Documents] In all of these actions and decisions, President George W. Bush has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and Commander in Chief, and subversive of constitutional government, to the prejudice of the cause of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States. Wherefore, President George W. Bush, by such conduct, is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting removal from office.", u"Mr. President, my distinguished counterpart, the Senator from Kentucky, Senator McConnell, held a press conference at 2:30, talking about what the Senate has not accomplished this year. I, of course, am very disappointed in that because I thought we had done a lot. I believe we have produced. The minority talk a lot about their desire to see this Congress pass meaningful legislation. They talk a lot about supporting our troops. We have heard a lot from them about the need to defeat terrorists and make the country more secure. Their actions do not match their rhetoric. In far too many instances, our Republican colleagues say one thing and do another. Last week, the 110th Congress reached its 100th day. In that time, the Senate has passed a series of bills that would move our country forward. With bipartisan support, we passed the toughest lobbying ethics reform legislation in the entire history of our country. With bipartisan support, we voted to give working Americans a much deserved and long overdue raise in the minimum wage. With bipartisan support, we passed a continuing resolution that enacted tough spending limits and eliminated earmarks for this year. With bipartisan support, we passed every single recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, after it languished in the Republican-controlled Congress for 2\\1/2\\ years. With bipartisan support, we passed a responsible, balanced, pay-as-you-go budget that reduces taxes for working Americans and invests more in education, veterans, and health care. With bipartisan support, we passed legislation that would fully fund our troops while forcing the President to change course in Iraq. And, last week, with bipartisan support, once again, we passed legislation to open the promise of stem cell research in a responsible and ethical way. The American people want Congress to put petty bickering aside. This is exactly what I believe this Congress has done. It has not been easy. My Republican colleagues have, time and time again, allowed a small minority in their caucus to block progress that the American people, and a bipartisan majority of the Senate, demand. On every piece of legislation I mentioned, we have had to file cloture. Sadly, on the most important issue facing our country, national security, this has been especially apparent. The minority forced us to come up with 60 votes to pass the 9/11 Commission recommendations. They required the same for the Iraq supplemental bill. Now it appears this same group of Republicans will attempt to block passage of the Intelligence Authorization bill, the bill they wrote when they were in the majority but failed to pass for 2 years. As everyone knows, the Intelligence Authorization bill funds the operation of 16 agencies of the U.S. intelligence community, including the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency, the Defense Department, and all the critical work they do in fighting the war on terror. We are so fortunate that we have bipartisan cooperation of the management of the Intelligence Committee. Senator Rockefeller and Senator Bond have worked closely together. They want this legislation to move forward. This should not be a partisan issue. We had to vote to get 60 votes to proceed to the legislation. I said at that time, if you want to offer amendments while we are in the 30 hours postcloture time, do it. Now I am told the ability for us to get on the bill is going to be thwarted by not allowing us to have 60 votes. I was upstairs this afternoon in room 407, getting a briefing on issues that are important to our country. It is so important that we move forward on this legislation and support our people who are making America safe and secure and protecting our interests all around the world. Sixteen agencies, I repeat, of the U.S. intelligence community want this legislation passed. We are in a battle around the world on terrorism. Shouldn't our intelligence community be able to move forward with this legislation? I repeat: It was written by the Republicans. Why would they not let us go forward on this legislation? Is it because--I don't know. Is it because Vice President Cheney thinks he is going to lose a little of his power directing everything covert that goes on in the intelligence community? Is he the one stopping this? Why? Why can't we pass legislation that was written by the Republicans to improve our intelligence operations? This legislation includes essential initiatives that would improve our efforts to fight terrorism and control weapons of mass destruction, enhance our intelligence collection capabilities, and strengthen intelligence oversight. Does anybody dispute that? For 27 years, since we first started doing an Intelligence bill, we passed it every year. But not the last 2 years. Blocking passage of the bill leaves Congress silent on these important matters, dealing with terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, intelligence collection capabilities, and intelligence oversight. It is so important to pass this bill. This is not a partisan issue. I don't think there are political points to be scored on either side. I hope my friends on the other side of the aisle will let this legislation go forward. We have a managers' amendment that Senator Rockefeller and Senator Bond worked on that would be accepted. I cannot imagine why we would be stopped on an Intelligence authorization. I have been told that the word is out, the Republicans are not going to support cloture on this most important bill. My friend, the distinguished Republican leader, pointed out this afternoon that we filed cloture a number of times this year. We surely have. We surely have, because there has been a minority of people on the other side who forced us to do this. The bills we passed have been bipartisan: Ethics/lobbying reform got a big bipartisan vote; minimum wage, big bipartisan vote; the continuing resolution, a big bipartisan vote--we had to do that to fund the Government--the 9/11 Commission recommendations, big bipartisan vote; stem cell, big bipartisan vote; the supplemental, a bipartisan vote. Sure, we have had to file cloture because there has been a minority of Senators on the other side who forced us to do that on these bipartisan bills. My friend, the minority leader, is right, we have filed cloture a number of times. The fact is, his side forced us to do so rather than let us proceed directly to these bills--and this bill. We have been forced to jump through a number of procedural hoops designed to block legislation that enjoyed bipartisan support. I will continue to do that. I understand the rights of just a few Senators and if a few Senators want to stop us from moving forward, that is fine. But to think that we couldn't get 10 Republicans to support us on a motion to invoke cloture on an Intelligence authorization bill? That is beyond my ability to comprehend, why the Republicans would stop us from moving forward on an Intelligence authorization bill. I have said they can offer amendments to the bill. Even though I thought it was absolutely wrong that we had to vote cloture on the motion to proceed, I said, during the 30 hours, if you want to offer amendments, go ahead and do so. ``No.'' This is not ethics reform, it is not minimum wage, it is not stem cell research, it is not the continuing resolution--it is the ability of our intelligence agencies to do their work: the CIA, FBI, NSA, Defense Department. I urge the minority to not stop this bill from going forward. The vote is at 5:30. But that is what I am told is going to happen. Their actions, if in fact they follow through on this, are not in the best interests of the American people. Anyone who has been told that they are being stymied from offering amendments is not being told the truth. We will continue to work in a bipartisan manner to move our country forward. The bills that passed this body so far this year have been bipartisan, with overwhelming support, and, yes, we did have to file cloture because a small number of people held us up from moving on this most important piece of legislation. I hope there will be people who will move away from this madding crowd who will not allow us to help these agencies do their work.", u"Mr. Speaker, as a proud member of the Progressive and the Out of Iraq Caucuses, I rise to announce that I will proudly cast my vote to override the President's veto of H.R. 1591, the ``U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans'' Health and Iraq Accountability Act.'' By vetoing the bipartisan Iraq Accountability Act last night, the President vetoed the will of the American people. The President vetoed a responsible funding bill for the troops that would have provided more funding for our troops and military readiness than even the President requested. By vetoing the Iraq Accountability Act, the President rejected a bill that reflects the will of the American people to wind down this war. By vetoing the Iraq Accountability Act, the President turned a deaf ear to the loud message sent by the American people last November. I will vote to override the President's veto because the Iraq Accountability Act offers us the first real chance to end the misguided invasion, war, and occupation of Iraq. It puts us on the glide path to the day when our troops come home in honor and triumph and where we can care for him who has borne the battle, and for his widow and orphan. This legislation helps to repair the damage to America's international reputation and prestige. It brings long overdue oversight, accountability, and transparency to defense and reconstruction contracting and procurement. Finally, it places the responsibility for bringing peace and security where it clearly belongs and that is squarely on the shoulders of the Iraqi government. Mr. Speaker, in vetoing the legislation, the President claimed the Iraq Accountability Act, H.R. 1591 would undermine our troops and threaten the safety of the American people here at home. Coming from an Administration that has been wrong on every important question relating to the decision to launch the Iraq War as well the conduct of it, this claim is laughable. It is nearly as ridiculous as the President's often stated claim of ``progress'' in Iraq. The facts, of course, are otherwise. The U.S. death toll in Iraq reached 104 for April--making it the deadliest month of the year and one of the deadliest of the entire war. It is therefore little wonder that nearly 70 percent of Americans disapprove of the way the President is handling the war. But more important, the President's claim that the Iraq Accountability Act undermines our troops and threatens the safety of the American people here at home is simply not true. Republican Senator Chuck Hagel recently returned from Iraq and paints a bleak picture: This thing is coming undone quickly, and [Prime Minister] Maliki's government is weaker by the day. The police are corrupt top to bottom. The oil problem is a huge problem. They still can't get anything through the parliament--no hydrocarbon law, no de-Baathification law, no provincial elections. Mr. Speaker, many of the Nation's most highly respected generals and several leading Republicans have endorsed H.R. 1591; all of them oppose the President's plan to escalate the war in Iraq. Take, for example, Maj. Gen. John Batiste, U.S. Army (Ret.): This important legislation sets a new direction for Iraq. It acknowledges that America went to war without mobilizing the nation, that our strategy in Iraq has been tragically flawed since the invasion in March 2003, that our Army and Marine Corps are at the breaking point with little to show for it, and that our military alone will never establish representative government in Iraq. The administration got it terribly wrong and I applaud our Congress for stepping up to their constitutional responsibilities. Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, USA, Ret. supports this legislation because it ``gives General Petraeus great leverage for moving the Iraqi government down the more disciplined path laid out by the Iraq Study Group.'' According to Major Eaton, the real audience for the timeline language is Prime Minister al-Maliki and the elected government of Iraq: The argument that this bill aides the enemy is simply not mature--nobody on the earth underestimates the United States' capacity for unpredictability. It may further create some sense of urgency in the rest of our government, beginning with the State Department. Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.), President Reagan's Director of the National Security Agency, supports the bill because it gives the President a chance to pull back from a disastrous course, re-orient U.S. strategy to achieve regional stability, and win help from many other countries--the only way peace will eventually be achieved. Mr. Speaker, to date, the war in Iraq has lasted longer than America's involvement in World War II, the greatest conflict in all of human history. But there is a difference. The Second World War ended in complete and total victory for the United States and its allies. But then again, in that conflict America was led by FDR, a great Commander-in-Chief, who had a plan to win the war and secure the peace, listened to his generals, and sent troops in sufficient numbers and sufficiently trained and equipped to do the job. As a result of the colossal miscalculation in deciding to invade Iraq, the loss of public trust resulting from the misrepresentation of the reasons for launching that invasion, and the breath taking incompetence in mismanaging the occupation of Iraq, the Armed Forces and the people of the United States have suffered incalculable damage. The war in Iraq has claimed the lives of 3,316 brave service men and women--64 in the first 16 days of this month. More than 24,912 Americans have been wounded, many suffering the most horrific injuries. American taxpayers have paid nearly $400 billion to sustain this misadventure. Mr. Speaker, it is time to hold the Bush Administration and the Iraqi government accountable. This bill's timetable and benchmarks finally hold the Iraqis accountable. As retired Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton has stated, This bill gives General Petraeus great leverage for moving the Iraqi government down the more disciplined path laid out by the Iraq Study Group. The real audience for the timeline language is Prime Minister al-Maliki and the elected government of Iraq. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates has noted that the timetable is helpful--and sends the message that ``the clock is ticking.'' Gates said ``The strong feelings expressed in the Congress about the timetable probably have had a positive impact. . . . in terms of communicating to the Iraqis that this is not an open-ended commitment.'' Mr. Speaker, in overriding the President's veto, this House will be doing the business and expressing the will of the American people. In the latest CBS News/New York Times poll, 64 percent of Americans favor a timetable that provides for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2008. In the same poll, 57 percent of Americans believe that Congress, not the President, should have the last say when it comes to setting troop levels in Iraq. Mr. Speaker, in overriding the President's veto, Congress is fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities and exercising the first check on the President's power in 6 years. As Iraq Study Group Co-Chairman Lee Hamilton has pointed out, The Founders of our Nation never envisioned an unfettered president making unilateral decisions about American lives and military power. They did indeed make the president the commander in chief, but they gave to Congress the responsibility for declaring war, for making rules governing our land and naval forces, for overseeing policy, and of course the ability to fund war or to cease funding it. Mr. Speaker, I urge all members to join me in overriding the President's veto of Iraq Accountability Act, H.R. 1591. This is the best way to ensure accountability to our soldiers who have been sent into battle without proper training or equipment or a clear mission. It is the best way to keep faith with our veterans who are not getting the best medical care when they come home. Overriding the President's veto is essential to restoring our military that is being stretched to the limits by the Bush policy. Last, it is absolutely necessary to regain the confidence of the American people who demand a new direction in Iraq.", u"Mr. Speaker, as a proud member of the Progressive and the Out of Iraq Caucuses, I rise to announce that I will proudly cast my vote in favor of H.R. 2206, the ``U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Act.'' By vetoing the bipartisan Iraq Accountability Act last week, the President vetoed the will of the American people. The President vetoed a responsible funding bill for the troops that would have provided more funding for our troops and military readiness than even the President requested. By vetoing the Iraq Accountability Act, the President rejected a bill that reflects the will of the American people to wind down this war. By vetoing the Iraq Accountability Act, the President turned a deaf ear to the loud message sent by the American people last November. The President demands a blank check to escalate the war in Iraq against the will of the Congress and the American people. The Constitution does not require it, he certainly has not earned it, and I am not prepared to give it to him. That is why I will proudly vote for The legislation crafted by the chairman of the Appropriations Committee in consultation with the leadership and the members of the Democratic Caucus offers us a real chance to end the misguided invasion, war, and occupation of Iraq. It puts us on the glide path to the day when our troops come home in honor and triumph and where we can ``care for him who has borne the battle, and for his widow and orphan.'' This legislation helps to repair the damage to America's international reputation and prestige. It brings long overdue oversight, accountability, and transparency to defense and reconstruction contracting and procurement. Finally, it places the responsibility for bringing peace and security where it clearly belongs and that is squarely on the shoulders of the Iraqi government. Mr. Speaker, in threatening to veto this legislation, the President claims it will ``undermine our troops and threaten the safety of the American people here at home.'' Coming from an administration that has been wrong on every important question relating to the decision to launch the Iraq war as well the conduct of it, this claim is laughable. It is nearly as ridiculous as the President's often stated claim of ``progress'' in Iraq. The facts, of course, are otherwise. The U.S. death toll in Iraq reached 104 for April--making it the deadliest month of the year and one of the deadliest of the entire war. It is therefore little wonder that nearly 70 percent of Americans disapprove of the way the President is handling the war. But more important, the President's claim that the Iraq Accountability Act undermines our troops and threatens the safety of the American people here at home is simply not true. Republican Senator Chuck Hagel recently returned from Iraq and paints a bleak picture: ``This thing is coming undone quickly, and [Prime Minister] Maliki's government is weaker by the day. The police are corrupt top to bottom. The oil problem is a huge problem. They still can't get anything through the parliament--no hydrocarbon law, no de-Baathification law, no provincial elections.'' Mr. Speaker, many of the Nation's most highly respected generals and several leading Republicans have endorsed the House Democratic majority's approach; all of them oppose the President's plan to escalate the war in Iraq. Take, for example, MG John Batiste, U.S. Army, (Ret.): This important legislation sets a new direction for Iraq. It acknowledges that America went to war without mobilizing the nation, that our strategy in Iraq has been tragically flawed since the invasion in March 2003, that our Army and Marine Corps are at the breaking point with little to show for it, and that our military alone will never establish representative government in Iraq. The administration got it terribly wrong and I applaud our Congress for stepping up to their constitutional responsibilities. MG Paul Eaton, USA, Ret. supports this legislation because it ``gives General Petraeus great leverage for moving the Iraqi government down the more disciplined path laid out by the Iraq Study Group.'' According to General Eaton, the real audience for the timeline language is Prime Minister al-Maliki and the elected government of Iraq: The argument that this bill aides the enemy is simply not mature--nobody on the earth underestimates the United States' capacity for unpredictability. It may further create some sense of urgency in the rest of our government, beginning with the State Department. LTG William E. Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.), President Reagan's Director of the National Security Agency, supports the bill because it ``gives the president a chance to pull back from a disastrous course, re-orient U.S. strategy to achieve regional stability, and win help from many other countries--the only way peace will eventually be achieved.'' Mr. Speaker, to date, the war in Iraq has lasted longer than America's involvement in World War II, the greatest conflict in all of human history. But there is a difference. The Second World War ended in complete and total victory for the United States and its allies. But then again, in that conflict America was led by FDR, a great Commander-in-Chief, who had a plan to win the war and secure the peace, listened to his generals, and sent troops in sufficient numbers and sufficiently trained and equipped to do the job. As a result of the colossal miscalculation in deciding to invade Iraq, the loss of public trust resulting from the misrepresentation of the reasons for launching that invasion, and the breathtaking incompetence in mismanaging the occupation of Iraq, the Armed Forces and the people of the United States have suffered incalculable damage. The war in Iraq has claimed the lives of 3,381 brave service men and women, 64 in the first 30 days of this month. More than 24,912 Americans have been wounded, many suffering the most horrific injuries. American taxpayers have paid nearly $400 billion to sustain this misadventure. Mr. Speaker, I support H.R. 2206 because it holds President Bush and the Iraqi government accountable--by fencing $52.8 billion of the $95.5 billion provided to the Defense Department until released by subsequent legislation. This bill requires the President to confront the realities of the Iraq war and take account of the facts on the ground. First, the bill requires the President to submit a report to Congress by July 13 regarding the success of the Iraqi Government in meeting security and political benchmarks. The President must report progress by the Iraqi Government in meeting key security benchmarks, articulated by Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki himself in January, including eliminating militia control of local security, I disarming the militias, and giving Iraqi Security Forces the authority to pursue all extremists, including Shiite militias. The legislation also requires the President to report on whether key political benchmarks, announced by President Bush himself in January have actually been accomplished by the Iraqi Government, relating to such issues as enacting a bill to equitably share oil revenue among all Iraqis, reforming current laws governing the de-Baathircation process, providing for provincial elections, and amending the constitution. Second, within 7 legislative days after receiving the report in July, both the House and Senate would vote on whether to release the remaining defense funds. Thus, the bill guarantees two votes by Congress in July. The first guaranteed vote is a vote on an amendment to the measure releasing the remaining defense funding, which would provide that this funding could only be used for planning and executing the redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq within 180 days of the bill's enactment, with only limited exceptions to this redeployment for troops for training and equipping Iraqi troops, targeted counterterrorism operations, and force protection. The second guaranteed vote is a vote on the underlying measure releasing the remaining defense funds. The bill contains expedited procedures to guarantee that the votes take place in both the House and Senate by the end of July. Mr. Speaker, it is time to hold the Bush administration and the Iraqi Government accountable. This bill's timetable and benchmarks finally hold the Iraqis accountable. As retired MG Paul Eaton has stated, ``This bill gives General Petraeus great leverage for moving the Iraqi government down the more disciplined path laid out by the Iraq Study Group. The real audience for the timeline language is Prime Minister al-Maliki and the elected government of Iraq. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates has noted that the timetable is helpful--and sends the message that ``the clock is ticking.'' Gates said ``The strong feelings expressed in the Congress about the timetable probably have had a positive impact . . . in terms of communicating to the Iraqis that this is not an open-ended commitment.'' Mr. Speaker, in passing H.R. 2206, this House will be doing the business and expressing the will of the American people. In the latest CBS News/New York Times poll, 64 percent of Americans favor a timetable that provides for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2008. In the same poll, 57 percent of Americans believe that Congress, not the President, should have the last say when it comes to setting troop levels in Iraq. Mr. Speaker, in passing H.R. 2206, Congress is fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities and exercising the first check on the President's power in 6 years. As Iraq Study Group Co-Chairman Lee Hamilton has pointed out, ``The founders of our nation never envisioned an unfettered president making unilateral decisions about American lives and military power. They did indeed make the president the commander in chief, but they gave to Congress the responsibility for declaring war, for making rules governing our land and naval forces, for overseeing policy, and of course the ability to fund war or to cease funding it.'' Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to join me in voting for H.R. 2206. This is the best way to ensure accountability to our soldiers who have been sent into battle without proper training or equipment or a clear mission. It is the best way to keep faith with our veterans who are not getting the best medical care when they come home. Passing this legislation is essential to restoring our military that is being stretched to the limits by the Bush policy. Last, it is absolutely necessary to regain the confidence of the American people who demand a new direction in Iraq.", u"Mr. President, I support the Senate fiscal year 2008 Commerce, Justice, Science and related agencies appropriations bill. This bipartisan bill increases funding for many important programs including some that aim to improve our Nation's innovation and manufacturing infrastructure. American companies can compete with any company in the world if we have a level playing field, but the problem is that our manufacturing companies often are not competing against foreign companies, but foreign governments. Two of the programs that have helped to give a boost to our manufacturing companies are the Advanced Technology Program, recently renamed the Technology Innovation Program, and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership. Unfortunately, the administration has cut funding for these programs in recent years. This bill turns that trend around by providing the necessary increased funding in fiscal year 2008 for both of these important programs. The bill increases funding for the National Institute for Standards and Technology, NIST, which administers the Advanced Technology Program, ATP. I have long fought for the Advanced Technology Program, and I believe we have achieved an important victory today. The ATP enables U.S. companies to develop the next generation of breakthrough technologies that allows our country to compete against foreign rivals who often employ large and effective programs to support their industries. The ATP invests Federal R&D resources in public-private partnerships, enhancing U.S. competitiveness by accelerating development, commercialization, and application of promising technologies, and by improving manufacturing techniques of small and medium-sized manufacturers. During Senate consideration of H.R. 2272, the 21st Century Competitiveness Act of 2007, the bill that authorizes NIST programs, I worked to build support for a more robust ATP program. The Energy and Natural Resources Committee chairman offered to support a funding increase for the ATP in the conference committee between the Senate and the House of Representatives, and with his support we were able to achieve a stronger ATP-like program. I was pleased that the final legislation that was signed into law adopted the Technology Innovation Program. This is a victory for innovation and manufacturing because the TIP Program is basically an improved version of the ATP program which retains many of ATP's best features while modifying the program to address past criticism. The TIP program will continue the excellent work that has been undertaken by ATP. Like the ATP, it will continue to bridge the gap between the research lab and the marketplace by providing cost-shared funding to small and medium-sized companies conducting high-risk R&D with broad commercial and societal benefits that would probably not be undertaken by the private sector because the risk is too great or because rewards to the private company would be insufficient to make it worth the investment. We have lost 3 million manufacturing jobs since January 2001. In the face of these losses and strong global economic competition, we should be doing all we can to promote programs that help create jobs and strengthen the technological innovation of American companies. I believe the TIP program is one way to give American companies resources they need in the important fight for American manufacturing to remain globally competitive. TIP allows for greater industry input in the operation of the program, allows university participation for the first time, and requires the lead grant recipient to be a small or medium-sized firm to address past criticism that grants went to large companies--joint ventures between smaller and larger companies will still be allowed. I am pleased this bill strongly supports the ATP/TIP program. A portion of the new funds must go toward funding new awards which guarantees there will be a new competition each year to fund high-risk groundbreaking research by some of America's most nimble and innovative small and medium-sized technology companies. The bill also increases funding for the Manufacturing Extension Partnership Program, MEP, providing $110 million in fiscal year 2008 to fund MEP centers and to fund a technology deployment pilot. The MEP co-funds a nationwide system of manufacturing support centers to assist small and midsized manufacturers modernize to compete in a demanding marketplace by providing technical assistance and helping small firms boost productivity, streamline operations, integrate new technologies and lower costs. The bill also provides important resources to combat illegal counterfeiting of America's innovation and products by providing an increase in funding for the FBI to enforce intellectual property laws and to the International Trade Administration, ITA, to improve enforcement of our trade agreements. Acknowledging the need to do more to fight against unfair foreign trade practices that result in our companies having to compete not against foreign companies but against foreign governments that are often illegally subsidizing their domestic industries at the expense of our industries, the bill provides important additional funding to the Department of Commerce's Import Administration which enforces U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws. This is especially timely since the Commerce Department recently agreed it should apply our countervailing duty law to imports from China, a non-market economy, and as a result, an increase in the number of subsidy cases is expected. I requested, and the bill provides, $2 million for the Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary and Underwater Preserve. The Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary is the only sanctuary designated in the Great Lakes, and it protects a significant collection of approximately 160 shipwrecks which span over a century of Great Lakes shipping history. The funding provided in this bill will be used for the completion of permanent displays for the facility's new visitor center as well as the acquisition of telepresence equipment. The Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary has been in existence since 2000, and the visitors center was only recently constructed. Therefore, it is important that the sanctuary construct exhibits for the new visitors center that educates visitors on the maritime history of the Great Lakes. Additionally, the Thunder Bay Sanctuary will have telepresence to allow students in classrooms across the country as well as visitors to the sanctuary, to see the actual shipwrecks at Thunder Bay through underwater cameras. I am pleased that my amendment to enhance the FBI National Name Check Program was included in the bill. The FBI National Name Check Program is used to run background checks on many who apply for immigration benefits, and those seeking employment with the U.S. Government, as well as other checks requested by the National Security Agency, other Government agencies, and some private users. Many immigrants who are applying for adjustment of status to legal permanent resident, applying for naturalization, asylum or a waiver end up waiting for months or years for the completion of the name check that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, CIS, or other agencies request from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI has recognized the flaws in this program. In 2003, Robert J. Garrity, Jr., then Acting Assistant Director of the Records Management Division of the FBI stated before the House Committee on Government Reform that, ``[t]he name check delays have significant consequences to FBI customers and stakeholders. The delays impede hiring or clearing skilled workers; completing government contracts; student enrollment, and . . . clearing requested visas for business visits to the United States. More importantly than all of the foregoing, these processing delays can also diminish counterterrorism effectiveness.'' In the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCIS, Ombudsman's 2007 Annual Report, Mr. Prakash Khatri, the USCIS Ombudsman, stated that ``the problem of long-pending FBI name check cases worsened'' since last year, with 93,358 more name check cases pending than last year for a total of 329,160 pending as of May 4, 2007. Around 31,000 cases have been pending for at least 33 months. This is unacceptable. If these individuals are a security threat, we must know that sooner rather than later. My amendment would help ensure that these important security checks are completed in a timely manner by requiring the FBI to report to Congress every year regarding progress made in improving the FBI's system of processing background checks and automating investigative files. This legislation restores vital law enforcement funding that has been decreasing for far too long. Although violent crime has increased over the past 25 years, the President has continued to propose reduced funding and the elimination of vital law enforcement programs. This bill appropriately restores that funding and reinforces our commitment to keeping our communities safe. For Michigan, the bill provides funding training programs for law enforcement personnel, computers for patrol vehicles and interoperable communications equipment. I am pleased that the Senate passed an amendment that I cosponsored that increases the drug court appropriation to $40 million. Drug courts intervene and break the cycle of substance abuse, addiction, and crime. They place substance abusing offenders under strict court monitoring and community supervision, coupled with effective, long-term treatment services, and I am pleased that we have appropriated adequate funding to continue these vital services. The Senate has put together a responsible bill that funds the programs that our citizens rely on, in spite of the fact that the President has threatened to veto it. I am hopeful that these funding levels will remain intact in conference.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3773, the ``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That Is Overseen, Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007.'' I support this legislation, the RESTORE Act, because it corrects the damage done by the misnamed Protect America Act and restores this Nation's commitment to the rule of law, the dignity of the individual, and the separation of powers. This legislation is worthy of an aye vote from all Members because it restores allegiance to the Constitution and gives our intelligence agencies all the tools they need to conduct the foreign surveillance necessary to keep our country safe. Mr. Speaker, in August of this year, I strongly opposed S. 1927, the so-called ``Protect America Act'' (PAA) when it came to a vote on the House floor. And I was a very reluctant supporter of H.R. 3356, the House alternative that attracted a majority of votes, but not a two-thirds super-majority, on the House floor. Had the Bush Administration and the Republican-dominated 109th Congress acted more responsibly in the two preceding years, we would not have been in the position of debating legislation that had such a profoundly negative impact on the national security and on American values and civil liberties in the crush of exigent circumstances. As that regrettable episode clearly showed, it is true as the saying goes that haste makes waste. The PAA was stampeded through the Congress in the midnight hour of the last day before the long August recess on the dubious claim that it was necessary to fill a gap in the Nation's intelligence gathering capabilities identified by Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell. But in reality it would have eviscerated the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution and represented an unwarranted transfer of power from the courts to the Executive Branch and a Justice Department led at that time by an Attorney General whose reputation for candor and integrity was, to put it charitably, subject to considerable doubt. The legislation before us, the RESTORE Act, H.R. 3773 is superior to the PAA by orders of magnitude. This is due in no small measure, Mr. Speaker, to the willingness of the leadership to reach out to and work with all members of the House. The result shows. The RESTORE Act does not weaken our Nation's commitment to its democratic traditions. Rather, it represents a sound policy proposal for achieving the only legitimate goals of a terrorist surveillance program, which is to ensure that American citizens and persons in America are secure in their persons, papers, and effects, but terrorists throughout the world are made insecure. Let me direct the attention of all members to several of the more important aspects of this salutary legislation. First, H.R. 3773 explicitly affirms that that the exclusive law to follow with respect to authorizing foreign surveillance gathering on U.S. soil is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). As initially enacted by Congress in 1978, the exclusivity of FISA was undisputed and unambiguous. I hasten to add, however, that while FISA remains the exclusive source of law, H.R. 3773 recognizes that the law as enacted in 1978 can and should be adapted to modern circumstances and to accommodate new technologies. And it does so by making clear that foreign to foreign communications are not subject to the FISA, even though modern technology enables that communication to be routed through the United States. Second, under H.R. 3773, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is indispensable and is accorded a meaningful role in ensuring compliance with the law. The bill ensures that the FISC is empowered to act as an Article III court should act, which means the court shall operate neither as a rubber-stamp nor a bottleneck. Rather, the function of the court is to validate the lawful exercise of executive power on the one hand, and to act as the guardian of individual rights and liberties on the other. Third, the bill does not grant amnesty to any telecommunications company or to any other entity or individual that helped Federal intelligence agencies spy illegally on innocent Americans. I strongly support this provision because granting such blanket amnesty for past misconduct will have the unintended consequence of encouraging telecommunications companies to comply with, rather than contest, illegal requests to spy on Americans. The only permissible path to legalization of conduct in this area is full compliance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Moreover, Mr. Speaker, it is important to point out that the loudest demands for blanket immunity comes not from the telecommunications companies but from the Administration, which raises the interesting question of whether the Administration's real motivation is to shield from public disclosure the ways and means by which government officials may have ``persuaded'' telecommunications companies to assist in its warrantless surveillance programs. I call my colleagues' attention to an article published in the Washington Post last Sunday, in which it is reported that Joseph Nacchio, the former CEO of Qwest, alleges that his company was denied NSA contracts after he declined in a February 27, 2001 meeting at Fort Meade with National Security Agency (NSA) representatives to give the NSA customer calling records. Mr. Speaker, the authorization to conduct foreign surveillance on U.S. soil provided by H.R. 3773 is temporary and will expire in 2 years if not renewed by the Congress. This is perhaps the single most important limitation on the authority conferred on the Executive Branch by this legislation. The good and sufficient reason for imposing this limitation is because the threats to America's security and the liberties of its people will change over time and thus require constant vigilance by the people's representatives in Congress. To give a detailed illustration of just how superior the RESTORE Act is to the ill-considered and hastily enacted Protect America Act, I wish to take a few moments to discuss an important improvement in the bill that was adopted in the full Judiciary Committee markup. The Jackson-Lee Amendment added during the markup made a constructive contribution to the RESTORE Act by laying down a clear, objective criterion for the Administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce in preventing reverse targeting. ``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the government targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to collect information on certain U.S. persons. One of the major concerns that libertarians and classical conservatives, as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, have with the PAA is that the understandable temptation of national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards in the PAA to prevent it. My amendment reduces even further any such temptation to resort to reverse targeting by requiring the administration to obtain a regular, individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the surveillance is a person in the United States. The amendment achieves this objective by requiring the administration to obtain a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person reasonably believed to be located in the United States.'' The current language in the bill provides that a warrant be obtained only when the Government ``seeks to conduct electronic surveillance'' of a person reasonably believed to be located in the United States. It was far from clear how the operative language ``seeks to'' is to be interpreted. In contrast, the language used in my amendment, ``significant purpose,'' is a term of art that has long been a staple of FISA jurisprudence and thus is well known and readily applied by the agencies, legal practitioners, and the FISA Court. Thus, the Jackson-Lee Amendment provides a clearer, more objective, criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce to prevent the practice of reverse targeting without a warrant, which all of us can agree should not be permitted. Let us be clear, Mr. Speaker, that nothing in the bill or in my amendment requires the Government to obtain a FISA order for every overseas target on the off chance that they might pick up a call into or from the United States. Rather, the bill requires, as our amendment makes clear, a FISA order only where there is a particular, known person in the United States at the other end of the foreign target's calls in whom the Government has a significant interest such that a significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire that person's communications. This will usually happen over time, and the Government will have the time to get an order while continuing its surveillance. And it is the national security interest to require it to obtain an order at that point, so that it can lawfully acquire all of the target person's communications rather than continuing to listen to only some of them. The Jackson-Lee amendment gives the Government precisely what Director of National Intelligence McConnell asked for when he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee: ``It is very important to me; it is very important to members of this Committee. We should be required--we should be required in all cases to have a warrant anytime there is surveillance of a US [sic] person located in the United States.'' In short, the Jackson-Lee amendment makes a good bill even better. For this reason alone, civil libertarians should enthusiastically embrace the RESTORE Act. Nearly 2 centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville, who remains the most astute student of American democracy, observed that the reason democracies invariably prevail in any martial conflict is because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that are indispensable to martial success: initiative, innovation, resourcefulness, and courage. Mr. Speaker, the best way to win the war on terror is to remain true to our democratic traditions. If it retains its democratic character, no nation and no loose confederation of international villains will defeat the United States in the pursuit of its vital interests. Thus, the way forward to victory in the war on terror is for the United States country to redouble its commitment to the Bill of Rights and the democratic values, which every American will risk his or her life to defend. It is only by preserving our attachment to these cherished values that America will remain forever the home of the free, the land of the brave, and the country we love.", u"Madam President, I wish to take this time to talk a little bit about the FISA bill we are considering today. I heard my friend from Alabama talk about the work that is being done at the National Security Agency. I have also taken the opportunity to visit with NSA to see firsthand the work they are doing. It wasn't my first visit. NSA, as my colleagues know, is located in Maryland. I have been there on numerous occasions. I had an opportunity to observe the manner in which our security intelligence agencies operate, and I must tell my colleagues these men and women are dedicated public servants doing a great job on behalf of their country and trying to get it done right. They are trying to do it the way it is supposed to be done and complying with laws, but they need the right legal basis, and it is our responsibility in Congress to get the statutes right to allow them to obtain the information they need in order to keep us safe. There is a right way of doing it. Congress needs to get this bill done right. We passed this bill in a hurry in August. We didn't have an opportunity at that time to review the classified information about the advice that was given in regard to the collection of data. Since that time, some of us have had that opportunity. I regret all of us have not had that opportunity. I have taken advantage of that opportunity as a member of the Judiciary Committee, and I have seen the information. I have seen the opinions of counsel. I have seen the information the telecommunications companies operated under. I have had a chance to review that information. It makes it a lot easier for me now to evaluate what we should do. I will tell my colleagues I wish to get this bill done. I think it is important that our intelligence community have the legal authority to be able to intercept communications that are foreign to foreign. That was the basic reason why they asked for us to modify the FISA law, because technology changed and we had a lot of foreign-to-foreign communications. But it was through facilities that were located within the jurisdiction of the United States; therefore, the FISA laws applied. The administration thought originally they didn't apply, but then the court said: Hey, wait a minute. Read the statute. It does apply. You have to come to Congress and get it done right. That is why they came to us. They wouldn't have come to us if the courts didn't demand they come to us. Now it is our responsibility to get the statute right. I wish to thank Senator Rockefeller and Senator Bond for the work they did in the Intelligence Committee. I serve on the Judiciary Committee. I can tell my colleagues, Senator Leahy, Senator Specter, and every member of our committee has taken our responsibility very seriously to try to understand the circumstances. But I can tell my colleagues it is important we modify the bill that has come out of the Intelligence Committee. I call my colleagues' attention to the work of the Judiciary Committee because we wanted to make sure the bill we recommended gives the intelligence community the tools they need, particularly as it relates to foreign-to-foreign communications but also protects the constitutional rights of the citizens of our own country, and it will be defensible before our courts. That is our responsibility. I think we got it right. So we are going to see some differences between these two bills, besides the big difference which is the immunity. I am going to get to the retroactive immunity in a moment. However, there are other differences which are very important, including exclusivity, to make it clear this statute controls so the administration can't say: Well, we have additional authority and we are going to do it our way, regardless of what the Congress says. That is an important provision. It is in the Senate bill. We need to make sure it is in the final bill that is sent to the President. There are other provisions that are important that are in the Senate bill but not in the House bill: Changes in minimization rules; changes in how--when we target an American overseas--we do, in fact, get appropriate court authorization to do it. I thank Senator Whitehouse for his contributions in that regard. These might be technical changes, but they are important to make sure they get into the bill that is finally passed and sent to the President. Let me talk for a moment, if I might, about the retroactive immunity because there has been a lot of conversation about retroactive immunity. I oppose retroactive immunity. I think it is the wrong way to help the carriers. Retroactive immunity, to me, violates our responsibility to respect each branch of Government. I want the courts to be able to look at what the executive branch is doing. I want the courts to protect individual rights. I think that when we start looking at retroactive immunity, we start violating the basic separation of powers. I must tell my colleagues that the telecommunications carriers that cooperated with the Government, believing that the authority was there and operating in good faith, are entitled to relief. But they shouldn't be given retroactive immunity. There are other suggestions which have been made. I hope my colleagues will listen to some of the amendments that are being offered. Senator Specter has an amendment that I call to the attention of my colleagues. Because if you believe that Government is responsible--and I have heard many of my colleagues say this--that if the Government was wrong, let them be sued and held accountable. That is exactly what Senator Specter's amendment does. It substitutes the Government for the carriers in the same position that the carriers would be so we can get the protection of the courts and the carriers get the protection they need, and the Government can control the case for national security purposes. It seems to be a compromise that if, in fact, the carriers were operating in good faith, then let the Government be there to take its responsibility in this matter. I call my colleagues' attention to another amendment offered by Senator Feinstein. I think it is a good amendment on this issue. It may be able to help us in trying to find common ground. Her amendment says: Look, the bill we passed that is supported by the Intelligence Committee--the bill we passed last August, now amended by the Intelligence Committee, would say: OK, we are going to grant retroactive immunity, and guess who is going to make the decision as to whether the carrier operated in good faith according to law. It is going to be the Attorney General, the administration. Well, to me, that doesn't sound quite objective. After all, we know it was the Attorney General who gave the advice. So at least let's have an objective review. The Feinstein amendment says: Let the FISA Court, which was set up for this purpose and which has the expertise in this area, make the judgment as to whether the carriers followed the law in good faith. Because I tell my colleagues, if they did, I believe they are entitled to relief. I do. But I don't think we should strip the court of its jurisdiction in solving that problem. I think there are better ways to do it. I urge my colleagues to look at the work of the Judiciary Committee because I think they will find some help in a product that will be submitted vis-a-vis amendments as we consider this legislation. I wish to mention one additional item I am going to bring to the attention of my colleagues, and that is an amendment I offered in the Judiciary Committee that was approved and one I hope will have bipartisan support: A 4-year sunset on the legislation. Why do I want to see this sunset in 4 years? The Intelligence bill has 6 years. I want the next administration to focus on this issue. I want them to come to Congress and cooperate with us on how they are using this power. It is interesting we have gotten tremendous cooperation, since August, from the administration because they knew they had to come back here in February, so we got their cooperation. We got the information we needed. But I don't know if we are going to see any information from the next administration. When they know they have the authority during the entire time, they don't have to come back to us. So I hope this 4-year sunset provision will be agreed to by all of us, so this Congress can exercise its appropriate oversight as to how this administration and the next administration use this extraordinary power. FISA is extraordinary power. These are secret courts. These aren't courts that issue written opinions that people can attend. These are secret courts, in order to protect the security of America but also the rights of the people of our Nation. They should at least have the ability for Congress to exercise appropriate oversight responsibility. A 4-year sunset will give us that opportunity in the next administration, and I hope that will be improved. So this is an important bill. This is a bill I hope will reach the President's desk and will be signed into law. But let's make sure we get it right. Let's make sure it is legislation we are proud of to protect the safety of the people of America and our civil liberties and legislation that can withstand the review of our courts as to constitutionality. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, last night I was in my office in the Russell Senate Office Building and we were evacuated to the parking deck, and following the excellent leadership of the Capitol Police, people responded professionally and well without any undue alarm and showed good discipline and good spirits. I point that out to ask, have we forgotten there is an enemy out there who desires to attack us, desires to attack our Nation's Capitol, or any other spot in our country, desires to cause us harm, and that we are spending billions of dollars, that some of the best people in this country are working night and day, like our Capitol Police, in localities all over this country to protect us? From local sheriffs, police officers, State police officers, the FBI, the CIA, the Customs Service, the Immigration Service, to all the agencies that are involved in protecting us, they are out there working their hearts out, and sometimes I think we in this body have gotten too comfortable about this. We have been the subject of a declaration of war by al-Qaida. Bin Laden has declared war on the United States. He has asserted it is his right and, indeed, the duty of his followers to attack Americans and even civilian targets, men, women and children. We have authorized the U.S. Government, the President, and the executive branch to exercise certain rights because it is war. It is not a criminal matter. If we capture our enemies, they are not entitled to a trial in the southern district of New York because they are prisoners of war. They are entitled to be held without trial as every prisoner of war since the beginning of the Republic and the rules of war have been instituted. They are held without trial. In the Hamdi case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that even an American citizen engaged in the war against the United States can be held without trial as an enemy combatant against the United States because it is not a criminal matter. A state has one primary responsibility, and that is to maintain its existence against those forces that would destroy it. I would ask if anyone thinks we would have any liberties at all if bin Laden ran this country. He would tell you what clothes to put on in the morning. We would have people not only not being free, they wouldn't be able to drive an automobile--women would not be--under his mentality. This is a serious question, and we need to respond to the challenge to this country in an effective way consistent with our heritage of laws and liberties. There is no doubt about that. Secretary Rumsfeld has pointed out recently something that is so obvious, but we should think about it. He said the military challenge today is to find, fix, and finish the enemy. He said there is no doubt if we target and develop a plan, we can finish them successfully. We have that military capability. There is no military in the world capable of destroying the military of this United States. I ask you to remember what we heard after 9/11. What we heard was our intelligence is weak. What we heard was we did not have enough intelligence, that we did not have enough information to find the enemy; that they had sleeper cells in this country and those sleeper cells were activated by phone calls from Afghanistan and bin Ladin over here to encourage them to step forward to carry out the events that led to September 11. Isn't that what happened? And we had this spasm of self-flagellation about intelligence and how we operate our intelligence community. Our job unfortunately was based on the fact that there were failures and we could have done better, had we had interceptions of some of those 18 responsible for 9/11 prior to 9/11, that if we had been able to listen to those conversations, we could well possibly have taken steps to avoid that and 3,000 American citizens would have civil liberties today. Now they have none because they are no longer with us. We have to ask those questions and go back and look at the history of our country and what is the legitimate power of the President and our forces in a time of war. What do our intelligence leaders tell us about the capability of the National Security Agency as it has dealt with the ability to intercept international phone calls involving al-Qaida members? What do they tell us? What do all three of our top intelligence people say? The National Intelligence Director John Negroponte testified last Thursday before the Intelligence Committee and he stated: This was not about domestic surveillance. It was about dealing with the international terrorist threat in the most agile and effective way possible. FBI Director Robert Mueller testified last Thursday as well, stating to the Senate Intelligence Committee: We get a number of leads from the NSA from a number of programs, including the program that's under discussion today. The FBI Director is saying we get a number of leads from this program under discussion today. And I can say that leads from that program have been valuable in identifying would-be terrorists in the United States, individuals who were providing material support to terrorists. Let me interject here. I was a Federal prosecutor for a long time. I dealt with a lot of drug gangs and some organized crime-type groups. They are pretty close-knit organizations. Sometimes you don't even know they exist. Then all of a sudden you have the ability to identify them and penetrate the organization and gain information against them, and all of a sudden you realize right in your own community there is a major drug-dealing gang or a major organized crime network. So one tip, one lead from an intercepted phone call, can identify a sleeper cell in any community in America. I kid you not. That is the way law enforcement works. How do you get a warrant to surveil the sleeper cell of terrorists in the United States? Oftentimes it is this kind of intercept on a national security call from foreign sources here that causes us to have the information that leads to the identification of a group bent on destroying our country. CIA Director Porter Goss testified to the Intelligence Committee: I'm sorry to tell you-- And I hope the American people listen to this-- I'm sorry to tell you that the damage has been very severe to our capabilities to carry out our mission. . . . I use the words ``very severe'' intentionally. That is my belief and I think the evidence will show that. He is talking about the revealing to the world our intelligence capabilities at NSA. He goes on to say: When I start talking about the disruption to our plans, things that we have under way that are being disrupted because of releases to the press or public discussion; when I talk about the risk to access, the sources or methods that are no longer viable or usable or less effective by a large degree; when I talk about the erosion of confidence in our working partners overseas, I'm stung to the quick when I get questions from my professional counterparts saying, ``Mr. Goss, can't you Americans keep a secret?'' How can we expect them to share intelligence with us if you pick it up in the newspapers? How can we have techniques of this kind and have them leaked to the press? I would say it is time for us to reevaluate how we do business. It is time for us to realize that we are in a war and that we are entitled to conduct that war and to win that war. Our military and our intelligence agencies have been charged by us--indeed, they have been criticized by us for not being effective enough in this effort. I will conclude. I see my colleague from Missouri is here, and he knows this issue very well. I would like to yield to him. I will conclude with this thought: Please note, Americans, that our military and intelligence agencies have every right to intercept foreign phone calls between two foreign sources. That has never been in dispute. The question we have is whether the authorization of force and the inherent power of the President allows warrantless surveillance of an international call that is connected to the group we are at war with, al-Qaida, that calls into the United States. To say we can't do that will lead to this weird result. We intercept an international phone call that has not been connected to the United States and we discover information that they are planning an attack on France, we can call France and tell them. If they have a plan that we discover that they are going to attack Canada, we can call them and warn them--or New Zealand or Mexico or any other of our allies and friends around the world. But if the call is into the United States from al-Qaida, we can't intercept that call, we can't use that capability to defend Americans. I believe that is not logical. The American people don't agree with it. They support and expect our military to carry on these activities. I hope and I believe they will be continued. Why do I believe they will be continued? Because despite the fact that we have told the world of this capability and severely damaged our capability, not one Member of this Congress that I know of has said we should stop it. If it is so evil and bad, why do they say it does not need to be stopped? I thank the Chair and yield the floor.", u"Mr. Speaker, on Wednesday February 15, 2006, a briefing was conducted in the Canon Caucus room of the U.S. House of Representatives. Entitled: Iran: Threats, Challenges and Prospects For Change, the briefing was sponsored by bipartisan group of Members of Congress. During this event speakers assessed the current situation in Iran, the Iranian nuclear threat and the status of the Iranian opposition group, the MEK. I would like to take this opportunity to share with all of my colleagues my opening statement and some of the highlights from the remarks of the panelists: I would like to begin by thanking all of the Iranian Americans who have traveled to Capitol Hill today to hear the views of our expert panelists. I also want to thank my fellow members of Congress who are here with us in support of this event. Let me start by recognizing Tom Tancredo of Colorado, thank you for being here, and also Congressman Boozman of Arkansas. Can we give them both a hand for their participation [applause]. I also want to thank our distinguished panelists for taking the time to share their insights and understanding of current events in Iran. It is critically important that all Americans understand the true nature of the grave threat posed by the radical extremists, anti American regime in Tehran. We're facing a very dangerous crisis with Iran today. The Iranian government is sponsoring terrorism, developing nuclear weapons, meddling in the future of Iraq and violating the fundamental human rights of their own people. The world community cannot afford to allow the Iranian mullahs to continue to be a regional threat or to grow into a nuclear threat. For too many years we have done nothing to help the Iranian people--inside and outside of Iran--in their struggle for democracy. For too many years we have tolerated terrorism and violence from Iranian extremists. It is time to take action. If we fail to take action against the mullahs meddling in Iraq we risk the future of the Iraqi people and we may find that the Iranian regime and not the Iraqi people were the real winners of the Iraq war. U.S. policies toward Iran have failed to achieve our goals. While many advocate more dialogue with Tehran our time is running short. We must seize the opportunity to aid the people of Iran and it is time to give support to the Iranian people who have longed for democracy for more than a quarter of a century. I am troubled by the strategy of our government and the insistence that the Iranian government and the Iranian opposition, the MEK are equal threats to peace and freedom. There is no logic in this reasoning and it is undermining our foreign policies. The U.S. must exercise a genuine commitment to helping the Iranian people overcome the oppressive regime that despises democratic principles and denies fundamental human rights. I commend all who are working today for the sake of human rights, peace and democracy in the Middle East. I share your vision of a free and peaceful Iranian nation. The first panelist to address the briefing was Professor Raymond Tanter the former member of the National Security Agency and the President of Iran Policy Committee. His statement began: Please allow me to cut to the chase and begin with my conclusions: Coercive diplomacy, military action, and regime change for Iran are three options for the international community. Rather than sliding into military action as coercive diplomacy also fails, it is time to consider regime change for Iran. Because the only possibility to carry out regime change is via the groups feared by the regime in Tehran, the United States should remove their terrorist designation. Coercive diplomacy combines threat of force with promise of diplomacy. For several years, the European Union pursued a policy of promise without threat, ostensibly in order to bolster the fortunes of moderates like former President Mohammad Khatami relative to the likes of the Supreme Leader and President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Rather than reinforcing the moderates, however, there has been a consolidation of power under the Supreme Leader and his selected President Ahmadinejad. Professor Tanter went on to say: President Bush should issue a Finding or Presidential Directive authorizing all appropriate measures to effect regime change in Iran The next panelist to address the conference was Ms. Lynn Derbyshire who is a representative of victims of terrorism in Beirut She recently testified in the U.S. Congress against the Mullah's regime support of terrorism. She started her remarks with the story of her brother who was killed in Beirut by the Iranian regime. Ms. Derbyshire then explained that placing the Iranian Resistance in the terrorist list was a present to the clerical regime in Iran. She said: ``Ahmadinejad, not Iranian Resistance, is a terrorist.'' She continued on saying that ``Iranian and American people basically want the same thing. They all want to put a stop on terrorism.'' Lt. General Tom McInerney (USAF, ret.), former Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and an IPC Co-Chair, also addressed the briefing. He examined the military option toward Iran: and said: The United States has the ability to target the known nuclear sites of Iran and delay its nuclear weapons program. With such capability in hand and in the context of failing diplomacy, we should leave the military option on the table. General McInerney added: However, military alternatives have risks, which suggest that choosing the military option should be a last resort. Prior to taking military action, it is important to begin a regime change clock. McInerney concluded: Regime change begins when the Great Powers remove Iranian opposition groups from so-called terrorist lists. I favor removing of the Mujahedeen-e Khalq from such lists; empowering the Iranian people by recognizing their main opposition groups; building an Arab political coalition to support these opposition groups; and eroding the legitimacy of Tehran regime to point where it collapses in face of determined efforts of the Iranian people working through dissidents and exiles. The next speaker to address the briefing was Mr. Bruce McColm, President, Institute for Democratic Strategies, a non-profit organization committed to strengthening democratic processes abroad. In his remarks he asked: Can we imagine one day saying that Iran is an island of democratic stability in a turbulent region? We can if we help the Iranian people stand up and demand a greater say in their government and in their own lives. He continued: Since the days of the Iranian Revolution, we in the West have viewed the Iranian people as victims of a repressive regime. Some thought the period of the Khatami Presidency could usher in much-needed reforms, a little more respect for basic human rights, and possibly the day when a democracy could be established and the Iranian people could take their rightful place in the world community. The election--I mean, selection--of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President should dispel this illusion once and for all. He stated: Now is the time when we should stop looking at Iranians as victims and use our considerable resources to empower this talented civilization so it can create the free, prosperous society their considerable talents are capable of. McColm also said: If we are serious about regime change in Iran, what can be done? He talked about the bills passed in the Congress that are necessary first steps to send the proper signal to Tehran that there is a new day dawning and their day is ending. He explained: Attempts by the United States and the European Union to placate the leadership of Iran by placing the MEK on the proscribed list of terrorist organizations should end. It is way past time to take back lran's lone diplomatic victory over the past fifteen years. De-List the MEK and the NCRI now. It is the right thing to do. He also said: Before his recent execution, MEK activist, 30-year old Hojjat Zamani wrote Kofi Annan a letter to encourage the United Nations investigation of the status of the families of political prisoners in Iran. He was too aware that the Iranian regime has been adroit in blackmailing families of those involved in activities considered contrary to the regime. This practice continues to this day. The international community should create a fund in Zamani's name to subsidize the families of political prisoners so as to alleviate their financial suffering. The last speaker was Mr. Nasser Rashidi who showed a picture of the Mojahedin member, Hojjat Zamani and announced his execution by the Iranian regime which took place on February 7th. He highly praised all the political prisoners and said that the people of Iran are determined to bring freedom and democracy back to their homeland no matter what price they have to pay. Mr. Rashidi said that the people of Iran have already sacrificed 120,000 of their best children who have been executed to bring freedom to their country and they will pay even more. He continued as saying: It is a mistake to believe that only one individual in the ruling elite is aiming to wipe another country off the map. The colossal mistake is to name the enemy as the individual called Ahmadinejad and not the ideology. The rulers of Iran are representing an ideology that is called ``Islamic Fundamentalism'', or sometimes is called ``Islamic Extremism.'' He said that many members of both chambers have expressed their opposition to the designation of MEK as an FTO. He thanked the many congressional advisors and staff present at the meeting for supporting the Iranian people and their resistance. He then pointed out the latest news conference held by Mrs. Maryam Rajavi in Auver-sur-Oise, France where she said: At the conclusion of the three hour briefing reporters interviewed the panelists about the Iranian threat.", u" Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred, as follows: H.R. 5399. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to eliminate the Medicare prescription drug late enrollment penalty for months during 2006, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. McCRERY (for himself, Mr. Allen, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Porter, and Mr. Boozman): H.R. 5400. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to permit States to obtain reimbursement under the Medicaid Program for care or services required under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act that are provided in a nonpublicly owned or operated institution for mental diseases; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mrs. EMERSON (for herself, Mr. Skelton, Mr. Rehberg, Mr. Cleaver, Mr. Holt, Mr. Hulshof, Mr. Moore of Kansas, and Mr. Osborne): H.R. 5401. A bill to amend section 308 of the Lewis and Clark Expedition Bicentennial Commemorative Coin Act to make certain clarifying and technical amendments; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. CONAWAY: H.R. 5402. A bill to provide for the establishment of a partnership between the Secretary of Energy and appropriate industry groups for the creation of a transportation fuel conservation education campaign, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. DeLAY (for himself, Mr. Herger, Mr. Stark, Mr. Camp of Michigan, Ms. Norton, Ms. Hart, Mr. Cardoza, and Mr. English of Pennsylvania): H.R. 5403. A bill to improve protections for children and to hold States accountable for the safe and timely placement of children across State lines, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. DUNCAN (by request): H.R. 5404. A bill to authorize the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to advance cooperative conservation efforts, to reduce barriers to the formation and use of partnerships to enable Federal environmental stewardship agencies to meet the conservation goals and obligations of the agencies, to promote remediation of inactive and abandoned mines, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, and Resources, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. FEENEY (for himself, Mr. Meeks of New York, Mr. Sessions, Mrs. Miller of Michigan, Mr. Hensarling, Mr. Jones of North Carolina, Ms. Foxx, Mr. Garrett of New Jersey, Mr. Stearns, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Wicker, Mr. Royce, Mr. Pence, and Mr. Flake): H.R. 5405. A bill to reduce the burdens of the implementation of section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. GINGREY: H.R. 5406. A bill to suspend the visa waiver program until certain entry-exit control requirements are met, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mrs. LOWEY: H.R. 5407. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand deductions allowed for education-related expenses and to allow an earned tuition credit against income tax for qualified tuition and related expenses; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. McCOLLUM of Minnesota (for herself and Mr. Oberstar): H.R. 5408. A bill to urge the Government of the Republic of Armenia to resolve the murder case of Joshua Haglund, a United States citizen, in Yerevan, Armenia, and to fund scholarships at the University of Minnesota in the memory of Joshua Haglund for study abroad and diversity training; to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mrs. MYRICK: H.R. 5409. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to require that the Commissioner of Social Security notify individuals of improper use of their social security account numbers; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. NORTON: H.R. 5410. A bill to provide for the treatment of the District of Columbia as a State for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives and Senate, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. PEARCE: H.R. 5411. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Interior to establish a demonstration program to facilitate landscape restoration programs within certain units of the National Park System established by law to preserve and interpret resources associated with American history, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Resources. By Mr. REYES (for himself, Mr. Kolbe, Mr. Ortiz, Mr. Doggett, Mr. Grijalva, and Mr. Filner): H.R. 5412. A bill to establish grant programs to improve the health of border area residents and for bioterrorism preparedness in the border area, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on International Relations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. SENSENBRENNER (for himself and Mr. Conyers): H.R. 5413. A bill to make improvements in the codification of title 46, United States Code; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. SENSENBRENNER (for himself and Mr. Conyers): H.R. 5414. A bill to enact certain laws relating to public contracts as title 41, United States Code, ``Public Contracts''; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. GERLACH: H. Con. Res. 402. Concurrent resolution requiring certain committees of Congress to review and evaluate the activities and progress of the Government of Iraq in securing and stabilizing Iraq; to the Committee on Rules. By Mr. HINCHEY (for himself, Mrs. Bono, and Mrs. Capps): H. Con. Res. 403. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress with regard to the importance of Women's Health Week, which promotes awareness of diseases that affect women and which encourages women to take preventive measures to ensure good health; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mrs. LOWEY: H. Con. Res. 404. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress concerning contraceptives for women; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Ms. McKINNEY: H. Con. Res. 405. Concurrent resolution opposing any agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Nigeria to deploy United States Armed Forces to Nigeria; to the Committee on International Relations. By Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi: H. Con. Res. 406. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the needs of children affected by major disasters are unique and should be given special consideration in conducting disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Mr. WEXLER: H. Res. 819. A resolution requesting the President and directing the Attorney General to submit to the House of Representatives all documents in the possession of the President and the Attorney General relating to requests made by the National Security Agency and other Federal agencies to telephone service providers requesting access to telephone communications records of persons in the United States and communications originating and terminating within the United States without a warrant; to the Committee on the Judiciary.", u" Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred, as follows: By Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut (for herself, Mr. Shaw, Mr. Shays, Mr. Ramstad, Mr. Ferguson, Mr. Simmons, Mr. Tiberi, Mr. Foley, Mr. English of Pennsylvania, Mr. Tom Davis of Virginia, Mr. Castle, Mr. Sweeney, Mrs. Kelly, Mr. Rehberg, Mr. Sherwood, Mr. Leach, Mr. Gerlach, Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia, Mr. Dent, Mr. Bass, Mr. Boehlert, Mr. Upton, Mr. Kirk, Mr. Schwarz of Michigan, Mr. Porter, and Mr. Bilirakis): H.R. 5399. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to eliminate the Medicare prescription drug late enrollment penalty for months during 2006, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. McCRERY (for himself, Mr. Allen, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Porter, and Mr. Boozman): H.R. 5400. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to permit States to obtain reimbursement under the Medicaid Program for care or services required under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act that are provided in a nonpublicly owned or operated institution for mental diseases; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mrs. EMERSON (for herself, Mr. Skelton, Mr. Rehberg, Mr. Cleaver, Mr. Holt, Mr. Hulshof, Mr. Moore of Kansas, and Mr. Osborne): H.R. 5401. A bill to amend section 308 of the Lewis and Clark Expedition Bicentennial Commemorative Coin Act to make certain clarifying and technical amendments; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. CONAWAY: H.R. 5402. A bill to provide for the establishment of a partnership between the Secretary of Energy and appropriate industry groups for the creation of a transportation fuel conservation education campaign, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. DeLAY (for himself, Mr. Herger, Mr. Stark, Mr. Camp of Michigan, Ms. Norton, Ms. Hart, Mr. Cardoza, and Mr. English of Pennsylvania): H.R. 5403. A bill to improve protections for children and to hold States accountable for the safe and timely placement of children across State lines, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. DUNCAN (by request): H.R. 5404. A bill to authorize the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to advance cooperative conservation efforts, to reduce barriers to the formation and use of partnerships to enable Federal environmental stewardship agencies to meet the conservation goals and obligations of the agencies, to promote remediation of inactive and abandoned mines, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, and Resources, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. FEENEY (for himself, Mr. Meeks of New York, Mr. Sessions, Mrs. Miller of Michigan, Mr. Hensarling, Mr. Jones of North Carolina, Ms. Foxx, Mr. Garrett of New Jersey, Mr. Stearns, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Wicker, Mr. Royce, Mr. Pence, and Mr. Flake): H.R. 5405. A bill to reduce the burdens of the implementation of section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. GINGREY: H.R. 5406. A bill to suspend the visa waiver program until certain entry-exit control requirements are met, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mrs. LOWEY: H.R. 5407. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand deductions allowed for education-related expenses and to allow an earned tuition credit against income tax for qualified tuition and related expenses; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. McCOLLUM of Minnesota (for herself and Mr. Oberstar): H.R. 5408. A bill to urge the Government of the Republic of Armenia to resolve the murder case of Joshua Haglund, a United States citizen, in Yerevan, Armenia, and to fund scholarships at the University of Minnesota in the memory of Joshua Haglund for study abroad and diversity training; to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mrs. MYRICK: H.R. 5409. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to require that the Commissioner of Social Security notify individuals of improper use of their social security account numbers; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. NORTON: H.R. 5410. A bill to provide for the treatment of the District of Columbia as a State for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives and Senate, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. PEARCE: H.R. 5411. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Interior to establish a demonstration program to facilitate landscape restoration programs within certain units of the National Park System established by law to preserve and interpret resources associated with American history, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Resources. By Mr. REYES (for himself, Mr. Kolbe, Mr. Ortiz, Mr. Doggett, Mr. Grijalva, and Mr. Filner): H.R. 5412. A bill to establish grant programs to improve the health of border area residents and for bioterrorism preparedness in the border area, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on International Relations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. SENSENBRENNER (for himself and Mr. Conyers): H.R. 5413. A bill to make improvements in the codification of title 46, United States Code; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. SENSENBRENNER (for himself and Mr. Conyers): H.R. 5414. A bill to enact certain laws relating to public contracts as title 41, United States Code, ``Public Contracts''; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. GERLACH: H. Con. Res. 402. Concurrent resolution requiring certain committees of Congress to review and evaluate the activities and progress of the Government of Iraq in securing and stabilizing Iraq; to the Committee on Rules. By Mr. HINCHEY (for himself, Mrs. Bono, and Mrs. Capps): H. Con. Res. 403. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress with regard to the importance of Women's Health Week, which promotes awareness of diseases that affect women and which encourages women to take preventive measures to ensure good health; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mrs. LOWEY: H. Con. Res. 404. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress concerning contraceptives for women; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Ms. McKINNEY: H. Con. Res. 405. Concurrent resolution opposing any agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Nigeria to deploy United States Armed Forces to Nigeria; to the Committee on International Relations. By Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi: H. Con. Res. 406. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the needs of children affected by major disasters are unique and should be given special consideration in conducting disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Mr. WEXLER: H. Res. 819. A resolution requesting the President and directing the Attorney General to submit to the House of Representatives all documents in the possession of the President and the Attorney General relating to requests made by the National Security Agency and other Federal agencies to telephone service providers requesting access to telephone communications records of persons in the United States and communications originating and terminating within the United States without a warrant; to the Committee on the Judiciary.", u"Madam President, last evening, something rather extraordinary happened here in the waning minutes of the session. My very good friend from Kansas, the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee, took the floor to discuss the Bolton nomination--an issue, I say to my colleagues, no one wants to be resolved more quickly than the Senator from Connecticut. I have been involved in this for two straight months. The Presiding Officer and I are both on the Committee on Foreign Relations. This goes back to April 11, the day we had hearings. My hope is that we can resolve this matter sooner rather than later. Last night, my friend from Kansas took the floor and announced that he knew what names the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were concerned about when dealing with the Bolton nomination. This is the matter of the intercepts Mr. Bolton requested--some 10 of them--involving 19 names of U.S. citizens, Americans, on those 10 intercepts. We made the request earlier on to allow the chairman and ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, as well as the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, to review the raw data on those 10 intercepts to determine whether there were any problems associated with Mr. Bolton's desire to see those intercepts, since there has been a basis of information concerning efforts by Mr. Bolton to intimidate a number of people within the intelligence community--of both the intelligence and research division of the State Department, as well as the CIA--concerning certain intelligence conclusions. Therefore, it is a matter of concern to many of us on the committee that we have an opportunity to review whether there has been any further intimidation. I offered initially that we have the four Senators I mentioned review the matter. That was rejected by the administration. I then suggested why not just submit the names we are interested in and have the Intelligence Director inform us as to whether those names were part of the intercepts. If they were not, end of matter. If they were, we might want to proceed further to determine why those names were sought out. That was also rejected because the number of names requested to be reviewed was some 36 names. The reason I made the request for 36 names is because we had no idea specifically what these 10 intercepts involved. We were even denied a synopsis of what may be involved. We were flying in the dark about this information. At any rate, my colleague and friend from Kansas proceeded to say he was familiar with what the six or seven names would be that we should be interested in. As a result, he proceeded to publicly name five of the seven individuals he identified. Not surprisingly, he also announced he consulted with Director Negroponte, who informed my friend that none of the names Senator Roberts provided to the administration were among the names Mr. Bolton and his staff were given by the National Security Agency. What is remarkable about what happened last evening is that the Senator from Kansas is not a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--the committee of jurisdiction with respect to the Bolton nomination. The Senator did not participate in more than 10 hours of hearings on the nomination. I sincerely doubt whether our colleague reviewed the more than 1,000 pages of transcripts from more than 30 interviews conducted by the bipartisan staff who jointly conducted those interviews. I know of no one on the committee who was consulted by our friend from Kansas to provide any input to the list that was settled upon. I do believe we owe our colleague from Kansas a debt of gratitude, because the administration has at least now accepted the principle of cross-checking names against the list of names reviewed by Mr. Bolton. If the administration, in a matter of hours can cross-check seven names offered up by Senator Roberts, chairman of the Intelligence Committee, why is it a problem to cross-check the 36 names we have drawn up based on our own participation in the 10 hours of committee hearings and review of over 1,000 pages of interview? We are not on some fishing expedition here at all to derail the Bolton nomination. We have not opened the State Department phonebook and selected names at random. There is a very specific rationale for each of the names on the list of 36 developed as a result of 10 hours of hearings, 1,000 pages of transcripts, and some 30 interviews. The report of Mr. Bolton's hearing quite clearly and starkly paints a picture of an individual who is an ideologue determined to have his own way. We know what he tried to do with the underlings at the State Department and CIA--that is not in debate--who dared resist his efforts to endorse as fact what was not supported by available intelligence. Mr. Bolton tried to crush them. We know what he tried to do with other career State Department employees who ran afoul of him for inexplicable reasons. He sought to have them excluded in legal deliberations in areas of their responsibility or blackballed them from being assigned positions within the Department. Mr. Bolton was a very driven individual when he sought to get his way with underlings. He even went so far as to propose a CIA analyst be denied country clearance so that he could not undertake official foreign travel. He even sought to have the same individual's State Department building pass revoked. I do not need to go over these matters in detail, but the fact is, there is more than ample justification for seeking these 36 names, as well as the information that Senator Biden has raised regarding the raw data, the draft speeches dealing with testimony before the House committees on Syria. These are not difficult requests to satisfy. As I said a minute ago, my friend from Kansas submitted seven names to the Department, and he was told within a matter of hours or less that they were not on the 10 intercepts. So whether or not the 36 names sought by the Foreign Relations Committee are included on those intercepts should also be a question that can be answered in a reasonable amount of time. I have not told anyone, despite a number of requests, the names of the 36 people we would like to have checked out. I think acknowledging certain names is dangerously close to bordering on revealing the importance of the intercept traffic. When certain names are mentioned and then excluded, there is an implication that maybe they should be on those lists. So I would caution Members from publicly talking about the names. We have made no effort to do so. We, of course, want to limit the number of Senators who would actually be able to review this matter to four Senators out of the 100 in this body. In all my years here, I have never faced such a situation where a coequal Member of this body has presumed to speak on behalf of another--in this case, suggesting that he knew which names we should request. Having submitted those names, he then discovered, of course, that those names were not on the intercept list that we saw. So I am still hopeful this matter can be resolved. I do not think it should take that long. Certainly, if the administration would just respond to the two requests regarding the draft statements--congressional testimony by Mr. Bolton--and check out the names that we have requested regarding these intercepts, if that information is provided and clears up those two matters, then I think this body is ready to vote up or down on Mr. Bolton. Perhaps he behaved more judiciously in dealing with his peers and superiors than he did with those below him in rank. Perhaps the information he requested from the NSA was routine and solely to carry out his responsibilities as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. But given Mr. Bolton's zealotry on proliferation, on North Korea, on Libya, on Syria and other policy areas, it is not unreasonable to worry that he used all tools at his disposal to advance his causes. That is what we seek to find out through a cross checking of our names of concern against the names provided to Mr. Bolton. As a matter of institutional right, we have, I think, an absolute right, as a coequal branch of Government, to solicit information that directly pertains to the qualifications of this individual to be confirmed by the Senate for the position to which he has been nominated. So I would hope that the information would be forthcoming and that we would be able to get the answers and move on.", u"Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Delaware, as well as my colleague from California for her comments. Let me say to the distinguished chairman of our committee, I know this has been a long ordeal, now going up to 2 months that this nomination has been before us. No one, except possibly the chairman of the committee, would like this matter to be terminated sooner rather than later more than I would. I am sure the Senator from Delaware feels similarly, as I know my colleague from California does as well. But there is an important issue before this body that transcends the nomination of the individual before us. That is whether as an institution we have a right to certain information pertaining to the matter before us. Certainly the matter that we have requested--Senator Biden has and I have--regarding this nomination is directly on point when it comes to the qualities of this nominee. For nearly a month since our May 26th cloture vote on this nomination, the administration has stonewalled our efforts to get the additional information we believe the Senate should have to make an informed judgment on this nomination. Senator Biden and I have attempted to reach an accommodation with the administration on the two areas of our inquiry--draft testimony and related documents concerning Syria's weapons of mass destruction capabilities and the nineteen names contained in ten National Security Agency intercepts which Mr. Bolton requested and was provided during his tenure as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Senator Biden has narrowed the scope of his request related to Syria. I have offered to submit a list of names of concern related to the NSA intercepts to be cross checked by director Negroponte against the list of names provided to Mr. Bolton. I am very puzzled, Mr. President, by the intransigent position that the administration has taken, particularly with respect to the intercept matter. If the intercepts are ``pure vanilla'' as our colleague, Senator Roberts, has described them, then why does the administration continue to withhold the information from the Senate? The answer is we don't know. Was Mr. Bolton using the information from the intercepts to track what other officials were doing in policy areas he disagreed with? Or was he simply utilizing the information in the normal course of carrying out his responsibilities? Again, we don't know. Under ordinary circumstances, I would not be inquiring whether a State Department official had sought access to sensitive intelligence for anything other than official purposes. But we know from the Foreign Relations Committee investigation of this nominee--from interviews of individuals who served with Mr. Bolton in the Bush administration--that Mr. Bolton's conduct while at the State Department was anything but ordinary. We learned how Mr. Bolton harnessed an abusive management style to attempt to alter intelligence judgments and to stifle the consideration of alternative policy options--all in furtherance of his own personal ideological agenda. According to a story that appeared in today's Washington Post, we now know that Mr. Bolton's machinations weren't limited to Cuba or Syria weapons of mass destruction. It would seem he was the ``Mr. No'' of the Department on a wide variety of policy initiatives, acting as a major roadblock to progress on such important initiatives as U.S.-Russian cooperative nuclear threat reduction. Mr. Bolton has done a disservice to the Bush administration and to the American people by putting his agenda ahead of the interests of the administration and the American people. It is not only that he had his own agenda that is problematic. It is the manner in which he sought to advance that agenda by imposing his judgments on members of the intelligence community and threatening to destroy the careers of those with the temerity to resist his demands to alter their intelligence judgments. In so doing, he breached the firewall between intelligence and policy which must be sacrosanct to protect U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. That is not to say there should not be a vibrant and healthy disagreement where one exists. There ought to be, in fact, more disagreements where these matters have caused friction. But the idea that you would allow that friction, those disagreements to transcend the firewall where you would then seek to have people dismissed from their jobs because you disagreed with their conclusions, that goes too far. Mr. Bolton went to far and for those reasons, in my view, does not deserve to be the confirmed nominee as ambassador to the United Nations. That fact is painfully clear to all Americans following the serious and dangerous intelligence failures related to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. We know that Mr. Bolton's efforts to manipulate intelligence wasn't some anomaly because he was having a bad day. The entire intelligence community knew of his reputation. We were fortunate to have individuals, like Dean Hutchings, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 2003-2005, who disapproved of and resisted Bolton's efforts to cherry pick intelligence. We also know that Mr. Bolton needed adult supervision to ensure that his speeches and testimony were consistent with administration policy. Deputy Secretary Armitage took it upon himself to personally oversee all of Mr. Bolton's public pronouncements to ensure that he stayed on the reservation. Is this really the kind of performance we want to reward by confirming this individual to the position of United States Representative to the United Nations? Is Mr. Bolton the kind of individual who we can trust to carry out the United States agenda at the United Nations at this critical juncture? I think not. We all know that these are difficult times. Our responsibilities in Iraq and Afghanistan are significant and costly. Other challenges to international peace and stability loom large on the horizon: Iran, North Korea, Middle East Peace. Humanitarian crises in Africa and Asia cry out for attention. The United States can not solve all these problems unilaterally. We need international assistance and cooperation to address them. And the logical focal point for developing that international support is the United Nations. But international support will not automatically be forthcoming. It will take real leadership at the United Nations to build the case for such cooperation. That United States leadership must necessarily be embodied in the individual that serves as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations. Based on what I know today about Mr. Bolton, I believe he is incapable of demonstrating that kind of leadership. The United States Ambassador to the United Nations is an important position. The individual who assumes this position is necessarily the face of our country before the United Nations. For all of the reasons I have cited--Mr. Bolton's management style, his attack on the intelligence community, his tunnel vision, his lack of diplomatic temperament--I do not believe that he is the man to be that face at the United Nations. I hope that when it comes time for an up or down vote on Mr. Bolton that my colleagues will join me in opposing this nominee. But this afternoon's vote is about who determines how the Senate will discharge its constitutional duties related to nominations. Will the executive branch tell this body what is relevant or not relevant with respect to its deliberations on nominations? Or will the Senate make that determination? If you believe as I do that the Senate is entitled to access to information that is so clearly relevant in the case of the Bolton nomination, then I would respectfully ask you to join Senator Biden and me in voting against cloture. But this vote isn't just about the nomination of Mr. Bolton, it is also about setting a precedent for future requests by the Senate of the executive on a whole host of other issues that may come before us--in this administration and in future administrations. For that reason I strongly urge all of our colleagues to support us in sending the right signal to the administration by voting no on cloture when it occurs at 6 p.m. I yield the floor.", u"The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill, modified by the amendment printed in Part A of House Report 109-141, is adopted. The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as modified, is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2006 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Department of State. (8) The Department of the Treasury. (9) The Department of Energy. (10) The Department of Justice. (11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (12) The National Reconnaissance Office. (13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (14) The Coast Guard. (15) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2006, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2475 of the One Hundred Ninth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2006 under section 102 when the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify promptly the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2006 the sum of $446,144,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2007. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 817 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2006. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2006 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2007. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2006, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2006 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of National Intelligence. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2006 the sum of $244,600,000. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Paragraph (5)(B) of section 102A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(d)), as added by section 1011(a) of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643), is amended by striking ``or agency involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''. (a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted by Elements of the Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e), as added by section 1011(a) of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108- 458; 118 Stat. 3643), is amended-- (1) by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate'' in paragraph (3)(A); and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be carried out by elements of the intelligence community.''. (b) Development of Technology Goals.--Section 103E of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-3e), as so added, is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (4); (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraph: ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology needs of the community; and''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of the Intelligence Community.--In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and Technology shall-- ``(1) perform systematic identification and assessment of the most significant intelligence challenges that require technical solutions; and ``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of research and design programs to meet the requirements of the intelligence community for timely support.''. (c) Report.--Not later than June 30, 2006, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing a strategy for the development and use of technology in the intelligence community through 2021. Such report may be submitted in classified form and shall include-- (1) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the use of technology; (2) goals for advanced research and development and a strategy to achieve such goals; (3) an explanation of how each advanced research and development project funded under the National Intelligence Program addresses an identified intelligence gap; (4) a list of all current and projected research and development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation dates, and estimated completion dates; and (5) a plan to incorporate technology from research and development projects into National Intelligence Program acquisition programs. Not later than January 15, 2006, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(7))) a classified report providing a comprehensive inventory of all special access programs under the National Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6))). It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should expeditiously establish the necessary budgetary processes and procedures with the heads of the departments containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence community, and the heads of such agencies and organizations, in order to-- (1) implement the budget execution authorities provided under, and submit the reports to Congress required by, subsection (c) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 1011(a) of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643); and (2) carry out the duties and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence with respect to the transfer and reprogramming of funds under the National Intelligence Program under subsection (d) of such section, as so amended. It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should promptly establish and oversee the implementation of a multi-level security clearance system across the intelligence community to leverage the cultural and linguistic skills of subject matter experts and individuals proficient in foreign languages critical to national security.", u"Mr. President, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, this body came together--Republicans and Democrats alike--around the shared goal of preventing a similar tragedy from ever occurring again on our soil. Toward this end, Congress worked in a bipartisan manner to pass the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, legislation that expanded many of our laws, providing our Government and law enforcement with the tools needed to ably combat these threats. We understood then, as we do now, that these tools are important in our fight against terrorism. And because there is no greater responsibility that we bear as Members of this body than ensuring the safety of our citizens, I voted in favor of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 and supported its reauthorization when the Senate considered its bill earlier this year. But even in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 tragedy, Congress recognized that in its haste to give law enforcement these expanded powers, there was a risk that this new authority was coming at the expense of constitutionally guaranteed rights and liberties. And so in the wisdom of both Republican and Democratic legislators, several provisions of the PATRIOT Act included 4-year sunsets, allowing Congress the opportunity to revisit whether the PATRIOT Act strikes the proper balance between securing our safety and ensuring our freedom. I have very serious concerns that the current PATRIOT Act reauthorization conference report, which was negotiated largely without the input of Democrats, does not do enough to strike this proper balance. I believe that we can be both safe and free. The conference report falls well short of achieving that goal. I am hopeful that bipartisan negotiations can result in a compromise bill like the one agreed to in the Senate in July, a bill which did a far better job of protecting our civil liberties. The current conference report fails in many respects. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act gives law enforcement in domestic intelligence investigations nearly limitless power to obtain all types of personal records, including business, library, and medical records. Under current law, the Government merely needs to demonstrate that the records it seeks are ``sought for'' a terrorism investigation. Upon such a showing, a secret court is required to issue the order. This is an extremely lenient standard, one that for the first time gives the Government almost unchecked access to the sensitive personal information of innocent Americans. To compound matters, the third parties--business, libraries, hospitals, and the like--who are recipients of these orders are subject to an automatic gag order. They cannot tell anyone that they have been asked for these records, including the person whose documents the Government is seeking. Given its broad scope, this provision has tremendous potential for abuse. Innocent Americans should not be subjected to these possible intrusions when adequate safeguards can be written into the law, ones that would not sacrifice the utility of these orders as a law enforcement tool. Americans should not have to hope that the Government will demonstrate self-restraint in its exercise of this power, nor should they fear that their personal records will be part of a Government fishing expedition. The Senate bill, which I supported, not only required the Government to meet a higher standard before issuing these orders, it also gave recipients of a FISA order an explicit and meaningful right to challenge these orders and their accompanying gag orders in court. The conference report sadly retains a variation of the current law's exceptionally lenient standard of review, a standard that effectively turns the courts into little more than a rubberstamp. Further, the conference report does not give the recipient of a FISA order any express right at all to seek meaningful judicial review of its gag order. Quite simply, the conference report places inadequate checks on these orders. Another failure of the conference report was exposed in an article appearing in the Sunday, November 6, 2005 edition of The Washington Post, which brought to light a very troubling practice by the FBI that underscores the importance of adopting proper safeguards. National security letters, NSLs, are administrative subpoenas that allow the FBI to obtain sensitive information about ordinary Americans in national security cases. NSLs are issued by FBI agents without the authorization or approval of a judge, grand jury or prosecutor. While the FBI has long employed NSLs, the PATRIOT Act greatly expanded their scope, significantly lowering the standard for their issuance. The result has been, according to The Washington Post, a ``hundredfold increase'' in their use, with the FBI annually issuing thousands of NSLs demanding private information about ordinary Americans not necessarily suspected of any crime. These records include financial, library, credit card, telephone, Internet service provider, and e-mail records as well as customer transaction information. These NSLs are governed by strict gag orders that prevent companies from telling their customers that their records were given to the FBI. As this description suggests, NSLs are very similar to section 215 FISA orders but with one very critical difference--NSLs do not require the Government to get any court approval whatsoever. While NSLs can be an important tool in our fight against terrorism, their unfettered and unchecked use makes them susceptible to abuse that infringes upon the privacy of innocent people. The Senate version of the PATRIOT Act reauthorization bill created important checks on the power to issue and enforce NSLs--protections absent from the conference report--without hindering the effectiveness of this law enforcement tool. Other sections of the conference report give rise to additional concerns. The conference report would give law enforcement the free-wheeling power to impose roving ``John Doe'' wiretaps without the safeguards needed to protect innocent Americans from unnecessary surveillance, casting aside important checks on this power that were included in the Senate bill. The report would also give the FBI the right to enter and search a home or business without providing notice to the owner of the residence or business for a month or longer after the search. And the conference report contains a provision that seriously curtails the habeas corpus rights of prisoners to challenge their convictions in court. This provision was in neither the House nor Senate bills, and there has been practically no debate on the merits of this change. Apart from the serious civil liberties concerns, perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the conference report is its failure to incorporate a threat-and-risk-based formula for the allocation of critical homeland security funds to our local communities, States, and first responders. This deficiency was emphasized just last week by the former 9/11 Commission, which issued a blistering indictment of our homeland security failures. As I said earlier, I have long maintained that protecting the security of our citizens and our homeland is the most important responsibility I bear as a Senator. To that end, I believe that to truly make America safe, we need to carefully allocate our homeland security resources. We need to make sure that the money gets to where it is needed, that our American cities and States living under the greatest threat receive the funding they need to protect themselves. Unfortunately, up until now, a substantial portion of our homeland security money has been allocated according to congressionally mandated formulas that bear little relation to need and risk. Our resources should be dedicated to addressing our most glaring weaknesses. During their negotiations, I encouraged my House and Senate colleagues considering the PATRIOT Act reauthorization bill to account for this reality in our homeland security funding. I have maintained--as the former 9/11 Commission reiterated in its report last week--that lawmakers should cease playing politics with the allocation of our limited resources by promoting distribution formulas that ignore risk and threat. The Commission's report card was a condemnation of this administration and the Congress, both of whom have demonstrated far too little urgency in enacting the reforms needed to properly secure our homeland and fight the war on terror. The former 9/11 Commission sent a clear, discernible message to the entire Nation last week--reform is needed at all levels of Government. The failure to incorporate in the PATRIOT Act conference report a much-needed threat-based formula for the allocation of homeland security funds is a major shortcoming and needs to be corrected. As I noted at the outset, apart from these concerns, the PATRIOT Act contains provisions that provide law enforcement with important tools in the war on terror. Because we cannot afford to be without these tools, I am supporting bipartisan legislation that will extend the sunsetting provisions of the PATRIOT Act by 3 months. Just because we are coming up against the end of the year does not mean we should have to compromise the rights of law-abiding Americans. This extension will preserve the current state of the law on a temporary basis, giving those working on the bill the opportunity to craft a compromise that both safeguards our liberty and gives our law enforcement the capabilities they need to effectively combat and investigate terrorist threats. I am also hopeful that during this 3-month extension, those working on the reauthorization bill will heed the call of the former 9/11 Commission and include provisions that mandate the distribution of homeland security funds on the basis of threat and risk. While we all recognize the importance of equipping our law enforcement with the tools they need to effectively combat terrorism, we also must ensure that those tools are administered in a manner that does not unnecessarily restrict the freedom and liberty that are the hallmark of American life. Like all Americans, I am troubled by recent reports that the President signed an order in 2002 that authorized the National Security Agency to conduct domestic spying on U.S. citizens and foreign nationals in the United States, despite legal prohibitions against such activity. Likewise, I am disturbed by recent reports that the Department of Defense is maintaining a database in order to monitor the activity of peaceful antiwar groups. The balance between the urgent goal of combating terrorism and the safeguarding of our most fundamental constitutional freedoms is not always an easy one to draw. However, they are not incompatible, and unbridled and unchecked executive power is not the answer. I believe the conference report falls short of this goal, and I am hopeful that with more time, those negotiating these provisions will find the proper balance.", u"Mr. President, perhaps the greatest oration ever delivered was the Oration on the Crown, delivered by Demosthenes in the year 330 B.C. In that inimitable oration, it seems to me the question was posed: Who least serves the state? And the question was answered in that oration: He who does not speak his mind. In this day, we should remember that. And I shall attempt to honor that credo. Mr. President, Americans have been stunned at the recent news of the abuses of power by an overzealous President. It has become apparent that this administration has engaged in a consistent and unrelenting pattern of abuse against our country's law-abiding citizens and against our Constitution. We have been stunned to hear reports about the Pentagon gathering information and creating databases to spy on ordinary Americans whose only sin is to choose to exercise their first amendment right to peaceably assemble. Those Americans who choose to question the administration's flawed policy in Iraq are labeled by this administration as ``domestic terrorists.'' Shame! We now know that the FBI's use of national security letters on American citizens has increased exponentially, requiring tens of thousands of individuals to turn over personal information and records. These letters are issued without prior judicial review, and they provide no real means for an individual to challenge a permanent gag order. And through news reports, my fellow Americans, through news reports we have been shocked to learn of the CIA's practice of rendition and the so-called black sites, secret locations--hear that, secret locations--in foreign countries where abuse and interrogations have been exported to escape the reach of U.S. laws protecting against human rights abuses. We know that our Vice President, Dick Cheney, has asked for exemptions for the CIA from the language maintained in the McCain torture amendment banning cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment. Thank God, Vice President Cheney's pleas have been rejected by this Congress. Now comes the stomach-churning revelation, through an Executive order, that President Bush has circumvented both the Congress and the court. Get that. Shame! Shame! He has usurped the third branch of Government, the branch charged with protecting the civil liberties of our people, by directing the National Security Agency to intercept and eavesdrop on the phone conversations and e-mails of American citizens without a warrant, which is a clear violation of the fourth amendment. Get that. He has stiff-armed the people's branch of Government, this branch, the people's branch. He has rationalized the use of domestic civilian surveillance with a flimsy claim that he has such authority because we are at war. The Executive order, which has been acknowledged by the President, is an end run around the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which makes it unlawful for any official to monitor the communications of an individual on American soil without the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. What is the President thinking? What is the President thinking? Congress has provided for the very situations which the President is blatantly exploiting. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, housed in the Department of Justice, reviews requests for warrants for domestic surveillance. The court can review these requests expeditiously and in times of great emergency. In extreme cases, where time is of the essence and national security is at stake, surveillance can be conducted before the warrant is even applied for. This secret court was established so that sensitive surveillance could be conducted and information could be gathered without compromising the security of the investigation. The purpose of the FISA Court is to balance the Government's role in fighting the war on terror with the fourth amendment rights afforded to each and every American. Yet the American public is given vague and empty assurances by the President that amount to little more than ``trust me.'' But we are a nation of laws and not of men. Where is the source of that authority the President claims? I defy the administration to show for the record where in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or where in the United States Constitution they are allowed to steal into the lives of innocent American citizens and spy. When asked recently what the source of that authority was, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had no answer. Secretary Rice seemed to insinuate that eavesdropping on Americans was acceptable because FISA was an outdated law and could not address the needs of the Government in combating the new war on terror. This is a patent falsehood. The USA PATRIOT Act expanded FISA significantly, equipping the Government with the tools it needed to fight terrorism. Further amendments to FISA were granted under the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002. In fact, in its final report, the 9/11 Commission noted that the removal of the pre-9/11 ``wall'' between intelligence officials and law enforcement was significant in that it ``opened up new opportunities for cooperative action.'' But the President claims--hear me!--that these powers are within his role as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. Make no mistake, the powers granted to the Commander in Chief in this Constitution are specifically those as head of the Armed Forces. These warrantless searches are conducted not against a foreign power but against whom? Against unsuspecting and unknowing American citizens--like you, like you, like you, and like you! They are conducted against individuals living on American soil--not in Iraq, not in Afghanistan. There is nothing within the powers granted in the Commander in Chief clause that grants the President the ability to conduct clandestine surveillance of American civilians. Nothing. We must not allow such groundless, foolish claims to stand unchallenged. Now, the President claims boundless authority, an unlimited authority through the resolution that authorized war on those who perpetrated the September 11 attacks. But that resolution does not give the President unchecked power to spy on our own people. Read it. That resolution does not give the President unchecked power to spy on our own people. That resolution does not give the White House, this administration, the power to create covert prisons for secret prisoners. That resolution does not authorize the torture of prisoners to extract information from them. That resolution does not authorize running black hole secret prisons in foreign countries to get around U.S. law. That resolution does not give this President, or any President, the powers reserved only for kings and potentates. I continue to be shocked and astounded by the breadth with which this administration undermines the constitutional protections afforded to the people--the people--and the raw arrogance with which it rebukes the powers held by the legislative and judicial branches. The President has cast off Federal law enacted by Congress, often bearing his own signature, as mere formality. He has rebuffed the rule of law, and he has trivialized and trampled upon, trampled under foot the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed to Americans by the United States Constitution. This Constitution still lives. This Constitution was made for all time, for all administrations, for all Presidents, for all Senators. We are supposed to accept these dirty little secrets, and we are told that it is irresponsible to draw attention to President Bush's gross abuse of power and constitutional violations. But what is truly irresponsible is to neglect to uphold the rule of law. We listened to the President speak last night on the potential for democracy in Iraq. The President claims to want to instill in the Iraqi people a tangible freedom and working democracy, at the same time that he violates our own U.S. laws and checks and balances. President Bush called the recent Iraqi election ``a landmark day in the history of liberty.'' I daresay in this country we may have reached our own sort of landmark. Never have the promises and protections of liberty seemed so illusory, so fleeting. These renegade assaults on the Constitution and our system of laws strike at the very core of our values and foster a sense of mistrust and apprehension about the reach of Government. I am reminded of Thomas Payne's famous words: ``These are the times that try men's souls.'' These astounding revelations about the bending, the twisting, the stretching, and contorting of the Constitution to justify a grasping, irresponsible administration under the banner of ``national security'' are an outrage. Congress can no longer sit on the sidelines. It is time to ask hard questions of the Attorney General. It is time to ask hard questions of the Secretary of State, of the Secretary of Defense, and of the Director of the CIA. The White House should not be allowed to exempt itself from answering the same questions simply because it might assert some kind of ``executive privilege'' in order to avoid further embarrassment. The practice of domestic spying on citizens should stop immediately. Oversight hearings need to be conducted. Judicial action may be in order. We need to finally be given answers to our questions: Where is the constitutional and statutory authority for spying on American citizens? Where? Where is that authority to be found? What is the content of these classified legal opinions asserting that there is a legality in this criminal usurpation of rights? Who is responsible for this dangerous and unconstitutional policy? How many American citizens' lives have been unknowingly affected? Mr. President, fellow Senators, let us in our day remember the words of Brutus to Cicero: Our ancestors scorned to bear even a gentle master! Mr. President, I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, last Saturday, President Bush castigated those of us who voted against cloture on the PATRIOT Act. He said: That decision is irresponsible and it endangers the lives of our citizens. That is a mistaken characterization. Every Senator supported the Senate's reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act last July when it passed the Senate unanimously. Last Friday, 47 of us said the House-Senate conference report is not yet good enough. Before we make the PATRIOT Act permanent, we must make it right. The PATRIOT Act that we passed 4 years ago, which I supported, gave the Federal Government unprecedented powers to conduct surveillance on American citizens and demand information about their private activities, about their personal lives. We passed the PATRIOT Act hastily in the Senate 4 years ago, too hastily in retrospect. We passed it when my caucus was in the majority. So we, and I, were responsible for that haste. It seemed necessary in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. One important consideration for this Senator, then, when we voted for the PATRIOT Act was that it would sunset in 4 years, and this Congress would take the time to review it carefully and modify it as necessary to assure the proper balance between combating terrorism and protecting the privacy of innocent Americans. As I said 5 months ago, the Senate passed unanimously our reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act with important changes to protect constitutional rights of innocent American citizens. The House passed its version of the new PATRIOT Act in July, also, allowing plenty of time for the House-Senate conference committee to resolve their differences in the best interests of all Americans. But the House did not appoint conferees until last month. The House leaders chose to engage in this take-it-or-leave-it brinksmanship to try to force the Senate to accept their permanent invasion of the private lives of innocent Americans. Last Friday, 47 Senators--5 Republicans, 41 Democrats, and 1 independent--said: No, we will not accept this version of the PATRIOT Act. We do not oppose the PATRIOT Act, as the President and others have falsely charged. Most of us voted for the original law 4 years ago, and all of us in this Senate voted for the new one last July. Many of us, myself included, have proposed extending the existing law for another 3 months to give conferees time to resolve our remaining differences to design a permanent PATRIOT Act that most of us can support. What we haven't said is there is more brinkmanship with the President and the Senate leader threatening to let the existing law expire so they can blame 47 of us for supposedly weakening the protections of the American people. Let us be very clear. Let the American people be very clear. If the PATRIOT Act is allowed to expire, that is the choice and the responsibility of the President and the Senate majority leadership. Today is December 19. The Senate is still in session with 12 more days until the year's end. That is enough time either to revise the conference report so that it has broad bipartisan support in the Senate or to extend the existing law. All of us, every Member of this Senate, supported the Senate version of the new law that passed unanimously 5 months ago. It is absurd and wrong for detractors to claim that we do not support it now when we just disagree with a few but a very important few features in it. Last Saturday, President Bush also reasserted his right to do whatever he deems necessary to protect the American people from terrorist attacks. That is an enormous responsibility, one that Congress shares with him. However, we differ in our approaches. The President's legal counsel has opined that he has the constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and the legal authority from Congress post-9/11 to override or ignore any laws or limitations that he decides necessary to combat terrorism. Whether Congress intended ``any and all force necessary'' to include that authority is highly questionable. But that is the President's operating assumption. If the President can do whatever he wants, whether it is legal or not, and his decision to do it makes it legal, then in a sense the PATRIOT Act is not even necessary because the President can order it all done anyway. In another sense, however, our getting the PATRIOT Act right becomes even more imperative because we are a nation of laws, laws which must be followed by everyone--even the President, even the FBI, even the National Security Agency, during good times and bad, during war and peace, because our existence as a nation, as a constitutional democracy requires it and depends upon it. No external threat to our way of life could be so great as the danger that our rule of law not be obeyed by our most powerful institutions and individuals. This Senate exists to make those laws. Every one of us--all 100 of us--takes that responsibility most seriously because we assume that our laws matter, that they will be honored and obeyed, or that they will be enforced so that they will define the legal courses of action that everyone in this country must follow. Otherwise, we are irrelevant and laws that we enact are meaningless. Our operating assumption, however, continues to be that our laws will be obeyed, and, thus, our efforts in the Senate do matter. That is why we want and we deserve the time necessary to get our laws right. That is the way our process is supposed to work. All 41 or more Senators to hold up legislation in order to get it right is the way our process is supposed to work. It is strange, to say the least, that those who assert their right to ignore our rules and our laws are vilifying us in this Senate for following them. For people watching us today who may be unfamiliar with the details of the existing PATRIOT Act, let me give you an example of what it is that we are trying to correct. According to the Washington Post, last year, under the PATRIOT Act, some 56 FBI field agents signed over 30,000 national security letters. That is 100 times more than before the act. They were not directed toward possible terrorists but, rather, to people, to businesses, to universities, to libraries that might have information about people who might be terrorists. The PATRIOT Act requires them to turn over the information demanded, the most personal information, including health records, Internet use, upon demand, with no recourse. It is a criminal act under the PATRIOT Act for them to tell anyone else about the Government's demands, even to consult with an attorney. Under an Executive order which President Bush signed 2 years ago, all that private-personal information remains permanently in the Government's files and can be shared with other Government agencies even after the suspect has been determined to be completely innocent. The new PATRIOT Act, which 100 Senators unanimously supported last July, would not prevent the Federal Government from demanding that information on some 30,000 businesses, universities, and individuals every year in order to combat terrorism. It would only provide minimal legal rights of independent judicial review of those demands when some innocent person, business, library, or university believes the Federal Government has gone too far. No one wants to prevent the Federal Government from stopping terrorists or preventing terrorist acts against the United States. We do want to prevent some people, however well intended they believe they are, from going too far. Secret torture prisons in other countries is going too far. Spying on Americans is going too far. Denying due process, even the right to consult with an attorney, for innocent Americans, is going too far. Former Republican Congressman Robert Barr said it well: Enough of this business of justifying everything as necessary for the war on terror. Either the Constitution and the laws of this country mean something or they don't. It's truly frightening what is going on in this country. Thank you, Congressman Barr. Those in the Senate who believe the Constitution and our laws enacted under it still mean something, we are trying to get the PATRIOT Act before we make it permanent, and we deserve our right to do so. It is an inversion and a perversion of the values of this great Nation when it becomes legitimate to set up illegal torture prisons in other countries or to conduct illegal spying in this country but illegitimate for the Senate to carry out its own due process. This Senate must not adjourn for this year until we either extend the existing PATRIOT Act or pass a new one acceptable to a broad bipartisan majority of this Senate. Anyone who prevents Members from doing one or the other is placing their personal politics ahead of the protection of the American people. That would be dangerous and destructive personal politics. That is why we must vote on a 3-month extension of the existing PATRIOT Act or a new conference report before we adjourn this year. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.", u"Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the sections of the consolidated Appropriations bill, H.R. 2673, that pertain to funding for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State. I want to recognize the conferees, especially CJS Appropriations Chairman Gregg and ranking minority member Hollings for their hard work on this bill. It has been just over 2 years since the horrific September 11 attack against our country. We must remain vigilant in fighting the threat of terrorism. Our priorities should reflect the need to ensure the security of our people. The Justice Department leads our Federal law enforcement efforts that are so critical to protecting our country. Securing the safety and security of Americans at home and abroad should continue to be the number one priority in the Federal law enforcement budget. Such security requires providing Federal law enforcement agencies, as well as State and local law enforcement agencies, with the tools necessary to combat terrorism. Providing adequate funding for these tools is essential to law enforcement's ability to protect America. I am pleased that the Omnibus appropriations bill reflects this priority. While we must continue to safeguard America from future terrorist attacks, we should, at the same time, exercise fiscal discipline in order to promote our economy. We face difficult budget decisions but I am optimistic that with the improving economy we can balance the need to fund fully the programs necessary to protect Americans with the continuing need to exercise the fiscal discipline that our constituents deserve. I am especially pleased that approximately $62 million will be appropriated to the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force FTTTF. This independent agency is responsible for coordinating and sharing information among agencies which is crucial to preventing terrorist attacks. The FTTTF is tasked with an enormous responsibility--gathering information from and sharing intelligence with--the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency and the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, Treasury, State and Defense. Breaking down the walls between our agencies is critical to our national security, and I applaud the increase in funding for the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force. While our Federal law enforcement agencies have focused on combating terrorism, they also carry the burden of investigating and prosecuting other significant crimes. I am pleased to see that the bill includes almost $557 million for Interagency Drug Enforcement which reflects funding for the multiple Departments, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Treasury, and the Department of Justice, which are responsible for cooperating and bringing together the expertise of each of the Federal agencies with the efforts of state and local law enforcement to combat major narcotics traffickers and money launderers. This represents a significant increase to assist law enforcement operations. I am especially pleased that the Conferees accepted the House funding levels for the Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA at approximately $2.2 billion rather than the Senate's level which would have severely hampered the DEA. At a time when the DEA is shouldering a greater burden in fighting drug trafficking, I commend the Senate for increasing the DEA's funding to make sure that our communities receive all the help they can to reduce the scourge of drugs. I am also pleased to see that the bill funds the Juvenile Accountability Block Grant, JABG, program which was recently reauthorized as part of the ``21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,'' P.L. 107-273. Congress reformed the federal role in the nation's juvenile justice system by providing relief from burdensome federal mandates and authorizing block grant assistance to States and local governments, which includes accountability-based juvenile justice programs. The authorization act strengthened the Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grant program. With the passage of Trade Promotion Authority in 2002, Congress set, as one of its priorities, the successful negotiation of free trade agreements. As many of my colleagues are aware, the burden of negotiating these agreements falls on the Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR. I submit that in order for USTR to do its job, we must ensure that they have the adequate resources necessary to perform the job that we demand of the agency. Let's examine some of the realities at USTR. One year prior to the passage of TPA, USTR's workload was comprised of two trade agreements. One year after the passage of TPA, USTR's has taken on more than five times its prior workload, negotiating nearly a dozen Free Trade Agreements and pursuing several dispute settlement talks. And the complexities of the negotiations before and after the passage of TPA have changed. Under the mandates of TPA, through the course of negotiating any Free Trade Agreement, U.S. negotiators seek: strong Intellectual Property Rights protections; access to telecommunications markets; access to financial markets; strong biotechnology protections; increased access to the services markets; strong investment protections; reasonable labor protections; common sense environmental protections; access to the e-commerce market; to ensure the safety of imported food; and strong dispute settlement mechanisms that help to protect America's economic interests. This is no small feat. I am pleased that the conferees accepted the House level of funding to this important agency which provided an additional $5 million--bringing USTR's funding to $41,994,000. This additional funding is consistent with the marked increase in the agency's workload and will help ensure that USTR will be able to adequately fulfill their Congressional mandate. I was hoping to see language in the bill which would ask the General Accounting Office, GAO, to look into several issues that will be relevant in the preparation of the 2010 census. What I would have liked to see could have been as simple as the following: the potential cost of any 2010 Overseas Census; the use of emerging technologies, including the internet, in any overseas enumeration; the feasibility of using State or Federal systems for assigning Americans living outside of the United States for purposes of appointment of Representatives in Congress among the several states; and the different ways of determining some legal basis for whom should be counted. These are important issues that need to be more fully explored. In my State of Utah, where some 14,000 Utah residents are serving an overseas mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of Later Day Saints and are not counted in any census--this is an especially critical issue. I submit that these four issues are not only important for Utahns but for the nation as a whole. There are many citizens of this great Nation that are either temporarily living or working overseas that are not counted in the decennial census. The Congress needs to identify the best and most cost effective ways to ensure that every citizen is counted. I would have also liked this bill to correct a provision enacted in Section 211 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999. That section was challenged before the WTO following its application in a U.S. lawsuit addressing the enforceability of a trade name confiscated by the Cuban government in 1960 without compensation to the owner. The court found the trademark to be unenforceable by the plaintiff entity, which had acquired the alleged rights to the mark from the Cuban government. Congress should bring the United States into compliance with the decision of the WTO Appellate Body in that case. The WTO found in favor of the United States on the section 211 challenge in all respects but one: it concluded that section 211 was drafted in a manner that transgressed the national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations under the TRIPS agreement. At issue was the language of section 211 specifying that the Cuban Government, Cuban nationals and their non-U.S. successors are ineligible to own, and therefore enforce, confiscated trademarks. We should clarify that the prohibition on owning trademarks confiscated in Cuba applies to all nationals, not just Cuban nationals and their successors, thus removing the basis of the WTO's criticism. While I urged the chairman and ranking Democratic member of the Appropriations Committee to look seriously at including this language in the bill to correct previous appropriations language, I do want to make it clear that it does not constitute a waiver of the Judiciary Committee's jurisdiction over this or any related matter. Again, I want to thank the Conferees for their efforts. Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I would like to remark briefly on a matter of critical importance to me, related to one of the bills included in this omnibus, VA-HUD. The Senate Committee on Appropriations' Report on VA-HUD contains language directing the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry--ATSDR--to assess the lead levels at the Tar Creek Superfund site in Oklahoma, and to submit a report to Congress on this assessment no later than July 31, 2004. As a Senator from Oklahoma, and as the chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of this endeavor to more fully understand the elevated lead levels we're seeing in this community, particularly in children. As the chairman of the committee with jurisdiction over both Superfund and ATSDR, I would like to take this opportunity to elaborate on my expectations of ATSDR in connection with this directive: I am urging ATSDR, in collaboration with the Oklahoma State Health Department, to work to identify significant sources and pathways of exposure to lead that may be contributing to elevated blood lead levels in children at the Tar Creek Superfund site in Oklahoma.", u"Mr. President, I want to say something about Ambassador Wilson and his activities, but I see Senator Bond is here. He is going to follow me, and I know he is going to talk about that. Suffice it to say, only one comment needs to be directed about the issue of Mr. Wilson; that is, he didn't tell the truth. He didn't tell the truth, and that is explicitly set forth in the Senate intelligence report. It was also set forth in the report issued by Mr. Butler in Britain last week. On the 7th of July, Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller of the Senate Intelligence Committee released a report on the U.S. intelligence community's prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq prepared by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This 511-page report is highly critical of our intelligence analysis and collection capabilities, especially in the field of human intelligence or what we refer to as HUMINT. Yesterday, the Senate Intelligence Committee began the first of a series of hearings on intelligence reform. We heard from our colleague Senator Feinstein about her proposal to create a new position of director of national intelligence to oversee the entire intelligence community. We also heard from three prominent experts--former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre; former Director of Central Intelligence, Jim Woolsey; and Lieutenant General Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency--on how best to structure the intelligence community to meet the needs of the threats we face today and will face tomorrow. This was a very interesting hearing. Senator Feinstein does her homework. She studied this issue. She presented a very insightful presentation regarding her bill. I look forward to continuing this debate and continuing to review the process, looking both at what we have in place today as well as what reforms we should make relative to the intelligence community. Tomorrow, we expect the 9/11 Commission to release its report on events leading up to the attack of September 11. There is no doubt that the intelligence community will also come under heavy criticism in that report. These various reports and hearings are getting wide coverage in the media. I am glad they are. It is important for our debate on reforming the intelligence community to be as inclusive as possible. Intelligence reform is a bipartisan issue. The problems we have uncovered span more than a decade, under both Republican and Democratic administrations and Republican- and Democratic-controlled Congresses. The fact is, the systemic changes and reforms in the intelligence community, which would have made it more difficult for terrorists to strike us on 9/11 or to have more accurate information on Iraq's WMD capabilities, simply did not take place. As more and more information gets into the public domain, especially in this highly charged political year, there will surely be attempts to politicize the complex issues of intelligence failures and intelligence reform. What I would like to do is to put some clarity on this for the American people. First, there is only one principle to follow on intelligence reform. Intelligence is our first line of defense against terrorism, and we must improve the collection capabilities and analysis of intelligence to protect the security of the United States and its allies. We should beware of anyone who tries to twist this principle in a political fashion. The truth is our country, our people, our liberties, and our way of life are under attack by radical Islamic terrorists who kill and destroy in the name of religion. The security of the United States, which is so dependent on having accurate and timely intelligence, is not a Republican or a Democratic issue. It is a responsibility of all of us in the Congress to make sure we legislate and appropriate moneys so we have the best possible intelligence community. Second, let's be clear about our tasks ahead. We are talking about amending the National Security Act of 1947, which has been the cornerstone of our security and intelligence structure for over half a century. While change is needed, it should be deliberate. It should also be substantive, even radical, if necessary. The first comprehensive report detailing critical shortfalls within the United States intelligence community's performance was conducted by the House Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. As the chairman of that subcommittee, I released its report on July 17, 2002. Following this, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence conducted a joint inquiry into the intelligence community's activities before and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and issued its report in December 2002. The Senate Intelligence Committee report released on July 7 reflects my deep concern that a number of issues identified both by the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security and the joint inquiry have not yet been acted upon. For example, the subcommittee identified that information sharing among intelligence agencies was abysmal, and the joint inquiry report pointed out the CIA was too heavily reliant on foreign liaison reporting and that it had not taken the steps necessary to penetrate hard targets, such as the inner circle of al-Qaida. These issues have not yet been corrected to my satisfaction. Third, as we address the question of how to reform the intelligence community, including the possible creation of a director for national intelligence, there are five important objectives for us to focus on. First, coordination and information sharing throughout the intelligence community must be improved. Second, HUMINT capabilities must be increased, and we must be willing to accept the risks associated with aggressive HUMINT operations. And that is a critical part of this. We must be willing to accept some of the risks that are going to be necessary to secure the type and quality of information on the intelligence side that we need. Third, analytical competition needs to be preserved. Fourth, our counterintelligence capabilities need improvement. And fifth, the role and scope of the military's position in the intelligence community should be reviewed. I included this last point because I want to ensure that the military's capability to support the intelligence requirements of our unified combatant commanders is maintained in any reformation of the intelligence community. That is absolutely critical. All one had to do was listen to our panel yesterday to understand the real importance of that point. The scope of the military's direct involvement in intelligence is enormous and it needs to have a proper role in the intelligence community. Eight of the fifteen members of the intelligence community belong to the Department of Defense. In the current structure, each one of these DOD elements acts more or less independently, representing one small segment of the overall intelligence interests of our military. The creation of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has helped somewhat to bring a common intelligence policy to DOD, but we should also consider the creation of a single DOD intelligence command as part of any extensive and meaningful intelligence reform. The Congress directed the establishment of the Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations, or what is known as SOCOM, over the objections of the Department of Defense because our colleagues had the vision to foresee the requirement. At the time, the DOD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected, but in hindsight, the creation of SOCOM was the correct path. The rationale for establishing a Unified Combatant Command for Intelligence, or INTCOM, is very much the same, and I believe now is the proper time to explore this idea. As we found in our review on the intelligence on Iraq, the intelligence community is made up of hard-working, dedicated men and women, and Chairman Roberts, in his statement, referred to giving them an intelligence community worthy of their efforts. So I welcome the proposal of Senator Feinstein for establishing a Director of National Intelligence as one of the several ideas and issues for us to address and debate. One final point. As President Bush has said many times, he is determined to make sure American intelligence is as accurate as possible for every challenge we face. America's enemies are secretive, they are ruthless, and they are resourceful. That is why the President supports intelligence reform as much as we do in the Congress. In the coming months, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will solicit a broad range of views on reforming the intelligence community, and we will vigorously debate each intelligence reform measure that comes before us. I look forward to this challenge, and I will do everything in my power to ensure that the United States has the intelligence collection and analytical capabilities necessary to protect our lives, our property, our way of life, and our liberties. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, with great respect for Senator Specter, friend and colleague, I rise to oppose this amendment. I want to say that Senator Specter has been a very constructive member of the Governmental Affairs Committee, not just on this matter but on so many others that come before the committee. He has contributed substantially to the strength of the bill that is before the Senate that Senator Collins and I have offered. He and I talked quite seriously about this earlier in the year, and ultimately my conclusion was that it would construct a bridge too far. We have a crisis, which the 9/11 Commission documents, which is that we have an intelligence community, as we discussed yesterday and showed on the graphs, without a leader, without anyone in charge. It is so frustrating to the point of being infuriating to read the lengthy narrative at the beginning of the 9/11 Report to see documented the failure to connect the dots. The cases that Senator Specter mentioned--one agency knowing something, not telling it to another agency, which might well have either kept out some of the terrorists who struck us on September 11--should have--or would have opened our eyes to the plot that was being hatched that FBI agents came face to face with, this is a system, the American intelligence community, without a leader. The most urgent recommendation, according to Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, that the Commission makes to us is to create a strong national intelligence director and then, right alongside that, a strong counterterrorism center--connect the dots. We have done this. Senator Collins documented the various powers we have given to the national intelligence director. First, this has been a recommendation of commission after commission. Going back to the late 1940s, when the National Security Act was adopted and the Central Intelligence Agency was created, post Second World War, there was the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence who was supposed to be not just the head of the CIA but the overseer of our entire intelligence community. The position was taken but hamstrung. It was not given the power. The DCI was the same person as the head of the CIA. That contributed to the community being without a leader. In this bill we separate these two positions. We create the overarching national intelligence director, separate from the head of the CIA, and we give that national intelligence director real budget authority, personnel authority and tasking, assignment coordinating authority, which we are convinced will make us a lot safer and stronger against the threat of terrorism here at home and against Americans and others throughout the world. The Specter amendment goes further than that and would provide that not only would the national intelligence director in the underlying bill direct, oversee, and execute the budgets of these agencies, but he or she would also supervise, direct, and control their day-to-day operations. That approach would create a department in everything but name and put the national intelligence director in charge of multiple agencies on a day-to-day basis. One of the witnesses before our committee was Philip Zelikow, Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission. We asked Dr. Zelikow: Did the Commission consider creating a department of intelligence, giving the national intelligence director the powers that the Specter amendment would give? Dr. Zelikow said: Yes, the Commission considered creating such a department but decided against it on several bases. And they are the bases of my opposition to the Specter amendment. First, the current job that the Director of Central Intelligence had--which was CIA Director, director of presumably the overall intelligence community and principle intelligence adviser to the President--was in itself more than one person could do. To give powers to the national intelligence director for day-to-day operations of the agencies under his or her control would again give more authority, more responsibility than the Commission decided was appropriate and manageable. The Commission also opted for what they considered to be a more modern management approach. They didn't want to create another big Federal bureaucracy; they wanted to create, really patterned after some very large and very successful private corporations in this country, a central management system, strong as our national intelligence director would be, with budget, personnel, tasking authority, but not top heavy, agile, and not in response or in charge of the day-to-day decisions of all of the agencies under that position. That is what we have in the approach we are taking in this bill. Senator Collins said some people will say--and you will hear of amendments on this floor, as the debate goes on, from Members and those outside the Chamber who feel the bill Senator Collins and I have put before the Senate gives the national intelligence director too much power. They will try to strip away that power or fuzz it up so that it is not clear and the status quo can remain. There will be plenty of opportunity to argue against that when those amendments are filed. But here we are in the middle of a war on terrorism, struck as we were on September 11, under a continuing threat of attack, alerts all over, particularly in Washington and New York--real concern--and to do what looks like protecting the status quo of the particular authority of existing agencies doesn't make sense. There will be those who feel our bill goes too far. I don't mean to put words into Senator Specter's mouth because he is very eloquent, but this amendment suggests we have not gone far enough. The Commission deliberately decided not to take the National Security Agency, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and National Reconnaissance Organization out of the Department of Defense. The Commission was concerned, Dr. Zelikow said, about the balance between national and departmental guidance, and they didn't want to tilt the balance too far away from defense. The Commission's executive director portrayed the Commission's idea of a lean, creative command center this way: Since terrorism poses such a revolutionary challenge to old ways of executive management in our national security bureaucracy, counterterrorism requires an innovative response. I believe the underlying bill does exactly that: real authority, decisionmaking authority, but lean and, may I add, mean, because the people who are threatening us are very mean. The other thing the kind of structure we have created does is make it harder for the problems that many in the Senate and Committee on Intelligence cited in its report on prewar intelligence are worried about, which is group-think. There is an increased danger that persons at the top of the daily operations of the organizations--there is a danger that you will begin to have not the competition of ideas we want to see in our intelligence community and that we feel strongly will be encouraged by the national intelligence director we are creating by the language in the bill, the focus on independence and objectivity of intelligence and by the national counterterrorism center, which is ultimately the place where everybody who knows anything about a particular problem--in this case terrorism--and maybe the director will create other centers on weapons of mass destruction for particularly problematic countries like Iran or North Korea. Everybody in the Government who knows anything about that will sit down together to share what they have collected in the way of intelligence, share their analysis of it, and then plan jointly on how to stop it, how to deal with the threat represented by those situations. So I believe Senator Specter's intentions are very good, and I admire him for them. But I think at this moment they are a bridge too far, both in the substance of where he would take us and also, frankly, in terms of the probability of any such measure passing Congress. There is an urgency to our deliberations, as we have said over and over again. I think if we reach too far, we may end up with nothing and nothing maintains the status quo, which failed us on September 11 and will fail us again unless we act. I oppose the amendment. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.", u"I know in normal times this amount of noise is about the best you can get, but I hope people will pay attention to what Senator Bayh is trying to accomplish and, as chairman of the Intelligence Committee, which I support very strongly. It is a commonsense measure. Speaking of the Intelligence Committee, the very committee that the 9/11 Commission said should be enabled to do a better job instead of the way it is now when we are so fractionalized, it says we should be on the same level playing field as other standing committees in the Senate--just fair play, same level playing field in terms of sequential referral. A committee brings up a subject, they pass a bill, they make an inquiry, they publish it, and another committee says: You know, we are interested in that as well. We would like to have sequential referral. How do you do that? You do it by unanimous consent or you go to the leaders and you say: You know, we have a dog in this fight. We are interested in it. We have expertise, we have background, and we would like to take a look at it as well. Not on the Intelligence Committee. Virtually every other committee in the Congress now has on-demand--that means you finish a product, you finish your authorizing bill, and we will grab it by the throat and we will do whatever we want to with it. That is not right. That is not right with regard to what we are trying to do to empower--and by empower I don't mean to empower over and above other important committees--or enable us to do our job. Let me give you the classic example. We don't have, despite all of the rhetoric, all of the activity, all of the effort by Senator Collins and by Senator Lieberman and the intelligence reform bill, all of the effort by the Joint Inquiry Task Force on 9/11, all of the effort by the Intelligence Committee in regard to the WMD report--now the report by Mr. Duelfer and the Iraq Survey Group, and the group of intelligence not only of the United States globally and the importance that that has for the daily lives and pocketbooks not only of people in America but around the world, and all of this discussion about 9/11, we do not have the intelligence authorization bill passed. We had a vote yesterday 90 to 7 on my amendment--probably the first time I will ever do that--saying regardless of what happens in intelligence we ought to authorize first and then appropriate. There is a novel thought. But even at this late date, we don't have the intelligence authorization act passed. Why? It is because of this on-demand referral that no other committee has as a millstone around its neck. Senator Bayh is one of the committee's most serious, capable members, and he and I agree. We worried about this, along with other members on the Intelligence Committee, mostly made up of senior Members who know their job and who have attended. Their attendance record is outstanding. I can't get into that because it takes a decision by the chairman and vice chairman, and also perhaps a vote in committee to get into attendance records. I am not going to do that, simply to say these people have many other duties. They come there and work hard. We have had over 125 hearings in the Intelligence Committee, 60 percent more than at any other time in history, with regard to the WMD report, 521 pages long, which I think is the most thorough study any committee has ever done on the intelligence community. Senator Bayh's presence on this floor on the issue underlines its importance. It is bipartisan in nature and impacts on the committee's ability to do its work. What will the amendment of Senator Bayh do if it passes? It will mean that for the first time in history the legislative priorities of the Senate Intelligence Committee will reach the Senate floor without being automatically filtered through the lens of other Senate committees. I must admit that under resolution 400 we have the ability in the Intelligence Committee--if anybody mentions intelligence, there might be another committee which can ask for referral. We don't normally do that. I don't think we have to do that. As a matter of fact, I am trying to think of when we did that in the history of the committee. But certainly that is a lot different than on-demand sequential referral by every other committee. Interested committees under the Bayh amendment will still be able to request sequential referral to the Intelligence Committee legislation. But just as other authorizing legislation, those committees would have to do so through a unanimous consent agreement instead of a demand letter. All we want is to be treated as any other committee. My goodness. If we are the ones who are supposed to be empowered and stand up according to the 9/11 Commission and do a better job--and I think we have in the last few years--why on Earth would you force the Intelligence Committee to go through this on-demand sequential referral? An example of the problems associated with on-demand sequential referral of intelligence--I don't know what to call this. On-demand special referral sounds like a lot of gobbledygook outside the beltway, an arcane thing. It is sort of like cattle rustling; you sort of take that bill and rustle it away from that pasture on demand and the poor owner of that cowherd can't do a doggone thing about it. It is time to end it. At any rate, an example of problems associated with on-demand sequential referral, or the cattle rustling of Intelligence Committee legislation to the Armed Services Committee, is the fate of intelligence reforms proposed by former Intelligence Committee Chairman Senator Specter, who was on the floor a while back, and Vice Chairman Bob Kerrey, who did a splendid job as vice chairman--that was back in 1997 during the Intelligence authorization bill, the Intelligence Committee proposal, what we have debated here for the last 2 weeks--this was back in 1997--direct appropriations of intelligence community funding by the Director of Central Intelligence is something which George Tenet and every other DCI has wanted for a long time. That appropriations would have funded the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office--what was then called the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The Armed Services Committee obtained sequential referral of the 1997 intelligence authorization bill. After 30 days of the Armed Services Committee being innovative and forward looking, the Specter-Kerrey reform measure became a computer system to track intelligence expenditures. It didn't have any authority. It became a computer center to track intelligence expenditures. On-demand sequential referral has had a chilling effect on the introduction of legislative initiatives by the Intelligence Committee. I see the distinguished former chairman, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, who had a reform measure back in 1997 which would have gone a long way toward intelligence reform that we have been considering on this floor for the last 3 days. I thank him for that effort. But he got sidetracked. His cattle got--well, they were sort of branded, sort of got into another pasture. I think that is unfortunate. A degree of self-policing occurs about what legislative provisions realistically can survive automatic referral through other committees. As a result, many provisions are dropped or diluted to make the bill as unobjectionable as possible. Senator Collins of Maine said we had a delicate balance. We had a discussion yesterday of the national intelligence director. The thought was that director should be able to move positions, but then we had a compromise. We could move positions and we couldn't move people. What the heck is that? I know that in compromise when you refer to other committees, you make it less objectionable, but sometimes you leave the cutting edge of reform with a very dull knife. This deterrent effect, I will tell you as chairman of the committee, begins prior to the committee markup. I know whatever we do in terms of authorization must go over to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I serve on that committee. I have the utmost respect for the chairman of that committee. It is a privilege to serve on that committee. I am chairman of something called Emerging Threat and Capabilities. I have enjoyed my service on the Armed Services Committee. But we know even before markup that we are going to have to go to the Armed Services Committee, and we could on demand referral have the same thing happen on Foreign Relations, on Appropriations, on Armed Services, and Judiciary because those are the members who now serve on the committee to make sure there are two people on that committee so it is widely represented. But I know, and everybody on the committee knows, that before we even do the authorization, we have to go through this Byzantine kind of machination before we get our product on the floor even to pass it. Again, where is the intelligence authorization bill for this year? I don't know. We have tried to hotline it. We have had objections. After all this year of reform we cannot even pass an intelligence authorization bill? Do we want to continue that? This deterrent effect, as I said, begins right at the start. We have 22 professional staffers who have backgrounds, analysts with the DIA, CIA throughout the intelligence community. They are the people who put together the 521-page report on the WMD. We let the chips fall where they may. Senator Rockefeller and I worked together, both sides, and we had a bipartisan vote, 17 to 0. It was tough. Can we do the job? You darn bet you, and we have 22 staffers who can do that job. I daresay none of the other committees that have on-demand sequential referral have this kind of staff. Yet we end up on the cutting-room floor. Sometimes we do not even get in the room where we end up on the cutting-room floor. I don't think that is right.", u"Among those who have been forced out or retired recently are the Deputy Director of the CIA, the Deputy Director of Operations, the second ranking member of the clandestine service, and the former head of the CIA bin Laden unit. Other resignations, retirements, or reassignments may follow. Apparently, Director Goss brought with him at least 4 former staffers from the House of Representatives and inserted them into senior positions at the agency where they have begun to force these resignations. This is troubling for two reasons: First, we cannot afford to lose any intelligence personnel, especially seasoned officers, in the midst of the war on terrorism. We have so few people we cannot fully staff the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, TTIC, that the President created to provide a coordinated counterterrorism response to the 9/11 attacks. Secondly, our intelligence staff have been working 24/7 since the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq began. They need morale boosters, not the morale downers that come from the forced resignations of well-respected leaders. So desperate is the personnel situation that the intelligence reform bill, S. 2845, now in conference, authorizes the establishment of a National Intelligence Reserve Corps for the temporary reemployment of former intelligence community employees during periods of emergency. Some would argue that the CIA is a ``damaged agency'' that needs to be reformed through ``hard love.'' Perhaps that is the case. Perhaps the operations directorate needs to be given new direction. I understand that both President Clinton and President Bush, in his first term, were focused on reforming the clandestine operations through the efforts of Director Tenet and that those reforms were yielding results. But if those results are insufficient, more needs to be done. If a ship needs to change course and requires a new crew, the new crew needs to knows both how to pilot a ship and how to plot a course. So far, the current upheaval at the Central Intelligence Agency makes me worry that the current new crew may not measure up to that challenge. I would like to be proved wrong because our national security depends on it. Washington, Nov. 16.--Porter J. Goss, the new intelligence chief, has told Central Intelligence Agency employees that their job is to ``support the administration and its policies in our work,'' a copy of an internal memorandum shows. ``As agency employees we do not identify with, support or champion opposition to the administration or its policies,'' Mr. Goss said in the memorandum, which was circulated late on Monday. He said in the document that he was seeking ``to clarify beyond doubt the rules of the road.'' While his words could be construed as urging analysts to conform with administration policies, Mr. Goss also wrote, ``We provide the intelligence as we see it--and let the facts alone speak to the policymaker.'' The memorandum suggested an effort by Mr. Goss to spell out his thinking as he embarked on what he made clear would be a major overhaul at the agency, with further changes to come. The changes to date, including the ouster of the agency's clandestine service chief, have left current and former intelligence officials angry and unnerved. Some have been outspoken, including those who said Tuesday that they regarded Mr. Goss's warning as part of an effort to suppress dissent within the organization. In recent weeks, White House officials have complained that some C.I.A. officials have sought to undermine President Bush and his policies. At a minimum, Mr. Goss's memorandum appeared to be a swipe against an agency decision under George J. Tenet, his predecessor as director of central intelligence, to permit a senior analyst at the agency, Michael Scheuer, to write a book and grant interviews that were critical of the Bush administration's policies on terrorism. One former intelligence official said he saw nothing inappropriate in Mr. Goss's warning, noting that the C.I.A. had long tried to distance itself and its employees from policy matters. ``Mike exploited a seam in the rules and inappropriately used it to express his own policy views,'' the official said of Mr. Scheuer. ``That did serious damage to the agency, because many people, including some in the White House, thought that he was being urged by the agency to take on the president. I know that was not the case.'' But a second former intelligence official said he was concerned that the memorandum and the changes represented an effort by Mr. Goss to stifle independence. ``If Goss is asking people to color their views and be a team player, that's not what people at C.I.A. signed up for,'' said the former intelligence official. The official and others interviewed in recent days spoke on condition that they not be named, saying they did not want to inflame tensions at the agency. Some of the contents of Mr. Goss's memorandum were first reported by The Washington Post. A complete copy of the document was obtained on Tuesday by The New York Times. Tensions between the agency's new leadership team, which took over in late September, and senior career officials are more intense than at any time since the late 1970's. The most significant changes so far have been the resignations on Monday of Stephen R. Kappes, the deputy director of operations, and his deputy, Michael Sulick, but Mr. Goss told agency employees in the memorandum that he planned further changes ``in the days and weeks ahead of us'' that would involve ``procedures, organization, senior personnel and areas of focus for our action.'' ``I am committed to sharing these changes with you as they occur,'' Mr. Goss said in the memorandum. ``I do understand it is easy to be distracted by both the nature and the pace of change. I am confident, however, that you will remain deeply committed to our mission.'' Mr. Goss's memorandum included a reminder that C.I.A. employees should ``scrupulously honor our secrecy oath'' by allowing the agency's public affairs office and its Congressional relations branch to take the lead in all contacts with the media and with Congress. ``We remain a secret organization,'' he said. Among the moves that Mr. Goss said he was weighing was the selection of a candidate to become the agency's No. 2 official, the deputy director of central intelligence. The name being mentioned most often within the C.I.A. as a candidate, intelligence officials said, is Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden of the Air Force, the director of the National Security Agency, which is responsible for intercepting electronic communications worldwide. The naming of a deputy director would be made by the White House, in a nomination subject to Senate confirmation. In interviews this week, members of Congress as well as current and former intelligence officials said one reason the overhaul under way had left them unnerved was that Mr. Goss had not made clear what kind of agency he intended to put in place. But Mr. Goss's memorandum did little to spell out that vision, and it did not make clear why the focus of overhaul efforts to date appeared to be on the operations directorate, which carries out spying and other covert missions around the world. ``It's just very hard to divine what's going on over there,'' said Senator Ron Wyden, Democrat of Oregon, who said he and other members of the Senate intelligence committee would be seeking answers at closed sessions this week. ``But on issue after issue, there's a real question about whether the country and the Congress are going to get an unvarnished picture of our intelligence situation at a critical time.'' Mr. Goss said in the memorandum that he recognized that intelligence officers were operating in an atmosphere of extraordinary pressures, after a series of reports critical of intelligence agencies' performance in the months leading up to the Sept. 11 attacks and the war in Iraq. ``The I.C. and its people have been relentlessly scrutinized and criticized,'' he said, using an abbreviation for intelligence community. ``Intelligence-related issues have become the fodder of partisan food fights and turf-power skirmishes. All the while, the demand for our services and products against a ruthless and unconventional enemy has expanded geometrically and we are expected to deliver-- instantly. We have reason to be proud of our achievements and we need to be smarter about how we do our work in this operational climate.''", u"Mr. President, I wish to speak on the military's recent discharge of several linguists who are critically needed in our Nation's fight against terrorism but who, in the military's eyes, are unfit for the job because of their sexual orientation. The military's treatment of these individuals is not only a grave injustice to these talented men and women who have bravely volunteered to defend our Nation, but it poses a serious threat to our Nation's preparedness. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, our Nation's security agencies and all branches of the military recognized that they must increase the recruitment and training of linguists who can speak and interpret languages such as Arabic, Farsi, Korean, Mandarin Chinese, and Russian. Understanding these languages is critical to ensuring our Nation's security. Those who are able to communicate in these languages can translate communications that may be made by terrorists or others intent on doing us harm. In fact, a large portion of the intelligence information retrieved by the U.S. security agencies currently cannot be translated, hindering the ability of the Federal Government to protect our country. According to a study released by the U.S. General Accounting Office in January 2002, the Army is facing a serious shortfall of linguists in five of the six languages it categorizes as most critical--Arabic, Korean, Mandarin Chinese, Farsi, and Russian. The Army has met only 50 percent of its need for linguists who speak Arabic, 63 percent of its need for Korean speakers, 62 percent of its need for Mandarin Chinese speakers, 32 percent of its need for Farsi speakers, and 63 percent of its need for Russian speakers. This leads to a 44 percent total shortfall in translators and interpreters for 5 of the 6 critical languages. Furthermore, the Army only has 75 percent of the cryptology linguists needed who speak Korean and Mandarin Chinese, and has a 13 percent shortfall of Army Human Intelligence Collectors in five of the languages found to be of critical importance. Spanish is the only language for which the Army has met its linguist needs. Although the military faces a crisis in the linguistics field, linguists with a high level of proficiency in languages determined critical by the military and security agencies have continued to be discharged from the Armed Forces simply because they are gay, lesbian, or bisexual. In 1993, the military instituted a plan known as ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue, Don't Harass,'' known more commonly as the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy. The basic premise of the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy is that, while military leaders know that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals have always played an important part in America's military, homosexual members of the military are not allowed to be asked about or to tell anyone about their sexual orientation. Furthermore, the Department of Defense generally cannot conduct investigations regarding the sexual orientation of service members, and the Armed Forces has a policy that does not tolerate harassment of anyone based on perceived or actual homosexuality. The ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy has been, by most accounts, a failure. Homosexual military personnel continue to be harassed within all the branches of the Armed Forces. In fact, according to the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, SDLN, an advocacy organization dedicated to aiding gay, lesbian, and bisexual service members who face discrimination in the armed services, in 2001 the armed services fired more than 1,250 gay, lesbian, and bisexual Americans B more than any other year since 1987. Furthermore, since the initiation of the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy, more than 7,800 American service members have lost their jobs because of anti-gay sentiment. Not only does the ``Don't Ask Don't Tell'' policy needlessly discriminate against courageous Americans, it also wastes millions in taxpayer dollars. For example, according to SLDN, the government spent $36 million to replace gays, lesbians, and bisexuals who were discharged from the military in 2001. Even more staggering is the fact that the government has spent over $234 million to train replacements for homosexual service members since the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy was enacted in 1993. Thus, instead of using those millions of dollars on fighting terrorism, the military is spending it to replace linguists that they already have in their ranks. Not only does the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy waste time, money and linguistic skill, it also initiates discrimination against those who simply want to serve their country. One of these Americans is Alastair Gamble. He had been in training in Arabic for only a few months at the Defense Language Institute when the terrorist attacks of September 11 occurred. After the attacks, he decided that his skills were needed more than ever. He continued his studies and soon was able to converse about military operations, economics, and politics in Arabic. He, however, would not be able to serve his country. Why? Because he was caught one night in his partner's room after hours. Though Gamble admits that he broke the military's policy, he states that many heterosexual couples also broke this same rule on that same night. The heterosexual couples, however, were only reprimanded. In stark contrast, Gamble's infraction led to a search of his room where military officials found evidence that led to the discovery of a relationship with another officer who was studying Korean at the time. Soon both Gamble and his partner were dismissed from the Army, and the American people were denied the service of two young men who were learning badly needed language skills. Gamble and his partner are not alone. From October 2001 through December 2002, seven other linguists specializing in critical languages were also discharged after telling superiors that they were gay. Gamble and the eight other linguists should not be treated this way. It is past time for the U.S. military to modernize its attitudes toward soldiers' sexual orientation. It is time for the U.S. military to recognize the contributions of gay, lesbian, and bisexual military officers and enlisted personnel by allowing them to serve in the Armed Forces without fear and prejudice. Currently, security organizations within the United States allow for open service--most notably, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. These openly gay men and women serve our country well. In fact, they sometimes serve along-side military men and women who cannot discuss their sexual orientation. Not only do United States intelligence agencies allow for open service, but many other nations allow open service as well. Some of our closest allies--Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Australia, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Iceland and Italy--allow open service in their military. In fact, the United States and Turkey are the only two NATO countries that do not allow open military service for gay men. Nations that allow for open military service have not reported any change in the way the military is run because of their policies. According to a study by Aaron Belkin, the Director of the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and Jason McNichol, senior officials, commanders, and military scholars within the Australian Defense Forces consistently praise the lifting of the gay ban, which occurred in 1992. The report states that there has been no overall pattern of disruption to the military, recruitment and retention have not suffered, and military performance was not affected because of the ban. In January 2000, Britain too lifted its ban on gays in the military. According to PlanetOut News, a review of the policy by the British military, released in late 2000, found that there was no discernable impact on the military after it lifted the ban. If some of our closest allies have been successful in allowing open service in the military, why not the United States? Our military has been fighting terrorism and may soon go to war against Iraq. We desperately need the specialized language skills of our fellow Americans as resources. Our military should cease the discriminatory and counter-productive policy of discharging competent military personnel simply because of their sexual orientation. I hope that this administration will consider the consequences of the decision to discharge the linguists I have spoken about today and will give gay, lesbian, and bisexual Americans the chance to serve openly in the United States military.", u"Mr. President, we had a time agreement and the Senator from New Jersey and the Senator from Arizona have spoken. I will make a few brief remarks and yield to my colleague. Then it is my intention to move to table these two amendments. Let me state why. First in regard to Senator McCain's amendment, I state this sincerely, I think Senator McCain provides a very useful function for this Congress and this Senate with regard to the process we are involved in, the appropriation of money from the Treasury, spending the people's money. I am very sincere. We have checked every one of the amendments we have agreed to by unanimous consent with the Senator's staff before getting that agreement. That is a process we didn't use before. At times they make comments that lead us to change the amendments. And the Senator has, through this process, picked out some he would like to take out of the bill or put in the bill before we pull it out of committee. Let me comment on a couple of those. The Senator mentioned the brown tree snakes. We have provided $1 million for control of these snakes. That primarily is to continue a very successful program so far that has been carried out on military planes to Hawaii from Guam. These snakes are carried inadvertently on military planes to Hawaii from Guam. The snakes are endemic to Guam and come on the military planes at Anderson Air Force base in Guam and then go into Hawaii. We hope we can prevent it. It will have an enormously adverse impact on the agriculture sector of the economy. But it is a military function. It is trying to eradicate or control these brown snakes where they come from, as they have been a menace to Hawaii because of their ability to crawl on to military planes as they come to Hawaii from Guam. I commend the Senator for raising the question, but clearly we have examined it. It is an ongoing program. The canola oil fuel cell initiative is an existing program between the Department of Defense and the Department of Interior. It is funded in this bill for $2.5 million. Both Departments put money into it. This project will extract and convert technologies, transforming agriculture materials into bio-based fuel. Specifically, it is the rapeseed-based biodiesel fuel, and the underlying goal is to convert bio-based fuel into a hydrogen-rich gas stream to use with fuel cells and micro turbines and other power generation systems. It does have a legitimate defense interest, and it is a program for the Department of the Army, primarily in research and development. Shakespeare in American Military Communities is a very interesting program. This is being done in conjunction with the National Endowment for the Arts. It is a partnership with the Department of Defense. The goal is to bring the arts to military personnel and their families as they are brought to other communities and high schools throughout the country. The proposal for this year is to perform ``Macbeth'' on 16 military bases in conjunction with educational programs. This is one of the programs the military is very pleased that we are trying to make available to them to improve the cultural activities on military bases, particularly for young children. We are looking into the prospect of taking some of these cultural programs overseas to meet the needs of the people stationed there. We have under consideration Fort Huachuca and Davis Monthan Air Force Bases. I know them both very well. Further, the Senator raised the question of the Griffiss hangar renovation. This is part of a hangar that is used for the ongoing work and research of the Air Force research laboratory in Rome, NY. Damage to the hangar increases the heating, utility, and other fixed costs of the laboratory facility to its detriment. It is a renovation of a former Air Force base, but it is used by the Air Force research laboratory. I regret to say I disagree with my good friend. I do note that what he is doing is trying to make certain we know what we are doing. On this amendment, I am sad to say I disagree with him, and I will move to table it in just a moment. With regard to the amendment offered by Senator Corzine, I have a problem, a decided problem with this. There is an ongoing investigation or series of hearings--I don't know whether you want to call it an investigation yet--of the items covered by this proposed amendment, creating a national commission on the development and use of intelligence related to Iraq. Iraq is still ongoing. To create a commission now to look into Iraq primarily based upon the problem related to the President's statement in his State of the Union Message--which, by the way, was true, but not really totally accurate in terms of the interpretation people gave to it--in order to start the campaign of 2004, at a time when we have men and women in uniform over there now, their commanders, Ambassador Bremer, all of the people who participated in the process of this intelligence activity, including the CIA and the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, all of them will be involved in hearings before the commission. They are already in hearings before the House and the Senate, and they have unknown involvement in the internal investigation also going on in the Department. As I said previously, almost all of us heard the Secretary of State, my great friend Colin Powell, tell us about his involvement and how this train of circumstances developed with regard to how that statement was in the President's State of the Union Message. We all know Presidents don't write their own State of the Union Message. They review drafts, and they rely on their subordinates to see that they are absolutely accurate. In the process, a statement was inserted that could be interpreted in a way that could mislead people. Already the Director of the CIA has admitted his system made a mistake. He has taken responsibility, as he should, for something that should have been taken out by the CIA reviewer. It was not. It was taken out of a previous statement at another time. No question was raised about its being taken out. In this instance, it was not taken out and Director Tenet said it should have been taken out. He takes the responsibility himself because of the failure of his Agency, just as I make a policy when any member of my staff makes a mistake, I treat it as my mistake. George Tenet didn't make the mistake. The process in the CIA made the mistake. The President didn't make a mistake. In the process of preparing that statement, there was a mistake made. I am tired of making a mountain out of a molehill on this one. I am particularly disturbed with the fact that people want to create another commission. This is not a time for a commission like the commissions we have known in the past. This is not Watergate. That is the impression. This is not a Watergate. It is not even a ``truth gate.'' The President read a speech that was prepared for him. We all clapped at it, and we all approved of it. It was one part of it, one tiny part of it that should have been taken out in the process of review. Now to create a commission primarily for that and all the rest of the garbage in this thing--pardon my French--all the statements in here as to what is going to be investigated with regard to the possession of mobile laboratories, with regard to an attempt to procure aluminum tubes--it wasn't an attempt; they were procured. But the concept of whether or not Iraq possessed delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction--we had 17 resolutions of the United Nations that were not complied with. Why were they passing 17 resolutions if there was nothing to investigate? But the main thing, why should we create a commission now to look into something that is ongoing? Once this is all tied down and we have our people home and Mr. Bremer is residing in the U.S., and the people involved in all of the intelligence activities that led to the statement are in the United States again, we can have some form of commission to review it. This Senator would not oppose that. But this is an ongoing operation, and this is an attempt to smear the President of the United States. I shall not permit that if I can possibly avoid it. As I understand it, there is no further time agreement. I have the floor. I intend to keep the floor until I make a motion to table this amendment. I am happy to yield to my friend from Arizona for a question.", u"I would like to give a copy to the chairman, just as a courtesy. Mr. President, I rise to offer this amendment that is in support of our first responders. This amendment would provide an additional $150 million to the fire grant program for firefighter equipment and firefighting training. What would the Mikulski-Dodd amendment do? Well, first, it would provide protective gear for 150,000 firefighters. It would buy 500 new fire trucks, 300 new rescue vehicles, and 25,000 new breathing masks. But this is not about protective gear and fire trucks. It is about saving lives. When we talk about homeland security and when we talk about protecting our firefighters so they can protect us, this money is about protecting them. It is so our firefighters are prepared for any attack. It offers double value for the taxpayer, whether it is a terrorist attack or whether we are hit by a tornado. When these events occur in our community, firefighters are always the first on the scene. We all remember that horrific and melancholy day of September 11 with planes crashing into the World Trade Center and a plane crashing into the Pentagon. It was the Chevy Chase Fire and Rescue Squad, Rescue One, that rushed to the Pentagon from Maryland as part of a doctrine of mutual aid. It was the LaPlata Fire Department that was the first to respond to a deadly tornado last year. It was the Baltimore Fire Department that rushed into a smoldering tunnel fire that cut off train traffic on the east coast. When they went down into that hell hole fuming with toxic chemicals, they did not know if a terrorist had caused it or it was an accident. All they knew was they had to respond in the name of duty. Well, it is our duty to make sure they have the right equipment and the right gear to protect us. We know they have the right stuff, but they need the right stuff to protect themselves. This is not something Barbara Mikulski has just concluded. The Council on Foreign Relations recently issued a bipartisan, independent report. It was led by Senator Rudman. Actually, it was not bipartisan. The Council on Foreign Relations does not have parties. What were their findings? They were absolutely chilling. The report found that the United States remains dangerously ill-prepared to handle a catastrophic attack on American soil. Specifically, it means this, and this is what they found: Fire departments across the country only have radios to equip 50 percent of the firefighters on a shift. Imagine this: People running up to the World Trade Center responding to a towering inferno. The firefighters will only have 50 percent of the radios they need. When they go into these situations where there are toxic chemicals like in the Baltimore Tunnel, or whether they are running into a building where they do not even know what is in it--asbestos burning, PCBs burning, the building burning--there is only breathing apparatus for one-third, and only 10 percent of the fire departments in America have the personnel and equipment to respond to a building collapse. What do terrorists do? They blow up buildings and they blow up people. We have to make sure that when our first responders are there, they have what they need. We did a survey in Maryland, working with our State fire agency. We need $52 million to provide protective equipment for firefighters in my State. Yet my State is facing a budget deficit of over $1 billion. Services are being cut, tuitions are being increased, and we ask our State and local governments to take on more. Every time our Nation goes to code orange, our communities go to code red. Since September 11, my city of Baltimore has spent over $16 million on homeland security, including $1.3 million for extra personnel and equipment for our fire departments. In Baltimore, the recent heightened alerts have cost Baltimore City $750,000 in overtime. Maryland cannot bear this burden alone. Because it is a national threat, we have to make sure there are national resources to secure the homeland to provide not only homeland security but hometown security. There are over 1 million firefighters in the United States of America; 750,000 are volunteers. They are true heroes. They save lives. They save homes. They save communities. We need to make sure we save them. That is what protective gear is all about. Every day when they are on duty, they do not know what they will face. They might enter a house to save a child trapped on the second floor. They might put out the flames of a building consumed by toxic chemicals. Many of our volunteers work three shifts: Their regular jobs, their families, and at the fire station. For the help they need, we cannot do this on tip jars, bingo, or charity. They need to be able to have their Government on their side. It costs over $6,000 to staff a firefighter in something they call bunker gear. Bunker gear means what they need in terms of the protective suits they wear, the breathing apparatus, the special gloves that will snatch a person out, the boots they wear that are fire retardant and fire resistant. That is an awful lot in resources for local communities to bear, and they have to be ready, particularly in high-risk areas, to be able to do this. Last year, there were close to 20,000 applications for fire grants, and I compliment the Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of the subcommittee, as well as Senator Byrd, for keeping the fire grant program as a freestanding program. My $150 million amendment that I am offering with Senator Dodd really goes to the fire grant program. Last year, there were close to 20,000 applicants with over $2 billion worth of requests. The fire grant program, on a merit based, peer review, no pork, no partisan basis could have spent $2.5 billion. What our money does is restore to the $900 million authorizing level. After September 11 we did a lot. We said we will express our gratitude; a grateful nation will never forget our first responders. In the first place, we should not forget it is in the Federal checkbook. I know the chairman and the ranking member did everything they could to fully fund this program. I compliment them on their efforts. But it would take another $150 million to reach the authorized level. The fire grant program needs to be expanded. When we look at what we could do in our State, we have a fire department in Anne Arundel County. This county includes the National Security Agency, the capital of the State of Maryland, the U.S. Naval Academy, and the Baltimore-Washington Airport. Don't they need help for their first responders? Then there is the Chevy Chase Fire Department. We think of Chevy Chase as an affluent community but they cannot raise these funds from property taxes, fish fries, and bingo. We need help. Maryland needs help because we are in a high-risk area. I rise not only for my State. I rise for the Nation. We are not prepared. The facts speak for themselves. Our esteemed colleague, Senator Rudman, said 50 percent of the fire departments do not have radios; only one-third have breathing apparatus equipment. They need their bunker gear. That is what it is called. The cost is $6,000 each. Imagine what a public investment means. We give them the right gear. They have the right stuff. They should be able to count on us to do this. We need this amendment. I welcome the fact that my colleague, Senator Dodd, is also a cosponsor. He authorized the fire grant program as the appropriator. We have worked to keep it going. Now it is in Homeland Security. This is not about process, about who did what. It is about what our first responders do. We count on them to save our lives. They should count on us to make sure they have the right equipment to save their own while they are saving ours. I yield the floor for my colleague.", u"Mr. President, I am pleased to appear before my colleagues to support early Senate passage of the fiscal year 2004 intelligence authorization bill. This is a good bill, crafted within the unique bipartisan process used for over a quarter century by the Senate Intelligence Committee. No bipartisan effort can be effective without good personal cooperation. I have received such cooperation from my friend and colleague, the distinguished Vice Chairman, Senator Rockefeller. It is a privilege to be working with him on these important national security issues. This bill will serve our Nation's security interests during a time of troubling international conflict. I would like to review a few of the bill's significant provisions and some of the difficult budget choices which the Intelligence Committee made. The version of our bill which Senators are considering reflects changes which the Armed Services Committee made to the bill on sequential referral. The Intelligence Committee and Armed Services Committee reconciled differences in the bills amicably and professionally, with the equities of both committees in mind. The unclassified fiscal year 2004 intelligence bill contains reasonable new management and national security authorities for the intelligence community. For example, section 311 will give the intelligence community additional flexibility to act quickly to meet higher priority needs by eliminating the ``unforeseen requirements'' criterion for reprogrammings. Section 312 of the bill accounts for increased construction costs by raising (but not eliminating) the thresholds for notification to Congress on certain intelligence community construction and renovation projects and by shortening or removing the waiting period for beginning urgent or emergency projects. Section 315 would set up a program to cultivate and encourage college students to become intelligence analysts. Good analysts do not grow on trees. As the intelligence community fights the war on terrorism, good language and area specialists are more important than ever. The bill also creates a series of ``one-time'' reporting requirements in critical areas. Many of these reports will form the basis for committee efforts to address the concerns outlined in the report of the joint inquiry into the attacks of September 11. For example, we require reports on the following topics: The threat that ``cleared insiders'' like Robert Hanssen pose to classified computer networks; the adequacy and future direction of U.S. Government security investigations and clearance procedures; the creation of a ``community of intelligence experts'' by transferring civilian intelligence personnel among all elements of the intelligence community; the modifications to law and policy necessary to facilitate intelligence sharing; the strategic planning by the Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense with respect to the intelligence community; and the growing dependence by the United States on computer hardware and software manufactured overseas. Two of the reporting requirements deal with Iraq. Section 337 requires a report to the Congress on Intelligence lessons learned in Iraq--similar to a provision in the current House intelligence bill. Section 338 of the bill requires a report on the conventional arms and ammunition acquired by Saddam Hussein in violation of U.N. sanctions. Given the subject matter, these reports will also be made available to the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees. Section 339 reduces burdens on the intelligence community and reconciles oversight priorities by repealing a number of recurring reporting requirements relating to intelligence activities. Reviewing reporting requirements and clearing out the cobwebs is a healty exercise for any committee. In title IV of the bill, there are notable ``CIA-specific'' provisions. Section 401 removes the ``prior notification'' requirement for a limited category of CIA ``quality of life'' benefits that have already been authorized by law for members of the Foreign Service. It does not disturb advance notification requirements for agency-unique benefits adopted under the CIA Act. Section 402 affords tort immunity benefits to CIA security protective officers (SPOs) and protective detail personnel designated by the DCI to protect certain agency employees, defectors, their immediate families, and other persons in the U.S. under CIA auspices. The provision would afford to SPOs and protective details the same protection against liability for assault, battery, false arrest, negligence, and other common law torts that certain law enforcement and Diplomatic Security Service officers enjoy already. Section 404 of our bill is a technical amendment to the recently passed Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002. The FISMA amendment permits inspector generals authorized by laws other than the Inspector General Act, such as the CIA inspector general, to perform security evaluations on information systems at their respective agencies. Title V of the bill contains provisions related to intelligence community elements residing in DOD. Section 501 of the bill would exempt certain National Security Agency operational files from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act and is identical to the provision recently approved by the Senate in the Defense Authorization bill. Section 503 allows designated NSA security officers to carry firearms while on official duty to protect NSA employees and property in the U.S. This provision would provide virtually identical protections to those in Section 402 for CIA security protective officers. Turning to the budget, when we began to review the President's fiscal year 2004 request, I became very concerned at the recent growth in intelligence funding. There is clearly not enough money in future years to fully fund the intelligence programs in this year's budget request. That is the sad reality of this budget. The intelligence community is stretched thin, with far more requirements than available funds. Too many projects and activities have been started that cannot be accommodated in the top line. It does not matter what caused this problem. The problem exists. A significant issue that must be addressed by the executive branch is the manner in which cost estimates for the procurement of major intelligence community systems are conducted. The magnitude and consistency in the cost growth on recent acquisitions indicates a systemic intelligence community bias to underestimate the cost of major systems. This ``perceived affordability'' creates difficulties in the out hears as the National Foreign Intelligence Program becomes burdened with content that is more costly than the budgeted funding. This underestimation of future costs has resulted in significant reshuffling of the NFIP to meet emerging shortfalls. Unless there is a dramatic and sustained increase in the intelligence budget, we face some hard choices. My colleagues and I decided that there is no time like the present to make them. In the reported bill, we have made an effort to address some of the shortfalls that came to light as a result of the joint inquiry into the September 11 attacks. In this bill, the committee tries to emphasize programs which begin to correct those deficiencies. We also sought to support the war on terrorism by supporting related intelligence community programs. We try, in this measure, to accelerate advanced technology programs to provide better intelligence in the future. In the managers' amendment, we would statutorily mandate a fundamentally more sound approach to cost estimates for major systems. In short, the committee made some tough choices. It is our hope that some of the additional programs we were forced to cut can be funded through alternative means. In closing, we have vetted and prepared a managers' amendment that reflects a number of additional items which Senator Rockefeller and I recommend for Senate passage in this bill. we have included some highly technical corrections to the bill and have worked to address concerns expressed by some Members regarding the committee's attempt to relieve the intelligence community from burdensome and dated reporting requirements. We have also added several substantive provisions, based on supporting materials supplied by the administration and further investigation by the committee staff. Our amendments would: create a one-time report to examine the analytic arm of the Department of Homeland Security and the interaction between the Department and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC); require the preparation and submission of independent cost estimates to accompany budget requests for major systems acquisitions over $500,000,000, and require the preparation of budgets consistent with these estimates; help prevent money laundering by ensuring ex parte and in camera review by the presiding judge of classified information used to identify jurisdictions, institutions, transactions, and accounts that are of primary money laundering concern; and permit Central Intelligence Agency employees in the compensation reform pilot program to contribute bonus pay to their Thrift Savings Plan--an added incentive for exceptional performers. The committee staff and I will provide any member additional information concerning any of the provisions or programs in the intelligence bill. Again, I urge my colleagues to support the bill.", u"Madam President, on four occasions since September 11, 2001, I have come to the Chamber to recommend to my colleagues that the Senate immediately consider the establishment of a national commission concerning the events of September 11, 2001. My request has been based on no motivation but the belief that the American people deserve honest answers and that the only means of preventing another terrorist attack on the United States is a fair, honest, and dispassionate view of what happened and what didn't happen, what was known, and what should have occurred. The historic basis of such an honest approach to the tragedy of New York and the Pentagon is overwhelming. Ten days after December 7, 1941, Franklin Delano Roosevelt recognized that he could not reassure the American people about their Government and could not unify the country for the war ahead unless he gave them an explanation about what failed at Pearl Harbor. Lyndon Johnson recognized almost immediately the same need to reassure the American people about the operations of their Government and the integrity of its officers after the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963. Ronald Reagan drew upon the same precedent establishing the Challenger Commission to assure the American people that they would receive an honest answer to prevent any recurrence in the loss of life in the Challenger. What I recommend has not only had precedents, it was the rule. Democratic and Republican administrations, for a century, have seen the need to assure the American people about the operation of their Government and that indeed we were a confident enough people under the rule of law to face honestly our own failings--all based on the belief that the only means of assuring that there would not be a recurrence would be to discover the reasons for the failings of the past. On those four occasions, there have been reasons to postpone, excuses to not act, and the debate has continued. The debate continued after it was revealed that the FBI had in its possession Zacarias Moussaoui, a Frenchman of Moroccan descent who, in August, was discovered in a flight training school. The Justice Department denied access to his computer. The debate continued after it was learned that French intelligence had warned American intelligence officials that they had knowledge of a possible terrorist plot to hijack aircraft. The debate continued after it was learned that Philippine intelligence and law enforcement authorities had warned United States Government officials of possible targeting of American aircraft. The debate continued after it was revealed that the FBI office in Phoenix had written a memorandum warning that large numbers of suspicious individuals were seeking pilot and security training at American flight schools. The debate continued. The debate has to end. Revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency might have intercepted suspicious communications as early as last July indicating a possible terrorist attack on American installations or facilities and that indeed the President of the United States himself was informed of this information should effectively end any debate. I do not rise to cast blame or aspersions on any individuals or institutions. I believe the officials of this Government have acted honorably, and I would never believe any American institution or individual, for a moment, would not have done everything possible to defend the people of this country if sufficiently warned. Something is wrong. The United States of America has a defense establishment of over $330 billion a year. Public accounts estimate intelligence budgets at over $30 billion a year. The heart of our greatest city was struck, the center of our military power was hit by 19 people, funded by $250,000. Something is wrong. I do not know whether there has been a failure to collect intelligence or an inability to share intelligence. I don't know whether law enforcement and intelligence agencies have failed to work together. I don't know whether they acted properly and a reasoned, rational person never could have put these pieces together. I don't know. But neither does anybody else in this Government. It was always going to be difficult to face the families of those who lost their lives on September 11. It just became impossible. Without some dispassionate and honest review of what was known by this Government and its agencies, without an honest assessment of how agencies performed and coordinated their activities, without a dispassionate assessment of what failed, not only can we not look the victims' families in the eyes and tell them, ``Your Government met its responsibility,'' we cannot assure this country that it will not happen again. Franklin Delano Roosevelt didn't have a Pearl Harbor commission, Earl Warren didn't have a commission on the Kennedy assassination, and Ronald Reagan didn't have a Challenger commission to assign blame. It wasn't about partisanship. It was about assuring the American people of the future that the Government had taken actions to assure it would never happen again. Who here would assure one of their constituents in any of our States that we have the confidence or the simple good judgment to undertake such a review? On March 21 of this year, the Governmental Affairs Committee voted on S. 1867, introduced by Senators Lieberman, McCain, Grassley, and myself, a bill to establish the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. That bill is ready for consideration. What reason do we offer for not acting immediately? What is the excuse to the American people? I trust that based on current revelations, law enforcement officials of the Justice Department, intelligence officials of the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, and, indeed, the national leadership of the White House itself will now end all excuses, stop all efforts to block this legislation or similar reviews, and join with us in one complete analysis of what happened, what went wrong, what was known, and, most importantly, what we do about it. There will be those who say this is a matter for the Senate and its Intelligence Committee. This is a matter for this Government and all of its representatives. Some secret analysis by a committee reviewing one aspect of the actions of the U.S. Government on classified material making recommendations unto itself is not what the country requires. Every element, every aspect of the Government should be reviewed on how it acted and how it should be changed, including this Congress. I suggest a reserve of analysis of no one and nothing from law enforcement, to the national intelligence community, to the executive branch, to the operations of this Congress itself. We all share the responsibility for the future of the country. We all share the responsibility for the security of our communities and our families. An honest analysis must involve all of us, including this Congress. Madam President, I hope the President of the United States and the relevant agencies accept this invitation to work with us. This legislation should be offensive to no one and, if successful, provide reassurance to everyone. There may be attempts to delay this legislation and put this review off for months or years. History is a demanding master, and ultimately it governs all of us. History will never settle for the excuse that we are not ready or it needed more time or it would offend someone. History will demand an answer of how the greatest Nation on Earth, with the greatest intelligence and military capabilities ever conceived by man, was laid vulnerable by a small band of terrorists who brought destruction to our greatest city and the very seat of our military authority. History will demand it, and we should answer it. It is not the responsibility of another generation to revisit this matter in 20 years. It is not the responsibility of our successors to return to this in another decade. The responsibility for the safety of the country and governance of its institutions is ours, and this legislation is ours. It should be adopted. Madam President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Mr. President, right quickly, the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island was talking about the firemen running up those steps. It brings to mind 4 years ago the creation of the Office of Domestic Preparedness by this Congress. We were confronting terrorism long before 9/11. Mr. President, 144,000 individuals have been through schools in Nevada, New Mexico, Louisiana, Texas, and Alabama. There are five big schools there to train the first responders. And that training has been really salutary in the sense that in the state of New York we have had over 17,000 first responders who were trained in the ODP program. So I say to the Senator, many who rushed up those steps had received the training and were responding in accordance with the foreseeability that we had in the congressional branch with respect to terrorism. I jump right quickly, with my time limited, to the hearings that we had. We hear so much about Hart-Rudman. We had hearings in the Senate, not just deciding on Hart-Rudman, that large bureaucracy, but, on the contrary, after 3 days of hearings in the State-Justice-Commerce Subcommittee of Appropriations we came down with a further beefing up of the Office of Domestic Preparedness. At the present time, ODP has a budget of $1.2 billion. We already have at the desk, unanimously approved by the Appropriations Committee and ready for debate, an increase of $1 billion, some $2.2 billion. In short, we were on the floor of the Senate on 9/11 debating terrorism. I emphasize that because they go right to the point and say they don't believe in domestic security. We have been working on domestic security since immediately after 9/11. I got together--and I must tell this story because it has already passed me with respect to the gun crowd--but be that as it may, I sat down with the El Al chief pilot from Israel who flew over from Tel Aviv and sat down and talked with us, myself and about four other Senators. At that seating, he emphasized the security of the cockpit door because I asked him: Sir, how is it that El Al, the airline most subject to be under the gun, where the terrorists do not even wait now, for example, to get to a plane--they shoot up the ticket counter like they did out in Los Angeles--that you have not had a hijacking in 30 years? He said: There is one way to prevent hijackings. Secure the cockpit door, and never open that door in flight. Let me emphasize, he said: My wife can be assaulted in the cabin. I would go straight to the ground, and law enforcement would meet me there. In flight, you do not want to give responsibility to the pilots for law and order. You give the pilots the responsibility for flying the plane. If they have the responsibility, with a gun, for law and order, then they have made a bad mistake because the pilots cannot prevent a plane from being hijacked. The enemy is not a single hijacker. There are teams of terrorists, suicidal terrorists, who do not mind losing their lives. And, yes, you can stop one or two, maybe, but the next three will take that plane over, and you will have a 9/11. I think our responsibility in this particular debate is--in addition to going up to New York on Friday, in addition to having the debate here, and a whole day turned over on next Wednesday, which I commend--but the main thing is for us to act and assume the responsibility that a 9/11 never happens again. Once you secure that door--Delta Airlines has gone along with it, JetBlue is going along with it, but we are still debating it. We immediately moved for airline security. We passed it 100-0 in a bipartisan bill. You see in the morning paper it is not turf. This Senate voted to put the Transportation Security Administration in the Justice Department. I was not trying to hold it because I am chairman of the Transportation Committee. I have commerce, science, and transportation. I was not trying to hold it in my committee. I voted to put it in Justice and defended this position on the House side arguing that Justice would get it up and going. Instead I got a bureaucrat who was more interested in the logo and his office equipment and did not even talk to the airline managers. We confirmed--the pressure was on--before Christmas. We voted without the committee confirming this particular gentlemen. We just reported it out and we had a vote on it without any debate whatsoever. But now we are behind the curve and we have Admiral Malloy over there, and I think he is a great man, and I think we can do a lot of repairing and we are going to be realistic about what we can accomplish. There is no use arguing about what kind of terminal dates and everything else. We live in the real world and we must work together. We put in rail security, we put in seaport security before Christmas of last year. You don't find the administration pressuring the House to get going to pass it. They are still fussing about fees and taxes over there. They don't want to pay for it. It is domestic politics, reelection, not seaport security. So there we are. We can go down the list of all the work we have done on it, and here comes this bill and what does it do? It organizes every entity that did not fail, like the Coast Guard, FEMA, and the Agriculture Department and everything else, and ignores the ones that did fail. 9/11 was an intelligence failure, and you will not get that out of the Select Committee on Intelligence that is investigating between the House and Senate because the entities of this administration--I am not saying the President knew anything will not be embarrassed. I am sure if the President knew anything he would have put measures in place to avoid it. But I can tell you here and now that the committee that is investigating is not going to speak out about the intelligence failure because it would reflect, if you please, poorly on the President's management of their FBI, their CIA, their National Security Agency. I have been on the Intelligence Committee. In fact, I started in this work in 1954 on the Hoover Commission. The same problem we had almost 50 years ago with the FBI talking to the CIA, and the CIA talking to the FBI, persists today. I have gotten together with Bob Mueller, and he is a good man. He has hired some CIA officials. Last year before Thanksgiving, we gave him $750 million to clean up his computerization. He reorganized the Department and instituted a Department of Domestic Intelligence and now is talking, I understand, to George Tenet, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA failed on 9/11. We already had the blowing up of the World Trade Towers almost 10 years ago. But the CIA said we didn't know a plane could be used. They did not know a plane could be used? They had the direct record in 1994. In 1994, they had the Islamic group that was going to blow up the Eiffel Tower. Then, in 1995, they were working on a case out there in the Philippines where they uncovered a plan to blow up 12 planes at one time. The documents revealed that the terrorists, who had links to al Qaida, planned to ram a plane into the CIA building itself. But now they say they had no idea you could fly a plane into a building. Then al-Qaida blew up our embassies and blew up the USS Cole. They knew. Right to the point, they had warned about this crowd so much so that the President actually had on his desk on September 10--the day before--a plan to attack Afghanistan. We had the intelligence. We just were not paying attention. The FBI also failed. There isn't any question about that. We know about the flight schools in Arizona. Agent Williams sent notice saying: There is something wrong. These people of Mideastern descent are trying to learn how to fly. We believe they are connected to fundamentalist groups, something's not right to me. That word never did get up to the head of the FBI or the President of the United States. That was an intelligence failure. But we had the woman--Agent Coleen Rowley, I think her name was. When they arrested Moussaoui in Minnesota, they became so exercised she wrote a memo that: Look, this fellow doesn't want to learn how to take-off or land. He only wants to learn how to fly. We need to investigate him further. But the Minnesota field office was denied permission for a warrant. Why should we investigate him further? Because he was training to run a plane into the World Trade Towers. That is the record. I am not on any Intelligence Committee. I am not giving you any security information. If you want any kind of information along that line, there is a wonderful article that appeared in Time magazine on May 27, 2002. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.", u"Madam President, I have been in Congress for 24 years, and I have never heard a better speech. I have never heard a clearer statement of principle. I congratulate the Senator from Georgia. Tomorrow, the Senator from Georgia and I will announce the completion of an effort we have had underway for several weeks. We will try to look at concerns about the President's bill that have been raised in the House, we will try to look at concerns that have been raised in the Senate, we will try to look at changes that were made in the House bill and the Senate bill, and even try to come up with a bill that addresses those concerns, but does it in such a way as to protect the President's ability to fight and to win this war on terrorism. Also, Madam President, let me make it clear: When 9/11 happened and the President decided he wanted to create a new independent agency by taking parts of the Government that were not working together, that were not communicating effectively, and putting them into a coherent whole, I would have thought 100 Members of the Senate would have supported that effort. I was wrong. If anybody had told me that in light of 9/11, the death of thousands of our people and the imminent danger we face every day that we would have an effort in the Senate to actually take power away from the President. This is power that President Carter had, power that President Reagan had, power that President Bush had, power that President Clinton had, and power that President Bush has today, I wouldn't have believed it. Who would believe that a bill that could not have been passed before 9/11, a bill that literally strips away the power of the President to designate a national emergency and in the process waive work rules that impede efficiency and jeopardize lives? Who would have believed, after thousands of our citizens were dead, after millions of our citizens are in danger, that the Senate would come forward with a bill that says: What is our response to 9/11? Our response is the President has too many national security powers. That is exactly what the Lieberman bill does. Incredibly, the President today has the power, in the name of national security, to set aside union work rules. The majority leader said yesterday: Show me one time in history when the circumstances threatening our country demanded we forgo the protections built into laws for Federal workers. Well, let me give you, very quickly, some concrete examples of exactly why, after 9/11, we need to preserve the powers the President has today. Let me remind my colleagues, today, prior to 9/11, the President had used these powers, as President Clinton did, to set aside union contracts in the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Air Marshals Office of the Federal Aviation Administration, the Office of Criminal Enforcement, and the Office of Enforcement and Intelligence at the Drug Enforcement Agency. Workers in those offices today are working under the procedures the President has asked that he be allowed to continue to exercise. What kinds of problems do you run into with these silly union work rules? Let me say to my colleagues, I don't see how anybody with a straight face can stand on the floor of the Senate and defend the civil service system as it exists today, when you are talking about threats to the lives of our children and our families. It is not as if we have not been warned. The Grace Commission warned us. The Volcker Commission stated: The current system is slow. It is legally trampled and intellectually confused. It is impossible to explain to potential candidates. It is almost certainly not fulfilling the spirit of our mandate to hire the most meritorious candidates. That is Paul Volcker, and that is in 1989. Our colleague, Senator Rudman headed the U.S. Commission on National Security. We all know Warren Rudman. We all know he is no union basher. We all know he has good judgment and good sense. This is what he said: Today's Civil Service system has become a drag on our national security. The morass of rules, regulation and bureaucracy prevent the government from hiring and retaining the workforce that is required to combat the threats of the future. I could go on. For example, the Brookings Institution has shown study after study that the system is broken. Now, after giving President Carter, President Reagan, President Bush, President Clinton, and the current President Bush the power to set aside these union work rules for national security reasons, and after the events of 9/11, the majority brings forth a bill that says: Well, we gave this power to President Clinton and we gave the power to President Carter, but after 9/11, we are going to take away security powers of the President. That is offensive and ludicrous on its face, and when the American people discover it, they are going to go absolutely crazy. When they discover that we currently have eight agencies operating under these rules today, and the Congress, in its response to 9/11, wants to say: Well, we are going to take away powers from this President that President Clinton needed and President Carter needed--I don't think so. I don't think people are going to buy it. What kinds of impediments are we talking about? Well, let me touch a few. These are actual cases. I am not talking about theoretical cases. The majority leader says, show him examples of where these work rules interfere with national security. Let me quickly give you a handful of them. We had an effort in Customs, in 1987, to change the makeup of our inspection center in the Customs office at Logan Airport. The idea was, change the makeup of the office in order to make it more efficient in fulfilling the functions of Customs. Guess what? Customs tried to change the configuration of the room. The public employee labor union, representing Customs officials, appealed to the Federal Labor Relations Authority, and the power of the Administration to change the configuration of the inspection room was rejected. Do we really want some work rule negotiated prior to 9/11 to prevent us from finding somebody who is carrying a bomb on a plane with your momma? Have people gone completely crazy? What is going on here? Let me touch on a couple of these. Union work rules prohibited an agency from working together to protect the border. Literally, as our former drug czar Barry McCaffrey pointed out, the union work rules prohibited one of the agencies from opening trunks. The drug smugglers were aware of it, had people at the border watching, and decided to move drugs based on those work rules. What if that is poisonous gas or biological weapons or a nuclear weapon coming into New York Harbor? We are going to go to the National Labor Relations Authority to renegotiate a union contract when millions of lives are at stake? I don't think so. And the idea that our colleagues would believe such a thing is possible just shows you how out of touch some people are with their commitment to the status quo as compared to their commitment to the job at hand. Very quickly, because I am running out of time, there was a prohibition of agencies for increasing the number of immigration inspectors. We had an effort to increase the number of inspections of immigration inspectors in 1990. And under union work rules, it was rejected because of a union contract. Do people really think, in light of 9/11, we should allow a union contract to stand in our way and spend months and months and months before the National Labor Relations Authority trying to change that contract, rather than saying there is a clear and present danger to America and we want to change it today? Now, the President has that power. But under the Lieberman bill, that power would be taken away. I could go on and give you dozens of real-life examples of how ridiculous these union work rules are. Look, if we were not talking about people's lives, we could all play this game of just saying how sacred these union work rules are that make our Federal Government the laughingstock of the country and the world. But when we are talking about lives and talking about the powers that four Presidents have had, the idea that we are going to take that power away from this President, at this time, is totally unacceptable. To add insult to injury, the President has asked for flexibility. He has asked for the right to promote good people and put them in the right place, and not wait 5 months to hire somebody, and to fire incompetents. The President cannot promote the lady from the FBI who sent a memo to the home office saying: Hey, we have people with terrorist links who are learning to fly planes and not land them, and maybe we ought to do something about it.", u"Madam Speaker, continuing my reservation of objection, I thank the gentleman very much for his comments. Madam Speaker, before I withdraw my reservation, I would like to bring to the attention of the House two additional matters with respect to this matter. I note and I am now reading from a story in the New York Times today which reads as follows: ``Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network held detailed plans for nuclear devices and other terrorist bombs in one of its Kabul headquarters. The Times discovered the partly burned documents in a hastily abandoned safe house in the Karte Parwan quarter of the city, written in Arabic, German, Urdu and English. The notes give detailed designs for missiles, bombs and nuclear weapons. There are descriptions of how the detonation of TNT compressed plutonium into a critical mass, sparking a chain reaction and ultimately a thermonuclear reaction. ``Both President Bush and the British Prime Minister are convinced that bin Laden has access to nuclear material, and Mr. Bush said earlier this morning that al Qaeda was seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. ``The discovery of the detailed bomb-making instructions, along with studies into chemical and nuclear devices, confirms the West's worse fears and raises the specter of plans for an attack that would far exceed the September 11 atrocities in scale and gravity. Nuclear experts say the design suggested bin Laden may be working on an fission device similar to Fat Man, the bomb dropped on Nagasaki. However, they emphasize it was extremely difficult to build a viable warhead.'' The story goes on. That is just one explanation of why the amendment that we seek to bring to the floor after this continuing resolution is approved, why that amendment contains $1 billion aimed at keeping weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists, including the items discussed most eloquently by the gentleman from Texas. I would simply say, Madam Speaker, there has been considerable misunderstanding about what the genesis of this amendment is. Let me simply say, Madam Speaker, that immediately after the need became apparent, the gentleman from Florida and I both instructed our staffs to review all of the agency requests for additional funds that might legitimately be considered by this body in order to strengthen homeland security; and we produced for discussion purposes a document which listed items Tier One, Tier Two, Tier Three, in the order of what people considered to be their importance. Some of them are funded, some of them are not, under the base bill. We feel that if there had not been intervention at a higher level in this institution, I feel strongly that we would have had a bipartisan amendment presented to the committee yesterday and to this House, whenever the bill is considered, which would have had us stand as one, just as we did a few weeks earlier when we passed with no dissenting votes the first down payment of $40 billion that the Speaker played a very constructive role in helping to negotiate. Let me simply say that I understand why our friend on the majority side of the aisle and the committee yesterday could not vote with us on the amendments that we were proposing. I also understand that, in their hearts, many of them would have liked to. I have an observation to make about that which has been, in my view, willfully misunderstood by one person in OMB who attended a meeting in the White House last week and willfully misdescribed to the press since. When I was at the White House, I simply made this observation about Congress as an institution. It had nothing whatsoever to do with the operation of the White House or any other branch of government. What I simply observed was this: When each of us is elected, we come to this body as politicians. All we prove when we win our first election is that we know how to win an election. We then come to this body and seek to become legislators as well as politicians, and that process is furthered by each of us being given a committee assignment. After we are given that committee assignment, we learn the business over which that committee has jurisdiction. Some Members of this House learn it awfully well on both sides of the aisle. The point I was trying to make is that for any legislative body to be a self-respecting legislative institution, there has to be a fair balance between the political requirements that sometimes drive the party leadership of both parties and the substantive legislative requirements that should drive the committees of this institution. In my view, when the leadership of the other party seeks to intervene and shut off the judgment of the committee that has responsibility for the subject matter at hand, there is nothing wrong with that happening occasionally. That is the job of the leadership in both parties. But when it happens routinely, especially on matters this sensitive, then what happens is that this body becomes more and more strictly a political rather than a legislative institution. That is not good for us, that is not good for the country, and that is the point I am trying to make. It seems to me that if the committee had been left to its own devices, we would have had a significantly uncontroversial proposal to make to the House, which would have increased funding for military expenditures associated with the war. It would have added these additional items which I believe are not at all controversial and are badly needed to plug some of the security holes, and we would have also assured that the original commitment made to New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia would have been maintained. That is the purpose of what we were trying to do yesterday. I urge the White House and I urge every Member of this House to, please, before they make up their mind about how they are going to vote on whatever rule is attached to the Defense Appropriations bill, I urge every Member to simply review line-by-line what it is that is being proposed. If they do, I think that you will find that the vast majority of members of both parties would recognize the substantive value of what it is we are trying to do. It just seems to me that that is our job. I also want to point out again, lest anyone think we are trying to ``bust the budget,'' each and every add-on to the homeland security package, each and every item in that bill contains as part of that item the following language: ``Provided further that such amounts shall be available only to the extent that an official budget request that includes designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency requirement, as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, is transmitted by the President to the Congress.'' What that language means, Madam Speaker, is that if this money were to be provided, not a dime could be spent unless the President later agreed that each and every one of those items represented an emergency that needed to be funded. If, in the judgment of the President after reviewing our arguments, he decided that spending could wait for another day, that is the way it would be. He would maintain total control over the expenditures. But we believe it is crucial to provide this, because we have talked to the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency, to many other agencies of government, and we are convinced that this is necessary for the good of the country. We have stimulus packages floating around here being promoted by both parties. I will not comment on what I think of them. But the fact is that if we want to stimulate the economy, the number one requirement is to restore public confidence in our ability to travel and people's ability to go into public places without fear, and that is what we attempt to do. That could do more to restore economic confidence than virtually anything else this body will do. So I urge each and every Member to review this. And I repeat, we are perfectly willing at any time to grant unanimous consent for that Defense bill to come up today or tomorrow, provided only that we have an opportunity to vote on these three amendments. Surely that is not too much to ask. Madam Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support today of the conference report before us. Before I begin the main part of my statement, let me first acknowledge and thank the Members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, each and every one of them, but especially our ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for hard work, dedication, showing up and doing the business that needed to be done, and doing it intelligently and with a good deal of thoughtfulness. I also want to specifically thank the committee staff on both sides of the aisle for their untiring efforts that have gotten us to this point. I very much appreciate the way they work in a nonpartisan way. Obviously, I need to thank the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Members and their staffs as well, especially under the steady hand of the chairman, my good friend, Senator Graham, and the vice chairman, my good friend, Senator Shelby. We appreciate the efforts they have put in. Mr. Speaker, by definition a conference is a time when the two bodies come together to settle whatever differences there may be between the bills, often including resolution of differences of opinion and viewpoints on how money is needed, how it should be spent, what laws should be changed, what direction the administration should go, those kinds of things. But in this case, we are talking about protecting our Nation's security at a time when this is very much in the forefront of everybody's attention. Ironically, Mr. Speaker, this conference found very, very few differences of opinion between the two bodies, and, frankly, between the points of view on either side of the aisle, on these and other areas. When it comes to national security, we seem to be pulling together very strongly in the area of intelligence. Let me briefly review some of the areas of agreement. First, intelligence is our first line of defense; and it must be treated as such, especially on our war on terrorism, one of the new transnational threats we are, regrettably, beginning to understand a lot better. Although it may get lost in the continuous CNN optic of the coverage going on in Afghanistan and the Pentagon releases of bombs exploding and troops on the move, none of the activity that is actually happening would be possible without good intelligence. Second, there are four key areas where the administration and Congress must immediately address themselves if we are to properly protect the country's rights and freedoms. They are revitalizing the National Security Agency and the signals intelligence system, upon which we have had such wonderful production and service over the years and now needs upgrading; correcting deficiencies in conducting and collecting human intelligence, a matter which we all understand very well, something we cannot do without; providing a more appropriate balance between intelligence collection and analysis to better achieve a global awareness capability, something we have been talking about for years; and rebuilding a robust research and development program across the intelligence communities. We have been so lucky and so well helped by the innovation and creativity that our country produces and the applications we have been able to use in the intelligence community over the last 50 years, and we need to have more of that in the days ahead. There are other areas of concern besides these four, but these are the most critical for the types of threats that we face now and that we are going to face, we think, over the next few years; and they are certainly the areas that we are in full agreement with the other body on. Thirdly, the intelligence community has got to be better focused on strategic intelligence and better positioned to be able to get access to so-called plans and intentions, that is, what is going on in the minds of the evil-doers, the mischief makers, in order to prevent the crisis. We do not want to be just great at sweeping up after the tragedy; we want to stop the tragedy before it happens. In short, we must have an intelligence community culture that is less risk averse. My last example is that the conferees believe that any effort to invest in and expand intelligence capabilities, and such efforts clearly must be made, will only be marginally successful if it does not also include provision for a more appropriate management structure for the intelligence community. We are talking here basic architecture and the appropriate management overlay to make the system work. Today's intelligence structure is insufficient for today's and tomorrow's challenges. We know it, and we have to get about the job of dealing with that; and I am pleased that the administration is taking up that challenge. We look forward to working with the President and his administration on these issues. They simply cannot wait. Mr. Speaker, this does not mean that there were not differences between the bodies during our conference. There were. I am happy to report that there were few and that they were worked out successfully and the result is a conference report that was approved by a vast bipartisan majority of the conferees. There are a couple of areas where I would have liked things to have turned out differently personally, but that did not happen; and in the spirit of compromise, I am happy to support what I think is a very good conference report which will serve this country well. Again, I commend my colleagues for working in that spirit. Mr. Speaker, on Monday we paused to remember the 3-month anniversary of the horrible and tragic attacks on America by the terrorists, those the President has referred to as the ``evil-doers.'' Also on Monday we laid to rest the first combat casualty of our war on terrorism, Mike Spann. The fact that the first casualty was a CIA officer speaks to the fact that intelligence is in fact in the lead in this war. There is no argument about that. But some have questioned how our Nation got into this position, how these attacks could have occurred in the first place; and frankly, there is no easy answer to that question, as there are many facets. For one thing, terrorists took advantage of the basic rights and freedoms that we so openly and charitably give to our citizens and visitors alike in this country. They abused those privileges. Another point is that communications between the entities and agencies assigned the responsibility for protecting our borders was simply not adequate. We know that. But there is also certainly an intelligence story here. Put simply, we do not have an intelligence community that is properly structured to collect the types of intelligence that would have prevented such attacks had the information been available. In part, this is of our own doing as a country and a Congress. After the Cold War, a decision was made to ``build down'' intelligence. Many thought that we were at peace, perhaps this would be part of the peace dividend. We did not have a single major threat that people really could identify, and we could afford to spend intelligence monies elsewhere. Congress acted. Money was shifted, indeed. Beginning in the 104th Congress, the Intelligence Committees of Congress on both sides, both Houses and both sides of the aisle, recognized the risks of the looming threats of transnational issues and year after year attempted to put more investment into intelligence. However, the administration's efforts were more focused on domestic issues and had little interest in that kind of investment at that time. Consequently, we ended up with a much-reduced intelligence capability, less access around the world, and a risk-averse environment, and, frankly, a growing threat. This is not to say that those brave men and women in the rank and file of the intelligence community were not doing their jobs. They were playing the hand they were dealt, and they were doing very well under the circumstances. This is also not to say that Congress was not aware of the risks. We certainly were, and we talked about them a lot. Recently, I had occasion to review the intelligence bills and conference reports since the 104th Congress. In the 104th Congress, we noted that there was a growing threat and a growing vulnerability to terrorism. We sent that message. We talked about the need to share information better between intelligence and law enforcement. Remember, this is back in the 104th Congress. We talked about the need to invest more robustly in intelligence resources. Then in the 105th Congress we noted that the intelligence community must ``keep a watchful eye on the areas that are likely to be tomorrow's crises.'' I would point out that we mentioned the transnational threats. We also mentioned that our national security was being affected by a broader set of issues that have not been identified with our global interests. We needed to rebuild our intelligence capabilities, and we expressed concern over the growing apathy toward national security and intelligence. Again these issues were raised in the 106th Congress, where we stated that there was a growing possibility that a rogue nation or group would acquire the ability to attack U.S. interests with nuclear, biological, chemical, or some other weapon of mass destruction. Mr. Speaker, I am not pointing these facts out to say ``we told you so.'' Far from it. The point is that we must engage with this administration now, and we must put significant effort into quickly rebuilding our intelligence capabilities. We cannot wait. The events of September 11, sadly, stand as a reminder of what happens when we let our intelligence guard down. Mr. Speaker, this conference report is a good start toward rebuilding what the Nation needs. But it is only a start. It is a snapshot in time. Many of us refer to it as the first year of a 5-year plan. We look forward to working with the administration to secure our national freedom. We look forward to working in a nonpartisan way to do this with the passage of this conference report. I am fully supportive of the report. I encourage its passage. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Our chairman has very well explained how we got to the point we are at today. I want to commend him for the leadership he has provided to the committee, not only at the conference meeting but throughout what has turned out to be a very challenging year. I thank the chairman. The House version of the intelligence authorization bill came to the floor a little over 3 weeks after the terrorist attacks on New York City, Washington, and Pennsylvania. Active and retired intelligence community personnel were killed in the World Trade Center and at the Pentagon. In the weeks since, the United States has begun to strike back at those who were involved in the September attacks, and at those who support them. On Monday, the first combat fatality of the struggle against terrorism in Afghanistan was buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Mike Spann was a CIA officer. We eulogized him yesterday on this floor with the suspension vote in the presence of his family: his wife, Shannon; his parents, and his children. Timely and reliable intelligence, as we know, is crucial to the successful conclusion of this campaign, and it is already clear that intelligence officers will be deeply involved, at home and in the field, in the difficult and dangerous job of ensuring that our policymakers and military commanders have the information on which they will increasingly depend. The emergency supplemental appropriations bill passed in the wake of the September attacks provided a large amount of additional resources for intelligence programs and activities. This conference report provides more; substantially more, than was provided last year, and significantly more than was requested by the President. Our chairman has gone over some of the priorities in the bill, and I want to associate myself with those. That would be human intelligence capabilities that he talked about and TPED, the tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination of intelligence. It is very important for us to put more resources there. Another priority for us in the bill was the investment in advanced research and development projects necessary to keep pace with changes in technology, and, of course, the technology necessary to improve the process of collecting and processing intelligence. Some of these funds that are in this bill will continue improvements as the chairman emphasized, in our human intelligence capabilities, to ensure that case officers receive the kind of training they need, particularly in foreign languages, to enable them to do their jobs effectively. Some of these funds will make investments in the kinds of systems required if agencies like the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office are to keep pace with rapid technological change. The modernization of NSA remains a top priority of the committee and measurable progress is expected in the coming year. As steadfast as the committee has been in advocating more spending on intelligence, it must now be equally engaged in conducting the kind of oversight necessary to make certain that these additional funds are spent efficiently on programs that will really make a difference, not only in the current effort against terrorism, but on the demands of an uncertain future as well. Although I am satisfied with the disposition made by the conferees on most of the items which separated the two bodies, I was disappointed with the resolution of the provision in the House bill which would have established an independent commission to review the Nation's security posture immediately preceding September 11. Our colleagues in the other body insisted that the two intelligence committees could undertake an inquiry into the readiness of the intelligence community, and other committees of jurisdiction could examine the other elements of the executive branch. The issue was never whether the committees had the resources to do this job, it was whether it made sense for them to do it. I am concerned that an independent review would have had credibility with the American people that a congressional review, no matter how professionally done, will not. The House version of the bill, when it left our committee stated, Mr. Speaker, ``The committee believes that the Commission will only be successful if it is seen to be truly independent of any preconceived notions about the effectiveness of the activities of the departments and agencies it will review. Appointing members with a reputation for challenging conventional wisdom, wide perspective, bold and innovative thought, and broad experience in dealing with complex problems will contribute directly to instilling the Commission with an independence of spirit which will enhance the credibility of its work.'' It goes on further. I want to put these words on the record. This body chose to modify the Commission and change its nature, but when we got to the conference, the Commission was eliminated all together. I want to put on the record the spirit of independence that I hoped the review would have. This is not about fingerpointing or assigning blame; it really is more about understanding whatever government shortcomings may have contributed to the events of September 11. An independent inquiry will one day be commissioned, I am certain, although perhaps without the congressional input that we tried to do in our committee. We need to know if there were gaps and where they were, again, not to assess blame, but to be sure that they are addressed. Our constituents must have confidence that an assessment of future needs is based on solid judgments about past performance. This will be especially important if we are to consider changing the structure of the intelligence community, and that is the challenge our chairman and our committee will have in the next year. Some of these reforms may be called for by President Bush, as is his right. On another important issue the conference report more faithfully reflects the position of the House, and that was a compromise that the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) took the lead in shaping and I was pleased to support. It was necessary because in 1995, in response to concerns that there was insufficient CIA headquarters involvement in decisions to recruit as assets individuals with poor records of respecting human rights or the law, guidelines were issued to ensure that senior officials were aware of and approved, certain recruitments. The intent of these guidelines was to protect relatively junior officers in the field from later charges that they acted unilaterally, and unwisely, in entering into relationships with certain individuals. Despite repeated assurances to the committee from high-level intelligence officials of two administrations that the guidelines had not prevented the recruitment of a single, identifiable, worthwhile asset, concerns were raised that the bureaucratic process through which the guidelines were administered was so time consuming that it provided a disincentive to case officers. This controversy has obscured the fact that encouraging a potential asset on a hard target, like a terrorist cell, to betray his or her country or cause is tremendously time consuming, difficult and dangerous. That we have had uneven success against these targets is more a reflection of those facts than it is the fault, in my view, of any guidelines. Nevertheless, to make clear that Congress wants the recruitment process to be as aggressive as possible given the totality of the circumstances involved, the House approved a provision in the committee's bill which would have required a rescission of the existing guidelines and their replacement with new guidelines which achieve balance that ``recognized concerns about egregious human rights behavior, but provides the much needed flexibility to seize upon opportunities as they present themselves.'' The House made clear that in striking this balance, ``clearly there is a certain class of individuals who, because of their unreliability, instability, or nature of past misconduct, should be avoided.'' Again, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) led the way on this compromise that was in the House bill. Although the DCI chose to rescind and reissue the guidelines before the legislative process was complete, the heart of the language which I was pleased to work with the gentleman from Nebraska on was retained in conference. The conferees want the current, more streamlined guidelines reviewed again to make certain that they provide appropriate encouragement to case officers to do their jobs well. As the statement of managers makes clear, however, whatever the results of that review, any guidelines issued ``must balance concerns about human rights behavior and law-breaking'' with the efforts to provide flexibility to take advantage of opportunities to gather information. That balance is the proper interpretation of the phrase ``more appropriately weigh and incentivize risk'' which appears in clause (2) of section 403 of the conference report. Mr. Speaker, our President, when he came to the House on September 14, three days after the tragedy, said that we will bring the perpetrators of that tragedy to justice, or we will bring justice to them, but justice will be done. We want to be sure that our intelligence capabilities help the President reach that goal, a goal that we all share. Hopefully, this bill will take us closer to that. I believe the conference agreement will contribute significantly to meeting the intelligence needs of the Nation, and I urge its adoption. I again associate myself with many of the remarks made by my chairman, particularly those about sharing of information by the FBI. Once again, I want to extend the sympathies of my constituents and I know all of our colleagues, to the family of Mike Spann and the Special Forces soldiers, the Green Berets who lost their lives. If I may, I would like to put their names in the Record also: Master Sergeant Jefferson Davis; Staff Sergeant Brian Cody Prosser; and Sergeant First Class Daniel Petithory. God bless them. God bless America.", u"Pursuant to House Resolution 506 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Thornberry in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Friday, May 19, 2000, all time for general debate had expired. Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule by title, and each title shall be considered read. No amendment to that amendment shall be in order except those printed in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for that purpose and pro forma amendments for the purpose of debate. Amendments printed in the Record may be offered only by the Member who caused it to be printed or his designee and shall be considered read. The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to not less than 5 minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any postponed question that immediately follows another vote by electronic device without intervening business, provided that the time for voting by electronic device on the first in any series of questions shall not be less than 15 minutes. The Clerk will designate section 1. The text of section 1 is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows: The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1? If not, the Clerk will designate title I. The text of title I is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2001 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The National Reconnaissance Office. (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2001, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4392 of the One Hundred Sixth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2001 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2001 the sum of $144,231,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available until September 30, 2002. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 356 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2001. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2001 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until September 30, 2002. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2001, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2001, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $28,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2002, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (a) Limitation on Delegation of Authority of Departments To Object to Transfers.--Section 104(d)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4(d)(2)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)''; (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) as clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v), respectively; (3) in clause (v), as so redesignated, by striking ``the Secretary or head'' and inserting ``subject to subparagraph (B), the Secretary or head''; and (4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), the authority to object to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) may not be delegated by the Secretary or head of the department involved. ``(ii) With respect to the Department of Defense, the authority to object to such a transfer may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense, but only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. ``(iii) An objection to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) shall have no effect unless submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence in writing.''. (b) Limitation on Delegation of Duties of Director of Central Intelligence.--Section 104(d)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4(d)(1)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(1)''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) The Director may only delegate any duty or authority given the Director under this subsection to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management.''.", u"Madam President, I want to thank Chairman Warner and Ranking Member Levin for their foresight in accepting the amended text of S. 1993, the Government Information Security Act, which was unanimously reported out of the Government Affairs Committee. We are now far enough into the digital age to understand both its promise and its pitfalls. Our booming economy is driven in large part by the dot.com entrepreneurs who are providing goods and services faster and more cost-effectively than ever before in our history. But we are also experiencing threats to our privacy, to the integrity of our digitized information, and even to our ability to use our computers freely. We know there will be trade-offs for the benefits government will reap in the digital age. But, I offer this sincere warning now: information security cannot be one of them. With this amendment, we would lay the groundwork for securing much of the government's electronic information. Above all else, protecting the integrity, the availability and the confidentiality of information stored on federal computers is central to serving taxpayers in the digital age. And we must be vigilant about it. Like the rest of the nation, the government is ever more dependent on automated information systems to store information and perform tasks. At hearings before the Government Affairs Committee last Congress, however, witnesses testified that such increased reliance has not been met by an equivalent strengthening of the security of those systems. It is chilling to think of less than perfect security in the context, for example, of tax and wage information the Internet Revenue Service maintains, troop movements monitored by the Defense Department, or public health threats analyzed by the Centers of Disease Control. Without proper security, government's dependence on computers would expose to exploitation all of this information--and much more. Indeed, some of this information may be in jeopardy right now. A series of General Accounting Office (GAO) studies found government computer security so lax that GAO put the entire apparatus on its list of ``high risk'' government programs. GAO reported in September 1998 that inadequate controls over information systems at the Veterans Administration exposed many of its service delivery and management systems to disruption or misuse. In May 1998, the GAO gained unauthorized access to State Department networks, enabling the GAO, had it tried, to modify, delete or download data and shut down services. In May 1999, GAO reported that one of its test teams gained access to mission critical computer systems at NASA, which would have allowed the team to control spacecraft or alter scientific data returned from space. Our problem is not simply a technical one. It is also a cultural one. The federal government can purchase and implement the most advanced security programs it can afford but unless top government officials acknowledge that our future depends on information security, those programs will be meaningless. But even high-level attention to and responsibility for security will mean little unless everyone and anyone who uses a computer--which, these days, must include practically every government worker--does their part to ensure the security of the system on which they work. This amendment, therefore, focuses on good management practices to ensure secure government information systems. Had this amendment been in place earlier this year when the ``Love Bug'' and successive, mutating viruses wreaked havoc on the world's computers, government would have been better prepared to withstand the attack. I hope that government employees would have been more aware of the need to upgrade their systems' security software to ensure that such ``worms,'' as they are called, were barred from the system. And this amendment's training provisions would have helped to ensure that employees were versed in the dangers of opening attachments from unknown senders. The cornerstone of this amendment is the plan each agency must develop to protect sensitive federal information systems. Agency chief information officers (CIOs) would be responsible for developing and implementing the security programs, which must undergo annual evaluations and be subject to the approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Because we need to change our cultural attitudes toward information security, the OMB also would be responsible for establishing government-wide policies promoting security as a central part of each agency's operation. And we intend to hold agency heads accountable for implementing those policies. This amendment requires high-level accountability for the management of agency systems beginning with the Director of OMB and agency heads. Each agency's plan must reflect an understanding that computer security is an integral part of the development process for any new system. Agencies now tend to develop a system and consider security issues only as the system is about to go online. This amendment establishes an ongoing, periodic reporting, testing and evaluation process to gauge the effectiveness of agencies' policies and procedures. This would be accomplished through reviews of agency budgets, program performance and financial management. And the amendment requires an independent, annual evaluation of all information security practices and programs to be conducted by the agency's Inspector General, GAO or an independent external auditor. I hope that the IGs will use their limited resources wisely and use their discretion in targeting those areas of their agencies' programs which require the most attention. In addition, I hope that agency heads will work with their IGs, especially when it comes to sharing information on potential threats to agencies' systems. Our amendment requires that agencies report unauthorized intrusions into government systems. GSA currently has a program for reporting and responding to such incidents. The amendment requires agencies to use this reporting and monitoring system. The amendment requires that the national security and classified systems adhere to the same management structure as every other government system under our bill. This means they must develop a plan addressing security upgrades, although the plan need not be approved by OMB. To address particular concerns raised by the defense and intelligence communities, the amendment allows the heads of agencies with national security and classified systems to designate their own independent evaluators in the interest of protecting sensitive information and system vulnerabilities. And the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other agency heads, as designated by the President, may develop their own procedures for detecting, reporting and responding to security incidents. Finally, President Clinton has proposed a very creative idea known as the Federal Cyber Service designed to strengthen the government's cadre of information security professionals. Our amendment authorizes this program and gives agencies the flexibility they need to implement it. The program includes scholarships in exchange for government service, retraining computer information specialists and, as part of our campaign to influence cultural behavior, proposals to promote cyber-security awareness among Federal workers and high school and secondary school students. Since Senator Thompson and I introduced S. 1993 last November, we have worked closely with the Administration, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the Department of Energy, the CIO Council, the Inspector General community, and interested parties outside government. We have made changes to address the concerns that have been raised and I am very pleased that the administration strongly supports the provisions. Witnesses testifying at the Governmental Affairs Committee hearing on S. 1993 were also very supportive of the bill. Jack Brock, Director of GAO's Governmentwide and Defense Information Systems Group in the Accounting and Information Management Division testified that ``the bill, in fact, incorporates the basic tenets of good security management found in our report on security practices of leading organizations. . . . '' He also said that ``the key to this process is recognizing that information security is not a technical matter of locking down systems, but rather a management problem. . . . Thus, it is highly appropriate that S. 1993 requires a risk management approach that incorporates these elements.'' Roberta Gross, the Inspector General at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration testified that ``. . . S. 1993 is a very positive step in highlighting the importance of centralized oversight and coordination in responding to risks and threats to IT [information technology] security.'' S. 1993 ``. . . importantly recognizes that IT security is one of the most important issues in shaping future Federal planning and investment . . . the Act makes it clear that each agency must be far more vigilant and involved than current practices.'' Another witness, James Adams, Chief Executive Officer of Defense, a security consulting firm, testified that S. 1993 is ``. . . thoughtful and badly needed legislation . . .'' which ``. . . takes a crucial step forward.'' Ken Watson of Cisco Systems noted hat S. 1993 is consistent with what industry has already been encouraging, that is that ``. . . security must be promoted as an integral component of each agency's business operations, and information technology security training is essential. . . .'' Mr. President, it is my hope that, if enacted, this amendment will improve our computer security to the point where the operations of government in the digital age are performed with the privacy and well-being of the American public in mind. Again, I am pleased the leadership of the Armed Services Committee has accepted this amendment because, in the digital age, there is no such thing as moving too quickly.", u" Mr. Goss submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes: The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 4392), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the community Management Account and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and disability System, and for other purposes having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amendment, insert the following: (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2001 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The National Reconnaissance Office. (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2001, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 4392 of the One Hundred Sixth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2001 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2001 the sum of $163,231,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available until September 30, 2002. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 313 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2001. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2001 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until September 30, 2002. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Community Management Account as of September 30, 2001, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2001, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than 1 year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $34,100,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2002, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (a) Limitation on Delegation of Authority of Departments To Object to Transfers.--Section 104(d)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4(d)(2)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)''; (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) as clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v), respectively; (3) in clause (v), as so redesignated, by striking ``the Secretary or head'' and inserting ``subject to subparagraph (B), the Secretary or head''; and (4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), the authority to object to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) may not be delegated by the Secretary or head of the department involved. ``(ii) With respect to the Department of Defense, the authority to object to such a transfer may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense, but only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. ``(iii) An objection to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) shall have no effect unless submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence in writing.''. (b) Limitation on Delegation of Duties of Director of Central Intelligence.--Section 104(d)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4(d)(1)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(1)''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) The Director may only delegate any duty or authority given the Director under this subsection to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management.''. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2001 the sum of $216,000,000. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS Subtitle A--Intelligence Community Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. It is the sense of the Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the United States. (a) In General.--Chapter 37 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating section 798A as section 798B; and (2) by inserting after section 798 the following new section 798A: (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:", u" There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, By Mr. MOYNIHAN (for himself, Mr. D'Amato, and Mr. Dodd): S. 2048. A bill to amend section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the Freedom of Information Act), to provide for disclosure of information relating to individuals who committed Nazi war crimes, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary. Mr. President, today I am joined by Senators D'Amato and Dodd in introducing the War Crime Disclosure Act. This legislation is a companion measure to a bill pending in the House, H.R. 1281, sponsored by Representative Maloney. The measure is a simple one. It requires the disclosure of information under the Freedom of Information Act regarding individuals who participated in Nazi war crimes. Ideally, such documents would be made available to the public without further legislation and without having to go through the slow process involved in getting information through the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA]. Unfortunately this is not the case. Researchers seeking information on Nazi war criminals are denied access to relevant materials in the possession of the United States Government, even when the disclosure of these documents no longer pose a threat to national security--if indeed they ever did. With the passing of time it becomes ever more important to document Nazi war crimes, lest the enormity of those crimes be lost to history. The greater access which this legislation will provide will add clarity of this important effort. I applaud those researchers who continue to pursue this important work. I would also like to call to the attention of my colleagues the excellent work of the Office of Special Investigations of the Department of Justice. This office has a monumental task and I would not wish to add to that burden or divert its officials from their primary goal of pursuing Nazi war criminals. To that end, I would note that this legislation does not apply to the Office of Special Investigations, as it is not identified in paragraph (1)(B) of the bill as a ``specified agency.'' I would also add that there is a provision in the bill which specifically prohibits the disclosure of information which would compromise the work of the Office of Special Investigations. Mr. President, I would like to thank Representative Maloney for her original work on this subject in the House of Representatives. I would also thank Senators D'Amato and Dodd for joining me in this effort here in the Senate. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not pay special tribute to A.M. Rosenthal, whose indefatigable efforts on this subject are as admirable as they are effective. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``War Crimes Disclosure Act''. (a) In General.--Section 552 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection: ``(d)(1)(A) Notwithstanding subsection (b), this section shall apply to any matter in the possession of a specified agency, that relates to any individual as to whom there exists reasonable grounds to believe that such individual, during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on May 8, 1945, under the direction of or in association with-- ``(i) the Nazi Government of Germany, ``(ii) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi Government of Germany, ``(iii) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi government of Germany, or ``(iv) any government that was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, (a) In General.--Section 552 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection: ``(d)(1)(A) Notwithstanding subsection (b), this section shall apply to any matter in the possession of a specified agency, that relates to any individual as to whom there exists reasonable grounds to believe that such individual, during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on May 8, 1945, under the direction of or in association with-- ``(i) the Nazi Government of Germany, ``(ii) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi Government of Germany, ``(iii) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi government of Germany, or ``(iv) any government that was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion. ``(B) For purposes of subparagraph (a), the term `specified agency' means the following entities, any predecessors of such an entity, and any component of such an entity (or of such a predecessor): ``(i) The Central Intelligence Agency. ``(ii) The Department of Defense. ``(iii) The National Security Agency. ``(iv) The National Security Council. ``(v) The Department of State. ``(vi) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. ``(vii) The United States Information Agency. ``(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the disclosure of any matter when there is clear and convincing evidence that such disclosure would-- ``(i) reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; ``(ii) pose a current threat to military defense, intelligence operations, or the conduct of foreign relations of the United States; ``(iii) reveal an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection; ``(iv) compromise an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between an agent of the Government and a cooperating individual or a foreign government; ``(v) constitute a substantial risk of physical harm to a living person who provided confidential information to the United States; or ``(vi) compromise an enforcement investigation,inquiry, or prosecution by the Office of Special Investigations of the Department of Justice. ``(B) Subparagraph (A) shall only apply to records, information, or other relevant matter which is-- ``(i) properly classified; and ``(ii) the protection of which outweighs the public interest in disclosure. ``(3) Any reasonably segregable portion of a matter referred to in paragraph (2) shall be provided, after deletion of all portions of the matter that are referred to in such subparagraph, to any person requesting the matter under this section if the reasonably segregable portion of the matter would otherwise be required to be disclosed under this section. ``(4) In the case of a request under this section for any matter required to be disclosed under this subsection, if the agency receiving such request is unable to locate the records so requested, such agency shall promptly supply, to the person making such a request, a description of the steps which were taken by such agency to search the indices and other locator systems of the agency to determine whether such records are in the possession or control of the agency.''. (b) Inapplicability of National Security Act of 1947 Exemption.--Section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection: ``(e) Subsection (a) shall not apply to any operational file, or any portion of any operational file, described under section 552(d) of title 5, United States Code (Freedom of Information Act).''. The amendments made by this Act shall apply to requests made after the expiration of the 180-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.", u"intelligence pertaining to national foreign intelligence program''. [(2) The table of contents in the first section of that Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 105 and inserting the following new item: Section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence,'' after ``Secretary of Defense'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1); and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(d) Annual Evaluation of the Director of Central Intelligence.--The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall submit each year to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence of the National Security Council and the appropriate congressional committees (as defined in section 109(c)) an evaluation of the performance and the responsiveness of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency in meeting their national missions.''. (a) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection.--Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 705(a)(1) of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(e)(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, there shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2)(A) If neither the Director of Central Intelligence nor the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces at the time of the nomination of an individual to the position of Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, the President shall nominate an individual for that position from among the commissioned officers of the Armed Forces who have substantial experience in managing intelligence activities. ``(B) The provisions of subsection (c)(3) shall apply to any commissioned officer of the Armed Forces while serving in the position of Assistant Director for Collection. ``(3) The Assistant Director for Collection shall manage the collection of national intelligence by the intelligence community in order to ensure the efficient and effective collection of national intelligence that is identified for collection by the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and [Production.] Production.''. [``(4) In carrying out the responsibility set forth in paragraph (3), the Assistant Director for Collection shall-- [``(A) provide guidance and direction for, and concur in, the procurement and operation of systems necessary for the collection of national intelligence; and [``(B) assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the formulation of plans and budgets for national intelligence collection activities.''.] (b) Consolidation of Human Intelligence Collection Activities.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence [shall enter into an agreement with the Secretary of Defense to transfer from the Secretary to the Director the responsibilities and authorities of the Secretary for the collection of clandestine intelligence from human sources currently conducted by the Defense Human Intelligence Service within the Department of Defense] and the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the National Security Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on the ongoing efforts of those officials to achieve commonality, interoperability, and, where practicable, consolidation of the collection of clandestine intelligence from human sources conducted by the Defense Human Intelligence Service of the Department of Defense and the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 709(a) of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(f)(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, there shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2) The Assistant Director for Analysis and Production shall-- ``(A) oversee the analysis and production of intelligence by the elements of the intelligence community; ``(B) establish standards and priorities relating to such analysis and production; ``(C) monitor the allocation of resources for the analysis and production of intelligence in order to identify unnecessary duplication in the analysis and production of intelligence; ``(D) identify intelligence to be collected for purposes of the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection; and ``(E) provide such additional analysis and production of intelligence as the President and the National Security Council may require.''. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 710 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(g)(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, there shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2) The Assistant Director for Administration shall manage such activities relating to the administration of the intelligence community as the Director of Central Intelligence shall require[, including management of civilian personnel (including recruitment, security investigations, processing, and training of such personnel), information systems, telecommunications systems, finance and accounting services, and security services, and procurement of supplies and support services.''.] Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence (3).''. (a) Establishment of Position.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 711 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``(h)(1) There is hereby established the Office of Congressional Affairs of [the Intelligence Community.] the Director of Central Intelligence. ``(2)(A) The Office shall be headed by the Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs of [the Intelligence Community.] the Director of Central Intelligence. ``(B) The Director of Central Intelligence may designate the Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs of the Central Intelligence Agency to serve as the Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs of [the Intelligence Community.] the Director of Central Intelligence. ``(3) The Director shall coordinate the congressional affairs activities of the elements of the intelligence community and have such additional responsibilities as the Director of Central Intelligence may prescribe. ``(4) Nothing in the subsection may be construed to preclude the elements of the intelligence community from responding directly to requests from Congress.''. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 105 the following new section: (a) In General.--Section 106 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is amended to read as follows: (a) Submittal With Annual Budget.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President shall include in each budget for a fiscal year submitted under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the following information: (1) The aggregate amount appropriated during the current fiscal year on all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government. (2) The aggregate amount requested in such budget for the fiscal year covered by the budget for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government. (b) Form of Submittal.--The President shall submit the information required under subsection (a) in unclassified form. (a) Indefinite Terms of Service.--Section 2(b) of Senate Resolution 400 of the Ninety-fourth Congress (adopted May 19, 1976) is amended by striking the first sentence. (b) Limit on Term of Chairman and Vice Chairman.--Section 2(c) of that resolution is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``No Member shall serve as chairman or vice chairman of the select committee for more than six years of continuous service.''. (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect with the commencement of the One Hundred Fifth Congress. (d) Rules of the Senate.--The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) are enacted as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate with full recognition of the constitutional right of the Senate to change rules at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as in the case of any other rule of the Senate. (a) In General.--(1) Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report setting forth-- (A) the results of a review of the threats to the United States on protecting the national information infrastructure against information warfare and other non-traditional attacks; and (B) the counterintelligence response of the Director. (2) The report shall include a description of the plans of the intelligence community to provide intelligence support for the indications, warning, and assessment functions of the intelligence community with respect to information warfare and other non-traditional attacks by foreign nations, groups, or individuals against the national information infrastructure. (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section: (1) The term ``national information infrastructure'' includes the information infrastructure of the public or private sector. (2) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). TITLE VIII--NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY (a) In General.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:", u"Mr. President, I am pleased to be able to submit for my colleagues' consideration the conference report on H.R. 3259, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. As you know, the Senate passed its authorization bill only last week and this may be an unprecedented turnaround time from passage of our bill to consideration of the conference report. For this, I want to thank House Chairman Larry Combest for his outstanding management of what could have been a difficult effort at reconciling our two bills. Ranking Member Norman Dicks and Vice Chairman Robert Kerrey played equally valuable roles in finding the right balance between ardently advocating their positions and ensuring eventual passage of this important legislation. The rapid progress of this conference report is all the more noteworthy in that, in addition to the usual annual authorization of expenditures for intelligence and intelligence-related activities, this year's authorization bill adds important new provisions to the National Security Act of 1947 designed to help the Director of Central Intelligence [DCI] exert stronger direction and control over the intelligence community. Let me remind my colleagues that under the National Security Act the DCI wears three hats: principal intelligence adviser to the President and the National Security Council; Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and head of the intelligence community, which is composed of 13 different intelligence agencies. For a variety of reasons, a long succession of DCI's have devoted almost all of their time and energy to their first two jobs--advising the President and running the CIA--and have given short shrift to the third--managing the intelligence community. The result has been an unfortunate lack of coordination and focused effort by our various intelligence agencies. This is not to say that our intelligence agencies have not been successful. The opposite is true: the United States has the premier intelligence apparatus in the world. But because they are scattered among so many different departments and agencies they have not been able to operate as efficiently and effectively as they could. Title VIII of the conference report--the Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996--contains provisions intended to strengthen the overall management of the intelligence community. In particular, to help the DCI perform his community responsibilities, title VIII establishes a new Senate-confirmed Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management and three new Senate-confirmed Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence. Since the National Security Act was enacted in 1947, there have been only two statutory positions to manage the intelligence community: a Director of Central Intelligence and a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The time has come to give the DCI a better community management structure. The conference report provides that the DDCI for Community Management will manage an intelligence community staff and will direct communitywide functions, including personnel, resources, requirements, collection, research and development, and analysis and production. Each of the three Assistant DCI's will oversee communitywide efforts in a particular functional area: collection, analysis and production, and administration. I should mention that the DCI has expressed some concern about whether the three Assistant DCI's should all be Presidential appointments subject to Senate confirmation. While noting the DCI's concerns, a majority of the conferees concluded that the advantages of Senate-confirmation outweigh any potential disadvantages. In light of the fact that the three Assistant DCI's will be responsible for coordinating functions that cut across a number of different departments and agencies, the conferees determined that Senate confirmation is necessary to ensure that each of these individuals has sufficient stature and focus to impose a more cohesive and coherent process for allocating resources in each of these key functional areas. The DCI has also questioned whether Senate confirmation of the Assistant Directors is warranted given the limited authority vested in these positions. In fact, the statutory authority vested in these positions is the full authority of the DCI for each respective area. Thus, the actual authority exercised by the Assistant Directors will depend in large measure on the authority the DCI chooses to delegate and support. In addition to creating a better intelligence community management team, the bill gives the DCI significant new management authorities. For example, the Secretary of Defense will be required to obtain the DCI's concurrence--or note the DCI's lack of concurrence--before recommending an individual to the President to be Director of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the new National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The DCI will also have to be consulted regarding the appointments of the heads of the smaller intelligence community elements, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the FBI's National Security Division. In addition, separate provisions added to this year's DOD authorization bill require the DCI to submit an annual performance evaluation of the heads of the major defense intelligence agencies to the Secretary of Defense. These provisions are very significant. Previously, the DCI had little or no say in the appointments or evaluation of the heads of the major operating elements of the intelligence community. I should note that the Director of the FBI objected strenuously to requiring the DCI to be consulted before the Attorney General appoints the head of the FBI's National Security Division. Director Freeh appeared to be concerned that requiring consultation might somehow make the FBI Director appear to be subservient to the DCI. In response to these concerns, the conferees agreed to modify the original Senate provision to require the FBI Director to give the DCI timely notice of his recommendation of an individual to fill the position, and to give the DCI an opportunity to consult. While agreeing to these changes, the conferees noted that the Director of the National Security Division manages a significant portion of the national intelligence budget and concluded that it is wholly appropriate to give the DCI some voice in his or her appointment. In addition to having a stronger voice in appointments, the DCI is given new statutory authority to participate in the preparation of defense intelligence budgets and to be consulted with respect to reprogrammings of funds among defensewide intelligence activities. For the first time, the DCI is also given the statutory right to establish intelligence collection requirements and priorities, and to resolve conflicts in collection priorities. I also want to take a moment to address the press reports that opposition from the Department of Defense killed intelligence reform this year. It is true that bureaucratic resistance to change threatened reform efforts and that both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees agreed to scale back some of their proposals in the interest of ensuring passage of the bill. However, many very significant provisions remain. The conference report gives the DCI important new authorities to manage the intelligence community and, for the first time in 50 years, establishes a new intelligence community management structure. We expect these provisions will go far to make the intelligence community operate more effectively and more efficiently. In short, to paraphrase Mark Twain, the reports of the death of intelligence reform are greatly exaggerated. With the end of the 104th Congress, we mark a significant milestone in the history of this Senate, the executive branch, and most of all, the intelligence community. Twenty years ago, on May 19, 1976, the Senate adopted Senate Resolution 400, establishing the Select Committee on Intelligence. The following day, May 20, 15 Senators were appointed to this committee, with Senator Inouye as its Chairman and Senator Howard Baker its Vice Chairman. Thus, from the very beginning, the nonpartisan nature of the committee was reinforced with the seating of a Vice Chairman rather than a ranking member. This nonpartisan attitude has continued for 20 years, with the Chairmen and Vice Chairmen working together overseeing U.S. intelligence, and at the same time ensuring that this important instrument of national security is maintained. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a brief statement outlining the impressive history of this committee be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my statement.", u" There being no objection, the essay was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: They spent many years fighting the same fight; trying to give the American worker a fair shake and keep the unions clean. 1913-1995 Victor Riesel, in his newspaper column that run for more than 40 years and on his radio show, fearlessly exposed labor corruption (and paid dearly for it). 1925-1995 Walter J. Sheridan, as a government investigator with Robert Kennedy in the Senate and in the Justice Department, helped send Jimmy Hoffa to prison. In the end, neither Riesel nor Sheridan was able to stem the downward slide of the labor movement, but it can't be said that they didn't try. When they died within days of each other in January, Victor Riesel and Walter Sheridan seemed like figures from a lost America. In their separate ways, they were shaped by that brief, romantic time when millions of Americans still believed that the labor movement would serve as the cement of the social contract. The theory was relatively simple. Unions--not government-- would establish hard limits on the powerful. Braided together into a mighty national force, unions would guarantee lives of security, decency and personal pride to ordinary citizens. Unions would provide a sense of community. And unions would be the ethical watch-dogs of the society, casting cold eyes on slippery politicians and predatory businessmen. Those ambitions were paid for with the blood of union members, from Ludlow, Colo., to Flint, Mich., and in hundreds of other places where a picket line was seen as a moral necessity. By the time Riesel and Sheridan followed their separate trails into our social history, the union movement was a sewer. They knew it better than almost all others, for Riesel and Sheridan were among the few Americans who carried torches into that sewer and came back to tell us what they had seen. Riesel was better known than Sheridan because for most of his adult life he was a labor columnist, first at The New York Post, where he began in 1942, and after 1948 at The New York Daily Mirror, with syndication in some 300 newspapers. It is one measure of how much our society has changed that even the job description ``labor columnist'' sounds as rare now as that of blacksmith. Riesel came to his life's work with superb credentials. He was born in 1913 on Manhattan's Lower East Side, that nursery of union organizers, artists, prize-fighters and hoodlums. His father was a union activist whose work carried the family on the familiar journey to the more serene precincts of the Bronx when Victor was 13. He graduated from Morris High School just as the Great Depression was beginning and immediately went to work. Over the next decade, he managed to earn a bachelor's degree in the night school of the City College of New York, while working in hat factories and lace- makers' lofts and steel mills. He learned journalism on college and union newspapers. As Riesel was starting his labor column, when American industry was gorged with wartime profits, the hoodlums were everywhere. Lepke Buchalter and Gurrah Shapiro had corrupted and terrorized the garment industry. The leaders of the waterfront unions were brutal and cynical in their alliances with the men who controlled the East Coast ports. Other unions were run as businesses by faceless men protected from scrutiny by the death of union democracy. Union treasuries were looted; pension funds were eaten by the mob. Dissidents had their heads broken or were dropped in swamps in New Jersey. In the postwar boom, union leaders began buying yachts. They played a lot of golf. They had become an oligarchy, as remote from the rank and file as the men who ran the great corporations. Riesel went after them in his column and on his radio program and would eventually pay a severe price. If Riesel was formed by the Depression, Walter Sheridan's character was shaped by World WAr II. he was born in 1925 in Utica, N.Y. His father ran a small hotel called the Monclair and a restaurant named Sheridan's, and though the Sheridans were far from rich, the Depression did not force them into soup kitchens. At the Utica Free Academy, a public high school, Walter was senior class president and quarterback of the football team. He joined the Navy, quickly volunteered for the submarine service and was on board the U.S.S. Pargo in the Sea of Japan on the day the war ended.ter the war, he came to New York City and enrolled at Fordham on the G.I. Bill. In 1948, while a student, he married Nancy Tuttle; they had met in high school in Utica (and would go on to have 5 children and 14 grandchildren). After graduation in 1950, Sheridan briefly tried law school in Albany, then decided to enter the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where he would spend four disillusioning years. The F.B.I. was then in the iron control of J. Edgar Hoover, whose anti-Communist obsessions, private intelligence files and bureaucratic genius made him as permanent, a fixture in Washington as the average union leader was in Bayonne. I once spent an hour with Sheridan during Robert F. Kennedy's 1968 campaign and asked him casually why he'd left the F.B.I. ``Because Hoover was more interested in guys who were Communists for 15 minutes in 1931,'' Sheridan said quietly, ``than he was in guys who were stealing New Jersey.'' After resigning from the F.B.I., Sheridan joined the National Security Agency, where he refined his skills as an investigator. These included a willingness to endure tedium, a stoical tenacity when faced with dry holes or disappointment and, above all, an ability to gaze at often purposefully obscure documents and discover a story line. Most great investigators have two other qualities: a passion for anonymity and a belief in the righteousness of the enterprise. Sheridan, by all accounts, was a great investigator. In 1957, his life was permanently changed when he was recruited by Robert Kennedy to join the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, better known as the McClellan Committee. The chairman was Senator John McClellan, a Democrat from Arkansas. John F. Kennedy was a member of the committee, and Robert Kennedy was the chief counsel. Sheridan established almost instant rapport with Bobby. They laughed when they discovered they were born on the same day--Nov. 20, 1925. Kennedy quickly recognized in Sheridan characteristics he admired in others who joined his team: tenacity, courage, a respect for detail and hard work and an absence of self- importance. The basic task of the committee was to dig into the mob takeover of the unions. It quickly began to focus on the complex, gifted and corrupt Jimmy Hoffa and the Teamsters, which, with almost two million members, was the nation's largest and richest union. The hearings had been called, in part, because of widespread national revulsion the year before at what had been done to Victor Riesel. On April 5, 1956, on his late-night radio show, Riesel attacked racketeering in Local 138 of the International Union of Operating Engineers, based in Long Island. He singled out William C. DeKoning Sr., recently released from prison after doing time for extortion, and his son, William C. DeKoning Jr., who had inherited the presidency of the local when his father was sent to jail. Riesel had also attacked Hoffa, who was maneuvering from his Middle Western base to take over the national leadership of the Teamsters. After the broadcast, Riesel went to Lindy's, the most famous of the late-night Broadway restaurants of the era. He stepped outside at 3 a.m., was fingered by a shadowy figure and then a young man stepped up and hurled sulfuric acid into Riesel's face. He was permanently blinded. The police learned that the acid thrower was a 22-year-old apprentice hoodlum named Abraham Telvi, who disappeared for a while. They arrested a second-level labor hoodlum--and Hoffa crony--named John DioGuardia (better known as Johnny Dio) and charged him with ordering the attack. But witnesses suddenly developed amnesia and Johnny Dio went free. When Telvi, who had been paid $1,175 by middlemen to do the job, understood the importance of his victim, he demanded more money. He was murdered on July 28 on the Lower East Side, not far from where Riesel grew up. There is no record of Riesel and Sheridan working together, but in Sheridan's 1972 book, ``The Fall and Rise of Jimmy Hoffa,'' he relates a tale told to him by an honest ", u"Madam President, I have been listening in my office, before I came to the floor, to Senator Kerrey's comments. While we don't agree on everything, we agree on most things working on the Intelligence Committee. I want to say this about the distinguished Senator from Nebraska who is the vice chairman of the committee. We have tried to work together on very tough issues in the Intelligence Committee and tried to bring them to the floor of the Senate together--not separately. I think it says a lot when we can do this. I certainly have a lot of respect for the Senator from Nebraska and enjoy working with him. One thing about him, he is candid, and that goes a long way on anything. I think we have to devote our time and our effort in the Intelligence Committee and in the Senate to what works, what works best on basic intelligence gathering, as well as counterintelligence, where there is a shortfall. In that spirit, Madam President, I rise in support of the motion to proceed to consideration of H.R. 1555, the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2000. As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am deeply disappointed that certain Members of the minority have decided to oppose this motion. I hope it will be short lived. The intelligence bill, I believe, is a balanced, thoroughly bipartisan piece of legislation that is critical to our national security. Some Senators are objecting to the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski amendment to restructure the Department of Energy, not the underlying bill. I am a cosponsor of that amendment, as is the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Kerrey. Basically, this is essentially the same proposal that prompted a filibuster threat when it first was offered to the Defense authorization bill back before the Memorial Day recess. At that time, the argument was, ``it's too soon, it's premature, there haven't been any hearings yet.'' Whatever the merit of those arguments at the time, I believe, they are wholly without merit today. The Intelligence Committee has held two open hearings on the Kyl amendment and DOE security and counterintelligence issues, including a joint hearing with the Energy, Armed Services, and Government Affairs Committees that more than 60 Senators had the opportunity to attend. The Intelligence Committee also held a detailed, closed briefing on the report of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, also known as the Rudman report. We heard testimony from Secretary of Energy Richardson twice, from Senator Rudman twice, and from the sponsors of this amendment. I also should point out that, long before the current controversy, the Senate Intelligence Committee, on a bipartisan basis, identified problems in DOE's counterintelligence program and took steps to address those weaknesses. Most importantly, it sought to energize the Department of Energy to allocate the necessary resources, and take the necessary steps, to eliminate these vulnerabilities. Since the Kyl et al amendment was first offered, the sponsors have negotiated extensively, and in good faith, with the Department of Energy in order to address the concerns that Secretary Richardson has expressed, without changing the underlying thrust of the amendment, which is to create a semiautonomous agency for nuclear security within the Department of Energy. Last month, the need for action was dramatically reinforced by the publication of the Rudman report, entitled ``Science at its Best; Security at its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy''--a report on security problems at the U.S. Department of Energy. I commend former Senator Rudman and also Dr. Drell, and others, who were so involved in this work. The Rudman report found among other things, that: At the birth of DOE, the brilliant scientific breakthroughs of the nuclear weapons laboratories came with a troubling record of security administration. Twenty years later, virtually every one of its original problems persists. . . . Multiple chains of command and standards of performance negated accountability, resulting in pervasive inefficiency, confusion, and mistrust. . . . In response to these problems, the Department has been the subject of a nearly unbroken history of dire warnings and attempted but aborted reforms. Building on the conclusions of the 1997 Institute for Defense Analyses report and the 1999 Chiles Commission, the Rudman panel concluded that: The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself. . . . Reorganization is clearly warranted to resolve the many specific problems . . . in the weapons laboratories, but also to address the lack of accountability that has become endemic throughout the entire Department. The panel is convinced that real and lasting security and counterintelligence reform at the weapons labs is simply unworkable within DOE's current structure and culture. . . . To achieve the kind of protection that these sensitive labs must have, they and their functions must have their own autonomous operational structure free of all the other obligations imposed by DOE management. To provide ``deep and lasting structural change that will give the weapons laboratories the accountability, clear lines of authority, and priority they deserve,'' the Rudman report endorsed two possible solutions: One was the creation of a wholly independent agency, such as NASA, to perform weapons research and nuclear stockpile management functions; or two, placing weapons research and nuclear stockpile management functions in a ``new semiautonomous agency within DOE that has a clear mission, streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines of authority and accountability.'' The latter option, or the second approach, is the one contained in the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski; amendment. Examples of organizations of this type are the National Security Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA, within the Defense Department. The new semi-autonomous agency, the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship, would be a single agency, within the DOE, with responsibility for all activities of our nuclear weapons complex, including the National Laboratories--nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and disposition of fissle materials. This agency will be led by an Under Secretary. The Under Secretary will be in charge of, and responsible for, all aspects of the agency's work, who will report--and this is very important--who will report directly and solely to the Secretary of Energy, and who will be subject to the supervision and direction of the Secretary of Energy. The Secretary of Energy will have full authority over all activities of this agency. Thus, for the first time--yes, Madam President the first time--this critical function of our national Government will have the clear chain of command that it requires. As recommended by the Rudman report, the new agency will have its own senior officials responsible for counterintelligence and security matters within the agency. These officials will carry out the counterintelligence and security policies established by the Secretary and will report to the Under Secretary and have direct access to the Secretary. It is very important that this happen. The agency will have a senior official responsible for the analysis and assessment of intelligence within the agency who will also report to the Under Secretary and have direct access to the Secretary. The Rudman report concluded that purely administrative reorganizational changes are inadequate to the challenge at hand: They say: ``To ensure its long-term success, this new agency must be established by statute.'' For if the history of attempts to reform DOE underscores one thing, it is the ability of the DOE and the labs to hunker down and outwait and outlast Secretaries and other would-be agents of change--yes, even Presidents. For example, as documented by Senator Rudman and his colleagues, ``even after President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 61 ordering that the Department make fundamental changes in security procedures, compliance by Department bureaucrats was grudging and belated.'' At the same time, we in the Senate should recognize that our work will not be done even after this amendment is adopted and enacted into law. As the Rudman report warned, ``DOE cannot be fixed by a single legislative act: management must follows mandate. . . . Thus, both Congress and the Executive branch . . . should be prepared to monitor the progress of the Department's reforms for years to come.'' It is an indication of how badly the Department of Energy is broken that it took over 100 studies of counterintelligence, security, and management practices--by the FBI and other intelligence agencies, the GAO, the DOE itself, and others, plus one enormous espionage scandal--to create the impetus for change. I am encouraged by what appears to be some progress toward getting to this bill. I think we all are seeking--and I hope we are--the same thing: A better and more secure Department of Energy. This nation must have no less. I ask my colleagues: please, do not let the Senate become the lastes obstacle to reform at the Department of Energy. Stop the delay. Vote for cloture tomorrow morning, and let's get on with the business of the people and make our labs safe for our future and our country. I yield the floor. Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I obviously rise in strong support of the conference report to accompany H.R. 1555, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. Mr. Speaker, in H.R. 1555 we begin the funding for the intelligence community of the next millennium. That, Mr. Speaker, is a most useful perspective for what we have tried to do in our conference report. How can we adapt the tools and skills of the Cold War to meet the challenges of the 21st century? These are new times. We need new ways to approach them. Underlying that question is how, and in some cases whether, we plan to meet those challenges. How we define our interests, Mr. Speaker, will depend on how we define ourselves. What kind of country will we be in the next century? In 2020, when my grandchildren are grown, what will the American flag mean to them and to people around the world? In the classified schedule of authorizations in our conference report, we frame a preliminary answer to these questions. In that report, Mr. Speaker, we bring forward the basic tools and skills of the Cold War to bear on the new threats of the next century: the international drug cartels that bring poison into our cities, the elusive conspiracies that put the pieces of nuclear weapons into the hands of rogue leaders, and the shadowy networks that want to bomb our buildings overseas and here at home. We will also need to use these tools and skills to meet new and unanticipated challenges that will arise in the coming years. Synthetic pharmaceuticals, genetic terrorists? I cannot know what threats will face my grandchildren in the year 2020 as Americans, but I can tell the Members what intelligence tools and skills will be necessary to meet those threats. That is our job. We may not know the who, In other words, but we clearly know the how. We have learned that, and now we have to provide for it. In our conference report, Mr. Speaker, we continue to focus on this, how we will meet the threats and the challenges of the future, which is indeed upon us. We will need more human intelligence or HUMINT, as we call it. Over the past year we have had to understand and to act upon crises in Belgrade, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, East Timor, southern Colombia, and a whole host of other hard-to-pronounce places. In each case, policymakers need more HUMINT on the plans and the intentions of the rogue leaders, dissidents, terrorists, guerillas, and traffickers involved in these crises. Where will the crises of the year 2000 arise, Kabul, Kinshasa, Lagos? I do not know, but they will be out there, and wherever they do arise our policymakers will need intelligence officers on the ground to collect HUMINT on the plans and intentions of those involved. For that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report continues the rebuilding of our HUMINT capabilities around the world. No surprises is the right way to go. We will continue to need signals intelligence, or SIGINT, as it is called. As in the past, our ability to collect SIGINT has helped to protect our shores from cocaine and our citizens from terrorists. That ability, however, is threatened in a fundamental way by digital technologies. For that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report continues the recapitalization of our SIGINT capability. This is a huge undertaking and an extraordinarily significant one. We must improve the processing of imagery intelligence, or IMINT as it is called. Our ability to collect imagery has accelerated at lightning speed, but our ability to process imagery remains at a crawl. Collection and processing, however, are two halves of one whole. They must work together. At present, the combination of collection and processing and imagery is a Ferrari welded to a Ford Falcon. That combination simply will not drive our IMINT capability in 2020. And for that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report challenges the Intelligence Community to invest more in its ability to process imagery. It does no good to have the pictures if we do not have analysts to review them. We must rebuild our covert action capability. The rise of rogue leaders and regional conflicts has demonstrated once again that the President must have an option between the use of F-16s and doing nothing. The President must have, whenever appropriate, the ability to influence an adversary through the various forms of covert action, properly oversighted, of course. For that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report provides additional funding for development of the Intelligence Community's covert action capabilities. Rebuilding and refining our HUMINT, our SIGINT, our IMINT, and our covert action capabilities are central to the conference report accompanying H.R. 1555. In addition, we address legislatively a number of specific issues that have arisen with regard to the use and the oversight of these capabilities. In section 309 of our conference report, we direct the National Security Agency, the NSA, to report in detail on the legal standards that it employs for the interception of communications. I can report, notwithstanding this provision, that the committee has substantial insight into the action of the NSA and the guidance of its legal staff. I have thus far no reason to believe that the NSA is not scrupulous in following the Constitution and the laws conducting its SIGINT mission. However, our job is oversight and we take it seriously. In section 311 of our conference report, we require that the Director of Central Intelligence report to Congress on any involvement of U.S. intelligence agencies in the abuses of the Pinochet regime in Chile. In response to public and Congressional interest, I have introduced legislation with Senator Moynihan that would coordinate and expedite the gathering and dissemination of such information. The story of U.S. intelligence in Chile, whether good or bad, inspiring or embarrassing, is part of American history. Such stories should, to the extent possible, be provided to the American people. I am hopeful that Senator Moynihan and I have introduced the means to make that happen, and I believe we have. Finally, in title VIII of our conference report, we provide the President with an important new tool against the menace of foreign drug lords who poison our cities. In title VIII, called ``The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act,'' the President and the Secretary of Treasury may publicly identify foreign drug lords and block their transactions and assets. Title VIII extends an executive order against Colombian drug lords to include all foreign drug lords. It provides the President with a new way to use intelligence in the war on drugs. It is long overdue. It is a tried and tested measure. It works and we need to use it. Mr. Speaker, only through a cooperative, bipartisan effort could our committee have addressed so wide a range of authorizations and legislative provisions in this conference report, and also, incidentally, with such a good professional staff as we have. The ideas and counsel of the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), our ranking member, form a major part of this report. It draws as well on the considerable expertise of the Democratic staff of this committee. And I am pleased to say our committee in my view works on a very close, bipartisan, cooperative basis and the results of that are evident to all. Our work together on this conference report is a part of an annual demonstration that partisanship, like beepers and cell phones, actually get checked at the outer door of our committee before Members can come into our committee's spaces. In sum, Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of a strong bipartisan conference report that provides funding and direction for the Intelligence Community of the next millennium. It also provides legislation that addresses oversight issues and expands the use of intelligence in the war on drugs. I urge Members to support this conference. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Mr. President, I rise today to ask that my colleagues support the conference report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. I want to thank my colleagues in the House for their work on this legislation and especially Chairman Goss and Ranking Member Dixon for their leadership in the conference. I believe that the conference committee put together a solid package for consideration by the full Senate that fairly represents the intelligence priorities set forth in both the Senate and House versions of the Intelligence Authorization Act. I am pleased to report that the conference committee accomplished its task in a bipartisan manner, and I want to thank my colleague from Nebraska, Senator Kerrey, for working so closely with me to produce this legislation. I believe that the conference report embraces many of the key recommendations that the Senate adopted in its version of the bill. We recommended significant increases in funding for high-priority projects aimed at better positioning the Intelligence Community for the threats of the 21st century, while at the same time reducing funds for programs and activities that were not adequately justified or redundant. In so doing, we authorized a moderate increase in overall funding for intelligence programs above the President's request. This is a positive step and I hope that next year the administration will follow our lead and begin to reinvest in our intelligence gathering capabilities. The conference report includes key initiatives that I believe are vital for the future of our Intelligence Community. These initiatives include: 1. bolstering advanced research and development across the Community, to facilitate, among other things, the modernization of NSA and CIA; 2. strengthening efforts in counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-intelligence, and effective covert action; 3. expanding the collection and exploitation of measurements and signatures intelligence, especially ballistic missile intelligence; 4. boosting education, recruiting, and technical training for Intelligence Community personnel; 5. enhancing analytical capabilities; 6. streamlining dissemination of intelligence products; 7. developing our ability to process, exploit and disseminate commercial imagery; and 8. providing new tools for information operations. I believe that the conferees have provided the funds and guidance necessary to ensure that military commanders and national policymakers continue to receive timely, accurate information on threats to our security. At the same time, we have found some critical areas within the Community that are in need of major improvements. In the Senate, we had a distinguished panel of Americans with a broad range of expertise--our Technical Advisory Group--that took a look at some key areas within the Intelligence Community and brought forward some very important recommendations. We thank all the members of the Technical Advisory Group for their time and efforts. I will briefly summarize some of their findings, to the extent that I can in open session, along with some of the other findings of our conference. First, our ability to collect and analyze information on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction requires renewed emphasis and innovative thinking. As our potential enemies seek out the ability to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, we must develop the ability to detect these efforts. This bill places a great deal of emphasis on our ability to collect such information known as Measurements and Signatures Intelligence or Second, both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees agree that our Intelligence Community and our Defense Department must move quickly to address what our Technical Advisory Group identifies as a critical shortfall in our ability to properly task, process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence information collection by our airborne and overhead imagery assets. As we modernize our Imagery Intelligence or IMINT architecture, the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees agree that we should not be spending the taxpayers money on collection architectures that we may not be able to utilize fully. Third, we have once again placed strong emphasis on recapitalizing the National Security Agency's information technology infrastructure. As we demand more from our Intelligence Community in a number of areas, we also demand fiscal responsibility. The conference report includes a number of reductions to programs that were not adequately justified or were redundant with other elements within the Intelligence Community. The legislation contains some important new authorities for the Intelligence Community. I'll mention some of the highlights: First, there are new protections for the identities of former covert agents and for the operational files of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency or ``NIMA.'' Second, there are new counterintelligence authorities--these include provisions allowing access to government computers used in classified work by executive branch employees. Also, there are new requirements for the FBI to begin its consultation with agencies that they are investigating at a far earlier stage than before. Third, we have established a commission to study the role and missions of the National Reconnaissance Office or ``NRO.'' This commission will look at the NRO from top to bottom--its findings and recommendations to us and the Senate Armed Services Committee will serve to guide our committees on the future funding and operations of the NRO. I look forward to working with the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee to ensure that the best candidates are selected for membership on this very important commission. If any Member of the Senate wishes to review the classified portions of the bill, they are available off the Senate floor. Finally, Mr. President, there is a significant piece of legislation in this bill that is intended to go after foreign international drug traffickers and those that support their illicit activities. Title eight of this bill, the so-called ``Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act,'' is modeled after the Executive Order that targets the assets of named Colombian traffickers and those that assist them in their trafficking activities. Mr. President, I support strongly efforts to target and destroy significant foreign drug trafficking organizations. I have placed significant emphasis on counter-narcotics in this and every Intelligence Authorization bill since I became Chairman of this Committee. The record is clear. The existing Colombian program has been highly successful. I would be the first to support the President if he chose to expand the program in a thoughtful and measured way. In fact, the Chief Executive already has the constitutional and statutory authority to do so. The President does not need this legislation to expand the scope of this program. Accordingly, Mr. President, I, along with other Members of Congress, have expressed concern with this legislation because it may have some very serious unintended consequences for innocent American citizens. Although the express language of the ``Kingpin'' legislation deals exclusively with foreign persons and entities, it will affect American citizens. Lurking within the seemingly innocuous language is the real possibility of unwitting and innocent American citizens being caught up in its global net. For example, an American business owner may be a joint venture partner with a foreign company that has been designated as ``supporting'' the activities of a foreign narcotics trafficker. Although the American person may be completely unaware of the illicit activities of their foreign partner, their own assets will also be blocked if they are jointly held. The ``Kingpin'' legislation does not provide an opportunity for an American person to seek judicial review of the blocking of their jointly held assets. The result is that Americans may be deprived of their property without due process of law. Let me repeat that, Mr. President, Americans may be deprived of their property without due process of law. Mr. President, I strongly support the expansion of this successful program. I do not, however, support depriving innocent Americans of their fundamental right to due process. Many attempts were made to amend the ``Kingpin'' legislation in conference to make it clear that American citizens have an immediate avenue into Federal District Court should they be snared unjustifiably in this trap. Unfortunately, the sponsors and proponents of this bill in the House and Senate opposed any effort to clarify this fundamental American right. In fact, I have been told that if we were to expressly state that a United States citizen has the right to immediate judicial review, this would, quote, gut the bill, unquote. I disagree. Thomas Jefferson said that our ``Bill of Rights is what the people are entitled to against any government on earth . . . and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference.'' Mr. President, I also believe that our right to due process should not ``rest on inference,'' but rather we should state it clearly and without equivocation. We do not do that in this bill. Mr. President, I fear that in our earnest to pass a ``tough drug bill'' we may have sacrificed part of our freedom. I applaud the sponsors and proponents of this bill for their dedication to protecting our shores from the scourge of illegal drugs. I caution them, however, that their enthusiasm may be dampened as the true implications of this legislation become known. Notwithstanding my concerns, I am encouraged that the conferees did agree to include a provision in the so-called ``Kingpin'' legislation that creates a panel to study whether these kinds of sanction regimes affect U.S. persons doing legitimate business with foreign partners, and whether there are adequate and fair remedies for honest U.S. persons. I commend my colleague from Nebraska, Senator Kerrey, for suggesting this study and also for other areas of leadership on which I have worked with the Senator during my tenure on the Intelligence Committee. He will be leaving the Intelligence Committee at the end of this year whenever his term is up, and we will miss him because he has certainly been a friend, but he has also been a leader to put America's national security first and foremost everywhere it comes up. In my opinion, we have put the cart squarely before the horse dealing with due process. I am confident that such a panel as I alluded to earlier will confirm my concerns and the concerns of others and make substantive recommendations that my well-meaning colleagues will ultimately acknowledge and I hope will be able to accept. The conference committee worked closely together in a bipartisan fashion to produce the comprehensive intelligence authorization act. I urge my colleagues to support its adoption.", u"Mr. President, I am very pleased to rise today in support of the Senate's passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2012. I understand that the House of Representatives intends to consider this legislation on the suspension calendar later this week, so it should be enacted prior to the end of this session. This will be the third time in less than 15 months that the Congress will enact an intelligence authorization bill--including bills for fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012--after a 6 year hiatus in passing such legislation. What this means is that Congress, through the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, is restoring oversight over the intelligence community and fulfilling our responsibility to thoroughly examine intelligence policies and budgets. Unlike the last two authorization bills, this bill was completed contemporaneously with, instead of after, the appropriations process that funds intelligence efforts. The classified annex to this legislation authorizes appropriations for intelligence activities and has helped guide the work of the appropriations committees as they considered intelligence spending. The days when the intelligence community can bypass the intelligence committees and deal solely with the appropriations committees are over. Since receiving the President's budget request for the intelligence community in February, the Intelligence Committee has recognized that the massive increase in intelligence spending over the past decade has come to an end. Our original bill, reported to the Senate in August of this year, reduced intelligence spending below the President's request. Since then, we have worked closely with the House Intelligence Committee, the Senate Appropriations Committee, and the executive branch to reflect the spending reductions set in the Budget Control Act of 2011. The legislation we are approving today keeps funding for intelligence essentially flat from fiscal year 2011, representing the a meaningful reduction from the President's request. As we look to 2013, many more difficult decisions will need to be made to make further reductions to intelligence spending. It is my belief that real reductions in intelligence spending can be accomplished without sacrificing capability, but this will require a rigorous review and the executive branch being more forthcoming than it has been to date about where it believes cuts are possible. Of course, the bill also provides significant legislative provisions to give the intelligence community the authorities and flexibilities it needs to continue protecting our national security and providing policymakers the information they need to make foreign policy and security decisions; and other provisions for the effective and appropriate functioning of our intelligence apparatus. I note that passage of the last intelligence authorization bill occurred shortly after the strike leading to the death of Usama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Since then, the intelligence community has had continued success in tracking and removing terrorist threats to the United States. Senior leaders and commanders of al-Qaida, including all of its affiliate groups as well as militant organizations involved in the Afghan war, have been removed from the fight, and terrorist plots and plotting have been disrupted. Among them, a plot to kill the Saudi Ambassador to the United States was thwarted due to the skillful and cooperative efforts of the FBI, DEA, CIA, and others. Intelligence has factored into significant policy decisions and U.S. actions, including with respect to interdicting the proliferation of weapons, setting economic sanctions, protecting ISAF forces in Afghanistan, blocking cyber attacks against our government and certain critical infrastructure companies, and contributing to the NATO effort in Libya. It is my hope that the provisions in this bill will continue to aid the intelligence community as it conducts its missions; ensure better stewardship of taxpayer dollars; and support its thousands of civilians and military employees. Among other things, this bill includes: A section that provides for burial allowances for intelligence employees killed in the line of duty, similar to those for members of the U.S. military; New procurement authorities that enable intelligence agencies to protect against supply chain risk to information technologies; a measure authorizing new accounts at the Department of Treasury that will enable defense intelligence agencies to become financially auditable; Provisions that strengthen congressional oversight of the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay; a section that will improve the accuracy of intelligence community cost estimates; and Provisions that provide the Director of National Intelligence with needed personnel management authorities. As I noted, the bill contains a 275-page classified schedule and annex that authorizes intelligence funding and implements the committee's oversight findings over the past year. That annex is available to all Senators in the intelligence committee's offices. Mr. President, let me note my sincere appreciation for the close collaboration of Senator Chambliss, the vice chairman of the committee, throughout the legislative process. He and his staff--in particular Martha Scott Poindexter and Jacqueline Russell--have continued the bipartisan approach that the committee followed in the last Congress, and we have together agreed to every provision in the bill. As can be imagined, it has taken enormous effort to produce a third bill in such a short time frame. I sincerely thank the efforts of the staff to review the President's requested funding levels and legislative provisions, to draft legislation, and to negotiate a final product. In particular, I thank Lorenzo Goco, the Deputy Staff Director who has overseen the legislative efforts, Michael Davidson, the general counsel of the Senate Intelligence Committee until this past Labor Day, and Christine Healey, who has carried the load of the legislative work throughout and who replaced Mr. Davidson as general counsel. I also extend my appreciation for the work of Eric Losick and Mike Buchwald, majority counsel on the Committee, and Jack Livingston and Kathleen Rice, the minority counsel. Similarly, the Committee's budget staff has worked diligently and expertly in their preparation of the classified annex to this bill and in working with intelligence agencies to understand and guide their efforts. I thank the committee's budget director, Peggy Evans, and the budget staff through this period: Hayden Milberg, Randy Bookout, Andrew Kerr, John Dickas, Paul Matulic, Matt Pollard, Amy Hopkins, Jamal Ware, Iram Ali, Jeffrey Howard, Andy Grotto, Jim Smythers, Brian Miller, Eric Chapman, John Maguire, Tyler Stephens, Evan Gottesman, Brian Walsh, Ryan Tully, and Christian Cook. I also appreciate the work and relationship with Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The version of the legislation approved today builds on the House legislation, and our two committees have consulted closely throughout this process. We held a joint open hearing on the tenth anniversary of the September 11, 2011, attacks and I look forward to continuing to work together next year to enact the fiscal year 2013 intelligence authorization bill. Let me also note my appreciation for two other Senate committees. The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense has closely followed our authorizations as it drafted its appropriations bill. This underscores the work done in our bill, and limits to a minimum the cases where the authorization and appropriations levels do not match. We have also worked over the past week with the Senate Armed Services Committee to include language in the classified annex to this bill concerning the Military Intelligence Program and a military construction program authorized for the National Security Agency. The Armed Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee both exercise jurisdiction over military construction projects with intelligence funding; in this instance, the two committees have both included authorizations for the High Performance Computing Center II, and have jointly agreed to the language included in this annex. Finally, Mr. President, I note that while there is no committee report or conference report associated with the text that we are approving today, the Intelligence Committee issued a report to accompany the bill it reported to the Senate in August. As the legislation has changed since House passage of its authorization bill and consideration today of this amendment, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a section-by-section analysis of the legislation so as to provide for the legislative history needed to explain the authors' intent and better clarify the effects of the provisions included.", u"Mr. President, the first hour here today will be equally divided and controlled between the two leaders or their designees. The majority will control the first half and the Republicans the final half. I filed cloture last night on a motion to proceed to the cybersecurity bill. I hope we can reach an agreement to have that cloture vote sometime today. If not, we will have it tomorrow. When a major storm ripped through the Mid-Atlantic region last month, it left millions of people without power--I repeat, millions of people. I was at my home here in Washington, which is different from my home in Searchlight, NV. In Searchlight, the wind blows a lot, so you can hear the wind. It is kind of pleasant for me. But the wind we heard at our home in Washington was not pleasant. At 9:30 or 10:00 at night, it was loud and it was abusive and it was, quite frankly, a little scary. Our power was not affected, but that wasn't the case for millions of other people. Residents of Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, and the District of Columbia soon realized how quickly a major power outage can alter life as we know it. I talked to Senator Manchin of West Virginia, and a week later power was still out in large parts of West Virginia. He said it was the worst storm they have ever known in West Virginia. This power outage altered life as people knew it here in the entire eastern part of the United States. The blackout was devastating to many families and many businesses. But it was also minor compared to the devastation that malicious cyber terrorists could wreak with a single keystroke. I repeat, as damaging and frightening as this storm was, we could have a malicious cyber attack by terrorists that would be far more devastating than this violent storm. Cyber attackers could all too easily shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast, the west coast, and the middle part of our country. Any one attack could leave dozens of major cities and tens of millions of Americans without power. We know, because we were shown in a room here in the Capitol, how an attack could take place and what damage it would do, so we know this is not just make-believe. Without ATMs or debit card readers, commerce would immediately grind to a halt. My daughter, who lives here in the DC area, lost power when the storm hit. They waited for a number of hours, and then they took all the food out of their freezer, they gave away what they could, and they threw the rest away. And that was the way it was all over. Their power was out for about a week, and it made it very difficult. They are fortunate enough to have a basement, and the heat wasn't oppressive down there. Without refrigeration, food would rot on the shelves, the freezers would have to be emptied, and people could actually go hungry. Without gas pumps, transportation arteries would clog with abandoned vehicles. Without cell phones or computers, whole regions of the country would be cut off from communication and families would be unable to reach each other. Without air-conditioning and without lifesaving technology and the service of hospitals and nursing homes, the elderly and sick would become much sicker and die. Most major hospitals have backup power, but it is only for a limited amount of time. It depends on how much fuel they can store, and that is very limited. The devastation is really unimaginable, but we have heard these ominous scenarios before. What many Americans haven't considered is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power every military base in our country. About 99 percent of electricity used to power military installations comes from outside the bases. Nellis Air Force Base, one of the largest in the world of its type, has some solar energy there that they have developed, but over 90 percent of their power, in spite of that, comes from outside the base, and more than 85 percent of that power is provided by the same electric utilities that power homes and businesses and schools in the civilian world. So a cyber attack that took out a civilian power grid would also soon cripple our Nation's military--very soon. Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out. Command and control centers would go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut down. Communication between commanders and their troops would go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power. Much of what we do militarily is now done by computers and done very remotely. It is no secret that the drones that operate for our country all over the world are not operated from Pakistan, Afghanistan, or Somalia, they are operated from a base 35 miles outside Las Vegas. That is all done with electricity. So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions. That is why our top national security officials--including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director--have said that the kind of malicious cyber attack I have just described is among the most urgent threats to our country. In fact, they have said that unless we do something and do it soon, it is not a question of if, it is only a question of when. There have already been cyber attacks on our nuclear infrastructure, our Defense Department's most advanced weapons, the NASDAQ stock exchange, and most major corporations. These are just a few of the things that have already been attacked by cyber. Senator McConnell and I recently received a letter from a bipartisan group of former national security officials, including six former Bush and Obama administration officials, that presented the danger in stark terms: We carry the burden of knowing that 9/11 might have been averted with the intelligence that existed at the time. We do not want to be in the same position again when ``cyber 9/11'' hits--it is not a question of whether this will happen; it is only a question of ``when.'' That is what they said, not me. The group said the threat of cyber attack ``represents the most serious challenge to our national security since the onset of the nuclear age sixty years ago.'' The bill before this body, proposed by a coalition of Democrats and Republicans--including Chairman Lieberman and ranking member Collins--is an excellent piece of legislation endorsed by many members of the national security community. In my view, it is not strong enough, but it is a tremendous step forward, and I admire the work they have done. I know some of my colleagues have suggestions on how to improve this legislation. I have a few of my own. There is plenty of room for good ideas. Some of them are already on the table. It is my intention for Senators to have an opportunity to have a robust debate on these proposals. Let's stick with what this bill is all about and let's have as many amendments as people feel is appropriate. The national security experts agree we can't afford to waste more time. The question is not whether we should act but whether we will act in time. As I mentioned at the start, we are scheduled to have this vote an hour after we come in tomorrow. I am working with Senator McConnell now to try to arrange a time, perhaps even today. My goal is to get on the bill. I hope we can get on the bill. It would be terrible for our country if we are not on the bill. I would like to get on the bill and have Senators Lieberman, Collins, Rockefeller, Feinstein, and the other committees that are involved come up with a list of amendments as we have done so well on a number of the bills we have worked through. When we come back next week, let's start doing some legislating and have some robust debate, get some of these amendments disposed of, and pass this bill on to the House. The House has done their bill. We can go to conference and get something done. It would be very important for our country.", u"Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here on New Year's Eve. I first wish to make an announcement with respect to the availability of the classified annex to the bill under consideration for the Members of the House. This is to reinforce a previous announcement I made to Members last evening. Madam Speaker, the classified Schedule of Authorizations and the classified annex accompanying the bill remain available for review by Members at the offices of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in room HVC-304 of the Capitol Visitor Center. The committee office will be open during regular business hours for the convenience of any Member who wishes to review this material prior to its consideration by the House. I recommend that Members wishing to review the classified annex contact the committee's director of security to arrange a time and date for that viewing. This will assure the availability of committee staff to assist Members who desire assistance during their review of these classified documents. Madam Speaker, I am pleased that the House is considering this intelligence authorization bill today, the last day of the year. If passed and enacted, this will be our third intelligence authorization bill since I assumed the chairmanship and my friend the gentleman from Maryland became the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee. In May, the House overwhelmingly passed, by a vote of 386-28, an intelligence authorization bill which is the same product as the bill that is before us today. I appreciate the ranking member's hard work on this year's bill and that of our colleagues in the Senate to achieve a bipartisan result between the two Chambers. This is indeed a rare occurrence in this town these days, but this is truly a bipartisan, bicameral product that moves forward when it comes to protecting the United States and putting us in the best national security posture we could imagine. The intelligence authorization bill is vital to ensuring that our intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities they need to do their important work. The intelligence community plays a critical role in the war on terrorism and securing the country from the many threats that we face. The annual authorization bill, which funds U.S. intelligence activities spanning 17 agencies, is also a vital tool for congressional oversight of the intelligence community's classified activities. Effective and aggressive congressional oversight is essential to ensuring the continued success of our intelligence community, and therefore the safety of all citizens of the United States. The current challenging fiscal environment demands the accountability and financial oversight of our classified intelligence programs that can only come with an intelligence authorization bill. The FY 2013 bill sustains our current intelligence capabilities and provides for the development of future capabilities, all while achieving significant savings and ensuring intelligence agencies are being good stewards of our taxpayers' money. This year, the bill is significantly below last year's enacted budget but up modestly from the President's roughly $72 billion budget request for fiscal year 2013. It is also in line with the House budget resolution, which provides for a modest increase of defense activities above the President's budget. The bill's comprehensive classified annex provides detailed guidance on intelligence spending, including adjustments to costly but important programs. The bill funds requirements of the men and women of the intelligence community, both military and civilian, many of whom directly support the war zones and are engaged in other dangerous operations designed to keep Americans safe. It provides oversight and authorization for vital intelligence activities, including the global counterwar on terrorism and efforts by the National Security Agency to defend us from advanced foreign state-sponsored cyberthreats. And I can't tell you enough, Madam Speaker, how in this Chamber we have acted to stand up in the face of a growing cyberthreat not only to government networks but to private networks as well. We have, in a bipartisan way, given the first step on how we stand up our defenses here in the United States to protect us from nation-states like China and Russia--and now Iran--who seek to do us harm using the Internet. We will again aggressively pursue next year, with the help of my ranking member, actions needed, I believe, to protect the United States against what is the largest threat we face that we are not prepared to handle, and that is the growing threat of cyberattack and cyberespionage. Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also a critical, important mission of our intelligence community, and we made sure the resources were available to that end, as well as for global monitoring of foreign militaries and advanced weapons systems and tests, and for research and development of new technology to maintain our intelligence agencies' technological edge. And like the House-passed bill, this bill promotes operating efficiencies in a number of areas, particularly in information technology, the ground processing of satellite data, and the procurement and operation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. The bill holds personnel levels, one of the first and biggest cost drivers, generally at last year's levels. Even so, the bill adds a limited number of new personnel positions for select, high-priority positions, such as FBI surveillance officers to keep watch on terrorists, and personnel for certain other programs that will increase cooperation and training with our foreign partners in the critically important role for our intelligence agencies as we move to protect ourselves from threats all around the world. The bill authorizes increased funding for intelligence collection programs, including increased counterintelligence to thwart foreign spies. It also increases funding for our intelligence community's comparative advantage--cutting-edge research and development. This is an incredibly important investment for the United States. If we are going to continue to lead in the ability to detect before they can do harm to the United States, we have to make the investment in research and development of high-end technological advancement. While I cannot get into the specifics of a lot of these programs, it's important to mention them as we are going through the process each year in conducting oversight of intelligence activities and making funding recommendations that will help the community meet its mission in the most effective, fiscally responsible way. The bipartisan fiscal year 2013 intelligence authorization bill we are considering today preserves and advances national security and is also fiscally responsible. The secrecy that is a necessary part of this country's intelligence work requires that the congressional Intelligence Committees conduct strong and effective oversight on behalf of the American people and even our colleagues here in the House. That strong and effective oversight is impossible, however, without the advancement of these bills. I want to thank all of the members of the committee for their bipartisan effort to find agreement on a bill that saves money and moves forward smartly on protecting the interests of national security for the United States. I want to thank both of the staffs for working together to produce this bill. This truly is a collaborative effort both from staff and Members in this Chamber and in the Senate, proving that you can work in a bipartisan way to accomplish the best interests of the United States and, in this case, particularly when it comes to national security. One final note: I want to congratulate Mrs. Myrick on her years of great service to the Intelligence Committee. She will be leaving us this year. This will be her last authorization bill that she will participate in. I am pleased to see that a provision she championed in May concerning the protection of the United States information technology supply chain is included in this bill. She has done great work in her time with the committee, and she certainly will be missed. She has been a true champion of the national security interests of this country. She is a great friend of mine, and I wish her well in her new endeavors. I thank all who participated. I also want to take this opportunity to thank my chief counsel for celebrating his birthday today on the House floor with us on New Year's Eve day. I appreciate that very much. With that, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"Mr. President, you can see our tone. We need everybody's cooperation, if they have amendments, to bring them to us and also to the leadership which is helping us negotiate which ones will come up, and I think we can get this bill done this week. But I wish to say why getting it done is worthwhile. I want to speak about agriculture, and I wish to speak about some of the content we have, and do it in alphabetical order because it is easier for folks to follow. In agriculture, our amendment makes sure we fund the Food Safety Modernization Act which is not included in the House bill. This is the first major reform of food safety laws in 70 years and is much needed. CDC says 48 million Americans suffer from food-borne illness each year. This morning before I came to the floor, I attended a hearing on the Select Committee on Intelligence that I am a member of. General James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, along with key people from the military, civilian agencies such as FBI Director Mueller, gave us a 30-page report on threats to the United States. One of the things they talked about was the safety of our food supply. We need to make sure we have inspectors on the ground for what might occur through bacteria or what might also be induced. So food safety is a big issue. This amendment is also better at improving clean water to rural communities, and provides 165 rural communities with clean water and waste disposal, creating construction jobs today, and improving community health. I am very well versed in that because, along with Senator Cardin, we represent 2,000 miles of the Chesapeake Bay. We have older communities. We have issues related to wastewater treatment that are not only polluting the Bay but are very difficult to repair because of the very nature of our population--wonderful, patriotic people who don't have a lot of cash to pay a lot of taxes for wastewater. But in helping them, we improve public health and we save the Chesapeake Bay with all its seafood industry. That is just me. But we could go everywhere. Commerce, Justice, Science, that is a subcommittee I chair. Boy, do I like it. Why do I like it? Because it goes to everything we are talking about: about justice, about jobs today and jobs tomorrow. When we look at our Department of Commerce, which should be the point place for American business really promoting private sector initiatives and, most of all, promoting exports--not sending jobs overseas but sending products and services--that is where the trade negotiation goes. This is part of our economic vitality. This is where we have bipartisan agreement. Let's engage in free and open and fair trade. That negotiation staff and so on is funded through our subcommittee. We also want to protect our borders. That is going to be in homeland security. In our justice funding, we fund Federal law enforcement and provide funds to local communities on a competitive basis to put cops on the beat and to give them the appropriate things they need to protect themselves. Let's look at the Byrne grants, the main Federal tool that helps State and local law enforcement. We provide more money. That means more money for body armor, more money for them to learn the latest tips and so on, and stopping the gang threat. It also provides COPS on the Beat grants. Both of those are modest increases over the House funding. When I say modest, do you know what I am talking about? For all that local law enforcement does, we are going to provide $15 million. That is not a lot of money by Washington's terms, but to the local police departments it will be a help. Commerce-Justice also supports innovation. It is in this subcommittee that we fund the National Science Foundation $220 million more than the House. That means we will be able to provide more help to 7,000 scientists and teachers making new discoveries for new products that will lead to new companies and new jobs. This is what we do. We are better than the House also in homeland security. This amendment does more to protect the Nation from cyber warfare. Cyber warfare is one of the greatest threats facing America. Again, in this 30-page report we have on threats, the first five pages were devoted to all of the cyber problems. What kind of cyber problems? Cyber attacks, cyber espionage, and the growing nexus between organized crime and nation states, preventing hacking, stealing our state secrets, our trade secrets and also the human trafficking of children and women, weapons of mass destruction. Where you sell women and children as a commodity across the borders of the world through organized crime and corrupt government officials, you will also sell other kinds of things, including weapons of mass destruction. So this is where we need to fund homeland security, the Department of Defense, the FBI, our contribution to Interpol. All of that is in the bill, and we do better--not a lot better because we are frugal; again, not what we would like to do, but what we must do. Also under homeland security, we make sure we look at that which puts people in harm's way. In my own State, and others, there is the issue of fires. Most fire departments in big cities are run by professionals, but in most rural communities they are run by the great volunteer fire departments. We have a fire grant program that I helped start that trains and equips local firefighters. What we do here is provide more money--$33 million above the House--to help provide those grants, and we also provide additional funds to help State and local fire departments. In the area of compelling human need, I want to talk about the Subcommittee on Education, Labor, and Human Services. This is the subcommittee that funds compelling human need. And what do we do here? We look after childcare development block grants, we support care for 9,000 more children, and we also make sure we adequately fund Head Start by providing modest sums there. In addition, we also provide more money to the National Institutes of Health, $71 billion. But put that into the context that they are going to take a $1.5 billion hit in sequester. I know the Presiding Officer represents a great State, Hawaii. Who wouldn't love Hawaii? But I wish the Presiding Officer would look at Maryland. Not only do we have the wonderful Chesapeake Bay, a Super Bowl championship, but we have other ``super bowl'' winners. They are called the National Institutes of Health, the National Security Agency, the National Weather Agency. Just the other day when I was over at NIH, they told me--and told America through their communications--that NIH's work, working with clinicians and the private-led science sector, has reduced cancer rates in the United States of America by 15 percent in breast cancer, prostate cancer, lung cancer. And it is all those wonderful researchers at the Bethesda campus and in academic centers of excellence all over America. But instead of pinning medals on those people and encouraging young people to come into science, we could end up giving them a pink slip. What are we doing? I not only want to lower cancer rates, but I want to improve and raise the discovery rate. This is what we do in this CR. We are working with them on a bipartisan basis. This is helping American people and giving us products that are approved by FDA that we can sell and ship around the world, particularly to countries that could never do it. So I am all about jobs--jobs today and jobs tomorrow. That is why what we do in transportation, housing, and urban development is also a big step forward. In addition to looking out for the homeless, we provide an additional amount of money for highway and road safety programs, where people actually working with funds going to Governors at the local level--not some shovel-ready gimmick--can identify projects in the pipeline we could generate in construction. We can improve public safety by smart highways. And, literally, we can help get America rolling again; we have a fragile economy. I could go on about this bill, but this is a general outline, and I will talk more about it. I feel very passionate about it because we have squeezed every nickel, we have looked at it very fastidiously to make sure that we are right within our mandated spending cap to assess our national priorities: national security, compelling human needs, how we can help create jobs, look out for the middle class, and make those investments that improve the lives of the American people and generate jobs tomorrow. I think we have a very good bill. I ask everyone's cooperation to get it passed. Mr. President, I yield the floor.", u"Madam President, you have heard me speak to the Democratic caucus and to the press that moving the continuing resolution, or I should call it the continued funding resolution--remember, continuing the funding for fiscal year 2013 to our fiscal New Year's Eve, October 1, is our goal. We don't want a government shutdown, we don't want a government slam-down, lockdown. So we have been working very diligently on a bipartisan basis to fashion the bill that would get 60 votes so we would be filibuster-proof. In the old days, majority ruled. Now it is supermajority. That is not a fight I am going to do here on this bill. My job is to keep the government funded, to work in an open, transparent, bipartisan and hopefully bicameral way. I said this was like the last helicopter leaving a disaster area. I was trying to get the cargo on it to make sure we protected national security. We honored compelling human need, particularly for women and children in the area of education and health care, and we also looked at how we could generate jobs--not in government but government-generated jobs in the private sector, such as transportation, and make important investments in science and technology that come up with the new ideas for the new products that will create jobs in our country and hopefully even for export around the world. That is what I have been trying to do. I also had to give up a lot. I had to give up the funding for ObamaCare. This was not my choice. I know there will be an amendment offered to even defund it further. I happen to believe in what we did with President Obama's health care framework. I liked ending discrimination against women. I liked ending the discrimination against people who have children with preexisting conditions. I liked funding the amendment that provided access for women for mammograms, and for children for early detection and screening. But we could not do it. One of the other things we could not do was we could not add a very modest pay raise for Federal employees. This bill will continue the existing pay rates. It is necessary to avoid a government shutdown for the entire government. Shutting down the government would make a tough situation worse for Federal employees. It would jeopardize our economic recovery. Shutting down the government would threaten the viability of small and medium-size businesses. It would even threaten the safety of our families, our economy, maybe even our country. This is not a happy day for me and it is not a happy day for the millions of people who work diligently for the Federal Government. I have the great honor to represent 130,000 Federal employees--I wish you could tour Maryland with me, the way I have been up to your home State--each one doing important work for the Nation. And who are they, these employees? They are people who work at the National Institutes of Health, finding cures or ways to contain diseases--the next vaccine to help the flu endemic or protect us against a pandemic. They are the civilian employees at the National Security Agency. We employ the largest number of mathematicians in the world. What do they do? They invent the kind of technology that breaks the codes and protects us--now in this whole new cyber domain. They are the people who run the weather satellites. The European model might have done a better job last week than they did, but do you know why? Because we have not had the resources to fund them the way the Europeans have. I have employees at FDA right this very minute at their jobs, looking at medical devices to see if they are safe. Right at this very minute they are working with the private sector, which is bringing them new pharmaceuticals, new biotech and biologics that they could look at to see if they are safe and effective so they could go into clinical practice to help save lives here and be certified by the FDA, which would give us the ability to sell them around the world. We say to them: We know what you are doing, but tough luck; we can't give you a pay raise because we say we have out-of-control spending. I don't think we have out-of-control spending. Do we have to be more frugal? Do we have to be smarter? Do we have to get more value for the dollar? Absolutely. We are onto that. But don't attack Federal employees for the mismanagement of the Federal Government. That is right here. That is what we do. Don't blame them and don't make them pay the price. It is like making the middle class pay the price for more domestic cuts while we protect subsidies to corporate jets. These 130,000 Federal employees help run the Hubbell Space Telescope, more discoveries--the most important telescope since Galileo invented the first one. I can't tell you how bad I feel that we are not at least giving them a .05-percent pay raise. And they are facing sequester, which could mean for many of them a 20-percent pay cut, if they are furloughed. I visited NIH to see what was the impact of sequester. There was Carol Greider from Hopkins. She won the Nobel Prize 2 years ago. We are proud of her. NIH, within a week of my arrival there to meet with them, as I have done so often--they cut cancer rates 15 percent. Instead of pinning medals on them, we say: You don't get a pay raise. We have more important things to do with the money. You are the problem. I don't think they are a problem at all. I think they are part of the solution--coming up with ways to help compelling human needs and creating jobs in our country in life sciences and giving us something to sell overseas. I think it is wrong to keep asking them for more when oil and gas companies make record profits and we don't ask them to give up tax breaks. It is wrong when we can't close one tax loophole that sends jobs overseas. When Senator Murray brings up her bill, I will talk more about these lavish tax earmarks. This is not the time and place. But it is time to say we have to protect our civil service. Senator Rubio just spoke about Egypt and he said they have to be able to govern. It is not enough to just bring down a dictator. That is an excellent point. We have to govern, too. And the hallmark of a democracy is a civil service that has integrity, that is promoted on the basis of meritocracy, that is independent of politics, doing missions that serve the Nation in research, technology, administering programs that help get transportation funding to Governors to build roads, bridges, and fund our pent-up demand for physical infrastructure, and then in human infrastructure--education, health care. That is what a democracy does and you need a civil service that is independent, has integrity and is promoted and hired and so on on the basis of meritocracy. What is the hallmark of a despotic, autocratic government, be they Communist or just plain despots? They are corrupt. You get ahead by taking a bribe, by doing a party favor, by looking the other way, on so many other things where you cannot even open a business or get a permit or so on unless there is a series of tipping fees. You can't get through an airport unless you bribe your way through it. That is what a corrupt, despotic, autocratic government does. But when you visit democracies, the first thing you see is they have a civil service. What is the civil service? Integrity, competency, incorruptible. But we say: Yeah, yeah, you know, we know you have a Ph.D, or we know you are the blue-collar worker who manages the facilities at NIH to keep the lights on so the researchers can do their work. It is those people who help us have a great country, and a country we can be proud of. I hope we resolve this sequester thing, with layoffs and furloughs and potential cuts of 20 percent. I wish we could have at least said one thing to the Federal employees, that we are at least going to give you a .05--a half of 1 percent--pay raise. I didn't like it because I thought it was so skimpy and Spartan. But I will say this. The helicopter could not take off if it was on it. I think this is a terrible mistake. I hope in next year's regular order we can make this up. But I want to say to my Federal employees this was a Draconian choice. Do we try to give you a pay raise that would be important to you? Every penny and every dollar counts. You led the Consumer Protection Agency. You certainly have the reputation, Madam President, of being a real fighter for the consumer, and you were the first in America to do a study that showed people were going bankrupt not because they bought too many Volvos, ate out too much, or lived a life of brie and wine and so on. It was because of medical catastrophes that faced them. You were the first to tell us about that, so you know about family incomes and what makes them and what breaks them. But I say this to you: Thank you for your work. And I want to say to the Federal employees, thank you for your work. I wanted to do it with a modest pay raise, but right now my duty in the situation I find myself in reluctantly is that the way I serve you is to make sure there is no government shutdown. Because you know what. In my heart and in my mind--and as I see how different places function--there is no such thing as a nonessential Federal employee. Everybody at the workplace and who serves the Nation is doing their job with honesty, integrity, meritocracy, and is incorruptible. Let's make sure we honor them. We have to get this bill done. Let's get on the Murray budget and right our economy. Whatever problems we have, don't blame the Federal employees for the decisions made by the Congress to get us in the deficit and debt we are in. They didn't do it, we did it. We should take the pay cut, not them. I yield the floor.", u"On Tuesday at midnight, the Federal Government shut its doors, closed for all but the most essential business concerning national security and the safety of the American people. Mr. President, you know Vermonters, like Americans in every State and town of this country, are frustrated. They are angry and confused. They have seen Congress's inability to do its job and keep the government running. They have seen us pass a budget--we passed a continuing resolution here in the Senate--and a small group in the House of Representatives, a small group of Republicans said: No, we have to have everything we want or nothing. Visual consequences of the shutdown can be found around Washington, where museums and national monuments are barricaded. But it is more than just that. It is more than that. In the States, national parks and national refuges have closed their gates and thousands of Federal offices are shuttered. We heard this morning in the Senate Judiciary Committee from the Director of the National Security Agency, Keith Alexander, that as ``each day goes by, the impact and the jeopardy [of a shutdown] to the safety and security of this country will increase.'' That is true, but the toll of this needless exercise is just beginning to be felt. While some decry Federal spending as though it were some kind of communicable disease, millions of American families--Republicans, Democrats, Independents--rely on government-supported programs that provide the very lifeline keeping them afloat. Key nutrition programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program support 100,000 Vermonters. Another 1,600 children and families benefit from Head Start. They are the ones who are going to create and run our jobs in the next generation. More than 117,000 seniors are enrolled in Medicare, and close to 200,000 Vermonters are enrolled in Medicaid. These Vermonters will continue to receive assistance through the shutdown, but at what pace, when and for how long is uncertain. They do not know how long this is going to continue. The shutdown is hurting in other areas, too. Buyers hoping to purchase a home with a loan from the Federal Housing Administration will be turned away. Can you imagine that ripple effect, when real estate has finally started to pick back up? What they are saying is: oh, the economy; we worry about the economy. They are trying to kill the economy by not letting the Federal Housing Administration work. Our Nation's readiness to respond is threatened. In Vermont alone, 450 technicians in the National Guard were furloughed yesterday, and another 100 were released from active orders. That has a financial effect, of course, but the national security effects are amazing. In Vermont we have a lot of agriculture. For farmers in Vermont requiring assistance from the Department of Agriculture, there is no one in the field and no one in the office; over 200 USDA workers--who, especially at this time of the year, are there to help Vermonters--have been forced to close up shop as a result of the shutdown. WIC, the supplemental food program for pregnant women and young children is 100 percent federally funded; there is only two weeks of funding available in Vermont for the nearly 16,000 participants in the State. We will say in two weeks, sorry, child, or sorry, pregnant woman, we cannot feed you. Can you just wait until we get our act together? We are eating very well, but could you go without food for a few weeks because we have a few more press conferences and a few more photo ops? What will happen to them? Our Republican colleagues in the House will not say. They apparently do not care. Just yesterday, my office heard from one Vermont organization, Rural Edge. With the assistance of the USDA Rural Rental Housing Loan Program, Rural Edge is building much needed affordable rental housing in St. Johnsbury, VT. The time has come for Rural Edge to pay their contractor. They have the money, but nobody is home at USDA's Rural Development office to authorize the payment, and the work is likely to stop. People are apt to be laid off. Winter is going to come, and the time to construct this affordable housing will be lost. This is just one of countless examples of how this needless shutdown has already started to impact my State. Every Senator could tell similar stories. Many Americans think a government shutdown is a Washington, D.C. problem, and that the hundreds of thousands of Federal workers furloughed live in or near the Nation's capital. Nothing could be further from the truth. Federal agencies operate in all 50 States. We know that. More than 40 Federal agencies operate in Vermont, from the Department of Homeland Security, to the U.S. Postal Service, the Veterans Administration to the Department of Defense, the Department of Agriculture to the Department of Justice. These agencies employ over over 7,000 people in my little State alone. Nearly 1,000 of these employees reported to work on Tuesday only to receive a furlough notice. These workers and their families are facing an unnecessary financial hardship, all because a handful of ideologues in Washington have elected to shut the government down rather than come to the table to find an acceptable way to pay our bills and respond to the needs of the American people. These people have families. They have mortgages. They have payments. They have medical expenses. Suddenly, we said: Oh, I am sorry, people; Republicans in the House of Representatives--a small segment of them--are saying, we are making points for our supporters, so tough for you. You are not going to find an acceptable way to pay your bills. We want you to pay your bills; we are just not going to pay ours. Failing to fund the government does not simply mean Federal workers are furloughed and government programs are suspended. No. Revenue streams for the Federal Government also dry up. The Department of Education? Nobody is there to collect on defaulted student loans. The Department of Justice? Civil fraud investigations and litigation, including False Claims Act and fraud cases that bring a lot of money back to the government, are on hold. They are on hold. The Internal Revenue Service? Audits that recoup millions in owed taxes are suspended. Billions of American taxpayers' dollars invested across the country and around the world. A shutdown means no one is home monitoring those investments. After ping-ponging a continuing resolution back and forth, the House of Representatives has now adopted a piecemeal approach to reopening the government, agency by agency. Cherry-picking the parts of the government they want to fund is no way to fulfill our responsibilities to the American people. Come on. If they really care about having the government going, they should pass the appropriations bills and go to conference. Let's do it without being filibustered here by some of their same supporters. Go to conference and vote them up or down. If Republicans in the House were so concerned with staffing our National Parks, they should have passed an Interior appropriations bill which would have funded not only the National Park Service, but also the Environmental Protection Agency, the Forest Service, and other agencies. They did not. If Republicans in the House want to address funding for individual agencies, there is a clear path forward. Let's reopen the government and get to the business of passing and conferencing appropriations bills in regular order. Let's consider the spending bills that include funding for the National Parks and the Smithsonian, but which also include funding for wildfire prevention and clean drinking water. Let's consider spending bills that fund the District of Columbia, along with the Treasury and Federal Judiciary. The Democrats in the Senate have passed a continuing resolution to fund all Federal agencies and would provide us the time needed to consider a path forward over the next 6 weeks. This is a crisis driven by a handful of partisans in the House of Representatives who say: No, we can't do it. Vote after vote, day after day, the Senate has rejected one flawed House proposal after another, and still the House has not voted on the clean continuing resolution passed by the Senate. For a handful of House members, there is no path to compromise to keep our government running. We are elected officials sent here to make decisions--not slogans--on behalf of our constituents. We are sent here to make government work for the American people. This Vermonter, like so many others, is sick and tired of the politics-as-usual approach that has led to this shutdown. Let's come to the table. Let's be grownups and do what we said we ran to do. Let's work together for the good of the American people, reopen the government, and find a responsible and reasonable way to get our fiscal house in order. It's time for each of us to be a leader, not a sloganeer.", u"Mr. President, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, was enacted 35 years ago to limit the government's ability to engage in domestic surveillance operations. In the years since September 11, 2001, Congress has repeatedly expanded the scope of this law to provide the government with broad new powers to gather information about law-abiding Americans. No one underestimates the threat this country continues to face, and we can all agree that the intelligence community should be given necessary and appropriate tools to help keep us safe. But we should also agree that there must be reasonable limits on the surveillance powers we give to the government. That is why I have consistently fought to curtail the sweeping powers contained in the USA PATRIOT Act and FISA Amendments Act, while also bolstering privacy protections and strengthening oversight. And that is why I continue my efforts today by joining with Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner, as well as members of Congress from both political parties, to introduce the bipartisan USA FREEDOM Act of 2013. Over the past several months, Americans have learned that government surveillance programs conducted under FISA are far broader than previously understood. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act has for years been secretly interpreted to authorize the dragnet collection of Americans' phone records on an unprecedented scale, regardless of whether those Americans have any connection to terrorist activities or groups. The American public also learned more about the government's broad collection of Internet data through the use of Section 702 of FISA. And the world has learned that this surveillance has extended to millions of individuals in the global community including some of our allies and their leaders. These revelations have undermined Americans' trust in our intelligence community and harmed our relationships with some of our most important international partners. While I do not condone the manner in which these and other highly classified programs were disclosed, I agree with the Director of National Intelligence that this debate about surveillance needed to happen. It is a debate that some of us in Congress have been engaged in for years. Since this summer, the Judiciary Committee convened two public hearings and a classified briefing with officials from the administration, including the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Deputy Attorney General. As a result of these hearings and the recent declassification of documents by the administration, the public now knows about the repeated and substantial legal and policy violations by the NSA in its implementation of both Section 215 and Section 702. The public now knows that, in addition to collecting phone call metadata on millions of law-abiding Americans, the NSA collected, without a warrant, the contents of tens of thousands of wholly domestic emails of innocent Americans. The NSA also violated a FISA Court order by regularly searching the Section 215 bulk phone records database without meeting the standard imposed by the Court. These repeated violations, which have occurred nearly every year that these programs have been authorized by the FISA Court, led to several reprimands from the FISA Court for what it called ``systemic noncompliance'' by the government. In addition, the Court admonished the government for making a series of substantial misrepresentations to the Court about its activities. The NSA has assured Congress that these problems have been corrected. Yet with each new revelation in the press about new techniques developed by the NSA that intrude into the privacy and everyday lives of Americans, I grow increasingly concerned about the lack of sufficient oversight and accountability. Last week, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Lisa Monaco, stated that the government should only collect data ``because we need it and not just because we can.'' I completely agree--and that is why the government's dragnet collection of phone records should end. The government has not made a compelling case that this program is an effective counterterrorism tool, especially when balanced against the intrusion on Americans' privacy. In fact, both the Director and the Deputy Director of the NSA have testified before the Judiciary Committee that there is no evidence that the Section 215 phone records collection program helped to thwart dozens or even several terrorist plots. It is clear that as the administration has become more open and forthright about these programs, the facts have not matched the rhetoric. It is time for serious and meaningful reforms to FISA in order to restore the confidence of the American people in our intelligence community. Modest transparency and oversight provisions are a good first step, but by themselves they are insufficient to protect the privacy rights and civil liberties of Americans. We must do more. The USA FREEDOM ACT is a legislative solution that comprehensively addresses a range of surveillance authorities contained in FISA. I want to thank Congressman Sensenbrenner for his dedicated work on this bipartisan, bicameral piece of legislation that we are introducing today. We are joined in this effort by members of Congress from both chambers and across the political spectrum, and I want to thank the following Senators for cosponsoring this legislation: Senator Lee, Senator Durbin, Senator Heller, Senator Blumenthal, Senator Murkowski, Senator Hirono, Senator Udall of New Mexico, Senator Begich, Senator Baldwin, Senator Heinrich, Senator Markey, Senator Udall of Colorado, Senator Warren, Senator Merkley, Senator Tester, and Senator Schatz. Our bill will end the dragnet collection of phone records under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act by requiring that only documents or records relevant and material to an investigation may be obtained, and that they have some particular nexus to a specific foreign agent or power. It will also ensure that the FISA pen register statute and National Security Letters cannot be used to authorize similar dragnet collection by applying the same standard. The bill also adds more meaningful judicial review of Section 215 orders and raises the standard for the government to obtain a gag order for every Section 215 order. In addition to stopping the dragnet collection of phone records, our legislation will address privacy concerns related to surveillance conducted under the FISA Amendments Act, which allows the government to gather vast amounts of Internet communications content by foreigners located overseas. Given the technological nature of Internet communications, we must vigilantly protect against the inadvertent collection of the contents of the wholly domestic communications of U.S. persons--something that the NSA acknowledged has happened before. Our bill will place stricter limits on this type of collection, and also require the government to obtain a court order prior to conducting `back door' searches looking for the communications of U.S. persons in databases collected without a warrant under Section 702 of FISA. Finally, the USA FREEDOM Act will require enhanced accountability, transparency, and oversight in the FISA process. Our bill builds on a proposal by Senator Blumenthal to provide for the creation of a Special Advocate who will advocate specifically for the protection of privacy rights and civil liberties before the FISA Court, as well as a process for publicly releasing FISA Court opinions containing significant interpretations of law. Under the bill, public confidence in the government's activities will also be strengthened by more detailed public reporting about the numbers and types of FISA orders that are issued. Importantly, this measure requires new Inspector General reviews and imposes new sunset dates. I have long believed that sunset provisions are an important tool because nothing focuses the attention of Congress or the Executive Branch like the looming chance that a law will end. It is important to note that Section 215, which the government is using to conduct dragnet phone records collection, will expire in June 2015 unless Congress decides otherwise. This bill also shortens the FISA Amendments Act sunset by 2 years, and adds a new sunset for National Security Letters. This aligns all of these FISA sunsets so that Congress can address them comprehensively in 2015, rather than in a piecemeal fashion. These are all commonsense, bipartisan improvements that will ensure appropriate limits are placed on the government's vast surveillance powers. The American people deserve to know how laws governing surveillance authorities are being interpreted and will implicate their personal information and activities. The American people also deserve to know whether these programs have proven sufficiently valuable as counterterrorism tools to justify their extraordinary breadth. This legislation will help to repair that trust deficit by providing enhanced layers of transparency, oversight, and accountability to ensure that we are protecting national security while restoring protections for the privacy rights and civil liberties of law-abiding Americans. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. Chairman, I want to respond to my colleague by saying there is a flaw in the New START Treaty, in my opinion, in that it originally called for reductions in U.S. nuclear forces and allowed Russia to increase its nuclear forces. So that right there I think is a problem. But when you have serial violations by the Russian Federation invading Ukraine, in violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the INF Treaty, and the CFE Treaty, they are not a reliable partner in these treaties. And so to reduce our forces, how can that be in our interest when the other party to the treaty is not someone who is performing on these other treaties? There could be questions on whether they are even fully complying with the New START Treaty. Mr. Chairman, I will enter into the Record an article from The New York Times dated January 29 of this year detailing some of their violations of the INF Treaty. Washington.--The United States informed its NATO allies this month that Russia had tested a new ground-launched cruise missile, raising concerns about Moscow's compliance with a landmark arms control accord. American officials believe Russia began conducting flight tests of the missile as early as 2008. Such tests are prohibited by the treaty banning medium-range missiles that was signed in 1987 by President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader at the time, and that has long been viewed as one of the bedrock accords that brought an end to the Cold War. Beginning in May, Rose Gottemoeller, the State Department's senior arms control official, has repeatedly raised the missile tests with Russian officials, who have responded that they investigated the matter and consider the case to be closed. But Obama administration officials are not yet ready to formally declare the tests of the missile, which has not been deployed, to be a violation of the 1987 treaty. With President Obama pledging to seek deeper cuts in nuclear arms, the State Department has been trying to find a way to resolve the compliance issue, preserve the treaty and keep the door open to future arms control accords. ``The United States never hesitates to raise treaty compliance concerns with Russia, and this issue is no exception,'' Jen Psaki, the State Department spokeswoman, said. ``There's an ongoing review process, and we wouldn't want to speculate or prejudge the outcome.'' Other officials, who asked not to be identified because they were discussing internal deliberations, said there was no question the missile tests ran counter to the treaty and the administration had already shown considerable patience with the Russians. And some members of Congress, who have been briefed on the tests on a classified basis for well over a year, have been pressing the White House for a firmer response. A public dispute over the tests could prove to be a major new irritant in the already difficult relationship between the United States and Russia. In recent months, that relationship has been strained by differences over how to end the fighting in Syria; the temporary asylum granted to Edward J. Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor; and, most recently, the turmoil in Ukraine. The treaty banning the testing, production and possession of medium-range missiles has long been regarded as a major step toward curbing the American and Russian arms race. ``The importance of this treaty transcends numbers,'' Mr. Reagan said during the treaty signing, adding that it underscored the value of ``greater openness in military programs and forces.'' But after President Vladimir V. Putin rose to power and the Russian military began to re-evaluate its strategy, the Kremlin developed second thoughts about the accord. During the administration of President George W. Bush, Sergei B. Ivanov, the Russian defense minister, proposed that the two sides drop the treaty. Though the Cold War was over, he argued that Russia still faced threats from nations on its periphery, including China and potentially Pakistan. But the Bush administration was reluctant to terminate a treaty that NATO nations regarded as a cornerstone of arms control and whose abrogation would have enabled the Russians to increase missile forces directed at the United States' allies in Asia. Since Mr. Obama has been in office, the Russians have insisted they want to keep the agreement. But in the view of American analysts, Russia has also mounted a determined effort to strengthen its nuclear abilities to compensate for the weakness of its conventional, nonnuclear forces. At the same time, in his State of the Union address last year, Mr. Obama vowed to ``seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals,'' a goal American officials at one point hoped might form part of Mr. Obama's legacy. But administration officials and experts outside government say Congress is highly unlikely to approve an agreement mandating more cuts unless the question of Russian compliance with the medium-range treaty is resolved. ``If the Russian government has made a considered decision to field a prohibited system,'' Franklin C. Miller, a former defense official at the White House and the Pentagon, said, ``then it is the strongest indication to date that they are not interested in pursuing any arms control, at least through the remainder of President Obama's term.'' It took years for American intelligence to gather information on Russia's new missile system, but by the end of 2011, officials say it was clear that there was a compliance concern. There have been repeated rumors over the last year that Russia may have violated some of the provisions of the 1987 treaty. But the nature of that violation has not previously been disclosed, and some news reports have focused on the wrong system: a new two-stage missile called the RS-26. The Russians have flight-tested it at medium range, according to intelligence assessments, and the prevailing view among Western officials is that it is intended to help fill the gap in Russia's medium-range missile capabilities that resulted from the 1987 treaty. The treaty defines medium-range missiles as ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles capable of flying 300 to 3,400 miles. But because Russia has conducted a small number of tests of the RS-26 at intercontinental range, it technically qualifies as a long-range system and will be counted under the treaty known as New Start, which was negotiated by the Obama administration. So it is generally considered by Western officials to be a circumvention, but not a violation, of the 1987 treaty One member of Congress who was said to have raised concerns that the suspected arms control violation might endanger future arms control efforts was John Kerry. As a senator and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, he received a classified briefing on the matter in November 2012 that dealt with compliance concerns, according to a report in The Daily Beast. As secretary of state, Mr. Kerry has not raised concerns over the cruise missile tests with his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov, but he has emphasized the importance of complying with arms accords, a State Department official said. Republican lawmakers, however, have urged the administration to be more aggressive. ``Briefings provided by your administration have agreed with our assessment that Russian actions are serious and troubling, but have failed to offer any assurance of any concrete action to address these Russian actions,'' Representative Howard McKeon, Republican of California and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Mike Rogers, the Michigan Republican who leads the Intelligence Committee, said in an April letter to Mr. Obama. And Senator Jim Risch, Republican of Idaho, and 16 other Republican senators recently proposed legislation that would require the White House to report to Congress on what intelligence the United States has shared with NATO allies on suspected violations of the 1987 treaty. Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have also cited the issue in holding up Ms. Gottemoeller's confirmation as under secretary of state for arms control and international security. It was against this backdrop that the so-called deputies committee, an interagency panel led by Antony Blinken, Mr. Obama's deputy national security adviser, decided that Ms. Gottemoeller should inform NATO's 28 members about the compliance issue. On Jan. 17, Ms. Gottemoeller discussed the missile tests in a closed-door meeting of NATO's Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee that she led in Brussels. The Obama administration, she said, had not given up on diplomacy. There are precedents for working out disputes over arms control complaints, and Ms. Gottemoeller said American officials would continue to engage the Russians to try to resolve the controversy. But even with the best of intentions, establishing what the Russians are doing may not be easy. The elaborate network of verification provisions created under the medium-range missile treaty is no longer in effect, since all the missiles that were believed to be covered by the agreement were long thought to have been destroyed by May 1991.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA FREEDOM Act, and I yield myself as much time as I may consume. On May 8, the House Intelligence Committee passed out of the committee the bipartisan USA FREEDOM Act, the identical bill that the Judiciary Committee passed out of committee on May 7. I especially want to thank Chairman Rogers for his years of leadership on the House Intelligence Committee. I also want to thank Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers, and also Congressman Sensenbrenner and the staff of our Intelligence and Judiciary Committees for the hard work they did on this bill. We have worked together in a bipartisan manner, and we have come a long way. After our committee markups, Chairman Rogers and I have continued to work with the Judiciary Committee and the administration to iron out some remaining issues, which we have done and which is represented in the current bill. The bill represents the productive efforts of bipartisanship and working together for the American people. Just yesterday, the administration stated that it ``strongly supports'' passage of our bill. Again, the administration said that it ``strongly supports'' passage of our bill. It also stated that the USA FREEDOM Act ``ensures our intelligence and law enforcement professionals have the authorities they need to protect the Nation, while further ensuring that individuals' privacy is appropriately protected.'' The USA FREEDOM Act contains important measures to increase transparency and enhance privacy while maintaining an important national security tool. First, we have ended bulk collection of telephone metadata and ensured the court reviews each and every search application. The big database up at the National Security Agency that contains phone numbers of millions of Americans will go away. It will be replaced with a tailored, narrow process that allows the government to search only for specific connections to suspected terrorists to keep us safe here at home. There is an important emergency exception when there isn't time to get prior approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, also know as FISC. Second, we have required expanded reporting for court decisions to improve transparency without threatening sources and methods. Third, we are creating an advocate to provide outside expertise for significant matters before the FISA Court. Fourth, we have established a declassification review process of court opinions to ensure the public has access to our national security legal rulings in a manner that still protects our sources and methods. The USA FREEDOM Act is critical to our country's safety and our intelligence community. It is a focused, logical bill that will let us protect our citizens from terrorist attacks through important legal tools while strengthening civil liberties. I was opposed to the original USA FREEDOM Act because it set too high a standard for intelligence collection. In short, it would have threatened America's safety by cutting off the building blocks of foreign intelligence investigations. We have worked together in a bipartisan manner and created a solid bill. Now, it ends bulk collection of all metadata by the government. Those that say this bill will legalize bulk collection are wrong. They are trying to scare you by making you think there are monsters under the bed. There aren't. We end all collection of metadata records. I am again saying read the bill. That is what the bill says. There is nothing else in the bill. It is direct, and it states that we will end all bulk collection by the government. The USA FREEDOM Act includes the necessary checks and balances across all three branches of government. It protects our Nation while also protecting Americans' privacy and civil liberties. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the bill. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA FREEDOM Act. I yield myself as much time as I may consume. On May 8th, the House Intelligence Committee favorably reported the bipartisan USA FREEDOM Act--the same bill that the Judiciary Committee favorably reported on May 7th. I especially want to thank Chairman Rogers for his years of leadership here on the House Intelligence Committee. I also want to thank Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers, and the staff of our Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. We have worked together in a bipartisan manner, and we have come a long way. After our Committee markups, Chairman Rogers and I have continued to work with the Judiciary Committee and the Administration to iron out some remaining issues, which we have done, and which is represented in the current bill. This bill represents the productive efforts of bipartisanship and working together for the American people. Just yesterday, the Administration stated that it ``strongly supports'' passage of our bill. As the Administration further stated, our bill ``ensures our intelligence and law enforcement professionals have the authorities they need to protect the Nation, while further ensuring that individuals' privacy is appropriately protected when these authorities are employed.'' The USA FREEDOM Act contains important measures to increase transparency and enhance privacy while maintaining an important national security tool. First, we have ended bulk collection of telephone metadata. ``Bulk'' collection means the/indiscriminate acquisition of information or tangible things. It does not mean the acquisition of a large number of communications records or other tangible things. Rather, the prohibition applies to the use of these authorities to engage in indiscriminate or ``bulk'' data collection. There is also an emergency exception when there isn't time to get prior approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court--also known as the FISC. Second, we have required expanded reporting for FISC decisions to improve transparency to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees without threatening sources and methods. Third, we are creating an advocate to provide the FISC with outside expertise for matters before the FISA Court. Importantly, we are doing this without infringing on any constitutional provisions or operational processes. Fourth, we have established a declassification review process of FISC opinions, to ensure that the public has access to our national security legal rulings, while having procedures in place to ensure that our sources and methods continue to be protected. The USA FREEDOM Act is critical to our Intelligence Community and to our country's safety. It is a focused, logical bill that will let us protect our citizens from terrorist attacks and protect their civil liberties while maintaining important legal tools. For instance, our bill is not intended to impact the current scope or use of FISA or National Security Letters, outside the context of bulk data collection, that are traditionally used for national security investigations. Notably, the introduction of the term ``specific selection term'' is not intended to limit the types of information and tangible things that the government is currently able to collect under FISA or National Security Letter statutes. These changes are prophylactic and intended to respond to concerns that these authorities could be used to permit bulk data collection. Furthermore, the legislation is not intended to limit the government to use a single ``specific selection term'' in an application under FISA or a National Security Letter. The government may use multiple ``specific selection terms'' in a single FISA application or a National Security Letter. For example, the government may request in a single FISA application or National Security Letter information or tangible things relating to multiple persons, entities, accounts, addresses or devices that are relevant to a pending investigation. Similarly, the government may, in a single FISA application or National Security Letter, use multiple ``specific selection terms''--such a date and premises--to further narrow the scope of production by a provider. Our bill also ensures that America can protect Americans' privacy interests while at the same time being able to adapt to evolving national security threats and terrorists' use of ever-changing technology and capabilities to evade detection. In particular, Section 501(c)(2)(F)(iii) provides for two hops--in other words, the Government will be able to obtain the call detail records in direct contact with a reasonable, articulable suspicion (or, RAS)-approved seed--this is the first hop--and then, using those call detail records or ones the Government identifies itself, obtain the second hop call detail records. The legislation also creates a new mechanism for obtaining call detail records on a continuing basis for up to 180 days when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the records are relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism and there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the records are associated with a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power. The legislation is not intended to affect any current uses of Section 501 outside the bulk collection context, including the use of Section 501 to obtain specified call detail records related to foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person, clandestine intelligence activities, or international terrorism. I believe that our bill has made real improvements in the way our intelligence collection operates and in improving FISA to achieve even greater privacy and civil liberties protections. I was opposed to the original USA FREEDOM Act because it put up too many legal hurdles that would have impeded our national security. In short, it would have threatened America's safety by effectively cutting off the building blocks of foreign intelligence investigations. But we have worked together in a bipartisan manner, and we have come a long way Additionally, since our Committee markups, Chairman Rogers and I have continued to work with the Judiciary Committee and the Administration to iron out some remaining issues, which we have done, and which is represented in the current bill. The USA FREEDOM Act includes the necessary checks and balances across all three branches of government and strikes the correct balance that is so critical to protecting our nation, while also protecting Americans' privacy and civil liberties.", u"Mr. Speaker, I appreciate what the gentleman has just said about those challenges and threats, along with the undermining of our national security, but it is further at risk this week by our own hand; that is, the Congress of the United States. The Department of Homeland Security will not be funded. There are 230,000 people who work at that Department, and 30,000 of them, mostly administrative personnel, will be laid off. The others, known as critically important--essential employees who are on the front line--will work, but they won't get paid. We can lament what others have done to undermine our national security and share--I think in a bipartisan way--the conclusion that we ought not to further those enterprises, but as I said, Mr. Speaker, by our own hand we are about to shut down the Department of Homeland Security. We have but 4 days to pass a bill continuing its funding. I will say with all due respect, Mr. Speaker, to my friends on the other side of the aisle, shutting down the government is a strategy they have employed on a number of occasions. In 1995, we shut it down twice, for almost a month, maybe a little longer. Just a few months ago, we shut it down again as a strategy--not as a happenstance, but as a strategy. Again, Mr. Speaker, there are those who are saying in this House: Well, it won't matter if we shut down the Department of Homeland Security. Some of the folks are funded on fees, others will be required to work anyway, so let's just keep playing this Russian roulette with America's security and the safety of Americans. Mr. Speaker, we are approaching the eleventh hour, and the House has not yet been given the opportunity to vote on a bill that, essentially, was agreed to by the Republican Appropriations Committee and reported to this floor, and we essentially passed it, but we passed it for a short period of time. There was no debate on funding levels, Mr. Speaker. There was no debate on whether this provision and that provision should or should not be in the bill. We passed it. Then the Republicans, Mr. Speaker, to accomplish another objective, have done what they said in the pledge to America they would not do, and that is put two different issues in the same bill. Well, they have put a poison pill in this bill. If we fail to act and send the President a bill he can and will sign, a bill free from partisan policy riders, then thousands of our Homeland Security agents will be furloughed, and almost--as I said--200,000 others will be forced to work without pay. Is that what America has come to? Surely not--the impact on our border security, law enforcement, and homeland security will be serious and make our country more vulnerable to threats. I came to the rostrum after a gentleman on the other side of the aisle correctly expressed concerns about the threats that confront us. I would hope he would join me in advocating and urging the Republican leadership to bring to the floor a clean--and by clean, I simply mean a bill on which both parties have essentially agreed. Chairman Mike McCaul, the Republican who leads the House Committee on Homeland Security said yesterday--Mr. Speaker, this is the Republican chairman of the Homeland Security Committee: ``I fully believe we should not be playing politics with the national security agency like the Department of Homeland Security, particularly given the high threat environment that we're in right now.'' What American would say it makes sense to play politics with Homeland Security in light of what the gentleman has just referenced and which all of us know to be the case? We have people who want to harm us as a people and as a nation. Mr. Speaker, this body has a responsibility to the American people to do everything we can to make them as secure as we can and to make our country as secure as we can. Senator Lindsey Graham, with whom I served in this body who now represents South Carolina and is a Republican Member of the Senate and an expert on national security, he told his Republican colleagues this--and, again, I quote: ``The worst possible outcome for this Nation is to defund the Department of Homeland Security, given the multiple threats we face to our homeland, and I will not be part of it.'' None of us ought to be part of it. 435 of us ought to vote to fund the Homeland Security Department starting on Friday. I urge the Republican majority to heed this advice of Mr. McCaul, of Mr. Graham, and, frankly, countless other Republicans in the Senate and some in the House to do the responsible thing and let this House work its will on the single subject of our national security. If a clean Homeland Security appropriation bill were to come to the floor, I am confident--and I tell my friend and the majority leader, Mr. Speaker, every Democrat will vote for it. We are 188 strong. Surely, there are 30 responsible Republicans who care more about our national security than their politics who would join us in voting for that bill--I am confident of that--many more, I think, than 30, but at least 30 would be needed, with 188, to get to the 218, and we would fund the Department of Homeland Security, and we could do it tomorrow. We could probably do it today by unanimous consent--well, no, I don't think we could do it by unanimous consent because there are some who continue to play politics with our national security. If the majority is dissatisfied with our immigration policy which they articulate and legitimately can have an alternative view to express and to try to enact, that is the democratic process. Offer a bill to change that which they do not like, not hold hostage the Department of Homeland Security until hopefully, from their standpoint, the President is bludgeoned into signing a bill that he does not agree with and he does not believe is good for our country and believes is bad for our economy. If the majority is dissatisfied, bring a bill to the floor. Former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, also a Republican with whom I have served when he was a Representative from Pennsylvania, subsequently the Governor of Pennsylvania and then our first Secretary of Homeland Security, I want to quote him as well as I have quoted the other two Republicans that I have quoted. ``Political folly'' and ``bad policy,'' that is Tom Ridge, former Republican Governor and mentioned for President. He went on to say: ``I think the political repercussions could be severe. And, on top of that, the men and women of Homeland Security deserve better.'' Who wants to work for an employer that simply takes them hostage every few months and says to them: You may or may not get paid, you may or may not be able to come to work, you may or may not be able to do your job. It depends upon whether or not our political ends are served. I urge Republican leaders to keep the pledge they made to the American people to consider issues one at a time. Bring a comprehensive immigration reform bill. If you don't like what the President has done, bring a bill that changes that. We have the power to do that. Do it. We can work in a bipartisan way to change our immigration policies through legislation and fix what everybody in this body believes is a broken system. Bring a clean appropriation bill to the floor to fund the Department of Homeland Security, and then, as well, bring a bill to the floor on comprehensive immigration reform or the bill that our Republican friends think is the appropriate bill to fix a broken system, and we will vote and debate on that. But let the Department of Homeland Security do its job for America, for Americans. Let's exercise responsible, adult legislating this time.", u"Mr. President, at the end of this month, Republicans will have been in charge of the Senate for almost half a year. After all of this time, what have they done to address issues facing the middle class? Zero. Let's take a quick look at what the Republican leadership has achieved this year. The Keystone Pipeline legislation took a month, a bill that was nothing more than a favor for billionaires and special interests. It would allow foreign oil to be imported into the United States to be shipped to foreign countries. It has spent almost another month on the shutdown of the Department of Homeland Security--the shutdown of the Department of Homeland Security--during a time when ISIS is raging and all the other problems around the world, and they--the Republicans--want to shut down the Federal Government as it relates to Homeland Security. We spent 3 weeks on a senseless delay over funding for victims of human trafficking, over an abortion issue that had nothing to do with human trafficking. I would respond to my friend, the majority leader, we would have passed this last Congress, except that they objected to it--short memory, I think. Now, here we are spending the last week considering trade legislation that has done nothing--nothing, not a single thing--to help working middle-class Americans. In fact, it causes huge job losses. As Einstein said, if you keep doing the same thing over and over again and you expect a different result, that is the definition of insanity. We can look at these trade bills over the years. Every one of them, without exception, causes job losses to American workers, millions of job losses. Yet they are going to try the same thing again and hope for a different result. That is insanity. If the Senate is not actively advocating for the well-being of middle-class Americans, we are wasting our time. When the Republicans took over the Senate, the majority leader promised to make the needs of Americans a priority. Here is what he said last November: ``Under a new majority, our focus would be on passing legislation that improves the economy, that makes it easier for Americans to find jobs, and that helps restore Americans' confidence in their country and their government.'' Why then have we not moved toward legislation that makes it easier for Americans to find jobs or reforms that help us restore Americans' confidence in their government? A few months after November--actually the beginning of this year--the majority leader reiterated a call for commonsense legislation that puts the middle class first. He said: ``Let's pass legislation that focuses on jobs and the real concerns of the middle class.'' But, again, what have the Senate Republicans done? They have stopped any effort made to help the middle class, whether it is minimum wage, equal pay for men and women, student debt, and on and on with things that would help the middle class. They have been ignored. We should be focusing on making it easier for Americans to find jobs, addressing the needs of the middle class and restoring Americans' faith in our government. It is not enough for the majority leader to mouth these words that he supports jobs. His agenda must reflect it, as well. But it does not. It does not do anything to help job creation. If we want to create jobs, why don't we do something with infrastructure, the surface transportation bill? To his credit, the Presiding Officer has an idea regarding how that should be paid for. I have worked with him and, whether his idea and my idea are perfect, at least it is an effort to figure out some way to do something about jobs. Jobs--we have to do something about surface transportation. Some 50 percent of America's roads are in disrepair, and 64,000 bridges are structurally deficient. Our railroad systems are outdated, and we know that recently from the headlines we have seen with that devastating accident in Pennsylvania. Instead of working with Democrats to provide adequate, long-term investment into our country's surface transportation, Republicans are advocating for short-term fix after short-term fix. Repairing our Nation's roads and bridges through long-term investments could provide thousands of jobs for Americans. If the Republican leader truly has the interests of the middle class at heart, he should be leading the charge for these investments, but he is leading the charge against them. Today, the Senate will resume consideration of the trade legislation. Because of Senate Democrats, that trade legislation includes vital programs that help America's workers retrain and find new employment if they lose their jobs because of foreign trade. And they are going to lose jobs. Even though a majority of the Senators don't support this trade legislation, we have tried hard to improve it, and this trade adjustment assistance is one way we can try to improve it. What was the Republican's first amendment to the trade bill? It was an amendment to strike a program known as trade adjustment assistance, which I just talked about, from the bill. This program helps those who lose their jobs because of trade. And they will lose their jobs. As we talk about opening foreign markets to American products, surely we should do something so that American companies have the tools to compete internationally. The Export-Import Bank is weeks away from expiring. If it expires, financing for billions of dollars of U.S. exports will disappear and thousands of American jobs will be in jeopardy. How much does it cost? Nothing. Zero. It is an ideological mindset that the Republicans have--they don't like government programs. We are losing internationally. We are losing trade. I don't think anyone can call the Boeing Company a leftwing liberal group, as the Republican leader refers to people who are complaining about what is going on here. Boeing thinks something should be done with the Export-Import Bank. Why? Because they can compete with Airbus and all of these other companies that build airplanes. If we don't have the Bank, they cannot compete. Mr. President, I could pick any State of the 50--I was given here this morning the State of Virginia because the State of Virginia was mentioned in some of the remarks by the Republican leader. I have page after page--millions and millions of dollars that benefit businesses in Virginia. It is the same all over the country--in Nevada, Kentucky, everyplace. We have talked about trade that won't work. Let's talk about the Export-Import Bank, which does work. I so admire and appreciate the persistence and advocacy of the Senator from Washington, Ms. Cantwell. But for her, this issue would be lost. It would be gone with all the other stuff that goes into the trash can because of the Republicans. The Republican leader has said over and over again that he is opposed to the Bank. Well, that is too bad. The American people certainly support it and American businesses support it. Last year, this vital program sustained 165,000 jobs at no cost to the taxpayers. If we don't reauthorize this program, American businesses will be at a competitive disadvantage. While the majority leader talks about restoring faith in government, he is standing in the way of reforming the National Security Agency's illegal spying program. I did not make up the words ``illegal spying program''; the Second Circuit Court said it. It is an illegal program. These are just a few areas where renewed focus would create jobs and produce positive outcomes for middle-class Americans. The Republican leader should revisit his vision, which up to this point has only been words. There has been no action. The direction this Congress has taken so far has only focused on the desires of a few at the expense of many. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the numbers I referred to from the State of Virginia be printed in the Record.", u"Madam President, during a debate about strategy on how to defeat al-Qaida, goal No. 1 should be figuring out their plans. What are their tactics and targets? How do we do this? We use our technological advantages to get this information. That is what the FISA modernization bill allows us to do. The Congress has been working on FISA modernization since April 2007--over 300 days ago. But I guess 300 days is not enough time for a bill of this magnitude, right? But wait, the Constitution of the United States has written in only about 115 days, and that included travel time on horseback for the Founding Fathers. So the entire Constitution of the United States was written in one-third of the time we have spent on FISA modernization. Congress has plenty of time and has had plenty of time to debate this issue. Given that the executive strategy in this instance is paramount, the next President's decision, whoever that may be, will be critical. Like many people, I have watched many of the Presidential debates. One thing amazes me: Out of at least 32 debates and forums, the candidates have yet to receive one question on FISA, the most important piece of legislation certainly in the last number of years and certainly in this Congress. There has not been not one question on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and what we are trying to do here. So we are continuing to talk about the most important bill in the entire 110th Congress, which is apparently not important enough to come up during over 50 hours of discussion with our next Commander in Chief. I did hear an interesting comment during the most recent debate. A decision to utilize military strikes to kill al-Qaida in Pakistan was seemingly supported. That is the irony of this situation. It is OK if we kill terrorists overseas with missiles, but we cannot listen to the phone calls of new terrorists without demonstrating ``probable cause.'' We have to ask what probable cause is and why it exists at all. That will tell us to whom it belongs. Probable cause is a check on Government power rooted in the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. Who may claim such due process protection under the Constitution of the United States? U.S. citizens, not foreign citizens overseas. We are constantly hearing from the leadership in Congress about the need to ``bring people together.'' Yet, at every turn, they seem to be willing to set aside bipartisanship in favor of the preferred policies--in favor of preferred policies of extreme political organizations. If Democrats really want to change the tone in Washington, they are going to have to, at some point, say no to the more radical elements of their base. With the current stalemate on FISA modernization legislation, we have seen both political parties blaming each other for the delay. We have heard notions that we are not in danger due to the lapse of the Protect America Act. While our opinions on this issue will remain in bitter disagreement, the solution to these problems is quite easy. In fact, it should take about 15 minutes to solve this problem. Here is the answer, and it is just four words: Let the House vote. That is it. It doesn't take a genius to come up with a solution. All of the disputes will go away, and the bipartisan majority of the House will approve the bill if given a chance to do so. Is this a novel concept? The House of Representatives has been voting on bills since 1789--over 219 years ago. Will we ever be in a situation as complicated as this again, where the solution to every problem is allowing our elected officials to vote? Back on December 17, on this very floor, I asked one of my Democratic colleagues if he agreed with me that should the FISA bill pass, it would be one of the best examples of bipartisanship in the whole 110th Congress and maybe in the history of this body. He agreed with this notion. Months later, this worthy goal came to fruition in the Senate. As we all know, the Senate approved a FISA modernization bill by a bipartisan supermajority vote, a veto-proof margin. Senators from both sides of the aisle engaged in lengthy and informative debate and came together to pass a bill that met the goals of modernizing FISA. This rare demonstration of unity came to a crashing halt on February 14. Rather than allow a bipartisan majority of the House to vote on and pass this bill, the House leadership refused to allow a vote on this bill. The House spent its last legislative day, before their weeklong recess period, debating and voting on a contempt resolution to further a partisan fishing expedition that has led to no credible evidence of wrongdoing. House Democrats had been sitting on these resolutions since July, for over 201 days. Yet they determined that they were so important that they superseded the needs of our intelligence community and the needs of protecting the American public. So a bipartisan majority of the House was ready and eager to vote on this bill and was prohibited from voting on this bill. While numerous lawmakers stated they would stay in Washington--including me--for as long as it took to get this bill passed, the leadership from the House forced them to go on vacation. So they were prohibited from voting on a bipartisan bill to protect our country but were mandated to take a recess period. You want to stay and vote on this bill? Too bad. We would rather you take some time off. Go back to your districts and take a break. Don't worry about our intelligence community. They have all the tools they need. That is what the House Members heard. These Representatives did not need to be patronized; they needed to be given a chance to vote. The Attorney General, the chief law enforcement official of the United States, and the Director of National Intelligence, the person who is responsible for our intelligence in this country, say that the lapse of the Protect America Act caused us to miss information. These officials have more institutional knowledge on this topic than anyone in either body, and they dispute the notions that ``the intelligence community has everything it needs.'' With all due respect to all of us who serve as politicians, I am going to trust in the expertise of the Attorney General and DNI over the assurances of politicians in an election year. So why doesn't the House leadership allow a vote on this bill? Could it be because they know it will pass, which it would? But we cannot have that. Heaven forbid, democracy would be free to run its course. So rather than vote on this bill, we are hearing that the House leadership wants to conference this bill. Conferences are about resolving disagreements between the Chambers. But remember, a bipartisan majority from both Chambers has no disagreements on this bill. There are no disagreements to resolve between the majority of the Senate and the House. So a conference is entirely inappropriate in this situation. I have also heard an argument that the House needs more time to review the immunity provision--the immunity that would protect these companies that patriotically cooperated with us in collecting the information that protected American citizens, which are now being sued in 40 different lawsuits for hundreds of billions of dollars. I want to make sure everybody is perfectly aware that the immunity provision has been publicly available and unaltered for 133 days. It has not been hidden. It has been available to everybody in Congress. It has been available to the world on the Web site of the Senate Intelligence Committee. It only takes about 3 minutes to read it. It should not take 133 days to analyze it, while putting our American public at risk. I am also amazed at the false descriptions floating around about the terrorist surveillance program, TSP, which is the program the President described on December 17, 2005, during a radio address. We have all heard the terms: the warrantless wiretapping, domestic spying, or eavesdropping bill. The list goes on. Let's look at what the President actually said during his radio address on December 17, 2005: In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our Nation, I authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution, to intercept the international communications of people with known links to al-Qaida and related terrorist organizations. Before we intercept these communications, the Government must have information that establishes a clear link to these terrorist networks. I don't see anything in this statement about domestic spying. I thought the definition of the word domestic was pretty clear. If the program intercepted communications in which at least one party was overseas, not to mention a member of al-Qaida, then it seems fairly obvious that the calls were not domestic. Look at this chart. Is this such a hard concept to grasp? The last time I flew overseas, I didn't fly on a domestic flight, I flew on an international flight. And there is a big difference between domestic calls and international calls. My last phone bill showed a big difference between the price of the two. Is it a domestic call when a foreign terrorist calls someone in our country or someone in our country involved in terrorism calls a terrorist in a foreign country? ``Domestic spying'' may sound catchy and mysterious, but it is a completely inaccurate way to describe the terrorist surveillance program or the FISA modernization bill. Why don't we describe them as we should: international spying. Isn't that a more accurate description? I guess accurate descriptions take a back seat to terms which incite fear and distrust in our Government. What about ``warrantless wiretapping,'' doesn't this sound like a bad thing? Perhaps we should read the fourth amendment to the Constitution. Notice that not all searches require a warrant. Every member of the public who is up in the galleries watching us today went through a warrantless search to get into this building. Every time an American comes into the United States at the border, they go through a highly intrusive warrantless search. Every time an American gets on a plane, they go through a warrantless search. Every time an American goes to see a rally or speech from the President of the United States, thus exercising their first amendment rights, they go through a warrantless search. And there is good reason for it. Remember, foreign citizens overseas receive no protection from the fourth amendment. So ``warrantless wiretapping'' in this instance is perfectly constitutional. In addition, look at what the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the highest court to look into this issue, previously said. This is 310 F3rd 717, FISA Court of Review in 2002. It is called In re: Sealed Case: The Truong court, as did all the other courts to have decided the issue, held that the President did have inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information. . . .We take for granted that the President does have that authority and, assuming that is so, FISA could not encroach on the President's constitutional power. That is one of the few formal cases out of the FISA Court. Given the staggering amount of misinformation in the public, how many people have incorrectly stated that the Government can listen to all of their phone calls, read all of their e-mails, spy on American families overseas, even spy on our own military members overseas? How many of these false representations have been made by my colleagues and by others? These accusations are completely false and are meant to incite fear of nonpolitical intelligence analysts who serve regardless of whom the President is. Isn't that the real fear mongering? Terrorists killed 3,000 Americans on September 11 and killed hundreds of other people in Madrid, London, Bali, and Kenya. They have sworn to kill more. They have said that ``the streets of America shall run red with blood, casualties will be too many to count, and the next wave of attacks may come at any moment.'' These terrorists recently called for the President of the United States to be ``received not with roses and applause, but with bombs and booby traps'' during a recent Presidential trip overseas. So they wish death on all Americans and they threaten the assassination of the President of the United States. Yet if we acknowledge their threats, if we try to prepare for these attacks, we are accused of the politics of fear. But there is no problem when numerous individuals completely misrepresent how our Government protects our country. Nobody is calling these tactics ``fear mongering,'' so is it perfectly acceptable to question the integrity of thousands of Americans who have taken an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States and who have dedicated their lives to preventing our great Nation from suffering these terrorist attacks? I am sorry to break it to people, but our intelligence analysts have more important things to do than look at someone's eBay transactions and listen to phone calls from the Jones family on their family vacation in Italy. I guess I shouldn't be surprised by these conspiracy theories, given the vocal lunacy expounded by those who think the September 11 attacks were an ``inside job.'' The FISA modernization bill should be the best example of how meaningful legislation becomes enacted. This bill passed by a veto-proof majority in the Senate. It came out of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on which I serve, 13 to 2. It was bipartisan. It is supported by the intelligence community, and it has the support of the executive branch. Isn't this about as good as it gets? When a bill has support from all these elements, there is no excuse for it being held up. The House leadership has indicated it intends to unveil a ``compromise'' FISA bill. Apparently, House Democrats are using an unconventional definition of the word ``compromise.'' What would they call the Senate bill? We went through months of hearings in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence asking about pros and cons, asked thousand of questions, met with the top people in all fields, were read into the program, went out to the National Security Agency to look at these programs. What do they call the Senate bill? No one, not the administration or anyone in the Senate, got everything they wanted with the Senate bill. It is a compromise. Is it everything I want? No. Are there things in there I wish we did not put in there? Yes. But it is a compromise, and I voted for it. All sides had to make concessions before a final solution was reached 13 to 2 in the committee and it was bipartisan, 68 to 29 in the Senate--bipartisan. That is precisely what the compromise is all about. I simply do not follow the logic of rejecting a bipartisan result, which is what we already have, in favor of a more partisan solution and calling it a ``compromise.'' I can only assume that when House Democrats say ``compromise,'' they mean something else--capitulation. I don't intend to capitulate on this issue. I hope the Representatives in the House who share my view will weigh in with the House leadership and other Democrats who have been holding this up to the detriment of the citizens of the United States of America. I have been to this floor countless times to discuss FISA modernization, and I will continue to do so. I will continue to fight for this cause because it is the right thing to do and especially since so many in both parties have come together to support the Senate bill and would support it in the House if the chance was given. Madam President, we are still in the month of February. We should be doing our work here in the Senate. We should be working toward legitimate, bipartisan agreements on the issues that matter most to Americans. That is what our constituents sent us here to do. Of course, in an election year, particularly a Presidential election year, we unfortunately slide into a silly season where very little gets done. Instead of listening to each other and trying to come up with commonsense solutions, there is a temptation to use the Senate as an arena to make one's opponents look bad. Usually the flowers of that silly season do not bloom until the summer. We are still in the month of February! We need to be getting the work of the American people done. We are in a time of legitimate economic distress. There are very different ideas about how to deal with this economic slowdown. There is nothing wrong with this difference of opinion. The majority seems to think that the principal way to deal with an economic challenge is to spend money. To be clearer, they think that the answer is to spend taxpayer money. And make no mistake, if there is not enough taxpayer money to go around, the solution to an economic slowdown for the majority is to raise taxes. Conservatives have a slightly different understanding of what it takes to get the economy running again. When the companies that Americans work for are loathe to invest, it hurts employees. When they don't invest, these companies do not create jobs. And when the economy is weak, it makes it more difficult for an entrepreneurial American to take the risks necessary and obtain the credit to start new businesses that will employ the people in his community. So conservatives think we should do more to encourage business investment and capital formation. Both sides want to do what they can to get the economy humming. And both sides think there are different ways to accomplish this. Sounds like an opportunity for compromise to me! But I think that some of my colleagues are more interested in an issue than a solution. We should not elevate politics above solutions. Congress needs to come together. Conservatives believe that their policies will work effectively to help the economy and the families that depend on good jobs and economic growth. We are not asking much. We are simply asking that our ideas be taken seriously. And we should be. Even in the most liberal of States, Members of this body have many conservative constituents. Is it really too much to ask that those ideas be given an opportunity for debate on the Senate floor? It shouldn't be. I am not sure, however, that the majority is interested in that debate. Twice this week, Senate minority voted to proceed to bills offered by the majority leader and my colleague from Wisconsin, Senator Feingold. Yet after voting to proceed to those bills, we were accused of blocking debate on the bills we helped to bring to the floor. That really is a classic. The majority casts 21 votes against proceeding to a bill the majority leader himself wanted to proceed to debate. The minority casts the votes to allow that debate. And then the minority stands accused of delay. A similar pattern has occurred with this housing bill. The majority rushed a bill to the floor. They bypassed the relevant committees. They bypassed the regular order. In their haste, they made a small mistake with the legislation. Well, maybe it was not that small. The majority intended to spend $2 billion on counseling for distressed homeowners. They accidentally made this a $200 billion program; $200 billion. I understand that this is a mistake. But it is a mistake born of a cavalier approach to legislating. We could have had a consensus bill. Instead, the majority never consulted with the minority as this bill was being put together. In our view, we have a much better plan. It includes titles that would address taxes, capital markets, housing, and tort reform. We would keep taxes low. We would extend the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, preventing a looming tax hike, and making sure that working families do not get socked with thousands of dollars in extra taxes when these tax cuts expire in 2010. We would increase the value of homes and prevent an unfair tax on their sale. We would help to keep jobs at home by encouraging job creation. We would help prevent foreclosures by providing credit stability. We would maintain the value and security of neighborhoods by encouraging the speedy sale and renovation of foreclosed homes. And we would protect small businesses from the threat of excessive and frivolous lawsuits. And let me tell you, when I talk to businesses, businesses that are subject to incessant litigation, tort reform is at the top of the list of things we have to do. It hurts companies large and small, and we need to do something about it. I think if we had been invited to the table to discuss this bill, had been a party to the negotiation, or even been allowed to offer amendments, we could have worked something out on this bill. We could have found common ground. I know that is what the American people want. We have been hearing a lot about common ground these days. Whenever I turn on the television, I hear someone telling us about the need to change our ways in Washington. I hear about the need to bring people together. Well, we certainly have our opportunities. But I feel that they are being missed. We do not have to be consumed by partisanship. In 2005 and 2006, Congress accomplished a number of serious policy reforms. We passed bankruptcy reform, class action reform, energy and highway bills, CAFTA and other trade bills, and the most significant reforms of pension laws in 30 years. And those bills only became law because of debate, negotiation, and compromise. Through amendments, the regular order, and serious debate, the Senate was able to pass consensus legislation. And today? It is not quite the same. Take it or leave it is not the stuff of statesmanship. It is the stuff of the sandlot. Leadership demands a willingness to listen to both sides. It requires compromise and openness to other ideas. The American people have made their position clear. They are tired of business as usual. In the coming months, I hope to work with the majority on the issues of importance to the American people. The last week has not been very promising. Nonetheless, my hope is that Congress will be able to accomplish important reforms for the American people even in this election year. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Mr. President, let me commend my colleague from the State of Oregon, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, a committee on which I served for 4 years. Senator Wyden's statement is consistent with his service on that committee. It shows that he takes that assignment very seriously, he does his homework on a very challenging committee assignment, and that he has given great thought and reflection to this important decision about whether General Hayden should be named to head the CIA. Senator Wyden and I have discussed this nomination. There are some things he cannot share with me because they were learned behind closed doors in the Senate Intelligence Committee, but I have become convinced, as well, that General Hayden, despite his many great attributes and good qualifications, is not the right person for this appointment. When we reflect on America since 9/11, there are many things that are very clear. First, this country was stricken in a way that it has never been stricken since the War of 1812, when the British invaded the United States, invaded this Capitol building, sacked and burned it. We found 3,000 in- nocent Americans destroyed on American soil--a gut-wrenching experience that we will never forget. It changed America and it called on the President, on the leadership in Congress, to summon the courage to respond. In the days that followed that horrible event, there were some inspiring images. We can recall the videotape of firefighters ascending the stairway into the World Trade Center, to certain death, braving what they knew was a terrible disaster to try to save innocent lives. We can recall the President of the United States going to the rubble of the World Trade Center in New York and in a few brief moments rallying America and the world behind our cause. We can remember Members of Congress standing just a few feet away from this Senate Chamber, Members of Congress who hours before had been locked in partisan combat, who put it all aside after 9/11, sang ``God Bless America,'' and said: What can we do to save America? After that, the response around the world; this great, giant, the United States of America, having suffered this terrible loss, was able to count its friends and allies very quickly. So many nations stepped forward and said: We are with you. We will help you. We understand that you must bury your dead and grieve your losses, but then you must defend yourself and your Nation for its future, and we will be there. It was an amazing outpouring of support for our great country. It was a wonderful, encouraging moment. The President came to this Congress and gave a speech shortly after 9/11 that I will say was one of the best I had ever heard, summoning us to gather together as a nation to defend ourselves against this threat of terrorism. Then, of course, we considered the PATRIOT Act. We changed the laws of America so our Government would have new tools to pursue the terrorists. It passed with an overwhelming bipartisan vote, very quickly, and we started to roll up our sleeves and take on this task. At the time I was a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. I realized then more than ever how important that committee was. Intelligence is the first line of defense, and good intelligence used wisely can protect America from terrorism and from enemies who would inflict great casualties and pain on us. Then, a few months later, came a new challenge, a challenge we had not anticipated on 9/11. The President and this administration told us that the real battle was against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. I remember sitting in that Senate Intelligence Committee just days before the vote on the Senate floor about the invasion of Iraq and turning to a staffer who said to me: Senator, something is unusual here. This is the first time we have ever considered any kind of effort of this magnitude without asking the intelligence agencies of the United States to tell us what they know so we can gather information from every source and make a conscious and sensible judgment about what we should do. It is called a National Intelligence Estimate, an NIE. So at my staffer's prompting, I requested a National Intelligence Estimate, as did Senator Graham of Florida. It turned out it was routine to produce them, but no one had taken the time to do that before the invasion of Iraq. In very short order, just a few weeks, a National Intelligence Estimate was submitted to the Intelligence Committee. There were claims in that NIE that turned out to be false, but at the time we didn't know it. There were claims about weapons of mass destruction that threatened the safety of the United States of America. There were claims of capacities and capabilities by Saddam Hussein in Iraq that were greatly exaggerated. There were claims that Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis were producing nuclear weapons which could be used against the United States. Leaders in the White House were telling us they were fearful of mushroom clouds that could result in a nuclear holocaust. All of this was given to the American people and the Intelligence Committee. The sad reality was when we sat in the Intelligence Committee behind closed doors, we knew that the American people were not getting the full story, that in fact even within this administration there was a dispute as to the truth of these statements, statements given every day and every night by the leaders of this administration. We know what happened. We invaded Iraq. Saddam Hussein, in a matter of weeks, was gone as their dictator, and we came to learn that all of the claims about weapons of mass destruction were false, totally false. The American people had been misled. There is nothing worse in a democracy than to mislead the people into war, and that is what happened. We learned, as well, that there were no nuclear weapons. All those who claim there was a connection between 9/11 and Saddam Hussein could find no evidence. The statements made by the President in his State of the Union Address that somehow or another Saddam Hussein was obtaining yellowcake or the makings of nuclear weapons from Africa turned out to be false, and the President had to concede that point. Then, in light of it, we decided it was time to take a look. The Intelligence Committee on which I served decided to ask two questions: First, did our intelligence agencies fail us? Did they come up with bad information when they should have given us good information and good advice? Were we, in fact, misled into this war by that information? And second: Did any member of this administration misuse that intelligence information, use it in a fashion that did mislead or deceive the American people? Those were two specific assignments accepted by the Senate Intelligence Committee. I served on the committee while we were in the process of meeting that obligation. We came to learn the first assignment was exactly right. The Senate Intelligence Committee concluded, as did the House, that our intelligence agencies had failed us. Our first line of defense had failed us, giving us information that was totally flawed, information which was not reliable, information which never should have resulted in the invasion of Iraq. The administration had argued that we have a new foreign policy, a preemptive foreign policy. We can't wait to be attacked, the President said, we have to attack first if there is a threat. It turns out the information used to measure that threat was wrong, in the invasion of Iraq. Mr. President, 23 of us in the Senate voted against the use of force in Iraq, 22 Democrats and 1 Republican. We believed then, most of us, that the information being given to the American people was misleading, the intelligence information was not accurate. It turns out that our estimate was true. It turns out that our invasion of Iraq was based on false pretenses and on intelligence information that was fatally flawed. The second investigation to be undertaken by the Senate Intelligence Committee, promised more than 2 years ago, was that we would look into the misuse of this intelligence by members of this administration. That is a tough thing to ask a Senate Intelligence Committee, led by a Republican chairman, to do, because it is likely to bring some embarrassment to the administration of the President. Unfortunately, as I stand here today, the promise of almost 2 years ago to complete this second phase has not been completed. We still don't know if members of this administration misused the intelligence. But there are things that we do know, things that are very clear. It is clear that in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq and afterwards there was a separate intelligence agency created in the Department of Defense by a man named Douglas Feith that became virtually a renegade, independent operation. It was not working in concert with other agencies of our Government gathering intelligence. That is inconsistent with what we hoped to be a coordinated intelligence effort in our Government. But Secretary Rumsfeld, who enjoyed the confidence of the President, was able to initiate this intelligence operation in defiance of many other intelligence agencies. We know that for a fact. Then we came to learn several other things. We learned that after 9/11, the Bush administration, for the first time in modern history, decided that they needed to rewrite the standards of interrogation for detainees. For decades we had held to the standard of the Geneva code, which basically said that we would not engage in torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. But the infamous Bybee memo, exchanged at the time with Alberto Gonzales, then-White House Counsel, and many others, was at least a suggestion that we could breach those rules and change those rules. That conversation, in closed sections of the White House, took place without the knowledge of the American people. But then the terrible disclosure at Abu Ghraib torture, inhuman treatment perpetrated, sadly, by those who were in the service of the United States. It was clear then that the issue of torture was one that was front and center for us as a Nation to face during this time of terror. So with this torture issue before us, we also had other things to consider. Not long thereafter came the news that this administration was engaging in activities which clearly were beyond the law--the so-called warrantless wiretaps of Americans. You see, under the laws of the United States and under our Constitution, one cannot invade through a wiretap the privacy of another without court approval. No executive branch office, Department of Justice, or FBI can engage in a wiretap without the approval of a court order or, when it comes to questions of international security, foreign intelligence gathering, through the FISA court, a special court created for that purpose. Those are the two options. But this administration said that it was above the law; that it didn't have to answer to those courts; that it didn't have to work through those courts; it could engage in warrantless wiretaps through the National Security Agency, an agency administered by General Hayden. Several weeks ago, USA Today disclosed more information indicating an invasion of privacy where the telephone records of innocent American people are being gathered by the same agency, the National Security Agency, in an effort I cannot describe in detail because I have not been briefed, but in an effort to find some intelligence information. Now comes the nomination of General Hayden to become Director of the Central Intelligence Agency after all of this experience. Let me say at the outset that I respect General Hayden. He is a man who has served his country with distinction for over three decades. Many say--and I cannot disagree--that he is one of brightest minds when it comes to intelligence, and the agencies that he has worked with in the past are clear evidence of that. I honor and appreciate his service. I know he is a man of considerable knowledge and formidable intellect. He is well versed in the questions of intelligence, particularly in the most technical areas. However, I have three primary reservations about this nomination. First, I am concerned about the role of General Hayden in the NSA's warrantless wiretapping of American citizens. Second, I am concerned about how the CIA will treat detainees in their custody and how they will implement the clear prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment standard that was passed last year in the McCain amendment, which I cosponsored, by a vote of 90-9 on the floor of the U.S. Senate. I am also concerned about the issue of the General's independence, not merely his independence as an individual but his ability to stand up to the Department of Defense and the likes of Secretary Rumsfeld, and separate defense intelligence operations under Douglas Feith. I raised these concerns when I met with General Hayden, and they we were echoed by many members of the committee during the hearings. First, I would like to address the issue of surveillance of American citizens. As Director of the NSA, General Hayden presided over a program that carried out warrantless wiretaps on innocent Americans. Those wiretaps did not have judicial approval, nor did they have meaningful congressional oversight. Precious few Members of Congress were briefed about the wiretaps, and they were sworn to secrecy about this procedure. General Hayden has stated that the Attorney General and other legal authorities within the administration had concluded that such actions were proper and legal. In fact, I have seen no evidence of that whatsoever. We created the FISA court to issue warrants for such surveillance. If the administration believes the FISA court is not sufficient in this age of terrorism and high technology, the administration should come to Congress and ask us to change the laws, as we did with the PATRIOT Act. In addition to warrantless wiretaps, General Hayden reportedly oversaw a program that assembled an enormous database, the largest in the history of the world, of literally millions of calls made by Americans to Americans in the United States. Tens of millions of Americans appeared to have been included in this database. And most of us in Congress learned about it on the front page of USA Today. I am disturbed about the role that General Hayden played in overseeing these practices. It is certainly critical that the Director of the CIA protect our security but also not endanger our liberties. Second, I am concerned about the way the CIA will treat detainees. When the McCain amendment was pending, it was opposed openly by Vice President Richard Cheney who said that he believed intelligence agents--those working for the CIA--should not be bound by the provisions of the McCain amendment. We disagreed. We passed, on the floor of the Senate, as I said earlier, by a vote of 90-9, clear standards barring torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. I believe that we should never engage in that treatment--and that is what the McCain amendment requires. Senator McCain said it well last year, and I quote him. He said, ``It's not about who they are. It's about who we are.'' I believe we should have one clear, uniform interrogation standard that applies to all United States personnel--those in uniform and those in a civilian capacity. I was disturbed when General Hayden was meeting with me and did not appear to share that view. He was evasive. While he said that we must establish clear guidelines, he indicated he might prefer to have one standard for the military and another standard for intelligence personnel. He said he wanted to study the question, but that two sets of rules might be appropriate. I disagree. There is only one standard. It should be clear and unequivocal. Finally, there is the question of independence. The Pentagon controls an estimated 80 percent of the intelligence budget. That fact alone makes it critical for the CIA to vigorously defend its independence over the Department of Defense. We need an independent voice at the I note that last year's intelligence authorization bill, as passed by the Senate Intelligence Committee, stated that the Director of the CIA should be appointed from ``civilian life.'' That bill in the end never reached the floor of the Senate for a vote, but we should nevertheless consider that recommendation seriously. General Hayden assured me that he stood up to Secretary Rumsfeld in the FISA operation when he disagreed with him, and that he will continue to do so. Colleagues on the Intelligence and Armed Services Committee, whom I deeply respect, including Senator Levin of Michigan, have concluded that General Hayden will assert that independence and stand up to the Pentagon. I certainly hope he does. Within the Bush administration, the question of the independence of intelligence agencies is particularly important. That is because the intelligence process has been abused. This administration clearly politicized and distorted the use of intelligence to promote the false premise that Saddam Hussein was tied to the 9/11 attacks and that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. We know now that was false. In 2002, the administration undermined the independence and credibility of the intelligence process by creating the Office of Special Plans at the Pentagon under the leadership of Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith. Several of us addressed this issue as part of the Intelligence Committee's 2004 Report on the Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. And Senator Levin joined me in this. We wrote: The Intelligence Community's findings did not support the link between Iraq and the 9/11 plot [that] administration policy officials wanted [in order] to help galvanize support for military action in Iraq. As a result, officials under the direction of Under Secretary Feith took upon themselves to push for a change in the intelligence analysis so that it bolstered administration policy statements and goals. I asked General Hayden about Douglas Feith and the Office of Special Plans. To his credit, he was critical of that operation. He said it was not legitimate ``alternative analysis,'' and he described the troubling pattern in which preconceptions shaped the search for intelligence. General Hayden reiterated his discomfort with the Feith approach in testifying before the Intelligence Committee. I hope that when he is confirmed, as I am certain he will be, that General Hayden will go even further in opposing efforts to subvert the intelligence process. Today, we face even graver dangers than we did in 2003 when Under Secretary Feith was operating his own intelligence shop. The war in Iraq has claimed over 2,400 American lives, and there is no end in sight. Iran has pursued three different methods of enriching uranium and has experimented with separating plutonium, moving closer to the possible development of nuclear weapons. Osama bin Laden is still at large; al-Qaida has splintered in different and dangerous directions, and North Korea is expanding its nuclear arsenal. All these issues make it extremely important that our intelligence community conduct independent, accurate, trustworthy analysis. And it is critical that we operate within the bounds of our own Constitution and our laws. We should not have one standard for the military and another for the intelligence community, a position once argued as high in this administration as Vice President Cheney. We should not engage in torture or hold detainees indefinitely without of charging them with a crime. Just 2 weeks ago, the President of the United States said it would soon be time to close Guantanamo. That certainly is something that many of us believe is in order. Those who are dangerous to the United States should be charged and imprisoned. Those who have no value to us from an intelligence viewpoint should be released, if they are not a danger to the United States. We cannot ignore the fundamental privacy rights of American citizens and the moral values and rights reflected in the treatment of those detainees. General Hayden will be taking charge of the CIA, by many reports at a time when the Agency is demoralized. He will have to oversee critical reforms. Last December, members of the 9/11 Commission handed out report cards on reform for the Bush administration. They gave the CIA an ``incomplete'' in terms of adapting to its new mission. I hope General Hayden can change that. I hope that he will be the independent voice that we need. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, General Hayden's nomination for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency comes at a critical time. The Agency is in disarray. Its current Director has apparently been forced out, and the previous Director, George Tenet, departed under a cloud after having compromised his own objectivity and independence and that of his Agency by misusing Iraq intelligence to support the administration's policy agenda. The next Director must right this ship and restore the CIA to its critically important mission. I will vote to confirm General Hayden because his actions have demonstrated on a number of important occasions the independence and strength of character needed to fulfill the most important role of the CIA Director--independence and a willingness to speak truth to power about the intelligence assessments of professionals in the intelligence community. This nomination has been considered by me on two key issues: One, whether or not General Hayden will be independent--and I believe he will--and two, what judgment should be rendered about him based on what is known about the National Security Agency's surveillance program which he administered during his tenure as Director of the NSA. Again, the highest priority of the new Director must be to ensure that intelligence provided to the President and the Congress is objective and independent of political considerations. It was only a few years ago that then-CIA Director George Tenet shaped intelligence to support the policy position of the administration. There are many examples. On February 11, 2003, just before the war, Director Tenet publicly stated, as though it were fact, that Iraq has ``provided training in poison and gases to two Al-Qaeda associates.'' However, we now know that the DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, had assessed a year earlier that the primary source of that report was more likely intentionally misleading his debriefers, and the CIA itself had concluded in January 2003, before the Tenet public declaration that I have quoted, that the source of the claim that Iraq had provided training in poisons was not in a position to know if any training had in fact taken place. On September 28, 2002, President Bush said that ``each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX nerve gas or someday a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group.'' A week later, on October 7, 2002, a letter declassifying CIA intelligence indicated that Iraq was unlikely to provide WMD to terrorists or al-Qaida and called such a move an ``extreme step,'' a very different perspective from that which had been stated by the President. But the very next day after that declassification was obtained, Director Tenet told the press that there was ``no inconsistency'' between the views in the letter and the President's views on the subject. His statement was flatly wrong. His effort to minimize the inconsistency or eliminate it not only revealed his lack of independence, but it damaged the credibility of the Central Intelligence Agency. At a hearing in 2004, I asked Director Tenet about the alleged meeting between 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001. He told us that the CIA had ``not gathered enough evidence to conclude that it had happened'' and that ``I don't know that it took place. I can't say that I did.'' What he neglected to say was that the CIA did not believe that the meeting had happened, a fact that he finally acknowledged publicly in July of 2004, after the war began, when he wrote that the CIA was ``increasingly skeptical that such a meeting occurred'' and that there was an ``absence of any credible information that the April 2001 meeting occurred.'' We determined later that that CIA skepticism dated back at least to June 2002, before the war. Director Tenet also looked the other way when the administration publicly alleged that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. As a matter of fact, he had personally called the Deputy National Security Adviser to urge that the allegation be removed from the President's October 2002 Cincinnati speech. Director Tenet was silent after the President included the allegation in his January 2003 State of the Union speech. It was not until July of 2003, long after the war began, 2 months after President Bush declared major combat operations were over in Iraq, that Director Tenet finally acknowledged publicly that the allegations should not have been included in the State of the Union speech. According to Bob Woodward's book ``Plan of Attack,'' when the President asked Director Tenet, following the CIA's presentation to him in December of 2002, about its intelligence relative to Iraq's suspected WMD programs, How confident are you in the intelligence about that, Director Tenet replied, ``Don't worry; it's a slam dunk,'' which it surely was not. But that is what the President wanted to hear. That is the message which Director Tenet presented to him, and that is the message that the President then presented to the American public. It is essential that the new Director of the CIA stand up to the administration in power, no matter what administration it is, when the intelligence does not support the direction that the administration wants to go. We cannot afford another Iraq intelligence fiasco. General Hayden has said that he will be an independent CIA Director. Based on his record, I believe him. One piece of evidence in that Hayden record relates to a strategy that the administration used to bolster its case for war. The decision was made by the administration to put a set of what was called ``fresh eyes'' to look over the intelligence relative to the alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaida. The Secretary of Defense created a separate operation in a DOD policy office led by Douglas Feith. While the intelligence community was consistently dubious of the links between al-Qaida and Iraq, the Feith office scraped and scratched and cherry-picked the intelligence to produce assessments that said that there was a strong relationship between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida. And then Mr. Feith bypassed the CIA, bypassed the intelligence community, and briefed that analysis to senior policymakers at the National Security Council and the Vice President's office. George Tenet told us that he was not aware of that prewar briefing by Mr. Feith, until I brought it to his attention in February of 2004. In making its case for war with Iraq, the administration used Mr. Feith's misleading intelligence to convince the country that Saddam and bin Laden were allies. There were few in the administration who had been willing to speak up against this bypass of the intelligence community process, a process whose very purpose is to provide balanced, objective assessments for the intelligence community. One of the few who has spoken up is General Hayden. At his nomination hearing, I asked General Hayden whether, when he was NSA Director before the Iraq war, he was comfortable with what Douglas Feith was up to. My question to General Hayden was not just about Doug Feith. It was about whether the General was willing to speak the truth as he saw it, even if it went against the administration's case for war. General Hayden told the committee, relative to the Feith operation: No, sir. I wasn't comfortable. Has anyone else in the administration said that, spoken up and said that which is so obvious about the Feith operation? There may be others, but General Hayden is the only one that comes to mind. This is what he then said to the committee at our hearing on his nomination: It is possible, Senator, if you want to drill down on an issue and just get laser beam focused, and exhaust every possible--every ounce of evidence, you can build up a pretty strong body of data, right? But you have to know what you're doing, all right. I got three great kids, but if you tell me go out and find all the bad things they've done, Hayden, I can build you a pretty good dossier, and you'd think they were pretty bad people, because that was what I was looking for and that's what I'd build up. General Hayden said this: That would be very wrong. That would be inaccurate. That would be misleading. Wrong, inaccurate, and misleading. That is a pretty good description of the Feith shop's prewar intelligence analysis. It is an indictment of the administration's use of that intelligence to make the case for war. But what is interesting, in particular, is not just what General Hayden said at his confirmation hearing; it is what he did at the time that the Feith office was actually out looking for intelligence to try to prove their premise that there was a connection between Saddam and al-Qaida. General Hayden actually placed a disclaimer on NSA reporting relative to any links between al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein, stating that SIGINT--or signals intelligence--``neither confirms nor denies'' such a link. So while you had the administration claiming the link and Doug Feith scrapping around, scratching for any little bit of evidence that could prove his preordained conclusion that there was such a link, you had General Hayden saying SIGINT, signals intelligence, neither confirms nor denies that such a link exists. In other words, we have in General Hayden more than just promises of independence and objectivity and a willingness to speak truth to power. We have somebody who has actually done so. There is another significant way in which General Hayden has spoken truth to power. When we were considering reforming the intelligence community to fill the gaps and the cracks that existed prior to 9/11 and the Iraq War, there was a major effort to derail the proposal, in part because the legislation sought to shift some authority from Department of Defense components to the new office of the Director of National Intelligence. Although General Hayden is a four star general, he stood up to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on this issue. It took some backbone and strength of character for him to do so. As to General Hayden remaining in active duty if he is confirmed, I would only make three points. One, he is not the first person to do so. Since the Central Intelligence Agency was established by law in 1947, three commissioned officers have held the tile of Director of Central Intelligence, RADM Roscoe Hillenkoetter, GEN Walter Bedell Smith, and ADM Stansfield Turner. I would also remind my colleagues that the Senate confirmed then LTG Colin Powell to be President Reagan's National Security Adviser even though there is no law that removes that position from the supervision or control of the Secretary of Defense. Secondly, General Hayden has sent a letter to Senator Warner which states ``I do not intend to remain in active military status beyond my assignment as Director, Central Intelligence Agency (if confirmed).'' This is an added assurance of independence and that he will not be shaping intelligence to please the Defense Department in order to put himself in a better position for some future appointment in the military establishment. Third, General Hayden's supervisor in his line of work as Director of the CIA will be by law Ambassador Negroponte, not Secretary Rumsfeld. So General Hayden would not be in the military chain of command but in the intelligence chain of command. To eliminate any doubt of that, we are including a provision in the Defense authorization bill, which is awaiting Senate floor action, to make that absolutely clear in law. Senator Warner and I think it is already clear, but we are going to make it doubly clear by putting that into the pending DOD authorization bill. As I mentioned, the key issue relative to General Hayden's nomination is the President's domestic surveillance program. Over the past 6 months, we have been engaged in a national debate about the appropriate limits on the Government's authority to conduct electronic eavesdropping on American citizens. General Hayden was Director of the National Security Agency when the President authorized the program, and many of our colleagues have raised concerns about that. The administration has repeatedly characterized the electronic surveillance program as applying only to international calls and not involving any domestic surveillance. In February, for instance, the Vice President said: Some of our critics call this a domestic surveillance program. Wrong, that is inaccurate; it is not domestic surveillance. Ambassador Negroponte said: This is a program that was ordered by the President with respect to international phone calls to or from suspected al- Qaida operatives and their affiliates . . . This was not about domestic surveillance. General Hayden found a way to signal that the administration has not described the entire program. When asked at his confirmation hearing whether the program the administration described is the entire program, General Hayden said he could not answer in open session. Presumably, if it were the entire program, he could have easily answered, ``yes.'' In addition, while Stephen Hadley, the President's National Security Adviser, has said relative to the reports that phone records had been provided to the Government under the NSA program, that it is hard to find a privacy issue here, General Hayden did not make that claim and instead acknowledged that, indeed, privacy was an issue, and surely whatever one thinks they believe about this program, privacy is an issue. There may be some who, when they understand the program, believe the privacy concerns are overridden by the security advantage. There may be others who reach the other conclusion that whatever security advantages are achieved do not overcome the privacy intrusions that are reported to exist by those phone records being in the possession or being available to the Government, according to those press reports. But whatever one's conclusion is, there are clearly privacy concerns involved. And when the general was in front of us--he was honest enough--and said: I cannot say there are no privacy concerns here, he was telling us something which should be obvious to each one of us. There are remaining for me a lot of unanswered questions about the NSA program, and I have been one who has been at least partially briefed. I am one of that subcommittee of seven for whom the briefing has begun. But the fact is, the legal opinions about this program are not General Hayden's, they are the Attorney General's. I am aware of no allegation that General Hayden took any action that went beyond what the President authorized or what the Attorney General advised was legal. There are legitimate grounds for criticism regarding this program, but such criticism should be aimed at the White House and the Attorney General. The Intelligence Committee is in the middle of an inquiry into the program. Now that the full committee has been authorized to be briefed on the program, all of the members of the Intelligence Committee need to catch up to where seven of us are, which is about halfway through the briefings. We are still waiting for the administration to answer many questions that we have asked about the program. I want to turn for a few moments to the issue of detainee treatment. I would have liked General Hayden to be more forthcoming on this issue at his hearing. In his testimony, General Hayden affirmed that the CIA is bound by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In particular, General Hayden stated that this legislation's prohibition on the cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment of detainees applies to all Government agencies, including the CIA. The Detainee Treatment Act also requires that no individual under the effective control of the Defense Department or in a DOD facility will be subjected to any interrogation technique that is not listed in the Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogations. In response to my questioning, General Hayden agreed that the Army field manual would apply to CIA interrogations of detainees under DOD's effective control or in a DOD facility. I was disappointed, however, that General Hayden repeatedly chose not to 12 respond in public to many other questions on detainee treatment, deferring his answers to the hearing's closed session. I believe that he could have answered these questions and related his professional opinion in the public hearing. In response to Senator Feinstein's questions, General Hayden would not say publicly whether individuals held at secret sites may be detained for decades. He would not say publicly whether waterboarding is an acceptable interrogation technique whether the Agency has received new legal guidance from the Department of Justice since passage of the Detainee Treatment Act in December of last year. General Hayden would not answer my question whether the Justice Department memo on the legality of specific interrogation techniques, referred to as the second Bybee memo, remains operative, saying only that ``additional legal opinions'' have been offered. The problem is exacerbated because the administration continues to deny our requests for the second Bybee memo and other Justice Department legal memos which set out the legal boundaries for what constitutes permissible treatment of detainees. Under the Detainee Treatment Act, we have established a single standard--no cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of detainees. This standard applies without regard to what agency holds a detainee, whether the Defense Department or the CIA, or where the detainee is being held. Yet the administration will not say publicly whether this standard has the same meaning for the intelligence community that it has for our military. The Government's views on the standard for how we treat detainees remains cloaked in secrecy. The Armed Services Committee has heard from the judge advocates general of our military services on what they believe the standard for detainee treatment is. The judge advocates general were asked about the use of dogs in interrogations; forcing a detainee to wear women's underwear during interrogation to humiliate him; leading a detainee around the room on all fours and forcing him to perform dog tricks; subjecting a detainee to provocative touching to humiliate or demean him; subjecting a detainee to strip searches and forcing him to stand naked in front of females as an interrogation method; and waterboarding. In each case, the judge advocates general said that such treatment is not consistent with the spirit or intent of the Army fie1d manual. As I mentioned earlier, with the enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act, the Army field manual applies to all interrogations of detainees under the effective control of the Defense Department and all interrogations conducted in DOD facilities. General Hayden, in contrast, would not say in open session whether even waterboarding is even permitted. When the Senate Armed Services Committee's markup of the national defense authorization bill for fiscal fear 2007 comes to the floor later this year, the Senate will have the chance to demand some answers on the standard for the treatment of detainees. The new bill includes a requirement that the President provide Congress a definitive legal opinion, coordinated across government agencies, on whether certain specific interrogation techniques--including waterboarding, sleep deprivation, stress positions, the use of dogs in interrogations and nudity or sexual humiliation--constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. This provision would also require the President to certify to Congress that this legal opinion is binding on all departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, including the CIA, their personnel, and their contractors. While I disagree with General Hayden's decision not to publicly state his personal view, the general did affirm that the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the Detainee Treatment Act applies to all Government agencies, including the CIA. We have asked the administration to clarify this matter. I would hope that the administration would, one, state clearly that waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and stress positions are unacceptable; two, state clearly that the standard in law prohibits the use of dogs in interrogations; and three, state clearly that acts like stripping a detainee for interrogation purposes or subjecting a detainee to sexual humiliation are prohibited. I also hope that the administration will state clearly that the International Committee of the Red Cross will be informed about all detainees held by the United States Government and adopt a policy of not rendering individuals in our custody where there is a reasonable possibility that the person will be tortured. As I said at the time the Senate approved the Detainee Treatment Act, enactment of this legislation means the United States has rejected any claim that this standard--cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment--has one meaning for the Department of Defense and another for the CIA--one meaning as applied to Americans and another applied to our enemies, or one meaning as applied on U.S. territory and another applied elsewhere in the world. I conclude by saying, in my view, General Hayden will be the independent Director of the Central Intelligence Agency that we so desperately need and that the country deserves. The record demonstrates his willingness to speak truth to power, and I will vote to confirm General Hayden. I yield the floor.", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Since the National Security Act's establishment of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, numerous independent commissions, experts, and legislative initiatives have examined the growth and performance of the U.S. Intelligence Community. While those efforts generated numerous proposals for reform over the years, some of the most significant proposals have not been implemented, particularly in the areas of organization and structure. These Committees believe that the cataclysmic events of September 11, 2001 provide a unique and compelling mandate for strong leadership and constructive change throughout the Intelligence Community. With that in mind, and based on the work of this Joint Inquiry, the committees recommend the following: 1. Congress should amend the National Security Act of 1947 to create and sufficiently staff a statutory Director of National Intelligence who shall be the President's principal advisor on intelligence and shall have the full range of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the entire U.S. Intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole. These responsibilities should include: Establishment and enforcement of consistent priorities for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence throughout the Intelligence Community; setting of policy and the ability to move personnel between elements of the Intelligence Community; review, approval, modification, and primary management and oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community budgets; review, approval modification, and primary management and oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community personnel and resource allocations; review, approval, modification, and primary management and oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community research and development efforts; review, approval, and coordination of relationships between the Intelligence Community agencies and foreign intelligence and law enforcement services; and exercise of statutory authority to insure that Intelligence Community agencies and components fully comply with Community-wide policy, management, spending, and administrative guidance and priorities. The Director of National Intelligence should be a Cabinet level position, appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation. Congress and the President should also work to insure that the Director of National Intelligence effectively exercises these authorities. To insure focused and consistent Intelligence Community leadership, Congress should require that no person may simultaneously serve as both the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or as the director of any other specific intelligence agency. 2. Current efforts by the National Security Council to examine and revamp existing intelligence priorities should be expedited, given the immediate need for clear guidance in intelligence and counterterrorism efforts. The President should take action to ensure that clear, consistent, and current priorities are established and enforced throughout the Intelligence Community. Once established, these priorities should be reviewed and updated on at least an annual basis to ensure that the allocation of Intelligence Community resources reflects and effectively addresses the continually evolving threat environment. Finally, the establishment of Intelligence Community priorities, and the justification for such priorities, should be reported to both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on an annual basis. 3. The National Security Council, in conjunction with the Director of National Intelligence, and in consultation with the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, should prepare, for the President's approval, a U.S. government-wide strategy for combating terrorism, both at home and abroad, including the growing terrorism threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies. This strategy should identify and full engage those foreign policy, economic, military, intelligence, and law enforcement elements that are critical to a comprehensive blueprint for success in the war against terrorism. As part of that effort, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop the Intelligence Community component of the strategy, identifying specific programs and budgets and including plans to address the threats posed by Usama Bin Ladin and al Qa'ida, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other significant terrorist groups. Consistent with applicable law, the strategy should effectively employ and integrate all capabilities available to the Intelligence Community against those threats and should encompass specific efforts to: Develop human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and networks both overseas and within the United States; fully utilize existing and future technologies to better exploit terrorist communications; to improve and expand the use of data mining and other cutting edge analytical tools; and to develop a multi-level security capability to facilitate the timely and complete sharing of relevant intelligence information both within the Intelligence Community and with other appropriate federal, state, and local authorities; enhance the depth and quality of domestic intelligence collection and analysis by, for example, modernizing current intelligence reporting formats through the use of existing information technology to emphasize the existence and the significance of links between new and previously acquired information; maximize the effective use of covert action in counterterrorist efforts; develop programs to deal with financial support for international terrorism; and facilitate the ability of CIA paramilitary units and military special operations forces to conduct joint operations against terrorist targets. 4. The position of National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism should be created on the National Intelligence Council and a highly qualified individual appointed to prepare intelligence estimates on terrorism for the use of Congress and policymakers in the Executive Branch and to assist the Intelligence Community in developing a program for strategic analysis and assessments. 5. Congress and the Administration should ensure the full development within the Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-source terrorism information fusion center that will dramatically improve the focus and quality of counterterrorism analysis and facilitate the timely dissemination of relevant intelligence information, both within and beyond the boundaries of the Intelligence Community. Congress and the Administration should ensure that this fusion center has all the authority and the resources needed to: Have full and timely access to all counterterrorism-related intelligence information, including ``raw'' supporting data as needed; have the ability to participate fully in the existing requirements process for tasking the Intelligence Community to gather information on foreign individuals, entities and threats; integrate such information in order to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the United States in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities; implement and fully utilize data mining and other advanced analytical tools, consistent with applicable law; retain a permanent staff of experienced and highly skilled analysts, supplemented on a regular basis by personnel on ``joint tours'' from the various Intelligence Community agencies; institute a reporting mechanism that enables analysts at all the intelligence and law enforcement agencies to post lead information for use by analysts at other agencies without waiting for dissemination of a formal report; maintain excellence and creativity in staff analytic skills through regular use of analysis and language training programs; and establish and sustain effective channels for the exchange of counterterrorism-related information with federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community as well as with state and local authorities. 6. Given the FBI's history of repeated shortcomings within its current responsibility for domestic intelligence, and in the face of grave and immediate threats to our homeland, the FBI should strengthen and improve its domestic capability as fully and expeditiously as possible by immediately instituting measures to: Strengthen counterterrorism as a national FBI program by clearly designating national counterterrorism priorities and enforcing field office adherence to those priorities; establish and sustain independent career tracks within the FBI that recognize and provide incentives for demonstrated skills and performance of counterterrorism agents and analysts; significantly improve strategic analytical capabilities by assuring the qualification, training, and independence of analysts, coupled with sufficient access to necessary information and resources; establish a strong reports officer cadre at FBI Headquarters and field offices to facilitate timely dissemination of intelligence from agents to analysts within the FBI and other agencies within the Intelligence Community; implement training for agents in the effective use of analysts and analysis in their work; expand and sustain the recruitment of agents and analysts with the linguistic skills needed in counterterrorism efforts; increase substantially efforts to penetrate terrorist organizations operating in the United States through all available means of collection; improve the national security law training of FBI personnel; implement mechanisms to maximize the exchange of counterterrorism-related information between the FBI and other federal, state and local agencies; and finally solve the FBI's persistent and incapacitating information technology problems. 7. Congress and the Administration should carefully consider how best to structure and manage U.S. domestic intelligence responsibilities. Congress should review the scope of domestic intelligence authorities to determine their adequacy in pursuing counterterrorism at home and ensuring the protection of privacy and other rights guaranteed under the Constitution. This review should include, for example, such questions as whether the range of persons subject to searches and surveillances authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) should be expanded. Based on their oversight responsibilities, the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of the Congress, as appropriate, should consider promptly, in consultation with the Administration, whether the FBI should continue to perform the domestic intelligence functions of the United States Government or whether legislation is necessary to remedy this problem, including the possibility of creating a new agency to perform those functions. Congress should require that the new Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security report to the President and the Congress on a date certain concerning: The FBI's progress since September 11, 2001 in implementing the reforms required to conduct an effective domestic intelligence program, including the measures recommended above; the experience of other democratic nations in organizing the conduct of domestic intelligence; the specific manner in which a new domestic intelligence service could be established in the United States, recognizing the need to enhance national security while fully protecting civil liberties; and their recommendations on how to best fulfill the nation's need for an effective domestic intelligence capability, including necessary legislation. 8. The Attorney General and the Director of the FBI should take action necessary to ensure that: The office of Intelligence Policy and Review and other Department of Justice components provide in-depth training to the FBI and other members of the Intelligence Community regarding the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to address terrorist threats to the United States; the FBI disseminates results of searches and surveillances authorized under FISA to appropriate personnel within the FBI and the Intelligence Community on a timely basis so they may be used for analysis and operations that address terrorist threats to the United States; and the FBI develops and implements a plan to use authorities provided by FISA to assess the threat of international terrorist groups within the United States fully, including the extent to which such groups are funded or otherwise supported by foreign governments. 9. The House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees should continue to examine the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and its implementation thoroughly, particularly with respect to changes made as a result of the USA PATRIOT Act and the subsequent decision of the United States Foreign Intelligence Court of Review, to determine whether its provisions adequately address present and emerging terrorist threats to the United States. Legislation should be proposed by those Committees to remedy any deficiencies identified as a result of that review. 10. The Director of the National Security Agency should present to the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense by June 30, 2003, and report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, a detailed plan that: Describes solutions for the technological challenges for signals intelligence; requires a review, on a quarterly basis, of the goals, products to be delivered, funding levels and schedules for every technology development program; ensures strict accounting for program expenditures; within their jurisdiction as established by current law, makes NSA a full collaborating partner with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the war on terrorism, including fully integrating the collection and analytic capabilities of NSA, CIA, and the FBI; and makes recommendations for legislation needed to facilitate these goals. In evaluating the plan, the Committees should also consider issues pertaining to whether civilians should be appointed to the position of Director of the National Security Agency and whether the term of service for the position should be longer than it has been in the recent past. 11. Recognizing that the Intelligence Community's employees remain its greatest resource, the Director of National Intelligence should require that measures be implemented to greatly enhance the recruitment and development of a workforce with the intelligence skills and expertise needed for success in counterterrorist efforts, including: The agencies of the Intelligence Community should act promptly to expand and improve counterterrorism training programs within the Community, insuring coverage of such critical areas as information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence personnel; language capabilities; the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; and watchlisting; the Intelligence Community should build on the provisions of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 regarding the development of language capabilities, including the Act's requirement for a report on the feasibility of establishing a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, and implement expeditiously measures to identify and recruit linguists outside the Community whose abilities are relevant to the needs of counterterrorism; the existing Intelligence Community Reserve Corps should be expanded to ensure the use of relevant personnel and expertise from outside the Community as special needs arise; Congress should consider enacting legislation, modeled on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to instill the concept of ``jointness'' throughout the Intelligence Community. By emphasizing such things as joint education, a joint career specialty, increased authority for regional commanders, and joint exercises, that Act greatly enhanced the joint warfighting capabilities of the individual military services. Legislation to instill similar concepts throughout the Intelligence Community could help improve management of Community resources and priorities and insure a far more effective ``team'' effort by all the intelligence agencies. The Director of National Intelligence should require more extensive use of ``joint tours'' for intelligence and appropriate law enforcement personnel to broaden their experience and help bridge existing organizational and cultural divides through service in other agencies. These joint tours should include not only service at Intelligence Community agencies, but also service in those agencies that are users or consumers of intelligence products. Serious incentives for joint service should be established throughout the Intelligence Community and personnel should be rewarded for joint service with career advancement credit at individual agencies. The Director of National Intelligence should also require Intelligence Community agencies to participate in joint exercises; Congress should expand and improve existing educational grant programs focused on intelligence-related fields, similar to military scholarship programs and others that provide financial assistance in return for a commitment to serve in the Intelligence Community; and the Intelligence Community should enhance recruitment of a more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce and devise a strategy to capitalize upon the unique cultural and linguistic capabilities of first-generation Americans, a strategy designed to utilize their skills to the greatest practical effect while recognizing the potential counterintelligence challenges such hiring decisions might pose. 12. Steps should be taken to increase and ensure the greatest return on this nation's substantial investment in intelligence, including: The President should submit budget recommendations, and Congress should enact budget authority, for sustained, long-term investment in counterterrorism capabilities that avoid dependence on repeated stop-gap supplemental appropriations; in making such budget recommendations, the President should provide for the consideration of a separate classified Intelligence Community budget; long-term counterterrorism investment should be accompanied by sufficient flexibility, subject to congressional oversight, to enable the Intelligence Community to rapidly respond to altered or unanticipated needs; the Director of National Intelligence should insure that Intelligence Community budgeting practices and procedures are revised to better identify the levels and nature of counterterrorism funding within the Community; counterterrorism funding should be allocated in accordance with the program requirements of the national counterterrorism strategy; and due consideration should be given to directing an outside agency or entity to conduct a thorough and rigorous cost-benefit analysis of the resources spent on intelligence. 13. The State Department, in consultation with the Department of Justice, should review and report to the President and the Congress by June 30, 2003 on the extent to which revisions in bilateral and multilateral agreements, including extradition and mutual assistance treaties, would strengthen U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The review should address the degree to which current categories of extraditable offenses should be expanded to cover offenses, such as visa and immigration fraud, which may be particularly useful against terrorists and those who support them. 14. Recognizing the importance of intelligence in this nation's struggle against terrorism, Congress should maintain vigorous, informed, and constructive oversight of the Intelligence Community. To best achieve that goal, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States should study and make recommendations concerning how Congress may improve its oversight of the Intelligence Community, including consideration of such areas as: Changes in the budgetary process; changes in the rules regarding membership on the oversight committees; whether oversight responsibility should be vested in a joint House-Senate Committee or, as currently exists, in separate Committees in each house; the extent to which classification decisions impair congressional oversight; and how Congressional oversight can best contribute to the continuing need of the Intelligence Community to evolve and adapt to changes in the subject matter of intelligence and the needs of policy makers. 15. The President should review and consider amendments to the Executive Orders, policies and procedures that govern the national security classification of intelligence information, in an effort to expand access to relevant information for federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community, for state and local authorities, which are critical to the fight against terrorism, and for the American public. In addition, the President and the heads of federal agencies should ensure that the policies and procedures to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence information are well understood, fully implemented and vigorously enforced. Congress should also review the statutes, policies and procedures that govern the national security classification of intelligence information and its protection from unauthorized disclosure. Among other matters, Congress should consider the degree to which excessive classification has been used in the past and the extent to which the emerging threat environment has greatly increased the need for real- time sharing of sensitive information. The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, should review and report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on proposals for a new and more realistic approach to the processes and structures that have governed the designation of sensitive and classified information. The report should include proposals to protect against the use of the classification process as a shield to protect agency self-interest. 16. Assured standards of accountability are critical to developing the personal responsibility, urgency, and diligence which our counterterrorism responsibility requires. Given the absence of any substantial efforts within the Intelligence Community to impose accountability in relation to the events of September 11, 2001, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of Intelligence Community agencies should require that measures designed to ensure accountability are implemented throughout the Community. To underscore the need for accountability: The Director of Central Intelligence should report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees no later than June 30, 2003 as to the steps taken to implement a system of accountability throughout the Intelligence Community, to include processes for identifying poor performance and affixing responsibility for it, and for recognizing and rewarding excellence in performance; as part of the confirmation process for Intelligence Community officials, Congress should require from those officials an affirmative commitment to the implementation and use of strong accountability mechanisms throughout the Intelligence Community; and the Inspectors General at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State should review the factual findings and the record of this Inquiry and conduct investigations and reviews as necessary to determine whether and to what extent personnel at all levels should be held accountable for any omission, commission, or failure to meet professional standards in regard to the identification, prevention, or disruption of terrorist attacks, including the events of September 11, 2001. These reviews should also address those individuals who performed in a stellar or exceptional manner, and the degree to which the quality of their performance was rewarded or otherwise impacted their careers. Based on those investigations and reviews, agency heads should take appropriate disciplinary and other action and the President and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees should be advised of such action. 17. The Administration should review and report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees by June 30, 2003 regarding what progress has been made in reducing the inappropriate and obsolete barriers among intelligence and law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism, what remains to be done to reduce those barriers, and what legislative actions may be advisable in that regard. In particular, this report should address what steps are being taken to insure that perceptions within the Intelligence Community about the scope and limits of current law and policy with respect to restrictions on collection and information sharing are, in fact, accurate and well-founded. 18. Congress and the Administration should ensure the full development of a national watchlist center that will be responsible for coordinating and integrating all terrorist- related watchlist systems; promoting awareness and use of the center by all relevant government agencies and elements of the private sector; and ensuring a consistent and comprehensive flow of terrorist names into the center from all relevant points of collection. 19. The Intelligence Community, and particularly the FBI and the CIA, should aggressively address the possibility that foreign governments are providing support to or are involved in terrorist activity targeting the United States and U.S. interests. State-sponsored terrorism substantially increases the likelihood of successful and more lethal attacks within the United States. This issue must be addressed from a national standpoint and should not be limited in focus by the geographical and factual boundaries of individual cases. The FBI and CIA should aggressively and thoroughly pursue related matters developed through this Joint Inquiry that have been referred to them for further investigation by these Committees. The Intelligence Community should fully inform the House and Senate Intelligence Committees of significant developments in these efforts, through regular reports and additional communications as necessary, and the Committees should, in turn, exercise vigorous and continuing oversight of the Community's work in this critically important area.", u"Mr. President, I will address the amendment first in order, amendment No. 3826. This is offered to clarify the duties and responsibilities of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. The bill currently states that the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall serve as the principal adviser to the President and the national intelligence director on joint operations related to counterterrorism. This amendment strikes ``joint operations'' and inserts in lieu thereof ``strategic planning.'' The bill under consideration creates the National Counterterrorism Center to develop and unify strategy, to develop interagency terrorism plans, not to conduct joint operations. I call attention to page 83, lines 3, 9, and 10, of the committee print. In support of the bill under consideration, this amendment clarifies the role of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center to support planning and not conduct operations. It is the intent of this amendment to make it perfectly clear that the national counterterrorism director would have no control over the conduct of joint operations. Having the intelligence director to report directly to the President would be inappropriate. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense is the principal adviser to the President on military operations. As currently drafted, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall serve as the principal adviser to the President on joint operations. This is very unclear. Does it include military operations? Our amendment eliminates that ambiguity by striking ``joint operation'' and inserting ``strategic planning,'' which would appear to be consistent with the amendment adopted by the committee in the markup to change the directorate of operations to directorate of planning within the National Counterterrorism Center. I would hope that the manager of the bill would give this amendment serious consideration because I think it clears up a defect in the bill as it is presently written. Now I will address amendment No. 3829. This amendment would delay the implementation of the bill from 6 months to 1 year. I want to make it clear that this amendment would not delay the implementation of the office of the national intelligence director or the National Counterterrorism Center but gives the administration 6 more months to implement the many offices, councils, and changes in the intelligence community that the bill requires. We are facing an election. We do not know what the outcome of the election is, but to put the burdens of this bill in the first 6 months on the administration, whether it is the existing one or a new one, is entirely inappropriate. The first 6 months of a new Congress and the new year of an administration go by very quickly, and I think there is just too much to do with regard to budget, presentation of State of the Union message, so many other things, to have this implementation done within 6 months. I make this recommendation because many of the individuals I have spoken to in the intelligence community and those who appeared before our Appropriations Committee suggest that executing these changes should not be at an accelerated pace. Here are the important quotes from Dr. Kissinger. What I say and what I have written should be read in conjunction with a joint statement that is being issued today by the following group of individuals: former Senator Boren, former Senator Bradley, former Secretary of Defense Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Robert Gates, former Under Secretary of Defense John Hamre, former Senator Gary Hart, myself, former Senator Sam Nunn, former Senator Warren Rudman, and former Secretary of State George Shultz. It is obviously a bipartisan group, and we are concerned that the reforms of the magnitude that are being talked about and with the impact that they will have on the conduct of intelligence and on the national security machinery should not be rushed through in the last weeks of the congressional session in the middle of a Presidential election campaign. The consequences of this reform will inevitably produce months and maybe years of turmoil as the adjustments are made in the operating procedures of the national security apparatus and of the intelligence machinery. That is inherent to reform. But we should not have to explain in retrospect why it was so necessary to come to a conclusion in the middle of a Presidential election campaign. Whatever decisions are made this week, we will have to deal with the immediate terrorist challenge by the apparatus that now exists, as it has already been reformed in the light of the experience of September 11. So urgency should not trump substance. From Dr. John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense: Mr. Chairman, we are now very far along the road in this debate. Unfortunately, from my perspective, the shape of this debate has been driven more by political imperative than deep analysis of the challenges we face in this area. We do need intelligence reform, I believe. But I believe the debate to date, and the proposals before the Congress, are too narrowly constructed around one perceived failure of the intelligence community, and that is the failure to coordinate the activities of the components of the intelligence community. Without this extra 6 months, I feel the administration would be hard-pressed to meet the strict requirements, recommendations, and guidelines this bill imposes. It does not require a delay of 6 months; it just gives 6 more months. If they can do it in 2 months, fine, but why put a 6-month deadline when the study that is involved has a 6-month deadline? My amendment allows the President to move fast if he believes it is prudent but does not mandate a rush to finish. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment which would only work to help the administration to execute this mission well. The amendment strikes line 20 on page 130 of the bill and all text that follows to line 2 on page 153 which relates to creation of a huge information sharing network. The current occupant of the Chair will be very interested in this amendment. I understand the need for this office to be created, and my amendment will create such an office. But, it would strike the specific requirements and guidelines that the national intelligence director would have to follow to establish a network for intelligence information sharing. My amendment would allow the intelligence community, and more importantly the national intelligence director, to be using the information to determine what type of network they need. During our Committee hearings, Dr. Henry Kissinger made the following analysis: Different components of the government have different missions and priorities that cause them to assign different levels of importance to protecting intelligence information. Good management requires that, when there are contradictions between using intelligence and protecting it, decisions are made by established procedure. Sharing should be optimized, not managed in detail. To attempt to prescribe all the circumstance in bureaucratic or legalistic language would involve so much detail and so many exceptions as to defeat its own purpose. Also, sharing of this information will not be the ultimate panacea. ADM James Ellis, former Commander of U.S. Strategic Commander until a few months ago, made the following point: We should be wary of homogenizing centralized processes that, albeit unintentionally, may suppress or filter differing views. Recent op-ed pieces have noted the inevitability of surprise in our past and offered as well that often a surprise is a result of deficient analysis, not collection or even sharing of data. Also, from our intelligence reform hearings, Judge Richard Posner, from the 7th Circuit, Court of Appeals stated the following: The Commission thinks the reason the bits of information that might have been assembled into a mosaic spelling 9/11 never came together in one place is that no one person was in charge of intelligence. That is not the reason. The reason, or rather, the reasons are, first, that the volume of information is so vast that even with the continued rapid advances in data processing it cannot be collected, stored, retrieved and analyzed in a single database or even network of linked databases. Second, legitimate security concerns limit the degree to which confidential information can safely be shared, especially given the ever-present threat of moles like the infamous Aldrich Ames. And third, the different intelligence services and the subunits of each service tend, because information is power, to hoard it. Efforts to centralize the intelligence function are likely to lengthen the time it takes for intelligence and analyses to reach the President, reduce diversity and competition in the gathering and analysis of intelligence data, limit the number of threats given serious consideration and deprive the president of a range of alternative interpretations of ambiguous and incomplete data--and intelligence data will usually be ambiguous and incomplete. I point out that the administration's statement, so-called SAP which came from the administration, says: The administration also believes that the detail in which the legislation prescribes the network is excessive. The network would be more likely to accomplish its beneficial goal if the bill simply provided the authority necessary for its establishment while leaving the details to be worked out and altered as the circumstances require. I am also concerned with the very ambitious schedule that the bill delineates. In 90 days, just 3 months, the Director of OMB would be required to submit to the President and the Congress a description of the Network, establish a director of services and conduct a review of relevant current Federal agency capabilities; it would seem to me that we are setting the administration up to fail with such an unreasonable time frame. I am also concerned about the cost. The bill estimates this could cost at least $50 million dollars. Where would the funds for this program come from? Also, how would they influence existing programs to coordinate these activities? Currently there are not any funds designated for these activities. Would they be requested from a supplemental or would they be taken from the intelligence community's very tight budget? Also, I was hoping that the chairman and the ranking member could provide a clearer picture about the protection of civil liberties. I understand that the Privacy and Civil Liberties Boards will be included in discussions--but I worry about the extent to which--and I am quoting from the bill now: This is another czar. We already have an intelligence czar. Now this provision in this bill creates an information czar. It ``requires that the national intelligence director is to set standards for information technology and communication.'' By the way, it does not say necessarily related to intelligence--across the entire executive branch, for every Cabinet Secretary and I presume for the The NID would also develop an integrated information technology and communication network that ensures information sharing across the entire executive branch again for every Cabinet Secretary The scope of this is beyond comprehension. How can this group, now, created by the OMB, assure that privacy and civil liberties will be ensured when there is only one person at the helm, and that person is selected by the OMB? Am I reading the bill wrong? I don't think so. What purposes are to be gained from a governmentwide database that includes every part of the Government--Federal. State, local? Are we dreaming up a new net? Is this a new Internet? Is this a government net? What is it and why should we give one person the authority to control communications in this manner in this bill? It would create the largest technological surveillance system ever seen in the world. I repeat that: The largest technological surveillance system ever seen in the world. I think it should be given very thoughtful analysis. We have to give NID time to establish what and how such information should be gathered, how it is to be analyzed, how it is to be stored, and how it is to be shared. That is to take place in 90 days. I hope the administration, the committee members and their staff take a look at this amendment. This provision is going to delay this bill, unless my amendment is adopted or some form of that. Again, I am ready to hear if we have misanalyzed this, but we have checked it with people who have been in the system a long time and they agree our reading is correct. I again refer the administration and the committee to amendment No. 2837. That is a significant amendment, in my opinion. I turn my attention to amendment No. 3840. This is an amendment cosponsored by Senators Warner, Inouye, and the current occupant of the chair, Senator Burns. It concerns the acquisition of major intelligence systems. The purpose of this amendment is to strike the provisions of the bill which transfer major decisionmaking authorities relating to acquisition of national security and defense systems to the national intelligence director. My concern stems from a few items, based on the language in this bill. It is unclear to me and to us if the national intelligence director would be responsible for the creation of an entire new staff for the acquisition of major systems or if the Department of Defense shall have to transfer to the NID its personnel to provide the manpower, expertise, and staff for these acquisition functions. If that is the case, then how would the Department of Defense execute its own oversight of its own programs? And, if the national intelligence directorate were to have to use its own people until they can hire new people, the national director would have to fall back to utilizing the personnel of the existing agencies, the people Congress deemed in 2004 were the problem and not the solution. Until it is clear to the Secretary of Defense whether the national intelligence director must create a bureaucracy or parallel structure, it is my recommendation that we continue the current structure which permits the Secretary of Defense the decision authority over these vital programs. The NID should request what authority he needs. We should not give it all to him and then have the Secretary of Defense fight to get back some of the normal functions of the Department of Defense. The underlying bill leaves that determination now to NID to begin with. The Secretary of Defense should continue to oversee the execution of acquisition programs within his Department, and the agencies related to defense, especially those combat support agencies such as the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The Congress recognized the fact that neither the National Security Agency nor the National Geospatial Agency currently possess capability to manage major acquisition programs by passing the fiscal year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 108-354, which transferred these very responsibilities to the Department of Defense. We, the Senate, just transferred these authorities and responsibilities to the Department of Defense. What led to this transfer of acquisition responsibility was a series of critical mistakes regarding the ability to obtain and manage the acquisition of major systems. Some of these mistakes wound up costing the taxpayers close to $1 billion. This is not something we should experiment with, especially with new, untested leadership or personnel. I repeat, we just changed this this year. We moved it over to prevent the further loss of money and now the committee suggests it should be changed again and now put under a new director who has no experience and no background in acquisition at all. The administration has taken a policy in that statement, indicating they believe the committee's provision relating to the NID's role in acquisition of major systems needs further study to ensure that the requirements of major consumers are met. They understand this transfer is premature. It may be the Congress should reverse itself now and move this acquisition authority back to the NID. But let's let the NID get up and running. Let's find out whether we have confidence in that system before we take it away from the Department of Defense, when we just took it away from the Intelligence Committee because of the failures of the past. Finally, the language currently in the bill would only cover the Department of Defense programs and not the programs in the National Intelligence Program, and that is where the problems lie. I urge the Senate not to act in haste where such large amounts of funds are currently in play. They currently have a considerable amount of money we have already put up for these acquisitions. The Senate should not break a system that is now working well since this transfer earlier this year, nor put up obstacles to our obtaining major acquisition systems necessary for national security as quickly as possible. Again, I urge members of the committee to take a look at that. Mr. President, have I called up amendment No. 3882? If not, I do wish it to be called up at this time. I ask all other amendments be set aside and this be called up, amendment No. 3882.", u"The bill (H.R. 2417), as amended, was read the third time and passed, as follows: Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert: (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2004 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The National Reconnaissance Office. (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (12) The Coast Guard. (13) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2004, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill ____ of the One Hundred Eighth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2004 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2004 the sum of $198,390,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2005. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 310 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2004. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2004 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2005. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2004, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2004 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $37,090,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2005, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill ____ of the One Hundred Eighth Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law. (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) Consultation in Preparation.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure that any report, review, study, or plan required to be prepared or conducted by a provision of this Act, including a provision of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) or the classified annex to this Act, that involves the intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy is prepared or conducted in consultation with the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate. (2) The Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy may carry out any consultation required by this subsection through an official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, as the case may be, designated by such Secretary for that purpose. (b) Submittal.--Any report, review, study, or plan referred to in subsection (a) shall be submitted, in addition to any other committee of Congress specified for submittal in the provision concerned, to the following committees of Congress: (1) The Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) The Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2004 the sum of $226,400,000. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (A); (2) by striking subparagraph (B); and (3) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (B). (a) Increase of Thresholds for Notice.--Subsection (a) of section 602 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 U.S.C. 403- 2b(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``$750,000'' each place it appears and inserting ``$5,000,000''; and (2) by striking ``$500,000'' each place it appears and inserting ``$1,000,000''. (b) Notice and Wait Requirements for Emergency Projects.-- Subsection (b)(2) of that section is amended-- (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as clauses (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively; (2) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2) Report.--''; (3) by striking ``21-day period'' and inserting ``7-day period''; and (4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), a project referred to in paragraph (1) may begin on the date the notification is received by the appropriate committees of Congress under that paragraph if the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine that-- ``(i) an emergency exists with respect to the national security or the protection of health, safety, or environmental quality; and ``(ii) any delay in the commencement of the project would harm any or all of those interests.''. (a) In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, carry out a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of permitting intelligence analysts of various elements of the intelligence community to access and analyze intelligence from the databases of other elements of the intelligence community in order to achieve the objectives set forth in subsection (c). (b) Covered Intelligence.--The intelligence to be analyzed under the pilot program under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) Signals intelligence of the National Security Agency. (2) Such intelligence of other elements of the intelligence community as the Director shall select for purposes of the pilot program. (c) Objectives.--The objectives set forth in this subsection are as follows: (1) To enhance the capacity of the intelligence community to undertake so-called ``all source fusion'' analysis in support of the intelligence and intelligence-related missions of the intelligence community. (2) To reduce, to the extent practicable, the amount of intelligence collected by the intelligence community that is not assessed, or reviewed, by intelligence analysts. (3) To reduce the burdens imposed on analytical personnel of the elements of the intelligence community by current practices regarding the sharing of intelligence among elements of the intelligence community. (d) Commencement.--The Director shall commence the pilot program under subsection (a) not later than December 31, 2003. (e) Various Mechanisms Required.--In carrying out the pilot program under subsection (a), the Director shall develop and utilize various mechanisms to facilitate the access to, and the analysis of, intelligence in the databases of the intelligence community by intelligence analysts of other elements of the intelligence community, including the use of so-called ``detailees in place''. (f) Security.--(1) In carrying out the pilot program under subsection (a), the Director shall take appropriate actions to protect against the disclosure and unauthorized use of intelligence in the databases of the elements of the intelligence community which may endanger sources and methods which (as determined by the Director) warrant protection. (2) The actions taken under paragraph (1) shall include the provision of training on the accessing and handling of information in the databases of various elements of the intelligence community and the establishment of limitations on access to information in such databases to United States persons. (g) Assessment.--Not later than February 1, 2004, after the commencement under subsection (d) of the pilot program under subsection (a), the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production shall jointly carry out an assessment of the progress of the pilot program in meeting the objectives set forth in subsection (c). (h) Report.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the assessment carried out under subsection (g). (2) The report shall include-- (A) a description of the pilot program under subsection (a); (B) the findings of the Under Secretary and Assistant Director as a result of the assessment; (C) any recommendations regarding the pilot program that the Under Secretary and the Assistant Director jointly consider appropriate in light of the assessment; and (D) any recommendations that the Director and Secretary consider appropriate for purposes of the report. (i) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (a) Pilot Program Required.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of providing for the preparation of selected students for availability for employment as intelligence analysts for the intelligence and intelligence- related activities of the United States through a training program similar to the Reserve Officers' Training Corps programs of the Department of Defense. (2) The pilot program shall be known as the Intelligence Community Analyst Training Program. (b) Elements.--In carrying out the pilot program under subsection (a), the Director shall establish and maintain one or more cadres of students who-- (1) participate in such training as intelligence analysts as the Director considers appropriate; and (2) upon completion of such training, are available for employment as intelligence analysts under such terms and conditions as the Director considers appropriate. (c) Duration.--The Director shall carry out the pilot program under subsection (a) during fiscal years 2004 through 2006. (d) Limitation on Number of Members During Fiscal Year 2004.--The total number of individuals participating in the pilot program under subsection (a) during fiscal year 2004 may not exceed 150 students. (e) Responsibility.--The Director shall carry out the pilot program under subsection (a) through the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. (f) Reports.--(1) Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to Congress a preliminary report on the pilot program under subsection (a), including a description of the pilot program and the authorities to be utilized in carrying out the pilot program. (2) Not later than one year after the commencement of the pilot program, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the pilot program. The report shall include-- (A) a description of the activities under the pilot program, including the number of individuals who participated in the pilot program and the training provided such individuals under the pilot program; (B) an assessment of the effectiveness of the pilot program in meeting the purpose of the pilot program; and (C) any recommendations for additional legislative or administrative action that the Director considers appropriate in light of the pilot program. (g) Funding.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act, $8,000,000 shall be available in fiscal year 2004 to carry out this section. Section 1007(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2442; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by striking ``September 1, 2003,'' and inserting ``September 1, 2004,''. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) Funds within the National Foreign Intelligence Program often must be shifted from program to program and from fiscal year to fiscal year to address funding shortfalls caused by significant increases in the costs of acquisition of major systems by the intelligence community. (2) While some increases in the costs of acquisition of major systems by the intelligence community are unavoidable, the magnitude of growth in the costs of acquisition of many major systems indicates a systemic bias within the intelligence community to underestimate the costs of such acquisition, particularly in the preliminary stages of development and production. (3) Decisions by Congress to fund the acquisition of major systems by the intelligence community rely significantly upon initial estimates of the affordability of acquiring such major systems and occur within a context in which funds can be allocated for a variety of alternative programs. Thus, substantial increases in costs of acquisition of major systems place significant burdens on the availability of funds for other programs and new proposals within the National Foreign Intelligence Program. (4) Independent cost estimates, prepared by independent offices, have historically represented a more accurate projection of the costs of acquisition of major systems. (5) Recognizing the benefits associated with independent cost estimates for the acquisition of major systems, the Secretary of Defense has built upon the statutory requirement in section 2434 of title 10, United States Code, to develop and consider independent cost estimates for the acquisition of such systems by mandating the use of such estimates in budget requests of the Department of Defense. (6) The mandatory use throughout the intelligence community of independent cost estimates for the acquisition of major systems will assist the President and Congress in the development and funding of budgets which more accurately reflect the requirements and priorities of the United States Government for intelligence and intelligence-related activities. (b) Budget Treatment of Costs of Acquisition of Major Systems.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506 the following new section:", u" The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 21 offered by Mr. Armey: Page 13, line 20, strike ``The Secretary'' and insert ``With respect to homeland security, the Secretary''. Page 22, line 13, strike ``Under the direction of the Secretary, developing'' and insert ``Developing''. Page 24, lines 10 to 11, strike ``and to other areas of responsibility described in section 101(b)''. Page 25, lines 9 to 10, strike ``and to other areas of responsibility described in section 101(b)''. Page 24, line 12, strike ``concerning infrastructure or other vulnerabilities'' and insert ``concerning infrastructure vulnerabilities or other vulnerabilities''. Page 25, lines 11 to 12, strike ``concerning infrastructure or other vulnerabilities'' and insert ``concerning infrastructure vulnerabilities or other vulnerabilities''. Page 28, line 14, strike ``(1) and (2)'' and insert ``(2) and (3)''. Page 19, line 16, strike ``Director of Homeland Security'' and insert ``President''. Page 43, line 11, strike ``the Congress'' and insert ``the appropriate congressional committees''. Page 142, line 2, insert ``including'' before ``interventions''. Page 142, line 4, insert a comma after ``asters''. In section 811(f)(1)-- (1) insert ``or'' before ``Harbor''; and (2) strike ``or Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund''. In section 205(1), strike ``information'' the first place it appears. In section 205(3) insert ``and regulatory'' after ``legislative''. In section 302, strike paragraph (1) and redesignate the subsequent paragraphs in order as paragraphs (1) and (2). In section 305(d), strike ``section 302(2)(D)'' and insert ``302(1)(D)''. Strike section 906, and redesignate sections 907 through 913 as sections 906 through 912, respectively. In section 301-- (1) in paragraph (8), strike ``homeland security, including'' and all that follows and insert ``homeland security; and''; (2) strike paragraph (9); and (3) redesignate paragraph (10) as paragraph (9). In title III, add at the end the following section: (a) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall establish and promote a program to encourage technological innovation in facilitating the mission of the Department (as described in section 101). (b) Elements of Program.--The program described in subsection (a) shall include the following components: (1) The establishment of a centralized Federal clearinghouse for information relating to technologies that would further the mission of the Department for dissemination, as appropriate, to Federal, State, and local government and private sector entities for additional review, purchase, or use. (2) The issuance of announcements seeking unique and innovative technologies to advance the mission of the Department. (3) The establishment of a technical assistance team to assist in screening, as appropriate, proposals submitted to the Secretary (except as provided in subsection (c)(2)) to assess the feasibility, scientific and technical merits, and estimated cost of such proposals, as appropriate. (4) The provision of guidance, recommendations, and technical assistance, as appropriate, to assist Federal, State, and local government and private sector efforts to evaluate and implement the use of technologies described in paragraph (1) or (2). (5) The provision of information for persons seeking guidance on how to pursue proposals to develop or deploy technologies that would enhance homeland security, including information relating to Federal funding, regulation, or acquisition. (c) Miscellaneous Provisions.-- (1) In general.--Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the Secretary or the technical assistance team established under subsection (b)(3) to set standards for technology to be used by the Department, any other executive agency, any State or local government entity, or any private sector entity. (2) Certain proposals.--The technical assistance team established under subsection (b)(3) shall not consider or evaluate proposals submitted in response to a solicitation for offers for a pending procurement or for a specific agency requirement. (3) Coordination.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall coordinate with the Technical Support Working Group (organized under the April 1982 National Security Decision Directive Numbered 30). In title II, at the end of subtitle A add the following: In carrying out the responsibilities under section 201, the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection shall-- (1) as appropriate, provide to State and local government entities, and upon request to private entitites that own or operate critical information systems-- (A) analysis and warnings related to threats to, and vulnerabilities of, critical information systems; and (B) in coordination with the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, crisis management support in response to threats to, or attacks on, critical information systems; and (2) as appropriate, provide technical assistance, upon request, to the private sector and other government entities, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, with respect to emergency recovery plans to respond to major failures of critical information systems. At the end of title II add the following: The Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection may establish a national technology guard, to be known as ``NET Guard'', comprised of local teams of volunteers with expertise in relevant areas of science and technology, to assist local communities to respond and recover from attacks on information systems and communications networks. Strike section 814. In section 761-- (1) in the proposed section 9701(b)(3)(D) strike ``title'' and insert ``part''; and (2) in the proposed section 9701(c), strike ``title'' and insert ``part''. At the end of title VII, insert the following new section: (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following: (1) Section 1385 of title 18, United States Code (commonly known as the ``Posse Comitatus Act''), prohibits the use of the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus to execute the laws except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. (2) Enacted in 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act was expressly intended to prevent United States Marshals, on their own initiative, from calling on the Army for assistance in enforcing Federal law. (3) The Posse Comitatus Act has served the Nation well in limiting the use of the Armed Forces to enforce the law. (4) Nevertheless, by its express terms, the Posse Comitatus Act is not a complete barrier to the use of the Armed Forces for a range of domestic purposes, including law enforcement functions, when the use of the Armed Forces is authorized by Act of Congress or the President determines that the use of the Armed Forces is required to fulfill the President's obligations under the Constitution to respond promptly in time of war, insurrection, or other serious emergency. (5) Existing laws, including chapter 15 of title 10, United States Code (commonly known as the ``Insurrection Act''), and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), grant the President broad powers that may be invoked in the event of domestic emergencies, including an attack against the Nation using weapons of mass destruction, and these laws specifically authorize the President to use the Armed Forces to help restore public order. (b) Sense of Congress.--The Congress reaffirms the continued importance of section 1385 of title 18, United States Code, and it is the sense of the Congress that nothing in this Act should be construed to alter the applicability of such section to any use of the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus to execute the laws. Amend the heading for section 766 to read as follows: In section 766-- (1) before the first sentence insert the following: ``(a) ``Regulatory Authority.--''; and (2) at the end of the section add the following: (b) Preemption of State or Local Law.--Except as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act preempts no State or local law, except that any authority to preempt State or local law vested in any Federal agency or official transferred to the Department pursuant to this Act shall be transferred to the Department effective on the date of the transfer to the Department of that Federal agency or official. Page 31, after line 5, insert the following: In carrying out the responsibilities under section 201, the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection shall-- (1) as appropriate, provide to State and local government entities, and, upon request, to private entities that own or operate critical information systems-- (A) analysis and warnings related to threats to, and vulnerabilities of, critical information systems; and (B) in coordination with the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, crisis management support in response to threats to, or attacks on, critical information systems; and (2) as appropriate, provide technical assistance, upon request, to the private sector and with other government entities, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, with respect to emergency recovery plans to respond to major failures of critical information systems. At the end of the bill add the following new title: (a) Short Title.--The amendments made by this title may be cited as the ``Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002''. (b) Information Security.-- (1) In general.--Subchapter II of chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``The purposes of this subchapter are to-- ``(1) provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over information resources that support Federal operations and assets; ``(2) recognize the highly networked nature of the current Federal computing environment and provide effective governmentwide management and oversight of the related information security risks, including coordination of information security efforts throughout the civilian, national security, and law enforcement communities; ``(3) provide for development and maintenance of minimum controls required to protect Federal information and information systems; ``(4) provide a mechanism for improved oversight of Federal agency information security programs; ``(5) acknowledge that commercially developed information security products offer advanced, dynamic, robust, and effective information security solutions, reflecting market solutions for the protection of critical information infrastructures important to the national defense and economic security of the nation that are designed, built, and operated by the private sector; and ``(6) recognize that the selection of specific technical hardware and software information security solutions should be left to individual agencies from among commercially developed products.''. Section 5131 of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (40 U.S.C. 1441) is amended to read as follows: Section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3), is amended by striking the text and inserting the following: ``(a) The Institute shall-- ``(1) have the mission of developing standards, guidelines, and associated methods and techniques for information systems; ``(2) develop standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, for information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency, other than national security systems (as defined in section 3532(b)(2) of title 44, United States Code); ``(3) develop standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, for providing adequate information security for all agency operations and assets, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems; and ``(4) carry out the responsibilities described in paragraph (3) through the Computer Security Division. ``(b) The standards and guidelines required by subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum-- ``(1)(A) standards to be used by all agencies to categorize all information and information systems collected or maintained by or on behalf of each agency based on the objectives of providing appropriate levels of information security according to a range of risk levels; ``(B) guidelines recommending the types of information and information systems to be included in each such category; and ``(C) minimum information security requirements for information and information systems in each such category; ``(2) a definition of and guidelines concerning detection and handling of information security incidents; and ``(3) guidelines developed in coordination with the National Security Agency for identifying an information system as a national security system consistent with applicable requirements for national security systems, issued in accordance with law and as directed by the President. ``(c) In developing standards and guidelines required by subsections (a) and (b), the Institute shall-- ``(1) consult with other agencies and offices (including, but not limited to, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Departments of Defense and Energy, the National Security Agency, the General Accounting Office, and the Secretary of Homeland Security) to assure-- ``(A) use of appropriate information security policies, procedures, and techniques, in order to improve information security and avoid unnecessary and costly duplication of effort; and ``(B) that such standards and guidelines are complementary with standards and guidelines employed for the protection of national security systems and information contained in such systems; ``(2) provide the public with an opportunity to comment on proposed standards and guidelines; ``(3) submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget for promulgation under section 5131 of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (40 U.S.C. 1441)-- ``(A) standards, as required under subsection (b)(1)(A), no later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this section; and ``(B) minimum information security requirements for each category, as required under subsection (b)(1)(C), no later than 36 months after the date of the enactment of this section; ``(4) issue guidelines as required under subsection (b)(1)(B), no later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act; ``(5) ensure that such standards and guidelines do not require specific technological solutions or products, including any specific hardware or software security solutions; ``(6) ensure that such standards and guidelines provide for sufficient flexibility to permit alternative solutions to provide equivalent levels of protection for identified information security risks; and ``(7) use flexible, performance-based standards and guidelines that, to the greatest extent possible, permit the use of off-the-shelf commercially developed information security products.'' ``(d) The Institute shall-- ``(1) submit standards developed pursuant to subsection (a), along with recommendations as to the extent to which these should be made compulsory and binding, to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget for promulgation under section 5131 of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (40 U.S.C. 1441); ``(2) provide assistance to agencies regarding-- ``(A) compliance with the standards and guidelines developed under subsection (a); ``(B) detecting and handling information security incidents; and ``(C) information security policies, procedures, and practices; ``(3) conduct research, as needed, to determine the nature and extent of information security vulnerabilities and techniques for providing cost-effective information security; ``(4) develop and periodically revise performance indicators and measures for agency information security policies and practices; ``(5) evaluate private sector information security policies and practices and commercially available information technologies to assess potential application by agencies to strengthen information security; ``(6) evaluate security policies and practices developed for national security systems to assess potential application by agencies to strengthen information security; ``(7) periodically assess the effectiveness of standards and guidelines developed under this section and undertake revisions as appropriate; ``(8) solicit and consider the recommendations of the Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board, established by section 21, regarding standards and guidelines developed under subsection (a) and submit such recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget with such standards submitted to the Director; and ``(9) prepare an annual public report on activities undertaken in the previous year, and planned for the coming year, to carry out responsibilities under this section. ``(e) As used in this section-- ``(1) the term `agency' has the same meaning as provided in section 3502(1) of title 44, United States Code; ``(2) the term `information security' has the same meaning as provided in section 3532(1) of such title; ``(3) the term `information system' has the same meaning as provided in section 3502(8) of such title; ``(4) the term `information technology' has the same meaning as provided in section 5002 of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (40 U.S.C. 1401); and ``(5) the term `national security system' has the same meaning as provided in section 3532(b)(2) of such title.''. Section 21 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-4), is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board'' and inserting ``Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board''; (2) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``computer or telecommunications'' and inserting ``information technology''; (3) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) by striking ``computer or telecommunications technology'' and inserting ``information technology''; and (B) by striking ``computer or telecommunications equipment'' and inserting ``information technology''; (4) in subsection (a)(3)-- (A) by striking ``computer systems'' and inserting ``information system''; and (B) by striking ``computer systems security'' and inserting ``information security''; (5) in subsection (b)(1) by striking ``computer systems security'' and inserting ``information security''; (6) in subsection (b) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following: ``(2) to advise the Institute and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget on information security and privacy issues pertaining to Federal Government information systems, including through review of proposed standards and guidelines developed under section 20; and''; (7) in subsection (b)(3) by inserting ``annually'' after ``report''; (8) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection: ``(f) The Board shall hold meetings at such locations and at such time and place as determined by a majority of the Board.''; (9) by redesignating subsections (f) and (g) as subsections (g) and (h), respectively; and (10) by striking subsection (h), as redesignated by paragraph (9), and inserting the following: ``(h) As used in this section, the terms ``information system'' and ``information technology'' have the meanings given in section 20.''. (a) Computer Security Act.--Sections 5 and 6 of the Computer Security Act of 1987 (40 U.S.C. 1441 note) are repealed. (b) Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.--The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398) is amended by striking subtitle G of title X. (c) Paperwork Reduction Act.--(1) Section 3504(g) of title 44, United States Code, is amended-- (A) by adding ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1); (B) in paragraph (2)-- (i) by striking ``sections 5 and 6 of the Computer Security Act of 1987 (40 U.S.C. 759 note)'' and inserting ``subchapter II of this title''; and (ii) by striking the semicolon and inserting a period; and (C) by striking paragraph (3). (2) Section 3505 of such title is amended by adding at the end-- ``(c)(1) The head of each agency shall develop and maintain an inventory of the information systems (including national security systems) operated by or under the control of such agency; ``(2) The identification of information systems in an inventory under this subsection shall include an identification of the interfaces between each such system and all other systems or networks, including those not operated by or under the control of the agency; ``(3) Such inventory shall be-- ``(A) updated at least annually; ``(B) made available to the Comptroller General; and ``(C) used to support information resources management, including-- ``(i) preparation and maintenance of the inventory of information resources under section 3506(b)(4); ``(ii) information technology planning, budgeting, acquisition, and management under section 3506(h), the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, and related laws and guidance; ``(iii) monitoring, testing, and evaluation of information security controls under subchapter II; ``(iv) preparation of the index of major information systems required under section 552(g) of title 5, United States Code; and ``(v) preparation of information system inventories required for records management under chapters 21, 29, 31, and 33. ``(4) The Director shall issue guidance for and oversee the implementation of the requirements of this subsection.''. (3) Section 3506(g) of such title is amended-- (A) by adding ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1); (B) in paragraph (2)-- (i) by striking ``the Computer Security Act of 1987 (40 U.S.C. 759 note)'' and inserting ``subchapter II of this title''; and (ii) by striking the semicolon and inserting a period; and (C) by striking paragraph (3). Nothing in this Act, or the amendments made by this Act, affects the authority of the National Institute of Standards and Technology or the Department of Commerce relating to the development and promulgation of standards or guidelines under paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 20(a) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g- 3(a)). In section 752(b)(1), strike ``and extensive''. In section 752(b)(1), strike ``and'' and insert ``or''. In section 752(b)(6), strike ``evaluation'' and insert ``Evaluation''. At the end of section 752(b), insert: (7) Anti-terrorism technology that would be effective in facilitating the defense against acts of terrorism. In section 753(d)(1), insert ``or other'' after ``liability''. In section 753(d)(3), strike ``those products'' and insert ``anti-terrorism technology''. In section 753(d)(3), strike ``product'' and insert ``anti- terrorism technology''. In section 754(a)(1), strike, ``to non-federal'' and insert ``to Federal and non-Federal''. In section 754(a)(1), insert ``and certified by the Secretary'' after ``section''. In section 755(1), strike ``device, or technology designed, developed, or modified'' and insert ``equipment, service (including support services), device, or technology (including information technology) designed, developed, modified, or procured''. Page 182, line 2, strike ``and'' and insert ``or''. At the end of subtitle G of title VII of the bill, add the following (and conform the table of contents of the bill accordingly): The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (49 U.S.C. 40101 note) is amended-- (1) in section 408 by striking the last sentence of subsection (c); and (2) in section 402 by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following: ``(1) Air carrier.--The term `air carrier' means a citizen of the United States undertaking by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air transportation and includes employees and agents (including persons engaged in the business of providing air transportation security and their affiliates) of such citizen. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term `agent', as applied to persons engaged in the business of providing air transportation security, shall only include persons that have contracted directly with the Federal Aviation Administration on or after February 17, 2002, to provide such security, or are not debarred.''. Page 12, line 5, strike ``and''. Page 12, line 9, strike the period and insert ``; and''. Page 12, after line 9, insert the following: (G) monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking. Page 195, line 16, after ``terrorism.'' insert: ``Such official shall-- (1) ensure the adequacy of resources within the Department for illicit drug interdiction; and (2) serve as the United States Interdiction Coordinator for the Director of National Drug Control Policy.''. In section 307(b)(1)-- (1) strike ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (A); (2) redesignate subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); and (3) after subparagraph (A), insert the following new subparagraph: (B) ensure that the research funded is of high quality, as determined through merit review processes developed under section 301(10); and In section 766 of the bill, insert ``sections 305(c) and 752(c) of'' after ``provided in''. Add at the end of title V of the bill the following section: It is the sense of the Congress that States should give particular emphasis to developing and implementing the trauma care and burn center care components of the State plans for the provision of emergency medical services using funds authorized through Public Law 107-188 for grants to improve State, local, and hospital preparedness for and response to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 502, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey), and a Member opposed each will control 20 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey).", u"Mr. President, this year's bill once again attempts to help the intelligence community make the transition to a post-cold-war world where the looming military threat of the Soviet Union has been replaced by a more subtle--but increasingly serious--array of threats. The committee has attempted to help intelligence make the transition with a series of provisions in the bill to reform the community's weaknesses and renew its confidence in itself and in the products it provides to policy makers. Chairman Specter has been key in ensuring the committee has moved forward to recommend to the Senate important changes in the intelligence community. Under his leadership, we have examined in detail many shortcomings and failures which can only lead to the conclusion substantial change is in order. Without Chairman Specter's tireless efforts on the part of reform and renewal, the committee would not have been able to get to the point where we are today: recommending improvements that will have far reaching effects and make sure the intelligence community is positioned to understand the threats of tomorrow. This year's bill also seeks to provide an adequate level of funding for the intelligence community, with the committee seeking a modest, 1 percent increase to the President's request. Congress has cut the DCI's request for national intelligence each year for the past 7 years, and I believe stress and strain in our national intelligence capabilities will follow unless we reverse this trend. However, since this bill was marked up in April, the defense authorization conference acted to cut national intelligence by some 3 percent and the ongoing defense authorization conference is likely to redirect funds requested by the administration for national intelligence to other defense programs. I am discouraged that there seems to be no constituency of support for national intelligence, even in a year in which the Congress is adding significant resources to the defense budget. I opened my remarks by saying the committee is once again attempting to reform and renew intelligence because it engaged in a similar effort as part of the fiscal year 1993 National Foreign Intelligence Program authorization process. The committee ran into many roadblocks in the fall of 1992 which prevented it from moving ahead with substantial reforms. Unfortunately, the committee finds itself in somewhat of a similar position today. Nevertheless, we are offering reforms which hopefully will point us in the direction of improved intelligence support to policy makers while at the same time streamlining some of the Intelligence community's procedures so they are more responsive to the evolving international environment. There are many reasons for intelligence reform and renewal. Several of the most significant have found their way into the media. We are all aware of the Aldrich Ames spy case where a CIA operations officer gave some of our most sensitive information to the Soviet Union reportedly resulting directly in the deaths of at least 10 people. We also know about the excess funds retained by the National Reconnaissance Office which prevented this funding from being available for more immediate projects. Incidents such as these help to underscore the need for reform. The need for reform is widely recognized outside of the Congress. Last year Congress authorized a special commission to ``conduct a comprehensive review of American intelligence.'' In March of this year, the Commission issued a 217-page report containing over 36 recommendations for significant change. Similarly, the Council on Foreign Relations this year issued its own report on the need for intelligence reform. Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy added its call for reform in a report entitled, ``Checklist for the Future of Intelligence.'' And the executive branch recognizes the need for reform as well. Their recognition is perhaps captured best by a CIA task force with the foreboding name of the ``Intelligence Community Revolution Task Force'' which called for sweeping changes. The need for reform must be balanced by at least two considerations. First, the intelligence community is full of dedicated men and women who, through a sense of patriotism and a desire to serve their country, will successfully take the intelligence community into the 21st century. They will be mentally ready to confront any challenge. Second, reform does not mean we should create a ``Department of Intelligence.'' Intelligence supports policy. It informs leaders throughout the Government and does not have to be organized as a separate part of the Government in order to be effective. What must be done, however, is to create an organization capable of capitalizing upon the abilities of its dedicated men and women and organize it so the leaders of the intelligence community have the authorities commensurate with the responsibilities for which we hold them accountable. The Congress and many parts of the executive branch expect only the best intelligence, and the community must be prepared to serve all segments of the Government, including the Department of Defense. In this regard, I would like to take this opportunity to thank our colleagues on the Armed Services Committee. We have worked together to make sure intelligence support will be improved in the future and to guarantee our unsurpassed defense capabilities remain intact. Without the support of the chairman and ranking member, we would not be able to present a comprehensive package of reform to the Senate in which we all have confidence we are doing the right thing. This year, we voted a bill out of Committee: First, changing intelligence support to policymakers so the community could better capitalize on the rich resources of its people; second, enhancing some of the powers of the Director of Central Intelligence so he would be able to exercise all of the necessary authorities in the areas for which we recognize his responsibility; and third, reorganizing parts of the intelligence community so that it is better structured for the profusion of different threats endemic to the post cold war world. In order to support policymakers better, the bill we introduce today contains several important innovations. First, it creates a Committee on Foreign Intelligence as part of the National Security Council. This committee would meet at least semiannually to provide broad guidance to the intelligence community on major issues. In addition to ensuring that intelligence would more closely support the needs of all policymakers in the Government, it would be required to document the priorities of the policymaking community so that intelligence would know how to allocate its relatively scarce resources. Second, the bill creates a Committee on Transnational Threats as part of the National Security Council. In many ways, the threats to our national security have changed significantly since the bipolar world where the Free World confronted a Communist bloc. The role of the nation state is evolving into something different and several increasingly serious threats to the United States crossnational boundaries. Among these, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--and their means of delivery--appear as the most significant. The policy community, however, still largely focuses on a world composed of nations which only theoretically control the destinies of all mankind. The intelligence community is struggling to bring the transnational threats to the forefront but, since intelligence supports policy and not vice versa, its warnings sometimes go unheeded. The Committee on Transnational Threats will help to change the focus to the new international disorder. Mr. President, the committee harbors no illusions about the possible destinies of these committees. We all know quite well the usefulness of the Low Intensity Conflict Board, an NSC-level board established by the Congress to force the policy community to address the growing importance of low-intensity conflict. The Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the Committee on Transnational Threats both could become the moribund bodies the low intensity conflict board has become. Nonetheless, our committee feels so strongly that intelligence can support policy properly only if the policy makers change their approach to international threats, we believe it is best to allow the intelligence community to focus its efforts in new and different ways based on NSC-level committees. We recommend the Congress should take the risk and create these two committees so the necessary tools will be available to the President if he chooses to use them. Our bill also requires the President to submit an annual report to Congress on intelligence needs and priorities for the next fiscal year and assess the performance of the intelligence community during the previous fiscal year. We envision this to be a companion document to the national security strategy of the United States which the President is required by law to submit annually to Congress. We believe this will help the Congress decide whether intelligence is supporting policy. As such, it will allow the Congress to make the tough decisions on which programs should be funded and reject those programs inconsistent with the President's national security strategy and congressional priorities. In some respects, the bill has created controversy in the manner with which it addresses the office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Most Americans expect the DCI to be a director. After 49 years of experience, however, it is still painfully obvious he is the coordinator of central intelligence, not the director. Each year, after he negotiates with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy and the FBI Director, the DCI assembles an intelligence budget. It often reflects what is bureaucratically possible instead of what is required. Therefore, he does not direct anything in the fundamental way any leader steers an organization. He does not direct the intelligence community because he does not create a budget based on his own tough decisions. To make matters worse, once he assembles the budget and Congress approves it, the DCI does not control how the money is spent. That control belongs to the people with whom he negotiated in the first place: the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the FBI Director. Since the bill's provisions dealing with budget control have created such controversy--sometimes misrepresented in the media as an attempt to create a ``Department of Intelligence''--the committee is reporting a bill at this late date with fewer DCI budget authorities than originally believed to be important. Nonetheless, there are some innovations still in the bill which will help the DCI better execute his responsibilities. Among these innovations is the creation of the positions of three Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence. Generally, intelligence is conducted in three steps. First, information is collected. Second, the information is analyzed and a report is written. Third, the report is disseminated to policy-makers. Today, no one other than the DCI is personally responsible for the collection of the information and its analysis. I think we can all agree the DCI is far too busy to focus on each day's priorities and requirements for collecting information. Further, he cannot personally supervise the daily work of the thousands of intelligence analysts to ensure their reports are properly focused, comprehensive, and delivered on time. Thus, the DCI relies on a series of interagency committees to help him manage intelligence collection and analysis. We all know what it means when someone says a committee is in charge: no one is in charge. The bill attempts to correct this lack of accountability for intelligence collection and analysis by creating assistant directors who will be in charge of those areas important for the production of intelligence. The bill also creates a third Assistant Director of Central Intelligence. Today, most people believe the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for administering an intelligence community consisting of tens of thousands of people. But, like the areas of intelligence collection and analysis, there is no one other than the DCI who is personally responsible for the daily management of the rambling institution we call the intelligence community. In order to assist the DCI in the daily execution of this important responsibility, the bill creates the position of an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration. The committee also has attempted in this bill to strengthen the DCI's abilities to discharge his responsibilities by statutorily requiring his participation in important executive branch deliberations. As many of my colleagues will remember, late last year the media carried stories stating the National Reconnaissance Office had amassed a large amount of funds excess to their immediate needs. Responding quickly in the media, senior Defense officials placed blame elsewhere. They accused the congressional oversight committees of being lax. They said a secret agreement between the DCI and Secretary of Defense prevented the Office of the Secretary of Defense from keeping tabs on NRO funding. They said excess funding levels found in the NRO would not be found in DOD programs because the NRO was not ``subject to the annual [DOD] programming and budgeting `scrub'.'' Based on these rapid Department of Defense off the record denials in the press, everyone turned to the DCI and asked, ``Where were you?'' As it turns out Mr. President, there was no secret agreement between DOD and the DCI. In fact, there was no agreement, secret or otherwise. When asked to produce a copy of the supposed agreement, the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided the committee with a memo signed in the early 1980's. In it, the Secretary of Defense simply reminded his staff they could not add or take money away from the National Foreign Intelligence Program without officially coordinating it with the DCI. Further, at the committee's request, the DOD Inspector General looked at eight of DOD's hundreds of procurement programs to see if there were funding levels in excess of annual requirements such as those Congress found in the NRO. The results are quite enlightening. Despite DOD s earlier denials in the media, five of the eight randomly selected programs had more money available than they needed in 1996. On the average, these five programs had almost 3 months extra funding. In fact, one program had 10 months more funding available to it than it could use in 1996. So after only a superficial IG evaluation of several DOD programs and despite DOD's protestations and claims of budget scrubs, we know DOD ends up each year with more funds than they can spend. I do not say this in criticism of Defense managers, but rather to point to a characteristic common to complex multi-year efforts involving new technology, regardless of the Government department responsible for them. What may be a surprise is the answer to the question: where was the DCI when the National Reconnaissance Office was accumulating a backlog of spending authority? The answer is, the DCI has no authority over how the NRO spends its money after Congress authorizes and appropriates the funds. Having no direct authority to move money around or to determine if the money could be spent better elsewhere, it should not be a surprise the DCI was not monitoring NRO's execution of its budget. That authority rested with the Secretary of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence does not have the authority to execute the intelligence budget. This has many serious consequences both from an internal executive branch oversight perspective and from an operational perspective. Budget execution authority has occupied a lot of the committee's attention. In the original version of the bill, the committee attempted to give the DCI greater authority over his own budget. In order to get the bill to this stage in the annual authorization process, however, we have dropped several provisions which would have ensured greater internal oversight of spending on intelligence. Nonetheless, the bill still gives the Director some insight into the Joint Military Intelligence Program, and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities--programs funded by the Department of Defense. While a modest improvement in aligning the DCI's authorities with his responsibilities, this new authority is important for ensuring better intelligence support of policy and for improving internal executive branch oversight of the Intelligence Community. The bill also has one other significant improvement for ensuring better oversight of intelligence. The committee is recommending the position of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. As stated in its report, the committee believes the confirmation process enhances accountability and strengthens the oversight process. Currently, all elements of the intelligence community, except the CIA, are part of departments having statutory general counsels who are Senate confirmed. Many legal issues are unique to the CIA. Unlike the other Senate-confirmed general counsels, there is little informed public debate to aid the CIA's general counsel in its deliberations because the issues often involve sensitive intelligence sources or methods. The confirmation process allows the Senate to ensure better accountability and oversight of this important position. Finally, the bill enhances the Director of Central Intelligence's authorities by giving him a formal say in the naming of the directors of two of his most important agencies: the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office. Under current law and regulation, the Secretary of Defense could name the heads of these two intelligence community agencies without seeing if the DCI agrees with the nominations. I think it should be obvious to my colleagues what I meant when I called the DCI the Coordinator of Central Intelligence. Not only does the Director not have much direct control over his budget, he also does not even have a required formal role in the naming of the heads of the intelligence community's agencies. The bill takes a small step forward in giving him the opportunity to formally concur with an appointment made by the Secretary of Defense. Even under the bill's provisions, the Secretary of Defense has sufficient independence he could appoint the heads of the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Security Agency over the DCI's objection. I must add one thing in closing. During the intense discussions over the appropriate authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence, it became clear to some of us there is a basic misunderstanding of intelligence and its relationship to the Department of Defense. Mr. President, as I have said time and time again, intelligence supports policy. It also supports the planning and the operations of our military forces. The Secretary of Defense directly controls the intelligence assets to ensure that this essential function of intelligence will be fulfilled, and our troops will be properly supported. In addition, as a principal customer of the DCI and the most knowledgeable and articulate customer, the Secretary of Defense will correctly ensure that national intelligence fulfills military requirements. This is appropriate and everyone agrees it must occur without exception. But the Department of Defense is only one of many agencies that executes the foreign policy of the United States. And, historically, DOD is the last part of the executive branch the President relies upon when he executes U.S. policy overseas. We are a nation that believes military power is the court of last resort in resolving international disputes, not the first. This makes intelligence support to the warfighter the last step of intelligence support to foreign policy--not the first. Thus, as some push for more and more intelligence support to the warfighter, they in fact risk diminishing the creativity and quality of our foreign policy by forcing the intelligence community to become ``militarized.'' The intelligence community's scarce resources can only do so much and if they focus almost exclusively on the Department of Defense, the other elements of our Government will not have the benefit of their advice and support. This is dangerous for the effectiveness of our foreign policy and could eventually lead to an over-reliance on the Department of Defense to solve our foreign policy problems simply because the best information we have on a foreign policy problem is focused on how to solve it with military force. Intelligence support outside of the Department of Defense is important, and it is critical to the proper functioning of the Government. The Congress must remain vigilant to make sure we do not cripple intelligence by relying too heavily on uninformed criticisms of intelligence support to the warfighter.", u"Mr. Speaker, these are interesting times we live in, and it's nice to follow my friend, Mr. Shimkus, a graduate of the United States Military Academy, a servant of this country in the military, and still a servant in this country. It's good to call him friend. Hopefully he calls me friend, as well. These are troubling times. When the name Justice Department depicts something other than justice, it's a very troubling time. Some of us are extremely familiar with the prosecution of what most would consider the most significant, largest prosecution of terrorism support and funding in the United States history, which occurred in Federal district court in Dallas, Texas. It was begun under the Bush Justice Department, all part of the aftermath of 9/11 because, as President Bush indicated, we can't just go after the people that actually plotted and carried out the events of 9/11, who plotted and carried out other terrorist attacks against the United States. It's not enough. We've got to go after those who have supported those efforts at terrorism, have supported the killing of innocent people around the world. And particularly, we have to protect Americans. And for those who have supported terrorism and continue to support terrorism, the United States must step forward in order to protect itself. The Justice Department in November of 2008, I believe, got convictions of the individuals they had prosecuted in the Holy Land Foundation trial. Not only did they get convictions, they got over 100 different counts in which they got convictions. Through that, there were names of coconspirators who were named and set forward in the pleadings, and evidence was introduced, admitted into evidence at trial that showed there were groups and individuals in the United States that were supporting terrorism, and there was significant evidence to support that. In fact, two of those groups, CAIR and the Islamic Society of North America, ISNA, had moved that their names be stricken from the pleadings as named coconspirators in supporting terrorism. At that time, the acting U.S. Attorney did a very good job not only in the prosecution, but also in the pleading to the Federal district court there before Judge Solis, and he established plenty of evidence so that Judge Solis found there was plenty of evidence to support the coconspirators continuing to have their names in the pleading, and they were not satisfied with the ruling of the Federal district court. They appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ended up ruling that, yes, there was plenty of evidence to support the fact that CAIR, ISNA, and others were supporting terrorism, so their names would not be stricken from the pleadings, they would be kept in the pleadings as named coconspirators of terrorism. After that very successful prosecution that was in conformity with President Bush's promise that if you're not with us, you're with them, and those who support terrorism would be made to account, that began the first stage of the prosecution of supporters of terrorism. Those were people and individual cases, those were organizations right here in America that were supporting terrorism, funding terrorism. Yes, they were supporting charities. Yes, they were giving money to good causes. That acted as a cover for them also funding terrorism, funding known terrorist organizations who had actually killed people and destroyed things, committing acts of war. Then, the Attorney General became Eric Holder. The President, the Commander in Chief, became Barack Hussein Obama. We know it's okay to use the President's full name, because he proudly uses it when he goes to Muslim nations. In fact, the first nations the President went to and apologized for America's arrogance and divisiveness, dismissiveness were Muslim nations. In fact, going to Cairo, he snubbed America's ally, Israel's ally, Mubarak, who is not a fine, upstanding wonderful man but a man who had managed to keep some peace along the Israel border, a man who had agreements with this government just as this government had agreements with Qadhafi, despite the blood on his hands from terrorist involvement himself. In fact, I've read of reports of people even from our own Senate who have been over there, one who had tweeted that he had met with Colonel Qadhafi: ``He was an interesting man. I met with him at his ranch.'' I understand that Senator now says that tweet didn't come from him. But there were Americans from this government negotiating with Qadhafi, working out agreements, and then they turned their backs on people with whom they had worked agreements: Mubarak, Qadhafi. I don't think we should have worked agreements with Qadhafi because of the blood on his hands, American blood on his hands. But it had been done, and yet this Nation turned its back on allies. It was no surprise to me to read that the King of Jordan--another person with whom we have a relatively good relationship--had sought an appointment with Ahmadinejad in Iran once he saw the way this administration not only turned its back on allies, but also would contribute to bombing to get them out of office. It's an amazing thing. Then, being part of the Judiciary Committee here in Washington, some of us became very troubled that despite all of this substantive evidence--I've got a stack of it in my office from that Holy Land Foundation trial--substantiating allegations, at least to the satisfaction of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the district court, that CAIR and ISNA and others should be named coconspirators, this Justice Department chose not to prosecute anyone else. Once again, using the old tactic, Well, the Bush administration didn't prosecute them. They did stage one, they got the initial prosecutions, and if those were successful, they intended to continue looking and pursuing all those who were implicated and could have cases proved, especially where there was substantial evidence, as there was with CAIR and ISNA. Instead of prosecuting CAIR and ISNA, this administration--and there's no question about this--despite the fussing and nay-saying of some once proud journalists of some once proud journalistic television networks, once proud newspapers, despite their failure to do their homework, despite their taking the easy road and simply asking opinions, Well, what do you think about these terrible accusations, and getting opinions instead of simply digging and looking at the facts and presenting the fact, they sought opinions on things that people had not even read. They asked opinions about letters that people had not read. They asked opinions about general tenor without actually showing people the tenor of the letters. And, unfortunately, some are always willing to respond without having read or reviewed the matter before them which they are being questioned about. But the facts are the facts. On the White House's own Web site, last time I checked, there were references to ISNA. There are references to ISNA's president, Imam Magid, who, as I understand, has now written a letter wanting condemnation of me and others who simply set out factual recitations to five different departments and then asked the question, Would you please investigate to see the extent of Muslim Brotherhood influence in this administration in this department. We know there's Muslim Brotherhood influence. The question is how much influence is there? When the White House's own Web site was carrying compliments, such as those spoken by Denis McDonough, the number two person in our National Security Agency, complimenting Imam Magid for the wonderful prayers he had given inside the sanctity of the White House itself, for the White House's iftar celebration during Ramadan. Compliments to Imam Magid, the president of the main coconspirator, for the wonderful introduction he gave the number two person in the National Security Agency. And within the FBI itself--it took until 2009 for the FBI to finally write a letter saying, Gee, because of all this evidence that came out about CAIR supporting terrorism in the Holy Land Foundation trial in 2008, we have suspended our relationship with them. At one place in the letter, they referred to it as a ``partner'' or a ``partnership.'' So there's no question there is Muslim Brotherhood influence in this administration. Anybody that says otherwise will likely find that they will end up at the lowest level of Nielsen ratings in their history, or at least in 20 years or so, because they simply are not doing their homework. It's much easier to bash the messenger than it is to actually do homework. And in fairness, I know there have been lots of budget cuts. It's tough for some entities, some networks to do the research they once did when they were much more popular. But, nonetheless, the truth is the truth. Facts are facts. The question remains: Just how extensive is the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in this administration? We know that the ACLU and CAIR have been demanding documentation of what trainees have been taught in our Justice Department, in other departments, making FOIA, Freedom of Information Act, requests trying to get information on what we are training our undercover agents, if any we have. Apparently, this administration has no problem outing people we have undercover in dangerous situations. At least somebody who has information about the very inner workings of this administration has leaked classified information. It remains to be found out who it is, but it is somebody that has access to some of the most important classified inner workings. Yet you've got CAIR and the ACLU demanding information about the information that was used to train these people. And the facts are that if you ever disclose that--and as I understand, our Justice Department was preparing to provide all that information to CAIR and to ACLU--and if they provide all of the information on exactly how people who have been undercover in radical Islamic situations, it will be easy for those individuals to be outed and killed because they'll know what their training is and their approach to radical Islam. They'll know the methods and means of our undercover, of our intelligence. And yet this administration continues to cater to such requests to accommodate complaints about CAIR. CAIR individuals can call the White House, as apparently was written up in material in the media after last August. They were complaining about people who were going to give a seminar to hundreds of law enforcement individuals. CAIR makes one call, as it was reported at least, makes a call to the White House. The seminar gets canceled. Hundreds of law enforcement individuals do not end up being taught about the inner workings of those who want to kill and destroy our way of life. And CAIR is happy. Just how far does the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood go? We know from the evidence in the Holy Land Foundation trial that ISNA is the largest Muslim Brotherhood front organization in America. And President Obama has had President Imam Magid in the inner sanctum of the State Department to listen to the speech that he gave, trying to upstage Prime Minister Netanyahu when he was on his way over here in May of last year. The report was that Imam Magid had actually given him advice on what he should say. Who knows, perhaps what Imam Magid said was, Oh, yes, Israel has agreed to go back to the 1967 boundary lines, so you can include that in your speech. Who knows. We wanted an Inspector General investigation to find out in the State Department, Defense Department, intelligence department, in these five departments just how extensive is the Muslim Brotherhood influence. We know it's there. Most Americans know it's there. There are some that still drink the Kool-Aid and refuse to acknowledge the facts that have been proven in court. There are facts that actually the prosecutor of the 1993 World Trade Center bombings has pointed out in his article--that's Andrew McCarthy--he has pointed out, We proved to New York jurors, wonderful New York jurors, beyond a reasonable doubt that there was this radical Islamic presence in America; and they did want to take over our country, that there is a civilization jihad. Some want to do it radically with violence. Some want to take over from inside our own governmental and civic organizations, and they're working toward that goal. There's no question about so many of these things. The question is, How far does the influence go? That's what we need to know. So we asked the question, and we had Attorney General Holder before our committee last year. And he was asked the question, Did you or did politics have any consideration in the refusal to prosecute any of the other named coconspirators about which the Fifth Circuit said there is plenty of evidence to support their involvement? Was there political involvement in that decision? Well, we didn't know it at the time; but since then, more recently, in the last couple of months, we've had the Attorney General testify before our committee that there are political aspects to justice, from his standpoint, which fly in the face of everything that any good law school, any legitimate law school has ever taught its law students. Justice is supposed to be blind. That's why the statue that depicts justice, holding the scales of justice, is blinded, is wearing a blindfold. Because justice is blind if it's real justice. And if justice is not blind, if we're looking to who it is and politically what the consequences will be, it's not justice. There are no political aspects to justice--or it's not true justice. And I'm afraid that's where we've gotten to in this so-called Justice Department. So we had the Attorney General say, Oh, no, no, no. There is no political involvement. In fact, I said to my friend Trent Franks, Gee, in fact, the U.S. Attorney handling that--I believe it was quoted in a newspaper--I believe it was the Dallas News--he said there was no politics involved in those dismissals because there was just no case there. There was no evidence to support it. Well, I happened to have read that Dallas Morning News report, and I happen to have read the quotes from that acting U.S. Attorney. And yes, he did say it was local; politics weren't involved. But that is not what he said. He says no, the evidence wasn't there, which is entirely different since he was not under penalty of potential jail when he spoke to a reporter, but he was under potential penalty of jail. If you ever commit a fraud upon a court by not giving all of the information or misrepresenting to a judge or tricking a judge by not being truthful, you can be looking at jail time. Lawyers before me knew that. I didn't care about politics, but I cared about truth. I cared about it in the Bush administration. So when we found out there were abuses of the National Security Letter, I was furious. And I grilled the Bush director of the FBI at that time. I was surprised there weren't more Democrats that were nearly as outraged as I was because that was so offensive. It was so improper. It was so unjust. I don't care who the President is; justice is justice. And for our Attorney General to act like oh, no, no, there wasn't anything. And then I know. I read the pleadings of that U.S. Attorney where he said there's plenty of evidence to support the name of CAIR and others being in here. And he convinced the Fifth Circuit of the same thing. So he was either lying to the courts or he was lying to the paper about the evidence. And now, after having had the head of civil rights of this Justice Department, Mr. Perez, testify that gee, there was no political aspect in the decision not to pursue the New Black Panther Party for what they did at a polling place in Pennsylvania, and now we have found out this week, Human Events has a great article, ``Federal judge rules political appointees interfered with voter intimidation case.'' That's from August 2, posted at 2:12 p.m. There's one from the American Spectator about the fact that Thomas Perez, assistant attorney general, is one of the most destructive forces against the rule of law in this Nation, including being the man responsible for the DOJ dropping charges again the New Black Panthers for voter intimidation in Philadelphia during the last Presidential election. It goes on to talk about he appeared before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Constitution, which is a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, and it goes on to say that he questioned Assistant Attorney General Perez over the administration's commitment to First Amendment rights. His questions were prompted by a Daily Caller article from late last year in which Perez was quoted as warmly embracing the proposals of Islamist advocates in a meeting at George Washington University, among them a request for a legal declaration that U.S. citizens' criticism of Islam constitutes racial discrimination. Well, we know that one of the 10-year goals of the Muslim Brotherhood is to subvert the U.S. Constitution to sharia law. And once they convince enough people that it should be a crime to burn a Koran or to criticize Islam, then they can check that box. I believe in the Bible. My eternity is based on belief of the Bible. But I also know under the U.S. Constitution, you can burn a Bible. I took a pledge and was willing to lay down my life, my 4 years in the Army, for our flag, but I also understand it's constitutional to burn a flag. And yet we have people in this injustice department saying they want to make it a crime to criticize Islam. No wonder they're purging their training materials, eliminating references to Islam. As one intelligence officer of this government told me, we are blinding our ability to see our enemy, and that can and will have dangerous consequences if we don't turn it around. Mr. Speaker, wrapping up here before we take this August recess that isn't a recess because we will be in pro forma session, we're willing, most of us, Republicans are willing to come back. All we have to know is that the Senate is finally doing something to pass some of the jobs bills we've sent their way. And in fairness, what we need is Republican leadership that will say okay, Senate, you want this bill, then you are going to have to pass some of the economic and jobs bills that will get this economy going, but we haven't used the leverage Republicans in the House have. And, unfortunately, with all of the talk about agreeing to another CR, it just means that we'll have finished out 2 years without cutting anything significant, as we promised 2 years ago after the biggest wave election in American history since the 1930s. It's time for Americans to make clear you want Congress to do what was promised when the Congressmen got elected. And if we do that, it doesn't matter how obstructive the Senate is, it will make it even more clear if we use our leverage and say: Hey, people, the government is shut down on weekends, you seem to live okay. Let's get back to just essential needs of the government. Allow a shutdown of other things. Pass my bill that will make sure our military gets paid during a shutdown, we know Social Security recipients will still get their payments in the event of a shutdown, and keep the government shut down until everybody understands we're going to start living within our means as a Congress, like all Americans have to do, or declare bankruptcy. They have to do that. We can't afford to declare bankruptcy. We must get this government under control. I hope that constituents across the country during this month will make that clear, and we'll replace the Senators who are standing in the way of getting this economy going, that we'll replace the administration who is creating injustice and allowing radical Islamic jihadists to have any influence at all. The Secretary of Homeland Security sat there and told me that it did absolutely not happen, that a member of a terrorist organization had been allowed in the White House; 6 days later, she not only admits to the Senate that it did happen after she told me absolutely not, but she said: Oh, but it's okay; we vetted him three times. It's time for a government that is more considerate and concerned about providing for the common defense, of getting out of the way and letting the economy grow than they are about playing favorites, playing to their cronies, and playing against religious freedom. And with that, Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.", u"Mr. Chairman, I rise today to discuss shocking revelations reported in the media starting last Wednesday, that is 9 days ago, and continuing for several days afterward, regarding the scope of the NSA's spying program, including both foreigners and Americans. The NSA is the National Security Agency. Its duty is, as part of DOD, to protect us against foreign attacks, just as DOD itself is supposed to protect us against foreign attacks. And DOD, like the CIA, is on the side of the firewall dealing with foreign threats as opposed to the FBI and the Justice Department who deal with domestic threats. As of a week ago last Wednesday, the Guardian reported that a particular court order had ordered Verizon, the largest cellular telephone company in America, to turn over its call records for all of its calls--all of its calls. I have the document from the Guardian's Web site here in front of me. It is a document that is issued as a secondary order by what's known as the FISA Court. That court is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Let's start with the name of the court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. As the name of the act implies, the jurisdiction of the court is limited to foreign surveillance and foreign threats. This is by statute. The order itself was printed and posted at the Web site. Millions of people have seen it since then. What it purports to be--I say purports to be, but, in fact, the agency involved in the NSA has not denied that this is a valid, real document--it says that the court, having found application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an order requiring the production of tangible things from Verizon--specifically Verizon Business Network Services, et cetera, et cetera--orders that the custodian of records produce--not to the FBI--but to the National Security Agency, a component of the Defense Department, upon service of this order, and continued production on an ongoing, daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: Right here. Take a look at it. These tangible things are identified in the order as follows: All call detail records or telephony metadata created by Verizon for communications 1) between the United States and abroad--it sounds like it might be international--and then 2) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls. On its face, this is an order for Verizon--our largest cellular telephone company--to turn over call records for every single call in its possession. Mr. Chairman, that includes calls by you, it also includes calls by me. In fact, it includes calls by me when I call my mother or my wife or my daughter. For those who are listening on C-SPAN or otherwise, it includes every call by you. Now, the first question that comes to mind is: Is this just for Verizon? Well, we don't know for sure, at this point, but the NSA has not denied that there are orders similar in extent for MCI, for AT&T, for Sprint, for every telephone company that carries any significant amount of data or calls in this country. Another question is: How far back does this order go? The order itself is dated on its face April 25, 2013. One of the more interesting things about this order, posted on the Guardian's Web site, is that it has no starting date. Under this order--under the plain terms of this order--Verizon has to go and give the Federal Government--specifically the Department of Defense, the NSA--all of its call records of all of its calls going back to the beginning of time. And this obligation continues until July 19, 2013, presumably because the order will be renewed at that point upon request of the NSA and the FBI. Let's be clear about this. This appears to be an order providing that our telephone companies providing service to us turn over call records for every single telephone call, regardless of whether it's international or not. Now, if somebody had come to me 9 days ago and said to me, Congressman Grayson, do you think that the Defense Department is taking records of every telephone call that you make or I make or anyone else makes, I would say, no, I have no reason to believe that. It would shock me if it was true. Well, it is true and it does shock me. Why should we have our personal telephone records, the records of whom we call, when we speak to them, how long we are talking, why should we have that turned over to the Defense Department? What possible rationale could there be for that? Well, I'll tell you what I think the rationale might be: because somehow that makes us safer. Well, let me say to the NSA and to the Defense Department, you can rest assured there is no threat to America when I talk to my mother. Now, what exactly is wrong with this? What's wrong with this, first of all, is that there is a firewall between the Defense Department and the CIA on the one hand, and the FBI and the Department of Justice on the other. One protects us from international threats, the other one protects us from domestic threats. That's been the law in America since the 1870s when Congress enacted and the President signed the Posse Comitatus Act. And this order crushes that distinction. It eliminates it, it obliterates it, it kills it now and forever. Now, the second thing that is offensive about this court order is that it clearly violates the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment reads as follows: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Now, first of all, when the government seizes your phone records, unless you happen to be Osama Bin Laden or someone close to him, there is no reason why the government would believe or have reason to believe probable cause that you've committed a crime or you're going to commit a crime or you have any evidence about someone committing a crime. There's no probable cause here. Secondly, the Fourth Amendment requires particularity. There's no particularity when the government insists by court order and under threat of further action that Verizon or AT&T or Sprint or anyone else be required to turn over their phone records to the government. There's no particularity. This really is the essence of the matter. Because if you ask the NSA for justification, they'll say: Well, it's legal. What do you mean it's legal? Well, according to their published statements, including a statement by their Director last Saturday, they maintain that it's legal because of a single Supreme Court case decided in 1979 that said that the government, specifically local police authorities, could acquire the phone records of one person once. That's the case of Smith v. Maryland in 1979. Because the Supreme Court says that, at that point, the government could acquire the phone records of one person once, the NSA is maintaining that its entire program is legal and that it can acquire the phone records of everyone, everywhere, forever. That is a farce. Now, the other document that came to light last Thursday--in other words, 8 days ago as I speak--was a document, again posted at the Guardian's and then later at the Washington Post's Web site. This is a document that is a PowerPoint presentation, which according to the reports was a PowerPoint presentation to analysts working for the NSA. This PowerPoint presentation is labeled ``PRISM/US-984XN Overview,'' or ``the SIGAD Used Most in NSA Reporting.'' What you see to my right is the reproduction of what was posted at the Web site a week ago. First of all, note that there are certain logos at the top of the page: Gmail, which for those of you who are not familiar, is the largest provider of email services and hosting. It's run by Google. Facebook. Many of us are familiar with that. I think my children are all too familiar with it and spend an awful lot of time on it. Facebook allows, among other things, private messaging between friends. Hotmail, which is Microsoft's email server and service. Yahoo, which performs a variety of functions, including, among other things, hosting a large number of Web pages. And by the way, when you go to their Web page they can tell who you are from your IP address. And also a very widely used email service. Google. I think Google needs no introduction, but I've already introduced it. Google allows you to do web searches. It, together with Microsoft, has almost 90 percent of the Web search market in the United States. They keep a record of the searches that you make based upon your IP address. Skype, which is a telephone company that transmits calls electronically over the Internet. PalTalk. I'm puzzled. I don't know what that one is. YouTube, which is the largest host of videos in the world, and again, can tell which videos you're looking at by your IP address. And AOL Mail, which, as it sounds, is the America Online email service. This document is dated at the bottom April of 2013, meaning last month--or maybe 2 months ago. Let's take a look inside. One of the pages that's been produced on the Guardian and Washington Post Web site is this: By way of background, it's been reported that this is part of a longer document. It's 41-pages long. Only 5 pages have been released to the public through the Guardian and through the Washington Post. So I'm sharing with you the five pages that were released a week ago and are now public. Let's take a look at this one. This one says that the NSA's PRISM program performs the following functions--and bear in mind, this is purported to be a training document given to NSA analysts to explain what they can do in this program. Who are the current providers to the program? Microsoft's Hotmail, et cetera, Google, Yahoo!, Facebook, Paltalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple. What are they providing? Specifically, as the document says, What will you--meaning the analyst--receive in collection, collection from surveillance and stored communications? The document says it varies by provider. We don't know how it varies, but, in general, what you get is the following: email. The NSA gets email from these providers. It gets Video and Voice Chat, videos, photos, stored data, VoIP, which is an electronic version of your actual words when you are speaking on the phone. VoIP stands for ``Voice over Internet Protocol.'' It's your voice. It gets file transfers, video conferencing, notification of target activity, including log-ons--in other words, are you on your computer or not?--et cetera, online social network details, and what is beliedly referred to as ``special requests,'' as if all of that weren't enough already. You might wonder: How does the government actually get this information? The five pages that are released give us one answer to that question. Let's take a look at that. If you look at the bottom, the green rectangle, you'll see that it says that PRISM collection is directly from the servers of these U.S. service providers: Microsoft, Yahoo!, Google, Facebook, Paltalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple. Since it's addressed to the trainees at the NSA, to the people who will actually be doing the analysis of this data--and with the injunction on the left which says you should do both--the plain meaning of this is that the NSA apparently has the capability to collect directly from the servers of these service providers the information on the previous page--in other words, our emails, our chats, our videos, our photos, our stored data, our Voice over Internet Protocol, our file transfers, our video conferencing, our log-ins, et cetera, et cetera. Now, there is an interesting distinction between these two documents: In the first case, with regard to the court order, the NSA's position is that it's a valid court order, and we regard it as legal. If you don't like it, that's too bad with you. Go change the law--to which I say, fine, I'm going to try to change that law. With regard to the second document, the situation is a little more ambiguous. What the NSA has said publicly is that the green rectangle is actually not correct. Now, bear in mind, no one has said that this is not an NSA document. No one has said that it's Photoshopped. No one has said that it is anything other than what it purports to be and what it was reported as. However, the NSA has taken the position that their own document is wrong for reasons that we don't know and that the NSA, in fact, does not have the capability to directly take-collect from the servers of these companies your emails, your Voice over Internet Protocol, your photos, and everything else. They say that they just don't do that. However, we are still waiting for an explanation of how this green rectangle ended up in this document. If it's not true, they need to explain how and why it's not true. The NSA also says that, for reasons not evident from this document at all, they don't do this for U.S. citizens. Now, that raises a host of questions. You might think that there might be something else in this document that says that, but the NSA hasn't maintained that. In other words, they haven't said, If you look somewhere else in this document, you'll find that we don't do this for U.S. citizens. Unless you think that this is somehow selective on my part or on anybody else's part, it has been reported that the whistleblower provided this entire document--all, apparently, 41 pages--to The Guardian and to The Washington Post, and they decided on their own to release only these five. So if there is something that indicates that the NSA is only doing this for Americans, apparently it's not in this document, and we've reached a strange point where people are being trained in the NSA to have the ability to get the emails and the other information on Americans, but somehow we are told later, separately, that that's not correct. In addition to that, the NSA says that there is some process by which they can distinguish between the emails of Americans and the emails of foreigners. Frankly, that is a technology so advanced to me that it seems like it might be magic. I used to be the president of a telephone company. I have literally no idea how I could distinguish between the email accounts of an American and a foreigner. I don't know how to do it. Maybe they can tell us how they do it if they're doing it at all. That's the real question: if they're doing it at all. I don't know how they could possibly say this email account is for a foreigner, and this email account is for an American. If they can't, that means they're taking all this stuff--American and foreign--and having it, using it, looking at it, and destroying our privacy rights. That really is the heart of the matter here. I don't understand why anyone would think that it's somehow okay for the Department of Defense to get every single one of our call records regardless of who we are, regardless of whether we are innocent or guilty of anything. I venture to say that there are Americans who have never even had a parking ticket; yet the Defense Department is pulling their call records as well. Eventually, we will find out whether the NSA's own document is misleading and whether the NSA is not pulling email accounts and emails and photos and VoIP calls on people who are Americans, because, if you read this document, it sure looks like they are. This is not the first time that we have had this problem. This is not the first time that the government has entered into surveillance on people without probable cause. Many of us remember that there was FBI surveillance of Martin Luther King, including the wiretapping and bugging of his personal conversations. I thought, perhaps naively, that we had moved beyond that. In some sense, we have moved beyond that because now they're doing it to everyone. In fact, one could well say that we are reaching the point at which Uncle Sam is Big Brother. I submit to you that this program, although the proponents picked it as American as ``apple spy,'' is an anti-American program. We are not North Koreans. We don't live in Nazi Germany. We are Americans and we are human beings, and we deserve to have our privacy respected. I have no way to call my mother except to employ the services of Verizon or AT&T or some other telephone company. I'm not going to string two cups between my house and her house 70 miles away. That doesn't mean that it's okay with me for the government--and specifically the Department of Defense--to be getting information about every telephone call I make to her. It's not okay with me. I submit to you, Mr. Speaker, it's probably not okay with you, and I know that, for most of the people who are listening to me today, it's not okay with you either. Then Franklin said: Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a I agree with that. We do not have to give up our liberty to be safe. I have already heard from people who tell me that they're afraid that they're going to be blown up by some terrorist somewhere, that they're afraid their personal safety is at risk, and it's okay with them if the government spies on them. Well, it's not okay with me. And I stand here on behalf of the millions of Americans who are wanting to say, It's not okay with me either. I'm fed up, and I'm not going to take it any more. When we had the Civil War and there were 1 million armed men in this country who rose up heavily armed to fight against our central government, we did not establish a spy network in every city, every town, every village, every home; but that's what we've done right now. When I was growing up and we had 10,000 nuclear warheads pointed at us and some people believed there was a Communist under every bed, even then we did not establish a spy network as intrusive as this one. I submit to you that this has gone way too far and that it's up to us to tell the Defense Department, the NSA, the so-called ``intelligence establishment,'' we've had enough. We are human beings. We are a free people. And based upon this evidence, we're going to have to work to keep it that way. That's what I'll be doing. I hope you'll join me. With that, I yield back the balance of my time.", u"Madam President, Shortly the Senate will be voting to invoke cloture on the nomination of James B. Comey to become the next Director of the FBI. I will vote to invoke cloture and expect many of my colleagues will do the same. The confirmation of a new FBI Director is a serious decision for this Chamber to consider. As a large Federal law enforcement agency, the FBI has numerous responsibilities and tremendous power. Only with quality leadership and proper Congressional oversight will the FBI be best equipped to fight crime, terrorism, and espionage. I think the President has made a fine choice in selecting Mr. Comey as the next leader of the FBI, and I plan to explain my support for him as we approach Mr. Comey's confirmation vote. I recognize there is a level of concern associated with this nomination regarding the use of drones by the FBI. I have been at the forefront of this issue, raising it last year with the Attorney General. The Attorney General gave me an incomplete answer as to the FBI's use of drones. Accordingly, after there was disclosure that the FBI was using drones on U.S. soil for surveillance, I questioned Mr. Comey about the extent of that policy. This needs to be addressed by the new director, and I have Mr. Comey's assurance he will review the policy. I will be monitoring this closely, but we need a director in place, and we need to confirm this nomination this week. Excellent leadership is only one ingredient in the recipe for success at any Federal agency. Another critical element is proper congressional oversight. And it is this component I fear too many of my colleagues have forgotten. Today, too many seem to believe that advice and consent really means rubberstamp and turn a blind eye. The American people deserve better than this approach to confirmations. Over the last few months, I have observed an alarming pattern. Too often, this administration submits subpar nominees while simultaneously obstructing any legitimate oversight by this Congress. Sadly, many of my colleagues appear to be choosing to ignore any effort to correct it. Let me cite just a few examples. We saw how Mr. Perez, an assistant attorney general, brokered an unwritten deal that cost the taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars. My colleagues on the other side largely ignored the shady deal. Mr. Perez tried to cover his tracks, but got caught leaving a voicemail that was recorded. Even then, my colleagues dismissed it. And when he was caught concealing evidence of the deal on his personal email accounts, he defied a lawfully issued congressional subpoena and refused to turn over the documentation. Incredibly, his defiance was ignored. Worse yet, for all this rotten behavior, the Senate rewarded him with a promotion by confirming him as Secretary of Labor. We see the same thing occurring with the nomination of Mr. Mayorkas. The nominee for the No. 2 position at the Department of Homeland Security is the target of an open investigation by the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security. The IG is investigating allegations that the nominee procured a visa as a political favor, even though the visa was properly rejected. Incredibly, the Senate Committee pressed on with the hearing despite unanimous objection from the minority for moving forward in the midst of an open investigation. That is incredible to me--a Senate Committee would move forward with a nominee who has an open investigation into the nominee's conduct. I wish this were a unique occurrence, but based on recent experience in the Judiciary Committee, it is not an isolated event. This is exactly what happened recently in the Senate Judiciary Committee with respect to Mr. B. Todd Jones, the nominee to be Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Earlier this year, I learned the Office of Special Counsel was investigating Mr. Jones in a complaint that he retaliated against a whistleblower in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Minnesota. In the Judiciary Committee, it has been the Committee's practice when a nominee is the subject of an open investigation, the Committee generally does not move forward until the issues are resolved. Because of this practice, I objected to holding his hearing last month and requested the hearing be postponed to allow the investigation to finish. My request was denied. I then objected to putting him on the committee agenda until the non-partisan investigation was complete. Again, my request was rejected. And now, despite the fact there remains an open complaint of whistleblower retaliation against Mr. Jones before the Office of Special Counsel, his nomination will soon be considered by the full Senate. I want all my colleagues to know what happened because I am quite concerned by the direction it has taken, especially in light of the fact this practice seems to be spreading into other Senate committees as well. Over the past few months, there has been correspondence between my office and the Office of Special Counsel regarding the status of their proceedings. I had previously received a copy of an anonymous letter to the Office of Special Counsel making various allegations against Mr. Jones. I sent a letter to OSC on April 8, asking for an update on those allegations. On April 12, the Office of Special Counsel responded that there were two pending matters involving the U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Minnesota, where Mr. Jones is the United States Attorney. The first matter was a prohibited personnel practice complaint alleging reprisal for whistleblowing and other protected activity. The second matter was a whistleblower disclosure, alleging gross mismanagement and abuses of authority. The complaint, filed by an Assistant United States Attorney in the office, alleged that personnel actions, including a suspension and a lowered performance appraisal, were taken in retaliation for protected whistleblowing or other protected activity. On June 5, OSC provided the committee with an update to the two pending cases. It reported the whistleblower disclosure case had been closed based on its determination that the information provided was insufficient to determine with a substantial likelihood that gross mismanagement, an abuse of authority, or a violation of a law, rule, or regulation had occurred. Accordingly, OSC closed that case file. OSC's action to close the whistleblower disclosure case was not based on any investigation by that office. That action was merely a determination based on a technical review of the complaint document itself. It was not a finding on the merits of the complaint. With regard to the other issue, the prohibited personnel practice, I was informed the complaint was referred for investigation. Subsequently the complainant and Justice Department agreed to mediation. I was told that if mediation was unsuccessful, the case would return to OSC's Investigation and Prosecution Division for further investigation. My colleagues should understand that, of all the complaints received by OSC, only about 10 percent of them merit an investigation. This case was one of them. Why did the career, nonpartisan staff at OSC forward the case for investigation? Presumably because they thought it needed to be investigated. That says something about the likely merits of the case. Before the hearing, there was disagreement regarding the status of the Special Counsel's investigation. Accordingly, I contacted the Special Counsel, inquiring as to the status of the complaints. The Special Counsel confirmed for the second time that the investigation remains open. She stated, ``The reassignment of the case for mediation did not result in the matter being closed.'' Despite this, and over my objection, on June 11, the committee went forward with a hearing on the Jones nomination. We were told Mr. Jones' hearing needed to be held in order for him to have an opportunity to respond to the Office of Special Counsel complaints. I would note that a similar rationale was used to justify the Mayorkas hearing--to publicly address the allegations against the nominee. In Mr. Jones' case, in advance of the hearing, the Department of Justice sent a letter to me stating: ``Mr. Jones looks forward to answering your questions about these matters during his nominations hearing. . . .'' Additionally, Mr. Jones was quoted in the Star Tribune as saying, ``I am looking forward to meeting with the Committee and answering all their questions.'' However, as I expected, the hearing provided no information to the committee with regard to the open Special Counsel investigation. At the hearing, Mr. Jones said he could not talk about the complaint. Of course, this negated the whole reason why the hearing had even been scheduled. At his hearing, my first question to Mr. Jones was about the investigation. This is his reply: Because those complaints are confidential as a matter of law, I have not seen the substance of the complaints, nor can I comment on them. I have learned more from your statement today than I knew before I came here this morning about the nature and substance of the complaint. A few questions later, I inquired of Mr. Jones, ``Will you answer the complaints about the Assistant U.S. Attorney--because that is why you are here today?'' He replied: Well, quite frankly, Senator, I am at a disadvantage with the facts. There is a process in place. I have not seen the OSC complaint. I do know that our office, working with the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, is in the process of responding to the issues that you have talked about this morning, but I have not had the opportunity to either be interviewed or have any greater knowledge about what the OSC complaint is.'' So there we were, left with an open investigation of serious allegations of whistleblower retaliation. We were told the hearing was the opportunity for us to question the nominee and get these questions answered, but the nominee couldn't even talk about them at all. This put the Committee in the position of either allowing time for the Office of Special Counsel to do its job or looking into the matter for ourselves before proceeding. Strangely, late in the day before the hearing, the Majority offered to conduct some interviews the Friday following the hearing. That was quite perplexing to me. We were going to begin the investigation after the hearing had concluded. I could not remember when the committee had ever conducted an investigation after a nominee's hearing. The day after the hearing, the chairman's staff indicated to the media we were conducting a bipartisan probe. The media reported the majority staff had offered to conduct a bipartisan inquiry into the matters before the Office of Special Counsel. However, I am disappointed to report there was no genuine effort to gather all the facts. The majority only agreed to jointly interview one witness, the whistleblower himself. However, the majority refused to look into the substance of the whistleblower's claims. Even more troubling, it quickly turned into an inquiry of the whistleblower rather than into the alleged retaliatory action done by the nominee. The majority reached its own conclusion that it was not a whistleblower matter at all, but a personnel matter wherein management simply imposed discipline on a disruptive or insubordinate employee. However, there was never a factual record before the committee to support this conclusion. The majority determined the whistleblower is an uncooperative witness for being ``unwilling to provide documents''--meaning his personnel file. The whistleblower in this instance is an Assistant U.S. Attorney with 30 years of Federal service, 24 years of which he has served in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Minnesota. He has extensive leadership experience and in 2012 received the Assistant Attorney General's Distinguished Achievement Award. It should be quite alarming to us all that a staff investigation of a whistleblower's complaint would be twisted around into an apparent attempt to investigate the whistleblower. I have worked with many Federal Government whistleblowers over the years and this is exactly the type of treatment that whistleblowers fear. It is one of the main reasons they are afraid to come forward. This type of treatment raises serious concerns. Unfortunately, I have come to expect this out of the Federal Government agencies--attacking the whistleblower rather than investigate the underlying problem. I have seen it over and over again. But this sort of inquiry shouldn't be the way the Senate deals with whistleblowers or others who come forward to testify. The Senate cannot conduct itself this way. We cannot ignore ongoing investigations. In my opinion, we are neglecting our constitutional obligations. Eventually, one of these situations will embarrass the Senate, damage the reputation of the Federal Government, and, ultimately, probably cost the taxpayers, our constituents. So I urge all of my colleagues to oppose taking further action at this time on the nomination of B. Todd Jones for Director of ATF, another nominee with an open investigation. I will vote no on cloture and encourage my colleagues to do likewise. This is about protecting the advice and consent function of the Senate. The Senate should wait until the Office of Special Counsel has concluded its investigation and we know the truth about his retaliatory conduct against a protected whistleblower. There will be time to debate the other substantive concerns regarding this nomination. There may be additional reasons why my colleagues should oppose Mr. Jones's nomination. Other Senators may vote to confirm the nominee. But as a starting point, we should all be in agreement that it is imprudent and unwise for the Senate to give final consideration to any nominee where there is an open investigation into that nominee's conduct. The Senate cannot abdicate its duty to advise and consent on these nominees and simply rubberstamp them. As we consider this nomination, as well as a number of other nominations this week, I would urge my colleagues to ponder what a Federal agency needs in order to be best positioned to succeed. In my opinion, a Federal agency needs at least two things: a quality leader and proper congressional oversight. I think this is especially relevant as we consider the next Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is a powerful law enforcement agency facing numerous challenges today. First and foremost, the FBI is still undergoing a transformation from a Federal law enforcement agency to a national security agency. Following 9/11, the FBI's mission changed. Director Mueller was immediately thrust into the role of reinventing a storied law enforcement agency into a national security agency. While Director Mueller rose to the challenge and made tremendous strides in accomplishing this transformation, that job is not yet complete. It is still adjusting to prevent domestic terrorism. It must grow to combat the growing threat of cybercrimes that threaten our national security, our economy, and our infrastructure. The FBI needs a Director to continue to guide it as it rises to counter these serious threats. Second, the FBI must confront the growing concerns over the use of invasive methods of gathering information on American citizens. One example would be the proper use of drones by domestic law enforcement agencies. Last year I raised this issue with the Attorney General. It now appears his response was less than forthright. This year, I raised the issue with Director Mueller and again with Mr. Comey, today's nominee. Frankly, it is going to require a Director who is knowledgeable on the subject, the law, and who is willing to work with Congress in order craft the best policy with regard to this technology's potential use in domestic law enforcement. Third, a host of legacy problems at the FBI remain unsolved. The FBI has struggled to develop a working case management computer system. Management concerns remain about the proper personnel balance between special agents and analysts. It has yet to effectively manage agent rotations to the Washington, DC headquarters. A real or perceived double standard of discipline between line agents and management must be repaired. Significant concerns about internal FBI policies dealing with whistleblower retaliation exist. Each of these matters must be addressed as they threaten to undermine the hard work of the employees at the FBI. The position of FBI Director is unique in that it is a 10-year appointment subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. This 10-year term was extended 2 years ago on a one-time only basis. The extension allowed Director Mueller to serve an additional time period as the President failed to nominate a replacement. At the time, we held a special hearing to discuss the importance of a term limit for the FBI Director. One of the reasons Congress created a 10-year term was to ensure accountability of the FBI. Today, we vote on the nomination of James B. Comey for Director. Mr. Comey has a distinguished legal career. After graduating from the University of Chicago Law School in 1985, Mr. Comey clerked for Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., U.S. district judge for the Southern District of New York. In 1986, he began his legal career with Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, where he focused on civil litigation. In 1987, Mr. Comey became an assistant U.S. attorney in the Southern District of New York, eventually serving as deputy chief of the Criminal Division. He left the Department of Justice to return to private practice in 1993, joining McGuireWoods, LLP. While at McGuireWoods, he served as a deputy special counsel on the U.S. Senate Special Committee to Investigate Whitewater and Related Matters. During this time, he also served as an adjunct professor at the University of Richmond Law School. In 1996, Mr. Comey returned to government service as Managing Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Office of the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia. By 2002, Mr. Comey was appointed U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York. And in December 2003, he was appointed Deputy Attorney General, a position he served with honor and distinction until 2005, when he left government service. However, I would like to point out, and I think Mr. Comey would agree, that perhaps one of the best indicators about his judgment is that he had the smarts to marry an Iowan. At his confirmation hearing, Mr. Comey addressed many concerns raised by Senators from both sides of the aisle. His answers were direct and thoughtful. On subjects with which he was familiar, he spoke intelligently and straightforward. If he didn't know enough, he said so. There was no trying to hide the ball or cover for his lack of expertise in a particular area. In short, it was a refreshing change from the many nominees who come up here and try to parrot to Senators what nominees think we want to hear. Not so with Mr. Comey. In fact, several times when pressed on his views on a specific FBI policy, such as FBI whistleblower policies or domestic drone use, he confessed he had little or no knowledge of the current FBI policy but promised to thoroughly review the existing policies in place and the legal and moral issues surrounding the controversies. Furthermore, he pledged to work with Congress by being responsive to our inquiries for information. Now, these promises are not unique to Mr. Comey. Almost every nominee promises the Senate that he or she will be responsive to our concerns and requests for information. Sadly, especially under this administration, once confirmed, we rarely get an adequate response until right before that individual has an oversight hearing before a Senate or House Committee. I can only hope that Mr. Comey's efforts to be more transparent will not be stymied by the Department of Justice. As I said, I think that if any Federal agency, but especially the FBI, is to succeed, it needs quality leadership and proper congressional oversight. After examining his record, I think that Mr. Comey will prove to be that leader. Only time will tell, however, if this administration will allow Mr. Comey to engage the Congress and allow us to perform our constitutional duty of oversight to ensure that existing legislation and policies best serve this nation. I thank Mr. Comey for his willingness to return to public service. And I urge my colleagues to support his nomination.", u"Madam President, I want to thank my colleague from Maryland, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. It is obvious this is a bipartisan effort in dealing with the security of the American people. The Senator from Maryland is not from my party. Together, we serve on the Intelligence Committee. We have served hundreds of hours on that committee together doing everything we can to provide our country with the opportunity to protect Americans from harm. The threat to Americans today has never been greater. We are dealing with fires raging in the Middle East and terrorist groups forming as we speak, targeting the United States and Americans, and inspiring Americans to take up arms against their fellow citizens for whatever jihadist cause they are using as the basis for the brutality that is spreading throughout the Middle East and that can happen here if they respond to these inspirational social media requests from organizations such as ISIS, Al Qaeda, and many others. I understand Americans' frustrations and concerns about their civil liberties and privacy. Those concerns have been bolstered by acts of government that can hardly be explained. Look at what has taken place with the IRS. Talk about targeting people, invading their privacy and civil rights and using the organization of government for political purposes is outrageous. Of course, people are up in arms about all of this, the debacle of Benghazi and Fast and Furious and on and on over the years. One can go into what has happened to instill distrust in the minds of the American people. When a program such as this comes along and, unfortunately, the American people are told by Members of this Congress falsehoods as to what this program is and what it isn't, it just feeds the narrative that Washington is in their bedroom, Washington is in their home, it is in their phone, it is listening to their calls--Washington is monitoring everything they do--their locations. This simply is not true. We have an organization and tools put in place with that organization, the National Security Agency, following the tragic events of 9/11 that the American people insisted on putting in place. Let's use the tools that we can to try to prevent another 9/11 from happening, to try to identify terrorist attacks before they happen, not to clean up after they happen. The frustration for those of us on the Intelligence Committee is we are not able to come down and refute statements that are false that are made here without breaching our oath not to release classified information. We have had briefings with all of our Members. Some don't choose to attend, and therefore their narrative continues without any ability to publicly challenge what is being said. It has been said on this floor that Big Government is listening to everyone's phone calls. That is patently false. First of all, it is impossible. There are trillions of phone calls made every day throughout the world. The calculation is that it would take 330 million employees sitting there monitoring Americans' phone calls to be able to listen to everyone's phone calls. It is an impossibility, No. 1. No. 2, it is guaranteed that this is not happening because the authorities given to the National Security Agency prevent that from happening. There are layers and layers of attorneys and others who oversee this process, including those of us in the Intelligence Committees in the Senate and the House, the Justice Department, and the executive branch. All three branches of government are so concerned that this program could potentially be abused that the oversight is such that it would take a monumental conspiracy, involving hundreds and hundreds of people, to all agree that, yes, let's do this and breach the law. If what has been said on this floor about the nature of this program was correct, I would be the first to line up and say I am here to defend the liberties that are being abused by the government. I guarantee to my constituents that this is a high priority for me, that I do not support anything that would violate their civil rights or violate their privacy. That is true of those of us on the Intelligence Committee, whether we are a Democrat or Republican. We have heard today from Senator King, who is on the committee. We have heard from Senator Mikulski of Maryland, who spoke. We heard from Senator Nelson, who was formerly on the committee on the Democratic side. On the Republican side, our leader of the committee, Senator Burr, has laid out in great detail how this works. The tragedy is that in being forced to describe what the program is and what it isn't, we have had to declassify information. Guess who is listening. I hope a lot of the American people are listening because they need to understand that much of what they have heard is simply a falsity. It is factually incorrect. I am not going to go into why this has happened, why some Members choose to say things like--and I am stating what has been said on this floor--``Big Government is looking at every American's records, all Americans' phone records all the time. They have said the NSA collects Americans' contacts from address books, buddy lists, calling records, phone records, emails, and do we want to live in a world where the government has us under constant surveillance?'' None of us want to live in that kind of world. That is why we live in America. That is why America is what it is. This is not Stasi Germany. This is not a Communist regime. This is not a totalitarian society. We would not allow that here. Our Constitution guarantees privacy and we cherish that privacy and we protect that privacy. But to come down to this floor and make statements such as those is irresponsible, and it is a narrative that is just not the case. Poor Ben Franklin has been dragged into this because the quote that has been attributed to Franklin that should drive our decision on this point was: ``Those who would give up essential Liberty to purchase a little temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.'' I agree with that, but the key word here is ``essential.'' This matter has come before the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has said that what the NSA is doing in storing phone numbers only--not names, not collecting information--is not essential to liberty. They have declared it as a necessary, effective tool that is open. The only information that is in your phone record is the date of the call, the number called, the duration, and the time of the call--nothing more than that. Why is this done? It is done so that when we determine the phone number of a known terrorist in a foreign country, we can go into that haystack of phone numbers and say, Was that phone number connected to a phone number held by someone in America? In fact, the former Director of the CIA said that we likely would have prevented 9/11 because we now know that a phone number in America was connected to a phone number of a terrorist group--Al Qaeda--and we could have taken that information to the FISA Court or to a court and gotten permission to check into that to see if that was leading to some kind of terror attacks. It doesn't take much to recall the images of what happened on 9/11, where we were, what horror we stood and watched coming over the airwaves, and the tragedy and the loss of life that took place, changing the face of America. So it is important that we tell the American people what it is and what it isn't. It is important that Members take responsibility to understand this is an issue that rises above politics. This is an issue that cannot be used and should not be used for political gain, whether it is monetary gain or whether it is feeding a base of support that responds to the scare tactics of America listening to all of your calls, Big Government in all of your business. This is too important an issue. This is about the safety of America. This is about preventing us from terrorist attacks. The threat is real, and it is more real than it has been in a long, long time. So I talked yesterday about the existing program, what it was and what it isn't. It has been talked about by my colleagues on the floor. We have moved to a point where we have to choose between the better of two bad choices. One choice is that we eliminate the program. One of our Members in the Senate has publicly indicated that is what he wants to do. He claims it is unconstitutional. Unfortunately, he doesn't have the support of the Supreme Court that has dealt with this issue, nor the constitutional lawyers. That is a case that just simply cannot be made because it doesn't impede on anyone's liberty. Again, I would say, if it did impede on Americans' liberty, I would be the first in line to state that and to fight against it. But it is a solution to something that is not a problem. But secondly, because one individual would not grant even the shortest of extensions, even an extension on two noncontroversial parts of this program that no one has challenged, to allow that to go forward so that we could keep something in place to address a potential threat that could happen--even that was denied us last evening as the clock was ticking toward midnight, and the program expired. Someone who is so determined to eliminate this entire program, who has misrepresented this program to the American people, so determined to stay with his narrative that he would not even allow an hour, not even allow a day, not even allow minutes for us to try to reconcile the differences here with the House of Representatives--and those differences are pretty small. Senator Burr has been in negotiations with the House and with Members of the Senate relative to some changes and modifications in the USA FREEDOM Act, which was supported by a significant bipartisan majority in the House of Representatives. I think that is a step in the right direction. It does not solve all of the problems. My concern with the FREEDOM Act is a concern of many; that is, the act has some major flaws, some of which I thought were fatal. But I have to measure that against nothing. Thanks to the procedural maneuvering by one Member here, we have been left with only two choices. The Senate majority leader laid those out with some clarity yesterday and today. The choices are completely eliminate the program, go completely dark, take away this tool, and put Americans more at risk--thanks very much, but it is over and try something else--or a provision that has been passed by the House of Representatives that moves collection of the phone numbers from NSA to the telephone companies. The problem with the bill is that it does not mandate that movement. It is a voluntary act that the phone companies are most likely not going to want to adhere to, primarily because they now have to set up a situation where they potentially could be liable for breaches of the people who are overseeing their program. There are 1,400 telephone companies in the United States. Many of them are small. But to move this program, which has six layers of oversight at NSA, which has the oversight of the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee, which has the oversight of the Department of Justice and the administration, and which has the oversight of the Federal intelligence court called FISA--all of that security oversight--to make sure there is no breach will now get transferred over to up to 1,400 telephone companies. The people who oversee this program--it is a very small number at NSA who operate this program--have had intensive background checks and security clearances. They have proven their commitment to make sure--to do everything possible not to abuse this program. There has never been a documented case, never one case of an abuse of this program--again, a solution to something that is not a problem. All of a sudden, now we will have dozens, if not hundreds, if not more than 1,000 phone companies all putting their own programs in place. This is not something they would like to do, No. 1, because it is going to be very costly, and, No. 2, they cannot guarantee that every one of their people is going to have the same kind of background check and security check NSA has. They will not have the oversight of the Intelligence Committees, of the Justice Department, of the executive branch. We are trusting a private entity to do the kinds of things that multiple agencies do. And you can just count on probably some breaches of security there as people want to use the capability to abuse that program for whatever reason--maybe checking up on their wife or their girlfriend or their business partner or who knows for what possible reasons they could use it. So it really does not add privacy protections; it detracts from privacy protections. Secondly, the retention of records is voluntary. Now, if we have some amendments that are passed by this body and accepted by the House, we will get notification if a company does not want to retain those records. But there is no retention authority granted here to us to ensure that those companies will keep any phone numbers, and then the capability of the program will be significantly reduced. We are having to look at a very sophisticated program that the NSA says: We are not sure it is going to work. We are not sure if this process that the FREEDOM Act requires to replace what we have now is going to be effective. It is going to take many months to determine if that is the case. So it is an untested program that we are putting a bet on that this is going to work. It would be nice to know we had something in place we can easily replace this with. So we are going from the known to the unknown. We are making a bet that this is going to be more effective and provide more privacy for the American people. It is a diminishment and a significant degradation of the current program. It will not be as effective as the program that is currently in place. Nevertheless, we have to weigh this against nothing. That is the position we have been put in because one Senator would not allow an extension of time for us to have a more lengthy debate and reasonable negotiation in consultation with the House of Representatives to arrive at something that will give us more assurance that we have a program in place that does not breach privacy but allows us to detect potential terrorist attacks and stop those attacks before they take place. Having had to go through all of this and raise these kinds of issues here and talk about a fellow colleague is not fun. It is not something I hoped I would ever have to do. But I could not stand by and watch a program that is helping protect American people from known terrorist threats and let their safety be jeopardized by falsehoods that are being said about what this program is and is not. It looks like we are coming together on something that is far from what we need, that is going to significantly degrade our capability, but it is the only choice that we have. We are going to have to weigh that decision. Is something that is far less better than nothing? Ultimately, given the fact that these threats have never been greater, something--even if it is not what we now have--something is better than nothing. But we have been put in this situation unnecessarily by misrepresentations and a public that has not been informed. It is not their fault. We have not been able to because so much of this has been classified. Now, much of it is. Our adversaries, the terrorist groups, know a lot about the program they did not know about before. Thanks to Edward Snowden and thanks to some misrepresentations, we are left with the devil's bargain, and that is to choose the best of the worst. We will talk this through today. We will have a vote tomorrow. In my mind, it is absolutely essential that the modifications that are being made, that are being presented--I will not go into depth about those. It has already been talked about here. It is essential that those be passed by this body. It is, of course, essential that the House accept them. I know a lot of negotiation has gone on back and forth, and it will continue. But it is the only way to keep a program in place. Even as degraded as it is, even as compromised as it is, it is the only way to keep a program in place. So I will be supporting those tweaks, those changes, even though I think they are far short of what we need to do to fix the issue that was rushed through the House without much deliberation. But to make it stronger, to put it in a better position, I will support those. If those amendments can be passed, then I will reluctantly choose to vote for something that is better than nothing, as degraded as it is, in order to keep this program as one of the essential tools--one of many--as we collect information, keep that in place. I know my colleague from Ohio has been seeking the floor for some time. I apologize for taking too long. I yield the floor.", u"I have sought recognition to introduce three bills relating to limiting Executive power. Because of the past period of time since 9/11, we have seen enormous expansion of Executive power. We have seen the President, during President George W. Bush's administration, use signing statements extensively. We have seen President Obama use a signing statement already in his short tenure, which, in effect, nullifies what the Congress has done. The Constitution is plain that there is a presentment of legislation to the President and he either signs it or vetoes it. What we have found is that Presidents are now cherry-picking the parts they like and the parts they don't like. So I am submitting legislation on Presidential signing statements. The second issue of concern involves the immunity for the telephone companies which would deprive Federal jurisdiction for some 40 cases. I believe telephone companies have been good citizens in providing very important information. I believe there is a way to maintain the jurisdiction of the Federal courts and still not subject the telephone companies to litigation or possible damages by having the Government substituted as the party defendant. I am introducing legislation on that subject. Third, I am introducing legislation that would establish a requirement that the Supreme Court of the United States take jurisdiction on all appeals involving the terrorist surveillance program. That program has caused a great deal of controversy because of the issue as to whether the President has authority under article II to ignore the explicit provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The terrorist surveillance program, was declared unconstitutional by a Federal court in Detroit. An appeal taken to the Sixth Circuit was dismissed for reasons of lack of standing. The forceful dissenting opinion in that case showed that there was sufficient basis for standing--a very flexible judicial doctrine. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, so at this point, we don't know whether the President's exercise of authority there under article II of the Constitution is correct. Certainly, if the President has that constitutional authority, it supercedes the statute. But that is a matter which should have been decided a long time ago by the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has avoided moving on that subject. Today, I have an article I have offered on executive power. It appears today in the New York review of books, where I outline my intent to introduce these pieces of legislation. The article comes from a longer floor statement I had prepared. It has been reduced somewhat in size. In the 7\\1/2\\ years since September 11, the United States has witnessed one of the greatest expansions of executive authority in its history, in derogation of the constitutionally mandated separation of powers. President Obama, as only the third sitting senator to be elected president in American history, and the first since John F. Kennedy, may be more likely to respect the separation of powers than President Bush was. But rather than put my faith in any president to restrain the executive branch, I intend to take several concrete steps, which I hope the new President will support. First, I intend to introduce legislation that will mandate Supreme Court review of lower court decisions in suits brought by the ACLU and others that challenge the constitutionality of the warrantless wiretapping program authorized by President Bush after September 11. While the Supreme Court generally exercises discretion as to whether it will review a case, there are precedents for Congress to direct Supreme Court review on constitutional issues--including the statutes forbidding flag burning and requiring Congress to abide by Federal employment laws--and I will follow those. Second, I will reintroduce legislation to keep the courts open to suits filed against several major telephone companies that allegedly facilitated the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping program. Although Congress granted immunity to the telephone companies in July 2008, this issue may yet be successfully revisited since the courts have not yet ruled on the legality of the immunity provision. My legislation would substitute the government as defendant in place of the telephone companies. This would allow the cases to go forward, with the government footing the bill for any damages awarded. Further, I will reintroduce my legislation from 2006 and 2007--the Presidential Signing Statements Act--to prohibit courts from relying on, or deferring to, Presidential signing statements when determining the meaning of any act of Congress. These statements, sometimes issued when the President signs a bill into law, have too often been used to undermine congressional intent. Earlier versions of my legislation went nowhere because of the obvious impossibility of obtaining two-thirds majorities in each House to override an expected veto by President Bush. Nevertheless, in the new Congress, my legislation has a better chance of mustering a majority vote and being signed into law by President Obama. To understand why these steps are so important, one must appreciate an imbalance in our ``checks and balances'' that has become increasingly evident in recent years. I witnessed firsthand, during many of the battles over administration policy since September 11, how difficult it can be for Congress and the courts to rally their members against an overzealous executive. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 2005 to 2007, I led the effort to reauthorize and improve the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, which was originally set to expire at the end of 2005. Indeed, after intensive bipartisan negotiations, the Judiciary Committee succeeded--to the surprise of most observers--in approving a revised bill by unanimous vote. The full Senate then approved the bill by unanimous consent, but the conference report negotiated with the House of Representatives faced stiffer opposition. Nevertheless, after days of floor debate, I awoke on December 16, 2005, fully expecting to finish Senate action on the long-delayed reauthorization. So, I was startled--really shocked--to read the lead story in the New York Times that morning, titled ``Bush Lets US Spy on Callers Without Courts,'' which revealed that our intelligence agencies had been engaged in warrantless wiretapping since shortly after September 11, in flat violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act--FISA--of 1978. This is James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, ``Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,'' the New York Times, December 16, 2005. The news caused the Senate to delay passage of the PATRIOT Act reauthorization for months. Senator Charles Schumer expressed the sentiments of many: ``I went to bed last night unsure of how to vote on this legislation. . . . Today's revelation that the Government listened in on thousands of phone conversations without getting a warrant is shocking and has greatly influenced my vote.'' More importantly, the disclosure in the Times launched a fierce debate about the extent of Presidential authority in the war on terror that has yet to be fully resolved. That day, I assured my colleagues the reports would be a ``matter for oversight by the Judiciary Committee . . . a very high priority item.'' When Congress reconvened in January 2006, I made good on my promise: I held multiple hearings into the program the Times revealed, later dubbed the Terrorist Surveillance Program. As acknowledged by President Bush, this highly classified program launched in the weeks after September 11 purported to authorize the National Security Agency to intercept phone calls between terror suspects overseas and persons inside the United States. Critics like me argued that the President's program violated FISA. After all, the law declared the procedures set up by FISA to be the ``exclusive means'' by which such surveillance of telephone calls and other communications could be conducted. FISA also made criminal all domestic electronic surveillance designed to obtain foreign intelligence ``except as authorized by statute.'' Although the law defined limited exceptions in emergencies, reports in the press made it clear that none of them applied to the warrantless wiretapping that was done in the Terrorist Surveillance Program. I recognized that, as administration supporters argued, the President might have inherent power to disregard FISA and to conduct unfettered foreign intelligence surveillance under article II of the Constitution, the section that defines his authority as Commander in Chief. I was not, however, sympathetic to the administration's further argument that Congress had implicitly authorized the President to carry out programs such as the Terrorist Surveillance Program when it authorized the use of military force against terrorists in September 2001. I was also convinced that President Bush's failure to notify Congress of the secret program violated provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. That statute requires the President to ``ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States.'' But the administration informed only eight legislators of the Terrorist Surveillance Program: the chairman and ranking members of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, and the two top leaders in the majority and minority of both Houses, leaving out both me and Senator Patrick Leahy as chair and ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, despite the fact that when FISA was enacted in 1978, it went through both the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. While the law explicitly permits notice to this limited ``Gang of 8'' for certain covert operations--such as efforts to influence political conditions abroad without disclosing the U.S. role--the Terrorist Surveillance Program did not fit this exception. Indeed, those notified were very uneasy about the arrangement. Senator Jay Rockefeller, then ranking member on the Intelligence Committee, sent a secret handwritten letter to the Vice President saying the administration's surveillance activities ``raised profound oversight issues'' on which, owing to the arrangement, Rockefeller could not ``consult staff or counsel.'' A sealed copy of the letter had to be stored in a classified Senate area for over 2 years until knowledge of the Terrorist Surveillance Program became public. Once the story broke, Representative Jane Harman, who as ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee was another Gang of 8 member, informed President Bush that she believed ``the practice of briefing only certain Members of the intelligence committees violates the specific requirements of the National Security Act of 1947.'' I raised this issue in a January 24, 2006, letter sent to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales in advance of the first Judiciary Committee hearing on the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Gonzales replied: ``It has for decades been the practice of both Democratic and Republican administrations to inform only the Chair and Ranking Members of the intelligence committees about certain exceptionally sensitive matters. The attorney general added that, according to the Congressional Research Service, the leaders of the intelligence committees had acquiesced in this practice. In my view, Gonzales's argument could appeal only to those unacquainted with the ways the executive branch has, in practice, dealt with the intelligence committees. Administrations of both parties have sometimes told the chair and ranking member that they have important information to disclose, but insisted that they will reveal this information only to some group within the committee and the top congressional leadership, such as the ``Gang of 8.'' In many cases, the offer is accepted as the only way of getting the information--at least in a timely manner. To the extent the administration relied on such precedents to justify notifying only the ``Gang of 8,'' it should have informed me and Senator Leahy as well. Indeed, administration officials briefed both of us on the Terrorist Surveillance Program when they later sought comprehensive FISA reform. It is quite glaring, then, that they neglected to brief us in 2005, even as we were considering reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, which was central to the administration's counterterrorism efforts. In the spring of 2006, new allegations about the government's surveillance activities surfaced--not at congressional hearings, but again through leaks to the press. On May 11, 2006, USA Today reported that the National Security Agency had been ``secretly collecting the phone call records of tens of millions of Americans, using data provided by AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth.'' This is Leslie Cauley, ``NSA Has Massive Database of American's Phone Calls,'' USA Today, June 11, 2006. Although the records reportedly included only data like telephone numbers, rather than the contents of calls, the revelations stirred new controversy. One month later, on June 22, the Chicago Sun-Times reported that AT&T had changed its privacy policy to make customer data a ``business record the company owns,'' one that ``can be disclosed to [the] government. . . .'' This is Associated Press, AT&T Says it Can Disclose Account Data on Net, TV Clients, Chicago Sun Times, June 22, 2006, at 25. I was very interested in the legal basis for this assertion of ownership and what relationship it had, if any, to the reported disclosures of communications data to the government. As luck would have it, that very day, the Judiciary Committee's Antitrust Subcommittee was holding an unrelated hearing on the proposed merger of AT&T and BellSouth, featuring the firms' respective CEOs, Edward Whitacre Jr. and Duane Ackerman. I could not let the presence of these CEOs pass without confronting them on the surveillance program. I asked Mr. Whitacre whether his ``company provide[d] information to the Federal Government.'' He kept repeating that they ``follow the law''--a comment that I told him was ``contemptuous of this committee,'' because I was asking a factual question and he was offering a legal conclusion. Mr. Whitacre defended his answer on the grounds that he had spoken to a number of attorneys who advised him he could say nothing more. The episode did not go unnoticed. For example, under the headline ``Privacy flap engulfs hearing,'' the Atlanta Journal-Constitution detailed that ``a Senate hearing Thursday intended to explore the consumer impact of a proposed AT&T-BellSouth merger instead turned into a contentious face-off over phone privacy.'' (see Marilyn Geewax, AT&T Bellsouth Merger; Privacy Flap Engulfs Hearing; Panel Wonders About Use of Phone Records, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, June 23, 2006, at 4G. In truth, the matter merited its own hearing, but my efforts to hold one were thwarted by Vice President Cheney. Soon after the story broke, I announced my intention to schedule a hearing with the CEOs of the named carriers. I planned to either subpoena the companies or arrange a hearing closed to the public, which the telephone companies had agreed to attend without receiving a subpoena. Unfortunately, Vice President Cheney went behind my back to persuade all of the other Republicans on the committee not to support the subpoena and to boycott the session I had called to discuss a possible private hearing. In the face of this opposition, I had little choice but to agree to a proposal by Senator Orrin Hatch for a brief delay to give him an opportunity to solicit the administration's views on my bill to permit court oversight of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. When I announced this course of action at the executive session, a highly contentious debate ensued. Senator Leahy, long at odds with the Vice President, opined that since we were not going to ``find out independently'' what the government sought from the telecoms and instead wait ``for Dick Cheney to tell us what we should know'' that we might as well ``just recess for the rest of the year.'' On the other hand, Senator Dianne Feinstein reported that she would not vote for the subpoenas because the ``telephone companies who are trying to be a good citizen should not be held out to dry.'' As a member of both the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, she added that ``it is very difficult for this committee to legislate without knowing the program'' and therefore the Intelligence Committee was the appropriate venue for legislation on the matter. Senator Dick Durbin, noting the absence of many Republicans, complained, ``I thought there would be a conversation about this, but apparently there will not be.'' He continued that the ``fortitude and strength [I] had shown in this committee, leading up through the month of May has ended in a June swoon.'' When this uncomfortable meeting--and the accompanying slings--concluded, I drafted what I refer to as a ``lawyer's letter'' to the Vice President. I wrote: I was surprised, to say the least, that you sought to influence, really determine, the action of the Committee without calling me first, or at least calling me at some point. This was especially perplexing since we both attended the Republican Senators caucus lunch yesterday and I walked directly in front of you on at least two occasions en route from the buffet to my table. I concluded with a solemn warning: If an accommodation cannot be reached with the administration, the Judiciary Committee will consider confronting the issue with subpoenas and enforcement. This spat proved great fodder for the editors. The lurid details were splashed across the pages of national newspapers around the country. The Los Angeles Times confided that the ``unusually public rupture between a senior GOP lawmaker and the White House'' provided ``a rare public glimpse of the tactics employed by a vice president who prefers to operate behind the scenes.'' It said I ``lashed out'' in a letter in an ``unusually harsh attack.'' This is Gregg Miller, Specter Says Cheney Tried to Derail Hearings, Los Angeles Times, June 8, 2006, at A6. The front page headline of The Hill screamed ``Specter Rebukes Cheney,'' and the Washington Post averred that the ``simmering tensions'' over the ``administrations tight-lipped position on the programs'' had finally ``boiled over.'' see Alexander Bolton, Specter Rebukes Cheney, The Hill, June 8, 2006, at 1; Michael A. Fletcher, Cheney Plays Down Dispute With Specter, Washington Post, June 9, 2006, at A4. Someone in Cheney's office must have been up all night, because I had my reply by mid-morning the next day. The White House, he said, was willing to negotiate in good faith. Extensive discussions culminated with a compromise bill and a July 11, 2006, meeting with President Bush in the Oval Office. The President agreed to submit the surveillance program to judicial review, but was insistent that the Senate not alter the agreed-upon terms. Usually, after securing such an agreement, one walks out of the Oval Office to the cameras and advertises it, but I chose to make the announcement at the committee's next executive session on July 13. My bill of 2006 to expand and revise FISA gave jurisdiction to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court--the Intelligence Court--which was set up by the original FISA law to rule on surveillance requests by Federal agencies--to review the legality of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Determining the constitutionality of the program would turn upon submissions to the Intelligence Court by the attorney general about its function and procedures, with particular attention to safeguards to ensure that the Terrorist Surveillance Program targeted suspected terrorists and not innocent Americans. The bill further required the attorney general to inform the House and Senate Intelligence Committees of all surveillance programs and created a new criminal offense for misuse of intercepted information. In return, the government was given additional flexibility with respect to the issuance and duration of emergency warrants. And in a nod to the administration, the bill also acknowledged that the president, as commander in chief, retains certain authority inherent in article II of the Constitution, although it left decisions about the scope of that authority to the courts. Some complained that I had ``sold out'' in making this deal. See, e.g., Jonathan Mahler, After the Imperial Presidency, N.Y. Times, November 9, 2008, Magazine, at MM42. These critics fail to appreciate the disadvantage Congress faces in resisting expansions of executive power. The Terrorist Surveillance Program was put into effect when President Bush signed a secret order in 2001. He did not need to hold any hearings or convince any colleagues. Vice President Cheney could rely on the fractious nature of the Senate, and the great influence of the executive, to easily kill the prospects for my planned subpoenas of the telephone companies. The administration's damage control, like the initial action, was swift and unilateral. By contrast, on the legislative side, we could not begin to act until we established a factual record through a series of hearings and secured consensus on a path forward. As committee chairman, I was battered by Senators on both sides in my efforts for oversight. On the right, there were members who touted Article II and party loyalty. They were inclined, at a minimum, to accept the strained arguments that the Authorization for Use of Military Force had authorized the Terrorist Surveillance Program, and that the failure to notify the full intelligence committees did not actually violate the National Security Act. On the left, there was genuine outrage at some administration tactics, but they were also in no hurry for compromise, no matter how favorable the terms. They were very cognizant of the fact that the longer they let the friction between the branches drag on, the worse it looked for Republicans and the better for them and their allies. For example, as the New York Sun reported in June 2006, ``[f]ear of government excess in the war on terror ha[d] driven membership rolls'' in the ACLU ``to more than 550,000 from less than 300,000,'' and the group's fundraising had ``surged.'' See Josh Gerstein, For ACLU's Anthony Romero, These Should Be Best Times, New York Sun, June 27, 2006. Ultimately, the Judiciary Committee approved my FISA reform bill on September 13, 2006, but in contrast to the bipartisan vote on the PATRIOT Act reauthorization a year earlier, there was a 10-8 party-line vote. A final vote on the Senate floor was never taken, largely because the House had settled on a different approach to the Terrorist Surveillance Program that did not authorize court review of the program. Once again, the inherent constraints on the bicameral legislative branch served to benefit the executive, as the President's surveillance program continued unabated throughout our internal debates. The courts fared no better at reining in the Terrorist Surveillance Program. In August 2006, Judge Anna Diggs Taylor of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan issued an opinion in ACLU v. NSA, finding the program unconstitutional. Almost a year later, in July 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned her decision. On a 2-1 vote, it declined to rule on the legality of the program, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. The Supreme Court then declined to hear the case, even though the doctrine of standing has enough flexibility for the Court to have acted. My bill to mandate Supreme Court review of this and other cases therefore seems all the more necessary to resolve the question. With the Supreme Court abstaining, another lone district judge took a stand. In In re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker in the Northern District of California considered a case brought by an Islamic charity that claims to have been a subject of the surveillance program. In a 56-page opinion he wrote: Congress appears clearly to have intended to--and did--establish the exclusive means for foreign intelligence surveillance activities to be conducted. Whatever power the executive may otherwise have had in this regard, FISA limits the power of the executive branch to conduct such activities. As detailed further below, the hurdles faced by the few judges willing to examine the Terrorist Surveillance Program, and the snails' pace of appellate review, make my bill to mandate Supreme Court review of this and other cases all the more necessary to resolve the question. Shortcomings of the Legislative and Judicial Branches as Checks on The courts, including the Supreme Court, have admittedly been more effective than Congress in restraining executive excesses, but both have been too slow. This failure is exemplified by the judicial and legislative efforts to address the administration's treatment of detainees in the war on terror. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, decided on June 28, 2004, nearly 3 years after September 11, the Supreme Court ruled that a U.S. citizen being held as an enemy combatant must be given an opportunity to contest the factual basis for his detention before a neutral magistrate. In a stern rebuke of executive overreaching, Justice O'Connor's opinion declared, ``We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the president when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.'' The same day, the Court held in Rasul v. Bush that detainees at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to challenge their detention by filing habeas corpus petitions--the time honored legal action used to contest the basis for government confinement. Two years later, on June 29, 2006, the Court announced in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the President could not conduct military commission trials under procedures that had not been authorized by Congress and that failed to satisfy the obligations of the Geneva Conventions' Common article III and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Instead of fully embracing these decisions, however, Congress responded with the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act of 2006, both of which eliminated detainees' right to habeas corpus review on grounds that foreign terrorist suspects did not have the same rights as others in U.S. custody. During debate on the Military Commissions Act, I offered an amendment that would have guaranteed habeas corpus for detainees. In the face of sharp criticism from my own party, I argued that I was not speaking ``in favor of enemy combatants.'' Rather, I was ``trying to establish . . . a course of judicial procedure'' to determine whether the accused were in fact enemy combatants. I pointed out that my fight to preserve habeas rights was, in essence, a struggle to defend ``the jurisdiction of the federal courts to maintain the rule of law.'' I concluded with a plea for the Senate not to deny ``the habeas corpus right which would take us back some 900 years and deny the fundamental principle of the Magna Charta imposed on King John at Runnymede.'' Despite these entreaties, my amendment narrowly lost on a 48-51 vote. I had lost the battle, but was not prepared to surrender. On January 18, 2007, Attorney General Gonzales testified before the Judiciary Committee and argued that proposals to restore habeas corpus, such as a bill Senator Leahy and I had introduced, were ``ill-advised and frankly defy common sense.'' I was astounded at his claim that ``there is no express grant of habeas in the Constitution.'' I asked him: ``The constitution says you can't take it away except in case of rebellion or invasion. Doesn't that mean you have the right of habeas corpus unless there is an invasion or rebellion?'' He replied, ``The constitution does not say every individual in the United States or every citizen is hereby granted or assured the right to habeas. . . . It simply says the right of habeas corpus shall not be suspended.'' I protested, ``You may be treading on your interdiction and violating common sense, Mr. Attorney General.'' This exchange received notice in a number of papers, as my position gained momentum. The Detroit Free Press, for example, editorialized: The moment when Alberto Gonzales proved he was just wrong for the job of U.S. attorney general came . . . after Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pa., asked him about the constitutional guarantee of criminal due process, known as habeas corpus. See Editorial, Gonzales Twisted Rule of Law Too Well, Detroit Free Press, August 28, 2007. That September, I made a second attempt to restore habeas corpus jurisdiction with an amendment to the Defense Department's authorization bill. This time, a majority of Senators voted for it, including seven Republicans. Unfortunately, the 56-43 majority was insufficient because, in the face of a filibuster threat, Senate procedure required sixty votes to pass. Ironically, a procedural tool that protects Senate minorities had become a shield for the executive branch. Thus, yet again, it was left to the Supreme Court to beat back the encroachment of executive power, which it finally did on June 12, 2008. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court held that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay ``are entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.'' Because the Combatant Status Review Tribunals established by the Defense Department in 2004, following the Hamdi and Rasul decisions, and the limited procedural review permitted before the DC Circuit failed to constitute an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus, the Court held that the Military Commissions Act had effected ``an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.'' As satisfying as it was to be vindicated, I was frustrated that Congress had left the task of reining in the executive to slow-paced and incomplete judicial review. While the Boumediene decision ensured habeas rights for detainees, it took 7 years; and even then the Court almost failed to take on the case. All along, the Court's rulings were piecemeal and avoided taking strong stands on controversial constitutional questions. The result was a protracted process that delayed justice for detainees and left important areas of constitutional law murky. Indeed, the Supreme Court actually denied Boumediene's initial petition for review on April 2, 2007. Then, on June 29, in a highly unusual move, the Court reconsidered and agreed to hear the case. The justices gave no reason for the reversal, but some speculate that they were moved by intervening disclosures concerning the military commissions. In particular, a military officer and lawyer who had been involved in overseeing the tribunals said that the process was flawed and that prosecutors had been pressured to label detainees as enemy combatants. As much time as it took in these cases, at least the Supreme Court eventually ruled on the merits in Boumediene. The same cannot be said for Supreme Court review, or even substantive appellate review, of President Bush's warrantless wiretapping program. Thus far, only individual judges in the district courts of Michigan and California have been willing to take a strong stand on the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Like many in the legislature, it appears the courts are reluctant to act. They do not want the responsibility. Only after significant time has passed, and it is relatively safe, do they finally consider such issues on the merits. I have proposed legislation in the past to require expedited review of certain important cases, including the challenges by civil liberties organizations and other plaintiffs to the Terrorist Surveillance Program, and I will do so again in the new Congress. Even where Congress manages to negotiate its internal checks and to act decisively against expansions of executive power, presidents have used signing statements that override the legislative language and defy congressional intent. There was an explosion in the use of signing statements during the Bush administration. The Boston Globe reported in 2006 that President Bush ``has used signing statements to claim the authority to disobey more than 750 statutes--more laws than all previous presidents combined.'' This is Charlie Savage, In Proposed Iran Deal, Bush Might Have to Waive Law: '05 Statute Forbids Providing Reactor, Boston Globe, June 8, 2006. Two prominent examples make the point. As detailed earlier, I spearheaded the delicate negotiations on the PATRIOT Act Reauthorization which included months of painstaking efforts to balance national security and civil liberties, disrupted by the dramatic disclosure of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. The final version of the bill to reauthorize the PATRIOT Act featured a carefully crafted compromise, which was necessary to secure its passage in 2006. Among other things, it included several oversight provisions designed to ensure that the FBI did not abuse special terrorism-related powers permitting it to make secret demands for business records. President Bush signed the measure into law, only to enter a signing statement insisting that he could withhold from Congress any information required by the oversight provisions if he decided that disclosure would ``impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative process of the executive, or the performance of the executive's constitutional duties.'' The second example arose in 2005. Congress overwhelmingly passed Senator John McCain's amendment to ban all U.S. personnel from inflicting ``cruel, inhuman or degrading'' treatment on any prisoner held by the United States. There was no ambiguity in Congress's intent; in fact, the Senate approved the proposal 90-9. However, after signing the bill into law, the President quietly issued a signing statement asserting that his administration would construe it ``in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power.'' Many understood this signing statement to undermine the legislation. In a January 4, 2006, article titled ``Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban: Waiver Right Is Reserved,'' the Boston Globe cited an anonymous ``senior administration official,'' according to whom ``the president intended to reserve the right to use harsher methods in special situations involving national security.'' These signing statements are outrageous, intruding on the Constitution's delegation of ``all legislative powers'' to Congress, but it is even more outrageous that Congress has done nothing to protect its constitutional powers. The legislation I introduced in 2006 would have given Congress standing to challenge the constitutionality of these signing statements, but has until now failed to muster the veto-proof majority it would surely require. The executive branch operates free of such internal dissent. Although John McCain promised to drop signing statements altogether, Barack Obama, while deploring Bush's practice, said during the campaign that ``no one doubts that it is appropriate to use signing statements to protect a president's constitutional prerogatives.'' Here again, the President does not need to convince any colleagues to issue a signing statement, he needs only put pen to paper. Indeed, 2 days after criticizing President Bush's signing statements, President Obama issued one of his own regarding the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009. Citing among others his ``commander in chief'' and ``foreign affairs'' powers, he refused to be bound by at least 11 specific provisions of the bill including one longstanding rider to appropriations bills designed to aid congressional oversight. As I told the Wall Street Journal, ``We're having a repeat of what Democrats bitterly complained about under President Bush,'' and if President Obama ``wants to pick a fight, Congress has plenty of authority to retaliate.'' Many of the issues surrounding the Terrorist Surveillance Program and executive authority resurfaced in 2008. FISA reform legislation, which began making its way through the Senate in February of last year, included a controversial provision giving retroactive immunity to the telecommunications companies for their alleged cooperation with the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Throughout, my chief concern was to keep the way to the courts open as a means to check executive excesses. I offered an amendment, both in committee and on the floor, to substitute the U.S. Government for the telephone companies facing lawsuits related to the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Instead of immunity, my amendment would have put the government in the place of the companies, so the cases could go forward without posing a legal threat to the companies themselves. When this proposal was defeated, I proposed yet another amendment, which would have required a federal district court to determine that the surveillance itself was constitutional before granting immunity. I also cosponsored an amendment that would have delayed the retroactive immunity for the telephone companies until a mandatory inspector general's report on the Terrorist Surveillance Program had been issued. I tried to impress upon my colleagues the importance of our actions: We are dealing here with a matter that is of historic importance. I believe that years from now, historians will look back on this period from 9/11 to the present as the greatest expansion of Executive authority in history-- unchecked expansion of authority . . . The Supreme Court of the United States has gone absent without leave on the issue, in my legal opinion. When the Detroit Federal judge found the terrorist surveillance program unconstitutional, it was [reversed] by the Sixth Circuit on a 2-to-1 opinion on grounds of lack of standing. Then the Supreme Court refused to review the case. But the very formidable dissenting opinion laid out all of the grounds where there was ample basis to grant standing. Now we have Chief Judge Walker declaring the act unconstitutional. The Congress ought to let the courts fulfill their constitutional function. . . . Although I am prepared to stomach this bill, if I must, I am not yet ready to concede that the debate is over. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I don't believe it is too late to make this bill better. The date was July 7 and the Senate had just returned from recess, which allowed me to close with a flourish: Perhaps the Fourth of July holiday will inspire the Senate to exercise its independence from the executive branch now that we have returned to Washington. Despite my fight to keep the courts open, in the end all my amendments were defeated. Nevertheless, as I said I would, I ultimately voted for the FISA reform bill. I chose not to reject the entire package--which had the support of nearly seventy senators, including both presidential candidates--not only because my classified briefings on the surveillance program convinced me of its value, but also because of the important oversight provisions it imposed on future surveillance programs. The FISA reform bill required prior court review of the government's procedures for surveillance of foreign targets, except in exigent circumstances. It also required that the Intelligence Court determine whether procedures for foreign targeting satisfy fourth amendment protections against unreasonable searches. In addition, before monitoring U.S. citizens outside the country, it required individualized court orders based on probable cause. Finally, the bill mandated a comprehensive review of the Terrorist Surveillance Program by several inspectors general. Indeed, the final bill had many elements in common with my earliest efforts to place the Terrorist Surveillance Program under FISA--it just took years to get there. And Congress and the courts may yet need to correct its flaws. These experiences have crystallized for me the need for Congress and the courts to reassert themselves in our system of checks and balances. The bills I have outlined are important steps in that process. Equally important is vigorous congressional oversight of the executive branch. This oversight must extend well beyond the national security arena, especially as we cede more and more authority over our economy to government officials.'' As for curbing executive branch excesses from within, I hope President Obama lives up to his campaign promise of change. His recent signing statements have not been encouraging. Adding to the feeling of deja vu is the Washington Post's report that the new administration has reasserted the ``state secrets'' privilege to block lawsuits challenging controversial policies like warrantless wiretapping: ``Obama has not only maintained the Bush administration approach, but [in one such case] the dispute has intensified.'' Government lawyers are now asserting that the trial court lacks authority to compel disclosure of secret documents, and ``warning'' that the government might ``spirit away'' the material before the court can release it to the litigants. This is Carrie Johnson, ``Handling of `State Secrets' at Issue: Like Predecessor, New Justice Dept. Claiming Privilege,'' The Washington Post, March 25, 2009. As the article notes, I have reintroduced legislation this year with Senators Leahy and Kennedy to reform the state secrets privilege. I doubt that the Democratic majority, which was so eager to decry expansions of executive authority under President Bush, will still be as interested in the problem with a Democratic president in office. I will continue the fight whatever happens. (The further remarks of Mr. Specter pertaining to the introduction of S. 875, S. 876 and S. 877 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')", u" The text of the bill is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Data Accountability and Trust Act''. (a) General Security Policies and Procedures.-- (1) Regulations.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall promulgate regulations under section 553 of title 5, United States Code, to require each person engaged in interstate commerce that owns or possesses data containing personal information, or contracts to have any third party entity maintain such data for such person, to establish and implement policies and procedures regarding information security practices for the treatment and protection of personal information taking into consideration-- (A) the size of, and the nature, scope, and complexity of the activities engaged in by, such person; (B) the current state of the art in administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for protecting such information; and (C) the cost of implementing such safeguards. (2) Requirements.--Such regulations shall require the policies and procedures to include the following: (A) A security policy with respect to the collection, use, sale, other dissemination, and maintenance of such personal information. (B) The identification of an officer or other individual as the point of contact with responsibility for the management of information security. (C) A process for identifying and assessing any reasonably foreseeable vulnerabilities in the system or systems maintained by such person that contains such data, which shall include regular monitoring for a breach of security of such system or systems. (D) A process for taking preventive and corrective action to mitigate against any vulnerabilities identified in the process required by subparagraph (C), which may include implementing any changes to security practices and the architecture, installation, or implementation of network or operating software. (E) A process for disposing of data in electronic form containing personal information by shredding, permanently erasing, or otherwise modifying the personal information contained in such data to make such personal information permanently unreadable or undecipherable. (F) A standard method or methods for the destruction of paper documents and other non-electronic data containing personal information. (3) Treatment of entities governed by other law.--Any person who is in compliance with any other Federal law that requires such person to maintain standards and safeguards for information security and protection of personal information that, taken as a whole and as the Commission shall determine in the rulemaking required under paragraph (1), provide protections substantially similar to, or greater than, those required under this subsection, shall be deemed to be in compliance with this subsection. (b) Special Requirements for Information Brokers.-- (1) Submission of policies to the ftc.--The regulations promulgated under subsection (a) shall require each information broker to submit its security policies to the Commission in conjunction with a notification of a breach of security under section 3 or upon request of the Commission. (2) Post-breach audit.--For any information broker required to provide notification under section 3, the Commission may conduct audits of the information security practices of such information broker, or require the information broker to conduct independent audits of such practices (by an independent auditor who has not audited such information broker's security practices during the preceding 5 years). (3) Accuracy of and individual access to personal information.-- (A) Accuracy.-- (i) In general.--Each information broker shall establish reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the personal information it collects, assembles, or maintains, and any other information it collects, assembles, or maintains that specifically identifies an individual, other than information which merely identifies an individual's name or address. (ii) Limited exception for fraud databases.--The requirement in clause (i) shall not prevent the collection or maintenance of information that may be inaccurate with respect to a particular individual when that information is being collected or maintained solely-- (I) for the purpose of indicating whether there may be a discrepancy or irregularity in the personal information that is associated with an individual; and (II) to help identify, or authenticate the identity of, an individual, or to protect against or investigate fraud or other unlawful conduct. (B) Consumer access to information.-- (i) Access.--Each information broker shall-- (I) provide to each individual whose personal information it maintains, at the individual's request at least 1 time per year and at no cost to the individual, and after verifying the identity of such individual, a means for the individual to review any personal information regarding such individual maintained by the information broker and any other information maintained by the information broker that specifically identifies such individual, other than information which merely identifies an individual's name or address; and (II) place a conspicuous notice on its Internet website (if the information broker maintains such a website) instructing individuals how to request access to the information required to be provided under subclause (I), and, as applicable, how to express a preference with respect to the use of personal information for marketing purposes under clause (iii). (ii) Disputed information.--Whenever an individual whose information the information broker maintains makes a written request disputing the accuracy of any such information, the information broker, after verifying the identity of the individual making such request and unless there are reasonable grounds to believe such request is frivolous or irrelevant, shall-- (I) correct any inaccuracy; or (II)(aa) in the case of information that is public record information, inform the individual of the source of the information, and, if reasonably available, where a request for correction may be directed and, if the individual provides proof that the public record has been corrected or that the information broker was reporting the information incorrectly, correct the inaccuracy in the information broker's records; or (bb) in the case of information that is non-public information, note the information that is disputed, including the individual's statement disputing such information, and take reasonable steps to independently verify such information under the procedures outlined in subparagraph (A) if such information can be independently verified. (iii) Alternative procedure for certain marketing information.--In accordance with regulations issued under clause (v), an information broker that maintains any information described in clause (i) which is used, shared, or sold by such information broker for marketing purposes, may, in lieu of complying with the access and dispute requirements set forth in clauses (i) and (ii), provide each individual whose information it maintains with a reasonable means of expressing a preference not to have his or her information used for such purposes. If the individual expresses such a preference, the information broker may not use, share, or sell the individual's information for marketing purposes. (iv) Limitations.--An information broker may limit the access to information required under subparagraph (B)(i)(I) and is not required to provide notice to individuals as required under subparagraph (B)(i)(II) in the following circumstances: (I) If access of the individual to the information is limited by law or legally recognized privilege. (II) If the information is used for a legitimate governmental or fraud prevention purpose that would be compromised by such access. (III) If the information consists of a published media record, unless that record has been included in a report about an individual shared with a third party. (v) Rulemaking.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall promulgate regulations under section 553 of title 5, United States Code, to carry out this paragraph and to facilitate the purposes of this Act. In addition, the Commission shall issue regulations, as necessary, under section 553 of title 5, United States Code, on the scope of the application of the limitations in clause (iv), including any additional circumstances in which an information broker may limit access to information under such clause that the Commission determines to be appropriate. (C) FCRA regulated persons.--Any information broker who is engaged in activities subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act and who is in compliance with sections 609, 610, and 611 of such Act with respect to information subject to such Act, shall be deemed to be in compliance with this paragraph with respect to such information. (4) Requirement of audit log of accessed and transmitted information.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall promulgate regulations under section 553 of title 5, United States Code, to require information brokers to establish measures which facilitate the auditing or retracing of any internal or external access to, or transmissions of, any data containing personal information collected, assembled, or maintained by such information broker. (5) Prohibition on pretexting by information brokers.-- (A) Prohibition on obtaining personal information by false pretenses.--It shall be unlawful for an information broker to obtain or attempt to obtain, or cause to be disclosed or attempt to cause to be disclosed to any person, personal information or any other information relating to any person by-- (i) making a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation to any person; or (ii) providing any document or other information to any person that the information broker knows or should know to be forged, counterfeit, lost, stolen, or fraudulently obtained, or to contain a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation. (B) Prohibition on solicitation to obtain personal information under false pretenses.--It shall be unlawful for an information broker to request a person to obtain personal information or any other information relating to any other person, if the information broker knew or should have known that the person to whom such a request is made will obtain or attempt to obtain such information in the manner described in subparagraph (A). (c) Exemption for Certain Service Providers.--Nothing in this section shall apply to a service provider for any electronic communication by a third party that is transmitted, routed, or stored in intermediate or transient storage by such service provider. (a) Nationwide Notification.--Any person engaged in interstate commerce that owns or possesses data in electronic form containing personal information shall, following the discovery of a breach of security of the system maintained by such person that contains such data-- (1) notify each individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States whose personal information was acquired or accessed as a result of such a breach of security; and (2) notify the Commission. (b) Special Notification Requirements.-- (1) Third party agents.--In the event of a breach of security by any third party entity that has been contracted to maintain or process data in electronic form containing personal information on behalf of any other person who owns or possesses such data, such third party entity shall be required to notify such person of the breach of security. Upon receiving such notification from such third party, such person shall provide the notification required under subsection (a). (2) Service providers.--If a service provider becomes aware of a breach of security of data in electronic form containing personal information that is owned or possessed by another person that connects to or uses a system or network provided by the service provider for the purpose of transmitting, routing, or providing intermediate or transient storage of such data, such service provider shall be required to notify of such a breach of security only the person who initiated such connection, transmission, routing, or storage if such person can be reasonably identified. Upon receiving such notification from a service provider, such person shall provide the notification required under subsection (a). (3) Coordination of notification with credit reporting agencies.--If a person is required to provide notification to more than 5,000 individuals under subsection (a)(1), the person shall also notify the major credit reporting agencies that compile and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis, of the timing and distribution of the notices. Such notice shall be given to the credit reporting agencies without unreasonable delay and, if it will not delay notice to the affected individuals, prior to the distribution of notices to the affected individuals. (c) Timeliness of Notification.-- (1) In general.--Unless subject to a delay authorized under paragraph (2), a notification required under subsection (a) shall be made not later than 60 days following the discovery of a breach of security, unless the person providing notice can show that providing notice within such a time frame is not feasible due to extraordinary circumstances necessary to prevent further breach or unauthorized disclosures, and reasonably restore the integrity of the data system, in which case such notification shall be made as promptly as possible. (2) Delay of notification authorized for law enforcement or national security purposes.-- (A) Law enforcement.--If a Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency determines that the notification required under this section would impede a civil or criminal investigation, such notification shall be delayed upon the written request of the law enforcement agency for 30 days or such lesser period of time which the law enforcement agency determines is reasonably necessary and requests in writing. A law enforcement agency may, by a subsequent written request, revoke such delay or extend the period of time set forth in the original request made under this paragraph if further delay is necessary. (B) National security.--If a Federal national security agency or homeland security agency determines that the notification required under this section would threaten national or homeland security, such notification may be delayed for a period of time which the national security agency or homeland security agency determines is reasonably necessary and requests in writing. A Federal national security agency or homeland security agency may revoke such delay or extend the period of time set forth in the original request made under this paragraph by a subsequent written request if further delay is necessary. (d) Method and Content of Notification.-- (1) Direct notification.-- (A) Method of notification.--A person required to provide notification to individuals under subsection (a)(1) shall be in compliance with such requirement if the person provides conspicuous and clearly identified notification by one of the following methods (provided the selected method can reasonably be expected to reach the intended individual): (i) Written notification. (ii) Notification by email or other electronic means, if-- (I) the person's primary method of communication with the individual is by email or such other electronic means; or (II) the individual has consented to receive such notification and the notification is provided in a manner that is consistent with the provisions permitting electronic transmission of notices under section 101 of the Electronic Signatures in Global Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. 7001). (B) Content of notification.--Regardless of the method by which notification is provided to an individual under subparagraph (A), such notification shall include-- (i) a description of the personal information that was acquired or accessed by an unauthorized person; (ii) a telephone number that the individual may use, at no cost to such individual, to contact the person to inquire about the breach of security or the information the person maintained about that individual; (iii) notice that the individual is entitled to receive, at no cost to such individual, consumer credit reports on a quarterly basis for a period of 2 years, or credit monitoring or other service that enables consumers to detect the misuse of their personal information for a period of 2 years, and instructions to the individual on requesting such reports or service from the person, except when the only information which has been the subject of the security breach is the individual's first name or initial and last name, or address, or phone number, in combination with a credit or debit card number, and any required security code; (iv) the toll-free contact telephone numbers and addresses for the major credit reporting agencies; and (v) a toll-free telephone number and Internet website address for the Commission whereby the individual may obtain information regarding identity theft. (2) Substitute notification.-- (A) Circumstances giving rise to substitute notification.-- A person required to provide notification to individuals under subsection (a)(1) may provide substitute notification in lieu of the direct notification required by paragraph (1) if the person owns or possesses data in electronic form containing personal information of fewer than 1,000 individuals and such direct notification is not feasible due to-- (i) excessive cost to the person required to provide such notification relative to the resources of such person, as determined in accordance with the regulations issued by the Commission under paragraph (3)(A); or (ii) lack of sufficient contact information for the individual required to be notified. (B) Form of substitute notification.--Such substitute notification shall include-- (i) email notification to the extent that the person has email addresses of individuals to whom it is required to provide notification under subsection (a)(1); (ii) a conspicuous notice on the Internet website of the person (if such person maintains such a website); and (iii) notification in print and to broadcast media, including major media in metropolitan and rural areas where the individuals whose personal information was acquired reside. (C) Content of substitute notice.--Each form of substitute notice under this paragraph shall include-- (i) notice that individuals whose personal information is included in the breach of security are entitled to receive, at no cost to the individuals, consumer credit reports on a quarterly basis for a period of 2 years, or credit monitoring or other service that enables consumers to detect the misuse of their personal information for a period of 2 years, and instructions on requesting such reports or service from the person, except when the only information which has been the subject of the security breach is the individual's first name or initial and last name, or address, or phone number, in combination with a credit or debit card number, and any required security code; and (ii) a telephone number by which an individual can, at no cost to such individual, learn whether that individual's personal information is included in the breach of security. (3) Regulations and guidance.-- (A) Regulations.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall, by regulation under section 553 of title 5, United States Code, establish criteria for determining circumstances under which substitute notification may be provided under paragraph (2), including criteria for determining if notification under paragraph (1) is not feasible due to excessive costs to the person required to provided such notification relative to the resources of such person. Such regulations may also identify other circumstances where substitute notification would be appropriate for any person, including circumstances under which the cost of providing notification exceeds the benefits to consumers. (B) Guidance.--In addition, the Commission shall provide and publish general guidance with respect to compliance with this subsection. Such guidance shall include-- (i) a description of written or email notification that complies with the requirements of paragraph (1); and (ii) guidance on the content of substitute notification under paragraph (2), including the extent of notification to print and broadcast media that complies with the requirements of such paragraph. (e) Other Obligations Following Breach.-- (1) In general.--A person required to provide notification under subsection (a) shall, upon request of an individual whose personal information was included in the breach of security, provide or arrange for the provision of, to each such individual and at no cost to such individual-- (A) consumer credit reports from at least one of the major credit reporting agencies beginning not later than 60 days following the individual's request and continuing on a quarterly basis for a period of 2 years thereafter; or (B) a credit monitoring or other service that enables consumers to detect the misuse of their personal information, beginning not later than 60 days following the individual's request and continuing for a period of 2 years. (2) Limitation.--This subsection shall not apply if the only personal information which has been the subject of the security breach is the individual's first name or initial and last name, or address, or phone number, in combination with a credit or debit card number, and any required security code. (3) Rulemaking.--As part of the Commission's rulemaking described in subsection (d)(3), the Commission shall determine the circumstances under which a person required to provide notification under subsection (a)(1) shall provide or arrange for the provision of free consumer credit reports or credit monitoring or other service to affected individuals. (f) Exemption.-- (1) General exemption.--A person shall be exempt from the requirements under this section if, following a breach of security, such person determines that there is no reasonable risk of identity theft, fraud, or other unlawful conduct. (2) Presumption.-- (A) In general.--If the data in electronic form containing personal information is rendered unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable through encryption or other security technology or methodology (if the method of encryption or such other technology or methodology is generally accepted by experts in the information security field), there shall be a presumption that no reasonable risk of identity theft, fraud, or other unlawful conduct exists following a breach of security of such data. Any such presumption may be rebutted by facts demonstrating that the encryption or other security technologies or methodologies in a specific case, have been or are reasonably likely to be compromised. (B) Methodologies or technologies.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and biannually thereafter, the Commission shall issue rules (pursuant to section 553 of title 5, United States Code) or guidance to identify security methodologies or technologies which render data in electronic form unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable, that shall, if applied to such data, establish a presumption that no reasonable risk of identity theft, fraud, or other unlawful conduct exists following a breach of security of such data. Any such presumption may be rebutted by facts demonstrating that any such methodology or technology in a specific case has been or is reasonably likely to be compromised. In issuing such rules or guidance, the Commission shall consult with relevant industries, consumer organizations, and data security and identity theft prevention experts and established standards setting bodies. (3) FTC guidance.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act the Commission shall issue guidance regarding the application of the exemption in paragraph (1). (g) Website Notice of Federal Trade Commission.--If the Commission, upon receiving notification of any breach of security that is reported to the Commission under subsection (a)(2), finds that notification of such a breach of security via the Commission's Internet website would be in the public interest or for the protection of consumers, the Commission shall place such a notice in a clear and conspicuous location on its Internet website. (h) FTC Study on Notification in Languages in Addition to English.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall conduct a study on the practicality and cost effectiveness of requiring the notification required by subsection (d)(1) to be provided in a language in addition to English to individuals known to speak only such other language. (i) General Rulemaking Authority.--The Commission may promulgate regulations necessary under section 553 of title 5, United States Code, to effectively enforce the requirements of this section. (j) Treatment of Persons Governed by Other Law.--A person who is in compliance with any other Federal law that requires such person to provide notification to individuals following a breach of security, and that, taken as a whole, provides protections substantially similar to, or greater than, those required under this section, as the Commission shall determine by rule (under section 553 of title 5, United States Code), shall be deemed to be in compliance with this section. (a) General Application.--The requirements of sections 2 and 3 shall only apply to those persons, partnerships, or corporations over which the Commission has authority pursuant to section 5(a)(2) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. (b) Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission.-- (1) Unfair or deceptive acts or practices.--A violation of section 2 or 3 shall be treated as an unfair and deceptive act or practice in violation of a regulation under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)) regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices. (2) Powers of commission.--The Commission shall enforce this Act in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this Act. Any person who violates such regulations shall be subject to the penalties and entitled to the privileges and immunities provided in that Act. (3) Limitation.--In promulgating rules under this Act, the Commission shall not require the deployment or use of any specific products or technologies, including any specific computer software or hardware. (c) Enforcement by State Attorneys General.-- (1) Civil action.--In any case in which the attorney general of a State, or an official or agency of a State, has reason to believe that an interest of the residents of that State has been or is threatened or adversely affected by any person who violates section 2 or 3 of this Act, the attorney general, official, or agency of the State, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action on behalf of the residents of the State in a district court of the United States of appropriate jurisdiction-- (A) to enjoin further violation of such section by the defendant; (B) to compel compliance with such section; or (C) to obtain civil penalties in the amount determined under paragraph (2). (2) Civil penalties.-- (A) Calculation.-- (i) Treatment of violations of section 2.--For purposes of paragraph (1)(C) with regard to a violation of section 2, the amount determined under this paragraph is the amount calculated by multiplying the number of days that a person is not in compliance with such section by an amount not greater than $11,000. (ii) Treatment of violations of section 3.--For purposes of paragraph (1)(C) with regard to a violation of section 3, the amount determined under this paragraph is the amount calculated by multiplying the number of violations of such section by an amount not greater than $11,000. Each failure to send notification as required under section 3 to a resident of the State shall be treated as a separate violation. (B) Adjustment for inflation.--Beginning on the date that the Consumer Price Index is first published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics that is after 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and each year thereafter, the amounts specified in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall be increased by the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index published on that date from the Consumer Price Index published the previous year. (C) Maximum total liability.--Notwithstanding the number of actions which may be brought against a person under this subsection the maximum civil penalty for which any person may be liable under this subsection shall not exceed-- (i) $5,000,000 for each violation of section 2; and (ii) $5,000,000 for all violations of section 3 resulting from a single breach of security. (3) Intervention by the ftc.-- (A) Notice and intervention.--The State shall provide prior written notice of any action under paragraph (1) to the Commission and provide the Commission with a copy of its complaint, except in any case in which such prior notice is not feasible, in which case the State shall serve such notice immediately upon instituting such action. The Commission shall have the right-- (i) to intervene in the action; (ii) upon so intervening, to be heard on all matters arising therein; and (iii) to file petitions for appeal. (B) Limitation on state action while federal action is pending.--If the Commission has instituted a civil action for violation of this Act, no State attorney general, or official or agency of a State, may bring an action under this subsection during the pendency of that action against any defendant named in the complaint of the Commission for any violation of this Act alleged in the complaint. (4) Construction.--For purposes of bringing any civil action under paragraph (1), nothing in this Act shall be construed to prevent an attorney general of a State from exercising the powers conferred on the attorney general by the laws of that State to-- (A) conduct investigations; (B) administer oaths or affirmations; or (C) compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary and other evidence. (d) Affirmative Defense for a Violation of Section 3.-- (1) In general.--It shall be an affirmative defense to an enforcement action brought under subsection (b), or a civil action brought under subsection (c), based on a violation of section 3, that all of the personal information contained in the data in electronic form that was acquired or accessed as a result of a breach of security of the defendant is public record information that is lawfully made available to the general public from Federal, State, or local government records and was acquired by the defendant from such records. (2) No effect on other requirements.--Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to exempt any person from the requirement to notify the Commission of a breach of security as required under section 3(a). In this Act the following definitions apply: (1) Breach of security.--The term ``breach of security'' means unauthorized access to or acquisition of data in electronic form containing personal information. (2) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the Federal Trade Commission. (3) Data in electronic form.--The term ``data in electronic form'' means any data stored electronically or digitally on any computer system or other database and includes recordable tapes and other mass storage devices. (4) Encryption.--The term ``encryption'' means the protection of data in electronic form in storage or in transit using an encryption technology that has been adopted by an established standards setting body which renders such data indecipherable in the absence of associated cryptographic keys necessary to enable decryption of such data. Such encryption must include appropriate management and safeguards of such keys to protect the integrity of the encryption. (5) Identity theft.--The term ``identity theft'' means the unauthorized use of another person's personal information for the purpose of engaging in commercial transactions under the name of such other person. (6) Information broker.--The term ``information broker''-- (A) means a commercial entity whose business is to collect, assemble, or maintain personal information concerning individuals who are not current or former customers of such entity in order to sell such information or provide access to such information to any nonaffiliated third party in exchange for consideration, whether such collection, assembly, or maintenance of personal information is performed by the information broker directly, or by contract or subcontract with any other entity; and (B) does not include a commercial entity to the extent that such entity processes information collected by or on behalf of and received from or on behalf of a nonaffiliated third party concerning individuals who are current or former customers or employees of such third party to enable such third party directly or through parties acting on its behalf to (1) provide benefits for its employees or (2) directly transact business with its customers. (7) Personal information.-- (A) Definition.--The term ``personal information'' means an individual's first name or initial and last name, or address, or phone number, in combination with any 1 or more of the following data elements for that individual: (i) Social Security number. (ii) Driver's license number, passport number, military identification number, or other similar number issued on a government document used to verify identity. (iii) Financial account number, or credit or debit card number, and any required security code, access code, or password that is necessary to permit access to an individual's financial account. (B) Modified definition by rulemaking.--The Commission may, by rule promulgated under section 553 of title 5, United States Code, modify the definition of ``personal information'' under subparagraph (A)-- (i) for the purpose of section 2 to the extent that such modification will not unreasonably impede interstate commerce, and will accomplish the purposes of this Act; or (ii) for the purpose of section 3, to the extent that such modification is necessary to accommodate changes in technology or practices, will not unreasonably impede interstate commerce, and will accomplish the purposes of this Act. (8) Public record information.--The term ``public record information'' means information about an individual which has been obtained originally from records of a Federal, State, or local government entity that are available for public inspection. (9) Non-public information.--The term ``non-public information'' means information about an individual that is of a private nature and neither available to the general public nor obtained from a public record. (10) Service provider.--The term ``service provider'' means a person that provides electronic data transmission, routing, intermediate and transient storage, or connections to its system or network, where the person providing such services does not select or modify the content of the electronic data, is not the sender or the intended recipient of the data, and such person transmits, routes, stores, or provides connections for personal information in a manner that personal information is undifferentiated from other types of data that such person transmits, routes, stores, or provides connections. Any such person shall be treated as a service provider under this Act only to the extent that it is engaged in the provision of such transmission, routing, intermediate and transient storage or connections. (a) Preemption of State Information Security Laws.--This Act supersedes any provision of a statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision of a State, with respect to those entities covered by the regulations issued pursuant to this Act, that expressly-- (1) requires information security practices and treatment of data containing personal information similar to any of those required under section 2; and (2) requires notification to individuals of a breach of security resulting in unauthorized access to or acquisition of data in electronic form containing personal information. (b) Additional Preemption.-- (1) In general.--No person other than a person specified in section 4(c) may bring a civil action under the laws of any State if such action is premised in whole or in part upon the defendant violating any provision of this Act. (2) Protection of consumer protection laws.--This subsection shall not be construed to limit the enforcement of any State consumer protection law by an Attorney General of a State. (c) Protection of Certain State Laws.--This Act shall not be construed to preempt the applicability of-- (1) State trespass, contract, or tort law; or (2) other State laws to the extent that those laws relate to acts of fraud. (d) Preservation of FTC Authority.--Nothing in this Act may be construed in any way to limit or affect the Commission's authority under any other provision of law. This Act shall take effect 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act. There is authorized to be appropriated to the Commission $1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2010 through 2015 to carry out this Act.", u"Mr. Speaker, my colleague from Virginia has offered a motion to recommit H.R. 2740 the MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act, to the Judiciary Committee and to amend the legislation with regard to intelligence activities. I will support this motion, but with two important qualifications. The motion to recommit would amend H.R. 2740 with a rule of construction, stating, ``nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect intelligence activities that are otherwise permissible prior to the enactment of this Act.'' This amendment does not at all modify the force of my legislation, does not limit the scope of the MEJA jurisdiction, and does not grant immunity to anyone, including contractor employees of the intelligence community. Put simply, I am voting in support of this motion because it in no way alters the underlying bill before us. With that said, let me attach two qualifications to my support. First, the amendment is unnecessary in the context of both current law and this legislation. Second, the amendment raises serious questions about the activities its proponents may be seeking to protect. My legislation would indeed place contractor employees of non-defense related agencies under the extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States federal law, granting the Department of Justice authority to prosecute felony offenses committed by non-defense contractors. Defense contractors are already covered by MEJA, a point that seems lost on the authors of this motion. Given that the majority of the intelligence community falls under the Department of Defense, it stands to reason that many--if not most--contractors engaged in intelligence-related activities are already under the jurisdiction of federal law. Not only that, employees of the Defense Department intelligence agencies, including agents of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and intelligence services of the different branches of the Armed Forces, among others, are covered by MEJA, and this coverage has not endangered our national security in the least. So concerns about my legislation, which deals with non-defense contractors, seem ill-founded in the context of current law. To my knowledge, there have never been significant concerns raised about the coverage of these Defense Department intelligence agents and contractors, for one major reason: prosecutorial discretion. The Department of Justice always has the discretion to refrain from prosecuting a case if it will endanger our national security interests. My legislation does not compel prosecution and it does not interfere with the prosecutor's discretion. If a prosecutor ever has concerns that prosecution of a contractor under MEJA would endanger state secrets, expose clandestine networks, or otherwise undermine our security interests, the prosecutor has the discretion not to prosecute the case. It's as simple as that. Let me also point out that this bill only affects contractors who commit felony crimes. So long as private contractors, including those who are engaged in intelligence-related activities, are conducting themselves within the bounds of the law, this legislation is irrelevant to them. However, if there are private, for-profit contractors tasked with duties that require them to commit felony offenses, Congress needs to know about it. Such a revelation would point to a need for a serious debate about whether we are using contractors appropriately. My second qualification is that this amendment raises serious questions about the activities it may be intended to protect. The question here is, given that my bill only targets activities that are unlawful, why do my colleagues feel the need to clarify that it does not affect activities that are permissible? What activities are contractors carrying out that are permissible but not lawful? I have great apprehension about what might be meant in this context, but first let me state clearly: the law is the highest authority in the land, other than the constitution. The law trumps executive orders, memorandums, and policies in all cases. I am voting for this motion with the understanding that there is no activity a contractor might be performing that could ever be permissible but not lawful. The activities that we assign to private contractors must be in accordance with the law on the books. Therefore, I interpret this motion simply to mean that nothing in my bill will have any effect on contractors working on lawful, permissible, appropriate intelligence activities. I raise this concern because, as my colleagues well know, Congress--including members on both sides of the aisle--and this Administration have been at significant odds about the activities appropriate for our military and intelligence community to perform in certain contexts relating to the war in Iraq and the broader war against terrorism, especially with regard to the treatment of suspects in interrogations and detentions. There is rampant evidence that this Administration believes certain activities to be ``permissible'' which are clearly illegal under several statutes in United States Code. Just today, for example, the New York Times reported that the Department of Justice has issued secret memorandums that, in direct contrast to the policies they have publicly avowed, amounted to ``an expansive endorsement of the harshest interrogation techniques ever used by the Central Intelligence Agency'' and ``for the first time provided explicit authorization to barrage terror suspects with a combination of painful physical and psychological tactics, including head-slapping, simulated drowning and frigid temperatures.'' I submit the full article for inclusion in the Record. The harshest forms of physical and psychological tactics outlined in this article are inappropriate and illegal for our military personnel and intelligence agents, to say nothing of private contractors, and it is abominable that this Administration continues to work to circumvent our time-honored values and laws to authorize behavior that is un-American to its core. There are clear laws on the books prohibiting torture, including the War Crimes Act (18 U.S. Code 2441) and the federal anti-torture statute (18 U.S. Code 2340). Moreover, torture is prohibited by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (articles 77-134). And the United States is a ratified signatory to international treaties, including the Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3) and the Convention Against Torture, which specifically outlaw torture. Most importantly, the United States Constitution (amendments 5, 8, and 14) explicitly prohibits cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment. The kinds of activities that, to the great shame of our nation, have been carried out at Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay detention facilities are not, in any circumstances, permissible. Let us be clear that, in the passage of this motion, we are in no way authorizing or legitimating these behaviors. Let us also be clear that, in this passage of this legislation, we are providing federal prosecutors the tools to arrest and prosecute any contractor working for this government who commits such abominable acts to the full extent of the law. Washington, Oct. 3.--When the Justice Department publicly declared torture ``abhorrent'' in a legal opinion in December 2004, the Bush administration appeared to have abandoned its assertion of nearly unlimited presidential authority to order brutal interrogations. But soon after Alberto R. Gonzales's arrival as attorney general in February 2005, the Justice Department issued another opinion, this one in secret. It was a very different document, according to officials briefed on it, an expansive endorsement of the harshest interrogation techniques ever used by the Central Intelligence Agency. The new opinion, the officials said, for the first time provided explicit authorization to barrage terror suspects with a combination of painful physical and psychological tactics, including head-slapping, simulated drowning and frigid temperatures. Mr. Gonzales approved the legal memorandum on ``combined effects'' over the objections of James B. Comey, the deputy attorney general, who was leaving his job after bruising clashes with the White House. Disagreeing with what he viewed as the opinion's overreaching legal reasoning, Mr. Comey told colleagues at the department that they would all be ``ashamed'' when the world eventually learned of it. Later that year, as Congress moved toward outlawing ``cruel, inhuman and degrading'' treatment, the Justice Department issued another secret opinion, one most lawmakers did not know existed, current and former officials said. The Justice Department document declared that none of the C.I.A. interrogation methods violated that standard. The classified opinions, never previously disclosed, are a hidden legacy of President Bush's second term and Mr. Gonzales's tenure at the Justice Department, where he moved quickly to align it with the White House after a 2004 rebellion by staff lawyers that had thrown policies on surveillance and detention into turmoil. Congress and the Supreme Court have intervened repeatedly in the last two years to impose limits on interrogations, and the administration has responded as a policy matter by dropping the most extreme techniques. But the 2005 Justice Department opinions remain in effect, and their legal conclusions have been confirmed by several more recent memorandums, officials said. They show how the White House has succeeded in preserving the broadest possible legal latitude for harsh tactics. A White House spokesman, Tony Fratto, said Wednesday that he would not comment on any legal opinion related to interrogations. Mr. Fratto added, ``We have gone to great lengths, including statutory efforts and the recent executive order, to make it clear that the intelligence community and our practices fall within U.S. law'' and international agreements. More than two dozen current and former officials involved in counterterrorism were interviewed over the past three months about the opinions and the deliberations on interrogation policy. Most officials would speak only on the condition of anonymity because of the secrecy of the documents and the C.I.A. detention operations they govern. When he stepped down as attorney general in September after widespread criticism of the firing of federal prosecutors and withering attacks on his credibility, Mr. Gonzales talked proudly in a farewell speech of how his department was ``a place of inspiration'' that had balanced the necessary flexibility to conduct the war on terrorism with the need to uphold the law. Associates at the Justice Department said Mr. Gonzales seldom resisted pressure from Vice President Dick Cheney and David S. Addington, Mr. Cheney's counsel, to endorse policies that they saw as effective in safeguarding Americans, even though the practices brought the condemnation of other governments, human rights groups and Democrats in Congress. Critics say Mr. Gonzales turned his agency into an arm of the Bush White House, undermining the department's independence. The interrogation opinions were signed by Steven G. Bradbury, who since 2005 has headed the elite Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department. He has become a frequent public defender of the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance program and detention policies at Congressional hearings and press briefings, a role that some legal scholars say is at odds with the office's tradition of avoiding political advocacy. Mr. Bradbury defended the work of his office as the government's most authoritative interpreter of the law. ``In my experience, the White House has not told me how an opinion should come out,'' he said in an interview. ``The White House has accepted and respected our opinions, even when they didn't like the advice being given.'' The debate over how terrorism suspects should be held and questioned began shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, when the Bush administration adopted secret detention and coercive interrogation, both practices the United States had previously denounced when used by other countries. It adopted the new measures without public debate or Congressional vote, choosing to rely instead on the confidential legal advice of a handful of appointees. The policies set off bruising internal battles, pitting administration moderates against hard-liners, military lawyers against Pentagon chiefs and, most surprising, a handful of conservative lawyers at the Justice Department against the White House in the stunning mutiny of 2004. But under Mr. Gonzales and Mr. Bradbury, the Justice Department was wrenched back into line with the White House. After the Supreme Court ruled in 2006 that the Geneva Conventions applied to prisoners who belonged to Al Qaeda, President Bush for the first time acknowledged the C.I.A.'s secret jails and ordered their inmates moved to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The C.I.A. halted its use of waterboarding, or pouring water over a bound prisoner's cloth-covered face to induce fear of suffocation. But in July, after a monthlong debate inside the administration, President Bush signed a new executive order authorizing the use of what the administration calls ``enhanced'' interrogation techniques--the details remain secret--and officials say the C.I.A. again is holding prisoners in ``black sites'' overseas. The executive order was reviewed and approved by Mr. Bradbury and the Office of Legal Counsel. Douglas W. Kmiec, who headed that office under President Ronald Reagan and the first President George Bush and wrote a book about it, said he believed the intense pressures of the campaign against terrorism have warped the office's proper role. ``The office was designed to insulate against any need to be an advocate,'' said Mr. Kmiec, now a conservative scholar at Pepperdine University law school. But at times in recent years, Mr. Kmiec said, the office, headed by William H. Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia before they served on the Supreme Court, ``lost its ability to say no.'' ``The approach changed dramatically with opinions on the war on terror,'' Mr. Kmiec said. ``The office became an advocate for the president's policies.'' From the secret sites in Afghanistan, Thailand and Eastern Europe where C.I.A. teams held Qaeda terrorists, questions for the lawyers at C.I.A. headquarters arrived daily. Nervous interrogators wanted to know: Are we breaking the laws against torture? The Bush administration had entered uncharted legal territory beginning in 2002, holding prisoners outside the scrutiny of the International Red Cross and subjecting them to harrowing pressure tactics. They included slaps to the head; hours held naked in a frigid cell; days and nights without sleep while battered by thundering rock music; long periods manacled in stress positions; or the ultimate, waterboarding. Never in history had the United States authorized such tactics. While President Bush and C.I.A. officials would later insist that the harsh measures produced crucial intelligence, many veteran interrogators, psychologists and other experts say that less coercive methods are equally or more effective. With virtually no experience in interrogations, the C.I.A. had constructed its program in a few harried months by consulting Egyptian and Saudi intelligence officials and copying Soviet interrogation methods long used in training American service men to withstand capture. The agency officers questioning prisoners constantly sought advice from lawyers thousands of miles away. ``We were getting asked about combinations--`Can we do this and this at the same time?' '' recalled Paul C. Kelbaugh, a veteran intelligence lawyer who was deputy legal counsel at the C.I.A.'s Counterterrorist Center from 2001 to 2003. Interrogators were worried that even approved techniques had such a painful, multiplying effect when combined that they might cross the legal line, Mr. Kelbaugh said. He recalled agency officers asking: ``These approved techniques, say, withholding food, and 50-degree temperature--can they be combined?'' Or ``Do I have to do the less extreme before the more extreme?'' The questions came more frequently, Mr. Kelbaugh said, as word spread about a C.I.A. inspector general inquiry unrelated to the war on terrorism. Some veteran C.I.A. officers came under scrutiny because they were advisers to Peruvian officers who in early 2001 shot down a missionary flight they had mistaken for a drug-running aircraft. The Americans were not charged with crimes, but they endured three years of investigation, saw their careers derailed and ran up big legal bills. That experience shook the Qaeda interrogation team, Mr. Kelbaugh said. ``You think you're making a difference and maybe saving 3,000 American lives from the next attack. And someone tells you, `Well, that guidance was a little vague, and the inspector general wants to talk to you,' '' he recalled. ``We couldn't tell them, `Do the best you can,' because the people who did the best they could in Peru were looking at a grand jury.'' Mr. Kelbaugh said the questions were sometimes close calls that required consultation with the Justice Department. But in August 2002, the department provided a sweeping legal justification for even the harshest tactics. That opinion, which would become infamous as ``the torture memo'' after it was leaked, was written largely by John Yoo, a young Berkeley law professor serving in the Office of Legal Counsel. His broad views of presidential power were shared by Mr. Addington, the vice president's adviser. Their close alliance provoked John Ashcroft, then the attorney general, to refer privately to Mr. Yoo as Dr. Yes for his seeming eagerness to give the White House whatever legal justifications it desired, a Justice Department official recalled. Mr. Yoo's memorandum said no interrogation practices were illegal unless they produced pain equivalent to organ failure or ``even death.'' A second memo produced at the same time spelled out the approved practices and how often or how long they could be used. Despite that guidance, in March 2003, when the C.I.A. caught Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the chief planner of the Sept. 11 attacks, interrogators were again haunted by uncertainty. Former intelligence officials, for the first time, disclosed that a variety of tough interrogation tactics were used about 100 times over two weeks on Mr. Mohammed. Agency officials then ordered a halt, fearing the combined assault might have amounted to illegal torture. A C.I.A. spokesman, George Little, declined to discuss the handling of Mr. Mohammed. Mr. Little said the program ``has been conducted lawfully, with great care and close review'' and ``has helped our country disrupt terrorist plots and save innocent lives.'' ``The agency has always sought a clear legal framework, conducting the program in strict accord with U.S. law, and protecting the officers who go face-to-face with ruthless terrorists,'' Mr. Little added. Some intelligence officers say that many of Mr. Mohammed's statements proved exaggerated or false. One problem, a former senior agency official said, was that the C.I.A.'s initial interrogators were not experts on Mr. Mohammed's background or Al Qaeda, and it took about a month to get such an expert to the secret prison. The former official said many C.I.A. professionals now believe patient, repeated questioning by well-informed experts is more effective than harsh physical pressure. Other intelligence officers, including Mr. Kelbaugh, insist that the harsh treatment produced invaluable insights into Al Qaeda's structure and plans. ``We leaned in pretty hard on K.S.M.,'' Mr. Kelbaugh said, referring to Mr. Mohammed. ``We were getting good information, and then they were told: ``Slow it down. It may not be correct. Wait for some legal clarification.'' The doubts at the C.I.A. proved prophetic. In late 2003, after Mr. Yoo left the Justice Department, the new head of the Office of Legal Counsel, Jack Goldsmith, began reviewing his work, which he found deeply flawed. Mr. Goldsmith infuriated White House officials, first by rejecting part of the National Security Agency's surveillance program, prompting the threat of mass resignations by top Justice Department officials, including Mr. Ashcroft and Mr. Comey, and a showdown at the attorney general's hospital bedside. Then, in June 2004, Mr. Goldsmith formally withdrew the August 2002 Yoo memorandum on interrogation, which he found overreaching and poorly reasoned. Mr. Goldsmith left the Justice Department soon afterward. He first spoke at length about his dissenting views to The New York Times last month, and testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Tuesday. Six months later, the Justice Department quietly posted on its Web site a new legal opinion that appeared to end any flirtation with torture, starting with its clarionlike opening: ``Torture is abhorrent both to American law and values and to international norms.'' A single footnote--added to reassure the C.I.A.--suggested that the Justice Department was not declaring the agency's previous actions illegal. But the opinion was unmistakably a retreat. Some White House officials had opposed publicizing the document, but acquiesced to Justice Department officials who argued that doing so would help clear the way for Mr. Gonzales's confirmation as attorney general. If President Bush wanted to make sure the Justice Department did not rebel again, Mr. Gonzales was the ideal choice. As White House counsel, he had been a fierce protector of the president's prerogatives. Deeply loyal to Mr. Bush for championing his career from their days in Texas, Mr. Gonzales would sometimes tell colleagues that he had just one regret about becoming attorney general: He did not see nearly as much of the president as he had in his previous post. Among his first tasks at the Justice Department was to find a trusted chief for the Office of Legal Counsel. First he informed Daniel Levin, the acting head who had backed Mr. Goldsmith's dissents and signed the new opinion renouncing torture, that he would not get the job. He encouraged Mr. Levin to take a position at the National Security Council, in effect sidelining him. Mr. Bradbury soon emerged as the presumed favorite. But White House officials, still smarting from Mr. Goldsmith's rebuffs, chose to delay his nomination. Harriet E. Miers, the new White House counsel, ``decided to watch Bradbury for a month or two. He was sort of on trial,'' one Justice Department official recalled. Mr. Bradbury's biography had a Horatio Alger element that appealed to a succession of bosses, including Justice Clarence Thomas of the Supreme Court and Mr. Gonzales, the son of poor immigrants. Mr. Bradbury's father had died when he was an infant, and his mother took in laundry to support her children. The first in his family to go to college, he attended Stanford and the University of Michigan Law School. He joined the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis, where he came under the tutelage of Kenneth W. Starr, the Whitewater independent prosecutor. Mr. Bradbury belonged to the same circle as his predecessors: young, conservative lawyers with sterling credentials, often with clerkships for prominent conservative judges and ties to the Federalist Society, a powerhouse of the legal right. Mr. Yoo, in fact, had proposed his old friend Mr. Goldsmith for the Office of Legal Counsel job; Mr. Goldsmith had hired Mr. Bradbury as his top deputy. ``We all grew up together,'' said Viet D. Dinh, an assistant attorney general from 2001 to 2003 and very much a member of the club. ``You start with a small universe of Supreme Court clerks, and you narrow it down from there.'' But what might have been subtle differences in quieter times now cleaved them into warring camps. Justice Department colleagues say Mr. Gonzales was soon meeting frequently with Mr. Bradbury on national security issues, a White House priority. Admirers describe Mr. Bradbury as low-key but highly skilled, a conciliator who brought from 10 years of corporate practice a more pragmatic approach to the job than Mr. Yoo and Mr. Goldsmith, both from the academic world. ``As a practicing lawyer, you know how to address real problems,'' said Noel J. Francisco, who worked at the Justice Department from 2003 to 2005. ``At O.L.C., you're not writing law review articles and you're not theorizing. You're giving a client practical advice on a real problem.'' As he had at the White House, Mr. Gonzales usually said little in meetings with other officials, often deferring to the hard-driving Mr. Addington. Mr. Bradbury also often appeared in accord with the vice president's lawyer. Mr. Bradbury appeared to be ``fundamentally sympathetic to what the White House and the C.I.A. wanted to do,'' recalled Philip Zelikow, a former top State Department official. At interagency meetings on detention and interrogation, Mr. Addington was at times ``vituperative,'' said Mr. Zelikow, but Mr. Bradbury, while taking similar positions, was ``professional and collegial.'' While waiting to learn whether he would be nominated to head the Office of Legal Counsel, Mr. Bradbury was in an awkward position, knowing that a decision contrary to White House wishes could kill his chances. Charles J. Cooper, who headed the Office of Legal Counsel under President Reagan, said he was ``very troubled'' at the notion of a probationary period. ``If the purpose of the delay was a tryout, I think they should have avoided it,'' Mr. Cooper said. ``You're implying that the acting official is molding his or her legal analysis to win the job.'' Mr. Bradbury said he made no such concessions. ``No one ever suggested to me that my nomination depended on how I ruled on any opinion,'' he said. ``Every opinion I've signed at the Office of Legal Counsel represents my best judgment of what the law requires.'' Scott Horton, an attorney affiliated with Human Rights First who has closely followed the interrogation debate, said any official offering legal advice on the campaign against terror was on treacherous ground. ``For government lawyers, the national security issues they were deciding were like working with nuclear waste--extremely hazardous to their health,'' Mr. Horton said. ``If you give the administration what it wants, you'll lose credibility in the academic community,'' he said. ``But if you hold back, you'll be vilified by conservatives and the administration.'' In any case, the White House grew comfortable with Mr. Bradbury's approach. He helped block the appointment of a liberal Ivy League law professor to a career post in the Office of Legal Counsel. And he signed the opinion approving combined interrogation techniques. Mr. Comey strongly objected and told associates that he advised Mr. Gonzales not to endorse the opinion. But the attorney general made clear that the White House was adamant about it, and that he would do nothing to resist. Under Mr. Ashcroft, Mr. Comey's opposition might have killed the opinion. An imposing former prosecutor and self- described conservative who stands 6-foot-8, he was the rare administration official who was willing to confront Mr. Addington. At one testy 2004 White House meeting, when Mr. Comey stated that ``no lawyer'' would endorse Mr. Yoo's justification for the N.S.A. program, Mr. Addington demurred, saying he was a lawyer and found it convincing. Mr. Comey shot back: ``No good lawyer,'' according to someone present. But under Mr. Gonzales, and after the departure of Mr. Goldsmith and other allies, the deputy attorney general found himself isolated. His troublemaking on N.S.A. and on interrogation, and in appointing his friend Patrick J. Fitzgerald as special prosecutor in the C.I.A. leak case, which would lead to the perjury conviction of I. Lewis Libby, Mr. Cheney's chief of staff, had irreparably offended the White House. ``On national security matters generally, there was a sense that Comey was a wimp and that Comey was disloyal,'' said one Justice Department official who heard the White House talk, expressed with particular force by Mr. Addington. Mr. Comey provided some hints of his thinking about interrogation and related issues in a speech that spring. Speaking at the N.S.A.'s Fort Meade campus on Law Day--a noteworthy setting for the man who had helped lead the dissent a year earlier that forced some changes in the N.S.A. program--Mr. Comey spoke of the ``agonizing collisions'' of the law and the desire to protect Americans. ``We are likely to hear the words: `If we don't do this, people will die,' '' Mr. Comey said. But he argued that government lawyers must uphold the principles of their great institutions. ``It takes far more than a sharp legal mind to say `no' when it matters most,'' he said. ``It takes moral character. It takes an understanding that in the long run, intelligence under law is the only sustainable intelligence in this country.'' Mr. Gonzales's aides were happy to see Mr. Comey depart in the summer of 2005. That June, President Bush nominated Mr. Bradbury to head the Office of Legal Counsel, which some colleagues viewed as a sign that he had passed a loyalty test. Soon Mr. Bradbury applied his practical approach to a new challenge to the C.I.A.'s methods. The administration had always asserted that the C.I.A.'s pressure tactics did not amount to torture, which is banned by federal law and international treaty. But officials had privately decided the agency did not have to comply with another provision in the Convention Against Torture--the prohibition on ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading'' treatment. Now that loophole was about to be closed. First Senator Richard J. Durbin, Democrat of Illinois, and then Senator John McCain, the Arizona Republican who had been tortured as a prisoner in North Vietnam, proposed legislation to ban such treatment. At the administration's request, Mr. Bradbury assessed whether the proposed legislation would outlaw any C.I.A. methods, a legal question that had never before been answered by the Justice Department. At least a few administration officials argued that no reasonable interpretation of ``cruel, inhuman or degrading'' would permit the most extreme C.I.A. methods, like waterboarding. Mr. Bradbury was placed in a tough spot, said Mr. Zelikow, the State Department counselor, who was working at the time to rein in interrogation policy. ``If Justice says some practices are in violation of the C.I.D. standard,'' Mr. Zelikow said, referring to cruel, inhuman or degrading, ``then they are now saying that officials broke current law.'' In the end, Mr. Bradbury's opinion delivered what the White House wanted: a statement that the standard imposed by Mr. McCain's Detainee Treatment Act would not force any change in the C.I.A.'s practices, according to officials familiar with the memo. Relying on a Supreme Court finding that only conduct that ``shocks the conscience'' was unconstitutional, the opinion found that in some circumstances not even waterboarding was necessarily cruel, inhuman or degrading, if, for example, a suspect was believed to possess crucial intelligence about a planned terrorist attack, the officials familiar with the legal finding said. In a frequent practice, Mr. Bush attached a statement to the new law when he signed it, declaring his authority to set aside the restrictions if they interfered with his constitutional powers. At the same time, though, the administration responded to pressure from Mr. McCain and other lawmakers by reviewing interrogation policy and giving up several C.I.A. techniques. Since late 2005, Mr. Bradbury has become a linchpin of the administration's defense of counterterrorism programs, helping to negotiate the Military Commissions Act last year and frequently testifying about the N.S.A. surveillance program. Once, he answered questions about administration detention policies for an ``Ask the White House'' feature on a Web site. Mr. Kmiec, the former Office of Legal Counsel head now at Pepperdine, called Mr. Bradbury's public activities a departure for an office that traditionally has shunned any advocacy role. A senior administration official called Mr. Bradbury's active role in shaping legislation and speaking to Congress and the press ``entirely appropriate'' and consistent with past practice. The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said Mr. Bradbury ``has played a critical role in achieving greater transparency'' on the legal basis for detention and surveillance programs. Though President Bush repeatedly nominated Mr. Bradbury as the Office of Legal Counsel's assistant attorney general, Democratic senators have blocked the nomination. Senator Durbin said the Justice Department would not turn over copies of his opinions or other evidence of Mr. Bradbury's role in interrogation policy. ``There are fundamental questions about whether Mr. Bradbury approved interrogation methods that are clearly unacceptable,'' Mr. Durbin said. John D. Hutson, who served as the Navy's top lawyer from 1997 to 2000, said he believed that the existence of legal opinions justifying abusive treatment is pernicious, potentially blurring the rules for Americans handling prisoners. ``I know from the military that if you tell someone they can do a little of this for the country's good, some people will do a lot of it for the country's better,'' Mr. Hutson said. Like other military lawyers, he also fears that official American acceptance of such treatment could endanger Americans in the future. ``The problem is, once you've got a legal opinion that says such a technique is O.K., what happens when one of our people is captured and they do it to him? How do we protest then?'' he asked.", u"SA 2649. Mr. MARTINEZ (for himself and Mr. Nelson of Florida) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2020, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 202(b) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: SA 2650. Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. Conrad, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Obama, and Mr. Salazar) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2020, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 202(b) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SA 2651. Mr. SUNUNU proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2020, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 202(b) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SA 2652. Mrs. LINCOLN (for herself, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Obama, and Mr. Rockefeller) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 2020, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 202(b) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006; as follows: At the end of title IV, add the following: SA 2653. Mr. BAUCUS (for Mr. Reid (for himself, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Lautenberg, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Salazar, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Bayh, Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Harkin, Mrs. Feinstein, and Ms. Collins)) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2020, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 202(b) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of title IV, add the following: At the end of title IV, add the following:Subtitle B--Extending Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy Production and Energy Efficient Construction Paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (9) of section 45(d) (relating to qualified facilities) are amended by striking ``2008'' each place it appears and inserting ``2011''. Paragraphs (2)(A)(i)(II) and (3)(A)(ii) (relating to energy credit) is amended by striking ``2008'' both places it appears and inserting ``2011''. Section 54(m) (relating to termination) is amended by striking ``2007'' and inserting ``2010''. Section 179D(h) (relating to termination) is amended by Section 45L(g) (relating to termination) is amended by striking ``2007'' and inserting ``2010''. Section 25D(g) is amended to read as follows: ``(a) Termination.--The credit allowed under this section shall not apply to-- ``(1) property described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (d) placed in service after December 31, 2010, and ``(2) property described in subsection (d)(3) placed in service after December 31, 2007.''. Section 25C(g) (relating to termination) is amended by striking ``2007'' and inserting ``2010''. SA 2654. Mr. GRASSLEY proposed an amendment to the bill S. 2020, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 202(b) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006; as follows: At the end of title IV, add the following: SA 2655. Mr. CRAIG (for himself and Mr. Rockefeller) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2020, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 202(b) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SA 2656. Ms. SNOWE (for herself and Ms. Collins) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 2020, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 202(b) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: On page 321, strike line 1 and all that follows through page 323, line 6, and insert the following: With respect to fiscal year 2006, in addition to amounts appropriated under any other provision of law, for making payments under title XXVI of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (42 U.S.C. 8621 et seq.), $2,920,000,000, shall be appropriated to distribute funds to all the States in accordance with section 2604 of that Act (42 U.S.C. 8623) (other than subsection (e) of such section). (a) In General.--Section 901 (relating to credit for taxes of foreign countries and of possessions of the United States) is amended by redesignating subsection (m) as subsection (n) and by inserting after subsection (l) the following new subsection: ``(m) Special Rules Relating To Dual Capacity Taxpayers.-- ``(1) General rule.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any amount paid or accrued by a dual capacity taxpayer to a foreign country or possession of the United States for any period shall not be considered a tax-- ``(A) if, for such period, the foreign country or possession does not impose a generally applicable income tax, or ``(B) to the extent such amount exceeds the amount (determined in accordance with regulations) which-- ``(i) is paid by such dual capacity taxpayer pursuant to the generally applicable income tax imposed by the country or possession, or ``(ii) would be paid if the generally applicable income tax imposed by the country or possession were applicable to such dual capacity taxpayer. (a) In General.--Section 901 (relating to credit for taxes of foreign countries and of possessions of the United States) is amended by redesignating subsection (m) as subsection (n) and by inserting after subsection (l) the following new subsection: ``(m) Special Rules Relating To Dual Capacity Taxpayers.-- ``(1) General rule.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any amount paid or accrued by a dual capacity taxpayer to a foreign country or possession of the United States for any period shall not be considered a tax-- ``(A) if, for such period, the foreign country or possession does not impose a generally applicable income tax, or ``(B) to the extent such amount exceeds the amount (determined in accordance with regulations) which-- ``(i) is paid by such dual capacity taxpayer pursuant to the generally applicable income tax imposed by the country or possession, or ``(ii) would be paid if the generally applicable income tax imposed by the country or possession were applicable to such dual capacity taxpayer.Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to imply the proper treatment of any such amount not in excess of the amount determined under subparagraph (B). ``(2) Dual capacity taxpayer.--For purposes of this subsection, the term `dual capacity taxpayer' means, with respect to any foreign country or possession of the United States, a person who-- ``(A) is subject to a levy of such country or possession, and ``(B) receives (or will receive) directly or indirectly a specific economic benefit (as determined in accordance with regulations) from such country or possession. ``(3) Generally applicable income tax.--For purposes of this subsection-- ``(A) In general.--The term `generally applicable income tax' means an income tax (or a series of income taxes) which is generally imposed under the laws of a foreign country or possession on income derived from the conduct of a trade or business within such country or possession. ``(B) Exceptions.--Such term shall not include a tax unless it has substantial application, by its terms and in practice, to-- ``(i) persons who are not dual capacity taxpayers, and ``(ii) persons who are citizens or residents of the foreign country or possession.'' (b) Effective Date.-- (1) In general.--The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxes paid or accrued in taxable years beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Contrary treaty obligations upheld.--The amendments made by this section shall not apply to the extent contrary to any treaty obligation of the United States. (a) Separate Basket for Foreign Tax Credit.-- (1) Years before 2007.--Paragraph (1) of section 904(d) (relating to separate application of section with respect to certain categories of income), as in effect for years beginning before 2007, is amended by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (H), by redesignating subparagraph (I) as subparagraph (J), and by inserting after subparagraph (H) the following new subparagraph: ``(I) foreign oil and gas income, and''. (2) 2007 and after.--Paragraph (1) of section 904(d), as in effect for years beginning after 2006, is amended by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (A), by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (B) and inserting ``, and'', and by adding at the end the following: ``(C) foreign oil and gas income.'' (b) Definition.-- (1) Years before 2007.--Paragraph (2) of section 904(d), as in effect for years beginning before 2007, is amended by redesignating subparagraphs (H) and (I) as subparagraphs (I) and (J), respectively, and by inserting after subparagraph (G) the following new subparagraph: ``(H) Foreign oil and gas income.--The term `foreign oil and gas income' has the meaning given such term by section 954(g).'' (2) 2007 and after.--Section 904(d)(2), as in effect for years after 2006, is amended by redesignating subparagraphs (J) and (K) as subparagraphs (K) and (L) and by inserting after subparagraph (I) the following: ``(J) Foreign oil and gas income.--For purposes of this section-- ``(i) In general.--The term `foreign oil and gas income' has the meaning given such term by section 954(g). ``(ii) Coordination.--Passive category income and general category income shall not include foreign oil and gas income (as so defined).'' (c) Conforming Amendments.-- (1) Section 904(d)(3)(F)(i) is amended by striking ``or (E)'' and inserting ``(E), or (I)''. (2) Section 907(a) is hereby repealed. (3) Section 907(c)(4) is hereby repealed. (4) Section 907(f) is hereby repealed. (d) Effective Dates.-- (1) In general.--The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Years after 2006.--The amendments made by paragraphs (1)(B) and (2)(B) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2006. (3) Transitional rules.-- (A) Separate basket treatment.--Any taxes paid or accrued in a taxable year beginning on or before the date of the enactment of this Act, with respect to income which was described in subparagraph (I) of section 904(d)(1) of such Code (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act), shall be treated as taxes paid or accrued with respect to foreign oil and gas income to the extent the taxpayer establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury that such taxes were paid or accrued with respect to foreign oil and gas income. (B) Carryovers.--Any unused oil and gas extraction taxes which under section 907(f) of such Code (as so in effect) would have been allowable as a carryover to the taxpayer's first taxable year beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act (without regard to the limitation of paragraph (2) of such section 907(f) for first taxable year) shall be allowed as carryovers under section 904(c) of such Code in the same manner as if such taxes were unused taxes under such section 904(c) with respect to foreign oil and gas extraction income. (C) Losses.--The amendment made by subsection (c)(3) shall not apply to foreign oil and gas extraction losses arising in taxable years beginning on or before the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) General Rule.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a taxpayer is an applicable integrated oil company for its last taxable year ending in calendar year 2005, the taxpayer shall-- (1) increase, effective as of the close of such taxable year, the value of each historic LIFO layer of inventories of crude oil, natural gas, or any other petroleum product (within the meaning of section 4611) by the layer adjustment amount, and (2) decrease its cost of goods sold for such taxable year by the aggregate amount of the increases under paragraph (1). SA 2657. Mr. ROCKEFELLER (for himself, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Bond, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Lott, Ms. Snowe, and Mrs. Feinstein) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2020, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 202(b) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of title IV, insert the following: (a) In General.--Subparagraph (A) of section 121(d)(9) (relating to exclusion of gain from sale of principal residence) is amended by striking ``duty'' and all that follows and inserting ``duty-- ``(i) as a member of the uniformed services, ``(ii) as a member of the Foreign Service of the United States, or ``(iii) as an employee of the intelligence community.''. (b) Employee of Intelligence Community Defined.-- Subparagraph (C) of section 121(d)(9) is amended by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v) and by inserting after clause (iii) the following new clause: ``(iv) Employee of intelligence community.--The term `employee of the intelligence community' means an employee (as defined by section 2105 of title 5, United States Code) of-- (a) In General.--Subparagraph (A) of section 121(d)(9) (relating to exclusion of gain from sale of principal residence) is amended by striking ``duty'' and all that follows and inserting ``duty-- ``(i) as a member of the uniformed services, ``(ii) as a member of the Foreign Service of the United States, or ``(iii) as an employee of the intelligence community.''. (b) Employee of Intelligence Community Defined.-- Subparagraph (C) of section 121(d)(9) is amended by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v) and by inserting after clause (iii) the following new clause: ``(iv) Employee of intelligence community.--The term `employee of the intelligence community' means an employee (as defined by section 2105 of title 5, United States Code) of--``(I) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ``(II) the Central Intelligence Agency, ``(III) the National Security Agency, ``(IV) the Defense Intelligence Agency, ``(V) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, ``(VI) the National Reconnaissance Office, ``(VII) any other office within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs, ``(VIII) any of the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Coast Guard, ``(IX) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, or ``(X) any of the elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analyses of foreign intelligence information.''. (a) In General.--Subparagraph (A) of section 121(d)(9) (relating to exclusion of gain from sale of principal residence) is amended by striking ``duty'' and all that follows and inserting ``duty-- ``(i) as a member of the uniformed services, ``(ii) as a member of the Foreign Service of the United States, or ``(iii) as an employee of the intelligence community.''. (b) Employee of Intelligence Community Defined.-- Subparagraph (C) of section 121(d)(9) is amended by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v) and by inserting after clause (iii) the following new clause: ``(iv) Employee of intelligence community.--The term `employee of the intelligence community' means an employee (as defined by section 2105 of title 5, United States Code) of--``(I) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ``(II) the Central Intelligence Agency, ``(III) the National Security Agency, ``(IV) the Defense Intelligence Agency, ``(V) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, ``(VI) the National Reconnaissance Office, ``(VII) any other office within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs, ``(VIII) any of the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Coast Guard, ``(IX) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, or ``(X) any of the elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analyses of foreign intelligence information.''.(c) Special Rule.--Subparagraph (C) of section 121(d)(9), as amended by subsection (b), is amended by adding at the end the following new clause: ``(vi) Special rule relating to intelligence community.--An employee of the intelligence community shall not be treated as serving on qualified extended duty unless-- (a) In General.--Subparagraph (A) of section 121(d)(9) (relating to exclusion of gain from sale of principal residence) is amended by striking ``duty'' and all that follows and inserting ``duty-- ``(i) as a member of the uniformed services, ``(ii) as a member of the Foreign Service of the United States, or ``(iii) as an employee of the intelligence community.''. (b) Employee of Intelligence Community Defined.-- Subparagraph (C) of section 121(d)(9) is amended by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v) and by inserting after clause (iii) the following new clause: ``(iv) Employee of intelligence community.--The term `employee of the intelligence community' means an employee (as defined by section 2105 of title 5, United States Code) of--``(I) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ``(II) the Central Intelligence Agency, ``(III) the National Security Agency, ``(IV) the Defense Intelligence Agency, ``(V) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, ``(VI) the National Reconnaissance Office, ``(VII) any other office within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs, ``(VIII) any of the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Coast Guard, ``(IX) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, or ``(X) any of the elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analyses of foreign intelligence information.''.(c) Special Rule.--Subparagraph (C) of section 121(d)(9), as amended by subsection (b), is amended by adding at the end the following new clause: ``(vi) Special rule relating to intelligence community.--An employee of the intelligence community shall not be treated as serving on qualified extended duty unless--``(I) for purposes of such duty such employee has moved from 1 duty station to another, and ``(II) at least 1 of such duty stations is located outside of the Washington, District of Columbia, and Baltimore metropolitan statistical areas (as defined by the Secretary of Commerce).''. SA 2658. Mr. DAYTON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2020, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 202(b) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006; as follows: At the end of the bill add the following: SA 2659. Mr. LAUTENBERG submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2020, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 202(b) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SA 2660. Mr. DODD (for himself and Ms. Mikulski) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2020, to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 202(b) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of title IV, add the following: (a) Modification of Tax Rates on Capital Gains and Dividends for Individuals With $1,000,000 or More of Taxable Income.-- (1) In general.--Section 1(h) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(12) Modified rates for individuals with $1,000,000 or more of taxable income.--If a taxpayer has taxable income of $1,000,000 or more for any taxable year-- ``(A) paragraph (11) (relating to dividends taxed as capital gain) shall not apply to any qualified dividend income of the taxpayer for the taxable year, and ``(B) paragraph (1)(C) shall be applied by substituting `20 percent' for `15 percent' with respect to the adjusted net capital gain of the taxpayer for the taxable year, determined by only taking into account gain or loss properly allocable to the portion of the taxable year after December 31, 2005.'' (2) Application to minimum tax.--Section 55(b)(3) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``In the case of a taxpayer with alternative minimum taxable income of $1,000,000 or more for any taxable year, the rules of section 1(h)(12) shall apply for purposes of this paragraph.'' (3) Effective dates.-- (A) Capital gains.--Section 1(h)(12)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by paragraph (1)) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2005. (B) Dividend rates.--Section 1(h)(12)(A) of such Code (as added by paragraph (1)) shall apply to dividends received after December 31, 2005. (4) Application of jgtrra sunset.--The amendment made by this subsection shall be subject to section 303 of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 to the same extent and in the same manner as the provision of such Act to which such amendment relates. (b) Dedication of Resulting Revenues.-- (1) No child left behind trust fund.--Subchapter A of chapter 98 (relating to trust fund code) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Modification of Tax Rates on Capital Gains and Dividends for Individuals With $1,000,000 or More of Taxable Income.-- (1) In general.--Section 1(h) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(12) Modified rates for individuals with $1,000,000 or more of taxable income.--If a taxpayer has taxable income of $1,000,000 or more for any taxable year-- ``(A) paragraph (11) (relating to dividends taxed as capital gain) shall not apply to any qualified dividend income of the taxpayer for the taxable year, and ``(B) paragraph (1)(C) shall be applied by substituting `20 percent' for `15 percent' with respect to the adjusted net capital gain of the taxpayer for the taxable year, determined by only taking into account gain or loss properly allocable to the portion of the taxable year after December 31, 2005.'' (2) Application to minimum tax.--Section 55(b)(3) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``In the case of a taxpayer with alternative minimum taxable income of $1,000,000 or more for any taxable year, the rules of section 1(h)(12) shall apply for purposes of this paragraph.'' (3) Effective dates.-- (A) Capital gains.--Section 1(h)(12)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by paragraph (1)) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2005. (B) Dividend rates.--Section 1(h)(12)(A) of such Code (as added by paragraph (1)) shall apply to dividends received after December 31, 2005. (4) Application of jgtrra sunset.--The amendment made by this subsection shall be subject to section 303 of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 to the same extent and in the same manner as the provision of such Act to which such amendment relates. (b) Dedication of Resulting Revenues.-- (1) No child left behind trust fund.--Subchapter A of chapter 98 (relating to trust fund code) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:``SEC. 9511. NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND TRUST FUND. (a) Modification of Tax Rates on Capital Gains and Dividends for Individuals With $1,000,000 or More of Taxable Income.-- (1) In general.--Section 1(h) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(12) Modified rates for individuals with $1,000,000 or more of taxable income.--If a taxpayer has taxable income of $1,000,000 or more for any taxable year-- ``(A) paragraph (11) (relating to dividends taxed as capital gain) shall not apply to any qualified dividend income of the taxpayer for the taxable year, and ``(B) paragraph (1)(C) shall be applied by substituting `20 percent' for `15 percent' with respect to the adjusted net capital gain of the taxpayer for the taxable year, determined by only taking into account gain or loss properly allocable to the portion of the taxable year after December 31, 2005.'' (2) Application to minimum tax.--Section 55(b)(3) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``In the case of a taxpayer with alternative minimum taxable income of $1,000,000 or more for any taxable year, the rules of section 1(h)(12) shall apply for purposes of this paragraph.'' (3) Effective dates.-- (A) Capital gains.--Section 1(h)(12)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by paragraph (1)) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2005. (B) Dividend rates.--Section 1(h)(12)(A) of such Code (as added by paragraph (1)) shall apply to dividends received after December 31, 2005. (4) Application of jgtrra sunset.--The amendment made by this subsection shall be subject to section 303 of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 to the same extent and in the same manner as the provision of such Act to which such amendment relates. (b) Dedication of Resulting Revenues.-- (1) No child left behind trust fund.--Subchapter A of chapter 98 (relating to trust fund code) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:``SEC. 9511. NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND TRUST FUND.``(a) Creation of Trust Fund.--There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the `No Child Left Behind Trust Fund', consisting of any amount appropriated or credited to the Trust Fund as provided in this section or section 9602(b). ``(b) Transfers to Trust Fund.--There are hereby appropriated to the No Child Left Behind Trust Fund the following amounts equivalent to the increased revenues received in the Treasury as the result of the amendment made by section 405(a) of the Tax Relief Act of 2005: ``(1) In the case of fiscal year 2006, $4,085,000,000. ``(2) In the case of fiscal year 2007, $4,543,000,000. ``(3) In the case of fiscal year 2008, $4,725,000,000. ``(c) Expenditures From Trust Fund.--Amounts in the No Child Left Behind Trust Fund shall be available for fiscal years beginning after 2005, as provided by appropriation Acts, to carry out programs under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 in accordance with the provisions of, and amendments made by, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.''. (2) Military restoration trust fund.--Subchapter A of chapter 98 (relating to trust fund code), as amended by paragraph (1), is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Modification of Tax Rates on Capital Gains and Dividends for Individuals With $1,000,000 or More of Taxable Income.-- (1) In general.--Section 1(h) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(12) Modified rates for individuals with $1,000,000 or more of taxable income.--If a taxpayer has taxable income of $1,000,000 or more for any taxable year-- ``(A) paragraph (11) (relating to dividends taxed as capital gain) shall not apply to any qualified dividend income of the taxpayer for the taxable year, and ``(B) paragraph (1)(C) shall be applied by substituting `20 percent' for `15 percent' with respect to the adjusted net capital gain of the taxpayer for the taxable year, determined by only taking into account gain or loss properly allocable to the portion of the taxable year after December 31, 2005.'' (2) Application to minimum tax.--Section 55(b)(3) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``In the case of a taxpayer with alternative minimum taxable income of $1,000,000 or more for any taxable year, the rules of section 1(h)(12) shall apply for purposes of this paragraph.'' (3) Effective dates.-- (A) Capital gains.--Section 1(h)(12)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by paragraph (1)) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2005. (B) Dividend rates.--Section 1(h)(12)(A) of such Code (as added by paragraph (1)) shall apply to dividends received after December 31, 2005. (4) Application of jgtrra sunset.--The amendment made by this subsection shall be subject to section 303 of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 to the same extent and in the same manner as the provision of such Act to which such amendment relates. (b) Dedication of Resulting Revenues.-- (1) No child left behind trust fund.--Subchapter A of chapter 98 (relating to trust fund code) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:``SEC. 9511. NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND TRUST FUND.``(a) Creation of Trust Fund.--There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the `No Child Left Behind Trust Fund', consisting of any amount appropriated or credited to the Trust Fund as provided in this section or section 9602(b). ``(b) Transfers to Trust Fund.--There are hereby appropriated to the No Child Left Behind Trust Fund the following amounts equivalent to the increased revenues received in the Treasury as the result of the amendment made by section 405(a) of the Tax Relief Act of 2005: ``(1) In the case of fiscal year 2006, $4,085,000,000. ``(2) In the case of fiscal year 2007, $4,543,000,000. ``(3) In the case of fiscal year 2008, $4,725,000,000. ``(c) Expenditures From Trust Fund.--Amounts in the No Child Left Behind Trust Fund shall be available for fiscal years beginning after 2005, as provided by appropriation Acts, to carry out programs under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 in accordance with the provisions of, and amendments made by, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.''. (2) Military restoration trust fund.--Subchapter A of chapter 98 (relating to trust fund code), as amended by paragraph (1), is amended by adding at the end the following new section:``SEC. 9512. MILITARY RESTORATION TRUST FUND. (a) Modification of Tax Rates on Capital Gains and Dividends for Individuals With $1,000,000 or More of Taxable Income.-- (1) In general.--Section 1(h) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(12) Modified rates for individuals with $1,000,000 or more of taxable income.--If a taxpayer has taxable income of $1,000,000 or more for any taxable year-- ``(A) paragraph (11) (relating to dividends taxed as capital gain) shall not apply to any qualified dividend income of the taxpayer for the taxable year, and ``(B) paragraph (1)(C) shall be applied by substituting `20 percent' for `15 percent' with respect to the adjusted net capital gain of the taxpayer for the taxable year, determined by only taking into account gain or loss properly allocable to the portion of the taxable year after December 31, 2005.'' (2) Application to minimum tax.--Section 55(b)(3) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``In the case of a taxpayer with alternative minimum taxable income of $1,000,000 or more for any taxable year, the rules of section 1(h)(12) shall apply for purposes of this paragraph.'' (3) Effective dates.-- (A) Capital gains.--Section 1(h)(12)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by paragraph (1)) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2005. (B) Dividend rates.--Section 1(h)(12)(A) of such Code (as added by paragraph (1)) shall apply to dividends received after December 31, 2005. (4) Application of jgtrra sunset.--The amendment made by this subsection shall be subject to section 303 of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 to the same extent and in the same manner as the provision of such Act to which such amendment relates. (b) Dedication of Resulting Revenues.-- (1) No child left behind trust fund.--Subchapter A of chapter 98 (relating to trust fund code) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:``SEC. 9511. NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND TRUST FUND.``(a) Creation of Trust Fund.--There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the `No Child Left Behind Trust Fund', consisting of any amount appropriated or credited to the Trust Fund as provided in this section or section 9602(b). ``(b) Transfers to Trust Fund.--There are hereby appropriated to the No Child Left Behind Trust Fund the following amounts equivalent to the increased revenues received in the Treasury as the result of the amendment made by section 405(a) of the Tax Relief Act of 2005: ``(1) In the case of fiscal year 2006, $4,085,000,000. ``(2) In the case of fiscal year 2007, $4,543,000,000. ``(3) In the case of fiscal year 2008, $4,725,000,000. ``(c) Expenditures From Trust Fund.--Amounts in the No Child Left Behind Trust Fund shall be available for fiscal years beginning after 2005, as provided by appropriation Acts, to carry out programs under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 in accordance with the provisions of, and amendments made by, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.''. (2) Military restoration trust fund.--Subchapter A of chapter 98 (relating to trust fund code), as amended by paragraph (1), is amended by adding at the end the following new section:``SEC. 9512. MILITARY RESTORATION TRUST FUND.``(a) Creation of Trust Fund.--There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the `Military Restoration Trust Fund', consisting of any amount appropriated or credited to the Trust Fund as provided in this section or section 9602(b). ``(b) Transfers to Trust Fund.--There are hereby appropriated to the Military Restoration Trust Fund the following amounts equivalent to the increased revenues received in the Treasury as the result of the amendment made by section 405(a) of the Tax Relief Act of 2005: ``(1) In the case of fiscal year 2006, $4,085,000,000. ``(2) In the case of fiscal year 2007, $4,543,000,000. ``(3) In the case of fiscal year 2008, $4,725,000,000. ``(c) Expenditures From Trust Fund.--Amounts in the Military Restoration Trust Fund shall be available for fiscal years beginning after 2005, as provided by appropriation Acts, to replenish equipment and vehicle stocks of the Marine Corps and the Army (including the National Guard and Reserve) that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.''. (3) Clerical amendments.--The table of sections for such subchapter is amended by adding at the end the following new items:", u" Title IV of Senate Resolution 4, agreed to by the Senate on February 4, 1977, calls for establishment of a system for a computerized schedule of all meetings and hearings of Senate committees, subcommittees, joint committees, and committees of conference. This title requires all such committees to notify the Office of the Senate Daily Digest--designated by the Rules Committee--of the time, place, and purpose of the meetings, when scheduled, and any cancellations or changes in the meetings as they occur. As an additional procedure along with the computerization of this information, the Office of the Senate Daily Digest will prepare this information for printing in the Extensions of Remarks section of the Congressional Record on Monday and Wednesday of each week. Meetings scheduled for Tuesday, April 13, 2010 may be found in the Daily Digest of today's Record. MEETINGS SCHEDULED APRIL 14 9:30 a.m. Judiciary To hold an oversight hearing to examine the Department of Justice. SD-226 Appropriations Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 2011 for the Department of Education and the education jobs crisis. SD-138 10 a.m. Environment and Public Works To hold hearings to examine opportunities to improve transportation safety. SD-406 Finance To hold hearings to examine using unemployment insurance to help Americans get back to work, focusing on creating opportunities and overcoming challenges. SD-215 Joint Economic Committee To hold hearings to examine the economic outlook. SD-106 10:30 a.m. Armed Services To hold hearings to examine United States policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran; to be immediately followed by a closed hearing in SVC-217. SR-253 Appropriations Defense Subcommittee To hold closed hearings to examine proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 2011 for national and military intelligence. SVC-217 2:30 p.m. Commerce, Science, and Transportation To hold hearings to examine reviewing the national broadband plan. SR-253 Foreign Relations European Affairs Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine Southeast Europe, focusing on opportunities and challenges in the Western Balkans. SD-419 Appropriations Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 2011 for the Consumer Product Safety Commission. SD-138 Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine deployed Federal civilians, focusing on advancing security and opportunity in Afghanistan. SD-342 Armed Services Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine the current readiness of United States forces. SD-562 Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine strategic forces programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration in review of the Defense Authorization request for fiscal year 2011. SR-222 APRIL 15 9:30 a.m. Armed Services To hold hearings to examine the nominations of Vice Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., United States Navy, to be admiral and Commander, United States Northern Command, and to be Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command, and Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, United States Army, to be general and Director, National Security Agency, to be Chief, Central Security Service, and to be Commander, United States Cyber Command, both of the Department of Defense; with the possibility of a closed session in SVC-217 following the open session. SD-G50 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs To hold hearings to examine legislative proposals in the Department of Housing and Urban Development's fiscal year 2011 budget request. SD-538 10 a.m. Appropriations Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 2011 for the Federal Bureau of Investigation; to be immediately followed by a closed hearing in SVC-217. SD-192 Finance To hold hearings to examine filing season update, focusing on current IRS issues. SD-215 Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions To hold hearings to examine Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) reauthorization, focusing on teachers and leaders. SD-430 Judiciary Business meeting to consider S. 1624, to amend title 11 of the United States Code, to provide protection for medical debt homeowners, to restore bankruptcy protections for individuals experiencing economic distress as caregivers to ill, injured, or disabled family members, and to exempt from means testing debtors whose financial problems were caused by serious medical problems, S. 3111, to establish the Commission on Freedom of Information Act Processing Delays, S. 3031, to authorize Drug Free Communities enhancement grants to address major emerging drug issues or local drug crises, S. 1346, to penalize crimes against humanity and for other purposes, and the nominations of Sharon Johnson Coleman, and Gary Scott Feinerman, both to be United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, and William Joseph Martinez, to be United States District Judge for the District of Colorado, and Loretta E. Lynch, to be United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Noel Culver March, to be United States Marshal for the District of Maine, George White, to be United States Marshal for the Southern District of Mississippi, Brian Todd Underwood, to be United States Marshal for the District of Idaho, and Kerry B. Harvey, to be United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Kentucky, all of the Department of Justice. SD-226 Commerce, Science, and Transportation Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine S. 817, to establish a Salmon Stronghold Partnership program to conserve wild Pacific salmon. SR-253 Rules and Administration To hold hearings to examine the nomination of Stephen T. Ayers, of Maryland, to be Architect of the Capitol. SR-301 Small Business and Entrepreneurship To hold hearings to examine assessing access, focusing on obstacles and opportunities for minority small business owners in today's capital markets. SD-562 11 a.m. Foreign Relations East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine United States and Japan relations. SD-419 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe To receive a briefing on a new international convention aimed at helping resource-rich developing countries make the best economic and social use of their natural resources. 2325, Rayburn Building 2 p.m. Armed Services Airland Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine Army modernization in review of the Defense Authorization request for fiscal year 2011 and the Future Years Defense Program. SR-222 Appropriations Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 2011 for the Department of Veterans Affairs. SD-124 2:30 p.m. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Contracting Oversight Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine contracts for Afghan National Police training. SD-342 Intelligence To hold closed hearings to consider certain intelligence matters. SH-219 3:15 p.m. Appropriations Legislative Branch Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 2011 for the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Government Printing Office (GPO), and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). SD-138 APRIL 16 9:30 a.m. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Investigations Subcommittee To resume hearings to examine Wall Street and the financial crisis, focusing on the role of bank regulators. SD-106 10 a.m. Judiciary To hold hearings to examine the nominations of Goodwin Liu, of California, to be United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, Kimberly J. Mueller, to be United States District Judge for the Eastern District of California, Richard Mark Gergel, and J. Michelle Childs, both to be United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, and Catherine C. Eagles, to be United States District Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina. SD-226 APRIL 20 9:30 a.m. Armed Services To hold hearings to examine ballistic missile defense policies and programs in review of the Defense Authorization request for fiscal year 2011 and the Future Years Defense Program; with the possibility of a closed session in SVC-217 following the open session. SD-G50 10 a.m. Energy and Natural Resources To hold hearings to examine S. 1856, to amend the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to clarify policies regarding ownership of pore space, and S. 1134, to ensure the energy independence and economic viability of the United States by promoting the responsible use of coal through accelerated carbon capture and storage and through advanced clean coal technology research, development, demonstration, and deployment programs. SD-366 Judiciary To hold an oversight hearing to examine the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. SD-226 2 p.m. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs To hold hearings to examine the nominations of Michael D. Kennedy, of Georgia, and Dana Katherine Bilyeu, of Nevada, both to be a Member of the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, Dennis P. Walsh, of Maryland, to be Chairman of the Special Panel on Appeals, and Milton C. Lee, Jr., Judith Anne Smith, and Todd E. Edelman, all to be an Associate Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. SD-342 4 p.m. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs To hold hearings to examine border security. SD-342 APRIL 21 9:30 a.m. Veterans' Affairs To hold an oversight hearing to examine implementation of the new post-9/11 Government Issue (GI) Bill. SR-418 10 a.m. Armed Services Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine nonproliferation programs at the Departments of Defense and Energy in review of the Defense Authorization request for fiscal year 2011 and the Future Years Defense Program. SR-222 Judiciary To hold hearings to examine combating cyber crime and identity theft in the digital age. SD-226 2:30 p.m. Energy and Natural Resources Public Lands and Forests Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine S. 1546, to provide for the conveyance of certain parcels of land to the town of Mantua, Utah, S. 2798, to reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire through the facilitation of insect and disease infestation treatment of National Forest System and adjacent land, S. 2830, to amend the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 to clarify that uncertified States and Indian tribes have the authority to use certain payments for certain noncoal reclamation projects, and S. 2963, to designate certain land in the State of Oregon as wilderness, to provide for the exchange of certain Federal land and non-Federal land. SD-366 Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine environmental management funding in review of the Defense Authorization request for fiscal year 2011 and funding under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. SR-222 APRIL 22 9:30 a.m. Armed Services To hold hearings to examine the Nuclear Posture Review. SD-G50 10 a.m. Appropriations Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 2011 for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. SD-192 APRIL 28 2 p.m. Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions To hold hearings to examine Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) reauthorization, focusing on standards and assessments. SD-430 MAY 5 9:30 a.m. Veterans' Affairs To hold an oversight hearing to examine Veterans Affairs (VA) Disability Compensation, focusing on presumptive disability decision-making. SR-418 10 a.m. United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control To hold hearings to examine violence in Mexico and Ciudad Juarez and its implications for the United States. SD-124 MAY 19 9:30 a.m. Veterans' Affairs To hold hearings to examine pending legislation. SR-418 POSTPONEMENTS APRIL 14 9:30 a.m. Armed Services SeaPower Subcommittee To hold hearings to examine Navy shipbuilding programs in review of the Defense Authorization request for fiscal year 2011 and the Future Years Defense Program. SD-562", u"Mr. President, as Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I wish to point out that as of Friday, there are three provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act which are going to expire. Those three provisions are something called roving wiretaps, the ``lone wolf'' provision, and the business records authority. Because of prior discussions, let me point out up-front that this does not include national security letters, just these three provisions: ``roving wiretaps,'' the ``lone wolf,'' and the ``business records'' authorities. I very much appreciate that the majority leader and the Republican leader have come together in agreement to bring this legislation to the Senate floor. Because of its importance, particularly at this point in time, I hope we will be able to conclude this business and see that those provisions are extended for 4 years before Friday. Many of us strongly believe when it comes to national security there should be no partisan divide, only strong bipartisan support. So this measure should receive a substantial vote this afternoon, and the Senate will pass it quickly this week before these key authorities expire. But before talking about the substance of the legislation, let me describe the context in which this debate occurs. Three weeks ago, on May 1, the United States carried out a risky, complicated but ultimately successful strike against Osama bin Laden, in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The strike was the culmination of nearly a decade-long intelligence operation to locate bin Laden. Similar to most complex intelligence challenges, finding bin Laden was the product of multiple intelligence sources and collection methods. It was a seamless effort led by the CIA, with important contributions from the National Security Agency--known as the NSA--and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency as well. The intelligence mechanisms that are employed in counterterrorism operations are carefully and regularly reviewed by the Senate's Intelligence Committee, which I have the honor to chair. Some are also overseen by the Judiciary Committee, on which I also have the pleasure to serve. These intelligence tools include the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, and in particular the three provisions that will, if not reauthorized, expire on May 27. Again, they are the ``roving wiretap,'' the ``lone wolf,'' and the ``business records'' authorities. The point is, we as a nation rely on certain secret sources and methods to protect our national security. Most other nations do as well. It is also important to note that the strike against bin Laden, while a critical strategic blow to al-Qaida, is also very likely to lead to reprisal attempts. There have been calls for attacks against the United States after the bin Laden strike from al-Qaida in Pakistan, from al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen and North Africa. There is a very real concern that radicalized Americans here at home may contemplate violence in response to extremists' calls for retribution. So this is a time of heightened threat--maybe no specific threat, but certainly heightened threats. We are seeing attacks in Pakistan carried but by the Taliban in reprisals for this attack as well. Therefore, this is a time when our vigilance must also be heightened. Key officials from the National Counterterrorism Center, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security recently described to the Intelligence Committee in closed session how their respective agencies have heightened their defensive posture over these very concerns. Clearly, this is a time where every legal counterterrorism and intelligence-gathering mechanism should be made available. It is also a time to seize the opportunity to further disrupt al-Qaida. The assault on the bin Laden compound netted a cache of valuable information: papers, videos, computer drives, and other materials about al Qaeda's vision and al-Qaida's plans. The intelligence community established an interagency task force to go through that material as quickly as possible. I am hopeful that previously unknown terror plots will be identified and information leading to the location of terrorists will be found. Authorities such as the three provisions set to expire this Friday may well prove critical to thwarting new plots and finding terrorists. They must be renewed. Let me describe the three provisions in more detail. First, the roving wiretap provision. Roving wiretap authority was first authorized for intelligence purposes in the PATRIOT Act in 2001. But, as you know, it has been used for years in the criminal context. This provision, codified in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, provides the government with the flexibility necessary to conduct electronic surveillance against elusive targets. Let me explain. In most cases under FISA, the government can go to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court--which I will describe in detail later--and present an application to tap the telephone of a suspected terrorist or spy. The FISA Court reviews the application and can issue an order--basically a warrant--to allow the government to tap a phone belonging to that target. We all know in this day and age there are disposable or ``throw away'' cell phones that allow foreign intelligence agents and terrorists not only to switch numbers but also to throw away their cell phone and replace it with another. This roving wiretap authority allows the government to make a specific showing to the FISA Court that the actions of a terrorist or spy may have the effect of thwarting intelligence. In other words, they make one appearance, and the government can thus seek, and the FISA Court can authorize, a roving wiretap so that the FBI, for example, can follow the target without having to go back to the Court for each cell phone change. Instead, the FBI in this case would report to the FISA Court, normally within 10 days of following the target to a new cell phone, with information on the fact justifying the belief that the new phone was or is being used by the target. The Justice Department has advised Congress that the authority to conduct roving electronic surveillance under FISA has proven to be operationally useful in some 20 national security investigations annually. So this provision is both used and very necessary in this day of throw away cell phones. ``Lone wolf'' authority allows the government to request, and the FISA Court to approve, intelligence collection against non-U.S. persons who engage in international terrorism but for whom an association with a specific international terrorist organization may not yet be known. Let me explain that more clearly. All other FISA surveillance and searches must be focused on a target who the government can prove is tied to a foreign power. Before the government can tap a phone or search a residence, it needs to demonstrate that the person it is after is an employee or spy or otherwise working for, or on behalf of, another country or terrorist group. The ``lone wolf'' provision, which was added to FISA in 2004, recognizes that there may be cases where the government suspects an individual inside the United States of plotting a terrorist attack, but it has not been able to link that individual to al-Qaida or al Shabaab or another group. The ``lone wolf'' authority allows the government to go to the FISA Court, show why it believes a non-U.S. person is engaging in terrorist activity, and get a warrant to begin surveillance. This is not done without a warrant from the court. It also allows for court-ordered collection against a non-U.S. target who may have broken with a terrorist organization while continuing to prepare for an act of international terrorism. The Justice Department has advised Congress that although to date it has not used this authority, the ``lone wolf'' authority nevertheless fills an important gap in U.S. collection capabilities, and we have it if we need it. The recent case of Khalid Aldawsari, a Saudi national arrested in Texas this past February, shows why the ``lone wolf'' authority is necessary. Aldawsari was arrested after the FBI learned he had purchased chemicals and conducted research needed to make improvised explosive devices. He had also researched bomb targets, including dams in California and the Dallas residence of former President George W. Bush. Unlike other recent terrorists such as Najibullah Zazi, David Headley, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Aldawsari was not identified on the basis of his connections to foreign terrorist organizations or known at the time of his capture to be working with one. He is better described as one of the most recent cases of individuals already inside the United States who became radicalized and committed to carrying out terrorist attacks. So it is for this kind of threat that the ``lone wolf'' authority is important and why we should extend this mechanism. It is also this kind of threat that the Intelligence Community is now especially worried about, as people inside the United States may be spurred to action in retaliation for the strike against bin Laden. If the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, or a State or local police officer identifies someone building bombs, it is necessary to move quickly and not take time to research a possible connection to al-Qaida before we use FISA authorities to learn what they are up to and when and how they might strike. Business records. The third authority covered by this legislation is known as the business records provision and provides the government the same authority in national security investigations to obtain physical records that exist in an ordinary criminal case through a grand jury subpoena. Business records authority has been used since 2001 in FISA to obtain driver's license records, hotel records, car rental records, apartment leasing records, credit card records, among other business records. This is the way in which you track a target. Let me note that while the debate over this provision has often focused on library circulation records, the Justice Department has advised the Congress that this authority has never--let me stress, never--been used to obtain library circulation records. We had a big debate on this issue when this came up before. In fact, this authority has never been used for library circulation records. The Department has informed Congress that it submitted 96 applications to the FISA Court for business record orders last year. The Justice Department has further stated that some business records orders have been used to support critically important and highly sensitive intelligence collection activities. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees have been fully briefed on that collection. Information about this sensitive collection has also been provided to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, and information has been available for months to all Senators for their review. The details on how the government uses all three of these authorities are classified and discussion of them here would harm our ability to identify and stop terrorist attacks and espionage. But, if any Senators would like further details, I encourage them to contact the Intelligence Committee, or to request a briefing from the Intelligence Community or the Department of Justice. I have mentioned several times the role of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Let me describe what it is and how it operates. The FISA Court is a special court. It is a set of 11 Federal district judges, each of whom is appointed by the Chief Justice to specifically serve in this role. At least one of these judges is available at all times--24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year--for the purpose of reviewing government applications to use FISA authorities and, if those applications are sufficient, approving them by issuing an order, or what we call in the criminal law, a warrant. The FISA Court judges meet in closed session to review classified declarations, and they provide very careful judicial review of the government's applications. They are expert in this specialized area of the law, as is their expert staff. The Department of Justice officials who come before them take all care in making their case and presenting their facts, as they do in public court. The American people should understand that these FISA authorities we are discussing now--the ability to conduct electronic surveillance and obtain records--are subject to strict oversight. A Senate-confirmed official in the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General for National Security--one of these three must, and I stress ``must''--sign off on every application before it goes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Federal judges, also confirmed by the Senate, must approve the applications. Inspectors General conduct regular audits and oversight as well. The Senate and House Intelligence and Judiciary Committees receive regular reports from the Department of Justice on the use of all FISA authorities, as well as receiving briefings from the FBI and NSA on the implementation of the FISA statute. The three authorities reauthorized by this legislation have been debated extensively on this floor and in this Congress since it came up for reauthorization in 2009. Every single national security official to come before the Congress in the past 2 years has testified that these provisions are vital to protect America and has urged their reauthorization. It is very hard, I think, to vote no in the face of what we have been told in classified intelligence briefings and in hearings by officials from the Attorney General's office and the FBI. In fact, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence wrote a letter to Leaders Reid and McConnell today, May 23, expressing their strong support for immediate enactment of the legislation we are now considering. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the letter to Leaders Reid and McConnell.", u" There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009''. (b) Clarification of Disclosures Covered.-- (1) In general.--Section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in subparagraph (A)-- (i) by striking ``which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences'' and inserting ``, without restriction to time, place, form, motive, context, forum, or prior disclosure made to any person by an employee or applicant, including a disclosure made in the ordinary course of an employee's duties, that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is evidence of''; (ii) in clause (i), by striking ``a violation'' and inserting ``any violation''; and (iii) by striking ``or'' at the end; (B) in subparagraph (B)-- (i) by striking ``which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences'' and inserting ``, without restriction to time, place, form, motive, context, forum, or prior disclosure made to any person by an employee or applicant, including a disclosure made in the ordinary course of an employee's duties, of information that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is evidence of''; (ii) in clause (i), by striking ``a violation'' and inserting ``any violation (other than a violation of this section)''; and (iii) in clause (ii), by adding ``or'' at the end; and (C) by adding at the end the following: ``(C) any disclosure that-- ``(i) is made by an employee or applicant of information required by law or Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is direct and specific evidence of-- ``(I) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; ``(II) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; or ``(III) a false statement to Congress on an issue of material fact; and ``(ii) is made to-- ``(I) a member of a committee of Congress having a primary responsibility for oversight of a department, agency, or element of the Federal Government to which the disclosed information relates and who is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed; ``(II) any other Member of Congress who is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed; or ``(III) an employee of Congress who has the appropriate security clearance and is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed.''. (2) Prohibited personnel practices under section 2302(b)(9).-- (A) Technical and conforming amendments.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended in subsections (a)(3), (b)(4)(A), and (b)(4)(B)(i) of section 1214, in subsections (a), (e)(1) and (i) of section 1221, and in subsection (a)(2)(C)(i) of 2302 by inserting ``or 2302(b)(9) (B) through (D)'' after ``section 2302(b)(8)'' or ``(b)(8)'' each place it appears. (B) Other references.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended in subsection (b)(4)(B)(i) of section 1214 and in subsection (e)(1) of section 1221 by inserting ``or protected activity'' after ``disclosure'' each place it appears. (c) Definitional Amendments.-- (1) Disclosures.--Section 2302(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) in subparagraph (C)(iii), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (C) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) `disclosure' means a formal or informal communication or transmission, but does not include a communication concerning policy decisions that lawfully exercise discretionary authority unless the employee or applicant providing the disclosure reasonably believes that the disclosure evidences-- ``(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or ``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.''. (2) Clear and convincing evidence.--Sections 1214(b)(4)(B)(ii) and 1221(e)(2) of title 5, United States Code, are amended by adding at the end the following: ``For purposes of the preceding sentence, `clear and convincing evidence' means evidence indicating that the matter to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.''. (d) Rebuttable Presumption.--Section 2302(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by amending the matter following paragraph (12) to read as follows: ``This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the withholding of information from Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to Congress. For purposes of paragraph (8), any presumption relating to the performance of a duty by an employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action may be rebutted by substantial evidence. For purposes of paragraph (8), a determination as to whether an employee or applicant reasonably believes that they have disclosed information that evidences any violation of law, rule, regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety shall be made by determining whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude that the actions of the Government evidence such violations, mismanagement, waste, abuse, or danger.''. (e) Personnel Actions and Prohibited Personnel Practices.-- (1) Personnel action.--Section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in clause (x), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; and (B) by redesignating clause (xi) as clause (xiv) and inserting after clause (x) the following: ``(xi) the implementation or enforcement of any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement; ``(xii) a suspension, revocation, or other determination relating to a security clearance or any other access determination by a covered agency; ``(xiii) an investigation, other than any ministerial or nondiscretionary fact finding activities necessary for the agency to perform its mission, of an employee or applicant for employment because of any activity protected under this section; and'' (2) Prohibited personnel practice.--Section 2302(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in paragraph (11), by striking ``or'' at the end; (B) in paragraph (12), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and (C) by inserting after paragraph (12) the following: ``(13) implement or enforce any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement, if such policy, form, or agreement does not contain the following statement: `These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by Executive Order No. 12958; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse, or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents); and the statutes which protect against disclosures that could compromise national security, including sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by such Executive order and such statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling'; or ``(14) conduct, or cause to be conducted, an investigation, other than any ministerial or nondiscretionary fact finding activities necessary for the agency to perform its mission, of an employee or applicant for employment because of any activity protected under this section.''. (f) Exclusion of Agencies by the President.--Section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following: ``(ii)(I) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency; and ``(II) as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, if the determination (as that determination relates to a personnel action) is made before that personnel action; or''. (g) Disciplinary Action.--Section 1215(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(3)(A) A final order of the Board may impose-- ``(i) disciplinary action consisting of removal, reduction in grade, debarment from Federal employment for a period not to exceed 5 years, suspension, or reprimand; ``(ii) an assessment of a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000; or ``(iii) any combination of disciplinary actions described under clause (i) and an assessment described under clause (ii). ``(B) In any case in which the Board finds that an employee has committed a prohibited personnel practice under paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b), the Board shall impose disciplinary action if the Board finds that the activity protected under paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b) was a significant motivating factor, even if other factors also motivated the decision, for the employee's decision to take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take a personnel action, unless that employee demonstrates, by preponderance of evidence, that the employee would have taken, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take the same personnel action, in the absence of such protected activity.''. (h) Remedies.-- (1) Attorney fees.--Section 1204(m)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``agency involved'' and inserting ``agency where the prevailing party is employed or has applied for employment''. (2) Damages.--Sections 1214(g)(2) and 1221(g)(1)(A)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, are amended by striking all after ``travel expenses,'' and inserting ``any other reasonable and foreseeable consequential damages, and compensatory damages (including attorney's fees, interest, reasonable expert witness fees, and costs).'' each place it appears. (i) Judicial Review.-- (1) In general.--Section 7703(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(b)(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and paragraph (2), a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review must be filed within 60 days after the date the petitioner received notice of the final order or decision of the Board. ``(B) During the 5-year period beginning on the effective date of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009, a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board in a case alleging a violation of paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b) shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction as provided under subsection (b)(2).''. (2) Review obtained by office of personnel management.-- Section 7703(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(d)(1) Except as provided under paragraph (2), this paragraph shall apply to any review obtained by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. The Director of the Office of Personnel Management may obtain review of any final order or decision of the Board by filing, within 60 days after the date the Director received notice of the final order or decision of the Board, a petition for judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit if the Director determines, in his discretion, that the Board erred in interpreting a civil service law, rule, or regulation affecting personnel management and that the Board's decision will have a substantial impact on a civil service law, rule, regulation, or policy directive. If the Director did not intervene in a matter before the Board, the Director may not petition for review of a Board decision under this section unless the Director first petitions the Board for a reconsideration of its decision, and such petition is denied. In addition to the named respondent, the Board and all other parties to the proceedings before the Board shall have the right to appear in the proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The granting of the petition for judicial review shall be at the discretion of the Court of Appeals. ``(2) During the 5-year period beginning on the effective date of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009, this paragraph shall apply to any review relating to paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b) obtained by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. The Director of the Office of Personnel Management may obtain review of any final order or decision of the Board by filing, within 60 days after the date the Director received notice of the final order or decision of the Board, a petition for judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction as provided under subsection (b)(2) if the Director determines, in his discretion, that the Board erred in interpreting paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b). If the Director did not intervene in a matter before the Board, the Director may not petition for review of a Board decision under this section unless the Director first petitions the Board for a reconsideration of its decision, and such petition is denied. In addition to the named respondent, the Board and all other parties to the proceedings before the Board shall have the right to appear in the proceeding before the court of appeals. The granting of the petition for judicial review shall be at the discretion of the Court of Appeals.''. (j) Merit System Protection Board Review of Security Clearances.-- (1) In general.--Chapter 77 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 7702 the following:", u"Madam President, the Senate now returns to the consideration of S. 2248, the FISA Amendments Act. As I said in December when we debated the motion to proceed to this bill, I believe this legislation is critical to our Nation's security. That phrase is thrown around a lot--``our Nation's security.'' It does have meaning. To protect America from the panoply of threats we face around the world, we must know what our enemies are planning and what they are doing. We get that information through our intelligence agencies, and one of the most useful sources for them is communications intelligence. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, gives the Government the authority, with court approval, to collect communications intelligence inside the United States. Unfortunately, the law has not kept pace with the incredible advances in telecommunications technology of the last 30 years. As this debate proceeds over these coming days, it is important for all Members to understand why FISA exists and why it is necessary for us to update it. The Congress passed FISA to protect Americans inside the United States from inappropriate eavesdropping by the Government. The FISA statute created a system that allowed the Government to go to a special court and show probable cause that someone inside the United States was an agent of a foreign power. If it agreed, if the court agreed, the court then issued an order allowing the Government to collect the intelligence. Over time, the flow of global communications changed. The nature of these communications changed. The system of fiber optic cables carrying international communications grew, and wireless technology began to dominate our domestic system. This was a marked change from the communications architecture that existed in 1978, when FISA was started, when local calls were transmitted over a wire and international ones usually went via satellite. As technology changed and America became the hub for international communication, our intelligence agencies were presented with collection opportunities that were never envisioned--never even thought about in 1978. But because of the way that FISA was drafted, they were unable to take advantage of the new opportunities to collect significant intelligence inside the United States against targets located overseas. After September 11, 2001, the President chose to deal with the problem unilaterally and created a warrantless surveillance program that relied on, to my mind, questionable legal justification. I think that was a mistake. I believe the President should have sought, and would have received from Congress, the necessary changes to FISA to accommodate the international communications he wished and needed to target. The public disclosure of the warrantless program ultimately led the President to seek approval from the FISA Court and then to seek additional authority from the Congress, which is where we are. Our first attempt to address this issue was the Protect America Act passed last August. That legislation allowed our intelligence community to undertake the collection needed to monitor terrorist communications, but the PAA, as we shall call it, is flawed legislation that does not achieve the balance between protecting security and preserving our civil liberties, which is so essential. It provided an expanse of new authority to collect intelligence inside the United States, with little court involvement or oversight from the Congress. But we had the foresight to include in the PAA--the Protect America Act--a 6-month sunset. That 6-month period allowed us the time we needed to craft a bill that does achieve this important balance: security and civil liberties. It gives the intelligence community the authority it needs to keep us safe, and it puts in place the safeguards needed to protect America's liberties. That is the bill the Senate is now considering; i.e., S. 2248. This bill was reported to the Senate last October on a strong bipartisan vote under Senator Bond and myself, Vice Chairman Bond and myself, by a vote of 13 to 2. Vice Chairman Bond and I worked hard to craft a bill that would garnish support from both sides of the aisle and that would have the support of the administration, leaders of the intelligence community and, most importantly, would achieve our twin goals of protecting the security and privacy of Americans. I should say at this point we went to great lengths to check all our bases in this process. We didn't do this in a cocoon and we didn't do it in a partisan way. We reached out to the experts, whether they were inside the administration or outside the administration. We wanted to do it so we could make this legislation as effective as possible. But, as with any legislation, this bill is not perfect. I have welcomed the input from others as we have moved forward. On this point, I must particularly acknowledge the work of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Judiciary and Intelligence Committees shared jurisdiction over FISA. The Judiciary Committee also happens to be led by two individuals with considerable knowledge and experience with these issues from the perspective of both committees. It may not be known to all, but Senator Pat Leahy served as vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the mid-1980s, and Senator Specter served as chairman in the mid-1990s. I appreciate the time and thought they have put into this legislation. The Judiciary Committee considered the Intelligence Committee bill on sequential referral and has reported a proposed amendment to our bill. That amendment is now the pending amendment. The Intelligence Committee bill and the Judiciary Committee amendment take a similar approach to addressing the underlying problems with FISA--not a huge difference. The Judiciary Committee included several provisions that I think further improve the already robust protections for privacy contained in S. 2248. We were enriched by working with them. I intend to support amendments to incorporate many of these changes into the underlying bill, which is the Intelligence Committee bill, and even though I cannot support everything in the Judiciary Committee substitute amendment, nevertheless, there is very good material there. Before I discuss possible amendments, let me take a few minutes to walk through the bill before us today. I apologize, but I think this is necessary as we begin this debate on what is a highly complicated and somewhat arcane subject. In crafting this legislation, the Intelligence Committee set out to accomplish four main goals. First, we wanted to ensure that activities authorized by this bill are only directed at persons outside the United States. The bill requires the FISA Court to approve targeting procedures designed to accurately make the determination of whether someone is outside the United States. For individuals inside the United States, the existing procedures under FISA continue to apply. Individual court orders, FISA orders, are still required. Secondly, our bill improves the protection of information from or about a U.S. person. Unlike the Protect America Act, this bill provides for court review of the so-called minimization procedures. These are procedures used to shield information about Americans who may be overheard or mentioned in the conversation of foreign targets. Court review of these procedures is central to the protection afforded under FISA. But the FISA Court's role was left out of the Protect America Act. Third, the bill includes a new protection for U.S. citizens outside the United States. The Intelligence Committee rejects the proposition that Americans lose their privacy rights because they travel or work elsewhere in the world. Under current law, the intelligence community can target U.S. citizens outside the U.S. solely on the authority of the Attorney General. Our bill requires an order of the FISA Court before an American can be targeted, regardless of the American's location. This is a concept that both committees endorsed, and it enjoys bipartisan support. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell also endorsed this in testimony before the Intelligence Committee. This is an area of law, however, that requires careful attention to avoid, as the Director described, ``unintended consequences.'' Both the Intelligence Committee and Judiciary Committee approaches need further refinement. Therefore, I believe we have reached an agreement on a bipartisan amendment that would reconcile the approaches of the two committees and resolve the concerns of the administration. Vice Chairman Bond and I will offer this modification as part of the managers' amendment. Finally, the Intelligence Committee bill adds significant new oversight authority to collect inside the United States against foreign targets. The new oversight will be conducted by all three branches of Government. The bill includes a series of annual reports to Congress on the authorized collection, including instances of noncompliance; inspector general reviews by the Justice Department and the Intelligence Committee; and FISA Court review and approval of acquisition and minimization procedures. Beyond these steps to update FISA, the other major component of the bill passed by the Intelligence Committee--and, unfortunately, not included in the Judiciary Committee amendment--is liability relief for companies that may have helped the Government collect critical intelligence after the September 11 terrorist attacks. I understand this is controversial. But everybody should know that this is an issue the Intelligence Committee has considered very carefully. We had a number of hearings on this subject. In reviewing the record of correspondence from the administration to these companies, I and most members of the committee became convinced that companies acted in good faith. They relied on the legal conclusion of the Nation's most senior law enforcement official, and they provided assistance because they wanted to help stop terrorist attacks. The companies received letters, and I tried very hard to convince Steve Hadley--Director McConnell very much approved of this--to make it possible for every Member of the Senate to have those letters that the companies received from the National Security Agency, so Members could understand that this was not some kind of a game, that this wasn't ``wordsmithing.'' What these letters stated was that the companies' assistance was ``required,'' that the requested assistance was based on an order of the President, and that the Attorney General had certified the legality of the order. And then the NSA Director, as I say, required, compelled these companies--there were various uses of words, but they were all very firm, leaving no wiggle room--to comply. And they did. They did it because they were told to do so by the highest authorities in the land. They did so because--I believe it is possible to say this--there are a lot of big corporations that are very patriotic. Private companies should be allowed to rely on this assertion from these high officials. They should be allowed to do that. Our longstanding legal structure is specifically designed not to force a private company to second guess the Government in these circumstances. I know many colleagues on the other side believe that the President acted with his constitutional authority when he established this program. I believe the legal foundation for this program was questionable at best and was part of an overarching legal framework that sought to dramatically alter the balance of power between the branches of power in favor of the executive. But that is a dispute that needs to be settled between the President, the Congress, and the courts. We should not allow private companies who simply wanted to come to the aid of their country, or were required or compelled to do so, to be caught in the crossfire of this disagreement. A bipartisan consensus of the Intelligence Committee supported the narrowly drawn liability relief included in the bill. We did not include the open-ended immunity sought by the administration that would have prevented suits against the Government, or Government officials who knowingly broke the law. The committee's liability relief provision applies only to companies who may have participated in the warrantless surveillance program after September 11, 2001, until January 2007, when the whole matter was placed under FISA Court authority. That is why there can be no question about prospective; it is retrospective. The question of whether the President had the authority to launch the warrantless surveillance program leads me to the issue of exclusivity. This is whether FISA is the exclusive means by which the President may authorize the surveillance of Americans for foreign intelligence purposes. The President's justification for creating the warrantless surveillance program relied in part on a claim that the legislation authorizing the use of military force after 9/11 somehow gave him the authority to ignore the FISA statute. I don't buy this argument. The President also claims he has the authority, as Commander in Chief, to approve surveillance even when statutes of this coequal branch of Government would prohibit him specifically from so doing. No act of Congress by itself can finally resolve the debate between Presidential and congressional authority. We can make it clear, however, which statutes authorize the use of electronic surveillance. This is not academic. It is important to clarify this point for the future. When the Nation next faces a military emergency, we don't want Congress to hesitate while it debates whether its authorization to use force will have unintended consequences, such as authorizing the President to spy on Americans. To avoid this situation, both the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees included provisions intended to clarify which statutes constitute the exclusive means for conducting electronic surveillance. I have worked with Senator Feinstein, who serves on both committees, and Senator Leahy on an amendment that will bridge the differences between the two bills and will settle this issue in a way that I think clarifies the statute. Another important provision is the sunset. This bill provides a significant new authority, and it is essential--because it is a significant new authority in what is still emerging in the collection of intelligence--that we carefully monitor the implementation of this authority and revisit it to ensure it is working as we now envision. The Intelligence Committee bill includes a 6-year sunset. The Judiciary Committee has a 4-year sunset. I will join with Senator Cardin and others in support of an amendment to incorporate the Judiciary Committee 4-year sunset into the underlying bill. Four years will ensure that the decision on permanency is made during the next Presidential term. As we proceed with this debate, every Member should have the same two goals we had in the Intelligence Committee: providing our intelligence professionals with the tools they need to keep us safe, and establishing a system with sufficient safeguards to ensure that Americans' civil liberties are protected over the long term. I think the Intelligence Committee bill does that, and with a few changes it will be even stronger. I yield the floor.", u"I just want to pick up in the timeline where you left off, because then Attorney General Mike Mukasey and the Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, the admiral you referenced, head of our national intelligence wrote: ``Our experience in the past few days, since the expiration of the act, demonstrates that these concerns are neither speculative, nor theoretical. Allowing the act to expire without passing the bipartisan Senate bill has had real and negative consequences for our national security. Indeed, this has led directly to a degraded intelligence capability.'' You know, if he testified to that before the 9/11 Commission or any of these commissions that occurred after 9/11, this House and the Senate would have said, my gosh, we've got to make sure we fix that problem. But for some reason, here we are in 2008 and there are some in the leadership who act like we'll just go about our merry way, everything's fine, there won't be a problem. And hopefully there won't be a problem. But, to me, when the Director of National Intelligence says our intelligence capabilities are degraded, we are losing intelligence-gathering abilities, we are at risk, et cetera, et cetera, it is time to act. Dear Chairman Reyes: The President asked us to respond to your letter of February 14, 2008, concerning the urgent need to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). Your assertion that there is no harm in allowing the temporary authorities provided by the Protect America Act to expire without enacting the Senate's FISA reform bill is inaccurate and based on a number of misunderstandings concerning our intelligence capabilities. We address those misunderstandings below. We hope that you find this letter helpful and that you will reconsider your opposition to the bill passed last week by a strong bipartisan majority in the Senate and, when Congress returns from its recess, support immediately bringing the Senate bill to the floor, where it enjoys the support of a majority of your fellow members. It is critical to our national security that Congress acts as soon as possible to pass the Senate bill. intelligence collection Our experience since Congress allowed the Protect America Act to expire without passing the bipartisan Senate bill demonstrates why the Nation is now more vulnerable to terrorist attack and other foreign threats. In our letter to Senator Reid on February 5, 2008, we explained that: ``the expiration of the authorities in the Protect America Act would plunge critical intelligence programs into a state of uncertainty which could cause us to delay the gathering of, or simply miss, critical foreign intelligence information.'' That is exactly what has happened since the Protect America Act expired six days ago without enactment of the bipartisan Senate bill. We have lost intelligence information this past week as a direct result of the uncertainty created by Congress's failure to act. Because of this uncertainty, some partners have reduced cooperation. In particular, they have delayed or refused compliance with our requests to initiate new surveillances of terrorist and other foreign intelligence targets under existing directives issued pursuant to the Protect America Act. Although most partners intend to cooperate for the time being, they have expressed deep misgivings about doing so in light of the uncertainty and have indicated that they may well cease to cooperate if the uncertainty persists. We are working to mitigate these problems and are hopeful that our efforts will be successful. Nevertheless, the broader uncertainty caused by the Act's expiration will persist unless and until the bipartisan Senate bill is passed. This uncertainty may well continue to cause us to miss information that we otherwise would be collecting. Thus, although it is correct that we can continue to conduct certain activities authorized by the Protect America Act for a period of one year from the time they were first authorized, the Act's expiration has and may well continue to adversely affect such activities. Any adverse effects will result in a weakening of critical tools necessary to protect the Nation. As we explained in our letter to Senator Reid, expiration would create uncertainty concerning: The ability to modify certifications and procedures issued under the Protect America Act to reflect operational needs and the implementation of procedures to ensure that agencies are fully integrated protecting the Nation; the continuing validity of liability protection for those who assist us according to the procedures under the Protect America Act; the continuing validity of the judicial mechanism for compelling the assistance of private parties needed to protect our national security; the ability to cover intelligence gaps created by new communication paths or technologies. Our experience in the past few days since the expiration of the Act demonstrates that these concerns are neither speculative nor theoretical: allowing the Act to expire without passing the bipartisan Senate bill has had real and negative consequences for our national security. Indeed, this has led directly to a degraded intelligence capability. It is imperative that our intelligence agencies retain the tools they need to collect vital intelligence information. As we have explained before, the core authorities provided by the Protect America Act have helped us to obtain exactly the type of information we need to keep America safe, and it is essential that Congress reauthorize the Act's core authorities while also extending liability protection to those companies who assisted our Nation following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Using the authorities provided in the Protect America Act, we have obtained information about efforts of an individual to become a suicide operative, efforts by terrorists to obtain guns and ammunition, and terrorists transferring money. Other information obtained using the authorities provided by the Protect America Act has led to the disruption of planned terrorist attacks. The bipartisan Senate bill would preserve these core authorities and improve on the Protect America Act in certain critical ways, including by providing liability protection to companies that assisted in defending the country after September 11. In your letter, you assert that the Intelligence Community's ability to protect the Nation has not been weakened, because the Intelligence Community continues to have the ability to conduct surveillance abroad in accordance with Executive Order 12333. We respectfully disagree. Surveillance conducted under Executive Order 12333 in a manner that does not implicate FISA or the Protect America Act is not always as effective, efficient, or safe for our intelligence professionals as acquisitions conducted under the Protect America Act. And, in any event, surveillance under the Protect America Act served as an essential adjunct to our other intelligence tools. This is particularly true in light of the changes since 1978 in the manner in which communications are transmitted. As a result of these changes, the Government often has been required to obtain a FISA Court order prior to surveillance of foreign terrorists and other national security threats located outside the United States. This hampered our intelligence collection targeting these individuals overseas in a way that Congress never intended, and it is what led to the dangerous intelligence gaps last summer. Congress addressed this issue temporarily by passing the Protect America Act but long-term FISA reform is critical to the national security. We have provided Congress with examples in which difficulties with collections under the Executive Order resulted in the Intelligence Community missing crucial information. For instance, one of the September 11th hijackers communicated with a known overseas terrorist facility while he was living in the United States. Because that collection was conducted under Executive Order 12333, the Intelligence Community could not identify the domestic end of the communication prior to September 11, 2001, when it could have stopped that attack. The failure to collect such communications was one of the central criticisms of the Congressional Joint Inquiry that looked into intelligence failures associated with the attacks of September 11. The bipartisan bill passed by the Senate would address such flaws in our capabilities that existed before the enactment of the Protect America Act and that are now resurfacing. We have provided Congress with additional and detailed examples of how the Protect America Act temporarily fixed this problem and have demonstrated the operational need to provide a long- term legislative foundation for these authorities by passing the bipartisan Senate bill. In your letter, you also posit that our intelligence capabilities have not been weakened, because the Government can employ the outdated provisions of FISA as they existed before the Protect America Act. We respectfully disagree. It was that very framework that created dangerous intelligence gaps in the past and that led Congress to pass the Protect America Act last summer. As we have explained in letters, briefings and hearings, FISA's requirements, unlike those of the Protect America Act and the bipartisan Senate bill, impair our ability to collect information on foreign intelligence targets located overseas. Most importantly, FISA was designed to govern foreign intelligence surveillance of persons in the United States and therefore requires a showing of ``probable cause'' before such surveillance can begin. This standard makes sense in the context of targeting persons in the United States for surveillance, where the Fourth Amendment itself often requires probable cause and where the civil liberties of Americans are most implicated. But it makes no sense to require a showing of probable cause for surveillance of overseas foreign targets who are not entitled to the Fourth Amendment protections guaranteed by our Constitution. Put simply, imposing this requirement in the context of surveillance of foreign targets located overseas results in the loss of potentially vital intelligence by, for example, delaying intelligence collection and thereby losing some intelligence forever. In addition, the requirement to make such a showing requires us to divert our linguists and analysts covering al-Qa'ida and other foreign threats from their core role--protecting the Nation--to the task of providing detailed facts for FISA Court applications related to surveillance of such foreign targets. Our intelligence professionals need to be able to obtain foreign intelligence from foreign targets with speed and agility. If we revert to a legal framework in which the Intelligence Community needs to make probable cause showings for foreign terrorists and other national security threats located overseas, we are certain to experience more intelligence gaps and miss collecting information. You imply that the emergency authorization process under FISA is an adequate substitute for the legislative authorities that have lapsed. This assertion reflects a basic misunderstanding about FISA's emergency authorization provisions. Specifically, you assert that the National Security Agency (NSA) or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ``may begin surveillance immediately'' in an emergency situation. FISA requires far more, and it would be illegal to proceed as you suggest. Before surveillance begins the Attorney General must determine that there is probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that FISA's other requirements are met. As explained above, the process of compiling the facts necessary for such a determination and preparing applications for emergency authorizations takes time and results in delays. Again, it makes no sense to impose this requirement in the context of foreign intelligence surveillance of targets located overseas. Because of the hurdles under FISA's emergency authorization provisions and the requirement to go to the FISA Court within 72 hours, our resource constraints limit our use of emergency authorizations to certain high-priority circumstances and cannot simply be employed for every foreign intelligence target. It is also inaccurate to state that because Congress has amended FISA several times, there is no need to modernize FISA. This statement runs counter to the very basis for Congress's passage last August of the Protect America Act. It was not until the passage of this Act that Congress amended those provisions of FISA that had become outdated due to the communications revolution we have experienced since 1978. As we explained, those outdated provisions resulted in dangerous intelligence gaps by causing constitutional protections to be extended to foreign terrorists overseas. It is critical that Congress enact long-term FISA modernization to ensure that the Intelligence Community can collect effectively the foreign intelligence information it needs to protect the Nation. The bill passed by the Senate would achieve this goal, while safeguarding the privacy interests of Americans.", u"Mr. President, I have been listening to the discussion this afternoon, which is a repeat of a discussion we have heard often in this Chamber: Who supports our troops; who waves the white flag of surrender. You know, in the discussion in this Chamber and out on the Presidential trail, we hear all of those terms, and who is willing to stick with it and defeat the terrorists with respect to the war on terror. Well, let me, if I might, suggest there is a smart way and a tough way to deal with terrorists, and we are not doing it very effectively, in my judgment. I want to review for a moment, because we have people coming to the floor who forget to review where we are, and where we have been, especially. In 2001, on September 11, terrorists attacked our country. Following the attack that killed thousands of innocent Americans--the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a farm field in Pennsylvania--following that attack, Osama bin Laden and the leadership of al-Qaida boasted that they engineered the attack against the American people. They boasted they engineered the attack against the American people. So the President says: We are going to have an effort to bring to justice the terrorists. Well, it is now 2008. That was 2001. In 2008, our National Intelligence Estimate, released about 4 months ago, said the greatest terrorist threat to our country, to our homeland, is the al-Qaida organization and its leadership, who are now plotting additional attacks against our country. Our National Intelligence Estimate says the greatest terrorist threat to our country, 7 years after 9/11, is the al-Qaida leadership, because they are planning new attacks. They have reconstituted in a safe and secure hideaway in northern Pakistan. Those are the words of our National Intelligence Estimate, not my words--safe, secure. Iraq leadership, Osama bin Laden, still alive 7 years later and creating new training camps, training new terrorists. So how effective has the war on terror been when the greatest terrorist threat to our country 7 years after the 9/11 attack, the greatest terrorist threat is now building and reconstituting in northern Pakistan? It is reasonable to ask the question: Who took their eye off the ball? Why has this country, why has our policy not been a policy to bring to justice Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida leadership? Instead, 7 years later, we are mired down in a war in Iraq, we have spent nearly two-thirds of $1 trillion dollars, thousands of American soldiers have died, and we have people asking us about who waves the white flag of surrender and who supports our soldiers. That is unbelievable to me. Let me review a bit. Following 9/11, we had top secret briefings for Senators and Congressmen--top secret briefings conducted by the head of the CIA. The Vice President was involved, the head of the National Security Agency, Condoleezza Rice, was involved. We went to those top secret briefings. All of us did. We were told things in top secret, shown classified materials, about what was happening in Iraq. It turns out that was a foundation for the invasion of Iraq. In fact, it was presented at the United Nations by Secretary of State Colin Powell. It turns out most of it was false; wrong on its face. Let me review it for a moment--the issue of mobile chemical weapons laboratories in Iraq that threatens our country. Mobile chemical weapons laboratories in Iraq. You know where that came from? We now know it came from a single source, through our intelligence organizations to the American people, to Congress, in top secret briefings, to the world at the United Nations, a single source: A fellow who used to drive a taxicab in Baghdad nicknamed ``Curveball'' and widely considered by German authorities as a drunk and a fabricator. A single source named Curveball gave this administration the ability to, in top secret briefings, tell us that Iraq had mobile chemical weapons laboratories and gave then-Secretary of State Colin Powell the opportunity to tell the world that Iraq had mobile chemical weapons laboratories. Turns out it wasn't true. Will Rogers once said: It is not what he says he knows that bothers me, it's what he says he knows for sure that just ain't so. Curveball. One single source this administration used to tell us that mobile chemical weapons laboratories in Iraq threatened this country, and it turns out to have been false, and they should have known it. And some may have known it, as it was described to us. The aluminum tubes. The aluminum tubes for the reconstitution of a nuclear capability in Iraq. Now, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, then National Security Adviser, even used the term the specter or the threat of a nuclear--or I guess she said mushroom cloud on television. The mushroom cloud. Well, it turns out her office had the information that a substantial portion of the Government didn't believe the nuclear tubes that were ordered by the Iraqis were for the purpose of reconstituting a nuclear capability. Most of that was discredited. The information in the National Security Adviser's office existed to say that there were very qualified people in this Government who didn't believe that. It turns out none of that was true. The aluminum tube issue was not true. Those who were telling the world, and in top secret briefings telling Members of Congress about the threat of the nuclear tubes for the reconstitution of nuclear capability, had information in their possession and knew better. Yellowcake from Niger is another big deal that made it into the President's address to the Congress in the State of the Union. It turns out that was based on falsified documents. It is unbelievable. Maybe we should review the facts a bit. All of this information turns out to have been false--the information that represented the foundation on which the administration made the case about the need to invade Iraq. Well, this country invaded Iraq and had no plans, once the invasion was complete and the military takeover was complete, on how to deal with Iraq at that point, and it turned into a civil war. Saddam Hussein, following that invasion, was captured and executed. He was hung by his neck until dead. He doesn't exist anymore. The Iraqi people then voted for a new constitution, and then the Iraqi people voted to constitute a new government. So Saddam Hussein was killed, executed, a brutal dictator was executed by the Iraqi people. They got a new Constitution, they got a new Government, and then this country, in the context of spending almost two-thirds of a trillion dollars, this country spent $16 billion training 350,000 able-bodied Iraqis to be policemen and firefighters and safety personnel and soldiers. We trained an array of people in Iraq for security; $16 billion training 350,000 Iraqis, principally for security, police, and soldier duty. Now, if the able-bodied people in Iraq who have been trained by this country are not willing and cannot and will not provide security in their country, our soldiers cannot stay there forever and do it. We cannot. It is interesting to me, and very disappointing to me, that the President decided: we are going to invade Iraq, but we are not going to pay for it. Every single penny we are going to borrow. So we are going to send soldiers to Iraq and send the bill to the debt. When the soldiers come back, they can pay the debt. As I said earlier, it is two-thirds of a trillion dollars now in Iraq and Afghanistan, all of it emergency, none of it paid for. In my judgment, that is exactly the wrong thing to have done. We should have been saying: Yes, we will ask soldiers to sacrifice. If that is what we ask our soldiers to do, we will ask the American people to reach a similar sacrifice. But this President would not do that. So we come now to a position where we have been in Iraq longer than we were engaged in the Second World War and we have folks who come to the Senate Chamber and we have folks out on the campaign trail saying: Who is going to wave the white flag of surrender? Some say we are going to stay in Iraq forever, 100 years. Others look at a Taj Mahal that has been built in Iraq, nearly $800 million for an embassy in Iraq, the largest embassy in the world by far, and they think they know, as a result of that, how long some intend for us to stay in Iraq. But we cannot do that. Let me mention one other addition. On top of all the things I have described--basically the false foundation of information on which this country made a decision to go to war--on top of all that, with this money we have spent, there has been the greatest amount of waste, fraud, and abuse in the history of this country and nobody seems to care very much. Let me tell a couple stories: $85,000 trucks on the side of the road in Iraq, because they had a flat tire and no wrench to fix it, so they torched it, burned it. It does not matter, the American taxpayer is paying for it because big companies got sweetheart, no-bid, cost-plus contracts. Got a flat tire, torch the truck. Got a plugged fuel pump, it does not matter, torch the truck. I mean, the stories are unbelievable. You got two builders to provide ice. The Haliburton Company is going to select between two bidders to provide ice. One is seven times more than the other bid. Well, pick the contract that costs seven times more than the other because the taxpayer is picking up the tab. They buy little hand towels for the troops, because Haliburton has to do that. Well, they do not want to buy ordinary hand towels for the troops, they want their logo embroidered on the hand towels, KBR, the subsidiary, Kellogg Brown and Root. Well, that is going to increase the cost of the hand towels triple, quadruple. It does not matter; the taxpayer is going to pay the bill. Do you want to know where there are 50,000 pounds of nails, 25 tons of nails? They are on the sands in Iraq. They ordered them. They were too short. What do you do with 50,000 pounds of nails that are too short? You throw them away because the taxpayer is going to pick it up. You just order the right size. This is the most unbelievable story that is yet to be told about the greatest waste, fraud, and abuse in the history of this country. There is a lot to talk about. We are going to have a hearing in the Senate Appropriations Committee. I have held 12 hearings in the policy committee on these issues. We are going to hold more. I have to run to a meeting. But I did want to come and talk a bit. I did not have the opportunity to describe who is it that is supporting America's soldiers and what is it that does support our fighting men and women? We send them off to war. There is going to be a Medal of Honor, by the way, awarded next Monday at 2:30 in the White House to a man who died 26 years ago, a Sioux Indian named Woody Keeble. I hope perhaps to come over tomorrow and tell the story of Woody Keeble. There are soldiers who have given so much for this country. Woody Keeble had 85 pieces of lead in his body when he finished what he did. He was still alive. But these folks then go to war and do what they do and come back home. And then the question is: Who stands up for our soldiers? Who stands up for our veterans? Who is willing to stand here and say we will keep our promise for veterans health care? Who does that? There is a lot to say. I regret I have a commitment that I have to be at in the majority leader's office, but I would like tomorrow to come back and speak at greater length about a remarkable American who on Monday will be recognized by President Bush, a North Dakotan from Wahpeton, ND, Standing Rock, the Wahpeton-Sisseton Sioux Tribe. He will be recognized as the first Sioux Indian in this country's history to receive the Medal of Honor. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise to urge that we defeat the previous question so we can adopt the Protect America Act. People in this country think that Washington, D.C., is broken, and they are absolutely right. It is. And this issue is proof positive of why Washington, D.C., is broken. Yes, we do have an agreement. It is a bipartisan agreement, 68 votes in the Senate. There is a majority here, but the majority leadership won't allow us to consider this very important and necessary legislation. Senator Rockefeller, the Democratic chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the Senate, has said our intelligence capacities are being degraded because we have failed to pass the Protect America Act. You know, it is time that we put the national interest ahead of the special interests. Why are we protecting the most litigious among us in our society at the expense of our troops serving overseas? We know the issues. It is retroactive immunity. The telecommunications companies were attempting to help us in good faith, and no good deed goes unpunished. That is what it happening here. It is time to get the job done. I'm going to refer to an article I read in the Wall Street Journal back in January, 2006, by Debra Burlingame, the sister of the pilot who crashed into the Pentagon. The title is, ``Al Qaeda, not the FBI, is the greater threat to America.'' I think we should heed her advice and recall, because of that wall that existed before 9/11 between the intelligence agency and our domestic law enforcement, it prevented us from being more effective. Today, we are placing barriers between our government and those who want to help us in the telecommunications sector, but they are going to be forced to comply with this. They will not be able to do so voluntarily. We know what the issue is. The Fraternal Order of Police, many State attorneys general, the VFW, all agree we should pass the bipartisan. We have it within our means to do it. I don't understand why not. It is important for the majority leadership to explain to this House why they won't let this bipartisan agreement be adopted. The American people are watching. They want us to get the job done. They have had enough. Mr. Speaker, I include the Burlingame article for the Record. One of the most excruciating images of the September 11 attacks is the sight of a man who was trapped in one of the World Trade Center towers. Stripped of his suit jacket and tie and hanging on to what appears to be his office curtains, he is seen trying to lower himself outside a window to the floor immediately below. Frantically kicking his legs in an effort to find a purchase, he loses his grip, and falls. That horrific scene and thousands more were the images that awakened a sleeping nation on that long, brutal morning. Instead of overwhelming fear or paralyzing self-doubt, the attacks were met with defiance, unity and a sense of moral purpose. Following the heroic example of ordinary citizens who put their fellow human beings and the public good ahead of themselves, the country's leaders cast aside politics and personal ambition and enacted the USA Patriot Act just 45 days later. A mere four-and-a-half years after victims were forced to choose between being burned alive and jumping from 90 stories, it is frankly shocking that there is anyone in Washington who would politicize the Patriot Act. It is an insult to those who died to tell the American people that the organization posing the greatest threat to their liberty is not al Qaeda but the FBI. Hearing any member of Congress actually crow about ``killing'' or ``playing chicken'' with this critical legislation is as disturbing today as it would have been when Ground Zero was still smoldering. Today we know in far greater detail what not having it cost us. Critics contend that the Patriot Act was rushed into law in a moment of panic. The truth is, the policies and guidelines it corrected had a long, troubled history and everybody who had to deal with them knew it. The ``wall'' was a tortuous set of rules promulgated by Justice Department lawyers in 1995 and imagined into law by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court. Conceived as an added protection for civil liberties provisions already built into the statute, it was the wall and its real-world ramifications that hardened the failure- to-share culture between agencies, allowing early information about 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi to fall through the cracks. More perversely, even after the significance of these terrorists and their presence in the country was known by the FBI's intelligence division, the wall prevented it from talking to its own criminal division in order to hunt them down. Furthermore, it was the impenetrable FISA guidelines and fear of provoking the FISA court's wrath if they were transgressed that discouraged risk-averse FBI supervisors from applying for a FISA search warrant in the Zacarias Moussaoui case. The search, finally conducted on the afternoon of 9/11, produced names and phone numbers of people in the thick of the 9/11 plot, so many fertile clues that investigators believe that at least one airplane, if not all four, could have been saved. In 2002, FISA's appellate level Court of Review examined the entire statutory scheme for issuing warrants in national security investigations and declared the ``wall'' a nonsensical piece of legal overkill, based neither on express statutory language nor reasonable interpretation of the FISA statute. The lower court's attempt to micromanage the execution of national security warrants was deemed an assertion of authority which neither Congress or the Constitution granted it. In other words, those lawyers and judges who created, implemented and so assiduously enforced the FISA guidelines were wrong and the American people paid dearly for it. Despite this history, some members of Congress contend that this process-heavy court is agile enough to rule on quickly needed National Security Agency (NSA) electronic surveillance warrants. This is a dubious claim. Getting a FISA warrant requires a multistep review involving several lawyers at different offices within the Department of Justice. It can take days, weeks, even months if there is a legal dispute between the principals. ``Emergency'' 72-hour intercepts require sign-offs by NSA lawyers and pre-approval by the attorney general before surveillance can be initiated. Clearly, this is not conducive to what Gen. Michael Hayden, principal deputy director of national intelligence, calls ``hot pursuit'' of al Qaeda conversations. The Senate will soon convene hearings on renewal of the Patriot Act and the NSA terrorist surveillance program. A minority of senators want to gamble with American lives and ``fix'' national security laws, which they can't show are broken. They seek to eliminate or weaken anti-terrorism measures which take into account that the Cold War and its slow-moving, analog world of landlines and stationary targets is gone. The threat we face today is a completely new paradigm of global terrorist networks operating in a high- velocity digital age using the Web and fiber-optic technology. After four-and-a-half years without another terrorist attack, these senators think we're safe enough to cave in to the same civil liberties lobby that supported that deadly FISA wall in the first place. What if they, like those lawyers and judges, are simply wrong? Meanwhile, the media, mouthing phrases like ``Article II authority,'' ``separation of powers'' and ``right to privacy,'' are presenting the issues as if politics have nothing to do with what is driving the subject matter and its coverage. They want us to forget four years of relentless ``connect-the-dots'' reporting about the missed chances that ``could have prevented 9/11.'' They have discounted the relevance of references to the two 9/11 hijackers who lived in San Diego. But not too long ago, the media itself reported that phone records revealed that five or six of the hijackers made extensive calls overseas. NBC News aired an ``exclusive'' story in 2004 that dramatically recounted how al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, the San Diego terrorists who would later hijack American Airlines flight 77 and fly it into the Pentagon, received more than a dozen calls from an al Qaeda ``switchboard'' inside Yemen where al-Mihdhar's brother-in-law lived. The house received calls from Osama Bin Laden and relayed them to operatives around the world. Senior correspondent Lisa Myers told the shocking story of how, ``The NSA had the actual phone number in the United States that the switchboard was calling, but didn't deploy that equipment, fearing it would be accused of domestic spying.'' Back then, the NBC script didn't describe it as ``spying on Americans.'' Instead, it was called one of the ``missed opportunities that could have saved 3,000 lives.'' Another example of opportunistic coverage concerns the Patriot Act's ``library provision.'' News reports have given plenty of ink and airtime to the ACLU's unsupported claims that the government has abused this important records provision. But how many Americans know that several of the hijackers repeatedly accessed computers at public libraries in New Jersey and Florida, using personal Internet accounts to carry out the conspiracy? Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi logged on four times at a college library in New Jersey where they purchased airline tickets for AA 77 and later confirmed their reservations on Aug. 30. In light of this, it is ridiculous to suggest that the Justice Department has the time, resources or interest in ``investigating the reading habits of law abiding citizens.'' We now have the ability to put remote control cameras on the surface of Mars. Why should we allow enemies to annihilate us simply because we lack the clarity or resolve to strike a reasonable balance between a healthy skepticism of government power and the need to take proactive measures to protect ourselves from such threats? The mantra of civil- liberties hard-liners is to ``question authority''--even when it is coming to our rescue--then blame that same authority when, hamstrung by civil liberties laws, it fails to save us. The old laws that would prevent FBI agents from stopping the next al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were built on the bedrock of a 35-year history of dark, defeating mistrust. More Americans should not die because the peace-at-any-cost fringe and antigovernment paranoids still fighting the ghost of Nixon hate George Bush more than they fear al Qaeda. Ask the American people what they want. They will say that they want the commander in chief to use all reasonable means to catch the people who are trying to rain terror on our cities. Those who cite the soaring principle of individual liberty do not appear to appreciate that our enemies are not seeking to destroy individuals, but whole populations. Three weeks before 9/11, an FBI agent with the bin Laden case squad in New York learned that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were in this country. He pleaded with the national security gatekeepers in Washington to launch a nationwide manhunt and was summarily told to stand down. When the FISA Court of Review tore down the wall in 2002, it included in its ruling the agent's Aug. 29, 2001, email to FBI headquarters: ``Whatever has happened to this--someday someone will die-- and wall or not--the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain problems. Let's hope the National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, [bin Laden], is getting the most `protection.' '' The public has listened to years of stinging revelations detailing how the government tied its own--hands in stopping the devastating attacks of September 11. It is an irresponsible violation of the public trust for members of Congress to weaken the Patriot Act or jeopardize the NSA terrorist surveillance program because of the same illusory theories that cost us so dearly before, or worse, for rank partisan advantage. If they do, and our country sustains yet another catastrophic attack that these antiterrorism tools could have prevented, the phrase ``connect the dots'' will resonate again--but this time it will refer to the trail of innocent American blood which leads directly to the Senate floor.", u"Having heard all of the answers to all of the questions that have been raised by the opposition, knowing that full justice, civil liberties and the protection is in this bill, I rise in support of the underlying bill. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3773, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This body has worked diligently with our colleagues in the Senate to ensure that the civil liberties of American citizens are appropriately addressed. We have worked to not simply reconcile the Senate language with the RESTORE Act (H.R. 3773) which we passed in the House on November 15, 2007, but to go beyond the RESTORE Act as part of FISA Reform legislation by: Adopting provisions from the Senate bill that will for the first time provide statutory protections for U.S. persons overseas, that ensures surveillance of their communications are conducted through the courts; and Providing a mechanism for telecommunications carriers to prove their case that they did not engage in any wrongdoing and to guarantee due process with a fair hearing in court. Like the RESTORE Act, the FISA reform legislation provides for collection against terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, while providing prior court approval of acquisition and an on-going process of review and oversight in order to protect Americans' privacy. The revised House bill creates a bipartisan commission on Warrantless Electronic Surveillance Activities with strong investigatory powers in order to preserve the rule of law in pending and future lawsuits. This revised version of the bill continues to reiterate FISA's exclusive control for conducting foreign intelligence surveillance, and requires explicit statutory authorization for any means outside of FISA. This is an area where the House version has differed from the Senate. Homeland security is not a Democratic or a Republican issue, it is not a House or Senate issue; it is an issue for all Americans--all of us need to be secure in our homes, secure in our thoughts, and secure in our communications. I find it disturbing that our Republican colleagues will not join us to ensure that Americans are safe here and abroad. Disturbing that they do not recognize that we must protect the civil liberties of this nation just as we protect American lives. Mr. Speaker, in August of this year, I strongly opposed S. 1927, the so-called ``Protect America Act'' (PAA) when it came to a vote on the House floor. Had the Bush Administration and the Republican-dominated 109th Congress acted more responsibly in the two preceding years, we would not have been in the position of debating legislation that had such a profoundly negative impact on the national security and on American values and civil liberties in the crush of exigent circumstances. As that regrettable episode clearly showed, it is true as the saying goes that haste makes waste. The PAA was stampeded through the Congress in the midnight hour of the last day before the long August recess on the dubious claim that it was necessary to fill a gap in the nation's intelligence gathering capabilities identified by Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell. In reality it would have eviscerated the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution and represented an unwarranted transfer of power from the courts to the Executive Branch and a Justice Department led at that time by an Attorney General whose reputation for candor and integrity was, to put it charitably, subject to considerable doubt. Under the House bill, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FISC is indispensable and is accorded a meaningful role in ensuring compliance with the law. The bill ensures that the FISC is empowered to act as an Article III court should act, which means the court shall operate neither as a rubber-stamp nor a bottleneck. Rather, the function of the court is to validate the lawful exercise of executive power on the one hand, and to act as the guardian of individual rights and liberties on the other. Moreover, Mr. Speaker, it is important to point out that the loudest demands for blanket immunity did not come from the telecommunications companies but from the administration, which raises the interesting question of whether the administration's real motivation is to shield from public disclosure the ways and means by which government officials may have ``persuaded'' telecommunications companies to assist in its warrantless surveillance programs. I call my colleagues' attention to an article published in the Washington Post in which it is reported that Joseph Nacchio, the former CEO of Qwest, alleges that his company was denied NSA contracts after he declined in a February 27, 2001 meeting at Fort Meade with National Security Agency, NSA, representatives to give the NSA customer calling records. To give a detailed illustration of just how superior the RESTORE Act is to the ill-considered and hastily enacted Protect America Act, I wish to take a few moments to discuss an important improvement in the bill that was adopted in the full Judiciary Committee markup. My amendment, which was added during the markup, made a constructive contribution to the RESTORE Act by laying down a clear, objective criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce in preventing reverse targeting. ``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the Government targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to collect information on certain U.S. persons. One of the major concerns that libertarians and classical conservatives, as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, have with the PAA is that the understandable temptation of national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards in the PAA to prevent it. My amendment reduces even further any such temptation to resort to reverse targeting by requiring the administration to obtain a regular, individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the surveillance is a person in the United States. The amendment achieves this objective by requiring the administration to obtain a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person reasonably believed to be located in the United States.'' The current language in the bill provides that a warrant be obtained only when the Government ``seeks to conduct electronic surveillance'' of a person reasonably believed to be located in the United States. It was far from clear how the operative language ``seeks to'' is to be interpreted. In contrast, the language used in my amendment, ``significant purpose,'' is a term of art that has long been a staple of FISA jurisprudence and thus is well known and readily applied by the agencies, legal practitioners, and the FISA Court. Thus, the Jackson Lee Amendment provides a clearer, more objective, criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce to prevent the practice of reverse targeting without a warrant, which all of us can agree should not be permitted. Mr. Speaker, nothing in the Act or the amendments to the Act should require the Government to obtain a FISA order for every overseas target on the off chance that they might pick up a call into or from the United States. Rather, what should be required, is a FISA order only where there is a particular, known person in the United States at the other end of the foreign target's calls in whom the Government has a significant interest such that a significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire that person's communications. This will usually happen over time and the Government will have the time to get an order while continuing its surveillance. It is the national security interest to require it to obtain an order at that point, so that it can lawfully acquire all of the target person's communications rather than continuing to listen to only some of them. It is very important to me, and it should be very important to Members of this body that we require what should be required in all cases--a warrant anytime there is surveillance of a United States citizen. In short, the Senate amendment to the House version makes a good bill even better. For this reason alone, civil libertarians should enthusiastically embrace H.R. 3773. Nearly two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville, who remains the most astute student of American democracy, observed that the reason democracies invariably prevail in any martial conflict is because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that are indispensable to martial success: initiative, innovation, resourcefulness, and courage. As I wrote in the Politico, ``the best way to win the war on terror is to remain true to our democratic traditions. If it retains its democratic character, no nation and no loose confederation of international villains will defeat the United States in the pursuit of its vital interests.'' Thus, the way forward to victory in the war on terror is for the United States country to redouble its commitment to the Bill of Rights and the democratic values which every American will risk his or her life to defend. It is only by preserving our attachment to these cherished values that America will remain forever the home of the free, the land of the brave, and the country we love. Mr. Speaker, FISA has served the Nation well for nearly 30 years, placing electronic surveillance inside the United States for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes on a sound legal footing, and I am far from persuaded that it needs to be jettisoned. However, I know that FISA as it is run currently attempts to circumvent the Bill of Rights and the civil liberties of the American people. I continue to insist upon individual warrants, based on probable cause, when surveillance is directed at people in the United States. The Attorney General must still be required to submit procedures for international surveillance to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for approval, but the FISA Court should not be allowed to issue a ``basket warrant'' without making individual determinations about foreign surveillance. In all candor, Mr. Speaker, I must restate my firm conviction that when it comes to the track record of this President's warrantless surveillance programs, there is still not enough on the public record about the nature and effectiveness of those programs, or the trustworthiness of this administration, to indicate that they require a blank check from Congress. The Bush administration did not comply with its legal obligation under the National Security Act of 1947 to keep the Intelligence Committees ``fully and currently informed'' of U.S. intelligence activities. Congress cannot continue to rely on incomplete information from the Bush administration or revelations in the media. It must conduct a full and complete inquiry into electronic surveillance in the United States and related domestic activities of the NSA, both those that occur within FISA and those that occur outside FISA. The inquiry must not be limited to the legal questions. It must include the operational details of each program of intelligence surveillance within the United States, including: (1) who the NSA is targeting; (2) how it identifies its targets; (3) the information the program collects and disseminates; and most important, (4) whether the program advances national security interests without unduly compromising the privacy rights of the American people. Given the unprecedented amount of information Americans now transmit electronically and the post-9/11 loosening of regulations governing information sharing, the risk of intercepting and disseminating the communications of ordinary Americans is vastly increased, requiring more precise--not looser--standards, closer oversight, new mechanisms for minimization, and limits on retention of inadvertently intercepted communications. Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to join me in a vote of support for the FISA Amendments Act, H.R. 3773, as it seeks to balance our Nation's securities and our civil liberties.", u"Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to final page of this legislation, H.R. 6304, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, FISA, Amendments Act of 2008, if it is not amended to change the retroactive immunity provisions. The President must have the necessary authority to track terrorists, intercept their communications, and disrupt their plots. Our Nation still faces individuals and groups that are determined to do harm to Americans, as well as our interests throughout the world. I have spent many hours at the National Security Agency, which is located in Fort Meade, MD. The men and women of our intelligence agencies are dedicated public servants who are doing a great job on behalf of their country. They are trying to do their jobs correctly, and comply with all applicable laws and regulations. As a member of the Judiciary Committee, I have received classified briefings about the advice and requests that were given to the telecommunications companies by the U.S. Government. I have seen the opinions of counsel on this issue. I have attended numerous hearings on this issue. Congress must indeed make needed changes to FISA to account for changes in technology and rulings from the FISA Court involving purely international communications that pass through telecommunications routes in the United States. While we have a solemn obligation to protect the American people, we must simultaneously uphold the Constitution and protect our civil liberties. After learning about executive branch abuses in the 1960s and 1970s, Congress passed very specific laws which authorize electronic surveillance. Congress has regularly updated these measures over the years to provide the executive branch the tools it needs to investigate terrorists, while preserving essential oversight mechanisms for the courts and the Congress. FISA requires the Government to seek an order or warrant from the FISA Court before conducting electronic surveillance that may involve U.S. persons. The act also provides for postsurveillance notice to the FISA Court by the Attorney General in an emergency. I am very concerned that the FISA law was disregarded by the administration, and want to ensure that we put an end to this type of abuse. We are a nation of laws and no one is above the law, including the President and Attorney General. The President deliberately bypassed the FISA Court for years with his warrantless wiretapping program--long after any emergency period directly following the 9/11 terrorist attacks--and did not ask Congress to change the FISA statute. In fact, President Bush refused to fully brief Congress on the Terrorist Surveillance Program, TSP, the existence of which was only exposed through a New York Times story. After the story broke, the administration reluctantly agreed to place this program under the supervision of the FISA Court. I do believe that many of the telecommunications companies cooperated with the Government in good faith, and may be entitled to relief. But the FISA statute of 1978 already lays out procedures for the Government to seek a court order and present this order to the telecommunications companies and require their assistance. The 1978 FISA statute also provides certain immunities to telecommunications companies that provide this type of assistance to the Government. The President chose to ignore the FISA statute. If the President did not want to use the FISA statute or wanted to change it, he had the responsibility to come to Congress and ask for that change. He cannot change the law by fiat, or by issuing a Presidential signing statement. Congress must change the law, and the courts must interpret the law. Congress and the courts have the power, and often the responsibility, to disagree with the President, and these co-equal branches have the constitutional checks to override his veto, disapprove of a request for a warrant, or strike down an action as unconstitutional. I will vote against retroactive immunity for the telecommunications companies. The current bill only authorizes the district court to review whether the companies received written requests from the U.S. Government stating that the activity was authorized by the President and determined to be lawful by the executive branch. The Court would have to simply accept the executive branch's conclusion that the warrantless wiretapping outside of the FISA statute and without FISA Court approval was legal, which means the executive branch--not the judiciary--gets to decide whether the law was broken. I want the courts to be able to look at what the executive branch is doing. I want the court to protect individual rights. Granting this type of immunity would violate the basic separation of powers. It would also create a dangerous precedent for future administrations and private actors to violate the law, and then seek relief in Congress or from the President through an after-the-fact amnesty or pardon. There was a way to provide the telecommunications companies with appropriate relief. Senator Feinstein's amendment would have allowed the courts to grant relief to the telecommunications companies if they acted reasonably under the reasonable assumption that the Government's requests were lawful. This amendment would have preserved the independent judgment of the judiciary, and preserved the necessary check and balance in our system of government. Unfortunately, the negotiators for this legislation rejected this compromise. I also want to note the improvements made to title I of this legislation, compared to current law and the Senate-passed Intelligence Committee version. I thank the Members of the House and Senate who worked hard on improvements to this legislation, particularly House majority leader Steny Hoyer. Title I is not perfect, but it is does bring the President's program under the FISA statute and FISA Court, and provides for oversight by Congress and the courts. Title I contains a sunset of December 2012 for this legislation. I feel strongly that the next administration should be required to come back and justify these new authorities to Congress. As a member of the Judiciary Committee, I believe the only meaningful cooperation we received from the executive branch on this issue occurred when they were facing a sunset and a potential lapsing of their authorities and powers under the statute. Congress will then have time to evaluate how the new law has been implemented, and debate whether further changes are needed. This legislation also requires the inspector general to review compliance with: (1) Targeting and minimization procedures; (2) reverse targeting guidelines; (3) guidelines for dissemination of U.S. person identities; and (4) guidelines for acquisition of targets who turned out to be in the United States. The inspector general review will be provided to the Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence, and the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees of the Senate and House. The public would also be given an unclassified version of these reviews, reports, and recommendations. These reviews will help Congress evaluate the new authorities under the FISA statute, and how the executive branch and the FISA Court are using these new authorities, before the legislation sunsets. Congress can then decide how best to reauthorize this program. The bill strengthens the exclusivity language of FISA and the criminal wiretap laws. Congress is making very clear that these statutes are the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance can be legally conducted by the U.S. Government. The bill also removes a troubling attempt to unduly broaden the definition of ``electronic surveillance.'' Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, in his opinion in the recent Boumediene case on the Guantanamo detainees, stated: ``The laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of the law.'' I believe title I should have been strengthened by more effective court review. However, absent the retroactive immunity provisions in title II, I would support the compromise legislation, because it is important for the intelligence community to have the tools it needs. However, I regret that if the retroactive immunity provision remains unchanged in the final legislation, I will vote against the legislation, because of the fundamental problem with that provision. In conclusion Mr. President, shortly we will be considering the amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the FISA act. I must tell you, I think it is important that our intelligence community have the tools they need to obtain information from foreign sources. That is what this legislation is about. We need to modernize the FISA law. Communication methods have changed, and we need to give the tools to the intelligence community to meet their modern needs of communication. I serve on the Judiciary Committee. I was privy to many hearings we had, some of which were classified, to find out the information as to what we could do. We brought forward legislation that I think was the right legislation that would have given the necessary tools to the intelligence agencies to get information from foreign sources without being burdened by unnecessary court approval and protect the civil liberties of the people of this Nation. Unfortunately, that compromise was rejected. We are in this situation today where we have had major disagreements on how to amend the FISA statutes because of the action of the Bush administration. It is absolutely clear to me that the President went beyond the legal or constitutional authority that he has in doing wiretaps without court approval. I want to make it clear, the men and women who work at our intelligence agencies, many of whom are in Maryland at NSA, are doing a great job. They are trying to do everything that is correct to protect our Nation and do it in the correct manner. It was the Bush administration that went beyond the law. It was the Bush administration that went beyond the Constitution. It is important for us to balance the needs of our community to get information to protect us but also protect the civil liberties with the proper checks and balances in our system. That brings me to H.R. 6304, the legislation that will shortly be before us. Title I is a much better bill than the bill that left the Senate earlier this year. I think this bill has been worked on in a very constructive environment. I compliment not only Senator Rockefeller, who is on the Senate floor, for his hard work on this legislation, I also compliment my colleague from Maryland, Congressman Hoyer, the majority leader of the House of Representatives, for the work he did in bringing us together on a bill that I think is a better bill than the bill that left the Senate. This bill provides for a sunset in 2012. That is important because I find we do not get the attention from the administration on this issue unless they are faced with a deadline from Congress. This will force the next administration to take a look at this legislation and come back to the Congress with modifications or justifications for the continuation of the legislation. I think that is an important improvement. The legislation provides for the inspector general to review the targeting and minimization provisions. The targeting is when a U.S. citizen, perhaps indirectly, is targeted. And the minimization procedures deal with when the intelligence community gets information about an American without court approval, to minimize the use of that information or to seek court approval. Both of those provisions will be reviewed by the inspector general and reports issued back to the Congress with unclassified versions available for public inspection. The FISA Court is strengthened through the compromise that has been reached. Let me make it clear, I would have liked to have seen the Judiciary Committee's bill passed and enacted into law. I think we can still improve title I. But I believe in the legislative process, and I think there has been a fair compromise reached on title I. If title I were before us as an individual action, I would support the compromise because I think it is time to move forward. But there is title II, and title II is the retroactive immunity. It gives retroactive immunity to our telecommunications companies, our telephone companies. They are entitled to some relief. They acted under the urgency of the attacks on our country on September 11 and with the request of the President of the United States. They are entitled for some relief. But this provision goes way too far. It authorizes the executive branch to determine the legality of their actions. In other words, the agency, the President who asked for the information, will determine whether the telephone companies acted properly. It should be the courts. This takes too much away from the judicial branch. It, in my view, compromises the checks and balances that are so important in our constitutional system. We didn't have to be here. I thought Senator Feinstein offered a fair compromise, and I am surprised it was not taken by the negotiators. Senator Feinstein said: Why don't we let the FISA Court make a decision as to whether the telephone companies acted legally? That is a compromise I could have supported. I think it would have been a fair compromise. Unfortunately, that was rejected. Title II is a fundamental flaw in the separation of powers, in the proper protection of civil liberties of the people of this Nation, and a dangerous precedent for future action by this Congress. I will vote to remove or modify title II by the amendments that will be presented later today. I prefer to modify it. As I suggested, I think we have compromises that can work, but I will vote to remove it if there are no other options presented. If we do not modify title II, reluctantly I will not be able to support the compromise legislation that has been presented. I urge my colleagues to try to get this done right. This is an important bill. Unfortunately, it is fatally flawed with the legislation that is before us. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Presiding Officer. I want the distinguished Presiding Officer to know the weather in our home State is much nicer today than it is here. I support the Free Flow of Information Act, S. 2035, which the distinguished majority leader has moved to. I hope the minority will allow us to consider this important legislation. I thank the majority leader for his willingness to bring this legislation before the Senate. I have worked with him on this matter to find an opportunity for Senate action since the Judiciary Committee reported this bill last October. I appreciate the support of the majority leader. He has offered a generous response to the bipartisan request Senator Specter and I made to him and the Republican leader earlier this year to proceed to this bill. In a bipartisan letter, we asked if he would proceed to the bill. He has done that. I applaud him for it. Our bill has 20 Senate cosponsors, Members of both parties. I hope the Republican cosponsors will join us in moving to the bill and will bring along the seven or eight Republicans we will need to overcome yet another filibuster and make progress. I have also supported and urged the Senate to proceed to the strong House-passed version of the Free Flow of Information Act, H.R. 2102. That bill passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 398 to 21--so it obviously has overwhelming bipartisan support. The House bill has more than 70 cosponsors--both Republicans and Democrats alike. Years ago, my mother and father owned a small daily newspaper in Waterbury, VT, the Waterbury Record. As a child, I grew up hearing, at the kitchen table, that a free and vibrant press is essential to a free society. That has been demonstrated again and again over the last eight years. That is why I cosponsored the Senate version of this bill and I have worked hard to enact a meaningful reporters' shield law this year. That is why I made sure that for the first time ever--for the first time ever--the Senate Judiciary Committee reported a media shield law to protect the public's right to know. The Judiciary Committee reported a bill sponsored by Senators Lugar, Dodd, Specter, Schumer, Graham, and myself with a strong bipartisan 15-to-4 vote. I wish to commend the leadership of Senator Lugar and Senator Dodd in connection with this matter. They began this quest for fairness when it seemed an impossibility several years ago. They have worked diligently to bring us to where we are today--at the cusp of achieving a Federal shield law--if only the Senate gets the support of a handful of Republican Senators to proceed to the bill. All of us--whether Republican, Democratic or Independent--have an interest in enacting a balanced and meaningful shield bill to ensure a free flow of information to the American people. Forty-nine States and the District of Columbia currently have codified or common law protections for confidential source information. But even with these State law protections, the press remains the first stop, rather than the stop of last resort, for our Government and private litigants when it comes to seeking information. Time and time again--especially during the years when this Congress refused to do real oversight of the current administration--when there was waste in Government, when there were serious mistakes in Government, even when Government was breaking the law, we found out about it first and foremost because of the press in America. Earlier this year, Toni Locy, a professor of journalism at West Virginia University, also a former USA TODAY reporter, was held in contempt of court for refusing to divulge her confidential sources. There are scores of other reporters who have been questioned by Federal prosecutors about their sources, notes, and reports in recent years. This is a dangerous trend that can have a chilling effect on the press, but even more so, on the public's right to know. If you don't have a free press, then you don't have a free society. If you don't have a way for Americans to know what their Government is doing, then we will all hurt. To paraphrase Mark Twain, you should support your country all the time but question your government when it deserves it. We need a press willing and able to do that. Enacting the Free Flow of Information Act--which carefully balances the need to protect confidential source information with the need to protect law enforcement and national security interests--would help to reverse this troubling trend and benefit all Americans. The bill creates a qualified privilege to protect journalists from being forced to reveal their confidential sources. The bill contains exceptions to the privilege for criminal conduct or national security. The legislation also requires that Federal courts weigh the need for the information with the public's interest in the free flow of information, before compelling reporters to disclose their confidential sources. Although I strongly support the enactment of a Federal shield law, I have some reservations about possible revisions to the bill we passed out of Committee. I am pleased that language has been drafted to address my concerns about making sure that legitimate bloggers and freelance journalists are included in the definition of the persons covered by this bill. However, I hope that any amendments to this legislation will include stronger protections for journalists and their sources with regard to matters of national security and classified information. No one would quibble with the notion that there are circumstances when the Government can and should have the right to compel information in order to keep us safe. But many newsworthy stories concerning national security, such as the exceptional reporting on the CIA's secret prisons and the warrantless--and many feel illegal--wiretapping by the National Security Agency were published with the help of confidential sources, to the great benefit of the general public and the accountability that ordinary Americans deserve from their Government. I fear that proposals from some in this body do not go far enough to protect against Government abuse in this area or to protect the public's interest in the dissemination of newsworthy information. Not all reporters will be as lucky as Bill Gertz of the Washington Times was when a judge recently upheld his claim in a case in a California Federal court. Even with this victory, however, the Government has responded by broadening its inquiries. To prevent further intrusions on our fundamental first amendment rights, we need some uniform standards. We need procedures to evaluate claims of privilege and protect the public's right to know. To do that, of course, the Congress must act. In a much touted speech to the American Enterprise Institute last week, current Attorney General Mukasey, who still opposes a Federal shield law, articulated principles that argue for enacting one. Attorney General Mukasey endorsed congressional legislative action when there exists a ``serious risk of inconsistent rulings and considerable uncertainty.'' He noted that congressional action to provide procedures in national security cases is ``well within the historic role and competence of Congress.'' Although he was proposing action in another setting, the Attorney General's remarks likewise support congressional action to standardize and clarify the procedures governing a Federal statutory press shield law. In view of the disparate rulings and outcomes that have developed in the courts since the Supreme Court's Branzburg decision 36 years ago, it is now time for Congress to establish a framework for the courts to resolve press privilege assertions fairly and consistently, and we can do this while preserving our national security. When he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in favor of the Federal shield law in 2005, William Safire told us that the essence of news gathering is this: If you do not have sources you trust and who trust you, then you don't have a solid story--and the public suffers for it. Well, Bill Safire is exactly right. We simply have no idea how many newsworthy stories have gone unwritten and unreported out of fear that a reporter would be forced to reveal a source or face jail time. We also do not know how many potential whistleblowers, or other confidential sources, have chosen to remain silent out of fear that journalists could be compelled to disclose their identity. Just recently, investigative journalism and confidential sources have helped to uncover significant Government failures in Iraq, in New Orleans, as well as Government neglect at the Walter Reed Medical Center. We wouldn't have found out how poorly the returning soldiers were being treated--people who have lost limbs or have been paralyzed or blinded in the war in Iraq--by the Veterans' Administration and the problems and events at our Government facilities. We would not have found out about that if a confidential source hadn't told a reporter. We have seen just in the past few days news articles about politicization at the Department of Justice. A lot of the spotlight on how politicized this administration's Justice Department has become came out of hearings we held in the Judiciary Committee. But much of what we found out about what was going on at the Justice Department came out of press reports based on confidential sources. We learned from the press that the White House, afraid that they might find out the truth, avoided implementing the Environmental Protection Agency's recommendations on global warming by not opening the agency's e-mails. Again, we find out about that from confidential sources. As a former prosecutor, I understand the importance of making sure that the Government can effectively investigate criminal wrongdoing, combat terrorism, and preserve national security. The Federal shield legislation we are seeking to bring before the Senate strikes a balance among these important objectives. The bill addresses the legitimate need for law enforcement to obtain information from reporters to prevent a crime or a national security threat. In addition, by providing a qualified and not an absolute privilege to withhold the identity of confidential sources, the bill also advances other important law enforcement objectives, such as encouraging whistleblowers to disclose fraud, waste, and abuse that might otherwise go unreported. The opposition to this carefully crafted bill by the Department of Justice and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI, is simply misplaced. Although 49 States, the District of Columbia, and several Federal courts have recognized a reporter's privilege either by statute or common law for years, the Department of Justice and ODNI have not cited a single circumstance where the privilege caused any harm to national security or to law enforcement. In fact, the legitimate concerns about the need to effectively combat crime and protect national security have been satisfied by the bill and by amendments to this bill offered in a bipartisan fashion by Senators Feinstein, Brownback, and Kyl. A free press in our country is what sets us apart from so many other nations in the world. The distinguished Presiding Officer, in his years in the House and in the Senate, can certainly point to examples where we have found out things that have been kept hidden from the Congress only because the press uncovered them. Certainly, that has been my experience in my years here in the Senate. I also know that there is a temptation--when any administration has made a serious mistake or is trying to hide wrongdoing by their administration, the first thing they want to do is to make sure nobody in the press or the Congress or the public finds out what they have done. For every administration, it is easy to have all of their press people go out and tout the things they want us to know, the things they consider a success. None want us to hear about the embarrassments or the mistakes or, more recently, out-and-out wrongdoing. That is where you need a press willing to go in and uncover Government wrongdoing and protect the sources who help them to do so. Do you think even with all of the hearings I and others have held we would have found out how law enforcement was manipulated and thwarted by this administration in the selection and manipulation of U.S. attorneys? We found out about it first and foremost by the press, and then through witness testimony in hearings, and now by the Justice Department's Inspector General who had the willingness to stand up and point to the wrongdoing of this administration. And then there was Abu Ghraib--how did we find out about that? We learned about it in the press, not because the administration was willing to say: Look at this terrible thing we have done. So after months and months of delaying tactics and opposition by the Bush administration, the time has come to pass a Federal shield law. I thank and commend the more than 60 news media and journalism organizations including ABC News, the Associated Press, CNN, the National Newspaper Association, the Society of Professional Journalists, and the Vermont Press Association, that worked so hard to get us to this point. I ask unanimous consent to have a copy of a support letter from the Media Coalition Supporting the Free Flow of Information Act printed in the Record following my statement.", u"Mr. President, on September 11, the senior Senator from Missouri, Mr. Bond, came to the floor to introduce a resolution which suggests that the Appropriations Committee should establish an Intelligence Subcommittee. While I don't agree that this would be beneficial to either the Senate or the Nation, the Senator, of course, has a right to his opinion. I would inform my colleagues that the leaders of the Appropriations Committees, Senators Byrd and Cochran, who are responsible for the division of labor on the committee addressed this matter in a letter they sent to Senators Reid and McConnell earlier this year. Rather than debating this matter I would just point out that the chairman and ranking member make a very compelling case in opposition to this proposal articulating the significant damage to intelligence oversight that could result from the proposal offered by Senator Bond. I would like to highlight one observation from their letter. They point out that the proposal that the Senator makes would have the effect of further limiting the number of members who have access to the details of intelligence programs. It would put all decisionmaking into fewer hands. They suggest that for intelligence programs in which the general public, the watchdog groups, and the press must be denied access to the information, the absolutely worst thing the Congress could do would be to further constrain oversight and eliminate the benefits that come from having more individuals share responsibility in the decisionmaking process. I share their view that the proposal made by the Senator from Missouri would not improve congressional oversight of intelligence. My colleague from Missouri spoke eloquently and passionately about the tragedy of 9/11 and the impact it had on him and this institution. On a personal note, I would like to thank him for the kind words he expressed about me and my role as chairman of the Defense Subcommittee. Senator Bond and I have served together on the Appropriations Committee since he joined us in 1991. He has served the committee in a number of key areas including on our Defense Subcommittee, but most notably as chairman of the former VA-HUD Subcommittee and currently as the ranking member of the Transportation-HUD Subcommittee. On the Appropriations Committee we have come to count on him for his expertise and sound judgment in these areas. As such, I must say I was surprised by some of the characterizations he made regarding action on classified programs. Senator Bond noted that billions of dollars has been spent on technology programs which, as he described, ``never get off the ground.'' I concur with this description and share his concern. He rightly blamed executive branch officials for many failures. But in so doing he failed to note that the Congress, including the Intelligence Committee, reviewed these programs for several years and authorized funding for them. He discussed a program that he referred to as a ``silver bullet.'' If I am right in assuming which program that is, I would point out that the Intelligence Committees, Appropriations Committees, and the intelligence community all originally supported the program. While the Senate Intelligence Committee soured on the program a few years ago, it remained supported by the House oversight committees, the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Strategic Command. But, yes, it was expensive. When a new DNI, new Secretary, and new Under Secretary assumed their posts, they determined that it simply wasn't affordable. The Senator from Missouri postulates that it didn't work. Since it was not completed, we will never really know, but no one involved in the program in DoD and the intelligence community ever contended it wouldn't work. It was cancelled because the executive branch determined it wasn't worth the continued investment. By cancelling the program as urged by the Intelligence Committee, the Government did, to use the Senator's word, ``waste'' billions of dollars. But this is not the only example of problems in this community. One notable program that was finally killed by the administration in the past few years on which significantly more funding had been spent was strongly supported by the Intelligence Committee from the program's inception. The committee had even suggested that this program could partially serve as an alternative to the program referred to above. It had been behind schedule and overbudget for years, but it continued to be supported by the executive branch and the Congress with the hope that it could be saved. Eventually, the administration realized that technically it could not be made to work, and it was cancelled. For the Senator to claim that it is the appropriations process which is so disconnected from the workings of the Intelligence Committee that billions of dollars come to naught puts the blame squarely on our committee for the failures which have occurred. This is not only unfair, but it is completely inaccurate. Mr. President, while the Senator and I may disagree on the relative merits of programs, and while I am not particularly proud of the Government's record in recent years, the responsibility for wasting of billions of dollars is shared by all of us, the executive branch, the Appropriations Committees, and the Intelligence Committees. The Senator attempted to link these past failures to a particular program which he advocates which was not funded by the Appropriations Committee this year. I would point out that the administration did not request funding for the program and that the Director of National Intelligence opposes funding the program. The funding sought by Senator Bond was not authorized by the House oversight committee. It was not recommended by the Intelligence oversight panel of the House Appropriations Committee. Moreover, I would disagree with his characterization of the action by the Defense Subcommittee on this subject. We recognize that several members of the Intelligence Committee feel this would be a worthwhile program. Senators Stevens, Cochran, and I considered the actions by the Intelligence Committee on this and many other programs very carefully. To address the concerns of the Intelligence Committee, we reallocated a substantial sum of money from other programs and provided an amount with which the intelligence community could fully fund the program that Senator Bond advocates. However, we didn't mandate that outcome. There is disagreement within the community about the proper approach which should be taken. In recognition that a new administration will be taking office, we requested that the program supported by Senator Bond be analyzed along with those of other contractors and the best option or options be selected next year. We felt we met the Senator halfway. We recommended sufficient funding which could be used for this program even though it was funded by neither the other intelligence oversight committees nor the intelligence community. We are familiar with the program in question. We believe it may have merit. We have confidence in individuals associated with the program, but we also are aware of those with great technical expertise who argue that the program will not work for technical reasons which I cannot discuss in unclassified session. We believed locking the intelligence community into another multibillion-dollar sole source contract when there are legitimate questions about its potential is probably a mistake. To imply that this program has broad-based support and that it is the Appropriations Committee which is out of step is categorically inaccurate. It is somewhat ironic that the Senator from Missouri is urging support for responding to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission while at the same time he is telling the Senate to ignore the judgment of the Director of National Intelligence who was established and empowered to make such decisions as the principal recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Finally, I would note that the Senator claimed that the root problem is that the Appropriations Committee simply does not have enough staff to pay adequate attention to intelligence. The Defense Subcommittee has a small staff and the Intelligence Committee staff is fairly large. But I would point out that the Intelligence Committee has one professional staff member on the majority staff who reviews the budget for the National Reconnaissance Office; so do we. The Intelligence Committee has one professional staff member on the majority staff who reviews the budget for the National Security Agency; so do we. Moreover, the staff which the Defense Subcommittee devotes to overseeing the intelligence budget has far greater experience in reviewing budgets than does the staff of the Intelligence Committee for such programs. I would also point out that several other subcommittees on the Appropriations Committee have jurisdiction over portions of the intelligence budget. To single out the Defense Subcommittee misses one of the key points of the appropriations process: that many individuals have oversight over these matters. I don't want to stir up passions on this issue any more than I may already have. I have the greatest respect for the workings of the Intelligence Committee. Many of my younger colleagues may not be aware that I served as the first chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I am proud of my service on that committee. I believe the work that Senators Rockefeller and Bond do is extremely important to the Senate. I believe they have a very competent staff. Since I resumed the chairmanship of the Defense Subcommittee last year, I have directed my staff to work closely with the staff of the Intelligence Committee to ensure that we have the benefit of their expertise and to minimize any disagreements between our two panels, and they have done so. Our staffs attend many briefings together. Members of our staffs have traveled together to review programs. I believe we have established a good relationship that strengthens Senate oversight. For example, there are literally thousands of line items in the intelligence budget. Our staffs spend countless hours discussing items which one committee or the other believes should be adjusted. We carefully review the classified annex of the Intelligence Committee and provide recommendations to the Appropriations Committee which are very close to those of the Intelligence Committee. This year we had two issues out of hundreds of items under review on which we disagreed. On one we were able to reach an agreement easily. The other has been described in vague terms above. Last year, Chairmen Byrd and Rockefeller, Ranking Members Cochran and Stevens, and I signed a significant memorandum of agreement between our two committees pledging greater cooperation. Senator Bond chose not to be party to that agreement. Since that time the signers and their staffs have tried to live up to the letter and the spirit of that pact. I believe we have been generally successful and the Senate is better served that two separate panels are continuing to review the intelligence budget but working together and generally resolving our differences amicably. It is rare for me to openly disagree with another Member. I want to assure all my colleagues that I do not mean anything personally by my statements today. However, the assertions and implications that were levied against the Appropriations Committee earlier this month were simply untrue. At times all of us can become passionate on matters which we care about. Perhaps that explains why such inaccuracies were offered as facts. Regardless of the reason, I felt it was my duty to come to the floor today and correct the record.", u"Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding to me, the distinguished chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. Madam Speaker, it has been a long and painful 4-year journey for the people of our country since this administration acted preemptively and unilaterally to invade and occupy Iraq, policies which I believe then and I still believe today would not and could not stand because they simply are not in our national character. We were told Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. None were found. We were told there was yellow cake. It was a falsehood. We were told that there were trailers containing the evidence of deadly chemicals. We were told the mission was accomplished. We endured national and international shame when the horrific pictures depicting Abu Ghraib appeared. We learned that our troops were not sufficiently equipped. We mourned with our constituents as the death toll of American troops mounted and continued to mount. Just think, 137 casualties in November of 2004, then the deadliest month overall. Today, over 3,000 precious U.S. lives have been lost, with thousands maimed and injured and God knows how many innocent Iraqi lives lost. We witnessed the world community's total support on 9/11, and we have witnessed the diminishment of America's credibility around the world because of the Iraq war. We have heard the President and the Vice President talk about victory and insurgency in its last throes. We have learned of manipulated intelligence and endured a no-oversight Congress. Preemptive war, unilateralism, invasion, occupation, no post-war plan, an insurgency born of our blunders, and arrogance instead of reality. Meanwhile, military experts, Generals Abizaid, Odom, Powell, and distinguished civilian leaders have called for change, a new strategy, and the urgency of diplomatic and political engagement, all to no avail. One of the central findings of the recent NIE, the National Intelligence Estimate, highlighted the lack of effective Iraqi leadership as a main component driving sectarian and communal violence. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group, appointed by the President, reported the utter urgency of action by the administration. Retired General William Odom, former director of the National Security Agency under President Reagan and member of the National Security Council under President Carter, wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post on February 11. I would ask that it be made part of the Record The new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq starkly delineates the gulf that separates President Bush's illusions from the realities of the war. Victory, as the president sees it, requires a stable liberal democracy in Iraq that is pro- American. The NIE describes a war that has no chance of producing that result. In this critical respect, the NIE, the consensus judgment of all the U.S. intelligence agencies, is a declaration of defeat. Its gloomy implications--hedged, as intelligence agencies prefer, in rubbery language that cannot soften its impact-- put the intelligence community and the American public on the same page. The public awakened to the reality of failure in Iraq last year and turned the Republicans out of control of Congress to wake it up. But a majority of its members are still asleep, or only half-awake to their new writ to end the war soon. Perhaps this is not surprising. Americans do not warm to defeat or failure, and our politicians are famously reluctant to admit their own responsibility for anything resembling those un-American outcomes. So they beat around the bush, wringing hands and debating ``nonbinding resolutions'' that oppose the president's plan to increase the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. For the moment, the collision of the public's clarity of mind, the president's relentless pursuit of defeat and Congress's anxiety has paralyzed us. We may be doomed to two more years of chasing the mirage of democracy in Iraq and possibly widening the war to Iran. But this is not inevitable. A Congress, or a president, prepared to quit the game of ``who gets the blame'' could begin to alter American strategy in ways that will vastly improve the prospects of a more stable Middle East. No task is more important to the well-being of the United States. We face great peril in that troubled region, and improving our prospects will be difficult. First of all, it will require, from Congress at least, public acknowledgment that the president's policy is based on illusions, not realities. There never has been any right way to invade and transform Iraq. Most Americans need no further convincing, but two truths ought to put the matter beyond question: First, the assumption that the United States could create a liberal, constitutional democracy in Iraq defies just about everything known by professional students of the topic. Of the more than 40 democracies created since World War II, fewer than 10 can be considered truly ``constitutional''-- meaning that their domestic order is protected by a broadly accepted rule of law, and has survived for at least a generation. None is a country with Arabic and Muslim political cultures. None has deep sectarian and ethnic fissures like those in Iraq. Strangely, American political scientists whose business it is to know these things have been irresponsibly quiet. In the lead-up to the March 2003 invasion, neoconservative agitators shouted insults at anyone who dared to mention the many findings of academic research on how democracies evolve. They also ignored our own struggles over two centuries to create the democracy Americans enjoy today. Somehow Iraqis are now expected to create a constitutional order in a country with no conditions favoring it. This is not to say that Arabs cannot become liberal democrats. When they immigrate to the United States, many do so quickly. But it is to say that Arab countries, as well as a large majority of all countries, find creating a stable constitutional democracy beyond their capacities. Second, to expect any Iraqi leader who can hold his country together to be pro-American, or to share American goals, is to abandon common sense. It took the United States more than a century to get over its hostility toward British occupation. (In 1914, a majority of the public favored supporting Germany against Britain.) Every month of the U.S. occupation, polls have recorded Iraqis' rising animosity toward the United States. Even supporters of an American military presence say that it is acceptable temporarily and only to prevent either of the warring sides in Iraq from winning. Today the Iraqi government survives only because its senior members and their families live within the heavily guarded Green Zone, which houses the U.S. Embassy and military command. As Congress awakens to these realities--and a few members have bravely pointed them out--will it act on them? Not necessarily. Too many lawmakers have fallen for the myths that are invoked to try to sell the president's new war aims. Let us consider the most pernicious of them. (1) We must continue the war to prevent the terrible aftermath that will occur if our forces are withdrawn soon. Reflect on the double-think of this formulation. We are now fighting to prevent what our invasion made inevitable! Undoubtedly we will leave a mess--the mess we created, which has become worse each year we have remained. Lawmakers gravely proclaim their opposition to the war, but in the next breath express fear that quitting it will leave a blood bath, a civil war, a terrorist haven, a ``failed state,'' or some other horror. But this ``aftermath'' is already upon us; a prolonged U.S. occupation cannot prevent what already exists. (2) We must continue the war to prevent Iran's influence from growing in Iraq. This is another absurd notion. One of the president's initial war aims, the creation of a democracy in Iraq, ensured increased Iranian influence, both in Iraq and the region. Electoral democracy, predictably, would put Shiite groups in power--groups supported by Iran since Saddam Hussein repressed them in 1991. Why are so many members of Congress swallowing the claim that prolonging the war is now supposed to prevent precisely what starting the war inexorably and predictably caused? Fear that Congress will confront this contradiction helps explain the administration and neocon drumbeat we now hear for expanding the war to Iran. Here we see shades of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy in Vietnam: widen the war into Cambodia and Laos. Only this time, the adverse consequences would be far greater. Iran's ability to hurt U.S. forces in Iraq are not trivial. And the anti-American backlash in the region would be larger, and have more lasting consequences. (3) We must prevent the emergence of a new haven for al- Qaeda in Iraq. But it was the U.S. invasion that opened Iraq's doors to al-Qaeda. The longer U.S. forces have remained there, the stronger al-Qaeda has become. Yet its strength within the Kurdish and Shiite areas is trivial. After a U.S. withdrawal, it will probably play a continuing role in helping the Sunni groups against the Shiites and the Kurds. Whether such foreign elements could remain or thrive in Iraq after the resolution of civil war is open to question. Meanwhile, continuing the war will not push al- Qaeda outside Iraq. On the contrary, the American presence is the glue that holds al-Qaeda there now. (4) We must continue to fight in order to ``support the troops. ``This argument effectively paralyzes almost all members of Congress. Lawmakers proclaim in grave tones a litany of problems in Iraq sufficient to justify a rapid pullout. Then they reject that logical conclusion, insisting we cannot do so because we must support the troops. Has anybody asked the troops? During their first tours, most may well have favored ``staying the course''--whatever that meant to them--but now in their second, third and fourth tours, many are changing their minds. We see evidence of that in the many news stories about unhappy troops being sent back to Iraq. Veterans groups are beginning to make public the case for bringing them home. Soldiers and officers in Iraq are speaking out critically to reporters on the ground. But the strangest aspect of this rationale for continuing the war is the implication that the troops are somehow responsible for deciding to continue the president's course. That political and moral responsibility belongs to the president, not the troops. Did not President Harry S. Truman make it clear that ``the buck stops'' in the Oval Office? If the president keeps dodging it, where does it stop? With Congress? Embracing the four myths gives Congress excuses not to exercise its power of the purse to end the war and open the way for a strategy that might actually bear fruit. The first and most critical step is to recognize that fighting on now simply prolongs our losses and blocks the way to a new strategy. Getting out of Iraq is the pre-condition for creating new strategic options. Withdrawal will take away the conditions that allow our enemies in the region to enjoy our pain. It will awaken those European states reluctant to collaborate with us in Iraq and the region. Second, we must recognize that the United States alone cannot stabilize the Middle East. Third, we must acknowledge that most of our policies are actually destabilizing the region. Spreading democracy, using sticks to try to prevent nuclear proliferation, threatening ``regime change,'' using the hysterical rhetoric of the ``global war on terrorism''--all undermine the stability we so desperately need in the Middle East. Fourth, we must redefine our purpose. It must be a stable region, not primarily a democratic Iraq. We must redirect our military operations so they enhance rather than undermine stability. We can write off the war as a ``tactical draw'' and make ``regional stability'' our measure of ``victory.'' That single step would dramatically realign the opposing forces in the region, where most states want stability. Even many in the angry mobs of young Arabs shouting profanities against the United States want predictable order, albeit on better social and economic terms than they now have. Realigning our diplomacy and military capabilities to achieve order will hugely reduce the numbers of our enemies and gain us new and important allies. This cannot happen, however, until our forces are moving out of Iraq. Why should Iran negotiate to relieve our pain as long as we are increasing its influence in Iraq and beyond? Withdrawal will awaken most leaders in the region to their own need for U.S.- led diplomacy to stabilize their neighborhood. If Bush truly wanted to rescue something of his historical legacy, he would seize the initiative to implement this kind of strategy. He would eventually be held up as a leader capable of reversing direction by turning an imminent, tragic defeat into strategic recovery. If he stays on his present course, he will leave Congress the opportunity to earn the credit for such a turnaround. It is already too late to wait for some presidential candidate for 2008 to retrieve the situation. If Congress cannot act, it, too, will live in infamy. He identified the shortcomings of the administration's Iraq policy and presented some of the clearest and most prescient thinking on the issue to date. He places in stark relief what many of our colleagues refuse to accept, that the preemptive, unilateral course set by the President is not a strategy for success in Iraq. He says: ``The first and most critical step is to recognize that fighting on now simply prolongs our losses and blocks the way to a new strategy. Getting out of Iraq is the precondition for creating new strategic options. Withdrawal will take away the conditions that allow our enemies in the region to enjoy our pain. ``Second,'' he says, ``we must recognize that the United States alone cannot stabilize the Middle East. ``Third, we must acknowledge that most of our policies are actually destabilizing the region. Spreading democracy, using sticks to try to prevent nuclear proliferation, threatening `regime change,' using the hysterical rhetoric of the `global war on terrorism' all undermine the stability we so desperately need in the Middle East. ``Fourth, we must redefine our purpose. It must be a stable region, not primarily a democratic Iraq. We must redirect our military operations so they enhance rather than undermine stability.'' So many experts, so many respected leaders, so many voices of patriots, and their critical analysis ignored. Madam Speaker, in the preamble to our Constitution, three magnificent words lead the document: ``We, the people.'' The people of our Nation made the clearest and most important solemn judgment on Iraq in last November's election. They said, in overwhelming numbers, to change the direction of this war, to de-escalate, not escalate. That is exactly what this debate is about. We pay tribute to and support our troops who honor our country with their service. We say, as the American people have said, enough is enough. I urge my colleagues to vote for this resolution.", u"Madam Speaker, it is time for a new exit strategy, one that removes the Vice President of the United States from office, voluntarily, if he chooses, but by impeachment if he stonewalls. The time has come for the Vice President to go. Our Nation and our national security interests at home and abroad cannot afford to have this Vice President one heartbeat away from the Presidency. As it stands now, the Vice President's damage to U.S. interests, security, system of government and our position at home and abroad will take years to overcome. As my constituents in the State of Washington's Seventh Congressional District know, I have struggled mightily with this matter for a long time. In grave matters facing our Nation, I believe conscience and a deep respect for our system of government should guide our actions and words. I didn't hesitate to speak the truth to power before the invasion of Iraq, despite the bitter partisan acts that I knew would follow. I have no doubt that I will be targeted for a new round of shelling after these remarks. The intent of this administration and this Vice President has been to silence all dissent, and it always happens the same way; relentless attacks until people ask themselves, do I want to subject myself to that kind of hell if I speak out? Fear is what kept this administration in office in 2004, and fear is the only public discourse this administration understands and practices. Why debate, when you can dictate? Why follow the law, when you can act like you are above the law? For months, I believed that impeachment was a dire course of action. Over these same months, I have seen the haven't repeatedly drive our Nation into increasingly dire situations in Iraq, Iran and within our country as he tramples on the Constitution like it was a doormat. For months I have considered if America would best be served by bringing forth articles of impeachment against the Vice President. I kept asking myself, is the Vice President's conduct that dire, because impeachment is the closest thing there is to internment on political death row. The Founders intended impeachment to be used when those running the government forgot that they worked for the people, and the Founders intended impeachment to be used when toughs running the government acted as though they were above the law. When you look at the record, you have to conclude that the Vice President has placed himself above the law. He holds himself accountable only to special interests, who meet with him in secret with no record kept of who was there, what was discussed or what promises the Vice President made. For the last 4 years, the Vice President has refused to allow routine office inspections by a Federal agency regarding the safe handling of America's secrets. The Vice President defies the Information Security Oversight Agency, claiming he is not part of the executive branch of government. When a sitting Vice President claims that he is not part of the executive branch of government to which he was elected, it is time to remove him. The Vice President holds himself accountable to no one. He ordered the Secret Service to destroy visitors logs, and we have learned in the Washington Post recently, that the Vice President circumvented every check and balance inside the White House to force through his own agenda, to spy on Americans through illegal wire traps, creating the gulag at Guantanamo, and subverting civil liberties and free speech at every turn. Since the President permits the flagrant disregard of the Constitution, it is up to the Congress to act and defend the American people. With each new revelation, America has seen only glints of what has been done totally in secret. For all we don't know, this much we do know: The Vice President holds himself above the law, and it is time for the Congress to enforce the law. I believe the evidence is overwhelming and the articles of impeachment against the Vice President should be drawn up. The Vice President likes to say the military option is on the table. Tonight it is time to say the impeachment option is on the table. I am adding my name to H.R. 333, calling for the impeachment. For the good of the Nation, the Vice President should leave office immediately. Call it a medical condition, call it a political condition, call it what it is; the departure of a person who forgot that he works for the American people. The Vice President must either resign or face impeachment. Madam Speaker, I submit for the Record an article in Slate magazine dated 27 June 2004, entitled ``Impeach Cheney.'' Impeach Cheney--The Vice President Has Run Utterly Amok and Must Be Under Dick Cheney, the office of the vice president has been transformed from a tiny acorn into an unprecedented giant oak. In grasping and exercising presidential powers, Cheney has dulled political accountability and concocted theories for evading the law and Constitution that would have embarrassed King George III. The most recent invention we know of is the vice president's insistence that an executive order governing the handling of classified information in the executive branch does not reach his office because he also serves as president of the Senate. In other words, the vice president is a unique legislative-executive creature standing above and beyond the Constitution. The House Judiciary Committee should commence an impeachment inquiry. As Alexander Hamilton advised in the Federalist Papers, an impeachable offense is a political crime against the nation. Cheney's multiple crimes against the Constitution clearly qualify. Take the vice president's preposterous theory that his office is outside the executive branch because it also exercises a legislative function. The same can be said of the president, who also exercises a legislative function in signing or vetoing bills passed by Congress. Under Cheney's bizarre reasoning, President Bush is not part of his own administration: The executive branch becomes acephalous. Today Cheney Chief of Staff David Addington refused to renounce that reasoning, instead laughably trying to diminish the importance of the legal question at issue. The nation's first vice president, John Adams, bemoaned: ``My country has in its wisdom contrived for me the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived; and as I can do neither good nor evil, I must be borne away by others and meet common fate.'' Vice President John Nance Garner, serving under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, lamented: ``The vice presidency isn't worth a pitcher of warm * * *.'' In modern times, vice presidents have generally been confined to attending state funerals or to distributing blankets after earthquakes. Then President George W. Bush outsourced the lion's share of his presidency to Vice President Cheney, and Mr. Cheney has made the most of it. Since 9/11, he has proclaimed that all checks and balances and individual liberties are subservient to the president's commander in chief powers in confronting international terrorism. Let's review the record of his abuses and excesses: The vice president asserted presidential power to create military commissions, which combine the functions of judge, jury, and prosecutor in the trial of war crimes. The Supreme Court rebuked Cheney in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Mr. Cheney claimed authority to detain American citizens as enemy combatants indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay on the president's say-so alone, a frightening power indistinguishable from King Louis XVI's execrated lettres de cachet that occasioned the storming of the Bastille. The Supreme Court repudiated Cheney in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. The vice president initiated kidnappings, secret detentions, and torture in Eastern European prisons of suspected international terrorists. This lawlessness has been answered in Germany and Italy with criminal charges against CIA operatives or agents. The legal precedent set by Cheney would justify a decision by Russian President Vladimir Putin to kidnap American tourists in Paris and to dispatch them to dungeons in Belarus if they were suspected of Chechen sympathies. The vice president has maintained that the entire world is a battlefield. Accordingly, he contends that military power may be unleashed to kill or capture any American citizen on American soil if suspected of association or affiliation with al-Qaida. Thus, Mr. Cheney could have ordered the military to kill Jose Padilla with rockets, artillery, or otherwise when he landed at O'Hare Airport in Chicago, because of Padilla's then-suspected ties to international terrorism. Mr. Cheney has championed a presidential power to torture in contravention of federal statutes and treaties. He has advocated and authored signing statements that declare the president's intent to disregard provisions of bills he has signed into law that he proclaims are unconstitutional, for example, a requirement to obtain a judicial warrant before opening mail or a prohibition on employing military force to fight narco-terrorists in Colombia. The signing statements are tantamount to absolute line-item vetoes that the Supreme Court invalidated in the 1998 case Clinton v. New York. The vice president engineered the National Security Agency's warrantless domestic surveillance program targeting American citizens on American soil in contravention of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. He concocted the alarming theory that the president may flout any law that inhibits the collection of foreign intelligence, including prohibitions on breaking and entering homes, torture, or assassinations. As a reflection of his power in this arena, today the Senate Judiciary Committee subpoenaed Cheney's office, as well as the White House, for documents that relate to the warrantless eavesdropping. The vice president has orchestrated the invocation of executive privilege to conceal from Congress secret spying programs to gather foreign intelligence, and their legal justifications. He has summoned the privilege to refuse to disclose his consulting of business executives in conjunction with his Energy Task Force, and to frustrate the testimonies of Karl Rove and Harriet Miers regarding the firings of U.S. attorneys. Cheney scorns freedom of speech and of the press. He urges application of the Espionage Act to prosecute journalists who expose national security abuses, for example, secret prisons in Eastern Europe or the NSA's warrantless surveillance program. He retaliated against Ambassador Joseph Wilson and his wife, Valerie Plame, through Chief of Staff Scooter Libby, for questioning the administration's evidence of weapons of mass destruction as justification for invading Iraq. Mr. Cheney is defending himself from a pending suit brought by Wilson and Plame on the grounds that he is entitled to the absolute immunity of the president established in 1982 by Nixon v. Fitzgerald. (Although this defense contradicts Cheney's claim that he is not part of the executive branch.) The Constitution does not expressly forbid the president from abandoning his chief powers to the vice president. But President Bush's tacit delegation to Cheney and Cheney's eager acceptance tortures the Constitution's provision for an acting president. The presidency and vice presidency are discrete constitutional offices. The 12th Amendment provides for their separate elections. The sole constitutionally enumerated function of the vice president is to serve as president of the Senate without a vote except to break ties. In contrast, Article II enumerates the powers and responsibilities of the president, including the obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. A special presidential oath is prescribed. Section 3 of the 25th Amendment provides a method for the president to yield his office to the vice president, when ``he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.'' There is no other constitutional provision for transferring presidential powers to the vice president. Yet without making a written transmittal to Congress, President Bush has ceded vast domains of his powers to Vice President Cheney by mutual understanding that circumvents the 25th Amendment. This constitutional provision assures that the public and Congress know who is exercising the powers of the presidency and who should be held responsible for successes or failures. The Bush-Cheney dispensation blurs political accountability by continually hiding the real decision-maker under presidential skirts. The Washington Post has thoroughly documented the vice president's dominance in a four-part series running this week. It is quite a read. In the end, President Bush regularly is unable to explain or defend the policies of his own administration, and that is because the heavy intellectual labor has been performed in the office of the vice president. Cheney is impeachable for his overweening power and his sneering contempt of the Constitution and the rule of law.", u"Mr. President, during the last week that we were not here during the Fourth of July recess, there was a lot of misinformation floating around about things that may or may not be happening concerning the war on terrorism. I would like to make some clarifications, if I could. I think it is very significant that we understand what is really going on, not what some of the media tell us is going on. I have found through my experience--and I say this: I come to the floor with probably having made more trips to the Iraqi AOR, 14 in total, than any other Member, so I have been there quite a few times. I have watched the changes as the changes have taken place. Let me share with my colleagues, first of all, a little background. The United States Code defines terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. Their goal is to inflict the maximum amount of damage and pain to civilians irrespective of age, race, gender, or religion. It will remain a global threat for the foreseeable future. It is global. I think a lot of people don't realize how global this is but, if we just look at the things that have happened recently, including terrorist attacks in Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania. We remember in those places the Embassies being blown up. The United States, France, Morocco, Turkey, Spain, Indonesia, Great Britain, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Philippines, Algeria, Yemen, and Tunisia are just a partial list of some of the places where there have been terrorist attacks. The National Counterterrorism Center reported approximately 14,000 terrorist attacks occurred in various countries during 2006. Over 50 percent of the attacks occurred in Iraq or Afghanistan. Reported incidents decreased for Europe, Eurasia, South Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. Now, the following terrorist-related attacks occurred within the past 30 days outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. The mentality that somehow it is all happening in Iraq is false. There were some statements made in declaring certain areas in Iraq to potentially be the terrorism capital, but we will talk about that in a minute. A car bomb exploded outside of the Somalian Prime Minister's residence killing six people. This is all in the last 30 days. A bomb exploded in front of a crowded tea shop in Thailand killing 1 woman and wounding 28 others. That was on June 8. An explosion outside the Ambassador Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya, killed 1 and injured 37. I might add that was a mere 3 days from the time I was actually staying in that hotel. A bomb exploded outside a clothing shop in Istanbul, Turkey, wounding 14 people. A car bomb in a Beirut seaside neighborhood killed 10 people and wounded 11 others. Suicide bombers drove an SUV into the Glasgow airport doors, injuring six people. A suicide bomber drove into a convoy of Spanish tourists, killing nine people and wounding five others. That is just what has been taking place in the last month. In the United States, President Bush organized and energized the Federal Government to pass the PATRIOT Act which broke down the walls between Federal law enforcement and intelligence communities. It created the Department of Homeland Security, merging 22 different Government organizations. It created the position of Director of National Intelligence to seamlessly integrate operations of intelligence agencies. We have had this problem for a long time. I recall when I was first elected, when I came from the House to the Senate, and my predecessor was David Boren, who is now the President of Oklahoma University, and the last thing he told me before I was sworn in was one of the biggest problems we have is in coordinating our intelligence communities so that everybody knows what everybody else is doing. We hadn't really done that until 9/11 came along and we started getting serious about it. I am sure President Boren will be very glad to know that this is an important improvement that has been made. We directed the National Security Agency to monitor terrorist communications and established a program to detain and question key terrorist leaders and operatives. I know there is a lot of talk about what is torture and what is not torture. But we do know that HUMINT, human intelligence, is very, very important. It is something we have to consider, the lives of those who would be lost versus the lives of criminals who are being interrogated. We placed state-of-the-art equipment in major cities in the United States to detect nuclear and radiological weapons and biological agents. We placed advanced screening and equipment and Homeland Security personnel at foreign ports to prescreen cargo headed for the United States. I think it is very interesting that a lot of people are talking about how much this has cost. Everything I have read costs something. The question is, How many lives has it saved? That is something very difficult to ascertain. Fighting the terrorists is a coalition of more than 90 nations. It is not just the United States, it is the United States and 90 other nations--a coalition of nations that has sought to synchronize diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, economic, financial, and military power to attack terrorism globally. I believe it is working. As the President has recently said, to strike our country, the terrorists only have to be right once. To protect our country, we have to be right 100 percent of the time. As we learned on 9/11, and many times in other countries, it only takes one time for them to be successful. We know that some of the results are significant. We captured an al-Qaida operative named Ali Saleh al-Marri in the United States, who we believe was targeting water reservoirs, the New York Stock Exchange, and the U.S. military academies in December 2001. This was the first post-9/11 plot that was thwarted. Al-Marri offered himself as a martyr to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11. He was his No. 1 man. He sent him to the United States after he received training in poisons at an al-Qaida camp. It is kind of interesting that people say there is no connection between Iraq and al-Qaida when, in fact, we know now and can release information on several training camps that were there. Very likely, he could have been trained in that particular camp. The British authorities broke up a plot to blow up passenger airplanes flying to America, which could have rivaled 9/11. We know that happened. The plot was foiled in August of 2006. They planned to blow up as many as 12 U.S.-bound passenger jets. They planned to use liquid explosives hidden in carry-on luggage. U.S.-British authorities had a group under surveillance for many months, and many of the suspects were British citizens of Pakistani origin. They thwarted that. That didn't happen. That could have happened and, very likely, would have except for all these efforts of the United States and other countries. We broke up two other post-9/11 aviation plots--one targeting the Library Tower in Los Angeles and the other targeting the east coast. An al-Qaida leader in Southeast Asia, known as Hambali, recruited Jemaah Islamiyah operatives of Asian origin. The plot was derailed early in 2002 with international cooperation. Library Tower is the tallest building west of the Mississippi, 1,018 feet tall. It is among the 25 tallest buildings in the world. That didn't happen. That was planned. It could have happened. It was stopped by this combined effort. Four men were indicted in an alleged plot to attack John F. Kennedy International Airport by blowing up a jet fuel supply. They planned to hit the fuel farms and a 40-mile aviation fuel supply pipeline, and they specifically targeted the symbolism of JFK, sought to invoke emotional reaction saying, ``It is like killing the man twice.'' That is their statement. Suspects were tied to extremist groups in South America and the Caribbean, specifically Guyana and Trinidad. One suspect was a former airport cargo worker. They sought massive disruption of the U.S. economy by cutting off this major artery of travel that connects the United States to the rest of the world--over a thousand flights a day, half of which are international, 45 million passengers and 1.5 million tons of cargo a year. They disrupted a plot by a group of al-Qaida-inspired extremists to kill American soldiers at Fort Dix in New Jersey, which was the result of a 16-month investigation by the Justice Department and the FBI. Suspects had taken an incriminating video to the store to be transferred to DVD. The video showed calls for jihad and radical and violent ranting in Arabic, including images of the men firing assault weapons. Terrorists attempted to detonate two car bombs using cell phones in London's West End. That happened over the last recess we had. It heightened public awareness and quick police action prevented detonations of two Mercedes car bombs. This was a concerted effort. We and the Brits were in on that. All others on this team worked very well and very effectively. Now, in Iraq, we have had success that is critical to our long-term fight against terrorism. Osama bin Laden calls the struggle in Iraq a ``war of destiny.'' Al-Qaida sees victory in Iraq as a religious strategic imperative, a base from which to launch new attacks around the globe. While I am troubled the war has cost us, I believe it is absolutely necessary for us to be able to have this success. I can recall a year ago standing at this podium in the Senate quoting al-Qaida, saying Ramadi--that province in Iraq was going to become the terrorist capital of Iraq. When I was in Ramadi a matter of days ago, we found that there are new groups of people cooperating now that never cooperated before. I think some of the people in this body who were talking about surrender resolutions and all that--it got their attention. Maybe that performed a useful function because all of a sudden the people woke up. I learned something there too. All these political leaders we hear about, such as Prime Minister Maliki and Defense Minister Jasim and Dr. Rubiya, and some of the rest--I thought they were the ones who were the leaders. I think it is the clerics in the mosques. All of a sudden, they became concerned and, up until that time, we had been monitoring all of the procedures and the performances they have had on a weekly basis in the mosques. Eighty-five percent of them have been, up until December of this last year, anti-American messages. As of April, there haven't been any anti-American messages. That shows that the clerics have gotten involved in this thing. In Tulsa, OK, we have neighborhood watch programs, where people get neighbors to watch and see what is going on. This is happening throughout Iraq, where they are spraying orange spray paint around IEDs that haven't been detonated so our troops could disarm them. Those things have happened. I think the joint security stations have been very successful in Baghdad. Instead of our troops going out and coming back into the green zone at night, they stay and get to know and develop close, intimate relationships with the Iraqi security forces and their families. That has had a tremendously positive effect. The future will be difficult in the fight against terrorism. It is not a sprint, it is a marathon. We have to remain vigilant, determined, and strong. I want our troops to come home as badly as anybody. When you think about the consequences of losing this thing, all it would take for these people who are crying out about their feelings and saying let's get out of Iraq, all it would take is one successful terrorist attack similar to those that have been stopped through this joint effort. We would have to pay dearly. I hope people will sit back and realize we have access to information the general public doesn't have. Sure, the polls show the majority of people would like to have our troops come back. I would, too, but when you ask the questions and give them the alternatives, they would rather win this war than resign from it.", u"``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES ``Sec. 105D. (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not later than 7 days after an application is submitted under section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e), the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-- ``(1) in the case of an application, a copy of the application, including the certification made under section 105B(b)(1); and ``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order, including the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E). ``(b) Quarterly Audits.-- ``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a) the results of such audit, including, for each order authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under section 105B-- ``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such order that were later determined to be located in the United States; ``(B) the number of persons located in the United States whose communications have been acquired under such order; ``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated containing information on a United States person that was collected under such order; and ``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose communications were acquired under such order. ``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a report containing the results of such audit. ``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the previous 120-day period. Each report submitted under this section shall include a description of any incidents of non- compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e), including incidents of non-compliance by-- ``(1) an element of the intelligence community with minimization procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(i); ``(2) an element of the intelligence community with procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(ii); ``(3) an element of the intelligence community with guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and ``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance under such order. ``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing the number of emergency authorizations of acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization under such section. ``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' means-- ``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; ``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.''. Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) In any case where the court established under subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any orders related to such matter.''. (a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of communications conducted without a court order on or after September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance Program referred to by the President in a radio address on December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers, and court orders. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report containing the results of such audit, including all documents acquired pursuant to conducting such audit. (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the investigation and adjudication of an application by the Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as possible. (a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track of-- (1) the instances where the identity of a United States person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) that collected the communications to other departments or agencies of the United States; and (2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed. (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created under subsection (a), including the number of instances referred to in paragraph (1). There are authorized to be appropriated the Department of Justice, for the activities of the Office of the Inspector General, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and other appropriate elements of the National Security Division, and the National Security Agency such sums as may be necessary to meet the personnel and information technology demands to ensure the timely and efficient processing of-- (1) applications and other submissions to the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)); (2) the audit and reporting requirements under-- (A) section 105D of such Act; and (B) section 7; and (3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements under section 8. (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information. (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.-- Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific statutory authorization shall be the only exception to subsection (a). (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the following new items:``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States persons outside the United States.``Sec. 105B. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States.``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States.``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of persons located outside of the United States.''. (b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''. (c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America Act.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public Law 110-55) are hereby repealed. (a) Sunset of New Provisions.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), effective on December 31, 2009-- (A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) are hereby repealed; and (B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D. (2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any authorization or order issued under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization or order. (b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.-- (1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of enactment, whichever is earlier. (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law 110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations, including-- (A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be located in the United States; (B) the number of persons located in the United States whose communications have been acquired under such section; (C) the number of reports disseminated containing information on a United States person that was collected under such section; (D) the number of applications submitted for approval of electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and (E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with an authorization under such section, including incidents of non-compliance by-- (i) an element of the intelligence community with procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section; (ii) an element of the intelligence community with minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of such section; and (iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section. (3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection, the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).", u"Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 18, 2007, the gentleman from California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, there is no other issue more central to the core responsibility of government than the duty to protect the safety and security of the American people. The right not to be killed is foundational to all other rights. The actions we take with respect to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, better known as FISA, will reflect the level of seriousness with which we have assumed this fundamental obligation. While I take a backseat to no one when it comes to the protection of civil liberties, it is essential to understand the proper context of the issue by us. Mr. Speaker, the focus of the debate here relates to overseas intelligence, the implications for the privacy rights of Americans, talked about so loudly on the floor last week by our colleagues on the other side of the aisle, the implications for privacy rights of Americans where surveillance targets of non-U.S. persons overseas is minimal to nonexistent. This debate over FISA must not be morphed into an ideological crusade by those who have such a visceral dislike for President Bush that any perceived defeat for this administration is in some perverse way chalked up as a victory. The debate is not about President Bush; it is about protecting the lives of those who have sent us here to represent them. And it is serious business. In my estimation, this is perhaps the most important issue that we will face here in the 110th Congress. It has been my privilege to serve on both the Homeland Security and Judiciary Committees. It is my belief that we have made progress in protecting the homeland since 9/11. Under the leadership of both parties on the Homeland Security Committee, there have been disagreements about the particulars, but there has always been a bipartisan commitment to moving the ball forward to make our Nation safer. To be brutally honest, we cannot rely on the prospect of getting it right every time someone might seek to come here to kill innocent Americans. The idea of having to construct a perfect defense in and of itself is not conceivable. However, this is where the role of intelligence comes into primary focus. Developing a homeland security strategy must not be considered in isolation. Intelligence collection overseas is the crucial element in any strategy to secure the homeland. Otherwise, we fall prey to what I refer to as the Maginot syndrome. You remember the Maginot line. That is where the French learned a terrible lesson concerning the folly of relying on the idea that they could protect themselves with a focus on massive defense perimeter. Much more is required and, again, intelligence collection targeting non-U.S. persons can extend our homeland defense perimeter overseas. Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation, a noted expert on terrorism, has stressed that our intelligence capability is a key element in our effort to protect our homeland. As he says, in the terror attacks since 9/11 we've seen combinations of local conspiracies inspired by, assisted by, and guided by al Qaeda's central leadership. It is essential that while protecting the basic rights of American citizens we find ways to facilitate the collection and exchange of intelligence across national and bureaucratic borders. So how do we make sense out of what is taking place in this House with respect to our consideration of FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act? Foreign intelligence surveillance, I'd like to underscore. The manner in which we address this crucial national security question is a clear measure of our level of seriousness about the threat posed to our Nation from another terrorist attack. The bottom line question to be asked is whether or not we are safer as a result of the action taken by this House concerning the collection of overseas intelligence. As in the game of football, you're either advancing the ball or you are losing yardage. Does our action make America safer or does it impose obstacles in the path of the intelligence community which make their job more difficult? In making this determination, I would suggest that the line of scrimmage should be drawn with the Protect America Act. That is the act we passed in early August, on a bipartisan basis, responding to the request of Admiral McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence. We should understand that that act represented a compromise reflecting what Admiral McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence, identified as absolutely necessary, absolutely necessary to the task of protecting the American people. Based upon his service to our Nation, I would suggest we should take his considered opinion with the seriousness that it deserves. As a career naval officer, former head of the National Security Agency under President Clinton for 4 years, and the current Director of National Intelligence, Admiral McConnell has had a distinguished career in his service to our Nation. Admiral McConnell and General Hayden came to the Congress with a larger package of needed changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act last April. However, in order to close what Admiral McConnell described as gaps in our intelligence, that is, an inability for us to be able to actually find the dots that were out there, we had to act immediately. A compromise was, therefore, reached by this body this past August. He defined the concept of ``gap'' to mean this: foreign intelligence information that we should have been collecting. In fact, Admiral McConnell indicated that prior to the enactment of our Protect America Act in August, we were not collecting somewhere between one-half and two-thirds of the foreign intelligence information which would have been collected were it not for the recent legal interpretations of FISA which required the government to obtain prior FISA warrants for overseas surveillance. In many cases, we couldn't obtain them. You have to have evidence to reach a standard that, frankly, at that stage you cannot reach. Secondly, the volume of number of targets and the paperwork and, more than the paperwork, the intellectual work, the cost in time by taking analysts off the job of analyzing, to working up these requests for warrants, basically made it impossible for us to be able to go after these targets, which we'd always been able to go after in the context of FISA as it was passed in 1978. What's the problem? The problem is that a definition of electronic surveillance constructed almost 28 years ago certainly has not kept pace with changes in technology. Ironically, when FISA was enacted, almost all international communications were wireless. Most local calls at that time were on a wire and fell within the definition of electronic surveillance requiring a warrant. Today, it's just the reverse. Almost all international communications are transmitted by wire. Thus, international communications not intended to be covered by the warrant requirement in the 1978 act are now inadvertently covered because of the change in technology. This was never ever the intention in Congress. Again, the act we passed in August closed the resulting national security gaps. However, less than 3 months later, here we are in the House of Representatives, the leadership of this House is now trying to reinvent the wheel. It will be one thing were we considering the other elements of a larger package which General Hayden and Admiral McConnell presented to us back in April, but that's not the case. Rather, the leadership of this body is retreating from the provisions of the Protect America Act, which Admiral McConnell told us he needs in order to do his job. The so-called RESTORE Act undoes core provisions of this compromise that we were told was necessary to close the gaps in our intelligence. That's why I call the RESTORE Act the Repeal Effective Surveillance Techniques Opposing Real Enemies Act, because that's what it does. It takes away the techniques that we allowed under the law that we passed last August in response to requests from Admiral McConnell based on his considered judgment that he was not able to do the job to protect the American people from the threat abroad. Admiral McConnell affirmed that prior to the Protect America Act the intelligence community attempted to work under the law as interpreted by the court. Unfortunately, he found that as a result of working under those restrictions his agency was prohibited from successfully targeting foreign conversations, foreign conversations, that otherwise would have been targeted for possible terrorist activity. Admiral McConnell has made it clear that although there remains elements of the larger package which would further enhance our ability to conduct surveillance against al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, the Protect America Act, that act that we passed in August which is now the law, has provided us with the tools, as he said, to close gaps in our foreign intelligence collection. Then why are we seeking to make these critical changes in the Protect America Act before the ink is barely dry? Well, one thing is certain: the immediate reviews by the leftist blogosphere were hardly positive. Although Admiral McConnell has worked for both President Clinton and for President Bush, much of the criticism of the act in the wake of its passage seemed to stem from these objections, now, listen to this, that the White House was trying to influence the outcome of the negotiations which took place prior to its enactment. Imagine that. When Admiral McConnell appeared before our Judiciary Committee, he faced questions along the lines of what did the White House know and when did they know it. Now, think of this: the idea that the White House would seek to have input on issues relating to the national security of the United States is about as startling as the discovery that gambling, yes, gambling, was taking place in Joe's bar during the movie ``Casablanca.'' This should not be the issue. Again, it's not about George Bush, whether you dislike him, love him or are indifferent to him. The only valid question is how best we can protect the American public from al Qaeda and others who seek to kill us. Surveillance of foreign persons outside the United States is a central part of that effort, and the bill they presented on the floor last week, the so-called RESTORE Act, changed what we had done in August to make it difficult, in some cases impossible, to gain that information. Even if it is Osama bin Laden on the line calling into the United States, under the terms of the bill that was presented on the floor, we couldn't use information gathered from that conversation against Osama bin Laden unless we went to a court for a court order, unless the Attorney General could specifically show that information was leading to the death of a particular individual. Now, I've said this on the floor before and I will say it again: that's just plain nuts. There's no other way to explain it. There is absolutely no other way to explain it; and perhaps with an ability to explain this kind of thinking on the floor, I would yield to the gentlelady from Tennessee to enlighten us as to her observations as to what is taking place on the floor on this important issue.", u"Madam President, this bill does not include language I authored to strengthen the exclusivity provisions of FISA. It has been reviewed by the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and they are both cosponsors, as well as an additional cosponsor in Senator Bill Nelson of Florida, who is also a member of the Intelligence Committee. Basically, what this amendment does is strengthen FISA as the only and exclusive authority for gathering intelligence through electronic surveillance. It specifically closes the AUMF loophole I mentioned earlier, whereby the administration contends it does not need FISA approval. Second, it provides that only another statute, specific statute can constitute an additional exclusive means of electronic surveillance. Third, it strengthens the requirements for certifications. The administration must identify the specific provision of the law on which the certification is based. The exclusivity amendment I have submitted is intended to reinforce the legislative intent of the bill. In 1978, when the bill was passed, the court was to be absolute when conducting electronic surveillance against Americans for foreign intelligence purposes. Unfortunately, despite the 1978 language, the Bush administration decided it could go outside the law. That was both wrong and unnecessary. To make matters worse, the administration made up an argument that Congress had authorized it to go around FISA by some passing the authorization for use of military force against al-Qaida and the Taliban. Does anyone here actually believe that? I do not know one Member of Congress who has stated publicly that they believed they were authorizing the terrorist surveillance program when they voted to go to war against bin Laden. In fact, to the contrary, it was never considered and to the best of my knowledge it was never thought of. When the Department of Justice came to the Congress in September 2001, outlining the changes it needed in FISA to wage this war, it did not mention anything about surveillance efforts such as those the TSP program addressed. Congressional intent from 1978 is clear. Congress clearly intended for FISA to be the exclusive authority under which the executive branch may conduct electronic surveillance. Let me briefly review the history, because it is important. Congress wrote, in 1978, in report language accompanying FISA: Despite any inherent power by the President to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance in the absence of legislation, by this bill and chapter 119 of title 18, Congress will have legislated with regard to electronic surveillance in the United States, that legislation, with its procedures and safeguards prohibit the President, notwithstanding any inherent powers, notwithstanding any inherent powers-- Which means AUMF, article II of the Constitution That is a quote. The legislative history continues by describing the Supreme Court's decision in the Keith case, in which the Court ruled at that time Congress hadn't ruled in this field, and simply left the Presidential powers where it found them. But at this point the legislative history turns. The 1978 language responded to the Keith case and said this: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, however, does not simply leave Presidential powers where it finds them. To the contrary, this bill would substitute a clear legislative authorization pursuant to statutory, not constitutional, standards. I want the record to show here the clear understanding in 1978 that FISA was the exclusive authority. That was the report language accompanying H.R. 7138 as it passed the 95th Congress. President Carter signed the bill. His signing statement said this: This bill requires, for the first time, a prior judicial warrant from all electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes in the United States in which communications of U.S. persons might be intercepted. That is pretty clear, on the part of the President who signed the bill, and the House and the Senate that passed that bill, what the intention was. The Intelligence Committee bill before us reiterates the 1978 exclusivity language, but I believe this needs to be strengthened in light of the article II and the AUMF arguments that this administration has been making. I am going to introduce this amendment at this time. This language closes loopholes that this Department of Justice squeezed through, to claim that the AUMF was an authorized exception to the FISA. It clearly was not. The amendment does this by tightening language in FISA, and in title 18 of the criminal code, making clear that future Presidents should not try to read between the lines in future legislation for authorization to go outside of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It also provides more specificity in what must be included in written requests or directives to telecommunications authorities for them to legally provide assistance. It is clear from the recent history that this is necessary. In fact, the whole issue of whether telecom immunity is needed is because past certifications have not been clear. I couldn't support a bill that did not clearly reestablish the primacy of FISA. I tried to do it in committee. I thought it was done in committee. It was not included in the base bill. The Republican side would not go along with it. I once again submit it. To me it is vital, and my vote on the bill was, at least 50 percent, based on this exclusivity provision. Now, if I may, may I mention telecom immunity and submit an amendment? I voted for telecom immunity in the committee. I am not inclined to vote for it, to be candid with you, unless this amendment is adopted. So let me begin by talking about the immunity provision of the bill. It is not as expansive as some would make it sound. The language would only cover cases where the Attorney General certifies that the defendant companies received written requests or directives from top levels of the Government for their assistance. In other words, the Government, in writing, I stress in writing, assured those companies that the program was legal, the President had authorized the program, and that its legality has been approved by the Attorney General. The legislation does not provide immunity for criminal wrongdoing, nor does the legislation provide liability relief for any Government official such as that the Director of National Intelligence had requested in April. No individual immunity of anyone in the government is included in this bill. There are approximately 40 cases pending in the Ninth Circuit. The companies in these cases are prevented from making their own defense. I do not know if Members understand the full importance of this. They are prevented from responding to inaccurate news articles, inaccurate press releases, they cannot come before the Congress and testify in public, they cannot respond to anything that is said in the public sector, and they are prevented from defending themselves in court. These defendants have to sit by and listen to what they consider to be misrepresentations, and they cannot respond to these misrepresentations. So, in effect, they are handcuffed and gagged by the administration's claim of state secrets. This is a matter of fairness. These companies have no financial motives in providing assistance to the Government. In fact, they incurred a substantial risk in doing so. They were given written requests, legal assurances in the weeks after September 11. The letters went out within 5 weeks of September 11, when we all feared this Nation might suffer additional attacks. In fact, evidence has come to light to indicate the second wave of attacks involving the West Coast was being planned. It was this administration, not the companies, that made a flawed legal determination. It was this administration that withheld its activities from the Congress for 4 long years. It was this administration that decided not to go to the FISA Court. They could have gone to the FISA Court. They could have asked for a program warrant, which they subsequently got. They could have put this program under FISA coverage, which it now is, which they did not at the time. It has been pointed out that there is a longstanding common law provision that allows citizens to rely on the assumption that the Government acted legally when it asks a private citizen or a company to assist it for the common good. All that is required is that the citizen act in good faith. So the question is whether the small number of people, and it was a small number of people, who were actually cleared in a classified sense, to deal with this, of these companies, were acting in good faith and whether it was reasonable for them to determine that the assistance, in fact, it provided was legal. A small number of telecom officials were acting under the cloak of secrecy and a directive not to disclose the Government's request. They are not experts on article II of the Constitution. The amendment I am going to submit would put before the FISA Court the question of whether the telecommunications companies should, in fact, receive immunity based on the law. The FISA Court would be required to act, en banc, and how this is, is 15 judges, Federal judges, appointed by the Chief Justice, they sit 24/7, and this is all they do, they would act en banc. They would look at the following: Did the letters sent to the carriers which were repeated virtually every 35 to 45 days over the last 4 to 5 years, did the letters sent to the carriers meet the conditions of law. Section 2511 of title 18 clearly states that a certification from the Government is required in cases where there is no court order. That is the only two ways that FISA allows this to proceed, by written certification or by court order. The Government has to certify in writing that all statutory requirements for the company's assistance have been met. So the FISA Court would first look at whether the letter sent to the companies met the terms of this law. The court would then look at, if the companies provided assistance, was it done in good faith and pursuant to a belief that the compliance was legal. Finally, the FISA Court would ask: Did the defendants actually provide assistance? If the FISA Court finds that defendant did not provide any assistance to the Government or that the assistance either met the legal requirements of the law or was reasonably and in good faith, the immunity provision would apply. If the FISA Court finds that none of these requirements were met, immunity would not apply to the defendant companies. I think the merit of this approach is it preserves judicial review, the method we look at in order to decide questions of legality. Now, the bulk of the Members of this body, probably 90 percent of them, have not been able to see the written certification, so you do not know what was there. What we ask in this amendment is: FISA Court, you take a look at these letters, and you make a ruling as to whether they essentially meet the certification requirements of the FISA law. Therefore, there is judicial review to determine whether, under existing law, this immunity should be forthcoming. It is a narrowing of the immunity provisions of the Intelligence bill. I think it makes sense. I read the letters. I am a layperson, I am not a lawyer. I cannot say whether they met the immunity provisions. Others can say that. But it should be up to a court to make that decision. It seems to me that if the FISA Court finds that none of these requirements were met, immunity would not apply to the defendant companies. The FISA Court of Review stated in 2002 that the President has article II authorities to conduct surveillance. The article II authority is the big rub in all this. The collection under this program was directed overwhelmingly at foreign targets. But no court has addressed this issue since FISA was enacted in 1978. And, candidly, I think the time has come to see whether the President's article II authority--and the FISA Court would be the first judge of this--in fact, supersedes the article II authority based on the reading that I had given you of FISA Court passage in 1978. So essentially that is the amendment I would like to send to the desk at this time which narrows the immunity provision of the FISA law. I thank the clerk for receiving the amendment. In sum, I have tried to pay a great deal of attention to this. I tried to do my due diligence, both as a member of the Judiciary Committee and the Intelligence Committee. I truly do believe electronic surveillance is vital in the war against terror. I believe it is the most likely way we learn what is being planned for the future and have an opportunity to prevent it from happening. I truly believe there are people who would do this Nation grievous injury and harm if they are given the opportunity to do it, and I think the telecom communities did depend on the good faith of the head of the National Security Agency and the Attorney General and the requests from the highest levels of Government. The question is, Did they comply with the law? And so the amendment I have suggested would give the FISA Court the opportunity to make a ruling as to whether, in fact, they did comply with the law. The second amendment would strengthen the exclusivity provisions of the FISA law so we never again, hopefully, will find ourselves in the same situation. I look for a vote on both those amendments, and I thank the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the Judiciary Committee and Senator Nelson for supporting my amendment on exclusivity. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Nelson of Florida be added as a cosponsor of the FISA Court evaluation on the immunity question amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Webb.) Without objection, it is so ordered.", u"Mr. President, I would first just express my appreciation for the thoughtfulness and eloquence of the Senator from Maryland. I think she has analyzed the matter very well and has called us to a compromise agreement that we should rally around and pass--an agreement that will protect our country and also protect our liberty; and that is, the agreement that came out of the Intelligence Committee 13 to 2. It is the kind of agreement that reflects weeks, even months, of study, both of law and of technology. Our Intelligence Committee, more than our Judiciary Committee, of which I am a member, was deeply involved in exactly what is being done in foreign intelligence and how it was being done. They studied it carefully. There are a lot of members of the Intelligence Committee who would not hesitate to object if they thought what was being done was in error or certainly if it violated our Constitution. As a result, we have moved forward with their bill. Unfortunately, the Senate Judiciary Committee that had referral on the matter has now come forward with additional ideas and proposals that are not wise, in my view. We did not spend nearly as much time on the matter. We are not nearly as involved and knowledgeable of the details of what has gone on as the Intel Committee is. I believe we should not move forward on the Judiciary Committee bill. I opposed it in committee and remain in opposition to it. With regard to this matter of immunity for our telecom companies that cooperated with the President, the Senator from Maryland has explained how we got to this point. Mr. President, 9/11 occurred. We had a 9/11 Commission that said we did not have good intelligence, we did not share the intelligence we had correctly, we were not analyzing properly the intelligence we had, and we ought to do much better with regard to intelligence. That was a uniform view, and the President authorized these programs, some of which basically had been authorized for years and had never been considered to be improper in any way. Government officials met with the telecom providers and asked for their assistance because the Government does not handle these communications systems. It is private companies that do. These companies were given a legal statement from the Attorney General that said the President had declared their cooperation to be important to national security, that it was legal, and asked them to help. Now, we discussed the basic principle in the Judiciary Committee at some length, and I would like to go back to it. The basic principle that has been embedded in our law for hundreds of years, from our British heritage, is that a citizen--when called upon by a law officer, the gendarme, the Federal official, or the State law officer who has apparent legal authority, to help in a situation involving a danger in the community--that citizen should respond. OK. How have we dealt with that? We are so committed to that fundamental principle that we have embedded in our common law the concept that if the Government official was in error and should not have asked the citizen to do something--an example would be where somebody is running from a building, and apparently, a burglary has occurred. Several uniformed police officers are chasing the apparent burglar. They ask a citizen to help. The citizen assaults, tackles, and holds the person he has been told to try to capture. He helps the police officers capture that person, and it turns out he is not the burglar, but an innocent person. It is absolutely clear as a matter of Anglo-American law--this is not some new deal; this is our heritage--that the citizen is not responsible and cannot be held legally liable because the only question is: Was he or she responding to what appeared to be a legitimate request by the Government to assist them? So that is the deal. That is what our telecom companies did. More than that, they did not just respond to some police officer in uniform, they did not just respond to a military officer or a National Guardsman or a Coast Guardsman to help, they responded to the Attorney General of the United States of America requesting in a formal letter saying that he was authorized by the President of the United States to ask for their assistance to preserve and protect the safety of American citizens. They were given assurance that what they were being asked to do by the Attorney General was lawful. How could we possibly suggest that these companies now are going to be rightfully sued for money damages? It is unthinkable we would allow that to happen. It would contradict our fundamental principles as a country. They say: Well, how do we know? We need to have a lawsuit. Well, we have all kinds of telecom communications statutes that we have imposed over the years. Apparently, a court, in reviewing these matters, interpreted one of these statutes in a way that rendered the procedures then utilized under the request of the White House incorrect. The court did not say that the program could not be done, but that it had to be done using different techniques and different procedures. But the practical effect of that decision, it turns out, was to make it impossible for those techniques to be continued to be used. You just could not do it. As a practical matter, you could not continue to conduct the surveillance the Intelligence community said was required. So the net result was we passed the Protect America Act this summer so the surveillance could continue because we, after great study, concluded it was needed and basically a lawful procedure. We passed the Protect America Act that allowed it to continue. So I want to go back to say, the fact there was an alteration in the way this process was ongoing does not mean American companies that agreed to be supportive of the Attorney General and the President of the United States in a time of national emergency ought to have been sued. The person responsible if there was an error was the Government, not the companies--the Government. And many of these matters are very complex. If we now are going to place the burden on the CEO or the legal counsel of every company in America to conduct their own independent research as to whether a request to participate in helping to defend America is constitutional, and they now are required to go beyond a certified letter from the Attorney General of the United States and have their lawyers express their own opinion, we are at a point where we are not going to get help in the future. It is just that simple. So I think we ought to be careful about it. In fact, in the letter Senator Hatch has referred to, which is a Statement of Administration Policy--what they call a SAP--issued today by the Executive Office of the President, the President's advisors indicate they would recommend to the President that this important, critical legislation be vetoed if certain objectionable matters are in it. One of the matters they are concerned about is this question of liability. I would like to read from page 4 from that SAP that deals with this issue. It sets out the question clearly. It says: In contrast to the Senate Intelligence Committee bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee substitute would not protect electronic communication service providers who are alleged to have assisted the Government with communications intelligence activities in the aftermath of September 11th from potentially debilitating lawsuits. Providing liability protection to these companies is a just result. In its Conference Report, the Senate Intelligence Committee ``concluded that the providers . . . had a good faith basis for responding to the requests for assistance they received.'' That was a bipartisan vote, 13 to 2. Senator Rockefeller, the Democratic chairman, and Senator Bond, the ranking Republican, and all members voted on that language. I am still quoting now from this SAP: The Committee further recognized that ``the Intelligence Community cannot obtain the intelligence it needs without assistance from these companies.'' In other words, we cannot get this intelligence without the cooperation of these companies, for heaven's sake. This is not a matter of dispute. This is an absolutely undeniable fact. It goes on to say: Companies in the future may be less willing to assist the Government if they face the threat of private lawsuits each time they are alleged to have provided assistance. The Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that: ``The possible reduction in intelligence that might result from this delay is simply unacceptable for the safety of our Nation.'' It is unacceptable. This SAP goes on to say: Allowing continued litigation also risks the disclosure of highly classified information regarding intelligence sources and methods. In addition to providing an advantage to our adversaries by revealing sources and methods during the course of litigation, the potential disclosure of classified information puts both the facilities and personnel of electronic communication service providers and our country's continued ability to protect our homeland at risk. It is imperative that Congress provide liability protection to those who cooperated with this country in its hour of need. It goes on to say this: The ramifications of the Judiciary Committee's decision to afford no relief to private parties that cooperated in good faith with the U.S. Government in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11 could extend well beyond the particular issues and activities that have been of primary interest and concern to the Committee. The Intelligence Community, as well as law enforcement and homeland security agencies, continue to rely on the voluntary cooperation and assistance of private parties. A decision by the Senate to abandon those who may have provided assistance after September 11 will invariably be noted by those who may someday be called upon again to help the Nation. I think that is indisputable. So I do not know how we got to a place where we are supporting an effort by some to allow these companies, these good corporate citizens, to be sued. I know it is being driven by a lot of leftist, the ``blame America first'' folks who seek to undo every single thing that is done to protect America from attack by foreign adversaries. They go through it. They attempt to find anything that can be complained about, and we end up having a big debate on these issues. But these matters have serious consequences. So I would say to my colleagues, we did not deny moveon.org any right to be heard. They have been heard--moveon.org, that's the organization that declared our fabulous General Petraeus to be a betrayer. But we have listened to all of their complaints. We have listened to the ACLU. The Intelligence Committee has spent months looking at it. The Department of Justice has been involved in it. The Senate Judiciary Committee has been involved in it. I would submit we have found that these surveillance procedures are not an extreme thing, that this is all consistent with the law of America and that it is legitimate in the way it was done. We ratified these procedures just this summer in the Protect America Act. I said a little earlier this morning that I know it is too much to expect that we would apologize to our security officers and the President for saying--as some have done--that they violated our Constitution to do these procedures because, after all this debate and effort, we have now passed laws, including the Protect America Act, that allows them to continue. If they are so horrible, why did we overwhelmingly vote to allow them to continue? I would say there was nothing fundamentally wrong with what was being done to begin with. This was necessary and legitimate. One more thought I wish to share on the basic question of surveillance abroad is this: American citizens abroad are protected by a rather strong Presidential order--Executive Order 12333--that protects them from surveillance without probable cause having been shown. It is a pretty strong order. Why have we never had the Supreme Court, which has ruled on surveillance in the United States, declare its power on the issue of surveillance abroad? Think about this: Can the Supreme Court--can a Federal judge in America approve a surveillance, electronic surveillance in a foreign country of an American citizen? The answer is, no, because they don't have jurisdiction. Federal judges don't have jurisdiction in France or Russia or Afghanistan. If you don't have jurisdiction to authorize a surveillance, you don't have jurisdiction to issue warrants or to assert jurisdiction at all, and that is the way it has always been interpreted. But because people were concerned about American citizens abroad, President Reagan issued an Executive order that controls those situations and that is being followed today. So I wish to say we need to be careful about our thought processes as we go forward. There has never, ever been any doubt that an American intelligence operative can surveil foreign persons abroad whom they believe may pose a threat to the United States or may possess information valuable to the United States. That has never been in doubt. So as we go through with this, I hope we will listen to the work of the Intelligence Committee. I think, for the most part, it is a pretty good bill. Their bill is something I can support. It has some things in it I don't believe are necessary that put restrictions on our efforts to make sure our officials don't overreach. We can create safeguards in a bipartisan way, and I hope we will. But in truth, we need to pass legislation soon because the current bill, the Protect America Act, expires in February. I went out a few weeks ago to the National Security Agency and got a full briefing, as a number of Senators have, on what is being done there. I was so proud of our personnel. These are fabulous Americans. The suggestions that have been made by some that they are sitting out there trying to listen in on somebody's private conversation about Christmas from Paris or Afghanistan is beyond reality. They are out there trying to protect America. They are looking to see if they have any information that they can legally pick up that would indicate an attack may be imminent or that people are plotting to attack the United States. So I thank the Chair. I hope we will move forward with this legislation based on the Intel bill and that we will reject efforts to deny liability protection to Americans who serve our country. Also, I hope we will reject the Wyden language in the Intel bill because I think it goes far too far in constricting the ability of our intelligence personnel to do their job, and it is not legally or constitutionally required. I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, on numerous occasions in the FISA debate, we have seen dramatic fear mongering. Many individuals, particularly on partisan blogs, are spreading misleading and malicious information in order to incite fear of alleged governmental activities. This bill should not include text which panders to people who believe in imaginary Government conspiracies. There is such a thing as irrational fear of Government. Let's not forget, our Government did not kill thousands of innocent Americans on September 11. Our Government did not kill hundreds of people in car bombings in U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Our Government did not kill 191 people in the Madrid train bombings. Our Government did not kill 52 people in the London train bombings. Our Government did not kill 202 people in suicide bombings Bali, Indonesia. The indisputable fact is terrorists have committed heinous attacks on Americans and have pledged themselves to conduct more. It is not politics of fear to acknowledge this. If we bury our heads in the sand and pass legislation that ignores these risks, we make ourselves and all our people more vulnerable. I will not stand by and see Congress pass laws which could create vulnerabilities for our people, vulnerabilities which expose our families and our friends to danger. Let me tell you what our Government does to protect us. It hires the finest men and women of this great country to utilize their skills to help prevent these types of attacks. Our job in Congress is to make sure these people who have sworn to defend us have the necessary tools to try and prevent terrorist attacks. What they don't need are laws with ambiguous language, as has been proposed, making their jobs more difficult. One of my colleagues previously stated: The authority in this bill greatly expands the Government's ability to conduct surveillance of foreign targets. How in the world he can make that statement, I don't understand. The only great expansion I see in this bill is judicial jurisdiction. In fact, I am amazed we don't rename the bill the unlimited expansion of judicial authority act. We have advocated so much new responsibility for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that I wonder whether people realize that court is composed of only 11 judges. Where is this great expansion in surveillance authority that has been argued on the floor? Since FISA was passed in 1978, the Government has been able to target terrorists overseas. This bill amends FISA so we can continue to target foreign terrorists when they utilize communications over a wire, not just communications over radio or satellite. This does not sound to me like a great expansion. Maybe that is why the Government has continued to say FISA needed to be ``modernized,'' not that it needed to be greatly expanded. There is, however, a key expansion in the bill. It is a statutory warrant requirement when targeting U.S. persons, regardless of who they are, what they have done or where they are located. Notice I said U.S. persons, not U.S. citizens. This idea may sound great to everyone, but we should realize, with eyes wide open, what this means. We have heard some individuals claim the Government could use the power of the Protect America Act to spy on innocent Americans. We have heard the fear mongering that the Government can spy on innocent Americans when they travel overseas. We have heard all about American families on vacation overseas in the Caribbean or in Europe. We have even heard our Government could spy on American military members who are overseas defending our country. I find these scare tactics not only ridiculous but extremely offensive. They walk a fine line in seemingly questioning the integrity and the judgment of these fine men and women who work for us and who don't have a political agenda, who have dedicated their professional lives to prevent catastrophic attacks on Americans. Do we think our intelligence analysts are sitting around waiting for the Smith family to go on their family vacation to Italy so they can tap their cell phones? Give me a break. To imply that our country's intelligence analysts are more concerned with random innocent Americans than foreign terrorists overseas is a slap in the face to the people who protect our Nation. Our Government is focusing their attention on terrorists who wish us death, not on innocent Americans. When some decry the lack of statutory protection for Americans overseas in the Protect America Act, I wonder if they realize the 1978 FISA law itself provides no statutory protections for Americans overseas. Yet we have called that the gold standard all these years. I would, however, tell my colleagues that Americans overseas are protected by the most important document in the history of our great Nation, and that is the U.S. Constitution. The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides protection from unreasonable search and seizure. That is the question. Is it always unreasonable for the Government to target an American overseas without a court order? Of course not. I would suggest the process that has worked for 26 years is the best approach. It is Executive Order 12333. Since 1981, the Government could only target Americans overseas if the Attorney General determined via probable cause that the American was an agent of a foreign power. Do we think an intelligence analyst is going to disregard an executive order and wiretap innocent Americans overseas? Of course not. Now, with the policy change included in both the Intelligence and Judiciary bills, I want to give an example of how this provision will apply in real life. Adam Gadahn is an American citizen from Orange County, CA. He is also one of the FBI's most wanted terrorists now believed to be living overseas. He has been indicted for treason and providing material support to al-Qaida. Here is what he said: The streets of America shall run red with blood . . . casualties will be too many to count and the next wave of attacks may come at any moment. He has appeared on multiple al-Qaida propaganda tapes. Here is another quote: The magnitude and ferocity of what is coming your way will make you forget all about September 11. Here is something that should make all Americans scratch their heads. Before September 11, the Government would not need a warrant to target this criminal. After September 11, the Government would not need a warrant to target Gadahn. But after this bill is signed, the Government will be required to get a warrant to target Gadahn. This bill does require that. Let's explain that one to the American public. Would a warrantless interception of Gadahn's communications be ``unreasonable'' under the fourth amendment? Of course not. But we are requiring something that even the Founding Fathers did not--a warrant for all electronic searches of U.S. persons. Now I understand the administration is willing to accept a modified version of this amendment that does not include unintended consequences. It is yet another example of how far this proposal goes to satisfy determined detractors who never seem to be satisfied that we are doing enough to ``protect'' innocent Americans. I am also amazed at the false descriptions floating around the Internet of the program which the President described on December 17, 2005, during a radio address. We have all heard the terms: ``warrantless wiretapping'' or ``domestic spying.'' But let's look at what the President actually said during his radio address on December 17, 2005. This is what he said: In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our Nation, I authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution, to intercept the international communications of people with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations. Before we intercept these communications, the government must have information that establishes a clear link to these terrorist networks. Now I do not see anything in this statement about domestic spying. I thought the definition of the word ``domestic'' was pretty clear. If the program intercepted communications in which at least one party was overseas, not to mention a member of al-Qaida, then it seems fairly obvious that the calls were not domestic. Here, as shown on this chart, is a call from the United States of America to overseas; or a call from overseas to the United States of America. Is that a domestic call? I hardly think so. Is this such a hard concept to grasp? The last time I flew overseas, I did not fly on a domestic flight. I flew on an international flight. ``Domestic spying'' may sound catchy and mysterious, but it is a completely inaccurate way to describe the terrorist surveillance program. Why don't the partisan blogs describe it as ``international spying''? Isn't that a more accurate description? I guess accurate descriptions take a back seat to terms which incite fear and distrust in our Government. Since so many are so interested in the opinion of the FISC, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, on these matters, I wish to draw attention to a recent decision. On Tuesday, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court denied a motion by the ACLU for release of court records related to alleged NSA surveillance programs. This FISC opinion was publicly released, which is only the third time in the entire history of the FISC in which this has occurred. Given the rarity of this event--this issued public opinion that denied a motion by the ACLU for the release of court records related to alleged NSA surveillance programs--I want to highlight a few sentences from that ruling: [T]he identification of targets and methods of surveillance would permit adversaries to evade surveillance, conceal their activities, and possibly mislead investigators through false information. Public identification of targets, and those in communication with them, would also likely result in harassment of, or more grievous injury to, persons who might be exonerated after full investigation. Disclosures about confidential sources of information would chill current and potential sources from providing information, and might put some in personal jeopardy. Disclosure of some forms of intelligence gathering could harm national security in other ways, such as damaging relations with foreign governments. All these possible harms are real and significant, and, quite frankly, beyond debate. Now, that is in re: Motion for release of court records of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, December 7 of this year. I think we can all agree this is a vitally important public opinion from the FISA, and I commend it to my colleagues. Regardless of how we came to this moment, it is time to do what is right for our country. The time has come for us to work together. We all know it is going to take bipartisan support to get this legislation passed. Let's represent our constituents with our heads held high, knowing we are doing our very best to balance the necessity for protections of civil liberties with the need to keep American families safe from deadly attacks. We owe our people this much. I hope we can continue to work, as the Intelligence Committee did, in a bipartisan way to resolve these very difficult problems. I have to say that the 13-to-2 bipartisan approach is one of the highlights of this year. It is probably the best example of bipartisanship we have this year. I have to tell you, to try to change that with some of the language from the Judiciary Committee--where it was a pure partisan vote on both sides--to try to change that is not the way to do it. So I hope our colleagues will realize that in the Intelligence Committee, in a bipartisan way, we have worked together to come up with the ways of solving these very technical and difficult problems, and to do so in the best traditions of the intelligence community, in the best traditions of gathering intelligence information, and in the best traditions of protecting our country that this country has ever known. Frankly, I compliment the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and my fellow Senators on the committee, Democrats and Republicans, who were willing to put partisanship aside and pass that bill 13 to 2 out of that committee. Mr. President, I notice my dear friend from Florida is desirous to speak on the floor, so I will withhold my further remarks and turn the time over to him. I yield the floor.", u"``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES ``Sec. 105D. (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not later than 7 days after an application is submitted under section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e), the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-- ``(1) in the case of an application, a copy of the application, including the certification made under section 105B(b)(1); and ``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order, including the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E). ``(b) Quarterly Audits.-- ``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a) the results of such audit, including, for each order authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under section 105B-- ``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such order that were later determined to be located in the United States; ``(B) the number of persons located in the United States whose communications have been acquired under such order; ``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated containing information on a United States person that was collected under such order; and ``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose communications were acquired under such order. ``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a report containing the results of such audit. ``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the previous 120-day period. Each report submitted under this section shall include a description of any incidents of non- compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e), including incidents of non-compliance by-- ``(1) an element of the intelligence community with minimization procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(i); ``(2) an element of the intelligence community with procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(ii); ``(3) an element of the intelligence community with guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and ``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance under such order. ``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing the number of emergency authorizations of acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization under such section. ``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' means-- ``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; ``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.''. Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) In any case where the court established under subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any orders related to such matter.''. (a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of communications conducted without a court order on or after September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance Program referred to by the President in a radio address on December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers, and court orders. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report containing the results of such audit, including all documents acquired pursuant to conducting such audit. (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the investigation and adjudication of an application by the Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as possible. (a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track of-- (1) the instances where the identity of a United States person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) that collected the communications to other departments or agencies of the United States; and (2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed. (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created under subsection (a), including the number of instances referred to in paragraph (1). There are authorized to be appropriated the Department of Justice, for the activities of the Office of the Inspector General, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and other appropriate elements of the National Security Division, and the National Security Agency such sums as may be necessary to meet the personnel and information technology demands to ensure the timely and efficient processing of-- (1) applications and other submissions to the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)); (2) the audit and reporting requirements under-- (A) section 105D of such Act; and (B) section 7; and (3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements under section 8. (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information. (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.-- Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific statutory authorization shall be the only exception to subsection (a). (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the following new items: (a) Sunset of New Provisions.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), effective on December 31, 2009-- (A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) are hereby repealed; and (B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D. (2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any authorization or order issued under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization or order. (b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.-- (1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of enactment, whichever is earlier. (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law 110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations, including-- (A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be located in the United States; (B) the number of persons located in the United States whose communications have been acquired under such section; (C) the number of reports disseminated containing information on a United States person that was collected under such section; (D) the number of applications submitted for approval of electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and (E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with an authorization under such section, including incidents of non-compliance by-- (i) an element of the intelligence community with procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section; (ii) an element of the intelligence community with minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of such section; and (iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section. (3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection, the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).", u"Mr. President, last week, the Judiciary Committee held an important hearing. That hearing should be the beginning of the process of congressional oversight into what has been called ``the President's program.'' This is a domestic spying program into emails and telephone calls of Americans without a judge's approval, apparently conducted by the National Security Agency. Having participated in the hearing and reviewed the transcript of the Attorney General's testimony, I understand the fear that this administration is engaged in an elaborate cover-up of illegality. I urge them to come clean with us and the American people. Perhaps their recent change of course and briefings with the full Intelligence Committees of the Senate and House will be a start. We need the whole truth not self-serving rationalizations. Since our hearing the Bush administration has had to adjust its course. That is good. They have had to acknowledge that they cannot simply ignore Congress and keep us in the dark about this illegal spying program. The classified briefings of the Intelligence Committees are a first step but cannot be used to cover up the facts through secrecy and arbitrary limitations. That is unacceptable. This domestic spying program has raised serious concern, not only among Democrats and Republicans here in Congress, but also among the Federal judges providing oversight over terrorist surveillance and even high-ranking Justice Department officials. I commend Chairman Specter for beginning this investigation. He and I have a long history of conducting vigorous bipartisan oversight investigations. If the Senate is to serve its constitutional role as a real check on the Executive, thoroughgoing oversight is essential. Today, Chairman Specter has announced a second Judiciary Committee hearing will be held on February 28. We expect by then to have received answers to the written questions that have already been sent to the Attorney General. The question facing us is not whether the Government should have all the tools it needs to protect the American people. Of course it should. The terrorist threat to America's security remains very real, and it is vital that we be armed with the tools needed to protect Americans' security. That is why I coauthored the PATRIOT Act 5 years ago. That is why we have amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act five times since 9/11 to provide more flexibility. And that is why within days of the despicable attacks we passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force on September 14, 2001, to send the United States Armed Forces into Afghanistan to get those who planned and carried out the vicious attacks on September 11. We all agree that we should be wiretapping al-Qaida terrorists. Congress has given the President authority to wiretap legally, with checks to guard against abuses when Americans' conversations and email are being monitored. But instead, the President has chosen to proceed outside the law, without those safeguards. He has done so in a way that is illegal and illogical. It remains confusing that the Attorney General testified last week that the Bush administration has limited ``the President's program'' of illegal wire taps to calls with an international component. The administration's rationale is not limited to calls and emails with an international component or to know al-Qaida operatives. It sounded at our hearing as if what the Bush Attorney General and former White House counsel was saying is that this particular ``program'' is limited because they were afraid of public outrage. The Attorney General said as much to Senator Kohl and confirmed to Senator Biden that the Bush administration does not suggest that the President's powers are limited by the Constitution to foreign calls. Their descriptions of the President's program seem to have more to do with public relations than anything else. It was even branded with a new name in the last few days after it has been known for years as simply ``the President's program.'' Senator Feinstein was right to observe after the Attorney General dodged and weaved and would not directly answer her questions: ``I can only believe--and this is my honest view--that this program is much bigger and much broader than you want anyone to know.'' The Attorney General's strenuous efforts to limit the hearing to ``those facts the President has publicly confirmed'' and ``the program that I am here testifying about today'' suggest that all of us must be skeptical about the secret games the Attorney General was playing through controlling the definition of ``the program'' to include only what he understood to exist at the beginning of last week. Senator Feinstein was not fooled. None of us should be. Such limiting definitions are what the Bush Administration used to redefine ``torture'' in order to say that we do not engage in ``torture'' as they redefined it. These are the word games of coverup and deception. It is not al-Qaida surprised that our Government eavesdrops on its telephone calls and emails. Al-Qaida knows that we eavesdrop and wiretap. It is the American people who are surprised and deceived by the President's program of secret surveillance on them without a judge's approval for the last 5 years--especially, after the Attorney General, the Justice Department, the head of the NSA and the President have all reassured the American people over and over that their rights are being respected--when they are not. I wish the President had effectively utilized the authority Congress did grant in the Authorization for the Use of Military Force in September 2001 to get Osama bin Laden and those responsible for the terrible attacks on September 11. That resolution was what it said it was, authorization to send troops to Afghanistan to get those responsible for 9/11. President Bush should have gotten Osama bin Laden when Congress authorized him to use our military might against al-Qaida in 2001 in Afghanistan. Instead of pursuing him to the end, he pulled our best forces out of the fight and diverted them to preparing for his invasion of Iraq. Last week the Attorney General left key questions unanswered and left impressions that are chilling. Under his approach, there is no limit to the power the President could claim for so long as we face a threat of terrorism. That is a real threat, which we have long faced and will continue to face for years if not decades toe. The Attorney General's testimony only hinted at the full dimensions of the Bush administration's illegality. He would not reassure us that Americans' domestic calls, emails, or first class mail have not been illegally spied upon. He sought to choose his words carefully to say that he was only willing to speak about the President's ``program'' as it existed that day. That means we do not yet know the full dimensions of the program as it has evolved over time from 2001 to today. That means we do not know what other illegal activities the Bush administration is still endeavoring to hide from us. Along with other Senators I asked about the lack of any limit to the legal rationale the Bush administration has embraced. Their rationalization for their actions is rationalization for any action. Under their view of the President's power, he can order houses and businesses searched without a warrant. Americans can be detained indefinitely. Detainees can be tortured. Property could be seized. Their rational is a prescription for lawlessness and the opposite of the rule of law. Regrettably, the Attorney General's testimony last week left much to be desired. He did not provide convincing answers to basic questions, relevant information or the relevant underlying documents. Facts are a dangerous thing in a coverup. They are seeking to rewrite history and the law and control the facts that Congress can know. The Bush administration refusal to provide the contemporaneous evidence of what the Congress and the Bush administration were indicating to each other regarding what the Authorization for the Use of Military Force was intended to mean, speaks volumes. Does anyone think that if they had any evidence in support of their after-the-fact rationalization they would hesitate to provide it, to trumpet it from the highest media mountain? Of course not. Their failure to provide the information we asked for is not based on any claim of privilege, nor could it be. It is just a deafening, damning silence. So what is so secret about precisely when they came to this legal view, this rationalization of their conduct? Could it have come after the illegal conduct had been initiated? Could it have come after the President sought to immunize and sanitize the illegal conduct? Could it have come months or years later than the impression Attorney General Gonzales is attempting to create? Is that why the Bush administration is also refusing to provide to us the formal legal opinions of our Government, the binding opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel from 2001 and 2004 that we have also requested? Would review of those opinions show that the after-the-fact legal rationalizations changed over time and in 2001 were not those that the Attorney General has repackaged for public consumption in their current public relations campaign? Now that we know of the existence of the years-old secret domestic spying program that included the warrantless wiretapping of thousands of Americans, the Bush administration says that we should just trust them. That is a blind trust this administration has not earned. We have seen this administration's infamous and short-lived ``Total Information Awareness'' program and know how disastrous the FBI's Carnivore and Trilogy computer programs have been. I have read recent reports of a secret Pentagon database containing information on a wide cross-section of ordinary Americans, including Quakers meeting in Florida and Vermont, and have gotten no satisfactory explanation of the Defense Department's Counterintelligence Field Activities that spy on law-abiding Americans. I read about a secret Homeland Security database and datamining activities, as well. Today we read about another database with the names of more than 325,000 terrorists but we do not know how many are Americans, how many are listed incorrectly or how the mistakes will be corrected. There are new and disturbing reports that the Defense Department and the FBI have been monitoring U.S. advocacy groups working on behalf of civil rights or against the continuing occupation of Iraq. This is all too reminiscent of the dark days when a Republican President compiled enemies lists and eavesdropped on political opponents and broke into doctors offices and used the vast power of the executive branch to violate the constitutional rights of Americans. That President resigned in disgrace after articles of impeachment were reported in the House of Representatives. I was first elected to the Senate in the aftermath of Watergate and the White House ``plumbers'' and the illegality that led to the impeachment inquiry of President Nixon. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was passed in 1978 as part of the reform and reaction to those abuses. It was enacted after decades of abuses by the Executive, including the wiretapping of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and other political opponents of earlier Government officials. It was enacted after the White House ``horrors'' of the Nixon years, during which another President asserted that whatever he did was legal because he was the President. The law has been extensively updated in accordance with the Bush administration's requests in the aftermath of 9/11 and has been modified further in the last 4 years. It is the governing law. The rule of law and freedoms we enjoy as Americans are principles upon which this Nation was founded and what we are defending and fighting for abroad. This type of covert spying on American citizens and targeted groups on American soil betrays those principles and it is unacceptable. What happens to the rule of law if those in power abuse it and only adhere to it selectively? What happens to our liberties when the government decides it would rather not follow the rules designed to protect our rights? What happens is that the terrorists are allowed to achieve a victory they could never achieve on the battlefield. We must not be intimidated into abandoning our fundamental values and treasured freedoms. We cannot let them scare us into giving up what defines us as Americans. There can be no accountability unless the Republican Congress begins to do its job and joins with us to demand real oversight and real answers. Senators take an oath of office, too. We swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, to bear true faith and allegiance to it, and to faithfully discharge our duties so help us God. Let each Senator fulfill that pledge and the Senate can resume its intended place in our democracy. Let us protect our national security and the national heritage of liberty for which so many have given so much.", u"Mr. President, Ms. Burlingame writes: A mere four-and-a-half years after victims were forced to choose between being burned alive and jumping from 90 stories, it is frankly shocking that there is anyone in Washington who would politicize the Patriot Act. It is an insult to those who died to tell the American people that the organization posing the greatest threat to their liberty is not al Qaeda but the FBI. Hearing any member of Congress actually crow about ``killing'' or ``playing chicken'' with this critical legislation is as disturbing today as it would have been when Ground Zero was still smoldering. Today we know in far greater detail what not having it cost us. She continues: The Senate will soon convene hearings on renewal of the Patriot Act-- And indeed we had those hearings-- She concludes: The public has listened to years of stinging revelations detailing how the government tied its own hands in stopping the devastating attacks of September 11. It is an irresponsible violation of the public trust for members of Congress to weaken the Patriot Act or jeopardize the NSA terrorist surveillance program because of the same illusory theories that cost us so dearly before, or worse, for rank partisan advantage. If they do, and our country sustains yet another catastrophic attack that these antiterrorism tools could have prevented, the phrase ``connect the dots'' will resonate again--but this time it will refer to the trail of innocent American blood which leads directly to the Senate floor. I urge my colleagues to heed the words of Ms. Burlingame. And today I join my voice with hers and the millions of Americans who are calling for us to do our duty and to do our utmost to protect this country and the American people. Mr. President, I yield the floor. One of the most excruciating images of the September 11 attacks is the sight of a man who was trapped in one of the World Trade Center towers. Stripped of his suit jacket and tie and hanging on to what appears to be his office curtains, he is seen trying to lower himself outside a window to the floor immediately below. Frantically kicking his legs in an effort to find a purchase, he loses his grip, and falls. That horrific scene and thousands more were the images that awakened a sleeping nation on that long, brutal morning. Instead of overwhelming fear or paralyzing self-doubt, the attacks were met with defiance, unity and a sense of moral purpose. Following the heroic example of ordinary citizens who put their fellow human beings and the public good ahead of themselves, the country's leaders cast aside politics and personal ambition and enacted the USA Patriot Act just 45 days later. A mere four-and-a-half years after victims were forced to choose between being burned alive and jumping from 90 stories, it is frankly shocking that there is anyone in Washington who would politicize the Patriot Act. It is an insult to those who died to tell the American people that the organization posing the greatest threat to their liberty is not al Qaeda but the FBI. Hearing any member of Congress actually crow about ``killing'' or ``playing chicken'' with this critical legislation is as disturbing today as it would have been when Ground Zero was still smoldering. Today we know in far greater detail what not having it cost us. Critics contend that the Patriot Act was rushed into law in a moment of panic. The truth is, the policies and guidelines it corrected had a long, troubled history and everybody who had to deal with them knew it. The ``wall'' was a tortuous set of rules promulgated by Justice Department lawyers in 1995 and imagined into law by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court. Conceived as an added protection for civil liberties provisions already built into the statute, it was the wall and its real-world ramifications that hardened the failure-to-share culture between agencies, allowing early information about 9/11 hijackers Khalid al- Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi to fall through the cracks. More perversely, even after the significance of these terrorists and their presence in the country was known by the FBI's intelligence division, the wall prevented it from talking to its own criminal division in order to hunt them down. Furthermore, it was the impenetrable FISA guidelines and fear of provoking the FISA court's wrath if they were transgressed that discouraged risk-averse FBI supervisors from applying for a FISA search warrant in the Zacarias Moussaoui case. The search, finally conducted on the afternoon of 9/11, produced names and phone numbers of people in the thick of the 9/11 plot, so many fertile clues that investigators believe that at least one airplane, if not all four, could have been saved. In 2002, FISA's appellate level Court of Review examined the entire statutory scheme for issuing warrants in national security investigations and declared the ``wall'' a nonsensical piece of legal overkill, based neither on express statutory language nor reasonable interpretation of the FISA statute. The lower court's attempt to micromanage the execution of national security warrants was deemed an assertion of authority which neither Congress or the Constitution granted it. In other words, those lawyers and judges who created, implemented and so assiduously enforced the FISA guidelines were wrong and the American people paid dearly for it. Despite this history, some members of Congress contend that this process-heavy court is agile enough to rule on quickly needed National Security Agency (NSA) electronic surveillance warrants. This is a dubious claim. Getting a FISA warrant requires a multistep review involving several lawyers at different offices within the Department of Justice. It can take days, weeks, even months if there is a legal dispute between the principals. ``Emergency'' 72-hour intercepts require sign-offs by NSA lawyers and preapproval by the attorney general before surveillance can be initiated. Clearly, this is not conducive to what Gen. Michael Hayden, principal deputy director of national intelligence, calls ``hot pursuit'' of al Qaeda conversations. The Senate will soon convene hearings on renewal of the Patriot Act and the NSA terrorist surveillance program. A minority of senators want to gamble with American lives and ``fix'' national security laws, which they can't show are broken. They seek to eliminate or weaken anti-terrorism measures which take into account that the Cold War and its slow-moving, analog world of landlines and stationary targets is gone. The threat we face today is a completely new paradigm of global terrorist networks operating in a high- velocity digital age using the Web and fiber-optic technology. After four-and-a-half years without another terrorist attack, these senators think we're safe enough to cave in to the same civil liberties lobby that supported that deadly FISA wall in the first place. What if they, like those lawyers and judges, are simply wrong? Meanwhile, the media, mouthing phrases like ``Article II authority,'' ``separation of powers'' and ``right to privacy,'' are presenting the issues as if politics have nothing to do with what is driving the subject matter and its coverage. They want us to forget four years of relentless ``connect-the-dots'' reporting about the missed chances that ``could have prevented 9/11.'' They have discounted the relevance of references to the two 9/11 hijackers who lived in San Diego. But not too long ago, the media itself reported that phone records revealed that five or six of the hijackers made extensive calls overseas. NBC News aired an ``exclusive'' story in 2004 that dramatically recounted how al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, the San Diego terrorists who would later hijack American Airlines flight 77 and fly it into the Pentagon, received more than a dozen calls from an al Qaeda ``switchboard'' inside Yemen where al-Mihdhar's brother-in-law lived. The house received calls from Osama Bin Laden and relayed them to operatives around the world. Senior correspondent Lisa Myers told the shocking story of how, ``The NSA had the actual phone number in the United States that the switchboard was calling, but didn't deploy that equipment, fearing it would be accused of domestic spying.'' Back then, the NBC script didn't describe it as ``spying on Americans.'' Instead, it was called one of the ``missed opportunities that could have saved 3,000 lives.'' Another example of opportunistic coverage concerns the Patriot Act's ``library provision.'' News reports have given plenty of ink and airtime to the ACLU's unsupported claims that the government has abused this important records provision. But how many Americans know that several of the hijackers repeatedly accessed computers at public libraries in New Jersey and Florida, using personal Internet accounts to carry out the conspiracy? Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi logged on four times at a college library in New Jersey where they purchased airline tickets for AA 77 and later confirmed their reservations on Aug. 30. In light of this, it is ridiculous to suggest that the Justice Department has the time, resources or interest in ``investigating the reading habits of law abiding citizens.'' We now have the ability to put remote control cameras on the surface of Mars. Why should we allow enemies to annihilate us simply because we lack the clarity or resolve to strike a reasonable balance between a healthy skepticism of government power and the need to take proactive measures to protect ourselves from such threats? The mantra of civil- liberties hard-liners is to ``question authority''--even when it is coming to our rescue--then blame that same authority when, hamstrung by civil liberties laws, it fails to save us. The old laws that would prevent FBI agents from stopping the next al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were built on the bedrock of a 35-year history of dark, defeating mistrust. More Americans should not die because the peace-at-any-cost fringe and antigovernment paranoids still fighting the ghost of Nixon hate George Bush more than they fear al Qaeda. Ask the American people what they want. They will say that they want the commander in chief to use all reasonable means to catch the people who are trying to rain terror on our cities. Those who cite the soaring principle of individual liberty do not appear to appreciate that our enemies are not seeking to destroy individuals, but whole populations. Three weeks before 9/11, an FBI agent with the bin Laden case squad in New York learned that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were in this country. He pleaded with the national security gatekeepers in Washington to launch a nationwide manhunt and was summarily told to stand down. When the FISA Court of Review tore down the wall in 2002, it included in its ruling the agent's Aug. 29, 2001, email to FBI headquarters: ``Whatever has happened to this--someday someone will die--and wall or not--the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain problems. Let's hope the National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, [bin Laden], is getting the most `protection.' '' The public has listened to years of stinging revelations detailing how the government tied its own hands in stopping the devastating attacks of September 11. It is an irresponsible violation of the public trust for members of Congress to weaken the Patriot Act or jeopardize the NSA terrorist surveillance program because of the same illusory theories that cost us so dearly before, or worse, for rank partisan advantage. If they do, and our country sustains yet another catastrophic attack that these antiterrorism tools could have prevented, the phrase ``connect the dots'' will resonate again--but this time it will refer to the trail of innocent American blood which leads directly to the Senate floor.", u"Thank you so much, Congresswoman Schmidt. I appreciate you coming and joining us tonight. Your stories are always spellbinding and very moving. And the story that you tell of your experience with your daughter on that fateful day is chilling. It brings back all the memories that all of us have and how thankful we all should be, are, can be of the incredible job that the first responders are doing all across this Nation, all across this Nation. So I thank you very much for coming and being with us. One of the privileges that we have, Mr. Speaker, as you well know, is to gain certain information, to be briefed on certain things that are happening around the world and certain activities that the American Government and American Defense Department are doing. Some of those things we can share, some of them we cannot share, but what I can share with the American people is this certainty. The fact that since 9/11 we have not had a major terrorist attack on the United States is not a mistake. It is not a mistake. It is not just by chance that we have, as Congresswoman Schmidt said, been able to awaken each morning and not really think about the possibility that it might happen again. There are men and women all across this Nation who are performing heroic tasks day in and day out, and we all should be incredibly grateful and appreciative of their efforts. I was pleased also to hear Congresswoman Schmidt bring up the NSA domestic terrorist surveillance project that is ongoing, a project that has been denigrated by many folks, a project that is frankly having an incredible effect on our national security and our ability to protect ourselves. It is a program that was put in place by the President and the National Security Agency. And Congress, the appropriate individuals in Congress, were informed, were in the loop, were given information, were told about it; and now some have kind of changed that story. But when it came to light in the public and there were discussions about whether or not it was the right thing to do or the wrong thing to do, it appeared to me that it was one of those issues that, as Congresswoman Schmidt said, our constituents believed in strongly. So I started asking. I hold a lot of town hall meetings, and I do a lot of speaking to a lot of groups back home, and when I do I oftentimes ask them. I said, if you had the opportunity as a nation, as the American Government, to know where terrorists were in terms of the use of a phone line, if you could know that and you were able to detect when they were making a telephone call from their home or from their cell phone into the United States, would you want to know what was going on in that conversation? Mr. Speaker, I promise you I have not had a single soul tell me that they do not think that that is what the government ought to be doing. In fact, what they say is, if we were not doing that, if we were not doing that, then we would not be living up to our responsibilities that we have as a government to do probably the most important thing that we do day in and day out as a Federal Government, and that is to protect our homeland, to provide national security. So I am certain that the support that we see for this program is universal around the Nation. And we are not talking about listening into an American citizen call to an American citizen call domestically. Remember what we are talking about. We are talking about known terrorist cells, known terrorist phone numbers, a known terrorist identity having communication with someone in the United States. Mr. Speaker, I am proud that we have the capability to detect that kind of communication, and I believe strongly, strongly, that my constituents, what they tell me is consistent with what folks believe around the Nation; and that is that we ought to continue that program and we ought to make certain that we are doing what we can do to protect our homeland. We have also the opportunity so many times to hear from world leaders, and today was a day that I will not forget very soon. We had the Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, come and he gave an address to a joint session of Congress. I was incredibly struck by so many of the comments that he made. And thank goodness they gave me a translation because my Italian is not very good. But I wanted to highlight a couple of the things that he said, because it just rings so true, and it talks about the incredible importance of what we as a Nation are doing, having done, and are doing now around the world. So here are a couple of quotes from Prime Minister Berlusconi that he gave before Congress today. He said, Today, I am still grateful to the United States for the high price in lives you continue to pay in the fight against terrorism to assure our common security and defend human rights around the world. As I will never tire of repeating, when I see your flag, I do not merely see the flag of a great country. Above all, I see a symbol, a universal symbol, of democracy and freedom. What an incredible picture he draws of what I feel in my heart and I know that so many of my constituents feel about the symbol of our Nation and about the incredibly important work that we are doing as a Nation. To have a leader of another country stand up and say proudly that he believes strongly in the work that the United States is doing to fight terrorism and to commit once again his nation to that fight was just incredibly inspiring. Prime Minister Berlusconi also said, History has shown that the aspiration to democracy is universal and that liberty and democracy are contagious. It is just a reaffirmation of what we have talked about for the past number of years and how important this war on terrorism is and how important it is to plant the seeds of democracy around the world. This is what we are doing, and what that does is make it so that we as a Nation are more secure. We are not only more free, but we are more secure as democracy moves around the world. Here are a couple of other quotes from the Prime Minister. He stood here just in this Chamber today and said, Only democracy can provide liberty and only liberty can guarantee that individuals will be able to develop their talents, channel their energies, achieve their dreams, and conquer prosperity. The only possible road is to work together to spread democracy. Is that not an inspiring message from another world leader? The only possible road is to work together to spread democracy. This is the final portion of his speech that I would like to share with you, Mr. Speaker, and with the Members once again of the House and frankly with our citizens. This was incredibly moving. Many of us had tears in our eyes as he closed, and he said, Allow me to conclude by sharing with you a brief story. It is the story of a young man who had just graduated from high school. His father took him to a cemetery that was the final resting place for brave young soldiers, young people who had crossed an ocean to restore dignity and liberty to an oppressed people. In showing him those crosses, that father made his son vow never to forget the ultimate sacrifice those young American soldiers made for his freedom. That father made his son vow eternal gratitude to that country. The Prime Minister said, That father was my father and that young man was me. I have never forgotten that sacrifice and that vow and I never will. Incredible words from a world leader, who draws us a picture of a time 60 years ago, 50 years ago, when his father took him to a cemetery filled with American soldiers who had fought for his freedom. He tells us that he was asked by his father never to forget that sacrifice, and he vowed that he never would. The seeds of liberty, the seeds of freedom, the seeds of democracy that we plant around the world, we may never know when we will see the fruit of that planting. I wonder myself today whether there is an Iraqi man and an Iraqi woman who are telling similar stories to their sons and their daughters and that in 30 or 40 years we would be honored and privileged to have the Prime Minister or the President of a free Iraq come before the United States House of Representatives and tell that same story, as how they were inspired by their mom or their dad as they recognize the sacrifice that American soldiers made on their behalf. An incredible, incredible picture in words. I had the opportunity to speak to an American Legion group at home a number of weeks ago, and then another American Legion chapter came and visited my office just the other day. I was struck by something that they said. The American Legion's motto is, ``For God and country,'' and it is an appropriate motto: ``For God and country.'' There is an American Legion division that was supposed to go to an elementary school, a public elementary school in our Nation and tell the young folks at the elementary school about the American Legion, about the history and their heritage. They were called a couple of days before their visit, and they were told, no, we cannot have you come; we have been threatened with a lawsuit because of your motto, ``For god and country.'' Mr. Speaker, I am just struck by the incredible diligence of all the men and women who fight for our national security, all of the men and women who have fought for our national security, and they recognize over and over and over again that freedom is not free, that there is a price to pay. Then I am struck by so many individuals it appears that want to destroy the roots that we have that brought about our national security and about our freedom, and I just appreciate so much the opportunity to stand before the House of Representatives as a member of the Official Truth Squad and bring these stories to try to invigorate and uplift the American people to be proud of our heritage, to be proud of the men and women who are serving us so remarkably around the Nation and around the world. I am pleased now to be joined by a colleague, Congressman Steve Pearce, who is coming and participating with the Official Truth Squad this evening, to talk about our national security, homeland security and bringing some truth and honesty to the debate that we have here in the United States House of Representatives. I am pleased to yield to Congressman Pearce.", u"Mr. President, yesterday, the Senate passed a bill negotiated by the junior Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Sununu, to strengthen civil liberties protections in the PATRIOT Act. In light of the improvements contained in the Sununu bill, I will now vote in favor of the pending conference report. As I have emphasized many times, Democrats support the basic authorities contained in the PATRIOT Act. We voted for the original act in 2001. We unanimously supported the reauthorization bill that passed the Senate last summer. In recent months, we have been vigilant to ensure that no provision of the act would expire during ongoing negotiations over a long-term extension of the law. But our support for the PATRIOT Act doesn't mean a blank check for the President. Last December, a bipartisan group of Senators joined together to insist that the reauthorization bill which had been returned from the House-Senate conference be improved. We defeated that conference report, we did it purposefully, and it was done on a bipartisan basis. I note that some of my ``admirers''--I use that caustically--have run ads in the State of Nevada trying to embarrass me, saying that I and the Democrats are not for the PATRIOT Act. That was raw politics at its worst. What we tried to do, on a bipartisan basis, was to have a better conference report. That is what is happening. Some would say it has not been improved enough. I could argue that, but it has been improved. Republicans and Democrats declared back then that Congress can provide the Government with the powers it needs to protect Americans and, at the same time, ensure sufficient checks and oversight to prevent abuses of these powers. Security and liberty are neither contradictory nor mutually exclusive. Our insistence that the PATRIOT Act be improved has borne fruit. We stood up to the White House to demand a more balanced approach to antiterror tactics, and we have succeeded. Some say we didn't improve it enough, but there is no question that we improved it. Thanks to the courageous stand of Senator Sununu and a handful of other Republicans, along with the longstanding efforts of Chairman Specter, Senator Leahy, and other Democrats on the Judiciary Committee, the Senate will soon pass a stronger, better PATRIOT Act. The current bill is far from perfect. It falls short of the unanimously supported Senate bill we passed last summer. I would have preferred additional improvements in the conference report, but the version of the PATRIOT Act we will soon reauthorize is a vast improvement over the law we passed hastily in 2001. For example, under the original PATRIOT Act, people who received a Government request for business records under section 215 were barred from discussing the request with anyone--their wives, sons, daughters, business partners--no one. But now, for the first time, recipients of such a gag order will be able to challenge it before a judge. In addition, the new bill will restrict Government access to library records. The bill makes it clear that libraries operating in the traditional role, including providing Internet access, are not subject to national security letters. Finally, under the Sununu bill we passed yesterday, individuals or businesses that receive a national security letter will not be required to tell the FBI the identity of a lawyer they may consult to obtain advice or assistance. It seems so obvious that it is the right thing to do, but we had to fight for that. Even before the Sununu improvements, the conference report included a number of crucial provisions to ensure congressional and public oversight of the Government's expansive powers under the PATRIOT Act. We insisted that the House accept 4-year sunsets instead of 7-year sunsets on the most controversial provisions of the act. In the original bill, we set sunsets. It is so important, as we look back and recognize why we did that. It is so important that we did that. Because of that, we were forced to improve this legislation. I again say that maybe it is not to the satisfaction of some, but it is certainly improved. The conference report also requires extensive congressional public reporting and mandates audits by an independent inspector general. That wasn't there before. I will continue to work for additional improvements in the act. I wish to say at this time that Senator Russ Feingold is a person for whom I have great admiration. We are so fortunate that he is a Senator. Academically, no one in the Senate has a record that is superior to his. He is a Rhodes scholar, someone who stands for principle. I disagree with him on this legislation. I can support this legislation not going with all of the improvements that he, as a matter of principle, has caused the Senate to review. I believe it is unfortunate that this good man, the Senator from Wisconsin, was not able to offer even two amendments. We asked the majority leader: How about two amendments? Don't fill the tree. He will take 15 minutes on each amendment. We were turned down. That is why I voted against cloture yesterday. That is a bad way, in my opinion, to run this Senate. So I want the record to be spread with my words that Russ Feingold is a fine lawyer. I congratulate and applaud him for his work on this issue and other issues. I will continue to work with him to seek additional improvements to the act. For example, I know he worked hard on an issue that is so important. Let's go back to the Senate-passed version of section 215, under which a Government request for medical records and other sensitive personal information must have a more direct connection to a suspected terrorist or spy. Second, I remain extremely concerned about the lack of meaningful checks on Government overuse or abuse of national security letters. The Washington Post reported last November that the FBI issues more than 30,000 such letters in a year, with no judicial supervision. So we need more oversight of the Government's power to issue these secret subpoenas--30,000 of them. How many is that a day? How many is that a week? How many is that a month? It is unfortunate that we were unable to get ahold of this and change this. Third, I still don't believe it was appropriate to include in the conference report sections not included in either the House or Senate bills limiting the right of habeas corpus in cases having nothing to do with terrorism. I will oppose any further weakening of the great writ. There is a hue and cry out there that we have to do something about earmarks. What they always talk about are appropriations earmarks, which include a fraction of a percentage of the spending of this Government. I do not back away or apologize for the earmarks I have placed in appropriations bills. I have a responsibility. I know better than some bureaucrat in Washington, DC, how the Forest Service should spend its money on the forests in Nevada. I know better than some bureaucrat from the Bureau of Land Management how money should be spent in Nevada. And 80 percent of the Federal lands controlled by the Bureau of Land Management are in Nevada. I know better than some bureaucrat in Washington, DC, how the money should be spent on roads and highways and bridges and dams in my State. I believe in the Constitution. I believe the Constitution sets forth three separate but equal branches of Government, and by our folding on this earmark procedure and not doing our jobs, we are caving in and not following the Constitution. There are ways we can improve the way earmarks are placed on bills, and I am happy to work on that. I have worked with the distinguished ranking member of the Appropriations Committee and his staff to make sure this earmarking legislation that will be on the floor is not going to hurt what this body does. But my point is that earmarking is more than the Appropriations Committee. Is this an earmark that they stick in a conference report, where it is not in the House or Senate bill, that changes one of the basic rights Americans have guaranteed by our Constitution--a writ of habeas corpus? Yes. It is wrong. So if you want something about earmarks, let's not just focus on the Appropriations Committee. I have talked about the flaws, and I am satisfied, in spite of them, that the conference report, as improved by Senator Sununu, is a step in the right direction and certainly better than the original PATRIOT Act. Let me say a word about the relationship between the current debate on the PATRIOT Act and the continuing controversy over unlawful eavesdropping by the National Security Agency. On the same day we voted on the PATRIOT Act conference report last December, when the conference report wasn't allowed to go forward, the New York Times reported that the President had authorized a secret program to eavesdrop on American citizens without warrants required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. That story had a clear impact on the vote that day, as it well should have. There was some question why we were even having this protracted debate over the PATRIOT Act, since the President seemed to believe he was free to ignore the laws we enact anyway. But, in fact, no one is above the law--not even the President of the United States. One lesson of the NSA spying scandal is that Congress must stand up to the President and must insist on additional checks on the powers exercised by the executive branch. That is what we are doing today with this PATRIOT Act. In addition to what we have here with the PATRIOT Act and NSA spying, now we have this Dubai port security, I think, scandal, on which the final decision was made by the Secretary of the Treasury, not the Secretary of Homeland Security. Whenever this administration is faced with a decision that affects the business community or the national security, the homeland security of this country, they always go with business. Why wasn't the Secretary of Homeland Security the one who signed off on that? These companies control the perimeters of these facilities; they decide who does the background checks. The debate over the PATRIOT Act and over NSA wiretapping and the Dubai port situation is all about checks and balances. That is what this is about. They go to the heart of our system of separation of powers. Today, we give the Government the tools it needs to help protect our national security, while placing sensible checks on the arbitrary exercise of Executive power. So today, when this bill passes, I hope everybody will understand that I am saying that I am voting for this conference report because I think it improves the original PATRIOT Act, not because it is perfect. It is far from perfect. I hope this administration--even though the President is in faraway India--gets the word that what is going on in this country with what I believe are constitutional violations is inappropriate. We need to get back to doing what is right for this country, following the Constitution and reestablishing the legislative branch of Government as a separate and equal branch of Government.", u"Mr. President, the National Security Agency has been wiretapping the conversations of Americans without obtaining court orders, as required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, for the past 5 years. In recent months, a number of bills have been proposed which would codify the President's program of warrantless surveillance. The White House is now pushing the Senate Judiciary Committee to pass sweeping legislation that would amend FISA and grant the President unprecedented authority to undertake wiretapping in the United States without the judicial scrutiny currently required by law. For Congress to legislate on this program in the coming days would not only be premature but irresponsible. The fact remains that despite repeated assurances from the administration, Members of Congress remain in the dark and cannot answer fundamental questions about the program's existence, effectiveness or legal justification. As one of the few Members who have received the most detailed information to date. I can tell you that, putting aside the legal argument, the administration has not been able to document convincingly the counterterrorism benefits of the program. In fact for the past 6 months, I have been requesting, without success, specific details about the program including how many terrorists have been identified, how many arrested, how many convicted, and how many terrorists have been deported or killed as a direct result of information obtained through the warrantless wiretapping program. I can assure you, not one person in Congress has the answers to these fundamental questions. At the same time, let me be perfectly clear, I support all efforts to track down terrorists wherever they are using all of our best technology and resources. But it can and must be done legally and in a way that protects the rights of all Americans. For 4\\1/2\\ years, the President had restricted knowledge of this program to the top leaders of the Senate and House and the two top leaders on the congressional Intelligence Committees. By limiting the briefings to 2 of the 15 Intelligence Committee members, the White House had sought to prevent the committee from conducting the legally required oversight of the NSA program. Because of this restriction on access to the program, the committee has been effectively prevented from knowing about the program, evaluating the program, and acting on the program. Frankly, I believe the White House goal of the past 5 years has been to use the iron cloak of secrecy to keep Congress ignorant of and powerless to challenge a controversial program of suspect legality. The repeated representations by the President and senior administration officials that the warrantless wiretapping program was and is subject to extensive congressional oversight are simply outrageous. Entire committees, not individual Senators, report out legislation that authorizes and funds intelligence collection programs. The full Senate, not individual Senators, takes action to approve or reject this legislation. The White House wanted a warrantless wiretapping program that was exempt from the scrutiny of both the courts and the Congress, even if it meant ignoring the legal requirements of FISA and the National Security Acts and shattering what had been decades of responsible, bipartisan congressional oversight of intelligence programs. Why? Administration officials have stated that the fact that the NSA was collecting the communications of suspected terrorists coming in or out of the United States without a court's determination that probable cause existed was simply too sensitive to disclose to the other Members of Congress intimating that the congressional Intelligence Committees could not keep aspects of the program classified. I would remind this administration that the Intelligence Committee is entrusted on a daily basis with the secrets that if disclosed would irreparably harm our national security, compromise multibillion-dollar collection programs, and even get people killed. There are 15 members of the Senate Intelligence Committee and many more of my colleagues who at an earlier time served on the committee. All Senators, by right of their elected position and the duties they are sworn to carry out have access to the details of these highly classified collection programs. It is a sobering responsibility but members of our committee and the Senate as a whole have protected these secrets because each of us understands what is at stake. In fact, as someone who has been briefed on the NSA wiretapping program, I can assure may colleagues that the sensitivity of the program pales in comparison with other intelligence activities our committee oversees on a routine basis. My colleagues should be troubled by the fact that the only NSA intelligence collection program that the White House has directed be described in detail publicly is also the only NSA program the White House continues to withhold from the full Senate. I want my colleagues to consider the implications of this carefully. At a time when terrorism is the No. 1 threat to America's security, the White House has decided that Congress cannot be trusted with the job of protecting our citizens. Instead of working with Congress, the President decided with an almost imperial disdain to ignore the constitutional role the legislative branch plays in providing for the National defense. It wasn't until March 9 of this year, and after enormous pressure, that the administration agreed to allow five additional committee members and three staffers to be briefed into the program. Another 2 months would pass before the White House agreed with our request that the entire committee membership be apprised of the program's operations. However, contrary to public statements in recent months by the President and Vice President that Congress is being fully briefed, I am dismayed to report that this administration continues to pursue its policy of depriving the Congress the information it needs to understand and evaluate the NSA program's legal underpinnings, operational conduct, and usefulness in identifying and arresting terrorists. On February 23, 2006, I wrote to NSA Director GEN Keith Alexander, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte requesting documents and information about the NSA program, including the Presidential orders authorizing the program, legal reviews and opinions relating to the program, procedures and guidelines on the use of information obtained through the program, and specifics about the counterterrorism benefits of the program. This letter was followed up with a second more refined request on May 15 of 54 items based on briefings the committee had recently received. The May letter repeated my earlier request for basic documentation and information, such as the Presidential authorization orders, which are essential in order for the Intelligence Committee to fully understand and thoroughly evaluate the NSA program, a necessary step before considering whether legislation relating to the program or amending FISA is needed. Over 6 months have passed since I sent my original February letter and the Intelligence Committee has not received the requested information. During this time, I and my staff director repeatedly raised the issue of the delinquent replies with White House and administration officials, including a direct appeal I made to Director Negroponte in July. Six months and no response from the administration. This is simply unacceptable. Three days after I met with Director Negroponte and expressed my concerns about the lack of a response to the February and May requests for documents and information, the Intelligence Committee received a fax from the NSA's Office of General Counsel forwarding ``a set of administration-approved unclassified talking points for members to use.'' The cover page of the fax included comments indicating that the talking points were prepared in response to questions from committee members about what could be said publicly about the NSA program. When I read the talking points, I was stunned to find that the NSA provided political talking points. Instead of providing the requested assistance in delineating what is and what is not classified about the program, the talking points contain subjective statements intended to advance a particular policy view and present the NSA program in the best possible light. Instead of providing the committee with the documents and information requested a half year earlier and allowing the committee to complete its own review of the NSA program and to draw its own independent conclusions, the administration preferred telling committee members what to think and what to say. The administration-approved talking points encouraged Senators to make statements such as ``I can say that the Program must continue; It is being run in a highly disciplined way,'' and ``There is strict oversight in place both at NSA and outside, now including the full congressional committees.'' The talking points also argue for changes to FISA claiming ``Current law is not agile enough to handle the threat'' and ``The FISA should be amended so that it is technologically neutral.'' These statements were intended to advocate the White House policy line rather than provide guidance on classification. Even before the intelligence committee can finish its own review of the NSA program the administration attempted to use the members of the intelligence committee--the only committee witting of the program's details--as mouthpieces to parrot conclusive statements in support of White House policy. These talking points are the latest examples of how the administration has co-opted an agency of the intelligence community to keep information from Congress in support of a controversial policy or program. Our committee has run into this disturbing practice with respect to the administration's program for the detention, interrogation and rendition of individuals suspected on involvement with terrorism as well. The White House's unwillingness to provide requested information to the Congress on the detention and interrogation program for many years created a void in congressional oversight, eventually filled by the courts and the Hamdan decision earlier this year. In this case, the administration took the calculated risk that it could go it alone, without working with Congress, and they guessed wrong. Now faced with a court decision not to its liking, the White House is coming to Congress seeking a legislative remedy. Evidently, the administration has failed to learn the lessons of this go-it-alone approach. The documents I requested of the NSA, Justice Department, and Office of the DNI 6 months ago have been withheld at the direction of the White House. The administration is trying to run out the clock on my requests in the hopes that Congress can be manipulated to pass legislation this session authorizing a program it does not fully understand. At the same time, a simple request of the NSA to detail what is and is not classified about the warrantless surveillance program is forced to go through the White House and, as a result, turned into a litany of administration P.R. statements. I and six other members of the Intelligence Committee wrote to NSA Director Alexander last month expressing our concerns over the appropriateness of these administration-approved talking points and objecting to the requirement that the NSA must clear with the White House any requested information about its own program before it is sent to Congress. We also asked that Director Alexander review this incident and provided the committee in writing an explanation of by whom and on what authority these talking points were prepared, who approved of their distribution to members of the Intelligence Committee, and who made the decision that they should be cleared by the administration prior to being provided to committee members. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the administration-approved NSA talking points, faxed to the Intelligence Committee on July 27, 2006, the August 29, 2006, letter to NSA Director Gen. Alexander signed by me and Senators Levin, Feinstein, Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, and Feingold, and the September 1, 2006, response from General Alexander.", u"Mr. President, this is one of two amendments which I intend to offer to strengthen the position of the national intelligence director. At the outset, I join many others in complimenting the chairwoman, Senator Collins, and the ranking member, Senator Lieberman, for their leadership and their outstanding work in presenting the bill which is now on the floor. This measure is a long time in coming for decision by the Congress. In my view, had there been a strong national intelligence director in existence prior to September 11, 2001, the attack on 9/11 might well have been prevented. There were many indicators present. Had they all been put together, I think there is a good chance we could have avoided the calamity of that day. There is a famous FBI report from Phoenix about this suspicious character who wanted to learn how to fly an airplane but who was not interested in takeoffs or landings. That information never got to the appropriate authority in headquarters at the FBI. There were two al-Qaida suspects in Kuala Lumpur known to the Central Intelligence Agency, information not communicated to the INS, to Immigration, so that those two al-Qaida agents came into the United States and were among the 19 hijackers who perpetrated the atrocities of 9/11. There was an extensive investigation conducted by the Minneapolis office of the FBI, the famous 13-page, single-spaced memorandum by special agent Coleen Rowley about Zacarias Moussaoui. Had those leads been followed, had there been an application for a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act using the right standard--the FBI used the wrong standard--that would have produced a great deal of information which could have, in combination with other information, been pieced together to have warned us of the impending attack. There is the information from NSA, where there was the tip that something was going to happen on 9/11 which was either not translated or not communicated to the Intelligence Committee. There had been the information about Murad, an al-Qaida operative back in 1996, and his plans to fly an airplane into the CIA. Those are only some of the threats. In combination and along with others, had we had all the information together, had we known what could have been pieced together, I think the likelihood is present that 9/11 could have been prevented. During my tenure as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee during the 104th Congress, the Intelligence Committee reported a bill, S. 1718, which sought to lodge effective power in the Director of Central Intelligence. That position theoretically was in charge of all the intelligence community but, because of lack of authority, lack of budget control, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency was never able to carry out the role of being the unifier, the real leader of the intelligence community. In section 707 of that bill, it provided for: Enhancement of authority of Director of Central Intelligence to manage, budget, personnel, and activities of the intelligence community. On a cross referral, by the time it got to the Armed Services Committee, the substance was taken out. There was a big turf battle and the effort to lodge authority in the Director of CIA to do effective direction and management of the Central Intelligence Agency went to naught. Thirty days after 9/11, Senator Lieberman and I introduced legislation to create the Department of Homeland Security. That was on October 11 of 2001. When special agent Coleen Rowley testified before the Judiciary Committee in June of 2002, there was finally impetus to get support from the administration to move ahead with a Department of Homeland Security, and when the matter was debated on the floor of the Senate, the effort was made to vest authority in the Secretary of Homeland Security to direct other intelligence agencies. It seemed to us that when we were creating a new department, Homeland Security, this was an opportune time to pick up the strands of what had been attempted by S. 1718 back in 1996, and by many others. It wasn't my idea alone. The Scowcroft Commission had come up with similar recommendations. Others had called for real power and real authority in a national director. It seemed to us that that was the time, with the new Department of Homeland Security, to give this effective power to the newly created Secretary of Homeland Security. Our efforts, again, were unsuccessful because of the turf battles, because of the interests of the CIA and the Department of Intelligence, DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense and the FBI, and the other agencies to protect their own turf. In October of 2002, the House of Representatives passed a bill and went home leaving the Senate with the alternative of either taking the bill or letting the matter go over until the next year. I was prepared at that time to offer the amendment to give the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to direct some real power. After talking to Secretary Ridge, talking with the Vice President, and talking with the President, rather than have no bill at all, it was decided to proceed and let the matter stand without having that kind of authority for the Secretary of Homeland Security. There the matter languished until the families of the victims of September 11 became a powerful advocacy group, which led to the creation of the 9/11 Commission, and the 9/11 Commission report was filed in July of this year. There was very substantial momentum finally to create a national intelligence director with some real authority to really manage the entire community. Senator McCain, Senator Lieberman, Senator Bayh, and I have produced a bill as had been recommended by the 9/11 Commission and then the Governmental Affairs Committee proceeded to have hearings, came back after the recess in late July, had hearings in August, marked up the bill, and passed it out of committee last week. So it is now on the floor in a context where there is considerable public pressure created by the 9/11 Commission report and what the families of the victims have done. And the momentum is present. There has been very substantial opposition to moving at this time. There are those who say this legislation is precipitous, that it ought not to be passed on the eve of an election, that we have more of an eye on 11/2, the election date, than we have on 9/11. I reject those contentions. This issue has been under study for decades, and personally on my behalf since I spent 8 years on the Intelligence Committee and chaired the committee during the 104th Congress. The 9/11 Commission unanimously and emphatically has called for the creation of a national intelligence director. It is my view that is a proposition whose time has come. When I offered the amendment in committee, which was rejected although we received five votes in the committee, there was very intense lobbying coming, as I understand it--you can never present competent evidence which would stand up in court but a lot of lobbying from the protectors of their turf. My amendment to create the strength of the national intelligence director was deferred until this day. It is my hope and expectation that from this bill we will have a national intelligence director if it is the one proposed by amendment or if it is the one which is in the bill which has been reported by the committee. It is my conclusion after very substantial study and after very substantial thought and after very substantial consideration that we need a very strong national intelligence director. We need an independent national intelligence director who will stand up to the executive branch, who will stand up to the Congress, who will tell the Congress exactly what is needed by way of resources, and who will have the stature and strength to get that job done. There is an enormous controversy about the resolution to authorize the use of force which Congress passed and the President acted on--a lot of concern about the adequacy of the intelligence which led to that judgment, the 77 votes in this body joined by a majority of Democrats as well as Republicans. But there is no doubt that however one views the resolution for use of force, it would have been highly desirable to have better intelligence. The amendment which is embodied in amendment No. 3706 would give substantial additional authority to the national intelligence director than is contained in the committee bill. It would put the CIA under the national intelligence director. The national intelligence director would have the authority to manage and oversee the intelligence community, including the CIA, the NSA, the National Security Agency, the NRO, the National Reconnaissance Office, the NGA, the National Geospacial Agency, and national collection from the Defense Intelligence Agency leaving tactical intelligence within the Department of Defense as it is now. Valid considerations have been raised that tactical intelligence ought to be left in the Department of Defense so the Department of Defense can carry out its functions. My amendment would leave that important facet with the Department of Defense. The national intelligence director under the committee bill has budget authority over the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After a great deal of thought, this amendment No. 3706 does not include the FBI under the supervision, direction, and control of the national intelligence director as the other agencies enumerated would have the national intelligence director with the authority to supervise, direct, and control which, in my judgment, would give the national intelligence director the authority to manage and oversee the national intelligence community in an effective way. The essence of my bill was circulated to the Governmental Affairs Committee with a letter dated August 3 of this year. I put the bill into the Congressional Record on September 7. I introduced the bill on September 15 under the caption of S. 2081. The amendment embodied in No. 3706 is somewhat different, as I have described it. We are dealing here with agencies where there are inbred cultures of concealment. It is very difficult to get information, even as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. My experience has shown it was very difficult for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to know fully and adequately what has happened within his own agency. One of the matters which I referred to during the committee hearings was information which was disseminated by the CIA Chief of Reports and Requirements in the Soviet East European Division of the Central Intelligence Agency. This was a man who was in the CIA from 1950 until 1991. He had information which was tainted by the Soviet Union--information where the individual conceded that he knew the intelligence came from Soviet-controlled sources and that he disseminated that information at the highest levels of government without disclosing that fact to the individuals whom he transmitted the information that it came from controlled or tainted sources. That information was transmitted, including transmission on January 13 of 1993. So it went to President George Herbert Walker Bush and it went to President-elect Bill Clinton. When I took his testimony and expressed shock at what he had done, the individual confidently responded that he had acted entirely properly because disclosure of the controlled source that the information was tainted would have made it even harder, as he put it, to sell the intelligence to policymakers; that there was no reason to believe the Soviets used deception was inaccurate, and no customer would use it unless he had concealed the fact it was tainted. This was an extraordinary approach, as I saw it, but I think revealing as to what happens within the Central Intelligence Agency, within the Bureau, where the individuals have their empires, where they know better than anybody else, and transmit information to the President of the United States and the President-elect, knowing it to be tainted and not telling the President or President-elect that it was tainted because they then would not use it, and saying that the information was given because the CIA agent, the CIA individual, knew that it was correct. That is just the height of audacity but I think indicative of the kinds of problems we face with the cultures of concealment that we have in the intelligence agencies. Another matter which I refer to, in the course of the committee hearings, is relevant for presentation; that is, the difficulty of having adequate oversight over the intelligence agencies and the duties that the intelligence agencies have to make disclosures to the oversight committee. In the spring of 2002, when I chaired a subcommittee of oversight on the Department of Justice and had a wide-ranging subpoena, a document was presented which I ask unanimous consent be printed in the Record, Mr. President.", u" SA 3709. Mrs. HUTCHISON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 2845, to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: This title may be cited as the ``Air Cargo Security Improvement Act''. Section 44901(f) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(f) Cargo.-- ``(1) In general.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall establish systems to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of all cargo that is to be transported in-- ``(A) passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air transportation; or ``(B) all-cargo aircraft in air transportation and intrastate air transportation. ``(2) Strategic plan.--The Under Secretary shall develop a strategic plan to carry out paragraph (1) within 6 months after the date of enactment of the Air Cargo Security Improvement Act. ``(3) Pilot program.--The Under Secretary shall conduct a pilot program of screening of cargo to assess the effectiveness of different screening measures, including the use of random screening. The Under Secretary shall attempt to achieve a distribution of airport participation in terms of geographic location and size.''. (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 449 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 449 of title 49, United States Code, is further amended by adding at the end the following: The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall establish a training program for any persons that handle air cargo to ensure that the cargo is properly handled and safe- guarded from security breaches. (a) In General.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall establish a program requiring that air carriers operating all-cargo aircraft have an approved plan for the security of their air operations area, the cargo placed aboard such aircraft, and persons having access to their aircraft on the ground or in flight. (b) Plan Requirements.--The plan shall include provisions for-- (1) security of each carrier's air operations areas and cargo acceptance areas at the airports served; (2) background security checks for all employees with access to the air operations area; (3) appropriate training for all employees and contractors with security responsibilities; (4) appropriate screening of all flight crews and persons transported aboard all-cargo aircraft; (5) security procedures for cargo placed on all-cargo aircraft as provided in section 44901(f)(1)(B) of title 49, United States Code; and (6) additional measures deemed necessary and appropriate by the Under Secretary. (c) Confidential Industry Review and Comment.-- (1) Circulation of proposed program.--The Under Secretary shall-- (A) propose a program under subsection (a) within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act; and (B) distribute the proposed program, on a confidential basis, to those air carriers and other employers to which the program will apply. (2) Comment period.--Any person to which the proposed program is distributed under paragraph (1) may provide comments on the proposed program to the Under Secretary not more than 60 days after it was received. (3) Final program.--The Under Secretary of Transportation shall issue a final program under subsection (a) not later than 90 days after the last date on which comments may be provided under paragraph (2). The final program shall contain time frames for the plans to be implemented by each air carrier or employer to which it applies. (4) Suspension of procedural norms.--Neither chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, nor the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall apply to the program required by this section. (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, in consultation with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, appropriate law enforcement, security, and terrorism experts, representatives of air carriers and labor organizations representing individuals employed in commercial aviation, shall develop guidelines to provide air carriers guidance for detecting false or fraudulent passenger identification. The guidelines may take into account new technology, current identification measures, training of personnel, and issues related to the types of identification available to the public. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to any meeting held pursuant to this subsection. (b) Air Carrier Programs.--Within 60 days after the Under Secretary issues the guidelines under subsection (a) in final form, the Under Secretary shall provide the guidelines to each air carrier and establish a joint government and industry council to develop recommendations on how to implement the guidelines. (c) Report.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure within 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act on the actions taken under this section. SA 3710. Mr. CHAMBLISS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 2845, to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: On page 153, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following: (a) In General.--Chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 167a the following new section: ``Sec. 167b. Unified combatant command for military intelligence (a) In General.--Chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 167a the following new section: ``Sec. 167b. Unified combatant command for military intelligence ``(a) Establishment.--(1) With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish under section 161 of this title a unified combatant command for military intelligence (hereinafter in this section referred to as the `military intelligence command'). ``(2) The principle functions of the military intelligence command are-- ``(A) to coordinate all military intelligence activities; ``(B) to develop new military intelligence collection capabilities; and ``(C) to represent the Department of Defense in the intelligence community under the National Intelligence Director. ``(b) Assignment of Forces and Civilian Personnel.--(1) Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all active and reserve military intelligence forces of the armed forces within the elements of the Department of Defense referred to in subsection (i)(2) shall be assigned to the military intelligence command. ``(2) Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the civilian personnel of the elements of the Department of Defense referred to in subsection (i)(2) shall be under the military intelligence command. ``(c) Grade of Commander.--The commander of the military intelligence command shall hold the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral while serving in that position, without vacating his permanent grade. The commander of such command shall be appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate, for service in that position. ``(d) Duties of Commander.--Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the commander of the military intelligence command shall-- ``(1) carry out intelligence collection and analysis activities in response to requests from the National Intelligence Director; and ``(2) serve as the principle advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Intelligence Director on all matters relating to military intelligence. ``(e) Authority of Commander.--(1) In addition to the authority prescribed in section 164(c) of this title, the commander of the military intelligence command shall be responsible for, and shall have the authority to conduct, all affairs of the command relating to military intelligence activities. ``(2) The commander of the military intelligence command shall be responsible for, and shall have the authority to conduct, the following functions relating to military intelligence activities: ``(A) Developing strategy, doctrine, and tactics. ``(B) Preparing and submitting to the Secretary of Defense and the National Intelligence Director recommendations and budget proposals for military intelligence forces and activities. ``(C) Exercising authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds for personnel and activities assigned to the command. ``(D) Training military and civilian personnel assigned to or under the command. ``(E) Conducting specialized courses of instruction for military and civilian personnel assigned to or under the command. ``(F) Validating requirements. ``(G) Establishing priorities for military intelligence in harmony with national priorities established by the National Intelligence Director and approved by the President. ``(H) Ensuring the interoperability of intelligence sharing within the Department of Defense and within the intelligence community as a whole, as directed by the National Intelligence Director. ``(I) Formulating and submitting requirements to other commanders of the unified combatant commands to support military intelligence activities. ``(J) Recommending to the Secretary of Defense individuals to head the components of the command. ``(3) The commander of the military intelligence command shall be responsible for-- ``(A) ensuring that the military intelligence requirements of the other unified combatant commanders are satisfied; and ``(B) responding to intelligence requirements levied by the National Intelligence Director. ``(4)(A) The commander of the military intelligence command shall be responsible for, and shall have the authority to conduct the development and acquisition of specialized technical intelligence capabilities. ``(B) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the commander of the command, in carrying out the function under subparagraph (A), shall have authority to exercise the functions of the head of an agency under chapter 137 of this title. ``(f) Inspector General.--The staff of the commander of the military intelligence command shall include an inspector general who shall conduct internal audits and inspections of purchasing and contracting actions through the command and such other inspector general functions as may be assigned. ``(g) Budget Matters.--(1) The commander of the military intelligence command shall, with guidance from the National Intelligence Director, prepare the annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities program that are presented by the Secretary of Defense to the President. ``(2) In addition to the activities of a combatant commander for which funding may be requested under section 166(b) of this title, the budget proposal for the military intelligence command shall include requests for funding for-- ``(A) development and acquisition of military intelligence collection systems; and ``(B) acquisition of other material, supplies, or services that are peculiar to military intelligence activities. ``(h) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations for the activities of the military intelligence command. The regulations shall include authorization for the commander of the command to provide for operational security of military intelligence forces, civilian personnel, and activities. ``(i) Identification of Military Intelligence Forces.--(1) For purposes of this section, military intelligence forces are the following: ``(A) The forces of the elements of the Department of Defense referred to in paragraph (2) that carry out military intelligence activities. ``(B) Any other forces of the armed forces that are designated as military intelligence forces by the Secretary of Defense. ``(2) The elements of the Department of Defense referred to in this paragraph are as follows: ``(A) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(B) The National Security Agency. ``(C) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(D) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(E) Any intelligence activities or units of the military departments designated by the Secretary of Defense for purposes of this section. ``(j) Military Intelligence Activities.--For purposes of this section, military intelligence activities include each of the following insofar as it relates to military intelligence: ``(1) Intelligence collection. ``(2) Intelligence analysis. ``(3) Intelligence information management. ``(4) Intelligence workforce planning. ``(5) Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.''. ``(k) Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the term `intelligence community' means the elements of the intelligence community listed or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of that chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 167a the following new item:", u"In my judgment, the discussion we have just had is easily resolved. Either the Senator is providing much greater authority and therefore more flexibility at the expense of less accountability to the Congress or he is not. As I read this, I believe the amendment that has been offered by Senator Byrd, Senator Stevens, Senator Inouye, Senator Warner, myself and others, a bipartisan amendment, does not in any way weaken the bill that came to the Senate floor on which the Senator has spent a lot of time. I think it, in fact, strengthens it. It strengthens the role of Congress and I think makes this a better bill. So I understand the Senator believes that the way the Senator has created this underlying Collins-Lieberman bill does not provide less accountability for Congress. The Senator has described it as much better flexibility, and that flexibility, as I read this, comes at the expense of accountability for the Congress. My only point is, all of us want exactly the same thing. We want this to work. If there is anybody in here who does not want this to work, they do not belong in this Chamber. We want this to work. Why do we want it to work? Because we know people want to murder innocent Americans. They want to commit acts of terror in this country and we need to stop them. Now, how do we stop them? With good intelligence. I cannot say how profoundly disappointed I am at the poor intelligence we have been given as a Congress in recent years. Somebody needs to answer to that. Somebody needs to be accountable for that. In part, that is what Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins are trying to do with this legislation. That is why I commend them for their work. Let me describe a continuing problem that we have with our law enforcement and intelligence communities in their efforts to prevent another terrorist attack. On September 10, 2001, the day before 9/11, two messages apparently related to the 9/11 hijackings were intercepted by our Government, by the National Security Agency. The Arabic language messages said, ``The match is about to begin'' and ``tomorrow is zero hour.'' Those messages were not translated until the day after 9/11. You would think that the FBI's translation capabilities would have been vastly improved in the intervening three years. Yet last week we learned that the Inspector General of the Department of Justice had issued a report, which found that three years later, the FBI has neglected to translate hundreds of thousands of hours of intercepted communications among suspected terrorists. This is not about politics at all. There is no partisanship in this. The question is, Do the FBI, CIA, the NSA, and others do an effective job or do they not? Can we prevent acts of terrorism or can we not? Let me read this, from the Inspector General's report: Three years after September 11, more than 120,000 hours of potentially valuable terrorism-related recordings have not yet been translated by the linguists at the FBI. In fact, some recordings have been deleted from audio computer files, and FBI officials speaking on condition of anonymity said officials have had to go back to original al-Qaida recordings on some occasions to try to restore them, after realizing that copies had been deleted because of capacity problems. The inspector general's report said the linguists might not have realized that material was deleted unless a case officer simply happened to notice it missing from the final transactions. The FBI had failed to institute necessary controls to prevent critical audio material from being automatically deleted. After September 11, 2001, the FBI director said this: The FBI needed to change from an agency primarily focused on investigating crime to one whose primary focus is the prevention of future terrorist attacks. The Inspector General says: Yet necessary system controls have not been established to prevent critical audio materials from being automatically deleted, such as protecting sessions of the highest priority on digital collection systems, active on-line storage until linguists review them. This is the Inspector General, again. He says: The results of our tests showed that three of our FBI offices tested had al-Qaida sessions that potentially were deleted by the system before linguists had a chance to review them. There is something wrong here. How can you have 120,000 hours of intercepted phone messages and all kinds of audio recordings--terrorists, al-Qaida recordings--that have never been listened to? Is there a recording in that 120,000 hours that sounds like the recording on September 10, 2001, a recording that says: ``Tomorrow is the zero hour,'' and no one has listened to it? I don't know. The American people understand, I think, that the capability of our intelligence system, the CIA, the FBI, and others, will determine whether we are successful in preventing another terrorist attack. So it is disheartening when you see the same failures cited over and over, with little improvement. Let's go back to August 2000, before this administration took over. In that month, we had a report of the National Commission on Terrorism--a report authorized by this Congress, issued by a commission chaired by Ambassador Paul Bremer. This was the same Paul Bremer who later went on to head the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. The Bremer commission, 4 years ago--this is before 9/11--had this to say: The FBI's ability to exploit the increasing volume of terrorism information has been hampered by aging technology. All U.S. Government agencies faced a chronic shortage of linguists to translate raw data into useful information. This shortage has a direct impact on our counterterrorism efforts. Mr. Bremer said then, over 4 years ago, that what we need are additional linguists, we need to interpret the raw data, we need to be able to understand it, determine what it means for this country's safety. Here we are 4 years later and we get an Inspector General's report that says there are 120,000 hours of potentially valuable terrorism-related recordings not even translated. Indeed, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice concluded that one-third of terrorism-related audio recordings were not translated within 12 hours as mandated by the FBI rules. There are 123,000 hours in languages primarily related to counterterrorism--Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, Pashtun--that have not been translated; 370,000 hours of recordings in languages connecting to counterintelligence probes had not been deciphered by that time. That is nearly one-half million hours potential leads to terrorist plots, sitting there, uninterpreted. We can pass legislation. We can have a debate about all these issues. But if agencies can't get their act together, can't do the job, don't even interpret the al-Qaida recordings to understand what is there, how on Earth are we going to protect this country? The 9/11 Commission, incidentally, the Commission which has prompted this bill coming to the floor of the Senate, says the following: The analysts for the 9/11 Commission . . . had difficulty getting access to the FBI and intelligence community information they were expected to analyze. The poor state of the FBI's information systems meant that such access depended in large part on an analyst's personal relationships with the individual in the operational units or squads where the information resided. For all of these reasons, prior to 9/11 relatively few strategic analytic reports about counterterrorism had been completed. Indeed, the FBI had never completed an assessment of the overall terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland. And I continue to quote: The FBI did not have an effective intelligence collection effort. The FBI did not dedicate sufficient resources to the surveillance and translation needs of counterterrorism agents. It lacked sufficient translators proficient in Arabic and other key languages, resulting in a significant backlog of untranslated intercepts. This from the 9/11 Commission. Following the release of this information from the 9/11 Commission, we now have the release of the Inspector General's report, which is absolutely stunning. It is astonishing to receive a report that, nearly 4 years after a recommendation was made by the Bremmer-Sonnenberg Commission, 3 years after we were attacked on 9/11, that we have 120,000 hours of recordings of intercepted information, a portion of which is from al-Qaida, and it has not yet been interpreted or translated. This is unbelievable. I talked for a few moments about accountability. Where is the accountability here? Who is accountable for that? Who is responsible for that? I want to make one other point, if I might. Again, I know I had a discussion with my colleague from Connecticut. My colleague from Maine is on the floor. I don't know whether she heard me, but I said I appreciated the work the two have done to bring this to the floor. Much of it has great merit, in my judgment. Much will be very protective of this country's interests and advances our interests in combating terrorism. I do support the amendment because I think that amendment will strengthen the bill. But let me say one other thing. The 9/11 report is a roadmap and we are using that roadmap in an attempt to construct some legislation here. Other roadmaps, for example, include this Inspector General's report of which we have just become aware. That ought to tell us something about where we are headed here. It is not good. Let me mention one additional point. As we evaluate what yet needs to be done to protect this country, and discuss issues of transparency, there remain 28 pages of information up in the Intelligence Committee that should still be released. They are classified ``top secret.'' Some in the Senate have read this material; all have the opportunity to read it. It comes from the December 2002 report of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the House and Senate that was sent to the White House and then was published. That report was on 9/11, what happened, and how it happened. That report was published in the December 2002 with 28 pages missing, and the 28 pages deal with Saudi Arabia. That is what has been said publicly, disclosed publicly, but yet they are deemed top secret and the American public is not able to see them. Then, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Richard Shelby, indicated that he thought 95 percent of it could be easily declassified. The Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia thought it should be declassified. Yet it has been classified by the White House, which refuses to share this information with Congress and the American people. I believe, once again, that all of us should continue to ask the White House to declassify those 28 pages. That, too, is a contribution to understanding what happened and what we do about it. Those 28 pages, in my judgment, should be released. They cannot as long as they are classified ``top secret.'' In my judgment, they should be declassified. Again, Senator Shelby indicated that he thought 95 percent of it could easily be declassified, and, as I indicated, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia called for its declassification. Considering that fifteen of the 19 terrorists who struck this country were Saudis, I think our country deserves to get to the bottom of this. I believe, once again, as we finish discussing these issues on intelligence, 9/11, and how to strengthen this country, how to prevent future acts of terrorism, that these 28 pages ought to be made available to the American people. I came to the floor today to talk about this inspector general's report and to weigh in briefly on an amendment offered by my colleague, Senator Byrd. Let me conclude as I started by saying that I believe Senator Byrd has done a great service to the Senate by once again saying there is merit in many of these proposals and that he doesn't come to the floor to denigrate these proposals. He comes to the floor to strengthen these proposals. I agree with him that we have a government in which we have separating powers with respect to the ability and the fight to try to prevent further acts of terrorism from occurring in this country. All of us need to work together. But we need to work smart. Working hard and working smart sometimes can be two different things. I hope we will work smart working together to have accountability in Congress to provide the flexibility while still retaining accountability so we can create this new agency, get rid of these stovepipes, and have agencies that are forward working, that will share information which will protect this country from future acts of terrorism. All of us share that goal. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, I will make a comment or two on the bill as a whole. I will not hold the Senate up a long time. We are trying to get this bill done, and I fully support that. There is an area of the bill I would like to register, for the record, concern on the part of this Senator. Probably the bill's managers will recognize the legitimacy of that concern. First, I want to say how much I have appreciated the work by the Senator from Maine and the Senator from Connecticut on this bill. I have enjoyed this debate and enjoyed the part that I played in it--not that it has been significant but just attending the briefings, visiting with the Senators on and off the Senate floor. In my work on the Armed Services Committee, we have had hearings on this subject. This has been handled in the way the American people like to see the Senate handle things. It has been bipartisan in the best sense of that word--not that we have tried to conceal legitimate differences of opinion that sometimes separate the two parties, but because we have understood that the right way to deal with those differences is to reconcile them where we can, to have them out without being personal or political about it, and understand we are all working for the good of the American people and the security of the country. We can all agree, having been here now through almost this entire Congress, that unfortunately, the Senate does not always operate in that ideal fashion. I believe it has operated in that way on this bill, and the leadership of the two Senators is the reason. It is clear from listening to this debate and watching it on TV in my office that both of these Senators have done their due diligence. They know their subject. There has not been a point raised that they were unfamiliar with. That has been very impressive to me and has led me to decide that I am going to give them the benefit of the doubt on amendments that are offered because clearly they have studied this. It is not a case where they are refusing to consider any concern or looking down on a Senator who is raising it. It is important for the public to know that personal factors like that can play a part in legislation. The trust and regard in which these two Senators are held by the rest of the body is making a difference. I also agree with them that it is time to do something; that 3 years is long enough. Some people say 40 years, because there have been a number of recommendations for changing how we do intelligence over the decades. I think it is time to get something done. I agree with that. I also like the creation of a national intelligence director. I do wish we could have come up with a different name than NID. Imagine how often that name is going to be used and what it may come to represent in Washington, but it may be too late to do anything about that. For some reason, I do not think people have aired on the floor--and I want to; it is a practical reason--there are times in our history when foreign policy and national defense are bigger issues than at other times. The American people in the United States of America are a people who are concerned with their day-to-day lives. That is as it should be. We would rather, if we could, avoid having to engage extensively in these tremendous efforts abroad and in all the foreign policy discussions and reconstructions that go with that. In our elections, sometimes we elect Presidents in a context where foreign policy does not seem to be all that important. I think it is another way of saying some Presidents are more interested than other Presidents in intelligence on a day-to-day basis. I do not say that to be critical. I do not think there has been a President who has ever served in that high office who has not cared about the security of the country. But I think people here understand what I mean. Now that we are fighting this terrorist war, we all read stories about intelligence. We know how important it is. We are all following it on a day-to-day basis. Everybody wants to serve on the Intelligence Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee, and that is fine. But in other times, attention and interest wanes. I think by having a national intelligence director, what we will help ensure is that even in those times when interest is waning on the part of other high-level political actors, maybe even the President, we will have somebody in Washington whose job it is to look at all this in a comprehensive way, and try to make sure the agencies under him or her are working together on behalf of the interests of the American people, in a way rather like we have done with the Federal Reserve, where we have created an agency and we have vested a lot of authority in a Chairman of the Federal Reserve. We know that person is watching monetary policy and other policy. Over time, what has happened is Presidents of both parties and under all circumstances realize that appointments to that kind of job are very highly scrutinized, and you put in people who have prestige and gravitas and the regard of people of both parties and the regard of the country. It is my hope that will happen with the national intelligence director. Presidents, whether foreign policy is the No. 1 concern for them or not, will know this is an important appointment and they need to put somebody in this position, from administration to administration, who has the regard of everybody in the country, who watches and knows about foreign policy and about intelligence. That will help create a stability over time and a continuity in our intelligence policy. Now, I am not downgrading the concerns people have expressed. There is always a tension in this kind of thing. You cannot create and set up a higher authority such as this without increasing the risk that if you get a person in there who is very autocratic, it may tend to create a certain kind of group-think among the agencies even more than we now have, that people could be acting in way that is designed to please only this national intelligence director rather than trying to have their own opinions regarding intelligence. But there are safeguards in the bill designed to deal with that. I certainly have had some concerns along those lines, but I am going to exercise the benefit of the doubt in favor of supporting the creation of a national intelligence director. There is an area, though--and the Senators have addressed it; I think perhaps they could again in response to my remarks--I am concerned about the flow of intelligence to the troops in the field. Here is the kind of classic situation I am concerned about. We have, of course, an extensive satellite system in place. We get intelligence all the time from those satellites. Particularly since the first Gulf War, the Department of Defense has become pretty good at getting that intelligence off the set satellites and getting it out to the field in real time. That means virtually instantaneously, so that it can be used by our special operations troops, by commanders in the field to check and select targets. This kind of mapping and satellite intelligence can be used even to move troops around during some kind of an engagement. It works pretty well. I know that for a fact. I think one of the reasons it does work is these agencies--the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency--are in the Department of Defense and the customers they are serving with that intelligence are in the Department of Defense. It is very reasonable to believe that if the provider of the intelligence and the customer of the intelligence are in the same Department, the same bureaucratic structure, they will share intelligence better. If that were not true, then why are we doing this bill? Because the whole point of the bill is to get all these intelligence agencies under some kind of joint authority so they will share better. In most cases, I think it is very clear how the bill is doing that, that the bill is breaking down existing bureaucratic barriers. But I do think we all ought to be honest enough to admit with respect to this particular kind of sharing, we are setting up a bureaucratic barrier that does not exist now, because we are going to pull those agencies out of the control of the Department of Defense and put them under the national intelligence director, at least partially. So there is at least a risk we will put up a stovepipe in the name of taking down stovepipes, that we will put up a stovepipe in an area where the sharing is working. It would be ironic if one of the effects of the bill were to interrupt the sharing of the intelligence in the one area where we have confidence now that it is being shared. Now, I feel a lot better about this concern than I did when I first heard about this bill. I know the Senator from Maine and the Senator from Connecticut have put measures in the bill designed to ensure that flow of intelligence continues. I am glad they have done that. I am glad they recognized the importance of this concern, because it is going to grow as time goes on. Let me give you an example. We are trying, on the Armed Services Committee--and both Senators serve on that Committee, so they know this as well as I--to make all the various what we call weapons platforms for the Army network-centric. What this means is they will all be networked in, so that we hope in the near future intelligence from a satellite will not even have to go through a middleman at the NGA or the NSA, it will go directly from the satellite down to the commander in the field. It is very important that we procure weapons systems and platforms and communications systems and signal intelligence systems that are all linked together. This bill, for example, gives procurement authority to the NID over the satellite end of those systems. So we are going to have the NID procuring the satellites, the platforms that are getting the intelligence. We are going to have the Department of Defense procuring its end of the platform that is going to be receiving the intelligence, and there is a danger we will end up with a stovepipe we do not want. I am not saying this is a reason to oppose the bill. I am not saying it is a reason to change the bill. I am saying it is a concern. I guess what I would say to my friends from Connecticut and Maine is, if they could give us their assurance that not only in the passage of the bill but in the implementation of it, and in the months and years after that, they will remain conscious of these concerns and try to ensure a free flow of intelligence from these various intelligence organizations out to the troops in the field, even though they will no longer be in the same bureaucratic organizations. Maybe the Senator from Maine would yield for a question from me or have a brief colloquy, if I can ask consent to do that. I have been airing the point you and I have talked about privately, and you have addressed on the floor as well, about the importance of making sure that tactical military intelligence continues to flow from the NGA and the NRO and the others out to troops in the field. I was telling the Presiding Officer you all have done a lot to allay my concern in that regard. What I was hopeful of, and I wanted to put on the record, is to get assurance from you and the Senator from Connecticut that in implementing this bill you will continue to oversee this aspect of it and try to make certain the NID understands the importance of acting jointly with the DOD in ensuring that this intelligence continues to flow. Because no matter what protocols you put in the bill, this is a fruitful area for oversight to make certain that this intelligence is not interrupted. Would the Senator from Maine care to comment?", u"[Strike the parts shown in black brackets and insert the parts shown in italic] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Department of Justice. (10) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (11) The National Reconnaissance Office. (12) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (13) The Coast Guard. (14) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2005, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill __ of the One Hundred Eighth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2005 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2005 the sum of $342,995,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2006. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 310 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2005. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2005 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2006. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2005, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2005 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $34,911,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2007. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill __ of the One Hundred Eighth Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law. (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. Funds appropriated for an intelligence or intelligence- related activity of the United States Government for fiscal year 2004 in excess of the amount specified for such activity in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2599) shall be deemed to be specifically authorized by Congress for purposes of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)). (a) Consultation in Preparation.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure that any report, review, study, or plan required to be prepared or conducted by a provision of this Act, including a provision of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) or the classified annex to this Act, that involves the intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy is prepared or conducted in consultation with the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate. (2) The Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy may carry out any consultation required by this subsection through an official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, as the case may be, designated by such Secretary for that purpose. (b) Submittal.--Any report, review, study, or plan referred to in subsection (a) shall be submitted, in addition to any other committee of Congress specified for submittal in the provision concerned, to the following committees of Congress: (1) The Committee on Armed Services, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) The Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2005 the sum of $239,400,000. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``and'' at the end; (2) by striking subparagraph (B); and (3) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (B). (a) In General.--Section 101(b)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(b)(1)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(C) engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor; or''. (b) Sunset.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall be subject to the sunset provision in section 224 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56; 115 Stat. 295), including the exception provided in subsection (b) of such section 224. (a) Additional Reporting Requirements.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended-- (1) by redesignating title VI as title VII; (2) by redesignating section 601 as section 701; and (3) by inserting after title V the following new title VI: (a) Repeal.--Section 2 of Senate Resolution 400 (94th Congress) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (b); and (2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (b). (b) Rules of the Senate.--Subsection (a) is enacted-- (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate; and (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of the Senate to change the rules of the Senate at any time and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of the Senate. (a) In General.--Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (f); and (2) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively. (b) Termination of Funds Remittance Requirement.--(1) Section 2 of such Act is further amended by striking subsection (i). (2) Section 4(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331 note) is amended by striking ``, or section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public Law 103-36; 107 Stat. 104)''. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: [Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking the second sentence.] Section 552a(e)(3) of title 5, United States Code, shall not apply with respect to the collection of information by intelligence personnel of the Department of Defense who are authorized by the Secretary of Defense to collect intelligence from human sources. (a) Authority.--Funds designated for intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for assistance to the Government of Colombia for counterdrug activities for fiscal year 2005, and any unobligated funds available to any element of the intelligence community for such activities for a prior fiscal year, shall be available-- (1) to support a unified campaign by the Government of Colombia against narcotics trafficking and against activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self- Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)); and (2) to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue operations. (b) Applicability of Certain Laws and Limitations.--The use of funds pursuant to the authority in subsection (a) shall be subject to the following: (1) Sections 556, 567, and 568 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (Public Law 107-115; 115 Stat. 2160, 2165, and 2166). (2) Section 8077 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-87; 117 Stat. 1090). (3) The numerical limitations on the number of United States military personnel and United States individual civilian contractors in section 3204(b)(1) of the Emergency Supplemental Act, 2000 (division B of Public Law 106-246; 114 Stat. 575), as amended by the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (115 Stat. 2131). (c) Limitation on Participation of United States Personnel.--No United States Armed Forces personnel or United States civilian contractor employed by the United States Armed Forces will participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance made available under this section, except for the purpose of acting in self defense or during the course of search and rescue operations for United States citizens.", u"Mr. Speaker, I commend this speech by the leader of the liberal party in the House of Lords. Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, I too thank the Deputy Leader of the House for the very forceful, although not at all untypical, way in which she addressed the House. We on these Benches share completely the objective of the disarmament of Iraq. There is no question about that. I want to remind the noble Baroness of the second part of Resolution 1441. It states that Iraq should have, ``a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council'', and that it has been accordingly decided, ``to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process''. The difference between these Benches, the noble Lord, Lord Howell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, is straightforwardly that we believe that the present draft resolutions pre-empt that process, that it is not yet completed, and that there is still an opportunity to avoid war. Let me say very clearly, in case there is any misunderstanding, that we believe that we, as powerfully as any other part of this House, have an obligation to our troops to make absolutely certain that men and women are not put into war, risking their lives, unless it can be shown to be absolutely necessary to do so. It is to that that I intend to address my remarks. The first question is whether we are convinced that Iraq is an imminent and present threat. There is no question but that it could be a potential threat, although I must dispute briefly with the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford. Not only the CIA in the United States but Ministers in this House have on more than one recent occasion admitted that there is no clear evidence to link Al'Qaeda to the Government of Iraq, much as we might find things easier if that were so. That must be stated very explicitly, because repeating a misconception over and again does not turn that misconception into a truth. Therefore, I doubt whether we can show that Iraq is an imminent threat. If we are seeking imminent threat, I need only quote from a very senior colleague of mine who is the head of the security unit in the Belfer Center at Harvard University. Ash Carter is a former National Security Agency assistant secretary. He said: ``News reports late last week indicated that . . . North Korea is trucking the fuel rods away where they can neither be inspected nor entombed by an airstrike . . . as this loose nukes disaster unfolds and the options for dealing with it narrow, the world does nothing''. That is a much more imminent threat. Secondly, we are not convinced that containment has failed. I can quote from an authoritative source. These are the words of the Prime Minister himself in November 2000: ``We believe that the sanctions regime has effectively contained Saddam Hussein in the last 10 years. During this time he has not attacked his neighbours, nor used chemical weapons against his own people''.--[Official Report, Commons, 1/11/00; col. 511 W.] Nor has he done either in the past three years--since that statement. Another authoritative source said: ``Through a process of inspection and verified destruction, the UNSCOM inspectors have demolished more weapons capability than was destroyed by the allied forces during the Gulf war''.--[Official Report, Commons, 17/2/98; col. 900.] Those are the words of Robin Cook, then the Foreign Secretary. Even much more recently, it has been restated more than once that containment has proved more effective in destroying weapons of mass destruction than any war at any time in the past few years. The third issue is whether we believe that the peaceful options have been exhausted. Again, I quote from two unimpeachable sources. The first is the Congressional Research Service of the United States Congress, which said: ``In meetings with Blix and ElBaradei in Baghdad on February 8 and 9, 2003, Iraqi officials handed over documents on anthrax, VX, and missile programs . . . On February 10, Iraq notified the UN that it would permit overflights of American U-2, French Mirage, and Russian Antonov aircraft''. Let us add to that the report in the Independent today, which said: ``Mr. Blix said the details of the weapons''-- I have described when they were handed over to the inspectors--``were `positive steps which need to be explored further'. Asked if there was any indication by the Iraqis of `substantive progress or proactive co-operation' '', which are exactly the requirements mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, Mr Blix, a man of few words, replied, ``Yes''. That was only yesterday. We on these Benches are not persuaded that all peaceful options have been exhausted. We point, not to illusions or statements by Members on these Benches, but to clear and unimpeachable sources such as the Congressional Research Service and the chief inspector, Mr Blix himself. None of this would matter so much if the consequences of war were less serious than they are. I wish to say a few words about them. First, the Financial Times states: ``The coalition of the willing, sounds ever more like a coalition of the reluctant''. Huge pressures are being brought to bear, not least on moderate Muslim countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Egypt and others, to subscribe to being part of an alliance to destroy the Iraqi regime. Those countries have protested over and over again that they do not wish to be involved in the war. Let me give two examples. There was a great deal of controversy over Turkey because it was argued that it had been refused Patriot missiles as a result of a disagreeable coalition between France and Germany. It later emerged that Turkey had never asked for Patriot missiles or for any of the other equipment that was sent to it. Turkey had asked for consultation under Article 4 of the NATO treaty. It had not invoked Article 5, which is the article concerning mutual defense. Even now, Turkey is driving a colossally hard bargain. Members of the House will have seen that one part of the bargain is that Turkey should be allowed to bring 55,000 troops into northern Iraq--the Kurdish area, much of which is protected by a no-fly-zone--a situation which, at the very least, is likely to foment great anger and, at worst, could lead to civil war and the disintegration of Iraq. It has also--incidentally, almost--helped to destroy the real prospect of a united Cyprus entering the European Union some time in the next seven or eight years. The International Crisis Group--I declare an interest as a board member--has discovered that there is tremendous public concern about the possibility of a war against Iraq in the Middle East. In its report, it states: ``ICG interviews throughout the region, in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt and Algeria, indicate that there exists wide and deep scepticism about US motives''. That may be unfair, but it is a fact that we have to take into account when deciding whether the price of war is too high. It also emphasizes the importance of pursuing every other possible alternative. I need not add the special complication of the wretched situation in the Middle East, referred to in another place yesterday by that distinguished and brave Member of Parliament, Gerald Kaufman, as the daily almost casual slaughter of Palestinians by the IDF and the daily almost casual slaughter of Israelis by terrorists from the West Bank and Gaza. We cannot pretend that this is not a desperately serious complication. With great respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, she and I both know that the reason why the UN resolutions are mandatory on Iraq, and not mandatory on Israel, which has also broken many of them, is because the United States refuses to agree to their being made mandatory on Israel. I have the greatest respect for the Prime Minister. He has virtually ripped himself into pieces trying to hold the Administration in the United States to the UN process. He is the reason why George Bush went to the United Nations: I pay the Prime Minister great credit for that. But the distinction I have just drawn between Israel and Iraq shows all too clearly that it is not the Prime Minister who is in the driving seat. It is concern about who is in the driving seat that underlies much of the scepticism. I do not need to mention at length the possible humanitarian consequences of a war. That has been done effectively by the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford. But they are extreme. One has only to consider the desperate plight with regard to food. According to a leaked UN document, 30 per cent of children under five will be at risk of death from malnutrition if the war lasts more than a week or so. There are also warnings about cholera and many other extreme diseases. The warnings come from a United Nations leaked document, called the ``Humanitarian Consequences of the War''. Before I come to my conclusion, I shall say in the words of a famous politician whom many Labour Members of this House will remember, ``You don't need to look at the crystal if you can read the book''. What is the book? The book concerns Afghanistan. I shall quote again from two sources, the first of which is The Times of 13 February, which states that ``large parts of the country are once more on the verge of anarchy''. An article by the senior fellow at the American Council on Foreign Relations--I declare an interest as a member of its international advisory council--states: ``Basic security and stability have still not been achieved''. Worst of all, when the President drew up his budget for 2004, he forgot to put even a penny for the reconstruction of Afghanistan into it. Paul Krugman, of the New York Times, states: ``The Bush team forgot about it. Embarrassed Congressional staff members had to write in $300 million to cover the lapse''. So much for Afghanistan, already largely forgotten, coming back to anarchy, and neglected by the international community. I conclude with two thoughts. First, there is clear evidence that the obsession with Iraq is drawing us away from what should be our first priority, which is to attack international terrorism. For that we need the widest possible support. I shall not go on quoting, but it was President Jimmy Carter who said a few days ago that the obsession with Iraq had essentially diverted the American Administration from concern about terrorism. There is more evidence that we are beginning to neglect the remnants--not dead remnants, but live ones--of Al'Qaeda in many other parts of the world. Finally, there is a fundamental thought, to which my colleague Lord Wallace of Saltaire will address himself. There is undoubtedly among European opinion, including the United Kingdom, more than 80 per cent opposition to a war without UN support and considerable opposition to a war even with UN support. That does not reflect anti-Americanism, except perhaps among a small minority. Many of us regard America as one of the most enterprising, imaginative, democratic and open societies in the world. What it reflects is concern with an Administration propelled to some extent by what I can only describe as a fundamentalist Christian and fundamentalist Jewish drive that is almost as powerful as fundamentalist Islam itself. The Administration has set aside the structures of the multilateral community by removing themselves from treaties and conventions, by refusing to sign the Kyoto agreement or agreeing to the biological weapons convention being resumed, and now by embarking on nuclear plans that threaten even the nuclear proliferation treaty. It is who is in the driving seat that frightens many of us; certainly not that great country the United States.", u"Mr. President, there has been a great deal of debate in Washington, DC, about the circumstances leading up to the invasion of Iraq earlier this year. No one has come to the defense of Saddam Hussein, nor should they. He was a tyrant who oppressed his people. The fact that he is out of power is in the best interest of not only the people in Iraq but in the Middle East and the world. But leading up to our invasion of Iraq were a series of statements and events from the administration justifying our role and our leadership. They were hotly debated on the floor of the Senate last October, leading to a vote on the use of force resolution--a vote which 23 of us opposed, believing that if we were going to be engaged in Iraq, it should be on an international basis, using the United Nations and other countries to join us in a coalition that would not only lead to a successful military invasion but also to a successful peace afterward, stability in Iraq for years to come. The prevailing view, the majority view in the House and the Senate, was otherwise, giving the President the authority to go forward with this military invasion of Iraq. And so, for the months that followed between October and the ultimate invasion, the administration came forward with additional evidence, additional statements, and additional rationalization for our role and our leadership. One of the key moments in the development of this case against Iraq and support by the American people was President Bush's State of the Union Address. It is a historic gathering each year, where a joint session of Congress comes together in the House Chamber, joined by the President's Cabinet, the Supreme Court, the diplomatic corps, and scores of people in the balconies, as the President comes and speaks from his heart to the American people. It is probably the most closely watched and covered Presidential speech of any year, and should be, because the President really tries to outline where America is and where it is going. So we listened carefully to each word. And many times during the course of that speech, President Bush made his case for the United States invasion of Iraq. One of the statements he made during the course of that speech has taken on quite a bit of controversy. It was a statement that the President made, attributing to British intelligence sources, which suggested that from the African country of Niger there was a sale or shipment of uranium which could be used for nuclear weapons in Iraq. President Bush said those words in his State of the Union Address. And, of course, this was growing evidence of our concern about the increased militarization of Saddam Hussein and his threat not only to his people and the region but to other nations as well. This was one of many elements in the President's case against Iraq, but it was an important one because there was the belief that if Saddam Hussein had moved beyond chemical and biological weapons and now could threaten the world with nuclear weapons, he had to be viewed in a different context, as a much more dangerous leader than ever before. So people listened carefully to President Bush's statement. But then, after that State of the Union Address--within a matter of days--questions were being raised as to the truthfulness of the President's statement, whether or not it was accurate to say that uranium or any type of nuclear fissile material had been sent from an African nation to Iraq. The debate ensued for many months, even as the invasion started. Last night, CBS issued a special report based on statements coming out of the Central Intelligence Agency. Those statements are very troubling. Those statements indicate that America's intelligence agencies came to the White House before the State of the Union Address and told the National Security Council there was no credible evidence linking Niger or any African nation with providing nuclear fissile materials to Iraq, and despite that statement from the CIA to the National Security Council, and to the White House, decisions were made in the White House for the President to go forward with his speech saying exactly the opposite, carefully wording it so that it attributed that information to British intelligence sources, carefully making certain that the President did not allude to the fact that American intelligence sources thought that was not a credible statement. So where do we stand today? The President said earlier this week that he apologizes, that that was an unsubstantiated remark and it was not accurate. And now, with this release of information from our intelligence agencies, reporters, who are traveling with the President and his group in Africa, are asking the leaders of the White House who made this decision, who decided to go forward with the statement in the President's State of the Union Address which was not accurate, which was misleading. Condoleezza Rice, the President's National Security Adviser, insists that George Tenet of the CIA approved this information that was included in the President's speech. George Tenet, in a press report, said he did not, he was not involved in making that statement to the White House. Two of the highest officials in the Bush administration are at odds as to who was responsible for that information. That question has to be asked and answered, and it has to be done so immediately. I can think of nothing worse than someone at the highest level of leadership in the White House deliberately misleading the President or deliberately misleading the American people about something as essential as whether or not nuclear materials were being sent into Iraq before our invasion. What was at stake, of course, was not just another foreign policy debate. What was at stake was an invasion of military force, largely led by the United States, putting American lives on the line. The case was being made in that State of the Union Address for the American people to rally behind the President, rally behind the troops, and invade Iraq. And now we know that one of the elements--one of the central elements--in that argument was, at best, misleading--that in fact we knew better. We knew, based on our own investigation, based on a visit by former Ambassador Joe Wilson, based on the evidence of forged documents, that uranium and other fissile materials were not in fact transported from Niger to Iraq. Despite that, in the State of the Union Address, exactly the opposite was said. Yesterday, on the State Department authorization, I offered an amendment, a bipartisan amendment, joined in by several of my Democratic colleagues and many of my Republican colleagues, calling on the inspectors general in the Department of State and the CIA to get to the bottom of this, and do it immediately. I believe the American people deserve an answer. We need to know what White House official decided to distort the intelligence information and give the President a statement which was in fact misleading. I want to make it clear that there is no evidence whatsoever that the President knew this information was inaccurate. I do not make that accusation, nor will I. But someone knew. Someone in the White House knew the National Security Council had been briefed and told that this information was not accurate, and yet it was still included in the State of the Union Address. It really calls into question the leadership of the White House and our intelligence agencies. And I can tell you, now, more than ever, we need to have the best intelligence sources in the world. You cannot successfully wage a war on terrorism without the very best military intelligence, without the best information about those threatening the United States. It has to be credible evidence. The people in the intelligence agency have to have a sound working relationship with the White House and the Congress. What we saw in the State of the Union Address was a breakdown of that relationship. That does not make America safer. It makes us more vulnerable. Secondly, this is a Nation now pledged to a policy of preemption. We are prepared, according to this President, to invade a nation that may threaten us, even if they do not apparently pose any imminent danger to us at the time. How do you reach the conclusion that a nation threatens us? Clearly from intelligence information. Clearly, the intelligence coming out of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and others has to be delivered to the National Security Council and to the President in a credible fashion. Yet we have clear evidence that the chain of communication which we count on for the security of our Nation broke down when it came to the President's State of the Union Address. The credibility of our President is on the line. I believe he should move forward as quickly as possible to call for a full investigation. We should be able to point to those people responsible for putting this misleading language in the State of the Union Address. They should be held accountable, and they should be dismissed. That is inexcusable conduct by someone at that level of government to mislead the President or allow him to mislead the American people. It is interesting to me that this issue is gaining ground and velocity as the President travels overseas. I certainly wish that were not the case. It would be better for him to be home because he has an important mission in Africa and a message that now will not be as clear because of this surrounding controversy. It is incumbent on us in Congress in our oversight role, and it is incumbent on the press corps in America to stand up to their responsibility to ask the hard questions and, in asking those questions, find out who should be held accountable for this misleading statement in the President's State of the Union Address. We owe it to the American people to give them the answers, to tell them that in the war on terrorism our intelligence sources are credible, that they have a good linkage and dialog with the White House and that the linkage will make America a safer place. Someone made a decision to twist and distort this information for reasons which have yet to be disclosed. As we led to the buildup to the invasion of Iraq, that was one of the things the American people believed because they heard it from their President. The President in the State of the Union Address speaks from the heart to the American people. He should be believed. In that situation, he needs to have the very best advisers and staff near him giving him accurate information. We now know that the President has been embarrassed by information which he said and has now had to say to the American people was not true. That has to change. People have to be held accountable. That should be done immediately. If Congress cannot force this investigation, the President, as our leader, as the person responsible for the executive branch, should initiate this investigation on his own, find those responsible, hold them accountable, and dismiss them from the Federal Government. I yield the floor.", u"``Budget treatment of costs of acquisition of major systems by the ``Sec. 506A. (a) Independent Cost Estimates.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of each element of the intelligence community concerned, prepare an independent cost estimate of the full life-cycle cost of development, procurement, and operation of each major system to be acquired by the intelligence community. ``(2) Each independent cost estimate for a major system shall, to the maximum extent practicable, specify the amount required to be appropriated and obligated to develop, procure, and operate the major system in each fiscal year of the proposed period of development, procurement, and operation of the major system. ``(3)(A) In the case of a program of the intelligence community that qualifies as a major system, an independent cost estimate shall be prepared before the submission to Congress of the budget of the President for the first fiscal year in which appropriated funds are anticipated to be obligated for the development or procurement of such major system. ``(B) In the case of a program of the intelligence community for which an independent cost estimate was not previously required to be prepared under this section, including a program for which development or procurement commenced before the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, if the aggregate future costs of development or procurement (or any combination of such activities) of the program will exceed $500,000,000 (in current fiscal year dollars), the program shall qualify as a major system for purposes of this section, and an independent cost estimate for such major system shall be prepared before the submission to Congress of the budget of the President for the first fiscal year thereafter in which appropriated funds are anticipated to be obligated for such major system. ``(4) The independent cost estimate for a major system shall be updated upon-- ``(A) the completion of any preliminary design review associated with the major system; ``(B) any significant modification to the anticipated design of the major system; or ``(C) any change in circumstances that renders the current independent cost estimate for the major system inaccurate. ``(5) Any update of an independent cost estimate for a major system under paragraph (4) shall meet all requirements for independent cost estimates under this section, and shall be treated as the most current independent cost estimate for the major system until further updated under that paragraph. ``(b) Preparation of Independent Cost Estimates.--(1) The Director shall establish within the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management an office which shall be responsible for preparing independent cost estimates, and any updates thereof, under subsection (a), unless a designation is made under paragraph (2). ``(2) In the case of the acquisition of a major system for an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense, the Director and the Secretary of Defense shall provide that the independent cost estimate, and any updates thereof, under subsection (a) be prepared by an entity jointly designated by the Director and the Secretary in accordance with section 2434(b)(1)(A) of title 10, United States Code. ``(c) Utilization in Budgets of President.--If the budget of the President requests appropriations for any fiscal year for the development or procurement of a major system by the intelligence community, the President shall request in such budget an amount of appropriations for the development or procurement, as the case may be, of the major system that is equivalent to the amount of appropriations identified in the most current independent cost estimate for the major system for obligation for each fiscal year for which appropriations are requested for the major system in such budget. ``(d) Inclusion of Estimates in Budget Justification Materials.--The budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the budget of the President shall include the most current independent cost estimate under this section for each major system for which appropriations are requested in such budget for any fiscal year. ``(e) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) The term `budget of the President' means the budget of the President for a fiscal year as submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code. ``(2) The term `independent cost estimate' means a pragmatic and neutral analysis, assessment, and quantification of all costs and risks associated with the acquisition of a major system, which shall be based on programmatic and technical specifications provided by the office within the element of the intelligence community with primary responsibility for the development, procurement, or operation of the major system. ``(3) The term `major system' means any significant program of an element of the intelligence community with projected total development and procurement costs exceeding $500,000,000 (in current fiscal year dollars), which costs shall include all end-to-end program costs, including costs associated with the development and procurement of the program and any other costs associated with the development and procurement of systems required to support or utilize the program.''. (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506 the following new item: (a) Clarification.--Section 224 of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 (Public Law 107-56; 115 Stat. 295) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(c) Effect of Sunset.--Effective on December 31, 2005, each provision of law the amendment of which is sunset by subsection (a) shall be revived so as to be in effect as such provision of law was in effect on October 25, 2001.''. (b) Modification.--Subsection (a) of that section is amended by inserting ``204,'' after ``203(c),''. (a) Report Required.--The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the risks to the national security of the United States of the current computer security practices of the elements of the intelligence community and of the Department of Defense. (b) Assessments.--The report under subsection (a) shall include an assessment of the following: (1) The vulnerability of the computers and computer systems of the elements of the intelligence community, and of the Department of Defense, to various threats from foreign governments, international terrorist organizations, and organized crime, including information warfare (IW), Information Operations (IO), Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), and Computer Network Attack (CNA). (2) The risks of providing users of local area networks (LANs) or wide-area networks (WANs) of computers that include classified information with capabilities for electronic mail, upload and download, or removable storage media without also deploying comprehensive computer firewalls, accountability procedures, or other appropriate security controls. (3) Any other matters that the Director and the Secretary jointly consider appropriate for purposes of the report. (c) Information on Access to Networks.--The report under subsection (a) shall also include information as follows: (1) An estimate of the number of access points on each classified computer or computer system of an element of the intelligence community or the Department of Defense that permit unsupervised uploading or downloading of classified information, set forth by level of classification. (2) An estimate of the number of individuals utilizing such computers or computer systems who have access to input-output devices on such computers or computer systems. (3) A description of the policies and procedures governing the security of the access points referred to in paragraph (1), and an assessment of the adequacy of such policies and procedures. (4) An assessment of viability of utilizing other technologies (including so-called ``thin client servers'') to achieve enhanced security of such computers and computer systems through more rigorous control of access to such computers and computer systems. (d) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall also include such recommendations for modifications or improvements of the current computer security practices of the elements of the intelligence community, and of the Department of Defense, as the Director and the Secretary jointly consider appropriate as a result of the assessments under subsection (b) and the information under subsection (c). (e) Submittal Date.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than February 15, 2004. (f) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, at the election of the Director. (g) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (2) The term ``elements of the intelligence community'' means the elements of the intelligence community set forth in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (a) Report Required.--The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the utility and effectiveness of the current security background investigations and security clearance procedures of the Federal Government in meeting the purposes of such investigations and procedures. (b) Particular Report Matters.--In preparing the report, the Director and the Secretary shall address in particular the following: (1) A comparison of the costs and benefits of conducting background investigations for Secret clearance with the costs and benefits of conducting full field background investigations. (2) The standards governing the revocation of security clearances. (c) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall include such recommendations for modifications or improvements of the current security background investigations or security clearance procedures of the Federal Government as the Director and the Secretary jointly consider appropriate as a result of the preparation of the report under that subsection. (d) Submittal Date.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than February 15, 2004. (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (a) Report Required.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on means of improving the detail or transfer of civilian intelligence personnel between and among the various elements of the intelligence community for the purpose of enhancing the flexibility and effectiveness of the intelligence community in responding to changes in requirements for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. (b) Report Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall-- (1) set forth a variety of proposals on means of improving the detail or transfer of civilian intelligence personnel as described in that subsection; (2) identify the proposal or proposals determined by the heads of the elements of the intelligence community to be most likely to meet the purpose described in that subsection; and (3) include such recommendations for such legislative or administrative action as the heads of the elements of the intelligence community consider appropriate to implement the proposal or proposals identified under paragraph (2). (c) Submittal Date.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than February 15, 2004. (d) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (2) The term ``elements of the intelligence community'' means the elements of the intelligence community set forth in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (3) The term ``heads of the elements of the intelligence community'' includes the Secretary of Defense with respect to each element of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense or the military departments. (a) Report.--Not later than four months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that-- (1) identifies impediments in current policy and regulations to the sharing of classified information horizontally across and among Federal departments and agencies, and between Federal departments and agencies and vertically to and from agencies of State and local governments and the private sector, for national security purposes, including homeland security; (2) proposes appropriate modifications of policy, law, and regulations to eliminate such impediments in order to facilitate such sharing of classified information for homeland security purposes, including homeland security; and (3) outlines a plan of action (including appropriate milestones and funding) to establish the Terrorist Threat Integration Center as called for in the Information on the State of the Union given by the President to Congress under section 3 of Article II of the Constitution of the United States in 2003. (b) Considerations.--In preparing the report under subsection (a), the President shall-- (1) consider the extent to which the reliance on a document-based approach to the protection of classified information impedes the sharing of classified information; and (2) consider the extent to which the utilization of a database-based approach, or other electronic approach, to the protection of classified information might facilitate the sharing of classified information. (c) Coordination With Other Information Sharing Activities.--In preparing the report under subsection (a), the President shall, to the maximum extent practicable, take into account actions being undertaken under the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act (subtitle I of title VIII of Public Law 107-296; 116 Stat. 2252; 6 U.S.C. 481 et seq.). (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (a) Report.--Not later than February 15, 2004, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses progress in the following: (1) The development by the Department of Defense and the intelligence community of a comprehensive and uniform analytical capability to assess the utility and advisability of various sensor and platform architectures and capabilities for the collection of intelligence. (2) The improvement of coordination between the Department and the intelligence community on strategic and budgetary planning. (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form. (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (a) Report.--Not later than February 15, 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the extent of United States dependence on computer hardware or software that is manufactured overseas. (b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall address the following: (1) The extent to which the United States currently depends on computer hardware or software that is manufactured overseas. (2) The extent to which United States dependence on such computer hardware or software is increasing. (3) The vulnerabilities of the national security and economy of the United States as a result of United States dependence on such computer hardware or software. (4) Any other matters relating to United States dependence on such computer hardware or software that the Director considers appropriate. (c) Consultation With Private Sector.--In preparing the report under subsection (a), the Director may consult, and is encouraged to consult, with appropriate persons and entities in the computer hardware or software industry and with other appropriate persons and entities in the private sector. (d) Form.--(1) The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (2) The report may be in the form of a National Intelligence Estimate. (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the intelligence lessons learned as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom. (b) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall include such recommendations on means of improving training, equipment, operations, coordination, and collection of or for intelligence as the Director considers appropriate. (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form. (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (a) Preliminary Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the cessation of hostilities in Iraq (as determined by the President), the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall, after such consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General as the Director considers appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a preliminary report on all information obtained by the Department of Defense and the intelligence community on the conventional weapons and ammunition obtained by Iraq in violation of applicable resolutions of the United Nations Security Council adopted since the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990. (b) Final Report.--(1) Not later than 270 days after the date of the cessation of hostilities in Iraq (as so determined), the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a final report on the information described in subsection (a). (2) The final report under paragraph (1) shall include such updates of the preliminary report under subsection (a) as the Director considers appropriate. (c) Elements.--Each report under this section shall set forth, to the extent practicable, with respect to each shipment of weapons or ammunition addressed in such report the following: (1) The country of origin. (2) Any country of transshipment. (d) Form.--Each report under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and International Relations of the House of Representatives. (a) Annual Evaluation of Performance and Responsiveness of Intelligence Community.--Section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5) is amended by striking subsection (d). (b) Periodic and Special Reports on Disclosure of Intelligence Information to United Nations.--Section 112 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (b); and (2) by redesignating subsections (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively. (c) Annual Report on Intelligence Community Cooperation With Counterdrug Activities.--Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (a); and (2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as subsections (a) through (e), respectively. (d) Annual Report on Covert Leases.--Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by this section, is further amended-- (1) by striking subsection (d); and (2) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d). (e) Annual Report on Protection of Covert Agents.--Section 603 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423) is repealed. (f) Annual Report on Certain Foreign Companies Involved in Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.--Section 827 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2430; 50 U.S.C. 404n-3) is repealed. (g) Annual Report on Intelligence Activities of People's Republic of China.--Section 308 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-107; 111 Stat. 2253; 50 U.S.C. 402a note) is repealed. (h) Annual Report on Coordination of Counterintelligence Matters With FBI.--Section 811(c) of the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 (title VIII of Public Law 103-359; 50 U.S.C. 402a(c)) is amended-- (1) by striking paragraph (6); and (2) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8) as paragraphs (6) and (7), respectively. (i) Report on Postemployment Assistance for Terminated Intelligence Employees.--Section 1611 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking subsection (e). (j) Annual Report on Activities of FBI Personnel Outside the United States.--Section 540C of title 18, United States Code, is repealed. (k) Annual Report on Exceptions to Consumer Disclosure Requirements for National Security Investigations.--Section 604(b)(4) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681b(b)(4)) is amended-- (1) by striking subparagraphs (D) and (E); and (2) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (D). (l) Conforming Amendments.--Section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) by striking subparagraphs (A), (C), (D), (G), (I), (J), and (L); and (ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (E), (F), (H), (K), (M), and (N) as subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), and (G), respectively; and (iii) in subparagraph (G), as so redesignated, by striking ``section 114(c)'' and inserting ``section 114(b)''. (B) in paragraph (2)-- (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``section 114(b)'' and inserting ``section 114(a)''; (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``section 114(d)'' and inserting ``section 114(c)''; (iii) by striking subparagraphs (C), (E), and (F); and (iv) by redesignating subparagraphs (D) and (G) as subparagraphs (C) and (D), respectively; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) by striking paragraph (1); and (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (8) as paragraphs (1) through (7), respectively. (m) Clerical Amendments.-- (1) National security act of 1947.--The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item relating to section 603. (2) Title 18, united states code.--The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 33 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 540C. (n) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take effect on December 31, 2003. (a) Report Required.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the operations of the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland Security and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The report shall include the following: (1) An assessment of the operations of the Directorate, including the capability of the Directorate-- (A) to meet personnel requirements, including requirements to employ qualified analysts, and the status of efforts to employ qualified analysts; (B) to share intelligence information with the other elements of the intelligence community, including the sharing of intelligence information through secure information technology connections between the Directorate and the other elements of the intelligence community; (C) to disseminate intelligence information, or analyses of intelligence information, to other departments and agencies of the Federal Government and, as appropriate, to State and local governments; (D) to coordinate with State and local counterterrorism and law enforcement officials; (E) to access information, including intelligence and law enforcement information, from the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, including the ability to access, in a timely and efficient manner, all information authorized by section 202 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 122); and (F) to fulfill, given the current assets and capabilities of the Directorate, the responsibilities set forth in section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121); (2) A delineation of the responsibilities and duties of the Directorate and of the responsibilities and duties of the Center. (3) A delineation and summary of the areas in which the responsibilities and duties of the Directorate and the Center overlap. (4) An assessment of whether the areas of overlap, if any, delineated under paragraph (3) represent an inefficient utilization of the limited resources of the Directorate and the intelligence community. (5) Such information as the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, considers appropriate to explain the basis for the establishment and operation of the Center as a ``joint venture'' of participating agencies rather than as an element of the Directorate reporting directly to the Secretary through the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. (b) Submittal Date.--The report required by this section shall be submitted not later than May 1, 2004. (c) Form.--The report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Governmental Affairs, the Judiciary, and Appropriations of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committees on the Judiciary and Appropriations of the House of Representatives. Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``TWO-YEAR'' before ``SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION''; and (2) in the text, by striking ``ending on October 1, 2003'' and inserting ``ending on the date that is 60 days after the appropriate congressional committees of jurisdiction (as defined in section 324(d) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 7304(d)) are notified jointly by the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (or the Director's designee) that the operational framework for the office has been terminated''. (a) Clarification of Aliens Authorized To Distribute Explosive Materials.--Section 842(d)(7) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (B)-- (A) by inserting ``or'' at the end of clause (i); and (B) by striking clauses (iii) and (iv); and (3) by adding the following new subparagraphs: ``(C) is a member of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or other friendly foreign military force, as determined by the Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, who is present in the United States under military orders for training or other military purpose authorized by the United States and the shipping, transporting, possession, or receipt of explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized military purpose; or ``(D) is lawfully present in the United States in cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence, and the shipment, transportation, receipt, or possession of the explosive materials is in furtherance of such cooperation;''. (b) Clarification of Aliens Authorized To Possess or Receive Explosive Materials.--Section 842(i)(5) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (B)-- (A) by inserting ``or'' at the end of clause (i); and (B) by striking clauses (iii) and (iv); and (3) by adding the following new subparagraphs: ``(C) is a member of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or other friendly foreign military force, as determined by the Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, who is present in the United States under military orders for training or other military purpose authorized by the United States and the shipping, transporting, possession, or receipt of explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized military purpose; or ``(D) is lawfully present in the United States in cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence, and the shipment, transportation, receipt, or possession of the explosive materials is in furtherance of such cooperation;''. Section 313(e)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1424(e)(4)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``when Department of Defense activities are relevant to the determination'' after ``Secretary of Defense''; and (2) by inserting ``and the Secretary of Homeland Security'' after ``Attorney General''. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 1101(1) (12 U.S.C. 3401(1)), by inserting ``, except as provided in section 1114,'' before ``means any office''; and (2) in section 1114 (12 U.S.C. 3414), by adding at the end the following: ``(c) For purposes of this section, the term `financial institution' has the same meaning as in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code, except that, for purposes of this section, such term shall include only such a financial institution any part of which is located inside any State or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the United States Virgin Islands.''. (a) Workshops for Coordination of Research.--The National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall jointly sponsor not less than two workshops on the coordination of Federal Government research on the use of behavioral, psychological, and physiological assessments of individuals in the conduct of security evaluations. (b) Deadline for Completion of Activities.--The activities of the workshops sponsored under subsection (a) shall be completed not later than March 1, 2004. (c) Purposes.--The purposes of the workshops sponsored under subsection (a) are as follows: (1) To provide a forum for cataloging and coordinating federally-funded research activities relating to the development of new techniques in the behavioral, psychological, or physiological assessment of individuals to be used in security evaluations. (2) To develop a research agenda for the Federal Government on behavioral, psychological, and physiological assessments of individuals, including an identification of the research most likely to advance the understanding of the use of such assessments of individuals in security evaluations. (3) To distinguish between short-term and long-term areas of research on behavioral, psychological, and physiological assessments of individuals in order maximize the utility of short-term and long-term research on such assessments. (4) To identify the Federal agencies best suited to support research on behavioral, psychological, and physiological assessments of individuals. (5) To develop recommendations for coordinating future federally-funded research for the development, improvement, or enhancement of security evaluations. (d) Advisory Group.--(1) In order to assist the National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy in carrying out the activities of the workshops sponsored under subsection (a), there is hereby established an interagency advisory group with respect to such workshops. (2) The advisory group shall be composed of the following: (A) A representative of the Social, Behavioral, and Economic Directorate of the National Science Foundation. (B) A representative of the Office of Science, and Technology Policy. (C) The Secretary of Defense, or a designee of the Secretary. (D) The Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary. (E) The Attorney General, or a designee of the Attorney General. (F) The Secretary of Energy, or a designee of the Secretary. (G) The Secretary of Homeland Security, or a designee of the Secretary. (H) The Director of Central Intelligence, or a designee of the Director. (I) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a designee of the Director. (J) The National Counterintelligence Executive, or a designee of the National Counterintelligence Executive. (K) Any other official assigned to the advisory group by the President for purposes of this section. (3) The members of the advisory group under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) shall jointly head the advisory group. (4) The advisory group shall provide the Foundation and the Office such information, advice, and assistance with respect to the workshops sponsored under subsection (a) as the advisory group considers appropriate. (5) The advisory group shall not be treated as an advisory committee for purposes of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). (e) Report.--Not later than March 1, 2004, the National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall jointly submit Congress a report on the results of activities of the workshops sponsored under subsection (a), including the findings and recommendations of the Foundation and the Office as a result of such activities. (f) Funding.--(1) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by section 104(a), $500,000 shall be available to the National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy to carry out this section. (2) The amount authorized to be appropriated by paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended. (a) National Security Act of 1947.--Subsection (c)(1) of section 112 of the National Security Act of 1947, as redesignated by section 339(b) of this Act, is further amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6)'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7)''. (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``(c)(6)'' each place it appears and inserting ``(c)(7)''. (2) Section 6 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''. (2) Section 15 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``special policemen of the General Services Administration perform under the first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318),'' and inserting ``officers and agents of the Department of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United States Code,''; and (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``the fourth section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) of this section (40 U.S.C. 318c)'' and inserting ``section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code''. (c) National Security Agency Act of 1959.--Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``special policemen of the General Services Administration perform under the first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318)'' and inserting ``officers and agents of the Department of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United States Code,''; and (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``the fourth section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) (40 U.S.C. 318c)'' and inserting ``section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code''. (d) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.-- Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''; and (2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 103(c)(6)'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7)''. (e) Public Law 107-173.--Section 201(c)(3)(F) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173; 116 Stat. 548; 8 U.S.C. 1721(c)(3)(F)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''. Section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(f) Classified Information.--In any judicial review of a finding of the existence of a primary money laundering concern, or of the requirement for 1 or more special measures with respect to a primary money laundering concern, made under this section, if the designation or imposition, or both, were based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.), such information may be submitted by the Secretary to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review of any finding made or required under this section.''. Section 4(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403e(b)(5)) is amended inserting ``, other than regulations under paragraph (1),'' after ``Regulations''. Section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Agency personnel designated by the Director under subsection (a), or designated by the Director under section 5(a)(4) to carry firearms for the protection of current or former Agency personnel and their immediate families, defectors and their immediate families, and other persons in the United States under Agency auspices, shall be considered for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office or employment when such Agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include the use of force, to-- ``(A) protect an individual in the presence of such Agency personnel from a crime of violence; ``(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or ``(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such Agency personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of violence in the presence of such Agency personnel. ``(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the Attorney General under section 2679(d)(1) of title 28, United States Code. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United States Code.''. Section 21(f)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u(f)(2)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Director'' and inserting ``The Director''; and (2) by striking subparagraph (B). Section 3535(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added by section 1001(b)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), and section 3545(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added by section 301(b)(1) of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347), are each amended by inserting ``or any other law'' after ``1978''. (a) CSRS Participants.--Section 8351(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(d)''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2)(A) An employee of the Central Intelligence Agency making contributions to the Thrift Savings Fund out of basic pay may also contribute (by direct transfer to the Fund) any part of bonus pay received by the employee as part of the pilot project required by section 402(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2403; 50 U.S.C. 403-4 note). ``(B) Contributions under this paragraph are subject to section 8432(d) of this title.''. (b) FERS Participants.--Section 8432 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(k)(1) An employee of the Central Intelligence Agency making contributions to the Thrift Savings Fund out of basic pay may also contribute (by direct transfer to the Fund) any part of bonus pay received by the employee as part of the pilot project required by section 402(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2403; 50 U.S.C. 403-4 note). ``(2) Contributions under this subsection are subject to subsection (d). ``(3) For purposes of subsection (c), basic pay of an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency shall include bonus pay received by the employee as part of the pilot project referred to in paragraph (1).''. (a) Consolidation of Current Provisions on Protection of Operational Files.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by transferring sections 105C and 105D to the end of title VII and redesignating such sections, as so transferred, as sections 703 and 704, respectively. (b) Protection of Operational Files of NSA.--Title VII of such Act, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, agency personnel designated by the Director of the National Security Agency under subsection (a) shall be considered for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office or employment when such agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include the use of force, to-- ``(A) protect an individual in the presence of such agency personnel from a crime of violence; ``(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or ``(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such agency personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of violence in the presence of such agency personnel. ``(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the Attorney General under section 2679(d)(1) of title 28, United States Code. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United States Code.''. (a) Authority.--Funds designated for intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for assistance to the Government of Colombia for counterdrug activities for fiscal year 2004 or 2005, and any unobligated funds available to any element of the intelligence community for such activities for a prior fiscal year, shall be available-- (1) to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and against activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)); and (2) to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue operations. (b) Termination of Authority.--The authority provided in subsection (a) shall cease to be effective if the Secretary of Defense has credible evidence that the Colombian Armed Forces are not conducting vigorous operations to restore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations. (c) Application of Certain Provisions of Law.--Sections 556, 567, and 568 of Public Law 107-115, section 8093 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, and the numerical limitations on the number of United States military personnel and United States individual civilian contractors in section 3204(b)(1) of Public Law 106-246 shall be applicable to funds made available pursuant to the authority contained in subsection (a). (d) Limitation on Participation of United States Personnel.--No United States Armed Forces personnel or United States civilian contractor employed by the United States will participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance made available under this section, except for the purpose of acting in self defense or rescuing any United States citizen to include United States Armed Forces personnel, United States civilian employees, and civilian contractors employed by the United States. Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by this Act, $2,500,000 shall be available for the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) for scene visualization technologies.", u"SA 2099. Mr. BENNETT (for Mr. Inouye) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: SA 2100. Mr. BENNETT (for himself and Mr. Kohl) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: SA 2101. Mr. BENNETT (for Mr. Kohl) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: SA 2102. Mr. BENNETT (for Mr. Brownback) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: SA 2103. Mr. BENNETT proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: SA 2104. Mr. BENNETT (for himself and Mr. Kohl) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: SA 2105. Mr. BENNETT (for Mr. Grassley (for himself and Mr. Dorgan)) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: On page 79, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following: SA 2106. Mr. BENNETT ( for Mr. Craig) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: SA 2107. Mr. BENNETT (for Mr. Graham of Florida (for himself and Mr. Nelson of Florida)) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: On page 79, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following: SA 2108. Mr. BENNETT (for Mr. Burns (for himself and Mrs. Clinton)) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: On page 79, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following: SA 2109. Mr. BENNETT (for Mr. Durbin) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: SA 2110. Mr. BENNETT (for Mr. Schumer (for himself and Mrs. Clinton)) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: SA 2111. Mr. BENNETT (for Mr. Miller) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: On page 79, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following: SA 2112. Mr. BENNETT (for Mr. Frist (for himself and Mr. Daschle)) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 2673, making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes; as follows: On page 79, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following: (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Sun Grant Research Initiative Act of 2003''. (b) Research, Extension, and Educational Programs on Biobased Energy Technologies and Products.--Title IX of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. 8101 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Sun Grant Research Initiative Act of 2003''. (b) Research, Extension, and Educational Programs on Biobased Energy Technologies and Products.--Title IX of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. 8101 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 9011. RESEARCH, EXTENSION, AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS ON BIOBASED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES AND PRODUCTS. SA 2113. Mr. BENNETT (for Mr. Thomas (for himself, Mr. Bingaman, and Mr. Hagel)) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 1442, to authorize the design and construction of a visitor center for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial; as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: TITLE I--VIETNAM VETERANS MEMORIAL VISITOR CENTER Public Law 96-297 (16 U.S.C. 431 note) is amended by adding at the end the following: Public Law 96-297 (16 U.S.C. 431 note) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 6. VISITOR CENTER. Public Law 96-297 (16 U.S.C. 431 note) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 6. VISITOR CENTER. ``(a) Authorization.-- ``(1) In general.--The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, Inc., is authorized to construct a visitor center at or near the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on Federal land in the District of Columbia, or its environs, subject to the provisions of this section, in order to better inform and educate the public about the Vietnam Veterans Memorial and the Vietnam War. ``(2) Location.--The visitor center shall be located underground. ``(3) Consultation on design phase.--The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, Inc. shall consult with educators, veterans groups, and the National Park Service in developing the proposed design of the visitor center. ``(b) Compliance With Standards Applicable to Commemorative Works.--Chapter 89 of title 40, United States Code, shall apply, including provisions related to the siting, design, construction, and maintenance of the visitor center, and the visitor center shall be considered a commemorative work for the purposes of that Act, except that-- ``(1) final approval of the visitor center shall not be withheld; ``(2) the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of section 8908 of title 40, United States Code, requiring further approval by law for the location of a commemorative work within Area I and prohibiting the siting of a visitor center within the Reserve shall not apply; ``(3) the size of the visitor center shall be limited to the minimum necessary-- ``(A) to provide for appropriate educational and interpretive functions; and ``(B) to prevent interference or encroachment on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial and to protect open space and visual sightlines on the Mall; and ``(4) the visitor center shall be constructed and landscaped in a manner harmonious with the site of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, consistent with the special nature and sanctity of the Mall. ``(c) Operation and Maintenance.-- ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of the Interior shall-- ``(A) operate and maintain the visitor center, except that the Secretary shall enter into a written agreement with the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, Inc. for specified maintenance needs of the visitor center, as determined by the Secretary; and ``(B) as soon as practicable, in consultation with educators and veterans groups, develop a written interpretive plan for the visitor center in accordance with National Park Service policy. ``(2) Donation for perpetual maintenance and preservation.--Paragraph (1)(A) does not waive the requirements of section 8906(b) of title 40, United States Code, with respect to the visitor center. ``(d) Funding.--The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, Inc. shall be solely responsible for acceptance of contributions for, and payment of expenses of, the establishment of the visitor center. No Federal funds shall be used to pay any expense of the establishment of the visitor center.''. Public Law 96-297 (16 U.S.C. 431 note) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 6. VISITOR CENTER. ``(a) Authorization.-- ``(1) In general.--The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, Inc., is authorized to construct a visitor center at or near the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on Federal land in the District of Columbia, or its environs, subject to the provisions of this section, in order to better inform and educate the public about the Vietnam Veterans Memorial and the Vietnam War. ``(2) Location.--The visitor center shall be located underground. ``(3) Consultation on design phase.--The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, Inc. shall consult with educators, veterans groups, and the National Park Service in developing the proposed design of the visitor center. ``(b) Compliance With Standards Applicable to Commemorative Works.--Chapter 89 of title 40, United States Code, shall apply, including provisions related to the siting, design, construction, and maintenance of the visitor center, and the visitor center shall be considered a commemorative work for the purposes of that Act, except that-- ``(1) final approval of the visitor center shall not be withheld; ``(2) the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of section 8908 of title 40, United States Code, requiring further approval by law for the location of a commemorative work within Area I and prohibiting the siting of a visitor center within the Reserve shall not apply; ``(3) the size of the visitor center shall be limited to the minimum necessary-- ``(A) to provide for appropriate educational and interpretive functions; and ``(B) to prevent interference or encroachment on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial and to protect open space and visual sightlines on the Mall; and ``(4) the visitor center shall be constructed and landscaped in a manner harmonious with the site of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, consistent with the special nature and sanctity of the Mall. ``(c) Operation and Maintenance.-- ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of the Interior shall-- ``(A) operate and maintain the visitor center, except that the Secretary shall enter into a written agreement with the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, Inc. for specified maintenance needs of the visitor center, as determined by the Secretary; and ``(B) as soon as practicable, in consultation with educators and veterans groups, develop a written interpretive plan for the visitor center in accordance with National Park Service policy. ``(2) Donation for perpetual maintenance and preservation.--Paragraph (1)(A) does not waive the requirements of section 8906(b) of title 40, United States Code, with respect to the visitor center. ``(d) Funding.--The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, Inc. shall be solely responsible for acceptance of contributions for, and payment of expenses of, the establishment of the visitor center. No Federal funds shall be used to pay any expense of the establishment of the visitor center.''. TITLE II--COMMEMORATIVE WORKS This title may be cited as the ``Commemorative Works Clarification and Revision Act of 2003''. (a) Findings.--Congress finds that-- (1) the great cross-axis of the Mall in the District of Columbia, which generally extends from the United States Capitol to the Lincoln Memorial, and from the White House to the Jefferson Memorial, is a substantially completed work of civic art; and (2) to preserve the integrity of the Mall, a reserve area should be designated within the core of the great cross-axis of the Mall where the siting of new commemorative works is prohibited. (b) Reserve.--Section 8908 of title 40, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(c) Reserve.--After the date of enactment of the Commemorative Works Clarification and Revision Act of 2003, no commemorative work or visitor center shall be located within the Reserve.''. (a) Purposes.--Section 8901(2) of title 40, United States Code, is amended by striking ``Columbia;'' and inserting ``Columbia and its environs, and to encourage the location of commemorative works within the urban fabric of the District of Columbia;''. (b) Definitions.--Section 8902 of title 40, United States Code, is amended by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following: ``(a) Definitions.--In this chapter: ``(1) Commemorative work.--The term `commemorative work' means any statue, monument, sculpture, memorial, plaque, inscription, or other structure or landscape feature, including a garden or memorial grove, designed to perpetuate in a permanent manner the memory of an individual, group, event or other significant element of American history, except that the term does not include any such item which is located within the interior of a structure or a structure which is primarily used for other purposes. ``(2) The district of columbia and its environs.--The term `the District of Columbia and its environs' means those lands and properties administered by the National Park Service and the General Services Administration located in the Reserve, Area I, and Area II as depicted on the map entitled `Commemorative Areas Washington, DC and Environs', numbered 869/86501 B, and dated June 24, 2003. ``(3) Reserve.--The term `Reserve' means the great cross- axis of the Mall, which generally extends from the United States Capitol to the Lincoln Memorial, and from the White House to the Jefferson Memorial, as depicted on the map referenced in paragraph (2). ``(4) Sponsor.--The term `sponsor' means a public agency, or an individual, group or organization that is described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code, and which is authorized by Congress to establish a commemorative work in the District of Columbia and its environs.''. (c) Authorization.--Section 8903 of title 40, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) by striking ``work commemorating a lesser conflict'' and inserting ``work solely commemorating a limited military engagement''; and (B) by striking ``the event'' and inserting ``such war or conflict''; (2) in subsection (d)-- (A) by striking ``Consultation with National Capital Memorial Commission.--'' and inserting ``Consultation with National Capital Memorial Advisory Commission.--''; (B) by striking ``House Administration'' and inserting ``Resources''; and (C) by inserting ``Advisory'' before ``Commission''; and (3) by striking subsection (e) and inserting the following: ``(e) Expiration of Legislative Authority.--Any legislative authority for a commemorative work shall expire at the end of the seven-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of such authority, or at the end of the seven-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of legislative authority to locate the commemorative work within Area I, if such additional authority has been granted, unless-- ``(1) the Secretary of the Interior or the Administrator of General Services (as appropriate) has issued a construction permit for the commemorative work during that period; or ``(2) the Secretary or the Administrator (as appropriate), in consultation with the National Capital Memorial Advisory Commission, has made a determination that-- ``(A) final design approvals have been obtained from the National Capital Planning Commission and the Commission of Fine Arts; and ``(B) 75 percent of the amount estimated to be required to complete the commemorative work has been raised. (a) Purposes.--Section 8901(2) of title 40, United States Code, is amended by striking ``Columbia;'' and inserting ``Columbia and its environs, and to encourage the location of commemorative works within the urban fabric of the District of Columbia;''. (b) Definitions.--Section 8902 of title 40, United States Code, is amended by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following: ``(a) Definitions.--In this chapter: ``(1) Commemorative work.--The term `commemorative work' means any statue, monument, sculpture, memorial, plaque, inscription, or other structure or landscape feature, including a garden or memorial grove, designed to perpetuate in a permanent manner the memory of an individual, group, event or other significant element of American history, except that the term does not include any such item which is located within the interior of a structure or a structure which is primarily used for other purposes. ``(2) The district of columbia and its environs.--The term `the District of Columbia and its environs' means those lands and properties administered by the National Park Service and the General Services Administration located in the Reserve, Area I, and Area II as depicted on the map entitled `Commemorative Areas Washington, DC and Environs', numbered 869/86501 B, and dated June 24, 2003. ``(3) Reserve.--The term `Reserve' means the great cross- axis of the Mall, which generally extends from the United States Capitol to the Lincoln Memorial, and from the White House to the Jefferson Memorial, as depicted on the map referenced in paragraph (2). ``(4) Sponsor.--The term `sponsor' means a public agency, or an individual, group or organization that is described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code, and which is authorized by Congress to establish a commemorative work in the District of Columbia and its environs.''. (c) Authorization.--Section 8903 of title 40, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) by striking ``work commemorating a lesser conflict'' and inserting ``work solely commemorating a limited military engagement''; and (B) by striking ``the event'' and inserting ``such war or conflict''; (2) in subsection (d)-- (A) by striking ``Consultation with National Capital Memorial Commission.--'' and inserting ``Consultation with National Capital Memorial Advisory Commission.--''; (B) by striking ``House Administration'' and inserting ``Resources''; and (C) by inserting ``Advisory'' before ``Commission''; and (3) by striking subsection (e) and inserting the following: ``(e) Expiration of Legislative Authority.--Any legislative authority for a commemorative work shall expire at the end of the seven-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of such authority, or at the end of the seven-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of legislative authority to locate the commemorative work within Area I, if such additional authority has been granted, unless-- ``(1) the Secretary of the Interior or the Administrator of General Services (as appropriate) has issued a construction permit for the commemorative work during that period; or ``(2) the Secretary or the Administrator (as appropriate), in consultation with the National Capital Memorial Advisory Commission, has made a determination that-- ``(A) final design approvals have been obtained from the National Capital Planning Commission and the Commission of Fine Arts; and ``(B) 75 percent of the amount estimated to be required to complete the commemorative work has been raised. If these two conditions have been met, the Secretary or the Administrator (as appropriate) may extend the seven-year legislative authority for a period not to exceed three additional years. Upon expiration of the legislative authority, any previous site and design approvals shall also expire.''. (d) National Capital Memorial Advisory Commission.--Section 8904 of title 40, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the heading, by inserting ``Advisory'' before ``Commission''; (2) in subsection (a), by striking ``There is a National'' and all that follows through ``consists of'' and inserting the following: ``There is established the National Capital Memorial Advisory Commission, which shall be composed of''; (3) in subsection (c)-- (A) by inserting ``Advisory'' before ``Commission shall''; and (B) by striking ``Services'' and inserting ``Services (as appropriate)''; and (4) in subsection (d) by inserting ``Advisory'' before ``Commission''. (e) Site and Design Approval.--Section 8905 of title 40, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking ``person'' each place it appears and inserting ``sponsor''; and (B) in paragraph (1)-- (i) by inserting ``Advisory'' before ``Commission''; and (ii) by striking ``designs'' and inserting ``design concepts''; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) by striking ``Secretary, and Administrator'' and inserting ``and the Secretary or Administrator (as appropriate)''; and (B) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking, ``open space and existing public use.'' and inserting ``open space, existing public use, and cultural and natural resources.''. (f) Criteria for Issuance of Construction Permit.--Section 8906 of title 40, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(3) and (a)(4) by striking ``person'' and inserting ``sponsor''; and (2) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following: ``(b) Donation for Perpetual Maintenance and Preservation.-- ``(1) In addition to the criteria described above in subsection (a), no construction permit shall be issued unless the sponsor authorized to construct the commemorative work has donated an amount equal to 10 percent of the total estimated cost of construction to offset the costs of perpetual maintenance and preservation of the commemorative work. All such amounts shall be available for those purposes pursuant to the provisions of this subsection. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply in instances when the commemorative work is constructed by a Department or agency of the Federal Government and less than 50 percent of the funding for such work is provided by private sources. ``(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, money on deposit in the Treasury on the date of enactment of the Commemorative Works Clarification and Revision Act of 2003 provided by a sponsor for maintenance pursuant to this subsection shall be credited to a separate account in the Treasury. ``(3) Money provided by a sponsor pursuant to the provisions of this subsection after the date of enactment of the Commemorative Works Clarification and Revision Act of 2003 shall be credited to a separate account with the National Park Foundation. ``(4) Upon request of the Secretary or Administrator (as appropriate), the Secretary of the Treasury or the National Park Foundation shall make all or a portion of such moneys available to the Secretary or the Administrator (as appropriate) for the maintenance of a commemorative work. Under no circumstances may the Secretary or Administrator request funds from a separate account exceeding the total money in the account established under paragraph (2) or (3). The Secretary and the Administrator shall maintain an inventory of funds available for such purposes. Funds provided under this paragraph shall be available without further appropriation and shall remain available until expended.''. (g) Areas I and II.--Section 8908(a) of title 40, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking ``Secretary of the Interior and Administrator of General Services'' and inserting ``Secretary of the Interior or the Administrator of General Services (as appropriate)''; and (2) by striking ``numbered 869/86581, and dated May 1, 1986'' and inserting ``entitled `Commemorative Areas Washington, DC and Environs', numbered 869/86501 B, and dated June 24, 2003''. Section 8905(b) of title 40, United States Code (as amended by section 203(e)), is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(5) Museums.--No commemorative work primarily designed as a museum may be located on lands under the jurisdiction of the Secretary in Area I or in East Potomac Park as depicted on the map referenced in section 8902(2). ``(6) Site-specific guidelines.--The National Capital Planning Commission and the Commission of Fine Arts may develop such criteria or guidelines specific to each site that are mutually agreed upon to ensure that the design of the commemorative work carries out the purposes of this chapter. ``(7) Donor contributions.--Donor contributions to commemorative works shall not be acknowledged in any manner as part of the commemorative work or its site.''. Except for the provision in the amendment made by section 202(b) prohibiting a visitor center from being located in the Reserve (as defined in section 8902 of title 40, United States Code), nothing in this title shall apply to a commemorative work for which a site was approved in accordance with chapter 89 of title 40, United States Code, prior to the date of enactment of this title. SA 2114. Mr. BENNETT (for Ms. Collins) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 589, to strengthen and improve the management of national security, encourage Government service in areas of critical national security, and to assist government agencies in addressing deficiencies in personnel possessing specialized skills important to national security and incorporating the goals and strategies for recruitment and retention for such skilled personnel into the strategic and performance management systems of Federal agencies; as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: This Act may be cited as the ``Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act of 2003''. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The security of the United States requires the fullest development of the intellectual resources and technical skills of its young men and women. (2) The security of the United States depends upon the mastery of modern techniques developed from complex scientific principles. It depends as well upon the discovery and development of new principles, new techniques, and new knowledge. (3) The United States finds itself on the brink of an unprecedented human capital crisis in Government. Due to increasing competition from the private sector in recruiting high-caliber individuals, Government departments and agencies, particularly those involved in national security affairs, are finding it hard to attract and retain talent. (4) The United States must strengthen Federal civilian and military personnel systems in order to improve recruitment, retention, and effectiveness at all levels. (5) The ability of the United States to exercise international leadership is, and will increasingly continue to be, based on the political and economic strength of the United States, as well as on United States military strength around the world. (6) The Federal Government has an interest in ensuring that the employees of its departments and agencies with national security responsibilities are prepared to meet the challenges of this changing international environment. (7) In January 2001, the General Accounting Office reported that, at the Department of Defense ``attrition among first- time enlistees has reached an all-time high. The services face shortages among junior officers, and problems in retaining intelligence analysts, computer programmers, and pilots.'' The General Accounting Office also warned of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's ``lack of staff to perform intelligence functions and unclear guidance for retrieving and analyzing information.'' (8) The United States Commission on National Security also cautioned that ``the U.S. need for the highest quality human capital in science, mathematics, and engineering is not being met.'' The Commission wrote, ``we must ensure the highest caliber human capital in public service. U.S. national security depends on the quality of the people, both civilian and military, serving within the ranks of government.'' (9) The events on and after September 11th have highlighted the weaknesses in the Federal and State government's human capital and its personnel management practices, especially as it relates to our national security. (b) Purposes.--It is the purpose of this Act to-- (1) provide attractive incentives to recruit capable individuals for Government and military service; and (2) provide the necessary resources, accountability, and flexibility to meet the national security educational needs of the United States, especially as such needs change over time. (c) Effect of Law.--Nothing in this Act, or an amendment made by this Act, shall be construed to affect the collective bargaining unit status or rights of any Federal employee. (a) In General.--Subchapter VII of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 5379, the following: (a) In General.--Subchapter VII of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 5379, the following: ``Sec. 5379a. Pilot program for student loan repayment for Federal employees in national security positions (a) In General.--Subchapter VII of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 5379, the following: ``Sec. 5379a. Pilot program for student loan repayment for Federal employees in national security positions ``(a) In this section: ``(1) The term `agency' means the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. ``(2) The term `national security position' means an employment position determined by the head of an agency for the purposes of a pilot program established under this section, to involve important homeland security applications. ``(3) The term `student loan' means-- ``(A) a loan made, insured, or guaranteed under part B of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1071 et seq.); ``(B) a loan made under part D or E of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087a et seq., 1087aa et seq.); and ``(C) a health education assistance loan made or insured under part A of title VII of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 292 et seq.) or under part E of title VIII of such Act (42 U.S.C. 297a et seq.). ``(b)(1) The head of an agency shall, in order to recruit or retain highly qualified professional personnel, establish a pilot program under which the head of that agency may agree to repay (by direct payments on behalf of the employee) any student loan previously taken out by such employee if the employee is employed by the agency in a national security position. The head of an agency may provide for a program to apply to, and be administered with respect to, 1 or more organizational units of the agency. ``(2) Payments under this section shall be made subject to such terms, limitations, or conditions as may be mutually agreed to by the agency and employee concerned. ``(3) The amount paid by the agency on behalf of an employee under this section may not exceed $10,000 in any calendar year toward the remaining balance of the student loan for each year that the employee remains in service in the position, except that the employee shall remain in such position for at least 3 years. The maximum total amount that may be paid on behalf of an employee under this paragraph shall be $60,000. ``(4) An employee may participate in the program under section 5379 and any program under this section at the same time, except the total amount paid by all agencies on behalf of that employee under section 5379 and this section may not exceed-- ``(A) $10,000 in any calendar year; or ``(B) $60,000 in total. ``(5) Nothing in this section shall be considered to authorize an agency to pay any amount to reimburse an employee for any repayments made by such employee prior to the agency's entering into an agreement under this section with such employee. ``(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed-- ``(A) to affect student loan repayment programs existing on the date of enactment of this section; ``(B) to revoke or rescind any existing law, collective bargaining agreement, or recognition of a labor organization; ``(C) to authorize the head of an agency to determine national security positions for any other purpose other than to make such determinations as are required by this section in order to carry out the purposes of this section; or ``(D) as a basis for determining the exemption of any position from inclusion in a bargaining unit under chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, or from the right of any incumbent of a national security position determined by the head of an agency under this section, from entitlement to all rights and benefits under such chapter. ``(c)(1)(A) Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this section, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall report to the appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of the program under this section. ``(B) Not later than 4 years after the date of enactment of this section, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall report to the appropriate committees of Congress on the status of the programs established under this section and the success of such programs in recruiting and retaining employees for national security positions, including an assessment as to whether the program should be expanded to other agencies or to non-national security positions to improve overall Federal workforce recruitment and retention. ``(2) The head of each agency establishing a program under this section shall provide any necessary information to the Office of Personnel Management to carry out this subsection. ``(d) An employee shall not be eligible for benefits under this section if such employee-- ``(1) occupies a position that is excepted from the competitive service because of its confidential, policy- determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character; or ``(2) does not occupy a national security position. ``(e)(1) An employee selected to receive benefits under this section shall agree in writing, before receiving any such benefit, that the employee shall-- ``(A) remain in the service of the agency in a national security position for a period to be specified in the agreement, but not less than 3 years, unless involuntarily separated; and ``(B) if separated involuntarily on account of misconduct, or voluntarily, before the end of the period specified in the agreement, repay to the Government the amount of any benefits received by such employee from that agency under this section. ``(2) The repayment provided for under paragraph (1)(B) may not be required of an employee who leaves the service of such employee's agency voluntarily to enter into the service of any other agency unless the head of the agency that authorized the benefits notifies the employee before the effective date of such employee's entrance into the service of the other agency that repayment will be required under this subsection. ``(3) If an employee who is involuntarily separated on account of misconduct or who (excluding any employee relieved of liability under paragraph (2)) is voluntarily separated before completing the required period of service fails to repay the amount provided for under paragraph (1)(B), a sum equal to the amount outstanding is recoverable by the Government from the employee (or such employee's estate, if applicable) by-- ``(A) setoff against accrued pay, compensation, amount of retirement credit, or other amount due the employee from the Government; and ``(B) such other method as is provided for by law for the recovery of amounts owing to the Government. ``(4) The head of the agency concerned may waive, in whole or in part, a right of recovery under this subsection if it is shown that recovery would be against equity and good conscience or against the public interest. ``(5) Any amount repaid by, or recovered from, an individual (or an estate) under this subsection shall be credited to the appropriation, fund, or account from which the original payment was made. Any amount so credited shall be merged with other sums in such appropriation, fund, or account and shall be available for the same purposes and period, and subject to the same limitations (if any), as the sums with which merged. ``(f) An employee receiving benefits under this section from an agency shall be ineligible for continued benefits under this section from such agency if the employee-- ``(1) separates from such agency; or ``(2) does not maintain an acceptable level of performance, as determined under standards and procedures which the agency head shall by regulation prescribe. ``(g) In selecting employees to receive benefits under this section, an agency shall, consistent with the merit system principles set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 2301(b) of this title, take into consideration the need to maintain a balanced workforce in which women and members of racial and ethnic minority groups are appropriately represented in Government service. ``(h) Any benefit under this section shall be in addition to basic pay and any other form of compensation otherwise payable to the employee involved. ``(i)(1) Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this section and after consultations with the heads of agencies, the Office of Personnel Management shall propose regulations for criteria to be used by the heads of agencies to make determinations of national security positions. ``(2) Not later than 180 days after the date on which the comment period for proposed regulations under paragraph (1) ends, the Office of Personnel Management shall promulgate final regulations containing such criteria. ``(j) A program established under this section may remain in effect for the 8-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this section. Such program shall continue to pay employees recruited under this program who are in compliance with this section their benefits through their commitment period regardless of the preceding sentence. ``(k) For the purpose of enabling the Federal Government to recruit and retain employees critical to the national security under this section, there are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section for each fiscal year.''. (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 5379 the following: (a) In General.--Subchapter VII of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 5379, the following: ``Sec. 5379a. Pilot program for student loan repayment for Federal employees in national security positions ``(a) In this section: ``(1) The term `agency' means the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. ``(2) The term `national security position' means an employment position determined by the head of an agency for the purposes of a pilot program established under this section, to involve important homeland security applications. ``(3) The term `student loan' means-- ``(A) a loan made, insured, or guaranteed under part B of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1071 et seq.); ``(B) a loan made under part D or E of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087a et seq., 1087aa et seq.); and ``(C) a health education assistance loan made or insured under part A of title VII of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 292 et seq.) or under part E of title VIII of such Act (42 U.S.C. 297a et seq.). ``(b)(1) The head of an agency shall, in order to recruit or retain highly qualified professional personnel, establish a pilot program under which the head of that agency may agree to repay (by direct payments on behalf of the employee) any student loan previously taken out by such employee if the employee is employed by the agency in a national security position. The head of an agency may provide for a program to apply to, and be administered with respect to, 1 or more organizational units of the agency. ``(2) Payments under this section shall be made subject to such terms, limitations, or conditions as may be mutually agreed to by the agency and employee concerned. ``(3) The amount paid by the agency on behalf of an employee under this section may not exceed $10,000 in any calendar year toward the remaining balance of the student loan for each year that the employee remains in service in the position, except that the employee shall remain in such position for at least 3 years. The maximum total amount that may be paid on behalf of an employee under this paragraph shall be $60,000. ``(4) An employee may participate in the program under section 5379 and any program under this section at the same time, except the total amount paid by all agencies on behalf of that employee under section 5379 and this section may not exceed-- ``(A) $10,000 in any calendar year; or ``(B) $60,000 in total. ``(5) Nothing in this section shall be considered to authorize an agency to pay any amount to reimburse an employee for any repayments made by such employee prior to the agency's entering into an agreement under this section with such employee. ``(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed-- ``(A) to affect student loan repayment programs existing on the date of enactment of this section; ``(B) to revoke or rescind any existing law, collective bargaining agreement, or recognition of a labor organization; ``(C) to authorize the head of an agency to determine national security positions for any other purpose other than to make such determinations as are required by this section in order to carry out the purposes of this section; or ``(D) as a basis for determining the exemption of any position from inclusion in a bargaining unit under chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, or from the right of any incumbent of a national security position determined by the head of an agency under this section, from entitlement to all rights and benefits under such chapter. ``(c)(1)(A) Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this section, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall report to the appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of the program under this section. ``(B) Not later than 4 years after the date of enactment of this section, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall report to the appropriate committees of Congress on the status of the programs established under this section and the success of such programs in recruiting and retaining employees for national security positions, including an assessment as to whether the program should be expanded to other agencies or to non-national security positions to improve overall Federal workforce recruitment and retention. ``(2) The head of each agency establishing a program under this section shall provide any necessary information to the Office of Personnel Management to carry out this subsection. ``(d) An employee shall not be eligible for benefits under this section if such employee-- ``(1) occupies a position that is excepted from the competitive service because of its confidential, policy- determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character; or ``(2) does not occupy a national security position. ``(e)(1) An employee selected to receive benefits under this section shall agree in writing, before receiving any such benefit, that the employee shall-- ``(A) remain in the service of the agency in a national security position for a period to be specified in the agreement, but not less than 3 years, unless involuntarily separated; and ``(B) if separated involuntarily on account of misconduct, or voluntarily, before the end of the period specified in the agreement, repay to the Government the amount of any benefits received by such employee from that agency under this section. ``(2) The repayment provided for under paragraph (1)(B) may not be required of an employee who leaves the service of such employee's agency voluntarily to enter into the service of any other agency unless the head of the agency that authorized the benefits notifies the employee before the effective date of such employee's entrance into the service of the other agency that repayment will be required under this subsection. ``(3) If an employee who is involuntarily separated on account of misconduct or who (excluding any employee relieved of liability under paragraph (2)) is voluntarily separated before completing the required period of service fails to repay the amount provided for under paragraph (1)(B), a sum equal to the amount outstanding is recoverable by the Government from the employee (or such employee's estate, if applicable) by-- ``(A) setoff against accrued pay, compensation, amount of retirement credit, or other amount due the employee from the Government; and ``(B) such other method as is provided for by law for the recovery of amounts owing to the Government. ``(4) The head of the agency concerned may waive, in whole or in part, a right of recovery under this subsection if it is shown that recovery would be against equity and good conscience or against the public interest. ``(5) Any amount repaid by, or recovered from, an individual (or an estate) under this subsection shall be credited to the appropriation, fund, or account from which the original payment was made. Any amount so credited shall be merged with other sums in such appropriation, fund, or account and shall be available for the same purposes and period, and subject to the same limitations (if any), as the sums with which merged. ``(f) An employee receiving benefits under this section from an agency shall be ineligible for continued benefits under this section from such agency if the employee-- ``(1) separates from such agency; or ``(2) does not maintain an acceptable level of performance, as determined under standards and procedures which the agency head shall by regulation prescribe. ``(g) In selecting employees to receive benefits under this section, an agency shall, consistent with the merit system principles set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 2301(b) of this title, take into consideration the need to maintain a balanced workforce in which women and members of racial and ethnic minority groups are appropriately represented in Government service. ``(h) Any benefit under this section shall be in addition to basic pay and any other form of compensation otherwise payable to the employee involved. ``(i)(1) Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this section and after consultations with the heads of agencies, the Office of Personnel Management shall propose regulations for criteria to be used by the heads of agencies to make determinations of national security positions. ``(2) Not later than 180 days after the date on which the comment period for proposed regulations under paragraph (1) ends, the Office of Personnel Management shall promulgate final regulations containing such criteria. ``(j) A program established under this section may remain in effect for the 8-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this section. Such program shall continue to pay employees recruited under this program who are in compliance with this section their benefits through their commitment period regardless of the preceding sentence. ``(k) For the purpose of enabling the Federal Government to recruit and retain employees critical to the national security under this section, there are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section for each fiscal year.''. (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 5379 the following:``5379a. Pilot program for student loan repayment for Federal employees in national security positions.''. The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 802 the following: The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 802 the following: ``SEC. 802A. FELLOWSHIPS FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS TO ENTER FEDERAL SERVICE. The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 802 the following: ``SEC. 802A. FELLOWSHIPS FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS TO ENTER FEDERAL SERVICE. ``(a) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) Agency.--The term `agency' means the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and other Federal Government agencies as determined by the Board. ``(2) Institution of higher education.--The term `institution of higher education' has the meaning given to such term in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001). ``(3) National security position.--The term `national security position' means an employment position determined by the Board, in consultation with an agency, for the purposes of a program established under this section, to involve important homeland security applications. ``(4) Science.--The term `science' means any of the natural and physical sciences including chemistry, biology, physics, and computer science. Such term does not include any of the social sciences. ``(b) In General.--The Board shall establish and implement a program for the awarding of fellowships (to be known as `National Security Fellowships') to graduate students who, in exchange for receipt of the fellowship, agree to employment with the Federal Government in a national security position. The Board may provide for the program to apply to, and be administered with respect to, 1 or more organizational units of an agency. ``(c) Eligibility.--To be eligible to participate in the program established under subsection (b), a student shall-- ``(1) have been accepted into a graduate school program at an accredited institution of higher education within the United States and be pursuing or intend to pursue graduate education in the United States in the disciplines of foreign languages, science, mathematics, engineering, nonproliferation education, or other international fields that are critical areas of national security (as determined by the Board); ``(2) be a United States citizen, United States national, permanent legal resident, or citizen of the Freely Associated States; and ``(3) agree to employment with an agency or office of the Federal Government in a national security position. ``(d) Service Agreement.--In awarding a fellowship under the program under this section, the Board shall require the recipient to enter into an agreement under which, in exchange for such assistance, the recipient-- ``(1) will maintain satisfactory academic progress (as determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Board) and provide regularly scheduled updates to the Board on the progress of their education and how their employment continues to relate to a national security objective of the Federal Government; ``(2) will, upon completion of such education, be employed by the agency for which the fellowship was awarded for a period of at least 3 years as specified by the Board; and ``(3) agrees that if the recipient is unable to meet either of the requirements described in paragraph (1) or (2), the recipient will reimburse the United States for the amount of the assistance provided to the recipient under the fellowship, together with interest at a rate determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Board, but not higher than the rate generally applied in connection with other Federal education loans. ``(e) Federal Employment Eligibility.--If a recipient of a fellowship under this section demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Board that, after completing their education, the recipient is unable to obtain a national security position in the Federal Government because such recipient is not eligible for a security clearance or other applicable clearance necessary for such position, the Board may permit the recipient to fulfill the service obligation under the agreement under subsection (d) by working in another office or agency in the Federal Government for which their skills are appropriate, by teaching math, science, or foreign languages, or by performing research, at an institution of higher education, for a period of not less than 3 years, in the area of study for which the fellowship was awarded. ``(f) Fellowship Selection.-- ``(1) In general.--The Board shall consult with agencies in the selection and placement of national security fellows under this section. ``(2) Functions.--The Board shall carry out the following functions: ``(A) Develop criteria for awarding fellowships under this section. ``(B) Provide for the wide dissemination of information regarding the activities assisted under this section. ``(C) Establish qualifications for students desiring fellowships under this section, including a requirement that the student have a demonstrated commitment to the study of the discipline for which the fellowship is to be awarded. ``(D) Provide for the establishment and semiannual update of a list of fellowship recipients, including an identification of their skills, who are available to work in a national security position. ``(E) Not later than 30 days after a fellowship recipient completes the study or education for which assistance was provided under this section, work in conjunction with agencies to make reasonable efforts to hire and place the fellow in an appropriate national security position. ``(F) Review the administration of the program established under this section. ``(G) Develop and provide to Congress a strategic plan that identifies the skills needed by the Federal national security workforce and how the provisions of this Act, and related laws, regulations, and policies will be used to address such needs. ``(g) Special Consideration for Current Federal Employees.-- ``(1) Set aside of fellowships.--Twenty percent of the fellowships awarded under this section shall be set aside for Federal employees who are working in national security positions on the date of enactment of this section to enhance the education and training of such employees in areas important to national security. ``(2) Full- or part-time education.--Federal employees who are awarded fellowships under paragraph (1) shall be permitted to obtain advanced education under the fellowship on a full-time or part-time basis. ``(3) Part-time education.--A Federal employee who pursues education or training under a fellowship under paragraph (1) on a part-time basis shall be eligible for a stipend in an amount which, when added to the employee's part-time compensation, does not exceed the amount described in subsection (i)(2). ``(h) Fellowship Service.--Any individual under this section who is employed by the Federal Government in a national security position shall be able to count the time that the individual spent in the fellowship program towards the time requirement for a reduction in student loans as described in section 5379a of title 5, United States Code. ``(i) Amount of Award.--A National Security Fellow who complies with the requirements of this section may receive funding under the fellowship for up to 3 years at an amount determined appropriate by the Board, but not to exceed the sum of-- ``(1) the amount of tuition paid by the fellow; and ``(2) a stipend in an amount equal to the maximum stipend available to recipients of fellowships under section 10 of the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 (42 U.S.C. 1869) for the year involved. ``(j) Consultation With Chief Human Capital Officers.--The Board shall consult with the chief human capital officers of participating agencies in carrying out this section. ``(k) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed-- ``(1) to authorize the Board to determine national security positions for any other purpose other than to make such determinations as are required by this section in order to carry out the purposes of this section; and ``(2) as a basis for determining the exemption of any position from inclusion in a bargaining unit under chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, or from the right of any incumbent of a national security position determined by the Board under this section, from entitlement to all rights and benefits under such chapter. ``(l) Authorization of Appropriations.--For the purpose of enabling the Board to provide for the recruitment and retention of highly qualified employees in national security positions, there are authorized to be appropriated $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2004, and such sums as may be necessary for each fiscal year thereafter.''. The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 802a (as added by section 201 of this Act) the following: ``(a) Findings and Purposes.-- ``(1) Findings.--Congress finds that-- ``(A) a proficient national security workforce requires certain skills and knowledge, and effective professional relationships; and ``(B) a national security workforce will benefit from the establishment of a National Security Service Corps. ``(2) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are to-- ``(A) provide mid-level employees in national security positions within agencies the opportunity to broaden their knowledge through exposure to other agencies; ``(B) expand the knowledge base of national security agencies by providing for rotational assignments of their employees at other agencies; ``(C) build professional relationships and contacts among the employees and agencies of the national security community; and ``(D) invigorate the national security community with exciting and professionally rewarding opportunities. ``(b) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) Agency.--The term `agency' means the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, and the National Security Agency. ``(2) Corps.--The term `Corps' means the National Security Service Corps. ``(3) Corps position.--The term `corps position' means a position that-- ``(A) is a position-- ``(i) at or above GS-12 of the General Schedule; or ``(ii) in the Senior Executive Service; ``(B) the duties of which do not relate to intelligence support for policy; and ``(C) is designated by the head of an agency as a Corps position. ``(c) Goals and Administration.--The Board shall-- ``(1) formulate the goals of the Corps; ``(2) resolve any issues regarding the feasibility of implementing this section; ``(3) evaluate relevant civil service rules and regulations to determine the desirability of seeking legislative changes to facilitate application of the General Schedule and Senior Executive Service personnel systems to the Corps; ``(4) create specific provisions for agencies regarding rotational programs; ``(5) formulate interagency compacts and cooperative agreements between and among agencies relating to-- ``(A) the establishment and function of the Corps; ``(B) incentives for individuals to participate in the Corps; ``(C) professional education and training; ``(D)(i) the process for competition for a Corps position; ``(ii) which individuals may compete for Corps positions; and ``(iii) any employment preferences an individual participating in the Corps may have when returning to the employing agency of that individual; and ``(E) any other issues relevant to the establishment and continued operation of the Corps; and ``(6) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, submit a report to the Office of Personnel Management on all findings and relevant information on the establishment of the Corps. ``(d) Corps.-- ``(1) Proposed regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date on which the report is submitted under subsection (c)(6), the Board shall publish in the Federal Register, proposed regulations describing the purpose, and providing for the establishment and operation of the Corps. ``(2) Comment period.--The Board shall provide for-- ``(A) a period of 60 days for comments from all stakeholders on the proposed regulations; and ``(B) a period of 180 days following the comment period for making modifications to the regulations. ``(3) Final regulations.--After the 180-day period described under paragraph (2)(B), the Board shall promulgate final regulations that-- ``(A) establish the Corps; ``(B) provide guidance to agencies to designate Corps positions; ``(C) provide for individuals to perform periods of service of not more than 2 years at a Corps position within agencies on a rotational basis; ``(D) establish eligibility for individuals to participate in the Corps; ``(E) enhance career opportunities for individuals participating in the Corps; ``(F) provide for the Corps to develop a group of policy experts with broad-based experience throughout the executive branch; and ``(G) provide for greater interaction among agencies with traditional national security functions. ``(4) Actions by agencies.--Not later than 180 days after the promulgation of final regulations under paragraph (3), each agency shall-- ``(A) designate Corps positions; ``(B) establish procedures for implementing this section; and ``(C) begin active participation in the operation of the Corps. ``(e) Consultation With Chief Human Capital Officers.--The Board shall consult with the chief human capital officers of participating agencies in carrying out this section. ``(f) Allowances, Privileges, and Benefits.--An employee serving on a rotational basis with another agency under this section is deemed to be detailed and, for the purpose of preserving allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other benefits with respect to the employee, is deemed to be an employee of the original employing agency and is entitled to the pay, allowances, and benefits from funds available to that agency. ``(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Board such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.''. The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 803(b)-- (A) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (7) as paragraphs (7) through (9), respectively; and (B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following: ``(5) The Secretary of Homeland Security. ``(6) The Attorney General of the United States.''; (2) in section 803(c), by striking ``subsection (b)(6)'' and inserting ``subsection (b)(8)''; (3) in section 804(b)(1), by inserting ``, including section 802a'' before the semicolon; (4) by inserting after section 807, the following: The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 803(b)-- (A) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (7) as paragraphs (7) through (9), respectively; and (B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following: ``(5) The Secretary of Homeland Security. ``(6) The Attorney General of the United States.''; (2) in section 803(c), by striking ``subsection (b)(6)'' and inserting ``subsection (b)(8)''; (3) in section 804(b)(1), by inserting ``, including section 802a'' before the semicolon; (4) by inserting after section 807, the following: ``SEC. 807A. NONAPPLICATION OF PROVISIONS TO CERTAIN GRADUATE ``Sections 805, 806, and 807 shall not apply with respect to section 802a or 802b.''; and (5) in section 808(4), by striking ``The term'' and inserting ``Except as provided under section 802a, the term''. ``Sections 805, 806, and 807 shall not apply with respect to section 802a or 802b.''; and (5) in section 808(4), by striking ``The term'' and inserting ``Except as provided under section 802a, the term''. TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS Section 306(a) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following: ``(3) a description of how the goals and objectives are to be achieved, including a description of the operational processes, training, skills and technology, and the human, capital, information, and other resources required to meet those goals and objectives.''; (2) by redesignating paragraphs (4) through (6) as paragraphs (5) through (7), respectively; and (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following: ``(4) a discussion of the extent to which the specific skills in the agency's human capital are needed to achieve the mission, goals, and objectives of the agency;''.", u" Mr. GOSS (during consideration of motion to instruct conferees on H.R. 1) submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes: The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2417), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amendment, insert the following: (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2004 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Department of Justice. (10) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (11) The National Reconnaissance Office. (12) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (13) The Coast Guard. (14) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2004, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 2417 of the One Hundred Eighth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2004 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2004 the sum of $221,513,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2005. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 310 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2004. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2004 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2005. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2004, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2004 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $47,142,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2005, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (a) Establishment of Office.--(1) Chapter 3 of subtitle I of title 31, United States Code, is amended-- (A) by redesignating section 311 as section 312; and (B) by inserting after section 310 the following: (a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 2417 of the One Hundred Eighth Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law. (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) Consultation in Preparation.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure that any report, review, study, or plan required to be prepared or conducted by a provision of this Act, including a provision of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) or the classified annex to this Act, that involves the intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy is prepared or conducted in consultation with the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate. (2) The Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy may carry out any consultation required by this subsection through an official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, as the case may be, designated by such Secretary for that purpose. (b) Submittal.--Any report, review, study, or plan referred to in subsection (a) shall be submitted, in addition to any other committee of Congress specified for submittal in the provision concerned, to the following committees of Congress: (1) The Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) The Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2004 the sum of $226,400,000. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Subtitle B--Intelligence (a) Authority.--(1) Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after section 301 (50 U.S.C. 409a) the following new section: (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) Funds within the National Foreign Intelligence Program often must be shifted from program to program and from fiscal year to fiscal year to address funding shortfalls caused by significant increases in the costs of acquisition of major systems by the intelligence community. (2) While some increases in the costs of acquisition of major systems by the intelligence community are unavoidable, the magnitude of growth in the costs of acquisition of many major systems indicates a systemic bias within the intelligence community to underestimate the costs of such acquisition, particularly in the preliminary stages of development and production. (3) Decisions by Congress to fund the acquisition of major systems by the intelligence community rely significantly upon initial estimates of the affordability of acquiring such major systems and occur within a context in which funds can be allocated for a variety of alternative programs. Thus, substantial increases in costs of acquisition of major systems place significant burdens on the availability of funds for other programs and new proposals within the National Foreign Intelligence Program. (4) Independent cost estimates, prepared by independent offices, have historically represented a more accurate projection of the costs of acquisition of major systems. (5) Recognizing the benefits associated with independent cost estimates for the acquisition of major systems, the Secretary of Defense has built upon the statutory requirement in section 2434 of title 10, United States Code, to develop and consider independent cost estimates for the acquisition of such systems by mandating the use of such estimates in budget requests of the Department of Defense. (6) The mandatory use throughout the intelligence community of independent cost estimates for the acquisition of major systems will assist the President and Congress in the development and funding of budgets which more accurately reflect the requirements and priorities of the United States Government for intelligence and intelligence-related activities. (b) Budget Treatment of Costs of Acquisition of Major Systems.--(1) Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506 the following new section:", u"Mr. President, I agree with the chairman of the committee, the Senator from Kansas. There is no objection on this side. It has been cleared. There is no objection on our side. I presume the bill will be voted through. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the distinguished chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence in recommending passage of the conference report on H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. The bill authorizes appropriations for the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence components of the F.B.I. and other U.S. government agencies. It also contains a number of important provisions intended to lay the foundation for process and organizational changes in the intelligence community. The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities prevents us from disclosing publicly the details of our budgetary recommendations. As I described to the Senate when our bill was considered in July, 10 years ago I joined a majority of Senate colleagues in voting to express the sense of Congress that the aggregate amount requested, authorized, and spent for intelligence should be disclosed to the public in an appropriate manner. The House opposed the provision. I continue to believe that we should find a means, consistent with national security, of sharing with the American taxpayer information about the total amount, although not the details, of our intelligence spending. In holding the intelligence community accountable for performance, and the Congress and the President accountable for the resources they provide to the Intelligence Community, citizens should know the Nation's overall investment in intelligence. The bill includes a number of provisions intended to promote innovations in information sharing, human intelligence, and counterintelligence, among other things. Many of these initiatives represent initial steps rather than solutions, but they are necessary to raise the level of awareness in Congress and the executive branch regarding a variety of urgent and complex challenges and to lay the foundation for reforms the committee will be considering next year. Section 351 of the bill requires a report on the threat posed by espionage in an era when secrets are stored on powerful, classified U.S. computer networks rather than on paper. A single spy today can remove more information on a disk than spies of yesteryear could remove with a truck. We have already suffered losses, for example, in the Ames, Regan, and Hanssen cases, where sloppy computer security permitted traitors to exploit large quantities of highly classified information. Unfortunately, these cases provide a warning that appears to have gone largely unheeded. We still do not have a cohesive set of policies and procedures to protect our classified networks from cleared insiders who seek to betray their country, Our reliance on classified information systems for warfighting and intelligence is growing daily, yet hundreds of thousands of individuals have virtually unrestricted access to these critical networks. All but a few Government personnel are honest and patriotic Americans, but the sad fact is that there has not been a day since WWII when we have not had spies within our Government. There have been over 80 espionage convictions in the last 25 years. They include personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, NSA, CIA, FBI, State Department, the National Reconnaissance Office and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is a very real and continuing problem and there will undoubtedly be more espionage arrests in the months and years ahead. Espionage is an unfortunate fact of life, and we simply cannot afford to operate classified systems in which thousands of individuals enjoy the ability to download or upload classified information at will. Other countries are seeking to exploit this situation to collect defense secrets, and no doubt contemplate blinding our Government and troops in time of war. We would never permit such broad access to weapons in an armory, yet these classified systems are of much greater strategic significance than M-16 rifles, tanks, or 500 pound gravity bombs. We simply must develop the policies and capabilities necessary to control input and output devices on these systems and monitor their use. Section 352 of the bill calls for a review of our cumbersome, outmoded, and many would say ineffective personnel security system. It is a fact that almost every spy has held high-level security clearances. It is also a fact that few, if any of these individuals were identified through routine security clearance updates. Most people who become spies join the government with no intention of betraying their country. Research by the Defense Department shows that most spies are people who develop grievances as their careers progress, at times having developed money and alcohol problems as well, and then turn to espionage as a way of feeding their egos and their bank accounts. Yet, we give a young, single Navy recruit seeking an intelligence assignment the same scrutiny as a 30-year intelligence operative with financial troubles who routinely travels to countries of concern. Further, even when derogatory information surfaces, sometimes even very disturbing information which raises serious espionage issues, the government rarely revokes the clearances we rely on so heavily and which cost so much. In the information age, we cannot wait 5 to10 years to identify employee problems that may be related to espionage. Too much damage can be done too quickly. We need fresh thinking and recommendations that will provide more effective security for the large sums of money the taxpayer is investing. Section 354 of our bill calls for a review of classified information sharing policies within the Federal Government. This is an issue closely related to the foregoing provisions regarding inadequate security policies. ATM machines, for example, are a wonderfully convenient and effective means of providing access to banking resources--but they could not exist without magnetic cards, personal identification numbers, cameras and locks. Similarly, improved security is not a barrier to more flexible information sharing, it is a fundamental ingredient. The Joint Inquiry report on the 9/11 attacks highlighted information sharing as a critical shortcoming that prevented the interception of several hijackers. To help accelerate reform, the Joint Inquiry requested an administration report by this past June 30 on progress to reduce barriers among intelligence and law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism. Unfortunately, no report has been submitted. We have the technology for improved information sharing, and significant progress is being made. A Terrorist Threat Integration Center has been established, and new guidelines regarding sharing of grand jury information have been promulgated. These are very important steps forward. But to truly break down the barriers to information sharing, rather than relying on work-arounds, we need revised policies on sharing classified information which recognize and exploit the opportunities provided by modern information technology. This is especially important as we look to bridging the gap between the Intelligence Community and organizations charged with Homeland Security. Section 355 of the bill identifies a problem that would probably stun most taxpayers. Simply stated, notwithstanding the many billions of dollars invested in complex intelligence systems, ranging from satellites, to aircraft, to ships, and land-based collection platforms, there is no capability in the executive branch to independently and comprehensively model the performance of these systems. Consequently, new multi-billion-dollar systems are procured without the ability to rigorously evaluate potential trade-offs with other systems. Questions such as these should be asked: Given projected satellite, aircraft and UAV constellations, what is the marginal value of adding space-based radar satellites? Are there alternative investments that can better satisfy intelligence requirements? Don't senior policymakers need the ability to systematically examine the interactions of these many systems to identify trade-offs that can be achieved? Currently, most of the analysis of proposed collection systems is performed by the agencies seeking to justify their programs, or by senior policy officials who struggle to apply common sense and spread-sheet level analysis to systems that often have overlapping capabilities. There is no reason that a rigorous, independent and comprehensive capability cannot be developed to support the programmatic reviews of the DCI and the Defense Department. This is but one example, though an important one, of the ways in which we believe the intelligence community can improve its strategic planning and decisionmaking processes. Section 356 of the bill raises an issue of profound strategic significance for the United States, namely the growing reliance of our country on hardware and software produced overseas. Although specific cases are classified, this is clearly a growing problem. After 1973, when the risks inherent in America's reliance on foreign oil became clear, many positive steps were taken to ameliorate our national vulnerabilities. Those steps included establishment of a strategic petroleum reserve, establishment of the Central Command, and research into alternative fuels. Unlike our dependence on foreign oil, however, our rapidly growing dependence on foreign hardware and software creates numerous opportunities for espionage and information operations that are extremely difficult to detect. Ironically, the countries identified by the FBI as most actively engaged in economic espionage against the United States are leading producers of the hardware and software we all use on a daily basis. The plain truth is that even the Defense Department does not know where most of the hardware and software it uses originates. Moreover, the Government does not have the right to examine source code unless voluntarily supplied. Further, at the present time, there are limited capabilities for analyzing source code that is made available. This situation requires serious attention by senior policymakers, including Congress, and the report required by section 356 should help to prompt a long overdue discussion of these issues. In concluding my remarks, I would like to look beyond our current bill to the issues the Intelligence Committee must contend with next year. Other committees share responsibility for reviewing the funding and systems needed by the intelligence community, but our committee is uniquely positioned to evaluate the intelligence community's performance--both its successes and failures--and to identify the changes required to meet the challenges of the future. In my view, money alone is not sufficient to enable the intelligence community to reach its full potential. The current structure of the intelligence community is fundamentally unchanged from its establishment in 1947. Serious change is long overdue. I strongly believe that new structures and authorities, coupled with able and aggressive leadership, are required to dramatically improve our intelligence community's efficiency and effectiveness. In many respects, the organizational issues confronting the intelligence community are analogous to those confronting the Defense Department prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The fundamental problem confronting the Department of Defense prior to Goldwater-Nichols was excessive military service control over military operations, policies and budgets. In response, Congress strengthened the weak integrating mechanisms in DoD, specifically the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands. The difference in military performance before Goldwater-Nichols--e.g., Desert 1, Lebanon, and Grenada--and after--Panama, Haiti, and Iraq--is stark and clear. In fact, I am convinced that the Goldwater-Nichols Act did more to enhance U.S. national security than any weapons system ever procured by the Department of Defense. Although the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization is not a precise template for restructuring the intelligence community, the problems are fundamentally similar: towering vertical structures--NSA, CIA, DIA, NRO, NIMA, the service intelligence components--and relatively weak integrating mechanisms--the DCI and his Community Management Staff. Any reorganization proposal needs to address this fundamental problem of inadequate integration and coordination. In that regard, I would suggest that the intelligence community's lack of responsiveness to the DCI's declaration of war on al- Qaida prior to 9/11 was in part a result of the DCI's weak community management authorities and inability to move the system. I am convinced that a strengthened DCI could more effectively manage the intelligence community, leading to performance improvements comparable to those achieved by the military in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. A conservative, incremental approach would involve the creation of a permanent cadre to staff the DCI much as the Secretary of Defense has an OSD staff. This simple change, coupled with aggressive business process reengineering and ``year of execution budget authority'' for the DCI over NFIP programs, would significantly strengthen the DCI's ability to manage the intelligence community and respond to new threats and opportunities. A more aggressive and far-reaching plan would have to address the fundamental changes that have occurred since the current structure was established by the National Security Act of 1947. Specifically, it would recognize that the once useful distinction between home and abroad has become not only irrelevant, but dysfunctional. This is not to suggest any need to reduce the protections afforded U.S. persons under the Constitution, merely that globalization and the development of cyberspace, combined with the rise of apocalyptic terrorists groups empowered by lethal new technologies, require a different, more agile structure that is not impeded by outmoded geographic distinctions. In that regard, we should find ways to more effectively coordinate foreign and domestic intelligence. Achievement of any substantial reorganization will require meticulous research by the congressional oversight committees, a substantial hearing record, and sustained interest by the administration. At the end of the day, incremental steps will be better than none, and a more aggressive reorganization require a consensus not only on the Intelligence Authorization Committees, but with the Armed Services Committees as well. As challenging as these issues are, we simply cannot fulfill our duty to the American people unless we confront these crucial issues when Congress returns next year. In conclusion, the important steps we have taken with this measure, to include full funding of the administration's requests for intelligence activities, are the result of lengthy deliberations on matters as complex as they are vital. It is gratifying to see the work that has been done in both Chambers come together today in a bill we can send to the President. It is a useful first step, but only a first step, towards the development of an intelligence community better able to adapt to the rapidly evolving threats confronting our great nation. Finally, I would like to thank the chairman and the Committee staff for their arduous work on this bill. I look forward to making great strides together next year. I urge support for this measure.", u"Mr. president, since the horrifying events of September 11, our country's number one priority has been to secure our families against the scourge of terrorism. First, in our hearts, of course, are the men and women on the frontlines of the fight: the soldiers fighting for freedom half a world away; the firefighters and police officers in New York; the postal workers here in Washington. Those of us elected to serve in Washington have a special responsibility to protect our security. To discharge that duty, I have been working with my colleagues here in the Senate. We have made a great deal of progress, but there's a lot more work to do. After a long debate, Congress passed and the President signed important legislation, based partly on a bill I introduced, to tighten security in our airports. But we have to do more. There are several bills that I have helped author that are working their way through Congress. Two of these bills, to tighten security at seaports and to protect against bioterrorism, have already passed the Senate and are awaiting action in the House. Another bill, to tighten our border security, should reach the Senate floor soon. All three should be enacted quickly. You can be sure our enemies are not waiting for us to act. One of the greatest challenges in the struggle for security is to prepare for the next attack, not just the last one. We have seen how vicious thugs can destroy innocent life with airplanes, how they can terrorize ordinary people with biological weapons. We are responding to those threats. But what about threats whose awful consequences we haven't yet felt? Today I want to talk about one of those threats: the threat of ``cyberterrorism'', an attack against the computer networks upon which our safety and economy now depend. Computers have become a foundation of our electricity, oil, gas, water, telephones, emergency services, and banks, not to mention our national defense apparatus. Computer networks have brought extraordinary improvements in the way we live and work. We communicate more often, more quickly, more cheaply. With the push of a button in a classroom or a bedroom, our children can get more information than most libraries have ever held. Yet there is a dark side to the internet, a new set of dangers. Today, if you ask an expert quietly, he or she will tell you that cyberspace is a very vulnerable place. Terrorists could cause terrible harm. They might be able to stop all traffic on the internet. Shut down power for entire cities for extended periods. Disrupt our phones. Poison our water. Paralyze our emergency services--police, firefighters, ambulances. The list goes on. We now live in a world where a terrorist can do as much damage with a keyboard and a modem as with a gun or a bomb. Already, one hacker has broken into a computer-controlled waste management system and caused millions of gallons of raw sewage to spill into parks, rivers, and private property. You probably haven't heard about this attack because it occurred in Australia. But imagine if terrorists launched calculated, coordinated attacks on America. Our enemies are already targeting our networks. After September 11, a Pakistani group hacked into two government web services, including one at the Department of Defense, and declared a ``cyber jihad'' against the United States. Another series of attacks, known as ``Moonlight Maze,'' assaulted the Pentagon, Department of Energy, and NASA, and obtained vast quantities of technical defense research. To date, we can be thankful that these attacks have not been terribly sophisticated. But that could change soon. As the Defense Science Board recently stated, the U.S. will eventually be attached ``by a sophisticated adversary using an effective array of information warfare tools and techniques. Two choices are available: adapt before the attack or afterward.'' In addition, cybercrime is already a billion-dollar drain on our economy, a drain growing larger each year. In 1955, one survey reported that losses from FBI-reported computer crime had already reached $2 billion. Last year, the ``ILOVEYOU'' virus alone caused $8.7 billion in damage worldwide, much of it here. Cyberattacks have shut down major web sites like Yahoo! and eBay, not to mention the FBI. According to a recent survey, 85 percent of large corporations and government agencies detected computer security breaches over the prior 12 months. Two thirds suffered financial losses as a result. So the danger is clear, and the only question is how we address it. I think we need to address it in many ways. Today I want to focus on just two that are especially critical. The first is to encourage computer users to take proven measures to protect themselves. In the industry, these proven measures are known as ``best practices''--steps like using customized passwords, not the ones that come with software, or promptly installing known ``patches'' to keep intruders out. The National Academy of Sciences recently reported that cybersecurity today is far worse than what known best practices can provide. As a result, viruses have shut down tens of thousands of machines even after patches to block them were widely available. Because the password protections on some systems are so weak, intruders have taken the ``routers'' that control Internet traffic hostage. And the government is as guilty as anyone. According to the report card issued by a member of the House of Representatives, most government agencies rate between a ``D'' and an ``F'' on cybersecurity. Improving our security by implementing existing best practices is our first big task. Our second challenge is to train more researchers, teachers, and workers to fight cyberthreats. Today the private sector engages in some short-term R&D on cybersecurity. But broader research and knowledge needs aren't being met. In addition, our workforce in cybersecurity is woefully inadequate, especially in academia. Each year, American universities award Ph.D.'s in computer science to about one thousand people each year. But less than one-half of one-percent specialize in cybersecurity, and fewer still go on to train others in the discipline. As Dr. Bill Chu, Chairman of the Software and Information Systems Department at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and one of the country's leading experts on cybersecurity puts it: ``The weakest link . . . is the lack of qualified information security professionals. The majority of information technology professionals in this country have not been trained in the basics of information security. Information technology faculty in most universities do not have sufficient background to properly train students.'' As a whole, the challenge of cybersecurity is not unlike the challenge of a terrible disease like cancer. First, we have to encourage everyone to do what they can to reduce the risk of disease--don't smoke, eat right, exercise. That is what cybersecurity ``best practices'' like changing passwords are all about. Second, we have to make sure we have got top-notch scientists working to find new medicines to prevent and fight the disease. And that is why we need more cyber teachers and researchers. To tackle these two challenges, I'm proud today to introduce two new bills that will support an intensive, $400 million cybersecurity effort over the next five years. The first bill is called the Cyberterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002. That bill's first step is to establish a new, nonprofit, nongovernment, consortium of academic and private sector experts to lay out a clear set of ``best practices'' that protect against cyberattack. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology have all recommended a new, nonprofit cybersecurity consortium. Such a consortium can work closely with the private sector, unfettered by bureaucracy, in a way that all the country can see and learn from. The goals of the consortium are simple: first, the establishment of ``best practices'' that are tailored to different computer systems and needs; second, the widest possible dissemination of those practices; and third, long-term, multi-disciplinary research on cybersecurity-research that isn't occurring now. The second part of the Cyberterrorism Preparedness Act will implement ``best practices'' for government systems. The government has a duty to lead by example, something we aren't doing right now. And so, within 6 months after this Act passed, the National Institute of Standards and Technology would immediately begin the process of implementing best practices for government agencies, beginning with small-scale tests and concluding with government-wide adoption of the recommended best practices. The last part of my bill will assess the issue of best practices for the private sector. While the bill doesn't impose new mandates beyond the government, it does require careful consideration of how to encourage the widest possible use of known best practices. There's a particular focus on entities that do business with the Federal Government as grantees or contractors. Government agencies should not be exposed to security vulnerabilities in the products supplied by these companies. And Federal dollars should not be flowing to firms that expose America to cyberterrorism. So the new consortium would be required to study whether and how government could condition grants and contracts on the adoption of cybersecurity best practices. The President is authorized to implement recommendations from that study. The Cyberterrorism Preparedness Act will address the first goal of cybersecurity--making sure we're taking the steps we already know to improve our security. The second bill I am introducing today--the Cybersecurity Research and Education Act--focuses on our second task: ``training the trainers'' and increasing the number of researchers, teachers, and workers committed to cybersecurity. First, the bill establishes a Cybersecurity Graduate Fellowship Program at the National Science Foundation. Individuals selected to participate in the program will receive a loan that covers the full tuition and fees as well as a living stipend for 4 years of doctoral study. Upon graduation, these loans will be forgiven at 20 percent per year for each year that the individual teaches at a college or university. After only 5 years of teaching, the entire loan will be paid off. That way, we can ensure that the money we invest in these promising young scientists will be used to train others interested in cybersecurity. Second, my bill also establishes a competitive sabbatical for Distinguished Faculty in Cybersecurity. Under the program, a qualified faculty member will receive a stipend to spend a year working and researching at the Department of Defense, a university specializing in cybersecurity, or some other appropriate facility. Universities sending faculty on sabbatical will receive funding to hire a temporary replacement instructor. In addition, when the faculty member returns, the university will get a generous grant to enhance its cybersecurity infrastructure needs. For example, the university could purchase advanced computing equipment and hire graduate research assistants. Participants in this program will have a unique opportunity to engage in cutting-edge research with some of the best minds in the country. When they return to their schools, these faculty will be even better equipped to advance the state of cybersecurity education. Third, this bill will create a Cybersecurity Awareness, Training, and Education Program at the National Security Agency. NSA has a strong history of supporting cybersecurity education, as exemplified through initiatives such as the Centers of Excellence program and the National Colloquium for Information Systems Security Education. The program I propose would build on NSA's expertise and would enable the agency to make grants to universities specializing in cybersecurity. The grants could be used for projects like teaching basic computer security to K-12 teachers, or for the development of a ``virtual university.'' Students who don't have access to nearby course offerings would then be able to take cybersecurity classes online. All of these programs are critical in our fight against cyberterrorism. A strong and vibrant academic community is essential for building the trained workforce of tomorrow. We must be committed to funding long-term research. And we must vigilantly maintain basic cybersecurity protections in government, while promoting them in the private sector. When it comes to the threat of a sophisticated, coordinated cyberterrorist attack, the question most likely is not whether such an attack will come. The question is when. And so we must be prepared to fight against a ``cyberjihad,'' and we must be prepared to win. I ask unanimous consent that the text of my two bills be printed in the Record.", u"TITLE VI--NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED There is established the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (in this title referred to as the ``Commission''). (a) Members.--Subject to the requirements of subsection (b), the Commission shall be composed of 10 members, of whom-- (1) 3 members shall be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate; (2) 3 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; (3) 2 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate; and (4) 2 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives. (b) Qualifications.-- (1) Political party affiliation.--Not more than 5 members of the Commission shall be from the same political party. (2) Nongovernmental appointees.--No member of the Commission shall be an officer or employee of the Federal Government or any State or local government. (3) Other qualifications.--It is the sense of Congress that individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent United States citizens, with national recognition and significant depth of experience in such professions as governmental service and intelligence gathering. (c) Chairperson; Vice Chairperson.-- (1) In general.--Subject to the requirement of paragraph (2), the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Commission shall be elected by the members. (2) Political party affiliation.--The Chairperson and Vice Chairperson shall not be from the same political party. (d) Initial Meeting.--If 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, 6 or more members of the Commission have been appointed, those members who have been appointed may meet and, if necessary, select a temporary Chairperson and Vice Chairperson, who may begin the operations of the Commission, including the hiring of staff. (e) Quorum; Vacancies.--After its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the call of the Chairperson or a majority of its members. Six members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made. (a) In General.--The functions of the Commission are to-- (1) review the implementation by the intelligence community of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of-- (A) the Joint Inquiry of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives regarding the terrorist attacks against the United States which occurred on September 11, 2001; (B) other reports and investigations of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (C) other such executive branch, congressional, or independent commission investigations of such the terrorist attacks or the intelligence community; (2) make recommendations on additional actions for implementation of the findings, recommendations and conclusions referred to in paragraph (1); (3) review resource allocation and other prioritizations of the intelligence community for counterterrorism and make recommendations for such changes in those allocations and prioritization to ensure that counterterrorism receives sufficient attention and support from the intelligence community; (4) review and recommend changes to the organization of the intelligence community, in particular the division of agencies under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, the dual responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as head of the intelligence community and as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the separation of agencies with responsibility for intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination; and (5) determine what technologies, procedures, and capabilities are needed for the intelligence community to effectively support and conduct future counterterrorism missions, and recommend how these capabilities should be developed, acquired, or both from entities outside the intelligence community, including from private entities. (b) Definition of Intelligence Community.--In this section, the term ``intelligence community'' means-- (1) the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, which shall include the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the National Intelligence Council; (2) the Central Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security Agency; (4) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (5) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (6) the National Reconnaissance Office; (7) other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs; (8) the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Coast Guard; (9) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; and (10) such other elements of any other department or agency as are designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community under section 3(4)(J) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(J)). (a) Hearings and Evidence.--The Commission may, for purposes of carrying out this title-- (1) hold hearings, sit and act at times and places, take testimony, receive evidence, and administer oaths; and (2) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents. (b) Subpoenas.-- (1) Service.--Subpoenas issued under subsection (a)(2) may be served by any person designated by the Commission. (2) Enforcement.-- (A) In general.--In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under subsection (a)(2), the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order requiring such person to appear at any designated place to testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of that court. (B) Additional enforcement.--Sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192 through 194) shall apply in the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section. (c) Closed Meetings.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law which would require meetings of the Commission to be open to the public, any portion of a meeting of the Commission may be closed to the public if the President determines that such portion is likely to disclose matters that could endanger national security. (d) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its duties under this title. (e) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Commission may secure directly from any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States any information related to any inquiry of the Commission conducted under this title. Each such department, agency, or instrumentality shall, to the extent authorized by law, furnish such information directly to the Commission upon request. (f) Assistance From Federal Agencies.-- (1) General services administration.--The Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Commission on a reimbursable basis administrative support and other services for the performance of the Commission's functions. (2) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and agencies of the United States are authorized to provide to the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support services as they may determine advisable and as may be authorized by law. (g) Gifts.--The Commission may, to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property. (h) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as departments and agencies of the United States. (i) Powers of Subcommittees, Members, and Agents.--Any subcommittee, member, or agent of the Commission may, if authorized by the Commission, take any action which the Commission is authorized to take by this section. (a) Director.--The Commission shall have a Director who shall be appointed by the Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson, acting jointly. (b) Staff.--The Chairperson, in consultation with the Vice Chairperson, may appoint additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its functions. (c) Applicability of Certain Civil Service Laws.--The Director and staff of the Commission may be appointed without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code. Any individual appointed under subsection (a) or (b) shall be treated as an employee for purposes of chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title. (d) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her regular employment without interruption. (e) Consultant Services.--The Commission is authorized to procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code. (a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission may be compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission. (b) Travel Expenses.--While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code. The appropriate executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the Commission members and staff appropriate security clearances in a manner consistent with existing procedures and requirements, except that no person shall be provided with access to classified information under this section who would not otherwise qualify for such security clearance. (a) Initial Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the first meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress an initial report containing-- (1) such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members; and (2) such findings, conclusions, and recommendations regarding the scope of jurisdiction of, and the allocation of jurisdiction among, the committees of Congress with oversight responsibilities related to the scope of the investigation of the Commission as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members. (b) Final Report.--Not later than 6 months after the submission of the initial report of the Commission, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a final report containing such updated findings, conclusions, and recommendations described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members. (c) Noninterference With Congressional Joint Inquiry.-- Notwithstanding subsection (a), the Commission shall not submit any report of the Commission until a reasonable period after the conclusion of the Joint Inquiry of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives regarding the terrorist attacks against the United States which occurred on September 11, 2001. (d) Termination.-- (1) In general.--The Commission, and all the authorities of this title, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which the final report is submitted under subsection (b). (2) Administrative activities before termination.--The Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its reports and disseminating the second report. There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission to carry out this title $3,000,000, to remain available until expended. For purposes of this title: (1) The term ``chemical weapon precursor'' means a Schedule 1 chemical agent or a Schedule 2 chemical agent, as such terms are defined in section 3 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6701). (2) The term ``licensee'' means a person holding a license under this title. (3) The term ``qualified person'' means a person found by the Secretary to meet such qualifications as the Secretary may, by rule, prescribe to protect the public health and safety from the misuse of chemical weapon precursors. No person who has been convicted of a criminal offense under this title or under any similar or related provision of Federal or State law shall be a qualified person for purposes of this title. After December 31, 2002, no person may purchase, sell, or distribute in interstate commerce any chemical weapon precursor unless such person is licensed under section 1103. (a) Application.--Any qualified person may submit to the Secretary an application for a license to purchase, sell, or distribute in interstate commerce a chemical weapon precursor. (b) Issuance.--Upon receiving an application containing such information as the Secretary may require, the Secretary is authorized to issue a license to such person to purchase, sell, or distribute in interstate commerce a chemical weapon precursor if the Secretary finds that such person is a qualified person and if such person agrees to comply with this title and the regulations under this title. (c) Term; Revocation.--A license under this section shall remain in effect for such term as the Secretary may prescribe, except that the Secretary may at any time revoke such license if the Secretary determines that the licensee has failed or refused to comply with this title or any regulation under this title. Each licensee shall comply with each of the following requirements and such other requirements as the Secretary may establish by rule to carry out the purposes of this title: (1) The licensee shall report any suspicious purchases or sales of chemical weapon precursors. (2) The licensee shall maintain and make available to the Secretary and to Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities records of the purchase, sale, or distribution of chemical weapon precursors. Such records shall be in such form and shall contain such information as the Secretary shall, by rule, prescribe. Any person who violates any provision of this title or any regulation under this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for a first offense and not more than $20,000 for a second or subsequent offense. If such violation was intentional, such person shall be subject to a criminal penalty of up to 10 years in prison in addition to such civil penalties.", u"Mr. President, I thank Chairman Lieberman for his leadership on the Governmental Affairs Committee. I think the record demonstrates that before the President called for the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, our committee, the Governmental Affairs Committee of the Senate, under Senator Lieberman's leadership, proposed a law to create such a Department. At the time, it is interesting because it was on a partisan roll call, if I remember correctly, nine Democrats for it, seven Republicans against it. We argued that a question of this magnitude, a challenge of this gravity, required a separate Department at that moment in time. Neither the President nor his loyal followers in the Senate were prepared to join us in that effort. So I salute Senator Lieberman for his leadership, and I am happy now that we have reached the point where we are speaking again, as we should when it comes to our Nation's defense, in a bipartisan manner. I hope that as we proceed to the debate on this bill, we can gather together again that same bipartisan force. There is nothing that says Congress or the Senate have to agree on everything and, frankly, if we did, it would probably betray the principles and values of this Nation. But when it comes to our national security and defense, particularly the creation of a Department of this magnitude, I think it is all well and good that when the debate ends, we do try to find some common ground. Our Government simply has to change and adapt to the challenge of international terrorism. A reorganization of this magnitude is not going to be simple--it is going to take some time--but this Congress is up to the task. Throughout our history, from 1789 when the first Congress created the first executive branch Departments of State, War, and Treasury, to 1988 when the latest Department, the Department of Veterans Affairs, was created, Congress has worked to make sure the Government was organized to do the job the American people asked of it. Protecting our Nation's people is our highest priority. On March 15, 2001, almost 6 months before the attack on September 11, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, known by the shorthand name of the Hart-Rudman Commission, named after its co-chairmen the distinguished former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, released a report entitled ``Road Map For National Security: An Imperative For Change.'' The Commission was, unfortunately, prescient in seeing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism. The No. 1 recommendation of the Hart-Rudman Commission was to create a Department of Homeland Security. It is worth quoting for the record some of the report that came out of the Commission. It says, the combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. These words were written 6 months before September 11. They went on in their report to recommend the creation of an independent national homeland security agency, and they suggested there were some agencies of Government which naturally would come under the roof and under the authority of this new Department and quite effectively, or at least more effectively, defend the United States. The blueprint they laid out was really the basis for this bill we have before us, the Senate version, the Governmental Affairs version, from Senator Lieberman. The backbone of the new Department will be FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, along with the Departments guarding our borders and our perimeter. This new Department everyone sees as a way to protect our country more robustly. Some have questioned, though, how a new Department and how reorganizing Government will really make us any safer. Right now there are more than 45 agencies in the Federal Government with some responsibility for homeland security. If we look at it, it is just too diffuse. It cannot be focused. It cannot be coordinated. In the words of my friend and former House colleague, Gov. Tom Ridge, we are going to, frankly, not have the force multipliers we need that organization and coordination will bring. Some of my colleagues have charged we are moving too quickly. Well, I happen to agree with the premise that this race to enact this legislation by September 11 of this year, on the 1-year anniversary of that terrible disaster, was precipitous. It would have been a miracle if we had been able to create a bill that quickly which would have really met the task. It is better for us to take the additional time to do it right. To meet some self-imposed deadline or some deadline imposed by the press or our critics does not make a lot of sense when we are talking about a Department that is going to be facing the responsibility of protecting America for decades to come. As a member of the committee, I want to report to our colleagues that I think our committee has done its job. This does not mean we should not debate the issue and deliberate on some alternatives and some modifications. What we have before us is an effort, backed by bipartisan work for many years under both Republican and Democrat chairmen. This committee has held 18 hearings since last September 11 setting up this new Department. It is a committee that has held a series of hearings over the last 4 or 5 years on the issues that are involved. I remind my colleagues that this extensive body of work of this committee and its chairman allowed our committee to report out a bill on May 22. Once the President decided he wanted a similar Department, we tried to coordinate his intentions with our own. Realizing that all wisdom does not reside in one branch of Government or the other, we have listened to the President's suggestions. I am hopeful he will be open to our own. One of the things I included in this as an element that was of particular personal interest related to the whole question of information technology. The proposal to restructure 28 agencies into a new, unified Homeland Security Department poses a complex challenge to integrate the system's infrastructure of our information technology to support the new Department's mission. Let me get away from these high falutin' words, high sounding words, and get back to the real world where I live, because I am not part of this computer generation. I struggle with my own computers and e-mail to try to be up to speed. In the amendment that I adopted, what we are really saying to the Office of Management and Budget is: We want you to have a special person, a special group, assigned the responsibility to coordinate the architecture of the computers that are supposed to be cooperating and working together in all of the different intelligence agencies. I am sorry to report to the Senate and to the people following this debate that that does not exist today. In fact, it has been a very low priority. If we look at the sorry state of affairs of computers at agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we can certainly understand the need for this amendment. Currently, each of the agencies we expect to consolidate has its own separate information technology budget and program--the Coast Guard, Customs, FEMA, INS, Secret Service, Transportation Security Administration, and others. Each one has a unique system that does not necessarily have the capacity to communicate or coordinate these activities. Frankly, is that not what this debate is all about, so that all the agencies of the Federal Government will coordinate their resources, their authority, and their wisdom into one unified effort to create the force multiplier that Governor Ridge mentioned? Because these divergent systems need to be linked, it is important to ask key questions now to ensure this new Department will help the agencies brought together and others outside to coordinate their communication and share information. It is equally important to establish appropriate links between the Homeland Security Department and other agencies, such as the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Department of Defense, the FBI, the State Department, and State and local officials, which may not be embraced under the Homeland Security Department's organizational umbrella. Given the current state of affairs in the Federal information technology systems reflected in incomprehensible delays in meeting congressional mandates, I think this is long overdue. I will give two illustrations of why this is timely. Six years ago, Congress mandated the Customs Department and INS to establish a database to record those exiting the United States with visitor's visas. Those coming into the United States in many instances need visas to be in the United States, and we thought we should keep track of those who are leaving so we will know the net number of visa holders in the United States, which can range in the tens of millions at any given time. Six years ago, Congress said to the INS: Keep track of people leaving with a visa. Six years later, it is still not done. It has not been accomplished. The inspector general at the Department of Justice tells us it is years away. So when Attorney General Ashcroft said, to make America safer, we are going to take the fingerprints and photographs of all people coming into the United States on a visa, I am sure people around America were nodding their heads saying, I guess that is necessary; it is certainly reasonable. Well, it is technologically impossible today to do it. We do not have the computer capability to keep track of people leaving the United States with a visa, let alone the millions coming into the United States on visas. So for the Attorney General to make that suggestion is to say that he is going to go drill for oil on the Moon. It is not going to happen--not until we come a long way from where we are today. We also said, incidentally, to the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service: We notice that they both collect fingerprints. Can they merge their databases so that law enforcement agencies across the Federal Government, across the Nation, around the world, will have access to a common database of fingerprints collected by the United States? We asked them to do that 3 years ago. It still has not been done. So when it comes to information technology, do not delude yourself into believing we are where we ought to be. We are not. The creation of this Department and the amendment which Senator Lieberman and others were happy to accept and said nice things about, I hope will move forward in achieving that goal. The enterprise architecture and resulting systems must be designed for interoperability between many different agencies. I hope we get this achieved quickly. I have had a great deal of frustration, even anger, over the lack of progress we have made since September 11. To have the new person in charge of information technology from the FBI testify before the Judiciary Committee saying it will be 2 years before the FBI is up to speed with their computers is totally unacceptable. Members should not stand for that one second. To think one can go to any computer store in any major city in America and buy computers with better capability than the computers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is shameful. That exists today; it should change. This bill will be part of the change. Also, I raise another issue briefly. After the events of September 11, we heard from a number of people--Governor Ridge, Secretary Thompson of the Department of Health and Human Services--about concern for our Nation's food supply and its vulnerability to attack. We have to be mindful and sensitive. I thank Senator Lieberman for including my language on food safety and security in this legislation, directing the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to contract with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a detailed study to review all Federal statutes and regulations affecting the safety and security of the food supply, as well as the current organizational structure of food safety oversight to figure out if we can do it better. I think we can. I believed that for a long time. I pushed for better coordination, better definition, better objectives for food safety. Now, this is a different level. It is not a question of food that can be contaminated by natural causes, but food that could be jeopardized and contaminated by enemies of the United States. It is part of the same consideration but raises it to a much higher level. I close by thanking Senator Lieberman for his leadership on this issue. This reorganization is complicated. Although we are a great deliberative body, we have to roll up our sleeves and deal with it. We approach the anniversary of September 11 and know further attacks are not only possible, but in many instances our open society invites them. We do not have the luxury of waiting. If there were another attack since last September 11, this bill would have passed out of here a lot sooner. Now that we have the time to do it, let's do it and do it right. I thank Senator Lieberman for his leadership, and I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, more has changed in the last year than any of us, 1 year ago, would have cared to imagine. It was on a September day not unlike this one that terrorists committed mass murder in America, transforming forever the way we think about our security and our role in the world. One year later, we are in the midst of restricting our entire apparatus of Government to protect against future acts of terror in our homeland. But we have yet to comprehensively assess what went wrong last September 11--how our defenses failed us, why our worldwide intelligence network did not provide us warning of imminent attack, how terrorists operated and trained within our borders, how policy decisions may have made the events more likely, and how various Government agencies failed to analyze information in their possessions that could well have provided us a blueprint of the terrorists' intentions. The anniversary of September 11 is past us, and with it the celebration of heroism and sacrifice that will forever mark that day. Now is the time to take a harder look at the other side of that tragic event: the utter failure of the United States Government to predict and prevent the slaughter of Americans in America's greatest city. The September 11 attacks were incredibly depraved but not, as it turns out unimaginable. As early as 1995, an accomplice of Ramzi Yousef revealed that the mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center attack intended to plant bombs on 12 U.S.-bound airliners and crash a light plane packed with explosives into CIA headquarters. The accomplice had trained as a pilot at three separate U.S. flight schools. In 1999 the Library of Congress prepared a report for the National Intelligence Council warning that al-Qaeda suicide bombers ``could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives'' in the Pentagon, the CIA, or the White House. Two months before the September 11 attacks, Kenneth Williams, an FBI field agent in Phoenix, suspected that terrorists had enrolled in an Arizona pilot training school. He urged the FBI to begin investigating whether other U.S. flight schools might be training terrorists to fly. His prophetic warnings went unheeded. Similarly, FBI agent Coleen Rowley, whose efforts to have the FBI and CIA investigate hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui were rebuffed, believes such an investigation could have uncovered the terrorists' plot in the weeks before the attacks. Yesterday, the joint congressional intelligence committee reported that U.S. intelligence received a number of reports indicating that terrorists were plotting to use planes as weapons and planning to attack domestic targets. According to the committee, U.S. intelligence learned in August 1998 that a ``group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center.'' This information was given to the FBI and the FAA, which took little action. CIA Director Tenet told the intelligence community in December 1998 that ``We are at war,'' and ``I want no resources or people spared in this effort.'' According to the joint committee, ``Despite the D.C.I.'s declaration of war in 1998, there was no massive shift in budget or reassignment of personnel to counterterrorism until after September 11, 2001.'' The committee's report continues: ``By late 1998, the intelligence community had amassed a growing body of information--though general in nature, and lacking specific details on time and on place--indicating that bin Laden and the Al Qaeda notework intended to strike within the United States, and concern about bin Laden continued to grow over time and reached peak levels in the spring and summer of 2001, as the intelligence community faced increasing numbers of reports of imminent Al Qaeda attacks against U.S. interests. . . .'' According to the congressional investigators, senior government officials in July 2001 were briefed on the threat in the following language: ``Based on a review of all source reporting over the last five months, we believe that [Osama bin Laden] will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning.'' National Security Agency intercepts on September 10th warning in Arabic that ``The match is about to begin'' and ``Tomorrow is zero hour'' went untranslated until the attacks, when their meaning became all too apparent. Asking for, urging, and demanding answers for why various agencies of the Federal Government failed to understand the enormity of the danger facing the United States is an obligation shared by all elected Federal officials. As is the responsibility for understanding why and how the previous administration failed to combat the growing menace of international terrorism more effectively. As is responsibility for questioning Congress' inability or unwillingness to exercise more diligently its oversight responsibilities for those agencies. As is the expectation that officials who did not competently discharge their responsibilities be held accountable. Congress is on the verge of creating a Department of Homeland Security that constitutes the largest reorganization of the Federal Government in many of our lifetimes. But there has been no comprehensive diagnosis of the state of our preparedness for terrorism prior to last September, no proper analysis of the security loopholes in our immigration and airline security organization that provided the terrorists with the access they needed to kill Americans; no systematic review of the failure of Government agencies to analyze and share information on the terrorists' planning that coordinated analysis could have revealed prior to the attacks; and no formal assessment of the consequences of policy decisions dating back years that led to a climate in Afghanistan in which a terrorist network could train and flourish, with consequences that need no retelling. We need an honest search for answers, so that we and the people we represent can arrive at fair conclusions about what went wrong and develop ways to repair it. The independent commission we are proposing to look into these and all matters concerning our vulnerability and our initial response to the attacks would provide a blueprint for reform of the way we defend America. The insights of a blue-ribbon panel of experts, removed from the pressures of partisan politics, would add to the reforms we are making with creation of a Homeland Security Department by highlighting additional areas where the way our Government is organized have made us vulnerable. Eleven days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt mandated an investigation into how such tragedy could have struck an unknowing America. Ultimately, four different major panels appointed by the President and Congress investigated this ``Day of Infamy.'' Seven days after President Kennedy was murdered, President Johnson appointed a commission of distinguished leaders to investigate the assassination. The independent commission we are proposing would carry on this requirement for answers, which has gone unquestioned and been deemed necessary in previous crises of this magnitude. There is a crisis of confidence in America today. Americans are more proud than ever to be American. But large percentages deeply distrust the institutions that shape our daily lives--the Federal Government, corporate America, the Church. Corporate corruption, the scandals of campaign financing and corruption of the political process have deprived many Americans of the sense that they have a stake in the way they are governed. In the same way, I believe the lack of a fundamental accounting for the greatest tragedy in the Nation's history--one that touched all Americans and permanently altered the way we live and think about ourselves--is another source of alienation and insecurity. I do not believe the administration and the Congress have given the American people reason to be confident that we no longer remain vulnerable to terrorist attack, despite the admirable leadership our President has shown in prosecuting the war on terror, and despite the important work of Congress to create a Department of Homeland Security. The congressional intelligence committees have been conducting a very limited investigation into the intelligence failures related to September 11 and even this narrow inquiry has been sidelined by staff disputes that disrupted its operations and an FBI investigation into leaked material. Strangely, the FBI is now investigating the same people who are investigating the FBI. Indeed, until this week the joint committee has not held any open hearings. Ranking Republican Senator Shelby in particular has been outspoken in criticizing its lack of progress before it goes out of existence when the 107th Congress adjourns. Both Senator Shelby and joint committee co-chairman Senator Bob Graham support the establishment of an independent commission to carry on the work performed by the congressional intelligence investigation they helped to lead. I am pleased that a number of the Senate members of the joint congressional intelligence committee have endorsed our proposal to establish a panel that would build upon their work. The rationale for an independent commission seems indisputable if the very leaders charged with a more narrow inquiry do not believe their own investigation met the necessary standards to authoritatively report on and learn from our past failures. Many in Congress and the administration voiced concern last year that an independent investigation into September 11th's causes and consequences would interfere with Congress' investigation into these matters. With Congress planning to adjourn very soon, the congressional investigation represents only a first step into the intelligence and other failures that gave the terrorists their opening. The independent commission Senator Lieberman and I are proposing would explicitly build on the work of the congressional investigation and would go far beyond it by examining Government practice and policy in a host of other areas, including foreign policy, border control, aviation security, and law enforcement. Americans deserve answers after the events of September. This issue rises above politics, as the families and friends who lost loved ones will attest. Indeed, a commission would remove the issue from the political realm and serve the needs of both the administration and Congress by providing a blueprint for action, above and beyond any conclusions the joint congressional intelligence investigation may draw from its limited review. Leaders of the joint congressional investigation into the intelligence failures of September 11th have said the attacks may well have been preventable, based on everything we have learned since then about what we knew and how it fit together in a way that formed a blueprint for attack. I find it unfathomable, and frankly unacceptable, that we would accept that we could have prevented the attacks, but in the same breath say we should move on. We should move on--after we have answered all the lingering questions about why we were neither prepared nor organized to meet the challenge of terrorism, and after we have made the kind of reforms that only a panel of distinguished experts separated from politics could propose. An independent inquiry will not impose a serious burden on the administration as it prosecutes our just war on terrorism, any more than a similar inquiry after Pearl Harbor impeded Franklin D. Roosevelt's prosecution of World War II. Nor should it prevent members of Congress, the press, or any American citizen from questioning or criticizing the Government's apparent failures over the course of successive administrations. All wars and national security failures have occasioned contemporaneous criticism, and the Republic has managed to thrive. It is irresponsible in a time of war, or any time for that matter, to attack or defend unthinkingly or because partisan identification is one's supreme interest. But it is not responsible or right to shrink from offering thoughtful criticism when and to whom it is due, and when the consequences of incompletely understanding failures of governance are potentially catastrophic. On the contrary, such timidity is indefensibly irresponsible especially in times of war, so irresponsible that it verges on the unpatriotic. Two years before the attacks, the distinguished Hart-Rudman Commission on national security warned that as a result of the threat of catastrophic terrorism, ``Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.'' Congress and successive administration ignored the commission's recommendations for reform to defend against this threat--many of which are now embodied in the homeland security legislation we are considering this week. We shouldn't wait for the next attack to investigate what more we need to do to protect the American people. Until we have comprehensive assessment of needed reforms across the spectrum of our Government, based on what went wrong last September, we will not be prepared to predict and prevent the next attack. Americans need answers. I urge my colleagues to join us to create a commission that will tell them the truth--and put in place the protections that will prevent future generations from judging us for abdicating our responsibility to that truth.", u"Mr. President, I personally want to express my regard for the distinguished Senator from Kentucky and his excellent remarks today. I think he covered the problems quite well. I personally appreciate the friendship we have together and the great leadership he provides in the Senate. I think he did a very good job. I agree with him. Mr. President, every Member of this body, and every citizen in this country, knows that the most critical issue facing our Nation today is the task of securing our homeland and protecting our country from further terrorist attacks. The enormousness of this task cannot be overstated; and its implementation is equal measures vexing and daunting. But we must rise to the challenge. And we must do so together. No less than the lives of our citizens and the security of our nation hangs in the balance. With regard to this, I pay my compliments to the distinguished Senator from Georgia who gave a speech this morning that was really very good. Senator Miller, it seems to me, has made a real effort to bridge the gap between Democrats and Republicans on the floor and otherwise. His remarks were just absolutely right on the money. I personally express my regards for his remarks and express my love and affection for him as a Senator. He is a good man, and we ought to listen to him. I speak today out of a spirit of bipartisanship. I am proud of the way that Congress has come together on issues of national security since the horrific attacks of September 11. In the wake of these tragic events, members of the Judiciary Committee and Congress worked tirelessly to provide the Attorney General with the tools necessary to fight terrorism worldwide and protect our country. Specifically, we passed the PATRIOT Act, a critical set of reforms needed to unleash our government's ability to detect and prevent terrorist attacks, by an near-unanimous vote of 99-1. It is my hope that enough of that robust bipartisan spirit remains today as we consider the landmark legislation to create the Department of Homeland Security. As we have just passed the anniversary of the terrorist attacks that killed thousands of innocent Americans, such a sentiment is not just sorely welcome; it is also fundamental and necessary and appropriate. Today, we face a significant new type of military threat, one far different than post-World War II communism. We face today the danger of numerous, well-financed, well-trained and completely ruthless terrorist groups who will stop at nothing to cross our borders and attack our institutions, infrastructures, people and freedoms with all types of weapons. They engage in unconventional warfare and are bound by no rules. I speak not of just al-Qaida but many other terrorist groups. The creation of the new Homeland Security Department is a massive task precisely because the terrorist threat is so pressing and pernicious. The proposal to create a new Homeland Security Department is the next logical and necessary step in our country's war against terrorism. In my view, there are several components that are critical to ensuring its success. One of these involves our intelligence practices. In the aftermath of September 11, it is abundantly clear that we must improve the gathering, sharing, and analyzing of information within and among our Federal, State and local agencies. Our nation clearly needs to have a centralized office that is responsible for reviewing all of the terrorism-related information that collected by any agency, be it the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or one of the others. The Homeland Security Department is a critical step to ensuring that intelligence information is comprehensively collected, analyzed and disseminated. We must be sure not to handcuff the new Department's ability to do its job in this area. In particular, we must take pains to ensure that we do not unnecessarily limit the use of this intelligence within the new Department. The stakes are simply too high to place artificial constraints on this important function. Another critical area involves managerial flexibility. The new Department of Homeland Security must be given the ability to hire and retain the very best people to do the work of keeping our country safe. We need to give the Secretary of Homeland Security such fundamental management powers as the ability to remove poor performers and reward exemplary employees with merit-based pay raises. Believe it or not, under our antiquated system of Federal employment rules, it can take five months to hire a new employee and 18 months to fire a terrible worker. Most Federal employees also get annual pay raises based on how long they have worked for the government, not how well they do their jobs. The vast majority of ordinary Americans don't have such outdated rules in their workplaces. There is absolutely no sound reason to move such inefficiencies to the new Department of Homeland Security. That is the current law. The bill before us even expands that. Let me be clear: I am convinced that the vast majority of Federal workers do an outstanding job for our country. That is why I am not concerned with giving the Department of Homeland Security more managerial flexibility. Indeed, because most Federal workers do great work, they have nothing to fear and everything to gain from an improved system that allows their work to be rewarded through merit-based bonuses and raises. Only poor workers need be concerned, and they should be. Frankly, there is no place for underperforming or incompetent workers in the agency charged with protecting our safety. The new Department has the Herculean task of preventing terrorist attacks and keeping our country safe. I cannot imagine any reason why we would handicap it by imposing a system of rules that protect bad Federal workers at the expense of good ones and, more importantly, at the expense of our nation's safety. That is what the amendment to the bill by Senator Gramm and Senator Miller changes. The need for flexibility, in my view, must run through every corner of the Department of Homeland Security. The very nature of our enemy is quick and deliberate action; terrorists are quick to change their members, associations, plans, training bases, and destructive methods. Terrorists, moreover, come in many different shapes, colors and ideological bents. We must equip our security forces with the ability to be similarly adaptable. The Department simply must have the ability to adapt itself to a constantly changing enemy threat. We will fail our task miserably if all we end up doing is reorganizing dozens of inflexible agencies into a new titular Department of Homeland Security. If the Secretary of Homeland Security is required to keep intact within the Department each of the individual agency's personnel, components, budgets and rules, then we don't have a new department--just a hodgepodge of independent agencies. We will have created just another layer of bureaucracy. That cannot be our goal. That cannot constitute effective governance. For this reason, I think it is absolutely essential that we give the Secretary of Homeland Security the ability to move personnel, assets and money to best meet the rapidly shifting terrain of terrorist threats. We all recognize that the war against terrorism cannot be won simply by reorganizing existing government agencies into a Department of Homeland Security. That Department must be equipped with the tools to complete its task. Moreover, it is essential that we tap into the resources and expertise of America's private sector. The new Department must enlist the aid and expertise of America's businesses to enhance our nation's security, and I am committed to making sure that the new Department is able to receive the uninhibited advice and counsel of our business leaders. It is private businesses which own and operate most of our infrastructure--our telecommunications, energy and financial systems. Our government cannot effectively fight this war against terrorism without their support. We must arm our agencies with the best technologies available, and our private sector is a critical player in this process, as it has been in our national defense and military. Our war against terrorism would be hopeless without the active innovation and support of private industries. We must also recognize that the private sector cannot realistically step up to help wage our fight against terrorism without some reasonable protection from frivolous tort litigation. Congress must act and must do so quickly and carefully without political gamesmanship. Our task is too important; we cannot afford to sacrifice our country's safety in the process. The threat of terrorist attacks on our homeland, as well as abroad, is here to stay. Our response to this threat requires a singleness of focus. All of us in Government have a duty to do all we can to protect the American people from future terrorist attacks. I have spent considerable time considering the tools that the new Department of Homeland Security simply must have to create an effective system of protecting our borders from terrorism. Having done so, I have reluctantly concluded that I cannot support Senator Lieberman's proposal, which simply cobbles together dozens of disparate agencies without any mechanism for adapting their personnel and missions to meet the challenge of the new Department. On the other hand, I find myself in great agreement with the central proposals of the Gramm-Miller bill. It is a bipartisan measure. And, as all bipartisan bills, it represents a series of compromises. But, I am convinced, the compromises will not, in my view, detract from the core ability of the Department to do its job and protect American lives. Critically, the Gramm-Miller bill provides enough flexibility for the President and the Secretary of Homeland Security to respond to an ever-changing, multi-headed threat. The task of guarding against terrorism is immense; the risk of failure is enormous. We simply cannot be bound by partisan interest groups in this time of war and crisis. Let us join together to pass the bipartisan Gramm-Miller bill so that we can feel certain that we have done all we possibly could to protect the mothers, fathers and children for whom each of us work. The same considerations that compel me to support the Gramm-Miller bill cause me to oppose the Nelson-Chafee-Breaux amendment. While this amendment is a slight improvement from the Lieberman substitute, it still ties the President's hands much too much. Like the Lieberman substitute, the proposal cuts back on the President's existing authority to decertify the union affiliation for workers in the new Department in the interests of national security. This would be a step back under any circumstances; it certainly is not a forward-thinking way of creating a successful new Department of Homeland Security. Moreover, the amendment allows the unions to arbitrate any attempt by the President to loosen the civil service rules governing promotions and dismissals. I think I need to be entirely candid on this issue: how many members of this body would feel good about these rules if it took us 5 months to hire a staffer and 18 months to fire an incompetent one? How many of us would stand up and support such a system if it affected the way we do business? There is not one of us who would do that. And that is what we will get if we have the underlying bill. In all honesty, I think it is time to bring this matter to a close. I personally have seen how the majority has loaded up the tree with a bunch of Democrat amendments in an attempt to prevent a vote on the Gramm-Miller amendment. We intend to have a vote on the Gramm-Miller amendment, and the sooner the better. It may be that the majority will win on that amendment; it may be that they won't. But that is the nature of the process around here. We can't keep playing parliamentary games with homeland security. That is what is going on around here. That is the reason I have come to the floor. I don't come to the floor that often to raise Cain. And I am not raising Cain here, I am just speaking frankly. I think it is time for us to get about voting on these two different aspects of the bill. We ought to vote on the Gramm-Miller bill. There will have to be a vote on it. We ought to vote on the underlying bill, if that is the case--the Lieberman bill. I am not objecting to that. I don't think our side is objecting, nor is our side filibustering. We just want to be treated in a decent, honorable fashion; that is, give us a vote on the Gramm-Miller amendment, or the Gramm-Miller substitute, to put it in better terms. I get a little tired of politics around here, especially now that we are dealing with homeland security. That is what the President was criticizing. I hate to say this, but I saw the remarks of the distinguished majority leader earlier. It was on all three cable networks, as far as I could tell. Those remarks implied that the President was politicizing Democrats. That is not the case. The President did say we are muddling around here. He didn't say it in those terms. I will put it in these terms--muddling around with this homeland security bill instead of voting up or down and getting the job done. That is what we need to do. We don't need to have any distortions of what the President said or what Vice President Cheney said. That is what I think, unfortunately--I am sure it was sincere and well intentioned--was a distortion, but it is still a distortion. I think it is time we get rid of those types of attempts to have political games at the expense of a bill of this importance. That is what the President is driven by. After seeing all the weeks that we have been on this bill, I think the President is justified in his criticism. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, S. 2506, a bill to authorize appropriations for the intelligence community for fiscal year 2003, represents the first intelligence budget for the War on Terrorism--a war where intelligence is our most effective weapon. The Congress historically has considered the annual Intelligence Authorization bill to be important legislation, but now it has become a matter of national survival. Without an enhanced and effective intelligence capability integrated into the significant capabilities of the U.S. military and tightly linked to law enforcement and the new Department of Homeland Security, we will continue be at the mercy of international terrorists bent on the destruction of our society and we may suffer even more devastating attacks. Since the tragedy of September 11, the men and women of the U.S. intelligence community have worked every day, nonstop to protect us against those who would seek to do us harm. This bill represents an important step in our effort to provide them with the necessary resources and authorities to get the job done. In its budget request for fiscal years 2003 through 2007, the administration proposes significant resource increases for our national intelligence effort. Such increases build upon substantial supplemental appropriations approved for the intelligence community for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 after September 11. As the community has noted in past years, the challenges confronting the intelligence community have, for too long, received inadequate fiscal attention. I am encouraged by the commitment of resources proposed by the administration for fiscal year 2003 and beyond. The intelligence community is poised to benefit from an infusion of additional people and funding that can provide momentum for a range of intelligence efforts against those individuals, groups, and states--to include al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden--that threaten our security and safety. As the intelligence community is our first line of defense, the administration's fiscal year 2003 request for the National Foreign Intelligence Program is a necessary first step in correcting the deficiencies of the past. Earlier this year, the Select Committee on Intelligence conducted a thorough review of the administration's budget request for the National Foreign Intelligence Program for fiscal year 2003. This review included an extensive examination of the individual programs and agencies--such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office--which comprise the U.S. intelligence community. Building on the approach we took last year, our review once again focused on specific priority areas as well as individual agencies and functions. The committee highlighted five areas that must continue to receive priority attention in the near term if intelligence is to fulfill its role in our overall national security strategy and the ongoing war on terrorism. They are: (1) revitalizing the National Security Agency; (2) correcting deficiencies in human intelligence; (3) addressing the imbalance between intelligence collection and analysis; (4) rebuilding a robust research and development program; and (5) increasing the capabilities of measurements and signatures intelligence to fulfill key intelligence requirements. These priorities address the basic building blocks of intelligence--capabilities that will support the War on Terrorism as well as the multitude of other intelligence requirements. S. 2506 authorizes additional resources for these areas. While the additional funding for intelligence programs goes a long way towards alleviating existing near term deficiencies, other long term problems remain to be addressed. We face a looming crisis in our ability to collect critical information from key platforms as a result of unexpected failures; a major acquisition program is experiencing significant cost overruns and schedule slippage; and, we have inadequate funding to ensure that information collected by the next generation of space-based sensors will be processed, exploited, and disseminated appropriately to intelligence analysts. Higher levels or resources, however, will not address all of the important challenges which confront the intelligence community. The intelligence community must overcome an aversion to risk that has crept into the culture since the end of the cold war. The world will be a dangerous and unstable place for foreseeable future. In order to protect our country, we will need to deal with unsavory characters and we will need to operate in unsafe parts of the world. The CIA has suffered casualties in the war in Afghanistan and we must steel ourselves to the inevitability of more loss of life. Some problems, such as the intelligence community's current organization or its ability to exchange information effectively and efficiently with other government agencies, may require additional legislative actions in the future. The bicameral investigation into the events of September 11 is ongoing and I expect that the investigation will result in recommendations for actions to be taken to strengthened our intelligence community. The bill includes legislative provisions that are important additions to the work the Intelligence Committee did last year--both in the fiscal year 2002 Intelligence Authorization Act and the USA-PATRIOT Act. I will summarize a few of these provisions: Section 304 is designed to make improvements in the information available to the Committee each year as it prepares its budget authorizations in the areas of counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics and counterintelligence. The provision requires the administration each year to specify in its budget submission the aggregate amount requested in each of these four critical areas. Currently, these numbers are spread throughout the budget submission in the requests for particular programs in individual agencies. The committee believes that it is essential to rational decision-making in the budget process--both for the administration and for Congress--to have ``cross-cut'' budget numbers so that it is clear how much money is being requested across the Government in these important areas. Section 306 is a provision that supplements changes implemented under the USA-PATRIOT Act. Under that act, foreign intelligence information that has been collected by law enforcement agencies in the course of criminal investigations can, and in fact must, be provided to the Director of Central Intelligence to be included in the all-source analytic products prepared by intelligence analysts. In other words, these ``dots'' of foreign intelligence that are collected in criminal cases, including grand jury proceedings and criminal wiretaps, now flow to the intelligence community. The purpose of Section 306 is to clarify that the intelligence committees of the Congress, in the conduct of their oversight of the intelligence community, shall also have access to that law-enforcement-derived information that has been provided to the intelligence agencies. The intelligence committees cannot conduct effective oversight of the intelligence agencies if there are categories of information upon which intelligence operations and analyses are based that is off limits of the committees. Sections 311 and 312 follow up on provisions that were included in the USA-PATRIOT Act and the FY02 Intelligence Authorization bill. Congress required the Director of Central Intelligence to review and report to the intelligence committees his recommendations of how best to create two new centers: ``The National Virtual Translation Center'' and the ``Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center.'' We have finally received those reports and Sections 311 and 312 establish those centers in law as part of the intelligence community. We are hopeful that the very difficult problems of translation resources in the intelligence community and the efficient and effective tracking of terrorist finances will be significantly enhanced by the creation of these centers. Section 313 is similar to S. 2459, a bill introduced by Senator Wyden. This excellent provision addresses the problem we have all heard so much about in the press: Is there a complete and accurate list of known or suspected international terrorists that is derived from all-source information available to the U.S. Government and that is provided to all agencies whose job is to protect our borders from penetration by terrorists? This provision requires the establishment of a ``Terrorist Identification Classification System'' that will be available to all Federal agencies, State and local governments and, as appropriate, to foreign governments. It will solve a problem that we have identified in our committee of the proliferation of ``watch lists'' in our Government--all with different suspected terrorists names, used by different agencies for different purposes. Title V of the bill establishes in statute the National Counterintelligence Executive, the ``NCIX''. At the urging of our committee, the President created the NCIX in 2001 to provide the U.S. Government in the counterintelligence area with (1) strong, policy-driven leadership; (2) new and enhanced counterintelligence capabilities; and (3) coherent program, strategies and cooperative approaches. The committee's oversight of this fledging effort revealed problems, however, that Title V is designed to remedy. By establishing the NCIX in statute and placing it in the Executive Office of the President, with oversight by the intelligence committees, the committee believes that the NCIX leadership problems, resource constraints and, overall, lack of sufficient status and visibility within the Government, will be remedied. Finally, Title VI of the bill establishes a National Commission for Review of Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community. The committee supports a strong intelligence community R & D program. Research and Development supports virtually all other intelligence community efforts by laying the groundwork for the necessary modernization and innovation of intelligence capabilities. The purpose of the Commission, to be composed of government officials and private sector experts, is to review the current state of research and development in the intelligence community and, in particular, to determine if the level of resources devoted to various efforts across the community is in line with those scientific and technological fields judged to be of the greatest importance to the intelligence needs of the future. I mentioned earlier the tireless efforts of the men and women of the intelligence community. I am privileged as chairman of the Intelligence Committee to travel to the different agencies around Washington and to visit various installations around the world. I am consistently impressed with competence, professionalism and dedication of these individuals. For years they have been unsung heroes, serving under difficult conditions and often putting their lives on the line. They do this not for money or glory--indeed the nature of their work means that success goes unacknowledged--but because they love their country and they have a profound sense of duty. We owe these people a debt of gratitude of their sacrifices, now more than ever before. I must mention another group of people who are critical to the process of bringing this legislation to the floor. The staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee has once again done a superb job preparing this bill. The staff is led by Al Cumming the staff director and Bill Duhnke the minority staff director. They have guided the staff through a very difficult year including the anthrax evacuation and the launching of the joint investigation with the House Intelligence Committee into events related to September 11. Through all the turmoil they kept the committee focused on our work and our oversight responsibilities. They are assisted by Kathleen McGhee, Chief Clerk, Bob Filippone, Deputy Staff Director, Jim Hensler, Deputy Minority Staff Director, Vicki Divoll, General Counsel, Chris Ford, Minority Counsel, Melvin Dubee, Budget Director, and the rest of a very talented staff. A special thanks goes to Jim Wolfe, the committee's Security Director for his efforts to ensure the security of our people and our classified materials last fall and winter when the committee was forced to work from temporary offices during the anthrax episode. Finally and most importantly, I must acknowledge the excellent cooperation and support of Vice Chairman Shelby. Senator Shelby has served on the committee for almost 8 years and his experience and commitment have been critical to the success of the committee. We have not agreed on everything but we have agreed on the goal of giving the American people the best intelligence organization possible and have worked together toward that goal. I have appreciated his support and advice. At this time in our Nation's history, our support for the U.S. intelligence community is vitally important. I urge support for this bill.", u"Mr. Speaker, as the federal government has increased its use of the Internet and other information technologies to conduct its business, the need for a comprehensive approach to the management Electronic Government initiatives has become evident. Therefore, Congressman Jim turner, the Ranking Member of the Government Reform Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement Policy, introduced H.R. 2458, the Electronic Government Act of 2002. H.R. 2458 is a bipartisan bill to enhance the management and promotion of electronic government services and processes and to increase the electronic availability of information to the public. I worked closely with Congressman Turner to develop this bill. H.R. 2458 was reported favorably by the Committee on Government Reform with a unanimous vote. With agreed upon changes reflected in the text before the House today, the bill is supported by the Science and Armed Services Committees, as well as by the leadership of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. Following action by the House, the legislation is expected to be taken up by the Senate and acted on in its present form. The bill contains five titles, covering a broad array of government information management issues. Title I would strengthen government-wide approaches to improving the use of information technology for service delivery and governmental efficiency and effectiveness by establishing an Office of Electronic Government in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), a statutory interagency Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council, a program to promote contractor innovation and excellence in E-Gov services and processes, and an interagency E-Gov Fund to provide funding for innovative E-Gov initiatives. Title II would mandate a number of specific initiatives to enhance Federal E-Gov capabilities. Among its provisions are requirements to support broader use of electronic signatures, a develop a Federal Internet portal, improve public access to public information in Federal agencies and the courts, strengthen privacy protections, improve Federal workforce information technology skills, and make greater use of share-in-savings contracts. Title III, ``Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002'' (FISMA), would permanently authorize a government-wide risk-based approach to information security and otherwise strengthen Government Information Security Reform (GISRA) provisions of the FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act. Title IV would provide authorization of appropriations for the legislation and effective dates for its provisions. Title V would reduce paperwork burdens and improve privacy protections by establishing new procedures for statistical data sharing among key statistical agencies. Following favorable action on the bill by the Committee on Government Reform, the managers renewed discussions with the Administration, including OMB, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Commerce, and the Committees on Science and Armed Services, and the Senate Committee on Government Affairs. The resulting agreement involved making a number of revisions to the reported bill. The changes are described below. Section 205 of H.R. 2458 is revised at the request of the Administration to ensure that on-line access to Federal court records not compromise legitimate privacy and security concerns. The revised language would require the judiciary to develop rules to clearly set forth litigant rights and obligations, as well as court responsibilities with regards to the treatment of privacy and security issues associated with court records. Section 209 is revised with the addition of subsection (b) to require the Director of OPM, in consultation with the Director of OMB, the CIO Council, and the Administration of GSA, to analyze, identify, assess, and oversee the government-wide development of information technology and information resource management training curricula and methods. Agency heads will use these curricula and methods to establish training programs that meet their needs for information technology and information resource management while designing the training to maximize efficiency and economy. Section 210 authorizing the government-wide use of share-in savings contracts for information technology has been amended to sunset in September 2005, rather than in 2009. The provision has also been amended to prohibit the agency letting the contract to retain any savings attributable to a decrease in the number of employees performing the function and to prohibit the inclusion in savings of enhanced revenues from the collection of fees, taxes, debts, claims, or other amounts collected by the government. The requirement that the General Accounting Office (GAO) review the Office of Management and Budget report to Congress on the use by the agencies of the share-in-savings authority has been expanded to include an independent assessment by the GAO of the effectiveness of share-in-savings contracts and of whether the authority should be continued. Finally the section now provides for the repeal of the current share-in-savings pilot authority in 40 U.S.C. 11521. Section 213(b) requires a study to evaluate the best practices of community technology centers that receive federal funds. 213(b)(1) is amended to clarify that OMB must ensure that such a study is conducted. Likewise, Section 214(b)(1) is amended to clarify that OMB must ensure a study is conducted on the use of information technology to enhance crisis management. A new section 216 is added to Title II that calls for the development of protocols for geographic information systems so that industry and government can develop innovative multi-layered maps and analyses using the government's massive amount of geographic data. This section is not intended to inappropriately move activity into the government that is best left to the private sector. Furthermore, nothing in this provision is intended to encourage the development of technical standards that would require the procurement of specific hardware or software. A new subsection (c) is added to Sec. 3533 in section 301 of the bill. This subsection delegates to the Secretary of the Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence OMB authority under Sec. 3533(a)(1) for developing and overseeing the implementation of information security policies, and under Sec. 3533(a)(2) for providing risk-based information security protections, for DOD and CIA systems that process information whose unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the missions of the agencies. This revision was requested by the Administration and the Armed Services Committee. Sec. 3536(a)(4) in section 301 of the bill is modified to require that the Federal information security incident center described under this section is to keep the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as well as other appropriate agencies, informed about information security incidents and related matters. Section 303 of the legislation as reported by the Committee on Government Reform would amend 40 U.S.C. 11331 to transfer to OMB the authority to promulgate information security standards, which is currently a responsibility of the Secretary of Commerce. After much discussion about the practical consequences of such a transfer, it was agreed to retain the current law's structure while strengthening it in a number of instances. First, FISMA's revision of 40 U.S.C. 11331, at sec. 303, is modified to maintain standards promulgation by the Secretary of Commerce, largely as currently provided in law. Sec. 11331 is revised, however, to continue FISMA provisions for minimum mandatory security standards, a time limit on promulgation of the standards, and the elimination of waiver authority. Second, FISMA's Sec. 3533(a), in sec. 301, is revised accordingly to strike references to OMB promulgation of the NIST-developed standards. In place of that mandate, OMB would be required, at Sec. 3533(a)(1), to use its oversight authority to ensure agency use of such standards, and at Sec. 3533(a)(8), to include an assessment of the standards in its annual report to Congress. Third, to harmonize other references in the legislation to standards promulgation, a number of provisions in Titles I and II are also revised purely for the sake of consistency: i.e., in Sec. 3602(f)(8) in sec. 101, in sec. 202(a)(2), in sec. 202(f)(2), in sec. 207(d)(2)(iii), in Sec. 3534(a)(1)(B)(i) in sec. 301, in Sec. 20(c)(3), (e)(1), and (e)(8) in sec. 303, and in sec. 304(6). Finally, sec. 306 is stricken because given the transfer back to Commerce of all standards promulgation, there is no need to address the division in authority between OMB (security standards) and Commerce (system standards). Section 303's amendments to section 20 of the NIST Act, 15 U.S.C. 278g-3, are modified in several respects. First, NIST guidance concerning the identification of national security systems, at subsection (b)(3), is to be developed in conjunction with the Department of Defense, including the National Security Agency. Second, as requested by the Administration and the Science Committee, subsections (c)(5), (6), and (7) are modified to be ``to the maximum extent practicable.'' These changes are intended to preserve the policy of reliance on flexible, performance-based, technology-neutral requirements, while recognizing that there likely will be times where needs such as interoperability or the reality of market predominance will require guidance that addresses specific technologies or products. Third, as requested by the Science Committee, the bill drops subsection (d), which would have established a NIST Office for Information Security Programs. Finally, also at the request of the Science Committee, subsection (e) is revised consistent with current law to provide for NIST technical assistance to agencies, at (e)(2), and to authorize NIST to help the private sector, upon request, with NIST guidance and other assistance, at (e)(6). Title V of this bill is based on H.R. 5215, the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002, introduced by Congressman Stephen Horn, Chairman of the Government Reform Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations. Chairman Horn and Ranking Member Janice D. Schakowsky have worked tirelessly with the Administration to finalize these provisions. This section creates the opportunity for three federal statistical agencies to reduce reporting burdens on businesses while simultaneously making the process of developing economic statistics more efficient. This title provides the statutory changes necessary to allow the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the U.S. Census Bureau to enter into negotiated agreements to share confidential business information. The magnitude of the gains in efficiency and burden reduction will turn on the willingness of these agencies to move swiftly to capitalize on the opportunities presented by these changes. Title V also include language introduced in this Congress by Representatives Sawyer and Waxman, which provides strong protection from disclosure for information provided to the government by individuals and businesses. A new provision added to Title V provides a resolution to a longstanding problem of information exchange between the Congressional Budget Office and statistical agencies by making it clear that Congressional intent is for CBO, in fulfilling its statistical service to the Congress, to have access to the necessary information held by statistical agencies in the executive branch. Finally, a number of technical corrections are made: At Sec. 3532(b)(2)(A) in sec. 101 to correct a paragraph indentation; and at Sec. 3533(a)(8)(D) in sec. 101 to correct a subsection cross-reference. With these changes, the managers of H.R. 2458 are able to state that the legislation before the House of Representatives today reflects agreement across the aisle, among key members and committees in both houses of Congress, and with the executive branch. I urge passage of this bill.", u"Madam President, I have sought recognition to comment about the legislation on homeland security, which I believe the Senate is about to pass. It has been accurately characterized as historic legislation. It reorganizes the Government of the United States of America to meet the threat of terrorism. On September 11, 2001, this country sustained a devastating loss, a loss deeply emblazoned on the minds of all Americans. With the attacks on the World Trade Center, the attack on the Pentagon, and the plane that went down in Somerset County, PA, it was obvious that we faced a very extraordinary threat. We should have taken action against al-Qaida long before September 11. There were many warning signals available. Osama bin Laden was well known for his jihad against the West, against our values, against our civilization. Osama bin Laden was indicted for killing Americans in Mogadishu in 1993. Osama bin Laden was indicted for blowing up the U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998. He was known to have been involved with al-Qaida and the terrorism against the destroyer Cole, and he had made his announcement of his worldwide jihad. But the United States has historically been reluctant to take preemptive action. We did little in responding to the attacks on the embassies of August 20, 1998. When we sent a missile to Afghanistan, it went to an empty factory. When we put a missile in a factory in the Sudan, it may or may not have been a factory with chemical weapons. But then, with the events of 9/11, it became apparent that we had to respond, and we had to respond very dramatically and emphatically. Senator Lieberman and I introduced legislation on October 11, 2001--exactly 1 month after the 9/11 attack. It was apparent to many of us at that time that we needed to have an office of homeland defense and a Secretary with power to deal with the many agencies that would be involved. First and foremost among those agencies, in my view, was the coordination of activities among our intelligence agencies. When I was chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the 104th Congress, I introduced legislation in 1996 to bring all of the intelligence agencies under one umbrella, under the Director of Central Intelligence. That had been the spot that was supposed to coordinate all of the intelligence activities. But the fact of the matter was that the Director of the CIA did not have that authority because there were too many independent agencies--the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the counterintelligence of the FBI, intelligence units in the State Department, and intelligence units spread throughout the Government--and there were fierce battles on turf, and the coordination was not undertaken. As a result of not having all of the intelligence agencies under one umbrella, the United States paid a very heavy price. It is my view that had all of the dots been on the board, had there been coordination at all of these intelligence agencies under one umbrella, we might well have prevented September 11. After the fact, we learned that in July there was a very important FBI report coming out of Phoenix, AZ, about a suspicious man taking flight training, and he had a big picture of Osama bin Laden in his living quarters. That memorandum was buried somewhere in the FBI headquarters. We found out after the fact that the CIA had information on two al-Qaida agents at Kuala Lumpur. The CIA did not tell the FBI or the Immigration and Naturalization Service that those agents came into the United States, and they were two of the suicide bombers on 9/11. There was information about a man named Zacarias Moussaoui. The FBI field office in Minneapolis made an effort to get a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. They never got the warrant. They were using the wrong standard. They were using a standard of probable cause of 51 percent. The FBI agent testified that the U.S. attorney in Minneapolis thought he had to have a 75- to 80-percent probability. The fact is that, under the law, Gates v. Illinois, an opinion by Justice Rehnquist--now the Chief Justice, then an Associate Justice on the Court--says that probable cause is judged by the totality of the circumstances and suspicion, and had the warrant been obtained under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the computer of Zacarias Moussaoui was a virtual treasure trove of information. Then a man named Murad, a Pakistani, a member of al-Qaida, gave a statement in 1995 that al-Qaida had plans in 1995 to load explosives on an airplane and fly them into the White House or into the CIA. Then you had the experience with the trade towers themselves, attacked in 1993 by al-Qaida's agents. They had made an effort to blow up one of the towers to try to topple into the other tower to destroy them both. It was known that they were very unhappy about their failure. So the risks were present, but there was not coordination. We didn't bring all of those dots onto one screen. When FBI Director Mueller testified before the Judiciary Committee in early June, I asked him about all of these facts and concluded that there was a veritable blueprint had all of these dots been put together. That is what we have an opportunity to do now with homeland security, under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security. I had submitted an amendment, which would have given the Secretary greater authority than is present in the existing bill. The Secretary of Homeland Defense, under the existing legislation, may request that the agencies coordinate, but the Secretary does not have the authority to direct, and I believe that is a significant failing in this bill. When the House of Representatives passed a homeland security bill last Wednesday and, in effect, left town, sending a bill to the Senate, it was pretty much a matter of take it or leave it. If I had pressed my amendment to do what I thought was a very important improvement, to give the Secretary authority to direct all of these agencies, the bill would have had to go back to conference, and the Members of the House of Representatives had dispersed. They are present only in pro forma session. They can take some technical amendments without reconvening, but to press a substantive amendment would have sent the matter back for a conference, and it would have delayed the matter perhaps as long as April of next year. I had a long discussion on this matter with homeland security adviser, former Governor Tom Ridge, and pressed the point. Then I discussed the matter with Vice President Cheney and sought some sort of a commitment that the administration would look favorably upon this kind of an amendment when we reconvened. The Vice President said he could not speak for the President. I talked to President Bush, who urged me not to press the amendment, and I told him I would not because I did not want to tie up the bill. I did not want to put on a substantive amendment that would have required a conference. Early in the 108th Congress, I will refile that amendment to give the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to direct these agencies because I am still concerned about their turf battles. Turf battles in Washington, DC are endemic and epidemic. It is too serious a matter to engage in turf battles any longer. Now is the time where we have to use all of our resources to prevent another attack. We have made very significant advances on a number of lines--on the Border Patrol, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. We put up $3 billion last year on serums to deal with smallpox and anthrax, such as Cipro. That came through the Subcommittee on Labor, Health, Human Services, and Education. Senator Harkin, then the chairman, and I, ranking member, took the lead in putting up that money. All of these precautions in building up the hospital infrastructure and giving assistance to the fire departments is vital. Having coordination with Federal, State, and local authorities is vital, but if we have to respond to an attack, if we do not prevent an attack, then we will be in very bad shape. That is why I do believe our efforts have to be directed to preventing another attack. I discussed also with the administration, with Governor Ridge, Vice President Cheney, and President Bush the labor-management relations issue. I believe we could have worked out an accommodation which would have been satisfactory to all parties. When we had the amendment offered by the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. Nelson, cosponsored by Senator Chafee and Senator Breaux, there was initial confusion as to whether the two paragraphs of the Breaux amendment, which incorporated the so-called Morella amendment from the House bill, was in place of, substituted for, or in addition to. In a colloquy with the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, we established the amendment was in addition to and did not remove the President's national security authority to take steps if national security was endangered. That model could have been applied to the other five chapters on flexibility. The Subcommittee on Labor, Health, Human Services, and Education will schedule hearings promptly when we reconvene the 108th Congress to go into these issues, to have a thorough airing, have people from the Office of Personnel Management come in and explain what they need; to have labor representatives come in and explain what they have in mind, in order to work out an accommodation which is satisfactory for all parties to maintain a high level of morale. We also have to be concerned about provisions in this bill which could have the effect of trampling on civil liberties and constitutional rights. There is no doubt about the danger posed by al-Qaida, but there is similarly no doubt that we cannot give up our civil liberties and our constitutional rights in our efforts to combat al-Qaida. If we do that, if we give up our civil liberties, al-Qaida would have, in effect, won. There is an ongoing responsibility for oversight, and that responsibility will fall on the shoulders of the Governmental Affairs Committee and the Judiciary Committee to see to it that the detention of aliens is based upon some reason; to see to it that if American citizens are tried in a military court that there is an observance of constitutional rights. There is grave concern in America that we be protected from another terrorist attack, but there is also grave concern that we be careful in the preservation of our civil liberties. Madam President, how much of my 20 minutes remains?", u"Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 minutes. I would simply observe for the gentleman from Florida that many of my constituents would say that the Republic has never yet been harmed when a Member of Congress has been hoarse, but let me simply make some points about the issue at hand. Mr. Speaker, this body is an odd mixture of being both a legislative institution and a political institution. Sometimes I believe the fact that the cameras have come into this place have created all kinds of incentives for this place to be much more a political institution than it is a legislative institution, and I regret that. I also think that we have another problem in the House. Woodrow Wilson wrote in his famous book a long time ago that Congress did its work in committee, and in my view Congress does its best work in committee. And I think there is always a tension in a legislative and political body between efforts of the two parties to get their messages out and to get their will forced through the House, and, on the other hand, the efforts of the committees of the House to do the work of the House on behalf of every Member and on behalf of the country. We have a committee system because none of us can be an expert on everything, and we are, through the committee system, given the opportunity to specialize and develop knowledge in discrete areas of government. I think this is one of those times when the committee system needs to be allowed to work on behalf of the House rather than being frustrated by other pressures, and that is what drives me to make the comments I want to make today. This continuing resolution certainly deserves to be supported by every Member. It will allow the committee to begin to produce conferences, conference reports, between the two Houses now that the mini-filibuster is over on the other side of the Capitol, but I think there is a fundamental problem that we face as we go into dealing with each of those conference reports. As Members understand, after the events of September 11, we appropriated a $40 billion package to the President: $10 billion was to be used pretty much as he saw fit on an emergency situation; the next $10 billion is supposed to be spent after serious and involved consultation with the Congress, the President essentially has 15 days during which he is supposed to work out any potential differences with the Congress before he proceeds to spend that money; and then, lastly, we indicated that we would at a later date provide the other $20 billion that we had agreed to provide at that time. But during that debate, it was made clear many times over by people on both sides of the aisle that that $40 billion was just a down payment, not a ceiling, it was just a down payment. It was a limitation on how much could be spent immediately until the Congress and the executive branch got its act together and could make a more informed set of judgments about what else we needed to protect the country. And now I think we have to face the question of whether or not we are going to be asked to proceed with these bills under that $40 billion cap or if we are going to recognize that the world has changed a whole lot since that $40 billion package was passed. We will be bringing to the floor next week a defense bill which is essentially a peacetime defense bill. We are no longer at peace. In my view there are significant portions of the Pentagon budget that will need to be augmented above the levels provided in that appropriation bill. But there are a great many other items which I believe are going to cost far more than that $40 billion that we have so far provided authority for, and I think that money needs to be directed specifically and directly at homeland security issues. And without an understanding that we need to go above that $40 billion, we will not be able to provide the public or the Nation with the degree of safety that it has a right to expect. We have heard a lot of comments about airline security this morning. Obviously that has to be the first order of business. I think it is amazing that we have not passed an airline security bill more than a month after the tragic events of September 11. But even if we were to do that today, that is just the tip of the iceberg. There are a great many other security-related items which we need to focus on. We have had a lot of reference made to the fact that the House went out of business last week after the anthrax problem was discovered. That afforded me an opportunity to get a series of briefings that I otherwise would not have had time to get at this point in the year, and so I spent the next 4 days when this House was out of session being briefed by the NSA, the CIA, HHS, CDC, FBI, a whole range of agencies that have responsibilities directly related to homeland security. It is clear to me on the basis of those discussions that we need to move significantly beyond the amounts that the administration has provided in its budget submission of last week if we are to really do the job of securing the home front as well. We just passed a tax bill yesterday, not with my vote; but we gave large amounts of money to the largest corporations in this country: over $2 billion to Ford; $1.6 billion, or $1.4 billion, I believe, to AT&T; $600 million to GE, not exactly the most needy clients in the country. If we can do that, well, I do not think we should have done that. I think we should have instead protected the integrity of the budget process and protected the integrity of the fiscal bottom line by not providing them those outlandish reductions, and instead we should have used that money for security-related items. I do not want to get into a debate about what happened yesterday, but I want to give you some examples of the things I think we need to do that will require us to go far beyond the $40 billion that we are talking about. First of all, you cannot talk about the National Security Agency and what it does in public; but I am telling you, seeing what they are doing and seeing the work that they are trying to do to help us track terrorism, there is no doubt in my mind that they are going to need more people above and beyond those being provided right now. The same with the FBI. If you take a look what they are trying to do, the FBI asked for almost $1.5 billion in additional funding. They have been provided in the budget request submitted by the administration so far a little more than one-third of that amount. The Customs Service, we have had everybody talk about the vulnerabilities of this country on the Canadian border. The Customs Service, I am told, requested $800 million to do something about that. The budget submission provides only $114 million to meet that problem. I think that action is at great variance with our needs. We also have a number of other efforts at the CIA which I think need augmenting. In the area of public health, we have been told by my good friend the Secretary, who was formerly the Governor of Wisconsin, Tommy Thompson, we have been told that they are going to buy 300 million units of smallpox vaccine. I think that is terrific. But it will not do us much good if we have not strengthened the ability of public health officials down to the local level in every community in this land to actually deliver those vaccines, and, more importantly, to do the detection work and the detective work to make certain that we are not 2 weeks into an epidemic before we realize that we have got an epidemic. In transportation, I would challenge anyone to show me that we are buying all the bomb detection equipment that can be produced to provide greater security for this country. Rail passengers, how often have you had your bags checked when you get onto a train in this country? Amtrak has requested $500 million for increased security. That request was cut by $495 million, or 99 percent. The Coast Guard, we have a huge number of ports of entry in this country. The Coast Guard is taxed to the limit. They need more resources to protect this country and the security of this country, as far as I am concerned; yet they are not getting, in my view, nearly the resources they need. Food safety, we inspect less than 2 percent of the food that comes into this country. We desperately need to upgrade FDA, USDA and other agencies' ability to protect the Nation's food supply, both domestically and imported; and they are not getting sufficient resources to do that. There are many other areas of security-related concern that I could go into. I take this time simply to make the point that we cannot afford ``business as usual'' in dealing with these appropriation bills. In my view, we are going to have to live up to the words that we uttered on this House floor just a few weeks ago when we approved that initial $40 billion package. We are going to need to provide additional funds above $40 billion, in my view, to meet all of these threats. I want to make clear, I think that it is very likely that many of the requests from agencies that were turned down by OMB were turned down for very justifiable reasons, because we know that agencies will use almost any excuse to put their hand out to get more money. So I do not object to OMB scrubbing those numbers hard, but I do object to us having to live within an artificial dollar ceiling when the home base security of the United States is at stake. If we are at war, then we indeed ought to heed the words of the Vice President, who correctly said that this may be the first war in this country's history where we suffer more casualties at home than we do abroad. If that is the case, then we need to prepare for it; and we need to make the investments that are necessary. So I would urge every single Member of this House over the next 3 or 4 days to think through what they have heard from their own constituents and what they have seen as they travel around the United States when it comes to other areas of security that we need to deal with. Now, we know each party has our own preferences in terms of economic policy in this country, in terms of tax policy, in terms of spending policy. That is fine. Those differences are healthy, at least most of the time. But today I am not talking about that. There is nothing philosophical, there is nothing ideological, about the idea of spending whatever is necessary and whatever can be usefully spent in order to upgrade the security of our transportation system, of our food supply, of our schools, and every other point of vulnerability in this country. We are in a new era. We need to think like it, and that means we need to get rid of these artificial ceilings and think more clearly about what is the best use of our time and what are crucial uses of public money. I have no problem whatsoever stacking up the list of items that I just mentioned and comparing them to some of the tax items that this Congress passed yesterday. If you ask any citizen on the street, including many citizens who benefited the most by those tax cuts yesterday, I would bet you by at least a seven or eight to one ratio, they would say, look, put security first. That is all I am asking. We have got, in my judgment, about a week for the House to make some concrete judgments, or else all of these decisions are going to be made by the Senate. They may make some good decisions, but I think it would be kind of nice if we participated. I think as the body charged with the responsibility to initiate appropriations, I think that we ought to be dealing from the House document, rather than dealing from the Senate document that they put together at a later date. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u" Under clause 8 of rule XII, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows: 6439. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Imidacloprid; Time- Limited Pesticide Tolerance [OPP-300980; FRL-6493-2] (RIN: 2070-AB78) received March 1, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture. 6440. A letter from the Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Fenpropathrin; Pesticide Tolerance [OPP-300981; FRL-6492-6] (RIN: 2070-AB78) received March 1, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture. 6441. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Imidacloprid; Pesticide Tolerances for Emergency Exemptions [OPP-300969; FRL-6490-5] (RIN: 2070-AB78) received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture. 6442. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Emamectin Benzoate; Pesticide Tolerance Technical Correction [OPP-300958A; FRL- 6489-4] (RIN: 2070-AB78) received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture. 6443. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting request and availability of appropriations for the Department of Health and Human Services' Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program; (H. Doc. No. 106-206); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed. 6444. A letter from the Alternate OSD Federal Register Liason Officer, Office of the Secretary, Department of Defense, transmitting the Department's final rule--Screening the Ready Reserve [DoD Directive 1200.7] (RIN: 0790-AF57) received January 3, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Armed Services. 6445. A letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting a report on assistance provided by the Department of Defense to civilian sporting events in support of essential security and safety at such events; to the Committee on Armed Services. 6446. A letter from the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Labor-Management Standards, Department of Labor, transmitting the Department's final rule--Labor Organization Annual Financial Reports (RIN: 1215-AB29) received January 3, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. 6447. A letter from the Attorney, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule--Anthropomorphic Test Dummy; Occupant Crash Protection [Docket No. NHTSA-99- 6714] (RIN: 2127-AG76) received January 6, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce. 6448. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Delegation of National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories; State of Arizona; Arizona Department of Environmental Quality; Maricopa County Environmental Services Department [FRL-6545-2] received March 1, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce. 6449. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Texas; Reasonably Available Control Technology for Major Stationary Sources of Nitrogen Oxides for the Houston/Galveston and Beaumont/Port Arthur Ozone Nonattainment Areas [TX-102-1-7440; FRL-6543-1] received March 1, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce. 6450. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans Commonwealth of Kentucky State Implementation Plan [KY-105-9946a; FRL-6545-5] received March 1, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce. 6451. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of Missouri [MO 092-1092; FRL-6528-7] received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce. 6452. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; California State Implementation Plan Revision; South Coast Air Quality Management District [CA-266-0172a; FRL-6534-2] received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce. 6453. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Rhode Island: Determination of Adequacy for the State's Municipal Solid Waste Permit Program [FRL-6535-8] received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce. 6454. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Approval under Section 112(l) of the Clean Air Act; West Virginia; Permits for Construction, Modification, Relocation and Operation of Stationary Sources of Air Pollutants [SIPTRAX No. WV026-6012; FRL-6505-1] received January 7, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce. 6455. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Preliminary Assessment Information and Health and Safety Data Reporting; Addition and Removal of Certain Chemicals and Removal of Stay [OPPTS- 82050; FRL-5777-2] (RIN: 2070-AB08 and 2070-AB11) received January 7, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce. 6456. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources; Supplemental Delegation of Authority to the State of Wyoming [WY-001-0005; FRL-6521-1] received January 7, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce. 6457. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Commonwealth of Virginia; Oxygenated Gasoline Program [VA103- 5047a; FRL-6534-7] received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce. 6458. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule--Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Commonwealth of Virginia; Oxygenated Gasoline Program [VA103-5047a; FRL-6534-7] received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce. 6459. A letter from the Lieutenant General, USA Director, Department of Defense, transmitting notification concerning the Department of the Navy's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to Germany for defense articles and services (Transmittal No. 00-30), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on International Relations. 6460. A letter from the Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Office of the Secretary, Department of Defense, transmitting the Department's final rule--National Reconnaissance Office Freedom of Information Act Program Regulation--received January 3, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Government Reform. 6461. A letter from the Air Force Freedom of Information Act Manager, Department of Defense, transmitting the Department's final rule--Freedom of Information Act Program (RIN: 0701-AA-61) received January 3, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Government Reform. 6462. A letter from the Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Office of the Secretary, Department of Defense, transmitting the Department's final rule--National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) Freedom of Information Act Program (RIN: 0790-AG59) received January 3, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Government Reform. 6463. A letter from the Acting Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule--Atlantic Highly Migratory Species (HMS) Fisheries; Large Coastal Shark Species [I.D. 111899C] received January 7, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Resources. 6464. A letter from the Boy Scouts of America, transmitting the Boy Scouts of America 1999 report to the Nation, pursuant to 36 U.S.C. 28; to the Committee on the Judiciary. 6465. A letter from the Chief, Office of Regulations and Administrative Law, USCG, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule--Drawbridge Operating Regulation; Black River, Wisconsin [CGD08-99-064] (RIN: 2115-AE47) received January 6, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 6466. A letter from the Chief, Office of Regulations and Administrative Law, USCG, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule--Drawbridge Operation Regulations: Passaic River, NJ [CGD01-99-2061] received January 6, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 6467. A letter from the Attorney, Research and Special Programs Administration, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule--Hazardous Materials Transportation; Regulation and Fee Assessment Program [Docket No. RSPA-99-5137 (HM-208C)] (RIN: 2137-AD17) received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 6468. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule-- Establishment of Class E Airspace; Puerto Rico, PR [Airspace Docket No. 99-ASO-17] received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 6469. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule-- Standard Instrument Approach Procedures; Miscellaneous Amendments [Docket No. 29920; Amdt. No. 1974] received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 6470. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule-- Standard Instrument Approach Procedures; Miscellaneous Amendments [Docket No. 29919; Amdt. No. 1973] received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 6471. A letter from the Attorney, Research and Special Programs Administration, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule--Hazardous Materials: Hazardous Substances--Revisions [Docket No. RSPA- 2000-6744(HM-145 )] (RIN: 2137-AD39) received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 6472. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule-- Revisions to Digital Flight Data Recorder Requirements for Airbus Airplanes; Correction [Docket No. FAA-1999-6140; Amendment Nos. 121-271 and 125-32] (RIN: 2120-AG88) received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 6473. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule-- Flight Plan Requirements for Helicopter Operations Under Instrument Flight Rules [Docket No. FAA-98-4390; Amendment No. 21-76, 27-39, 29-46, 91-259] (RIN: 2120-AG53) received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 6474. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule-- Licensing and Training of Pilots, Flight Instructors and Ground Instructors Outside the United States [Docket No. FAA- 1998-4518-1; Amendment Nos. 61-105, 67-18, 141-11, & 141-3] (RIN: 2120-AG66) received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 6475. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportion, transmitting the Department's final rule-- Standard Instrument Approach Procedures; Miscellaneous Amendments [Docket No. 29919; Amdt. No. 1973] received February 11, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 6476. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a report that action has been taken by the United States in response to an official requests from the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 2602(g)(1); to the Committee on Ways and Means. 6477. A letter from the Chief, Regulations Unit, Internal Revenue Service, transmitting the Service's final rule-- Letter rulings, determination letters, and information letters issued by the Associate Chief Counsel (Domestic), Associate Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations), Associate Chief Counsel (Enforcement Litigation), and Associate Chief Counsel (International) [Rev. Procedure 2000-1] received January 5, 2000, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Ways and Means. 6478. A letter from the Executive Director, Office of Compliance, transmitting supplementary notice of proposed rulemaking for publication in the Congressional Record, pursuant to Public Law 104-1, section 303(b) (109 Stat. 28); jointly to the Committees on House Administration and Education and the Workforce.", u" TITLE VI--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1999 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The National Reconnaissance Office. (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1999, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 3694 of the 105th Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the Executive Branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 1999 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate upon an exercise of the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1999 the sum of $129,123,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee and the Advanced Technology Group shall remain available until September 30, 2000. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 283 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1999. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Community Management Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account by subsection (a), there is also authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 1999 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until September 30, 2000. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Community Management Account as of September 30, 1999, there is authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as is specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 1999, any officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of an element within the Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2000, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2001. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the United States funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (f) Transfer Authority for Funds for Security Requirements at Overseas Locations.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization in subsection (a), the Director of Central Intelligence may transfer funds to departments or other agencies for the sole purpose of supporting certain intelligence community security requirements at overseas locations, as specified by the Director. (2) Limitation.--Amounts made available for departments or agencies under paragraph (1) shall be-- (A) transferred to the specific appropriation; (B) allocated to the specific account in the specific amount, as determined by the Director; (C) merged with funds in such account that are available for architectural and engineering support expenses at overseas locations; and (D) available only for the same purposes, and subject to the same terms and conditions, as the funds described in subparagraph (C). (a) Authorization.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998 under section 101 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-107) for the conduct of the intelligence activities of elements of the United States Government listed in such section are hereby increased, with respect to any such authorized amount, by the amount by which appropriations pursuant to such authorization were increased by the following: (1) An emergency supplemental appropriation in title I of the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act (Public Law 105-174). (2) An emergency supplemental appropriation in a supplemental appropriations Act for fiscal year 1998 that is enacted after September 28, 1998, for such amounts as are designated by Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(b)(2)(A)). (b) Ratification.--For purposes of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any obligation or expenditure of those amounts deemed to have been specifically authorized by Congress in the Act referred to in subsection (a)(1) and in the supplemental appropriations Act referred to in subsection (a)(2) is hereby ratified and confirmed. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1999 the sum of $201,500,000. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is amended by striking out ``January 6, 1999'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``January 6, 2000''. It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the United States. (a) Assistance for Counterproliferation Studies.--The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended as follows: (1) Section 801 (50 U.S.C. 1901) is amended by inserting ``counterproliferation studies,'' after ``area studies,'' in subsections (b)(7) and (c)(2). (2) Section 802 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a), by inserting ``counterproliferation studies,'' after ``area studies,'' in paragraphs (1)(B)(i), (1)(C), and (4); and (B) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``counterproliferation study,'' after ``area study,'' in subparagraphs (A)(ii) and (B)(ii). (3) Section 803 (50 U.S.C. 1903) is amended by striking out ``and area'' in subsections (b)(8) and (d)(4) and inserting in lieu thereof ``area, and counterproliferation''. (4) Section 806(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1906(b)(1)) is amended by striking out ``and area'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``area, and counterproliferation''. (b) Revision of Membership of National Security Education Board.--Section 803(b)(6) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1903(b)(6)) is amended to read as follows: ``(6) The Secretary of Energy.''. Section 102(g)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(g)(2)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (D) and (E) as subparagraphs (E) and (F), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new subparagraph (D): ``(D) direct competitive analysis of analytical products having National importance;''. (a) Additional Annual Reports From the Director of Central Intelligence.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress-- (1) that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should jointly complete, in 1999 and every four years thereafter, a comprehensive review of United States intelligence programs and activities, with each such review-- (A) to include assessments of intelligence policy, resources, manpower, organization, and related matters; and (B) to encompass the programs and activities funded under the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) accounts; (2) that the results of each review should be shared with the appropriate committees of Congress and the congressional leadership; and (3) that the Director, in conjunction with the Secretary, should establish a nonpartisan, independent panel (with members chosen in consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress and the congressional leadership from individuals in the private sector) in order to-- (A) assess each review under paragraph (1); (B) conduct an assessment of alternative intelligence structures to meet the anticipated intelligence requirements for the national security and foreign policy of the United States through the year 2010; and (C) make recommendations to the Director and the Secretary regarding the optimal intelligence structure for the United States in light of the assessment under subparagraph (B). (b) Report.--(1) Not later than December 1, 1998, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the committees specified in paragraph (2) the views of the Director and the Secretary regarding-- (A) the potential value of conducting quadrennial intelligence reviews as described in subsection (a)(1); and (B) the potential value of assessments of such reviews as described in subsection (a)(3)(A). (2) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are the following: (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on National Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (a) Designation.--The headquarters compound of the Central Intelligence Agency located in Langley, Virginia, shall be known and designated as the ``George Bush Center for Intelligence''. (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the headquarters compound referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``George Bush Center for Intelligence''. Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended by striking out ``and the protection of Agency personnel and of defectors, their families,'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``and the protection of current and former Agency personnel and their immediate families, defectors and their immediate families,''. (a) Authorization.--The Director of Central Intelligence may make payments with respect to the period beginning on January 30, 1998, and ending on April 7, 1998, of the special pay allowance described in the Central Intelligence Agency notice dated April 7, 1998 (notwithstanding the otherwise applicable effective date for such payments of April 7, 1998). (b) Funds Available.--Payments authorized by subsection (a) may be made from amounts appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency for fiscal year 1998 or for fiscal year 1999. (a) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 is amended as follows: (1) Section 5(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended-- (A) by striking out ``subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 102(a)(2)'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a)''; (B) by striking out ``(c)(5)'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``(c)(6)''; (C) by inserting ``(3),'' after ``403(a)(2),''; (D) by inserting ``(c)(6), (d)'' after ``403-3''; and (E) by inserting ``(a), (g)'' after ``403-4''. (2) Section 6 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking out ``(c)(5)'' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof ``(c)(6)''. (b) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended by striking out ``section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5))'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``paragraph (6) of section 103(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c))''. Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out ``December 31, 1998'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``December 31, 2000''.", u"Pursuant to House Resolution 179 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 1775. Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 1775) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Thornberry in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time. Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] will each control 30 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss]. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the members of the House Intelligence Committee who have worked so hard in putting this bill together. In particular, I appreciate the very fine work of the gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum], our subcommittee chairmen. But I also have to point out that the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], the committee's ranking Democrat, and other Democratic members of the committee have played an extraordinarily constructive and helpful role in the formulation of this legislation. It is truly bipartisan. Finally, I would like to say to the staff on both sides of the aisle, ``Thank you for a job well done.'' They are a dedicated, talented, and professional group who have very special knowledge that serves the United States of America extremely well. This bill, which the committee reported out unanimously, is the product of a lot of work, intensive deliberation, and cooperation. The committee held seven full committee and two subcommittee budget hearings. In addition, there were over 100 staff and member briefings on programs, specific activities, and budget requests. H.R. 1775 authorizes the funds for fiscal year 1998 for all of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government. The National Security Act requires that spending for intelligence be specifically authorized. This is the only route we have. The intelligence budget has three major components: the national foreign intelligence program, known as NFIP; the tactical intelligence and related activities program, known as TIARA; and the joint military intelligence program, known as JMIP. NFIP funds activities providing intelligence to national policymakers and includes programs administered by such agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. TIARA, or Tactical Intelligence Activities, reside exclusively in the Department of Defense. They consist in large part of numerous reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a functional part of the basic military force structure and provide direct information in support of military operations. The Joint Military Intelligence Program provides military intelligence principally to defensewide or theater-level consumers. Although our committee has jurisdiction over these three intelligence programs, we must work closely with the Committee on National Security, particularly in the oversight and authorization of the TIARA and JMIP programs where we share jurisdiction. I would like to publicly acknowledge and personally thank the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] for the extraordinary cooperation that we received from him, the members of his committee and the members of his committee staff. I would be remiss if I did not also mention the cooperation we have received from the Committee on Appropriations, particularly and most importantly from my colleague on this committee, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young], who also chairs the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations and sits, of course, on HIPCE. Due to the classified nature of much of the work of the Committee on Intelligence, I cannot discuss many of the specifics of the bill before the House except in the broadest terms. In order to understand those specifics, I strongly urge those Members who have not already done so to read the classified annex to this bill. The annex is available in the committee office in the Capitol. It is about a 2-minute walk from here, for those who are interested, and I hope all are interested. Despite classification restrictions, there are several major elements of the bill that I can discuss here today. In this year's budget review, the committee continued to place heavy emphasis on understanding and addressing the future needs of the intelligence community, preparing for those needs and the several distinct roles that intelligence is going to play in our national security in what is, in fact, a different world situation today. Based on the threats we believe the United States will confront in the future, the committee's budget review focused on two specific areas. First, we looked at which intelligence programs are properly structured and sufficiently prepared to meet future needs and requirements. Second, we looked at the intelligence community's collection and analytical shortfalls. Unfortunately, the committee review revealed few areas where the intelligence community is well situated for the future, and an overabundance of shortfalls were found. These shortfalls are due, in part, to the fact that intelligence resources are stretched too thin while handling an ever-increasing multitude of issues. I would like to point out that this is not any kind of a shock to the intelligence community. It is realizing the fact that we are stretched thin and need to deal with it. Nonetheless, the committee is concerned that the intelligence community is not moving fast enough in some of the areas to address the threats of the future. Given these concerns, the committee has begun to address the shortfalls we see in the intelligence community's budgeting and responsibilities. In this year's mark the committee has specifically addressed the following issues: First, we have taken actions to help the intelligence community improve its analytic depth and breadth through improved training, targeted hiring, and the use of analytic tools. There is no point to have information if you cannot value enhance with the proper analysis. Second, the intelligence community places too much emphasis on intelligence collection at the expense of downstream activities. Downstream activities are processing the information we get, analyzing, disseminating, and so forth. We have to get a better balance. If we spend all our money collecting and none for analyzing, we will be awash in information that is not going to do us much good. Third, our espionage capabilities are limited and dependent on ad hoc funding. We have taken steps to tie funding for clandestine operations to the long-term needs of analysts, policymakers, and the military. That is putting it where we need it. I think that is almost the most critical part of this whole bill, from my personal perspective. Fourth, we have pushed the intelligence community toward developing, acquiring, investing in, and deploying more flexible technological capabilities in order to collect key information on the highest priority targets. Finally, we have continued our efforts from the last Congress to make the intelligence community work corporately across traditional bureaucratic boundaries and to enhance flexibility. The committee believes that such efforts are absolutely essential if the intelligence community is to succeed in dealing with increasingly complex threats to U.S. national interests. Very clearly, turf wars have no place in national security. Again, I congratulate the gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas], the former chairman, and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] for the work they did to bring this matter forward in the previous Congress, and we are following forward on that. Those threats and concerns are broader and more diverse to our national security than they ever have been. Among them are those issues that have been called the transnational threats. Those include terrorism, the proliferation of advanced weapons and weapons of mass destruction, narcotics trafficking and global criminal racketeering. Such problems demand that the intelligence community have a worldwide view and a highly flexible set of resources. Given the nature of these threats, our intelligence eyes and ears and brains are more important than they ever have been. As an example, in the realm of counterterrorism, we are aware of the recent success our intelligence community has had in locating international terrorists so as to allow law enforcement agencies to apprehend them and bring them to justice. Less well known, however, because we must guard against revealing intelligence methods, are the numerous successes intelligence has had in recent months in detecting terrorist activities in advance and foiling them, so Members did not read about them in the paper. U.S. facilities that would have been destroyed are intact today. American lives that could have been lost have been saved. As another example, in the area of counterproliferation, I would direct my colleagues' attention to this unclassified report which has been prepared by the CIA which describes the role of various countries in providing technologies and material for the development of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems by various rogue regimes around the world. This report, entitled ``The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction Advanced Conventional Munitions,'' put out by the Director of Central Intelligence, covers the time between July and December 1996 at the request of this committee. It is a very important report. The media has picked it up. It is unclassified. It tells us the world is real, the world is dangerous and there are people involved in serious mischief. It has received a great deal of attention in the press because of its rather extraordinary findings. When we read the classified evidence that is behind that report, we find it is even more extraordinary. That includes a great deal of specific and reliable intelligence that has given our policymakers and our military excellent insights into the activities of various countries and what we must do in response. Anyone who does not see the immense value to our national security to such work by the intelligence community I think is probably living in blissful ignorance of the dangers growing around us from rogue regimes that are getting closer and closer to being able to threaten Americans anywhere in the world with terrible weapons of extraordinary power. In closing, I strongly urge all Members to support this authorization. It is the unanimously accepted product of a bipartisan committee. It makes significant improvements, measured by over 200 cuts, yes, I said cuts, and some additions to the President's budget request, and yet it comes in at less than 1 percent above the President's request when all is said and done. I am convinced that in supporting it, we are supporting the development of critically important intelligence capabilities that will make us all safer and will surely save the lives of many Americans, whether they be soldiers in the field, tourists on their vacation abroad, common Americans at home going about their business and their lives, all of this for today and for the years ahead. Mr. Chairman, before I close, I would like to take one more moment to acknowledge an individual who is, I am sure, celebrating his last authorization process on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I said we had extraordinarily good staff. We do. But this year an individual, Mr. Ken Kodama, the senior substantive expert on the minority side, is retiring later this year after 9 years on the committee. Mr. Kodama represents the finest level of professionalism that other staff should emulate. His service to the full committee has been invaluable as well as to the subcommittee. In fact, Mr. Chairman, the reason that I could make some of the comments that I did at the beginning of this statement was in large part due to our ability to interact with Mr. Kodama in a truly bipartisan nature. To put it simply, he will be sorely missed. We wish him the best in his future endeavors, and I personally want to thank him for his assistance. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"The text of the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows: TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (a) In General.--Section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (a) through (f) as paragraphs (1) through (6), respectively; (2) by inserting ``(a)'' after ``Sec. 5.''; (3) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (5), as so redesignated; (4) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6), as so redesignated, and inserting ``; and''; (5) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph: ``(7) Notwithstanding section 1341(a)(1) of title 31, United States Code, enter into multiyear leases for up to 15 years that are not otherwise authorized pursuant to section 8 of this Act.''; and (6) by inserting at the end the following new subsection: ``(b)(1) The authority to enter into a multiyear lease under subsection (a)(7) shall be subject to appropriations provided in advance for (A) the entire lease, or (B) the first 12 months of the lease and the Government's estimated termination liability. ``(2) In the case of any such lease entered into under clause (B) of paragraph (1)-- ``(A) such lease shall include a clause that provides that the contract shall be terminated if budget authority (as defined by section 3(2) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(2))) is not provided specifically for that project in an appropriations Act in advance of an obligation of funds in respect thereto; ``(B) notwithstanding section 1552 of title 31, United States Code, amounts obligated for paying termination costs in respect of such lease shall remain available until the costs associated with termination of such lease are paid; ``(C) funds available for termination liability shall remain available to satisfy rental obligations in respect of such lease in subsequent fiscal years in the event such lease is not terminated early, but only to the extent those funds are in excess of the amount of termination liability in that subsequent year; and ``(D) annual funds made available in any fiscal year may be used to make payments on such lease for a maximum of 12 months beginning any time during the fiscal year.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies with respect to multiyear leases entered into pursuant to section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended by subsection (a), on or after October 1, 1997. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Subsection (a) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o(a)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; (2) by striking ``powers only within Agency installations,'' and all that follows through the end, and inserting the following: ``powers-- ``(A) within the Agency Headquarters Compound and the property controlled and occupied by the Federal Highway Administration located immediately adjacent to such Compound and in the streets, sidewalks, and the open areas within the zone beginning at the outside boundary of such Compound and property and extending outward 500 feet; and ``(B) within any other Agency installation and in the streets, sidewalks, and open areas within the zone beginning at the outside boundary of any such installation and extending outward 500 feet.''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) The performance of functions and exercise of powers under paragraph (1) shall be limited to those circumstances where such personnel can identify specific and articulable facts giving such personnel reason to believe that their performance of such functions and exercise of such powers is reasonable to protect against physical attack or threats of attack upon the Agency installations, property, or employees. ``(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude, or limit in any way, the authority of any Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency or of any other Federal police or Federal protective service. ``(4) The rules and regulations enforced by such personnel shall be the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director and shall only be applicable to the areas referred to in paragraph (1). ``(5) On December 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the Director shall submit a report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that describes in detail the exercise of the authority granted by this subsection, and the underlying facts supporting the exercise of such authority, during the preceding fiscal year. The Director shall make such report available to the Inspector General of the Agency.''. TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (a) Authority for New Bachelor's Degree.--Section 2161 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: (a) Extension, Reorganization, and Consolidation of Authorities.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Effective October 1, 1997, section 506(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-93; 109 Stat. 974) is amended by striking out ``fiscal years 1996 and 1997'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``fiscal years 1998 and 1999''. TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNITY PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS (a) Program Execution Coordination.--The Secretary of a military department or the head of a defense agency may not obligate or expend funds for any information security program of that military department without the concurrence of the Director of the National Security Agency. (b) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on October 1, 1997. All amounts appropriated for any fiscal year for intelligence information data broadcast systems may be obligated or expended by an intelligence element of the Department of Defense only with the concurrence of the official in the Department of Defense designated as the executive agent of the Integrated Broadcast Service. (a) Transfer of Functions.--Effective October 1, 1997, the functions described in subsection (b) with respect to the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle are transferred to the Secretary of the Air Force. (b) Functions To Be Transferred.--Subsection (a) applies to those functions performed as of June 1, 1997, by the organization within the Department of Defense known as the Unmanned Aerial Joint Program Office with respect to the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. (c) Transfer of Funds.--Effective October 1, 1997, all unexpended funds appropriated for the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle that are within the Defense-Wide Program Element number 0305205D are transferred to Air Force Program Element number 0305154F. (a) Requirement for Minimum Number of Aircraft.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure-- (1) that not less than 11 U-2 reconnaissance aircraft are equipped with RAS-1 sensor suites; and (2) that each such aircraft that is so equipped is maintained in a manner necessary to counter available threat technologies until the aircraft is retired or until a successor sensor suite is developed and fielded. (b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) takes effect on October 1, 1997. (a) In General.--The congressional budget justification books for any element of the intelligence community submitted to Congress in support of the budget of the President for any fiscal year shall include, at a minimum, the following: (1) For each program for which appropriations are requested for that element of the intelligence community in that budget-- (A) specification of the program, including the program element number for the program; (B) the specific dollar amount requested for the program; (C) the appropriation account within which funding for the program is placed; (D) the budget line item that applies to the program; (E) specification of whether the program is a research and development program or otherwise involves research and development; (F) identification of the total cost for the program; and (G) information relating to all direct and associated costs in each appropriations account for the program. (2) A detailed accounting of all reprogramming or reallocation actions and the status of those actions at the time of submission of those materials. (3) Information relating to any unallocated cuts or taxes. (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section: (1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a). (2) The term ``congressional budget justification books'' means the budget justification materials submitted to Congress for any fiscal year in support of the budget for that fiscal year for any element of the intelligence community (as contained in the budget of the President submitted to Congress for that fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code). (c) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to fiscal year 1999. (a) Contracts.--The Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office, may not modify, amend, or alter a JSAF program contract without coordinating with the Secretary of any other military department that would be affected by the modification, amendment, alteration. (b) New Developments Affecting Operational Military Requirements.--(1) The Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office, may not enter into a contract described in paragraph (2) without coordinating with the Secretary of the military department concerned. (2) Paragraph (1) applies to a contract for development relating to a JSAF program that may directly affect the operational requirements of one of the Armed Forces (other than the Air Force) for the satisfaction of intelligence requirements. (c) JSAF Program Defined.--For purposes of this section, the term ``JSAF program'' means a program within the Joint Signals Intelligence Avionics Family of programs administered by the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office. (d) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on October 1, 1997. Not later than October 1, 1999, the Secretary of Defense shall-- (1) discontinue the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (a program within the Joint Military Intelligence Program); and (2) close the organization within the Department of Defense known as the Defense Space Program Office (the management office for that program). (a) Termination of Office.--The organization within the Department of Defense known as the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office is terminated. No funds available for the Department of Defense may be used for the operation of that Office after the date specified in subsection (d). (b) Transfer of Functions.--(1) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), the Secretary of Defense shall transfer to the Defense Intelligence Agency those functions performed on the day before the date of the enactment this Act by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office that are specified in paragraph (2). (2) The functions transferred by the Secretary to the Defense Intelligence Agency under paragraph (1) shall include functions of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office relating to its responsibilities for management oversight and coordination of defense airborne reconnaissance capabilities (other than any responsibilities for acquisition of systems). (3) The Secretary shall determine which specific functions are appropriate for transfer under paragraph (1). In making that determination, the Secretary shall ensure that responsibility for individual airborne reconnaissance programs with respect to program management, for research, development, test, and evaluation, for acquisition, and for operations and related line management remain with the respective Secretaries of the military departments. (4) Any function transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency under this subsection is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. (c) Report.--(1) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the committees named in paragraph (2) a report containing the Secretary's plan for terminating the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office and transferring the functions of that office. (2) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are-- (A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives. (d) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect at the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act. The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute? The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House of today, proceedings will now resume on the amendment on which further proceedings were postponed: amendment No. 3 offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts Mr. Frank]. The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The Clerk designated the amendment. The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded. A recorded vote was ordered. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 182, noes 238, not voting 14, as follows: The Clerk announced the following pair: On this vote: Mr. Yates for, with Mr. McDade against. Messrs. FOLEY, WATTS of Oklahoma, and STEARNS changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.'' Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas, and Messrs. PAUL, SPRATT, JEFFERSON, HALL of Texas, and STENHOLM changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.'' So the amendment was rejected. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. The CHAIRMAN. There being no further amendments to the bill, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed to. The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises. Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. LaHood) having assumed the chair, Mr. Thornberry, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1775) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 179, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.", u"Mr. President, this amendment will address concerns that we have discussed here on the floor regarding the Base Realignment and Closure [BRAC] process. Before the Congress ever considers to authorize future BRAC commissions--a process which I strongly oppose, we should take a more detailed look at whether those elusive savings from infrastructure reductions will ever be achieved. That is what I accomplish by the amendment which I offer today. Mr. President, I have consistently asked what has happened to savings from the past four BRAC actions. The Pentagon estimated savings from the four previous base closing rounds to reach $57 billion over a 20-year period with annualized savings of $5.6 billion per year starting in 2001. In its April 1995 report, the GAO estimate for such savings projects the savings at less than half these numbers. GAO estimates that the 20-year savings may be $17.3 billion, with annual recurring savings possibly reaching $1.8 billion. Mr. President, GAO conducted further analysis and issued a following report in a April 1996. In this report, GAO found that the total amount of actual savings that may be estimated from BRAC actions is uncertain for several reasons. One of which is that DOD accounting systems do not provide adequate information or isolate their impact from that of other DOD initiatives. Despite the fact that DOD has complied with legislative requirements for submitting annual cost and savings estimates, the GAO further states that the estimates' usefulness is limited because the estimates are not budget quality, and that the inclusion of the estimates of reduced personnel costs by all the services are not uniform and further, the GAO determined that certain community assistance costs were excluded. In one example, GAO identified the fact that DOD BRAC cost estimates excluded more than $781 million in economic assistance to local communities as well as other costs. Mr. President, in its December 1996 report, CBO stated that it was unable to confirm or assess DOD's estimates of cost savings because the DOD is unable to report actual spending and savings from BRAC actions. So now Mr. President, we have the Pentagon, the GAO, and CBO with differing estimates on what has actually happened and what is supposed to happen as a result of the four previous BRAC rounds. There is no consensus on the numbers--and that is a significantproblem. It seems everybody has a different number on the issue, and there are numerous inconsistencies on the estimates of what the savings are supposed to be. And the Congress has been assured that starting in the year 2001, the savings may in fact be realized. I question that assurance Mr. President, because I do not think we know what they will be. But what we do know now, is that any savings from the past four base closure rounds have yet to be realized. Mr. President, the intent of DOD to streamline its infrastructure cost is not lost on us. We must recognize that the need to fill the projected $17 billion gap between projected procurement funding and the procurement funding objective of $60 billion. Mr. President, throughout this year's DOD authorization process, the Congress has heard testimony from the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the respective service chiefs and service secretaries, and to a person, each has testified on the importance of modernizing our military forces for the 21st century. But Mr. President, that just is not happening. Mr. President, the projections for national defense outlays decrease 34.4 percent over the period from 1990 to 2002. We have all seen the downward pressure on defense spending. Yet the future years defense plan [FYDP] calls for a 40-percent increase in the military's modernization budget within the confines of an overall defense budget that will more likely be flat at best. We have seen procurement funding plummet from $54 billion in 1990 to today's level of just over $42 billion. The U.S. military has undergone a significant transformation in the post-cold-war period. Specifically, from 1989 to 1997, DOD reduced total active duty end strength by 32 percent, with further reductions to 36 percent by 2003 as a result of the QDR. After the completion of four previous base closure rounds, the world-wide base structure will have been reduced by 26 percent, and domestic facilities will have been reduced by 21 percent. In more tangible numbers 97 of 495 major bases, as well as hundreds of smaller facilities and housing areas, and the realignment of many other bases and facilities has already been accomplished by this process. However, we are chasing elusive infrastructure savings, and there is no straight line corollary between the size of our forces and the infrastructure required to meet two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. DOD has even admitted to GAO investigators that they do not have accounting systems in place to isolate the impact of specific initiatives, such as BRAC. The amendment which I offer states that it is the sense of the Senate that the savings through previous BRAC actions which are estimated by the Department of Defense be made available to the Department solely for the purpose of modernization of new weapons systems. Mr. President, I am offering this amendment so that the Congress will send a very clear message to this administration. The Congress recognizes the limited resources that are available to the Department of Defense, and that we have to insure that these dollars are invested wisely. Not only so our military forces can meet the commitments of today, but also so our military forces will be prepared to meet the challenges of the 21st century, and continued to be the most capable military force in the world. Mr. President, we must send a very clear message that the past base closure process which has been so devastating to many local communities will actually result in savings that can be invested in our force modernization. Mr. President, that is what my amendment accomplishes, and I urge my colleagues to support it. (Purpose: To conform limits for Department of Energy General Plant On page 425, line 12, strike ``$2,000,000'' and insert ``$5,000,000''. On page 425, line 17, strike ``$2,000,000'' and insert ``$5,000,000''. On page 429, line 6, strike ``$2,000,000'' and insert ``$5,000,000''. for activities funded by the defense Environmental Restoration and On page 444, between lines 20 and 21, insert the following: (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is encourage the Secretary of Energy to dispose of or otherwise utilize certain assets of the Department of Energy by making available to the Secretary the proceeds of such disposal or utilization for purposes of activities funded by the defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management account. (b) Crediting of Proceeds.--(1) Notwithstanding section 3302 of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary may retain from the proceeds of the sale, lease, or disposal of an asset under subsection (c) an amount equal to the cost of the sale, lease, or disposal of the asset. The Secretary shall utilize amounts retained under this paragraph to defray the cost of the sale, lease, or disposal. (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the cost of a sale, lease, or disposal shall include-- (A) the cost of administering the sale, lease, or disposal; (B) the cost of recovering or preparing the asset concerned for the sale, lease, or disposal; and (C) any other cost associated with the sale, lease, or disposal. (3) If after amounts from proceeds are retained under paragraph (1) a balance of the proceeds remains, the Secretary shall-- (A) credit to the defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management account an amount equal to 50 percent of the balance of the proceeds; and (B) cover over into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts an amount equal to 50 percent of the balance of the proceeds. (c) Covered Transactions.--Subsection (b) applies to the following transactions: (1) The sale of heavy water at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina. (2) The sale of precious metals under the jurisdiction of the Environmental Management Program. (3) The lease of buildings and other facilities located at the Hanford Reservation, Washington and under the jurisdiction of the Environmental Management Program. (4) The lease of buildings and other facilities located at the Savannah River Site and under the jurisdiction of the Environmental Management Program. (5) The disposal of equipment and other personal property located at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, Colorado and under the jurisdiction of the Environmental Management Program. (6) The disposal of materials at the National Electronics Recycling Center, Oak Ridge, Tennessee and under the jurisdiction of the Environmental Management Program. (d) Availability of Amounts.--To the extent provided in advance in appropriations Acts, the Secretary may use amounts credited to the defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management account under subsection (b)(3)(A) for any purposes for which funds in that account are available. (e) Applicability of Disposal Authority.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of sections 202 and 203(j) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483 and 484(j)) to the disposal of equipment and other personal property covered by this section. (f) Annual Report.--Not later than January 31 each year, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the amounts credited by the Secretary under subsection (b)(3)(A) during the preceding fiscal year. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States has been an avowed enemy of Cuba for over 35 years, and Fidel Castro has made hostility towards the United States a principal tenet of his domestic and foreign policy. (2) The ability of the United States as a sovereign nation to respond to any Cuban provocation is directly related to the ability of the United States to defend the people and territory of the United States against any Cuban attack. (3) In 1994, the Government of Cuba callously encouraged a massive exodus of Cubans, by boat and raft, toward the United States. (4) Countless numbers of those Cubans lost their lives on the high seas as a result of those action of the Government of Cuba. (5) The humanitarian response of the United States to rescue, shelter, and provide emergency care to those Cubans, together with the actions taken to absorb some 30,000 of those Cubans into the United States, required immeasurable efforts and expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars for the costs incurred by the United States and State and local governments in connection with those efforts. (6) On February 24, 1996, Cuban MiG aircraft attacked and destroyed, in international airspace, two unarmed civilian aircraft flying from the United States, and the four persons in those unarmed civilian aircraft were killed. (7) Since the attack, the Cuban government has issued no apology for the attack, nor has it indicated any intention to conform its conduct to international law that is applicable to civilian aircraft operating in international airspace. (b) Review and Report.--Not later than March 30, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall carry out a comprehensive review and assessment of Cuban military capabilities and the threats to the national security of the United States that are posed by Fidel Castro and the Government of Cuba and submit a report on the review to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives. The report shall contain-- (1) a discussion of the result of the review, including an assessment of the contingency plans; and (2) the Secretary's assessment of the threats, including-- (A) such unconventional threats as-- (i) encouragement of migration crises; and (ii) attacks on citizens and residents of the United States while they are engaged in peaceful protest in international waters or airspace; (B) the potential for development and delivery of chemical or biological weapons; and (C) the potential for internal strife in Cuba that could involve citizens or residents of the United States or the Armed Forces of the United States. (c) Consultation on Review and Assessment.--In performing the review and preparing the assessment, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Southern Command, and the heads of other appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. (a) Plan.--Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to address the requirements for fire protection services and hazardous materials protection services at Fort Meade, Maryland, including the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, as identified in the preparedness evaluation report of the Army Corps of Engineers on Fort Meade. (b) Elements.--The plan shall include the following: (1) A schedule for the implementation of the plan. (2) A detailed list of funding options available to provide centrally located, modern facilities and equipment to meet current requirements for fire protection services and hazardous materials protection services at Fort Meade. agreement to provide police, fire protection, and other services at On page 347, between lines 15 and 16, insert the following: (a) Authority To Enter into Agreement.--(1) The Secretary of the Army may enter into an agreement with the local redevelopment authority for Red River Army Depot, Texas, under which agreement the Secretary provides security services, fire protection services, or hazardous material response services for the authority with respect to the property at the depot that is under the jurisdiction of the authority as a result of the realignment of the depot under the base closure laws. (2) The Secretary may not enter into the agreement unless the Secretary determines that the provision of services under the agreement is in the best interests of the United States. (3) The agreement shall provide for reimbursing the Secretary for the services provided by the Secretary under the agreement. (b) Treatment of Reimbursement.--Any amounts received by the Secretary under the agreement under subsection (a) shall be credited to the appropriations providing funds for the services concerned. Amounts so credited shall be merged with the appropriations to which credited and shall be available for the purposes, and subject to the conditions and limitations, for which such appropriations are available. (Purpose: To propose a substitute for section 1040, relating to GAO Strike out section 1040, and insert in lieu thereof the following: Section 719(b) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(3) The report under subsection (a) shall also include a statement of the staff hours and estimated cost of work performed on audits, evaluations, investigations, and related work during each of the three fiscal years preceding the fiscal year in which the report is submitted, stated separately for each division of the General Accounting Office by category as follows: ``(A) A category for work requested by the chairman of a committee of Congress, the chairman of a subcommittee of such a committee, or any other member of Congress. ``(B) A category for work required by law to be performed by the Comptroller General. ``(C) A category for work initiated by the Comptroller General in the performance of the Comptroller General's general responsibilities.''.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to discuss several defense issues, but before discussing those issues, I would like to follow up on the previous special order that we just heard, since many of our colleagues perhaps in their offices, and citizens around the country, have been listening to three of our colleagues discuss education. Mr. Speaker, I want to, first of all, applaud the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Green] because I heard him use the word ``bipartisanship'' a number of times in reference to education success. I want to applaud him, because I want to distinguish my colleague from Texas as opposed to the other two Members from whom we heard nothing except the phrases ``Democrats, Democrats, Democrats.'' Now, I do not know what amount of classroom teaching experience my colleagues that spoke have. I spent 7 years in the public schools of Pennsylvania, was active in my education association as a vice president, was a negotiator for a while, was involved in running a chapter 1 program in an impoverished area in my county. So my experience is based on real life. I am not one of the attorneys in this institution. Mr. Speaker, Republicans have in the past, continue today, and will be in the future, in the forefront of working to improve our educational system in this country, and for some Member to stand up here for 50 minutes and talk about only one party has a market on what we need to do to improve our schools is an absolute outrage. It is really a shame, because I think it is a slap in the face to people like the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Goodling] who chairs our Committee on Education and the Workplace, who himself was a classroom teacher, a superintendent, and someone who was involved in education. Or the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Porter], who spent a significant amount of time working on education priorities. The successes that we have had in this Congress have been bipartisan, and they have not been because of any one party. In fact, I would remind some of my colleagues who just spoke, and I again say with the exception of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Green], that it was the Democrat Party who for 50 years controlled this institution. In fact, the first 2 years of the Clinton administration the Democrats controlled the White House and both Houses of Congress. Is not it amazing that those who would seek to be most partisan in this debate on education would now begin to take credit as a political aspect of the Democrats' agenda for what a Republican Congress has enacted in the last 3 years? It has, in fact, not been a Democrat win and it has not been a Republican win. It has been a bipartisan effort, as the gentleman from Texas alluded to, to bring Members of Congress together for the good of our children and the schools of this country. Mr. Speaker, I take exception to some of the comments that were made, and as a classroom teacher who spent a number of years working to improve the quality of our children's educational opportunities, I am proud of what this party and this Congress has done, bringing Democrats in with us, to bring forth new initiatives and new ideas to help all of our schools across this great Nation. Mr. Speaker, my real purpose tonight is to discuss several defense priorities that are going to be coming up and should be on the minds of our colleagues over the next several weeks. In fact, one issue is going to be coming before several of our committees. It already has, in fact, been an issue in the Committee on International Relations as well as the Committee on the Judiciary where a bill has passed and is now pending before the Committee on National Security, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Commerce. This bill, Mr. Speaker, is a very technical piece of legislation dealing with an issue that many of us have not focused on, and that is the whole issue of information. One of our greatest challenges as we approach the 21st century is how to manage information and to make sure that we, in fact, can become smart cities, smart regions, and further utilize information technology to enhance the quality of the lives of our people. Mr. Speaker, in that process, however, we face a dilemma. At a hearing that I chaired in March of this year as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Development, I took testimony for 6 hours on the issue of information warfare, and I heard recommendations and reports provided to us that an adversary in the 21st century may not have to spend his or her dollars on sophisticated weapons systems or on bigger bullets or larger missiles or longer range technologies, but rather concentrate on using methods to compromise our information systems, to bring down our banking and financial systems, our mass transit systems. Mr. Speaker, the recommendation coming out of that hearing from the Defense Science Board was that we should dramatically increase spending for information security and control by about $3 billion a year. Mr. Speaker, we cannot afford to do that because that is just too much money. We made a modest increase in this year's defense bill and we are working to keep that modest increase in place to demonstrate new technologies to allow us to protect our systems in this country from the threat of an adversary taking them down. But there is a piece of legislation that is being pushed on a fast track basis that would totally remove the export controls over encryption technology. Encryption, Mr. Speaker, as we all know, is the technology and the process used to code information so that when we have a conversation over the Internet, no one else can intercept that conversation. There are very important principles in question here relative to the security of the people of this country having their ability to communicate and not having the Government or anyone else be able to have access to that. Encryption provides that protection and, in fact, it is available in this country. However, the piece of legislation that is now under consideration, H.R. 695, which a number of our colleagues have cosponsored, would basically remove export controls and allow this technology in its most sophisticated form to be sent overseas. Now, there are some in this country, and myself included, who have some concerns about the administration's current policy over encryption and want to see reforms that will allow our software industry to continue to be on the cutting edge of new technologies to encrypt information that, in fact, we will be using every day. However, while I do not support the current policy of this administration, I cannot in good conscience support a total wiping out of any export control on technology that a cartel, a drug cartel, or an adversary nation has been using and could be using to prevent our law enforcement, intelligence, and defense resources from protecting the American people from the threats of drug dealing, from the threats of intimidation, terrorist activities, or other activities of that type. Mr. Speaker, I urge our colleagues to carefully review the impact that this legislation will have, first of all, on our national security and on our intelligence-gathering capabilities. In fact, everyone in fact in the administration concerned with defense intelligence has come out with grave reservations about this legislation. Mr. Speaker, I have also received a letter from Secretary Cohen expressing his grave reservations about this legislation. Mr. Speaker, on Tuesday, when the Committee on National Security marks up this piece of legislation, I will be offering an amendment that will enjoy the support of both the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence], chairman of the Committee on National Security, and the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], ranking Democrat on that committee, that hopefully will pass, that will deal with one-half of the issue and that is whether or not we should completely eliminate all export controls and export process to review encryption technology that would be sold overseas and marketed overseas. I think it is a fair compromise. It does not, in fact, satisfy all of the industry groups who want to have no export controls, and it does not satisfy the administration, but it does give us an ability to have a process in place to continue to allow our Department of Defense to monitor the kinds of technologies that we allow to be sold to rogue nations. It is a very important amendment. It also closes a loophole, Mr. Speaker, in H.R. 695 that, in effect, would allow supercomputers to be sold overseas if, in fact, they have encryption built in. Now, this is kind of an ironic twist here, because many of the cosponsors of this bill voted for an amendment that criticized the administration for allowing Cray supercomputers to be sold to China and Russia. Yet, Mr. Speaker, in this very provision that some of them have unknowingly cosponsored, there is a loophole that would allow those same supercomputers, if encryption is contained in those supercomputers, to be sold overseas with no restrictions. I do not think that is the intent of most of our colleagues, and the amendment that I will be offering on Tuesday will correct that. Now, I would also encourage our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to try to get briefings from Louis Freeh, the Director of the FBI, who I had in my office today for 1 hour, or from the National Security Agency, on the domestic impact of a total elimination of controls over encryption. Again, I am not happy with the administration nor am I happy with their proposal to establish what is called a key recovery system. But we do need to allow the law enforcement entities in this Nation, we do need to allow the Justice Department, to go through the established system of our courts with court and judicial approval to gain access to gather data that can be used; for instance, in uncovering pedophiles who in fact have been using and continue to use our Internet to unknowingly get the attention and to communicate with young people through the Internet; or to get access to encrypted data that, in fact, has been used by drug cartels; or for instance, the group that was involved in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. Our law enforcement community has to have some ability, through a very difficult and very well-thought-out process, to get the approval from our courts to get access to encrypted data for very specific purposes when the national security of this Nation and our people is at risk. It is extremely important every law enforcement head in our Federal Government has, in fact, signed a letter to every Member of Congress stating their concern with this bill. I would also, Mr. Speaker, like to enter that letter into the Record.", u"Mr. President, this past Monday, the Washington Post reported that Justice Department attorneys have reached a settlement with lawyers representing the estate of Dr. Beatrice Braude concerning monetary damages equitably due for the wrongful dismissal of Dr. Braude from her Federal job in 1953 and subsequent blacklisting. The estate will receive $200,000 in damages. Family members have announced that the funds--which Congress must now appropriate--will be donated to Hunter College, the institution from which Dr. Braude received her bachelor's degree. This settlement stems from the enormously gratifying decision of U.S. Court of Federal Claims Judge Roger B. Andewelt on March 7, following a hearing last November, that the United States Information Agency (USIA) had wrongfully dismissed Dr. Braude and intentionally concealed the reason for her termination. He concluded that such actions constituted an equitable claim for which compensation is due. Dr. Braude's suit was made possible through legislation then-Senator Javits and I originally introduced in 1979 and which Senator D'Amato and I continued to press. When finally enacted, it lifted the statute of limitations, enabling the Court to hear Dr. Braude's case and hand down its decision. I know Senator D'Amato shares my gratification with the settlement announcement. With Judge Roger B. Andewelt's decision and this negotiated settlement, we have finally seen a measure of justice which brings back memories of an old and awful time. Dr. Braude, a linguist fluent in several languages, was dismissed from her position at the USIA in 1953 as a result of accusations of disloyalty to the United States. The accusations were old; 2 years earlier, the State Department's Loyalty Security Board had investigated and unanimously voted to dismiss them. The Board sent a letter to Dr. Braude stating ``there is no reasonable doubt as to your loyalty to the United States Government or as to your security risk to the Department of State.'' Dr. Braude was terminated 1 day after being praised for her work and informed that she probably would be promoted. USIA officials told that her that the termination was due to budgetary constraints. Congress had funded the USIA at a level 27 percent below the President's request. The Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1954 (Public Law 83-207) authorized a reduction in force commensurate to the budget cut. Fair enough. As Dr. Braude remarked years later, ``I never felt that I had a lien on a government job.'' But what Dr. Braude did not know is that she was selected for termination because of the old--and answered--charges against her. And because she did not know the real reason for her dismissal, she was denied certain procedural rights (the right to request a hearing, for instance). The true reason for her dismissal was kept hidden from her. When she was unable, over the next several years, to secure employment anywhere else within the Federal Government--even in a typing pool despite a perfect score on the typing test--she became convinced that she had been blacklisted. She spent the next 30 years fighting to regain employment and restore her reputation. Though she succeeded in 1982 (at the age of 69) in securing a position in the CIA as a language instructor, she still had not been able to clear her name by the time of her death in 1988. The irony of the charges against Dr. Braude is that she was an anti-communist, having witnessed first-hand communist-sponsored terrorism in Europe while she was an assistant cultural affairs officer in Paris and, for a brief period, an exchange officer in Bonn during the late 1940's and early 1950's. Mr. President, I would like to review the charges against Dr. Braude because they are illustrative of that dark era and instructive to us even today. There were a total of four. First, she was briefly a member of the Washington Book Shop on Farragut Square that the Attorney General later labeled subversive. Second, she had been in contact with Mary Jane Keeney, a Communist Party activist employed at the United Nations. Third, she had been a member of the State Department unit of the Communist-dominated Federal Workers' Union. Fourth, she was an acquaintance of Judith Coplon. With regard to the first charge, Dr. Braude had indeed joined the Book Shop shortly after her arrival in Washington in 1943. She was eager to meet congenial new people and a friend recommended the Book Shop, which hosted music recitals in the evenings. I must express some sensitivity here: my F.B.I. records report that I was observed several times at a ``leftist musical review'' in suburban Hampstead while I was attending the London School of Economics on a Fulbright Fellowship. Dr. Braude was aware of the undercurrent of sympathy with the Russian cause at the Book Shop, but her membership paralleled a time of close U.S.-Soviet collaboration. She drifted away from the Book Shop in 1944 because of her distaste for the internal politics of other active members. Her membership at the Book Shop was only discovered when her name appeared on a list of delinquent dues. It appears that her most sinister crime while a member of the book shop was her failure to return a book on time. Dr. Braude met Mary Jane Keeney on behalf of a third woman who actively aided Nazi victims after the war and was anxious to send clothing to another woman in occupied Germany. Dr. Braude knew nothing of Keeney's political orientation and characterized the meeting as a transitory experience. With regard to the third charge, Dr. Braude, in response to an interrogatory from the State Department's Loyalty Security Board, argued that she belonged to an anti-Communist faction of the State Department unit of the Federal Workers' Union. Remember that the Loyalty Security Board investigated these charges and exonerated her. The fourth charge, which Dr. Braude certainly did not--or could not--deny, was her friendship with Judith Coplon. Braude met Coplon in the summer of 1945 when both women attended a class Herbert Marcuse taught at American University. They saw each other infrequently thereafter. In May 1948, Coplon wrote to Braude, then stationed in Paris and living in a hotel on the Left Bank, to announce that she would be visiting shortly and needed a place to stay. Dr. Braude arranged for Coplon to stay at the hotel. Coplon stayed for 6 weeks, during which time Dr. Braude found her behavior very trying. The two parted on unfriendly terms. The friendship they had prior to parting was purely social. Mr. President, Judith Coplon was a spy. She worked in the Justice Department's Foreign Agents Registration Division, an office integral to the FBI's counterintelligence efforts. She was arrested early in 1949 while handing over notes on counterintelligence operations to Soviet citizen Valentine Gubitchev, a United Nations employee. Coplon was tried and convicted--there was no doubt of her guilt--but the conviction was overturned on a technicality. Gubitchev was also convicted but was allowed to return to the U.S.S.R. because of his quasi-diplomatic status. I bring all this up because, as I mentioned earlier, it is instructive. The world is a dangerous place. On July 11, 1995--6 days before the 50th anniversary of the first successful detonation of an atomic bomb--the National Security Agency released 49 of some 2,200 coded messages sent by the KGB and decrypted between 1943 and 1980. The decoded messages have been kept classified until now. They are known as the VENONA intercepts. The existence of a Soviet spy ring and the active involvement of American communists--fellow countrymen was the KGB code word for them--has long been established. Of late, details have been flooding in from Moscow. But this is the first American archive to be opened. At the onset of the Cold War, in Edward Shils' memorable phrase, the American visage began to cloud over. Some saw conspiracy everywhere. Recall, that in 1951, Senator Joseph McCarthy published America's ``Retreat from Victory: The Story of George Catlett Marshall.'' Some denied any such possibility and accused the accusers. Loyalty oaths and background checks proliferated, and all information became Top Secret. A culture of secrecy took hold within the American government, whilst a hugely divisive debate raged in Congress and the press. We got through it. But the world remains a dangerous place, and it is just possible that we might learn something from the VENONA files. Had they been published in 1950, we might have been spared the soft-on-communism charge that distorted our politics for four decades. We might have been spared the anti-anti-communist stance that was no less unhelpful. The fact is, there were spies in this country and they did awful things--Coplon among them. But there were innocent people, too, like Dr. Braude, who were caught in a hall of mirrors. My involvement in Dr. Braude's case dates back to early 1979, when Dr. Braude came to me and my colleague at the time, Senator Javits, and asked us to introduce private relief legislation on her behalf. In 1974, after filing a Freedom of Information Act request and finally learning the true reason for her dismissal, she filed suit in the Court of Claims to clear her name and seek reinstatement and monetary damages for the time she was prevented from working for the Federal Government. The Court, however, dismissed her case on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired. On March 5, 1979, Senator Javits and I together introduced a bill, S. 546, to waive the statute of limitations on Dr. Braude's case against the U.S. Government and to allow the Court of Claims to render judgment on her claim. The bill passed the Senate on January 30, 1980. Unfortunately, the House failed to take action on the bill before the 96th Congress adjourned. In 1988, and again in 1990, 1991, and 1993, Senator D'Amato and I re-introduced similar legislation on Dr. Braude's behalf. Our attempts met with repeated failure. Until at last, on September 21, 1993, we secured passage of Senate Resolution 102, which referred S. 840, the bill we introduced for the relief of the estate of Dr. Braude, to the Court of Claims for consideration as a congressional reference action. The measure compelled the Court to determine the facts underlying Dr. Braude's claim and to report back to Congress on its findings. The Court held a hearing on the case last November and Judge Andewelt issued his verdict in March. Forty-three years after her dismissal from the USIA and 8 years after her death, the Court found in favor of the estate of Dr. Braude. Senator D'Amato and I wish to express our profound admiration for Judge Andewelt's decision in which he absolved Dr. Beatrice Braude of the surreptitious charges of disloyalty with which she was never actually confronted. The Court declared that Dr. Braude ``cared about others deeply and was loyal to her friends, family and country.'' We are equally grateful to Christopher N. Sipes and William Livingston, Jr. of Covington & Burling, two of the many lawyers who have handled Dr. Braude's case on a pro bono basis over the years. Mr. Sipes quite properly remarked that the decision represents an important page in the annals of U.S. history: ``The Court of the United States has said it recognizes that this conduct is out of bounds. It tells the government it must acknowledge its wrongs and pay for them.'' Anthony Lewis wrote about Dr. Braude's case on March 15 in his regular New York Times column, Abroad at Home. He properly warns us that the cause of the injustice to Beatrice Braude and other loyalty victims--secret proceedings--is not ancient history. The anti-terrorism bill had a provision to allow for the deportation of aliens on secret evidence. It was stripped, fortunately, during floor consideration in the House. But the provision is likely to reappear in some fashion. We must remain vigilant. Now that the parties to the Braude case have reached an agreement on the monetary damages equitably due to Dr. Braude's estate, Senator D'Amato and I will be offering legislation soon to release the $200,000 to her estate. When that time comes, I hope that we will have the unqualified and unanimous support of our colleagues. Ann Kirchheimer, a friend--now 80--who carried on Dr. Braude's fight, recently commented that Dr. Braude's life following her dismissal from the USIA could have been taken from the opening lines of Franz Kafka's book, The Trial: ``Someone must have traduced Joseph K., for without having done anything wrong, he was arrested one fine morning.'' Indeed. What happened to Dr. Braude was a personal tragedy. But it was also part of a national tragedy, too. This nation lost, prematurely and unnecessarily, the exceptional services of a gifted and dedicated public servant. Stanley I. Kutler, a professor of constitutional history at the University of Wisconsin, estimates that Dr. Braude was one of about 1,500 Federal employees who were dismissed as security risks between 1953 and 1956. Another 6,000 resigned under the pressure of security and loyalty inquiries, according to Professor Kutler, who testified as an expert witness on Dr. Braude's behalf last November. It was, as I said earlier, an awful time. We had settled ``as on a darkling plain, Swept with confused alarm of struggle and flight, Where ignorant armies clash by night.'' It mustn't happen again. I ask unanimous consent that an article appearing in the June 17, 1996, issue of the Washington Post, ``$200,000 Repayment Agreement for Estate of McCarthy-Era Victim'', Mr. Lewis's March 15, 1996 column, ``Secrecy and Justice,'' from the New York Times, and a letter dated June 19, 1996 from Mr. Sipes to my legislative director, Gray Maxwell, be printed in the Congressional Record following my remarks.", u"Mr. President, the Department of Defense appropriations bill passed this chamber with my support. It is no small feat that a bill encompassing the size and gravity such as our national security can be addressed and passed through the U.S. Senate within the span of two days, with few amendments and little rancorous debate. The lion's share of the credit for this accomplishment goes to the managers of the bill, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Senator Stevens, and the Ranking Member, Senator Inouye. Through their efforts, they have again done the work which is the first priority of our government: the defense of American independence, lives, and security around the world. When programs have been consistently successful, it is easy to forget that national security and national defense are not a given in the political equation. But, national security doesn't just ``happen.'' We achieve our national security and defense goals because of the men and women honorably serving in our nation's Armed Forces. That security and defense is also achieved because Congress passes laws which authorize Defense programs and appropriate the funds to pay for them. Our contribution to the debate on these bills and our vote on these bills is an essential contribution to our nation's defense. It is our role in government's most solemn responsibility. Given the importance of this responsibility, then, I am encouraged that in this bill as well as in the Defense Authorization, the Senate has responded to the increased strain on our military caused by today's heightened operation tempo. Kosovo adds another requirement to a long list of regions in which U.S. deployment or U.S. commitment is stretching our military forces and supporting intelligence resources to their limit. I have often argued on this floor for allocating our defense and intelligence resources on the basis of threat priorities, and applying the greatest effort to the most dangerous threat. In the same vein, we should avoid overcommitment to places or situations which do not present a direct threat to American independence, lives, or livelihoods. For example, I think it is a mistake to tie up a significant percentage of our Army and Marine combat power in Yugoslav peacekeeping operations long term, and I hope our European allies will take our places there before very long. But wherever those forces are, they must be ready and fully manned, like the air elements of the Air Force, Navy, and Marines who performed so brilliantly over Yugoslavia these last seven weeks. The Defense Appropriations bill supports them. I would now like to take a few minutes to highlight some of the vitally important work that is being accomplished within this appropriations bill. These are provisions which illustrate that we are on the right track in providing for our military and for providing security for people back home in Nebraska, across the United States, and indeed, throughout the world. The backbone of the United States Armed Forces is the men and women who choose to serve their country in our military. From the lowest grade enlisted soldier to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I salute those who serve out of love for their country. Earlier this year, I was proud to support S. 4, the Soldiers', Sailors', Airmen's, and Marines Bill of Rights Act of 1999, which began to address the problems of pay levels, recruitment, and retention facing our military today. S. 4 was a good beginning, most markedly by increasing base pay by 4.8 percent. The appropriations bill is consistent with that 4.8 percent pay increase outlined in S. 4, and I am pleased to have supported this provision which will directly and immediately better the lives of the personnel of our Armed Forces. Another aspect of this appropriations bill which I would like to mention regards an important provision relating to nuclear weapons. During consideration of the Department of Defense Authorization bill for fiscal year 2000, I authored an amendment which would have lifted the restriction on strategic nuclear weapons levels, allowing the U.S. to lower the number of warheads below the START I level. It is my belief that my amendment would not only have increased U.S. security, but would have freed up billions of dollars for other high priority items. The Congressional Budget Office recently conducted a study in which it found we could save between $12.7 billion and $20.9 billion over the next ten years by reducing U.S. nuclear delivery systems within the overall limits of START II. While I would like to thank the 43 of my colleagues who supported my amendment, it unfortunately did not pass. I do not want to return to that debate at this time. However, there is a related program which I have previously supported which also deals with national security and Russian nuclear weapons--the Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction program, otherwise known as Nunn-Lugar. The Nunn-Lugar program provides assistance to states of the former Soviet Union for safeguarding nuclear materials, dismantling missiles and other weapons, and other demilitarization measures. The DoD Appropriations bill funds Nunn-Lugar in the amount of $476 million. Additionally, this bill allocates $25 million of these funds to support the Russian nuclear submarine dismantlement and disposal activities started in FY 1998. This is an important program that in a very concrete and discernable way, increases our security, and I am happy to have supported it. Along with programs of national concern, there are a number of provisions in this bill that directly allow Nebraska and Nebraskans to continue their vital work in safeguarding U.S. national security. Offutt Air Force Base, located in Bellevue, Nebraska, is responsible for a number of missions which are particularly noteworthy. Offutt, with over 10,000 military and civilian personnel, is home to the United States Strategic Command, the joint command charged with deterring nuclear attacks on our country. There are many threats out there, but only one of them, Russian nuclear weapons, is capable of ending our national life. STRATCOM's mission may not be in the news that often, but it the most essential of all defense missions, and it is commanded from Nebraska. Offutt Air Force Base also hosts the U.S. Air Force's premiere reconnaissance and command-and-control unit, the 55th Wing, the largest wing within the Air Force's Air Combat Command. The Fighting 55th's aircraft provide global situational awareness to military leaders and government officials. It is by now commonplace to say that we live in the Information Age. Information has become a precious commodity which often can mean the difference between success and defeat. The missions that Offutt specializes in focus on gathering this kind of critical information. In a variety of ways, Offutt's missions keep us more informed, more aware, and more safe. Here are some specifics on the various programs. The 55th's workhorse aircraft is the RC-135, also known as Rivet Joint. The RC-135 mission conducts electronic reconnaissance, providing direct, near real-time information and electronic warfare support to theater commanders and combat forces monitoring. Rivet Joint has played an important role in a number of recent military missions, including Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq. Information gathered by the RC-135 is made available to theater commanders, the Department of Defense and National Command Authorities. Data is processed, analyzed and stored by Air Combat Command, the Air Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. I am pleased that the bill passed yesterday appropriates $220.4 million for the refurbishing and upgrading of these important aircraft. Reengining these aircraft is a particularly important improvement. The WC-135 fulfills an air sampling mission in support of the Air Force Technical Applications Center at Patrick AFB, Florida, by verifying compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It gathers information on nuclear tests and conducts baseline air sampling. By collecting particles in the air during flight, the WC-135 is able to detect if and when nuclear tests are conducted or if a nuclear bomb is detonated, even from thousands of miles away. Considering the nuclear weapons testing last year of both India and Pakistan, it is clear that the WC-135 has not outlived its usefulness. The WC-135 is the only aircraft throughout the U.S. Air Force conducting this vital mission, and we in Nebraska are fortunate to have it based at home at Offutt Air Force Base. The OC-135, or Open Skies, is tasked to complete photo reconnaissance fly-overs. This mission supports the Defense Threat Reduction Agency by conducting observation flights in accord with the Open Skies Treaty. This treaty will allow the OC-135 to fly over Russian air space to monitor weapons reductions treaties. Although the Open Skies Treaty has not yet been ratified by all parties, the OC-135 has not been dormant. While the Open Skies Treaty awaits ratification, the OC-135 is heavily involved in additional photo reconnaissance projects, including missions such as weather observations of Hurricane Mitch. The Open Skies mission is fully funded through fiscal year 2004. Additionally, E-4B aircraft also stationed at Offutt provide transport and command and control for the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State. Much more than simply a transport aircraft, the E-4B allows senior officials complete access to critical information and communications in a secure fashion, keeping the President and others ``in the loop,'' even while in mid-flight. Along with Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska continues to make important contributions to our national security through components of the National Guard and the Reserves. Most recently, these components have played important roles in Kosovo alongside their active component counterparts. The 155th Wing of the Nebraska Air National Guard has been very active during the Kosovo mission, flying KC-135s--fuel tanker planes--above and around Kosovo. These KC-135s perform the remarkable task of mid-air refueling for a variety of aircraft, including the B-52 Stratofortress and the E6. Indeed, over the last several months, the Nebraska unit led the KC-135 refueling effort, involving hundreds of aircraft, and also was the last volunteer unit engaged in the region before the reserve call-up was instituted. This has all been done, even though the 155th Wing is the smallest of all the Air Guard wings across the country. I applaud their efforts and their successes. As well, the Nebraska Army National Guard is currently serving in a nine-month deployment in Bosnia as part of the NATO peace-keeping forces. The 24th Medical Company is working alongside Guard units from across the country to transport patients from the field to hospitals. At a time when a robust economy and opportunities in the private sector can pull people away from public service, I salute these men and women who continue to make sacrifices so that we may be safe. The examples I have given here of the hard work being done by our Armed Forces are not the exception, but the rule. In a time of tight budgets and increased missions, I am proud to say that our Armed Forces are second to none around the globe. Even when we continue to ask more of our military men and women, they always rise to the challenge. We must never forget the risks they take for our sake and the freedoms they forego, and we must provide them the best support, conditions, equipment, and training possible in return. I am proud to have supported passage of the defense appropriations bill yesterday, and I hope and expect that we will continue the strong support of those who are willing to sacrifice all for the cause of your freedom and mine, the men and women of our Armed Forces. ", u"Mr. President, it is not often an amendment is read in its entirety around here, even a short one. Usually we ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. I do not know how many times I have used those words on this floor in the last 20 years. But in this case I decided to have this amendment--it is fairly short--read in its entirety because it may sound familiar to some people. These are Senator Rudman's words. This amendment incorporates some very important parts of Senator Rudman's panel's recommendation that are left out of the pending amendment. That is why I wanted the entire amendment read. The sponsors of this amendment have correctly pointed out that Senator Rudman is recommending a semiautonomous agency, and that is the heart of Senator Rudman's proposal. It happens to be a proposal that I support. But the difference between my position and the sponsor's position, relative to Senator Rudman's recommendations, is that their amendment leaves out some very critical recommendations of the Rudman panel relative to the operation of the Department of Energy. My amendment would insert in the pending amendment some very important recommendations of the Rudman panel the pending amendment omits. We have heard a lot relative to the importance of the Rudman panel recommendations. Senator Rudman and his panel performed an extremely important service to this Nation in pointing out the complicated bureaucratic maze that exists at the Department of Energy and pointing out that for 20 years, report after report, recommendation after recommendation to streamline the bureaucracy the Department of Energy have been made, including made to the Congress, without action being taken by the Congress. All of us bear responsibility for that failure. Three administrations and 20 years of Congresses have been told in a number of reports there should be some reorganization done at the Department of Energy Finally, a year and a half ago, President Clinton issued a Presidential directive that reorganizes the Department of Energy. That directive has been mainly implemented, not yet fully apparently but mainly implemented. The Rudman panel goes beyond that Presidential directive but does give credit to President Clinton for being the first President in 20 years to direct the reorganization of the Department of Energy, even though three Presidents have been told there is significant organizational problems, and even though as early as 1990 there was a public statement about espionage being carried out by the People's Republic of China at one of these labs. Secretary Richardson is engaged in significant reorganization of this agency, and the Rudman panel gave credit to Secretary Richardson for beginning the important reorganizational changes. This Congress has taken some steps to reorganize the Department of Energy. The Armed Services Committee, for instance, upon which our Presiding Officer sits with distinction, has acted on our bill, which is now in conference, to carry out some significant reorganization of the Department of Energy. On the House side, the Armed Services Committee did the same thing. The language is different. Parts of their provision differ from ours. But the point is, there are some very important things going on in terms of reorganization in the Department of Energy, as we speak. But the Rudman panel goes beyond that. It would put into law, for instance, things which are in an Executive order. We know how much more important a law is than an Executive order because an Executive order, No. 1, can be changed by the next President but, No. 2, can be too often ignored by the bureaucracy. We had a recent example of that in another agency where an agency just almost totally ignored an Executive order. We want to put into law a significant reorganization, and we want to--at least I do, and I think most of my colleagues want to--put into law a reorganization along the lines of the Rudman panel recommendation. I do not know that there is any disagreement on that, but apparently there is a disagreement when it comes to setting forth not just the provisions of the Rudman panel's recommendations relative to the power of this new semiautonomous agency, but when it comes to setting forth the power of the Secretary of Energy relative to directing and controlling his Department. What is left out in this amendment is also important, according to the Rudman panel. This is not the Senator from Michigan talking; this amendment is the Rudman panel talking. I will go into what these provisions are in just one moment. I emphasize, the security breakdown that has existed for 20 years that was highlighted in the Cox commission report must be corrected. There are a number of steps underway to correct them, but we should act. There have been some pretty important, good-faith discussions going on over the last few days as to how we might be able to come up with a bill which can become law. We can pass a bill, and if the House does not accept the bill because they think it ought to be a freestanding bill and not on an intelligence authorization bill, or because they do not think it ought to be on a Department of Defense authorization bill--and that is their position in conference relative to the defense authorization bill--we can attach language here. But if we do not have a strong, healthy consensus, it seems to me we are in a much weaker position in getting this law actually passed in the House and signed by the President. That should be our goal. If we are serious about trying to tighten up and streamline the Department of Energy, if we are serious about passing a law to do that, then we ought to figure out a way we can come together, incorporate the Rudman panel recommendations, including the ones which are left out in this amendment which I will try to add in a moment, so we can go to the House of Representatives with a healthy consensus vote, a strong vote, rather than a divided vote, and the same message would then be delivered to the President. The Rudman report calls for a semiautonomous Agency for Nuclear Stewardship. I fully support that. That would be an agency which will oversee all nuclear-related matters in the Department of Energy, including defense programs and nuclear nonproliferation. It would also oversee all functions of the national security labs and the weapons production facilities. I strongly support that. It would streamline the new Agency's management structure by abolishing ties between the weapons labs and all DOE regional field and site offices and all contractor intermediaries. It would appoint the Director of the new Agency by the President with Senate confirmation, and it would have effective administration of safeguard security and counterintelligence at all the weapons labs and plants by creating a coherent security counterintelligence structure within the new Agency. In making the recommendation for a semiautonomous agency, the Rudman report cites as models similar agencies within the Department of Defense, such as the National Security Agency, NSA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA, and the National Reconnaissance Office, the NRO. Each of these three agencies is a separately organized agency run by an administrator within the Department of Defense. While the mission of each is different from the other, all three are under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense; all three are subject to Department of Defense policies and regulations; and all three are directed by the Secretary and his deputy through an assistant. That is the model Senator Rudman has based his recommendation on--three agencies in the Department of Defense, separately organized, each having their own staff, but where the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary direct that separately organized agency through an assistant. That is a very important part of that model which is omitted in this bill. So Senator Rudman and his panel, on June 30, sent a ``Memorandum of Clarification'' relative to their report. One of those recommendations in the statement is the following: ``The Secretary is still responsible,'' under their model, ``for developing and promulgating DOE-wide policy on these matters,'' these matters being security, intelligence, and counterintelligence, ``and it makes sense to us,'' that is, the Rudman panel, ``that a Secretary would want advisers on his/her immediate staff to assist in that vein.'' So the first sentence of our amendment says: The Secretary shall be responsible for developing and promulgating all Departmental-wide security, counterintelligence and intelligence policies, and may use his immediate staff to assist him in developing and promulgating such policies. It is verbatim from Senator Rudman's panel's recommendation. Senator Rudman's panel also says: ``. . . The Agency Director,'' that is the new Agency, ``. . . is responsible and held accountable for ensuring complete and faithful implementation of the Secretary's security, counterintelligence and intelligence policies within the new Agency.'' The second sentence of our amendment reads: The Director of the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship is responsible for implementation of the Secretary's security, counterintelligence, and intelligence policies within the New Agency. Again, it is verbatim from the Rudman panel's memorandum of June 30. The Rudman panel also said on that day that ``The Director of the Agency,'' that is, the new Agency ``may establish agency-specific policies so long as they are fully consistent with the departmental policies established by the Secretary.'' The third line in our amendment says: The Director of the Agency may establish agency-specific policies so long as they are fully consistent with the departmental policies established by the Secretary. It is verbatim from the Rudman panel recommendation. I do not think we can have it both ways. The Rudman panel's recommendations are very important. We are not obligated to adopt every one. We are not obligated to adopt any of them. But there are some of us who believe those recommendations are hugely important. As always is the case when you create a new agency within a Department, you have to figure out a balance between the power of the new Agency and the power of the Secretary to run his Department that contains that new Agency. That is a very important balance. We are doing it on the Senate floor. Usually that kind of a complex and rather arcane effort would be made by the Governmental Affairs Committee, but in this case, for many reasons, legitimate reasons, it comes to us in this form, and we must deal with it. But in dealing with these issues, as to that balance, we have guidance. We have guidance from the Rudman panel. The Rudman panel says: Create a semiautonomous agency. It then goes into detail on the functions of that semiautonomous agency and the power both of its director and the Secretary of Energy. It sets them out. It lays this out for us. The amendment before us omits some critically important recommendations of the Rudman panel, the ones I have just read and the ones that are in my amendment. It is that omission which, it seems to me, so flaws, and unnecessarily flaws, may I say, the amendment before us. I do not quite fathom why it is that specific recommendations of the Rudman panel, relative to what the balance and the relationship are, should be omitted when they are important. The sponsors of the amendment will no doubt say that the Secretary reserves the right in their amendment to direct and control the Department, and that is true. But when it comes down to putting any flesh on those bones, when it comes down to saying how the Secretary will do that--that he is able, for instance, to use his staff to promulgate policies, that the agency must comply with the Department's policies that apply departmentwide--when it comes to those things, then we have a problem with this amendment. This amendment actually suggests the opposite is true from what Rudman has suggested when it says that ``The Secretary may not delegate to any Department official the duty to supervise or direct'' but leaves out the critically important power that Rudman would give the Secretary to utilize his staff to assist him in developing and promulgating departmentwide policies. So we correct this omission. The spirit of Rudman is that there be a semiautonomous agency when it comes to spelling out how that agency would function, what the balance of powers and functions would be between the Secretary of the Department, of which this agency is a part, and the new Agency Director. It is at that point that we have the omissions that Rudman recommends and the omissions in this pending amendment which my amendment would fill in. Mr. President, I inquire how much time this Senator has left.", u"I yield back the balance of my time. The Acting CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered read. The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Definitions. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National IntelligenceSec. 401. Clarification of limitation on colocation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the In this Act: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2010 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2010, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2701 of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2010 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such element. (b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a). (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2010 the sum of $672,812,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2011. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 853 full-time or full- time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2010. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available to the Director of National Intelligence under section 103 are also available to the Director for the adjustment of personnel levels within the Intelligence Community Management Account. (d) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2010 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2011. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2010, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). (a) In General.--Nothing in the classified Schedule of Authorizations, a report of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate to accompany the bill H.R. 2701 of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress, a joint statement of the managers accompanying a conference report on such bill, or the classified annex to this Act, shall be construed to authorize or require the expenditure of funds for a congressional earmark. (b) Congressional Earmark Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional earmark'' means a provision or report language included primarily at the request of a Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner of the House of Representatives or a Senator providing, authorizing, or recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for a contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or other expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a specific State, locality, or congressional district, other than through a statutory or administrative formula-driven or competitive award process. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2010 the sum of $290,900,000. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3) is amended by-- (1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and (2) inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection: ``(e) Temporary Appointment to Fill Vacancies.-- Notwithstanding section 3345 of title 5, United States Code, if an officer of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, other than the Director of National Intelligence, whose appointment to office is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is unable to perform the functions and duties of the office-- ``(1) if during the 365-day period immediately preceding the date of death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve of the applicable officer, the person serving as the first assistant to the office of such officer served as such first assistant for not less than 90 days, such first assistant shall perform the functions and duties of the office temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of section 3346 of title 5, United States Code; ``(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President may direct a person who serves in an office for which appointment is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of such section 3346; or ``(3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence shall recommend to the President, and the President may direct, a person to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of such section 3346, if-- ``(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve of the applicable officer, such person served in a position in an element of the intelligence community for not less than 90 days; ``(B) the rate of pay for the position described under subparagraph (A) is equal to or greater than the minimum rate of pay payable for a position at GS-15 of the General Schedule; and ``(C) in the case of a person who is employed by an element of the intelligence community-- ``(i) the Director of National Intelligence shall consult with the head of such element; and ``(ii) if the head of such element objects to the recommendation, the Director of National Intelligence may make the recommendation to the President over the objection of the head of such element after informing the President of such objection.''. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 113 the following new section: (a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section-- (1) the term ``covered position'' means a defense intelligence position in the Department of Defense established under chapter 83 of title 10, United States Code, excluding an Intelligence Senior Level position designated under section 1607 of such title and any position in the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service; (2) the term ``DCIPS pay system'', as used with respect to a covered position, means the provisions of the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System under which the rate of salary or basic pay for such position is determined, excluding any provisions relating to bonuses, awards, or any other amounts not in the nature of salary or basic pay; (3) the term ``Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System'' means the personnel system established under chapter 83 of title 10, United States Code; and (4) the term ``appropriate pay system'', as used with respect to a covered position, means-- (A) the system under which, as of September 30, 2007, the rate of salary or basic pay for such position was determined; or (B) if subparagraph (A) does not apply, the system under which, as of September 30, 2007, the rate of salary or basic pay was determined for the positions within the Department of Defense most similar to the position involved, (a) Permanent Authorization.--Subtitle C of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Program.--Subtitle C of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.), as amended by section 311 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Expansion of Program to Graduate Students.--Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking ``undergraduate'' and inserting ``undergraduate and graduate''; and (B) by striking ``the baccalaureate'' and inserting ``a baccalaureate or graduate''; and (2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``undergraduate'' and inserting ``undergraduate and graduate''. (b) Termination.--Section 16(d)(1)(C) of such Act is amended by striking ``terminated either by'' and all that follows and inserting the following: ``terminated by-- ``(i) the Agency due to misconduct by the person; ``(ii) the person voluntarily; or ``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the person to maintain such level of academic standing in the educational course of training as the Director of the National Security Agency specifies in the agreement under this paragraph; and''. (c) Authority To Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With NSA.--Section 16(e) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''. (d) Other Elements of the Intelligence Community.-- (1) Authorization.--Subtitle C of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441g et seq.), as amended by section 312 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the National Security Education Board established under section 803(a) of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1903(a)), may establish a pilot program for intensive language instruction in African languages. (b) Program.--A pilot program established under subsection (a) shall provide scholarships for programs that provide intensive language instruction-- (1) in any of the five highest priority African languages for which scholarships are not offered under such Act, as determined by the Director of National Intelligence; and (2) both in the United States and in a country in which the language is the native language of a significant portion of the population, as determined by the Director of National Intelligence. (c) Termination.--A pilot program established in accordance with subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date on which such pilot program is established. (d) Authorization of Appropriations.-- (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000. (2) Availability.--Funds authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1) shall remain available until the termination of the pilot program in accordance with subsection (c). (a) General Congressional Oversight.--Section 501(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees all information necessary to assess the lawfulness, effectiveness, cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary authority, and risk of an intelligence activity, including-- ``(A) the legal authority under which the intelligence activity is being or was conducted; ``(B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought in carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, including dissenting legal views; ``(C) any specific operational concerns arising from the intelligence activity, including the risk of disclosing intelligence sources or methods; ``(D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of funds or other resources; and ``(E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will fail.''. (b) Procedures.--Section 501(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413(c)) is amended by striking ``such procedures'' and inserting ``such written procedures''. (c) Intelligence Activities.--Section 502(a)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)(2)) is amended by inserting ``(including any information or material relating to the legal authority under which an intelligence activity is being or was conducted, and any information or material relating to legal issues upon which guidance was sought in carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, including dissenting legal views)'' after ``concerning intelligence activities''. (d) Covert Actions.--Section 503 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``(including any information or material relating to the legal authority under which a covert action is being or was conducted, and any information or material relating to legal issues upon which guidance was sought in carrying out or planning the covert action, including dissenting legal views)'' after ``concerning covert actions''; (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following new paragraph: ``(2) If, pursuant to the procedures established by each of the congressional intelligence committees under section 501(c), one of the congressional intelligence committees determines that not all members of that committee are required to have access to a finding under this subsection, the President may limit access to such finding or such notice as provided in such procedures.''; and (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``is limited to the Members of Congress specified in paragraph (2)'' and inserting ``is not provided to all members of one of the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with paragraph (2)''; (3) in subsection (d)-- (A) by striking ``(d) The President'' and inserting ``(d)(1) The President''; (B) in paragraph (1), as designated by subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, by striking ``specified in'' and inserting ``informed in accordance with''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall constitute a `significant undertaking' if the activity-- ``(A) involves the potential for loss of life; ``(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, including authorities relating to research, development, or operations; ``(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or other resources; ``(D) requires notification under section 504; ``(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing intelligence sources or methods; or ``(F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic relations of the United States if such activity were disclosed without authorization.''; and (4) by adding at the end the following new subsections: ``(g)(1) A Member of Congress to which a finding is reported under subsection (c) or notice is provided under subsection (d)(1) may submit to the Director of National Intelligence an objection to any part of such finding or such notice. Not later than 48 hours after such an objection is submitted to the Director of National Intelligence, the Director shall report such objection in writing to the President and such Member of Congress. ``(2) In any case where access to a finding reported under subsection (c) or notice provided under subsection (d)(1) is not made available to all members of a congressional intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2), the President shall provide such members with general information on the content of the finding or notice. ``(3) The President shall-- ``(A) maintain a record of the Members of Congress to which a finding is reported under subsection (c) or notice is provided under subsection (d)(1) and the date on which each Member of Congress receives such finding or notice; and ``(B) not later than 30 days after the date on which such finding is reported or such notice is provided, provide such record to-- ``(i) in the case of a finding reported or notice provided to a Member of the House of Representatives, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and ``(ii) in the case of a finding reported or notice provided to a Member of the Senate, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. ``(h) Any requirement under section 501, 502, or this section to provide information to the congressional intelligence committees shall be construed to require the submission of such information to all members of such committees, unless such information is specifically authorized not to be submitted to all members of one of such committees in accordance with subsection (c)(2).''. Section 118 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404m) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``semiannual'' and inserting ``annual''; (2) in subsection (a)-- (A) in the heading, by striking ``Semiannual'' and inserting ``Annual''; (B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)-- (i) by striking ``semiannual basis'' and inserting ``annual basis''; and (ii) by striking ``preceding six-month period'' and inserting ``preceding one-year period''; (C) by striking paragraph (2); and (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively; and (3) in subsection (d)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the Committee on Armed Services,'' after ``the Committee on Appropriations,''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the Committee on Armed Services,'' after ``the Committee on Appropriations,''. Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 507 the following new section: (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 332, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 333 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 334 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 335 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``certification of compliance with oversight requirements ``Sec. 512. The head of each element of the intelligence community shall semiannually submit to the congressional intelligence committees-- ``(1) a certification that, to the best of the knowledge of the head of such element-- ``(A) the head of such element of the intelligence community is in full compliance with the requirements of this title; and ``(B) any information required to be submitted by such head of such element under this Act before the date of the submission of such certification has been properly submitted; or ``(2) if such head of such element is unable to submit a certification under paragraph (1), a statement-- ``(A) of the reasons such head of such element is not able to submit such a certification; ``(B) describing any information required to be submitted by such head of such element under this Act before the date of the submission of such statement that has not been properly submitted; and ``(C) that the head of such element will submit such information as soon as possible after the submission of such statement.''. (b) Applicability Date.--The first certification or statement required to be submitted by the head of each element of the intelligence community under section 512 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) In General.--Section 809(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. app. 2170b(b)) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Annual'' and inserting ``Biannual''; (2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following new paragraph: ``(1) Submission to congress.--The President shall biannually submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate, and congressional leadership a report updating the information referred to in subsection (a)(1)(D).''; (3) by striking paragraph (2); and (4) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2). (b) Initial Report.--The first report required under section 809(b)(1) of such Act, as amended by subsection (a)(2) of this section, shall be submitted not later than February 1, 2010. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 2010, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report describing the use of personal services contracts across the intelligence community, the impact of the use of such contracts on the intelligence community workforce, plans for conversion of contractor employment into Federal Government employment, and the accountability mechanisms that govern the performance of such personal services contracts. (b) Content.-- (1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include-- (A) a description of any relevant regulations or guidance issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community relating to minimum standards required regarding the hiring, training, security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and how those standards may differ from those for Federal Government employees performing substantially similar functions; (B) an identification of contracts where the contractor is performing substantially similar functions to a Federal Government employee; (C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings achieved by awarding contracts for the performance of such functions referred to in subparagraph (B) instead of using full-time employees of the elements of the intelligence community to perform such functions; (D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report describing the Director's long-term vision for transforming the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau and the progress of the internal reforms of the Bureau intended to achieve that vision. Such report shall include-- (1) the direction, strategy, and goals for transforming the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau; (2) a description of what the fully functional intelligence and national security functions of the Bureau should entail; (3) a candid assessment of the effect of internal reforms at the Bureau and whether such reforms have moved the Bureau towards achieving the goals of the Director for the intelligence and national security functions of the Bureau; and (4) an assessment of how well the Bureau performs tasks that are critical to the effective functioning of the Bureau as an intelligence agency, including-- (A) identifying new intelligence targets within the scope of the national security functions of the Bureau, outside the parameters of an existing case file or ongoing investigation; (B) collecting intelligence domestically, including collection through human and technical sources; (C) recruiting human sources; (D) training Special Agents to spot, assess, recruit, and handle human sources; (E) working collaboratively with other Federal departments and agencies to jointly collect intelligence on domestic counterterrorism and counterintelligence targets; (F) producing a common intelligence picture of domestic threats to the national security of the United States; (G) producing high quality and timely intelligence analysis; (H) integrating intelligence analysts into its intelligence collection operations; and (I) sharing intelligence information with intelligence community partners. Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on intelligence collection and analysis resources (1) dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal years 2008 and 2009, and (2) planned to be dedicated during fiscal year 2010. Such report shall include detailed information on fiscal, human, technical, and other intelligence collection and analysis resources. (a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2011, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report assessing the threat to national security presented by the efforts of foreign countries to acquire, through espionage, diversion, or other means, sensitive equipment and technology, and the degree to which United States export controls (including the International Traffic in Arms Regulations) are adequate to defeat such efforts. (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) International Traffic in Arms Regulations Defined.--The term ``International Traffic in Arms Regulations'' means those regulations contained in parts 120 through 130 of title (a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2010, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the illicit trade of nuclear and radiological material and equipment. (b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include, for a period of time including at least the preceding three years-- (1) details of all known or suspected cases of the illicit sale, transfer, brokering, or transport of-- (A) nuclear or radiological material; (B) equipment useful for the production of nuclear or radiological material; or (C) nuclear explosive devices; (2) an assessment of the countries that represent the greatest risk of nuclear trafficking activities; and (3) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence in the assessment referred to in paragraph (2). (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but shall include an unclassified summary. (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel of the intelligence community who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information, including whether revoking such pensions is feasible under existing law or under the administrative authority of the Director of National Intelligence or any other head of an element of the intelligence community. (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a). (a) Study.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall conduct a study on the electronic waste destruction practices of the intelligence community. Such study shall assess-- (1) the security of the electronic waste disposal practices of the intelligence community, including the potential for counterintelligence exploitation of destroyed, discarded, or recycled materials; (2) the environmental impact of such disposal practices; and (3) methods to improve the security and environmental impact of such disposal practices, including steps to prevent the forensic exploitation of electronic waste. (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a). (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to United States citizens for the service of such citizens prior to 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated company during a period when Air America or the associated company was owned or controlled by the United States Government and operated or managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Report Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) The history of Air America and the associated companies prior to 1977, including a description of-- (A) the relationship between Air America and the associated companies and the Central Intelligence Agency or any other element of the United States Government; (B) the workforce of Air America and the associated companies; (C) the missions performed by Air America, the associated companies, and their employees for the United States; and (D) the casualties suffered by employees of Air America and the associated companies in the course of their employment. (2) A description of-- (A) the retirement benefits contracted for or promised to the employees of Air America and the associated companies prior to 1977; (B) the contributions made by such employees for such benefits; (C) the retirement benefits actually paid such employees; (D) the entitlement of such employees to the payment of future retirement benefits; and (E) the likelihood that such employees will receive any future retirement benefits. (3) An assessment of the difference between-- (A) the retirement benefits that former employees of Air America and the associated companies have received or will receive by virtue of their employment with Air America and the associated companies; and (B) the retirement benefits that such employees would have received or be eligible to receive if such employment was deemed to be employment by the United States Government and their service during such employment was credited as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits. (4) Any recommendations regarding the advisability of legislative action to treat such employment as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in light of the relationship between Air America and the associated companies and the United States Government and the services and sacrifices of such employees to and for the United States. (5) If legislative action is considered advisable under paragraph (4), a proposal for such action and an assessment of its costs. (6) The opinions of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, if any, on any matters covered by the report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate. (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (d) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Air america.--The term ``Air America'' means Air America, Incorporated. (2) Associated company.--The term ``associated company'' means any entity associated with, predecessor to, or subsidiary to Air America, including Air Asia Company Limited, CAT Incorporated, Civil Air Transport Company Limited, and the Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport, during the period when such an entity was owned and controlled by the United States Government. (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a study on the feasability of-- (1) providing matching funds for contributions to college savings programs made by employees of elements of the intelligence community; and (2) establishing a program to pay the college tuition of each child of an employee of an element of the intelligence community that has died in the performance of the official duties of such employee. (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a). (c) College Savings Program Defined.--In this section, the term ``college savings program'' means-- (1) a qualified tuition program, as defined in section 529 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; (2) a Coverdell education savings account, as defined in section 530 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and (3) any other appropriate program providing tax incentives for saving funds to pay for college tuition, as determined by the Director of National Intelligence. (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a National Intelligence Estimate or National Intelligence Assessment on the global supply chain to determine whether such supply chain poses a risk to defense and intelligence systems due to counterfeit components that may be defective or deliberately manipulated by a foreign government or a criminal organization. (b) Review of Mitigation.-- (1) NCIX review.--The National Counterintelligence Executive shall conduct a review of the adequacy of the mechanisms to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in the global supply chain that pose a risk to defense and intelligence systems due to counterfeit components that may be defective or deliberately manipulated by a foreign government or a criminal organization. (2) Submission.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Counterintelligence Executive shall submit to Congress a report containing the results of the review conducted under paragraph (1). (a) Review.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct a classification review of the records of the Agency that are relevant to the known or potential health effects suffered by veterans of Operation Desert Storm as described in the November 2008, report by the Department of Veterans Affairs Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses. (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress the results of the classification review conducted under subsection (a), including the total number of records of the Agency that are relevant. (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to implement the program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation requiring the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau after such supervisor serves in a management position for seven years (commonly known as the ``seven and out'' program) until the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation submits to the congressional intelligence committees a certification that the Director has completed a review of issues related to the pensions of former employees of the Bureau affected by a previous program of mandatory reassignment after serving in a management position for five years (commonly known as the ``five and out'' program) and the effect of such program on the Bureau and the results of such review. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of-- (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of-- (1) intelligence relating to threats posed by Uighur detainees currently or formerly held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than December 31, 2009, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the state of research, analysis, and training in interrogation and debriefing practices. (b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a) shall include-- (1) an assessment of-- (A) the quality and value of scientific and technical research in interrogation and debriefing practices that has been conducted independently or in affiliation with the Federal Government and the identification of areas in which additional research could potentially improve interrogation practices; (B) the state of interrogation and debriefing training in the intelligence community, including the character and adequacy of the ethical component of such training, and the identification of any gaps in training; (C) the adequacy of efforts to enhance career path options for intelligence community personnel that serve as interrogators and debriefers, including efforts to recruit and retain career personnel; and (D) the effectiveness of existing processes for studying and implementing lessons learned and best practices of interrogation and debriefing; and (2) any recommendations that the Director considers appropriate for improving the performance of the intelligence community with respect to the issues described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (1). (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 2010, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each element to increase diversity within the intelligence community. (b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include specific implementation plans to increase diversity within each element of the intelligence community, including-- (1) specific implementation plans for each such element designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic plan of the Director of National Intelligence on equal employment opportunity and diversity; (2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates; (3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior, midgrade, senior, and management levels; (4) a description of specific diversity awareness training and education programs for senior officials and managers of each such element; and (5) a description of performance metrics to measure the success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs described in paragraphs (1) through (4). Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a review of constraints under international law and the laws of foreign nations to the assertion of enforcement jurisdiction with respect to criminal investigations of terrorism offenses under the laws of the United States conducted by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in foreign nations and using funds made available for the National Intelligence Program, including constraints identified in section 432 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. (a) Annual Report on Intelligence.--Section 109 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404d) is repealed. (b) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence Initiatives.--Section 1102(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(1) The Director'' and inserting ``The Director'' ; and (2) by striking paragraph (2). (c) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (d); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively. (d) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.-- Section 826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873 note) is repealed. Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the classified annex to this Act is hereby incorporated into this Act and is hereby made a requirement in law. (a) Report Submission Dates.--Section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (G); (ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (H), (I), and (N) as subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and (iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: ``(I) The annual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets required by section 118. ``(J) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community required by section 510.''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraph (D); and (2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (6). (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by section 313 of this Act, is further amended by-- (1) striking the item relating to section 109; and (2) inserting after the item relating to section 507 the following new items:``Sec. 508. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community.``Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear weapons programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea.``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community.``Sec. 511. Government Accountability Office analyses, evaluations, and investigations.``Sec. 512. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.''. Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows: ``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and''. (a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover Intelligence Officers and Agents.-- (1) Disclosure after access to information identifying agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''. (2) Disclosure after access to classified information.-- Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking ``five years'' and inserting ``10 years''. (b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of Intelligence Identities.--The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by inserting ``including an assessment of the need for any modification of this title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert agents,'' after ``measures to protect the identities of covert agents,''. Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head of such element certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods. ``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who shall keep a record of such information. ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''. Section 119 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Section 404o) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(k) Exemption of Dissemination of Terrorist Identity Information From Freedom of Information Act.--(1) Terrorist identity information disseminated for terrorist screening purposes or other authorized counterterrorism purposes shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code. ``(2) In this section: ``(A) Authorized counterterrorism purpose.--The term `authorized counterterrorism purpose' includes disclosure to and appropriate use by an element of the Federal Government of terrorist identifiers of persons reasonably suspected to be terrorists or supporters of terrorists. ``(B) Terrorist identity information.--The term `terrorist identity information' means-- ``(i) information from a database maintained by any element of the Federal Government that would reveal whether an individual has or has not been determined to be a known or suspected terrorist or has or has not been determined to be within the networks of contacts and support of a known or suspected terrorist; and ``(ii) information related to a determination as to whether or not an individual is or should be included in the Terrorist Screening Database or other screening databases based on a determination that the individual is a known or suspected terrorist. ``(C) Terrorist identifiers.--The term `terrorist identifiers'-- ``(i) includes-- ``(I) names and aliases; ``(II) dates or places of birth; ``(III) unique identifying numbers or information; ``(IV) physical identifiers or biometrics; and ``(V) any other identifying information provided for watchlisting purposes; and ``(ii) does not include derogatory information or information that would reveal or compromise intelligence or law enforcement sources or methods.''. (a) Intelligence Community.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Reports Relating to Security Clearances.-- (1) Quadrennial audit; security clearance determinations.-- (A) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 336 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence may not use any of the amounts authorized to be appropriated in this Act for fiscal year 2010 or any subsequent fiscal year to release or transfer any individual described in subsection (d) to the United States, its territories, or possessions, until 120 days after the President has submitted to the congressional defense committees the plan described in subsection (b). (b) Plan Required.--The President shall submit to Congress a plan on the disposition of each individual described in subsection (d). Such plan shall include-- (1) an assessment of the risk that the individual described in subsection (d) poses to the national security of the United States, its territories, or possessions; (2) a proposal for the disposition for each such individual; (3) a plan to mitigate any risks described in paragraph (1) should the proposed disposition required by paragraph (2) include the release or transfer to the United States, its territories, or possessions of any such individual; and (4) a summary of the consultation required in subsection (c). (c) Consultation Required.--The President shall consult with the chief executive of the State, the District of Columbia, or the territory or possession of the United States to which the disposition in subsection (b) includes a release or transfer to that State, District of Columbia, or territory or possession. (d) Detainees Described.--An individual described in this subsection is any individual who is located at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, who-- (1) is not a citizen of the United States; and (2) is-- (A) in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense, or (B) otherwise under detention at the United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) it is no longer excusable to allow poor business systems, a deficiency of resources, or a lack of commitment from senior leadership of the intelligence community to foster waste or nonaccountability to the United States taxpayer; (2) the Director of National Intelligence has not made compliance with financial management and audit readiness standards a top priority; and (3) the Director of National Intelligence should require each element of the intelligence community to develop and implement a specific plan to become compliant with the law. (b) Review; Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall-- (1) conduct a review of the status of the auditability compliance of each element of the intelligence community; and (2) develop a plan and timeline to achieve a full, unqualified audit of each element of the intelligence community not later than September 30, 2013. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3), as amended by section 302(1) of this Act, is further amended-- (1) in subsection (f) (as so redesignated)-- (A) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of Headquarters With Headquarters of''; (B) by striking ``Commencing as of October 1, 2008, the'' and inserting ``(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the''; (C) in paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (2) of this section, by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the Office''; (D) in paragraph (1) (as so designated), by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the headquarters of any other element''; and (E) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) The President may waive the limitation in paragraph (1) if the President determines that-- ``(A) a waiver is in the interests of national security; or ``(B) the costs of a headquarters of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that is separate from the headquarters of the other elements of the intelligence community outweighs the potential benefits of the separation.''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) Location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.--The headquarters of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may be located in the Washington metropolitan region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40, United States Code).''. Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the Director's designee.''. Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7); (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``; and'' and inserting ``;''; and (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraphs: ``(5) assist the Director of National Intelligence in establishing goals for basic, applied, and advanced research to meet the technology needs of the intelligence community; ``(6) submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the science and technology strategy of the Director that shows resources mapped to the goals of the intelligence community; and''; and (2) in subsection (d)(3)-- (A) in subparagraph (A)-- (i) by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate''; and (ii) by striking ``; and'' and inserting ``;''; (B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); and (C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new subparagraph: ``(B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence community; and''. (a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the report submitted to Congress under section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote the use of energy efficient computer servers in the United States'' (Public Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the plan developed under subsection (a). (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (3) in subsection (c) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 366 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 103H (as added by such section 366) the following new section: (a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b), as amended by section 321 of this Act, is further amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (i) and transferring such subsection to the end; and (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection: ``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.-- ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such audits shall be conducted subject to the provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q). ``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that has been terminated or suspended if such covert action was terminated or suspended prior to the last audit of such covert action conducted by the Inspector General and has not been restarted after the date on which such audit was completed. ``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of such audit.''. (b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)''; (2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)''; and (3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)''. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``prohibition on the use of private contractors for interrogations involving persons in the custody of the central intelligence agency ``Sec. 24. (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall not expend or obligate funds for payment to any contractor to conduct the interrogation of a detainee or prisoner in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency. ``(b) Exception.-- ``(1) In general.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may request, and the Director of National Intelligence may grant, a written waiver of the requirement under subsection (a) if the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency determines that-- ``(A) no employee of the Federal Government is-- ``(i) capable of performing such interrogation; and ``(ii) available to perform such interrogation; and ``(B) such interrogation is in the national interest of the United States and requires the use of a contractor. ``(2) Clarification of applicability of certain laws.--Any contractor conducting an interrogation pursuant to a waiver under paragraph (1) shall be subject to all laws on the conduct of interrogations that would apply if an employee of Section 8(d) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 U.S.C. 607(d)) is amended by inserting before the sentence beginning with ``In exercising'' the following new sentence: ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an appeal from a decision of a contracting officer of the Central Intelligence Agency relative to a contract made by that agency may be filed with whichever of the Armed Services Board or the Civilian Board is specified by the contracting officer as the Board to which such an appeal may be made and the Board so specified shall have jurisdiction to decide that appeal.''. (a) Establishment and Duties of Deputy Director of CIA.-- Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 104A the following new section: Section 17(e)(3)(B) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(3)(B)) is amended by inserting ``or providing such information'' after ``making such complaint''. (a) In General.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), as amended by section 412 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H), by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine Corps,''; and (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``The elements'' and all that follows through ``the Coast Guard'' and inserting ``The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security''. Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(H)), as amended by section 421 of this Act, is further amended by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''. (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), respectively; and (3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2) of this subsection, by striking paragraphs (3) and (4). (b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further amended-- (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (f)'' and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (f)'' and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''. (a) Director of National Security Agency.--The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after the first section the following new section: ``Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law.''. (b) Director of National Reconnaissance Office.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 106(b)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is amended-- (1) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B); (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) through (I) as subparagraphs (A) through (G), respectively; and (3) by moving subparagraph (G), as redesignated by paragraph (2) of this subsection, two ems to the left. (d) Effective Date and Applicability.--The amendment made by subsection (a) and the provisions of subsection (b) shall apply upon the earlier of-- (1) the date of the nomination by the President of an individual to serve in the position concerned, except that the individual serving in such position as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to such position, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or (2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of such position by the individual performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by section 424 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 2 (as added by such section 424) the following new section: ``Sec. 3. (a) There is an Associate Director of the National Security Agency for Compliance and Training, who shall be appointed by the Director of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Associate Director of the National Security Agency for Compliance and Training shall ensure that-- ``(1) all programs and activities of the National Security Agency are conducted in a manner consistent with all applicable laws, regulations, and policies; and ``(2) the training of relevant personnel is sufficient to ensure that such programs and activities are conducted in such a manner.''. (a) General Counsel.--The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by section 425 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 3 (as added by such section 425), the following new section: ``Sec. 4. (a) There is a General Counsel of the National Security Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(b) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency shall serve as the chief legal officer of the National Security Agency.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date on which the Director of the National Security Agency is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in accordance with section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959, as added by section 424 of this Act. Section 12 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the National Security Agency;'' after ``the Federal Emergency Management Agency,''; and (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the National Security Agency,'' after ``the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,''. Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code) a revised charter for the National Reconnaissance Office (in this section referred to as the ``NRO''). The charter shall include the following: (1) The organizational and governance structure of the NRO. (2) NRO participation in the development and generation of requirements and acquisition. (3) The scope of NRO capabilities. (4) The roles and responsibilities of the NRO and the relationship of the NRO to other elements of the intelligence community and the defense community. (a) Extension.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking ``September 1, 2004'' and inserting ``February 1, 2011''. (2) Effective date.--Subject to paragraph (3), the amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of such section 1007. (3) Commission membership.-- (A) In general.--The membership of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community established under subsection (a) of section 1002 of such Act (Public Law 107- 306; 116 Stat. 2438) (referred to in this section as the ``Commission'') shall be considered vacant and new members shall be appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as amended by subparagraph (B). (B) Technical amendment.--Paragraph (1) of section 1002(b) of such Act is amended by striking ``The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management.'' and inserting ``The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.''. (4) Clarification of duties.--Section 1002(i) of such Act is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``including--'' and inserting ``including advanced research and development programs and activities. Such review shall include--''. (b) Funding.-- (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the Intelligence Community Management Account, the Director of National Intelligence shall make $2,000,000 available to the Commission to carry out title X of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2437). (2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended. Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``terrorism and homeland security information'' and inserting ``national security information''; (B) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively; and (C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph: ``(4) National security information.--The term `national security information' includes homeland security information and terrorism information.''; (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``terrorism information'' and inserting ``national security information''; and (B) in paragraph (2) in the first sentence of the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``terrorism information'' and inserting ``national security information''; and (3) in subsection (f)(1)-- (A) in the second sentence, by inserting ``in the Executive Office of the President and shall serve'' after ``The individual designated as the program manager shall serve''; and (B) in the third sentence, by striking ``homeland security information, terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction information'' and inserting ``national security information''. The Director of National Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures established by each of the congressional intelligence committees, conduct a classification review of materials in the possession of each of those committees that-- (1) are not less than 25 years old; and (2) were created, or provided to that committee, by the executive branch. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to provide the warnings of constitutional rights described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966), to a person located outside of the United States who is not a United States person and is-- (1) suspected of terrorism, associated with terrorists, or believed to have knowledge of terrorists; or (2) a detainee in the custody of the Armed Forces of the United States. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 5(a)(1), by striking ``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3)'' and all that follows through ``(50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a)''; and (2) in section 17(d)(3)(B)-- (A) in clause (i), by striking ``advise'' and inserting ``advice''; and (B) in clause (ii)-- (i) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director'' and inserting ``Associate Deputy Director''; (ii) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National Clandestine Service''; (iii) in subclause (III), by striking ``Deputy Director for Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of Intelligence''; (iv) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for Administration'' and inserting ``Director of Support''; and (v) in subclause (V), by striking ``Deputy Director for Science and Technology'' and inserting ``Director of Science and Technology''. Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)(A)) is amended to read as follows: ``(A) Upon reaching age 65, in the case of a participant in the system who is at the Senior Intelligence Service rank of level 4 or above; and''. (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code is amended by striking the item relating to the General Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item: ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 101-- (A) in subsection (a), by moving paragraph (7) two ems to the right; and (B) by moving subsections (b) through (p) two ems to the right; (2) in section 103, by redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (h); (3) in section 109(a)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 112.;'' and inserting ``section 112;''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the second period; (4) in section 301(1), by striking `` `United States' '' and all that follows through ``and `State' '' and inserting `` `United States', `person', `weapon of mass destruction', and `State' ''; (5) in section 304(b), by striking ``subsection (a)(3)'' and inserting ``subsection (a)(2)''; and (6) in section 502(a), by striking ``a annual'' and inserting ``an annual''. Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after ``subsection (a)),''. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended-- (1) in section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and inserting ``Department of Justice''; (2) in section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)-- (A) in subsection (c)(1)-- (i) by striking ``shall,'' and inserting ``shall''; and (ii) by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional culture''; (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; and (C) in subsection (f) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``shall,'' and inserting ``shall''; and (3) in section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and inserting ``Federal''; and (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and inserting ``specific''. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``FOREIGN''; (2) in subsection (a)-- (A) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign''; (B) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears; and (C) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; (3) in subsection (b), by striking ``The Director'' and inserting ``The Director of National Intelligence''; and (4) in subsection (c)-- (A) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (B) by striking ``section 114a'' and inserting ``section The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is further amended-- (1) section 3(4)(L), by striking ``other'' the second place it appears; (2) in section 102A-- (A) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program''; (B) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence Program or any successor program''; (ii) in paragraph (3) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; and (iii) in paragraph (5)-- (I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); and (II) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or agency involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''; (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``paragraph''; and (D) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after ``Acquisition''; (3) in section 103(b), by striking ``, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.),''; (4) in section 104A(g)(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; (5) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''; (6) in section 701(b)(1), by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; (7) in section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''; and (8) in the table of contents in the first section-- (A) by striking the item relating to section 1002; and (B) by inserting after the item relating to section 1001 the following new item:``Sec. 1002. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and training.''. Section 528(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Associate Director of CIA for Military Affairs'' and inserting ``Associate Director of Military Affairs, CIA''; and (2) by striking ``Associate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs'' and inserting ``Associate Director of Military Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, or any successor position''. The Acting CHAIR. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order except those printed in House Report 111-419. Each amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question. The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House Report 111-419.", u"Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 5349, to extend the Protect America Act of 2007 for 21 days. Let me be clear that while I do not support legislation that grants legal immunity to telecommunications companies that provide information to Federal investigators without a warrant, I recognize that the current legislation is set to expire this Saturday, February 16th. Although I do not support the Protect America Act, we need more time to work with our colleagues in the Senate on the substance of this legislation in order to ensure that we reconcile the Senate language with the RESTORE Act (H.R. 3773), which we passed in the House on November 15, 2007. I would like to thank my Senate colleague Senator Feingold, from Wisconsin, for his diligent work in trying to amend this legislation to protect American civil liberties, both at home and abroad. Homeland security is not a Democratic or a Republican issue, it is not a House or Senate issue; it is an issue for all Americans--all of us. The original legislation offered by the House Majority gave the Administration everything that they needed, but what the Senate is proposing virtually throws our Bill of Rights out the window, because they are telling Americans that no matter what your business is, you are subject to the unchecked scrutiny of the Attorney General without judicial intervention. I am disheartened by the other body for their failure to recognize that we can secure America by passing responsible electronic surveillance legislation that does not compromise our civil liberties. Madam Speaker, in August of this year, I strongly opposed S. 1927, the so-called ``Protect America Act'' (PAA) when it came to a vote on the House floor. Had the Bush administration and the Republican-dominated 109th Congress acted more responsibly in the 2 preceding years, we would not have been in the position of debating legislation that had such a profoundly negative impact on the national security and on American values and civil liberties in the crush of exigent circumstances. As that regrettable episode clearly showed, it is true as the saying goes that haste makes waste. The PAA was stampeded through the Congress in the midnight hour of the last day before the long August recess on the dubious claim that it was necessary to fill a gap in the Nation's intelligence gathering capabilities identified by Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell. But in reality it would have eviscerated the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution and represented an unwarranted transfer of power from the courts to the Executive Branch and a Justice Department led at that time by an Attorney General whose reputation for candor and integrity was, to put it charitably, subject to considerable doubt. The RESTORE Act, H.R. 3773, is superior to the PAA by orders of magnitude. This is due in no small measure, Madam Speaker, to the willingness of the leadership to reach out to and work with all members of the House. The result shows. The RESTORE Act does not weaken our Nation's commitment to its democratic traditions. Rather, it represents a sound policy proposal for achieving the only legitimate goals of a terrorist surveillance program, which is to ensure that American citizens and persons in America are secure in their persons, papers, and effects, but terrorists throughout the world are made insecure. Let me direct the attention of all members to several of the more important aspects of this salutary legislation. First, H.R. 3773 explicitly affirms that the exclusive law to follow with respect to authorizing foreign surveillance gathering on U.S. soil is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). As initially enacted by Congress in 1978, the exclusivity of FISA was undisputed and unambiguous. I hasten to add, however, that while FISA remains the exclusive source of law, H.R. 3773 recognizes that the law as enacted in 1978 can and should be adapted to modem circumstances and to accommodate new technologies. And it does so by making clear that foreign-to-foreign communications are not subject to the FISA, even though modern technology enables that communication to be routed through the United States. Second, under H.R. 3773, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is indispensable and is accorded a meaningful role in ensuring compliance with the law. The bill ensures that the FISC is empowered to act as an Article III court should act, which means the court shall operate neither as a rubber- stamp nor a bottleneck. Rather, the function of the court is to validate the lawful exercise of executive power on the one hand, and to act as the guardian of individual rights and liberties on the other. Third, the bill does not grant amnesty to any telecommunications company or to any other entity or individual that helped federal intelligence agencies spy illegally on innocent Americans. I strongly support this provision because granting such blanket amnesty for past misconduct will have the unintended consequence of encouraging telecommunications companies to comply with, rather than contest, illegal requests to spy on Americans. The only permissible path to legalization of conduct in this area is full compliance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Moreover, Madam Speaker, it is important to point out that the loudest demands for blanket immunity come not from the telecommunications companies but from the Administration, which raises the interesting question of whether the Administration's real motivation is to shield from public disclosure the ways and means by which government officials may have ``persuaded'' telecommunications companies to assist in its warrantless surveillance programs. I call my colleagues' attention to an article published in the Washington Post in which it is reported that Joseph Nacchio, the former CEO of Qwest, alleges that his company was denied NSA contracts after he declined in a February 27, 2001 meeting at Fort Meade with National Security Agency (NSA) representatives to give the NSA customer calling records. Madam Speaker, the authorization to conduct foreign surveillance on U.S. soil provided by H.R. 3773 is temporary and will expire in 2 years if not renewed by the Congress. This is perhaps the single most important limitation on the authority conferred on the Executive Branch by this legislation. The good and sufficient reason for imposing this limitation is because the threats to America's security and the liberties of its people will change over time and thus require constant vigilance by the people's representatives in Congress. To give a detailed illustration of just how superior the RESTORE Act is to the ill-considered and hastily enacted Protect America Act, I wish to take a few moments to discuss an important improvement in the bill that was adopted in the full Judiciary Committee markup. The Jackson Lee amendment added during the markup made a constructive contribution to the RESTORE Act by laying down a clear, objective criterion for the administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce in preventing reverse targeting. ``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the government targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to collect information on certain U.S. persons. One of the major concerns that libertarians and classical conservatives, as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, have with the PAA is that the understandable temptation of national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards in the PAA to prevent it. My amendment reduces even further any such temptation to resort to reverse targeting by requiring the administration to obtain a regular, individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the surveillance is a person in the United States. The amendment achieves this objective by requiring the Administration to obtain a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person reasonably believed to be located in the United States.'' The current language in the bill provides that a warrant be obtained only when the Government ``seeks to conduct electronic surveillance'' of a person reasonably believed to be located in the United States. It was far from clear how the operative language ``seeks to'' is to be interpreted. In contrast, the language used in my amendment, ``significant purpose,'' is a term of art that has long been a staple of FISA jurisprudence and thus is well known and readily applied by the agencies, legal practitioners, and the FISA Court. Thus, the Jackson Lee amendment provides a clearer, more objective, criterion for the Administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce to prevent the practice of reverse targeting without a warrant, which all of us can agree should not be permitted. Let us be clear, Madam Speaker, that nothing in the bill or in my amendment requires the Government to obtain a FISA order for every overseas target on the off chance that they might pick up a call into or from the United States. Rather, the bill requires, as our amendment makes clear, a FISA order only where there is a particular, known person in the United States at the other end of the foreign target's calls in whom the Government has a significant interest such that a significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire that person's communications. This will usually happen over time and the Government will have the time to get an order while continuing its surveillance. And it is the national security interest to require it to obtain an order at that point, so that it can lawfully acquire all of the target person's communications rather than continuing to listen to only some of them. The Jackson Lee amendment gives the Government precisely what Director of National Intelligence McConnell asked for when he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee: It is very important to me; it is very important to members of this Committee. We should be required--we should be required in all cases to have a warrant anytime there is surveillance of a U.S. [sic] person located in the United States. In short, the Jackson Lee amendment makes a good bill even better. For this reason alone, civil libertarians should enthusiastically embrace the RESTORE Act. Nearly two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville, who remains the most astute student of American democracy, observed that the reason democracies invariably prevail in any martial conflict is because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that are indispensable to martial success: initiative, innovation, resourcefulness, and courage. As I wrote in the Politico, ``the best way to win the war on terror is to remain true to our democratic traditions. If it retains its democratic character, no nation and no loose confederation of international villains will defeat the United States in the pursuit of its vital interests.'' Thus, the way forward to victory in the war on terror is for the United States country to redouble its commitment to the Bill of Rights and the democratic values which every American will risk his or her life to defend. It is only by preserving our attachment to these cherished values that America will remain forever the home of the free, the land of the brave, and the country we love. I would ask my colleagues to support this 21-day extension so that we may work together as a body, Members of both the House and the Senate to provide our citizens with the protections they so richly deserve. We need to have time to reconcile the differences between the House and the Senate in order to ensure that the important provisions of the RESTORE Act protecting the constitutional rights of Americans is preserved. I ask my colleagues to support the Bill of Rights and national security by supporting the 21-day extension in H.R. 5349. Madam Speaker, FISA has served the Nation well for nearly 30 years, placing electronic surveillance inside the United States for foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence purposes on a sound legal footing, and I am far from persuaded that it needs to be jettisoned. First, I was prepared to accept temporarily obviating the need to obtain a court order for foreign-to-foreign communications that pass through the United States. However, I continue to insist upon individual warrants, based on probable cause, when surveillance is directed at people in the United States. This can be negotiated during this 21-day extension period. The Attorney General must still be required to submit procedures for international surveillance to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for approval, but the FISA Court should not be allowed to issue a ``basket warrant'' without making individual determinations about foreign surveillance. In all candor, Madam Speaker, I must restate my firm conviction that when it comes to the track record of this President's warrantless surveillance programs, there is still not enough on the public record about the nature and effectiveness of those programs, or the trustworthiness of this administration, to indicate that they require a blank check from Congress. The Bush administration did not comply with its legal obligation under the National Security Act of 1947 to keep the Intelligence Committees ``fully and currently informed'' of U.S. intelligence activities. Congress cannot continue to rely on incomplete information from the Bush administration or revelations in the media. It must conduct a full and complete inquiry into electronic surveillance in the United States and related domestic activities of the NSA, both those that occur within FISA and those that occur outside FISA. The inquiry must not be limited to the legal questions. It must include the operational details of each program of intelligence surveillance within the United States, including: (1) Who the NSA is targeting; (2) how it identifies its targets; (3) the information the program collects and disseminates; and most important, (4) whether the program advances national security interests without unduly compromising the privacy rights of the American people. Given the unprecedented amount of information Americans now transmit electronically and the post-9/11 loosening of regulations governing information sharing, the risk of intercepting and disseminating the communications of ordinary Americans is vastly increased, requiring more precise--not looser--standards, closer oversight, new mechanisms for minimization, and limits on retention of inadvertently intercepted communications. Madam Speaker, the legislation before us is only necessary to give this body time to work with our colleagues in the Senate. The 21-day extension will give us time to impress upon the Senate, how important it is to protect the civil rights of all Americans. I encourage my colleagues to join me in a vote of support of this 21-day extension. H.R. 5349 gives us time to amend the unwise and ill-considered reauthorization of the Protect America Act of 2007.", u"Mr. President, I rise in response to the comments by my \nesteemed colleague from Colorado about my amendment No. 753. And I \nwould say this first. My amendment does not provide immunity to \nterrorists. What my amendment does is treat terrorists as they should \nbe treated. We are at war, and under the laws of war, traditionally we have tried \nenemy combatants in military commissions. And those individuals my \ncolleague from Colorado cited, including Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, \ncould be held accountable in a military commission because our priority \nhas to be, when we are at war, to gather intelligence, to protect our \ncountry, and not whether we should prosecute in our article III courts, \nin which I have great confidence. I served as attorney general of our \nState and believe very much in our article III court system. But our \narticle III court system is not where terrorists with whom we are at \nwar should be tried. In light of the recent comments here on the floor, I feel compelled \nto point out some of the facts that I think are important for the \nAmerican people to know about some of the cases that have been cited in \nsupport of saying terrorists should be tried in article III courts. On October 12, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab pleaded guilty in the U.S. \ndistrict court in Detroit. That case has been cited not only by the \nSenator from Colorado but by the Senator from Maryland and the Senator \nfrom Illinois, and our Attorney General has cited it as well as the \nultimate and final vindication of the use of our civilian courts for \nthe trial of enemy combatants. The senior Senator from Illinois and the \nObama administration were so confident that the so-called Underwear \nBomber, as he has been named, guilty plea would settle the dispute once \nand for all, that on October 13, the Senator from Illinois came to the \nfloor and essentially declared the controversy over. We have heard \nthose same arguments today. I think we need to review who exactly Abdulmutallab is. He is no \ncommon criminal. We are not talking about people who have robbed liquor \nstores or who are Americans who have committed criminal acts in this \ncountry. He is the Nigerian man who tried to detonate plastic \nexplosives hidden in his underwear while onboard Northwest Airline's \nflight 253 to Detroit on December 25, 2009. Al-Qaida in the Arabian \nPeninsula claimed to have organized the attack with the Underwear \nBomber claiming that AQAP supplied him with the bomb and trained him. He was subsequently charged in Federal court with eight counts, \nincluding the attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and \nattempted murder of 290 Americans. The Underwear Bomber pleaded guilty \nat trial, telling a surprised courtroom on the second day of his trial \nthat the failed attack was in retaliation for the killing of Muslims \nworldwide. This case has been cited as the final vindication for civilian \ntrials, and I \nthink it is important to mention three points about this case. First of all, the presumption seems to be that the civilian court \nsystem should have the primary responsibility for questioning, trying, \nand ultimately detaining foreign enemy combatants with whom the United \nStates is in a declared war. That has not been the rule in prior \nconflicts. We are treating this conflict differently than we have \ntreated other conflicts, where enemy combatants have been tried in \nmilitary commissions. Secondly, in my view, the administration's eagerness to appease the \nACLU by trying enemy combatants in civilian courts misses the whole \npoint about detention in a time of war. When we are at war, we detain \nand interrogate enemy combatants according to the laws of war to glean \nvaluable intelligence that will help prevent future attacks, save \nAmerican lives, and help us capture other enemy combatants. Al-Qaida was at war with the United States long before our country \nrecognized or strongly reacted to this threat. We remain at war with \nal-Qaida. When we put enemy combatants in our civilian court system, we \nare focusing on prosecution, and we potentially miss important \nopportunities to gather information to prevent future attacks by doing \nso. In Abdulmutallab's case, the administration read him his Miranda \nrights after 50 minutes of questioning. In my view, this jeopardized \nvaluable intelligence. And I know my colleagues on the other side of \nthe aisle have said: Well, eventually he spoke, and he gave us lots of \ninformation. But why would we put information in jeopardy? Why would we \nread terrorists Miranda rights? I, as a prosecutor, have never heard a \nlaw enforcement official tell me that Miranda rights are a helpful \ninformation-gathering tool, but that seems to be the position I am \nhearing today. Jeopardizing this intelligence was clearly unnecessary. And in this \ncase, the fact that we didn't have to rely on a confession--this was a \ncase where we caught the Underwear Bomber redhanded. So even if we were \nto have tried him in a military commission and had not given him \nMiranda rights, had gathered intelligence for as long as we could have, \nwe still would have had him redhanded because the passengers on that \nflight saw him. He was caught with the explosives on his body. This was \nnever a case about a guilty plea and whether we got some information \nabout him. The essential question is whether we got the most \ninformation possible from a terrorist who was trying to attack \nAmericans and our allies, to prevent future attacks, not whether we \ngave him Miranda rights. With a case that was as open and shut as Abdulmutallab's, without any \nneed to use confessional evidence or classified information, it doesn't \nprove the civilian court system is superior to military commissions. \nHis conviction was never realistically in doubt. Defenders of bringing our enemy combatants to the U.S. civilian trial \noften cite a number of cases and convictions related to military \ncommissions. Again, I want to reiterate, I am a strong believer in our \ncivilian court system, but I want to point out some of the downsides to \nusing our civilian court system for enemy combatants: the costs of \nsecurity; the cause of civic disruption in the area; the risk of \ncompromising classified information; and the risk of eventual release \nof these combatants not to some other country but into American \nsociety, regardless of whether they are convicted in civilian court. \nAnd these concerns aren't academic. I have heard some of my colleagues cite the case of Zacarias \nMoussaoui, who was a member of al-Qaida who was involved in the 9/11 \nattacks. The civilian proceedings spanned nearly a decade, and his case \nwas finally resolved only last year. These proceedings cost millions of \ndollars and caused substantial civic disruption. For example, the \nFederal courthouse in Alexandria, VA, was described as ``an armed camp, \nwith the courthouse complex and surrounding neighborhood becoming a \nvirtual encampment, with heavily armed guards, rooftop snipers, bomb-\nsniffing dogs, blocked streets and identification checks.'' If we had \ntried him at Guantanamo Bay, in the military commission there, these \nsecurity concerns would have been accounted for, and we wouldn't have \nhad to disrupt Virginia to do that. It is not a problem we would \nconfront in our military commission system. In addition, in the civilian trial of 9/11 terrorist Zacarias \nMoussaoui, sensitive material was inadvertently leaked because our \ncivilian court system, as wonderful as it is, is not set up as well to \ndeal with cases involving sensitive information during a time of war. Moussaoui also mocked 9/11 victims and used the civilian trial as a \nplatform to spew terrorist propaganda. All of these negative side effects of trying a terrorist in a \ncivilian court would have been eliminated or significantly mitigated if \nhe had been detained in military custody and tried before a military \ncommission. In the case of Omar Abdel Rahman, commonly known as the Blind Sheik, \nwhich has also been cited here today, the civilian trial provided \nintelligence to Osama bin Laden. So when I hear that case cited as a \nsuccess, the first thing that comes to my mind is, if intelligence was \nprovided to Osama bin Laden, how is that a success when our No. 1 focus \nshould be on protecting the American people? And that has to be the \ndistinction between trying enemy combatants in a time of war and the \nvery important purpose of our civilian court system. In the case of the Blind Sheik, according to Michael Mukasey, the \nformer Attorney General, ``in the course of prosecuting Omar Abdel \nRahman, the government was compelled--as it is in all cases that charge \na coconspiracy charge--to turn over a list of unindicted coconspirators \nto the defendants. Within 10 days, a copy of that list of unindicted \ncoconspirators reached bin Laden in Khartoum.'' The notion that a list--because you had to do it, according to our \ncivilian court system where notice requirements are very important, \nwhere generally our court systems are open--would be provided to Osama \nbin Laden, in my view, is unacceptable, a risk we could have avoided if \nwe treated the Blind Sheik as he should have been treated, which is as \nan enemy combatant and tried in a military commission. Civilian trials of enemy combatants have provided a treasure trove of \ninformation to terrorists, and I think those risks have been very \ndiscounted by my esteemed colleagues who have come to the floor to \noppose my amendment. According to open source reporting, the cost of disclosing \ninformation unwisely became clear after the New York trials of bin \nLaden associates for the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Africa. \nSome of the evidence indicated that the National Security Agency, the \nU.S. foreign eavesdrop organization, had intercepted cell phone \nconversations. Shortly thereafter, bin Laden's organization stopped \nusing cell phones to discuss sensitive operational details. It is also important to note that the record of trying enemy \ncombatants in civilian courts is not as good as it has been made out to \nbe. Opponents of my amendment don't often speak about Ahmed Ghailani. Ghailani is a Tanzanian who was charged with a total of 284 counts, \nincluding 200-plus counts of murder and 1 count of conspiracy in the \n1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. The bombings \nkilled 224 people, including 12 Americans. He also spent time as Osama \nbin Laden's bodyguard. He was tried in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of \nNew York. The Department of Justice directed the U.S. attorney not to \nseek the death penalty. At trial, the presiding justice excluded from \nevidence the testimony of a key witness--a Tanzanian, who may have \nissued statements implicating him in the bombings. And on November 17, \n2010, a jury, after this evidence was excluded, found Ghailani only \nguilty of 1 count of a conspiracy and acquitted him of all 284 other \ncharges, including the murder charges. He murdered 284 people--12 \nAmericans--and he was acquitted of murder charges. I think that is a \ncase that shows our civilian court system is not always the best way to \ndeal with enemy combatants and is very contrary to what I have heard on \nthe cases cited from my opponents of this amendment. Proponents of civilian trial, such as Attorney General Holder, want \nto criminalize the war, but they fail to cite these cases where the \ncivilian \ncourt system leaked classified information to terrorists or, because of \nexcluded evidence, where terrorists are not held fully accountable. Military detention for enemy combatants has always been the rule, not \nthe exception. Why are we treating this war any differently? Civilian \ncourts rightly focus on prosecution, but in detaining enemy combatants \nwhen at war, they miss the most important goal we have to have; that \nis, gathering intelligence and protecting the American people against \nfuture attacks. Civilian trials for enemy combatants incur tremendous costs and cause \ncivic disruption. That is why the administration itself has reversed \nits position on trying Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in New York City. They \nwanted to try the mastermind behind 9/11 in the middle of New York \nCity, but the American people were so outraged by trying someone who is \nthe mastermind of 9/11 in the middle of New York City and the millions \nof dollars it would have cost to protect the citizens of New York from \nthis horrible individual, giving him a forum in the middle of New York \nCity. Again, the costs associated with protecting the American people in \nthese civilian trials alone is enough to treat them as they should be--\nin military commissions. We risk compromising classified information, and we risk the eventual \nrelease of these combatants into American society. For these reasons, consistent with a longstanding precedent, we \nshould not be bringing enemy combatants to the United States for \ncivilian trials. If the Obama administration is willing to kill enemy \ncombatants without due process, and I applaud them for doing so, why is \nthe administration so against placing these same enemy combatants in \nmilitary custody and detaining them under the law of war, and when \nappropriate trying them in military commissions? I think the answer is clear. Unfortunately, I am concerned that it is \na political decision rather than putting intelligence gathering first \nin order to protect the American people and treat these enemy \ncombatants as what they are--enemies of our country. I urge my \ncolleagues to support my amendment. In my view, beyond the policy \nreasons for not trying enemy combatants in civilian courts, we should \nask ourselves why should we bring foreign terrorists to the United \nStates and give them the legal protections reserved for U.S. citizens \nand secured by those Americans who have fought and died for those \nrights? Why do these people deserve access to our American court \nsystem? They are our enemies. In the civilian court systems there are \nrights guaranteed, such as Miranda rights and speedy presentment, that \nshould not be extended to enemy combatants. We need to prioritize \nprotecting our country. I think the American people will agree with me \nwhen I say that no terrorist should ever hear the words ``you have the \nright to remain silent.'' I urge my colleagues to support my amendment No. 753.", u"Mr. Speaker, Congress and the American people need to hear the truth about Afghanistan. It is impossible for us to make thoughtful, rational decisions on policy if we do not receive straight, accurate information about the situation on the ground. And we have no right to keep our brave service men and women in harm's way day after day, week after week, based on a steady diet of rosy statements that tell us everything is going well, progress is being made, conditions are improving, and victory is at hand. On January 18, I had the privilege of sitting down with U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis for a special briefing on his assessment of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. He had recently submitted reports in both classified and unclassified versions to his superiors at the Pentagon. I was joined at that briefing by my colleagues Congressman Walter Jones and John Garamendi, and we were not only impressed with Lieutenant Colonel Davis' character, but the information and analysis he shared with us. Simply put, the situation in Afghanistan does not reflect the optimistic statements we repeatedly hear from high military officials and commanders on a regular basis. This week, a great deal of what Lieutenant Colonel Davis told us has appeared in the media in an article he wrote for the Armed Forces Journal, the Nation's oldest independent military magazine, and in The New York Times. Lieutenant Colonel Davis talks about the difficulties of training the Afghan police and military, the challenges facing our own troops to establish sustainable security zones, the rampant corruption, and the great discrepancy between the military's positive public statements and the classified material that contradicts such claims. The briefing with Danny Davis comes close on the heels of a number of articles that appeared toward the end of last year about the more pessimistic conclusions found in the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan. According to the press, the current NIE on Afghanistan recognizes that U.S. policy has not achieved the objectives outlined by the President; that instead it casts doubt on official assertions of progress made by the U.S. Government and military leaders. No one likes to hear bad news, Mr. Speaker, but we do need to hear the unvarnished truth. We need accurate information in order to get a genuine understanding of what the situation is like on the ground in Afghanistan. We need to know the very real challenges faced by our troops and our diplomatic, development, and humanitarian workers every day. As Lieutenant Colonel Davis asserts, the amount of unclassified information available to the American people, the media, and public officials continues to shrink. Ironically, one week before being briefed by Davis, Congressman Walter Jones and I sent a letter on January 12 to the President asking him to declassify and release the 2011 NIE in Afghanistan. We are still waiting for a response to that request. Mr. Speaker, the U.S. has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on military operations in Afghanistan. Over 5,500 Americans were wounded or killed in Afghanistan last year alone. Over the course of a decade, tens of thousands have come home. Many will carry for a lifetime the unseen scars of post-traumatic stress or traumatic brain injury. Like soldiers everywhere, they face a callous and unsympathetic battlefield. They do what is expected of them, and they do it with courage and determination. As my colleagues know, the majority of Americans want a safe and orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan as quickly as possible. I want every single one of our troops home and reunited with their families and loved ones as soon as humanly possible. I want them to be able to leave safely and in a manner that generates confidence in what the next day will bring for Afghanistan and the region. On February 1, the administration announced that it will end U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan at the end of next year. This is welcome news. To ensure that timeline is met and to ensure that our policies and priorities pave the way for a successful transition, we need to know now what the real conditions are on the ground. We can only do that with a clear-eyed, hard-eyed assessment of what is going on in Afghanistan. An unclassified version of Lieutenant Colonel Davis' report can be found at Afghanreport.com. I encourage all my House colleagues to read it. I encourage them to meet with Lieutenant Colonel Davis for a briefing. I urge my House colleagues to ask the President to declassify the 2011 NIE on Afghanistan. And I ask the Pentagon public affairs office to stop stalling and formally approve the release of Lieutenant Colonel Danny Davis' unclassified report.www. Mr. Speaker, the Congress and the people of this country deserve more than a whitewash. Too often over the last decade we have been misled about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Too often Congress has made decisions based on false information, and too many of our brave service men and women have lost their lives. This must change. America needs and deserves the truth. Dear Mr. President: Recent media reports have detailed that the current National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Afghanistan recognizes that U.S. policy has not achieved the objectives you have stated for our nation in Afghanistan. Similar reports were published concerning the 2010 NIE. These reports reinforce outside, independent assessments of the Afghan war and cast doubt on official assertions of progress by the U.S. government and military. Outside of official public statements by U.S. officials, there seems to be near universal recognition that the situation in Afghanistan over the last several years has deteriorated significantly. We are conscious of and sympathetic to the timing of a debate on the Afghan War during an election year. However, as you are aware, the majority of Americans continue to favor an accelerated withdrawal of American troops from the midst of what they rightly recognize as a civil war internal to Afghanistan, one devoid of significant or meaningful al-Qaeda participation. In order to facilitate an honest understanding of America's involvement in Afghanistan we request that you authorize the declassification and release of the 2011 National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan. There are historical precedents for the declassification and release of NIEs. Tragically, there are also historical precedents for inaccurate and misleading public assertions of progress in war by those opposed to bringing military actions to a close. It is haunting in the face of the enormous expenditure of American lives, limbs and resources that progress in Afghanistan may, in fact, be something other than is being represented by those who advocate continued involvement. The American public and its elected representatives deserve to have a full understanding of the situation in and outlook for Afghanistan as understood by our government. Too many families of our service members are sacrificing too greatly to allow for anything else. Respectfully, James P. McGovern, Member of Congress. Walter B. Jones, Member of Congress. Lieutenant Colonel Davis, Death and Deception in Afghanistan ``God help this country when someone sits in this chair who doesn't know the military as well as I do.''--President Dwight D. Eisenhower In late December, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta assured Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA) that the United States was ``making undeniable progress'' in its war in Afghanistan and that a congressionally mandated, independent assessment of the war was ``not necessary.'' However, recent media reports of internal Department of Defense and Intelligence Community assessments of the war contradict, again, claims of progress and illustrate instead that the war is stalemated with US policies over the last several years weakening the Karzai government and alienating the Afghan population, while strengthening the Afghan insurgency and ruining the US relationship with nuclear armed Pakistan. Independent studies of the conflict by non-government and international organizations corroborate these reports and assessments. Today, the New York Times reports that an active duty Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Davis, has submitted a classified report to members of Congress that documents the failings of US policy in Afghanistan. More importantly, LTC Davis attests that senior leaders of the Department of Defense, both uniformed and civilian, have intentionally and consistently misled the American people and Congress on the conduct and progress of the Afghan War. The 58-page classified report he prepared, briefed and submitted to senators, representatives and cleared staff members over the last few weeks utilizes nearly 50 historical and current classified sources and draws from 250 interviews he conducted with soldiers throughout Afghanistan during his most recent year- long combat deployment. In addition to the classified report, LTC Davis has written an 86-page unclassified version, as well as an article, published today by the Armed Forces Journal. These reports depict a near institutionalizing of dishonesty and deception by senior DOD leadership towards the American public and Congress. LTC Davis documents, as well, examples from the Iraq war and major weapons procurement programs to illustrate the persistent duplicity of the Pentagon's senior ranks. Victory narratives, career ambitions and institutional protection fuel these deceits. Deceits that have only delivered the loss of thousands of lives, the waste of hundreds of billions of dollars and the failure to achieve American policy objectives. LTC Davis has submitted his reports to the Department of the Army, his chain of command and the Department of Defense Inspector General. Hard copies of the classified reports are available for viewing by appropriately cleared members and staff of Congress. However, DOD has not publicly released the unclassified version, even with it being verified as not containing classified information. This is in spite of LTC Davis having provided the report for review to the Defense Department over two weeks ago (Defense Department regulations require only a 10 business day review). I am not surprised DOD is slow with its approval; his allegations are harsh and damning, although accurate and honest. Danny Davis is a friend of mine; we have known each other since the fall of 2009. Bonding over coffees and lunches as rightful skeptics of the escalation of the Afghan war, we are now observing our worst concerns being realized. At a cost of over 11,000 killed and wounded Americans, the surge in Afghanistan is now being wound down without the achievement of its core objectives.* However, accompanying such a failure, are triumphant claims of success and accomplishment from American generals and their civilian counterparts. For those that comprehend the true consequences of this war: the cold, waxen dead; the mutilated flesh and shattered bone; the fatherless children so very young and the new widows so alone and so heartbroken; such specious and unfounded claims of progress without fact in this war are reckless, dishonorable and injurious. Over the last several months, at great risk to his career and personal life, LTC Davis has documented the deliberate misleading of the American people and Congress by the leaders of the Department of Defense.** He has done his nation and the United States Army a tremendous service. Thus far the Army has taken no punitive action against LTC Davis, however, I have no doubt his character and motivations will ultimately be attacked and disparaged. I suspect elements of DOD leadership and their supporters will seek to discredit him and persecute him. I am afraid he will face significant, but spurious, investigations and prosecutions for his truth telling actions, such as Justice Department lawyer Thomas Tamm or National Security Agency employee Thomas Drake had to suffer, or that State Department officer Peter Van Buren is currently enduring. Over 5,500 Americans were killed or wounded in Afghanistan in 2011. Tens of thousands who have come home will soldier a lifetime with the unseen scars of post-traumatic stress or traumatic brain injury. Our service members find themselves held to account on a callous and unsympathetic battlefield in a schizophrenic and absurd war. They do what is expected of them and hold themselves responsible to those who depend on them. In contrast, for those in Washington charged with the decisions of war and peace, many of the participants seem to alternate between Pollyannas, chickenhawks and those who have lost sight of the difference between respect for and deference to the military. Any accounting for last year's 5,500 killed and wounded, if the discussants are even aware of the toll, is only a mathematical exercise, and an abstract one at that. We expect our service members in Afghanistan to do the hard, brutal and savage fighting our policies ask of them without question. They do. Their expectation of those of us in Washington, those of us in our heated offices, wearing ties and high heels, who wake each day safe with our families, is that we ask hard questions, examine the reality of the conflict and not accept assertions of success without evidence. The assumptions underlying the escalation of the Afghan war were incorrect. The Afghan surge, viewed by policy makers and some in the military as some form of social experiment to validate personal and institutional legacies and theories, rather than achieve US objectives worthy of bodily sacrifice, is failing. LTC Davis has demonstrated the courage to expose the deceptions that perpetuate this war, its failings and its deaths. It is now up to the American people and its Congress to hold those who were not just wrong, but mendacious, to account. * To be clear, however, continuation of the current war policy would simply be madness. Secretary Panetta's recent announcement to end US combat operations in 2013 is a wise decision (wiser if it had been made in 2009); particularly if this policy shift is coupled with a transition of the role of the US from belligerent in the conflict to mediator of an inclusive political process to settle the three decade plus Afghan war. ** Myself and investigative journalist and historian Gareth Porter, and former intelligence officer and author Tony Shaffer, have provided moral support throughout this process.", u"Mr. Speaker, I rise today to share troubling information that has come to my attention about Huawei, a Chinese telecom firm which is attempting to increase its market share in the U.S. Yesterday, The Wall Street Journal reported that, ``Huawei's network business has thrived at the expense of struggling Western network companies,'' and is ``quietly building and investing in its own brand of high-end smart phones and tablets.'' But many Americans may not be aware that numerous government reports have linked Huawei's corporate leadership to the People's Liberation Army, raising serious concerns about its products being used for espionage by the Chinese Government. Last week, respected national security reporter Bill Gertz wrote: New information about Chinese civilian telecommunications companies' close support of the Chinese military and information warfare programs is raising fresh concerns. That is why both the Bush administration and the Obama administration have repeatedly intervened to block Huawei's growth. Huawei is controlled by the same government that jails Catholic bishops and Protestant pastors, oppresses the Uyghur Muslims, has plundered Tibet, and that is providing the very rockets that Sudanese President Bashir is using to kill his own people. Mr. Speaker, the American people have a right to know whether their government is doing everything it can to protect their cell phone and data networks from foreign espionage and cyberattacks. As Huawei increases its lobbying presence in Washington, the American people should be fully aware of the firm's intimate links to the PLA and the serious concerns of our defense and intelligence community. I rise today to share troubling information that has come to my attention about Huawei, a Chinese telecom firm, which is attempting to increase its market share in the United States and around the world. Numerous government reports have linked Huawei's corporate leadership to the Chinese intelligence services and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), raising concerns about Huawei networks and devices being subject to espionage by the Chinese government. These connections are particularly noteworthy given Huawei's rapid rise as a telecom giant. According to an article in yesterday's Wall Street Journal, ``Huawei Technologies Co. has almost doubled its work force over the past five years as it strives to become a mobile technology heavyweight.'' The article also noted that, ``Huawei's network business has thrived at the expense of struggling Western network companies such as Alcatel-Lucent Co. and Nokia Siemens Networks. Initially, Huawei supplied low-cost phones to telecommunications operators in the West under their own brand, but over the past year, Huawei has also been quietly building and investing in its own brand of high-end smartphones and tablets.'' Huawei executives make no secret of their goal to dominate the telecom market. In a March 6, 2012, interview with the technology news Web site, Engadget, Huawei device chief Richard Yu said, ``In three years we want Huawei to be the industry's top brand.'' However, Huawei's growth in the U.S. market should give all Americans serious pause. Last week, respected national security reporter Bill Gertz wrote in the Washington Free Beacon that, ``New information about Chinese civilian telecommunications companies' close support of the Chinese military and information warfare programs is raising fresh concerns about the companies' access to U.S. markets,'' according to a report by the congressional US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. ``One of the companies identified in the report as linked to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is Huawei Technologies, a global network hardware manufacturer that has twice been blocked by the U.S. government since 2008 from trying to buy into U.S. telecommunications firms.'' The congressional report noted that, ``Huawei is a well established supplier of specialized telecommunications equipment, training and related technology to the PLA that has, along with others such as Zhongxing, and Datang, received direct funding for R&D on C4ISR [high-tech intelligence collection] systems capabilities.'' The report further added, ``All of these [Chinese telecom] firms originated as state research institutes and continue to receive preferential funding and support from the PLA,'' the report said. Huawei's efforts to sell telecom equipment to U.S. networks have long troubled the U.S. defense and intelligence community, which has been concerned that Huawei's equipment could be easily compromised and used in Chinese cyberattacks against the U.S. or to intercept phone calls and e-mails from American telecom networks. According to a 2005 report by the RAND Corporation, ``both the [Chinese] government and the military tout Huawei as a national champion,'' and ``one does not need to dig too deeply to discover that [many Chinese information technology and telecommunications firms] are the public face for, sprang from, or are significantly engaged in joint research with state research institutes under the Ministry of Information Industry, defense-industrial corporations, or the military.'' In fact, in 2009, the Washington Post reported that the National Security Agency ``called AT&T because of fears that China's intelligence agencies could insert digital trapdoors into Huawei's technology that would serve as secret listening posts in the U.S. communications network.'' Over the last several years, Huawei's top executives' deep connections to the People's Liberation Army and Chinese intelligence have been well documented. As Gertz summarized in his article, ``A U.S. intelligence report produced last fall stated that Huawei Technologies was linked to the Ministry of State Security, specifically through Huawei's chairwoman, Sun Yafang, who worked for the Ministry of State Security (MSS) Communications Department before joining the company.'' That is why senior administration officials in the Bush and Obama administrations have repeatedly intervened to block Huawei's access to U.S. networks. ``In 2008, the Treasury Department-led Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) blocked Huawei from purchasing the U.S. telecommunications firm 3Com due to the company's links to the Chinese military,'' Gertz reported. ``Last year, under pressure from the U.S. government, Huawei abandoned their efforts to purchase the U.S. server technology company 3Leaf. In 2010, Congress opposed Huawei's proposal to supply mobile telecommunications gear to Sprint over concerns that Sprint was a major supplier to the U.S. military and intelligence agencies.'' It's not just Huawei's longstanding and tight connections to Chinese intelligence that should trouble us. Huawei has also been a leading supplier of critical telecom services to some of the worst regimes around the world. Last year, the Wall Street Journal reported that Huawei ``now dominates Iran's government-controlled mobile-phone industry . . . it plays a role in enabling Iran's state security network.'' Gertz reported that Huawei has also been ``linked to sanctions-busting in Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the 1990s, when the company helped network Iraqi air defenses at a time when U.S. and allied jets were flying patrols to enforce a no-fly zone. The company also worked with the Taliban during its short reign in Afghanistan to install a phone system in Kabul.'' Mr. Speaker, given all of this information, there should be no doubt Huawei poses a serious national and economic security threat to the U.S. It is no secret that the People's Republic of China has developed the most aggressive espionage operation in modern history, especially given its focus on cyberattacks and cyberespionage. Perhaps that is why Beijing has ensured that Huawei is able to continue its global market growth by ``unsustainably low prices and [Chinese] goverment export assistance,'' according to January 2011 congressional report on the national security implications of Chinese telecom companies. Due to China's secrecy, the full extent of Huawei's subsidies are not be fully known. But given its unrealistically low prices, it remains unknown whether Huawei is even making a profit as it seeks to dominate the telecom market. Why would the Chinese government be willing to generously subsidize such unprofitable products? Earlier this year, The Economist magazine published a special report on Communist Party management of Chinese corporations. The Economist reported that, ``The [Communist] party has cells in most big companies--in the private as well as state-owned sector--complete with their own offices and files on employees. It holds meetings that shadow formal board meetings and often trump their decisions'' The Chinese even have an expression for this strategy: ``The state advances while the private sector retreats.'' Author Richard McGregor wrote that the executives at Chinese companies have a ``red machine'' with an encrypted line to Beijing next to their Bloomberg terminals and personal items on their desks. Last year, the Financial Times reported that the PLA has even documented how it will use telecom firms for foreign espionage and cyberattacks. A paper published in the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences' journal noted: ``[These cyber militia] should preferably be set up in the telecom sector, in the electronics and internet industries and in institutions of scientific research,'' and its tasks should include ``stealing, changing and erasing data'' on enemy networks and their intrusion with the goal of ``deception, jamming, disruption, throttling and paralysis.'' The same article also documented the growing number PLA-led cyber militias housed in ``private'' Chinese telecom firms. The article reported on one example at the firm Nanhao: ``many of its 500 employees in Hengshui, just south-west of Beijing, have a second job. Since 2005 Nanhao has been home to a cybermilitia unit organized by the People's Liberation Army. The Nanhao operation is one of thousands set up by the Chinese military over the past decade in technology companies and universities around the country. These units form the backbone of the country's internet warfare forces, increasingly seen as a serious threat at a time of escalating global cybertensions. Senior U.S. military and intelligence officials have become increasingly vocal about their concerns about the scope of Chinese espionage and cyberattacks. According to recent testimony given before the Senate, Defense Intelligence Agency chief General Ron Burgess said, ``China has used its intelligence services to gather information via a significant network of agents and contacts using a variety of methods . . . In recent years, multiple cases of economic espionage and theft of dual-use and military technology have uncovered pervasive Chinese collection efforts.'' Last year, the reticent Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive issued a warning that, ``Chinese actors are the world's most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage.'' The counterintelligence office took this rare step of singling out the Chinese due to the severity of the threat to U.S. national and economic security. And March 8, 2012 Washington Post article described how, ``For a decade or more, Chinese military officials have talked about conducting warfare in cyberspace, but in recent years they have progressed to testing attack capabilities during exercises . . . The [PLA] probably would target transportation and logistics networks before an actual conflict to try to delay or disrupt the United States' ability to fight, according to the report prepared by Northrop Grumman for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.'' We are beginning to witness the consequences of this strategy. According to a March 13, 2012 New York Times article, ``During the five-month period between October and February, there were 86 reported attacks on computer systems in the United States that control critical infrastructure, factories and databases, according to the Department of Homeland Security, compared with 11 over the same period a year ago.'' In an interview with the New York Times, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said, ``I think General Dempsey said it best when he said that prior to 9/11, there were all kinds of information out there that a catastrophic attack was looming. The information on a cyberattack is at the same frequency and intensity and is bubbling at the same level, and we should not wait for an attack in order to do something.'' A 2010 Pentagon report found ``. . . In the case of key national security technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials not readily obtainable through commercial means or academia, the People's Republic of China resorts to more focused efforts, including the use of its intelligence services and other-than legal means, in violation of U.S. laws and export controls.'' The report also highlighted China's cyber-espionage efforts. The U.S. intelligence community notes that China's attempts to penetrate U.S. agencies are the most aggressive of all foreign intelligence organizations. Notably, Chinese espionage isn't limited to government agencies. In an October 4 Washington Post article, Rep. Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, remarked, ``When you talk to these companies behind closed doors, they describe attacks that originate in China, and have a level of sophistication and are clearly supported by a level of resources that can only be a nation-state entity.'' This prolific espionage is having a real and corrosive effect on job creation. Last year, the Washington Post reported that, ``The head of the military's U.S. Cyber Command, Gen. Keith Alexander, said that one U.S. company recently lost $1 billion worth of intellectual property over the course of a couple of days--`technology that they'd worked on for 20-plus years--stolen by one of the adversaries.' '' That is why, in February 2012 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence FBI Director Robert Mueller said that while terrorism is the greatest threat today, ``down the road, the cyber threat will be the number one threat to the country.'' Mr. Speaker, I firmly believe that Huawei is one face of this emerging threat. And the American people have a right to know whether their government is doing everything it can to protect their cell phone and data networks. As Huawei increases its lobbying presence in Washington, members should be fully aware of the firm's intimate links to the PLA and the serious concerns of our defense and intelligence community. Verizon, Sprint, AT&T, T-Mobile and other U.S. network carriers should not be selling Huawei devices given these security concerns. But if they do, they have an obligation to inform their customers of these threats. This is especially important when carriers are selling Huawei phones and tablets to corporate customers. They have a right to know that Beijing may be listening.", u"Madam President, our Nation's inadequate cybersecurity poses an ever-growing threat to our safety, our prosperity, and our privacy. Attackers go after our intellectual property, our national security, and our critical infrastructure. The McAfee Night Dragon Report, for example, concluded that foreign intruders had access to major oil, energy, and petrochemical companies' computer networks for at least 2 years and likely as many as 4 years. Government reports are equally sobering, though usually classified. One that is not classified is the Department of Homeland Security report recently that attacks on computer systems that control critical infrastructure, factories, and databases increased almost eightfold in just the last 12 months. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has warned that ``the next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a cyber attack.'' Majority Leader Reid has recognized the severity of this national and economic security threat and intends to bring cybersecurity legislation to the Senate floor soon. We recognize too the hard work of Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins of the Homeland Security Committee, as well as Chairman Feinstein of the Intelligence Committee, and Senator Rockefeller of the Commerce Committee. The Cybersecurity Act of 2012, which they introduced--and I am proud to cosponsor--is a good start toward addressing the many cybersecurity threats that face this Nation. The SECURE IT Act, introduced by Senator McCain and seven colleagues, seeks to improve the sharing of cybersecurity threat information; the Federal Information Security Management Act, or FISMA, which governs cybersecurity at Federal agencies; and our cyber research and development. There is considerable overlap between these bills, which signals that the Senate could legislate on cybersecurity in a bipartisan and serious manner. Support for cybersecurity legislation is also bicameral. The Cybersecurity Task Force constituted by House Republicans produced recommendations that share key points with our Cybersecurity Act of 2012. Numerous bills are working their way through the House on a bipartisan basis. Central to that work in the House are the contributions of Rhode Island Congressman Jim Langevin. His leadership is a major reason the House has come to recognize the dangerous vulnerabilities within our critical infrastructure and that we now stand on the verge of a breakthrough in improving the security of those networks. When a test at the Idaho National Labs showed hackers could blow up a power generator from thousands of miles away, Congressman Langevin brought the owners and operators of our electric grid before Congress and investigated their promise the issue was being addressed. When he found out that wasn't true, he called them out. His subsequent work as a cochair of the Center for Strategic and International Study Commission on Cybersecurity, along with other experts from within and outside of government, resulted in many of the recommendations reflected in our legislation. Then, in 2010, Congressman Langevin passed a landmark cybersecurity amendment in the House that provided a legislative template for setting standards for critical infrastructure. I thank Jim Langevin, my colleague from Rhode Island, for his relentless commitment to keeping America safe in cyberspace. I am here this morning to stress four points I believe we must keep in mind as we take up cybersecurity legislation. The first is that cybersecurity legislation should improve the public's limited awareness of current cybersecurity threats and the harm those threats present to our national security economy and privacy. The public, for years, has been kept in the dark, and that is wrong. The corporate sector systematically underreports cyber attacks for fear of scaring customers, for fear of encouraging competitors or for fear of triggering regulatory review. I was pleased the Securities and Exchange Commission, after prompting by Senator Rockefeller and myself and others, issued guidance for when registered companies must disclose breach information. The government itself systematically underreports cyber attacks because it overclassifies information about cyber attacks on government systems. Jim Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example, recently explained that cybersecurity has a unique problem in that some of the most reliable data is classified. It was a rare exception when a November 2011 report by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive identified China and Russia as responsible for the systematic theft of American intellectual property through cyber espionage. The legislation that we pass must shed light on the scale and severity of the cyber threat to the American public. In that vein, I am pleased the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 includes provisions from the Cybersecurity Public Awareness Act, S. 813, which I introduced with Senator Kyl. These provisions will at least begin to improve the public's awareness of the current cyber threat environment we face. Second, we must recognize that inadequate awareness and inadequate protection against cyber risks is endemic among our largest corporations. Part of the problem is a gulf in cybersecurity awareness between corporate chief information officers and corporate CEOs. Carnegie Mellon's CyLab recently reported: Boards and senior management still are not exercising appropriate governance over the privacy and security of their digital assets . . . These findings are consistent with the complaints by CISO/CSOs that they cannot get the attention of their senior management and boards and their budgets are inadequate . . . There is still an apparent disconnect. Nor is this an area in which the market can be trusted to work. As former Bush Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff has explained: The marketplace is likely to fail in allocating the correct amount of investment to manage risk across the breadth of the networks on which our society relies. This is not an area where corporations manage adequately on their own. FBI Director Robert Mueller recently explained: There are only two types of companies: those that have been hacked and those that will be. Even more trenchant, the McAfee report on the ``Shady RAT'' attacks similarly stated it is possible to divide ``the entire set of Fortune Global 2,000 firms into two categories: those that know they've been compromised and those that don't yet know.'' Kevin Mandia of the leading security firm Mandiant has explained: [I]n over 90 percent of the cases we have responded to, government notification was required to alert the company that a security breach was underway. In our last 50 incidents, 48 of the victim companies learned they were breached from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Defense or some other third party. The National Cybersecurity Investigation Joint Task Force, led by the FBI, told me the same thing: more than 90 percent of the time the corporate victim had no idea. What we can conclude from this is that improved sharing of cybersecurity threat information is necessary but is not sufficient to protect our Nation's cybersecurity. Even a perfect information-sharing process will not prevent cyber attacks if the information being shared is incomplete. The blindness of most corporations to this threat limits the effectiveness of corporate-to-corporate information sharing. The NSA's Defense Industrial Base pilot--the so-called ``DIB'' pilot--proved the government can share classified information with trusted corporations, but it revealed significant risks and limitations, particularly if the government were to share its most sensitive intelligence information with a broad set of private companies. The third point I want to make this morning, and perhaps the most important, is that this legislation on cybersecurity will have failed if it does not ensure that our American critical infrastructure has adequate cybersecurity. There must be a process for identifying critical infrastructure, establishing appropriate security standards, and ensuring that critical infrastructure companies meet the standard. If an attack comes, we must be sure that America's most capable defenses and countermeasures are pre-positioned to defend critical American infrastructure. We simply cannot wait until an attack is underway on basic needs and services on which we depend, such as our electric grid, our communications networks, and the servers that process our financial transactions. So there are two measures here: One is that we must have a way to define critical infrastructure so we know what it is and, just as important from a civil liberties perspective, we know what it isn't. When we identify critical infrastructure on which our safety and economic and national security depend, we are also defining what does not qualify and where privacy concerns can be much more important than national security concerns. Nobody wants government in our chat rooms, e-mails, or social media; everyone gets why government should protect the electric grids that bring power to our homes. The second is that once we identify our critical infrastructure, we need to find a way for our national security assets to protect that critical infrastructure. Our government has unique capabilities to protect those basics, such as our electric grid. As Kevin Mandia has explained: Some of this information can be disclosed, but some cannot be, in order to protect sensitive sources and methods. This requires us to find other ways for our most sophisticated government capabilities to protect our critical infrastructure. For example, we should think seriously about the concept of secure domains and how they can be deployed effectively while protecting civil liberties. I am glad section 804 of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 takes on that task by requiring expert study of the advantages and disadvantages of establishing secure domains for critical infrastructure. If the business community can identify a workable alternative approach, such as a voluntary or opt-in regulatory system, I am willing to get to work, but we must not balk at taking on the hard question of how to secure our critical American infrastructure. The last point I want to make today is that Congress, in this bill, should consider the appropriate structure and resources for the cybersecurity and cyber crime mission of the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and law enforcement components of the Department of Homeland Security. We do not do enough to investigate, prosecute, and take other appropriate legal action against cyber crime, cyber espionage and other cyber threats. Last year's takedown by the Department of Justice of the Coreflood botnet should be a regular occurrence, not a special occurrence. But it will not be--it cannot be--with our current cyber crime resources. The technical, international, and legal aspects of these investigations are too complex. I spent 4 years as a United States attorney, I spent 4 years as our State's attorney general. These are astonishingly complicated and difficult cases. They are massively resource intensive. So it is time for a fundamental rethinking of cyber law enforcement resources: both the level of resources and the manner in which they are structured. We should be discussing whether cyber crime should have a dedicated investigatory agency akin to the DEA or ATF or whether existing task force models should be used. These are important questions the legislation has not addressed. Accordingly, I plan to offer a floor amendment that will require an expert study of our current cyber law enforcement resources that can recommend a proper level of funding and structure of forces going forward. Once again, I thank my colleagues for their hard work to date on cybersecurity issues. I urge that all of us join together to pass cybersecurity legislation into law as soon as possible. Two years ago, I said that because of cyber we in the United States are on the losing end of the largest transfer of wealth through theft and piracy in the history of the world. GEN Keith Alexander, who leads the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, has reached the same conclusion when saying recently that cyber theft is ``the greatest transfer of wealth in history.'' McAfee likewise has recently evaluated the theft of national secrets, source code, designs, and other documents, and concluded that what ``we have witnessed over the past 5 to 6 years has been nothing short of a historically unprecedented transfer of wealth.'' We are the losers in that transfer of wealth. We cannot afford to wait to address this enormous and ever-growing threat. I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, I will take my time now and talk about a number of things. The first thing I wish to mention is that my friend the Republican leader talked about the fact that the President has not done enough to create jobs. Mr. President, we all have heard that longstanding joke--in fact, it was not a joke. I represented a young man who murdered his parents, and the joke during that period of time was, I guess now your defense is going to be that he is going to claim he is an orphan. There was nothing novel or new or unique in the experience I had representing that young man who had killed his parents, but the Republican leader's remarks remind me of that. He is saying that the problem with this country is President Obama. That is like the fact that someone kills their parents and then claims they are an orphan. Republicans have blocked bill after bill after bill. These pieces of legislation have been suggested by, introduced by friends of President Obama. These were all job-creating bills, and simply every one of these, with rare exception, has been stopped on a procedural basis by the Republicans. Then the Republican leader cites nonrelevant Republican amendments they would like to offer on the farm bill as ways to create jobs. But it is precisely these nonrelevant, nongermane amendments that keep the Senate from doing its work--its job-creating work--like the farm bill. The farm bill involves 16 million people who work doing farm programs. We have not done one in 5 years. The highway bill is something we are waiting for Republicans in the House to move with us on. So I would just simply say that we live in a world that is imperfect. We live in a country that is imperfect. But let's give credit where credit is due. President Obama and this administration found themselves in a terribly deep hole when he was elected 3\\1/2\\ years ago. The administration he replaced lost more than 8 million jobs--about 1 million jobs a year in the prior administration. And President Obama has had 27 straight months of private sector job creation. So I think we deserve and he deserves some credit for the work he has done in that regard. So I really strongly object to the Republican leader's remarks. It is just simply wrong. And if we had some cooperation from my friends on the other side of the aisle, as we say, we would have a lot more jobs created in this country. But my friend has said that his No. 1 issue is to defeat President Obama, and that is what has happened here. We simply have not been able to legislate appropriately because that is their mantra. Cybersecurity Mr. President, technology has changed our world, and that is an understatement. It has changed the way we shop, the way we bank, even the way we travel. It changes the way we get information, and that is an understatement, and the way we share it, and that is an understatement. It was about 10 years ago or so that I decided to sell my home here in the suburbs, and I was stunned by one of my boys telling me: Hey, Dad, do you want to find out what other homes have been selling for around that area? Give me about a minute. And they pulled up on the computer every home in that area that had been sold in the last 2 years--when, how much. There was even more detail than that. I was like: How do you do that? That was 10 years ago. That was in the Dark Ages with technology. There is so much that can be done now. Somebody can go online, go to Amazon, they can buy virtually anything in the world on that one Web site. I met with someone a couple weeks ago who had gone to work with Google when they had 15 employees, and he talked to us about the tremendous problems they had starting this company. They wanted to give people information. I will not go into all the details, but it was very difficult to come up with the Google that now exists. It was not there when there were 15 employees. They were working all night long trying to shut down computers and keep others going. So it is amazing what we have on the computer. Everyone can do it. Who wrote that song? What is the name of that play? What is the capital of Uzbekistan? Go to our BlackBerry. Go to whatever we have and get it in a second. So the way we get information, the way we share it, has changed so dramatically. It has changed the way our country protects itself. That is not something people understand as well as Google and Amazon. But the way we protect our country has changed. It has changed the type of attacks we have to guard against. Some of the top national security officials, including GEN Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN David Petraeus, four-star general, now head of the CIA, one of America's great patriots, and Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense, have all said that malicious cyber attacks are the most urgent threat to our country, not North Korea, not Iran, not Pakistan, not Afghanistan but cyber attacks. We have already seen some of these. They have been kind of quiet to some but not to those in the security field. We have seen cyber attacks on our nuclear infrastructure, our Defense Department's most advanced weapons, and the stock exchange Nasdaq had an attack. Most major corporations have been attacked. They spend huge amounts of money protecting their products or their operations from not collapsing because of cyber attacks. Cyber attacks do not threaten only our national security, they threaten our economic security. These attacks cost our economy billions of dollars every year, millions of dollars every hour, and thousands of jobs. So we need to act quickly to pass legislation to make our Nation safer and protect American jobs. The Defense Department, Department of Homeland Security, and experts from across the intelligence community have issued chilling warnings about the seriousness of this threat. I cannot stress enough how concerned people who understand security feel about this. Just a few days ago, Senator McConnell and I received a letter from a remarkable bipartisan group of former national security officials, Democrats and Republicans. The group includes six former Bush and Obama administration officials: Michael Chertoff, who has been a circuit court judge, judicial scholar, became head of the Department of Homeland Security during some very difficult times we had in this country; Paul Wolfowitz, who has been advising Presidents for decades; ADM Mike McConnell; GEN Michael Hayden; GEN James Cartwright, William Lynn, III. That is who signed the letter, and I could give a short dissertation on every one of these individuals about what they know about the security of our country. The letter presented the danger in stark terms, as stark as I could ever imagine. This is a public letter. Listen to what this one paragraph says: ``We carry the burden of knowing that 9/11 might have been averted with intelligence that existed at the time.'' Listen to that. They are admitting 9/11 could have been averted with the tools we had at hand. They go on to say: We do not want to be in the same position again when ``cyber 9/11'' hits--it is not a question of whether this will happen; it is a question of when. This is not me saying this. This is General Hayden, who was the head of the CIA, briefing us many times about some of the most sensitive matters going on during the height of the Iraq war, Marine GEN James Cartwright, Defense Department expert William Lynn, III. This eminent group called the threat of a cyber attack imminent. What does imminent mean? It means now. They said it ``represents the most serious challenge to our national security since the onset of the nuclear age sixty years ago.'' Let me reread that. They said it ``represents the most serious challenge to our national security since the onset of the nuclear age sixty years ago.'' They said it; I did not. The letter noted that the top cybersecurity priority is safeguarding critical infrastructure: computer networks--we talked about those a little bit already. But computer networks that control our electrical grid, our water supply, our sewers, our nuclear plants, energy pipelines, communication systems and financial systems and more. Because of Senator Mikulski--she was the one who said this was important--we did this. We went down to this classified room. We had a briefing on an example of what would happen to New York City if they took down the computer system to run that State's electricity. It would be disastrous, not only for New York but for our country. These vital networks must be required to meet minimum cybersecurity standards. That is what these prominent Americans believe, and so do I. The letter was clear that securing the infrastructure must be part of any cybersecurity legislation this Congress considers. I believe that also. GEN Keith Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency, has said something very similar. This is what he wrote to Senator McCain recently: Critical infrastructure protection needs to be addressed in any cyber security legislation. The risk is simply too great considering the reality of our interconnected and interdependent world. General Alexander is one voice among many. President Obama; the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Cyber Security; the two Chairmen of the 9/11 Commission, Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton; the Director of National Intelligence, General Clapper; the Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, have all echoed a call to action--not sometime in the distant future but now. They believe the attack is imminent. The attack may not be one that knocks down buildings, starts fires that we saw on 9/11, but it will be a different kind of attack, even more destructive. The entire national security establishment, including leading officials of the Bush and Obama administrations, civilian and military leaders, Republicans and Democrats, agree on the urgent need to protect this vital infrastructure. That is only part of it. Yet some key Republicans continue to argue that we should do nothing to secure the critical infrastructure, that we should just focus on the military. When virtually every intelligence expert says we need to secure the systems that make the lights come on, inaction is not an option. A coalition of Democrats and Republicans, including the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, Senator Lieberman, and the ranking member, Senator Collins; the chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Rockefeller--remember, Senator Rockefeller was for years chairman of the Intelligence Committee and/or the ranking member; Senator Feinstein, now the chair of the Intelligence Committee, have joined together and proposed one approach to address the problem. It is legislation. It is not something that is theoretical. It is not an issue paper. It is legislation. Their bill is an excellent piece of legislation. It has been endorsed by many members of the national security community. It is a good approach, and it would make our Nation safer. But there are other possible solutions to this urgent challenge. Unfortunately, the critics of the bill have failed to offer any alternatives to secure our Nation's critical infrastructure. The longer we argue over how to tackle these problems, the longer our powerplants, financial system, and water infrastructure go unprotected. Everyone knows this Congress cannot pass laws that do not have broad bipartisan support. There are 53 of us, 47 of them. So we will need to work together on a bill that addresses the concerns of the lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. But for that to happen, more of my Republican colleagues need to start taking this threat seriously. It is time for them to participate productively in the conversation instead of just criticizing the current approach. There is room for more good ideas on the table, and I welcome the discussion of any Republican generally interested in being part of the solution. The national security experts agree. We cannot afford to waste any more time. The question is not whether to act but how quickly we can act. I put everyone on notice. We are going to move to this bill at the earliest possible date.", u"Mr. President, I am here this afternoon to speak about the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, the measure that is on the Senate floor right now. This important bill addresses a serious and immediate threat to our Nation's security. I served 4 years on the Intelligence Committee during which I worked hard to understand the cyber security threat. I helped Senator Mikulski and Senator Snowe write the Senate Intelligence Committee Cyber Security Report. I am the chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism that has jurisdiction over cyber security. As I have explained before on the floor of the Senate, the cyber threat against our Nation--against our intellectual property, against our privacy, and against our safety--is vast and it is upon us. It is a national security threat. It is a national economic threat. We cannot afford to wait to pass legislation to respond to this threat. The leading national security experts in each party agree: Now is the time to pass comprehensive cyber security legislation. The Cybersecurity Act of 2012 is a strong, comprehensive bill that will make our Nation safer. It will provide for the sharing of threat information between the government and private sector, and it will provide for the hardening, for the protection of the networks of the private companies that operate America's critical infrastructure--that run our electric grid, that run our financial networks, that run our communications systems and the other infrastructure that is essential to conducting the day-to-day way of life Americans enjoy, that is essential to our national security and to our economic well-being. The Senate voted to proceed to this bill in a very broad, bipartisan manner--84 votes, as I recall. It has been disappointing in the wake of that that some elements within the business community are failing to cooperate, are failing to, for instance, provide constructive suggestions in areas where they have disagreement with this important legislation. Indeed, some appear intent on just preventing the Senate from passing legislation that would make us all safer. In some cases these interests are not negotiating to get a bill that protects their interests. They are blockading to stop a bill that will protect all of our interests. To put this blockade into context, consider the views of GEN Keith Alexander, the Director of the National Security Agency and of United States Cyber Command. General Alexander is the most senior and respected cyber security expert in our Nation's military. He runs our two most technically sophisticated and skilled cyber operations. Today he wrote: The cyber threat facing the Nation is real and demands immediate action. The time to act is now; we simply cannot afford further delay. Moreover, to be most effective in protecting against this threat to our national security, cyber security legislation should address both information sharing and core critical infrastructure hardening. The Cybersecurity Act addresses both of those issues, information sharing and core critical infrastructure hardening. It does what our military's leading cyber security expert says is necessary to be done to protect the Nation. That, then, is the view of the leader of our military cyber warriors and cyber defenders based on both deep experience and access to the most deeply classified information held by the U.S. Government. In contrast, industry arguments against cyber security legislation appear to have been developed with little or no awareness of the threat facing our Nation. Kevin Mandia of the leading security firm Mandiant has explained, for example, that ``in over 90 percent of the cases we have responded to, government notification was required to alert the company that a security breach was underway. In our last 50 incidents, `` he said, ``48 of the victim companies learned they were breached from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Defense, or some other third party.'' The FBI's experience was similar. When the FBI-led National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force informs the corporation it has been hacked, 9 times out of 10, the FBI reports, the corporation had no idea. In Operation Aurora, the cyber attack which targeted numerous companies, only 3 out of the approximately 300 companies attacked were aware that they had been attacked before they were contacted by the government. These are not unique incidents. Globally, I have said, General Alexander has said, and others have said that America is right now on the losing end of the largest illicit transfer of wealth in human history through cyber attack and through the theft through cyber attack of our intellectual property. So this is an industrywide problem. Even the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been the completely unwitting victim of a long-term and extensive cyber intrusion. Just last year the Wall Street Journal reported that a group of hackers in China breached the computer defenses of the U.S. Chamber, gained access to everything stored on its systems, including information about its 3 million members, and remained on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's network for at least 6 months and possibly more than a year. The chamber only learned of the break-in when the FBI told the group that servers in China were stealing its information. Even after the chamber was notified and increased its cyber security, the article stated that the chamber continued to experience suspicious activity, including a ``thermostat at a townhouse the Chamber owns on Capitol Hill . . . communicating with an Internet address in China . . . and . . . a printer used by Chamber executives spontaneously . . . printing pages with Chinese characters.'' These are the people we are supposed to listen to about cyber security. A recent Bloomberg News article makes it clear that this was not an isolated incident. It describes how hackers linked to China's army have been seen on the networks of a vast array of American businesses. The article describes how what started as assaults on military and defense contractors have widened into a rash of attacks from which no corporate entity is safe. Among other cyber attacks, Bloomberg News reported, the networks of major oil companies have been harvested for seismic maps charting oil reserves--it saves work if you can steal that information rather than find it yourself-- patent law firms have been hacked for their clients' trade secrets--again, free access to valuable information--and investment banks have been hacked into for market analysis that might impact the global ventures of certain state-owned--nation-state-owned, foreign-country-owned operations. After having been victimized repeatedly by cyber attacks and having learned about them only when the government arrived to help them fix the problem, one would think critical infrastructure operators or their representatives would be keenly aware of the urgent need for cyber security legislation. One would think they might come to this issue with some sense of humility based on the patent inadequacy of their defenses. One would think that elected officials sworn to the protection of this country might view with some caution and some skepticism claims by folks who are hacked and penetrated virtually at will, usually without even knowing about it, that they can handle this just fine on their own. Yet industry opposition remains, even after the bill has been revised to include a very business-friendly, voluntary, incentive-based approach to hardening up critical infrastructure that we all depend on. Unfortunately, some colleagues can only hear the siren song of the industry lobbyists, even with plain and ominous national security threats staring them in the face. Some in industry claim that a bill with only information sharing between the government and business would be sufficient and that protection of critical infrastructure is not necessary. This premise is wrong. Statements to the contrary are simply false. Such assertions have been repudiated by the people who lead the charge with our Nation's defense, and who have been confirmed in these roles by the Senate who have repeatedly, and as recently as today, emphasized the need to protect critical infrastructure. These officials include Secretary of Defense Panetta, Director of National Intelligence Clapper, Attorney General Holder, Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano, and others. Indeed, it is not just this administration that holds this view. A wide range of national security experts from previous Republican administrations have emphasized the vulnerability of our critical infrastructure, including former Director of National Intelligence and NSA Director ADM Mike McConnell, former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, and former assistant attorney general OLC, and now Harvard Law School professor Jack Goldsmith. These people know what they are talking about, they are not kidding around, and they deserve to be listened to. Secretary Chertoff has explained that the existing status quo is not generating adequate cyber security for our critical infrastructure. The marketplace, former Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff has explained, is likely to fail in allocating the correct amount of investment to manage risk across the breadth of the networks on which our society relies. One example of this type of market failure is the decision of gas, electric power, and water utility industries to forgo implementation of a powerful new encryption system to shield substations, pipeline compressors, and other key infrastructure from cyber attack because of cost concerns. It should be noted the costs in this case would be approximately $500 per vulnerable device, and they still would not do it. The unwillingness of industry to adopt necessary security standards is particularly troubling when we consider the scope and scale of the risks associated with a failure of critical infrastructure. The current electricity grid knocked down in India--leaving 600 million people without power--shows how bad things can get when critical infrastructure fails. The cause of this massive failure is not clear, and there is not yet any evidence that it was caused by a cyber attack, but it vividly illustrates the vulnerability of humankind when the critical infrastructure we depend on is knocked down and of the terrible possible consequences of the failure of that critical infrastructure. The scale of the threat we face, the plain inadequacy of current safeguards in the corporate sector, and the consequences of failure in this area of critical infrastructure all join together to demand passage of comprehensive cyber security legislation. This is a matter of national security. It is our responsibility here in this building to do what we can to make the Nation safer regardless of any parochial interests. Now is the time for us all to come together to get this important job done. I will conclude by saying we are tantalizingly close to having an agreement. If people will take one last step forward to get that agreement, I think we can do it. If people back away because of the urging of parochial interests, we will fail at this opportunity. I want to conclude by expressing my congratulations to the chairman of the committee on Homeland Security and his ranking member who have worked hard and who have given an enormous amount. We began with a traditional government-run regulatory procedure, which is one that everybody is familiar with and has lots of checks and balances in it, but it is also a fairly mandatory and top-controlled procedure. As a result of considerable bipartisan discussions, a new model emerged that allows the industry immense independence and control in this area. The regime it has been moved to is a huge step by the chairman and the ranking member and begins with the rule that originates in the private sector, has it vetted by experts from the private sector, has a national institute for science and technology review as well, ends up with an array of government agencies approving or disapproving that, and whatever standard is ultimately approved by the government council of agencies, the industry companies are free to opt in or opt out. If they think the regulation is unreasonable, they are at liberty to opt out entirely. A comprehensive liability protection structure has been created as an inducement for companies to participate, but it is a strong and powerful check on the standard-setting apparatus that ultimately the industry can choose to opt out if it is unreasonable. An enormous step has been taken by the authors of the current bill toward a compromise. We need a step coming back the other way in order to get this done. I see my distinguished colleague from Tennessee is here. Let me take one moment as I yield to express my appreciation to Nick Patterson of the Department of Justice who has been on my staff on assignment from the national security division for months and months working on this issue. Today is his last day. I want to thank him for his work on this effort. I want to thank the Department of Justice for loaning him to me and having them lose this valuable member of their national security division to help us develop this legislation. He has been a valuable part of an immensely capable team in my office, led by Stephen Lilley, that has gotten us to at least where I am today on this legislation. I thank the Presiding Officer, and I thank the Senator from Tennessee for his courtesy. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, I haven't been able to watch all the speeches by my friends on the other side of the aisle, but I have watched enough to understand what is going on. This has been a remarkable show of hubris or arrogance from the Republican side of the aisle. One after another, the Republicans have stood to complain about how the Senate hasn't gotten a lot done. The Presiding Officer has been one of the leaders in having a more effective Senate, because my friend, the Presiding Officer, has watched what the Republicans have done. We are going to do something about it. The Presiding Officer knows that, I know that. What they have done is the very definition of chutzpah. The nerve. What nerve. They are complaining about a result that they themselves created. They have created the fact that we haven't gotten anything done. They are good at it. A bill that would allow veterans to get jobs, they stopped it on a technicality. They have conducted filibuster after filibuster, blocking one bill after another, and then they complain the Senate can't pass anything when they are the ones holding things up. The record is pretty detailed and deep, and I am not going to cover it all today because, really, it is significant. I said here yesterday, I have been the leader for 6 years. I may be off 1 or 2, but I have had to file motions to overcome 382 filibusters in 6 years. I know the Senate has changed a little bit since Lyndon Johnson was the majority leader, but during the 6 years he was the majority leader, he had to file cloture once. To think that they are here complaining we are not getting anything done when they are the ones who caused it? And we start from this point. I have to say, I appreciate the Republican leader being so candid and honest with the American people when he stood at the beginning of this Congress and said his No. 1 goal was to stop President Obama from being reelected. That is what he said. And they have legislated accordingly, stopping us from doing the most important things for this country. Measures to create jobs, they have stopped. Measures to stop jobs from being lost, they have stopped. They have done it so many times. How about this: We have lost approximately 1 million teachers, firefighters, and police officers because of Republicans stopping us from get things done, really hurting State and local government. So we over here thought it would be a good idea that we stop these significant layoffs of teachers, firefighters, and police officers. We want to make sure it is paid for and we agree it should be paid for. So we said, Okay, no more layoffs of teachers, firefighters, and police officers, and we are going to pay for it. How are we going to pay for it? Anyone making more than $1 million a year would have to pay a surtax of three-tenths of 1 percent. Every Republican voted against that. The Veterans Jobs bill I just talked about. The cyber security bill. The Pentagon has said the most important issue facing this country is cyber security. The National Security Agency: The most issue facing this country? Cyber security. We know, they know, the Republicans know, because they were down at the same demonstration I had of our intelligence agency showing what would happen if a cyber security attack took place in the Northeast just dealing with the power grid. We know it can happen. I have heard Senator Feinstein, the chairman of our Intelligence Committee, say several times it is not a question of if, it is a question of when. The Republicans blocked a cyber security bill, stopped it. They have conducted filibuster after filibuster, blocking one bill after another. They blocked a bill to stop outsourcing jobs--more than once. On all these TV ads that you see, we thought it would be kind of a good idea that the American people knew who was paying for these ads. But, no, twice they said let's keep them secret--Crossroads USA or whatever name they have there, all these names that sound so good. But I think we would be better served if people knew the ads were being paid by the Koch brothers or Sheldon Adelson from Las Vegas or Simmons from Texas who is boasting about giving $34 million to defeat President Obama. And that is what the Republican leader wants. On the passage of several small business jobs bills, one July 12, just a month or two ago; the motion to proceed to paycheck fairness, violence against women--they stopped us from going to conference on that. On April 16 they blocked a motion to proceed to a bill to reduce the deficit by imposing a minimum tax rate on high-income taxpayers, the Buffett rule, Warren Buffett. He wants to make sure he pays a tax rate comparable to his secretary's. That is what we wanted. They defeated that. They blocked many bills dealing with unnecessary tax subsidies for these large oil companies. They have held up hundreds of measures out of the Energy Committee--hundreds. It used to be we would pass those just matter-of-factly. Senator Stabenow had an amendment to decrease taxes on American businesses. She wanted to do that by extending expiring energy tax credits for energy that has created hundreds of jobs in America. They blocked the nomination for weeks and weeks of Richard Cordray to be the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. They blocked judge after judge. They blocked a motion to proceed to a bill to put workers back on the job while rebuilding and modernizing American infrastructure. It creates jobs. They blocked motions to proceed to a bill to keep teachers and first responders--in addition to the one I just talked about--and other ones. They blocked a bill to reauthorize the Economic Development Administration. This has been something we have done for 25, 30 years. They blocked it. We wanted to reduce the deficit by doing something about these outlandish subsidies we give Big Oil--blocked it. We were trying to do a bill to create jobs. We spent weeks because they wanted to dictate what women could do dealing with contraception. Then they have this little--this little deal with the House Republicans. If we work and are able once in a while to get something done over here, such as a postal bill to save our postal system, then the Republicans block it in the House. The farm bill--reduces the debt by $23 billion--they have this deal with the House and now they blocked that. China currency? The same thing; they blocked it over in the House. The record is very clear. The party of trying to defeat President Obama has done everything they can to make the economy look as bad as it can because they think if the economy is really bad, it is going to help them defeat President Obama. The middle class--we know how they feel about the middle class. That was exemplified by statements that came out in the last few days by the Presidential nominee. This morning, as I said, I wasn't able to listen to everything, but I listened to enough. One party stands for obstruction and the rich. The big lie--listen to this: How many times did we have the Republicans come to this floor and say: They have not passed a budget? I have served in this Congress for 30 years, and I have admired two people very much for their knowledge of certain things. One person I have admired dealing with the finances of this country more than anyone else is someone with whom I came to the Senate 26 years ago, Kent Conrad. Kent Conrad has come here and time and time again said: Yes, we did not pass a budget resolution because we did not need to. We passed a law. That is why the CR is going forward. We passed a law that set numbers for us. It is a big lie for them to come here and say we have not passed a budget. It is a lie. It is untruthful. My friend with whom we have served in Congress, we came the same day, the senior Senator from Arizona, I have said before, and I will say it again: I admire him. I admire his service to our country. But for him to come and say that the Senate is not working well because of the Democrats, that is one of the big lies. We have tried to legislate. They are holding up virtually everything we try to do, including the Defense authorization bill. I have been waiting for months for them to come to me with an agreement. This is part of the big game they are playing to try to make us look bad when they are the cause of it. They are the reason we have not done this legislation. We can't. We have spent weeks on matters that we would have done before in a matter of an hour or 20 minutes. Republicans are complaining about a result that they themselves caused. The Defense authorization bill--we are going to come back after the election, and we will get that done with their help. Here is the issue with Republicans, here is why suddenly they are all upset. They have been upset for some time, but really this week has been something that would upset nearly everyone because--we thought the Olympics were over, but yesterday we saw it in full go. We had Republicans running to break marathon records, sprint records to get away from their Presidential nominee because it makes it a little hard for them to have somebody running for President representing their party who says: I only have to worry about half the people in this country. We are going to continue to work to the best we can to move forward with the legislation we believe is important. We are going to come back after the election, during the lameduck. Hopefully, they will decide at that time maybe they have something better to do than try to make the President of the United States look bad. We are a very fortunate country. We have a two-party system that is the envy of the rest of the world. These parliamentary governments, they work for months and weeks and sometimes longer than that to try to form a government. We don't have to do that. We are a government of laws, and we have a system that works pretty well. But we know, based on some academic work that has been done--it is not just me talking. We have two of the foremost experts who have watched this country for more than 40 years--Thomas Mann from the Brookings Institute and Norm Ornstein from the conservative Enterprise Institute--who have said the problem with the government today is the Republicans. They said they have been here for 40 years and have never seen anything like it. I haven't seen anything like it, and I have been here 30 years. We used to work together. When I came to the Senate we had Republican Senators and Democratic Senators. We joined hands and we got things done. But now, because they are being led by someone who believes the most important thing to do is to defeat Obama, we are getting nothing done and they are following him like lemmings off the cliff.", u"Mr. President, first, let me thank the Senator from West Virginia for his comments. He has worked so hard on this issue for many years but, in particular, the past 3 years, as he and the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Feinstein, have worked with Senator Lieberman and me. I rise this evening to urge our colleagues to vote to begin the debate on the Cyber Security Act of 2012. Senator Lieberman and I have introduced this bill along with our colleagues Senator Rockefeller, Senator Feinstein, and Senator Carper. It has been a great pleasure to work with all of them--and work we have--in numerous sessions over literally a period of years, as we have attempted to merge the bills that were reported by the Commerce Committee and the Homeland Security Committee. Of course, it is always a great pleasure to once again work with my dear friend the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, Senator Lieberman, as we bring forth yet another bipartisan bill to the Chamber for its consideration. FBI Director Robert Mueller has warned that the cyber threat will soon equal or surpass the threat from terrorism. He has argued that we should be addressing the cyber threat with the same kind of intensity we have applied to the terrorist threat. This vital legislation would provide the Federal Government and the private sector with the tools needed to help protect our country from the growing cyber threat. It would promote information sharing, improve the security of the Federal Government's own networks, enhance research and development programs and, most important of all, it would help to better secure our Nation's most critical infrastructure from cyber attack. These are the powerplants, the pipelines, the water treatment facilities, the electrical grid, the transportation systems, and the financial networks upon which Americans rely each and every day. The fact is the computerized industrial controls that open and close the valves and switches in our infrastructure are particularly vulnerable to cyber attack. Indeed, the Internet is under constant siege on all fronts by nations such as China, Russia, and Iran, by transnational criminals, by terrorist groups, by activists, and by persistent hackers. That is why our Nation's top national security and homeland security leaders from the current and former administrations have urged us to take legislative action to address this unacceptable risk to both our national security and our economic prosperity. Earlier this year, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta described our bill as ``essential to addressing our Nation's critical infrastructure and network cyber security vulnerabilities, both of which pose serious national and economic security risks to our Nation.'' Just last month, the Secretary reiterated his call for Congress to pass our bill and stress the potential for a cyber attack to cripple our critical infrastructure in a way that would virtually paralyze this country. The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, has also sounded the alarm. He has described the cyber threat as a ``profound threat to this country, to its future, its economy and its very being.'' The warnings have not been confined to officials in the Obama administration. Former national security officials, including Michael Chertoff, Michael McConnell, Paul Wolfowitz, Michael Hayden have written that the cyber threat ``is imminent and . . . represents one of the most serious challenges to our national security since the onset of the nuclear age sixty years ago.'' They have urged us to protect the ``infrastructure that controls our electricity, water and sewer, nuclear plants, communications backbone, energy pipelines, and financial networks'' with appropriate cyber security standards. Similarly, in a letter to our colleague, Senator John McCain, GEN Keith Alexander, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command and the Director of the National Security Agency, wrote: Given DOD reliance on certain core critical infrastructure to execute its mission, as well as the importance of the Nation's critical infrastructure to our national and economic security overall, legislation is also needed to ensure that infrastructure is sufficiently hardened and resilient. The threats to our infrastructure are not hypothetical; they are already occurring. For example, while many of the details are classified, we know multiple natural gas pipeline companies have been the target of a sophisticated cyber intrusion campaign that has been ongoing since December of last year. The cyber threat to our critical infrastructure is also escalating in its frequency and severity. According to DHS's Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, last year, almost 200 cyber intrusions were reported by critical infrastructure owners and operators. That is nearly a 400-percent increase from the previous year, and these are only the intrusions that have been reported to the Department of Homeland Security. Many go unreported and, even worse, many owners are not even aware their systems have been compromised. What would a successful cyber attack on our critical infrastructure look like? We have just seen recently what a serious storm that leaves more than 1 million people without power can cause: the loss of life, the blow to economic activity, the hardship for the elderly, the nonworking traffic lights that resulted in accidents. Multiply that impact many times over if there were a sustained cyber attack that deliberately knocked out our electric grid. The threat is not just to our national security but also to our economic edge, to our competitiveness. The rampant cyber theft targeting the United States by countries such as China has led to the ``greatest transfer of wealth in history,'' according to General Alexander. You have heard many of us use his quote. Let me give some specifics of his estimates. He believes American companies have lost about $250 billion a year through intellectual property theft, $114 billion to theft through cyber crime, and another $274 billion in downtime the thefts have caused. In their op-ed earlier this year, former DNI McConnell, former Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff, and former Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Lynn warned that the cost of cyber espionage and theft ``easily means billions of dollars and millions of jobs.'' The threat of a cyber attack doesn't just go to our national security, critical though that is. It also directly is a threat to America's ability to compete, to our economic edge. In recent years, a growing number of U.S. firms, including sophisticated firms such as Google, Adobe, Lockheed Martin, RSA, Sony, NASDAQ, and many others have been hacked by malicious actors. Earlier this month, the security firm McAfee released a report on a highly sophisticated cyber intrusion dubbed ``Operation High Roller,'' which has attempted to steal more than $78 million in fraudulent financial transfers at at least 60 different financial institutions. Trade associations have been attacked too. The Chamber of Commerce was the victim of a cyber attack for many months, blissfully unaware until informed by the FBI that its membership data was being stolen. The evidence of our cybersecurity vulnerability is overwhelming. It compels us to act. Yesterday 18 experts in national security strongly endorsed the revised legislation we have introduced. The Aspen Homeland Security Group, made up of officials from both Republican and Democratic administrations and chaired by former Secretary Chertoff and former Congresswoman Jane Harman, urged the Senate to adopt a program of voluntary cybersecurity standards and strong positive incentives for critical infrastructure to implement those standards. This group called for action on our bill, saying: The country is already being hurt by foreign cyber intrusions, and the possibility of a devastating cyber attack is real. Congress must act now. Mr. President, you have heard some Members of this body say that somehow this process has been rushed or the bill inadequately considered. Nothing could be further from the truth. Since 2005--7 years ago--our Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee alone has held 10 hearings on cybersecurity. Other Senate committees have also held hearings, for a total of 25 hearings since 2009, not to mention numerous briefings the Presiding Officer and Senator Mikulski of Maryland have helped to convene--classified briefings--for any Member to attend. In 2010, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Carper, and I introduced our cybersecurity bill, which was reported by our committee later that same year. As I indicated, we have been working with Chairman Rockefeller to merge our bill with legislation he has championed, which was reported by the Commerce Committee. We have also worked very closely with Senator Feinstein, an expert on information sharing. The bill we are urging our colleagues to proceed to today is the product of these efforts. It also incorporates substantial changes based on the feedback from the private sector, our colleagues, and the administration. This new bill is a good-faith effort to address the concerns raised by Members on both sides of the aisle by establishing a framework that relies upon the expertise of government and the innovation of the private sector. It improves privacy protections that Americans expect from their government. It also reflects many concepts proposed by Senators Kyl, Whitehouse--the Presiding Officer--Blunt, Coats, Graham, Mikulski, Blumenthal, and Coons. We have revised our bill in a very substantial way. We have abandoned the approach--which I still believe to be a good idea--of mandatory standards and, instead, have adopted a voluntary approach to standards. This is a significant change from our initial bill, and it was one that was promoted by Senator Kyl's and Senator Whitehouse's group. The new version encourages owners of critical infrastructure to voluntarily adopt the cybersecurity practices in exchange for various incentives for entities complying with these best practices. This was also one of the primary recommendations of the House Republican Cybersecurity Task Force. These incentives include liability protection against punitive damages. I, for one, am open to making that a more robust liability protection. They include the opportunity to receive expedited security clearances, eligibility for prioritized technical assistance from the government, and access to timely cyber threat information held by the government. These major changes from the approach we initially proposed demonstrate our willingness to adopt alternatives recommended in good faith by our colleagues, and we are still open to changes to the bill. Our bill also includes strong information-sharing provisions that promote voluntary information sharing within the private sector and the government, while ensuring that privacy and civil liberties are protected. And again, we incorporated some suggestions from the Democratic side of the aisle to strengthen these provisions. To be sure, more information sharing is essential to improving our understanding of the risks and threats. But let us be clear: More information sharing, while absolutely essential, is not sufficient to ensure our Nation's vital, critical infrastructure is protected. If you survey the vast majority of experts in this field, they will tell you that to pass a bill that only provides for more information sharing does not begin to accomplish the job that must be done to better secure our Nation from this threat. With 85 percent of our Nation's critical infrastructure owned by the private sector, government obviously must work with the private sector. Our bill--both our original bill and our revised bill--has always envisioned a partnership between government and the private sector. We have a very stringent definition of what constitutes covered critical infrastructure. It is infrastructure whose disruption could result in truly catastrophic consequences. What do I mean by that? I am talking about mass casualties or mass evacuations or severe degradation of our national security or a serious blow to our economy. That is the kind of disruption we are talking about. Obviously those who have claimed that every company or every part of our infrastructure is going to be considered as critical infrastructure have not read the definition in our bill. But here is more evidence of why we must act. A study done in 2011 by the computer security firm McAfee and CSIS revealed that approximately 40 percent of the companies surveyed--the critical infrastructure companies--were not regularly patching and updating their software, despite the fact these safeguards are among the most basic and widely known cybersecurity risk mitigation practices. We have even found reports where companies haven't bothered to change the default password that came with the industrial control software. In many cases, the control devices used to operate our Nation's most critical infrastructure are inherently insecure. A Washington Post special report last month noted that security researchers found six out of seven control system devices are ``riddled with hardware and software flaws,'' and that ``some included back doors that enabled hackers to download passwords or sidestep security completely.'' Another front-page story in the Post earlier this month highlighted the fact that as technological advances have allowed everyone from plant managers to hospital nurses to control their systems remotely via the Internet, these vital systems have become even more vulnerable to cyber attacks. To prove the point, the story described how a security researcher was able to easily steal passwords from a provider that connects millions of these systems to the Internet. These examples illustrate that far too many critical infrastructure owners are not taking even the most basic measures to protect their systems, and this is simply dangerous and unacceptable to the security of our country. These basic practices need not be expensive. In most cases, they are not expensive. And I will tell you, they are a lot less costly than the consequences of a breach, not to mention a major cyber attack. A recent report by Verizon, the Secret Service, and other international law enforcement agencies analyzed 855 data breaches and found that 96 were not difficult to pull off and 97 percent of them could have been prevented through fairly simple and inexpensive means. The point is, we must act, and we must act now. We cannot afford to wait for a cyber 9/11 before taking action on this legislation. In all the years I have been working to identify vulnerabilities facing our country in the area of homeland security, I cannot identify another area where I believe the threat is greater and that we have done less. I urge my colleagues to listen to the wisdom of former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and former NSA Chief General Hayden. They wrote the following: We carry the burden of knowing that 9/11 might have been averted with the intelligence that existed at the time. We do not want to be in the same position again when ``cyber 9/11'' hits--it is not a question of ``whether'' this will happen; it is a question of ``when.'' And this time all the dots have been connected. This time we know that attacks are occurring against our Internet systems and cyber systems each and every day. This time the warnings from all across the board are loud and clear. I urge our colleagues to heed these warnings and to support the motion to proceed to the cybersecurity bill.", u"Mr. President, today I wish to support the Cybersecurity Act of 2012. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I know that cyber security is the most pressing economic and national security threat facing our country. There still needs to be a sense of urgency in addressing this issue, and we must pass this legislation. Doing so will allow us to defend our computer networks and critical infrastructure from a hostile, predatory attack. Such an attack is meant to humiliate, intimidate, and cripple us. If we wait until a major attack occurs, we will likely end up over-reacting, over-regulating, and overspending in order to address our weakness. The threat of a cyber attack is real. Our Nation is already under attack. We are in a cyber war, and cyber attacks are happening every day. Cyber terrorists are working to damage critical infrastructure through efforts to take over the power grid or disrupt our air traffic control systems. Those carrying out these attacks are moving at breakneck speeds to steal state secrets and our Nation's intellectual property. They are stealing financial information and disrupting business operations. Cyber attacks can disrupt critical infrastructure, wipe out a family's entire life savings, and put human lives at risk. They can take down entire companies by hacking into computer networks where they remain undiscovered for months, even years. FBI Director Mueller testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee, stating that cyber crime will eventually surpass terrorism as the No. 1 threat to America. The economic losses of cyber crime alone are stunning. A Norton Cybercrime Report valued losses from cyber attacks at $388 billion in 2011. I have been working on cyber issues since I was elected to the Senate. The National Security Agency--our cyber warriors--are in Maryland. I have been working with the NSA to ensure that signals intelligence is a focus of our national security even before cyber was a method of warfare. In 2007, Estonia was attacked. Estonia was strengthening its ties to NATO, and Russian hackers swiftly struck back. They waged war on Estonia and threatened its government, rendered Estonia's networks obsolete for days. This attack was designed to intimidate, manipulate, and distort. The cyber attacks on Estonia raised important questions. Would article 5 of the NATO Charter be invoked? Since the attack was on one member of NATO--was it an attack on all members? How would the U.S. and other allies need respond to future attacks? What would happen if America experienced a similar cyber attack? As member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I served on the Cyber Working Group where we developed core findings to guide Congress. The need to get governance right, the need to protect civil liberties, and the need to improve the cyber workforce. As chair of the Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations Subcommittee, I fund critical cyber security agencies: the FBI which investigates cyber crime, NIST, which works with the private sector to develop standards for cyber security technology, and NSF, which does research. As a member of Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I work to ensure critical funding for Intel and cyber agencies such as the NSA, CIA, and IARPA. These organizations are coming up with the new ideas that will create jobs and keep our country safe. Funding is critical to build the workforce, provide technology and resources, and to make our cyber security smarter, safer, and more secure. Yet technology will mean nothing unless we have a trained workforce. In order to fight the cyber security war, we have to maintain our technological development, maintain our qualitative advantage, and have our cyber warriors ready at battle stations. In order to develop our cyber shield, we need to train cyber warriors so they can protect our Nation. I have been working with Maryland colleges and universities to create world-class programs, a national model, and for training our next generation of cyber warriors. I asked Senator Reid to conduct a cyber security exercise, which showed us in real time how the U.S. Government would respond to a predatory cyber attack of great magnitude. I asked for the Senate cyber exercise for three reasons. First, we need a sense of urgency here in the Senate to pass cyber security legislation. Second, we need to put the proper legislative policy in place. Third, I wanted to create a sense of bipartisanship camaraderie. One example of the impact a cyber attack would have is the power outages caused by our freak storms this summer. We got a glimpse of what an attack on the grid would be like. At least Pepco has the ability to respond and restore and turn the power back on. With an attack on the grid we could lose the power to turn electricity back on because it was shut down by power manipulation. Imagine our largest cities, like New York and Washington, like the Wild West with no power, schools shut down, parents stuck in traffic, public transit crippled, no traffic lights, and 9-1-1 systems failing. In the financial industry, the FBI currently has 7,600 pending bank robbery cases and over 9,000 pending cyber investigations. According to the FBI, the Bureau is currently investigating over 400 reported cases of corporate account takeovers where cyber criminals have made unauthorized transfers from the bank accounts of U.S. businesses. These cases involve the attempted theft of over $255 million and actual losses of approximately $85 million. Hackers have repeatedly penetrated the computer network of the company that runs the Nasdaq Stock Market. The New York Stock Exchange has been the target of cyber attacks. In the future, successful attempts to shut down or steal information from our financial exchanges could wreak havoc of untold proportions on our economy. In the 2010 ``flash crash'', the Dow Jones plunged 1,000 points in matter of minutes when automatic computerized traders shut down. This was the result of turbulent trading, not a cyber attack and the market recovered. But this is a micro-example of what could happen if stock market computers are hacked, infected, or go dark. In November 2008 the American credit card processor RBS Worldpay was hacked--$9 million was stolen in less than 12 hours. The hackers broke into accounts and changed limits on payroll debit cards employees use to withdraw their salaries from ATMs. The cards were used at over 2,100 ATMs in at least 280 cities around the world, United States, Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Italy, Hong Kong, Japan, Canada, stealing over $9 million from unsuspecting employers and employees. This heist, one of the most sophisticated and organized computer fraud attacks ever conducted proves that you don't need a visa to steal someone's visa card. From 2008 to 2010, a Slovenian citizen created ``Butterfly Bot'' and sold it to other criminals worldwide. Cyber criminals developed networks of infected computers. The Mariposa variety from Spain was the most notorious and largest. Mariposa infected personal computers, stole credit card and bank account information, launched denial attacks to shut down online services, and spread viruses to disable computers and networks. Industry experts estimated the Mariposa Botnet may have infected as many as 8 million to 12 million computers. The size and scope of the infection makes it difficult to quantify financial losses but could easily be tens of millions of dollars. Speaking simply, this bill does two key things from a national security perspective. It helps businesses voluntarily get cyber standards that they can use to protect themselves, and it allows businesses and the government to share information with each other about cyber threats. That is, to help ``.gov'' to protect ``.com.'' In a constitutional manner, these two things are not necessarily connected, but they can be. The reason why these provisions are such an innovation is that despite all the amazing talent and expertise that companies have, many are being attacked and don't know it. And this legislative framework gives the structure to allow for unprecedented ``.com'' and ``.gov'' cooperation. There are also other several other key components in the bill focusing on research and development, workforce development, and FISMA reform. Why do we need a bill to make some of these vital partnerships and exchanges happen? Because, as I have outlined, America is under attack every second of every day. General Alexander, the head of NSA and U.S. Cyber Command, has said that we have witnessed the greatest transfer of wealth in history in the heist that foreign actors have perpetrated on our country. By stealing our secrets, stealing our intellectual property, and stealing our wealth. It is mindboggling. Take just one example. A theft by a foreign actor that took, among other things, key plans for our F-35 fighter. One attack on the Pentagon made off with so many sensitive documents that they would have filled delivery trucks end-to-end stretching from Washington, DC to Baltimore Harbor. But don't take my word for it that this issue is urgent and that we need to address critical infrastructure. Who else says it is urgent? Experts from both side of the aisle do. Folks like former CIA Director Mike McConnell, DHS head Michael Chertoff, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright, former cyber czar Richard Clarke, and many others have said we need to address critical infrastructure. And our top defense and military leaders such as Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey, Director of National Intelligence Clapper, and again, GEN Keith Alexander. The threat is here and it is now. And if we do not act, if we let the perfect be the enemy of the good, then this country will be more vulnerable than ever before, and Congress will have done nothing. This bill is not perfect, but I want to say upfront that Senators Lieberman and Collins have heard the critics and tried to incorporate their views. DHS's role has been criticized by many, myself included. I have been skeptical that they could perform some of the duties assigned in this bill. To be honest, I still am skeptical, although less so than before, but I think this bill takes important steps to diversify the government and private sector actors involved. So we are not just focusing on DHS, but also the right civilian agencies in charge because in the end we cannot have intelligence agencies leading this effort with the private sector. Some would like to see that go further, and that is what the amendment process is there for. We have had people in the civil liberties community worried about whether this bill could allow intrusions by the government into people's privacy. As a Marylander, this was a tantamount concern for me as well. If we don't protect our civil liberties, then all this added security is for naught because we would have lost what we value most, our freedom. Again, I think the authors of this bill, especially Senator Feinstein, have made key improvements on issues of law enforcement powers and protecting core privacy concerns. I know not everyone is totally pleased. But I think this bill has made important strides to balance information sharing and privacy. We all have been concerned that the business community has opposed a lot of key critical infrastructure elements of this bill. They fear strangulation and over-regulation. They fear that they will open themselves up to lawsuits if they participate in the program with the government. These are valid concerns, and I have heard them from Maryland businesses. I think this new bill has made the most strides in trying to accommodate business and building a voluntary framework to allow businesses to choose protection. Protection does not come without responsibility for participants, but I think this bill links the need for cyber security with appropriate liability protection and the expertise of our business community in a way that answers a lot of companies' concerns. We cannot eliminate all government involvement in this issue. That won't work. And we will lose key government expertise in DOD, FBI, and elsewhere. But we work to try to minimize it while maintaining government's role in protecting our national security. I am so proud that the Senate came together in a bipartisan way to draft this legislation. The Senate must pass this legislation now. Working together we can make our Nation safer and stronger and we can show the American people that we can cooperate to get an important job done.", u"Mr. President, I rise this morning to talk about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the concerns I and many of my colleagues have. Earlier this morning, Senator Wyden, the senior Senator from Oregon, was discussing at length the importance of the fourth amendment, the importance of Americans knowing the boundaries and the rules under which our government collects intelligence and to know their rights to privacy are protected. Under this Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, there are a variety of ways in which that assurance is compromised, and Senator Wyden did a very good job of laying those out. I wish to emphasize that same message; that our country was founded on the principles of privacy and liberty, of protection from an overreaching central government. During the founding, we set out and said we are going to be a new kind of nation; one that will not permit an overbearing, intrusive government spying on citizens or meddling in their private affairs. This belief was enshrined in our fourth amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. I think that is an extraordinarily complete description saying that the government is bound--bound--by having to demonstrate before a court probable cause a case that is put forward and backed up by oath or affirmation, a case that is put forward with great detail about the places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. So the concept is laid out very clearly about what constitutes unreasonable searches and seizures. It is certainly not that the government can't collect information, just they have to show probable cause of a crime in order to create that boundary that says the information we have in our daily lives. I don't know how much broader it can be than houses, papers, and effects. It pretty much covers the entire parameter. One of the problems we have is that sometimes lawyers start looking for loopholes, and we can address those loopholes if they are discussed in a public setting, if we can get our hands around them. But if they are loopholes created in secrecy, then indeed it is very hard to have a debate on the floor of the Senate about whether those loopholes or interpretations are right or whether we should change the law in order to address them. Of course, our laws have had to be updated and changed over time to adapt to new technology and changing threats, and one of those developments was the creation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in the 1970s. In 1972, the Supreme Court held the fourth amendment does not permit warrantless surveillance for intelligence investigations within our country. One may wonder how this even took a Supreme Court decision since the fourth amendment is so absolutely clear on this point. In 1978, Congress enacted FISA--Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act--to regulate government surveillance within our country that is conducted for foreign intelligence purposes. Under FISA, the government had to obtain an order from a special court called the FISA Court in order to spy on Americans. This is certainly an appropriate boundary to implement. The order required the government to obtain a warrant and show probable cause. These are the same basic, commonsense protections we have had in place for other types of searches. This development required individualized and particular orders from the FISA Court to collect communications. But now let's fast forward to 2001. President Bush decided in secret to authorize the National Security Agency to start a new program of warrantless surveillance inside the United States. This is in complete contravention of the fourth amendment and in complete contravention of the law at that time. As I am sure many of my colleagues will certainly recall, this was revealed to the American people 4 years later when it was reported in the New York Times in 2005. In response, after years of back and forth contentious debate, Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act--the bill we are considering on this floor today. We are considering a reauthorization. This law gave the government new surveillance authority but also included a sunset provision to ensure that Congress examines where the law is working and the way it was intended. The debate we are having right now on this floor is that reexamination. I will note that I think it is unfortunate that we are doing this at the last second. We have known that this intelligence law is going to expire for years. It was laid out for a multiyear span. Certainly, it is irresponsible for this Chamber to be debating this bill under a falsely created pressure that it needs to be done without any amendments in order to match the bill from the House. That is a way of suppressing debate on critical issues here in America. If you care about the fourth amendment, if you care about privacy, you should be arguing that we should either create a very short-term extension in order to have this debate fully or that we should have had this debate months ago so it could have been done in a full and responsible manner, with no pressure to vote against amendments in order to falsely address the issue of partnering with the House bill. This law included that sunset provision. Now here we are looking at the extension. It is a single-day debate, crowded here into the holidays when few Americans will be paying attention. But I think it is important, nonetheless, for those of us who are concerned about the boundaries of privacy and believe the law could be strengthened to make our case here in hopes that at some point we will be able to have the real consideration these issues merit. In my opinion, there are serious reforms that need to be made before we consider renewing this law. This law is supposed to be about giving our government the tools it needs to collect the communications of foreigners, outside of our country. If it is possible that our intelligence agencies are using the law to collect and use the communications of Americans without a warrant, that is a problem. Of course, we cannot reach conclusions about that in this forum because this is an unclassified discussion. My colleagues Senator Wyden and Senator Udall, who serve on Intelligence, have discussed the loophole in the current law that allows the potential of backdoor searches. This could allow the government to effectively use warrantless searches for law-abiding Americans. Senator Wyden has an amendment that relates to closing that loophole. Congress never intended the intelligence community to have a huge database to sift through without first getting a regular probable cause warrant, but because we do not have the details of exactly how this proceeds and we cannot debate in a public forum those details, then we are stuck with wrestling with the fact that we need to have the sorts of protections and efforts to close loopholes that Senator Wyden has put forward. What we do know is that this past summer, the Director of National Intelligence said in a public forum that on at least one occasion the FISA Court has ruled that a data collection carried out by the government did violate the fourth amendment. We also know that the FISA Court has ruled that the Federal Government has circumvented the spirit of the law as well as the letter of the law. But too much else of what we should know about this law remains secret. In fact, we have extremely few details about how the courts have interpreted the statutes that have been declassified and released to the public. This goes to the issue of secret law my colleague from Oregon was discussing earlier. If you have a phrase in the law and it has been interpreted by a secret court and the interpretation is secret, then you really do not know what the law means. The FISA Court is a judicial body established by Congress to consider requests for surveillance made under the FISA Amendments Act, but, almost without exception, its decisions, including significant legal interpretations of the statute, remain highly classified. They remain secret. I am going to put up this chart just to emphasize that this is a big deal. Here in America, if the law makes a reference to what the boundary is, we should understand how the court interprets that boundary so it can be debated. If the court reaches an interpretation with which Congress is uncomfortable, we should be able to change that, but of course we cannot change it, not knowing what the interpretation is because the interpretation is secret. So we are certainly constrained from having the type of debate that our Nation was founded on--an open discussion of issues. These are issues that can be addressed without in any way compromising the national security of the United States. Understanding how certain words are interpreted tells us where the line is drawn. But that line, wherever it is drawn, is, in fact, relevant to whether the intent of Congress is being fulfilled and whether the protection of citizens under the fourth amendment is indeed standing strong. An open and democratic society such as ours should not be governed by secret laws, and judicial interpretations are as much a part of the law as the words that make up our statute. The opinions of the FISA Court are controlling. They do matter. When a law is kept secret, public debate, legislative intent, and finding the right balance between security and privacy all suffer. In 2010, due to concerns that were raised by a number of Senators about the problem of classified FISA Court opinions, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence said they would establish a process to declassify opinions of the FISA Court that contained important rulings of law. In 2011, prior to her confirmation hearing, Lisa Monaco, who is our Assistant Attorney General for National Security, expressed support for declassifying FISA opinions that include ``significant instructions or interpretations of So here we have the situation where the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence said they would establish a process of declassifying opinions. They understood that Americans in a democracy deserve to know what the words are being interpreted to mean. We have the Assistant Attorney General for National Security during her hearings express that she supports significant instructions or interpretations being made available to the public. But here we are 2 years later since the 2010 expressions and a year from the confirmation hearings for Lisa, and nothing has been declassified--nothing. The amendment I am offering today sets out a three-step process for sending the message it is important Americans know the interpretations of these laws. It does so in a fashion that is carefully crafted to make sure there is no conflict with national security. First you call upon the Attorney General to declassify the FISA report in court of review opinions that include significant legal interpretations. If the Attorney General makes a decision, however, that it cannot be declassified--those decisions--in a way that does not jeopardize national security, then the amendment requires the administration to declassify summaries of their opinions. So at the first point, you have the official written court opinions. But possibly woven into those court opinions are a variety of contexts about ways and manner of gathering intelligence that pose national security problems. This amendment says: OK, if that is the case, we certainly do not want to disclose sensitive information about ways and means of collecting intelligence, so declassify summaries. That way, we can understand the legal interpretation without adjoining information that might represent a national security problem. This amendment goes further. If the Attorney General decides that not even a summary can be declassified without compromising national security, then the amendment requires the administration to report to Congress regarding the status of its process for declassifying these opinions--a process the administration has already said it is undertaking. It just says: Tell us where you are. It is probably very clear from my discussion that I would prefer that the opinions, the actual court opinions, be declassified and that perhaps, if they are sensitive, the national security information would be redacted. That is the normal process in which documents are declassified--you black out or remove sections that are sensitive. But the amendment I am presenting goes further on the side of protecting national security, saying: You don't have to just redact court opinions, you can do a summary that addresses significant legal implications without addressing the ways and means that might be embedded in a further court decision. Furthermore, Mr. Attorney General, if you make a decision that not even that is possible, then update us on the process. But the key point is that it requires the Attorney General to make a decision, a clear decision over the national security balance and provide what can be done within the context, within the framework of not compromising our national security. This is so straightforward that anyone bringing the argument to this floor that we should not do it because it compromises national security really has no case to make--absolutely no case to make.", u"Mr. Speaker, I submit a copy of my June 19, 2013 letter again urging the creation of a bipartisan Select Committee to investigate the terrorist attack on the U.S. consulate and annex in Benghazi last September. There are only five legislative weeks left before the one-year anniversary of the attacks. Yet there remain too many unanswered questions resulting from too few public hearings with key witnesses who were present the night of the attack. That's why 158 Members have cosponsored H. Res. 36 to create a Select Committee to conduct a full investigation with public hearings. The Select Committee has also been endorsed by family members of the Benghazi victims, more than 700 retired Special Operations officials and the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association. I urge the prompt creation of a Select Committee to ensure the American people learn the truth. Dear Mr. Speaker: The American people are losing confidence in their government. The tragedy in Benghazi, along with a stream of recent controversies, including the IRS and the Justice Department's targeting of reporters at Fox News and the Associated Press, as well as the ambiguity about recently disclosed programs at the National Security Agency, are eroding public trust in the institutions of government. This diminishing of public confidence isn't limited to the Executive Branch. Congress' approval rating is at an all-time low. A June 14 National Journal article said, ``Nearly 8 in 10 Americans told Gallup pollsters this month that they disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job, the 45th consecutive month that more than two-thirds of Americans graded Congress poorly. The problem isn't as much what Congress is doing as what it is not getting done.'' I believe most Americans would agree that one of the items ``not getting done'' is a thorough, comprehensive and ultimately definitive investigation into the response to the Benghazi attacks. That is why I have been pushing so hard for a bipartisan Select Committee to investigate the September 11, 2012 terrorist attack in Benghazi. The response among most of our colleagues and the public has been overwhelming. Since January, when I proposed including the Select Committee in the House Rules package for the 113th Congress, more than two-thirds of House Republicans--a majority of the majority-- have cosponsored my bill, H. Res. 36, to create the Select Committee. Since that time, there has been a growing chorus of support. The bill has been endorsed by the parents of some of the victims, by more than 700 retired Special Operations officials, by the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Associations, which represents the State Department security officers who were on the ground in Benghazi, and by The Wall Street Journal editorial page in addition to dozens of other commentators, former diplomats and military officials. I believe this broad support speaks to the public's hunger for clear answers on Benghazi--answers which to date have been elusive. That is why more than nine months after the devastating attack, my resolution continues to add new cosponsors; it now has the support of 158 Republicans. I recognize that ``regular order'' has made some progress over the last six months; most notably Chairman Issa's constructive hearing with several State Department whistleblowers. I also understand that Chairman McKeon has planned a hearing with Gen. Carter Ham for next week, but like so many of these hearings, this, too, will be held behind closed doors. There is no reason Gen. Ham's testimony shouldn't be public. This latest classified hearing is symptomatic of a broader problem with respect to the current congressional approach to investigating Benghazi: Too much has been done in a piecemeal fashion, behind closed doors, thereby robbing the American people of clear answers to important questions surrounding the murder of a sitting U.S. ambassador and three civilian employees, and the grievous injury of untold others. Deuteronomy 16:20 tells us, ``Justice, justice shalt thou pursue.'' As we quietly marked the nine-month anniversary of the attacks last week, I know many people wondered if there will ever be any clear resolution to this investigation, let alone justice. Writing about Benghazi in The Wall Street Journal last month, columnist Peggy Noonan pondered, ``Was all this incompetence? Or was it politics disguised as the fog of war? Who called these shots and made these decisions? Who decided to do nothing?'' More than nine months later, the Congress still cannot answer these questions. No one has been held responsible for the failure to respond that night. A few mid-level career officials have been penalized, but ultimately those senior officials who were in the position to actually say the buck stops here--cabinet secretaries and political appointees at the White House, State Department, Defense Department and CIA--have emerged unscathed, and in some cases, seemingly the better for it. Consider that former Secretary Clinton now earns hundreds of thousands of dollars for every speech she gives, former Secretary Panetta just signed a $3 million book deal and former CIA Director Petraeus recently joined an investment firm in New York. Similarly, several other administration officials associated with the Benghazi response to the attack have been promoted. Ambassador Rice has been promoted to national security advisor, then-deputy national security advisor Dennis McDonough has been promoted to White House chief of staff, and then-White House chief of staff Jack Lew has been promoted to Treasury Secretary. If all responsible for the government's response to Benghazi have been rewarded with lucrative contracts or promotions within the administration, what signal does this send to the American people about accountability? Mr. Speaker, we're fast approaching the Independence Day recess. We will only have four legislative weeks in July before the August recess. When we return in September we will be just days away from the one-year anniversary of the Benghazi attacks. We must not wait until the second year of this investigation to commit the focused resources of a Select Committee in pursuit of government accountability and, ultimately, truth. Sources are disappearing and leads are drying up. The Select Committee legislation needs to be Swiftly brought to the floor for a vote, so the House can hold public hearings over the summer--focused exclusively on the core issues about why no assistance was sent to the Americans under fire in Benghazi--and attempt to provide a final public report by the first anniversary of this attack. You have a number of committee chairman who would be excellent at leading the Select Committee. Chairman Issa has shown in his hearing with the State Department whistleblowers that he would be a good chairman. Similarly, Chairman Royce, Chairman Rogers, Chairman McKeon, Chairman Goodlatte and Chairman McCaul are all strong leaders and would ably chair a Select Committee. Further, we have a lot of talent in our conference to draw from. There are a number of newer members who have proven themselves to be capable and insightful investigators. You could consider appointing some of them to the Select Committee, too. As I mentioned earlier, a number of new controversies involving the Obama Administration have surfaced in recent months that demand the committees' full attention. This is all the more reason to take the best of the best under a Select Committee to build, at no additional cost, on the work that has already been done through regular order. There would be no need to start over, as some have tried to say. Nor would there be additional costs--the resolution specifically states that we should use existing resources. We owe it to the families of the Benghazi victims and to the not yet named survivors, whose lives will be indelibly marked by the wounds they endured protecting the annex, to honor their sacrifice and their service. Harkening back to Deuteronomy, we must pursue justice on their behalf, recognizing their heroism and an accounting for the failures in leadership that left them exposed and vulnerable. We also owe it to the men and women who serve our country now and in the years ahead to restore confidence that if they come under fire, we will make every effort to come to their defense. For these reasons alone, we should not give up on this issue. I am afraid that if we don't move on a Select Committee, we'll never find out the truth. Just as The Wall Street Journal editorial page in May said, ``A Select Committee is the only means available now for the U.S. political system to extricate itself from the labyrinth called Benghazi.'' The need for a Select Committee is underscored by the difficulty we're having getting answers on a number of current investigations. Consider that in the case of the IRS scandal, both the Ways and Means Committee and the Oversight and Government Reform Committee have opened up independent investigations that will likely take significant resources for months to come. It is important that they investigate, and they are doing an excellent job. But despite these efforts, much remains unknown about the IRS scandal--which involves only a single agency and does not have to deal with sensitive, classified information--including whether the political targeting of groups was confined to the Cincinnati office or was actually directed by Washington. We still don't have a clear answer. In comparison, the Benghazi case cuts across multiple national security agencies and the White House involving sensitive information, thereby putting it in a league of its own among the various scandal investigations. Also of great interest is the increasing concern that the FBI is being used by various agencies as an excuse to avoid answering questions on Benghazi, especially as this investigation drags on longer. The American people should be troubled by the anemic pace of the FBI's investigation of those responsible for the attacks. Nearly a year later, the U.S. does not have a single suspect in custody. The Tunisians released one suspect earlier this year, after making the FBI wait for months to interview him. Another person of significant interest has been held since last fall by the Egyptian government, a recipient of billions of dollars in U.S. foreign assistance, but they will not allow the FBI to interview him. Even more concerning, last month the Associated Press reported that the FBI allegedly has identified five men believed to be responsible for the Benghazi attacks, but won't detain them because it does not have enough evidence to try them in a U.S. civilian court. For the U.S. to know the identities and possible locations of those who killed four Americans and fail to take action immediately because the administration insists on an Article III trial is shameful. For these reasons, any worthwhile Benghazi investigation must also consider how the Justice Department has managed its investigation into the terrorists over the last year. Despite these serious issues, much of the House's investigation on Benghazi to date has centered on secondary discussions like the ``talking points'' and the Accountability Review Board process, to the detriment of more fundamental issues like the administration's apparent abandonment of Americans who were facing a deadly siege. On the issues that matter most, there is nothing that happened that deadly night in Benghazi that can't be addressed in a public hearing and accompanying report of findings. There are ways to protect classified information while still allowing the public to learn what actually happened that night. There is no legitimate reason that the public shouldn't know what calls for help were made from Benghazi, who received those calls and, most importantly, why no support was sent to the Americans under siege. There is no reason that officials in the chain of command at various agencies shouldn't be asked to answer publicly why no effort was made to rescue those in Benghazi. It has been repeated often that there were no military assets in the region that could have responded in time to stop the initial attack on the consulate. But when the attacks started, no one could have known whether it would last eight minutes, eight hours, or eight days, or longer. It appears that not even a single plane was scrambled. We can't help but draw the deeply troubling conclusion that within minutes of the attack, the decision was made that the battle was lost and the Americans left there would be collateral damage in the greater War on Terror. If our government never sent a plane to help defend the annex, it begs the question: Did they even send an American plane to get the bodies and survivors out of Benghazi after the attacks? There's no reason the public should not learn the answer to this question, too. As Lt. Gen. William. G. Boykin (ret.) and other former Special Operations officials have noted, a bedrock American ethos--that our nation never leaves anyone behind on the battlefield--was shattered that night in Benghazi. No one came to rescue them despite pleas for help. More than nine months later, too many questions remain unanswered: Who took the call that night? What were they told and how did they respond? Why was the determination made not to intervene in a horrific assault on a U.S. diplomat and his brave support staff? In the dangerous world in which we live there are undoubtedly hard fought battles where American blood is spilled, and lives lost--our nation is painfully aware of this reality through our experience in distant lands like Iraq and Afghanistan. But Benghazi was an unanticipated battlefield where terrorist elements seized on the occasion of the anniversary of 9/11 to strike at an American outpost abroad. They did so with deadly consequence, and their attack was met with silence from a superpower. This is a black mark on our national history. It emboldens others with similarly gruesome aims. It leaves vulnerable Americans serving in dangerous posts. And ultimately, the lack of transparency from the various government agencies and entities involved undermines the faith of the American people in their government. This is a less obvious ``casualty'' of that dark day, but it has lasting implications which we as public servants know well. For in a functioning democracy there is a sacred trust that must exist between the government and the governed and that trust is precipitously eroding. As the Wall Street Journal noted in its May editorial, ``Let Benghazi's chips fall. The House should appoint a Select Committee.'' Best wishes. Sincerely, Frank R. Wolf, Member of Congress. ", u"Mr. President, before the Internet, RCA knew how many records Elvis sold every day. Before the Internet, Ford knew how many cars they were selling every day. Before the Internet, McDonald's could tell you how many hamburgers it was selling every day. Yet the Obama administration cannot tell us how many Americans have tried to sign up for ObamaCare. They can't tell us how many Americans did sign up for ObamaCare. They can't tell us what level of insurance they bought, nor can they tell us in what zip code they live. They told us that 20 million Americans have visited the ObamaCare Web site. They have the basic information to shop, but how many have tried to sign up? How many did sign up? Where do they live? What kind of insurance did they buy? Not only have they not told us, they have done their best to keep us from finding out. With WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden spilling our beans every day, what is happening on the ObamaCare exchanges is the biggest secret left in Washington, DC. The National Security Agency could learn lessons from Secretary Sebelius. We should not have to rely on anonymous sources to get basic information about what is happening with ObamaCare. Therefore, I am introducing legislation today to require the administration answer the following questions every week: How many people tried to sign up? How many people did sign up? What level of insurance did they buy? In what ZIP code do they live? What are they doing to fix the problems? This is not complicated information. In the Internet age, the administration ought to be able to provide this information not every week but every day. In fact, they should be able to provide it every minute. We should not have to pass a law to find these things out. I hope that every Senator will support this simple request that this legislation makes. It is a six-page bill. I will put it in the Congressional Record today, and everyone will have a chance to read it tomorrow. After everyone has had a chance to read it, I intend to ask unanimous consent to pass it. This Congress--both sides of the aisle--is dedicated to transparency. This administration has described itself as the most transparent administration in American history. So why should we not unanimously pass legislation to ask for the most basic information about what is happening on the ObamaCare exchanges? Health insurance companies say that in order to guarantee that everyone has a chance to sign up for insurance before January 1, which is when the law says they must, the application has to be in by December 15. That is not very far away. The administration has been talking about giving a grace period of a few weeks before the IRS will fine them for not having bought insurance, as ObamaCare says most Americans must buy health insurance. Still, if the Web site is not fixed, millions of Americans will be required to sign up for health insurance on a Web site that does not work. As a consequence of not being able to sign up for health care, they will be fined by the Internal Revenue Service. There is a much bigger problem than the fine, and that is millions of Americans may be without any health insurance at all after January 1 because their insurance is being canceled because of ObamaCare. Remember when President Obama said: If you like your insurance, you can keep it? Well, like a lot of things that have been said about ObamaCare, that is turning out not to be the case. Our staff has counted the announcements by health insurance companies that are ceasing to offer policies on January 1 because they don't qualify under the ObamaCare law. For example, in Tennessee, the State provides 16,000 Tennesseans who have trouble getting insurance with a plan called CoverTN. Because it doesn't meet the exact requirements of ObamaCare, the State is having to cancel that insurance on January 1, and those 16,000 Tennesseans won't have health insurance. Other Americans--for example, Tennesseans I have talked to--have what we call catastrophic insurance. They have insurance that provides for a catastrophe. That kind of insurance is often not available under ObamaCare. It is not allowed by ObamaCare for most people. An insurance company that offers these policies will not be offering them after January 1, and as a result, millions of Americans will not be able to buy the insurance they now have. If individuals can't or won't sign up, that will mean that after January 1, many of the sickest people will go into the exchanges. The result will be that the price of insurance--for everyone who has insurance--will go through the roof. We are already seeing that in the insurance markets today. The bottom line: If the Web site is not fixed, millions of Americans will not only be fined by the IRS for not buying insurance on a Web site that doesn't work, more importantly, they will be without health care insurance on January 1, insurance that many of them have today. The President has said over the last few days that the Web site will be ready by November 30. You are supposed to have your application in by December 15 and have the insurance bought by January 1, which only gives 2 weeks for millions of Americans to make their way through this maze. We tried to obtain this simple information that I have asked for, yet repeatedly, the requests which I have directed to Secretary Sebelius have come back with no answer at all--no answers, nothing. Outside analysts tell us that only \\1/2\\ of 1 percent of the people who logged on to the ObamaCare Web site in the first week were able to enroll, but we really don't know. Two weeks ago I sent a letter with House Oversight Chairman Darrell Issa to Secretary Sebelius, asking for the information she and the President are not giving us Such as how many people have enrolled successfully in the exchanges, what the technical problems are, how much it already costs, and how much it will cost to address these problems. The deadline for a response to our request has passed. Chairman Issa has said--and I joined him in the letter--that he may consider a subpoena to get that information. The American people deserve an answer to these questions. Often when the debate comes up, someone will say, Well, the Republicans don't have any proposals of their own. I have often made those proposals. I remember on this floor of the Senate many times proposing steps we should take to change our health care system so more people could afford insurance. We went back and counted the number of times when, during the health care debate, various Republicans talked about our step-by-step proposals for what we should do about health care, and there were 173 mentions of our step-by-step proposals. The basic problem with what happened with the new health care law was that we--the Democratic Congress did, I didn't; I didn't vote for it--expanded a health care delivery system that already costs too much. That was the wrong thing to do. That was an historic mistake. What we should have done is to make changes, step by step, in the health care delivery system that would reduce the cost of health care for the largest number of Americans so more people could have afforded it. Those were the steps we should have taken. We can still do that. Our health care delivery system is nearly 20 percent of our economy. ObamaCare is not our health care delivery system. Rather, ObamaCare includes some additions to our health care delivery system. ObamaCare is an expansion of a health care delivery system that already costs too much. The law is making some changes such as the ones I described earlier in my remarks. Those changes have been described as a train wreck, but we can turn the train around and head it in another direction--a direction of more competition, more choices, and lower costs for Americans buying health insurance. How can we do that? That is a subject for a long discussion, but here are a few of the ideas: Make Medicare solvent. The trustees have said that in 10 years there won't be enough money to pay hospital bills. We have a duty to make Medicare solvent. Reform Medicare Advantage to increase more choices and put it on a more level playing field with Traditional Medicare. That will provide seniors more options and it should save some money. Make Medicaid more flexible. I was Governor. I said on the floor that every Senator who voted for ObamaCare ought to be sentenced to go home and serve as Governor and try to implement the law. During my time as Governor, Medicaid was 8 percent of the State budget. I see it has grown to 26 percent today in Tennessee, soaking up money that otherwise would go for higher education or for other needed parts of State government. We should encourage workplace wellness. We had a lot of debate about that during the ObamaCare debate and we have ended up with a regulation that is too restrictive. We can change that. We can allow small businesses to pool their resources and offer a larger number of plans to a larger number of Americans at prices they can afford. We can allow Americans to purchase insurance across State lines. That would reduce the cost of health care, which should be our major goal. We could expand health care savings accounts. There is bipartisan legislation before the Senate that would define full-time employment for purposes of the health care law--this one or any one in the future--as 40 hours instead of 30 hours. That would be a great help to American business and an even bigger help to the employees who are being forced to go from 40 hours to 30 hours--employees who most need that income, and who, by going to 30 hours, will have to go to a second part-time job, and in many cases, in doing so, lose whatever health care benefits that might be available to them. I don't know where the 30 hours came from. That sounds as though it was made in France. A made-in-America part-time job ought to be up to 40 hours. Those are just a few of the steps we could take to turn the train around and avoid the wreck and move us in the right direction. We will be making those arguments over time. But for now, we need information about what is happening on the ObamaCare exchanges. I intend to ask unanimous consent tomorrow to pass a simple, six-page bill. It is legislation which requires the administration to give us weekly reports about how many have tried to enroll, how many have succeeded, what ZIP Code they live in, and what level of insurance they have purchased. Congress needs to know that, if millions of Americans are going to lose insurance on January 1, before they have a way to buy it through a Web site that doesn't work. States need to know it because, as time goes on, these decisions are going to have an effect on the Medicaid Programs that States are a partner in and are operating. Americans need to know it because, in many cases--we have counted at least 1.5 million cases and we expect millions more policies that were available to Americans when the law passed will not be available after January 1. So these Americans--and this includes people working in the Congress and people who are in the Congress--these Americans are going to have to make decisions before January 1 about what insurance they will have, because the insurance they now have isn't going to be available under the new health care law. This is a six-page bill, and a pretty simple idea. If RCA knew how many records Elvis was selling every day, if Ford knew before the Internet age how many cars Ford was selling every day, if McDonald's before the Internet age knew how many hamburgers it was selling every day, surely the Obama administration can tell us every week how many are enrolling on ObamaCare's Web site, how many are successfully getting their insurance, where they live, and what kind of insurance they buy. The stakes are much higher than Elvis's records, than Ford's cars, and than McDonald's hamburgers. These are the stakes of health insurance that involve the lives of millions of Americans, and I hope my colleagues will join me tomorrow when I ask unanimous consent to approve legislation that will require these weekly reports. By Mrs. HAGAN: S. 1591. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow the work opportunity credit to small businesses which hire individuals who are members of the Ready Reserve or National Guard, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.", u"Mr. President, I too wish to congratulate the Senator from Oklahoma and Kay for their 54th wedding anniversary. It is quite a landmark for an outstanding couple. I hope they get to celebrate on their day. I think that probably, if we knew the final vote on this was going to be the end of the whole process before Christmas, it probably would include time yielded back. But if there are going to be a whole bunch of things thrown in that really have relatively little importance before the end of the year, the Senator probably won't get his wish. So I am hoping we can end it with this bill. I rise to express my disappointment that this National Defense Authorization Act on which we will soon be having a final vote is the product of another deal instead of the result of discussion, debate, and amendment process on the floor. Once again, the Senate has failed to do its job. The Senate majority leader has blocked all but two amendments to this NDAA from consideration, and those were to prevent any other amendments from happening. That is not right. That is not the way we used to do it. If we want to know what is wrong with the Senate and why people of all political persuasions are upset with Congress, that is a big part of the answer right there--no amendments allowed. Here we are at the end of the year--this didn't have to come at the end of the year. In fact, I never remember us debating it this late in the year. Incidentally, this is the only committee that gets a bill every year. The other committees have to fight for some time and hopefully have a persuasive enough bill to get it. But every year I have been here, we have debated this National Defense Authorization Act, and it is important. There are two primary things we are charged with, and one is spending for the United States and the other is national defense. And this is about the national defense. It shouldn't be crowded into 30 hours or even 1 week. There ought to be the ability to express what we think is important dealing with national defense, and we are not being allowed to do that. This is an important bill for our country. There are a lot of important issues in it that we need to discuss. We haven't considered issues relating to our nuclear deterrent, to privacy concerns related to the National Security Administration, to detention of U.S. citizens, and the need to address sexual assault in the military, or a number of other important issues. In the past, we have spent multiple weeks on the Defense bill and considered dozens of amendments. That is what we should be doing this year too. I understand we have come up against this December 31 deadline and how critical that is. That should not have happened. Our national security needs to be fully debated, and it needs to be debated by the whole Senate. Every voice needs to be heard. That means every constituent out there whom we represent has to have at least an opportunity to have their interests reflected in this national bill. We all have some military in our States, and it is very important. That is how it is supposed to happen, and that is the way the Senate does its best work. One of the things that have been holding it up, of course, are the nominations. Most of those nominations did not have urgency to them. They could have been done next year without hurting the United States at all--not the case with the National Defense Authorization Act. So we do not have priorities on what we are debating around here, and then we have limits because of the timeframe. It is not right. One of those important issues we are skipping over is the nuclear deterrent. I offered several amendments on this issue because I believe the administration is playing a dangerous game with national security. The solution I proposed in my amendment was simple and straightforward. It would have ensured that American citizens and our allies would not be harmed by this administration's bad policy decisions--both today and for years to come--by ensuring that any further reductions in our nuclear arsenal could not be done by the administration unilaterally. As background, here in the Senate I have the honor of representing the city of Cheyenne, WY, which is the home of F.E. Warren Air Force Base and the 90th ICBM Missile Wing. Those who proudly serve there have an awesome responsibility and a history of doing excellent work. We have entrusted the most powerful of our weaponry to the best, to the most capable of managing these weapons in a thoroughly professional and reliable manner. Every day, the top-notch men and women who are stationed at F.E. Warren work together to maintain the world's most powerful military force, our ICBMs. Seven days a week, 24 hours a day, they stand guard to ensure our safety and our freedom. They maintain a constant vigil from which they can never stand down because their mission is that critical. In a very real sense, that is why each one of us is able to sleep well at night. Moms and dads and grandpas and grandmas all across America know that when they tuck their kids in at night, someone is on duty and will continue to be watching through the lonely hours of the night to make sure their little ones are safe and secure. Unfortunately, there are those in the administration who take the contributions of our military for granted. They do not have the sense of history that is needed to fully appreciate why these weapons were designed and put into operation in the first place. They do not see how much they are needed today and will still be needed tomorrow to ensure our future. They do not fully appreciate the key role they have played in the past either. They seem to think that nuclear weapons are part of a bygone era, a relic of the past that has not been needed since the Cold War ended. The adoption of such a position is dangerous because it takes our position of strength for granted. What they fail to understand is the power of this deterrent and how it has kept us safe for decades. In the past, any nation that gave even a casual thought to threatening us or trying to do us harm had to quickly shelve those plans when the realization of what they would be up against was made clear. That is, after all, the point of having these weapons. That is one of the reasons why they are necessary. They have served us well ever since they were first deployed. The administration's views on our nuclear deterrent should not come as a surprise to any of us who have watched the development of these ideas when they were first offered for consideration. We have seen President Obama promise to do all he can to reduce our nuclear arsenal--step by step. First, he rammed the New START treaty through the Senate by promising commitments that he ultimately did not keep. One of those was the promise to modernize our nuclear force, which we are still waiting on. I voted against ratification of the New START treaty because I believe maintaining a strong nuclear force is a critical part of protecting our country. It still is. The Obama administration has stated its intention to reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads to as few as 1,000, which would be 550 fewer than is allowed under that New START treaty. What is more, in the factsheet on the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study, it states that the President could go outside the formal treaty-making process and reduce our nuclear arsenal unilaterally. That has ``bad idea'' written all over it. It means the administration can still make drastic nuclear reductions even if Russia will not agree to do the same. Does that make any sense? Should we just bargain with ourselves? That is something which should give us all pause and encourage us to go on record as to what needs to be done to keep our people safe. In case you think I am overreacting, last year President Obama was caught on an open microphone promising former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that he would have more flexibility to negotiate on nuclear defense issues after his election. Those comments are still before us, and they do not exactly instill trust and confidence that the President will not choose to bypass Congress and act unilaterally on nuclear reductions. All we have to do is look around the world to see why we should be concerned. Everywhere we look, nations are looking to increase, not decrease, their weaponry. In fact, as the President makes plans for reducing our own nuclear arsenal, it appears Russia and China are looking for ways to modernize and update their own arsenals. These are dangerous weapons, and we need to be certain we do everything we can to ensure that they continue to be fully monitored. They must never be used. But it seems to me that the best way to make certain they are never used is to be certain that no one would ever dare to think of using them against us or our allies. The concerns I have that some other country might use these weapons first are increased, not decreased, when I see the administration sending signals that they might not wait for everyone to disarm; they might do it on their own first. It would be like taking your own team off the field and allowing the other team to score at will. Relying on the good will of the opponent rarely works, and it is clearly not a good strategy. One final point. We are not the only ones who are relying on our nuclear arsenal for our safety and security. There are other countries that rely on the United States for their national security. If we make it clear that we are dropping out of this vital source of our strength as a nation, this could encourage other countries to increase their own nuclear capability because they will suspect that they can no longer rely on us. Increasing the number of nations that have a nuclear capability is clearly something we dare not encourage. Simply put, this is exactly what my amendment was trying to stop. It would have ensured that any further reductions in our nuclear arsenal could not be done on a unilateral basis by the President alone. Instead, any changes would have to follow the application of the treaty system, which would give the Senate an opportunity to weigh in on this matter again when a proposal in the form of a treaty is brought before us for our consideration. Just as ridiculous, the President threatened a veto if the amendment were in the bill. Now, unfortunately, due to the majority leader's actions, we are not going to be able to debate this and other important issues like I mentioned before--the privacy issue at the National Security Agency, the NSA listening in on telephone calls; the detention of U.S. citizens; addressing sexual assault in the military; and a number of others. For all of these reasons, I cannot support moving forward on the Defense bill. I hope that on our next Defense authorization bill we will all recognize the importance of being allowed to fully debate these issues, so we will not wait until the end of the year when there is this looming deadline regarding bonuses, so our men and women in uniform can continue to fulfill their mission of keeping our Nation safe, secure, and free, knowing what their future is. Something as important as the Defense authorization bill must not be drafted or taken up for a vote until it has made it through the whole legislative process. The legislative process was created for a reason, and we do ourselves and our constituents and those who serve in our Armed Forces a disservice when we fail to make full use of it. The bill has not made it through each step of the process. In my opinion, that is a fatal flaw. We can do better. We need to do better. We better do better in the future. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"I thank the gentleman. As indicated, the bill specifically contains an explicit prohibition on bulk collection of tangible things pursuant to section 215. The FREEDOM Act provides that section 215 may be used only where specific selection term is provided as the basis for the production of tangible things. Clearly, we worked very hard to contain what was an amoeba that would not end. Finally, I believe section 301 of the bill, as I indicated, was included, as it was in my amendment in H.R. 3773. Let me conclude by simply saying that the Bill of Rights lives. The Bill of Rights is for the American people, both the right to freedom, both the right in essence to privacy, and our respect for the gathering of intelligence to protect us from terrorists. This bill, the USA FREEDOM Act, is indeed an enormous step forward. Let us work together to move us even more, but today, we end megadata collecting as we know it. Mr. Speaker, I believe we have made a giant step forward for civil liberties, respect for the integrity of the American people, and their right to freedom, as well as for the protecting of all of us from terror. Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee and a co-sponsor, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3361, the ``USA Freedom Act,'' which is short for ``Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection, and Online Monitoring Act.'' The USA Freedom Act is the House's unified response to the unauthorized disclosures and subsequent publication in the media in June 2013 regarding the National Security Agency's collection from Verizon of the phone records of all of its American customers, which was authorized by the FISA Court pursuant to Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Public reaction to the news of this massive and secret data gathering operation was swift and negative. There was justifiable concern on the part of the public and a large percentage of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of this NSA data collection operation, which exceeded by orders of magnitude anything previously authorized or contemplated, may constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy and threat to the civil liberties of American citizens. To quell the growing controversy, the Director of National Intelligence declassified and released limited information about this program. According to the DNI, the information acquired under this program did not include the content of any communications or the identity of any subscriber. The DNI stated that ``the only type of information acquired under the Court's order is telephony metadata, such as telephone numbers dialed and length of calls.'' The assurance given by the DNI, to put it mildly, was not very reassuring. In response, many Members of Congress, including the Ranking Member Conyers, and Mr. Sensenbrenner, and myself, introduced legislation in response to the disclosures to ensure that the law and the practices of the executive branch reflect the intent of Congress in passing the USA Patriot Act and subsequent amendments. For example, I introduced H.R. 2440, the ``FISA Court in the Sunshine Act of 2013,'' bipartisan legislation, that much needed transparency without compromising national security to the decisions, orders, and opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or ``FISA Court.'' Specifically, my bill would require the Attorney General to disclose each decision, order, or opinion of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), allowing Americans to know how broad of a legal authority the government is claiming under the PATRIOT Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct the surveillance needed to keep Americans safe. I am pleased that these requirements are incorporated in substantial part as Sections 402 and 604 of the USA Freedom Act, which requires the Attorney General to conduct a declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion of the FISA court that includes a significant construction or interpretation of law and to submit a report to Congress within 45 days. I also am pleased that the bill before us contains an explicit prohibition on bulk collection of tangible things pursuant to Section 215 authority. Instead, the USA Freedom Act provides that Section 215 may only be used where a specific selection term is provided as the basis for the production of tangible things. Another important improvement is that the bill's prohibition on domestic bulk collection, as well as its criteria for specifying the information to be collected, applies not only to Section 215 surveillance activities but also to other law enforcement communications interception authorities, such as national security letters. Finally, I strongly support the USA Freedom Act because Section 301 of the bill continues the prohibition against ``reverse targeting,'' which became law when an earlier Jackson Lee Amendment was included in H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007. ``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the government targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to collect information on certain U.S. persons. One of the main concerns of libertarians and classical conservatives, as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, in giving expanded authority to the executive branch was the temptation of national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards to prevent it. The Jackson Lee Amendment, codified in Section 301 of the USA Freedom Act, reduces even further any such temptation to resort to reverse targeting by requiring the Administration to obtain a regular, individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the surveillance is a person in the United States. In retaining the prohibition on reverse targeting, Section 301 achieves honors the Constitution by requiring the government to obtain a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person reasonably believed to be located in the United States.'' I should that nothing in Section 301 requires the Government to obtain a FISA order for every overseas target on the off chance that they might pick up a call into or from the United States. Rather, a FISA order is required only where there is a particular, known person in the United States at the other end of the foreign target's calls in whom the Government has a significant interest such that a significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire that person's communications. Mr. Speaker, while the bill before is a good bill, it is not perfect. No legislation ever is. In particular, my preference would have been to retain the provision in the bill as originally introduced establishing an Office of the Special Advocate to vigorously advocate in support of legal interpretations that protect individual privacy and civil liberties. As initially contemplated, the Office of the Special Advocate would be authorized to participate in proceedings before the FISA Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, and to request reconsiderations of FISA Court decisions and participate in appeals and reviews. Regrettably, the provision establishing the Office of the Special Advocate fell victim to a compromise and replaced with a provision authorizing both the FISA court and the FISA Court of Review, if they deem it necessary, to appoint an individual to serve as amicus curiae in a case involving a novel or significant interpretation of law. Under this arrangement, the presiding judges of the courts must designate five individuals eligible to serve in that position who possess expertise in privacy and civil liberties, intelligence collection, telecommunications or any other area that may lend legal or technical expertise to the courts. The Office of the Special Advocate arrangement in my opinion is superior because it provides for mandatory participation of the public advocate rather than the discretionary involvement of court designated amicus curiae provided in the bill before us. Mr. Speaker, as I noted in an op-ed published way back in October 2007, nearly two centuries ago, Alexis DeTocqueville, who remains the most astute student of American democracy, observed that the reason democracies invariably prevail in any military conflict is because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that are indispensable to success: initiative, innovation, courage, and a love of justice. I ask unanimous consent to include in the Record a copy of that op-ed. I support the USA Freedom Act because it will help keep us true to the Bill of Rights and strikes the proper balance between our cherished liberty and smart security. I urge my colleagues to support the USA Freedom Act. The USA FREEDOM Act takes steps to: End bulk collection under Patriot Act Section 215. The bill requires the government to show the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that the specific records it seeks from phone companies pertain to a specific email address, account number or other ``selection term'' before it can demand a customer's personal information. It creates a new collection authority for call records but takes meaningful steps to ensure that such records are not vacuumed up wholesale, as was happening under the secret programs revealed by Edward Snowden. Prevent bulk collection under FISA pen register and National Security Letter authorities. The bill also requires the government to use a ``selection term'' that uniquely describes its surveillance target and serves as the basis for collecting information from a telephone line, facility, or other account. This would help ensure that the government won't use pen registers and National Security Letters as convenient substitutes for the 215 program. Increase transparency. Finally, the bill requires the government to provide to Congress and to the public additional reporting on its surveillance programs, while enabling companies who receive national security informational requests to more fully inform customers about the extent to which the government is collecting their data. Additional governmental reporting requirements and more particularized third party reporting authorities, however, are needed in order to ensure that Congress and the public have the information they need to perform truly robust oversight. While the bill makes significant reforms to U.S. surveillance law, Congress clearly chose not to let the perfect be the enemy of the good. And, to be clear, more work needs to be done. Some of the additional reforms we are calling for, which were in the original USA FREEDOM Act, include: Ensuring that judges in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) have the authority to determine whether an application passes legal muster and do not return to being mere rubber stamps. Limiting the circumstances under which the government can gather records more than one ``hop'' out from a target to help ensure Americans' information is not unnecessarily swept up. Closing the ``back door'' search loophole in the FISA Amendments Act to prevent the government from searching information collected under Section 702 of FISA for the U.S. persons' communications content.", u" Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred, as follows: By Mr. OLSON (for himself, Mr. McCarthy of California, Mr. McClintock, Mr. Schweikert, Mr. Stockman, Mr. Chaffetz, Mr. Pearce, Mr. Pompeo, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Tipton, Mr. Salmon, Mr. Weber of Texas, Mr. Duncan of South Carolina, Mr. Gosar, Mr. Poe of Texas, Mr. Franks of Arizona, Mr. Neugebauer, Mr. Marchant, Mr. Culberson, Mr. Conaway, Mr. Latta, Mr. Williams, and Mr. Kelly of Pennsylvania): H.R. 4957. A bill to amend the Clean Air Act with respect to exceptional event demonstrations, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. FLORES (for himself and Mr. Gohmert): H.R. 4958. A bill to provide monetary awards to any individual who provides information pertaining to the electronic communications sent by Lois Lerner during her employment at the Internal Revenue Service, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. HUDSON (for himself, Mr. Kline, and Mr. Walberg): H.R. 4959. A bill to direct the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to maintain up-to-date information on its website regarding charges and actions brought by the Commission, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mr. YOUNG of Indiana (for himself, Ms. Linda T. Sanchez of California, Mr. Reichert, Mrs. Black, Mr. Kelly of Pennsylvania, Mr. Nunes, Mr. Tiberi, Mr. Boustany, Mr. Price of Georgia, Mr. Schock, Mr. Paulsen, Mr. Marchant, Mr. Griffin of Arkansas, Mr. Neal, Mr. Larson of Connecticut, Mr. Pascrell, Mr. Rangel, Ms. Schwartz, Mr. Danny K. Davis of Illinois, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Kind, Mr. Gerlach, and Mr. Renacci): H.R. 4960. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify the substantiation rules for the donation of vehicles valued between $500 and $5,000 dollars; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. McCAUL: H.R. 4961. A bill to prevent organized human smuggling, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Homeland Security, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. FRANKS of Arizona (for himself, Mr. Schweikert, Mr. Gosar, Mr. Fincher, Mr. Stockman, Mr. LaMalfa, Mr. Crenshaw, Mr. Weber of Texas, Mr. Poe of Texas, Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas, Mr. Neugebauer, Mr. McClintock, Mr. DeSantis, Mr. Posey, Mr. Yoho, Mrs. Bachmann, and Mr. Miller of Florida): H.R. 4962. A bill to provide for enhanced border security, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Homeland Security, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Natural Resources, and Agriculture, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Ms. MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM of New Mexico (for herself and Ms. Kaptur): H.R. 4963. A bill to amend the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 to provide protections to borrowers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. BRALEY of Iowa: H.R. 4964. A bill to direct the Commissioner of Social Security to continue to make Social Security number printouts and benefit verification letters available at field offices of the Social Security Administration; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. CASTRO of Texas (for himself, Mr. Fattah, and Mr. Veasey): H.R. 4965. A bill to amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to award grants to improve childhood care and education for local governments and local educational agencies; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Ms. DeLAURO (for herself and Ms. Slaughter): H.R. 4966. A bill to amend the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products Inspection Act, and the Egg Products Inspection Act to provide that meat, poultry, and egg products containing certain pathogens or contaminants are adulterated, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture. By Mr. FRANKS of Arizona (for himself, Mr. Lamborn, Mr. Yoho, Mr. DeSantis, Mr. Salmon, Mr. Fleming, Mr. Posey, Mr. King of Iowa, Mr. Perry, and Mr. Chabot): H.R. 4967. A bill to provide congressional review of nuclear agreements with Iran; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. HORSFORD (for himself, Mrs. Beatty, Mr. Messer, and Mrs. Brooks of Indiana): H.R. 4968. A bill to posthumously award a Congressional gold medal to Maya Angelou in recognition of her achievements and contributions to American culture and the civil rights movement; to the Committee on Financial Services, and in addition to the Committee on House Administration, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. KINZINGER of Illinois (for himself and Mr. Courtney): H.R. 4969. A bill to direct the Federal Communications Commission to extend to private land use restrictions its rule relating to reasonable accommodation of amateur service communications; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. LoBIONDO (for himself, Mr. Kildee, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. Runyan, Mr. Horsford, Mr. King of New York, Ms. Titus, and Mr. Smith of New Jersey): H.R. 4970. A bill to provide for the extension of certain unemployment benefits; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, and Education and the Workforce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. O'ROURKE (for himself, Mr. Flores, Ms. Gabbard, Mr. Horsford, Mr. Israel, Mr. Jolly, Mr. Michaud, Mr. Pallone, Mr. Swalwell of California, Ms. Hanabusa, Ms. Hahn, and Mr. Thompson of California): H.R. 4971. A bill to direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to conduct annual surveys of veterans on experiences obtaining hospital care and medical services from medical facilities of the Department of Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. PAYNE: H.R. 4972. A bill to award posthumously a Congressional Gold Medal to Althea Gibson, in recognition of her groundbreaking achievements in athletics and her commitment to ending racial discrimination and prejudice within the world of athletics; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. PEARCE: H.R. 4973. A bill to amend the rural and low-income program under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to include professional development in STEM education, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Ms. SHEA-PORTER (for herself, Mr. Loebsack, and Mr. Tierney): H.R. 4974. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide for the repayment of higher education loans for certain employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. THORNBERRY (for himself and Mr. Smith of Texas): H.R. 4975. A bill to amend the Controlled Substances Act relating to controlled substance analogues; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. MICHAUD: H. Con. Res. 104. Concurrent resolution supporting the goals and ideals of Vietnam Veterans Day; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. SCHNEIDER (for himself and Mr. Weber of Texas): H. Res. 642. A resolution calling for the immediate and unconditional release of the three kidnapped teenagers held captive in the West Bank, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. By Mr. CHABOT (for himself, Mr. Bera of California, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Collins of Georgia, and Mr. Connolly): H. Res. 643. A resolution calling for further defense against the People's Republic of China's state-sponsored cyber-enabled theft of trade secrets, including by the People's Liberation Army; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on Intelligence (Permanent Select), Armed Services, Ways and Means, and Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. RIGELL (for himself, Mr. Ribble, Mr. Barrow of Georgia, and Mr. Rahall): H. Res. 644. A resolution condemning and disapproving of the Obama administration's failure to comply with the lawful statutory requirement to notify Congress before releasing individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and expressing national security concerns over the release of five Taliban leaders and the repercussions of negotiating with terrorists; to the Committee on Armed Services. By Mr. STOCKMAN: H. Res. 645. A resolution requesting that the President of the United States transmit to the House of Representatives copies of any emails in the possession of the Executive Office of the President that were transmitted to or from the email account(s) of former Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations Division Director Lois Lerner between January 2009 and April 2011; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. STOCKMAN: H. Res. 646. A resolution directing the Attorney General to transmit to the House of Representatives copies of any emails in the possession of the Department of Justice that were transmitted to or from the email account(s) of former Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations Division Director Lois Lerner between January 2009 and April 2011; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. STOCKMAN: H. Res. 647. A resolution directing the Secretary of the Treasury to transmit to the House of Representatives copies of any emails in the possession of the Department that were transmitted to or from the email account(s) of former Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations Division Director Lois Lerner between January 2009 and April 2011; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. STOCKMAN: H. Res. 648. A resolution directing the Chairman of the Federal Election Commission to transmit to the House of Representatives copies of any emails in the possession of the Commission that were transmitted to or from the email account(s) of former Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations Division Director Lois Lerner between January 2009 and April 2011; to the Committee on House Administration. By Mr. STOCKMAN: H. Res. 649. A resolution directing the Secretary of Defense to transmit to the House of Representatives copies of any emails in the possession of the Department of Defense or the National Security Agency that were transmitted to or from the email account(s) of former Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations Division Director Lois Lerner between January 2009 and April 2011; to the Committee on Armed Services. By Mr. STIVERS (for himself, Mr. Tiberi, and Mr. Walz): H. Res. 650. A resolution congratulating the American Motorcyclist Association on their 90th Anniversary; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.", u"Mr. President, I am going to speak on another issue. I see my distinguished colleague from Utah Senator Lee is on the floor. It is an issue he has worked with me on. We have tried to join together. It was more than a year ago that not only here in the United States but the whole world learned some very startling details about the massive scope of the National Security Agency's surveillance programs. Since then the American people, and actually, all three branches of government have been debating the same fundamental questions about the extent of government power that the Framers considered when they crafted the Constitution. Many of us had been arguing those same issues, whether in the Judiciary Committee, the Intelligence Committee, or others. But it was hard to get anybody's attention. Suddenly the whole world was listening. The obvious question is, when and how should the government be permitted to gather information about its citizens? How do we protect our country while we preserve our fundamental principles and our constitutional liberties? These questions are even more relevant and more complex as technology develops rapidly, and as more data is created every second. Nobody questions that the government cannot just walk into our houses, rifle through our drawers, our filing cabinets, and our cupboards, to see what we might have there. But that is not where we keep our data anymore. It is on computers. By the same token, they shouldn't have the right to rifle through our electronic files either. If they collect all this data, should the government be allowed to collect and use all of it? To what extent does this massive collection of data improve our national security and at what cost to our privacy and free expression? If we pick up everything, do we actually have anything? The Senate Judiciary Committee considered these and other important questions during the course of six public hearings held over the past year. During this deliberative process, the Committee considered whether the bulk collection of Americans' phone records has been effective in preventing terrorist attacks, the privacy implications of the program, and the effect on the U.S. technology industry. Those hearings helped to demonstrate the need for additional limits on government surveillance authorities. As these hearings continued, the call for an end to bulk collection under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act grew louder and more persistent. The President's own Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology testified before the Judiciary Committee to call for an end to bulk collection, concluding that ``[t]he information contributed to terrorist investigations by the use of section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional section 215 orders.'' The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board also called for an end to bulk collection, concluding that the program ``lacks a viable legal foundation under Section 215.'' Technology executives, legal scholars and privacy advocates called for an end to bulk collection. These witnesses also proposed meaningful reforms to other government authorities, such as Section 702 of FISA, the pen register and trap and trace authorities under FISA, and the national security letter statutes. Then, earlier this year, President Obama himself embraced the growing consensus that the bulk collection of phone records should not continue in its current form. Just this week two new reports highlighted the costs of not placing reasonable limits on government surveillance, not just the significant economic cost if you don't put limits but the impact of journalistic freedom and also our right to counsel--our right to counsel--something we assume is an unalienable right, and it is, but it is being undermined. That is why the technology industry, the privacy and civil liberties community are unified in support for this bill. It is actually now time for Congress to act. That is why I am introducing the USA FREEDOM Act of 2014. It builds on the legislation that was passed by the House of Representatives in May, as well as the original bicameral, bipartisan legislation I introduced with Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner 10 months ago--last October. I continue to prefer the original version of the USA FREEDOM Act, but we are running short on time in this Congress. Since passage of the House version in May, I have been working to address concerns that the text of the House bill--though clearly intended to end bulk collection--did not do so effectively. I have worked with both Republicans and Democrats, House Members and Senators. I spent the past several months in discussions with the intelligence community and a wide range of stakeholders, other Senators, privacy and civil liberties groups, and our U.S. technology industry. The bill I am introducing today is the result of those hundreds of hours of negotiations and meetings. First, and most importantly, this bill ensures that the ban on bulk collection is a real ban on bulk collection and that it is effective. It ensures the government cannot rely on section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act--the FISA pen register and trap-and-trace device statute or the national security letter statutes--to engage in the indiscriminate collection of Americans' private records: yours, mine or anybody else's who may be watching this debate. Under this legislation, when the government uses these authorities to collect information, it has to narrowly limit its collection based on a ``specific selection term'' that identifies the focus of the collection. ``Specific selection term'' is carefully defined. For Section 215 and the pen register statute, the definition ensures that the government must use a term that is narrowly limited to the greatest extent reasonably practicable consistent with the purpose for seeking the information. The bill specifies the term cannot be a broad geographic area, such as city or State or ZIP Code or area code, nor can it simply be a service provider. For national security letters, the government must specifically identify the target about whom it seeks information. These provisions preclude the government from seeking large swaths of information that it does not need--and that might very well include private details about the lives of law-abiding Americans. As a backstop, the bill also mandates additional minimization procedures when the government's collection under Section 215 is likely to be overbroad. It requires the government to destroy data unrelated to its investigation within a reasonable time frame. Second, the bill enhances transparency regarding the government's use of surveillance tools. That is one of the best checks on a runaway government. FISA and other national security laws provide law enforcement with an extraordinary amount of power. The American people have a right to know how that power is exercised. Among other things, this bill requires the government to report to the public key information about the scope of the collection under a range of national security authorities, including the number of queries about Americans that it conducts in databases collected under Section 702. It also allows private companies more leeway to disclose the number of FISA orders and national security letters they receive. I see the distinguished Senator from Minnesota, Mr. Franken, on the floor. I thank him in particular for his leadership and helping to draft these transparency provisions. Likewise, I thank Senator Blumenthal for his work on the bill's key reforms to the FISA Court. The bill requires the FISA Court and the FISA Court of Review, in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, to appoint a panel of special advocates who can advance legal positions supporting individual privacy and civil liberties--in other words, it will not be just one voice that is heard, we will actually have dissenting voices--and improve judicial review. The FISA Court would be required to appoint one of these advocates whenever it confronts a significant or novel issue of law, or it must issue a written finding that appointment of an advocate is not appropriate. The bill also requires the FISA Court to report the number of times that it appoints or declines to appoint an advocate when confronting a novel or significant issue of law. This bill additionally provides a certification mechanism for appellate review of FISA Court decisions when the government prevails, and it provides a declassification process for significant FISA Court decisions. Finally, this bill improves the judicial review procedures for nondisclosure orders that accompany Section 215 orders and national security letters. These have been so overused. This legislation responds to decisions by Federal courts that found these provisions violate the First Amendment. While this bill contains significant reforms and improvements, it doesn't fix every problem, and we know there is more work to be done--in particular, with regard to Section 702 of FISA and other broad government surveillance authorities that implicate the privacy rights of Americans. We could spend the next 20 years waiting to get 100 percent of everything we need. I would like to get most of what we need and then work on the rest. The bill provides for public reporting on Section 702. That will help set the stage for reform, but transparency alone is not enough. I will continue to work with both Republican and Democratic Senators and other outside experts to work on these issues. For developing the legislation, I consulted closely with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the NSA, the FBI, and the Department of Justice--and every single word of this bill was vetted with those agencies. I am grateful for their receptiveness to the public's concerns and for their constructive participation in this process. Together, we worked hard to ensure that this bill enacts significant and meaningful reforms to protect individual privacy, while providing the Intelligence Community with operational flexibility to safeguard this country. The Intelligence Community will still have the ability to safeguard this country--nobody is suggesting they shouldn't, but collecting everything is the same as having nothing. That was the mistake we had before 9/11, where we had the information that could have stopped the attack on 9/11, but we failed to look at it all. I am pleased the executive branch supports our bill. I am pleased the President agrees it should be enacted as soon as possible. But ultimately we--Senators and our colleagues in the other body--have the responsibility of the American people to do what is right and to protect the privacy of the American people. That is why we have worked hard with everybody to ensure the bill enacts meaningful reforms. This is the most important thing to remember: We can enact this bill, get it signed into law, and it would represent the most significant reform of government surveillance authorities since Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act 13 years ago. It is a historic opportunity. We would be derelict in our duty to this country if we passed up that opportunity. I think if people such as Senator Lee, Senator Durbin, Senator Heller, Senator Franken, Senator Cruz, Senator Blumenthal, Senator Tom Udall, Senator Coons, Senator Heinrich, Senator Markey, Senator Hirono, Senator Klobuchar, and Senator Whitehouse have joined, this is not a partisan bill, this is not a Democratic or Republican bill, this is a good bill that protects America. I also note the particular contributions over many years of Senator Wyden and Senator Mark Udall. They have worked tirelessly to protect Americans' privacy from their posts on the Intelligence Committee. I am introducing this revised version of the USA FREEDOM Act today because we cannot afford to wait any longer to end the bulk collection of Americans' records. I am concerned that we are running out of time on the legislative calendar. Typically, my strong preference would be to take up the bill in the Judiciary Committee and mark it up. But given the need to act quickly, I am willing to forego regular order and take this bill directly to the Senate Floor. We cannot let this opportunity go by. This is a debate about Americans' fundamental relationship with their government, about whether our government should have the power to create massive databases of information about its citizens or whether we are in control of our own government, not the other way around. I believe we have to impose stronger limits on government surveillance powers. I am confident that most Vermonters, and most Americans, agree with me. We need to get this right, and we need to get it done without further delay. I close with one very quick story I have used before. About the only thing I have actually saved from a newspaper that was written about me, and I liked it so much I framed it. As the distinguished Presiding Officer knows, I live on a dirt road, a place where my wife and I celebrated our honeymoon 52 years ago. The adjoining farmer has known me since I was a little kid. The whole story in that paper goes like this: A man in an out-of-State car on a Saturday morning drives up, sees the farmer on the porch, and says: Does Senator Leahy live up this way? He says: Are you a relative of his? Well, no, I am not. Are you a friend of his? Well, not really. Is he expecting you? No. Never heard of him. We like our privacy. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to bring a clean fiscal year 2015 bill for the Department of Homeland Security to the Senate floor as soon as possible. Earlier this month the world watched in horror as terrorists massacred journalists and other innocent civilians in and around Paris. In December we were stunned as computers at a major corporation, Sony Entertainment, were attacked by North Korea. Over the past year, as recently as last week, in fact, we witnessed brutal executions at the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. These events illustrate all too well that the threats faced today by America and by our allies are real. As a former chairman and now ranking member of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, I know this to be the case. Nearly 12 years ago, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security--we call it DHS--to help secure our Nation and to help ensure that our Nation is protected against these continuing and evolving threats. Given the origins of the Department, the work the men and women do there every day to keep us safe, and the grave nature of the threats our country faces, it is shocking to me and disappointing to me that we are here today having this debate. We are now discussing ways we can make the Department and its employees more effective. We are not discussing how we can enable them to work better. Senator Coburn and those with whom we served in the last Congress did that throughout the year. Senator Johnson and I did that just yesterday with our first hearing on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee this year. Unbelievably, as we focused on cyber security attacks, we are debating whether to give this key national security agency funding for the remainder of the fiscal year. In order for that Department to efficiently and effectively carry out its critical role, it needs adequate and reliable funding. They need it. Another short-term budget--or even worse, another shutdown--would be bad for the Department and bad for employee morale--very bad. More importantly, though, it would pose a grave threat to our security. Instead of sending us a straightforward clean funding bill for the Department, the House has unfortunately sent us a bill that includes a number of amendments aimed at undermining the President's immigration policies. Many of our colleagues on both sides have significant concerns with these amendments, and the President has indicated that he would veto the funding bill if the amendments stay attached to it. Thus, these amendments jeopardize passage of the bill, and they threaten to prolong the crippling budget uncertainty the Department of Homeland Security has operated under. The Department of Homeland Security already has a lot to say grace over. We do them no favor by playing games with their budget. I understand why some of our colleagues are upset about the President's immigration policies, and we should have a debate about those concerns. But first we should be doing what we have been asked to do by giving the Department of Homeland Security the resources that it needs to keep Americans safe in an ever more dangerous world. Two of our colleagues, Senator Jeanne Shaheen and Barbara Mikulski, have introduced a clean appropriations bill that mirrors funding provisions of the House bill. Overall, funding provisions in their bill, S. 272--which I understand both Democrats and Republicans on the Appropriations Committee agreed to last year, last December--in fact, provides for $39.6 billion in discretionary funding for the Department of Homeland Security. That is an increase of $400 million above last year's funding, but this measure is more than just a funding bill. To my colleagues who want to do what we can now to protect our country from the kinds of attacks we have been seeing around the world of late, I say: Support a clean DHS funding bill. To our colleagues who want reforms at the U.S. Secret Service, I say: Support a clean DHS funding bill. A clean bill would provide the resources the Secret Service needs to carry out much-needed reforms in the wake of the most recent White House fence-jumper incident and other security lapses. To my colleagues whose States need to recover from this week's blizzards or to prepare for the next storm, let me just say: Support a clean DHS funding bill. We need to ensure that FEMA and our States have access to nearly $2.6 billion in grants to respond to future disasters--both natural and manmade. To my colleagues who want stronger border security and immigration enforcement, a clean DHS funding bill is what we ought to be rallying around. The clean bill put forward by Senator Shaheen and Mikulski would take additional measures to secure our border and enforce our immigration laws, something I know is a priority to me and, I think, to all of our colleagues. In fact, most of the funding increase in the Shaheen-Mikulski bill would go to border security and immigration enforcement. The bill our colleagues have put forward contains a little more than $10 billion for Customs and Border Protection, an increase of approximately $118 million above last year's enacted level. This funding level would support the largest operational force level for the Agency in its history--maintaining over 21,000 Border Patrol agents and supporting the new funding level for nearly 24,000 officers. The Shaheen-Mikulski bill would also enable Customs and Border Protection to fly more patrols along our maritime and land borders and to continue purchasing new force-multiplying gear and equipment. It would also increase funding for critical surveillance technologies along our border, especially along areas such as the Rio Grande Valley, by some $20 million. As our colleagues will recall, last year our Nation saw tens of thousands of unaccompanied minors and families from Central America come to our southern border. This clean full-year funding bill would provide Immigration and Customs Enforcement $689 million more than last year's funding to help address the additional needs associated with that surge. Specifically, it includes $3.4 billion for immigration detention and funds 34,000 adult detention beds. The Shaheen-Mikulski bill would also fully fund the employment eligibility verification system, known as E-Verify, which helps businesses to ensure they are hiring legal employees. Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson recently said--and I fully agree with him--that to deny his Department full-year funding would actually hurt our border security. We cannot continue to default to short-term continuing resolutions and force the Department to cut corners and scramble to fund its highest priorities. As we have learned over these years, stopgap crisis budgeting is an egregious waste of money. Let me say that again--an egregious waste of money. By shutting down the Department or keeping it on a continuing resolution, we will waste tens of millions of taxpayer dollars, including the cost of renegotiating contracts, lost employee and contractor productivity, and lost training. For example, it would delay the award of a $600 million contract to build a national security cutter that the Coast Guard needs. But there is more than just a financial impact. The dramatic consequences of failing to provide full-year funding for the Department will be felt throughout our country. While most of the Department's workforce will continue to perform essential functions in the event of a shutdown, the bulk of its management and administrative support activities would cease and frontline personnel would not receive the support they need. It would be like trying to fight a war without planners, without logistics, and without supplies. It would be like us here in the Senate working without our staffs. We might be able to find a way to get our work done, but we wouldn't be as effective. And those at DHS who are required to come to work if a shutdown were to occur would not be paid until Congress restores funding. Essentially, a large part of our Federal homeland security efforts would be operating under an IOU. A stopgap budget or a shutdown would also further degrade employee morale at the Department of Homeland Security. As many of us know, the Department continues to rank dead last--dead last--among all other large Federal agencies when it comes to workforce morale. While Secretary Johnson, Deputy Secretary Mayorkas, and their team are taking important steps to make the agency a better place to work--and we are helping them--the Department still lacks a strong sense of cohesion and a sense of team. But Congress too has a responsibility. Providing this large and complex agency the funding it needs would be a terrific next step. If my colleagues and I expect the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies to show improved outcomes, we cannot continue to play games with their budgets and expect them to not feel the negative consequences. No business owner or manager could be expected to be effective and efficient under these conditions. The leadership of the Department of Homeland Security is no exception. A clean Homeland Security funding bill for the rest of the fiscal year is the fiscally responsible step to take. If we deny them that funding, we will not be punishing the President. In a sense, we will be punishing a number of the employees. But most of all we will be punishing taxpayers because we are wasting their money and we are diminishing and reducing the kind of security they need in this country today. Let me just say, don't take my word for this. Our good friend Tom Ridge, the first Secretary of Homeland Security and a former Republican Governor, with whom I served, said: I would be very, very disappointed if I were Secretary, and the Democrats did it to me . . . It's pretty difficult to plan long term when you don't know exactly how much you're going to have available and what strings might be attached to it. Give them the funding they need. And I would say to our Republican colleagues, give them the funding they need. For these reasons, I urge our colleagues in the Senate to join me in doing the right thing in supporting passage of a clean full-year appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security and rejecting the amendments approved by the House. It would be irresponsible for us to continue kicking the can down the road when it comes to national security, and we certainly cannot afford to let this vital agency's funding run out. I ask my colleagues to think about what we are trying to accomplish by failing to provide the Department of Homeland Security with the funds they need to operate. The American voters sent Congress a clear message on election day. This is what they said: They want us to work together. They want us to get things done. And they especially want us to enhance our economic recovery. Given recent events around the world, they also want us to do all we can to keep them and their families safe. We need to show Americans through our actions here in Washington that we have heard them. With that, I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, a few weeks ago, I spoke on the floor about two of the outstanding Federal workers at the National Institutes of Health and I indicated at the time that I would be speaking periodically about other Federal workers who are doing extraordinary things on behalf of the American taxpayer. People wonder where their tax dollars go; I would like to provide a few examples. As I said at the time, ``Government workers guard our borders; protect us from terrorists; treat our wounded veterans; dispense Social Security checks to our retirees; find cures for diseases; guide the Nation's air traffic; explore the tiniest particles and the vast expanse of outer space; ensure our air is safe to breathe, our water is safe to drink, and our food is safe to eat; support our servicemen and women in harm's way; and promote our interests and ideals abroad. Who does the government work for? Government Works for America.'' The Partnership for Public Service announced the finalists for the 2015 Samuel J. Heyman Service to America Medals, also known as the ``Sammies,'' last month during Public Service Recognition Week. As the Partnership notes, ``Federal employees are responsible for many noteworthy and inspiring accomplishments that are seldom recognized or celebrated. The Samuel J. Heyman Service to America Medals highlight excellence in our Federal workforce and inspire other talented and dedicated individuals to go into public service.'' Also last month, on May 5, the Washington Post, citing an Office of Personnel Management--OPM--exit survey of senior government managers who have retired or moved to other, nonfederal jobs, reported that the single biggest factor for leaving is the ``political environment'', which was blamed as a contributing factor ``to a great extent'' or ``to a very great extent'' by 42 percent of the individuals surveyed. The article, by Post columnist Joe Davidson, quoted Brian M. Kent, a retired senior-level Federal scientist, who said, ``Expect to be overworked, undercompensated and mistreated by both parties on the Hill, who do not appreciate the value of our expertise, our dedication and our talents.'' Congress and the American people need to realize that the Federal workforce is a crucial asset. There are some people who dislike government so much that they want to demonize and demoralize the workforce and deter young people from considering a career in public service. That is counterproductive. Find and remove the bad apples--yes, but acknowledge that they are few and far between. Overwhelmingly, Federal workers are hard-working and patriotic Americans. Rather than denigrate them, we should treat them with respect in acknowledging their service to our Nation. One way to acknowledge that service is through the Sammies. I am proud that so many of the finalists this year work and/or live in Maryland, spread across several agencies and several of the award categories. I would like to mention a few today. The mission of the National Institute of Standards & Technology, NIST, which is headquartered in Gaithersburg, MD, is to ``promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life''. NIST's weights and measures services, a job assigned to the Federal Government in the Constitution, provide the basis for the fairness and efficiency of sales. These services underpin the efficiency of about one-half of the U.S. economy, or about $7 trillion of the U.S. gross domestic product--GDP. Eighty percent of global merchandise trade is influenced by testing and other measurement-related requirements of regulations and standards. U.S. companies increasingly depend on NIST to help ensure access to global markets that create new business and jobs. Gretchen K. Campbell is a physicist at NIST and is a finalist in the 2015 ``Call To Service'' Medal. This medal recognizes a Federal employee whose professional achievements reflect the important contributions that a new generation brings to public service. We are all familiar with electronics. Now, scientists like Dr. Campbell are exploring a new frontier--a circuitry system that uses the flow of atoms rather than electrons that may lead to a wide range of future technological advances. Dr. Campbell, who is just 35, is a pioneer and intellectual leader in this new and theoretical field of physics known as atomtronics, and has conducted a series of seminal experiments that show its promise and possibilities. Using light to control matter, Dr. Campbell created the first controllable atomtronic circuit in 2011 by moving ultra-cold atoms through a wire made of light--just as electrons flow through a metal wire. She added a permeable barrier to this circuit, also made of light, to serve as the control element, much as a transistor can control the current in an electronic circuit. Just as electronic devices manipulate the flow of electrons, atomtronic devices manipulate the flow of atoms, which are made up of electrons, protons, and neutrons. Since atoms have properties that are very different from electrons--they do not have charged particles, for instance--atomtronic devices have the potential to go beyond the capabilities of electronics. Atomtronics will not supplant electronics, but may offer new kinds of functions and applications. An atomtronic circuit, for example, could be useful in applications such as rotation sensors, improving the functioning of gyroscopes used to stabilize spacecraft and airplanes. Atomtronic circuitry may be able to perform quantum computations that could offer a significant leap forward in computing speed, performance, and capability and lead to the next generation of technology that will enable smaller and cheaper devices. Dr. Ronald Ross, a Fellow at NIST, is a finalist for the 2015 Homeland Security & Law Enforcement Medal. This medal recognizes a Federal employee for a significant contribution to the Nation in activities related to homeland security and law enforcement. Mr. Ross, called the ``rock star of cybersecurity'' by his colleagues, developed and implemented a state-of-the-art system to assess risks and protect Federal computer networks from cyberattacks, helping secure information critical to the Nation's national and economic security. Most recently, Dr. Ross helped to establish the government-wide program for cloud security assessment and authorization. The Federal Government used to rely on a rigid checklist approach to securing computer networks, often ignoring changing threats and evolving technology, and not always distinguishing what information needed higher security and what data was of lesser importance. Dr. Ross, belying the image of a hidebound bureaucrat, designed the Risk Management Framework as a way for government agencies to decide how critical their various data sets are and to pick the right level of protection. With the framework Dr. Ross developed, agencies can go through an assessment process and decide where to concentrate resources and tighten security. The impact of Dr. Ross's work includes reducing the cost of implementing cybersecurity controls and demonstrating compliance with multiple security requirements, and enhancing system interoperability among Federal agencies. Dr. Ross and his team have worked with the General Services Administration, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security to test and validate the risk framework unveiled earlier this year that will be used by cloud computing service providers, allowing them to host some of the Federal Government's most sensitive information. And as the principal architect of a new national testing program and infrastructure, Dr. Ross also has been collaborating with the National Security Agency to develop the first-ever network of commercial testing laboratories capable of evaluating the security of information technology--IT--products. The National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration--NOAA--is headquartered in Silver Spring, MD. NOAA's mission is ``Science, Service, and Stewardship''. The agency attempts ``to understand and predict changes in climate, weather, oceans, and coasts; to disseminate that knowledge and information; and to conserve and manage coastal and marine ecosystems and resources''. NOAA's research, services, and products--ranging from daily weather forecasts, severe storm warnings and climate monitoring to fisheries management, coastal restoration and supporting marine commerce--affect more than one-third of America's Robert Bunge, Michael Gerber, Mark Paese, and Gregory Zwicker of the National Weather Service's Wireless Emergency Alerts Team at NOAA are also finalists for the 2015 Homeland Security & Law Enforcement Medal. They have developed a fast and geographically targeted cell phone alert system, launched in 2012, for weather emergencies such as tornadoes, flash floods, and hurricanes that reaches millions of people, saving lives and preventing injuries. So far, the system has transmitted more than 13,000 warnings for the most dangerous types of severe weather to the cell phones of millions of people potentially in harm's way across the United States. While other weather alert systems have been in use for years, this new method of using mobile devices and targeting very precise geographic areas is a significant improvement. It took many years of coordination with the Federal Communications Commission, DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the major wireless telecommunications providers. Previously, weather emergency alerts from one of the 122 weather service offices around the country were emailed to the Washington, D.C. office and then forwarded to FEMA, which sent the alert to affected counties using television and radio broadcast technology. Cellular companies could independently text the warning information to their cell phone customers in the affected county, but the system was slow and too broadly targeted. The new weather alert system structures the information into concise messages--90 or fewer characters--and uses geo-targeted data to broadcast the messages rapidly over cell phones only in the affected areas. The team worked with six of the largest cell phone companies to build the sophisticated technology needed to make the system work. They developed the infrastructure and protocol for the alerts, facilitated the decision-making for the weather alerts to be transmitted, and conducted extensive public awareness and educational programs. Mr. Bunge led the technical team, overseeing the software development, the data specialists, the coding, the host servers and other information technology needs, and helped create a system that targets the cell phone alerts to specific geographic locations. Mr. Gerber is a meteorologist and a specialist in how the weather service information is disseminated, and he played a critical role in making sure the right kind of weather alerts would be available and properly transmitted. He also is credited with convincing the wireless carriers to participate and make the needed investments. Mr. Paese handled many of the complicated management issues while Mr. Zwicker was involved in training some 2,000 weather forecasters in more than 122 offices around the country to use the system in coordination with Federal emergency management officials. Here's an example of how effective the new system is: on July 1, 2013, a tornado obliterated a dome in East Windsor, CT, where 29 children had been playing soccer. Seconds before the tornado struck, a cell phone alert prompted the camp manager to rush the children out of the dome and into an adjacent building, preventing injuries and quite possibly fatalities. The Agricultural Research Service--ARS--is the U.S. Department of Agriculture's USDA chief scientific in-house research agency, with headquarters colocated here in Washington, DC and in Beltsville, MD. The agency's job is ``to find solutions to agricultural problems that affect Americans every day from field to table''. ARS conducts research to develop and transfer solutions to agricultural problems of high national priority and provide information access and dissemination to: ensure high-quality, safe food, and other agricultural products; assess the nutritional needs of Americans; sustain a competitive agricultural economy; enhance the natural resource base and the environment; and provide economic opportunities for rural citizens, communities, and society as a whole. Dr. Hyun Lillehoj, a senior research molecular biologist at ARS in Beltsville, is a finalist for the 2015 Career Achievement Medal. This medal recognizes a Federal employee for significant accomplishments throughout a lifetime of achievement in public service. Dr. Lillehoj has pioneered industry-leading research to improve the health of commercial poultry without the use of antibiotics, protecting consumers and making the U.S. poultry industry more competitive by saving it billions of dollars. There is growing concern over the widespread use of antibiotics in poultry and other food industries, which health experts say contributes to the development of drug-resistant bacteria. These so-called ``superbugs'' infect hundreds of thousands and kill tens of thousands of Americans each year, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. During three decades as a molecular biologist at ARS, Dr. Lillehoj has helped mitigate the use of antibiotics in poultry, finding that certain food supplements, probiotics, and nutrients can replace antibiotics as an effective means of enhancing the immune system and fighting common parasitic diseases and bacterial infections. The USDA estimates that the poultry diseases Dr. Lillehoj is working to combat cause more than $600 million in losses in the United States and $3.2 billion worldwide. Dr. Lillehoj has developed novel diagnostic and therapeutic products and discovered DNA markers for the genetic selection of disease-resistant chickens, paving the way for breeding healthier chickens that will benefit both consumers and the Nation's $45 billion poultry industry. She has done this by creating one of the first gene libraries from commercial chickens and depositing more than 55,000 individual gene sequences from this database into the public domain, providing other researchers with information that could lead to breeding poultry with superior resistance to parasites. She also has identified natural antimicrobial molecules that have anti-cancer properties and kill infectious parasites; discovered a second-generation parasite vaccine with an improved protection profile over current vaccines; developed therapeutic antibodies that boost immunity for poultry; formulated health-promoting probiotics for veterinary use; and discovered organic, plant-derived herbal extracts and essential oils that fight infectious diseases affecting animals and humans. She is recognized as a world leader in understanding host-pathogen interactions of an avian parasite closely related to human malaria that is a major cause of disease affecting poultry and livestock. She also has done original research on a bacterium that is one of the most common causes of food-borne illness in the U.S. Her scientific breakthroughs are documented in 10 U.S. and international patents, more than 350 peer-reviewed scientific papers, 14 book chapters, and 230 worldwide collaborations with academia, foreign governments and private industry. She has mentored more than 120 young scientists. Dr. Lillehoj embodies the American Dream. She is from South Korea. She came to the United States in 1969 after her father died, when she was just out of high school, and with just $200 in her pocket. At first, she wanted to be a cancer researcher, but her focus soon turned to immunology and she received a government scholarship. After she received her Ph.D., she went to work at the National Institutes of Health. USDA successfully recruited her in 1984, and she has been at ARS ever since. The government's investment in her has paid enormous dividends. These are just a few of the Nation's talented, creative, dedicated, and hard-working Federal employees. I ask my colleagues and all Americans to join me in congratulating them on their successes and thanking them for their public service. We are a strong and prosperous Nation, in part, because of our Federal workforce. We cannot take it for granted. ", u"Mr. Chair, today I want to highlight a critical issue facing the Intelligence Community: increasing reliance on contractors. A 2010 Washington Post story reported that 30 percent of the workforce in our intelligence agencies is contractors. Furthermore, the Post estimated that out of 854,000 people with top-secret clearances, 265,000 are contractors. I encourage my colleagues to read this eye opening article. These startling facts cause me great concern--we've learned the hard way time and time again what happens when we fail to monitor the work of federal contractors. The federal government has the responsibility to maintain its commitment to monitoring their use--with special attention made to the evolving nature of their work and the associated national security risks inherent to outsourcing these tasks. I look forward to working with the Select Committee on Intelligence to achieve this goal. In June, a stone carver from Manassas chiseled another perfect star into a marble wall at CIA headquarters, one of 22 for agency workers killed in the global war initiated by the 2001 terrorist attacks. The intent of the memorial is to publicly honor the courage of those who died in the line of duty, but it also conceals a deeper story about government in the post-9/11 era: Eight of the 22 were not CIA officers at all. They were private contractors. To ensure that the country's most sensitive duties are carried out only by people loyal above all to the nation's interest, federal rules say contractors may not perform what are called ``inherently government functions.'' But they do, all the time and in every intelligence and counterterrorism agency, according to a two-year investigation by The Washington Post. What started as a temporary fix in response to the terrorist attacks has turned into a dependency that calls into question whether the federal workforce includes too many people obligated to shareholders rather than the public interest--and whether the government is still in control of its most sensitive activities. In interviews last week, both Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and CIA Director Leon Panetta said they agreed with such concerns. The Post investigation uncovered what amounts to an alternative geography of the United States, a Top Secret America created since 9/11 that is hidden from public view, lacking in thorough oversight and so unwieldy that its effectiveness is impossible to determine. It is also a system in which contractors are playing an ever more important role. The Post estimates that out of 854,000 people with top-secret clearances, 265,000 are contractors. There is no better example of the government's dependency on them than at the CIA, the one place in government that exists to do things overseas that no other U.S. agency is allowed to do. Private contractors working for the CIA have recruited spies in Iraq, paid bribes for information in Afghanistan and protected CIA directors visiting world capitals. Contractors have helped snatch a suspected extremist off the streets of Italy, interrogated detainees once held at secret prisons abroad and watched over defectors holed up in the Washington suburbs. At Langley headquarters, they analyze terrorist networks. At the agency's training facility in Virginia, they are helping mold a new generation of American spies. Through the federal budget process, the George W. Bush administration and Congress made it much easier for the CIA and other agencies involved in counterterrorism to hire more contractors than civil servants. They did this to limit the size of the permanent workforce, to hire employees more quickly than the sluggish federal process allows and because they thought--wrongly, it turned out--that contractors would be less expensive. Nine years later, well into the Obama administration, the idea that contractors cost less has been repudiated, and the administration has made some progress toward its goal of reducing the number of hired hands by 7 percent over two years. Still, close to 30 percent of the workforce in the intelligence agencies is contractors. ``For too long, we've depended on contractors to do the operational work that ought to be done'' by CIA employees, Panetta said. But replacing them ``doesn't happen overnight. When you've been dependent on contractors for so long, you have to build that expertise over time.'' A second concern of Panetta's: contracting with corporations, whose responsibility ``is to their shareholders, and that does present an inherent conflict.'' Or as Gates, who has been in and out of government his entire life, puts it: ``You want somebody who's really in it for a career because they're passionate about it and because they care about the country and not just because of the money.'' Contractors can offer more money--often twice as much--to experienced federal employees than the government is allowed to pay them. And because competition among firms for people with security clearances is so great, corporations offer such perks as BMWs and $15,000 signing bonuses, as Raytheon did in June for software developers with top-level clearances. The idea that the government would save money on a contract workforce ``is a false economy,'' said Mark M. Lowenthal, a former senior CIA official and now president of his own intelligence training academy. As companies raid federal agencies of talent, the government has been left with the youngest intelligence staffs ever while more experienced employees move into the private sector. This is true at the CIA, where employees from 114 firms account for roughly a third of the workforce, or about 10,000 positions. Many of them are temporary hires, often former military or intelligence agency employees who left government service to work less and earn more while drawing a federal pension. Across the government, such workers are used in every conceivable way. Contractors kill enemy fighters. They spy on foreign governments and eavesdrop on terrorist networks. They help craft war plans. They gather information on local factions in war zones. They are the historians, the architects, the recruiters in the nation's most secretive agencies. They staff watch centers across the Washington area. They are among the most trusted advisers to the four- star generals leading the nation's wars. So great is the government's appetite for private contractors with top-secret clearances that there are now more than 300 companies, often nicknamed ``body shops,'' that specialize in finding candidates, often for a fee that approaches $50,000 a person, according to those in the business. Making it more difficult to replace contractors with federal employees: The government doesn't know how many are on the federal payroll. Gates said he wants to reduce the number of defense contractors by about 13 percent, to pre-9/ 11 levels, but he's having a hard time even getting a basic head count. ``This is a terrible confession,'' he said. ``I can't get a number on how many contractors work for the Office of the Secretary of Defense,'' referring to the department's civilian leadership. The Post's estimate of 265,000 contractors doing top-secret work was vetted by several high-ranking intelligence officials who approved of The Post's methodology. The newspaper's Top Secret America database includes 1.931 companies that perform work at the top-secret level. More than a quarter of them--533--came into being after 2001, and others that already existed have expanded greatly. Most are thriving even as the rest of the United States struggles with bankruptcies, unemployment and foreclosures. The privatization of national security work has been made possible by a nine-year ``gusher'' of money, as Gates recently described national security spending since the 9/11 attacks. With so much money to spend, managers do not always worry about whether they are spending it effectively. ``Someone says, `Let's do another study,' and because no one shares information, everyone does their own study,'' said Elena Mastors, who headed a team studying the al-Qaeda leadership for the Defense Department. ``It's about how many studies you can orchestrate, how many people you can fly all over the place. Everybody's just on a spending spree. We don't need all these people doing all this stuff.'' Most of these contractors do work that is fundamental to an agency's core mission. As a result, the government has become dependent on them in a way few could have foreseen: wartime temps who have become a permanent cadre. Just last week, typing ``top secret'' into the search engine of a major jobs Web site showed 1,951 unfilled positions in the Washington area, and 19,759 nationwide: ``Target analyst,'' Reston. ``Critical infrastructure specialist,'' Washington, D.C. ``Joint expeditionary team member,'' Arlington. ``We could not perform our mission without them. They serve as our `reserves,' providing flexibility and expertise we can't acquire,'' said Ronald Sanders, who was chief of human capital for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence before retiring in February. ``Once they are on board, we treat them as if they're a part of the total force.'' The Post's investigation is based on government documents and contracts, job descriptions, property records, corporate and social networking Web sites, additional records, and hundreds of interviews with intelligence, military and corporate officials and former officials. Most requested anonymity either because they are prohibited from speaking publicly or because, they said, they feared retaliation at work for describing their concerns. The investigation focused on top-secret work because the amount classified at the secret level is too large to accurately track. A searchable database of government organizations and private companies was built entirely on public records. [For an explanation of the newspaper's decision making behind this project, please see the Editor's Note.] The national security industry sells the military and intelligence agencies more than just airplanes, ships and tanks. It sells contractors' brain power. They advise, brief and work everywhere, including 25 feet under the Pentagon in a bunker where they can be found alongside military personnel in battle fatigues monitoring potential crises worldwide. Late at night, when the wide corridors of the Pentagon are all but empty, the National Military Command Center hums with purpose. There's real-time access to the location of U.S. forces anywhere in the world, to granular satellite images or to the White House Situation Room. The purpose of all this is to be able to answer any question the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff might have. To be ready 24 hours a day, every day, takes five brigadier generals, a staff of colonels and senior noncommissioned officers--and a man wearing a pink contractor badge and a bright purple shirt and tie. Erik Saar's job title is ``knowledge engineer.'' In one of the most sensitive places in America, he is the only person in the room who knows how to bring data from far afield, fast. Saar and four teammates from a private company, SRA International, teach these top-ranked staff officers to think in Web 2.0. They are trying to push a tradition-bound culture to act differently, digitally. That sometimes means asking for help in a public online chat room or exchanging ideas on shared Web pages outside the military computer networks dubbed .mil--things much resisted within the Pentagon's self-sufficient culture. ``Our job is to change the perception of leaders who might drive change,'' Saar said. Since 9/11, contractors have made extraordinary contributions--and extraordinary blunders--that have changed history and clouded the public's view of the distinction between the actions of officers sworn on behalf of the United States and corporate employees with little more than a security badge and a gun. Contractor misdeeds in Iraq and Afghanistan have hurt U.S. credibility in those countries as well as in the Middle East. Abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, some of it done by contractors, helped ignite a call for vengeance against the United States that continues today. Security guards working for Blackwater added fuel to the five-year violent chaos in Iraq and became the symbol of an America run amok. Contractors in war zones, especially those who can fire weapons, blur ``the line between the legitimate and illegitimate use of force, which is just what our enemies want,'' Allison Stanger, a professor of international politics and economics at Middlebury College and the author of ``One Nation Under Contract,'' told the independent Commission on Wartime Contracting at a hearing in June. Misconduct happens, too. A defense contractor formerly called MZM paid bribes for CIA contracts, sending Randy ``Duke'' Cunningham, who was a California congressman on the intelligence committee, to prison. Guards employed in Afghanistan by ArmorGroup North America, a private security company, were caught on camera in a lewd-partying scandal. But contractors have also advanced the way the military fights. During the bloodiest months in Iraq, the founder of Berico Technologies, a former Army officer named Guy Filippelli, working with the National Security Agency. invented a technology that made finding the makers of roadside bombs easier and helped stanch the number of casualties from improvised explosives, according to NSA officials. Contractors have produced blueprints and equipment for the unmanned aerial war fought by drones, which have killed the largest number of senior al-Qaeda leaders and produced a flood of surveillance videos. A dozen firms created the transnational digital highway that carries the drones' real- time data on terrorist hide-outs from overseas to command posts throughout the United States. Private firms have become so thoroughly entwined with the government's most sensitive activities that without them important military and intelligence missions would have to cease or would be jeopardized. Some examples: *At the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the number of contractors equals the number of federal employees. The department depends on 318 companies for essential services and personnel, including 19 staffing firms that help DHS find and hire even more contractors. At the office that handles intelligence, six out of 10 employees are from private industry. *The National Security Agency, which conducts worldwide electronic surveillance, hires private firms to come up with most of its technological innovations. The NSA used to work with a small stable of firms; now it works with at least 484 and is actively recruiting more. *The National Reconnaissance Office cannot produce, launch or maintain its large satellite surveillance systems, which photograph countries such as China, North Korea and Iran, without the four major contractors it works with. *Every intelligence and military organization depends on contract linguists to communicate overseas, translate documents and make sense of electronic voice intercepts. The demand for native speakers is so great, and the amount of money the government is willing to pay for them is so huge, that 56 firms compete for this business. *Each of the 16 intelligence agencies depends on corporations to set up its computer networks, communicate with other agencies' networks, and fuse and mine disparate bits of information that might indicate a terrorist plot. More than 400 companies work exclusively in this area, building classified hardware and software systems. Hiring contractors was supposed to save the government money. But that has not turned out to be the case. A 2008 study published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence found that contractors made up 29 percent of the workforce in the intelligence agencies but cost the equivalent of 49 percent of their personnel budgets. Gates said that federal workers cost the government 25 percent less than contractors. The process of reducing the number of contractors has been slow, if the giant Office of Naval Intelligence in Suitland is any example. There, 2,770 people work on the round-the- clock maritime watch floor tracking commercial vessels, or in science and engineering laboratories, or in one of four separate intelligence centers. But it is the employees of 70 information technology companies who keep the place operating. They store, process and analyze communications and intelligence transmitted to and from the entire U.S. naval fleet and commercial vessels worldwide. ``Could we keep this building running without contractors?'' said the captain in charge of information technology. ``No, I don't think we could keep up with it.'' Vice Adm. David J. ``Jack'' Dorsett, director of naval intelligence, said he could save millions each year by converting 20 percent of the contractor jobs at the Suitland complex to civil servant positions. He has gotten the go- ahead, but it's been a slow start. This year, his staff has converted one contractor job and eliminated another--out of 589. ``It's costing me an arm and a leg,'' Dorsett said. Washington's corridors of power stretch in a nearly straight geographical line from the Supreme Court to the Capitol to the White House. Keep going west, across the Potomac River, and the unofficial seats of power--the private, corporate ones--become visible, especially at night. There in the Virginia suburbs are the brightly illuminated company logos of Top Secret America: Northrop Grumman, SAIC, General Dynamics. Of the 1,931 companies identified by The Post that work on top-secret contracts, about 110 of them do roughly 90 percent of the work on the corporate side of the defense- intelligence-corporate world. To understand how these firms have come to dominate the post-9/11 era, there's no better place to start than the Herndon office of General Dynamics. One recent afternoon there, Ken Pohill was watching a series of unclassified images, the first of which showed a white truck moving across his computer monitor. The truck was in Afghanistan, and a video camera bolted to the belly of a U.S. surveillance plane was following it. Pohill could access a dozen images that might help an intelligence analyst figure out whether the truck driver was just a truck driver or part of a network making roadside bombs to kill American soldiers. To do this, he clicked his computer mouse. Up popped a picture of the truck driver's house, with notes about visitors. Another click. Up popped infrared video of the vehicle. Click: Analysis of an object thrown from the driver's side. Click: U-2 imagery. Click: A history of the truck's movement. Click: A Google Earth map of friendly forces. Click: A chat box with everyone else following the truck, too. Ten years ago, if Pohill had worked for General Dynamics, he probably would have had a job bending steel. Then, the company's center of gravity was the industrial port city of Groton, Conn., where men and women in wet galoshes churned out submarines, the thoroughbreds of naval warfare. Today, the firm's commercial core is made up of data tools such as the digital imagery library in Herndon and the secure BlackBerry-like device used by President Obama, both developed at a carpeted suburban office by employees in loafers and heels. The evolution of General Dynamics was based on one simple strategy: Follow the money. The company embraced the emerging intelligence-driven style of warfare. It developed small-target identification systems and equipment that could intercept an insurgent's cellphone and laptop communications. It found ways to sort the billions of data points collected by intelligence agencies into piles of information that a single person could analyze. It also began gobbling up smaller companies that could help it dominate the new intelligence landscape, just as its competitors were doing. Between 2001 and 2010, the company acquired 11 firms specializing in satellites, signals and geospatial intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, technology integration and imagery. On Sept. 11, 2001, General Dynamics was working with nine intelligence organizations. Now it has contracts with all 16. Its employees fill the halls of the NSA and DHS. The corporation was paid hundreds of millions of dollars to set up and manage DHS's new offices in 2003, including its National Operations Center, Office of Intelligence and Analysis and Office of Security. Its employees do everything from deciding which threats to investigate to answering phones. General Dynamics' bottom line reflects its successful transformation. It also reflects how much the U.S. government--the firm's largest customer by far--has paid the company beyond what it costs to do the work, which is, after all, the goal of every profit-making corporation. The company reported $31.9 billion in revenue in 2009, up from $10.4 billion in 2000. Its workforce has more than doubled in that time, from 43,300 to 91,700 employees, according to the company. Revenue from General Dynamics' intelligence- and information-related divisions, where the majority of its top- secret work is done, climbed to $10 billion in the second quarter of 2009, up from $2.4 billion in 2000, accounting for 34 percent of its overall revenue last year. The company's profitability is on display in its Falls Church headquarters. There's a soaring, art-filled lobby, bistro meals served on china enameled with the General Dynamics logo and an auditorium with seven rows of white leather-upholstered seats, each with its own microphone and laptop docking station. General Dynamics now has operations in every corner of the intelligence world. It helps counterintelligence operators and trains new analysts. It has a $600 million Air Force contract to intercept communications. It makes $1 billion a year keeping hackers out of U.S. computer networks and encrypting military communications. It even conducts information operations, the murky military art of trying to persuade foreigners to align their views with U.S. interests. ``The American intelligence community is an important market for our company,'' said General Dynamics spokesman Kendell Pease. ``Over time, we have tailored our organization to deliver affordable, best-of-breed products and services to meet those agencies' unique requirements.'' In September 2009, General Dynamics won a $10 million contract from the U.S. Special Operations Command's psychological operations unit to create Web sites to influence foreigners' views of U.S. policy. To do that, the company hired writers, editors and designers to produce a set of daily news sites tailored to five regions of the world. They appear as regular news Web sites, with names such as ``SETimes.com: The News and Views of Southeast Europe.'' The first indication that they are run on behalf of the military comes at the bottom of the home page with the word ``Disclaimer.'' Only by clicking on that do you learn that ``the Southeast European Times (SET) is a Web site sponsored by the United States European Command.'' What all of these contracts add up to: This year, General Dynamics' overall revenue was $7.8 billion in the first quarter, Jay L. Johnson, the company's chief executive and president, said at an earnings conference call in April. ``We've hit the deck running in the first quarter,'' he said, ``and we're on our way to another successful year.'' In the shadow of giants such as General Dynamics are 1,814 small to midsize companies that do top-secret work. About a third of them were established after Sept. 11, 2001, to take advantage of the huge flow of taxpayer money into the private sector. Many are led by former intelligence agency officials who know exactly whom to approach for work. Abraxas of Herndon, headed by a former CIA spy, quickly became a major CIA contractor after 9/11. Its staff even recruited midlevel managers during work hours from the CIA's cafeteria, former agency officers recall. Other small and medium-size firms sell niche technical expertise such as engineering for low-orbit satellites or long-dwell sensors. But the vast majority have not invented anything at all. Instead, they replicate what the government's workforce already does. A company called SGIS, founded soon after the 2001 attacks, was one of these. In June 2002, from the spare bedroom of his San Diego home, 30-year-old Hany Girgis put together an information technology team that won its first Defense Department contract four months later. By the end of the year, SGIS had opened a Tampa office close to the U.S. Central Command and Special Operations Command, had turned a profit and had 30 employees. SGIS sold the government the services of people with specialized skills; expanding the types of teams it could put together was one key to its growth. Eventually it offered engineers, analysts and cyber-security specialists for military, space and intelligence agencies. By 2003, the company's revenue was $3.7 million. By then, SGIS had become a subcontractor for General Dynamics, working at the secret level. Satisfied with the partnership, General Dynamics helped SGIS receive a top-secret facility clearance, which opened the doors to more work. By 2006, its revenue had multiplied tenfold, to $30.6 million, and the company had hired employees who specialized in government contracting just to help it win more contracts. ``We knew that's where we wanted to play,'' Girgis said in a phone interview. ``There's always going to be a need to protect the homeland.'' Eight years after it began, SGIS was up to revenue of $101 million, 14 offices and 675 employees. Those with top-secret clearances worked for 11 government agencies, according to The Post's database. The company's marketing efforts had grown, too, both in size and sophistication. Its Web site, for example, showed an image of Navy sailors lined up on a battleship over the words ``Proud to serve'' and another image of a Navy helicopter flying near the Statue of Liberty over the words ``Preserving freedom.'' And if it seemed hard to distinguish SGIS's work from the government's, it's because they were doing so many of the same things. SGIS employees replaced military personnel at the Pentagon's 24/7 telecommunications center. SGIS employees conducted terrorist threat analysis. SGIS employees provided help-desk support for federal computer systems. Still, as alike as they seemed, there were crucial differences. For one, unlike in government, if an SGIS employee did a good job, he might walk into the parking lot one day and be surprised by co-workers clapping at his latest bonus: a leased, dark-blue Mercedes convertible. And he might say, as a video camera recorded him sliding into the soft leather driver's seat, ``Ahhhh . . . this is spectacular.'' And then there was what happened to SGIS last month, when it did the one thing the federal government can never do. It sold itself. The new owner is a Fairfax-based company called Salient Federal Solutions, created just last year. It is a management company and a private-equity firm with lots of Washington connections that, with the purchase of SGIS, it intends to parlay into contracts. ``We have an objective,'' says chief executive and President Brad Antle, ``to make $500 million in five years.'' Of all the different companies in Top Secret America, the most numerous by far are the information technology, or IT, firms. About 800 firms do nothing but IT. Some IT companies integrate the mishmash of computer systems within one agency; others build digital links between agencies; still others have created software and hardware that can mine and analyze vast quantities of data. The government is nearly totally dependent on these firms. Their close relationship was on display recently at the Defense Intelligence Agency's annual information technology conference in Phoenix. The agency expected the same IT firms angling for its business to pay for the entire five-day get- together, a DIA spokesman confirmed. And they did. General Dynamics spent $30,000 on the event. On a perfect spring night, it hosted a party at Chase Field, a 48,569-seat baseball stadium, reserved exclusively for the conference attendees. Government buyers and corporate sellers drank beer and ate hot dogs while the DIA director's morning keynote speech replayed on the gigantic scoreboard, digital baseballs bouncing along the bottom of the screen. Carahsoft Technology, a DIA contractor, invited guests to a casino night where intelligence officials and vendors ate, drank and bet phony money at craps tables run by professional dealers. The McAfee network security company, a Defense Department contractor, welcomed guests to a Margaritaville-themed social on the garden terrace of the hotel across the street from the convention site, where 250 firms paid thousands of dollars each to advertise their services and make their pitches to intelligence officials walking the exhibition hall. Government officials and company executives say these networking events are critical to building a strong relationship between the public and private sectors. ``If I make one contact each day, it's worth it,'' said Tom Conway, director of federal business development for McAfee. As for what a government agency gets out of it: ``Our goal is to be open and learn stuff,'' said Grant M. Schneider, the DIA's chief information officer and one of the conference's main draws. By going outside Washington, where many of the firms are headquartered, ``we get more synergy. . . . It's an interchange with industry.'' These types of gatherings happen every week. Many of them are closed to anyone without a top-secret clearance. At a U.S. Special Operations Command conference in Fayetteville, N.C., in April, vendors paid for access to some of the people who decide what services and gadgets to buy for troops. In mid-May, the national security industry held a black-tie evening funded by the same corporations seeking business from the defense, intelligence and congressional leaders seated at their tables. Such coziness worries other officials who believe the post- 9/11 defense-intelligence-corporate relationship has become, as one senior military intelligence officer described it, a ``self-licking ice cream cone.'' Another official, a longtime conservative staffer on the Senate Armed Services Committee, described it as ``a living, breathing organism'' impossible to control or curtail. ``How much money has been involved is just mind-boggling,'' he said. ``We've built such a vast instrument. What are you going to do with this thing? . . . It's turned into a jobs program.'' Even some of those gathered in Phoenix criticized the size and disjointedness of the intelligence community and its contracting base. ``Redundancy is the unacceptable norm,'' Lt. Gen. Richard P. Zahner, Army deputy chief of staff for intelligence, told the 2,000 attendees. ``Are we spending our resources effectively? . . . If we have not gotten our houses in order, someone will do it for us.'' On a day that also featured free back rubs, shoeshines, ice cream and fruit smoothies, another speaker, Kevin P. Meiners, a deputy undersecretary for intelligence, gave the audience what he called ``the secret sauce,'' the key to thriving even when the Defense Department budget eventually stabilizes and stops rising so rapidly. ``Overhead,'' Meiners told them--that's what's going to get cut first. Overhead used to mean paper clips and toner. Now it's information technology, IT, the very products and services sold by the businesspeople in the audience. ``You should describe what you do as a weapons system, not overhead,'' Meiners instructed. ``Overhead to them--I'm giving you the secret sauce here--is IT and people. . . . You have to foot-stomp hard that this is a war-fighting system that's helping save people's lives every day.'' After he finished, many of the government officials listening headed to the exhibit hall, where company salespeople waited in display booths. Peter Coddington, chief executive of InTTENSITY, a small firm whose software teaches computers to ``read'' documents, was ready for them. ``You have to differentiate yourself,'' he said as they fanned out into the aisles. Coddington had glass beer mugs and pens twirling atop paperweight pyramids to help persuade officials of the nation's largest military intelligence agency that he had something they needed. But first he needed them to stop walking so fast, to slow down long enough for him to start his pitch. His twirling pens seemed to do the job. ``It's like moths to fire,'' Coddington whispered. A DIA official with a tote bag approached. She spotted the pens, and her pace slowed. ``Want a pen?'' Coddington called. She hesitated. ``Ah . . . I have three children,'' she said. ``Want three pens?'' She stopped. In Top Secret America, every moment is an opportunity. ``We're a text extraction company . . . ,'' Coddington began, handing her the pens.", u"Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 18, 2007, the gentleman from California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, thank you for the recognition. And I would say that this week ought to be known as ``FISA week.'' The reason I say that is because this week we will make an important vote on determining whether or not we will have the ability to defend our country, both now and in the future. As we have moved on a bipartisan basis since 9/11 to attempt to meet the challenge of the threat internationally that is sometimes called the ``war on terror,'' sometimes called the ``war of Islamo-fascism,'' sometimes called the ``war on radical jihad,'' no matter what the name, the American people know what it is we are speaking of. We have, in this House, in the Senate and in the executive branch adopted an analysis which allows us to respond in the most effective way, and that analysis is a risk-based analysis. And simply put, broken down into its constituent parts, risk equals threat plus vulnerability plus consequence. The interesting thing in this equation is that the knowledge base of the bottom two elements, vulnerability and consequence, are within our grasp. Now, what do I mean by that? What I mean by that is vulnerability is our ability to assess how vulnerable our assets are that might be attacked by the enemy surrounding us. We can make educated judgments with respect to those assets, their value, how they could be attacked or destroyed, and how we can protect them against such attack or attempt of destruction. Similarly, consequence is within our knowledge base. We know, with a successful attack, what the consequence would be. For instance, if the attack were lodged against a dam, a catastrophic event, a collapse of a dam as a result of an attack, we can measure what the consequences would be. How? Well, we know the number of people that would be in the way. We know the number of buildings that would be in the way. We can make a determination as to the overall destructive power of the surging water that would come through a destroyed dam. We can make an educated judgment as to the time by which those assets that would be destroyed, the time it would take to restore such assets, such as highways, byways, such as shopping malls, homes, hospitals, all of those sorts of things. So, within our risk assessment, we are capable, more or less, of determining what our vulnerability is and what the consequences of a successful attack would be. There is a third element, threat, which is not as much in control of our already existing knowledge. Why? Because threat essentially is the intention of the enemy, the targets of the enemy, the timing of the enemy. That's what, in fact, a threat is. So, since that knowledge base is not within our power, essentially, how do we deal with that? How do we calculate what the threat is? We do so by utilizing intelligence. We gather intelligence. We find information from the other side, if you will, of the battle. This is not a novel approach. It is recognized in the Constitution and the interpretations of the Constitution by the Supreme Court and other Federal courts from the beginning of this Republic in that it is recognized that the President of the United States was given Commander-in-Chief powers. Why? Because of the failure of the Continental Congress, because of the failure of the first Confederation of States when they found that you could not have multiple commanders in chief. You had to have a single executive, particularly in the area of war, defense of our country, or relationships with foreign governments. Now, implicit in the ability or the capability of a Commander-in-Chief to exercise military strength on behalf of the Nation to defend itself, that is, to destroy those who would attempt to destroy us, yes, to give the President of the United States the power to exercise lethal action against the enemy, and that means, quite frankly, to wound or kill the enemy, to stop the enemy from destroying us, implicit in that authority is the authority to gather intelligence, the authority to gather foreign intelligence. In other words, one of the ways you find out what the enemy is to do on the battlefield is to find out what he is saying, the conversations that take place on the other side, the plans that they are developing, and the commands that they give to carry out their intended lethal action. That, essentially, is foreign intelligence. And what we are going to vote on this week is something called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA. Now, the reason I bring this to the floor and I spell out these words is to remember what the focus of this bill is. It is on foreign intelligence, not domestic intelligence, not the ability to try and stop the mob from acting in the United States, not the ability to stop certain criminals in the United States from committing a crime or to investigate after they've committed the crime in order to prove up the case against them and to give them their just punishment, but rather, foreign intelligence, intelligence which deals with foreign governments, foreign powers, and associated organizations or people. The FISA Act was passed by the Congress in 1978, intended to establish a statutory procedure authorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the United States against foreign powers or agents of foreign powers. FISA established two new courts. First, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which authorizes such electronic surveillance, and secondly, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, which has jurisdiction to review any denial of an order under FISA. These courts are made up of Federal judges from around the country, and they meet in secret session here in Washington, D.C. I would note that the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report that accompanied FISA in 1978 clearly expressed Congress' intent to exclude from coverage overseas intelligence activities. In other words, they never intended for the FISA court and procedure to somehow have authority over what is truly overseas intelligence activities dealing with foreign intelligence or intelligence of foreign governments or foreign organizations. The report stated this: ``The Committee has explored the feasibility of broadening this legislation to apply overseas, but has concluded that certain problems and unique characteristics involved in overseas surveillance preclude the simple extension of this bill to overseas intelligence.'' In other words, it was not the focus of the 1978 act, rather, the act focused on domestic surveillance of persons located within the United States. The law was crafted specifically to exclude surveillance operations against targets outside the U.S., including those circumstances where the targets were in communication with Americans, as long as the U.S. side of the communication was not the real target. That's a very important thing to understand. In the ability to be able to record these messages or in some way pick up these communications, you really have the ability to target one side of the communication. And so what we do is we target a foreign person in a foreign country. Contrary to what Congress originally intended, due to the changes in technology and resulting interpretation of the FISA Act, warrants have been recently required in order to conduct surveillance against terrorists located overseas in some circumstances. Why? The technology changed in that, in 1978, most local communication was by wire, most international communication was wireless by satellite. We could take it basically out of the air, for want of a better description, and it was overseas. The 1978 act did not contemplate bringing those conversations, those communications within the ambit of FISA. In the intervening years, we've had a revolution in technology by which most local communication now is by wireless and international communication basically comes by wire. And the fact of the matter is the nodes or the centers or the switching places, whatever you want to call it, not technical terms, happen to be, most of them, in the United States. And so suddenly the interpretation of FISA, now looking at the connection where you would try and somehow be able to capture this conversation that really was of someone overseas and not American, now, because it transited somehow the U.S., an interpretation by the FISA court was that a warrant was now needed. Now, why would this present a problem for our intelligence community? Admiral McConnell, the former head of the National Security Agency, NSA, under President Clinton and now the current Director of National Intelligence, explained this to our Judiciary Committee. It takes about 200 man-hours to prepare a request for a court order in the FISA court for just one telephone number; 200 man-hours. As he explained to the judiciary in the other body, intelligence community agencies were required to make a showing of probable cause in order to target for surveillance the communications of a foreign intelligence target located overseas; then, they need to explain the probable cause finding in documentation and obtain approval of the FISA court to collect against a foreign terrorist located in a foreign country. Frequently, although not always, that person's communications were with another foreign person located overseas. In such cases, prior to the Protect America Act, that's the act that we passed before we left in August, which I might add is not going to be allowed to be considered on the floor, at least the Rules Committee told us earlier today they would allow no amendments, the FISA's requirement to obtain a court order based on a showing of probable cause slowed, and in some cases, prevented altogether the government's ability to collect foreign intelligence information out serving any substantial privacy or civil liberties interests. Again, as the legislative history of the 1978 FISA Act made clear, it was never the intention of the act to cover surveillance of non-U.S. persons overseas so long as the U.S. person located in the United States was not the real target of the surveillance. Yet prior to the enactment of the bill that we passed in August, which has a sunset in February of next year, that's the reason we have to consider it this week, our intelligence community was saddled with the requirement that they devote substantial resources for the preparation of applications required to be submitted to the FISA court. As an economist might say, this substantial diversion of resources imposed opportunity costs measured in terms of the intelligence analysis which was not done because of the need to complete paperwork in order to surveil foreign intelligence assets outside the U.S. who were never intended to be covered by the old law. In other words, you had to take the analysts off the job of looking at current communications that might protect us against attacks in the United States or elsewhere by those who want to kill Americans, who have said, by the way, that they would be justified in killing 4 million Americans, 2 million of whom would be women and children. We take them off that pursuit and instead put them on this job of doing the intellectual work that would allow for the paperwork to be presented to the FISA Court. Furthermore, in response to a question I posed to him, Admiral McConnell affirmed that prior to the Protect America Act, again, the act we passed just before we left in August, the intelligence community attempted to work under the laws interpreted by the court but found that as a result of working under those restrictions, his agency was prohibited from successfully targeting foreign conversations that otherwise would have been targeted for possible terrorist activity. Think of that: those kinds of conversations that we always were able to pick up before, before we ever had a FISA, after we had the 1978 FISA Act, we were not able to pick up anymore. In fact, he said that prior to the enactment of the Protect America Act this past August, we were not collecting somewhere between one-half and two-thirds of the foreign intelligence information which would have been collected were it not for the recent legal interpretations of FISA requiring the government to obtain FISA warrants for overseas surveillance. To put it in graphic terms, we have put blinders on one of our two eyes as to the ability for us to look at those dots and connect those dots that the 9/11 Commission said we weren't finding and weren't connecting before 9/11. The consequences of this for our Nation's security are very real. As Admiral McConnell explained to our committee: ``In the debate over the summer and since, I heard from individuals from both inside and outside the government assert that threats to our Nation do not justify this authority. Indeed, I have been accused of exaggerating the threats that face our Nation,'' said Admiral McConnell. He continued: ``Allow me to attempt to dispel this notion. The threats that we face are real and they are indeed serious. In July of this year, we released a National Intelligence Estimate, commonly referred to as an NIE, on the terrorist threat to the homeland. In short, these assessments conclude the following: the United States will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next 3 years.'' Why 3 years? That is the total time of the NIE. They are not saying it will only just be 3 years, but in the time frame that they were supposed to assess, this threat will continue. They say that the main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially al Qaeda. Al Qaeda continues to coordinate with regional terrorist groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq, across North Africa and other regions. Al Qaeda will likely continue to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets with a goal of producing mass casualties. Mass casualties. That means thousands, if not millions, of Americans if they were successful. Visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershock and fear among the U.S. population. These terrorists are weapons proficient. They are innovative and they are persistent. Al Qaeda will continue to seek to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material for attack; and they will use them given the opportunity. This is the threat we face today and one that our intelligence community is challenged to counter. So says Admiral McConnell. This is the real issue, the 800-pound gorilla in the room, if you will, which remains the central question before us: How do we best protect America and the American people from another cataclysmic event? I do not believe it is good enough for us to say we are preparing to respond to an attack. I believe what we need to do is to prepare to prevent such an attack. As I have suggested before, when you assess the risk which allows us a proper assessment to be able to determine how we best array our resources against such an attack, we need to have threat, plus vulnerability, plus consequence. And the only way you can assess threat is by having proper intelligence. As the National Security Estimate makes clear, those who seek to kill us continue in their resolve to, once again, inflict mass casualties upon our Nation. The threat is still there. Although we have been successful in thwarting another attack since 9/11, there are no guarantees in this business. In fact, if you would look at the polls that I've seen most recently, you will find that something like 70 percent of the American people, in fact I believe it is 73 percent of the American people in the latest poll I saw, believe that we, that the U.S. Government, has been effective in forestalling a terrorist attack on our shores. However, 57 percent believe that we are less safe. So you put those two things together, you try and figure out what the American people are saying. I think what we are saying is they believe that many of the things that we have done in government with the support of the American people and the funding of the American people have been successful in forestalling a terrorist attack on American shores, but they know that al Qaeda and their affiliates and associates have not been deterred to the extent that they are still trying to do us harm. So they see a continuing problem, and they expect us to see the continuing problem and bring us the efforts necessary to protect against a successful attack as seen from the other side. Independent sources such as Brian Jenkins in the RAND Corporation have stressed that intelligence capability is a key element in our effort to protect our homeland. He states this: ``In the terror attacks since 9/11, we have seen combinations of local conspiracies inspired by, assisted by, and guided by al Qaeda's central leadership. It is essential that while protecting the basic rights of American citizens, we find ways to facilitate the collection and exchange of intelligence across national and bureaucratic borders.'' In this regard, Admiral McConnell came before us last August asking for changes in the 1978 FISA Act. When you think about it, a definition of ``electronic surveillance'' constructed almost 28 years ago certainly could not have kept pace with changes in technology. Ironically, as I said, when FISA was first enacted, almost all international communications were wireless. The cell phone did not even exist. Although the revolution in telecommunications technology has improved the quality of all of our lives, it has taken a quantum leap beyond the law. When FISA was passed in 1978, almost all local calls were on a wire and almost all international calls were wireless. However, now the situation is upside down. International communications which would have been wireless 29 years ago are now transmitted by wire. While wireless radio and satellite communications were excluded from FISA's coverage in 1978, certain wire or fiber optic transmissions fell under the definition of electronic surveillance. Thus, changes in technology have brought communications within the scope of FISA which Congress never intended to cover in 1978. Similarly, the rise of a global telecommunications network rendered irrelevant the premium placed on geographic location by the 1978 act. As Admiral McConnell explained to our committee, it is the Judiciary Committee, in the old days location was much easier. Today, with mobile communications, it is much more difficult. So a target can move around. So the evolution of communications over time has made it much more difficult. So what we were attempting to do is get us back to 1978 so we could do our business and legitimately target foreign targets and keep track of threats and respect the privacy rights of Americans. Because a cell phone, he continued, for example, with a foreign number, GSM system, theoretically could come into the United States and you wouldn't appreciate it had changed. So you would have to now work that problem, and if you did then determine that it was in the United States and you had a legitimate foreign intelligence interest, at that point, you have to get a warrant. It was with this backdrop that we enacted the Protect America Act this past August. According to Admiral McConnell, this act has provided us with the tools to close our gaps in our foreign intelligence collection. Think of that. That is what the 9/11 Commission asked us to do, close those gaps. He found those gaps that were at least as wide and even wider following the decision by the FISA Court earlier this year. He said, and says, that the bill we passed in August has closed those gaps. He described five pillars in the important new law. First, it clarified the definition of electronic surveillance under FISA that it would not be interpreted to include surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. Under the law, it is not required for our intelligence community to obtain a FISA warrant when the subject of the surveillance is a foreign intelligence target located outside the U.S. This important element of the law is entirely consistent with the legislative history of the 1978 act. As I previously mentioned, it was not intended to reach foreign intelligence outside the U.S. The second pillar of the act we passed in August establishes a role for the FISA Court in determining that the procedures used by the intelligence community are reasonable in terms of their capacity to determine that surveillance target is outside the U.S. The third pillar of the act provides the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence with the authority to direct communications providers to provide information, facilities and assistance necessary to obtain other information when targeting foreign intelligence targets outside the U.S. The corollary of this obligation to provide intelligence information is the fourth pillar which establishes liability protection for private parties who assist the intelligence community when complying with a lawful direction under the law. Finally, the law continues the requirement that the intelligence community must obtain a court order to conduct electronic surveillance or a physical search when the targeted person is located in the U.S. Admiral McConnell defined the concept of the gap to be closed to mean foreign intelligence information that we should have been collecting. I am sure that most Americans would agree with the admiral that in a world with weapons of mass destruction there is no room for gaps in our intelligence capacity. Let me repeat: this is the considered judgment of a career officer in the U.S. Navy who headed the National Security Agency under President Clinton for 4 years and who now serves as the Director of National Intelligence. It is his considered judgment that the changes we made in the law in August were necessary. Although it was scheduled to sunset 180 days after enactment on February 5, the ink was hardly dry before the left-wing blogosphere was going bananas. Now, don't get my wrong. I defend the right of any American to scrutinize and seek a different course concerning our national security policy. However, based on Admiral McConnell's service to his country to Democrat and Republican administrations, I would suggest that those who seek substantive changes in what he has told us to be necessary should face a heavy burden of proof. In fact, in his appearance before the Judiciary Committee while reserving the right to see the fine print, he indicated he himself was open to discussions concerning changes in the end. I would also make the observation that it is time for all of us to agree that this is not about President Bush. Whether you hate him or love him or don't have any feelings about him at all, that is not the issue here. We are talking about the security of our Nation, the safety of our people, the men, women, children, grandchildren we encounter in our districts at Little League games, Girl Scout meetings, and our town halls. Those who send us here to represent them are depending on us to protect their lives and the lives of their children. This is the context within which we must consider this ultimate matter of our responsibility. While the law we passed in August, the Protect America Act, represents a major step forward in protecting the American people, there remain elements of the larger package unveiled by Admiral McConnell and General Hayden which should receive our prompt attention. First and foremost, it is imperative for this body to extend liability protection to companies who responded to the entreaties of their government since the 9/11 attacks. That is why I am so disappointed when I appeared before the Rules Committee earlier today and we were told, as we walked in, as anybody walked in with an amendment, We will listen to you, but we have already decided it is going to be a closed rule. One of the amendments offered would have given this liability protection. At a time when our country was in peril, these companies responded to the call for help. In an earlier era, maybe in a simpler time, this might have been described as patriotism. But now, instead of kudos, what do they get? They receive a summons and a complaint. They were met by costly litigation because of their willingness to respond to our country in a time of need. When we brought the issue up in our Judiciary Committee, one of the members on the other side of the aisle said, Well, these companies have millions dollars' worth of lawyers so they can defend themselves. Boy, that is the way we ought to do things. We are going to fight the war on terror with summonses and warrants. We are going to sue them out of existence. Oh, I'm sorry. We are not suing the terrorists; we are suing the companies who helped us respond to the terrorists. Figure that one out. Mr. Speaker, I would go so far as to suggest that regardless of what you think of the war in Iraq, regardless of what you may think of the war on terror, this violates all notions of fundamental fairness. It sends the worst possible message, not only to companies, but to the American public itself, that those who would come to the aid of their country are fools, and it is those on such an ideological crusade seeking to protect this Nation through lawsuits that are somehow the true American heroes. Rosy the Riveter of World War II fame has been replaced by lawyers in three-piece suits. Some of you may be old enough to remember the standard text used in our typing classes. We would practice over and over again. Boy, I recall this, typing out the following sentence: Now is the time for all good men to come to the aid of their country. Of course it would have been better stated that: Now is the time for all good men and women to come to the aid of their country. This was an ethos which went unchallenged. Believe me, in typing classes it wasn't a Republican idea, it wasn't a Democratic idea, it was an American idea, so noncontroversial, that it was standard text: Now is the time for all good men and women to come to the aid of their country. Mr. Speaker, we must not send a message to our companies and the American people that if you respond to your government when our fellow citizens are threatened by a cataclysmic attack that the very government which sought your help will not be there for you when the ideologues come after you with lawsuits. Even if you hate this President so much you can't see him to succeed in anything, at least consider the possibility that there will be a war down the line that you may support. Furthermore, those who drive around with 1/20/09 bumper stickers need to consider the fact that maybe, possibly there could be a new occupant in the White House more to their liking. He or she is going to need all the help that he or she can get. Mr. Speaker, the war on terror is not going to end with the term of the current President. The new administration is going to need to call on the help of all Americans, including companies like those whose only offense was to respond to the tragedy of 9/11. By what? Serving their government. Consider the additional downside of using litigation as an ideological weapon. As anyone who picks up the daily newspaper knows, there is always a story concerning the latest lawsuits. The litigation system can produce leaks of the most sensitive information. It is not the dissemination of information to the public which is even our principal concern. Rather, potential leaks of sensitive information to terrorists will better equip them with the ability to maneuver in the plan which they are committed to doing, killing innocent Americans. Unfortunately, H.R. 3773, to be considered on this floor, the so-called RESTORE Act that we passed out of Judiciary Committee last week and passed out of the Intelligence Committee, and which is scheduled for floor action as early as tomorrow, fails to address this issue. It does nothing, zero, provides no protection for the companies who came to the aid of our Nation after 9/11. As a matter of fact, if you listen to what happened in the Rules Committee, if you heard the debate in the Judiciary Committee, I presume if you heard the debate in the Intelligence Committee, you would not consider these companies to be something valuable in the defense of our Nation. They are suspect. They are questioned. They are, in essence, patsies, if you really look at this. Mr. Speaker, the Protect America Act does not contain retroactive liability protection; not because we didn't believe in it, but because Admiral McConnell agreed to delay discussion on the agreement in order to reach an agreement on the law we passed in August to enable us to close the critical gaps in our Nation's intelligence-gathering ability prior to the August break. Since by its own terms that law was to expire February 5, this was an issue to be resolved at this time. Unfortunately, the RESTORE Act resolves it by ignoring it. It is, therefore, essential for this body to take the necessary action to ensure that those who responded to the call for help after 9/11 will not be fed to the litigators. Mr. Speaker, I would be pleased to yield to my friend from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson), a member of the Intelligence Committee, a former member of our military forces, and someone who has been probably the most articulate in explaining the need for the changes in the law that we passed in August and for making that permanent as we go forward.", u" There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This title may be cited as the ``Military Commissions Act of 2006''. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Constitution of the United States grants to Congress the power ``To define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations'', as well as the power ``To declare War . . . To raise and support Armies . . . [and] To provide and maintain a Navy''. (2) The military commission is the traditional tribunal for the trial of persons engaged in hostilities for violations of the law of war. (3) Congress has, in the past, both authorized the use of military commission by statute and recognized the existence and authority of military commissions. (4) Military commissions have been convened both by the President and by military commanders in the field to try offenses against the law of war. (5) It is in the national interest for Congress to exercise its authority under the Constitution to enact legislation authorizing and regulating the use of military commissions to try and punish violations of the law of war. (a) In General.--The President is authorized to establish military commissions for the trial of alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and other offenses specifically made triable by military commission as provided in chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code, and chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code (as enacted by this Act). (b) Construction.--The authority in subsection (a) may not be construed to alter or limit the authority of the President under the Constitution and laws of the United States to establish military commissions for areas declared to be under martial law or in occupied territories should circumstances so require. (c) Scope of Punishment Authority.--A military commission established pursuant to subsection (a) shall have authority to impose upon any person found guilty under a proceeding under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code (as so enacted), a sentence that is appropriate for the offense or offenses for which there is a finding of guilt, including a sentence of death if authorized under such chapter, imprisonment for life or a term of years, payment of a fine or restitution, or such other lawful punishment or condition of punishment as the military commission shall direct. (d) Execution of Punishment.--The Secretary of Defense is authorized to carry out a sentence of punishment imposed by a military commission established pursuant to subsection (a) in accordance with such procedures as the Secretary may prescribe. (e) Annual Report on Trials by Military Commissions.-- (1) Annual report required.--Not later than December 31 each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on any trials conducted by military commissions established pursuant to subsection (a) during such year. (2) Form.--Each report under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) Military Commissions.-- (1) In general.--Subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 47 the following new chapter: (a) Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.--Section 1004(b) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of Public Law 109- 148; 119 Stat. 2740; 42 U.S.C. 200dd-1(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``may provide'' and inserting ``shall provide''; (2) by inserting ``or investigation'' after ``criminal prosecution''; and (3) by inserting ``whether before United States courts or agencies, foreign courts or agencies, or international courts or agencies,'' after ``described in that subsection,''. (b) Uniform Code of Military Justice.--Chapter 47 of title, 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended as follows: (1) Section 802 (article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(13) Lawful enemy combatants (as that term is defined in section 948a(3) of this title) who violate the law of war.''. (2) Section 821 (article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) is amended by striking ``by statute or law of war''. (3) Section 836(a) (article 36(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) is amended by inserting ``(other than military commissions under chapter 47A of this title)'' after ``other military tribunals''. (c) Punitive Article of Conspiracy.--Section 881 of title 10, United States Code (article 81 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice)), is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(a)'' before ``Any person''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(b) Any person subject to this chapter or chapter 47A of this title who conspires with any other person to commit an offense under the law of war, and who knowingly does an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the victims, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct, and, if death does not result to any of the victims, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial or military commission may direct.''. (d) Review of Judgments of Military Commissions.-- (1) Review by supreme court.--Section 1259 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(5) Cases tried by military commission and reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under section 950g of title 10.''. (2) Detainee treatment act of 2005.--Section 1005(e)(3) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of Public Law 109-148; 119 Stat. 2740; 10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended-- (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``pursuant to Military Commission Order No. 1. dated August 31, 2005 (or any successor military order)'' and inserting ``by a military commission under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code''; (B) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following new subparagraph (B): ``(B) Grant of review.--Review under this paragraph shall be as of right.''; (C) in subparagraph (C)-- (a) In General.--Section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (e) (as added by section 1005(e)(1) of Public Law 109-148 (119 Stat. 2742)) and by striking subsection (e) (as added by added by section 1405(e)(1) of Public Law 109-163 (119 Stat. 3477)); and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who-- ``(A) is currently in United States custody; and ``(B) has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. ``(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien detained by the United States who-- ``(A) is currently in United States custody; and ``(B) has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States since September 11, 2001. (a) In General.--No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions, or any protocols thereto, in any habeas or civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States, is a party, as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its States or territories. (b) Geneva Conventions Defined.--In this section, the term ``Geneva Conventions'' means-- (1) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217); (2) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217); (3) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and (4) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516). (a) Implementation of Treaty Obligations.-- (1) In general.--The acts enumerated in subsection (d) of section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, as added by subsection (b) of this section, and in subsection (c) of this section, constitute violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibited by United States law. (2) Prohibition on grave breaches.--The provisions of section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by this section, fully satisfy the obligation under Article 129 of the Third Geneva Convention for the United States to provide effective penal sanctions for grave breaches which are encompassed in common Article 3 in the context of an armed conflict not of an international character. No foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts of the United States in interpreting the prohibitions enumerated in subsection (d) of such section 2441. (3) Interpretation by the president.--(A) As provided by the Constitution and by this section, the President has the authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions and to promulgate higher standards and administrative regulations for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. (B) The President shall issue interpretations described by subparagraph (A) by Executive Order published in the Federal Register. (C) Any Executive Order published under this paragraph shall be authoritative (as to non-grave breach provisions of common Article 3) as a matter of United States law, in the same manner as other administrative regulations. (D) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the constitutional functions and responsibilities of Congress and the judicial branch of the United States. (4) Definitions.--In this subsection: (A) The term ``Geneva Conventions'' means-- (i) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217); (ii) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217); (iii) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and (iv) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516). (B) The term ``Third Geneva Convention'' means the international convention referred to in subparagraph (A)(iii). (b) Revision to War Crimes Offense Under Federal Criminal Code.-- (1) In general.--Section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in subsection (c), by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following new paragraph (3): ``(3) which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 as defined in subsection (d) when committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an international character; or''; and (B) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d) Common Article 3 Violations.-- ``(1) Prohibited conduct.--In subsection (c)(3), the term `grave breach of common Article 3' means any conduct (such conduct constituting a grave breach of common Article 3 of the international conventions done at Geneva August 12, 1949), as follows: ``(A) Torture.--The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, an act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or any reason based on discrimination of any kind. ``(B) Cruel or inhuman treatment.--The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, an act intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions), including serious physical abuse, upon another within his custody or control. ``(C) Performing biological experiments.--The act of a person who subjects, or conspires or attempts to subject, one or more persons within his custody or physical control to biological experiments without a legitimate medical or dental purpose and in so doing endangers the body or health of such person or persons. ``(D) Murder.--The act of a person who intentionally kills, or conspires or attempts to kill, or kills whether intentionally or unintentionally in the course of committing any other offense under this subsection, one or more persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including those placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause. ``(E) Mutilation or maiming.--The act of a person who intentionally injures, or conspires or attempts to injure, or injures whether intentionally or unintentionally in the course of committing any other offense under this subsection, one or more persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including those placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, by disfiguring the person or persons by any mutilation thereof or by permanently disabling any member, limb, or organ of his body, without any legitimate medical or dental purpose. ``(F) Intentionally causing serious bodily injury.--The act of a person who intentionally causes, or conspires or attempts to cause, serious bodily injury to one or more persons, including lawful combatants, in violation of the law of war. ``(G) Rape.--The act of a person who forcibly or with coercion or threat of force wrongfully invades, or conspires or attempts to invade, the body of a person by penetrating, however slightly, the anal or genital opening of the victim with any part of the body of the accused, or with any foreign object. ``(H) Sexual assault or abuse.--The act of a person who forcibly or with coercion or threat of force engages, or conspires or attempts to engage, in sexual contact with one or more persons, or causes, or conspires or attempts to cause, one or more persons to engage in sexual contact. ``(I) Taking hostages.--The act of a person who, having knowingly seized or detained one or more persons, threatens to kill, injure, or continue to detain such person or persons with the intent of compelling any nation, person other than the hostage, or group of persons to act or refrain from acting as an explicit or implicit condition for the safety or release of such person or persons. ``(2) Definitions.--In the case of an offense under subsection (a) by reason of subsection (c)(3)-- ``(A) the term `severe mental pain or suffering' shall be applied for purposes of paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B) in accordance with the meaning given that term in section 2340(2) of this title; ``(B) the term `serious bodily injury' shall be applied for purposes of paragraph (1)(F) in accordance with the meaning given that term in section 113(b)(2) of this title; ``(C) the term `sexual contact' shall be applied for purposes of paragraph (1)(G) in accordance with the meaning given that term in section 2246(3) of this title; ``(D) the term `serious physical pain or suffering' shall be applied for purposes of paragraph (1)(B) as meaning bodily injury that involves-- ``(i) a substantial risk of death; ``(ii) extreme physical pain; ``(iii) a burn or physical disfigurement of a serious nature (other than cuts, abrasions, or bruises); or ``(iv) significant loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; and ``(E) the term `serious mental pain or suffering' shall be applied for purposes of paragraph (1)(B) in accordance with the meaning given the term `severe mental pain or suffering' (as defined in section 2340(2) of this title), except that-- ``(i) the term `serious' shall replace the term `severe' where it appears; and ``(ii) as to conduct occurring after the date of the enactment of the Military Commission Act of 2006, the term `serious and non-transitory mental harm (which need not be prolonged)' shall replace the term `prolonged mental harm' where it appears. ``(3) Inapplicability of certain provisions with respect to collateral damage or incident of lawful attack.--The intent specified for the conduct stated in subparagraphs (D), (E), and (F) or paragraph (1) precludes the applicability of those subparagraphs to an offense under subsection (a) by reasons of subsection (c)(3) with respect to-- ``(A) collateral damage; or ``(B) death, damage, or injury incident to a lawful attack. ``(4) Inapplicability of taking hostages to prisoner exchange.--Paragraph (1)(I) does not apply to an offense under subsection (a) by reason of subsection (c)(3) in the case of a prisoner exchange during wartime.''. (2) Retroactive applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection, except as specified in subsection (d)(2)(E) of section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, shall take effect as of November 26, 1997, as if enacted immediately after the amendments made by section 583 of Public Law 105- 118 (as amended by section 4002(e)(7) of Public Law 107-273). (c) Additional Prohibition on Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.-- (1) In general.--No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. (2) Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment defined.--In this subsection, the term ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment'' means cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 1984. (3) Compliance.--The President shall take appropriate action to ensure compliance with this subsection, including through the establishment of administrative rules and procedures. Section 1005(e)(2)(B)(i) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of Public Law 109-148; 119 Stat. 2742; 10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended by striking ``the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba'' and inserting ``the United States''. If any provision of this Act or amendment made by a provision of this Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and the amendments made by this Act, and the application of such provisions and amendments to any other person or circumstance, shall not be affected thereby. This title may be cited as the ``Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006''. Congress finds the following: (1) After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush authorized the National Security Agency to intercept communications between people inside the United States, including American citizens, and terrorism suspects overseas. (2) One of the lessons learned from September 11, 2001, is that the enemies who seek to greatly harm and terrorize our Nation utilize technologies and techniques that defy conventional law enforcement practices. (3) The President, as the constitutional officer most directly responsible for protecting the United States from attack, requires the ability and means to detect and track an enemy that can master and exploit modern technology. (4) It is equally essential, however, that in protecting the United States against our enemies, the President does not compromise the very civil liberties that he seeks to safeguard. As Justice Hugo Black observed, ``The President's power, if any, to issue [an] order must stem either from an Act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.'' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (opinion by Black, J.). Similarly, in 2004, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor explained in her plurality opinion for the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: ``We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.'' Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (citations omitted). (5) When deciding issues of national security, it is in our Nation's best interest that, to the extent feasible, all 3 branches of the Federal Government should be involved. This helps guarantee that electronic surveillance programs do not infringe on the constitutional rights of Americans, while at the same time ensuring that the President has all the powers and means necessary to detect and track our enemies and protect our Nation from attack. (6) As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor explained in her plurality opinion for the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, ``Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all 3 branches when individual liberties are at stake.'' Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (citations omitted). (7) Similarly, Justice Jackson famously explained in his Youngstown concurrence: ``When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate . . . When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility . . . When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.'' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). (8) Congress clearly has the authority to enact legislation with respect to electronic surveillance programs. The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers of oversight over national security and foreign policy, under article I, section 8 of the Constitution of the United States, which confers on Congress numerous powers, including the powers-- (A) ``To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water''; (B) ``To raise and support Armies''; (C) ``To provide and maintain a Navy''; (D) ``To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces''; (E) ``To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions''; and (F) ``To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States''. (9) While Attorney General Alberto Gonzales explained that the executive branch reviews the electronic surveillance program of the National Security Agency every 45 days to ensure that the program is not overly broad, it is the belief of Congress that approval and supervision of electronic surveillance programs should be conducted outside of the executive branch, by the article III court established under section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) and the congressional intelligence committees. It is also the belief of Congress that it is appropriate for an article III court to pass upon the constitutionality of electronic surveillance programs that may be directed at Americans. (10) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is the proper court to approve and supervise classified electronic surveillance programs because it is adept at maintaining the secrecy with which it was charged and it possesses the requisite expertise and discretion for adjudicating sensitive issues of national security. (11) In 1975, [then] Attorney General Edward Levi, a strong defender of executive authority, testified that in times of conflict, the President needs the power to conduct long-range electronic surveillance and that a foreign intelligence surveillance court should be empowered to issue special approval orders in these circumstances. (12) Granting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court the authority to review electronic surveillance programs and pass upon their constitutionality is consistent with well- established, longstanding practices. (13) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court already has broad authority to approve surveillance of members of international conspiracies, in addition to granting warrants for surveillance of a particular individual under sections 104, 105, and 402 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804, 1805, and 1842). (14) Prosecutors have significant flexibility in investigating domestic conspiracy cases. Courts have held that flexible warrants comply with the 4th amendment to the Constitution of the United States when they relate to complex, far-reaching, and multifaceted criminal enterprises like drug conspiracies and money laundering rings. The courts recognize that applications for search warrants must be judged in a common sense and realistic fashion, and the courts permit broad warrant language where, due to the nature and circumstances of the investigation and the criminal organization, more precise descriptions are not feasible. (15) The Supreme Court, in the ``Keith Case'', United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), recognized that the standards and procedures used to fight ordinary crime may not be applicable to cases involving national security. The Court recognized that national ``security surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of ordinary crime'' and that courts should be more flexible in issuing warrants in national security cases. United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972). (16) By authorizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review electronic surveillance programs, Congress enables the President to use the necessary means to guard our national security, while also protecting the civil liberties and constitutional rights that we cherish. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended-- (1) by redesignating title VII as title VIII; (2) by redesignating section 701 as section 801; and (3) by inserting after title VI the following: (a) In General.--Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 3, is amended by adding at the end the following: Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 4, is amended by adding at the end the following: Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 18 of 1978, as amended by section 5, is amended by adding at the end the following: Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 6, is amended by adding at the end the following: (a) Repeal.--Sections 111, 309, and 404 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811, 1829, and 1844) are repealed. (b) Clarifying Amendments.-- (1) Title 18.--Section 2511(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in paragraph (e), by striking ``, as defined in section 101'' and all that follows through the end of the paragraph and inserting the following: ``under the Constitution or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.''; and (B) in paragraph (f), by striking ``from international or foreign communications,'' and all that follows through the end of the paragraph and inserting ``that is authorized under a Federal statute or the Constitution of the United States.''. (2) FISA.--Section 109 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a)-- (i) in paragraph (1)-- (a) Reference.--In this section, a reference to ``FISA'' shall mean the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.). (b) Definitions.--Section 101 of FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(1)-- (A) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``or'' after the semicolon; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) otherwise is reasonably expected to possess, control, transmit, or receive foreign intelligence information while that person is in the United States, provided that the official making the certification required by section 104(a)(6) deems such foreign intelligence information to be significant; or''; (2) by striking subsection (f) and inserting the following: ``(f) `Electronic surveillance' means-- ``(1) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device for acquiring information by intentionally directing the surveillance at a particular known person who is reasonably believed to be in the United States under circumstances in which that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes; or ``(2) the intentional acquisition of the contents of any communication under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located within the United States.''; (3) in subsection (h), by striking paragraph (4) and inserting the following: ``(4) notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), with respect to any electronic surveillance approved pursuant to section 102 or 704, procedures that require that no contents of any communication originated or sent by a United States person shall be disclosed, disseminated, used or retained for longer than 7 days unless a court order under section 105 is obtained or unless the Attorney General determines that the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.''. (4) by striking subsection (l); and (5) by striking subsection (n) and inserting the following: ``(n) `contents', when used with respect to a communication, includes any information concerning the substance, symbols, sounds, words, purport, or meaning of a communication, and does not include dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information.''. (c) Electronic Surveillance Authorization.--Section 102 of FISA (50 U.S.C. 1802) is amended to read as follows: The table of contents for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is amended-- (1) by striking the item relating to section 102 and inserting the following new item:", u" There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Military Commissions Act of 2006''. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Constitution of the United States grants to Congress the power ``To define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations'', as well as the power ``To declare War . . . To raise and support Armies . . . [and] To provide and maintain a Navy''. (2) The military commission is the traditional tribunal for the trial of persons engaged in hostilities for violations of the law of war. (3) Congress has, in the past, both authorized the use of military commission by statute and recognized the existence and authority of military commissions. (4) Military commissions have been convened both by the President and by military commanders in the field to try offenses against the law of war. (5) It is in the national interest for Congress to exercise its authority under the Constitution to enact legislation authorizing and regulating the use of military commissions to try and punish violations of the law of war. (a) In General.--The President is authorized to establish military commissions for the trial of alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and other offenses specifically made triable by military commission as provided in chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code, and chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code (as enacted by this Act). (b) Construction.--The authority in subsection (a) may not be construed to alter or limit the authority of the President under the Constitution and laws of the United States to establish military commissions for areas declared to be under martial law or in occupied territories should circumstances so require. (c) Scope of Punishment Authority.--A military commission established pursuant to subsection (a) shall have authority to impose upon any person found guilty under a proceeding under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code (as so enacted), a sentence that is appropriate for the offense or offenses for which there is a finding of guilt, including a sentence of death if authorized under such chapter, imprisonment for life or a term of years, payment of a fine or restitution, or such other lawful punishment or condition of punishment as the military commission shall direct. (d) Execution of Punishment.--The Secretary of Defense is authorized to carry out a sentence of punishment imposed by a military commission established pursuant to subsection (a) in accordance with such procedures as the Secretary may prescribe. (e) Annual Report on Trials by Military Commissions.-- (1) Annual report required.--Not later than December 31 each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on any trials conducted by military commissions established pursuant to subsection (a) during such year. (2) Form.--Each report under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) Military Commissions.-- (1) In general.--Subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 47 the following new chapter: (a) Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.--Section 1004(b) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of Public Law 109- 148; 119 Stat. 2740; 42 U.S.C. 200dd-1(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``may provide'' and inserting ``shall provide''; (2) by inserting ``or investigation'' after ``criminal prosecution''; and (3) by inserting ``whether before United States courts or agencies, foreign courts or agencies, or international courts or agencies,'' after ``described in that subsection,''. (b) Uniform Code of Military Justice.--Chapter 47 of title, 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended as follows: (1) Section 802 (article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(13) Lawful enemy combatants (as that term is defined in section 948a(3) of this title) who violate the law of war.''. (2) Section 821 (article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) is amended by striking ``by statute or law of war''. (3) Section 836(a) (article 36(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) is amended by inserting ``(other than military commissions under chapter 47A of this title)'' after ``other military tribunals''. (c) Punitive Article of Conspiracy.--Section 881 of title 10, United States Code (article 81 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice)), is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(a)'' before ``Any person''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(b) Any person subject to this chapter or chapter 47A of this title who conspires with any other person to commit an offense under the law of war, and who knowingly does an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the victims, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct, and, if death does not result to any of the victims, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial or military commission may direct.''. (d) Review of Judgments of Military Commissions.-- (1) Review by supreme court.--Section 1259 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(5) Cases tried by military commission and reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under section 950g of title 10.''. (2) Detainee treatment act of 2005.--Section 1005(e)(3) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of Public Law 109-148; 119 Stat. 2740; 10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended-- (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``pursuant to Military Commission Order No. 1. dated August 31, 2005 (or any successor military order)'' and inserting ``by a military commission under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code''; (B) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following new subparagraph (B): ``(B) Grant of review.--Review under this paragraph shall be as of right.''; (C) in subparagraph (C)-- (a) In General.--Section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (e) (as added by section 1005(e)(1) of Public Law 109-148 (119 Stat. 2742)) and by striking subsection (e) (as added by added by section 1405(e)(1) of Public Law 109-163 (119 Stat. 3477)); and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who-- ``(A) is currently in United States custody; and ``(B) has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. ``(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien detained by the United States who-- ``(A) is currently in United States custody; and ``(B) has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States since September 11, 2001. (a) In General.--No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions, or any protocols thereto, in any habeas or civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States, is a party, as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its States or territories. (b) Geneva Conventions Defined.--In this section, the term ``Geneva Conventions'' means-- (1) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217); (2) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217); (3) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and (4) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516). (a) Implementation of Treaty Obligations.-- (1) In general.--The acts enumerated in subsection (d) of section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, as added by subsection (b) of this section, and in subsection (c) of this section, constitute violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibited by United States law. (2) Prohibition on grave breaches.--The provisions of section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by this section, fully satisfy the obligation under Article 129 of the Third Geneva Convention for the United States to provide effective penal sanctions for grave breaches which are encompassed in common Article 3 in the context of an armed conflict not of an international character. No foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts of the United States in interpreting the prohibitions enumerated in subsection (d) of such section 2441. (3) Interpretation by the president.--(A) As provided by the Constitution and by this section, the President has the authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions and to promulgate higher standards and administrative regulations for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. (B) The President shall issue interpretations described by subparagraph (A) by Executive Order published in the Federal Register. (C) Any Executive Order published under this paragraph shall be authoritative (as to non-grave breach provisions of common Article 3) as a matter of United States law, in the same manner as other administrative regulations. (D) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the constitutional functions and responsibilities of Congress and the judicial branch of the United States. (4) Definitions.--In this subsection: (A) The term ``Geneva Conventions'' means-- (i) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217); (ii) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217); (iii) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and (iv) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516). (B) The term ``Third Geneva Convention'' means the international convention referred to in subparagraph (A)(iii). (b) Revision to War Crimes Offense Under Federal Criminal Code.-- (1) In general.--Section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in subsection (c), by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following new paragraph (3): ``(3) which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 as defined in subsection (d) when committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an international character; or''; and (B) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d) Common Article 3 Violations.-- ``(1) Prohibited conduct.--In subsection (c)(3), the term `grave breach of common Article 3' means any conduct (such conduct constituting a grave breach of common Article 3 of the international conventions done at Geneva August 12, 1949), as follows: ``(A) Torture.--The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, an act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or any reason based on discrimination of any kind. ``(B) Cruel or inhuman treatment.--The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, an act intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions), including serious physical abuse, upon another within his custody or control. ``(C) Performing biological experiments.--The act of a person who subjects, or conspires or attempts to subject, one or more persons within his custody or physical control to biological experiments without a legitimate medical or dental purpose and in so doing endangers the body or health of such person or persons. ``(D) Murder.--The act of a person who intentionally kills, or conspires or attempts to kill, or kills whether intentionally or unintentionally in the course of committing any other offense under this subsection, one or more persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including those placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause. ``(E) Mutilation or maiming.--The act of a person who intentionally injures, or conspires or attempts to injure, or injures whether intentionally or unintentionally in the course of committing any other offense under this subsection, one or more persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including those placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, by disfiguring the person or persons by any mutilation thereof or by permanently disabling any member, limb, or organ of his body, without any legitimate medical or dental purpose. ``(F) Intentionally causing serious bodily injury.--The act of a person who intentionally causes, or conspires or attempts to cause, serious bodily injury to one or more persons, including lawful combatants, in violation of the law of war. ``(G) Rape.--The act of a person who forcibly or with coercion or threat of force wrongfully invades, or conspires or attempts to invade, the body of a person by penetrating, however slightly, the anal or genital opening of the victim with any part of the body of the accused, or with any foreign object. ``(H) Sexual assault or abuse.--The act of a person who forcibly or with coercion or threat of force engages, or conspires or attempts to engage, in sexual contact with one or more persons, or causes, or conspires or attempts to cause, one or more persons to engage in sexual contact. ``(I) Taking hostages.--The act of a person who, having knowingly seized or detained one or more persons, threatens to kill, injure, or continue to detain such person or persons with the intent of compelling any nation, person other than the hostage, or group of persons to act or refrain from acting as an explicit or implicit condition for the safety or release of such person or persons. ``(2) Definitions.--In the case of an offense under subsection (a) by reason of subsection (c)(3)-- ``(A) the term `severe mental pain or suffering' shall be applied for purposes of paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B) in accordance with the meaning given that term in section 2340(2) of this title; ``(B) the term `serious bodily injury' shall be applied for purposes of paragraph (1)(F) in accordance with the meaning given that term in section 113(b)(2) of this title; ``(C) the term `sexual contact' shall be applied for purposes of paragraph (1)(G) in accordance with the meaning given that term in section 2246(3) of this title; ``(D) the term `serious physical pain or suffering' shall be applied for purposes of paragraph (1)(B) as meaning bodily injury that involves-- ``(i) a substantial risk of death; ``(ii) extreme physical pain; ``(iii) a burn or physical disfigurement of a serious nature (other than cuts, abrasions, or bruises); or ``(iv) significant loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; and ``(E) the term `serious mental pain or suffering' shall be applied for purposes of paragraph (1)(B) in accordance with the meaning given the term `severe mental pain or suffering' (as defined in section 2340(2) of this title), except that-- ``(i) the term `serious' shall replace the term `severe' where it appears; and ``(ii) as to conduct occurring after the date of the enactment of the Military Commission Act of 2006, the term `serious and non-transitory mental harm (which need not be prolonged)' shall replace the term `prolonged mental harm' where it appears. ``(3) Inapplicability of certain provisions with respect to collateral damage or incident of lawful attack.--The intent specified for the conduct stated in subparagraphs (D), (E), and (F) or paragraph (1) precludes the applicability of those subparagraphs to an offense under subsection (a) by reasons of subsection (c)(3) with respect to-- ``(A) collateral damage; or ``(B) death, damage, or injury incident to a lawful attack. ``(4) Inapplicability of taking hostages to prisoner exchange.--Paragraph (1)(I) does not apply to an offense under subsection (a) by reason of subsection (c)(3) in the case of a prisoner exchange during wartime.''. (2) Retroactive applicability.--The amendments made by this subsection, except as specified in subsection (d)(2)(E) of section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, shall take effect as of November 26, 1997, as if enacted immediately after the amendments made by section 583 of Public Law 105- 118 (as amended by section 4002(e)(7) of Public Law 107-273). (c) Additional Prohibition on Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.-- (1) In general.--No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. (2) Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment defined.--In this subsection, the term ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment'' means cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 1984. (3) Compliance.--The President shall take appropriate action to ensure compliance with this subsection, including through the establishment of administrative rules and procedures. Section 1005(e)(2)(B)(i) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of Public Law 109-148; 119 Stat. 2742; 10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended by striking ``the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba'' and inserting ``the United States''. By Mr. McCONNELL (for himself and Mr. Frist): S. 3931. A bill to establish procedures for the review of electronic surveillance programs; read the first time. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006''. Congress finds the following: (1) After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush authorized the National Security Agency to intercept communications between people inside the United States, including American citizens, and terrorism suspects overseas. (2) One of the lessons learned from September 11, 2001, is that the enemies who seek to greatly harm and terrorize our Nation utilize technologies and techniques that defy conventional law enforcement practices. (3) The President, as the constitutional officer most directly responsible for protecting the United States from attack, requires the ability and means to detect and track an enemy that can master and exploit modern technology. (4) It is equally essential, however, that in protecting the United States against our enemies, the President does not compromise the very civil liberties that he seeks to safeguard. As Justice Hugo Black observed, ``The President's power, if any, to issue [an] order must stem either from an Act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.'' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (opinion by Black, J.). Similarly, in 2004, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor explained in her plurality opinion for the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: ``We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.'' Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (citations omitted). (5) When deciding issues of national security, it is in our Nation's best interest that, to the extent feasible, all 3 branches of the Federal Government should be involved. This helps guarantee that electronic surveillance programs do not infringe on the constitutional rights of Americans, while at the same time ensuring that the President has all the powers and means necessary to detect and track our enemies and protect our Nation from attack. (6) As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor explained in her plurality opinion for the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, ``Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all 3 branches when individual liberties are at stake.'' Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (citations omitted). (7) Similarly, Justice Jackson famously explained in his Youngstown concurrence: ``When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate . . . When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility . . . When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.'' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). (8) Congress clearly has the authority to enact legislation with respect to electronic surveillance programs. The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers of oversight over national security and foreign policy, under article I, section 8 of the Constitution of the United States, which confers on Congress numerous powers, including the powers-- (A) ``To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water''; (B) ``To raise and support Armies''; (C) ``To provide and maintain a Navy''; (D) ``To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces''; (E) ``To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions''; and (F) ``To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States''. (9) While Attorney General Alberto Gonzales explained that the executive branch reviews the electronic surveillance program of the National Security Agency every 45 days to ensure that the program is not overly broad, it is the belief of Congress that approval and supervision of electronic surveillance programs should be conducted outside of the executive branch, by the article III court established under section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) and the congressional intelligence committees. It is also the belief of Congress that it is appropriate for an article III court to pass upon the constitutionality of electronic surveillance programs that may be directed at Americans. (10) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is the proper court to approve and supervise classified electronic surveillance programs because it is adept at maintaining the secrecy with which it was charged and it possesses the requisite expertise and discretion for adjudicating sensitive issues of national security. (11) In 1975, [then] Attorney General Edward Levi, a strong defender of executive authority, testified that in times of conflict, the President needs the power to conduct long-range electronic surveillance and that a foreign intelligence surveillance court should be empowered to issue special approval orders in these circumstances. (12) Granting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court the authority to review electronic surveillance programs and pass upon their constitutionality is consistent with well- established, longstanding practices. (13) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court already has broad authority to approve surveillance of members of international conspiracies, in addition to granting warrants for surveillance of a particular individual under sections 104, 105, and 402 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804, 1805, and 1842). (14) Prosecutors have significant flexibility in investigating domestic conspiracy cases. Courts have held that flexible warrants comply with the 4th amendment to the Constitution of the United States when they relate to complex, far-reaching, and multifaceted criminal enterprises like drug conspiracies and money laundering rings. The courts recognize that applications for search warrants must be judged in a common sense and realistic fashion, and the courts permit broad warrant language where, due to the nature and circumstances of the investigation and the criminal organization, more precise descriptions are not feasible. (15) The Supreme Court, in the ``Keith Case'', United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), recognized that the standards and procedures used to fight ordinary crime may not be applicable to cases involving national security. The Court recognized that national ``security surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of ordinary crime'' and that courts should be more flexible in issuing warrants in national security cases. United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972). (16) By authorizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review electronic surveillance programs, Congress enables the President to use the necessary means to guard our national security, while also protecting the civil liberties and constitutional rights that we cherish. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended-- (1) by redesignating title VII as title VIII; (2) by redesignating section 701 as section 801; and (3) by inserting after title VI the following: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended-- (1) by redesignating title VII as title VIII; (2) by redesignating section 701 as section 801; and (3) by inserting after title VI the following: ``TITLE VII--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS (a) In General.--Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 3, is amended by adding at the end the following: Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 4, is amended by adding at the end the following: Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 18 of 1978, as amended by section 5, is amended by adding at the end the following: Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 6, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 705. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT. (a) Repeal.--Sections 111, 309, and 404 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811, 1829, and 1844) are repealed. (b) Clarifying Amendments.-- (1) Title 18.--Section 2511(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in paragraph (e), by striking ``, as defined in section 101'' and all that follows through the end of the paragraph and inserting the following: ``under the Constitution or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.''; and (B) in paragraph (f), by striking ``from international or foreign communications,'' and all that follows through the end of the paragraph and inserting ``that is authorized under a Federal statute or the Constitution of the United States.''. (2) FISA.--Section 109 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a)-- (i) in paragraph (1)-- (a) Reference.--In this section, a reference to ``FISA'' shall mean the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.). (b) Definitions.--Section 101 of FISA (50 U.S.C. 1801) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(1)-- (A) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``or'' after the semicolon; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) otherwise is reasonably expected to possess, control, transmit, or receive foreign intelligence information while that person is in the United States, provided that the official making the certification required by section 104(a)(6) deems such foreign intelligence information to be significant; or''; (2) by striking subsection (f) and inserting the following: ``(f) `Electronic surveillance' means-- ``(1) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device for acquiring information by intentionally directing the surveillance at a particular known person who is reasonably believed to be in the United States under circumstances in which that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes; or ``(2) the intentional acquisition of the contents of any communication under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located within the United States.''; (3) in subsection (h), by striking paragraph (4) and inserting the following: ``(4) notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), with respect to any electronic surveillance approved pursuant to section 102 or 704, procedures that require that no contents of any communication originated or sent by a United States person shall be disclosed, disseminated, used or retained for longer than 7 days unless a court order under section 105 is obtained or unless the Attorney General determines that the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.''. (4) by striking subsection (l); and (5) by striking subsection (n) and inserting the following: ``(n) `contents', when used with respect to a communication, includes any information concerning the substance, symbols, sounds, words, purport, or meaning of a communication, and does not include dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information.''. (c) Electronic Surveillance Authorization.--Section 102 of FISA (50 U.S.C. 1802) is amended to read as follows: The table of contents for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is amended-- (1) by striking the item relating to section 102 and inserting the following new item:", u"I thank the Chair. Madam President, I rise in support of the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski-Kerrey amendment. I will first identify the need for the amendment. What we found in this issue concerning the Department of Energy is lack of accountability. What this amendment will do, in a nutshell, is to create a single agency in the Department of Energy, an Agency for Nuclear Stewardship, that will undertake all activities of our nuclear weapons laboratories programs, including the nuclear weapons laboratories themselves. It puts one person in charge, and that will be the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship. That is the person in charge of and responsible for all aspects of the new Agency for Nuclear Stewardship. It creates a clear chain of command, a new Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship solely and directly reporting to the Secretary of Energy. Why do we need this? I believe all my colleagues will agree that the Department of Energy, as far as its security arrangements are concerned, is badly broken. To suggest that we should take time to evaluate at greater length when we have in the report of the investigative panel, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board--a report which I have before me entitled ``Science At Its Best, Security At Its Worst.'' I am very proud of the role of the laboratories as far as science is concerned, but what we have is a severe breach of our national security. In summary, the amendment would create a new agency within the Department of Energy called the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship. The Agency for Nuclear Stewardship would be semiautonomous because it would be responsible for all of its activities. It provides that the Secretary of Energy shall be responsible for all policies of the agency; that the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship, headed by the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship, would be just that, responsible, again, to the Secretary of Energy. The Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship shall report solely and directly to the Secretary; and that individual shall be subject to the supervision and direction of the Secretary. Make no mistake about it, the chain of command is to the Secretary of Energy. The Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship will have authority over all programs at the Department of Energy related to nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and fissile material disposition. The agency's semiautonomy, as recommended by the Rudman report, is created by making all employees of the agency accountable to the Secretary and Under Secretary of Energy but not to other officials of the Department of Energy outside the agency. Specifically, the language reads: All personnel of the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship, in carrying out any function of the agency, shall be responsible to and subject to the supervision and direction of the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship, or his designee within the agency, and shall not be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any other officer, employee or agent of any other part of the Department of Energy. The Secretary, however, may direct other officials, other departments who are not within the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship, to review the agency's programs and to make recommendations to the Secretary regarding the administration of such programs, including consistency with other similar programs and activities in the Department. The Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship will have three deputy directors who will manage programs in the following areas: First, Defense programs; that is, the lab directors and the heads of the production and test sites will report directly to this person; second, the nonproliferation and fissile materials disposition; and third, the naval reactors. The Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship will appoint chiefs of--and they are as follows--first, counterintelligence--this must be a senior FBI executive whose selection must be approved by the Secretary of Energy and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation--second, is security; and third is intelligence. These three chiefs shall report to the Under Secretary and shall have, statutorily provided, direct access to the Secretary and all other officials of the Department and its contractors concerning these matters. It requires the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship to report annually to the Congress regarding the status and effectiveness of security and counterintelligence programs at the nuclear weapons facilities and laboratories, the adequacy of the Department of Energy procedures and policy for protecting national security information, and whether each DOE National Laboratory and nuclear weapons production test site is in full compliance with all departmental security requirements, and, if not, what measures are being taken to bring the lab into compliance--security violators at the nuclear weapons facilities and laboratories, foreign visitors at the nuclear weapons facilities and laboratories. In other words, what we have is a complete listing of requirements for the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship to report annually to the Congress. So not only will he report to the Secretary but he will report to the Congress. It requires the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship to keep the Secretary and the Congress fully and currently informed regarding losses of national security information and requires every employee of the Department of Energy, the National Laboratories, or associated contractors to alert the Under Secretary whenever they believe there is a threat to or a loss of national security information. In order to address concerns that Department of Energy officials were blocked from notifying Congress of security and counterintelligence breaches, the amendment contains a provision stating that the Under Secretary shall not be required to obtain the approval of any DOE official except the Secretary before delivering these reports to the Congress and, likewise, prohibits any other Department or agency from interfering. As we look over the history of the debacle associated with the breach of our national security regarding the laboratories, clearly, we have case after case, as we look to the former Secretaries, where there was a lack of an effective transfer of information, transfer of security matters, and just the transfer of everyday activities associated with responsibility and accountability. The system failed. The system failed because various people did not have access to the Secretary who were in charge of responsible security areas that mandated that they have such access in order to complete the communication within the chain of command. As a consequence, I support this amendment. We need this amendment to protect the national security. We need it to keep our nuclear weapons secrets from falling into the wrong hands. We have already suffered a major loss of our nuclear weapons secrets. According to the House Select Committee, the Cox report, the Chinese have stolen design information on all of the United States' most advanced nuclear weapons. This is simply unacceptable. The question we now face is: Will we lose more national security information if we do not take action? The answer is: Certainly that we stand greater exposure. The problem is the management of the Department of Energy. The problem is lack of accountability and lack of responsibility. Let me quote from the report of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Rudman report. Again, I refer to this report, ``Science at its Best, Security at its Worst.'' Organizational disarray, managerial neglect, and a culture of arrogance--both at DOE headquarters and the labs themselves--conspired to create an espionage scandal waiting to happen. This is in the report itself. Further: The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself. Right out of this report. I quote further: Accountability at the Department of Energy has been spread so thinly and erratically that it is now almost impossible to find. Right out of the report. Further: Never have the members of the Special Investigative Panel witnessed a bureaucratic culture so thoroughly saturated with cynicism and disregard for authority. Further quote: Never before has this panel found such a cavalier attitude toward one of the most serious responsibilities in the federal government--control of the design information relating to nuclear weapons. Further: Never before has the panel found an agency with the bureaucratic insolence to dispute, delay, and resist implementation of a Presidential directive on security. If that isn't evidence enough that the security is at its worst, I do not know what other points to make. To date, the only DOE people who have been removed from their jobs as a consequence of the question of who is accountable are: Wen Ho Lee, who is alleged to have engaged in espionage at Los Alamos, is yet to be even charged with anything--not everyone a security violation; a gentleman by the name of Notra Trulock, the person who uncovered the alleged espionage and pushed perhaps too hard to stop it--which I might add, the Department of Energy felt a little uncomfortable with. He was shuffled off to a sideline position in the Department of Energy because he was too aggressive in bringing this matter to light. A gentleman by the name of Vic Reis, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Energy for Defense Programs, has, I understand, resigned because he disagrees with the officials down there and happens to support the pending amendment, the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski amendment. Not a single high-level bureaucrat at the Department of Energy, the FBI, or the Justice Department has been removed, demoted, or disciplined over this massive failure. One has to wonder with all the talent associated with these agencies who bears the responsibility for failure in this case? The questions we must answer are certainly clear: How long are we willing to put up with this? Do we want to continue with the status quo? Our proposal is pending the cloture vote tomorrow. Those that are in opposition--who feel perhaps a bit uncomfortable with this--do they have a proposal to fix it? Clearly, they don't. We want to fix the problem. For reasons that I fail to understand, the administration is very reluctant to address this problem with a strong proposal for identifying accountability in the Department of Energy. Unfortunately, Secretary Richardson is opposed to our amendment as it stands. When it came up the last time on the defense bill, Secretary Richardson sent two letters threatening a veto by the President. Why doesn't the administration want to do anything significant to correct this problem? They seem to be willing only to rearrange the deck chairs, so to speak. They seem to be willing to make changes, but only those that ultimately result in the status quo. We want to steer the ship in a different direction so that it won't hit another iceberg. This Nation should not have to suffer from another massive loss of our most sensitive nuclear weapons secrets. The President's own intelligence advisory board agrees with our legislative solution. That is what the Rudman report said. Our amendment is patterned after the Rudman report. Let me again quote from this report: The panel is convinced that real and lasting security and counterintelligence reform at the weapons labs is simply unworkable within the Department of Energy's current structure and culture. Further, to achieve the kind of protection that these sensitive labs must have, they and their functions must have their own autonomous operational structure, free of all of the other obligations imposed by the Department of Energy management. Well, today we have a situation where everybody is pointing the finger at everybody else. No one wants to take the responsibility. No one wants to be held accountable. Fundamentally, the issue is how to create accountability and responsibility at the Department of Energy. I encourage my colleagues to examine our amendment because that is just what it does. It creates accountability. It creates responsibility. No longer can we have a situation such as we have seen within the Department, where it is impossible to determine who bears the responsibility for the Wen Ho Lee breach of security. It creates accountability and responsibility by establishing a new Agency for Nuclear Stewardship inside of the Department of Energy to be headed up by a new Under Secretary of Energy. This new agency is now made responsible for all aspects of our nuclear weapons programs, including the previously loosely-managed laboratories. If there is a problem in the future, we will know who to point the finger at, who to hold responsible, a single agency with a single person heading it and in charge of all aspects of nuclear weapons programs. Our amendment also requires the new Under Secretary to report to the FBI and Congress all threats to our national security. No longer will we be kept in the dark, having to pretty much depend on the New York Times to find out what is going on. The Secretary of Energy is uncomfortable with this reorganization. Evidently, his idea is to rely on the same old management team, everyone in charge but no one responsible, no clear identifiable accountability. In conclusion, let me quote the testimony of Mr. Vic Reis. This came up late last week. Mr. Reis is the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs. He testified before the Energy Committee last week. I might add, Mr. Reis' responsibility in the line of command is that the lab directors report directly to Mr. Reis. Mr. Reis said: You may recall at previous hearings, Mr. Chairman, you noticed me in the audience and you asked for my opinion as to who or what was to blame for the security issues at the national laboratories. I responded that I didn't think you would find any one individual but that there were organizational structures of the Department of Energy that Now, this is the gentleman to whom heads of the labs report. He says that you can't find any individual to blame. The organizational structure was so flawed that security lapses were inevitable. Then Mr. Reis went on to say: The root cause of the difficulties at the Department of Energy is simply that the Department of Energy has too many disparate missions to be managed effectively as a cohesive organization. The price of gasoline, refrigerant standards, Quarks, nuclear cleanup and nuclear weapons just don't come together naturally. Because of all this multi-layered crosscutting, there is no one accountable for the operation of any part of the organization except the Secretary, and no Secretary has the time to lead the whole thing effectively. By setting up a semi-autonomous agency, many of these problems will go away. Madam President, in short, if you want espionage to continue at the laboratories and maintain the environment where it can occur, then stick with the present system. But if you, like me, want to stop this atmosphere where espionage can flourish, I think you should vote for the motion and invoke cloture for the amendment. What we have here is a situation where I think it is appropriate that we identify where the differences are between the Secretary, Senator Kyl, Senator Domenici, Senator Kerrey, and Senator Murkowski and in our amendment. What we do is we create a single semiautonomous agency, as I have indicated, that reports directly to the Secretary of Energy. The new Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship will be responsible for both setting policy and implementation of policy, subject to the overall supervision and direct control of the Secretary of Energy. I want to make that clear: Subject to the overall supervision and direct control of the Secretary of Energy. Evidently, that is not what the Secretary wants. The Secretary is willing to allow the new Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship to implement policy but not set policy. There is a big difference, implementing and setting. More significantly, the Secretary wants to allow any part of the Department of Energy to set the policies that the new Under Secretary would have to follow. So somebody else is setting it. The Secretary's proposal would violate our fundamental concept; that is, clear and identifiable lines of authority and responsibility--in other words, a direct chain of command. We have been discussing our differences, but so far we seem to be unable to resolve them. There is one other thing I will mention that was said the other day that relates to this matter under discussion. Two current nuclear weapons lab directors and one former lab director said at a hearing that while they could report their problems and issues to Mr. Reis, who is their supervisor, that Mr. Reis has no clear line of authority to pass those up through the chain of command to the Secretary. So here we have it. This substantiates the justification for our amendment. Here is the gentleman who is responsible to have the input from the lab directors report to him, the three labs, Livermore, Sandia, Los Alamos. But the gentleman in charge, Mr. Reis, under the current structure and chain of command within the Department of Energy, has no clear line of authority to pass those recommendations, those matters, up through the chain of command to the Secretary. So here you have the person that is responsible to get the information from the lab directors, but there is no provision, no requirement, no line of command up to the Secretary so that policy matters can be addressed. That one observation with these three lab directors illustrates the problem we are trying to fix with this legislation. As it stands today, there is no chain or lines of authority and responsibility. Right now, everybody is in charge, but nobody is responsible. I guess it is fair to say there are several missing links, if you will, in the DOE chain of command and authority. The purpose of the amendment is to fix that problem. I often think back to military concept and a ship at sea. Someone is in charge of the CON--in other words, the ship is under the direction of the officer in charge, and he has the CON. There is no question of where the responsibility sets. If he is relieved, the command of the ship is taken over and that person accepts the responsibility. In the DOE, we don't have those clear lines of authority, and that is the justification for the amendment pending before this body today. Is this thing broke to the point where it mandates that the Senate take action? I think it is fair to say that the answer is clearly yes. The ineptness, the bungling, the pure mismanagement at all levels are things that have occurred within this agency. The Department of Energy never took the most basic precautions to guard against the theft of the nuclear secrets. The FBI conducted feeble investigations. The Department of Justice, led by Attorney General Reno, virtually ignored requests for warrants to search Wen Ho Lee's computers. What we have here are the results of one of the worst cases in the history of this Nation of our national security being jeopardized. I have held about 9 hearings as chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee on these matters, and three important discoveries were made by my committee. First, the Department of Energy and the FBI bungled the computer waiver issue. I have a chart here. The lab directors, the attorneys, and directors of counterintelligence all agree that the DOE had the authority to search Lee's computer because he signed a waiver. Well, this is the waiver. This is a copy of the waiver that actually Wen Ho Lee signed, dated April 19, 1995: Warning: To protect the LAN system from unauthorized use and to ensure that the systems are functioning properly, activities on these systems are monitored and recorded and subject to audit. Use of these systems is expressed consent to such monitoring and recording. Any unauthorized access or use of this LAN is prohibited and could be subject to criminal and civil penalties. Here is the part Wen Ho Lee signed: I understand and agree to follow these rules in my use of the ENCHANTED LAN. I assume full responsibility for the security of my workstation. I understand that violations may be reported to my supervisor or FSS-14, that I may be denied access to the LAN, and that I may receive a security infraction for a violation of these rules. Now, the issue here is that the FBI claimed that the Department of Energy told him there was no waiver; no such waiver existed. The FBI wrongly assumed, then, that they needed a warrant to search. What is the result of this inept communication? Well, Lee's computer could have been searched, but instead was not searched for some three years. When the computer was finally searched, they discovered evidence that Wen Ho Lee had downloaded legacy codes to an unclassified computer. The fundamental problem is that nobody was looking at the big picture. Surely, protecting nuclear secrets and national security outweighs the feeble attempts that were made to get a possible conviction. What we have here is, one, the Department of Energy did not know that Wen Ho Lee had signed a waiver. They could not find it in his personnel file because the file had been mislaid. Had they known that, as I indicated earlier, they could have monitored his computer. Instead, the FBI said, no, they were doing an investigation, and since they didn't have a waiver, his computer was not monitored by the Department of Energy. Yet, they found later that the waiver existed, as evidenced by the poster I just showed in evidence. The FBI and the Department of Justice next bungled the counterintelligence warrant or the FISA, as evidenced by chart 2. The FBI, not once or twice, but three times requested warrants from the DOE. This is chart 2. This is the FISA report. Department of Energy, FBI, Department of Justice, and the FISA warrant, approved or rejected. Notra Trulock briefs the FBI. An FBI request was made by John Lewis, then assistant director of the FBI National Security Division. An FBI request was made to Gerald Schroeder, Acting Director, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. It was rejected. Here is the rejection. Here is the sequence of events. The first time we had the sequence of the DOE, FBI, and Department of Justice proceeding to authorize the FISA warrant to investigate the alleged counterintelligence and espionage charges alleged against Wen Ho Lee. The second time, Notra Trulock and others continued to prod FBI's investigation of Wen Ho Lee. FBI request made to John Lewis, then Assistant Director of the FBI National Security Division. FBI request made to Gerald Schroeder. Again, it was rejected. The second time it was rejected by the Department of Justice. Now, then the last time, Mr. Lewis, who is up there in the hierarchy, Assistant Director of the FBI, National Security Division, feels so frustrated that he makes a personal plea to Attorney General Janet Reno. Again, Notra Trulock and others continue to prod the FBI. John Lewis makes a personal request to the Attorney General because he feels so strongly that there is justification to authorize this investigation. But the personal appeal falls on deaf ears. Why was it rejected? What happened? We don't know. Nothing happened. But we do know that the Attorney General ignored two pleas for help. Notra Trulock, then DOE Director of Intelligence, personally briefed Janet Reno in ``great detail'' about the Lee case in August of 1997. John Lewis, FBI Director of Intelligence, also indicated he personally pled to Janet Reno to approve the FBI's request for a warrant to search Lee in August of 1997. Why did Attorney General Janet Reno ignore pleas from two top national security advisers? We don't know. We don't know because there is a great reluctance to provide the committees of jurisdiction with that information. I am personally disappointed in the FBI and the Department of Justice's refusal to testify publicly. Probably 90 percent of what has been found in closed sessions is not really classified, in my opinion. What we are looking for here is accountability. We in the Energy and Natural Resources Committee intend to continue to identify those persons whose inaction has led to one of the most potentially catastrophic losses in our national security history. Now we have a situation where they seem to want to hide behind the smokescreen of ``national security'' or to finger-point and say it is not our responsibility. That is simply an unconscionable set of circumstances. Finally, as we address a couple of other points that may come up in the debate which I think deserve consideration, why create one semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy? We are creating a hybrid that has no other identifiable comparison. Let me put that myth to rest. There are other semiautonomous agencies that function extremely well. That is what we are proposing with the amendment which has been laid down. Let's look at three of those semiautonomous agencies. DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, is a separate agency within the Department of Defense under a director appointed by the Secretary of Defense. It works. NOAA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, is the largest bureau within the Department of Commerce. It is a semiautonomous agency. It works. NSA, the National Security Agency, was established by Presidential directive as a separate department organized as an agency within the Department of Defense. It was structured in that manner and form because it was necessary that there be accountability and responsibility within the National Security Agency. It is a semiautonomous agency. I encourage my colleagues as we proceed to vote tomorrow--my understanding is that we are going to have one hour of debate equally divided on the cloture motion on the amendment--to recognize that the time to address this is now, that the responsibility clearly is within this body, and that the amendment we offered identifies the one thing that was lacking as we look at how this set of security breaches could have occurred, and that is, it addresses accountability and responsibility. For those who feel uncomfortable, I encourage them to recognize that they have a responsibility of coming up with something that will work. We think that the amendment pending, the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski-Kerrey amendment--I understand that Senators Thompson, Specter, Gregg, Hutchinson, Shelby, Warner, Bunning, Helms, Fitzgerald, Lott, Kerry, Feinstein, and Bob Smith are a few of the other Members of the Senate who are cosponsoring this amendment. It is a responsible amendment. Let's get on with the job. Let's put this issue in the restructured form that provides for accountability and responsibility, and move on. The American people and the taxpayers certainly deserve prompt action by this body. We have that obligation. The time is on the vote tomorrow. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment. I see no other Senator wishing time. I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Mr. President, I rise to speak on the motion to proceed to S. 3414, which is the Cybersecurity Act of 2012. This cloture motion has been filed that will ripen sometime tomorrow, but I think it is the hope of Members on both sides of the aisle that we can proceed to vote on the motion to proceed today. I am hopeful colleagues on both sides of the aisle will vote to proceed, because although there continues to be some disagreement about the content of this bill and different approaches taken, I don't think there is any Member of the Senate who doesn't appreciate the fact that our country is currently under cyber attack every day, our businesses are victims of cyber theft every day, with the consequential loss of billions of dollars' worth of investments and, I would say, tens of thousands of jobs going elsewhere. So this bill is not a solution in search of a problem; it is an attempt to solve a problem. Although there may be differences still on different components of the bill, I hope everybody will join together in at least saying: Let's proceed to the debate, and let's see if we can reach a conclusion before we leave for the August break next week. I will report in this regard that this morning there was a second meeting held of those who have been most active in supporting different legislation that deals with the cyber threat to America. Senator Collins and I, Senator Feinstein, Senator Rockefeller, Senator Carper--who introduced the pending matter, the Cybersecurity Act of 2012--Senators Hutchison and Chambliss were there today, Senator Coats--who It was a very good, substantive discussion, in which we were all fleshing out the details of the various proposals. We are seeing some areas where I think we feel we have a real opportunity to agree and some areas where it may be more difficult, but we haven't given up. But overall, I would say this process has been very encouraging. Basically, all the leading parties in the Senate and all the Senators are around the same table talking, which is very constructive to have happen. I appreciate that. To me, it is more reason to vote to proceed. I wish to begin by thanking the aforementioned Senators Collins, Rockefeller, Feinstein, and Carper, who joined me in sponsoring S. 3414, which I wish to talk about a bit now in this opening statement. I also wish to thank the majority leader, Senator Reid, for seeing the cyber threat to America in all its urgency and reality last year, urging Senator Collins and me to go forward and work on legislation, to work across party lines to get a bill out and now to thank Senator Reid for keeping his commitment to bring this bill to the floor, even though, as always, there are clearly other important issues vying for this body's attention. But, to me, there is none more important to America's security and prosperity than this topic, which is cybersecurity and the cybersecurity bill that is now pending. I would like to make three points in my remarks to my colleagues. First is that the danger of cyber attacks against the United States is clear, present, and growing, with enemies ranging from rival nations to cyber terrorists, to organized crime gangs, to rogue hackers sitting at computers almost anywhere around the world. The pending matter, S. 3414, Cybersecurity Act of 2012, responds directly and effectively to this danger. Second, this bill has been a long time in coming. In this regard, I note a letter sent out by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce overnight that, I must say, I found very disappointing overall because, if I may state it affirmatively, it doesn't embrace the same spirit I see Members of the Senate embracing; that although we have different positions, we can't afford to be inflexible. We can't be closed to compromise because of the urgency of the threat to our country and because of the general principle that has not been as evident in the Senate and Congress generally as it should be in recent years; that we never get anything done unless there is some compromise. I am not talking about compromise of principle. But if we go into every negotiation saying, I will only accept 100 percent of what I want, ultimately we are not going to get anything, if we can get 80 percent, 75 percent, 60 percent--particularly when we are dealing with a threat to the security of the United States and our prosperity as real as the cyber threat. I hope our friends at the Chamber will reconsider the tone of their opposition and come to the table to talk with us about their concerns and see if we can't reach common ground because there is a larger national interest at stake than represented by any particular group or any individual Senator or their point of view. In their letter of July 25, 2012, signed by R. Bruce Josten, executive VP for government affairs of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber says that: . . . S. 3414, the ``Cybersecurity Act of 2012,'' which has been rushed to the floor without a legislative hearing or markup. The bill was introduced just last week and remains a moving target; new and modified provisions of the bill are expected to be released in the coming days. If they are, it is going to be a result of the give-and-take compromise that leads to legislation that is going on now. But I wish to respond to the idea that this came out of nowhere. This bill has been a long time in coming. As a matter of fact, I went back and looked at the records. I attended my first hearing on cybersecurity as a member of the former Senate Governmental Affairs Committee--the predecessor to the current Homeland Security Governmental Affairs Committee--under the leadership of then-Chairman Fred Thompson. That was back in 1998, 14 years ago. I have been concerned ever since about the growing threat of cyber attack. Along with my dear friend and colleague on the committee, Senator Collins, our committee has held multiple hearings on cybersecurity; that is, the new Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and we weren't alone. There have been numerous hearings over the past several years and markups by multiple committees in both the Senate--many held by our colleagues Senator Rockefeller and Senator Feinstein in the Commerce and Senate Intel Committees--as well as in the House. Those deliberations and discussions were informed by numerous government and private sector studies on the dangers that lurk in cyberspace. So this bill didn't come out of nowhere. We reported a bill out of our committee, with a lot of hearings and an open markup. We began, at the majority leader's direction, to negotiate with the other committees, particularly Commerce and Intel. We reached agreement, which is essentially what this bill is. Incidentally, we then altered this bill--Senators Collins, Feinstein, Rockefeller, and I, in response to the bipartisan Kyl-Whitehouse group recommendations--to make it nonmandatory but still significant. So this bill has been aired and worked on and is ready for action. But more to the point, the Senate needs to act. That is why it is so important we adopt the motion to proceed, because this threat is real, dangerous, and growing every day. Third, this bill, S. 3414, is the result of bipartisan compromise. It is both bipartisan and it is the result of compromise. We cosponsors, as I mentioned, gave up some elements we thought were important that we had in our original bill. Given the cyber threat, we actually thought it was more important to move forward with a bill that will significantly strengthen our cybersecurity, even though it doesn't do everything we want it to do and thought should be done. We didn't want to lose the chance to pass cyber legislation this year that could prevent a cyber 9/11 attack against the United States before it happens, instead of rushing in the midst of mayhem back to the Senate and House to adopt cybersecurity legislation after we suffer a major attack. As I said, we have incorporated ideas from Senators Whitehouse, Kyl, and the other Members whom we were working with quite diligently to help us find common ground. I wish to explicitly and enthusiastically thank them for their efforts. We have heard and responded to Senators Durbin, Franken, Wyden, and others, and advocacy groups across the political spectrum from left to right, who have pressed for greater protections for privacy, personal privacy in this bill. We have made substantial changes designed to address concerns from stakeholders and colleagues. I am confident we can work through more issues as we debate the bill on the floor. But the main point here, if I may use quite a familiar expression around here with a slightly unique follow-on phrase, I hope: If in our quest for cybersecurity legislation we allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good, we are going to end up allowing our enemies to destroy a lot that is good in the United States of America. We have to act together for the good of the Nation, get the debate started and bring amendments to the floor for an up-or-down vote. Let me stress at this point that Senator Reid, the majority leader, has been quite clear that his desire, his intention is to have the process be an open amendment process so long as the amendments are germane and relevant to the topic of the bill, cybersecurity, not just open to any amendment about any subject. I want to go back over these three points and talk about them in a bit more detail. Let me start with the reality of the threat. I want to read from a letter sent to us recently by some of our Nation's most experienced security leaders from both Republican and Democratic administrations. Here is a letter to the majority and minority leader, signed by former Bush administration Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff; former Bush administration Director of National Intelligence ADM Mike McConnell; former Bush Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; former NSA and CIA Director General Michael Hayden; former vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine Gen. Jim Cartwright; and former Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn. I quote from the letter. It is quite an impressive group, clearly bipartisan--nonpartisan. We write to urge you to bring cybersecurity legislation to the floor as soon as possible. Given the time left in this legislative session and the upcoming election this fall, we are concerned that the window of opportunity to pass legislation that is in our view critically necessary to protect our national and economic security is quickly disappearing. These security leaders went on to say: Infrastructure that controls our electricity, water and sewer, nuclear plants, communications backbone, energy pipelines and financial networks must be required to meet appropriate cybersecurity standards. We carry the burden of knowing-- It is really chilling. We carry the burden of knowing that 9/11 might have been averted with the intelligence that existed at the time. We do not want to be in the same position again when ``cyber 9/11'' hits--it is not a question of whether it will happen--but when. That is not a statement from a Member of the Senate or an advocate on one side or the other. These are proven national security leaders who have worked in administrations of both political parties. ``It is not a question of whether a cyberattack will happen,'' they say, ``but when.'' Many others have issued similar warnings. Secretary of Defense Panetta has said the next Pearl Harbor-like attack against America will be launched from cyberspace. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey has warned: ``A cyberattack could stop our society in its tracks.'' Just this month, National Security Agency Cybercommand Chief Gen. Keith Alexander blamed cyber attacks for: ``The greatest transfer of wealth in history.'' General Alexander estimated that American companies lose about $250 billion a year through intellectual property theft through cyberspace; $114 billion to theft through cyber crime; and another $224 billion in downtime the thefts caused. We talk a lot here in the Senate these days, as we must, about how we protect American jobs. It turns out that in creating more cybersecurity in our country we are also going to protect tens of thousands of jobs which otherwise are going to end up elsewhere in the world because they will have stolen the industrial secrets that lead to the new industries that create those jobs. General Alexander concluded this part of the statement he made by saying: `` . . . this is our future disappearing before us.'' Cyber attack. These fears are not speculative. Let me go through a recent op-ed in the Wall Street Journal that President Obama wrote. In a future conflict, an adversary unable to match our military supremacy on the battlefield might seek to exploit our computer vulnerabilities here at home. Taking down vital banking systems could trigger a financial crisis. The lack of clean water or functioning hospitals could spark a public health emergency. And as we have seen in past blackouts-- Which were caused by natural disasters, for instance-- the loss of electricity can bring businesses, cities and entire regions to a standstill. These fears are not speculative. They are not theoretical. They are based on existing facts and existing vulnerabilities. Consider, if you will, this recent story in the Washington Post that detailed how a young man living an ocean away used his computer to hack into the control panel of a small town water utility in Texas. It took him just 10 minutes and required no special tools or training. The utility had no idea of what had happened until the hacker posted screen shots of his exploit online as a warning of how vulnerable all of us are. Imagine if terrorists decided to target a string of small utilities across the United States and either cut off fresh water or dumped raw sewage into our lakes, rivers, and streams. We would have an environmental and economic disaster on our hands. But this is a real possibility. This brings me to my second point. We need to act and act now. The challenge of cybersecurity has been studied for a long time and there is no need for more studies or hearings or delay, as the Chamber letter requests. I went back to the Congressional Research Service. According to a report that they issued, in the 112th Congress alone there have been 38 hearings and 4 markups in the House and 33 hearings in the Senate on cybersecurity. In the 112th Congress, the Judiciary Committee also held a markup on the Personal Data and Privacy Security Act and in previous Congresses the Senate has held markups on cybersecurity legislation in five separate committees under regular order, all of which is included in the bill that is pending before us today. Since 2005, the Senate Homeland Security Committee alone has held 10 hearings with 48 witnesses testifying and took questions over a total of 18 hours. Look at the bill's cosponsors. S. 3414: Senators Collins and I, along with Senators Feinstein and Rockefeller, have held numerous hearings, forums, and cybersecurity demonstrations for Members and staff. All these hearings and briefings were further informed by, according to the CRS, a total of 60 governmental reports totaling 2,624 pages produced by the GAO, the Department of Defense, the OMB, the Department of Energy, and other Federal agencies. This doesn't count the many more reports from the private sector--computer security firms such as SEMANTEC and think tanks and academic institutions such as MIT and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This matter is ready for action. I go back to a 1936 book Winston Churchill wrote, ``When England Slept.'' Not ``Why England Slept'' but ``When England Slept'' . He asked his colleagues in the Parliament who were refusing at that time to act decisively to counter the rise of German military power despite its clear threat to Europe--Churchill said: ``What will you know in a few weeks about this matter that you do not know now . . . and have been not been told any time in the last six months?'' I think the same can be said now. That is why I think it is so important to adopt the motion to proceed and get something done before we leave Washington for the August break. Finally, in the interest of moving forward, my cosponsors and I, as I indicated earlier, have made a major compromise in the bill we are bringing to the floor in terms of how we deal with critical cyber infrastructure. Here again, we are talking not about small businesses around America, we are talking about powerplants, energy pipelines, water systems, financial systems that we all depend on for our banking, water--sewer systems, for instance--that if sabotaged or commandeered in a cyber attack could lead to catastrophic deaths and economic and environmental losses. In our original bill, Senators Collins, Feinstein, Rockefeller, and I called for mandatory cyber safety standards for all critical infrastructure after those standards were developed in consultation with the private sector. We did not think this was a unique or onerous requirement but our responsibility in carrying out our constitutional oath to provide for the common defense. Since antiquity, as a matter of fact long before the American Constitution, societies have chosen to adopt safety standards to protect their citizens, particularly safety standards for physical structures starting with the homes we live in, but also our offices, factories, and critical infrastructure such as powerplants and dams. Today we call these building codes. Can you imagine if there were no building codes, the danger that people would take when they walked in our office buildings or factories or apartment houses or residences? I cannot resist saying these building codes in some sense are as old as the Bible. Here I go to Deuteronomy 22:8 which says: When you build a new house, you shall build a parapet for your roof, so you shall not bring the guilt of blood upon your house if anyone should fall from it. There is direct relevance in a very different context from the Biblical context to what we are trying to do here, which is to build a kind of parapet around our cyber systems so we do not bring the guilt of blood on us because somebody has attacked through those cyber systems. The reason we have done this over antiquity in the physical world is obvious. If one of our homes catches fire because of the wiring not up to code or it happens in an apartment building or an office building, the people in it are endangered, obviously, but also the lives and homes of our neighbors, the community are in danger as well. Numerous bipartisan national security experts have been in total agreement that mandatory requirements are needed to protect our national and economic security from the ever-rising risk of cyber attacks. But it was this provision, seen in the context of regulation of business while we were seeing it as homeland security, protecting homeland security, that was the most controversial in our compromise bill and drew the most criticism. To be more specific about it, it threatened to prevent passage of any cybersecurity legislation this year which, for the sponsors of this bill, was simply an unacceptable result. Following the rule that no matter how deeply one believes in the rightness of a provision in a bill, we agreed to change it because there is so much else that is critically important in our bill that will protect America's cybersecurity. So we withdrew the mandatory provision and created all the standards for performance of how the most critical infrastructure, cyber structure, would protect itself. But then we left it voluntary; however, we did create some incentives. Let me be clear that the decision is to be what we all want it to be, which is as a result of a collaborative, cooperative effort that businesses that operate the most critical cyber structure, such as, electrical systems, water systems, transportation, finance, communications, will want to comply. Under our revised bill, private industry, which incidentally owns as much as 85 percent of the Nation's critical infrastructure--that is the American way, and that is great. But when that 80 to 85 percent of our critical infrastructure can well and probably will be the target of not just theft but attacks by enemies of the United States, we have to work together to prevent that. In our bill we give the private sector the opportunity to develop a set of cybersecurity practices which will then be reviewed by the new National Cybersecurity Council that our bill creates. It will be chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security and made up of representatives of the Department of Defense, Commerce, Justice, and the intelligence community, and presumably the Director of National Intelligence. This National Cybersecurity Council will review the standards agreed upon by the private sector and decide whether they are adequate to provide the necessary level of cybersecurity for the American people. Owners of critical infrastructure will then have a decision to make. Do they want to essentially opt into the system or do they want to not do so? That is up to them under the bill as is put before them because it is voluntary. If they opt in--and this is what we hope will be an incentive--they will be entitled to receive some benefits, the most significant of which will be immunity from certain forms of liability in case of a cyber attack. We also offer expedited security clearances and prioritize technical assistance from our government on cyber questions from those critical covered cyber-infrastructure companies that opt into the system. I think our colleague from Rhode Island, Senator Whitehouse, has a very good metaphor for what we are trying to do. As he said, we are trying to build Fort Cybersecurity where we essentially become part of a system that provides greatly enhanced protection from cyber attack and cyber theft, but we are not compelling anybody to come into Fort Cybersecurity. We are encouraging them to do so, and we are giving them some incentives to do so. Of course, we hope that sound and wise administrators of those companies and forces of the marketplace will encourage them to make a decision to come into Fort Cybersecurity. Finally, our bill contains information-sharing provisions, which I think most people who have looked at the threat of cyber attack and cyber theft think are very important. These provisions will allow the private sector and government to share threat information between each other and among themselves. In other words, one private company can share information about an attack with another private company to see if the attack is part of a broader pattern. For instance, they can talk about where it may be coming from to raise their cyber defenses against it, and to do so without fear of--well, for instance, any trust action by the State or Federal Government. Also, very often companies that believe they have been a victim of cyber attack will go to the Federal Government, the Department of Homeland Security, or the National Security Administration for help; however, a lot of them don't. Part of the reason for that is they fear, among other things, they may compromise the privacy of their records. Others, quite frankly, don't want to admit they have been attacked. This is a real problem. I will come back to that in just a moment. We give protection from liability for companies that share their information with the government. Yet there were many individual Senators and many people from outside groups who are focused on privacy who were concerned that in doing this we were opening up a method by which parts of our Federal Government could basically violate privacy restrictions, take personal information off of the information shared by a private company with the government, and they be the victim of some kind of public intrusion or even law enforcement. So I think we negotiated a good series of agreements on this which, one, will ensure that companies who share cybersecurity information with the government give it directly to civilian agencies and not to military agencies. That was a concern people had. Second, we ensure that information shared under the program be reasonably necessary and described as a cybersecurity threat. In other words, not just wantonly share it because some of this is private information. Third, we restrict the government's use of information it receives under the cyber information-sharing authority so that it can be used only for actual cybersecurity purposes and to prosecute cyber crimes with two exceptions broadly agreed on: One is that the information can be used to protect people from imminent threat of death or physical harm; and, two, to protect children from serious threats of one sort or another. Next, we would require annual reports from the Justice Department, Homeland Security, the defense and intelligence community, and inspectors general to describe what information has been received in the previous year, such as, who got it and what was done with it. Finally, we allow individuals to sue our government if the government intentionally or willfully violates the law; that is to say, the law relating to these privacy protections. I am very pleased by these changes we made. I want to say this loudly and clearly: This bill is about cybersecurity. But in trying to elevate our cybersecurity, we didn't want to compromise people's privacy or their freedom. So what I have just read was intended to assure that this bill, as best we could, would not compromise privacy or freedom rights. Then I took this set of compromises to the most important people in our government who are focused on cybersecurity--the Department of Homeland Security, the National Security Agency, the FBI--and they all said, I am pleased to say, these privacy protections will not inhibit their ability to protect America's cybersecurity. They can live with these without the slightest diminishing of their focus, which understandably is not privacy but it is cybersecurity. They said these amendments to our original bill don't inhibit what they are doing. I conclude by, again, urging my colleagues to vote, presumably today, yes on the motion to proceed so we can get the debate started, so we can continue to work to achieve common ground and a meeting of the minds and enact this piece of crucial national and economic and security legislation in this session of Congress. I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.", u"TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TITLE VI--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONSSec. 601. Protection of intelligence community whistleblowers.Sec. 602. Review of security clearance or access determinations.Sec. 603. Revisions of other laws.Sec. 604. Policies and procedures; nonapplicability to certain terminations. In this Act: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2014 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2014, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill S. 1681 of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.-- (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President. (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except-- (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a)); (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or (C) as otherwise required by law. (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2014 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such element. (b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in-- (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program; (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or (3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training. (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a). (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2014 the sum of $528,229,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2015. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 855 positions as of September 30, 2014. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2014 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2015. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2014, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2014 the sum of $514,000,000. (a) In General.--Section 203(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2013(b)) is amended-- (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``service in the Agency performed'' and inserting ``service performed by an Agency employee''; and (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Agency activities'' and inserting ``intelligence activities''. (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall be applied to retired or deceased officers of the Central Intelligence Agency who were designated at any time under section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2013) prior to the date of the enactment of this Act. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Funds appropriated for the construction of the High Performance Computing Center 2 (HPCC 2), as described in the table entitled Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) in the classified annex to accompany the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (Public Law 113-6; 127 Stat. 198), in excess of the amount specified for such activity in the tables in the classified annex prepared to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-277; 126 Stat. 2468) shall be specifically authorized by Congress for the purposes of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Section 103H(g)(3)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``undertaken;'' and inserting ``undertaken, and this provision shall qualify as a withholding statute pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of section 552 of title 5, United States (a) Functional Managers Authorized.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103I the following new section: (a) Annual Assessments Required.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506I the following new section: (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 108 the following new section: Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3093) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(h) For each type of activity undertaken as part of a covert action, the President shall establish in writing a plan to respond to the unauthorized public disclosure of that type of activity.''. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Section 8H(a) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended in paragraph (1)-- (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) and (C) as subparagraphs (C) and (D), respectively; (2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following: ``(B) An employee of an element of the intelligence community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to the intelligence community, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report such complaint or information to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''; and (3) in subparagraph (D), as redesignated by paragraph (1)-- (A) by striking ``Act or section 17'' and inserting ``Act, section 17''; and (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, or section 103H(k) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)).''. Section 710(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note) is amended by striking ``2014.'' and inserting ``2018.''. Notwithstanding any other limitation on the amount of funds that may be used for official representation items, the Secretary of Homeland Security may use funds made available to the Secretary through the National Intelligence Program for necessary expenses for intelligence analysis and operations coordination activities for official representation items in support of the Coast Guard Attache Program. Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall-- (1) in the manner described in the classified annex to this Act-- (A) complete a declassification review of documents collected in Abbottabad, Pakistan, during the mission that killed Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011; and (B) make publicly available any information declassified as a result of the declassification review required under paragraph (1); and (2) report to the congressional intelligence committees-- (A) the results of the declassification review required under paragraph (1); and (B) a justification for not declassifying any information required to be included in such declassification review that remains classified. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of National Intelligence shall carry out the merger of the Foreign Counterintelligence Program into the General Defense Intelligence Program as directed in the classified annex to this Act. The merger shall go into effect no earlier than 30 days after written notification of the merger is provided to the congressional intelligence committees. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.), as added by section 309 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Process for Review for Official Publication.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, establish a process for the regular review for official publication of significant opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice that have been provided to an element of the intelligence community. (b) Factors.--The process of review of opinions established under subsection (a) shall include consideration of the following: (1) The potential importance of an opinion to other agencies or officials in the Executive branch. (2) The likelihood that similar questions addressed in an opinion may arise in the future. (3) The historical importance of an opinion or the context in which it arose. (4) The potential significance of an opinion to the overall jurisprudence of the Office of Legal Counsel. (5) Such other factors as the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence consider appropriate. (c) Presumption.--The process of review established under subsection (a) shall apply a presumption that significant opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel should be published when practicable, consistent with national security and other confidentiality considerations. (d) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall require the official publication of any opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, including publication under any circumstance as follows: (1) When publication would reveal classified or other sensitive information relating to national security. (2) When publication could reasonably be anticipated to interfere with Federal law enforcement efforts or is prohibited by law. (3) When publication would conflict with preserving internal Executive branch deliberative processes or protecting other information properly subject to privilege. (e) Requirement To Provide Classified Opinions to Congress.-- (1) In general.--Any opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel that would have been selected for publication under the process of review established under subsection (a) but for the fact that publication would reveal classified or other sensitive information relating to national security shall be provided or made available to the appropriate committees of Congress. (2) Exception for covert action.--If the President determines that it is essential to limit access to a covert action finding under section 503(c)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3093(c)(2)), the President may limit access to information concerning such finding that would otherwise be provided or made available under this subsection to those members of Congress who have been granted access to such finding under such section 503(c)(2). (f) Judicial Review.--The determination whether an opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel is appropriate for official publication under the process of review established under subsection (a) is discretionary and is not subject to judicial review. (a) In General.--Whenever the head of an applicable agency submits a plan to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with section 124 of Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11, pertaining to agency operations in the absence of appropriations, or any successor circular of the Office that requires the head of an applicable agency to submit to the Director a plan for an orderly shutdown in the event of the absence of appropriations, such head shall submit a copy of such plan to the following: (1) The congressional intelligence committees. (2) The Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. (3) The Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (4) In the case of a plan for an element of the intelligence community that is within the Department of Defense, to-- (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (b) Head of an Applicable Agency Defined.--In this section, the term ``head of an applicable agency'' includes the following: (1) The Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (3) Each head of each element of the intelligence community that is within the Department of Defense. (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the Syrian chemical weapons program. (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements: (1) A comprehensive assessment of chemical weapon stockpiles in Syria, including names, types, and quantities of chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location and form of storage, production, and research and development facilities. (2) A listing of key personnel associated with the Syrian chemical weapons program. (3) An assessment of undeclared chemical weapons stockpiles, munitions, and facilities. (4) An assessment of how these stockpiles, precursors, and delivery systems were obtained. (5) A description of key intelligence gaps related to the Syrian chemical weapons program. (6) An assessment of any denial and deception efforts on the part of the Syrian regime related to its chemical weapons program. (c) Progress Reports.--Every 90 days until the date that is 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a progress report providing any material updates to the report required under subsection (a). (a) Procedures for Reporting Penetrations.--The Director of National Intelligence shall establish procedures that require each cleared intelligence contractor to report to an element of the intelligence community designated by the Director for purposes of such procedures when a network or information system of such contractor that meets the criteria established pursuant to subsection (b) is successfully penetrated. (b) Networks and Information Systems Subject to Reporting.--The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with appropriate officials, establish criteria for covered networks to be subject to the procedures for reporting system penetrations under subsection (a). (c) Procedure Requirements.-- (1) Rapid reporting.--The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall require each cleared intelligence contractor to rapidly report to an element of the intelligence community designated pursuant to subsection (a) of each successful penetration of the network or information systems of such contractor that meet the criteria established pursuant to subsection (b). Each such report shall include the following: (A) A description of the technique or method used in such penetration. (B) A sample of the malicious software, if discovered and isolated by the contractor, involved in such penetration. (C) A summary of information created by or for such element in connection with any program of such element that has been potentially compromised due to such penetration. (2) Access to equipment and information by intelligence community personnel.--The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall-- (A) include mechanisms for intelligence community personnel to, upon request, obtain access to equipment or information of a cleared intelligence contractor necessary to conduct forensic analysis in addition to any analysis conducted by such contractor; (B) provide that a cleared intelligence contractor is only required to provide access to equipment or information as described in subparagraph (A) to determine whether information created by or for an element of the intelligence community in connection with any intelligence community program was successfully exfiltrated from a network or information system of such contractor and, if so, what information was exfiltrated; and (C) provide for the reasonable protection of trade secrets, commercial or financial information, and information that can be used to identify a specific person (other than the name of the suspected perpetrator of the penetration). (3) Limitation on dissemination of certain information.-- The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall prohibit the dissemination outside the intelligence community of information obtained or derived through such procedures that is not created by or for the intelligence community except-- (A) with the approval of the contractor providing such information; (B) to the congressional intelligence committees or the Subcommittees on Defense of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate for such committees and such Subcommittees to perform oversight; or (C) to law enforcement agencies to investigate a penetration reported under this section. (d) Issuance of Procedures and Establishment of Criteria.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish the procedures required under subsection (a) and the criteria required under subsection (b). (2) Applicability date.--The requirements of this section shall apply on the date on which the Director of National Intelligence establishes the procedures required under this section. (e) Coordination With the Secretary of Defense To Prevent Duplicate Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall establish procedures to permit a contractor that is a cleared intelligence contractor and a cleared defense contractor under section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239; 10 U.S.C. 2224 note) to submit a single report that satisfies the requirements of this section and such section 941 for an incident of penetration of network or information system. (f) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Cleared intelligence contractor.--The term ``cleared intelligence contractor'' means a private entity granted clearance by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community to access, receive, or store classified information for the purpose of bidding for a contract or conducting activities in support of any program of an element of the intelligence community. (2) Covered network.--The term ``covered network'' means a network or information system of a cleared intelligence contractor that contains or processes information created by or for an element of the intelligence community with respect to which such contractor is required to apply enhanced protection. (g) Savings Clauses.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter or limit any otherwise authorized access by government personnel to networks or information systems owned or operated by a contractor that processes or stores government data. (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the extent to which the intelligence community has implemented the recommendations of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community contained in the report entitled ``Study of Intelligence Community Electronic Waste Disposal Practices'' issued in May 2013. Such report shall include an assessment of the extent to which the policies, standards, and guidelines of the intelligence community governing the proper disposal of electronic waste are applicable to covered commercial electronic waste that may contain classified information. (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Covered commercial electronic waste.--The term ``covered commercial electronic waste'' means electronic waste of a commercial entity that contracts with an element of the intelligence community. (2) Electronic waste.--The term ``electronic waste'' includes any obsolete, broken, or irreparable electronic device, including a television, copier, facsimile machine, tablet, telephone, computer, computer monitor, laptop, printer, scanner, and associated electrical wiring. (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Secretary of Education and the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the anticipated hiring needs of the intelligence community in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, including cybersecurity and computer literacy. The report shall-- (1) describe the extent to which competitions, challenges, or internships at elements of the intelligence community that do not involve access to classified information may be utilized to promote education in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, including cybersecurity and computer literacy, within high schools or institutions of higher education in the United States; (2) include cost estimates for carrying out such competitions, challenges, or internships; and (3) include strategies for conducting expedited security clearance investigations and adjudications for students at institutions of higher education for purposes of offering internships at elements of the intelligence community. (b) Consideration of Existing Programs.--In developing the report under subsection (a), the Director shall take into consideration existing programs of the intelligence community, including the education programs of the National Security Agency and the Information Assurance Scholarship Program of the Department of Defense, as appropriate. (c) Definitions.--In this section: (1) High school.--The term ``high school'' mean a school that awards a secondary school diploma. (2) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)). (3) Secondary school.--The term ``secondary school'' has the meaning given the term in section 9101 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801). Section 504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-277; 126 Stat. 2477) is amended by striking subsection (e). (a) Repeal of Reporting Requirements.-- (1) Threat of attack on the united states using weapons of mass destruction.--Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3050) is amended by striking subsection (b). (2) Treaty on conventional armed forces in europe.--Section 2(5)(E) of the Senate resolution advising and consenting to ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of November 19, 1990, adopted at Vienna May 31, 1996 (Treaty Doc. 105-5) (commonly referred to as the ``CFE Flank Document''), 105th Congress, agreed to May 14, 1997, is repealed. (b) Modification of Reporting Requirements.-- (1) Intelligence advisory committees.--Section 410(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 3309) is amended to read as follows: ``(b) Notification of Establishment of Advisory Committee.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall each notify the congressional intelligence committees each time each such Director creates an advisory committee. Each notification shall include-- ``(1) a description of such advisory committee, including the subject matter of such committee; ``(2) a list of members of such advisory committee; and ``(3) in the case of an advisory committee created by the Director of National Intelligence, the reasons for a determination by the Director under section 4(b)(3) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) that an advisory committee cannot comply with the requirements of such Act.''. (2) Intelligence information sharing.--Section 102A(g)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(g)(4)) is amended to read as follows: ``(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a timely manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation, policy, or practice that the Director believes impedes the ability of the Director to fully and effectively ensure maximum availability of access to intelligence information within the intelligence community consistent with the protection of the national security of the United States.''. (3) Intelligence community business system transformation.--Section 506D(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3100(j)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``2015'' and inserting ", u"I thank the Senator for that question. In the New York Times, in March of 2014, Clara Miller writes about some of the costs on U.S. tech companies that are occurring from some of this: Microsoft has lost customers, including the government of Brazil. IBM is spending more than a billion dollars to build data centers overseas to reassure foreign customers that their information is safe from the prying eyes in the United States government. And tech companies abroad, from Europe to South America, say they are gaining customers that are shunning U.S. providers, suspicious because of the revelations by Edward J. Snowden that tied these providers to the National Security Agency's vast surveillance program. The estimates are in the billions of dollars lost to American companies. Even as Washington grapples with the diplomatic and political fallout of Mr. Snowden's leaks, the more urgent issue, companies and analysts say, is economic. Tech executives, including Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook, raised the issue when they went to the White House...for a meting with President Obama. It is impossible to see now the full economic ramifications of the spying disclosures--in part because most companies are locked in multiyear contracts--but the pieces are beginning to add up as businesses question the trustworthiness of American technology products. The confirmation hearing last week for the new NSA chief, the video appearance of Mr. Snowden at a technology conference in Texas and the drip of new details about government spying have kept attention focused on an issue that many tech executives hoped would go away. Despite the tech companies' assertions that they provide information on their customers only when required under law-- and not knowingly through a back door--the perception that they enabled the spying program has lingered. ``It's clear to every single tech company that this is affecting their bottom line,'' said Daniel Castro, a senior analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, who predicted that the United States cloud computing industry would lose $35 billion by 2016. Forester Research, a technology research firm, said the losses could be as high as $180 billion, or 25 percent of industry revenue, based on the size of the cloud computing, web hosting and outsourcing markets and the worst case for damages. The business effect of the disclosures about the NSA is felt most in the daily conversations between tech companies with products to pitch and their wary customers. The topic of the surveillance, which rarely came up before, is now ``the new normal'' in these conversations, as one tech company executive described it. ``We're hearing from customers, especially global enterprise customers, that they care more than ever about where their content is stored and how it is used and secured,'' said John E. Frank, deputy general counsel at Microsoft, which has been publicizing that it allows customers to store their data in Microsoft data centers in certain countries. Isn't that sad? Isn't it sad that a great American company is having to advertise that they are storing their information in other countries because in America we are not protecting your privacy? Isn't that sad, that a great American company, in order to stay in business, is having to advertise to their customers that they are keeping their information in another country? At the same time, Mr. Castro said, companies say they believe the Federal Government is only making a bad situation worse. ``Most of the companies in this space are very frustrated because there hasn't been any kind of response that's made it so they can go back to their customers and say, 'See, this is what's different now, you can trust us again,''' he said. In some cases, that has meant forgoing potential revenue. Though it is hard to quantify missed opportunities, American businesses are being left off some requests for proposals from foreign customers that previously would have included them, said James Staten, a cloud computing analyst at Forester who has read clients' requests for proposals. There are German companies, Mr. Staten said, ``explicitly not inviting certain American companies to join.'' He added, ``It's like, `Well, the very best vendor to do this is IBM, and you didn't invite them.''' The result has been a boon for foreign countries. Runbox, a Norwegian email service that markets itself as an alternative to American services like Gmail and says it does not comply with foreign court orders seeking personal information, reported a 34 percent annual increase in customers after news of the NSA surveillance. Brazil and the European Union, which had used American undersea cables for intercontinental communication, last month decided to build their own cables between Brazil and Portugal, and gave the contract to Brazilian and Spanish companies. Brazil also announced plans to abandon Microsoft Outlook for its own email system that uses Brazilian data centers. Anybody still think this bulk collection is a good idea for America? Mark J. Barrenechea, chief executor of OpenText, Canada's largest software company, said an anti-American attitude took root after the passage of the PATRIOT Act, the counterterrorism law passed after 9/11 that expanded the government's surveillance powers. This is all coming from a New York Times article by Claire Miller from March of 2014. But ``the volume of the discussion has risen significantly post-Snowden,'' he said. For instance, after the NSA surveillance was revealed, one of OpenText's clients, a global steel manufacturer based in Britain, demanded that its data not cross U.S. orders. ``Issues like privacy are more important than finding the cheapest price,'' said Matthias Kunisch, a German software executive who spurned U.S. cloud computing providers for Deutsche Telekom. ``Because of Snowden, our customers have the perception that American companies have connections to the NSA.'' Security analysts say that ultimately the fallout from Mr. Snowden's revelations could mimic what happened to Huawei, the Chinese technology and telecommunications company, which was forced to abandon major acquisitions and contracts when American lawmakers claimed that the company's products contained a backdoor for the People's Liberation Army of China--even though this claim was never definitively verified. Silicon Valley companies have complained to government officials that Federal actions are hurting American technology businesses. But companies fall silent when it comes to specifics about economic harm, whether to avoid frightening shareholders or because it is too early to produce concrete evidence. ``The companies need to keep the priority on the government to do something about it, but they don't have the evidence to go to the government and say billions of dollars are not coming to this country,'' Mr. Staten said. Some American companies say the business hit has been minor at most. John T. Chambers, the chief executive of Cisco Systems, said in an interview that the NSA disclosures had not affected Cisco's sales ``in a major way.'' Although deals in Europe and Asia have been slower to close, he said, they are still being completed--an experience echoed by other . . . companies. Security analysts say tech companies have collectively spent millions and possibly billions of dollars adding state- of-the-art encryption features to consumer services, like Google search and Microsoft Outlook, and to the cables that link data centers at Google, Yahoo and other companies. IBM said in January that it would spend $1.2 billion to build 15 new data centers, including in London, Hong Kong, and Sidney, Australia, to lure foreign customers that are sensitive about the location of their data. Isn't it sad that companies want to avoid being in America? They want to avoid having their information cross our borders. Salesforce.com announced similar plans this month. Germany and Brazil, where it was revealed that the NSA spied on government leaders, have been particularly adversarial towards American companies and the government. Lawmakers, including in Germany, are considering legislation that would make it costly or even technically impossible for American tech companies to operate inside their borders. Yet some government officials say laws like this could have a motive other than protecting privacy. Shutting out American companies ``means more business for local companies,'' Richard A. Clarke, a former White House counterterrorism adviser, said last month. This is an article that was published on NPR's Web site. The headline is ``As Congress Haggles over Patriot Act, We Answer 6 Basic Questions.'' Quoting from the article: A key section of the Patriot Act--a part of the law the White House uses to conduct mass surveillance on the call records of Americans--is set to expire June 1. That leaves legislators with a big decision to make: Rewrite the statute to outlaw or modify the practice or extend the statute and let the National Security Agency continue with its work. I think it will be interesting to see how the debate ultimately plays out. You have what has been passed in the House--the USA FREEDOM Act--and passed in the House overwhelmingly. The majority here probably believes we are not collecting enough bulk data. They would prefer to collect more bulk phone data and aren't too concerned that any privacy interests are being trampled upon. So you have two sort of contrary opinions in wondering which direction we go. Some who want more collection of data and say we are not collecting enough data say they might live with it if we add in and force the phone companies to keep the data. Right now, the bill doesn't have them keeping the data. But the concern for some of those of us who believe in privacy is that we may just be trading one form of bulk collection for another, that we may be trading a system where the government collects the data and there is a bulk collection for a system where the phone companies have the bulk collection but you are still having the same sort of collection of data. My concern with the USA FREEDOM Act is that it still, I believe, may allow for a nonspecific warrant. It still may allow for bulk collection in the sense that it says you have to select a specific person, but the specific person can be a corporation. So if you still have a corporation--the problem is that if we put the name ``Verizon'' in and you are getting all of Verizon's customers and the only difference is the phone company is holding the information and then divulging it versus the government holding it, I am not so sure we have had so much of an improvement. Some will say we just need to be safe, we just need to do whatever it takes, that it doesn't matter if we give up any kinds of basic freedoms or privacy in the process. But I think we give up on who we are as a people if we say that basically, at all cost, regardless of what it takes, we are going to do this to keep ourselves safe. The thing is that even the President's privacy commission and the President's review commission--two independent, nonpartisan bodies--ended up saying that they didn't think anybody was independently captured, that there was no unique information that was actually gotten from either of these programs, that the bulk collection of data hadn't made us safer but it has infringed upon our privacy. I think if we don't have a significant debate on this, if we continue to say ``Well, we are up against a deadline, and because there is a deadline, we don't have time for amendments,'' I think we run a real risk with the American people. Congress has about a 10-percent approval rating right now, and some argue that might be a little bit high considering how great a job we are doing--a 10-percent approval rating. The vast majority of the American people think we have gone too far in the bulk collection of records. In the ACLU survey we looked at a little bit earlier, in the age group between 19 to 39, over 80 percent of people think we have gone too far and we are not protecting privacy. (Mr. SCOTT assumed the Chair.) We just read an article from the New York Times in which they talk about what kind of business is potentially being lost because people don't want American products. I think it is kind of sad. Not only do they not want their data held in a center in our country, they don't want their data crossing into our country. I don't think we have to be that fearful of terrorism that we have to give up who we are in the process. I have met some of our young soldiers who have come back with missing limbs. I have met the parents of some who have died. And to a person, they say they were fighting for our Bill of Rights and they were fighting for our Constitution. It is difficult for me to understand how we can take into account the sacrifice they made in war and at the same time, while we are here safe at home, we can't even protect the documents they are fighting for. I see no reason why we can't rely on the Constitution. I see no reason why we can't rely on traditional warrants. Warrants are not hard to get. Warrants are actually quite easy to get. Warrants are, if anything, very easy to get. On the FISA Court, turning down a warrant is almost nonexistent. So I see no reason why we can't try using the Constitution for a while. I am concerned that the problem is bigger than just what we are talking about today. We are talking about the bulk collection of records supposedly under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. If we stop that, how much have we stopped? How much is still in existence? How much are we still doing through other venues? I think probably the most alarming thing we have come across as I have been talking today is the idea that some people believe the President has inherent powers that are not subject to Congress. That, to me, is very alarming. It also means that I think that because this opinion persists within the executive branch, there are in all likelihood many programs like the bulk collection of data--many programs that we don't know about, some that we have heard about. It is still not clear to me whether the Stellar Wind Program is completely gone, which involves more than just telephone data, email conversations, computer addresses, and credit cards. What is the government collecting? How much is being collected and under what authority? It does concern me that there are people--some of them elected officials--who believe in the inherent powers of the Presidency that cannot be challenged even by Congress. We have a lot of work if that is really what we are up against. I think it would be a big step forward if we do something about the bulk collection of data. But I think, given the court case, it is concerning to me that we might actually make the court case or the future of it moot and that we actually could make things worse. It wouldn't be the first time we have made things worse, thinking we were fixing things and made it worse. From the opinion of the Second Circuit Court, here are some quotes. The court writes: That telephone metadata do not directly reveal the content of telephone calls does not vitiate the privacy concerns arising out of the government's bulk collection of such data. . . . the startling amount of detailed information metadata can reveal, information that could traditionally only be obtained by examining the contents. . . . I think this is a good point because many people want to downplay what metadata is or what you can determine from it. But here is the court acknowledging that you may actually get more detailed information from metadata than what you once got from obtaining the content. When we think about how true this is, think about if someone were just going to come into your house and take your papers. What could they find? How many people even have personal letters anymore? People don't have anything on paper that is personal at all. A lot of people pay their bills online. But it is amazing, if you put the compilation of all the metadata together, what you can determine. Remember that a high-ranking intelligence official said that we kill people based on metadata. I presume he is talking about foreigners. But if we are killing people based on metadata, the assumption is that they can get an enormous amount of information from metadata, and we should be very careful about releasing this. They give an example of the sort of metadata and what it can determine: For example, a call to a single-purpose telephone number such as a ``hotline'' might reveal that an individual is: a victim of domestic violence or rape; a veteran; suffering from an addiction of one type or another; contemplating suicide; or reporting a crime. Metadata can reveal civil, political, or religious affiliations; they can also reveal an individual's social status, or whether and when he or she is involved in intimate relationships. The more metadata the government collects and analyzes, furthermore, the greater the capacity for such metadata to reveal ever more private and previously unascertainable information about individuals. That is sort of interesting also about metadata. We have so much online and so much information on our phones that you could probably be in someone's house for a month and never find that in paper because so much of our lives revolve through the phone, through things we order and phone calls and all of that, that in the old days what could have been gotten through someone's castle, through someone's actual papers in their house, I think pales in comparison to what you can get simply through metadata even without content. They make another point, too: Finally, as appellants . . . point out, in today's technologically based world, it is virtually impossible for an ordinary citizen to avoid creating metadata about himself [or herself] on a regular basis simply by conducting his ordinary affairs. The order thus requires Verizon to produce call detail records every day on all telephone calls made through its systems or using its service where one or both ends of the phone call are located in the United States. It is hard for me to believe that there are people who don't understand that what we are talking about here is a general warrant. This is what we fought the Revolution over. This is, as John Adams said, the spark that led to the Revolution. The spark that led to the Revolution was the whole worry and concern, one, that soldiers were writing the warrants, and the other concern was that in writing the warrants, they weren't specific to anyone, they were being written in a general fashion, and that by writing them generally so, there could be an injustice in having an entire group who ends up being subject to a warrant that is not specific. From the appellate court, we also hear that the metadata has a reach far beyond almost imagination. In the article ``As Congress Haggles over Patriot Act, We Answer 6 Basic Questions,'' which was published on npr.org, there are several questions they ask about the PATRIOT Act debate. Most of the talk has been about telephone surveillance, but the question is this: What about the NSA's surveillance of email and other Internet activities? This congressional debate has nothing to do with any of NSA's surveillance Internet activity. That's mostly because of the fact that those programs are authorized by different laws. The PRISM program, for example, which collects a vast amount of Internet data . . . is covered under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. Some have said that the PRISM Program probably is collecting more information in many ways, maybe even dwarfing the bulk collection of the phone records. So if we don't address section 702 in this debate, this is also what we were talking about earlier, is the backdoor, the ability to say: Well, we are investigating someone in a foreign country, but really they are trying to get access to someone in our country through the backdoor. If we don't address this, we may well not be addressing a significant part of the problem. This is one of the other questions: Is there anything else in the House bill we should know about? The bill [the USA FREEDOM Act] lifts the secrecy surrounding key decisions made by the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Going forward, some will be made public. I think this is a step in the right direction. There are a lot of legal decisions, and I think we can discuss the pros and cons of the legal decision without having to know the specific details. I think Senator Wyden made a good point on this earlier when he said that it is not the operational details we need to know, but when we are questioning and debating the law, there is no reason why that shouldn't be public knowledge. One of the reasons we would like to see the court rulings, too, is that the FISA Court found bulk data collection constitutional. I still find that somewhat inconceivable, that a court that is anything less than a rubberstamp could find it somehow reasonable to say that collecting all of our records in advance really is relevant to an investigation. I think it is a pretty significant point that they are not going to query the data until after they get it. So there is no investigation until they have already collected the data. The other point is that when they say it is relevant, is anybody really determining that arguing one way or the other or do we just accept what the NSA says, that the data is relevant? Nobody knows what will come of this debate. My hope in going on all day with this debate and trying to force the issue is to try to allow for some votes on some amendments to this. We shouldn't have just an up-or-down vote on whether to extend the PATRIOT Act. I think that when we have 80 percent of the population in some cases but at least two-thirds of the entire population saying that the bulk collection of all of our phone records all of the time without a warrant is something that has gone too far and needs to stop, it is an insult to the American people to think that we are not going to have any vote at all, that we would just have a vote up or down on extending this. I think we really do need to have a vote, and the vote needs to be on many different alternatives. It shouldn't just be on one alternative. It needs to be on section 702 and the FISA amendments. It should be on a variety of things that could make this better--whether FBI agents should be able to write their own warrants or whether they should be signed by judges. There are a variety of things we need to be talking about. The Senate could simply take up the House bill and pass the House bill, but I think that is unlikely. This is an interesting article from The Boston Globe, a while back. It says: ``What your metadata says about you: From MIT's Cesar Hidalgo, a new window on what your email habits reveal.'' The article is written by Abraham Rieseman. As recently as a few weeks ago, ``metadata'' was an obscure term known mainly to techies and academics. Broadly defined, metadata is data about other data. For the phone company, it might be the time and length of your calls, but not the conversation itself; in the context of email, it means information such as the sender and recipients of a message-- We spoke earlier about the suspicious activity reports. These are reports that the government requires that banks send in. It adds a cost to your banking, and it is a pretty significant intrusion into the banking affairs and also into an individual's affairs. This is an article that was written by the ACLU about suspicious activity reports. Law enforcement agencies have long collected information about their routine interactions with members of the public. Sometimes called ``field interrogation reports'' or ``stop and frisk records,'' this documentation, on the one hand, provides a measure of accountability over police activity. But it also creates an opportunity for police to collect the personal data of innocent people and put it into criminal intelligence files with little or no evidence of wrongdoing. As police records increasingly become automated, law enforcement and intelligence agencies are increasingly seeking to mine this data. The Supreme Court established ``reasonable suspicion'' as the standard for police stops in Terry v. Ohio in 1968. This standard required suspicions supported by articulable facts suggesting criminal activity was afoot . . . In the suspicious activity reports, though, these kinds of programs threaten this reasonable time-tested law enforcement standard by encouraging the police and the public to report behaviors that do not rise to reasonable suspicion. So it is one thing to say that someone has done something that rises to reasonable suspicion, but it is another to say that activity that could be perfectly normal, like withdrawing $1,000 from the bank or putting $1,000 in the bank, somehow is suspicion of a crime that we should be investigating. A lot of this stuff has gotten really, really out of control. It is one of the things where actually the newspapers have done a pretty good job of reporting some of the stuff--not necessarily the suspicious activity reports but on some of the other confiscations of people's assets without really evidence of a crime but maybe evidence that they have cash. You can be driving down the road in DC and make an unsafe lane change and the government asks you if you have money. You then find that the government takes it or the government says: Well, you have $2,000. We will let you keep $1,000 if you sign a statement saying that you will not sue us to get the $1,000 back. Believe it or not, that is stuff that is still happening in our country. It is called civil asset forfeiture. To make it worse, we actually give a perverse incentive. We say to the local officials that if you capture money from people, we will give you a percentage of it--so the more you take, the more you get. Some people have shown that people actually go after things that are paid off. There was a motel in New Jersey, the Motel Caswell. Local officials decided they would go after it because, they said, there had been some drug dealings at the motel. It turned out there were 6 people in the motel selling drugs out of 180,000 visits or something ridiculous. It turned out there were other hotels that had a higher percentage of drug busts done at the hotel, but they owed money and the Motel Caswell was completely paid off. It may have been part of the decisionmaking process, because when the government came and seized the hotel for illegal activity, they took the hotel and went sell it, but it has a lien against it. The bank owns it, and you do not get to sell it very easily. It was paid off. They were going to sell it. It is a $1.5 million hotel. And then, I guess, the local police forces would benefit by that. It is not just with our records that there is a problem. It is also with the concern for how we adjudicate justice in our country. As we see this moving forward, I think we need to be worried about not only the way our records are collected, but we need to be concerned about justice in general. As I have traveled around the country, one of the things I have seen is what I call an undercurrent of unease in our country. I traveled to Ferguson. I have traveled to Detroit. I have been to Chicago. I have been to most of our major cities, and I have also been to some of the places where there has been this anger. I think people are angry because they do not feel that government is treating them justly. People do not like to be treated arbitrarily. In fact, there are some who have given the definition of what is acceptable, what is good government and what is bad government, what is good law and what is bad law, what is just and what is unjust. But whether it is arbitrary or not, Hyack in ``The Road to Serfdom'' talks about that arbitrariness, not having the predictability of knowing what the law will do. That the law does not do the same thing to all individuals is a definition of the injustice that causes people to be unhappy about the way their government treats them. My fear is that this arbitrary nature of collecting bulk records, of collecting all of our records without a significant warrant--the problem here is going to be something that adds on to a sense of unease that is in our cities and in our country at-large. What happens is that everybody is not treated exactly equal. People do not have the same resources to try to escape the clutches of Big Brother when either data or information is used against them. One of the little-noticed sections in the USA FREEDOM Act deals with the safety of maritime navigation and nuclear terrorists and conventions implementation. Interestingly, there is a provision somehow in this for civil forfeiture. But I think the biggest problem with civil forfeiture is that we allow it to occur without a conviction. I think no one should have their possessions taken from them. I think you should be innocent until proven guilty. I see that the Senator from Connecticut has a question. I would be happy to entertain a question without losing the floor.", u" There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011''. (a) In General.--Section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ``a violation'' and inserting ``any violation''; and (2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``a violation'' and inserting ``any violation (other than a violation of this section)''. (b) Prohibited Personnel Practices Under Section 2302(b)(9).-- (1) Technical and conforming amendments.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended in subsections (a)(3), (b)(4)(A), and (b)(4)(B)(i) of section 1214, in subsections (a), (e)(1), and (i) of section 1221, and in subsection (a)(2)(C)(i) of section 2302, by inserting ``or section 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D)'' after ``section 2302(b)(8)'' or ``(b)(8)'' each place it appears. (2) Other references.--(A) Title 5, United States Code, is amended in subsection (b)(4)(B)(i) of section 1214 and in subsection (e)(1) of section 1221, by inserting ``or protected activity'' after ``disclosure'' each place it appears. (B) Section 2302(b)(9) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (i) by striking subparagraph (A)and inserting the following: ``(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation-- ``(i) with regard to remedying a violation of paragraph (8); or ``(ii) with regard to remedying a violation of any other law, rule, or regulation;''; and (ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``(i) or (ii)'' after ``subparagraph (A)''. (C) Section 2302 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(f)(1) A disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection (b)(8) because-- ``(A) the disclosure was made to a person, including a supervisor, who participated in an activity that the employee or applicant reasonably believed to be covered by subsection (b)(8)(A)(ii); ``(B) the disclosure revealed information that had been previously disclosed; ``(C) of the employee's or applicant's motive for making the disclosure; ``(D) the disclosure was not made in writing; ``(E) the disclosure was made while the employee was off duty; or ``(F) of the amount of time which has passed since the occurrence of the events described in the disclosure. ``(2) If a disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection (b)(8) if any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action with respect to the employee making the disclosure, took, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to that employee in reprisal for the disclosure.''. Section 2302(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (C)(iii), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) `disclosure' means a formal or informal communication or transmission, but does not include a communication concerning policy decisions that lawfully exercise discretionary authority unless the employee or applicant providing the disclosure reasonably believes that the disclosure evidences-- ``(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, and occurs during the conscientious carrying out of official duties; or ``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.''. Section 2302(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by amending the matter following paragraph (12) to read as follows: ``This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the withholding of information from Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to Congress. For purposes of paragraph (8), any presumption relating to the performance of a duty by an employee whose conduct is the subject of a disclosure as defined under subsection (a)(2)(D) may be rebutted by substantial evidence. For purposes of paragraph (8), a determination as to whether an employee or applicant reasonably believes that such employee or applicant has disclosed information that evidences any violation of law, rule, regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety shall be made by determining whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude that the actions of the Government evidence such violations, mismanagement, waste, abuse, or danger.''. (a) Personnel Action.--Section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in clause (x), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; and (2) by redesignating clause (xi) as clause (xii) and inserting after clause (x) the following: ``(xi) the implementation or enforcement of any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement; and''. (b) Prohibited Personnel Practice.-- (1) In general.--Section 2302(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in paragraph (11), by striking ``or'' at the end; (B) in paragraph (12), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (C) by inserting after paragraph (12) the following: ``(13) implement or enforce any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement, if such policy, form, or agreement does not contain the following statement: `These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by Executive Order 13526 (75 Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified national security information), or any successor thereto; Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access to classified information), or any successor thereto; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse, or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents); and the statutes which protect against disclosures that could compromise national security, including sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by such Executive order and such statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.' ''. (2) Nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement in effect before the date of enactment.--A nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement that was in effect before the date of enactment of this Act, but that does not contain the statement required under section 2302(b)(13) of title 5, United States Code, (as added by this Act) for implementation or enforcement-- (A) may be enforced with regard to a current employee if the agency gives such employee notice of the statement; and (B) may continue to be enforced after the effective date of this Act with regard to a former employee if the agency posts notice of the statement on the agency website for the 1-year period following that effective date. (c) Retaliatory Investigations.-- (1) Agency investigation.--Section 1214 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(h) Any corrective action ordered under this section to correct a prohibited personnel practice may include fees, costs, or damages reasonably incurred due to an agency investigation of the employee, if such investigation was commenced, expanded, or extended in retaliation for the disclosure or protected activity that formed the basis of the corrective action.''. (2) Damages.--Section 1221(g) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(4) Any corrective action ordered under this section to correct a prohibited personnel practice may include fees, costs, or damages reasonably incurred due to an agency investigation of the employee, if such investigation was commenced, expanded, or extended in retaliation for the disclosure or protected activity that formed the basis of the corrective action.''. Section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following: ``(ii)(I) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and ``(II) as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, provided that the determination be made prior to a personnel action; or''. Section 1215(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(3)(A) A final order of the Board may impose-- ``(i) disciplinary action consisting of removal, reduction in grade, debarment from Federal employment for a period not to exceed 5 years, suspension, or reprimand; ``(ii) an assessment of a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000; or ``(iii) any combination of disciplinary actions described under clause (i) and an assessment described under clause (ii). ``(B) In any case brought under paragraph (1) in which the Board finds that an employee has committed a prohibited personnel practice under section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), the Board may impose disciplinary action if the Board finds that the activity protected under section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) was a significant motivating factor, even if other factors also motivated the decision, for the employee's decision to take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take a personnel action, unless that employee demonstrates, by preponderance of evidence, that the employee would have taken, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take the same personnel action, in the absence of such protected activity.''. (a) Attorney Fees.--Section 1204(m)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``agency involved'' and inserting ``agency where the prevailing party was employed or had applied for employment at the time of the events giving rise to the case''. (b) Damages.--Sections 1214(g)(2) and 1221(g)(1)(A)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, are amended by striking all after ``travel expenses,'' and inserting ``any other reasonable and foreseeable consequential damages, and compensatory damages (including interest, reasonable expert witness fees, and costs).'' each place it appears. (a) In General.--Section 7703(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the matter preceding paragraph (2) and inserting the following: ``(b)(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and paragraph (2) of this subsection, a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board. ``(B) During the 5-year period beginning on the effective date of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board that raises no challenge to the Board's disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction as provided under paragraph (2).''. (b) Review Obtained by Office of Personnel Management.-- Section 7703(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(d)(1) Except as provided under paragraph (2), this paragraph shall apply to any review obtained by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. The Director of the Office of Personnel Management may obtain review of any final order or decision of the Board by filing, within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board, a petition for judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit if the Director determines, in the discretion of the Director, that the Board erred in interpreting a civil service law, rule, or regulation affecting personnel management and that the Board's decision will have a substantial impact on a civil service law, rule, regulation, or policy directive. If the Director did not intervene in a matter before the Board, the Director may not petition for review of a Board decision under this section unless the Director first petitions the Board for a reconsideration of its decision, and such petition is denied. In addition to the named respondent, the Board and all other parties to the proceedings before the Board shall have the right to appear in the proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The granting of the petition for judicial review shall be at the discretion of the Court of Appeals. ``(2) During the 5-year period beginning on the effective date of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, this paragraph shall apply to any review obtained by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management that raises no challenge to the Board's disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). The Director of the Office of Personnel Management may obtain review of any final order or decision of the Board by filing, within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board, a petition for judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction as provided under subsection (b)(2) if the Director determines, in the discretion of the Director, that the Board erred in interpreting a civil service law, rule, or regulation affecting personnel management and that the Board's decision will have a substantial impact on a civil service law, rule, regulation, or policy directive. If the Director did not intervene in a matter before the Board, the Director may not petition for review of a Board decision under this section unless the Director first petitions the Board for a reconsideration of its decision, and such petition is denied. In addition to the named respondent, the Board and all other parties to the proceedings before the Board shall have the right to appear in the proceeding before the court of appeals. The granting of the petition for judicial review shall be at the discretion of the court of appeals.''. (a) In General.--Chapter 23 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating sections 2304 and 2305 as sections 2305 and 2306, respectively; and (2) by inserting after section 2303 the following: (a) Definitions.--In this subsection-- (1) the term ``agency'' has the meaning given under section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code; (2) the term ``applicant'' means an applicant for a covered position; (3) the term ``censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information'' means any effort to distort, misrepresent, or suppress research, analysis, or technical information; (4) the term ``covered position'' has the meaning given under section 2302(a)(2)(B) of title 5, United States Code; (5) the term ``employee'' means an employee in a covered position in an agency; and (6) the term ``disclosure'' has the meaning given under section 2302(a)(2)(D) of title 5, United States Code. (b) Protected Disclosure.-- (1) In general.--Any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant for employment that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is evidence of censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information-- (A) shall come within the protections of section 2302(b)(8)(A) of title 5, United States Code, if-- (i) the employee or applicant reasonably believes that the censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information is or will cause-- (I) any violation of law, rule, or regulation, and occurs during the conscientious carrying out of official duties; or (II) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; and (ii) such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law or such information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs; and (B) shall come within the protections of section 2302(b)(8)(B) of title 5, United States Code, if-- (i) the employee or applicant reasonably believes that the censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information is or will cause-- (I) any violation of law, rule, or regulation, and occurs during the conscientious carrying out of official duties; or (II) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; and (ii) the disclosure is made to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector General of an agency or another person designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, consistent with the protection of sources and methods. (2) Disclosures not excluded.--A disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) for any reason described under section 2302(f)(1) or (2) of title 5, United States Code. (3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to imply any limitation on the protections of employees and applicants afforded by any other provision of law, including protections with respect to any disclosure of information believed to be evidence of censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information. Section 214(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 133(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``For purposes of this section a permissible use of independently obtained information includes the disclosure of such information under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code.''. Section 2302(c) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, including how to make a lawful disclosure of information that is specifically required by law or Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs to the Special Counsel, the Inspector General of an agency, Congress, or other agency employee designated to receive such disclosures'' after ``chapter 12 of this title''. Section 1212 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(h)(1) The Special Counsel is authorized to appear as amicus curiae in any action brought in a court of the United States related to any civil action brought in connection with section 2302(b) (8) or (9), or as otherwise authorized by law. In any such action, the Special Counsel is authorized to present the views of the Special Counsel with respect to compliance with section 2302(b) (8) or (9) and the impact court decisions would have on the enforcement of such provisions of law. ``(2) A court of the United States shall grant the application of the Special Counsel to appear in any such action for the purposes described under subsection (a).''. (a) Special Counsel.--Section 1214(b)(4)(B)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, after a finding that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor,'' after ``ordered if''. (b) Individual Action.--Section 1221(e)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, after a finding that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor,'' after ``ordered if''. (a) In General.-- (1) Requirement.--Each agreement in Standard Forms 312 and 4414 of the Government and any other nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement of the Government shall contain the following statement: ``These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by Executive Order 13526 (75 Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified national security information), or any successor thereto; Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access to classified information), or any successor thereto; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse, or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents); and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by such Executive order and such statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.''. (2) Enforceability.-- (A) In general.--Any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement described under paragraph (1) that does not contain the statement required under paragraph (1) may not be implemented or enforced to the extent such policy, form, or agreement is inconsistent with that statement. (B) Nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement in effect before the date of enactment.--A nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement that was in effect before the date of enactment of this Act, but that does not contain the statement required under paragraph (1)-- (i) may be enforced with regard to a current employee if the agency gives such employee notice of the statement; and (ii) may continue to be enforced after the effective date of this Act with regard to a former employee if the agency posts notice of the statement on the agency website for the 1-year period following that effective date. (b) Persons Other Than Government Employees.-- Notwithstanding subsection (a), a nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement that is to be executed by a person connected with the conduct of an intelligence or intelligence-related activity, other than an employee or officer of the United States Government, may contain provisions appropriate to the particular activity for which such document is to be used. Such policy, form, or agreement shall, at a minimum, require that the person will not disclose any classified information received in the course of such activity unless specifically authorized to do so by the United States Government. Such nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement shall also make it clear that such forms do not bar disclosures to Congress or to an authorized official of an executive agency or the Department of Justice that are essential to reporting a substantial violation of law, consistent with the protection of sources and methods. (a) Government Accountability Office.-- (1) Report.--Not later than 40 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit a report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives on the implementation of this title. (2) Contents.--The report under this paragraph shall include-- (A) an analysis of any changes in the number of cases filed with the United States Merit Systems Protection Board alleging violations of section 2302(b) (8) or (9) of title 5, United States Code, since the effective date of this Act; (B) the outcome of the cases described under subparagraph (A), including whether or not the United States Merit Systems Protection Board, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, or any other court determined the allegations to be frivolous or malicious; (C) an analysis of the outcome of cases described under subparagraph (A) that were decided by a United States District Court and the impact the process has on the Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal court system; and (D) any other matter as determined by the Comptroller General. (b) Merit Systems Protection Board.-- (1) In general.--Each report submitted annually by the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 1116 of title 31, United States Code, shall, with respect to the period covered by such report, include as an addendum the following: (A) Information relating to the outcome of cases decided during the applicable year of the report in which violations of section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B)(i), (C), or (D) of title 5, United States Code, were alleged. (B) The number of such cases filed in the regional and field offices, the number of petitions for review filed in such cases, and the outcomes of such cases. (2) First report.--The first report described under paragraph (1) submitted after the date of enactment of this Act shall include an addendum required under that subparagraph that covers the period beginning on January 1, 2009 through the end of the fiscal year 2009. (a) In General.--Section 1221 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(k)(1) In this subsection, the term `appropriate United States district court', as used with respect to an alleged prohibited personnel practice, means the United States district court for the judicial district in which-- ``(A) the prohibited personnel practice is alleged to have been committed; or ``(B) the employee, former employee, or applicant for employment allegedly affected by such practice resides. ``(2)(A) An employee, former employee, or applicant for employment in any case to which paragraph (3) or (4) applies may file an action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate United States district court in accordance with this subsection. ``(B) Upon initiation of any action under subparagraph (A), the Board shall stay any other claims of such employee, former employee, or applicant pending before the Board at that time which arise out of the same set of operative facts. Such claims shall be stayed pending completion of the action filed under subparagraph (A) before the appropriate United States district court and any associated appellate review. ``(3) This paragraph applies in any case in which-- ``(A) an employee, former employee, or applicant for employment-- ``(i) seeks corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 1221(a) based on an alleged prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542; or ``(ii) files an appeal under section 7701(a) alleging as an affirmative defense the commission of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542; ``(B) no final order or decision is issued by the Board within 270 days after the date on which a request for that corrective action or appeal has been duly submitted, unless the Board determines that the employee, former employee, or applicant for employment engaged in conduct intended to delay the issuance of a final order or decision by the Board; and ``(C) such employee, former employee, or applicant provides written notice to the Board of filing an action under this subsection before the filing of that action. ``(4) This paragraph applies in any case in which-- ``(A) an employee, former employee, or applicant for employment-- ``(i) seeks corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 1221(a) based on an alleged prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542; or ``(ii) files an appeal under section 7701(a)(1) alleging as an affirmative defense the commission of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542; ``(B)(i) within 30 days after the date on which the request for corrective action or appeal was duly submitted, such employee, former employee, or applicant for employment files a motion requesting a certification consistent with subparagraph (C) to the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title and assigned to the case, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board and assigned to the case; and ``(ii) such employee has not previously filed a motion under clause (i) related to that request for corrective action; and ``(C) the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title and assigned to the case, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board and assigned to the case certifies that-- ``(i) under standard applicable to the review of motions to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including rule 12(d), the request for corrective action (including any allegations made with the motion under subparagraph (B)) would not be subject to dismissal; and ``(ii)(I) the Board is not likely to dispose of the case within 270 days after the date on which a request for that corrective action has been duly submitted; or ``(II) the case-- ``(aa) consists of multiple claims; ``(bb) requires complex or extensive discovery; ``(cc) arises out of the same set of operative facts as any civil action against the Government filed by the employee, former employee, or applicant pending in a Federal court; or ``(dd) involves a novel question of law. ``(5) The Board shall grant or deny any motion requesting a certification described under paragraph (4)(ii) within 90 days after the submission of such motion and the Board may not issue a decision on the merits of a request for corrective action within 15 days after granting or denying a motion requesting certification. ``(6)(A) Any decision of the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title and assigned to the case, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board and assigned to the case to grant or deny a certification described under paragraph (4)(ii) shall be reviewed on appeal of a final order or decision of the Board under section 7703 only if-- ``(i) a motion requesting a certification was denied; and ``(ii) the reviewing court vacates the decision of the Board on the merits of the claim under the standards set forth in section 7703(c). ``(B) The decision to deny the certification shall be overturned by the reviewing court, and an order granting certification shall be issued by the reviewing court, if such decision is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. ``(C) The reviewing court's decision shall not be considered evidence of any determination by the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board on the merits of the underlying allegations during the course of any action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate United States district court in accordance with this subsection. ``(7) In any action filed under this subsection-- ``(A) the district court shall have jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy; ``(B) at the request of either party, such action shall be tried by the court with a jury; ``(C) the court-- ``(i) subject to clause (iii), shall apply the standards set forth in subsection (e); and ``(ii) may award any relief which the court considers appropriate under subsection (g), except-- ``(I) relief for compensatory damages may not exceed $300,000; and ``(II) relief may not include punitive damages; and ``(iii) notwithstanding subsection (e)(2), may not order relief if the agency demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of such disclosure; and ``(D) the Special Counsel may not represent the employee, former employee, or applicant for employment. ``(8) An appeal from a final decision of a district court in an action under this subsection shall be taken to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. ``(9) This subsection applies with respect to any appeal, petition, or other request for corrective action duly submitted to the Board, whether under section 1214(b)(2), the preceding provisions of this section, section 7513(d), section 7701, or any otherwise applicable provisions of law, rule, or regulation.''. (b) Sunset.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided under paragraph (2), the amendments made by this section shall cease to have effect 5 years after the effective date of this Act. (2) Pending claims.--The amendments made by this section shall continue to apply with respect to any claim pending before the Board on the last day of the 5-year period described under paragraph (1). (a) In General.--Section 1204(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following: ``(3) With respect to a request for corrective action based on an alleged prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542, the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board may, with respect to any party, grant a motion for summary judgment when the Board or the administrative law judge determines that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.''. (b) Sunset.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided under paragraph (2), the amendments made by this section shall cease to have effect 5 years after the effective date of this Act. (2) Pending claims.--The amendments made by this section shall continue to apply with respect to any claim pending before the Board on the last day of the 5-year period described under paragraph (1). (a) Prohibited Personnel Practices.--Section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' after the semicolon; (2) in subparagraph (B), by adding ``or'' after the semicolon; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(C) any communication that complies with subsection (a)(1), (d), or (h) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App);''. (b) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1), by adding at the end the following: ``(D) An employee of any agency, as that term is defined under section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report the complaint or information to the Inspector General (or designee) of the agency of which that employee is employed.''; (2) in subsection (c), by striking ``intelligence committees'' and inserting ``appropriate committees''; (3) in subsection (d)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``either or both of the intelligence committees'' and inserting ``any of the appropriate committees''; and (B) in paragraphs (2) and (3), by striking ``intelligence committees'' each place that term appears and inserting ``appropriate committees''; (4) in subsection (h)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``intelligence''; and (ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``or an activity involving classified information'' after ``an intelligence activity''; and (B) by striking paragraph (2), and inserting the following: ``(2) The term `appropriate committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, except that with respect to disclosures made by employees described in subsection (a)(1)(D), the term `appropriate committees' means the committees of appropriate jurisdiction.''. (a) In General.--Section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking subsection (d) and inserting the following: ``(d)(1) Each Inspector General shall, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations governing the civil service-- ``(A) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Auditing who shall have the responsibility for supervising the performance of auditing activities relating to programs and operations of the establishment; ``(B) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Investigations who shall have the responsibility for supervising the performance of investigative activities relating to such programs and operations; and ``(C) designate a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman who shall educate agency employees-- ``(i) about prohibitions on retaliation for protected disclosures; and ``(ii) who have made or are contemplating making a protected disclosure about the rights and remedies against retaliation for protected disclosures. ``(2) The Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman shall not act as a legal representative, agent, or advocate of the employee or former employee. ``(3) For the purposes of this section, the requirement of the designation of a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman under paragraph (1)(C) shall not apply to-- ``(A) any agency that is an element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))); or ``(B) as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counter intelligence activities.''. (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 8D(j) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) by striking ``section 3(d)(1)'' and inserting ``section 3(d)(1)(A)''; and (2) by striking ``section 3(d)(2)'' and inserting ``section 3(d)(1)(B)''. (c) Sunset.-- (1) In general.--The amendments made by this section shall cease to have effect on the date that is 5 years after the date of enactment of this Act. (2) Return to prior authority.--Upon the date described in paragraph (1), section 3(d) and section 8D(j) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) shall read as such sections read on the day before the date of enactment of this Act. TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS (a) In General.--Chapter 23 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2303 the following: (a) In General.--Section 3001(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b(b)) is amended-- (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``Not'' and inserting ``Except as otherwise provided, not''; (2) in paragraph (5), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; (3) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (4) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following: ``(7) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011-- ``(A) developing policies and procedures that permit, to the extent practicable, individuals who challenge in good faith a determination to suspend or revoke a security clearance or access to classified information to retain their government employment status while such challenge is pending; and ``(B) developing and implementing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure proper protections during the process for denying, suspending, or revoking a security clearance or access to classified information, including the provision of a right to appeal such a denial, suspension, or revocation, except that there shall be no appeal of an agency's suspension of a security clearance or access determination for purposes of conducting an investigation, if that suspension lasts no longer than 1 year or the head of the agency certifies that a longer suspension is needed before a final decision on denial or revocation to prevent imminent harm to the national security. ``Any limitation period applicable to an agency appeal under paragraph (7) shall be tolled until the head of the agency (or in the case of any component of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense) determines, with the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, that the policies and procedures described in paragraph (7) have been established for the agency or the Director of National Intelligence promulgates the policies and procedures under paragraph (7). The policies and procedures for appeals developed under paragraph (7) shall be comparable to the policies and procedures pertaining to prohibited personnel practices defined under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, and provide-- ``(A) for an independent and impartial fact-finder; ``(B) for notice and the opportunity to be heard, including the opportunity to present relevant evidence, including witness testimony; ``(C) that the employee or former employee may be represented by counsel; ``(D) that the employee or former employee has a right to a decision based on the record developed during the appeal; ``(E) that not more than 180 days shall pass from the filing of the appeal to the report of the impartial fact- finder to the agency head or the designee of the agency head, unless-- ``(i) the employee and the agency concerned agree to an extension; or ``(ii) the impartial fact-finder determines in writing that a greater period of time is required in the interest of fairness or national security; ``(F) for the use of information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs in a manner consistent with the interests of national security, including ex parte submissions if the agency determines that the interests of national security so warrant; and ``(G) that the employee or former employee shall have no right to compel the production of information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs, except evidence necessary to establish that the employee made the disclosure or communication such employee alleges was protected by subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subsection (j)(1).''. (b) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access Determinations.--Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(j) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access Determinations.-- ``(1) In general.--Agency personnel with authority over personnel security clearance or access determinations shall not take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, any action with respect to any employee's security clearance or access determination because of-- ``(A) any disclosure of information to the Director of National Intelligence (or an employee designated by the Director of National Intelligence for such purpose) or the head of the employing agency (or employee designated by the head of that agency for such purpose) by an employee that the employee reasonably believes evidences-- ``(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, and occurs during the conscientious carrying out of official duties; or ``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; ``(B) any disclosure to the Inspector General of an agency or another employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the employee reasonably believes evidences-- ``(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, and occurs during the conscientious carrying out of official duties; or ``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; ``(C) any communication that complies with-- ``(i) subsection (a)(1), (d), or (h) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.); ``(ii) subsection (d)(5)(A), (D), or (G) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q); or ``(iii) subsection (k)(5)(A), (D), or (G), of section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3h); ``(D) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation; ``(E) testifying for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of any right referred to in subparagraph (D); or ``(F) cooperating with or disclosing information to the Inspector General of an agency, in accordance with applicable provisions of law in connection with an audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the Inspector General, if the actions described under subparagraphs (D) through (F) do not result in the employee or applicant unlawfully disclosing information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs. ``(2) Rule of construction.--Consistent with the protection of sources and methods, nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to authorize the withholding of information from the Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to the Congress. ``(3) Disclosures.-- ``(A) In general.--A disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) because-- ``(i) the disclosure was made to a person, including a supervisor, who participated in an activity that the employee reasonably believed to be covered by paragraph (1)(A)(ii); ``(ii) the disclosure revealed information that had been previously disclosed; ``(iii) of the employee's motive for making the disclosure; ``(iv) the disclosure was not made in writing; ``(v) the disclosure was made while the employee was off duty; or ``(vi) of the amount of time which has passed since the occurrence of the events described in the disclosure. ``(B) Reprisals.--If a disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) if any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action with respect to the employee making the disclosure, took, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to that employee in reprisal for the disclosure. ``(4) Agency adjudication.-- ``(A) Remedial procedure.--An employee or former employee who believes that he or she has been subjected to a reprisal prohibited by paragraph (1) of this subsection may, within 90 days after the issuance of notice of such decision, appeal that decision within the agency of that employee or former employee through proceedings authorized by paragraph (7) of subsection (a), except that there shall be no appeal of an agency's suspension of a security clearance or access determination for purposes of conducting an investigation, if that suspension lasts not longer than 1 year (or a longer period in accordance with a certification made under subsection (b)(7)). ``(B) Corrective action.--If, in the course of proceedings authorized under subparagraph (A), it is determined that the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1) of this subsection, the agency shall take specific corrective action to return the employee or former employee, as nearly as practicable and reasonable, to the position such employee or former employee would have held had the violation not occurred. Such corrective action shall include reasonable attorney's fees and any other reasonable costs incurred, and may include back pay and related benefits, travel expenses, and compensatory damages not to exceed $300,000. ``(C) Contributing factor.--In determining whether the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1) of this subsection, the agency shall find that paragraph (1) of this subsection was violated if a disclosure described in paragraph (1) was a contributing factor in the adverse security clearance or access determination taken against the individual, unless the agency demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence of such disclosure, giving the utmost deference to the agency's assessment of the particular threat to the national security interests of the United States in the instant matter. ``(5) Appellate review of security clearance access determinations by director of national intelligence.-- ``(A) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term `Board' means the appellate review board established under section 204 of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011. ``(B) Appeal.--Within 60 days after receiving notice of an adverse final agency determination under a proceeding under paragraph (4), an employee or former employee may appeal that determination to the Board. ``(C) Policies and procedures.--The Board, in consultation with the Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and implement policies and procedures for adjudicating the appeals authorized by subparagraph (B). The Director of National Intelligence and Secretary of Defense shall jointly approve any rules, regulations, or guidance issued by the Board concerning the procedures for the use or handling of classified information. ``(D) Review.--The Board's review shall be on the complete agency record, which shall be made available to the Board. The Board may not hear witnesses or admit additional evidence. Any portions of the record that were submitted ex parte during the agency proceedings shall be submitted ex parte to the Board. ``(E) Further fact-finding or improper denial.--If the Board concludes that further fact-finding is necessary or finds that the agency improperly denied the employee or former employee the opportunity to present evidence that, if admitted, would have a substantial likelihood of altering the outcome, the Board shall remand the matter to the agency from which it originated for additional proceedings in accordance with the rules of procedure issued by the Board. ``(F) De novo determination.--The Board shall make a de novo determination, based on the entire record and under the standards specified in paragraph (4), of whether the employee or former employee received an adverse security clearance or access determination in violation of paragraph (1). In considering the record, the Board may weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact. In doing so, the Board may consider the prior fact-finder's opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. ``(G) Adverse security clearance or access determination.-- If the Board finds that the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1), it shall then separately determine whether reinstating the security clearance or access determination is clearly consistent with the interests of national security, with any doubt resolved in favor of national security, under Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access to classified information) or any successor thereto (including any adjudicative guidelines promulgated under such orders) or any subsequent Executive order, regulation, or policy concerning access to classified information. ``(H) Remedies.-- ``(i) Corrective action.--If the Board finds that the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1), it shall order the agency head to take specific corrective action to return the employee or former employee, as nearly as practicable and reasonable, to the position such employee or former employee would have held had the violation not occurred. Such corrective action shall include reasonable attorney's fees and any other reasonable costs incurred, and may include back pay and related benefits, travel expenses, and compensatory damages not to exceed $300,000. The Board may recommend, but may not order, reinstatement or hiring of a former employee. The Board may order that the former employee be treated as though the employee were transferring from the most recent position held when seeking other positions within the executive branch. Any corrective action shall not include the reinstating of any security clearance or access determination. The agency head shall take the actions so ordered within 90 days, unless the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Energy, or the Secretary of Defense, in the case of any component of the Department of Defense, determines that doing so would endanger national security. ``(ii) Recommended action.--If the Board finds that reinstating the employee or former employee's security clearance or access determination is clearly consistent with the interests of national security, it shall recommend such action to the head of the entity selected under subsection (b) and the head of the affected agency. ``(I) Congressional notification.-- ``(i) Orders.--Consistent with the protection of sources and methods, at the time the Board issues an order, the Chairperson of the Board shall notify-- ``(I) the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate; ``(II) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; ``(III) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives; ``(IV) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and ``(V) the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives that have jurisdiction over the employing agency, including in the case of a final order or decision of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, or the National Reconnaissance Office, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. ``(ii) Recommendations.--If the agency head and the head of the entity selected under subsection (b) do not follow the Board's recommendation to reinstate a clearance, the head of the entity selected under subsection (b) shall notify the committees described in subclauses (I) through (V) of clause (i). ``(6) Judicial review.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit or require judicial review of any-- ``(A) agency action under this section; or ``(B) action of the appellate review board established under section 204 of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011. ``(7) Private cause of action.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit, authorize, or require a private cause of action to challenge the merits of a security clearance determination.''. (c) Access Determination Defined.--Section 3001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(9) The term `access determination' means the process for determining whether an employee-- ``(A) is eligible for access to classified information in accordance with Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access to classified information), or any successor thereto, and Executive Order 10865 (25 Fed. Reg. 1583; relating to safeguarding classified information with industry); and ``(B) possesses a need to know under that Order.''. (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b), as amended by this Act, shall be construed to require the repeal or replacement of agency appeal procedures implementing Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to classified national security information), or any successor thereto, and Executive Order 10865 (25 Fed. Reg. 1583; relating to safeguarding classified information with industry), or any successor thereto, that meet the requirements of section 3001(b)(7) of such Act, as so amended. (a) In General.--Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) If the head of an establishment determines that a complaint or information transmitted under paragraph (1) would create a conflict of interest for the head of the establishment, the head of the establishment shall return the complaint or information to the Inspector General with that determination and the Inspector General shall make the transmission to the Director of National Intelligence. In such a case, the requirements of this section for the head of the establishment apply to the recipient of the Inspector General's transmission. The Director of National Intelligence shall consult with the members of the appellate review board established under section 204 of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Review Act of 2011 regarding all transmissions under this paragraph.''; (2) by designating subsection (h) as subsection (i); and (3) by inserting after subsection (g), the following: ``(h) An individual who has submitted a complaint or information to an Inspector General under this section may notify any member of Congress or congressional staff member of the fact that such individual has made a submission to that particular Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was made.''. (b) Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B)-- (A) by inserting ``(i)'' after ``(B)''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(ii) If the Director determines that a complaint or information transmitted under paragraph (1) would create a conflict of interest for the Director, the Director shall return the complaint or information to the Inspector General with that determination and the Inspector General shall make the transmission to the Director of National Intelligence. In such a case the requirements of this subsection for the Director apply to the recipient of the Inspector General's submission; and''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(H) An individual who has submitted a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this section may notify any member of Congress or congressional staff member of the fact that such individual has made a submission to the Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was made.''. (a) Definitions.--In this section-- (1) the term ``congressional oversight committees'' means the-- (A) the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate; (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; (C) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives; and (D) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the term ``intelligence community element''-- (A) means-- (i) the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and (ii) any executive agency or unit thereof determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal function the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities; and (B) does not include the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (b) Regulations.-- (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe regulations to ensure that a personnel action shall not be taken against an employee of an intelligence community element as a reprisal for any disclosure of information described in section 2303A(b) of title 5, United States Code, as added by this Act. (2) Appellate review board.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the heads of appropriate agencies, shall establish an appellate review board that is broadly representative of affected Departments and agencies and is made up of individuals with expertise in merit systems principles and national security issues-- (A) to hear whistleblower appeals related to security clearance access determinations described in section 3001(j) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b), as added by this Act; and (B) that shall include a subpanel that reflects the composition of the intelligence committee, which shall be composed of intelligence community elements and inspectors general from intelligence community elements, for the purpose of hearing cases that arise in elements of the intelligence community. (c) Report on the Status of Implementation of Regulations.--Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a report on the status of the implementation of the regulations promulgated under subsection (b) to the congressional oversight committees. (d) Nonapplicability to Certain Terminations.--Section 2303A of title 5, United States Code, as added by this Act, and section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b), as amended by this Act, shall not apply to adverse security clearance or access determinations if the affected employee is concurrently terminated under-- (1) section 1609 of title 10, United States Code; (2) the authority of the Director of National Intelligence under section 102A(m) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(m)), if-- (A) the Director personally summarily terminates the individual; and (B) the Director-- (i) determines the termination to be in the interest of the United States; (ii) determines that the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termination of the employment of such employee cannot be invoked in a manner consistent with the national security; and (iii) not later than 5 days after such termination, notifies the congressional oversight committees of the termination; (3) the authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 104A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(e)), if-- (A) the Director personally summarily terminates the individual; and (B) the Director-- (i) determines the termination to be in the interest of the United States; (ii) determines that the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termination of the employment of such employee cannot be invoked in a manner consistent with the national security; and (iii) not later than 5 days after such termination, notifies the congressional oversight committees of the termination; or (4) section 7532 of title 5, United States Code, if-- (A) the agency head personally terminates the individual; and (B) the agency head-- (i) determines the termination to be in the interest of the United States; (ii) determines that the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termination of the employment of such employee cannot be invoked in a manner consistent with the national security; and (iii) not later than 5 days after such termination, notifies the congressional oversight committees of the termination. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to imply any limitation on any protections afforded by any other provision of law to employees and applicants. This Act shall take effect 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act.", u" The text of the bill is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2010''. (a) In General.--Section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A)(i)-- (A) by striking ``a violation'' and inserting ``any violation''; and (B) by adding ``except for an alleged violation that is a minor, inadvertent violation, and occurs during the conscientious carrying out of official duties,'' after ``regulation,''; and (2) in subparagraph (B)(i)-- (A) by striking ``a violation'' and inserting ``any violation (other than a violation of this section)''; and (B) by adding ``except for an alleged violation that is a minor, inadvertent violation, and occurs during the conscientious carrying out of official duties,'' after regulation,''. (b) Prohibited Personnel Practices Under Section 2302(b)(9).-- (1) Technical and conforming amendments.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended in subsections (a)(3), (b)(4)(A), and (b)(4)(B)(i) of section 1214, in subsections (a), (e)(1), and (i) of section 1221, and in subsection (a)(2)(C)(i) of section 2302, by inserting ``or section 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D)'' after ``section 2302(b)(8)'' or ``(b)(8)'' each place it appears. (2) Other references.--(A) Title 5, United States Code, is amended in subsection (b)(4)(B)(i) of section 1214 and in subsection (e)(1) of section 1221, by inserting ``or protected activity'' after ``disclosure'' each place it appears. (B) Section 2302(b)(9) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (i) by striking subparagraph (A)and inserting the following: ``(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation-- ``(i) with regard to remedying a violation of paragraph (8); or ``(ii) with regard to remedying a violation of any other law, rule, or regulation;''; and (ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``(i) or (ii)'' after ``subparagraph (A)''. (C) Section 2302 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(f)(1) A disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection (b)(8) because-- ``(A) the disclosure was made to a person, including a supervisor, who participated in an activity that the employee or applicant reasonably believed to be covered by subsection (b)(8)(A)(ii); ``(B) the disclosure revealed information that had been previously disclosed; ``(C) of the employee's or applicant's motive for making the disclosure; ``(D) the disclosure was not made in writing; ``(E) the disclosure was made while the employee was off duty; or ``(F) of the amount of time which has passed since the occurrence of the events described in the disclosure. ``(2) If a disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection (b)(8) if any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action with respect to the employee making the disclosure, took, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to that employee in reprisal for the disclosure.''. Section 2302(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (C)(iii), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) `disclosure' means a formal or informal communication or transmission, but does not include a communication concerning policy decisions that lawfully exercise discretionary authority unless the employee or applicant providing the disclosure reasonably believes that the disclosure evidences-- ``(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, except for an alleged violation that is a minor, inadvertent violation, and occurs during the conscientious carrying out of official duties; or ``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.''. Section 2302(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by amending the matter following paragraph (12) to read as follows: ``This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the withholding of information from Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to Congress. For purposes of paragraph (8), any presumption relating to the performance of a duty by an employee whose conduct is the subject of a disclosure as defined under subsection (a)(2)(D) may be rebutted by substantial evidence. For purposes of paragraph (8), a determination as to whether an employee or applicant reasonably believes that such employee or applicant has disclosed information that evidences any violation of law, rule, regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety shall be made by determining whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude that the actions of the Government evidence such violations, mismanagement, waste, abuse, or danger.''. (a) Personnel Action.--Section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in clause (x), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; and (2) by redesignating clause (xi) as clause (xii) and inserting after clause (x) the following: ``(xi) the implementation or enforcement of any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement; and''. (b) Prohibited Personnel Practice.-- (1) In general.--Section 2302(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in paragraph (11), by striking ``or'' at the end; (B) in paragraph (12), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (C) by inserting after paragraph (12) the following: ``(13) implement or enforce any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement, if such policy, form, or agreement does not contain the following statement: `These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by Executive Order 13526 (75 Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified national security information), or any successor thereto; Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access to classified information), or any successor thereto; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse, or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents); and the statutes which protect against disclosures that could compromise national security, including sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by such Executive order and such statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.' ''. (2) Nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement in effect before the date of enactment.--A nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement that was in effect before the date of enactment of this Act, but that does not contain the statement required under section 2302(b)(13) of title 5, United States Code, (as added by this Act) for implementation or enforcement-- (A) may be enforced with regard to a current employee if the agency gives such employee notice of the statement; and (B) may continue to be enforced after the effective date of this Act with regard to a former employee if the agency posts notice of the statement on the agency website for the 1-year period following that effective date. (c) Retaliatory Investigations.-- (1) Agency investigation.--Section 1214 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(h) Any corrective action ordered under this section to correct a prohibited personnel practice may include fees, costs, or damages reasonably incurred due to an agency investigation of the employee, if such investigation was commenced, expanded, or extended in retaliation for the disclosure or protected activity that formed the basis of the corrective action.''. (2) Damages.--Section 1221(g) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(4) Any corrective action ordered under this section to correct a prohibited personnel practice may include fees, costs, or damages reasonably incurred due to an agency investigation of the employee, if such investigation was commenced, expanded, or extended in retaliation for the disclosure or protected activity that formed the basis of the corrective action.''. Section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following: ``(ii)(I) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and ``(II) as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, provided that the determination be made prior to a personnel action; or''. Section 1215(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(3)(A) A final order of the Board may impose-- ``(i) disciplinary action consisting of removal, reduction in grade, debarment from Federal employment for a period not to exceed 5 years, suspension, or reprimand; ``(ii) an assessment of a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000; or ``(iii) any combination of disciplinary actions described under clause (i) and an assessment described under clause (ii). ``(B) In any case brought under paragraph (1) in which the Board finds that an employee has committed a prohibited personnel practice under section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), the Board may impose disciplinary action if the Board finds that the activity protected under section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) was a significant motivating factor, even if other factors also motivated the decision, for the employee's decision to take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take a personnel action, unless that employee demonstrates, by preponderance of evidence, that the employee would have taken, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take the same personnel action, in the absence of such protected activity.''. (a) Attorney Fees.--Section 1204(m)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``agency involved'' and inserting ``agency where the prevailing party was employed or had applied for employment at the time of the events giving rise to the case''. (b) Damages.--Sections 1214(g)(2) and 1221(g)(1)(A)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, are amended by striking all after ``travel expenses,'' and inserting ``any other reasonable and foreseeable consequential damages, and compensatory damages (including interest, reasonable expert witness fees, and costs).'' each place it appears. (a) In General.--Section 7703(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the matter preceding paragraph (2) and inserting the following: ``(b)(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and paragraph (2) of this subsection, a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board. ``(B) During the 5-year period beginning on the effective date of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2010, a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board that raises no challenge to the Board's disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction as provided under paragraph (2).''. (b) Review Obtained by Office of Personnel Management.-- Section 7703(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(d)(1) Except as provided under paragraph (2), this paragraph shall apply to any review obtained by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. The Director of the Office of Personnel Management may obtain review of any final order or decision of the Board by filing, within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board, a petition for judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit if the Director determines, in the discretion of the Director, that the Board erred in interpreting a civil service law, rule, or regulation affecting personnel management and that the Board's decision will have a substantial impact on a civil service law, rule, regulation, or policy directive. If the Director did not intervene in a matter before the Board, the Director may not petition for review of a Board decision under this section unless the Director first petitions the Board for a reconsideration of its decision, and such petition is denied. In addition to the named respondent, the Board and all other parties to the proceedings before the Board shall have the right to appear in the proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The granting of the petition for judicial review shall be at the discretion of the Court of Appeals. ``(2) During the 5-year period beginning on the effective date of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2010, this paragraph shall apply to any review obtained by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management that raises no challenge to the Board's disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). The Director of the Office of Personnel Management may obtain review of any final order or decision of the Board by filing, within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board, a petition for judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction as provided under subsection (b)(2) if the Director determines, in the discretion of the Director, that the Board erred in interpreting a civil service law, rule, or regulation affecting personnel management and that the Board's decision will have a substantial impact on a civil service law, rule, regulation, or policy directive. If the Director did not intervene in a matter before the Board, the Director may not petition for review of a Board decision under this section unless the Director first petitions the Board for a reconsideration of its decision, and such petition is denied. In addition to the named respondent, the Board and all other parties to the proceedings before the Board shall have the right to appear in the proceeding before the court of appeals. The granting of the petition for judicial review shall be at the discretion of the court of appeals.''. (a) In General.--Chapter 23 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating sections 2304 and 2305 as sections 2305 and 2306, respectively; and (2) by inserting after section 2303 the following: (a) Definitions.--In this subsection-- (1) the term ``agency'' has the meaning given under section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code; (2) the term ``applicant'' means an applicant for a covered position; (3) the term ``censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information'' means any effort to distort, misrepresent, or suppress research, analysis, or technical information; (4) the term ``covered position'' has the meaning given under section 2302(a)(2)(B) of title 5, United States Code; (5) the term ``employee'' means an employee in a covered position in an agency; and (6) the term ``disclosure'' has the meaning given under section 2302(a)(2)(D) of title 5, United States Code. (b) Protected Disclosure.-- (1) In general.--Any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant for employment that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is evidence of censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information-- (A) shall come within the protections of section 2302(b)(8)(A) of title 5, United States Code, if-- (i) the employee or applicant reasonably believes that the censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information is or will cause-- (I) any violation of law, rule, or regulation, except for an alleged violation that is a minor, inadvertent violation, and occurs during the conscientious carrying out of official duties; or (II) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; and (ii) such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law or such information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs; and (B) shall come within the protections of section 2302(b)(8)(B) of title 5, United States Code, if-- (i) the employee or applicant reasonably believes that the censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information is or will cause-- (I) any violation of law, rule, or regulation, except for an alleged violation that is a minor, inadvertent violation, and occurs during the conscientious carrying out of official duties; or (II) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; and (ii) the disclosure is made to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector General of an agency or another person designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, consistent with the protection of sources and methods. (2) Disclosures not excluded.--A disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) for any reason described under section 2302(f)(1) or (2) of title 5, United States Code. (3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to imply any limitation on the protections of employees and applicants afforded by any other provision of law, including protections with respect to any disclosure of information believed to be evidence of censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information. Section 214(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 133(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``For purposes of this section a permissible use of independently obtained information includes the disclosure of such information under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code.''. Section 2302(c) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, including how to make a lawful disclosure of information that is specifically required by law or Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs to the Special Counsel, the Inspector General of an agency, Congress, or other agency employee designated to receive such disclosures'' after ``chapter 12 of this title''. Section 1212 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(h)(1) The Special Counsel is authorized to appear as amicus curiae in any action brought in a court of the United States related to any civil action brought in connection with section 2302(b) (8) or (9), or as otherwise authorized by law. In any such action, the Special Counsel is authorized to present the views of the Special Counsel with respect to compliance with section 2302(b) (8) or (9) and the impact court decisions would have on the enforcement of such provisions of law. ``(2) A court of the United States shall grant the application of the Special Counsel to appear in any such action for the purposes described under subsection (a).''. (a) Special Counsel.--Section 1214(b)(4)(B)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, after a finding that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor,'' after ``ordered if''. (b) Individual Action.--Section 1221(e)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, after a finding that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor,'' after ``ordered if''. (a) In General.-- (1) Requirement.--Each agreement in Standard Forms 312 and 4414 of the Government and any other nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement of the Government shall contain the following statement: ``These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by Executive Order 13526 (75 Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified national security information), or any successor thereto; Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access to classified information), or any successor thereto; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse, or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents); and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by such Executive order and such statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.''. (2) Enforceability.-- (A) In general.--Any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement described under paragraph (1) that does not contain the statement required under paragraph (1) may not be implemented or enforced to the extent such policy, form, or agreement is inconsistent with that statement. (B) Nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement in effect before the date of enactment.--A nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement that was in effect before the date of enactment of this Act, but that does not contain the statement required under paragraph (1)-- (i) may be enforced with regard to a current employee if the agency gives such employee notice of the statement; and (ii) may continue to be enforced after the effective date of this Act with regard to a former employee if the agency posts notice of the statement on the agency website for the 1-year period following that effective date. (b) Persons Other Than Government Employees.-- Notwithstanding subsection (a), a nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement that is to be executed by a person connected with the conduct of an intelligence or intelligence-related activity, other than an employee or officer of the United States Government, may contain provisions appropriate to the particular activity for which such document is to be used. Such policy, form, or agreement shall, at a minimum, require that the person will not disclose any classified information received in the course of such activity unless specifically authorized to do so by the United States Government. Such nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement shall also make it clear that such forms do not bar disclosures to Congress or to an authorized official of an executive agency or the Department of Justice that are essential to reporting a substantial violation of law, consistent with the protection of sources and methods. (a) Government Accountability Office.-- (1) Report.--Not later than 40 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit a report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives on the implementation of this title. (2) Contents.--The report under this paragraph shall include-- (A) an analysis of any changes in the number of cases filed with the United States Merit Systems Protection Board alleging violations of section 2302(b) (8) or (9) of title 5, United States Code, since the effective date of this Act; (B) the outcome of the cases described under subparagraph (A), including whether or not the United States Merit Systems Protection Board, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, or any other court determined the allegations to be frivolous or malicious; (C) an analysis of the outcome of cases described under subparagraph (A) that were decided by a United States District Court and the impact the process has on the Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal court system; and (D) any other matter as determined by the Comptroller General. (b) Merit Systems Protection Board.-- (1) In general.--Each report submitted annually by the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 1116 of title 31, United States Code, shall, with respect to the period covered by such report, include as an addendum the following: (A) Information relating to the outcome of cases decided during the applicable year of the report in which violations of section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B)(i), (C), or (D) of title 5, United States Code, were alleged. (B) The number of such cases filed in the regional and field offices, the number of petitions for review filed in such cases, and the outcomes of such cases. (2) First report.--The first report described under paragraph (1) submitted after the date of enactment of this Act shall include an addendum required under that subparagraph that covers the period beginning on January 1, 2009 through the end of the fiscal year 2009. (a) In General.--Section 1221 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(k)(1) In this subsection, the term `appropriate United States district court', as used with respect to an alleged prohibited personnel practice, means the United States district court for the judicial district in which-- ``(A) the prohibited personnel practice is alleged to have been committed; or ``(B) the employee, former employee, or applicant for employment allegedly affected by such practice resides. ``(2)(A) An employee, former employee, or applicant for employment in any case to which paragraph (3) or (4) applies may file an action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate United States district court in accordance with this subsection. ``(B) Upon initiation of any action under subparagraph (A), the Board shall stay any other claims of such employee, former employee, or applicant pending before the Board at that time which arise out of the same set of operative facts. Such claims shall be stayed pending completion of the action filed under subparagraph (A) before the appropriate United States district court and any associated appellate review. ``(3) This paragraph applies in any case in which-- ``(A) an employee, former employee, or applicant for employment-- ``(i) seeks corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 1221(a) based on an alleged prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542; or ``(ii) files an appeal under section 7701(a) alleging as an affirmative defense the commission of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542; ``(B) no final order or decision is issued by the Board within 270 days after the date on which a request for that corrective action or appeal has been duly submitted, unless the Board determines that the employee, former employee, or applicant for employment engaged in conduct intended to delay the issuance of a final order or decision by the Board; and ``(C) such employee, former employee, or applicant provides written notice to the Board of filing an action under this subsection before the filing of that action. ``(4) This paragraph applies in any case in which-- ``(A) an employee, former employee, or applicant for employment -- ``(i) seeks corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 1221(a) based on an alleged prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542; or ``(ii) files an appeal under section 7701(a)(1) alleging as an affirmative defense the commission of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542; ``(B)(i) within 30 days after the date on which the request for corrective action or appeal was duly submitted, such employee, former employee, or applicant for employment files a motion requesting a certification consistent with subparagraph (C) to the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title and assigned to the case, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board and assigned to the case; and ``(ii) such employee has not previously filed a motion under clause (i) related to that request for corrective action; and ``(C) the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title and assigned to the case, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board and assigned to the case certifies that-- ``(i) under standard applicable to the review of motions to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including rule 12(d), the request for corrective action (including any allegations made with the motion under subparagraph (B)) would not be subject to dismissal; and ``(ii)(I) the Board is not likely to dispose of the case within 270 days after the date on which a request for that corrective action has been duly submitted; or ``(II) the case-- ``(aa) consists of multiple claims; ``(bb) requires complex or extensive discovery; ``(cc) arises out of the same set of operative facts as any civil action against the Government filed by the employee, former employee, or applicant pending in a Federal court; or ``(dd) involves a novel question of law. ``(5) The Board shall grant or deny any motion requesting a certification described under paragraph (4)(ii) within 90 days after the submission of such motion and the Board may not issue a decision on the merits of a request for corrective action within 15 days after granting or denying a motion requesting certification. ``(6)(A) Any decision of the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title and assigned to the case, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board and assigned to the case to grant or deny a certification described under paragraph (4)(ii) shall be reviewed on appeal of a final order or decision of the Board under section 7703 only if-- ``(i) a motion requesting a certification was denied; and ``(ii) the reviewing court vacates the decision of the Board on the merits of the claim under the standards set forth in section 7703(c). ``(B) The decision to deny the certification shall be overturned by the reviewing court, and an order granting certification shall be issued by the reviewing court, if such decision is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. ``(C) The reviewing court's decision shall not be considered evidence of any determination by the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board on the merits of the underlying allegations during the course of any action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate United States district court in accordance with this subsection. ``(7) In any action filed under this subsection-- ``(A) the district court shall have jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy; ``(B) at the request of either party, such action shall be tried by the court with a jury; ``(C) the court-- ``(i) subject to clause (iii), shall apply the standards set forth in subsection (e); and ``(ii) may award any relief which the court considers appropriate under subsection (g), except-- ``(I) relief for compensatory damages may not exceed $300,000; and ``(II) relief may not include punitive damages; and ``(iii) notwithstanding subsection (e)(2), may not order relief if the agency demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of such disclosure; and ``(D) the Special Counsel may not represent the employee, former employee, or applicant for employment. ``(8) An appeal from a final decision of a district court in an action under this subsection shall be taken to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. ``(9) This subsection applies with respect to any appeal, petition, or other request for corrective action duly submitted to the Board, whether under section 1214(b)(2), the preceding provisions of this section, section 7513(d), section 7701, or any otherwise applicable provisions of law, rule, or regulation.''. (b) Sunset.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided under paragraph (2), the amendments made by this section shall cease to have effect 5 years after the effective date of this Act. (2) Pending claims.--The amendments made by this section shall continue to apply with respect to any claim pending before the Board on the last day of the 5-year period described under paragraph (1). (a) In General.--Section 1204(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following: ``(3) With respect to a request for corrective action based on an alleged prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542, the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board may, with respect to any party, grant a motion for summary judgment when the Board or the administrative law judge determines that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.''. (b) Sunset.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided under paragraph (2), the amendments made by this section shall cease to have effect 5 years after the effective date of this Act. (2) Pending claims.--The amendments made by this section shall continue to apply with respect to any claim pending before the Board on the last day of the 5-year period described under paragraph (1). (a) Prohibited Personnel Practices.--Section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' after the semicolon; (2) in subparagraph (B), by adding ``or'' after the semicolon; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(C) any communication that complies with subsection (a)(1), (d), or (h) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App);''. (b) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1), by adding at the end the following: ``(D) An employee of any agency, as that term is defined under section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report the complaint or information to the Inspector General (or designee) of the agency of which that employee is employed.''; (2) in subsection (c), by striking ``intelligence committees'' and inserting ``appropriate committees''; (3) in subsection (d)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``either or both of the intelligence committees'' and inserting ``any of the appropriate committees''; and (B) in paragraphs (2) and (3), by striking ``intelligence committees'' each place that term appears and inserting ``appropriate committees''; (4) in subsection (h)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``intelligence''; and (ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``or an activity involving classified information'' after ``an intelligence activity''; and (B) by striking paragraph (2), and inserting the following: ``(2) The term `appropriate committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, except that with respect to disclosures made by employees described in subsection (a)(1)(D), the term `appropriate committees' means the committees of appropriate jurisdiction.''. (a) In General.--Section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking subsection (d) and inserting the following: ``(d)(1) Each Inspector General shall, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations governing the civil service-- ``(A) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Auditing who shall have the responsibility for supervising the performance of auditing activities relating to programs and operations of the establishment; ``(B) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Investigations who shall have the responsibility for supervising the performance of investigative activities relating to such programs and operations; and ``(C) designate a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman who shall educate agency employees-- ``(i) about prohibitions on retaliation for protected disclosures; and ``(ii) who have made or are contemplating making a protected disclosure about the rights and remedies against retaliation for protected disclosures. ``(2) The Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman shall not act as a legal representative, agent, or advocate of the employee or former employee. ``(3) For the purposes of this section, the requirement of the designation of a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman under paragraph (1)(C) shall not apply to-- ``(A) any agency that is an element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))); or ``(B) as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counter intelligence activities.''. (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 8D(j) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) by striking ``section 3(d)(1)'' and inserting ``section 3(d)(1)(A)''; and (2) by striking ``section 3(d)(2)'' and inserting ``section 3(d)(1)(B)''. (c) Sunset.-- (1) In general.--The amendments made by this section shall cease to have effect on the date that is 5 years after the date of enactment of this Act. (2) Return to prior authority.--Upon the date described in paragraph (1), section 3(d) and section 8D(j) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) shall read as such sections read on the day before the date of enactment of this Act. TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS (a) In General.--Chapter 23 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2303 the following: (a) In General.--Section 3001(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b(b)) is amended-- (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``Not'' and inserting ``Except as otherwise provided, not''; (2) in paragraph (5), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; (3) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (4) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following: ``(7) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2010-- ``(A) developing policies and procedures that permit, to the extent practicable, individuals who challenge in good faith a determination to suspend or revoke a security clearance or access to classified information to retain their government employment status while such challenge is pending; and ``(B) developing and implementing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure proper protections during the process for denying, suspending, or revoking a security clearance or access to classified information, including the provision of a right to appeal such a denial, suspension, or revocation, except that there shall be no appeal of an agency's suspension of a security clearance or access determination for purposes of conducting an investigation, if that suspension lasts no longer than 1 year or the head of the agency certifies that a longer suspension is needed before a final decision on denial or revocation to prevent imminent harm to the national security. ``Any limitation period applicable to an agency appeal under paragraph (7) shall be tolled until the head of the agency (or in the case of any component of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense) determines, with the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, that the policies and procedures described in paragraph (7) have been established for the agency or the Director of National Intelligence promulgates the policies and procedures under paragraph (7). The policies and procedures for appeals developed under paragraph (7) shall be comparable to the policies and procedures pertaining to prohibited personnel practices defined under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, and provide-- ``(A) for an independent and impartial fact-finder; ``(B) for notice and the opportunity to be heard, including the opportunity to present relevant evidence, including witness testimony; ``(C) that the employee or former employee may be represented by counsel; ``(D) that the employee or former employee has a right to a decision based on the record developed during the appeal; ``(E) that not more than 180 days shall pass from the filing of the appeal to the report of the impartial fact- finder to the agency head or the designee of the agency head, unless-- ``(i) the employee and the agency concerned agree to an extension; or ``(ii) the impartial fact-finder determines in writing that a greater period of time is required in the interest of fairness or national security; ``(F) for the use of information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs in a manner consistent with the interests of national security, including ex parte submissions if the agency determines that the interests of national security so warrant; and ``(G) that the employee or former employee shall have no right to compel the production of information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs, except evidence necessary to establish that the employee made the disclosure or communication such employee alleges was protected by subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subsection (j)(1).''. (b) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access Determinations.--Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(j) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access Determinations.-- ``(1) In general.--Agency personnel with authority over personnel security clearance or access determinations shall not take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, any action with respect to any employee's security clearance or access determination because of-- ``(A) any disclosure of information to the Director of National Intelligence (or an employee designated by the Director of National Intelligence for such purpose) or the head of the employing agency (or employee designated by the head of that agency for such purpose) by an employee that the employee reasonably believes evidences-- ``(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, except for an alleged violation that is a minor, inadvertent violation, and occurs during the conscientious carrying out of official duties; or ``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; ``(B) any disclosure to the Inspector General of an agency or another employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the employee reasonably believes evidences-- ``(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, except for an alleged violation that is a minor, inadvertent violation, and occurs during the conscientious carrying out of official duties; or ``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; ``(C) any communication that complies with-- ``(i) subsection (a)(1), (d), or (h) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.); ``(ii) subsection (d)(5)(A), (D), or (G) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q); or ``(iii) subsection (k)(5)(A), (D), or (G), of section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3h); ``(D) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation; ``(E) testifying for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of any right referred to in subparagraph (D); or ``(F) cooperating with or disclosing information to the Inspector General of an agency, in accordance with applicable provisions of law in connection with an audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the Inspector General, if the actions described under subparagraphs (D) through (F) do not result in the employee or applicant unlawfully disclosing information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs. ``(2) Rule of construction.--Consistent with the protection of sources and methods, nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to authorize the withholding of information from the Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to the Congress. ``(3) Disclosures.-- ``(A) In general.--A disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) because-- ``(i) the disclosure was made to a person, including a supervisor, who participated in an activity that the employee reasonably believed to be covered by paragraph (1)(A)(ii); ``(ii) the disclosure revealed information that had been previously disclosed; ``(iii) of the employee's motive for making the disclosure; ``(iv) the disclosure was not made in writing; ``(v) the disclosure was made while the employee was off duty; or ``(vi) of the amount of time which has passed since the occurrence of the events described in the disclosure. ``(B) Reprisals.--If a disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) if any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action with respect to the employee making the disclosure, took, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to that employee in reprisal for the disclosure. ``(4) Agency adjudication.-- ``(A) Remedial procedure.--An employee or former employee who believes that he or she has been subjected to a reprisal prohibited by paragraph (1) of this subsection may, within 90 days after the issuance of notice of such decision, appeal that decision within the agency of that employee or former employee through proceedings authorized by paragraph (7) of subsection (a), except that there shall be no appeal of an agency's suspension of a security clearance or access determination for purposes of conducting an investigation, if that suspension lasts not longer than 1 year (or a longer period in accordance with a certification made under subsection (b)(7)). ``(B) Corrective action.--If, in the course of proceedings authorized under subparagraph (A), it is determined that the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1) of this subsection, the agency shall take specific corrective action to return the employee or former employee, as nearly as practicable and reasonable, to the position such employee or former employee would have held had the violation not occurred. Such corrective action shall include reasonable attorney's fees and any other reasonable costs incurred, and may include back pay and related benefits, travel expenses, and compensatory damages not to exceed $300,000. ``(C) Contributing factor.--In determining whether the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1) of this subsection, the agency shall find that paragraph (1) of this subsection was violated if a disclosure described in paragraph (1) was a contributing factor in the adverse security clearance or access determination taken against the individual, unless the agency demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence of such disclosure, giving the utmost deference to the agency's assessment of the particular threat to the national security interests of the United States in the instant matter. ``(5) Appellate review of security clearance access determinations by director of national intelligence.-- ``(A) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term `Board' means the appellate review board established under section 204 of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2010. ``(B) Appeal.--Within 60 days after receiving notice of an adverse final agency determination under a proceeding under paragraph (4), an employee or former employee may appeal that determination to the Board. ``(C) Policies and procedures.--The Board, in consultation with the Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and implement policies and procedures for adjudicating the appeals authorized by subparagraph (B). The Director of National Intelligence and Secretary of Defense shall jointly approve any rules, regulations, or guidance issued by the Board concerning the procedures for the use or handling of classified information. ``(D) Review.--The Board's review shall be on the complete agency record, which shall be made available to the Board. The Board may not hear witnesses or admit additional evidence. Any portions of the record that were submitted ex parte during the agency proceedings shall be submitted ex parte to the Board. ``(E) Further fact-finding or improper denial.--If the Board concludes that further fact-finding is necessary or finds that the agency improperly denied the employee or former employee the opportunity to present evidence that, if admitted, would have a substantial likelihood of altering the outcome, the Board shall remand the matter to the agency from which it originated for additional proceedings in accordance with the rules of procedure issued by the Board. ``(F) De novo determination.--The Board shall make a de novo determination, based on the entire record and under the standards specified in paragraph (4), of whether the employee or former employee received an adverse security clearance or access determination in violation of paragraph (1). In considering the record, the Board may weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact. In doing so, the Board may consider the prior fact-finder's opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. ``(G) Adverse security clearance or access determination.-- If the Board finds that the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1), it shall then separately determine whether reinstating the security clearance or access determination is clearly consistent with the interests of national security, with any doubt resolved in favor of national security, under Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access to classified information) or any successor thereto (including any adjudicative guidelines promulgated under such orders) or any subsequent Executive order, regulation, or policy concerning access to classified information. ``(H) Remedies.-- ``(i) Corrective action.--If the Board finds that the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1), it shall order the agency head to take specific corrective action to return the employee or former employee, as nearly as practicable and reasonable, to the position such employee or former employee would have held had the violation not occurred. Such corrective action shall include reasonable attorney's fees and any other reasonable costs incurred, and may include back pay and related benefits, travel expenses, and compensatory damages not to exceed $300,000. The Board may recommend, but may not order, reinstatement or hiring of a former employee. The Board may order that the former employee be treated as though the employee were transferring from the most recent position held when seeking other positions within the executive branch. Any corrective action shall not include the reinstating of any security clearance or access determination. The agency head shall take the actions so ordered within 90 days, unless the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Energy, or the Secretary of Defense, in the case of any component of the Department of Defense, determines that doing so would endanger national security. ``(ii) Recommended action.--If the Board finds that reinstating the employee or former employee's security clearance or access determination is clearly consistent with the interests of national security, it shall recommend such action to the head of the entity selected under subsection (b) and the head of the affected agency. ``(I) Congressional notification.-- ``(i) Orders.--Consistent with the protection of sources and methods, at the time the Board issues an order, the Chairperson of the Board shall notify-- ``(I) the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate; ``(II) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; ``(III) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives; ``(IV) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and ``(V) the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives that have jurisdiction over the employing agency, including in the case of a final order or decision of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, or the National Reconnaissance Office, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. ``(ii) Recommendations.--If the agency head and the head of the entity selected under subsection (b) do not follow the Board's recommendation to reinstate a clearance, the head of the entity selected under subsection (b) shall notify the committees described in subclauses (I) through (V) of clause (i). ``(6) Judicial review.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit or require judicial review of any-- ``(A) agency action under this section; or ``(B) action of the appellate review board established under section 204 of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2010. ``(7) Private cause of action.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit, authorize, or require a private cause of action to challenge the merits of a security clearance determination.''. (c) Access Determination Defined.--Section 3001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(9) The term `access determination' means the process for determining whether an employee-- ``(A) is eligible for access to classified information in accordance with Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access to classified information), or any successor thereto, and Executive Order 10865 (25 Fed. Reg. 1583; relating to safeguarding classified information with industry); and ``(B) possesses a need to know under that Order.''. (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b), as amended by this Act, shall be construed to require the repeal or replacement of agency appeal procedures implementing Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to classified national security information), or any successor thereto, and Executive Order 10865 (25 Fed. Reg. 1583; relating to safeguarding classified information with industry), or any successor thereto, that meet the requirements of section 3001(b)(7) of such Act, as so amended. (a) In General.--Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) If the head of an establishment determines that a complaint or information transmitted under paragraph (1) would create a conflict of interest for the head of the establishment, the head of the establishment shall return the complaint or information to the Inspector General with that determination and the Inspector General shall make the transmission to the Director of National Intelligence. In such a case, the requirements of this section for the head of the establishment apply to the recipient of the Inspector General's transmission. The Director of National Intelligence shall consult with the members of the appellate review board established under section 204 of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Review Act of 2010 regarding all transmissions under this paragraph.''; (2) by designating subsection (h) as subsection (i); and (3) by inserting after subsection (g), the following: ``(h) An individual who has submitted a complaint or information to an Inspector General under this section may notify any member of Congress or congressional staff member of the fact that such individual has made a submission to that particular Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was made.''. (b) Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B)-- (A) by inserting ``(i)'' after ``(B)''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(ii) If the Director determines that a complaint or information transmitted under paragraph (1) would create a conflict of interest for the Director, the Director shall return the complaint or information to the Inspector General with that determination and the Inspector General shall make the transmission to the Director of National Intelligence. In such a case the requirements of this subsection for the Director apply to the recipient of the Inspector General's submission; and''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(H) An individual who has submitted a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this section may notify any member of Congress or congressional staff member of the fact that such individual has made a submission to the Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was made.''. (a) Definitions.--In this section-- (1) the term ``congressional oversight committees'' means the-- (A) the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate; (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; (C) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives; and (D) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the term ``intelligence community element''-- (A) means-- (i) the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and (ii) any executive agency or unit thereof determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal function the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities; and (B) does not include the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (b) Regulations.-- (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe regulations to ensure that a personnel action shall not be taken against an employee of an intelligence community element as a reprisal for any disclosure of information described in section 2303A(b) of title 5, United States Code, as added by this Act. (2) Appellate review board.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the heads of appropriate agencies, shall establish an appellate review board that is broadly representative of affected Departments and agencies and is made up of individuals with expertise in merit systems principles and national security issues-- (A) to hear whistleblower appeals related to security clearance access determinations described in section 3001(j) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b), as added by this Act; and (B) that shall include a subpanel that reflects the composition of the intelligence committee, which shall be composed of intelligence community elements and inspectors general from intelligence community elements, for the purpose of hearing cases that arise in elements of the intelligence community. (c) Report on the Status of Implementation of Regulations.--Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a report on the status of the implementation of the regulations promulgated under subsection (b) to the congressional oversight committees. (d) Nonapplicability to Certain Terminations.--Section 2303A of title 5, United States Code, as added by this Act, and section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b), as amended by this Act, shall not apply to adverse security clearance or access determinations if the affected employee is concurrently terminated under-- (1) section 1609 of title 10, United States Code; (2) the authority of the Director of National Intelligence under section 102A(m) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(m)), if-- (A) the Director personally summarily terminates the individual; and (B) the Director-- (i) determines the termination to be in the interest of the United States; (ii) determines that the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termination of the employment of such employee cannot be invoked in a manner consistent with the national security; and (iii) not later than 5 days after such termination, notifies the congressional oversight committees of the termination; (3) the authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 104A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(e)), if-- (A) the Director personally summarily terminates the individual; and (B) the Director-- (i) determines the termination to be in the interest of the United States; (ii) determines that the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termination of the employment of such employee cannot be invoked in a manner consistent with the national security; and (iii) not later than 5 days after such termination, notifies the congressional oversight committees of the termination; or (4) section 7532 of title 5, United States Code, if-- (A) the agency head personally terminates the individual; and (B) the agency head-- (i) determines the termination to be in the interest of the United States; (ii) determines that the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termination of the employment of such employee cannot be invoked in a manner consistent with the national security; and (iii) not later than 5 days after such termination, notifies the congressional oversight committees of the termination. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to imply any limitation on any protections afforded by any other provision of law to employees and applicants. This Act shall take effect 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act.", u" SA 843. Mr. ROCKEFELLER (for himself and Mr. Bond) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 372, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes; as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIESSec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.Sec. 103. Incorporation of classified annex.Sec. 104. Personnel ceiling adjustments.Sec. 105. Intelligence Community Management Account.Sec. 106. Incorporation of reporting requirements.Sec. 107. Availability to public of certain intelligence funding information.Sec. 108. Response of intelligence community to requests from Congress for intelligence documents and information. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEMSec. 201. Authorization of appropriations. TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERSSec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.Sec. 303. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under the National Security Act of 1947.Sec. 304. Improvement of notification of Congress regarding intelligence activities of the United States Government.Sec. 305. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for intelligence collection personnel.Sec. 306. Modification of availability of funds for different intelligence activities.Sec. 307. Additional limitation on availability of funds for intelligence and intelligence-related activities.Sec. 308. Increase in penalties for disclosure of undercover intelligence officers and agents.Sec. 309. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of the intelligence community.Sec. 310. Extension to intelligence community of authority to delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.Sec. 311. Availability of funds for travel and transportation of personal effects, household goods, and automobiles.Sec. 312. Director of National Intelligence report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.Sec. 313. Report on any clandestine detention facilities for individuals captured in the Global War on Terrorism. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National IntelligenceSec. 401. Additional authorities of the Director of National Intelligence on intelligence information sharing.Sec. 402. Modification of limitation on delegation by the Director of National Intelligence of the protection of intelligence sources and methods.Sec. 403. Authority of the Director of National Intelligence to manage access to human intelligence information.Sec. 404. Additional administrative authority of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 405. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 406. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Sec. 407. Appointment and title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 409. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.Sec. 410. National Space Intelligence Center.Sec. 411. Operational files in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 412. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 413. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.Sec. 414. Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act to advisory committees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 415. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight Board.Sec. 416. Applicability of the Privacy Act to the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Subtitle B--Central Intelligence AgencySec. 421. Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.Sec. 422. Enhanced protection of Central Intelligence Agency intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.Sec. 423. Additional exception to foreign language proficiency requirement for certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence Agency.Sec. 424. Additional functions and authorities for protective personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.Sec. 425. Director of National Intelligence report on retirement benefits for former employees of Air America. Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence ComponentsSec. 431. Enhancements of National Security Agency training program.Sec. 432. Codification of authorities of National Security Agency protective personnel.Sec. 433. Inspector general matters.Sec. 434. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components of the intelligence community.Sec. 435. Clarification of national security missions of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for analysis and dissemination of certain intelligence information.Sec. 436. Security clearances in the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Subtitle D--Other ElementsSec. 441. Foreign language incentive for certain non-special agent employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.Sec. 442. Authority to secure services by contract for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.Sec. 443. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration as elements of the intelligence community.Sec. 444. Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. TITLE V--OTHER MATTERSSec. 501. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.Sec. 502. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities.Sec. 503. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.Sec. 504. Technical amendments to title 10, United States Code, arising from enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.Sec. 505. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.Sec. 506. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National Intelligence Program.Sec. 507. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.Sec. 508. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2007 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Department of State. (8) The Department of the Treasury. (9) The Department of Energy. (10) The Department of Justice. (11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (12) The National Reconnaissance Office. (13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (14) The Coast Guard. (15) The Department of Homeland Security. (16) The Drug Enforcement Administration. SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2007, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill S. 372 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress and in the Classified Annex to such report as incorporated in this Act under section 103. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. SEC. 103. INCORPORATION OF CLASSIFIED ANNEX. (a) Status of Classified Annex.--The Classified Annex prepared by the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate to accompany its report on the bill S. 372 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress and transmitted to the President is hereby incorporated into this Act. (b) Construction With Other Provisions of Division.--Unless otherwise specifically stated, the amounts specified in the Classified Annex are not in addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated by other provisions of this Act. (c) Limitation on Use of Funds.--Funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization contained in this Act that are made available for a program, project, or activity referred to in the Classified Annex may only be expended for such program, project, or activity in accordance with such terms, conditions, limitations, restrictions, and requirements as are set out for that program, project, or activity in the Classified Annex. (d) Distribution of Classified Annex.--The President shall provide for appropriate distribution of the Classified Annex, or of appropriate portions of the annex, within the executive branch of the Government. SEC. 104. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2007 under section 102 when the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. SEC. 105. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2007 the sum of $648,952,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2008. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 1,575 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2007. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2007 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2008. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2007, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2007 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of National Intelligence. SEC. 106. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. (a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill ___ of the One Hundred Tenth Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law. (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. SEC. 107. AVAILABILITY TO PUBLIC OF CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE FUNDING INFORMATION. (a) Amounts Requested Each Fiscal Year.--The President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2007 the aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. (b) Amounts Authorized and Appropriated Each Fiscal Year.-- Congress shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2006 the aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, by Congress for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. SEC. 108. RESPONSE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO REQUESTS FROM CONGRESS FOR INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``RESPONSE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO REQUESTS FROM CONGRESS FOR INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION ``Sec. 508. (a) Requests of Committees.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the Director of a national intelligence center, or the head of any other department, agency, or element of the Federal Government, or other organization within the Executive branch, that is an element of the intelligence community shall, not later than 30 days after receiving a request for any intelligence assessment, report, estimate, legal opinion, or other intelligence information from the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, make available to such committee such assessment, report, estimate, legal opinion, or other information, as the case may be. ``(2) A committee making a request under paragraph (1) may specify a greater number of days for submittal to such committee of information in response to such request than is otherwise provided for under that paragraph. ``(b) Requests of Certain Members.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the Director of a national intelligence center, or the head of any other department, agency, or element of the Federal Government, or other organization within the Executive branch, that is an element of the intelligence community shall respond, in the time specified in subsection (a), to a request described in that subsection from the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or the Chairman or Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. ``(2) Upon making a request covered by paragraph (1)-- ``(A) the Chairman or Vice Chairman, as the case may be, of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate shall notify the other of the Chairman or Vice Chairman of such request; and ``(B) the Chairman or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives shall notify the other of the Chairman or Ranking Member of such request. ``(c) Assertion of Privilege.--In response to a request covered by subsection (a) or (b), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the Director of a national intelligence center, or the head of any other department, agency, or element of the Federal Government, or other organization within the Executive branch, that is an element of the intelligence community shall provide the document or information covered by such request unless the President certifies that such document or information is not being provided because the President is asserting a privilege pursuant to the Constitution of the United States.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 507 the following new item:``Sec. 508. Response of intelligence community to requests from Congress for intelligence documents and information.''. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2007 the sum of $256,400,000. TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. SEC. 303. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947. Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking ``other'' the second place it appears. SEC. 304. IMPROVEMENT OF NOTIFICATION OF CONGRESS REGARDING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. (a) Clarification of Definition of Congressional Intelligence Committees To Include All Members of Committees.--Section 3(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(7)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``, and includes each member of the Select Committee'' before the semicolon; and (2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, and includes each member of the Permanent Select Committee'' before the period. (b) Notice on Information Not Disclosed.-- (1) In general.--Section 502 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended-- (A) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and (B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b): ``(b) Notice on Information Not Disclosed.--(1) If the Director of National Intelligence or the head of a department, agency, or other entity of the United States Government does not provide information required by subsection (a) in full or to all the members of the congressional intelligence committees, and requests that such information not be provided, the Director shall, in a timely fashion, notify such committees of the determination not to provide such information in full or to all members of such committees. Such notice shall be submitted in writing in a classified form, include a statement of the reasons for such determination and a description that provides the main features of the intelligence activities covered by such determination, and contain no restriction on access to this notice by all members of the committee. ``(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as authorizing less than full and current disclosure to all the members of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives of any information necessary to keep all the members of such committees fully and currently informed on all intelligence activities covered by this section.''. (2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (d) of such section, as redesignated by paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection, is amended by striking ``subsection (b)'' and inserting ``subsections (b) and (c)''. (c) Reports and Notice on Covert Actions.-- (1) Form and content of certain reports.--Subsection (b) of section 503 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended-- (A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; (B) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) Any report relating to a covert action that is submitted to the congressional intelligence committees for the purposes of paragraph (1) shall be in writing, and shall contain the following: ``(A) A concise statement of any facts pertinent to such report. ``(B) An explanation of the significance of the covert action covered by such report.''. (2) Notice on information not disclosed.--Subsection (c) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(5) If the Director of National Intelligence or the head of a department, agency, or other entity of the United States Government does not provide information required by subsection (b) in full or to all the members of the congressional intelligence committees, and requests that such information not be provided, the Director shall, in a timely fashion, notify such committees of the determination not to provide such information in full or to all members of such committees. Such notice shall be submitted in writing in a classified form, include a statement of the reasons for such determination and a description that provides the main features of the covert action covered by such determination, and contain no restriction on access to this notice by all members of the committee.''. (3) Modification of nature of change of covert action triggering notice requirements.--Subsection (d) of such section is amended by striking ``significant'' the first place it appears. SEC. 305. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON CARRIERS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL. (a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director''; (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may only delegate'' and all that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority in subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the intelligence community.''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such senior officials of such element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''. (b) Submittal of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe and submit to the congressional intelligence committees the guidelines referred to in paragraph (2) of section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a). (c) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. SEC. 306. MODIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DIFFERENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows: ``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and''. SEC. 307. ADDITIONAL LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES. Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``the congressional intelligence committees have been fully and currently informed of such activity and if'' after ``only if''; (2) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively; and (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b): ``(b) In any case in which notice to the congressional intelligence committees on an intelligence or intelligence- related activity is covered by section 502(b), or in which notice to the congressional intelligence committees on a covert action is covered by section 503(c)(5), the congressional intelligence committees shall be treated as being fully and currently informed on such activity or covert action, as the case may be, for purposes of subsection (a) if the requirements of such section 502(b) or 503(c)(5), as applicable, have been met.''. SEC. 308. INCREASE IN PENALTIES FOR DISCLOSURE OF UNDERCOVER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND AGENTS. (a) Disclosure of Agent After Access to Information Identifying Agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''. (b) Disclosure of Agent After Access to Classified Information.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking ``five years'' and inserting ``ten years''. SEC. 309. RETENTION AND USE OF AMOUNTS PAID AS DEBTS TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``RETENTION AND USE OF AMOUNTS PAID AS DEBTS TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ``Sec. 1103. (a) Authority To Retain Amounts Paid.-- Notwithstanding section 3302 of title 31, United States Code, or any other provision of law, the head of an element of the intelligence community may retain amounts paid or reimbursed to the United States, including amounts paid by an employee of the Federal Government from personal funds, for repayment of a debt owed to the element of the intelligence community. ``(b) Crediting of Amounts Retained.--(1) Amounts retained under subsection (a) shall be credited to the current appropriation or account from which such funds were derived or whose expenditure formed the basis for the underlying activity from which the debt concerned arose. ``(2) Amounts credited to an appropriation or account under paragraph (1) shall be merged with amounts in such appropriation or account, and shall be available in accordance with subsection (c). ``(c) Availability of Amounts.--Amounts credited to an appropriation or account under subsection (b) with respect to a debt owed to an element of the intelligence community shall be available to the head of such element, for such time as is applicable to amounts in such appropriation or account, or such longer time as may be provided by law, for purposes as follows: ``(1) In the case of a debt arising from lost or damaged property of such element, the repair of such property or the replacement of such property with alternative property that will perform the same or similar functions as such property. ``(2) The funding of any other activities authorized to be funded by such appropriation or account. ``(d) Debt Owed to an Element of the Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the term `debt owed to an element of the intelligence community' means any of the following: ``(1) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence community by an employee or former employee of such element for the negligent or willful loss of or damage to property of such element that was procured by such element using appropriated funds. ``(2) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence community by an employee or former employee of such element as repayment for default on the terms and conditions associated with a scholarship, fellowship, or other educational assistance provided to such individual by such element, whether in exchange for future services or otherwise, using appropriated funds. ``(3) Any other debt or repayment owed to an element of the intelligence community by a private person or entity by reason of the negligent or willful action of such person or entity, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or in a lawful administrative proceeding.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of that Act is amended by adding at the end the following new item:``Sec. 1103. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of the intelligence community.''. SEC. 310. EXTENSION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS. Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the head of such element certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods. ``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence. ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `element of the intelligence community' means an element of the intelligence community listed in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''. SEC. 311. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONAL EFFECTS, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, AND AUTOMOBILES. (a) Funds of Office of Director of National Intelligence.-- Funds appropriated to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and available for travel and transportation expenses shall be available for such expenses when any part of the travel or transportation concerned begins in a fiscal year pursuant to travel orders issued in such fiscal year, notwithstanding that such travel or transportation is or may not be completed during such fiscal year. (b) Funds of Central Intelligence Agency.--Funds appropriated to the Central Intelligence Agency and available for travel and transportation expenses shall be available for such expenses when any part of the travel or transportation concerned begins in a fiscal year pursuant to travel orders issued in such fiscal year, notwithstanding that such travel or transportation is or may not be completed during such fiscal year. (c) Travel and Transportation Expenses Defined.--In this section, the term ``travel and transportation expenses'' means the following: (1) Expenses in connection with travel of personnel, including travel of dependents. (2) Expenses in connection with transportation of personal effects, household goods, or automobiles of personnel. SEC. 312. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT OF 2005. (a) Report Required.--Not later than May 1, 2007, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report on all measures taken by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and by each element, if any, of the intelligence community with relevant responsibilities to comply with the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of division A of Public Law 109-148). (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) A description of the detention or interrogation methods, if any, that have been determined to comply with section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 2739; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd), and, with respect to each such method-- (A) an identification of the official making such determination; and (B) a statement of the basis for such determination. (2) A description of the detention or interrogation methods, if any, whose use has been discontinued pursuant to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, and, with respect to each such method-- (A) an identification of the official making the determination to discontinue such method; and (B) a statement of the basis for such determination. (3) A description of any actions that have been taken to implement section 1004 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 2740; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd-1), and, with respect to each such action-- (A) an identification of the official taking such action; and (B) a statement of the basis for such action. (4) Any other matters that the Director considers necessary to fully and currently inform the congressional intelligence committees about the implementation of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. (5) An appendix containing-- (A) all guidelines for the application of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to the detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence community; and (B) all legal opinions of any office or official of the Department of Justice about the meaning or application of Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 with respect to the detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence community. (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form. (d) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee of the House of Representatives. (2) The term ``intelligence community'' means the elements of the intelligence community specified in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). SEC. 313. REPORT ON ANY CLANDESTINE DETENTION FACILITIES FOR INDIVIDUALS CAPTURED IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM. (a) In General.--The President shall ensure that the United States Government continues to comply with the authorization, reporting, and notification requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.). (b) Director of National Intelligence Report.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the members of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on any clandestine prison or detention facility currently or formerly operated by the United States Government for individuals captured in the global war on terrorism. (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) The date each prison or facility became operational, and if applicable, the date on which each prison or facility ceased its operations. (B) The total number of prisoners or detainees held at each prison or facility during its operation. (C) The current number of prisoners or detainees held at each operational prison or facility. (D) The total and average annual costs of each prison or facility during its operation. (E) A description of the interrogation procedures used or formerly used on detainees at each prison or facility, including whether a determination has been made that such procedures are or were in compliance with the United States obligations under the Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture. (3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence SEC. 401. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHARING. Section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (F), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: ``(G) in carrying out this subsection, have the authority-- ``(i) to direct the development, deployment, and utilization of systems of common concern for elements of the intelligence community, or that support the activities of such elements, related to the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information; and ``(ii) without regard to any provision of law relating to the transfer, reprogramming, obligation, or expenditure of funds, other than the provisions of this Act and the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458), to expend funds for purposes associated with the development, deployment, and utilization of such systems, which funds may be received and utilized by any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government for such purposes; and ``(H) for purposes of addressing critical gaps in intelligence information sharing or access capabilities, have the authority to transfer funds appropriated for a program within the National Intelligence Program to a program funded by appropriations not within the National Intelligence Program, consistent with paragraphs (3) through (7) of subsection (d).''. SEC. 402. MODIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON DELEGATION BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OF THE PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. Section 102A(i)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i)(3)) is amended by inserting before the period the following: ``, any Deputy Director of National Intelligence, or the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community''. SEC. 403. AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TO MANAGE ACCESS TO HUMAN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. Section 102A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(b)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``Unless''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall-- ``(A) have access to all national intelligence, including intelligence reports, operational data, and other associated information, concerning the human intelligence operations of any element of the intelligence community authorized to undertake such collection; ``(B) consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods and applicable requirements in Executive Order 12333 (or any successor order) regarding the retention and dissemination of information concerning United States persons, ensure maximum access to the intelligence information contained in the information referred to in subparagraph (A) throughout the intelligence community; and ``(C) consistent with subparagraph (B), provide within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a mechanism for intelligence community analysts and other officers with appropriate clearances and an official need-to-know to gain access to information referred to in subparagraph (A) or (B) when relevant to their official responsibilities.''. SEC. 404. ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(s) Additional Administrative Authorities.--(1) Notwithstanding section 1532 of title 31, United States Code, or any other provision of law prohibiting the interagency financing of activities described in clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A), in the performance of the responsibilities, authorities, and duties of the Director of National Intelligence or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence-- ``(A) the Director may authorize the use of interagency financing for-- ``(i) national intelligence centers established by the Director under section 119B; and ``(ii) boards, commissions, councils, committees, and similar groups established by the Director; and ``(B) upon the authorization of the Director, any department, agency, or element of the United States Government, including any element of the intelligence community, may fund or participate in the funding of such activities. ``(2) No provision of law enacted after the date of the enactment of this subsection shall be deemed to limit or supersede the authority in paragraph (1) unless such provision makes specific reference to the authority in that paragraph.''. SEC. 405. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON CO-LOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``WITH'' and inserting ``OF HEADQUARTERS WITH HEADQUARTERS OF''; (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the Office''; and (3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the headquarters of any other element''. SEC. 406. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. (a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted by Elements of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be carried out by elements of the intelligence community.''. (b) Development of Technology Goals.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (8); and (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraphs: ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology needs of the intelligence community; ``(6) under the direction of the Director, establish engineering standards and specifications applicable to each acquisition of a major system (as that term is defined in section 506A(e)(3)) by the intelligence community; ``(7) ensure that each acquisition program of the intelligence community for a major system (as so defined) complies with the standards and specifications established under paragraph (6); and''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and Technology shall-- ``(1) systematically identify and assess the most significant intelligence challenges that require technical solutions; ``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of research and design programs of the elements of the intelligence community to meet the requirements of the intelligence community for timely support; and ``(3) assist the Director of National Intelligence in establishing research and development priorities and projects for the intelligence community that-- ``(A) are consistent with current or future national intelligence requirements; ``(B) address deficiencies or gaps in the collection, processing, analysis, or dissemination of national intelligence; ``(C) take into account funding constraints in program development and acquisition; and ``(D) address system requirements from collection to final dissemination (also known as `end-to-end architecture').''. (c) Report.--(1) Not later than June 30, 2007, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing a strategy for the development and use of technology in the intelligence community through 2021. (2) The report shall include-- (A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the use of technology; (B) goals for advanced research and development and a strategy to achieve such goals; (C) an explanation of how each advanced research and development project funded under the National Intelligence Program addresses an identified intelligence gap; (D) a list of all current and projected research and development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation dates, and estimated completion dates; and (E) a plan to incorporate technology from research and development projects into National Intelligence Program acquisition programs. (3) The report may be submitted in classified form. SEC. 407. APPOINTMENT AND TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Appointment.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended by striking ``the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence''. (2) Applicability.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply with respect to any appointment of an individual as Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community that is made on or after that date. (b) Title.--Such section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'' the first place it appears. SEC. 408. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Establishment.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103G the following new section: ``INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ``Sec. 103H. (a) Office of Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community is to-- ``(1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently investigations, inspections, and audits relating to-- ``(A) the programs and operations of the intelligence community; ``(B) the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; and ``(C) the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community; ``(2) recommend policies designed-- ``(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of such programs and operations, and in such relationships; and ``(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs, operations, and relationships; ``(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of National Intelligence fully and currently informed about-- ``(A) problems and deficiencies relating to the administration and implementation of such programs and operations, and to such relationships; and ``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions; and ``(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly informed of-- ``(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to the administration and implementation of such programs and operations, and to such relationships; and ``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions. ``(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1) There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector General shall be made-- ``(A) without regard to political affiliation; ``(B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of the intelligence community, and prior experience in the field of intelligence or national security; and ``(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or auditing. ``(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the Director of National Intelligence. ``(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the President. The President shall immediately communicate in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal of any individual from the position of Inspector General. ``(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections (g) and (h), it shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community-- ``(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations, inspections, and audits relating to the programs and operations of the intelligence community, the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, and the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and regulations; ``(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, and fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in such programs and operations, and in such relationships, and to report the progress made in implementing corrective action; ``(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; and ``(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities under this section, to comply with generally accepted government auditing standards. ``(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. ``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7 days to the congressional intelligence committees. ``(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such report. ``(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General considers appropriate. ``(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. ``(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section. ``(C) The level of classification or compartmentation of information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any materials under subparagraph (B). ``(D) Failure on the part of any employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence community to cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate administrative actions by the Director or, on the recommendation of the Director, other appropriate officials of the intelligence community, including loss of employment or the termination of an existing contractual relationship. ``(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the Federal Government-- ``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; and ``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any employee in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity. ``(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or before an officer having a seal. ``(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of all information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General. ``(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by subpoenas. ``(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for or on behalf of any other element of the intelligence community, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. ``(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the United States. ``(g) Coordination Among Inspectors General of Intelligence Community.--(1) In the event of a matter within the jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject to an investigation, inspection, or audit by both the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and an Inspector General, whether statutory or administrative, with oversight responsibility for an element or elements of the intelligence community, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and such other Inspector or Inspectors General shall expeditiously resolve which Inspector General shall conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit. ``(2) The Inspector General conducting an investigation, inspection, or audit covered by paragraph (1) shall submit the results of such investigation, inspection, or audit to any other Inspector General, including the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit who did not conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit. ``(3)(A) If an investigation, inspection, or audit covered by paragraph (1) is conducted by an Inspector General other than the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, upon completion of such investigation, inspection, or audit by such other Inspector General, conduct under this section a separate investigation, inspection, or audit of the matter concerned if the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community determines that such initial investigation, inspection, or audit was deficient in some manner or that further investigation, inspection, or audit is required. ``(B) This paragraph shall not apply to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense or to any other Inspector General within the Department of Defense. ``(h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall be provided with appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices. ``(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector General. The Inspector General shall ensure that any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed has security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such officer or employee. ``(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively. ``(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the Inspector General shall create within the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General. ``(3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government. ``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance. ``(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the intelligence community, conduct, as authorized by this section, an investigation, inspection, or audit of such element and may enter into any place occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. ``(i) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate, unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community during the immediately preceding 6-month periods ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. ``(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following: ``(i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation, inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered by such report, including a summary of the progress of each particular investigation, inspection, or audit since the preceding report of the Inspector General under this paragraph. ``(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration and implementation of programs and operations of the intelligence community, and in the relationships between elements of the intelligence community, identified by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report. ``(iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective or disciplinary action made by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii). ``(iv) A statement whether or not corrective or disciplinary action has been completed on each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective action has been completed, a description of such corrective action. ``(v) A certification whether or not the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General. ``(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report. ``(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of programs and operations undertaken by the intelligence community, and in the relationships between elements of the intelligence community, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and operations and in such relationships. ``(C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt of a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the report to the congressional intelligence committees together with any comments the Director considers appropriate. ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration and implementation of programs or operations of the intelligence community or in the relationships between elements of the intelligence community. ``(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) within seven calendar days of receipt of such report, together with such comments as the Director considers appropriate. ``(3) In the event that-- ``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General; ``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any current or former intelligence community official who-- ``(i) holds or held a position in an element of the intelligence community that is subject to appointment by the President, whether or not by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, including such a position held on an acting basis; ``(ii) holds or held a position in an element of the intelligence community, including a position held on an acting basis, that is appointed by the Director of National Intelligence; or ``(iii) holds or held a position as head of an element of the intelligence community or a position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of section 106; ``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a current or former official described in subparagraph (B); ``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current or former official described in subparagraph (B); or ``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit, the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a report on such matter to the congressional intelligence committees. ``(4) Pursuant to title V, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees any report or findings and recommendations of an investigation, inspection, or audit conducted by the office which has been requested by the Chairman or Vice Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either committee. ``(5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report such complaint or information to the Inspector General. ``(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall determine whether the complaint or information appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a notice of that determination, together with the complaint or information. ``(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within seven calendar days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the congressional intelligence committees, together with any comments the Director considers appropriate. ``(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or both of the congressional intelligence committees directly. ``(ii) An employee may contact the intelligence committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee-- ``(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the employee's complaint or information and notice of the employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence committees directly; and ``(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices. ``(iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information under clause (i) does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a member or employee of such committee. ``(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is taken. ``(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review. ``(G) In this paragraph, the term `urgent concern' means any of the following: ``(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity involving classified information, but does not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters. ``(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity. ``(iii) An action, including a personnel action described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection (f)(3)(B) of this section in response to an employee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph. ``(H) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the findings set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 701(b) of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (title VII of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App. 8H note). ``(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States Code, the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint received by the Inspector General relating to violations of Federal criminal law that involves a program or operation of an element of the intelligence community, or in the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community, consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each such report shall be furnished to the Director. ``(j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by the Director in consultation with the congressional intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (g), the performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to modify or effect the duties and responsibilities of any other Inspector General, whether statutory or administrative, having duties and responsibilities relating to such element.''. (2) The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103G the following new item:``Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''. (b) Repeal of Superseded Authority To Establish Position.-- Section 8K of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is repealed. (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item: ``Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''. SEC. 409. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND OFFICIALS. (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting the following: ``(a) In General.-- ``(1) Establishment.--The''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403- 3(c)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraphs: ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. ``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center.''. SEC. 410. NATIONAL SPACE INTELLIGENCE CENTER. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 119B the following new section: ``NATIONAL SPACE INTELLIGENCE CENTER ``Sec. 119C. (a) Establishment.--There is established within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a National Space Intelligence Center. ``(b) Director of National Space Intelligence Center.--The National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology, or a successor position designated by the Director of National Intelligence, shall act as the Director of the National Space Intelligence Center. ``(c) Missions.--The National Space Intelligence Center shall have the following missions: ``(1) To coordinate and provide policy direction for the management of space-related intelligence assets. ``(2) To prioritize collection activities consistent with the National Intelligence Collection Priorities framework, or a successor framework or other document designated by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(3) To provide policy direction for programs designed to ensure a sufficient cadre of government and nongovernment personnel in fields relating to space intelligence, including programs to support education, recruitment, hiring, training, and retention of qualified personnel. ``(4) To evaluate independent analytic assessments of threats to classified United States space intelligence systems throughout all phases of the development, acquisition, and operation of such systems. ``(d) Access to Information.--The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the National Space Intelligence Center has access to all national intelligence information (as appropriate), and such other information (as appropriate and practical), necessary for the Center to carry out the missions of the Center under subsection (c). ``(e) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National Intelligence shall include in the National Intelligence Program budget a separate line item for the National Space Intelligence Center.''. (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for that Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 119B the following new item:``Sec. 119C. National Space Intelligence Center.''. (b) Report on Organization of Center.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Space Intelligence Center shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on the organizational structure of the National Space Intelligence Center established by section 119C of the National Security Act of 1947 (as added by subsection (a)). (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) The proposed organizational structure of the National Space Intelligence Center. (B) An identification of key participants in the Center. (C) A strategic plan for the Center during the five-year period beginning on the date of the report. SEC. 411. OPERATIONAL FILES IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. (a) In General.--Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by inserting before section 701 the following new section: ``OPERATIONAL FILES IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ``Sec. 700. (a) Exemption of Certain Files From Search, Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) Information and records described in paragraph (2) shall be exempt from the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, that require search, review, publication, or disclosure in connection therewith when-- ``(A) such information or records are not disseminated outside the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; or ``(B) such information or records are incorporated into new information or records created by personnel of the Office in a manner that identifies such new information or records as incorporating such information or records and such new information or records are not disseminated outside the Office. ``(2) Information and records described in this paragraph are the following: ``(A) Information disseminated or otherwise provided to an element of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from the operational files of an element of the intelligence community that have been exempted from search, review, publication, or disclosure in accordance with this title or any other provision of law. ``(B) Any information or records created by the Office that incorporate information described in subparagraph (A). ``(3) An operational file of an element of the intelligence community from which information described in paragraph (2)(A) is disseminated or provided to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as described in that paragraph shall remain exempt from search, review, publication, or disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, to the extent the operational files from which such information was derived remain exempt from search, review, publication, or disclosure under section 552 of such title. ``(b) Search and Review of Certain Files.--Information disseminated or otherwise provided to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence by another element of the intelligence community that is not exempt from search, review, publication, or disclosure under subsection (a), and that is authorized to be disseminated outside the Office, shall be subject to search and review under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, but may remain exempt from publication and disclosure under such section by the element disseminating or providing such information to the Office to the extent authorized by such section. ``(c) Search and Review for Certain Purposes.-- Notwithstanding subsection (a), exempted operational files shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning any of the following: ``(1) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 or 552a of title 5, United States Code. ``(2) Any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code. ``(3) The specific subject matter of an investigation by any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity: ``(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. ``(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. ``(C) The Intelligence Oversight Board. ``(D) The Department of Justice. ``(E) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. ``(F) The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of that Act is amended by inserting before the item relating to section 701 the following new item:``Sec. 700. Operational files in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. SEC. 412. ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (50 U.S.C. 403e-1) is amended to read as follows: ``(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the same manner as such authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of the Office. ``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency in the same manner as such authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of the Agency.''. (b) Repeal of Obsolete Authority.--That section is further amended-- (1) by striking subsection (c); and (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c). (c) Expeditious Payment.--That section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection (d): ``(d) Expeditious Payment.--Payment of an award under this authority in this section shall be made as expeditiously as is practicable after the making of the award.''. (d) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (b), by striking ``to the Central Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff'' and inserting ``to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or to the Central Intelligence Agency''; and (2) in subsection (c), as redesignated by subsection (b)(2) of this section, by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (e) Technical and Stylistic Amendments.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``Personnel Eligible for Awards.--'' after ``(b)''; (B) by striking ``subsection (a) of this section'' and inserting ``subsection (a)''; and (C) by striking ``a date five years before the date of enactment of this section'' and inserting ``December 9, 1978''; and (2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by inserting ``Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--'' after ``(c)''. SEC. 413. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE. (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (d), (g), (h), (i), and (j); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (k), (l), and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively. (b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''. SEC. 414. INAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT TO ADVISORY COMMITTEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. Section 4(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or''; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. SEC. 415. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD. Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the Director's designee.''. SEC. 416. APPLICABILITY OF THE PRIVACY ACT TO THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. (a) Authority To Exempt.--The Director of National Intelligence may prescribe regulations to exempt any system of records within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from the applicability of the provisions of subsections (c)(3), (c)(4), and (d) of section 552a of title 5, United States Code. (b) Promulgation Requirements.--In prescribing any regulations under subsection (a), the Director shall comply with the requirements (including general notice requirements) of subsections (b), (c), and (e) of section 553 of title 5, United States Code. Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency SEC. 421. DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. (a) Appointment of Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--Subsection (a) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a) is amended by inserting ``from civilian life'' after ``who shall be appointed''. (b) Establishment of Position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--Such section is further amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) as subsections (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b): ``(b) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director. ``(3) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the absence or disability of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or during a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (c) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of such section, as redesignated by subsection (b)(1) of this section, is further amended by striking ``subsection (d)'' and inserting ``subsection (e)''. (d) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item: ``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (e) Role of DNI in Appointment.--Section 106(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(C) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (f) Military Status of Individual Serving as Director of Central Intelligence Agency or Administratively Performing Duties of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.-- (1) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces who is serving as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or is engaged in administrative performance of the duties of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall not, while continuing in such service, or in the administrative performance of such duties, after that date-- (A) be subject to supervision or control by the Secretary of Defense or by any officer or employee of the Department of Defense; or (B) exercise, by reason of the officer's status as a commissioned officer, any supervision or control with respect to any of the military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense except as otherwise authorized by law. (2) Except as provided in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), the service, or the administrative performance of duties, described in that paragraph by an officer described in that paragraph shall not affect the status, position, rank, or grade of such officer in the Armed Forces, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of such status, position, rank, or grade. (3) A commissioned officer described in paragraph (1), while serving, or continuing in the administrative performance of duties, as described in that paragraph and while remaining on active duty, shall continue to receive military pay and allowances. Funds from which such pay and allowances are paid shall be reimbursed from funds available to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (g) Effective Date and Applicability.-- (1) Director of central intelligence agency.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall-- (A) take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; and (B) apply upon the occurrence of any act creating a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency after such date, except that if the vacancy occurs by resignation from such position of the individual serving in such position on such date, that individual may continue serving in such position after such resignation until the individual appointed to succeed such resigning individual as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position. (2) Deputy director of central intelligence agency.--The amendments made by subsections (b) through (e) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (A) the date of the nomination by the President of an individual to serve as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, except that the individual administratively performing the duties of the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to the position of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency by the individual administratively performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 422. ENHANCED PROTECTION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE. (a) Responsibility of Director of Central Intelligence Agency Under National Security Act of 1947.--Subsection (e) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a), as redesignated by section 421(b)(1) of this Act, is further amended-- (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4): ``(4) protect intelligence sources and methods of the Central Intelligence Agency from unauthorized disclosure, consistent with any direction issued by the President or the Director of National Intelligence; and''. (b) Protection Under Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section 102A(i)'' and all that follows through ``unauthorized disclosure'' and inserting ``sections 102A(i) and 104A(e)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i), 403-4a(e)(4))''. (c) Construction With Exemption From Requirement for Disclosure of Information to Public.--Section 104A(e)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by subsection (a), and section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended by subsection (b), shall be treated as statutes that specifically exempt from disclosure the matters specified in such sections for purposes of section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code. (d) Technical Amendments to Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended-- (1) in the subsection caption, by striking ``of DCI''; (2) by striking ``section 102A(i)'' and inserting ``sections 102A(i) and 104A(e)(4)''; (3) by striking ``of National Intelligence''; and (4) by inserting ``of the Central Intelligence Agency'' after ``methods''. SEC. 423. ADDITIONAL EXCEPTION TO FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. (a) Additional Exception.--Subsection (h) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a), as redesignated by section 421(b)(1) of this Act, is further amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and (B) by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service''; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``position or category of positions'' each place it appears and inserting ``individual, individuals, position, or category of positions''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any individual in the Directorate of Intelligence or the National Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency who is serving in a Senior Intelligence Service position as of December 23, 2005, regardless of whether such individual is a member of the Senior Intelligence Service.''. (b) Report on Waivers.--Section 611(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 118 Stat. 3955) is amended-- (1) by striking the first sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress a report that identifies individuals who, or positions within the Senior Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the National Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency that, are determined by the Director to require a waiver under subsection (h) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) and redesignated by section 421(b)(1) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.''; and (2) in the second sentence-- (A) by striking ``section 104A(g)(2), as so added'' and inserting ``subsection (h)(2) of section 104A, as so added and redesignated''; and (B) by striking ``position or category of positions'' and inserting ``individual, individuals, position, or category of positions''. SEC. 424. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITIES FOR PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)''; (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated-- (A) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the protection''; and (B) by striking the semicolon and inserting ``, and the protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) Authorize personnel engaged in the performance of protective functions authorized pursuant to subparagraph (A), when engaged in the performance of such functions, to make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States, if such personnel have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony, except that any authority pursuant to this subparagraph may be exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Director and the Attorney General and such personnel may not exercise any authority for the service of civil process or for the investigation of criminal offenses;''. SEC. 425. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AIR AMERICA. (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to United States citizens for the service of such individuals before 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated company while such company was owned or controlled by the United States Government and operated or managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Report Elements.--(1) The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (A) The history of Air America and associated companies before 1977, including a description of-- (i) the relationship between such companies and the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the United States Government; (ii) the workforce of such companies; (iii) the missions performed by such companies and their employees for the United States; and (iv) the casualties suffered by employees of such companies in the course of their employment with such companies. (B) A description of the retirement benefits contracted for or promised to the employees of such companies before 1977, the contributions made by such employees for such benefits, the retirement benefits actually paid such employees, the entitlement of such employees to the payment of future retirement benefits, and the likelihood that former employees of such companies will receive any future retirement benefits. (C) An assessment of the difference between-- (i) the retirement benefits that former employees of such companies have received or will receive by virtue of their employment with such companies; and (ii) the retirement benefits that such employees would have received and in the future receive if such employees had been, or would now be, treated as employees of the United States whose services while in the employ of such companies had been or would now be credited as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits. (D) The recommendations of the Director regarding the advisability of legislative action to treat employment at such companies as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in light of the relationship between such companies and the United States Government and the services and sacrifices of such employees to and for the United States, and if legislative action is considered advisable, a proposal for such action and an assessment of its costs. (2) The Director of National Intelligence shall include in the report any views of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on the matters covered by the report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate. (c) Assistance of Comptroller General.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall, upon the request of the Director of National Intelligence and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information, assist the Director in the preparation of the report required by subsection (a). (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``Air America'' means Air America, Incorporated. (2) The term ``associated company'' means any company associated with or subsidiary to Air America, including Air Asia Company Limited and the Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport, Incorporated. Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components SEC. 431. ENHANCEMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TRAINING PROGRAM. (a) Termination of Employees.--Subsection (d)(1)(C) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``terminated either by'' and all that follows and inserting ``terminated-- ``(i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the employee; ``(ii) by the employee voluntarily; or ``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the employee to maintain such level of academic standing in the educational course of training as the Director of the National Security Agency shall have specified in the agreement of the employee under this subsection; and''. (b) Authority To Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With NSA.--Subsection (e) of such section is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''. SEC. 432. CODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 21. (a) The Director is authorized to designate personnel of the Agency to perform protective functions for the Director and for any personnel of the Agency designated by the Director. ``(b)(1) In the performance of protective functions under this section, personnel of the Agency designated to perform protective functions pursuant to subsection (a) are authorized, when engaged in the performance of such functions, to make arrests without a warrant for-- ``(A) any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel; or ``(B) any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if such personnel have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony. ``(2) The authority in paragraph (1) may be exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Director and the Attorney General. ``(3) Personnel of the Agency designated to perform protective functions pursuant to subsection (a) shall not exercise any authority for the service of civil process or the investigation of criminal offenses. ``(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect any authority under any other provision of law relating to the performance of protective functions.''. SEC. 433. INSPECTOR GENERAL MATTERS. (a) Coverage Under Inspector General Act of 1978.-- Subsection (a)(2) of section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8G) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``the Defense Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,''; (2) by inserting ``the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the National Endowment for the Arts,''; and (3) by inserting ``the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency,'' after ``the National Labor Relations Board,''. (b) Certain Designations Under Inspector General Act of 1978.--Subsection (a) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8H) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) The Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency shall be designees of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for purposes of this section.''. (c) Power of Heads of Elements Over Investigations.-- Subsection (d) of section 8G of that Act-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(d)''; (2) in the second sentence of paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection, by striking ``The head'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (2), the head''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense may prohibit the Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community specified in subparagraph (D) from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation if the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. ``(B) If the Director or the Secretary exercises the authority under subparagraph (A), the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, shall submit to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E) an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of the authority not later than seven days after the exercise of the authority. ``(C) At the same time the Director or the Secretary submits under subparagraph (B) a statement on the exercise of the authority in subparagraph (A) to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E), the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, shall notify the Inspector General of such element of the submittal of such statement and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such statement. The Inspector General may submit to such committees of Congress any comments on a notice or statement received by the Inspector General under this subparagraph that the Inspector General considers appropriate. ``(D) The elements of the intelligence community specified in this subparagraph are as follows: ``(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(ii) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(iii) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(iv) The National Security Agency. ``(E) The committees of Congress specified in this subparagraph are-- ``(i) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''. SEC. 434. CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT OF HEADS OF CERTAIN COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Director of National Security Agency.--The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after the first section the following new section: ``Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law.''. (b) Director of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.-- Section 441(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2) The Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.''. (c) Director of National Reconnaissance Office.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (d) Positions of Importance and Responsibility.-- (1) Designation of positions.--The President may designate any of the positions referred to in paragraph (2) as positions of importance and responsibility under section 601 of title 10, United States Code. (2) Covered positions.--The positions referred to in this paragraph are as follows: (A) The Director of the National Security Agency. (B) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (C) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (e) Effective Date and Applicability.--(1) The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b), and subsection (c), shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (A) the date of the nomination by the President of an individual to serve in the position concerned, except that the individual serving in such position as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to such position, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of such position by the individual performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Subsection (d) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 435. CLARIFICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY MISSIONS OF NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION OF CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. Section 442(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2)(A) As directed by the Director of National Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall also analyze, disseminate, and incorporate into the National System for Geospatial-Intelligence, likenesses, videos, or presentations produced by ground-based platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations or available as open-source information. ``(B) The authority provided by this paragraph does not include the authority to manage or direct the tasking of, set requirements and priorities for, set technical requirements related to, or modify any classification or dissemination limitations related to the collection of, handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations.''; and (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (1)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (1) and (2)''. SEC. 436. SECURITY CLEARANCES IN THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL- INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The Secretary of Defense shall, during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2007, delegate to the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency personnel security authority with respect to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (including authority relating to the use of contractor personnel in investigations and adjudications for security clearances) that is identical to the personnel security authority of the Director of the National Security Agency with respect to the National Security Agency. Subtitle D--Other Elements SEC. 441. FOREIGN LANGUAGE INCENTIVE FOR CERTAIN NON-SPECIAL AGENT EMPLOYEES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. (a) Authority To Pay Incentive.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may pay a cash award authorized by section 4523 of title 5, United States Code, in accordance with the provisions of such section, to any employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation described in subsection (b) as if such employee were a law enforcement officer as specified in such section. (b) Covered Employees.--An employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation described in this subsection is any employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation-- (1) who uses foreign language skills in support of the analyses, investigations, or operations of the Bureau to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities (or maintains foreign language skills for purposes of such support); and (2) whom the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, subject to the joint guidance of the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, may designate for purposes of this section. SEC. 442. AUTHORITY TO SECURE SERVICES BY CONTRACT FOR THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Title I of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 23 the following new section: ``SERVICES BY CONTRACT FOR BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH ``Sec. 23A. (a) Authority To Enter Into Contracts.--The Secretary may enter into contracts with individuals or organizations for the provision of services in support of the mission of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State if the Secretary determines that-- ``(1) the services to be procured are urgent or unique; and ``(2) it would not be practicable for the Department to obtain such services by other means. ``(b) Treatment as Employees of the United States Government.--(1) Individuals employed under a contract pursuant to the authority in subsection (a) shall not, by virtue of the performance of services under such contract, be considered employees of the United States Government for purposes of any law administered by the Office of Personnel Management. ``(2) The Secretary may provide for the applicability to individuals described in paragraph (1) of any law administered by the Secretary concerning the employment of such individuals. ``(c) Contract To Be Appropriate Means of Securing Services.--The chief contracting officer of the Department of State shall ensure that each contract entered into by the Secretary under this section is the appropriate means of securing the services to be provided under such contract.''. SEC. 443. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AS ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H)-- (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine Corps,''; and (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''. SEC. 444. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004. Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after ``subsection (a)),''. TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS SEC. 501. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947. The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended as follows: (1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)-- (A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``subsection''; (B) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); and (iii) in paragraph (5)(B), by striking ``or agency involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''; (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``paragraph''; and (D) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after ``Acquisition''. (2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''. (3) In section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''. SEC. 502. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; and (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''. SEC. 503. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004. (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458) is further amended as follows: (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 458(e)(10)(B)), by striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and inserting ``Department of Justice''. (2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)-- (A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''. (3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''. (4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''. (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows: (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)-- (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional culture''; (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; and (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''. (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and inserting ``Federal''; and (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and inserting ``specific''. SEC. 504. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, ARISING FROM ENACTMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004. (a) References to Head of Intelligence Community.--Title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'': (1) Section 193(d)(2). (2) Section 193(e). (3) Section 201(a). (4) Section 201(b)(1). (5) Section 201(c)(1). (6) Section 425(a). (7) Section 431(b)(1). (8) Section 441(c). (9) Section 441(d). (10) Section 443(d). (11) Section 2273(b)(1). (12) Section 2723(a). (b) Clerical Amendments.--Such title is further amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'': (1) Section 441(c). (2) Section 443(d). (c) Reference to Head of Central Intelligence Agency.-- Section 444 of such title is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. SEC. 505. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949. Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g) of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a).''. SEC. 506. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended-- (1) in the subsection caption, by striking ``Foreign''; and (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears. (b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National Intelligence'' after ``Director''. (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to read as follows: ``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''. SEC. 507. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE. (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence. (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item: ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. SEC. 508. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO REDESIGNATION OF THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY AS THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. (a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'': (A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii). (B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B). (C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)). (D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B). (E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)). (F) Section 5342(a)(1) (in clause (K)). (G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E). (H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)((XIII). (2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' both places it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (B) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows: ``Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications''. (2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 1336 and inserting the following new item:``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.''. (c) Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 201(f)(2)(E) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(f)(2)(E)) is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (d) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (e) Ethics in Government Act of 1978.--Section 105(a)(1) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (f) Other Acts.--(1) Section 7(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2006(b)(2)(A)(i)) is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (2) Section 207(a)(2)(B) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1993 (44 U.S.C. 501 note) is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.", u" Mr. SKELTON submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 2082) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes: Conference Report (H. Rept. 110-478) The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2082), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amendment, insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Definitions. TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONSSec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.Sec. 105. Specific authorization of funds within the National Intelligence Program for which fiscal year 2008 appropriations exceed amounts authorized. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEMSec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.Sec. 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act. TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS Subtitle A--Personnel MattersSec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.Sec. 302. Enhanced flexibility in nonreimbursable details to elements of the intelligence community.Sec. 303. Multi-level security clearances.Sec. 304. Pay authority for critical positions.Sec. 305. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for intelligence collection personnel.Sec. 306. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence community.Sec. 307. Comprehensive report on intelligence community contractors.Sec. 308. Report on proposed pay for performance intelligence community personnel management system.Sec. 309. Report on plans to increase diversity within the intelligence community. Subtitle B--Acquisition MattersSec. 311. Vulnerability assessments of major systems.Sec. 312. Business enterprise architecture and business system modernization for the intelligence community.Sec. 313. Reports on the acquisition of major systems.Sec. 314. Excessive cost growth of major systems. Subtitle C--Other MattersSec. 321. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.Sec. 322. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under the National Security Act of 1947.Sec. 323. Modification of availability of funds for different intelligence activities.Sec. 324. Protection of certain national security information.Sec. 325. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.Sec. 326. Report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006.Sec. 327. Limitation on interrogation techniques.Sec. 328. Limitation on use of funds.Sec. 329. Incorporation of reporting requirements.Sec. 330. Repeal of certain reporting requirements. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National IntelligenceSec. 401. Clarification of limitation on colocation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight Board.Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology.Sec. 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.Sec. 405. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy efficiency reports.Sec. 406. Comprehensive listing of special access programs.Sec. 407. Reports on the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea.Sec. 408. Requirements for accountability reviews by the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 409. Modification of limitation on delegation by the Director of National Intelligence of the protection of intelligence sources and methods.Sec. 410. Authorities for intelligence information sharing.Sec. 411. Authorities of the Director of National Intelligence for interagency funding.Sec. 412. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 413. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 414. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community.Sec. 415. Director of National Intelligence report on retirement benefits for former employees of Air America.Sec. 416. Space intelligence.Sec. 417. Operational files in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 418. Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act to advisory committees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 419. Applicability of the Privacy Act to the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 420. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. Subtitle B--Central Intelligence AgencySec. 431. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.Sec. 432. Inapplicability to Director of the Central Intelligence Agency of requirement for annual report on progress in auditable financial statements.Sec. 433. Additional functions and authorities for protective personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.Sec. 434. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain Central Intelligence Agency positions.Sec. 435. Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence ComponentsSec. 441. Enhancement of National Security Agency training program.Sec. 442. Codification of authorities of National Security Agency protective personnel.Sec. 443. Inspector general matters.Sec. 444. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components of the intelligence community.Sec. 445. Clarification of national security missions of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for analysis and dissemination of certain intelligence information.Sec. 446. Security clearances in the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Subtitle D--Other ElementsSec. 451. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration as elements of the intelligence community. TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS Subtitle A--General Intelligence MattersSec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community.Sec. 502. Report on intelligence activities.Sec. 503. Aerial reconnaissance platforms. Subtitle B--Technical AmendmentsSec. 511. Technical amendments to title 10, United States Code, arising from enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.Sec. 512. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.Sec. 513. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National Intelligence Program.Sec. 514. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities.Sec. 515. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.Sec. 516. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.Sec. 517. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule. SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) Element of the intelligence community.--The term ``element of the intelligence community'' means an element of the intelligence community listed in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (3) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2008 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2008, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 2082 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS. (a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2008 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such element. (b) Transition to Full-Time Equivalency.-- (1) Treatment for fiscal year 2008.--For fiscal year 2008, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each element of the intelligence community, may treat the personnel ceilings authorized under the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) as full-time equivalents. (2) Consideration.--In exercising the authority described in paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence may consider the circumstances under which civilian employees are employed and accounted for at each element of the intelligence community in-- (A) a student program, trainee program, or similar program; (B) reserve corps or equivalent status as a reemployed annuitant or other employee; (C) a joint duty rotational assignment; or (D) other full-time or part-time status. (3) Notification to congress.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing of-- (A) the policies for implementing the authorities described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and (B) the number of all civilian personnel employed by, or anticipated to be employed by, each element of the intelligence community during fiscal year 2008 accounted for-- (i) by position; (ii) by full-time equivalency; or (iii) by any other method. (4) Treatment for fiscal year 2009.--The Director of National Intelligence shall express the personnel levels for all civilian employees for each element of the intelligence community in the congressional budget justifications submitted for fiscal year 2009 as full-time equivalent positions. (c) Authority for Conversion of Activities Performed by Contractors.--In addition to the authority in subsection (a), upon a determination by the head of an element of the intelligence community that activities currently being performed by contractor employees should be performed by government employees, the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence in such determination, and the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize for that purpose employment of additional full-time equivalent personnel in such element of the intelligence community equal to the number that is-- (1) in the case of personnel of Office of the Director of National Intelligence, not more than 5 percent of the number of such personnel authorized for fiscal year 2008 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a); or (2) except as provided in paragraph (1), not more than 10 percent of the number authorized for fiscal year 2008 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). (d) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a) or (c). SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2008 the sum of $734,126,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2009. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 952 full-time or full- time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2008. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available to the Director of National Intelligence under section 103 are also available to the Director for the adjustment of personnel levels within the Intelligence Community Management Account. (d) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2008 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2009. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2008, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $39,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2009, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2010. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of National Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used for purposes of exercising police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions. (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. SEC. 105. SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDS WITHIN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM FOR WHICH FISCAL YEAR 2008 APPROPRIATIONS EXCEED AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED. Funds appropriated for an intelligence or intelligence- related activity within the National Intelligence Program for fiscal year 2008 in excess of the amount specified for such activity in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) shall be deemed to be specifically authorized by Congress for purposes of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)). TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2008 the sum of $262,500,000. SEC. 202. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT. Subparagraph (A) of section 235(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``receiving compensation under the Senior Intelligence Service pay schedule at the rate'' and inserting ``who is at the Senior Intelligence Service rank''. TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS Subtitle A--Personnel Matters SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. SEC. 302. ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY IN NONREIMBURSABLE DETAILS TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h) and section 904(g)(2) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c(g)(2)) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any fiscal year after fiscal year 2007 an officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces may be detailed to the staff of an element of the intelligence community funded through the Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, as jointly agreed to by the Director of National Intelligence and the head of the detailing element (or the designees of such officials), for a period not to exceed 2 years. SEC. 303. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES. (a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that the elements of the intelligence community adopt a multi- level security clearance approach in order to enable the intelligence community to make more effective and efficient use of persons proficient in foreign languages or with cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter expertise that is critical to national security.''. (b) Implementation.--The Director of National Intelligence shall issue guidelines to the intelligence community on the implementation of subsection (s) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 304. PAY AUTHORITY FOR CRITICAL POSITIONS. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 303 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(t) Pay Authority for Critical Positions.--(1) Notwithstanding any pay limitation established under any other provision of law applicable to employees in elements of the intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence may, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, grant authority to fix the rate of basic pay for 1 or more positions within the intelligence community at a rate in excess of any applicable limitation, subject to the provisions of this subsection. The exercise of authority so granted is at the discretion of the head of the department or agency employing the individual in a position covered by such authority, subject to the provisions of this subsection and any conditions established by the Director of National Intelligence when granting such authority. ``(2) Authority under this subsection may be granted or exercised-- ``(A) only with respect to a position which requires an extremely high level of expertise and is critical to successful accomplishment of an important mission; and ``(B) only to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an individual exceptionally well qualified for the position. ``(3) A rate of basic pay may not be fixed under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written approval of the Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by law. ``(4) A rate of basic pay may not be fixed under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate payable for level I of the Executive Schedule under section 5311 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written approval of the President in response to a request by the Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by law. ``(5) Any grant of authority under this subsection for a position shall terminate at the discretion of the Director of National Intelligence.''. SEC. 305. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON CARRIERS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL. (a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director''; (2) in paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection, by striking ``may only delegate'' and all that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority in subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the intelligence community.''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such senior officials of such element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''. (b) Submission of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe and submit to the congressional intelligence committees the guidelines referred to in paragraph (2) of section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a). SEC. 306. ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506A the following new section: ``SEC. 506B. ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ``(a) Requirement To Provide.--The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of the element of the intelligence community concerned, prepare an annual personnel level assessment for such element of the intelligence community that assesses the personnel levels for each such element for the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the assessment is submitted. ``(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees each year along with the budget submitted by the President under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code. ``(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) submitted during a fiscal year shall contain, at a minimum, the following information for the element of the intelligence community concerned: ``(1) The budget submission for personnel costs for the upcoming fiscal year. ``(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current fiscal year. ``(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such costs as compared to the personnel costs during the prior 5 fiscal years. ``(4) The number of personnel positions requested for the upcoming fiscal year. ``(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of such number as compared to the number of personnel positions of the current fiscal year. ``(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of such number as compared to the number of personnel positions during the prior 5 fiscal years. ``(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of contractors to be funded by the element for the upcoming fiscal year. ``(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of such costs of contractors as compared to the best estimate of the costs of contractors of the current fiscal year. ``(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of contractors, and the number of contractors, during the prior 5 fiscal years. ``(10) A written justification for the requested personnel and contractor levels. ``(11) The number of intelligence collectors and analysts employed or contracted by each element of the intelligence community. ``(12) A list of all contractors that have been the subject of an investigation completed by the Inspector General of any element of the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal year, or are or have been the subject of an investigation by such an Inspector General during the current fiscal year. ``(13) A statement by the Director of National Intelligence that, based on current and projected funding, the element concerned will have sufficient-- ``(A) internal infrastructure to support the requested personnel and contractor levels; ``(B) training resources to support the requested personnel levels; and ``(C) funding to support the administrative and operational activities of the requested personnel levels.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506A the following new item:``Sec. 506B. Annual personnel levels assessment for the intelligence community.''. SEC. 307. COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than March 31, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the personal services activities performed by contractors across the intelligence community, the impact of such contractors on the intelligence community workforce, plans for conversion of contractor employment into government employment, and the accountability mechanisms that govern the performance of such contractors. (b) Content.-- (1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include-- (A) a description of any relevant regulations or guidance issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community relating to minimum standards required regarding the hiring, training, security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and how those standards may differ from those for government employees performing substantially similar functions; (B) an identification of contracts where the contractor is providing a substantially similar functions to a government employee; (C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings achieved by awarding contracts for the performance of such functions referred to in subparagraph (B) instead of using full-time employees of the elements of the intelligence community to perform such functions; (D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph (2); (E) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the number of personnel working under such contracts, related to the performance of activities described in paragraph (2); (F) a comparison of the compensation of contract employees and government employees performing substantially similar functions; (G) an analysis of the attrition of government personnel for contractor positions that provide substantially similar functions; (H) a description of positions that will be converted from contractor employment to government employment under the authority described in section 103(c) of this Act and the justification for such conversion; (I) an analysis of accountability mechanisms within services contracts awarded for intelligence activities by each element of the intelligence community during fiscal years 2006 and 2007; (J) an analysis of procedures in use in the intelligence community for conducting oversight of contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel; and (K) an identification of best practices of accountability mechanisms within services contracts. (2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are the following: (A) Intelligence collection. (B) Intelligence analysis. (C) Covert actions, including rendition, detention, and interrogation activities. SEC. 308. REPORT ON PROPOSED PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. (a) Prohibition on Pay for Performance Until Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the head of an element of the intelligence community may not implement a plan that provides compensation to personnel of that element of the intelligence community based on performance until the date that is 45 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence submits a report for that element under subsection (b). (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on performance-based compensation for each element of the intelligence community, including, with respect to each such element-- (1) an implementation time line which includes target dates for completion of-- (A) the development of performance appraisal plans; (B) establishment of oversight and appeal mechanisms; (C) deployment of information technology systems; (D) management training; (E) employee training; (F) compensation transition; and (G) full operational capacity; (2) an estimated budget for the implementation of the performance-based compensation system; (3) an evaluation plan to monitor the implementation of the performance-based compensation system and to improve and modify such system; (4) written standards for measuring the performance of employees; (5) a description of the performance-based compensation system, including budget oversight mechanisms to ensure sufficient funds to pay employees for bonuses; (6) a description of internal and external accountability mechanisms to ensure the fair treatment of employees; (7) a plan for initial and ongoing training for senior executives, managers, and employees; (8) a description of the role of any advisory committee or other mechanism designed to gather the input of employees relating to the creation and implementation of the system; (9) an assessment of the impact of the performance-based compensation system on women, minorities, persons with disabilities, and veterans; and (10) an assessment of the consistency of the plan described in subsection (a) for such element with the plans of the Director of National Intelligence for a performance-based compensation system for the intelligence community. SEC. 309. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than March 31, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each element to increase diversity within the intelligence community. (b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include specific implementation plans to increase diversity within each element of the intelligence community, including-- (1) specific implementation plans for each such element designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic plan of the Director of National Intelligence on equal employment opportunity and diversity; (2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates; (3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior, midgrade, senior, and management levels; (4) a description of specific diversity awareness training and education programs for senior officials and managers of each such element; and (5) a description of performance metrics to measure the success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs described in paragraphs (1) through (4). Subtitle B--Acquisition Matters SEC. 311. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF MAJOR SYSTEMS. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 306 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506B, as added by section 306(a), the following new section: ``VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF MAJOR SYSTEMS ``Sec. 506C. (a) Initial Vulnerability Assessments.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct an initial vulnerability assessment for any major system and its significant items of supply that is proposed for inclusion in the National Intelligence Program prior to completion of Milestone B or an equivalent acquisition decision. The initial vulnerability assessment of a major system and its significant items of supply shall, at a minimum, use an analysis-based approach to-- ``(1) identify vulnerabilities; ``(2) define exploitation potential; ``(3) examine the system's potential effectiveness; ``(4) determine overall vulnerability; and ``(5) make recommendations for risk reduction. ``(b) Subsequent Vulnerability Assessments.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct subsequent vulnerability assessments of each major system and its significant items of supply within the National Intelligence Program-- ``(A) periodically throughout the life span of the major system; ``(B) whenever the Director determines that a change in circumstances warrants the issuance of a subsequent vulnerability assessment; or ``(C) upon the request of a congressional intelligence committee. ``(2) Any subsequent vulnerability assessment of a major system and its significant items of supply shall, at a minimum, use an analysis-based approach and, if applicable, a testing-based approach, to monitor the exploitation potential of such system and reexamine the factors described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (a). ``(c) Major System Management.--The Director of National Intelligence shall give due consideration to the vulnerability assessments prepared for a given major system when developing and determining the annual consolidated National Intelligence Program budget. ``(d) Congressional Oversight.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a copy of each vulnerability assessment conducted under subsection (a) or (b) not later than 10 days after the date of the completion of such assessment. ``(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide the congressional intelligence committees with a proposed schedule for subsequent vulnerability assessments of a major system under subsection (b) when providing such committees with the initial vulnerability assessment under subsection (a) of such system as required by subsection (d). ``(e) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) The term `items of supply'-- ``(A) means any individual part, component, subassembly, assembly, or subsystem integral to a major system, and other property which may be replaced during the service life of the major system, including spare parts and replenishment parts; and ``(B) does not include packaging or labeling associated with shipment or identification of items. ``(2) The term `major system' has the meaning given that term in section 506A(e). ``(3) The term `Milestone B' means a decision to enter into system development and demonstration pursuant to guidance prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(4) The term `vulnerability assessment' means the process of identifying and quantifying vulnerabilities in a major system and its significant items of supply.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 306 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506B, as added by section 306(b), the following:``Sec. 506C. Vulnerability assessments of major systems.''. SEC. 312. BUSINESS ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE AND BUSINESS SYSTEM MODERNIZATION FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Business Enterprise Architecture and Business System Modernization.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by sections 306 and 311 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506C, as added by section 311(a), the following new section: ``INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEMS, ARCHITECTURE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND MODERNIZATION ``Sec. 506D. (a) Limitation on Obligation of Funds for Intelligence Community Business System Modernization.--(1) After April 1, 2008, no funds appropriated to any element of the intelligence community may be obligated for an intelligence community business system modernization described in paragraph (2) unless-- ``(A) the approval authority designated by the Director of National Intelligence under subsection (c)(2) makes the certification described in paragraph (3) with respect to the intelligence community business system modernization; and ``(B) the certification is approved by the Intelligence Community Business Systems Management Committee established under subsection (f). ``(2) An intelligence community business system modernization described in this paragraph is an intelligence community business system modernization that-- ``(A) will have a total cost in excess of $1,000,000; and ``(B) will receive more than 50 percent of the funds for such cost from amounts appropriated for the National Intelligence Program. ``(3) The certification described in this paragraph for an intelligence community business system modernization is a certification, made by the approval authority designated by the Director under subsection (c)(2) to the Intelligence Community Business Systems Management Committee, that the intelligence community business system modernization-- ``(A) complies with the enterprise architecture under subsection (b); or ``(B) is necessary-- ``(i) to achieve a critical national security capability or address a critical requirement in an area such as safety or security; or ``(ii) to prevent a significant adverse effect on a project that is needed to achieve an essential capability, taking into consideration the alternative solutions for preventing such adverse effect. ``(4) The obligation of funds for an intelligence community business system modernization that does not comply with the requirements of this subsection shall be treated as a violation of section 1341(a)(1)(A) of title 31, United States Code. ``(b) Enterprise Architecture for Intelligence Community Business Systems.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall, acting through the Intelligence Community Business Systems Management Committee established under subsection (f), develop and implement an enterprise architecture to cover all intelligence community business systems, and the functions and activities supported by such business systems. The enterprise architecture shall be sufficiently defined to effectively guide, constrain, and permit implementation of interoperable intelligence community business system solutions, consistent with applicable policies and procedures established by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. ``(2) The enterprise architecture under paragraph (1) shall include the following: ``(A) An information infrastructure that, at a minimum, will enable the intelligence community to-- ``(i) comply with all Federal accounting, financial management, and reporting requirements; ``(ii) routinely produce timely, accurate, and reliable financial information for management purposes; ``(iii) integrate budget, accounting, and program information and systems; and ``(iv) provide for the systematic measurement of performance, including the ability to produce timely, relevant, and reliable cost information. ``(B) Policies, procedures, data standards, and system interface requirements that apply uniformly throughout the intelligence community. ``(c) Responsibilities for Intelligence Community Business System Modernization.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for review, approval, and oversight of the planning, design, acquisition, deployment, operation, and maintenance of an intelligence community business system modernization if more than 50 percent of the cost of the intelligence community business system modernization is funded by amounts appropriated for the National Intelligence Program. ``(2) The Director shall designate 1 or more appropriate officials of the intelligence community to be responsible for making certifications with respect to intelligence community business system modernizations under subsection (a)(3). ``(d) Intelligence Community Business System Investment Review.--(1) The approval authority designated under subsection (c)(2) shall establish and implement, not later than March 31, 2008, an investment review process for the review of the planning, design, acquisition, development, deployment, operation, maintenance, modernization, project cost, benefits, and risks of the intelligence community business systems for which the approval authority is responsible. ``(2) The investment review process under paragraph (1) shall-- ``(A) meet the requirements of section 11312 of title 40, United States Code; and ``(B) specifically set forth the responsibilities of the approval authority under such review process. ``(3) The investment review process under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements: ``(A) Review and approval by an investment review board (consisting of appropriate representatives of the intelligence community) of each intelligence community business system as an investment before the obligation of funds for such system. ``(B) Periodic review, but not less often than annually, of every intelligence community business system investment. ``(C) Thresholds for levels of review to ensure appropriate review of intelligence community business system investments depending on the scope, complexity, and cost of the system involved. ``(D) Procedures for making certifications in accordance with the requirements of subsection (a)(3). ``(E) Mechanisms to ensure the consistency of the investment review process with applicable guidance issued by the Director of National Intelligence and the Intelligence Community Business Systems Management Committee established under subsection (f). ``(F) Common decision criteria, including standards, requirements, and priorities, for purposes of ensuring the integration of intelligence community business systems. ``(e) Budget Information.--For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2009, the Director of National Intelligence shall include in the materials the Director submits to Congress in support of the budget for such fiscal year that is submitted to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the following information: ``(1) An identification of each intelligence community business system for which funding is proposed in such budget. ``(2) An identification of all funds, by appropriation, proposed in such budget for each such system, including-- ``(A) funds for current services to operate and maintain such system; and ``(B) funds for business systems modernization identified for each specific appropriation. ``(3) For each such system, identification of approval authority designated for such system under subsection (c)(2). ``(4) The certification, if any, made under subsection (a)(3) with respect to each such system. ``(f) Intelligence Community Business Systems Management Committee.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish an Intelligence Community Business Systems Management Committee (in this subsection referred to as the `Committee'). ``(2) The Committee shall-- ``(A) recommend to the Director policies and procedures necessary to effectively integrate all business activities and any transformation, reform, reorganization, or process improvement initiatives undertaken within the intelligence community; ``(B) review and approve any major update of-- ``(i) the enterprise architecture developed under subsection (b); and ``(ii) any plans for an intelligence community business systems modernization; ``(C) manage cross-domain integration consistent with such enterprise architecture; ``(D) be responsible for coordinating initiatives for intelligence community business system modernization to maximize benefits and minimize costs for the intelligence community, and periodically report to the Director on the status of efforts to carry out an intelligence community business system modernization; ``(E) ensure that funds are obligated for intelligence community business system modernization in a manner consistent with subsection (a); and ``(F) carry out such other duties as the Director shall specify. ``(g) Relation to Annual Registration Requirements.-- Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the requirements of section 8083 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-287; 118 Stat. 989), with regard to information technology systems (as defined in subsection (d) of such section). ``(h) Relation to Defense Business Systems Architecture, Accountability, and Modernization Requirements.--An intelligence community business system that receives more than 50 percent of its funds from amounts available for the National Intelligence Program shall be exempt from the requirements of section 2222 of title 10, United States Code. ``(i) Relation to Clinger-Cohen Act.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence and the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall fulfill the executive agency responsibilities in chapter 113 of title 40, United States Code, for any intelligence community business system that receives more than 50 percent of its funding from amounts appropriated for the National Intelligence Program. ``(2) Any intelligence community business system covered by paragraph (1) shall be exempt from the requirements of such chapter 113 that would otherwise apply to the executive agency that contains the element of the intelligence community involved. ``(j) Reports.--Not later than March 15 of each of the years 2009 through 2014, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the compliance of the intelligence community with the requirements of this section. Each such report shall-- ``(1) describe actions taken and proposed for meeting the requirements of subsection (a), including-- ``(A) specific milestones and actual performance against specified performance measures, and any revision of such milestones and performance measures; and ``(B) specific actions on the intelligence community business system modernizations submitted for certification under such subsection; ``(2) identify the number of intelligence community business system modernizations that received a certification described in subsection (a)(3)(B); and ``(3) describe specific improvements in business operations and cost savings resulting from successful intelligence community business systems modernization efforts. ``(k) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) The term `enterprise architecture' has the meaning given that term in section 3601(4) of title 44, United States Code. ``(2) The terms `information system' and `information technology' have the meanings given those terms in section 11101 of title 40, United States Code. ``(3) The term `intelligence community business system' means an information system, other than a national security system, that is operated by, for, or on behalf of the intelligence community, including financial systems, mixed systems, financial data feeder systems, and the business infrastructure capabilities shared by the systems of the business enterprise architecture that build upon the core infrastructure used to support business activities, such as acquisition, financial management, logistics, strategic planning and budgeting, installations and environment, and human resource management. ``(4) The term `intelligence community business system modernization' means-- ``(A) the acquisition or development of a new intelligence community business system; or ``(B) any significant modification or enhancement of an existing intelligence community business system (other than necessary to maintain current services). ``(5) The term `national security system' has the meaning given that term in section 3542 of title 44, United States Code.''. (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of that Act, as amended by sections 306 and 311 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506C, as added by section 311(b), the following new item:``Sec. 506D. Intelligence community business systems, architecture, accountability, and modernization.''. (b) Implementation.-- (1) Certain duties.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall-- (A) complete the delegation of responsibility for the review, approval, and oversight of the planning, design, acquisition, deployment, operation, maintenance, and modernization of intelligence community business systems required by subsection (c) of section 506D of the National Security Act of 1947 (as added by subsection (a)); and (B) designate a vice chairman and personnel to serve on the Intelligence Community Business System Management Committee established under subsection (f) of such section 506D (as so added). (2) Enterprise architecture.-- (A) Schedule for development.--The Director shall develop the enterprise architecture required by subsection (b) of such section 506D (as so added) by not later than September 1, 2008. (B) Requirement for implementation plan.--In developing such enterprise architecture, the Director shall develop an implementation plan for such enterprise architecture that includes the following: (i) An acquisition strategy for new systems that are expected to be needed to complete such enterprise architecture, including specific time-phased milestones, performance metrics, and a statement of the financial and nonfinancial resource needs. (ii) An identification of the intelligence community business systems in operation or planned as of December 31, 2006, that will not be a part of such enterprise architecture, together with the schedule for the phased termination of the utilization of any such systems. (iii) An identification of the intelligence community business systems in operation or planned as of December 31, 2006, that will be a part of such enterprise architecture, together with a strategy for modifying such systems to ensure that such systems comply with such enterprise architecture. (C) Submission of acquisition strategy.--The Director shall submit the acquisition strategy described in subparagraph (B)(i) to the congressional intelligence committees not later than March 1, 2008. SEC. 313. REPORTS ON THE ACQUISITION OF MAJOR SYSTEMS. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by sections 306, 311, and 312 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506D, as added by section 312(a)(1), the following new section: ``REPORTS ON THE ACQUISITION OF MAJOR SYSTEMS ``Sec. 506E. (a) Annual Reports Required.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees each year, at the same time the budget of the President for the fiscal year beginning in such year is submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, a separate report on each acquisition of a major system by an element of the intelligence community. ``(2) Each report under this section shall be known as a `Report on the Acquisition of Major Systems'. ``(b) Elements.--Each report under this section shall include, for the acquisition of a major system, information on the following: ``(1) The current total acquisition cost for such system, and the history of such cost from the date the system was first included in a report under this section to the end of the calendar quarter immediately proceeding the submittal of the report under this section. ``(2) The current development schedule for the system, including an estimate of annual development costs until development is completed. ``(3) The planned procurement schedule for the system, including the best estimate of the Director of National Intelligence of the annual costs and units to be procured until procurement is completed. ``(4) A full life-cycle cost analysis for such system. ``(5) The result of any significant test and evaluation of such major system as of the date of the submittal of such report, or, if a significant test and evaluation has not been conducted, a statement of the reasons therefor and the results of any other test and evaluation that has been conducted of such system. ``(6) The reasons for any change in acquisition cost, or schedule, for such system from the previous report under this section, if applicable. ``(7) The major contracts or subcontracts related to the major system. ``(8) If there is any cost or schedule variance under a contract referred to in paragraph (7) since the previous report under this section, the reasons for such cost or schedule variance. ``(c) Determination of Increase in Costs.--Any determination of a percentage increase in the acquisition costs of a major system for which a report is filed under this section shall be stated in terms of constant dollars from the first fiscal year in which funds are appropriated for such contract. ``(d) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) The term `acquisition cost', with respect to a major system, means the amount equal to the total cost for development and procurement of, and system-specific construction for, such system. ``(2) The term `full life-cycle cost', with respect to the acquisition of a major system, means all costs of development, procurement, construction, deployment, and operation and support for such program, without regard to funding source or management control, including costs of development and procurement required to support or utilize such system. ``(3) The term `major contract,' with respect to a major system acquisition, means each of the 6 largest prime, associate, or government-furnished equipment contracts under the program that is in excess of $40,000,000 and that is not a firm, fixed price contract. ``(4) The term `major system' has the meaning given that term in section 506A(e). ``(5) The term `significant test and evaluation' means the functional or environmental testing of a major system or of the subsystems that combine to create a major system.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of that Act, as amended by sections 306, 311, and 312 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506D, as added by section 312(a)(2), the following new item:``Sec. 506E. Reports on the acquisition of major systems.''. SEC. 314. EXCESSIVE COST GROWTH OF MAJOR SYSTEMS. (a) Notification.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by sections 306, 311, 312, and 313 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 506E, as added by section 313(a), the following new section: ``EXCESSIVE COST GROWTH OF MAJOR SYSTEMS ``Sec. 506F. (a) Cost Increases of at Least 25 Percent.-- (1)(A) On a continuing basis, and separate from the submission of any report on a major system required by section 506E of this Act, the program manager shall determine if the acquisition cost of such major system has increased by at least 25 percent as compared to the baseline cost of such major system. ``(B) Not later than 10 days after the date that a program manager determines that an increase described in subparagraph (A) has occurred, the program manager shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence notification of such increase. ``(2)(A) If, after receiving a notification described in paragraph (1)(B), the Director of National Intelligence determines that the acquisition cost of a major system has increased by at least 25 percent, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written notification of such determination as described in subparagraph (B), a description of the amount of the increase in the acquisition cost of such major system, and a certification as described in subparagraph (C). ``(B) The notification required by subparagraph (A) shall include-- ``(i) an updated cost estimate; ``(ii) the date on which the determination covered by such notification was made; ``(iii) contract performance assessment information with respect to each significant contract or sub-contract related to such major system, including the name of the contractor, the phase of the contract at the time of the report, the percentage of work under the contract that has been completed, any change in contract cost, the percentage by which the contract is currently ahead or behind schedule, and a summary explanation of significant occurrences, such as cost and schedule variances, and the effect of such occurrences on future costs and schedules; ``(iv) the prior estimate of the full life-cycle cost for such major system, expressed in constant dollars and in current year dollars; ``(v) the current estimated full life-cycle cost of such major system, expressed in constant dollars and current year dollars; ``(vi) a statement of the reasons for any increases in the full life-cycle cost of such major system; ``(vii) the current change and the total change, in dollars and expressed as a percentage, in the full life-cycle cost applicable to such major system, stated both in constant dollars and current year dollars; ``(viii) the completion status of such major system expressed as the percentage-- ``(I) of the total number of years for which funds have been appropriated for such major system compared to the number of years for which it is planned that such funds will be appropriated; and ``(II) of the amount of funds that have been appropriated for such major system compared to the total amount of such funds which it is planned will be appropriated; ``(ix) the action taken and proposed to be taken to control future cost growth of such major system; and ``(x) any changes made in the performance or schedule of such major system and the extent to which such changes have contributed to the increase in full life-cycle costs of such major system. ``(C) The certification described in this subparagraph is a written certification made by the Director and submitted to the congressional intelligence committees that-- ``(i) the acquisition of such major system is essential to the national security; ``(ii) there are no alternatives to such major system that will provide equal or greater intelligence capability at equal or lesser cost to completion; ``(iii) the new estimates of the full life-cycle cost for such major system are reasonable; and ``(iv) the management structure for the acquisition of such major system is adequate to manage and control full life- cycle cost of such major system. ``(b) Cost Increases of at Least 50 Percent.--(1)(A) On a continuing basis, and separate from the submission of any report on a major system required by section 506E of this Act, the program manager shall determine if the acquisition cost of such major system has increased by at least 50 percent as compared to the baseline cost of such major system. ``(B) Not later than 10 days after the date that a program manager determines that an increase described in subparagraph (A) has occurred, the program manager shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence notification of such increase. ``(2) If, after receiving a notification described in paragraph (1)(B), the Director of National Intelligence determines that the acquisition cost of a major system has increased by at least 50 percent as compared to the baseline cost of such major system, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written certification stating that-- ``(A) the acquisition of such major system is essential to the national security; ``(B) there are no alternatives to such major system that will provide equal or greater intelligence capability at equal or lesser cost to completion; ``(C) the new estimates of the full life-cycle cost for such major system are reasonable; and ``(D) the management structure for the acquisition of such major system is adequate to manage and control the full life- cycle cost of such major system. ``(3) In addition to the certification required by paragraph (2), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an updated notification, with current accompanying information, as required by subsection (a)(2). ``(c) Prohibition on Obligation of Funds.--(1) If a written certification required under subsection (a)(2)(A) is not submitted to the congressional intelligence committees within 60 days of the determination made under subsection (a)(1), funds appropriated for the acquisition of a major system may not be obligated for a major contract under the program. Such prohibition on the obligation of funds shall cease to apply at the end of the 30-day period of a continuous session of Congress that begins on the date on which Congress receives the notification required under subsection (a)(2)(A). ``(2) If a written certification required under subsection (b)(2) is not submitted to the congressional intelligence committees within 60 days of the determination made under subsection (b)(2), funds appropriated for the acquisition of a major system may not be obligated for a major contract under the program. Such prohibition on the obligation of funds for the acquisition of a major system shall cease to apply at the end of the 30-day period of a continuous session of Congress that begins on the date on which Congress receives the notification required under subsection (b)(3). ``(d) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) The term `acquisition cost' has the meaning given that term in section 506E(d). ``(2) The term `baseline cost', with respect to a major system, means the projected acquisition cost of such system that is approved by the Director of National Intelligence at Milestone B or an equivalent acquisition decision for the development, procurement, and construction of such system. The baseline cost may be in the form of an independent cost estimate. ``(3) The term `full life-cycle cost' has the meaning given that term in section 506E(d). ``(4) The term `independent cost estimate' has the meaning given that term in section 506A(e). ``(5) The term `major system' has the meaning given that term in section 506A(e). ``(6) The term `Milestone B' means a decision to enter into system development and demonstration pursuant to guidance prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(7) The term `program manager', with respect to a major system, means-- ``(A) the head of the element of the intelligence community which is responsible for the budget, cost, schedule, and performance of the major system; or ``(B) in the case of a major system within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the deputy who is responsible for the budget, cost, schedule, and performance of the major system.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of that Act, as amended by sections 304, 311, 312, and 313 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after the items relating to section 506E, as added by section 313(b), the following new item:``Sec. 506F. Excessive cost growth of major systems.''. Subtitle C--Other Matters SEC. 321. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. SEC. 322. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947. Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking ``other'' the second place it appears. SEC. 323. MODIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DIFFERENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows: ``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and''. SEC. 324. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION. (a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover Intelligence Officers and Agents.-- (1) Disclosure of agent after access to information identifying agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''. (2) Disclosure of agent after access to classified information.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking ``five years'' and inserting ``10 years''. (b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of Intelligence Identities.--The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by inserting ``including an assessment of the need for any modification of this title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert agents,'' after ``measures to protect the identities of covert agents,''. SEC. 325. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS. Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head of such element certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods. ``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who shall keep a record of such information. ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `element of the intelligence community' means an element of the intelligence community listed in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''. SEC. 326. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT OF 2005 AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006. (a) Report Required.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report on all measures taken by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and by each element, if any, of the intelligence community with relevant responsibilities to comply with the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of division A of Public Law 109-148; 119 Stat. 2739) and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-366; 120 Stat. 2600). (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) A description of the detention or interrogation methods, if any, that have been determined to comply with section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 2739; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd) and section 6 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (120 Stat. 2632; 18 U.S.C. 2441 note) (including the amendments made by such section 6), and, with respect to each such method-- (A) an identification of the official making such determination; and (B) a statement of the basis for such determination. (2) A description of the detention or interrogation methods, if any, whose use has been discontinued pursuant to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or the Military Commission Act of 2006, and, with respect to each such method-- (A) an identification of the official making the determination to discontinue such method; and (B) a statement of the basis for such determination. (3) A description of any actions that have been taken to implement section 1004 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 2740; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd-1), and, with respect to each such action-- (A) an identification of the official taking such action; and (B) a statement of the basis for such action. (4) Any other matters that the Director considers necessary to fully and currently inform the congressional intelligence committees about the implementation of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. (5) An appendix containing-- (A) all guidelines for the application of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to the detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence community; and (B) the legal justifications of any office of the Department of Justice about the meaning or application of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 with respect to the detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence community. (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form. (d) Submission to the Congressional Armed Services Committees.--To the extent that the report required by subsection (a) addresses an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense, that portion of the report, and any associated material that is necessary to make that portion understandable, shall also be submitted by the Director of National Intelligence to the congressional armed services committees. (e) Congressional Armed Services Committee Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional armed services committees'' means-- (1) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. SEC. 327. LIMITATION ON INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES. (a) Limitation.--No individual in the custody or under the effective control of an element of the intelligence community or instrumentality thereof, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by the United States Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations. (b) Instrumentality Defined.--In this section, the term ``instrumentality'', with respect to an element of the intelligence community, means a contractor or subcontractor at any tier of the element of the intelligence community. SEC. 328. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS. Not more than 30 percent of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the Expenditure Center referred to on page 157 of Volume VI, Book 1 of the Fiscal Year 2008 - Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Budget Justification, National Intelligence Program, may be obligated or expended until each member of the congressional intelligence committees has been fully and currently informed with respect to intelligence regarding a facility in Syria subject to reported military action by the State of Israel on September 6, 2007, including intelligence relating to any agent or citizen of North Korea, Iran, or any other foreign country present at the facility, and any intelligence provided to the Federal Government by a foreign country regarding the facility (as available). SEC. 329. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the classified annex to this Act is hereby incorporated into this Act and is hereby made a requirement in law. SEC. 330. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. (a) Annual Report on Intelligence.-- (1) Repeal.--Section 109 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404d) is repealed. (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item relating to section 109. (b) Annual and Special Reports on Intelligence Sharing With the United Nations.--Section 112 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (b); and (2) by redesignating subsections (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively. (c) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence Initiatives.--Section 1102(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(1)''; and (2) by striking paragraph (2). (d) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (d); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively. (e) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.-- Section 826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873 note) is repealed. (f) Conforming Amendments.--Section 507(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b(a)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B); and (B) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) through (N) as subparagraphs (A) through (L), respectively; and (2) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraph (D). TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON COLOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of Headquarters With Headquarters of''; (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the Office''; and (3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the headquarters of any other element''. SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD. Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the Director's designee.''. SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7); (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end; and (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following: ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for basic, applied, and advanced research to meet the technology needs of the intelligence community and to be executed by elements of the intelligence community by-- ``(A) systematically identifying, assessing, and prioritizing the most significant intelligence challenges that require technical solutions; and ``(B) examining options to enhance the responsiveness of research programs; ``(6) submit to Congress an annual report on the science and technology strategy of the Director; and''; and (2) in paragraph (3) of subsection (d)-- (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as subparagraphs (B) and (C), respectively; (B) in subparagraph (B), as so redesignated, by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate''; and (C) by inserting before subparagraph (B), as so redesignated, the following new subparagraph: ``(A) identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence community;''. SEC. 404. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND OFFICIALS. (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting the following: ``(a) In General.-- ``(1) Establishment.--The''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403- 3(c)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraphs: ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. ``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center.''. SEC. 405. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA CENTER ENERGY EFFICIENCY REPORTS. (a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the report submitted to Congress under section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote the use of energy efficient computer servers in the United States'' (Public Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later then February 1, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the plan developed under subsection (a). (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. SEC. 406. COMPREHENSIVE LISTING OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS. Not later than February 1, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a classified comprehensive listing of all special access programs under the National Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6))). Such listing may be submitted in a form or forms consistent with the protection of national security. SEC. 407. REPORTS ON THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN AND NORTH KOREA. (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less frequently than once during fiscal year 2008 and twice during fiscal year 2009, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with regard to the nuclear programs of each such country. (b) Content.--Each report submitted by subsection (a) shall include, with respect of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-- (1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each such country; (2) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting standards and practices, of the sources upon which the intelligence used to prepare the assessment described in paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such sources and an assessment of the reliability of each such source; (3) a summary of any intelligence related to any such program gathered or developed since the previous report was submitted under subsection (a), including intelligence collected from both open and clandestine sources for each such country; and (4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence in the assessment described in paragraph (1). (c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of National Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence Estimate on the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in lieu of a report required by subsection (a). (d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form. SEC. 408. REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEWS BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. (a) Responsibility of the Director of National Intelligence.--Subsection (b) of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in paragraph (3)-- (A) by striking ``2004,'' and inserting ``2004 (50 U.S.C. 403 note),''; and (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon and ``and''; and (3) by inserting after paragraph (3), the following new paragraph: ``(4) conduct accountability reviews of elements of the intelligence community and the personnel of such elements, if appropriate.''. (b) Tasking and Other Authorities.--Subsection (f) of section 102A of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8), as paragraphs (8) and (9), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (6), the following new paragraph: ``(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a congressional intelligence committee, conduct accountability reviews of elements of the intelligence community or the personnel of such elements in relation to significant failures or deficiencies within the intelligence community. ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and procedures for conducting accountability reviews under subparagraph (A). ``(C) The requirements of this paragraph shall not limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. SEC. 409. MODIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON DELEGATION BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OF THE PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. Section 102A(i)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i)(3)) is amended by inserting before the period the following: ``or the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community''. SEC. 410. AUTHORITIES FOR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHARING. (a) Authorities for Interagency Funding.--Section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (F), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: ``(G) in carrying out this subsection, without regard to any other provision of law (other than this Act and the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643)), expend funds and make funds available to other departments or agencies of the United States for, and direct the development and fielding of, systems of common concern related to the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information; and ``(H) for purposes of addressing critical gaps in intelligence information sharing or access capabilities, have the authority to transfer funds appropriated for a program within the National Intelligence Program to a program funded by appropriations not within the National Intelligence Program, consistent with paragraphs (3) through (7) of subsection (d).''. (b) Authorities of Heads of Other Departments and Agencies.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of any department or agency of the United States is authorized to receive and utilize funds made available to the department or agency by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)), as amended by subsection (a), and receive and utilize any system referred to in such section that is made available to the department or agency. (c) Reports.-- (1) Requirement for reports.--Not later than February 1 of each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2012, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report detailing the distribution of funds and systems during the preceding fiscal year pursuant to subparagraph (G) or (H) of section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)), as added by subsection (a). (2) Content.--Each such report shall include-- (A) a listing of the agencies or departments to which such funds or systems were distributed; (B) a description of the purpose for which such funds or systems were distributed; and (C) a description of the expenditure of such funds, and the development, fielding, and use of such systems by the receiving agency or department. SEC. 411. AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INTERAGENCY FUNDING. (a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by sections 303 and 304 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(u) Authorities for Interagency Funding.--(1) Notwithstanding section 1346 of title 31, United States Code, or any other provision of law prohibiting the interagency financing of activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B), upon the request of the Director of National Intelligence, any element of the intelligence community may use appropriated funds to support or participate in the interagency activities of the following: ``(A) National intelligence centers established by the Director under section 119B. ``(B) Boards, commissions, councils, committees, and similar groups that are established-- ``(i) for a term of not more than 2 years; and ``(ii) by the Director. ``(2) No provision of law enacted after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 shall be construed to limit or supersede the authority in paragraph (1) unless such provision makes specific reference to the authority in that paragraph.''. (b) Reports.--Not later than February 1 of each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2012, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report detailing the exercise of any authority pursuant to subsection (u) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by subsection (a), during the preceding fiscal year. SEC. 412. TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'' the first place it appears. SEC. 413. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103G the following new section: ``INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ``Sec. 103H. (a) Office of Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community is to-- ``(1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently investigations, inspections, and audits on matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence; ``(2) recommend policies designed-- ``(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence; and ``(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such matters; ``(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of National Intelligence fully and currently informed about-- ``(A) problems and deficiencies relating to matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence; and ``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions; and ``(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly informed of-- ``(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence; and ``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions. ``(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1) There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector General shall be made-- ``(A) without regard to political affiliation; ``(B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of the intelligence community, and prior experience in the field of intelligence or national security; and ``(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or auditing. ``(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the Director of National Intelligence. ``(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the President. The President shall immediately communicate in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal of any individual from the position of Inspector General. ``(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections (g) and (h), it shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community-- ``(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations, inspections, and audits relating to matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and regulations; ``(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director, and to report the progress made in implementing corrective action; ``(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; and ``(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities under this section, to comply with generally accepted government auditing standards. ``(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. ``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7 days to the congressional intelligence committees. ``(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such report. ``(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General considers appropriate. ``(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. ``(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section. ``(C) The level of classification or compartmentation of information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any materials under subparagraph (B). ``(D) Failure on the part of any employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence community to cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate administrative actions by the Director or, on the recommendation of the Director, other appropriate officials of the intelligence community, including loss of employment or the termination of an existing contractual relationship. ``(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the Federal Government-- ``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; and ``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any employee in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity. ``(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an officer having a seal. ``(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of all information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General. ``(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by subpoenas. ``(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on behalf of, any other element of the intelligence community, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. ``(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the United States. ``(g) Coordination Among Inspectors General of Intelligence Community.--(1)(A) In the event of a matter within the jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject to an investigation, inspection, or audit by both the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and an Inspector General, whether statutory or administrative, with oversight responsibility for an element or elements of the intelligence community, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and such other Inspector or Inspectors General shall expeditiously resolve the question of which Inspector General shall conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit. ``(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph (A), the Inspectors General concerned may request the assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum established under subparagraph (C). In the event of a dispute between an Inspector General within an agency or department of the United States Government and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that has not been resolved with the assistance of the Forum, the Inspectors General shall submit the question to the Director of National Intelligence and the head of the agency or department for resolution. ``(C) There is established the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum which shall consist of all statutory or administrative Inspectors General with oversight responsibility for an element or elements of the intelligence community. The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall serve as the chair of the Forum. The Forum shall have no administrative authority over any Inspector General, but shall serve as a mechanism for informing its members of the work of individual members of the Forum that may be of common interest and discussing questions about jurisdiction or access to employees, employees of a contractor, records, audits, reviews, documents, recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be of assistance to more than 1 of its members. ``(2) The Inspector General conducting an investigation, inspection, or audit covered by paragraph (1) shall submit the results of such investigation, inspection, or audit to any other Inspector General, including the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit who did not conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit. ``(h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall be provided with appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices. ``(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector General. The Inspector General shall ensure that any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed has security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such officer or employee. ``(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively. ``(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the Inspector General shall create within the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General. ``(3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government. ``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance. ``(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the intelligence community, conduct, as authorized by this section, an investigation, inspection, or audit of such element and may enter into any place occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. ``(i) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate, unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community during the immediately preceding 6-month period ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall provide any portion of the report involving a component of a department of the United States Government to the head of that department simultaneously with submission of the report to the Director of National Intelligence. ``(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following: ``(i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation, inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered by such report, including a summary of the progress of each particular investigation, inspection, or audit since the preceding report of the Inspector General under this paragraph. ``(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration and implementation of programs and operations of the intelligence community, and in the relationships between elements of the intelligence community, identified by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report. ``(iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective or disciplinary action made by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii). ``(iv) A statement whether or not corrective or disciplinary action has been completed on each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective action has been completed, a description of such corrective action. ``(v) A certification whether or not the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General. ``(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report. ``(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such matters. ``(C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt of a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the report to the congressional intelligence committees together with any comments the Director considers appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any portion of the report involving a component of such department simultaneously with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence committees. ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence. ``(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together with such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any portion of each report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse, or deficiency related to a component of such department simultaneously with transmission of the report to the congressional intelligence committees. ``(3) In the event that-- ``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General; ``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any current or former intelligence community official who-- ``(i) holds or held a position in an element of the intelligence community that is subject to appointment by the President, whether or not by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, including such a position held on an acting basis; ``(ii) holds or held a position in an element of the intelligence community, including a position held on an acting basis, that is appointed by the Director of National Intelligence; or ``(iii) holds or held a position as head of an element of the intelligence community or a position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of section 106; ``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a current or former official described in subparagraph (B); ``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current or former official described in subparagraph (B); or ``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit, the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a report on such matter to the congressional intelligence committees. ``(4) Pursuant to title V, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees any report or findings and recommendations of an investigation, inspection, or audit conducted by the office which has been requested by the Chairman or Vice Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either committee. ``(5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report such complaint or information to the Inspector General. ``(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall determine whether the complaint or information appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a notice of that determination, together with the complaint or information. ``(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the congressional intelligence committees, together with any comments the Director considers appropriate. ``(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or both of the congressional intelligence committees directly. ``(ii) An employee may contact the intelligence committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee-- ``(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the employee's complaint or information and notice of the employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence committees directly; and ``(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices. ``(iii) A member or employee of 1 of the congressional intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information under clause (i) does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a member or employee of such committee. ``(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is taken. ``(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review. ``(G) In this paragraph, the term `urgent concern' means any of the following: ``(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity involving classified information, but does not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters. ``(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity. ``(iii) An action, including a personnel action described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection (f)(3)(B) of this section in response to an employee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph. ``(H) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the findings set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 701(b) of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (title VII of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App. 8H note). ``(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States Code, the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint received by the Inspector General relating to violations of Federal criminal law that involves a program or operation of an element of the intelligence community, or in the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community, consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each such report shall be furnished to the Director. ``(j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by the Director in consultation with the congressional intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (g), the performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to modify or effect the duties and responsibilities of any other Inspector General, whether statutory or administrative, having duties and responsibilities relating to such element.''. (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103G the following new item:``Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''. (b) Repeal of Superseded Authority To Establish Position.-- Section 8K of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is repealed. (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item: ``Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''. SEC. 414. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Report.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by title III of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ``Sec. 508. Not later than February 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the proficiency in foreign languages and, if appropriate, in foreign dialects of each element of the intelligence community, including-- ``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency and the level of proficiency required; ``(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each element will require during the 5-year period beginning on the date of the submission of the report; ``(3) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by-- ``(A) military personnel; and ``(B) civilian personnel; ``(4) the number of applicants for positions in such element in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the proficiency level; ``(5) the number of persons hired by such element with foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language and proficiency level; ``(6) the number of personnel of such element currently attending foreign language training, including the provider of such training; ``(7) a description of such element's efforts to recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a foreign language; ``(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, advanced, and intensive foreign language training; ``(9) for each foreign language and, where appropriate, dialect of a foreign language-- ``(A) the number of positions of such element that require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect; ``(B) the number of personnel of such element that are serving in a position that-- ``(i) requires proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; and ``(ii) does not require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; ``(C) the number of personnel of such element rated at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable; ``(D) whether the number of personnel at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the requirements of such element; ``(E) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as linguists for such element that are not qualified as linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language Roundtable; ``(F) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists for such element during the preceding calendar year; ``(G) the number of personnel serving as linguists that discontinued serving such element during the preceding calendar year; ``(H) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by an ally of the United States; and ``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by contractors; ``(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; and ``(11) recommendations for eliminating required reports relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer relevant.''. (2) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 415b(a)(1)), as amended by section 328(f) of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(M) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community required by section 508.''. (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of such Act is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 507 the following new item:``Sec. 508. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community.''. SEC. 415. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AIR AMERICA. (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to United States citizens for the service of such individuals before 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated company while such company was owned or controlled by the United States Government and operated or managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Report Elements.-- (1) In general.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (A) The history of Air America and associated companies before 1977, including a description of-- (i) the relationship between such companies and the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the United States Government; (ii) the workforce of such companies; (iii) the missions performed by such companies and their employees for the United States; and (iv) the casualties suffered by employees of such companies in the course of their employment with such companies. (B) A description of the retirement benefits contracted for or promised to the employees of such companies before 1977, the contributions made by such employees for such benefits, the retirement benefits actually paid such employees, the entitlement of such employees to the payment of future retirement benefits, and the likelihood that former employees of such companies will receive any future retirement benefits. (C) An assessment of the difference between-- (i) the retirement benefits that former employees of such companies have received or will receive by virtue of their employment with such companies; and (ii) the retirement benefits that such employees would have received and in the future receive if such employees had been, or would now be, treated as employees of the United States whose services while in the employ of such companies had been or would now be credited as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits. (D) Any recommendations regarding the advisability of legislative action to treat employment at such companies as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in light of the relationship between such companies and the United States Government and the services and sacrifices of such employees to and for the United States, and if legislative action is considered advisable, a proposal for such action and an assessment of its costs. (2) Other Content.--The Director of National Intelligence shall include in the report any views of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on the matters covered by the report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate. (c) Assistance of Comptroller General.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall, upon the request of the Director of National Intelligence and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information, assist the Director in the preparation of the report required by subsection (a). (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Air america.--The term ``Air America'' means Air America, Incorporated. (2) Associated company.--The term ``associated company'' means any company associated with or subsidiary to Air America, including Air Asia Company Limited and the Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport, Incorporated. SEC. 416. SPACE INTELLIGENCE. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) as amended by sections 303, 304, and 411 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(v) Consideration of Space Intelligence.-- ``(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall require that space-intelligence related issues and concerns are fully considered in carrying out the authorities of the intelligence community under this Act and under other provisions of law, including in carrying out-- ``(A) the responsibilities and authorities described under subsections (f), (h), and (q); and ``(B) the creation of policy, and in the recruitment, hiring, training, and retention of personnel. ``(2) Additional considerations.--The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that agencies give due consideration to the vulnerability assessment prepared for a given major system, as required in section 506C of this Act, at all stages of architecture and system planning, development, acquisition, operation, and support of a space- intelligence system.''. SEC. 417. OPERATIONAL FILES IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. (a) In General.--Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``OPERATIONAL FILES IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ``Sec. 706. (a) Records From Exempted Operational Files.-- (1) Any record disseminated or otherwise provided to an element of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from the exempted operational files of elements of the intelligence community designated in accordance with this title, and any operational files created by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that incorporate such record in accordance with subparagraph (A)(ii), shall be exempted from the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code that require search, review, publication, or disclosure in connection therewith, in any instance in which-- ``(A)(i) such record is shared within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and not disseminated by that Office beyond that Office; or ``(ii) such record is incorporated into new records created by personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and maintained in operational files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and such record is not disseminated by that Office beyond that Office; and ``(B) the operational files from which such record has been obtained continue to remain designated as operational files exempted from section 552 of title 5, United States Code. ``(2) The operational files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence referred to in paragraph (1)(A)(ii) shall be substantially similar in nature to the originating operational files from which the record was disseminated or provided, as such files are defined in this title. ``(3) Records disseminated or otherwise provided to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from other elements of the intelligence community that are not protected by paragraph (1), and that are authorized to be disseminated beyond the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, shall remain subject to search and review under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, but may continue to be exempted from the publication and disclosure provisions of that section by the originating agency to the extent that such section permits. ``(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, records in the exempted operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, or the Defense Intelligence Agency shall not be subject to the search and review provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, solely because they have been disseminated to an element or elements of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or referenced in operational files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and that are not disseminated beyond the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. ``(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the incorporation of records from the operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, or the Defense Intelligence Agency, into operational files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall not subject that record or the operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency to the search and review provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code. ``(b) Other Records.--(1) Files in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that are not exempted under subsection (a) of this section which contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files shall be subject to search and review under section 552 of title 5, United States Code. ``(2) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that are not exempted under subsection (a) shall not affect the exemption of the originating operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure. ``(3) Records from exempted operational files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence which have been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under subsection (a), and which have been returned to exempted operational files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for sole retention, shall be subject to search and review. ``(c) Search and Review for Certain Purposes.-- Notwithstanding subsection (a), exempted operational files shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning any of the following: ``(1) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 or 552a of title 5, United States Code. ``(2) Any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code. ``(3) The specific subject matter of an investigation by any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity: ``(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. ``(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. ``(C) The Intelligence Oversight Board. ``(D) The Department of Justice. ``(E) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. ``(F) The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ``(d) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) Not less than once every 10 years, the Director of National Intelligence shall review the operational files exempted under subsection (a) to determine whether such files, or any portion of such files, may be removed from the category of exempted files. ``(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of the particular category of files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained therein. ``(3) A complainant that alleges that the Director of National Intelligence has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of the United States of the district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to determining the following: ``(A) Whether the Director has conducted the review required by paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10- year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 or before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the most recent review. ``(B) Whether the Director of National Intelligence, in fact, considered the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review. ``(e) Supersedure of Other Laws.--The provisions of this section may not be superseded except by a provision of law that is enacted after the date of the enactment of this section and that specifically cites and repeals or modifies such provisions. ``(f) Applicability.--The Director of National Intelligence will publish a regulation listing the specific elements within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence whose records can be exempted from search and review under this section. ``(g) Allegation; Improper Withholding of Records; Judicial Review.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), whenever any person who has requested agency records under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, alleges that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has withheld records improperly because of failure to comply with any provision of this section, judicial review shall be available under the terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code. ``(2) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided for under paragraph (1) as follows: ``(A) In any case in which information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court. ``(B) The court shall determine, to the fullest extent practicable, the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties. ``(C) When a complainant alleges that requested records are improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(D)(i) When a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall meet its burden under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission that exempted operational files likely to contain responsive records currently meet the criteria set forth in subsection (a). ``(ii) The court may not order the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to review the content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make the demonstration required under clause (i), unless the complainant disputes the Office's showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(E) In proceedings under subparagraph (C) or (D), a party may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36. ``(F) If the court finds under this subsection that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has improperly withheld requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this section, the court shall order the Office to search and review the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and such order shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to comply with this section. ``(G) If at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this paragraph the Office of the Director of National Intelligence agrees to search the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 705 the following new item:``Sec. 706. Operational files in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. SEC. 418. INAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT TO ADVISORY COMMITTEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. Section 4(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or''; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. SEC. 419. APPLICABILITY OF THE PRIVACY ACT TO THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. Subsection (j) of section 552a of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or''; (2) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and (3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph: ``(2) maintained by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; or''. SEC. 420. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE. (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), respectively; and (3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking paragraphs (3) and (4). (b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further amended-- (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''. Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency SEC. 431. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. (a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended by-- (1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g) and transferring such subsection to the end; and (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection: ``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.-- ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such audits shall be conducted subject to the provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q). ``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that has been terminated or suspended if such covert action was terminated or suspended prior to the last audit of such covert action conducted by the Inspector General and has not been restarted after the date on which such audit was completed. ``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of such audit.''. (b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; (2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; and (3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''. SEC. 432. INAPPLICABILITY TO DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON PROGRESS IN AUDITABLE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking ``the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,''. SEC. 433. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITIES FOR PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. (a) In General.--Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)''; (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated-- (A) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the protection''; and (B) by striking the semicolon and inserting ``, and the protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) Authorize personnel engaged in the performance of protective functions authorized pursuant to subparagraph (A), when engaged in, and in furtherance of, the performance of such functions, to make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States, if such personnel have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony, except that any authority pursuant to this subparagraph may be exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Director and the Attorney General and such personnel may not exercise any authority for the service of civil process or for the investigation of criminal offenses;''. (b) Requirement To Report.--As soon as possible after the date of an exercise of authority under subparagraph (B) of section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)), as added by subsection (a)(3), and not later than 10 days after such date, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing such exercise of authority. SEC. 434. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO TITLES OF CERTAIN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSITIONS. Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended-- (1) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director'' and inserting ``Associate Deputy Director''; (2) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National Clandestine Service''; (3) in subclause (III), by striking ``Deputy Director for Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of Intelligence''; (4) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for Administration'' and inserting ``Director of Support''; and (5) in subclause (V), by striking ``Deputy Director for Science and Technology'' and inserting ``Director of Science and Technology''. SEC. 435. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004. Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after ``subsection (a)),''. Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components SEC. 441. ENHANCEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TRAINING PROGRAM. Subsection (e) of section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''. SEC. 442. CODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 21. (a) The Director of the National Security Agency is authorized to designate personnel of the National Security Agency to perform protective functions for the Director and for any personnel of the Agency designated by the Director. ``(b)(1) In the performance of protective functions under this section, personnel of the Agency designated to perform protective functions pursuant to subsection (a) are authorized, when engaged in, and in furtherance of, the performance of such functions, to make arrests without a warrant for-- ``(A) any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel; or ``(B) any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if such personnel have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony. ``(2) The authority in paragraph (1) may be exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Director and the Attorney General. ``(3) Personnel of the Agency designated to perform protective functions pursuant to subsection (a) shall not exercise any authority for the service of civil process or the investigation of criminal offenses. ``(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect any authority under any other provision of law relating to the performance of protective functions. ``(d) As soon as possible after the date of an exercise of authority under this section and not later than 10 days after such date, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing such exercise of authority. ``(e) In this section, the term `congressional intelligence committees' means-- ``(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''. SEC. 443. INSPECTOR GENERAL MATTERS. (a) Coverage Under Inspector General Act of 1978.-- Subsection (a)(2) of section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8G) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``the Defense Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,''; (2) by inserting ``the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,'' after ``the National Endowment for the Humanities,''; and (3) by inserting ``the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency,'' after ``the National Labor Relations Board,''. (b) Certain Designations Under Inspector General Act of 1978.--Subsection (a) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8H) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) The Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency shall be designees of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for purposes of this section.''. (c) Power of Heads of Elements Over Investigations.-- Subsection (d) of section 8G of that Act-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(d)''; (2) in the second sentence of paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this subsection, by striking ``The head'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (2), the head''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2)(A) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, may prohibit the Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community specified in subparagraph (D) from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation if the Secretary determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. ``(B) If the Secretary exercises the authority under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall submit to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E) an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of the authority not later than 7 days after the exercise of the authority. ``(C) At the same time the Secretary submits under subparagraph (B) a statement on the exercise of the authority in subparagraph (A) to the committees of Congress specified in subparagraph (E), the Secretary shall notify the Inspector General of such element of the submittal of such statement and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such statement. The Inspector General may submit to such committees of Congress any comments on a notice or statement received by the Inspector General under this subparagraph that the Inspector General considers appropriate. ``(D) The elements of the intelligence community specified in this subparagraph are as follows: ``(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(ii) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(iii) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(iv) The National Security Agency. ``(E) The committees of Congress specified in this subparagraph are-- ``(i) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''. SEC. 444. CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT OF HEADS OF CERTAIN COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Director of National Security Agency.--The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after the first section the following new section: ``Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law.''. (b) Director of National Reconnaissance Office.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (c) Positions of Importance and Responsibility.-- (1) Designation of positions.--The President may designate any of the positions referred to in paragraph (2) as positions of importance and responsibility under section 601 of title 10, United States Code. (2) Covered positions.--The positions referred to in this paragraph are as follows: (A) The Director of the National Security Agency. (B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (d) Effective Date and Applicability.--The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply upon the earlier of-- (1) the date of the nomination by the President of an individual to serve in the position concerned, except that the individual serving in such position as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to such position, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or (2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the duties of such position by the individual performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 445. CLARIFICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY MISSIONS OF NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION OF CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. Section 442(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2): ``(2)(A) As directed by the Director of National Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall also develop a system to facilitate the analysis, dissemination, and incorporation of likenesses, videos, and presentations produced by ground-based platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations or available as open-source information, into the National System for Geospatial Intelligence. ``(B) The authority provided by this paragraph does not include authority for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to manage tasking of handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations.''; and (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (1)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (1) and (2)''. SEC. 446. SECURITY CLEARANCES IN THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL- INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The Secretary of Defense shall, during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2008, delegate to the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency personnel security authority with respect to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (including authority relating to the use of contractor personnel in investigations and adjudications for security clearances) that is identical to the personnel security authority of the Director of the National Security Agency with respect to the National Security Agency. Subtitle D--Other Elements SEC. 451. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AS ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H)-- (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine Corps,''; and (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''. TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Extension.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking ``September 1, 2004'' and inserting ``December 31, 2008''. (2) Effective date.--Subject to paragraph (3), the amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of such section 1007. (3) Commission membership.-- (A) In general.--The membership of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community established under subsection (a) of section 1002 of such Act (Public Law 107- 306; 116 Stat. 2438) (referred to in this section as the ``Commission'') shall be considered vacant and new members shall be appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as amended by subparagraph (B). (B) Technical amendment.--Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) of such section 1002 is amended by striking ``The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management.'' and inserting ``The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Funding.-- (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the Intelligence Community Management Account, the Director of National Intelligence shall make $2,000,000 available to the Commission to carry out title X of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2437). (2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended. SEC. 502. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing authorizations, if any, granted during the 10-year period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act to engage in intelligence activities related to the overthrow of a democratically elected government. SEC. 503. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS. Section 133(b) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364; 120 Stat. 2112) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) by striking ``After fiscal year 2007'' and inserting ``For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2007''; and (B) by inserting ``, in that fiscal year,'' after ``Secretary of Defense''; and (2) in paragraph (2)-- (A) by inserting ``in a fiscal year'' after ``Department of Defense''; and (B) by inserting ``in that fiscal year'' after ``Congress''. Subtitle B--Technical Amendments SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, ARISING FROM ENACTMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004. (a) References to Head of Intelligence Community.--Title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'' in the following: (1) Section 193(d)(2). (2) Section 193(e). (3) Section 201(a). (4) Section 201(b)(1). (5) Section 201(c)(1). (6) Section 425(a). (7) Section 431(b)(1). (8) Section 441(c). (9) Section 441(d). (10) Section 443(d). (11) Section 2273(b)(1). (12) Section 2723(a). (b) Clerical Amendments.--Such title is further amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'' in the following: (1) Section 441(c). (2) Section 443(d). (c) Reference to Head of Central Intelligence Agency.-- Section 444 of such title is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. SEC. 512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949. Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a).''. SEC. 513. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears. (b) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence.-- That section is further amended-- (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National Intelligence'' after ``Director''. (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to read as follows: ``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''. SEC. 514. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; and (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''. SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947. The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended as follows: (1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)-- (A) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); and (iii) in paragraph (5)(B), by striking ``or agency involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''; (B) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``paragraph''; and (C) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after ``Acquisition''. (2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''. (3) In section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''. SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004. (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643) is amended as follows: (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and inserting ``Department of Justice''. (2) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''. (3) In section 1072(b), in the subsection heading by inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''. (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended as follows: (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)-- (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional culture''; (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; and (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''. (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and inserting ``Federal''; and (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and inserting ``specific''. SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE. (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item: ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. And the Senate agree to the same. From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for consideration of the House bill and the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Silvestre Reyes, Alcee L. Hastings, Leonard L. Boswell, Bud Cramer, Anna G. Eshoo, Rush Holt, C.A. Ruppersberger, Mike Thompson, Janice Schakowsky, James R. Langevin, Patrick J. Murphy. From the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of defense tactical intelligence and related activities: Ike Skelton, John M. Spratt, Jr., Managers on the Part of the House. John Rockefeller, Dianne Feinstein, Ron Wyden, Evan Bayh, Barbara A. Mikulski, Russell D. Feingold, Bill Nelson, Sheldon Whitehouse, Chuck Hagel, Olympia J. Snowe, As additional conferee: Carl Levin, Managers on the Part of the Senate. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE The managers on the part of the Senate and the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2082), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, submit the following joint statement to the Senate and House in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying conference report. The classified nature of United States intelligence activities precludes disclosure of details of budgetary recommendations in this conference report. The managers have therefore prepared a classified supplement to this conference report that contains the classified annex to this conference report and the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The managers agree that the congressionally directed actions described in the House bill, the Senate amendment, the respective committee reports, and classified annexes accompanying H.R. 2082 and S. 1538, should be undertaken to the extent that such congressionally directed actions are not amended, altered, substituted, or otherwise specifically addressed in either this Joint Explanatory Statement or in the classified annex to the conference report on the bill H.R. 2082. The Senate amendment struck all of the House bill after the enacting clause and inserted a substitute text. The House recedes from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate with an amendment that is a substitute for the House bill and the Senate amendment. The differences between the House bill, the Senate amendment, and the substitute agreed to in conference are noted below, except for clerical corrections, conforming changes made necessary by agreements reached by the conferees, and minor drafting and clarifying changes. TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS Section 101. Authorization of appropriations Section 101 of the conference report authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of a list of United States Government departments, agencies, and other elements. Section 101 is identical to Section 101 of the House bill, and similar to Section 101 of the Senate amendment. Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts authorized to be Section 101 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal year 2008, and (subject to Section 103) the personnel ceilings authorized for fiscal year 2008, are contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Schedule of Authorizations will be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. Section 102 is similar to Section 102 of the House bill. Section 102 of the Senate amendment had provided that personnel authorizations for the Intelligence Community would be in terms of personnel levels, expressed as full-time equivalent positions, rather than personnel ceilings, as in the House bill and prior intelligence authorizations. The conferees followed the House in this regard, but established in Section 103 an authority during fiscal year 2008 for the management of the personnel authorized under Section 102 as full-time equivalents. Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments Section 103 provides procedures to enhance the flexibility of the Director of National Intelligence (``DNI'') to manage the personnel levels of the Intelligence Community. Section 103(a) allows the DNI, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB''), to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized under Section 102 by an amount not to exceed three percent of the total limit applicable to each Intelligence Community element. Before the DNI may authorize this increase, the DNI must determine that the action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions and notify the congressional intelligence committees. Section 103 of the Senate amendment had provided that this authority could extend to five percent. Section 103 of the House bill had set the additional amount at two percent. The conference agreement of three percent is part of a package of personnel flexibility mechanisms in Section 103. Section 103(b) provides for a one-year transition in the description of the personnel authorization in the annual intelligence authorization, and the subsequent implementation of that authorization by the DNI, from ``personnel ceilings'' to ``personnel levels expressed as full-time equivalent positions.'' Although the DNI has not previously managed Intelligence Community personnel limits in terms of full-time equivalent positions, the conferees have determined that the DNI should use this practice in the future to plan and manage personnel levels within the Intelligence Community. The use of full-time equivalent positions will allow Intelligence Community elements to plan for and manage its workforce based on overall hours of work, rather than number of employees, as a truer measure of personnel levels. This approach is consistent with general governmental practice and will provide the DNI and Congress with a more accurate measurement of personnel levels. For example, it will enable Intelligence Community elements to count two half-time employees as holding the equivalent of one full-time position, rather than counting them as two employees against a ceiling. To provide the DNI with time to address any difficulties arising from counting by full-time equivalent positions rather than personnel levels, the conferees agreed that Sections 102 and 103 would allow, but do not require, the DNI to manage personnel levels by full-time equivalent positions in fiscal year 2008. One aspect of this transition will be the consideration of the manner in which elements of the Intelligence Community account for (or presently fail to account for) a variety of part-time arrangements. These include, but are not limited to, the circumstances set forth in paragraph (2) of subsection 103(b): student or trainee programs; reemployment of annuitants in the National Intelligence Reserve Corps; joint duty rotational assignments; and other full-time or part-time positions. During their consideration of the DNI's request for authority to manage personnel as full-time equivalents, the congressional intelligence committees have learned that practices within the Intelligence Community on the counting of personnel are inconsistent, and include not counting certain personnel at all against personnel ceilings. The discretionary authority that is granted to the DNI during fiscal year 2008 will permit the DNI to authorize Intelligence Community elements to continue (but not expand) for this one additional fiscal year their existing methods of counting, or not counting, part-time employees against personnel ceilings, while ensuring that by the beginning of fiscal year 2009 there is a uniform and accurate method of counting all Intelligence Community employees under a system of personnel levels expressed as full-time equivalents. To ensure that the transition is complete by the beginning of fiscal year 2009, paragraph (4) of Section 103(b) provides that the DNI shall express the personnel level for all civilian employees of the Intelligence Community as full-time equivalent positions in the congressional budget justifications for that fiscal year. Section 103(c) establishes authority that will enable the DNI to reduce the number of Intelligence Community contractors by providing the flexibility to add a comparable number of government personnel to replace those contractor employees. Section 103(c) accomplishes this by permitting the DNI to authorize employment of additional personnel if the head of an element in the Intelligence Community determines that activities currently being performed by contractor employees should be performed by government employees, the DNI agrees with the determination, and the Director of OMB approves. The DNI may not authorize this for more than ten percent of the total number of personnel authorized for each element of the Intelligence Community under Section 102, except that within the Office of the DNI that limit shall be five percent. Section 103(c) is similar to Section 103(b) of the Senate amendment. The House bill did not have a similar provision. The percentage limits on the authority are part of the conferees' agreement. Section 103(d) provides for notifications to the congressional intelligence committees of the exercise of authority under Sections 103(a) and 103(d). Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account Section 104 authorizes the sum of $734,126,000 in fiscal year 2008 for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence. The Intelligence Community Management Account is part of the Community Management Account. The section authorizes 952 full-time or full-time equivalent personnel for the Intelligence Community Management Account, who may be either permanent employees or individuals detailed from other elements of the United States Government. Section 104 also authorizes additional funds and personnel in the classified Schedule of Authorizations for the Community Management Account. Section 104 is similar to Section 104 of the Senate amendment and Section 104 of the House bill. As in Section 104 of the Senate amendment, the DNI may use the authorities in Section 103 to adjust personnel levels in elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account, subject to the limitations in that section. Section 104 also authorizes funds from the Intelligence Community Management Account for the National Drug Intelligence Center (``NDIC''). These funds may not be used for purposes of exercising police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions. This provision authorizing funds for NDIC was included in Section 104 of the House bill, but was not included in Section 104 of the Senate amendment. Section 105. Specific authorization of funds within the National Intelligence Program for which fiscal year 2008 appropriations exceed amounts authorized Section 105 authorizes, solely for the purposes of reprogramming under Section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)), those funds appropriated within the National Intelligence Program in fiscal year 2008 in excess of the amount specified for such activity in the classified Schedule of Authorizations (as described in greater detail in the Classified Annex) to accompany this conference report. Under this authority, funds appropriated for a specific purpose but not authorized for that purpose will still be available for use by the Intelligence Community but can be applied only to other intelligence activities within the National Intelligence Program under established reprogramming procedures. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM Section 201. Authorization of appropriations Section 201 authorizes appropriations of $262,500,000 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund. Section 201 of the House bill and Section 201 of the Senate amendment are identical. Section 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act Section 202 updates the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act to reflect the use of pay levels within the Senior Intelligence Service program, rather than pay grades, by the Central Intelligence Agency (``CIA''). Section 202 is identical to Section 202 of the Senate amendment, and substantially similar to Section 202 of the House bill. TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS Subtitle A--Personnel Matters Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law. Section 301 is identical to Section 301 of the Senate amendment and the House bill. Section 302. Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable details to elements of the Intelligence Community Section 302 expands from one year to up to two years the length of time that United States Government personnel may be detailed to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (``ODNI'') on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis under which the employee continues to be paid by the home agency. To utilize this authority, the joint agreement of the DNI and head of the detailing element is required. As explained by the DNI, this authority will provide flexibility for the ODNI to receive support from other elements of the Intelligence Community for community-wide activities where both the home agency and the ODNI would benefit from the detail. Section 308 of the Senate amendment would have expanded the time available for reimbursable or non-reimbursable details to three years. Section 104 of the House bill allowed non- reimbursable details of less than one year. The conferees agreed to a two-year maximum for reimbursable or non- reimbursable details. Section 303. Multi-level security clearances Section 303 adds a provision to section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), which generally sets forth the responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence. The new provision states that the DNI shall be responsible for ensuring that the elements of the Intelligence Community adopt a multi-level clearance approach that allows for clearances consistent with the protection of national security that can be tailored to particular circumstances in order to enable the more effective and efficient use of persons proficient in foreign languages or with cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter expertise that is critical to national security. Section 303 is based on Section 406 of the House bill. The Senate amendment did not have a comparable provision. Under the House provision, the DNI would have been required to establish a multi-level clearance system throughout the Intelligence Community. Pursuant to the conference amendment, the DNI shall, within six months of enactment, issue guidelines to the Intelligence Community to support and facilitate the implementation of a multi-level approach across the Intelligence Community. Section 304. Pay authority for critical positions Section 304 adds a new subsection to section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) to provide enhanced pay authority for critical positions in portions of the Intelligence Community where that authority does not now exist. It allows the DNI to authorize the head of a department or agency with an Intelligence Community element to fix a rate of compensation in excess of applicable limits with respect to a position that requires an extremely high level of expertise and is critical to accomplishing an important mission. A rate of pay higher than Executive Level II would require written approval of the DNI. A rate higher than Executive Level I would require written approval of the President in response to a DNI request. Section 304 is identical to the corresponding portion of Section 405 of the Senate amendment. The House bill did not have a comparable provision. The section of the Senate bill that contained this pay authority also would have provided additional authority to enable the DNI to harmonize personnel rules in the Intelligence Community. It would have enabled the DNI, with the concurrence of a department or agency head, to convert competitive service positions and incumbents within an Intelligence Community element to excepted positions. It also would have granted authority to the DNI to authorize Intelligence Community elements--with concurrence of the concerned department or agency heads and in coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management--to adopt compensation, performance, management, and scholarship authority that have been authorized for any other Intelligence Community element. The conferees recommend that these proposals be studied further during consideration of the fiscal year 2009 authorization. Section 305. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for intelligence collection personnel Section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k) allows the DNI to authorize travel on any common carrier when it is consistent with Intelligence Community mission requirements or, more specifically, is required for cover purposes, operational needs, or other exceptional circumstances. As presently written, the DNI may only delegate this authority to the Principal Deputy DNI (``PDDNI'') or, with respect to CIA employees, to the Director of the CIA. Section 305 provides that the DNI may delegate the authority in section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 to the head of any element. This expansion is consistent with the view of the conferees that the DNI should be able to delegate authority throughout the Intelligence Community when such delegation serves the overall interests of the Intelligence Community. Section 305 also provides that the head of an Intelligence Community element to which travel authority has been delegated is empowered to delegate it to senior officials of the element as specified in guidelines issued by the DNI. This allows for administrative flexibility consistent with the guidance of the DNI for the entire Intelligence Community. To facilitate oversight, the DNI shall submit the guidelines to the congressional intelligence committees. Section 305 is identical to Section 304 of the Senate amendment and substantially the same as Section 306 of the House bill. Section 306. Annual personnel level assessments for the Intelligence Community Section 306 requires the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the head of the element of the Intelligence Community concerned, to prepare an annual assessment of the personnel and contractor levels for each element of the Intelligence Community for the following fiscal year. Section 306 is a new mechanism to allow both the Executive branch and Congress to better oversee personnel growth in the Intelligence Community. Section 306 combines elements from Section 315 of the Senate amendment, and Sections 411 and 414 of the House bill. The assessment required by Section 306 seeks information about budgeted personnel and contractor costs and levels, a comparison of this information to current fiscal year and historical five year data, and a written justification for the requested personnel and contractor levels. The assessment also requires the DNI to state that, based on current and projected funding, the element will have sufficient internal infrastructure and training resources to support the requested personnel and contractor levels, and sufficient funding to support the administrative and operational activities of the requested personnel levels. All of this information was required in Section 315 of the Senate amendment. Section 306 also requires that the assessment contain information about intelligence collectors and analysts employed or contracted by each element of the Intelligence Community, and contractors who are the subjects of an Inspector General investigation, information that was requested in Sections 414 and 411, respectively, of the House bill. The assessment must be submitted to congressional intelligence committees with the submission of the President's budget request. The conferees believe that the personnel level assessment required by Section 306 will provide information necessary for the Executive branch and Congress to understand the consequences of modifying the Intelligence Community's personnel levels. Section 306 therefore recognizes that, although the conferees supported personnel growth in the post-September 11, 2001 period, personnel growth must be better planned in the future to accomplish the goals of strengthening intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. In addition, the Administration must adequately fund its personnel growth plan, and structure its resources, to ensure that personnel growth is not done at the expense of other programs. With regard to historical contractor levels to be included in the annual assessments, the DNI has expressed concern that there was no completed effort, prior to the ODNI's contractor inventory initiated in June 2006, to comprehensively capture information on the number and costs of contractors throughout the Intelligence Community. Although the Intelligence Community has not adequately focused on this issue in past years, the conferees believe it is important to require the DNI to attempt to assess historical contractor levels. Because of the concerns outlined by the DNI, however, conferees understand that information about contractor levels prior to June 2006 may need to be reported as a best estimate. The conferees are also concerned about the Intelligence Community's increasing reliance on contractors to meet mission requirements. The Intelligence Community employs a significant number of ``core'' contractors who provide direct support to Intelligence Community mission areas and are generally indistinguishable from the United States Government personnel whose mission they support. Because of the cost disparity between employing a United States civilian employee, estimated to cost an average of $126,500 annually, and a core contractor, estimated to cost an average of $250,000 annually, the conferees believe that the Intelligence Community should strive to reduce its dependence on contractors. The personnel assessment required in Section 306 should assist the DNI and the congressional intelligence committees in determining the appropriate balance of contractors and permanent government employees. Section 307. Comprehensive report on Intelligence Community contractors Section 307 requires the DNI to provide a one-time report by March 31, 2008, describing the personal services activities performed by contractors across the Intelligence Community, the impact of contractors on the Intelligence Community, and the accountability mechanisms that govern contractors. Intelligence Community leaders continue to lack an adequate factual and policy basis for controlling the size and use of its large contractor workforce. Among other things, the Intelligence Community lacks a clear definition of the functions that may be appropriately performed by contractors and, as a result, whether contractors are performing functions that should be performed by government employees. Generally, the conferees are concerned that the Intelligence Community does not have procedures for overseeing contractors and ensuring the identification of criminal violations or the prevention and redress of financial waste, fraud, or other abuses by contractors. The report is intended to help both the Intelligence Community and the congressional intelligence committees identify the facts and chart solutions. The report should also address the DNI's plans for conversion of contractors into employees under the authority provided in Section 103 of this Act. Section 307 is based on Section 411 of the House bill. Section 411 would have required an annual report on the oversight of Intelligence Community contractors, and three separate one-time reports on accountability mechanisms governing Intelligence Community contractors, the impact of contractors on the Intelligence Community workforce, and the use of contractors for intelligence activities. The Senate amendment had addressed reporting on contractors in Section 315 of the Senate amendment. The conferees consolidated these reporting requirements into the single report required by Section 307 and the annual assessment on consideration of the levels of the contractor workforce in Section 306. Section 308. Report on proposed pay-for-performance Intelligence Community personnel management system Section 308 prohibits the implementation of pay-for- performance compensation reform within an element of the Intelligence Community until 45 days after the DNI submits to the Congress a detailed plan for the implementation of the compensation plan at the particular element of the Intelligence Community in question. The DNI voiced concern that Section 307 of the House bill would have prohibited the heads of the elements of the Intelligence Community from implementing tailored pay plans under other existing statutory authorities and would have hindered DNI efforts to establish a program within the Intelligence Community ``to provide common pay, performance evaluation and benefits throughout the Community.'' By agreeing that the requirements of Section 308 would be applicable on an element-by-element basis, the conferees sought to ensure that plans for elements that are ready to proceed are not delayed by the planning requirements for elements that are not ready to proceed. With regard to the objective of providing for common pay, performance evaluation, and benefits throughout the Intelligence Community, the conferees added as an item of each report how the implementation of pay-for-performance in the element is consistent with the DNI's overall plans for a performance-based compensation system. The Senate amendment had no comparable provision. Section 309. Report on plan to increase diversity within the Intelligence Community Section 309 requires the DNI, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the Intelligence Community, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each element of the Intelligence Community, including the Office of the DNI (``ODNI''), to increase diversity within that element. The report shall include the specific implementation plans to increase diversity. Section 308 of the House bill had required the DNI to submit a strategic plan to increase diversity within the Intelligence Community and had prohibited the expenditure of more than 80 percent of the amount appropriated to the Intelligence Community Management Fund until the report was delivered to Congress. The conferees altered the requirements of Section 308 of the House bill to recognize the information submitted to the congressional intelligence committees by the DNI following passage of the House bill, and to tailor the provision to obtain other information sought by the congressional intelligence committees. To ensure that the report is submitted in a timely fashion, Section 309 now requires the DNI to submit the report by no later than March 31, 2008. The Senate amendment had no comparable provision. Subtitle B--Acquisition Matters Section 311. Vulnerability assessments of major systems Section 311 adds a new oversight mechanism to the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) that requires the DNI to conduct an initial vulnerability assessment and subsequent assessments of every major system and its significant items of supply in the National Intelligence Program (``NIP''). The intent of the provision is to provide Congress and the DNI with an accurate assessment of the unique vulnerabilities and risks associated with each National Intelligence Program major system to allow a determination of whether funding for a particular major system should be modified or discontinued. The vulnerability assessment process will also require the various elements of the Intelligence Community responsible for implementing major systems to give due consideration to the risks and vulnerabilities associated with such implementation. Section 311 requires the DNI to conduct an initial vulnerability assessment on every major system proposed for the NIP prior to completion of Milestone B or an equivalent acquisition decision. The minimum requirements of the initial vulnerability assessment are fairly broad and intended to provide the DNI with significant flexibility in crafting an assessment tailored to the proposed major system. Thus, the DNI is required to use at a minimum, an analysis-based approach to identify vulnerabilities, define exploitation potential, examine the system's potential effectiveness, determine overall vulnerability, and make recommendations for risk reduction. The DNI is obviously free to adopt a more rigorous methodology for the conduct of initial vulnerability assessments. Vulnerability assessment should continue through the life of a major system. Numerous factors and considerations can affect the viability of a given major system. For that reason, Section 311 provides the DNI with the flexibility to set a schedule of subsequent vulnerability assessments for each major system when the DNI submits the initial vulnerability assessment to the congressional intelligence committees. The time period between assessments should depend upon the unique circumstances of a particular major system. For example, a new major system that is implementing some experimental technology might require annual assessments while a more mature major system might not need such frequent reassessment. The DNI is also permitted to adjust a major system's assessment schedule when the DNI determines that a change in circumstances warrants the issuance of a subsequent vulnerability assessment. Section 311 also provides that a congressional intelligence committee may request the DNI to conduct a subsequent vulnerability assessment of a major system. The minimum requirements for a subsequent vulnerability assessment are almost identical to those of an initial vulnerability assessment. There are only two additional requirements. First, if applicable to the given major system during its particular phase of development or production, the DNI must also use a testing-based approach to assess the system's vulnerabilities. Obviously, common sense needs to prevail here. For example, the testing approach is not intended to require the ``crash testing'' of a satellite system. Nor is it intended to require the DNI to test system hardware. However, the vulnerabilities of a satellite's significant items of supply might be exposed by a rigorous testing regime. Second, the subsequent vulnerability assessment is required to monitor the exploitation potential of the major system. Thus, a subsequent vulnerability assessment should monitor ongoing changes to vulnerabilities and understand the potential for exploitation. Since new vulnerabilities can become relevant and the characteristics of existing vulnerabilities can change, it is necessary to monitor both existing vulnerabilities and their characteristics, and to check for new vulnerabilities on a regular basis. Section 311 requires the DNI to give due consideration to the vulnerability assessments prepared for the major systems within the NIP. It also requires that the vulnerability assessments be provided to the congressional intelligence committees within ten days of their completion. The conferees encourage the DNI to also share the results of these vulnerabilities assessments, as appropriate, with other congressional committees of jurisdiction. Finally, the section contains definitions for the terms ``items of supply,'' ``major system,'' ``Milestone B,'' and ``vulnerability assessment.'' Section 311 is similar to Section 310 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. Section 312. Business enterprise architecture and business system modernization for the Intelligence Community Section 312 requires the DNI to create a business enterprise architecture that defines all Intelligence Community business systems, as well as the functions and activities supported by those business systems, in order to guide with sufficient detail the implementation of interoperable Intelligence Community business system solutions. The conferees expect the DNI will include Department of Defense representatives in the established forum as appropriate. The conferees agreed that the business enterprise architecture and transition plan are to be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees by September 1, 2008. The acquisition strategy, however, is to be submitted by March 1, 2008. Section 312 will provide the congressional oversight committees the assurance that business systems that cost more than a million dollars and that receive more than 50 percent of their funding from the National Intelligence Program will be efficiently and effectively coordinated. It will also provide a list of all ``legacy systems'' that will be either terminated or transitioned into the new architecture. Further, this section will require the DNI to report to the Committee no less often than annually, for five years, on the progress being made in successfully implementing the new architecture. Section 312 is similar to Section 312 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. Section 313. Reports on acquisition of major systems Section 313 amends Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) to require annual reports from the DNI for each major system acquisition by an element of the Intelligence Community. These reports must include, among other items, information about the current total acquisition cost for such system, the development schedule for the system including an estimate of annual development costs until development is completed, the planned procurement schedule for the system, including the best estimate of the DNI of the annual costs and units to be procured until procurement is completed, a full life-cycle cost analysis for such system, and the result of any significant test and evaluation of such major system as of the date of the submittal of such report. Section 313 includes definitions for ``acquisition cost,'' ``full life-cycle cost,'' ``major contract,'' ``major system,'' and ``significant test and evaluation.'' Section 313 is similar to Section 313 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. Section 314. Excessive cost growth of major systems Section 314 amends Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) to require that, in addition to the report required under Section 313, the program manager of a major system acquisition project shall determine on a continuing basis if the acquisition cost of such major system has increased by at least 25 percent as compared to the baseline of such major system. The program manager must inform the DNI of any such determination and the DNI must submit a written notification to the congressional intelligence committees if the DNI makes the same such determination. Section 314 is intended to mirror the Nunn-McCurdy provision in Title 10 of the United States Code that applies to major defense acquisition programs. The conferees envision that the determination will be done as needed by the program manager of the major system acquisition and should not wait until the time that the DNI's annual report is filed. In other words, the conferees expect the congressional intelligence committees to be advised on a regular basis by the DNI about the progress and associated costs of major system acquisitions within the Intelligence Community. If the cost growth is 25 percent or more, the DNI must prepare a notification and submit, among other items, an updated cost estimate to the congressional intelligence committees, and a certification that the acquisition is essential to national security, there are no other alternatives that will provide equal or greater intelligence capability at equal or lesser cost to completion, the new estimates of the full life-cycle cost for such major system are reasonable, and the structure for the acquisition of such major system is adequate to manage and control full life- cycle cost of such major system. If the program manager makes a determination that the acquisition cost has increased by 50 percent or more as compared to the baseline, and the DNI makes the same such determination, then the DNI must submit a written certification to certify the same four items as described above, as well as an updated notification and accompanying information. If the required certification, at either the 25 percent or 50 percent level, is not submitted to the congressional intelligence committees within 60 days of the DNI's determination of cost growth, Section 318 creates a mechanism in which funds cannot be obligated for a period of time. If Congress does not act during that period, then the acquisition may continue. Section 314 is similar to Section 314 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. Subtitle C--Other Matters Section 321. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities Section 321 provides that the authorization of appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. Section 321 is identical to Sections 302 of the Senate amendment and the House bill. Section 322. Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community under the National Security Act of 1947 Section 322 amends Section 3(4)(L) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(L)) to permit the designation as ``element of the intelligence community'' of elements of departments and agencies of the United States Government whether or not those departments and agencies are listed in Section 3(4). Section 322 is identical to Section 303 of the Senate amendment and the House bill. Section 323. Modification of availability of funds for different intelligence activities Section 323 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B) (governing the funding of intelligence activities)) with the text of Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403- 1(d)(5)(A)(ii)), as amended by Section 1011(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004) (``Intelligence Reform Act'') (governing the transfer and reprogramming by the DNI of certain intelligence funding). This amendment to the National Security Act replaces the ``unforeseen requirements'' standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B) with a more flexible standard to govern reprogrammings and transfers of funds authorized for a different intelligence or intelligence-related activity. Under the new standard, a reprogramming or transfer is authorized if, in addition to the other requirements of Section 504(a)(3), the new use of funds ``supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.'' This modification brings the standard for reprogrammings and transfers of intelligence funding into conformity with the standards applicable to reprogrammings and transfers under Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947. The modification preserves congressional oversight of proposed reprogrammings and transfers while enhancing the Intelligence Community's ability to carry out missions and functions vital to national security. Section 323 is identical to Sections 305 of the Senate amendment and the House bill. Section 324. Protection of certain national security information Section 324 amends the National Security Act of 1947 in two respects. Section 324(a) amends Section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) to increase the criminal penalties for individuals with authorized access to classified information who intentionally disclose any information identifying a covert agent, if those individuals know that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal the covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States. Currently, the maximum sentence for disclosure by someone who has had ``authorized access to classified information that identifies a covert agent'' is ten years. Subsection (a)(1) increases that maximum sentence to 15 years. Currently, the maximum sentence for disclosure by someone who ``as a result of having authorized access to classified information, learns the identity of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent'' is five years. Subsection (a)(2) increases that maximum sentence to ten years. Section 324(a) is identical to Section 306 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no comparable provision. Section 324(b) amends Section 603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) to provide that the annual report from the President on the protection of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources, also include an assessment of the need for any modification for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert agents. Section 324(b) is identical to Section 309 of the House bill. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. Section 325. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations Current law (5 U.S.C. 7342) requires that certain federal ``employees''--a term that generally applies to all Intelligence Community officials and personnel and certain contractors, spouses, dependents, and others--file reports with their employing agency regarding receipt of gifts or decorations from foreign governments. Following compilation of these reports, the employing agency is required to file annually with the Secretary of State detailed information about the receipt of foreign gifts and decorations by its employees, including the source of the gift. The Secretary of State is required to publish a comprehensive list of the agency reports in the Federal Register. With respect to Intelligence Community activities, public disclosure of gifts or decorations in the Federal Register has the potential to compromise intelligence sources (e.g., confirmation of an intelligence relationship with a foreign government) and could undermine national security. Recognizing this concern, the Director of Central Intelligence (``DCI'') was granted a limited exemption from reporting certain information about such foreign gifts or decorations where the publication of the information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources. Section 1079 of the Intelligence Reform Act extended a similar exemption to the DNI in addition to applying the existing exemption to the CIA Director. Section 325 provides to the heads of each Intelligence Community element the same limited exemption from specified public reporting requirements that is currently authorized for the DNI and CIA Director. The national security concerns that prompt those exemptions apply equally to other Intelligence Community elements. Section 325 mandates that the information not provided to the Secretary of State be provided to the DNI to ensure continued independent oversight of the receipt by Intelligence Community personnel of foreign gifts or decorations. The conferees agreed to require the DNI to keep a record of such information. Section 325 is otherwise similar to Section 307 of the Senate amendment and Section 304 of the House bill. Gifts received in the course of ordinary contact between senior officials of elements of the Intelligence Community and their foreign counterparts should not be excluded under the provisions of Section 325 unless there is a serious concern that such contacts and gifts would adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods. Section 326. Report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 Section 326 requires the DNI to submit a classified comprehensive report to the congressional intelligence committees on all measures taken by the ODNI and by any Intelligence Community element with relevant responsibilities on compliance with detention and interrogation provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006. The report is to be submitted no later than 45 days after enactment of this Act. The Detainee Treatment Act provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Congress reaffirmed this mandate in Section 6 of the Military Commissions Act, adding an implementation mechanism that requires the President to take action to ensure compliance including through administrative rules and procedures. Section 6 provides not only that grave breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are war crimes under Title 18 of the United States Code, but also that the President has authority for the United States to promulgate higher standards and administrative regulations for violations of U.S. treaty obligations. It requires the President to issue those interpretations by Executive Order published in the Federal Register. The report required by Section 326 is to include a description of the detention or interrogation methods that have been determined to comply with the prohibitions of the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act or have been discontinued pursuant to them. The Detainee Treatment Act also provides for the protection against civil or criminal liability for United States Government personnel who had engaged in officially authorized interrogations that were determined to be lawful at the time. Section 326 requires the DNI to report on actions taken to implement that provision. The report shall also include an appendix containing all guidelines on the application of the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act to the detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any Intelligence Community element. The appendix shall also include the legal justifications of any office of the Department of Justice about the meaning of the Acts with respect to detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any Intelligence Community element. The conferees struck the requirement from Section 309 of the Senate amendment that the appendix contain the legal justifications of ``any official of the Department of Justice'' to accommodate the concern that this provision might compel the production of internal deliberative legal materials. This provision therefore seeks only the legal justifications of any office of the Department of Justice that rendered an opinion on the matter. To the extent that the report required by Section 326 addresses an element of the Intelligence Community within the Department of Defense, that portion of the report, and associated material that is necessary to make that portion understandable, shall also be submitted by the DNI to the congressional armed services committees. Section 326 is similar to Section 309 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. Section 327. Limitation on interrogation techniques Section 327 prohibits the use of any interrogation treatment or technique not authorized by the United States Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations (``U.S. Army Field Manual'') against any individual in the custody or effective control of any element of the Intelligence Community. This limitation on interrogation conducted by Intelligence Community personnel is similar to the limitation on interrogation conducted by Department of Defense personnel in Section 1002(a) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 2000dd-0(a)). Section 327 was adopted as an amendment at the conference after significant deliberation in the past year by both congressional intelligence committees of the legality and effectiveness of CIA's detention and interrogation program. The congressional intelligence committees have held numerous hearings on interrogation-related issues, have had many additional member and staff briefings, and have solicited input from a variety of outside experts on both interrogation and the effects of current U.S. interrogation policy. The inclusion of Section 327 reflects the conferees' considered judgment that the CIA's program is not the most effective method of obtaining the reliable intelligence we need to protect the United States from attack. Further, the conferees concluded that damage to international perception of the United States caused by the existence of classified interrogation procedures that apply only to CIA's program and are different from those used by the U.S. military outweighs the intelligence benefits that may result from the interrogation of individuals using the interrogation techniques authorized in the CIA's program. Section 327 therefore seeks to create one consistent interrogation policy across both the U.S. military and the Intelligence Community. Any individual in the custody or under the effective control of an element of the Intelligence Community may therefore be subject only to those interrogation techniques authorized for use by the U.S. military, that is, the interrogation techniques authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual. As the primary U.S. Government beneficiaries of the protections of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the U.S. military should play an important role in ensuring that U.S. interrogation policy complies with those international protections. Other countries look to U.S. policy as a whole, not the policy of particular agencies, in assessing how Americans captured on the battlefield should be treated. Requiring the Intelligence Community to follow the U.S. Army Field Manual ensures that the United States adopts only those interrogation techniques that would not be seen as abuse if used against an American soldier. As updated in September of 2006, the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM 2-22.3) provides a detailed and unclassified description of the interrogation process, along with a number of interrogation approaches that can be used to elicit information from detainees. The Army Field Manual leaves interrogators with significant flexibility to determine what approaches will work in particular situations or with particular detainees; it does not mandate that particular interrogation approach strategies be used in any given situation. The congressional intelligence committees have received testimony that the approaches in the U.S. Army Field Manual are effective at eliciting information from detainees and that they can be appropriately tailored to all detainees, including senior terrorist leaders. The procedures in the Army Field Manual have also been extensively reviewed to ensure compliance with both ``American constitutional standards related to concepts of dignity, civilization, humanity, decency, and fundamental fairness,'' as well as U.S. obligations under international law, including the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. See Army Field Manual at 5-21. In addition to describing interrogation approaches, the U.S. Army Field Manual includes a number of specific prohibitions. In particular, it prohibits ``acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation.'' It also explicitly prohibits forcing a detainee to be naked, perform sexual acts, or pose in a sexual manner; placing hoods or sacks over the head of a detainee; using duct tape over the eyes of a detainee; applying beatings, electric shock, burns, or other forms of physical pain; waterboarding; using military working dogs; inducing hypothermia or heat injury; conducting mock executions; and depriving the detainee of necessary food, water, or medical care. Requiring the Intelligence Community to comply with the U.S. Army Field Manual thus prohibits the Intelligence Community's use of these actions as interrogation techniques. Section 328. Limitation on use of funds Section 328 was added by an amendment at conference. It provides that not more than 30 percent of the funds authorized to be appropriated in a specific Expenditure Center referred to in a classified Executive Branch Congressional Budget Justification for fiscal year 2008-- fiscal year 2009 may be obligated or expended until the full membership of the congressional intelligence committees are fully and currently informed about an important intelligence matter. The matter is a facility in Syria that was the subject of reported Israeli military action on September 6, 2007. The information on which the full membership of the committees should be briefed includes intelligence if any relating to any agent or citizen of North Korea, Iran, or any other foreign country present at the facility. It should also include any intelligence (as available) provided to the United States by a foreign country regarding the facility. ``To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters,'' Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a) requires that the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all entities of the United States Government involved in intelligence activities shall ``keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities.'' As explained in a Senate report at the time of the original enactment of this requirement in 1980, the limited caveat about sensitive sources and methods or matters applies to ``extremely rare circumstances'' when there is a decision not to communicate to the intelligence committees ``certain sensitive aspects of operations or collection programs.'' S. Rep. No. 96-730, at 6. The key phrase ``certain sensitive aspects'' indicates that the scope of any withholding of information should be limited to certain details rather than to bar information about entire activities. Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(b)) provides for only limited circumstances for not providing information to the full membership of the intelligence committees but, instead, informing the Chairmen and Vice Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of those committees as well as the congressional leadership. That exception applies only when the President determines that ``it is essential to limit access to [a covert action] finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States.'' In agreeing to Section 328, the conferees concluded that it is essential that the full membership of the House and Senate intelligence committees be fully informed, in a manner consistent with the National Security Act, about intelligence that would indicate, among other matters, any presence at a Syrian facility of agents or citizens of states-- particularly, North Korea and Iran--which have had nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction programs. Section 329. Incorporation of reporting requirements Section 329 incorporates into the Act by reference each requirement contained in the classified annex to this Act to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees. Sections 105 of the Senate amendment and the House bill both also made reference to reporting requirements included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report. As no reporting requirements were included in the joint explanatory statement, this reference was eliminated. Because the classified information in the annex cannot be included in the text of the bill, incorporating the reporting provisions of the classified annex is the only available mechanism to give these reporting requirements the force of law. The conferees therefore chose to include Section 329 to reflect the importance they ascribe to the reporting requirements in the classified annex. Section 330. Repeal of certain reporting requirements Section 330 eliminates five reporting requirements that were considered particularly burdensome to the Intelligence Community in cases where the usefulness of the report has diminished either because of changing events or because the information contained in those reports is duplicative of information already obtained through other avenues. Section 330 is similar to Section 316 of the Senate amendment. Section 316 had proposed eliminating a total of seven reporting requirements. The conferees agreed to remove two of these reports from the list of reports to be eliminated after certain congressional committees expressed an interest in continuing to receive these two reports. The House bill had no similar provision. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(e)), as added by the Intelligence Reform Act, provides that commencing on October 1, 2008, the Office of the DNI may not be co-located with any other element of the Intelligence Community. Section 401 clarifies that this ban applies only to the co-location of the headquarters of the ODNI with the headquarters of any other Intelligence Community element. Accordingly, the ODNI may be colocated with non-headquarters units of Intelligence Community elements. Section 401 is identical to Section 406 of the Senate amendment and Section 401 of the House bill. Section 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight Board Section 402 substitutes the DNI, or the DNI's designee, as a member of the Transportation Security Oversight Board established under section 115(b)(1) of Title 49, United States Code, in place of the CIA Director or CIA Director's designee. The Transportation Security Oversight Board is responsible for, among other things, coordinating intelligence, security, and law enforcement activities affecting transportation and facilitating the sharing of intelligence, security, and law enforcement information affecting transportation among Federal agencies. Section 402 is identical to Section 416 of the Senate amendment and Section 402 of the House bill. Section 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology Section 403 clarifies the duties of the Director of Science and Technology (DST) and the Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology Committee (NISTC). The conferees expect the DST to systematically identify, assess and prioritize the most significant intelligence challenges that require technical solutions, set long-term science and technology goals, develop a strategy/roadmap to be shared with congressional intelligence committees that meets these goals, and prioritize and coordinate efforts across the Intelligence Community. As chair of the NISTC, the DST should leverage the expertise of members of the committee to accomplish these duties. Research and development efforts, including basic, advanced, and applied research and development projects, benefit the Intelligence Community most when they are consistent with current or future national intelligence requirements. Once a project is prototyped and successfully demonstrated, the conferees expect the DST to lead the NISTC to ensure the successful transition of projects from research and development into operational systems. To sustain and further Intelligence Community's research and development goals, it is imperative that the DNI recruit and retain the country's top science and technology leadership talent. This is especially important during this period marked by the restructuring of Intelligence Community research and development management. The conferees also note that science and technology are major factors driving change in today's world and believe that the Intelligence Community must return to preeminence in this area in order to fully protect our nation's security. The conferees urge the DST to develop multi-year projections and assessments of Intelligence Community human resource needs to better ensure that appropriate steps are taken to recruit and retain a robust scientific and engineering workforce. The conferees also urge the Intelligence Community to enhance its support to scholarship programs, research grants, and cooperative work-study programs to achieve these human resources goals. Section 403 is similar to Section 407 of the Senate amendment and Section 403 of the House bill. Section 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials Section 404 confirms in statute that various officers are within the ODNI. These are (1) the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community (as renamed by Section 412); (2) the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (as named under Section 413); (3) the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center; and (4) the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC). Section 404 also expressly provides in statute that the DNI shall appoint the Director of the NCPC. Section 119A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1), as added by the Intelligence Reform Act, had provided that the President could establish the NCPC. In doing so, the President delegated to the DNI the authority to name the Director. Section 404 ratifies that delegation. Section 404 is identical to Section 411 of the Senate amendment and Section 404 of the House bill. Section 405. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy efficiency reports Section 405 requires the DNI to develop a plan to implement across the Intelligence Community the recommendations of the Environmental Protection Agency report on improving data center energy efficiency. This planning requirement is intended to encourage the Intelligence Community to fulfill its responsibility to assess the use of environmental resources with regard to the power, space, and cooling challenges of Intelligence Community data centers. Section 405 is similar to Section 408 of the House bill. The Senate amendment did not have a comparable provision. Section 406. Comprehensive listing of special access programs Section 406 provides that the DNI shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a classified comprehensive listing of special access programs under the National Intelligence Program. The listing need not describe the programs, but must provide a reference to them to enable the congressional intelligence committees to determine whether the Intelligence Community has fulfilled its obligation to keep the committees informed about intelligence activities. In response to a concern of the DNI that a single document would create security and counterintelligence concerns, the conferees agreed to include a provision that allows the DNI to submit the listing in a form or forms consistent with national security. Section 406 is based on Section 409 of the House bill. The Senate amendment did not have a comparable provision. Section 407. Reports on the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea Section 407 provides that not less than once during the remainder of this fiscal year and twice during fiscal year 2009, the DNI shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a classified report on the nuclear intentions and capabilities of Iran and North Korea. A national intelligence estimate may count as one of those reports for each country. The conferees encourage the DNI to make these reports available to other congressional oversight committees of jurisdiction to the extent consistent with the protection of sources and methods. Section 407 is based on Section 410 of the House bill. The Senate amendment did not contain a comparable provision. The House provision had required quarterly reports indefinitely. In response to concerns of the DNI, the conferees reduced the number of reports required, but otherwise concur that it is essential that the Intelligence Community place a high priority on reporting to Congress on nuclear developments in Iran and North Korea. Section 408. Requirements for accountability reviews by the Director of National Intelligence Section 408 provides that the DNI shall have authority to conduct accountability reviews of elements of the Intelligence Community and the personnel of those elements. The primary innovation of this provision is the authority to conduct accountability reviews concerning an entire element of the Intelligence Community in relation to significant failures or deficiencies. This accountability process is separate and distinct from any accountability reviews conducted internally by elements of the Intelligence Community or their Inspectors General. Also, as stated explicitly in Section 408, the new authority does not limit the existing authority of the DNI with respect to supervision of the CIA. The DNI, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and procedures for conducting accountability reviews. The Senate bill, as reported by the Select Committee on Intelligence, arguably would have mandated the DNI to conduct an accountability review at the direction of a congressional intelligence committee. To avoid a construction that a committee of Congress on its own could require such a review over the objection of the DNI, a concern raised by the ODNI, a managers' amendment prior to Senate passage made clear that the DNI shall conduct a review if the DNI determines it is necessary, and the DNI may conduct an accountability review (but is not statutorily required to do so) if requested by one of the congressional intelligence committees. Section 408 is identical to Section 401 of the Senate amendment. The House bill did not have a comparable provision. Section 409. Modification of limitation on delegation by the Director of National Intelligence of the protection of intelligence sources and methods Section 409 amends section 102A(i)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 to modify the limitation on delegation by the DNI (which now extends only to the PDDNI) of the authority to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. It permits the DNI also to delegate the authority to the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. Section 409 is based on Section 403 of the Senate amendment. The House bill did not have a comparable provision. The Senate bill, as originally reported, would have additionally permitted the delegation of this authority to any Deputy DNI or to the head of any Intelligence Community element. In a managers' amendment before passage in the Senate, the authority to delegate outside of the Office of the DNI was struck in accordance with the sequential report of the Committee on the Armed Services, S. Rep. No. 110-92, at 3. The conferees further limited the delegation authority to the Chief Information Officer, who is a presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed official whose responsibilities expressly involve information matters throughout the Intelligence Community. Section 410. Authorities for intelligence information sharing Section 410 amends section 102A(g)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(1)) to provide the DNI with statutory authority to use NIP funds to quickly address deficiencies or needs that arise in intelligence information access or sharing capabilities. It authorizes the DNI to provide to an agency or component, and for that agency or component to accept and use, funds or systems (which could include services or equipment) related to the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information. It also grants the DNI authority to provide funds to non-NIP activities for the purpose of addressing critical gaps in intelligence information access or sharing capabilities. Without the authority, development and implementation of necessary capabilities could be delayed by an agency's lack of authority to accept or utilize systems funded from the NIP, inability to use or identify current- year funding, or concerns regarding the augmentation of appropriations. Section 410 is based on Section 402 of the Senate amendment. The House did not have a comparable provision. To aid in oversight, the conferees have added a four-year reporting requirement from fiscal years 2009 through 2012. No later than February 1 of each of those years, the DNI shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the distribution of funds under the new section during the preceding fiscal year to facilitate implementation of information sharing. Section 411. Authorities of the Director of National Intelligence for interagency funding Section 411 provides the DNI with the ability to rapidly focus the Intelligence Community on an intelligence issue through a coordinated effort that uses all available resources. The premise of this authority is that the DNI's ability to coordinate the Intelligence Community response to an emerging threat should not depend on the budget cycle and should not be constrained by general limitations in appropriations law (e.g., 31 U.S.C. 1346) or other prohibitions on interagency financing of boards, commissions, councils, committees, or similar groups. To provide this flexibility, this section grants the DNI the authority to approve interagency financing of national intelligence centers established under section 119B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-2). It also authorizes interagency funding for boards, commissions, councils, committees, or similar groups established by the DNI for a period not to exceed two years. This would include funding for Intelligence Community mission managers. Under this section, the DNI could authorize the pooling of resources from various Intelligence Community agencies to finance national intelligence centers or other organizational groupings designed to address identified intelligence matters. Section 411 is based on Section 404 of the Senate amendment. The House bill did not have a comparable provision. To aid in oversight of the implementation of the authority granted by this section, the conferees have added a four-year reporting requirement from fiscal years 2009 through 2012. No later than February 1 of each of those years the DNI shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the exercise of this authority to support interagency activities. Section 412. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community Section 412 expressly designates the position of Chief Information Officer as Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. The modification to the CIO title is consistent with the position's overall responsibilities as outlined in section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g). Section 412 is identical to Section 408 of the Senate amendment. The House bill did not have a comparable provision. Section 413. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Section 1078 of the Intelligence Reform Act authorized the DNI to establish an Office of Inspector General if the DNI determined that an Inspector General would be beneficial to improving the operations and effectiveness of the ODNI. It further provided that the DNI could grant to the Inspector General any of the duties, responsibilities, and authorities set forth in the Inspector General Act of 1978. The DNI has appointed an Inspector General and has granted certain authorities pursuant to DNI Instruction No. 2005-10 (Sept. 7, 2005). A strong Inspector General is vital to achieving the goal, set forth in the Intelligence Reform Act, of improving the operations and effectiveness of the Intelligence Community. It is also vital to achieving the broader goal of identifying problems and deficiencies wherever they may be found in the Intelligence Community with respect to matters within the responsibility and authority of the DNI, especially the manner in which elements of the Intelligence Community interact with each other in providing access to information and undertaking joint or cooperative activities. By way of a new section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947, this section establishes an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community in order to provide to the DNI, and through reports to the Congress, the benefits of an Inspector General with full statutory authorities and the requisite independence. The office is established within the ODNI. The Inspector General will keep both the DNI and the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies in Intelligence Community programs and operations and the need for corrective actions. The Inspector General will be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and will report directly to the DNI. To bolster the Inspector General's independence within the Intelligence Community, the Inspector General may be removed only by the President, who must communicate the reasons for the removal to the congressional intelligence committees. The DNI may prohibit the Inspector General from conducting an investigation, inspection, or audit if the DNI determines that is necessary to protect vital national security interests. If the DNI exercises the authority to prohibit an investigation, the DNI must provide the reasons to the congressional intelligence committees within seven days. The Inspector General may provide a response to the committees. The Inspector General will have direct and prompt access to the DNI and any Intelligence Community employee or employee of a contractor whose testimony is needed. The Inspector General will also have direct access to all records that relate to programs and activities for which the Inspector General has responsibility. Failure to cooperate will be grounds for appropriate administrative action. The Inspector General will have subpoena authority. However, information within the possession of the United States government must be obtained through other procedures. Subject to the DNI's concurrence, the Inspector General may request information from any U.S. government department, agency, or element. They must provide the information to the Inspector General insofar as practicable and not in violation of law or regulation. The Inspector General must submit semiannual reports to the DNI that include a description of significant problems relating to Intelligence Community programs and operations and to the relationships between Intelligence Community elements. The reports must include a description of Inspector General recommendations and a statement whether corrective action has been completed. The Inspector General shall provide any portion of the report involving a component of a department of the U.S. government simultaneously to the head of that department with submission of the report to the DNI. Within 30 days of receiving it from the Inspector General, the DNI must submit each semiannual report to Congress. The Inspector General must immediately report to the DNI particularly serious or flagrant violations. Within seven days, the DNI must transmit those reports to the congressional intelligence committees together with any comments. In the event the Inspector General is unable to resolve differences with the DNI, the Inspector General is authorized to report a serious or flagrant violation directly to the congressional intelligence committees. Reports to the congressional intelligence committees are also required with respect to investigations concerning high-ranking Intelligence Community officials. Intelligence Community employees or employees of contractors who intend to report to Congress an ``urgent concern''--such as a violation of law or Executive order, a false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress--may report such complaints and supporting information to the Inspector General. Following a review by the Inspector General to determine the credibility of the complaint or information, the Inspector General must transmit such complaint and information to the DNI. On receiving the complaints or information from the Inspector General (together with the Inspector General's credibility determination), the DNI must transmit the complaint or information to the congressional intelligence committees. If the Inspector General does not find a complaint or information to be credible, the reporting individual may submit the matter directly to the congressional intelligence committees by following appropriate security practices outlined by the DNI. Reprisals or threats of reprisal against reporting individuals constitute reportable ``urgent concerns.'' In providing this channel for whistleblower communications to Congress, Section 413 does not disturb, and the conferees intend to retain, the authoritative guidance for analogous provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-272 (October 20, 1998) as set forth in the findings in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 701(b) of that Act, the Senate committee report for the legislation, S. Rep. No. 105-185, at 25-27, and particularly the conference report, H.R. Rep. 105-780, at 33-34, which emphasized that a disclosure to the Inspector General ``is not the exclusive process by which an Intelligence Community employee may make a report to Congress.'' For matters within the jurisdiction of both the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and an Inspector General for another Intelligence Community element, the Inspectors General shall expeditiously resolve who will undertake an investigation, inspection, or audit. In resolving that question, under an extensive subsection entitled ``Coordination Among Inspectors General of Intelligence Community,'' the Inspectors General may request the assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum (a presently existing informal body whose existence is ratified by this section). In the event that the Inspectors General are still unable to resolve the question, they shall submit it for resolution to the DNI and the head of the department (or to the Director of the CIA in matters involving the CIA Inspector General, in accordance with a clarifying amendment of the conferees) in which an Inspector General with jurisdiction concurrent to that of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community is located. This basic limitation addresses the concern raised by the DNI about the preservation of the authority of heads of departments and agencies over their respective departments. Within Congress, mutuality of oversight is assured by the requirement that Inspector General reports concerning Intelligence Committee elements within departments are shared with committees that have jurisdiction over those departments. Except for the provision clarifying that unresolved questions involving the CIA Inspector General will also be submitted to the Director of the CIA, rather than the head of a department, Section 413 is identical to Section 410 of the Senate amendment. The House bill did not have a similar provision. Section 414. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the Intelligence Community Section 414 provides for an annual report by the DNI on the proficiency of each element of the Intelligence Community in foreign languages and, if appropriate, in foreign dialects. The section also requires the DNI to report on foreign language training. The Intelligence Community has an increasing need for fluency in difficult-to-master languages and for expertise in foreign cultures. The information required by the report will allow the congressional intelligence committees to better assess the Intelligence Community's ability to manage language resources. Section 414 is based on Sections 412 and 413 of the House bill, which have been merged by the conferees. The Senate amendment did not have a comparable provision. Section 415. Director of National Intelligence report on retirement benefits for former employees of Air America Section 415 provides for a report by the DNI on the advisability of providing federal retirement benefits to United States citizens who were employees of Air America or an associated company prior to 1977, during the time that the company was owned or controlled by the United States and operated by the CIA. Section 415 is identical to Section 425 of the Senate amendment and Section 415 of the House bill. The conferees note that H.R. 1271 was introduced in the House in the 110th Congress, and H.R. 1276 and S. 651 were introduced in the House and Senate in the 109th Congress, to make service performed with Air America and certain other entities creditable for federal civil service retirement purpose. By including Section 415 in this authorization bill, the conferees take no position on the merits of that legislation. Although the section invites the DNI to submit any recommendations on the ultimate question of providing benefits, the main purpose of the report is to provide Congress with the facts upon which Congress can make that determination. Accordingly, Section 415 outlines the factual elements required by the report. To aid in the preparation of the report, the section authorizes the assistance of the Comptroller General. Among the elements of the report should be: the relationship of Air America to the CIA, the missions it performed, and the casualties its employees suffered, as well as the retirement benefits that had been contracted for or promised to Air America employees and the retirement benefits Air America employees received. On September 25, 2007, the CIA provided a three page letter to the congressional intelligence and appropriations committees in response to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report 109-259 to S. 3237, requesting a report on ``the advisability of providing federal retirement benefits to United States citizens who were employees of Air America or an associated company prior to 1977, during the time that the company was owned or controlled by the United States and operated by the CIA.'' Although the letter describes the legal basis for denying federal retirement benefits to employees of Air America, it does not provide the factual background that would allow Congress to make an assessment of whether to provide employees of Air America with federal retirement benefits. The report requested in Section 415 therefore continues to be necessary for a comprehensive exploration of the underlying issues. Section 416. Space Intelligence Section 416 underscores the importance of the DNI's consideration of space intelligence issues by adding this responsibility to the DNI's statutory duties in Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1). Section 416 requires the DNI to consider space intelligence issues and concerns in setting intelligence priorities, conducting analysis, and acquiring major systems. The Section also requires the DNI to ensure that agencies give due consideration to the vulnerability assessments prepared for a given major system at all stages of architecture and system planning, development, acquisition, operation, and support of a space intelligence system. Section 412 of the Senate amendment would have created a new National Space Intelligence Office within the ODNI to coordinate and provide policy direction for the management of space-related intelligence assets and the development of personnel in space-related fields. The National Space Intelligence Office would also have been responsible for prioritizing space-related collection activities and evaluating analytic assessments of threats to classified United States space intelligence systems. The DNI, however, expressed concern about the creation of a dedicated office in the ODNI for space intelligence. Section 416 addresses that concern by highlighting the importance of space intelligence, while still giving the DNI flexibility to organize the Intelligence Community to implement responsibilities for that intelligence. The House bill had no similar provision. Section 417. Operational files in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence In the CIA Information Act, Pub. L. No. 98-477 (October 15, 1984) (50 U.S.C. 431), Congress authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to exempt operational files of the CIA from several requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (``FOIA''), particularly those requiring search and review in response to FOIA requests. In a series of amendments to Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress has extended the exemption to the operational files of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (``NGA''), the National Security Agency (``NSA''), the National Reconnaissance Office (``NRO''), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (``DIA''). It has also provided that files of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (``NCIX'') should be treated as operational files of the CIA (to the extent they meet the criteria for CIA operational files). Section 417 adds a new section 706 to the National Security Act of 1947. Components of the ODNI, including the National Counterterrorism Center (``NCTC''), require access to information contained in CIA and other operational files. The purpose of section 706 is to make clear that operational files of any Intelligence Community component, for which an operational files exemption is applicable, retain their exemption from FOIA search, review, disclosure, or publication when they are provided to an element of the ODNI. They also retain their exemption when they are incorporated in any substantially similar files of the ODNI. Section 706 provides several limitations. The exemption does not apply to information disseminated beyond the ODNI. Also, as Congress has provided in the operational files exemptions for the CIA and other Intelligence Community elements, section 706 provides that the exemption does not apply to requests by United States citizens or permanent residents for information about themselves (although other FOIA exemptions, such as appropriate classification, may continue to protect such files from public disclosure). The exemption would not apply to the subject matter of a congressional or Executive branch investigation into improprieties or violations of law. Finally, Section 706 provides for a decennial review by the DNI to determine whether exemptions may be removed from any category of exempted files. This review shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of those categories and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained in them. The conferees underscore the importance of this requirement, which applies to the other operational exemptions in Title VII. The conferees also expect the DNI to submit the results of such review to the congressional intelligence committees in a timely manner. Section 417 is based on Section 412 of the Senate amendment. The House bill did not contain a comparable provision. The conferees added the requirement of substantiality in the similarity between ODNI files and those of the originating element in order to tighten the connection between the files that are exempt in the originating element and the files in the ODNI that would also be exempt. Section 418. Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act to advisory committees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) (5 U.S.C. App.) to regulate the use of advisory committees throughout the Federal Government. FACA sets forth the responsibilities of the Executive branch with regard to such committees and outlines procedures and requirements for them. As originally enacted in 1972, FACA expressly exempted advisory committees utilized by the CIA and the Federal Reserve System. Section 418 amends FACA to extend this exemption to advisory committees established or used by the ODNI. Section 418 is identical to Section 415 of the Senate amendment. The House bill did not contain a comparable provision. Section 419. Applicability of the Privacy Act to the Director of National Intelligence and Office of the Director of National Intelligence The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) has long contained a provision under which the Director of Central Intelligence and then (after enactment of the Intelligence Reform Act) the CIA Director could promulgate rules to exempt any system of records within the CIA from certain disclosure requirements under the Act. The exemption authority was designed to ensure that the CIA could provide safeguards for certain sensitive information in its records systems. In assuming the leadership of the Intelligence Community, the DNI similarly requires the ability to safeguard sensitive information in records systems within the ODNI. Accordingly, Section 419 extends to the DNI the authority to promulgate rules under which records systems of the ODNI may be exempted from certain Privacy Act disclosure requirements. It is identical to Section 417 of the Senate amendment. The House bill did not contain a comparable provision. Section 420. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive Section 420 amends the authorities and structure of the NCIX to eliminate certain independent administrative authorities that had been vested in the NCIX when that official was appointed by and reported to the President. Those authorities are unnecessary now that the NCIX is to be appointed by and is under the authority of the DNI. Section 420 is identical to Section 414 of the Senate amendment and Section 432 of the House bill. Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency Section 431. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency Title V of the National Security Act of 1947, entitled ``Accountability for Intelligence Activities,'' sets forth the Act's basic requirements on Executive branch obligations to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully informed about intelligence activities. Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is specifically devoted to presidential findings and congressional notification of covert actions. Section 431 augments the oversight of covert actions by adding a new subsection to Section 503 that requires that the CIA Inspector General conduct an audit of each covert action at least every three years and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the audit results within 60 days of completing the audit. To a considerable extent, this requirement confirms in statute existing practice and assures its regularity. The Director of National Intelligence has expressed concern that this audit requirement, and several other provisions on Intelligence Community reports, raise concerns with respect to the President's authority to control access to national security information. To allay any such concern regarding the covert action audit requirement, the conferees have amended Section 431 to state that the requirement is subject to the longstanding provisions of section 17(b)(3) and (4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)(3) and (4)) that empower the CIA Director to prohibit the CIA Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit if the Director determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States, provided that the Director report the reasons to the congressional intelligence committees. Section 431 is based on Section 423 of the House bill. The Senate amendment did not contain a comparable provision. Section 432. Inapplicability to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency of requirement for annual report on progress in auditable financial statements Section 432 is identical to Section 422 of the Senate amendment and Section 424 of the House bill. Section 432 relieves the CIA Director from the requirement in section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report describing the activities being taken to ensure that financial statements of the CIA can be audited in accordance with applicable law and the requirements of OMB. Although concern remains that the CIA has had minimal success in achieving unqualified opinions on its financial statements, the report required by Section 114A is unnecessary as CIA is now submitting audited financial statements. The requirements of Section 114A continue to apply to the Directors of NSA, DIA, and NGA. Section 433. Additional functions and authorities for protective personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency Section 433 amends section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) which authorizes protective functions by designated security personnel who serve on CIA protective details. The section authorizes protective detail personnel, when engaged in, and in furtherance of, the performance of protective functions, to make arrests in two circumstances. Protective detail personnel may make arrests without a warrant for any offense against the United States--whether a felony, misdemeanor, or infraction--that is committed in their presence. They may also make arrests without a warrant if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony, but not other offenses, under the laws of the United States. Guidelines approved by the CIA Director and the Attorney General will provide safeguards and procedures to ensure the proper exercise of this authority. Section 433 specifically does not grant any authority to serve civil process or to investigate crimes. The authority provided by this section is consistent with those of other Federal elements with protective functions, such as the Secret Service (18 U.S.C. 3056(c)(1)(C)), the State Department Diplomatic Security Service (22 U.S.C. 2709(a)(5)), and the Capitol Police (2 U.S.C. 1966(c)). Arrest authority will contribute significantly to the ability of CIA protective detail personnel to fulfill their responsibility to protect officials against serious threats without being dependent on the ability of Federal, State, or local law enforcement officers to respond immediately. The grant of arrest authority is supplemental to all other authority CIA protective detail personnel have by virtue of their statutory responsibility to perform the protective functions set forth in the CIA Act of 1949. Section 433 also authorizes the CIA Director on the request of the DNI to make CIA protective detail personnel available to the DNI and to other personnel within the ODNI. The CIA Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees as soon as possible, but not later than 10 days after an arrest, a report describing each exercise of authority under this section. Section 433 is based on Section 423 of the Senate amendment. The House bill did not include a comparable provision. The conferees added the explicit requirement that arrests be in furtherance of the performance of protective functions and the requirement for a report to the congressional intelligence committees about each exercise of arrest authority. Section 434. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain CIA positions Section 434 replaces out-of-date titles for CIA positions with the current titles of the successors of those positions in a provision in section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) on the obligation of the CIA Inspector General to notify the congressional intelligence committees about investigations, inspections, or audits concerning high-ranking CIA officials. Section 434 is similar to Section 424 of the Senate amendment and Section 516 of the House bill, except for a conference agreement to add additional titles that needed to be changed. Section 435. Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 Section 435 changes the reference to the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of National Intelligence to clarify that the establishment of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis within the Department of the Treasury (section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-177 (Dec. 13, 2003)), and its reorganization within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (section 222 of the Transportation, Treasury, Independent Agencies, and General Government Appropriations Act, 2005 (Division H, Pub. L. No. 108-447 (Dec. 8, 2004)), do not affect the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with respect to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis as an element of the Intelligence Community. Section 435 is identical to Section 442 of the Senate amendment and Section 431 of the House bill. Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components Section 441. Enhancement of National Security Agency training program Section 441 permits the Director of the National Security Agency to protect intelligence sources and methods by deleting a requirement that NSA publicly identify to educational institutions students who are NSA employees or training program participants. Deletion of this disclosure requirement will enhance the ability of NSA to protect personnel and prospective personnel and to preserve the ability of training program participants to undertake future clandestine or other sensitive assignments for the Intelligence Community. The conferees recognize that nondisclosure is appropriate when disclosure would threaten intelligence sources or methods, would endanger the life or safety of the student, or would limit the employee's or prospective employee's ability to perform intelligence activities in the future. Notwithstanding the deletion of the disclosure requirement, the conferees expect NSA to continue to prohibit participants in the training program from engaging in any intelligence functions at the institutions they attend under the program. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-690, Part I (July 17, 1986) (``NSA employees attending an institution under the program will have no intelligence function whatever to perform at the institution.''). Section 441 is similar to Section 431(b) of the Senate amendment. The conferees did not include subsection (a) of Section 431 of the Senate amendment, which was a clarifying provision to allow the NSA to recoup the educational costs expended for the benefit of a student who fails to maintain satisfactory academic performance. The conferees believe that this matter and its application to other Intelligence Community scholarship programs should be given further study by the congressional intelligence committees. The House bill had no similar provision. Section 442. Codification of authorities of National Security Agency protective personnel Section 442 amends the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) by adding a new Section 21 to clarify and enhance the authority of protective details for NSA. The new section 21(a) would authorize the Director of NSA to designate NSA personnel to perform protective detail functions for the Director and other personnel of NSA who are designated from time to time by the Director as requiring protection. Section 11 of the NSA Act of 1959 presently provides that the Director of NSA may authorize agency personnel to perform certain security functions at NSA headquarters, at certain other facilities, and around the perimeter of those facilities. The new authority for protective details would enable the Director of the NSA to provide security when the Director or other designated personnel require security away from those facilities. The new section 21(b) would provide that NSA personnel, when engaged in performing protective detail functions, and in furtherance of the performance of those functions, may exercise the same arrest authority that Section 433 of this Act provides for CIA protective detail personnel. The arrest authority for NSA protective detail personnel would be subject to guidelines approved by the Director of NSA and the Attorney General. The purpose and extent of that arrest authority, the limitations on it, and reporting expectations about it are described in the explanation for Section 433. That analysis and explanation applies equally to the arrest authority provided to NSA protective detail personnel by Section 21(b). While this Act provides separately for authority for CIA and NSA protective details, the DNI should advise the congressional intelligence committees whether overall policies, procedures, and authority should be provided for protective services, when necessary, for other Intelligence Community elements or personnel (or their immediate families). Section 442 is similar to Section 432 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no comparable provision. Section 443. Inspector general matters The Inspector General Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-452 (Oct. 12, 1978)) established a government-wide system of Inspectors General, some appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and others ``administratively appointed'' by the heads of their respective Federal entities. These Inspector Generals were authorized to ``conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations'' of the government and ``to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and * * * to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs and operations.'' 5 U.S.C. App. 2. These Inspectors General also perform an important reporting function, ``keeping the head of the establishment and the Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of * * * programs and operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action.'' Id. The investigative authorities exercised by Inspectors General, and their relative independence from the government operations they audit and investigate, provide an important mechanism to ensure that the operations of the government are conducted as efficiently and effectively as possible. The Inspectors General of the CIA and Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. These Inspectors General--authorized by either the Inspector General Act of 1978 or section 17 of the CIA Act of 1949--enjoy a degree of independence from all but the head of their respective departments or agencies. They also have explicit statutory authority to access information from their departments or agencies or other United States Government departments and agencies and may use subpoenas to access information (e.g., from an agency contractor) necessary to carry out their authorized functions. The National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency have established their own ``administrative'' Inspectors General. However, because they are not identified in section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978, they lack explicit statutory authorization to access information relevant to their audits or investigations, or to compel the production of information via subpoena. This lack of authority has impeded access to information, in particular information from contractors, that is necessary for them to perform their important oversight function. These Inspectors General also lack the indicia of independence necessary for the Government Accountability Office to recognize their annual financial statement audits as being in compliance with the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-576 (Nov. 15, 1990)). The lack of independence also prevents the Department of Defense Inspector General, and would prevent the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, from relying on the results of NRO, DIA, NSA, or NGA Inspector General audits or investigations that must meet ``generally accepted government auditing standards.'' To provide an additional level of independence and to ensure prompt access to the information necessary for these Inspectors General to perform their audits and investigations, Section 443 amends Section 8G(a)(2) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 to include NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA as ``designated federal entities.'' As so designated, the heads of these Intelligence Community elements will be required by statute administratively to appoint Inspectors General for these agencies. Also, as designated Inspectors General under the Inspector General Act of 1978, these Inspectors General will be responsible to the heads of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA. The removal or transfer of any of these Inspectors General by the head of their office or agency must be promptly reported to the congressional intelligence committees. These Inspectors General will also be able to exercise other investigative authorities, including those governing access to information and the issuance of subpoenas, utilized by other Inspectors General under the Inspector General Act of 1978. To protect vital national security interests, Section 443 permits the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to prohibit the Inspectors General of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation they are otherwise authorized to conduct. This authority is similar to the authority of the CIA Director under section 17 of the CIA Act of 1949 with respect to the Inspector General of the CIA and the authority of the Secretary of Defense under section 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 with respect to the Department of Defense Inspector General. It will provide the President, through the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the DNI, a mechanism to protect extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other vital national security interests. The Committee expects that this authority will be exercised rarely by the Secretary of Defense. The Senate amendment had provided the authority to prohibit the Inspectors General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation to either the DNI or the Secretary of Defense. To address Administration concerns that authorizing the DNI to cut off an investigation that had been ordered by the head of an executive department would be inconsistent with the preservation of the authority of the heads of departments and agencies over their respective departments, the conferees changed this provision to limit the authority to the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the DNI. Section 443 is similar to Section 433 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. Section 444. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components of the Intelligence Community Under present law and practice, the directors of the NSA and NRO, each with a distinct and significant role in the national intelligence mission, are not confirmed by the Senate in relation to their leadership of these agencies. Presently, the President appoints the Director of NSA and the Secretary of Defense appoints the Director of the NRO. Neither of these appointments must be confirmed by the Senate, unless a military officer is promoted or transferred into the position. Under that circumstance, Senate confirmation of the promotion or assignment is the responsibility of the Committee on Armed Services. That committee's review, however, relates to the military promotion or assignment and not specifically to the assumption by the individual of the leadership of a critical element of the Intelligence Community. Section 434 of the Senate amendment provided that the heads of NSA, NGA, and NRO would be nominated by the President and that the nominations would be confirmed by the Senate. Through advice and consent, the Senate can enable the Congress to fulfill more completely its responsibility for providing oversight to the intelligence activities of the United States Government. To respond to the concerns of the DNI about the increase in the number of Senate- confirmed positions within the Intelligence Community, the conferees agreed that only the heads of the NSA and NRO, as the larger two of the three agencies, should be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate at this time. While all three agencies play a critical role in the national intelligence mission, the spending of NSA and NRO comprises a significant portion of the entire intelligence budget of the United States, and a substantial portion of the National Intelligence Program. The activities of NSA and NRO are also of particular concern to the congressional intelligence committees, because of the need for NSA's authorized collection to be consistent with the protection of the civil liberties and privacy interests of U.S. persons, and because of concerns about NRO's management of the significant budget resources and mission with which it is entrusted. Section 444(b) provides that the amendments made by section 444 apply prospectively. Therefore, the Directors of NSA and NRO on the date of the enactment of this Act will not be affected by the amendments, which will apply initially to the appointment and confirmation of their successors. Section 444 does not alter the role of the Committee on Armed Services in reviewing and approving the promotion or assignment of military officers. The House bill had no similar provision. Section 445. Clarification of national security missions of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for analysis and dissemination of certain intelligence information The National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104-201 (Sept. 23, 1996) (NIMA Act)) formally merged the imagery analysis and mapping efforts of the Department of Defense and the CIA. In the NIMA Act, Congress cited a need ``to provide a single agency focus for the growing number and diverse types of customers for imagery and geospatial information resources within the Government * * * to harness, leverage, and focus rapid technological developments to serve the imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information customers.'' Section 1102(1) of the NIMA Act. Since then, there have been rapid developments in airborne and commercial imagery platforms, new imagery and geospatial phenomenology, full motion video, and geospatial analysis tools. Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-136 (Nov. 24, 2003)) changed the name of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The name change was intended to introduce the term ``geospatial intelligence'' to better describe the unified activities of NGA related to the ``analysis and visual representation of characteristics of the earth and activity on its surface.'' See S. Rep. 108-46 (May 13, 2003) (accompanying The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, S. 1050, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.). Though the NGA has made significant progress toward unifying the traditional imagery analysis and mapping missions of the CIA and Department of Defense, it has been slow to embrace other facets of ``geospatial intelligence,'' including the processing, storage, and dissemination of full motion video (``FMV'') and ground-based photography. Rather, the NGA's geospatial product repositories--containing predominantly overhead imagery and mapping products--continue to reflect its heritage. While the NGA is belatedly beginning to incorporate more airborne and commercial imagery, its data holdings and products are nearly devoid of FMV and ground- based photography. The conferees believe that FMV and ground-based photography should be included, with available positional data, in NGA data repositories for retrieval on Department of Defense and Intelligence Community networks. Current mission planners and military personnel are well-served with traditional imagery products and maps, but FMV of the route to and from a facility or photographs of what a facility would look like to a foot soldier--rather than from an aircraft--would be of immense value to military personnel and intelligence officers. Ground-based photography is amply available from open sources, as well as other government sources such as military units, United States embassy personnel, defense attaches, special operations forces, foreign allies, and clandestine officers. These products should be better incorporated into NGA data holdings. To address these concerns, Section 445 adds an additional national security mission to the responsibilities of the NGA. To fulfill this new mission, NGA would be required, as directed by the DNI, to develop a system to facilitate the analysis, dissemination, and incorporation of likenesses, videos, or presentations produced by ground-based platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations or available as open-source information, into the national system for geospatial intelligence. Section 445 also makes clear that this new responsibility does not include the authority to manage tasking of handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations. Although Section 445 does not give the NGA authority to set technical requirements for collection of handheld or clandestine photography, the conferees encourage the NGA to engage other elements of the Intelligence Community on these technical requirements to ensure that their output can be incorporated into the national system for geospatial-intelligence within the security handling guidelines consistent with the photography's classification as determined by the appropriate authority. Section 445 is similar to Section 435 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. Section 446. Security clearances in the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency Section 446 requires the Secretary of Defense to delegate to the Director of NGA through December 31, 2008, the personnel security authority with respect to NGA personnel that is identical to the personnel security authority of the Director of NSA with respect to NSA personnel. Section 446 is designed as an interim measure to address what has been a large backlog in security clearances at NGA. The conferees believe the DNI and the Secretary of Defense must continue to seek a permanent method of addressing clearance matters such as these. Section 446 is identical to Section 436 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. subtitle D--other elements Section 451. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration as elements of the Intelligence Community Section 451 restores, with respect to the United States Coast Guard, the prior definition of ``intelligence community'' in the National Security Act of 1947 applicable to that service. See 50 U.S.C. 401a. Section 1073 of the Intelligence Reform Act modified the definition of ``intelligence community,'' inadvertently limiting the Coast Guard's inclusion in the Intelligence Community to the Office of Intelligence or those portions of the Coast Guard concerned with the analysis of intelligence. Section 451 clarifies that all of the Coast Guard's intelligence elements are included within the definition of the ``intelligence community.'' Section 451 also codifies the joint decision of the DNI and Attorney General that the Drug Enforcement Administration should be within the Intelligence Community. Section 451 is similar to Section 441 of the Senate amendment and Section 433 of the House bill. TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS subtitle A--general intelligence matters Section 501. Extension of National Commission for Review of Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community The National Commission for Review of Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community was authorized in Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, and lapsed on September 1, 2004. Section 501 renews authority for this Commission by extending the reporting deadline to December 31, 2008, and requiring that new members be appointed to the Commission. This section also authorizes funds for the commission from the Intelligence Community Management Account. Section 501 is similar to Section 502 of the House bill. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. Section 502. Report on intelligence activities Section 502 requires the DNI to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees describing any authorization, if it exists, to engage in intelligence activities related to the overthrow of a democratically elected government during the 10-year period prior to enactment of this Act. Section 502 is similar to Section 503 of the House bill. The Senate had no comparable provision. Section 503. Aerial Reconnaissance Platforms The conferees agreed to include in Section 503 of the conference report the same amendment to Section 133(b) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (``NDAA'') that was included in H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 as passed by the House on May 17, 2007. Section 501 of the House bill reflected the interest of the House that the Secretary of Defense not make the certification required in Section 133(b) of the NDAA until after a study has been completed to determine whether the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle has reached mission capability and has attained collection capabilities on a par with the capabilities of the U-2 aircraft; the Secretary has made a determination whether the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle has reached mission capability and has attained collection capabilities on a par with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft program as of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review; and the study has been submitted to the congressional committees of jurisdiction in accordance with the rules of each chamber. The Senate had no comparable provision. Subtitle B--Technical Amendments Section 511. Technical amendments to Title 10, United States Code, arising from enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 Section 511 corrects a number of technical errors in the United States Code arising from the enactment of the Intelligence Reform Act in 2004. Section 511 is identical to Section 504 of the Senate amendment. The House bill has no similar provision. Section 512. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 Section 512 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 by updating references to the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect amendments made by the Intelligence Reform Act. Section 512 is identical to Section 505 of the Senate bill and similar to Section 422 of the House bill. Section 513. Technical amendments to the multiyear National Intelligence Program Section 513 updates the ``multiyear national intelligence program'' to incorporate organizational and nomenclature changes made by the Intelligence Reform Act. Section 506 is identical to Section 513 of the Senate amendment and Section 511 of the House bill. Section 514. Technical clarifications of certain references to Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Section 514 makes technical clarifications to the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect the consolidation of the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities program into the Military Intelligence Program. This section preserves the requirement that the DNI participate in the development of the annual budget and be consulted prior to the transfer or reprogramming of funds for the Military Intelligence Program. Section 514 is identical to Section 502 of the Senate amendment and Section 512 of the House bill. Section 515. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 Section 515 makes a number of technical corrections to the National Security Act of 1947 arising from enactment of the Intelligence Reform Act. Conferees removed one technical correction because it was unnecessary to clarify the scope of a completed reporting requirement. Section 515 is otherwise identical to Section 501 of the Senate bill and Section 513 of the House bill. Section 516. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 Section 516 makes a number of technical and conforming amendments to the Intelligence Reform Act. Section 516 is identical to Section 503 of the Senate amendment and Section 514 of the House bill. Section 517. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule Section 517 makes technical amendments to the Executive Schedule to correct outdated and incorrect references to ``Director of Central Intelligence,'' ``Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence,'' and ``General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director.'' Section 517 is substantially similar to Section 507 of the Senate amendment and Section 515 of the House bill. General Matters Items not included The managers agreed not to include in the conference report certain sections from the House bill and the Senate amendment because these sections were unnecessary; the requirements in the section had been or would be otherwise fulfilled; the sections related to activities for which funds would not be available; or for other reasons. Because the DNI expressed concerns over the increase in the number of Senate-confirmed positions within the Intelligence Community, the conferees reviewed the total number of Senate- confirmed positions in the Senate amendment and the House bill. On that review, the conferees determined to limit the additional confirmed positions in this conference report to the three positions they identified to be the highest current priority. In doing so, the conferees eliminated a provision that would have required the head of NGA to be confirmed by the Senate, as discussed in Section 444 of this joint explanatory statement, and removed Section 421 of the Senate amendment and Section 421 of the House bill. Section 421 of the Senate amendment and House bill would have made the position of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency a statutory position that required appointment by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The conferees expect that the congressional intelligence committees will continue to consider the appropriate method of appointment of the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The conference report also eliminates Section 407 of the House bill, which would have required the DNI to submit a National Intelligence Estimate on the anticipated geopolitical effects of global climate change on the national security of the United States. The conferees remain fully committed to this assessment. The conferees note the DNI has stated that work on such a national intelligence assessment has already begun. The conferees expect that the national intelligence assessment will be transmitted to Congress in a timely manner. The House receded on the following sections: Section 405, eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Section 504, reiteration of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (``FISA'') as the exclusive means for electronic surveillance; Section 517, technical amendments relating to redesignation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; Section 601, identification of best practices for the communication of information concerning a terrorist threat; and Section 602, centers of best practices. The Senate receded on the following sections: Section 106, development and acquisition program; Section 315, submittal to Congress of certain FISA court orders; Section 409, reserve for contingencies of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Section 508, technical amendments relating to redesignation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and Section 509, technical amendments relating to the responsibility of the Director of National Intelligence. The elimination of Section 106 of the Senate amendment is discussed in more detail in the classified annex. With respect to the two provisions in the House bill and Senate amendment dealing with FISA, it was the judgment of the conferees that they would best be addressed in pending legislation to amend FISA. Compliance with rule XXI, CL. 9 (House) and with rule XLIV (Senate) The following list is submitted in compliance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives and rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, which require publication of a list of congressionally directed spending items (Senate), congressional earmarks (House), limited tax benefits, and limited tariff benefits included in the conference report, the joint explanatory statement, or the classified schedule of authorizations accompanying the conference report, including the name of each Senator, House Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner who submitted a request to the Committee of jurisdiction for each item so identified. Congressionally directed spending items (as defined in the Senate rule) and congressional earmarks (as defined in the House rule) in this division of the conference report, the joint explanatory statement, or the classified schedule of authorizations are listed below. The conference report, the joint explanatory statement, and the classified schedule of authorizations contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits as defined in the applicable House and Senate rules. The following items are included in the NIP authorization: (1) A provision directing the expenditure of $3,000,000 for research into advanced mirror development in the National Reconnaissance Program. The provision was requested by Congressman Tierney. (2) A provision adding $3,200,000 to the National Security Agency for the RC-135 sensor upgrade. The provision was added at the request of Congressman Hall of Texas. (3) A provision adding $2,750,000 to the National Security Agency for geo-location software development. The provision was added at the request of Congresswoman Eshoo. (4) A provision adding $3,000,000 to the National Security Agency for a Counterproliferation system prototype. The provision was requested by Congressman Ruppersberger. (5) A provision adding $23,000,000 to fund the operations of the NDIC. The provision was added at the request of Congressman Murtha. (6) A provision adding $1,600,000 to the Community Management Account for the Centers of Academic Excellence. The provision was requested by Congressman Hastings of Florida. (7) A provision adding $1,500,000 for the Laboratory for High-Performance Computational Systems at the Missile and Space Intelligence Center. The provision was requested by Congressman Cramer. (8) A provision adding $1,000,000 to improve rapid missile all-source analysis at the Missile and Space Intelligence Center. The provision was requested by Congressmen Cramer and Everett. (9) A provision adding $4,000,000 for a Missile and Space Intelligence Center simulation project. The provision was requested by Congressman Cramer and Everett. (10) A provision adding $1,000,000 for seismic research to the General Defense Intelligence Program. The provision was requested by Congressman Tierney. (11) A provision adding $2,000,000 to the National Geospatial Intelligence Program for a global geospatial data project. The provision was requested by Congressman Everett. (12) A provision adding $1,000,000 for joint intelligence training and education to the Joint Counterintelligence Training Activity. The provision was requested by Congressman Murtha. (13) A provision adding $1,000,000 for mobile missile analysis and detection to the General Defense Intelligence Program. The provision was requested by Congressman Murtha. (14) A provision adding $200,000 to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for an Intelligence Training Program run by the Kennedy School of Government. This program was started in fiscal year 2007, but the President did not request funding for it for fiscal year 2008. The provision was added at the request of Senator Rockefeller. (15) A provision adding $3,000,000 to the Naval Oceanographic Command. This provision was added at the request of Senator Lott. (16) A provision directing the expenditure of $3,000,000 for a classified effort with the National Reconnaissance Office's GEOINT/SIGINT Integrated Ground Development Engineering and Management Expenditure Center. This provision was added at the request of Senator Rockefeller. In addition, the following earmarks (as defined in the House rule) are included in the Military Intelligence Program and the Information Systems Security Program. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence shares jurisdiction of these programs with the House Armed Services Committee. (1) A provision adding $2,000,000 to the National Security Agency for a radio frequency signal collection program. The provision was requested by Congressman Ruppersberger. (2) A provision adding $1,000,000 to the National Security Agency for a next-generation signal intelligence sensor. The provision was requested by Congressman McCaul. (3) A provision adding $1,000,000 to Special Operations Command for tactical signals intelligence and geo-location cognitive analysis. The provision was requested by Congressman Cramer. (4) A provision adding $1,000,000 to the United States Army for Battle Lab collection management tool synchronization. The provision was requested by Congressman Cramer. (5) A provision adding $1,500,000 to the United States Army for sensor visualization and data fusion. The provision was requested by Congressman Tierney. (6) A provision adding $3,000,000 to the United States Air Force for the RC-135 modernization. The provision was requested by Congressman Hall of Texas. (7) A provision adding $2,000,000 to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. The provision was requested by Congressman Hastings of Florida. (8) A provision adding $10,000,000 to the National Security Agency for the national/tactical gateway. The provision was requested by Congressman Ruppersberger. (9) A provision adding $2,500,000 for computer chip hardening to the National Security Agency. The provision was requested by Congressman Ruppersberger. (10) A provision adding $2,500,000 for the cryptographic modernization program to the National Security Agency. The provision was requested by Congressman Honda. From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for consideration of the House bill and the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Silvestre Reyes, Alcee L. Hastings, Leonard L. Boswell, Bud Cramer, Anna G. Eshoo, Rush Holt, C. A. Ruppersberger, Mike Thompson, Janice Schakowsky, James R. Langevin, Patrick J. Murphy. From the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of defense tactical intelligence and related activities: Ike Skelton, John M. Spratt, Jr., Managers on the Part of the House. John Rockefeller, Dianne Feinstein, Ron Wyden, Evan Bayh, Barbara a. Mikulski, Russell D. Feingold, Bill Nelson, Sheldon Whitehouse, Chuck Hagel, Olympia J. Snowe, Carl Levin. Managers on the Part of the Senate.", u"There are other proposals that have been made. The chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Roberts, has proposed legislation. So we have a great many ideas to choose from. As I sat at the Governmental Affairs hearing in early August, it was my hope that we would report out a bill early. I am pleased to say Chairman Collins has listed a markup for the week of September 20th, so that we should have a bill to present to the Senate early on. Then it is my hope we will act on this matter and act expeditiously. We have to get it right. These are complicated matters. We have been studying them for a very long time. We have been studying them, to my personal knowledge, going back to 1987 in legislation I introduced, and again in 1996, and with the very extensive consideration of the legislation on homeland security in 2002. So I think we are ready to move ahead and make the kinds of judgments that are tough decisions, but that is the pay grade around here. I think the time has come to act. It may not be a perfect bill. I have been in the Senate for 24 years now and I have not seen a perfect bill. The risks of inaction, in my view, are much greater than the risks of action. We know enough to make a sound judgment as to how to put the entire intelligence community under one umbrella. I see my colleague Senator Bayh on the floor. I yield the floor. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Reformation Act of 2004'' or ``9-11 Act''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows: Subtitle A--Modification of Authorities on Elements of Intelligence (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) Timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States. All reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the United States receives the best intelligence available. (2) The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) created a formal structure under an official who would lead the Central Intelligence Agency and, in a separate role as Director of Central Intelligence, the intelligence community of the United States Government, and serve as the principal adviser to the President on intelligence. (3) Executive Order 12333 (December 4, 1981; 46 F.R. 59941) states that ``the United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal''. (4) The intelligence community of the United States is supposed to function as a single corporate enterprise, supporting those who manage the strategic interests of the United States, whether political, economic, or military. (5) The United States has suffered through an escalating cycle of intelligence failures, especially since the end of the Cold War, while witnessing the onset of new and emerging global threats such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (6) The Director of Central Intelligence has no genuine influence over elements of the intelligence community other than the Central Intelligence Agency because, among other things, the Director controls only a small portion of the funds, personnel, and related assets of the intelligence community. There is no structural mechanism to enforce the mandate of Executive Order 12333 that all elements of the intelligence community must fully cooperate with one another. (7) As such, the existing intelligence structure is dysfunctional, and not organized to effectively respond to new and emerging threats. In fact, the intelligence apparatus of the United States has for decades grown more cumbersome and unaccountable and may now properly be characterized as a Cold War model in an era of terrorism. (8) The existing dysfunctional structure of the intelligence community has severe consequences, as the Director of Central Intelligence--or those ostensibly under the Director's control--missed, ignored, or failed to connect numerous warnings which could have averted the terrorist plot of September 11, 2001. Similar errors may have caused the Director to mislead the President on the nature of weapons of mass destruction threats as the Administration weighed military action against Iraq. (9) Despite the best efforts of the Administration of President George W. Bush, Congress, and the American people, much of the dysfunction in the intelligence community-- including the lack of common terrorist watchlists and the inability to detect and apprehend terrorists traveling in the United States--has not been remedied in the three years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. (10) The final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, while making certain recommendations on the restructuring of the intelligence community to meet new and emerging terrorist threats, leaves much discretion to Congress in determining the scope and nature of the restructuring of the intelligence community. (11) President George W. Bush on August 2, 2004, specifically requested that Congress create a national intelligence director in a ``free-standing entity similar to a cabinet agency or an agency'' and ``who will have a great deal of budget authority'' and will have ``the same relationship to the White House and the President that the Secretary of Defense would have, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, [or] the Secretary of the Treasury would have.'' The Executive Orders issued on August 27, 2004, while properly focusing on strengthened management of the intelligence community, strengthening information sharing, and the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center, also leaves a great deal of discretion to Congress to codify these matters in law and determine the scope and nature of the restructuring of the intelligence community. (12) To effectively counter the grave threat of transnational terrorism, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently conceded, as he must, that ``strong, entrenched agencies must be willing to give up some of their turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient, government-wide effort''. (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are as follows: (1) To provide for fundamental reform of the intelligence community of the United States Government involving a robust Department of Intelligence and Director of Intelligence with control over the budgets, personnel, and related assets of the intelligence community. (2) To compel the elements of the intelligence community to work together to accomplish their common mission, much as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) fostered ``jointness'' among the various Armed Forces, in conformance with the requirements of law and Executive orders. (3) To facilitate the provision to the President and the National Security Council of the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign policy, defense policy, and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from security threats, including threats related to transnational terrorism. (4) To ensure that all means, consistent with United States laws, Executive orders, and regulations and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, are used to develop intelligence for the President and the National Security Council. (5) To create a structure for the intelligence community that will better serve the President in his duty under the Constitution of the United States to protect the security of the United States. In this Act: (1) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the Department of Intelligence. (2) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of Intelligence. (3) Intelligence.--The term ``intelligence'' includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. (4) Foreign intelligence.--The term ``foreign intelligence'' means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (5) Counterintelligence.--The term ``counterintelligence'' means information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (6) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' includes-- (A) the Department, which shall include the Office of the Director of Intelligence and such other offices as the Director may designate or are prescribed by law; (B) the Central Intelligence Agency; (C) the National Security Agency; (D) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (E) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (F) the National Reconnaissance Office; (G) other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs; (H) the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Coast Guard; (I) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; (J) the elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analyses of foreign intelligence information; and (K) such other elements of any other department or agency of the United States as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community. (7) National intelligence; intelligence related to the national security.--The terms ``national intelligence'' and ``intelligence related to the national security''-- (A) refer to intelligence which pertains to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government; and (B) do not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by the Director and the Attorney General, or otherwise as expressly provided for in this Act or otherwise provided by law. (8) National foreign intelligence program.--The term ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' refers to all programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community, as well as any other programs of the intelligence community designated jointly by the Director and the head of a department or agency of the United States Government or by the President. Such term does not include programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed Forces. (9) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (10) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism information'' means any information, whether collected, produced, or distributed by intelligence, law enforcement, military, homeland security, or other United States Government activities, relating to-- (A) the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals, or of domestic groups or individuals involved in transnational terrorism; (B) threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, United States persons, or United States interests, or to other nations or the persons or interests of other nations; (C) communications of or by such groups or individuals; or (D) groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with such groups or individuals. (a) Executive Department.--The Department of Intelligence is an executive department of the United States. (b) Composition.--The Department is composed of the following: (1) The Office of the Director of Intelligence. (2) The elements specified in title II. (3) Such other offices, agencies, and activities as may be established by law or by the President. (c) Seal.--The Director shall have a seal for the Department. The design of the seal is subject to approval by the President. Judicial notice shall be taken of the seal. (a) Director of Intelligence.--There is a Director of Intelligence, who is the head of the Department of Intelligence, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (b) Individuals Eligible for Nomination.--Any individual nominated for appointment as Director shall have extensive national security expertise. (c) Term of Office.--(1) The term of service of the Director shall be 10 years. (2) Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to any individual appointed as Director after the date of the enactment of this Act. (3) If the individual serving as the Director of Central Intelligence on the date of the enactment of this Act is the first person appointed as Director of Intelligence under this section, the date of appointment of such individual as Director of Intelligence shall be treated as the date of the commencement of the term of service of the individual as Director of Intelligence for purposes of this subsection. (d) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Director shall-- (1) serve as head of the intelligence community in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law; (2) act as a principal adviser to the President for intelligence related to the national security; and (3) determine the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government in accordance with section 133. (a) Office of Director of Intelligence.--There is within the Department an Office of the Director of Intelligence. (b) Function.--The function of the Office of the Director of Intelligence is to assist the Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director under this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law and to carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by law. (c) Composition.--The Office of the Director of Intelligence is composed of the following: (1) The Deputy Director of Intelligence. (2) The National Counterterrorism Center. (3) Other national intelligence centers established under section 114. (4) The Assistant Director of Intelligence for Research, Development, and Procurement. (5) The Assistant Director of Intelligence for Civil Liberties and Privacy. (6) The National Intelligence Council. (7) The General Counsel of the Department of Intelligence. (8) The Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence. (9) The Intelligence Comptroller. (10) The Chief Information Officer of the Department of Intelligence. (11) The Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Intelligence. (12) Such other offices and officials as may be established by law or the Director may establish or designate in the Office. (d) Staff.--(1) To assist the Director in fulfilling the responsibilities of the Director as head of the intelligence community, the Director shall employ and utilize in the Office of the Director of Intelligence a professional staff having an expertise in matters relating to such responsibilities, and may establish permanent positions and appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff. (2) The staff of the Office under paragraph (1) shall include the elements of the Community Management Staff that are transferred to the Office under title IV. (3) To the maximum extent practicable, the Director shall utilize existing personnel, resources, and expertise in organizing the staff of the Office under paragraph (1). (a) Deputy Director of Intelligence.--There is a Deputy Director of Intelligence who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (b) Individuals Eligible for Nomination.--Any individual nominated for appointment as Deputy Director of Intelligence shall have extensive national security expertise. (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Deputy Director of Intelligence shall, subject to the direction of the Director, be responsible for assisting the Director in carrying out the responsibilities of the Director, including-- (1) assisting the Director in the development and execution of budgets under section 133, evaluating programs, and exercising authority under section 133(f) with respect to reprogramming and reallocation of funds and transfers of personnel; (2) assisting the Director in the transition of elements of the intelligence community to the Department under this Act; (3) assisting the Director in the development, implementation, and management of a personnel system for intelligence community personnel; (4) collecting data and preparing separate quarterly reports on the obligation and expenditures of funds from the elements of the intelligence community under the National Foreign Intelligence Program; (5) assisting the Director in the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center and the national intelligence centers; (6) assisting the Director in the management and administration of the staff of the Office of the Director of Intelligence; (7) assisting the Director in performing management functions across the intelligence community, including the management of personnel and resources; (8) assisting the Director in ensuring that the elements of the intelligence community make better use of open source intelligence analysis; (9) assisting the Director in directing the efficient and effective tasking of national intelligence collection using technical means and human sources; (10) assisting the Director with the establishment of standards, requirements, and priorities for the analysis and production of intelligence by all elements of the intelligence community; (11) assisting the Director in overseeing the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence by all elements of the intelligence community; (12) assisting the Director in monitoring the allocation of resources for the collection, analysis, and production of intelligence in order to identify any unnecessary duplication in the collection, analysis and production of intelligence; (13) assisting the Director in directing the competitive analysis of analytical products having national importance; (14) assisting the Director with the establishment of priorities and requirements for daily tasking of collection, analysis, and dissemination of information; (15) assisting the Director in conducting daily tasking of collection, analysis, and dissemination of information; (16) assisting the Director in providing advisory guidance on the tasking of collection, analysis, and dissemination of information to elements of the departments and agencies of the United States Government that collect intelligence and are not within the National Foreign Intelligence Program; (17) assisting the Director with the establishment of procedures and mechanisms to provide for real-time automated tasking across multiple intelligence disciplines, such as signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, human intelligence, imagery intelligence, and electronic intelligence; (18) assisting the Director in assessing the performance of the elements of the intelligence community with respect to tasking requests and priorities; and (19) making recommendations to the Director regarding the assignment within the Department of officers or employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and other elements of the Department to assist in the tasking of collection, analysis, and dissemination of information to all elements of the intelligence community under the National Foreign Intelligence Program. (d) Power To Act as Director of Intelligence.--The Deputy Director of Intelligence shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during the Director's absence or disability or during a vacancy in the position of Director of Intelligence. (e) Precedence in Office of Director of Intelligence.--The Deputy Director of Intelligence takes precedence in the Office of the Director of Intelligence immediately after the Director. (a) National Counterterrorism Center.--There is a National Counterterrorism Center. (b) Missions.--(1) The missions of the National Counterterrorism Center shall be as follows: (A) To serve as the primary organization within the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism or counterterrorism (other than purely domestic counterterrorism information) and, in furtherance of such mission-- (i) to receive, retain, and disseminate information from any department, agency, or other element of the Federal Government, any State or local government, or any other source to the extent consistent with applicable law; and (ii) to respond to inquiries from any department, agency, or other element of the Federal Government, or any State or local government agency, that is discharging counterterrorism responsibilities in order to assist such department, agency, or element in discharging such responsibilities. (B) To conduct strategic planning for operations for counterterrorism activities that integrate all instruments of National power, including diplomacy, finance, military force, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement. (C) Consistent with applicable law, to assign general responsibilities for counterterrorism in support of strategic plans under paragraph (2) to departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government having counterterrorism responsibilities, and provide such departments, agencies, and elements with access to intelligence necessary to accomplish the responsibilities so assigned, without undertaking the direction of such operations. (D) To serve as the central and shared information repository within the United States Government on terrorism information. (E) To ensure that appropriate departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government have access to and receive all-source intelligence support necessary to executive their counterterrorism plans or perform alternative, independent analysis. (F) To unify the strategic intelligence and planning of operations against transnational terrorist threats across the foreign-domestic divide. (G) To foster joint action among the department, agencies, and elements of the United States Government involved in counterterrorism. (H) To oversee the counterterrorism operations of the United States Government. (I) To ensure that an accountable official has authority to guide the Government-wide counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government. (2) A department, agency, or element of the United States Government that objects to the assignment of general operational authority to such department, agency, or element under paragraph (1)(C) shall notify the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council under title IX of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 491 et seq.) of such objection. (c) Administrator of National Counterterrorism Center.--(1) There is an Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Any individual nominated for appointment as Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center shall have significant expertise in matters relating to the national security of the United States and matters relating to terrorism that threatens the national security of the United States. (d) Duties and Responsibilities of Administrator.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, at the policy direction of the President and the National Security Council, the Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center shall, through the Director, be responsible for the following insofar as it relates to counterterrorism: (1) Serving as the principal advisor to the President on counterterrorism matters. (2) Directing the efficient and effective tasking of national intelligence collection using technical means and human sources. (3) Establishing standards and priorities relating to the analysis and production of intelligence by the elements of the intelligence community. (4) Directing the tasking of analysis and production of intelligence by the elements of the intelligence community. (5) Directing competitive analysis of analytical products having national importance. (6) Identifying intelligence requirements. (e) Authorities of Administrator.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities specified in subsection (d), the Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center shall-- (1) monitor the implementation of counterterrorism operations and coordinate the updating of plans for such operations as needed; (2) oversee interagency task forces on counterterrorism (including task forces of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government), and, as the Administrator determines necessary, incorporate the coordinating activities of such task forces into the Center; (3) incorporate into the Center any interagency planning of operations on counterterrorism that is being conducted by the staff of the National Security Council as of the date of the enactment of this Act; (4) establish priorities and requirements for, and coordinate the efficient and effective tasking of, national intelligence collection on counterterrorism, whether inside or outside the United States, using technical means and human sources, including the establishment of mechanisms and procedures to provide for automated tasking across multiple intelligence disciplines in real time; (5) develop assessments comparing terrorist capabilities and intentions with United States defenses against such threats (commonly referred to as ``net-assessments''); (6) provide warnings of terrorist threats as directed by the President; (7) incorporate, as necessary, the perspectives and needs of State and local counterterrorism officials in implementing the mission of the Center; and (8) access, as considered necessary by the Administrator for the performance of the functions of the Center, information to which the Administrator is granted access by subsection (i). (f) Deputy Administrators of National Counterterrorism Center.--(1) There is in the National Counterterrorism Center a Deputy Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center for Intelligence who shall be appointed by the Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center. (2) There is in the National Counterterrorism Center a Deputy Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center for Operations who shall be appointed by the Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center. (3) The Deputy Administrators shall have the responsibilities set forth in subsection (g). (g) Duties and Responsibilities of Deputy Administrators.-- (1) The Deputy Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center for Intelligence shall have responsibilities for matters as follows: (A) Strategic analysis of terrorist threats. (B) The pooling of all-source intelligence (whether domestic or foreign) about transnational terrorist organizations with worldwide reach. (C) The development of assessment comparing terrorist capabilities and intentions with United States defenses against such threats (commonly referred to as ``net assessments''). (D) The provision of warnings on terrorist threats. (E) The discharge of the tasking of national intelligence under subsection (d) and (e). (F) The duties of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) transferred to the Department under title IV. (2) The Deputy Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center for Operations shall have responsibilities as follows: (A) Joint planning for the assignment of responsibilities for operations to lead agencies. (B) The tracking of operations so assigned. (C) The overall coordination of operations of the intelligence community. (h) Staff.--(1) To assist the Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center in fulfilling the responsibilities of the Administrator under this section, the Administrator shall employ and utilize in the Center a professional staff having an expertise in matters relating to such responsibilities. (2) The head of any element of the intelligence community may, upon the request of the Director, assign or detail to the Center any officer or employee of such element to assist the Administrator in carrying out the responsibilities of the Administrator under this section. (i) Access to Terrorism Information.--The head of each department, agency, or other element of the United States Government that possesses or acquires terrorism information shall-- (1) give prompt access to such information to the Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center, unless otherwise expressly prohibited by law or otherwise directed by the President; (2) cooperate in, and facilitate the production of, reports based on terrorism information with contents and formats that permit dissemination of such information in a manner that maximizes the utility of such information in protecting the territory, people, and interests of the United States; and (3) if such department, agency, or other element conducts diplomatic, financial, military, homeland security, intelligence, or law enforcement activities relating to counterterrorism, keep the Administrator fully and currently informed of such activities, unless expressly prohibited by law or otherwise directed by the President. (a) National Intelligence Centers.--(1) The Director shall establish within the Department one or more centers (to be known as ``national intelligence centers'') to address intelligence priorities established by the National Security Council. (2) Each national intelligence center shall be assigned an area of intelligence responsibility, whether expressed in terms of a geographic region (including the Middle East), in terms of function (including counterterrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international crime and narcotics), or in other terms. (b) Requirements Relating to Establishment of Centers.--(1) In establishing a national intelligence center, the Director shall assign lead responsibility for such center to an element of the intelligence community selected by the Director for that purpose. (2) The Director shall determine the structure and size of each national intelligence center. (3) The Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the establishment of a national intelligence center not later than 60 days before the date of the establishment of the center. (c) Mission of Centers.--(1) Each national intelligence center shall provide joint all source intelligence analysis and planning of intelligence operations in the area of intelligence responsibility assigned the center by the Director pursuant to intelligence priorities established by the National Security Council. (2) As part of its intelligence analysis mission, a national intelligence center shall-- (A) undertake primary responsibility for strategic and tactical intelligence analysis, fusing all-source intelligence, whether foreign or domestic, on the area of intelligence responsibility of the center; (B) develop intelligence net assessments; (C) provide threat warnings to the Director and to appropriate departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government for further dissemination at the State and local level; and (D) direct foreign and domestic intelligence collection and analysis to address threats and to support implementation of operations. (3) As part of its mission to plan intelligence operations, a national intelligence center shall-- (A) develop, based on policy objectives and priorities established by the National Security Council, plans for operations for intelligence collection for its area of intelligence responsibility; (B) assign responsibilities for operations for intelligence collection for its area of intelligence responsibility to the elements of the intelligence community, which operations shall be directed and conducted by the elements of the intelligence community concerned; and (C) oversee implementation of such plans and operations, and update such plans, as the administrator of the center considers appropriate. (d) Supervision.--The administrator of each national intelligence center shall report directly to the Director in order to ensure adequate sharing of intelligence analysis and adequate planning of intelligence operations in the area of intelligence responsibility assigned to such center. (e) Staff of Centers.--(1) The head of an element of the intelligence community shall, upon the request of the administrator of a national intelligence center and with the approval of the Director, assign or detail to the center any personnel, including intelligence analysts and intelligence operations specialists, of such element as the administrator of the center considers appropriate to carry out the mission of the center. (2) Personnel assigned or detailed to a national intelligence center under paragraph (1) shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the administrator of the center on all matters for which the center has been assigned responsibility and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the mission of the center. (3) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or detailed to a national intelligence center under this subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such personnel at the center. (4) The supervisors of the staff of a national center may, with the approval of the Director, reward the staff of the center for meritorious performance by the provision of such performance awards as the Director shall prescribe. (5) The administrator of a national intelligence center may recommend to the head of the element of the intelligence community concerned the reassignment to such element of any personnel of such element previously assigned or detailed to the center. (f) Modification or Termination of Centers.--(1) The Director may terminate a national intelligence center if the Director determines that the center is no longer required to meet an intelligence priority established by the National Security Council. (2) The Director may from time to time recommend to the National Security Council a modification of the mission or responsibilities of a national intelligence center, and may, with the approval of the National Security Council, modify the mission or responsibilities of a national intelligence center. (g) Support.--The element of the intelligence community assigned lead responsibility for a national intelligence center under subsection (b)(1) shall be responsible for the provision of administrative support for the center, including the provision of funds to the center necessary for the administration of the center, until such time as the center is included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program Budget. (a) Assistant Director of Intelligence for Research, Development, and Procurement.--There is an Assistant Director of Intelligence for Research, Development, and Procurement who shall be appointed by the Director. (b) Direction.--The Assistant Director of Intelligence for Research, Development, and Procurement shall report to the Director regarding the activities of the Assistant Director. (c) Principal Responsibilities.--The Assistant Director of Intelligence for Research, Development, and Procurement shall-- (1) manage and oversee the research and development activities of the intelligence community with respect to the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government; (2) ensure that research and development projects are consistent with national intelligence requirements; (3) establish priorities among such projects in order to address deficiencies in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of national intelligence; (4) account for funding constraints in program development and acquisition; (5) address system requirements from collection to final dissemination (also known as ``end-to-end architecture''); and (6) in consultation with the Director, the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Intelligence, and the Intelligence Comptroller, ensure that tactical military intelligence systems, military systems, and national intelligence systems are sufficiently interoperable. (e) Responsibility for Performance of Specific Function.-- In carrying out responsibilities under this section, the Assistant Director of Intelligence for Research, Development, and Procurement shall ensure through the National Reconnaissance Office the continued operation of an effective unified organization for the research, development, and acquisition of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to satisfy-- (1) the requirements of all elements of the intelligence community; and (2) the needs of the Department of Defense, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands. (a) Assistant Director of Intelligence for Civil Liberties and Privacy.--There is an Assistant Director of Intelligence for Civil Liberties and Privacy who shall be appointed by the Director. (b) Direction.--The Assistant Director of Intelligence for Civil Liberties and Privacy shall report to the Director regarding the activities of the Assistant Director. (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Assistant Director of Intelligence for Civil Liberties and Privacy shall-- (1) serve as the head of the Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy under section 242; and (2) in that capacity, have the duties and responsibilities specified in that section. (a) National Intelligence Council.--There is a National Intelligence Council. (b) Composition.--(1) The National Intelligence Council shall be composed of substantive experts on matters addressed by the Council who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of the Director. (2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements for service on the Council to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods. (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--(1) The National Intelligence Council shall-- (A) produce national intelligence estimates for the United States Government, including alternative views held by elements of the intelligence community; (B) evaluate intelligence community-wide collection, analysis, and production of intelligence and the requirements and resources of the collection, analysis, and production of such intelligence; and (C) otherwise assist the Director in carrying out the responsibilities described in section 131. (2)(A) National intelligence estimates produced under paragraph (1)(A) shall-- (i) separately state, and distinguish between, the intelligence underlying the estimate and the assumptions and judgment of analysts with respect to that intelligence and estimate; (ii) describe the quality and reliability of the intelligence underlying the estimates; and (iii) present and explain alternative conclusions with respect to the intelligence and estimates. (B) Before publication and distribution of a national intelligence estimate, the estimate shall be certified by both the Director and the Chairman of the Council as approved for publication and distribution. (d) Access to Intelligence.--To the extent approved by the President and recommended by the Director, the National Intelligence Council shall have access to all intelligence related to the national security that is necessary for its duties and responsibilities under this section. (e) Contract Authority.--Subject to the direction and control of the Director, the National Intelligence Council may carry out its duties and responsibilities under this section by contract, including contracts for substantive experts necessary to assist the Council with particular assessments under this section. (f) Staff.--The Director shall make available to the National Intelligence Council such staff as may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its duties and responsibilities under this section. (g) Availability to Policymakers.--The National Intelligence Council shall be readily accessible to policymaking officials of the United States. (h) Assistance of Intelligence Community.--The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall, as appropriate, furnish such support to the National Intelligence Council, including the preparation of intelligence analyses, as may be required by the Director. (a) General Counsel.--There is a General Counsel of the Department of Intelligence who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (b) Prohibition on Dual Service as General Counsel of Another Agency.--The individual serving in the position of General Counsel of the Department of Intelligence may not, while so serving, also serve as the General Counsel of any other department, agency, or element of the United States Government. (c) Scope of Position.--The General Counsel of the Department of Intelligence is the chief legal officer of the Department. (d) Functions.--The General Counsel of the Department of Intelligence shall perform such functions as the Director may prescribe. (a) Inspector General.--There is an Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence who shall be appointed as provided in section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 3). (b) Supervision and Control; Removal.--(1) The Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence shall report to and be under the general supervision of the Director. (2) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the President. The President shall immediately communicate in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal of any individual from the position of Inspector General. (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence-- (1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the inspections, investigations, and audits relating to the programs and operations of the Department and the intelligence community to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and regulations; (2) to keep the Director fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, and fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in such programs and operations, and to report the progress made in implementing corrective action; (3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; (4) to prepare semiannual reports as provided in subsection (d); and (5) to perform such other duties specified for inspectors general in the Inspector General Act of 1978 as the Director shall prescribe. (d) Powers and Authorities.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence shall have access to any employee or any employee of a contractor of the Department or any other element of the intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General. (B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other materials which relate to the programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section. (C) The level of classification or compartmentation of information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any materials under subparagraph (B). (2) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the Department or any other element of the intelligence community-- (A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; and (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any employee of the Agency or any other element of the intelligence community in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity. (3) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the Inspector General's duties, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or before an officer having a seal. (4) The Inspector General shall have such additional powers and authorities specified for inspectors general in the Inspector General Act of 1978 as the Director shall prescribe. (e) Semiannual Reports.--(1) Not later than April 30 and October 31 each year, the Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence shall submit to the Director a report on the activities of the Inspector General under this section during the six-month period ending March 31 and September 30 of such year, respectively. (2) Each report shall include, for the period covered by such report, the following: (A) The matters specified for semiannual reports of inspectors general in section 5 of the Inspector General Act of 1978. (B) An assessment of the effectiveness of all measures in place in the Department for the protection of civil liberties and privacy of United States persons. (3) Not later than 30 days after receipt of a report under paragraph (1), the Director shall transmit to the congressional intelligence committees a complete, unabridged copy of such report together with such comments on such report as the Director considers appropriate. (f) Cooperation With Other Inspectors General of Intelligence Community.--Each inspector general of an element of the intelligence community shall cooperate fully with the Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence in the performance of any duty or function by the Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence under this section regarding such element. (g) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence Community.--The performance by the Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence of any duty or function regarding an element of the intelligence community may not be construed to modify or affect the responsibility of any other inspector general having responsibilities regarding the element of the intelligence community. (a) Intelligence Comptroller.--There is an Intelligence Comptroller who shall be appointed by the Director. (b) Supervision.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall report directly to the Director. (c) Duties.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall-- (1) assist the Secretary of Defense in the preparation and execution of the budget of the Department of Defense insofar as such budget relates to the tactical intelligence programs; (2) assist the Deputy Director of Intelligence in the preparation and execution of the budget of the intelligence community under the National Foreign Intelligence Program; (3) provide unfettered access to the Director to financial information under the National Foreign Intelligence Program; and (4) provide information to the Deputy Director of Intelligence necessary for reports under section 112(c)(4). (d) Staff.--The staff of the Intelligence Comptroller shall consist of personnel of the intelligence community who are assigned to the staff by the Director, in consultation with the heads of the other elements of the intelligence community. (a) Chief Information Officer of Department of Intelligence.--There is a Chief Information Officer of the Department of Intelligence who shall be appointed by the Director. (b) Eligibility for Appointment.--Any individual appointed as Chief Information Officer of the Department of Intelligence shall have extensive experience in the management, operation, and maintenance of complex information networks, including the use of advanced information technology applications and products to promote the efficient and secure exchange of information across such networks. (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Chief Information Officer of the Department of Intelligence shall-- (1) develop an integrated information technology network that provides for the efficient and secure exchange of intelligence information among the elements of the intelligence community and, as directed by the President, other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government and of State and local governments; (2) develop an enterprise architecture for the intelligence community and ensure that elements of the intelligence community comply with such architecture; (3) ensure that the elements of the intelligence community have direct and continuous electronic access to all information (including unevaluated intelligence) necessary for appropriately cleared analysts to conduct comprehensive all-source analysis and for appropriately cleared policymakers to perform their duties; (4) review and provide recommendations to the Director on intelligence community budget requests for information technology and national security systems; (5) ensure the interoperability of information technology and national security systems throughout the intelligence community; (6) promulgate and enforce standards on information technology and national security systems that apply throughout the intelligence community; (7) provide for the elimination of duplicate information technology and national security systems within and between the elements of the intelligence community; and (8) maintain a consolidated inventory of mission critical and mission essential information systems for the intelligence community, identify interfaces between such systems and other information systems, and develop and maintain contingency plans for responding to a disruption in the operation of any of such systems. (a) Chief Financial Officer of Department of Intelligence.--There is a Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Intelligence who shall be appointed from civilian life by the Director. (b) Supervision.--The Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Intelligence shall report directly to the Director. (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Intelligence Comptroller-- (1) assist the Director and the Deputy Director of Intelligence in the preparation and execution of the budget of the elements of the intelligence community under the National Foreign Intelligence Program; (2) assist the Secretary of Defense in the preparation and execution of the budget of the Department of Defense insofar as such budget relates to the elements of the intelligence community within the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program; and (3) provide unfettered access to the Director to financial information under the National Foreign Intelligence Program. (d) Staff.--The staff of the Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Intelligence shall consist of personnel of the elements of the intelligence community who are assigned to the staff by the Director. (a) In General.--(1) Not more than one of the individuals serving in the positions specified in subsection (b) may be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces in active status. (2) It is the sense of Congress that at least one of the individuals serving in a position specified in subsection (b) should be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, whether in active or retired status. (b) Covered Positions.--The positions referred to in this subsection are the following: (1) The Director. (2) The Deputy Director of Intelligence. (c) Service of Commissioned Officers.--(1) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, while serving in a position specified in subsection (b)-- (A) shall not be subject to supervision or control by the Secretary of Defense or by any officer or employee of the Department of Defense; (B) shall not exercise, by reason of the officer's status as a commissioned officer, any supervision or control with respect to any of the military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, except as otherwise authorized by law; and (C) shall not be counted against the numbers and percentages of commissioned officers of the rank and grade of such officer authorized for the military department of that officer. (2) Except as provided in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), the appointment of an officer of the Armed Forces to a position specified in subsection (b) shall not affect the status, position, rank, or grade of such officer in the Armed Forces, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of such status, position, rank, or grade. (3) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces on active duty who is appointed to a position specified in subsection (b), while serving in such position and while remaining on active duty, shall continue to receive military pay and allowances and shall not receive the pay prescribed for such position. Funds from which such pay and allowances are paid shall be reimbursed from funds available to the Director. (a) Provision of National Intelligence.--The Director shall be responsible for providing national intelligence-- (1) to the President; (2) to the heads of other departments and agencies of the executive branch; (3) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; and (4) upon request, to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof. (b) Sense of Congress.--The national intelligence provided under subsection (a) should be timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community. (a) In General.--The Director shall, in consultation with the heads of relevant entities and taking into consideration the intelligence requirements established by the National Security Council for purposes of national security and foreign policy-- (1) direct and manage the tasking of collection, analysis, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the intelligence community, including the establishment of requirements and priorities of such tasking; (2) approve collection and analysis requirements, determine collection and analysis priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection and analysis priorities levied on national collection and analysis assets, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the direction of the President; (3) promote and evaluate the utility of national intelligence to consumers within the United States Government; (4) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication within the intelligence community; (5) establish requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and provide assistance to the Attorney General to ensure that information derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches under that Act is disseminated so it may be used efficiently and effectively for foreign intelligence purposes, except that the Director shall have no authority to direct, manage, or undertake electronic surveillance or physical search operations pursuant to that Act unless otherwise authorized by statute or Executive order; (6) establish requirements and procedures for the classification of information; (7) establish requirements and procedures for the dissemination of classified information by elements of the intelligence community; (8) establish intelligence reporting guidelines while protecting intelligence sources and methods; (9) oversee and ensure compliance by each element of the intelligence community with the statutes and Executive orders of the United States, including laws related to the protection of civil liberties and privacy of United States persons; (10) protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure as provided in subsection (b); (11) establish and implement policies and procedures governing access to, and use of, specified data base information by officers and employees of the elements of the intelligence community and, as directed by the President (after recommendations by the Attorney General), law enforcement personnel of the United States Government; (12) develop, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, an integrated communications network that provides interoperable communications capabilities among all elements of the intelligence community and such other entities and persons as the Director considers appropriate; (13) develop and implement, in consultation with the heads of the other elements of the intelligence community, policies and programs within the intelligence community for the rotation of personnel among the elements of the intelligence community in a manner that-- (A) makes service in more than one element of the intelligence community pursuant to such rotation a condition of promotion to such positions within the intelligence community as the Director shall specify; (B) ensures the effective management of intelligence community personnel who are specially training in intelligence community-wide matters; and (C) establishes standards for education and training that will facilitate assignments to the national intelligence centers under section 114; (14) consolidate and manage a common personnel security system for the Department; (15) develop and implement, as necessary, a common personnel system and common retirement and disability system for the Department; (16) ensure that the composition of the personnel of the intelligence community is sufficiently diverse for purposes of the collection and analysis of intelligence by recruiting and training for service in the intelligence community women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds; (17) appoint officers or employees of the Department of Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and other elements of the Department of Intelligence to serve as tasking directors to assist in the tasking of collection, analysis, and dissemination of information for all elements of the intelligence community under the National Foreign Intelligence Program; (18) in accordance with the provisions of section 106 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6), make recommendations to the President regarding the appointment of certain heads of elements of the intelligence community; (19) develop such objectives and guidance for the intelligence community as, in the judgment of the Director, are necessary to ensure the timely and effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence, of whatever nature and from whatever source derived, concerning current and potential threats to the security of the United States and its interests, and to ensure that the National Foreign Intelligence Program is structured adequately to achieve such objectives; (20) work with the elements of the intelligence community to ensure that the intelligence collection activities of the United States Government are integrated in-- (A) collecting against enduring and emerging threats to the national security of the United States; (B) maximizing the value of such intelligence collection to the national security of the United States; and (C) ensuring that all collected data is available, to the maximum extent practicable, for integration, analysis, and dissemination to those who can act on, add value to, or otherwise apply it to mission needs; (21) ensure that appropriate departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government have access to, and receive, all-source intelligence support needed to perform independent, alternative analysis; (22) establish policies, procedures, and mechanisms that translate intelligence objectives and priorities approved by the President into specific guidance for the intelligence community; (23) receive access to all foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and national intelligence, including intelligence derived from activities of any department, agency, or element of the United States Government, and to all other information that is related to the national security or is otherwise required for the performance of the duties of the Director, except in cases in which the access of the Director to such information is expressly prohibited by law, by the President, or by the Attorney General acting at the direction of the President; (24) consistent with section 133, review, and approve or disapprove, any proposal to-- (A) reprogram funds within an appropriation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program; (B) transfer funds from an appropriation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program to an appropriation that is not for the National Foreign Intelligence Program within the intelligence community; or (C) transfer funds from an appropriation that is not for the National Foreign Intelligence Program within the intelligence community to an appropriation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program; (25) ensure that any intelligence and operational systems and architectures of the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government are consistent with national intelligence requirements set by the Director and all applicable information sharing and security guidelines and information privacy requirements; (26) in consultation with the Attorney General, set forth common standards, through written requirements, procedures, and guidelines, for the collection and sharing of information collected abroad and in the United States by the elements of the intelligence community, and with State and local governments in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, while to the maximum extent practicable, protecting the privacy and civil liberties of United States persons and ensuring that relevant officers of the United States Government are provided with clear, understandable, consistent, effective, and lawful procedures and guidelines for the collection, handling, distribution, and retention of information; (27) require, at the outset of the intelligence collection and analysis process, the creation of records and reporting, for both raw and processed information, in such a manner that sources and methods are protected so that the information can be distributed at lower classification levels, and by creating unclassified versions for distribution whenever possible; (28) require information to be shared free of originator controls, including controls requiring the consent of the originating agency prior to the dissemination of the information outside any other agency to which it has been made available, and otherwise minimizing the applicability of information compartmentalization systems to information while holding personnel accountable for increased sharing of intelligence related to the national security; (29) direct, supervise, and control all aspects of national intelligence, including the programs, projects, and activities of the national intelligence centers; and (30) perform such other functions as the President may direct. (b) Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.--(1) In order to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure and, consistent with that protection, to maximize the dissemination of intelligence, the Director shall establish and implement guidelines for the following purposes: (A) The classification of information. (B) Access to and dissemination of intelligence, both in final form and in the form when initially gathered. (C) The preparation of intelligence reports to ensure that, to the maximum extent practicable, information contained in such reports is also available in unclassified form. (2) The Director may not delegate a duty or authority under this subsection. (c) Uniform Procedures for Sensitive Compartmented Information.--The President, acting through the Director, shall-- (1) establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to sensitive compartmented information to any officer or employee of any department, agency, or element of the United States Government and to employees of contractors of the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government; (2) ensure the consistent implementation of those standards and procedures throughout the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government; and (3) ensure that security clearances granted by individual elements of the intelligence community are recognized by all elements of the intelligence community, and under contracts entered into by such elements. (a) Access to Intelligence.--To the extent approved by the President, the Director shall have access to all intelligence related to the national security which is collected by any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government. (b) Determination of Budgets for NFIP and Other Intelligence Activities.--The Director shall determine, as appropriate, the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States under section 102(d)(3) by-- (1) developing and presenting to the President an annual budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, including, in furtherance of such budget-- (A) the preparation, review, modification, and approval of budgets of the elements of the intelligence community; and (B) the preparation, review, modification, and approval of personnel and resource allocations by the elements of the intelligence community; (2) participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program; (3) having direct jurisdiction of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the National Foreign Intelligence Program as specified in subsection (e); and (4) managing and overseeing the execution, and, if necessary, the modification of the annual budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, including directing the reprogramming and reallocation of funds, and the transfer of personnel, among and between elements of the intelligence community in accordance with subsection (f). (c) Budget Authorities.--(1) For purposes of subsection (b)-- (A) the Director shall, acting through the Deputy Director of Intelligence, direct, coordinate, and prepare the annual budgets of the elements of the intelligence community within the National Foreign Intelligence Program, in consultation with the heads of such elements; (B) the Director shall provide guidance for the development of the annual budgets for such other elements of the intelligence community as are not within the National Foreign Intelligence Program; (C) the heads of the elements referred to in subparagraph (B), shall coordinate closely with the Deputy Director of Intelligence in the development of the budgets of those elements, before the submission of their recommendations to the Director for approval; and (D) the budget of any element of the intelligence community within the National Foreign Intelligence Program may not be provided to the President for transmission to Congress unless the Director has approved such budget. (2)(A) In preparing and presenting an annual budget under subsection (b)(1), the Director shall develop the annual budget for the elements of the intelligence community within the National Foreign Intelligence Program. (B) If any portion of the budget for an element of the intelligence community is prepared outside the Office of the Director of Intelligence, the Director-- (i) shall approve such budget before submission to the President; and (ii) may require modifications of such budget to meet the requirements and priorities of the Director before approving such budget under clause (i). (d) Management and Oversight of National Foreign Intelligence Program.--(1) The Director shall manage and oversee the execution by each element of the intelligence community of any amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to such element under the National Foreign Intelligence Program. (2) Consistent with subsections (e) and (f), the Director may modify the resource and personnel allocations of any element of the intelligence community. (e) Jurisdiction of Funds Under NFIP.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law and consistent with section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the National Foreign Intelligence Program shall be considered to be appropriated or otherwise made available to, and under the direct jurisdiction, management, and oversight of, the Director. (f) Reprogramming and Reallocation of Funds and Transfer of Personnel Under NFIP.--(1)(A) Consistent with section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Intelligence may, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and in accordance with procedures developed by the Director of Intelligence, reprogram funds appropriated or otherwise made available for a program within the National Foreign Intelligence Program to another such program. (B) Consistent with section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947, no funds appropriated or otherwise made available under the National Foreign Intelligence Program may be reprogrammed by any element of the intelligence community without the prior approval of the Director except in accordance with procedures issued by the Director. (2) Consistent with section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director may reallocate funds appropriated or otherwise made available for a program within the National Foreign Intelligence Program for other purposes under such program. (3) Consistent with section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director may, in accordance with procedures developed by the Director, transfer personnel authorized for an element of the intelligence community to another element of the intelligence community for a period of up to a year. (4) Consistent with section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director before reprogramming funds available under the Joint Military Intelligence Program or the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program. (5) The Director may not delegate a responsibility or authority of the Director under this subsection. (6) A reprogramming of funds or a transfer of funds or personnel may be made under this subsection only if-- (A) the funds or personnel are being reprogrammed or transferred, as the case may be, to an activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity; (B) the need for funds or personnel for such activity is based on unforeseen requirements; and (C) in the case of a reprogramming of funds, the reprogramming of funds does not involve a reprogramming of funds to the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency. (7) Funds reprogrammed or transferred under this subsection shall remain available for the same period as the account or subaccount to which reprogrammed or transferred, as the case may be. (8)(A) Any reprogramming of funds under this subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the appropriate congressional committees. (B) Any proposed reprogramming of funds for which notice is given to the appropriate congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report explaining the nature of the proposed reprogramming and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. (C) The congressional intelligence committees shall be promptly notified of any reprogramming of funds under this subsection in any case in which the reprogramming of such funds would not have otherwise required reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of October 24, 1992. (9)(A) The Director shall promptly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and, in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Defense, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, a report on any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this subsection. (B) The Director shall include in any report under subparagraph (A) an explanation of the nature of the transfer concerned and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. (g) Delegation of Certain Administrative Authorities.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director may delegate to the head of any other element of the intelligence community any authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency under a provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 as follows: (A) Section 3 (50 U.S.C. 403c), relating to procurement. (B) Section 4 (50 U.S.C. 403e), relating to travel allowances and related expenses. (C) Section 5 (50 U.S.C. 403f), relating to administration of funds. (D) Section 6 (50 U.S.C. 403g), relating to exemptions from certain information disclosure requirements. (E) Section 8 (50 U.S.C. 403j), relating to availability of appropriations. (F) Section 11 (50 U.S.C. 403k), relating to payment of death gratuities. (G) Section 12 (50 U.S.C. 403l), relating to acceptance of gifts, devises, and bequests. (H) Section 21 (50 U.S.C. 403u), relating to operation of a central services program. (2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of an element of the intelligence community delegated an authority under paragraph (1) with respect to such element may exercise such authority with respect to such element to the same extent that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency. (h) Termination of Employees of Department.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director may, at the discretion of the Director, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Department whenever the Director considers the termination of employment of such officer or employee necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States. (2) Any such termination of employment shall not affect the right of the officer or employee terminated to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the United States Government if declared eligible for such employment by the Office of Personnel Management. (i) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the direction of the National Security Council and in a manner consistent with section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the Director shall coordinate the relationships between elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments on all matters involving intelligence related to the national security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine means. (j) Standards and Qualifications for Performance of Intelligence Activities.--The Director shall develop standards and qualifications for persons engaged in the performance of intelligence activities within the intelligence community. (k) Personal Services.--The Director may-- (1) procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants (or organizations thereof) in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code; and (2) whenever necessary due to a need related to intelligence functions of the Department, procure temporary (not to exceed 1 year) or intermittent personal services, including the services of experts or consultants (or organizations thereof), without regard to the pay limitations of such section 3109. (a) Element of Department of Intelligence.--The Central Intelligence Agency is an element of the Department. (b) Head of Agency.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is the head of the Central Intelligence Agency as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law. (c) Supervision and Control.--(1) The Central Intelligence Agency shall be under the supervision, direction, and control of the Director of Intelligence. (2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall report directly to the Director of Intelligence. (a) Mission.--The Central Intelligence Agency shall have the mission provided for the Agency under the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) and as otherwise provided by law or directed by the President. (b) Power and Authorities.--Except as otherwise provided by this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall have such powers and authorities as are provided the Director in the National Security Act of 1947 and Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 and as are otherwise provided by law or directed by the President or the Director. (a) Element of Department of Intelligence.--The National Security Agency is an element of the Department. (b) Head of Agency.--The Director of the National Security Agency is the head of the National Security Agency. (c) Supervision and Control.--(1) The National Security Agency shall be under the supervision, direction, and control of the Director of Intelligence. (2) The Director of the National Security Agency shall report directly to the Director of Intelligence. (a) Mission.--The National Security Agency shall have the mission provided for the Agency under the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) or as otherwise provided by law or directed by the President. (b) Power and Authorities.--The Director of the National Security Agency shall have such powers and authorities as are provided the Director in the National Security Act of 1959 or as are otherwise provided by law or directed by the President. (a) Element of Department of Intelligence.--The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is an element of the Department. (b) Head of Agency.--(1) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is the head of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (2) If an officer of the Armed Forces on active duty is appointed to the position of Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the position shall be treated as having been designated by the President as a position of importance and responsibility for purposes of section 601 of title 10, United States Code, and shall carry the grade of lieutenant general, or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, vice admiral. (c) Supervision and Control.--(1) The National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency shall be under the supervision, direction, and control of the Director of Intelligence. (2) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall report directly to the Director of Intelligence. (a) Mission.--The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall have the mission provided for the Agency under subtitle B of title III or as otherwise provided by law or directed by the President. (b) Power and Authorities.--The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall have such powers and authorities as are provided the Agency under subtitle B of title III or as otherwise provided by law or directed by the President. (c) Availability and Continued Improvement of Imagery Intelligence Support to All-Source Analysis and Production Function.--The Director of Intelligence shall take all necessary steps to ensure the full availability and continued improvement of imagery intelligence support for all-source analysis and production. (a) Element of Department of Intelligence.--The National Reconnaissance Office is an element of the Department. (b) Head of Office.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office is the head of the National Reconnaissance Office. (c) Supervision and Control.--(1) The National Reconnaissance Office shall be under the supervision, direction, and control of the Director of Intelligence. (2) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall report directly to the Director of Intelligence. (a) Mission.--The National Reconnaissance Office shall have the mission provided by law or as directed by the President. (b) Power and Authorities.--The National Reconnaissance Office shall have such powers and authorities as are provided by law or as directed by the President. (a) Elements of Department of Intelligence.--Each element of the Federal Bureau of Investigation specified in subsection (b) shall, after the date of the enactment of this Act, be an element of the Department. (b) Specified Elements.--The elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation specified in this subsection are as follows: (1) The Office of Intelligence. (2) The Counterterrorism Division personnel under the National Foreign Intelligence Program. (3) The Counterintelligence Division personnel under the National Foreign Intelligence Program. (c) Supervision and Control.--(1) Each element of the Department under subsection (a) shall be under the supervision, direction, and control of the Director of Intelligence. (2)(A) Each element of the Department under subsection (a) shall remain at all times subject to applicable guidelines on investigations of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice in effect as of September 1, 2004, and any successor guidelines to such guidelines, particularly the provisions of such guidelines relating to investigations within the United States and investigations of United States persons. (B) A copy of any guidelines covered by subparagraph (A) shall be made available to congressional intelligence committees and the public before their implementation or utilization by the elements of the Department under subsection (a). In making guidelines available to the public under this subparagraph, the Director of Intelligence may redact any portions of such guidelines that are classified for reasons of national security. (3) The Attorney General shall review, and approve prior to execution, the tasking of, or requests for, domestic collection against United States persons, collection against United States persons, domestic intelligence operations, and assignment of operational responsibilities by the Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center. (d) Mission.--Each element of the Department under subsection (a) shall have the mission provided for such element by law or as directed by the President. (e) Power and Authorities.--Each element of the Department under subsection (a) shall have such powers and authorities as are provided such element by law or as directed by the President. (f) Support.--(1) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, in coordination with the Director of Intelligence, ensure that each element of the Department under subsection (a) is provided all administrative resources necessary to perform its intelligence and intelligence- related functions. (2) The Attorney General shall ensure through the Director of Intelligence that the domestic intelligence operations of the elements of the Department under subsection (a), and any intelligence operations of such elements directed against United States persons, comply with the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines of the United States applicable to such operations. (a) Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy.--There is within the Department an Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy. (b) Head of Office.--The Assistant Director of Intelligence for Civil Liberties and Privacy is the head of the Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy. (c) Supervision.--The Assistant Director of Intelligence for Civil Liberties and Privacy shall report directly to the Director. (d) Duties Relating to Civil Liberties.--The Assistant Director of Intelligence for Civil Liberties and Privacy shall, with respect to matters of the Department relating to civil liberties-- (1) assist the Director in ensuring that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties is appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures developed for and implemented by the Department; (2) oversee compliance by the Department with requirements under the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines relating to civil rights and civil liberties; (3) review, investigate, and assess complaints and other information indicating possible abuses of civil rights or civil liberties in the administration of the programs and operations of the Department unless, in the determination of the Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence, the review, investigation, or assessment of a particular complaint or information can better be conducted by the Inspector General; (4) issue guidance on civil liberties concerns with, or civil liberties objections to, any policy or practice of the Department; and (5) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (e) Duties Relating to Privacy.--The Assistant Director of Intelligence for Civil Liberties and Privacy shall, with respect to matters of the Department relating to privacy-- (1) assure that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information; (2) assure that personal information contained in Privacy Act systems of records is handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 1974; (3) conduct a privacy impact assessment of proposed rules of the Department or that of the Department on the privacy of personal information, including the type of personal information collected and the number of people affected; and (4) conduct privacy impact assessments when appropriate or as required by law. TITLE III--OTHER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the President should, for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005, make available to the public the information described in subsection (b) unless the President certifies that public disclosure of such information would cause damage to the national security of the United States. (b) Covered Information.--The information described in this subsection is as follows: (1) The aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for the fiscal year concerned for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government. (2) The aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, by Congress for the fiscal year concerned for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government. Section 105(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5(b)) is amended-- (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``Consistent with sections 103 and 104, the Secretary of Defense shall'' and inserting ``Consistent with sections 132 and 133 of the Intelligence Reformation Act of 2004, the Secretary of Defense shall, in coordination with the Director of Intelligence''; and (2) in paragraph (2)(D), by striking ``notwithstanding any other provision of law,''. The text of section 106 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is amended to read as follows: ``(a) Recommendations of Director of Intelligence in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the Director of Intelligence shall recommend to the President an individual for appointment to the position. ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: ``(A) The Deputy Director of Intelligence. ``(B) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. ``(C) The Director of the National Security Agency. ``(D) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(E) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. ``(F) The Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center. ``(b) Concurrence of Director of Intelligence in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the Director of Intelligence before recommending to the President an individual for appointment to the position. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position may make the recommendation to the President without the Director's concurrence, but shall include in the recommendation a statement that the Director does not concur in the recommendation. ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: ``(A) The Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland Security. ``(B) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. ``(C) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(D) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. ``(E) The Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing of the Department of the Treasury. ``(F) The Director of the Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy. ``(G) The Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.''. Section 111 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404f) is amended by striking ``(except as otherwise agreed by the Director and the Secretary of Defense)''. (a) Oversight.--(1) Chapter 8 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 193 the following new section: (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States in its final report stated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, under the current Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has made significant progress in improving its intelligence capabilities. (2) In the report, the members of the Commission also urged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation fully institutionalize the shift of the Bureau to a preventive counterterrorism posture. (b) National Security Workforce.--(1) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall continue efforts to develop and maintain within the Federal Bureau of Investigation a national security workforce. (2) In a developing and maintaining a national security workforce under paragraph (1), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, subject to the direction and control of the President, develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national security workforce who are recruited, trained, rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence within the Bureau of an institutional culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence and national security missions of the Bureau. (3) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the enactment of this Act shall receive basic training in both criminal justice matters and national security matters. (4) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the enactment of this Act shall, to the maximum extent practicable, be given the opportunity to undergo, during such agent's early service with the Bureau, meaningful assignments in criminal justice matters and in national security matters. (5) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall carry out a program to enhance the capacity of the Bureau to recruit and retain individuals with backgrounds in intelligence, international relations, language, technology, and other skills relevant to the intelligence and national security missions of the Bureau. (6) Commencing as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, each senior manager of the Bureau shall be a certified intelligence officer. (7) It is the sense of Congress that the successful discharge of advanced training courses, and of one or more assignments to another element of the intelligence community, should be a precondition to advancement to higher level national security assignments within the Bureau. (c) Field Office Matters.--(1) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall ensure that each field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has an official at the deputy level or higher with responsibility for national security matters. (2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide for such expansion of the secure facilities in the field offices of the Bureau as is necessary to ensure the discharge by the field offices of the intelligence and national security missions of the Bureau. (d) Reports.--(1) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to Congress a report on the progress made as of the date of such report in carrying out the requirements of this section. (2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall include in each semiannual program review of the Bureau that is submitted to Congress a report on the progress made by each field office of the Bureau during the period covered by such review in addressing Bureau and national program priorities. (3) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every six months thereafter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to Congress a report on the progress of the Bureau in implementing information-sharing principles. (a) National Security Missions.--(1) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall, in support of the national security objectives of the United States, provide geospatial intelligence consisting of the following: (A) Imagery. (B) Imagery intelligence. (C) Geospatial information. (2) Geospatial intelligence provided in carrying out paragraph (1) shall be timely, relevant, and accurate. (b) Navigation Information.--The National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency shall improve means of navigating vessels of the Navy and the merchant marine by providing, under the authority of the Director of Intelligence, accurate and inexpensive nautical charts, sailing directions, books on navigation, and manuals of instructions for the use of all vessels of the United States and of navigators generally. (c) Maps, Charts, Etc.--The National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency shall prepare and distribute maps, charts, books, and geodetic products as authorized under part II of this subtitle. (d) National Missions.--The National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency also has national missions as specified in section 110(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404e(a)). (e) Systems.--The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency may, in furtherance of a mission of the Agency, design, develop, deploy, operate, and maintain systems related to the processing and dissemination of imagery intelligence and geospatial information that may be transferred to, accepted or used by, or used on behalf of-- (1) the Armed Forces, including any combatant command, component of a combatant command, joint task force, or tactical unit; or (2) any other department or agency of the United States. (a) Use of Appropriated Funds.--The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency may use appropriated funds available to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to provide foreign countries with imagery intelligence and geospatial information support. (b) Use of Funds Other Than Appropriated Funds.--The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency may use funds other than appropriated funds to provide foreign countries with imagery intelligence and geospatial information support, notwithstanding provisions of law relating to the expenditure of funds of the United States, except that-- (1) no such funds may be expended, in whole or in part, by or for the benefit of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for a purpose for which Congress had previously denied funds; (2) proceeds from the sale of imagery intelligence or geospatial information items may be used only to purchase replacement items similar to the items that are sold; and (3) the authority provided by this subsection may not be used to acquire items or services for the principal benefit of the United States. (c) Accommodation Procurements.--The authority under this section may be exercised to conduct accommodation procurements on behalf of foreign countries. The Director of Intelligence may-- (1) have the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency prepare maps, charts, and nautical books required in navigation and have those materials published and furnished to navigators; and (2) buy the plates and copyrights of existing maps, charts, books on navigation, and sailing directions and instructions. (a) Notice on Preparation by Agency.--There shall be conspicuously printed on pilot charts prepared in the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency the following: ``Prepared from data furnished by the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency of the Department of Intelligence and by the Department of Commerce, and published at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency under the authority of the Director of Intelligence''. (b) Information from Department of Commerce.--The Secretary of Commerce shall furnish to the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, as quickly as possible, all meteorological information received by the Secretary of Commerce that is necessary for, and of the character used in, preparing pilot charts. (a) Prices.--All maps, charts, and other publications offered for sale by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall be sold at prices and under regulations that may be prescribed by the Director Intelligence. (b) Use of Proceeds To Pay Foreign Licensing Fees.--(1) The Director of Intelligence may pay any NGA foreign data acquisition fee out of the proceeds of the sale of maps, charts, and other publications of the Agency, and those proceeds are hereby made available for that purpose. (2) In this subsection, the term ``NGA foreign data acquisition fee'' means any licensing or other fee imposed by a foreign country or international organization for the acquisition or use of data or products by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The Director of Intelligence may authorize the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to exchange or furnish mapping, charting, and geodetic data, supplies and services to a foreign country or international organization pursuant to an agreement for the production or exchange of such data. (a) Sale of Maps and Charts.--The National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency shall offer for sale maps and charts at scales of 1:500,000 and smaller, except those withheld in accordance with subsection (b) or those specifically authorized under criteria established by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order. (b) Exception.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of Intelligence may withhold from public disclosure any geodetic product in the possession of, or under the control of, the Department of Intelligence-- (A) that was obtained or produced, or that contains information that was provided, pursuant to an international agreement that restricts disclosure of such product or information to government officials of the agreeing parties or that restricts use of such product or information to Government purposes only; (B) that contains information that the Director of Intelligence has determined in writing would, if disclosed, reveal sources and methods, or capabilities, used to obtain source material for production of the geodetic product; or (C) that contains information that the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency has determined in writing would, if disclosed, jeopardize or interfere with ongoing military or intelligence operations, reveal military operational or contingency plans, or reveal, jeopardize, or compromise military or intelligence capabilities. (2) In this subsection, the term ``geodetic product'' means imagery, imagery intelligence, or geospatial information. (c) Regulations.--(1) Regulations to implement this section (including any amendments to such regulations) shall be published in the Federal Register for public comment for a period of not less than 30 days before they take effect. (2) Regulations under this section shall address the conditions under which release of geodetic products authorized under subsection (b) to be withheld from public disclosure would be appropriate-- (A) in the case of allies of the United States; and (B) in the case of qualified United States contractors (including contractors that are small business concerns) who need such products for use in the performance of contracts with the United States. (a) Claims Barred.--No civil action may be brought against the United States on the basis of the content of a navigational aid prepared or disseminated by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (b) Navigational Aids Covered.--Subsection (a) applies with respect to a navigational aid in the form of a map, a chart, or a publication and any other form or medium of product or information in which the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency prepares or disseminates navigational aids. (a) Authority.--The Director of Intelligence may withhold from public disclosure operational files described in subsection (b) to the same extent that operational files may be withheld under section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431). (b) Covered Operational Files.--The authority under subsection (a) applies to operational files in the possession of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency that-- (1) as of September 22, 1996, were maintained by the National Photographic Interpretation Center; or (2) concern the activities of the Agency that, as of such date, were performed by the National Photographic Interpretation Center. (c) Operational Files Defined.--In this section, the term ``operational files'' has the meaning given that term in section 701(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431(b)). (a) Scope.--If there is no obligation under the provisions of chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, for the head of an agency of the United States to consult or negotiate with a labor organization on a particular matter by reason of that matter being covered by a provision of law or a Governmentwide regulation, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is not obligated to consult or negotiate with a labor organization on that matter even if that provision of law or regulation is inapplicable to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (b) Bargaining Units.--The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall accord exclusive recognition to a labor organization under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, only for a bargaining unit that was recognized as appropriate for the Defense Mapping Agency on September 30, 1996. (c) Termination of Bargaining Unit Coverage of Position Modified To Affect National Security Directly.--(1) If the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency determines that the responsibilities of a position within a collective bargaining unit should be modified to include intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or security duties not previously assigned to that position and that the performance of the newly assigned duties directly affects the national security of the United States, then, upon such a modification of the responsibilities of that position, the position shall cease to be covered by the collective bargaining unit and the employee in that position shall cease to be entitled to representation by a labor organization accorded exclusive recognition for that collective bargaining unit. (2) A determination described in paragraph (1) that is made by the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency may not be reviewed by the Federal Labor Relations Authority or any court of the United States. The Director of Intelligence may establish an undergraduate training program with respect to civilian employees of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency that is similar in purpose, conditions, content, and administration to the program established by the Secretary of Defense under section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) for civilian employees of the National Security Agency. In this subtitle: (1) Imagery.--(A) The term ``imagery'' means, except as provided in subparagraph (B), a likeness or presentation of any natural or manmade feature or related object or activity and the positional data acquired at the same time the likeness or representation was acquired, including-- (i) products produced by space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems; and (ii) likenesses or presentations produced by satellites, airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other similar means. (B) Such term does not include handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations. (2) Imagery intelligence.--The term ``imagery intelligence'' means the technical, geographic, and intelligence information derived through the interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral materials. (3) Geospatial information.--The term ``geospatial information'' means information that identifies the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on the earth and includes-- (A) statistical data and information derived from, among other things, remote sensing, mapping, and surveying technologies; and (B) mapping, charting, geodetic data, and related products. (4) Geospatial intelligence.--The term ``geospatial intelligence'' means the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. Subtitle A--Modification of Authorities on Elements of Intelligence (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 102 through 104 and inserting the following new sections: (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following provisions: (A) Section 3(4)(J) (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(J)). (B) Section 3(5)(B) (50 U.S.C. 401a(5)(B)). (C) Section 3(6) (50 U.S.C. 401a(6)). (D) Section 101(h)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(2)(A)). (E) Section 101(h)(5) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(5)). (F) Section 101(i)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(i)(2)(A)). (G) Section 101(j) (50 U.S.C. 402(j)), both places it appears. (H) Section 105(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)). (I) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)). (J) Section 105(b)(6)(A) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(b)(6)(A)). (K) Section 105(d) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(d)). (L) Section 105B(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(1)). (M) Section 105B(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(2)). (N) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), both places it appears. (O) Section 110(b) (50 U.S.C. 404e(b)). (P) Section 110(c) (50 U.S.C. 404e(c)). (Q) Section 111 (50 U.S.C. 404f). (R) Section 112(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(a)(1)). (S) Section 112(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)). (T) Section 113(b)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 404h(b)(2)(A)). (U) Section 113(c) (50 U.S.C. 404h(c)). (V) Section 114(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(a)(1)). (W) Section 114(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(b)(1)). (X) Section 115(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404j(a)(1)). (Y) Section 115(b) (50 U.S.C. 404j(b)). (Z) Section 115(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404j(c)(1)(B)). (AA) Section 116(a) (50 U.S.C. 404k(a)). (BB) Section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)). (CC) Section 117(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404l(a)(1)). (DD) Section 303(a) (50 U.S.C. 405(a)), both places it appears. (EE) Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C. 413(d)). (FF) Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)). (GG) Section 502(c) (50 U.S.C. 413a(c)). (HH) Section 503(b) (50 U.S.C. 413b(b)). (II) Section 504(d)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(d)(2)). (JJ) Section 603(a) (50 U.S.C. 423(a)). (KK) Section 702(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(6)(B)(viii)). (LL) Section 702(b) (50 U.S.C. 432(b)), both places it appears. (2) That Act is amended further amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency'' each place it appears in the following provisions: (A) Section 504(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)). (B) Section 504(a)(3)(C) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(C)). (C) Section 701(a) (50 U.S.C. 431(a)). (D) Section 702(a) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)). (3) Section 701(c)(3) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431(c)(3)) is amended by striking ``or the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Office of the Director of Intelligence, or the Office of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (4)(A) The heading for section 114 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended to read as follows: (a) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H(a)(1)(C) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8H(a)(1)(C)) is amended by inserting before the period at the end the following: ``or to the Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence''. (b) Other Officers.--(1) Section 528 of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support'' and inserting ``Assistant Deputy Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center for Operations''; and (B) in the heading, by striking ``ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR MILITARY SUPPORT'' and inserting ``ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER FOR OPERATIONS''. (2) The item relating to section 528 in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 32 of such title is amended by striking ``Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support'' and inserting ``Assistant Deputy Administration of the National Counterterrorism Center for for Operations''. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) by inserting before section 5 the following new sections: ``Sec. 2. (a) The National Security Agency is an element of the Department of Intelligence. ``(b) The National Security Agency is an element of the intelligence community under the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). ``Sec. 3. (a) The Director of the National Security Agency is the head of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency is subject to the direction and control of the Director of Intelligence. ``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall report directly to the Director of Intelligence on matters relating to the National Security Agency.''; (2) by striking ``Secretary of Defense'' each place it appears (other than the second place it appears in section 9(b), section 9(d), and section 10(c)(1)) and inserting ``Director of Intelligence''; and (3) in section 9(d), by striking ``Secretary of Defense shall'' and inserting ``Director of Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly''. Subparagraph (A) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended to read as follows: ``(A) the Department of Intelligence, which shall include the Office of the Director of Intelligence, the National Intelligence Council, and such other offices as the Director of Intelligence may designate;''. (a) Repeal.--Chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed. (b) Conforming Amendments.--The table of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A, and part I of subtitle A, of such title are each amended by striking the item relating to chapter 22. Section 110(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking ``section 442 of title 10, United States Code,'' and inserting ``section 232 of the Intelligence Reformation Act of 2004''. The Director of Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government shall jointly take such actions as are appropriate to preserve the intelligence capabilities of the United States during the transfer of agencies, offices, and functions to the Department under this Act. (a) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of Intelligence Community.--Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of Intelligence. (b) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of Central Intelligence Agency.--Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (c) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence as Deputy to Head of Intelligence Community.--Any reference to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in the Deputy Director's capacity as deputy to the head of the intelligence community in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Deputy Director of Intelligence. (a) Transfer.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall transfer to the Director of Intelligence administrative jurisdiction and control of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). (b) Administration.--The Director of Intelligence shall administer the Terrorist Threat Integration Center as a component of the National Counterterrorism Center under section 113. (a) Transfer.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall transfer to the Director of Intelligence administrative jurisdiction and control of the Community Management Staff. (b) Administration.--The Director of Intelligence shall administer the Community Management Staff as a component of the Office of the Director of Intelligence under section 111. (a) Transfer.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall transfer to the Director Intelligence administrative jurisdiction and control of the elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as follows: (1) The Office of Intelligence. (2) The Counterterrorism Division personnel under the National Foreign Intelligence Program. (3) The Counterintelligence Division personnel under the National Foreign Intelligence Program. (b) Administration.--The Director of Intelligence shall administer each element transferred to the Director under subsection (a) as an element of the Department under subtitle E of title II. In accordance with the provisions of this subtitle, there shall be transferred to the Director of Intelligence the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of each of the following: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The National Security Agency. (3) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Reconnaissance Office. (5) The Office of Intelligence. (6) The elements of the Counterterrorism Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation specified in section 241(b). (7) The elements of the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation specified in section 241(b). (8) The Terrorist Threat Integration Center. (9) The Community Management Staff. (a) Provision of Assistance by Officials.--Until the transfer of an agency or office to the Department under this Act, any official having authority over or functions relating to the agency or office immediately before the date of the enactment of this Act shall provide to the Director such assistance, including the use of personnel and assets, as the Director may request in preparing for the transfer and integration of the agency or office into the Department. (b) Services and Personnel.--Upon the request of the Director, the head of any department or agency of the United States may, on a reimbursable basis, provide services or detail personnel to assist with the transition of an agency or office to the Department under this Act. (c) Transfer of Personnel, Assets, Obligations, and Functions.--Upon the transfer of an agency or office to the Department under this Act-- (1) the personnel, assets, and obligations held by or available in connection with the agency or office shall be transferred to the Director of Intelligence for appropriate allocation, subject to the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and in accordance with the provisions of section 1531(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code; and (2) the Director of Intelligence shall have all functions relating to the agency or office that any other official could by law exercise in relation to the agency immediately before such transfer, and shall have in addition all functions vested in the Director by this Act or other law. (a) Completed Administrative Actions.--(1) Completed administrative actions of an agency or office shall not be affected by the enactment of this Act or the transfer of such agency or office to the Department, but shall continue in effect according to their terms until amended, modified, superseded, terminated, set aside, or revoked in accordance with law by an officer of the United States or a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law. (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term ``completed administrative action'' includes orders, determinations, rules, regulations, personnel actions, permits, agreements, grants, contracts, certificates, licenses, registrations, and privileges. (b) Pending Proceedings.--Subject to the authority of the Director-- (1) pending proceedings in an agency or office, including notices of proposed rulemaking, and applications for licenses, permits, certificates, grants, and financial assistance, shall continue notwithstanding the enactment of this Act or the transfer of the agency or office to the Department, unless discontinued or modified under the same terms and conditions and to the same extent that such discontinuance could have occurred if such enactment or transfer had not occurred; and (2) orders issued in such proceedings, and appeals therefrom, and payments made pursuant to such orders, shall issue in the same manner and on the same terms as if this Act had not been enacted or the agency or office had not been transferred, and any such orders shall continue in effect until amended, modified, superseded, terminated, set aside, or revoked by an officer of the United States or a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law. (c) Pending Civil Actions.--Subject to the authority of the Director, pending civil actions shall continue notwithstanding the enactment of this Act or the transfer of an agency or office to the Department, and in such civil actions, proceedings shall be had, appeals taken, and judgments rendered and enforced in the same manner and with the same effect as if such enactment or transfer had not occurred. (d) References.--References relating to an agency or office that is transferred to the Department in statutes, Executive orders, rules, regulations, directives, or delegations of authority that precede such transfer or the date of the enactment of this Act shall be deemed to refer, as appropriate, to the Department, to its officers, employees, or agents, or to its corresponding organizational units or functions. Statutory reporting requirements that applied in relation to such an agency or office immediately before the date of the enactment of this Act shall continue to apply following such transfer if they refer to the agency or office by name. (e) Employment Provisions.--(1) Notwithstanding the generality of the foregoing (including subsections (a) and (d)), in and for the Department the Director of Intelligence may, in regulations prescribed jointly with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, adopt the rules, procedures, terms, and conditions, established by statute, rule, or regulation before the date of the enactment of this Act, relating to employment in any agency or office transferred to the Department pursuant to this Act; and (2) except as otherwise provided in this Act, or under authority granted by this Act, the transfer pursuant to this Act of personnel shall not alter the terms and conditions of employment, including compensation, of any employee so transferred. (f) Statutory Reporting Requirements.--Any statutory reporting requirement that applied to an agency or office transferred to the Department under this Act, immediately before the date of the enactment of this Act shall continue to apply following that transfer if the statutory requirement refers to the agency or office by name. Section 101 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``The Department of Intelligence.''. (a) Executive Schedule Level I.--Section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item: ``Director of Intelligence.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new items: ``Director of Central Intelligence Agency. ``Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center.''. (c) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Deputy Director of Intelligence.''. (d) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking the item relating to the Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence; (2) by striking the item relating to the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency and inserting the following new items: ``Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency. ``Inspector General, Department of Intelligence.''; (3) by inserting after the item relating to the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency the following new item: ``General Counsel of the Department of Intelligence.''; and (4) by adding at the end the following new items: ``Assistant Directors of Intelligence (2). ``Deputy Administrators of the National Counterterrorism Center (2).''.", u" There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``9/11 Commission Report Implementation Act of 2004''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows: This title may be cited as the ``National Intelligence Authority Act of 2004''. In this title: (1) The term ``intelligence'' includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. (2) The term ``foreign intelligence'' means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (3) The term ``counterintelligence'' means information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the following: (A) The National Intelligence Authority. (B) The Central Intelligence Agency. (C) The National Security Agency. (D) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (F) The National Reconnaissance Office. (G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs. (H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy. (I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. (J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. (K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard. (L) Such other elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the National Intelligence Director and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community. (5) The terms ``national intelligence'' and ``intelligence related to the national security''-- (A) each refer to intelligence which pertains to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government; and (B) do not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by the National Intelligence Director and the Attorney General, or otherwise as expressly provided for in this title. (6) The term ``National Intelligence Program''-- (A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs, projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence community; and (ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities (whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland Security; but (B) does not refer-- (i) to any program, project, or activity pertaining solely to the requirements of a single department, agency, or element of the United States Government; or (ii) to any program, project, or activity of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by the United States Armed Forces. (7) The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) Independent Establishment.--There is hereby established as an independent establishment in the executive branch of government the National Intelligence Authority. (b) Composition.--The National Intelligence Authority is composed of the following: (1) The Office of the National Intelligence Director. (2) The elements specified in subtitle C. (3) Such other elements, offices, agencies, and activities as may be designated by law or by the President as part of the Authority. (c) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National Intelligence Authority are as follows: (1) To unify and strengthen the efforts of the intelligence community. (2) To ensure the organization of the efforts of the intelligence community in a collective manner relating to intelligence responsibilities. (3) To provide for the operation of the National Counterterrorism Center and the national intelligence centers under subtitle C. (4) To eliminate barriers in the conduct of the counterterrorism activities of the United States Government between foreign intelligence activities conducted inside and outside the United States while ensuring the protection of civil liberties. (5) To establish clear responsibility and accountability for counterterrorism and other intelligence matters relating to the national security of the United States. (d) Seal.--The National Intelligence Director shall have a seal for the National Intelligence Authority. The design of the seal is subject to the approval of the President. Judicial notice shall be taken of the seal. (a) National Intelligence Director.--There is a National Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (b) Individuals Eligible for Nomination.--Any individual nominated for appointment as National Intelligence Director shall have extensive national security expertise. (c) Principal Duties and Responsibilities.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) serve as head of the intelligence community in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law; (2) act as a principal adviser to the President for intelligence related to the national security; (3) serve as the head of the National Intelligence Authority (but may not serve as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency); and (4) direct, manage, and oversee the execution of the National Intelligence Program. (d) General Responsibilities and Authorities.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities set forth in subsection (c), the National Intelligence Director shall have the responsibilities set forth in section 132 and the authorities set forth in section 133 and other applicable provisions of law. (a) Office of National Intelligence Director.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority an Office of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Function.--The function of the Office of the National Intelligence Director is to assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director under this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law, and to carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by the President or by law. (c) Composition.--The Office of the National Intelligence Director is composed of the following: (1) The Deputy National Intelligence Director. (2) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Foreign Intelligence. (3) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Defense Intelligence. (4) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Homeland Intelligence. (5) The National Intelligence Council. (6) The General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority. (7) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority. (8) The Intelligence Comptroller. (9) The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority. (10) The Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (11) The Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (12) Such other offices and officials as may be established by law or the Director may establish or designate in the Office. (d) Staff.--(1) To assist the National Intelligence Director in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the Director, the Director shall employ and utilize in the Office of the National Intelligence Director a professional staff having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and responsibilities, and may establish permanent positions and appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff. (2) The staff of the Office under paragraph (1) shall include the elements of the Community Management Staff that are transferred to the Office under section 181. (a) Deputy National Intelligence Director.--(1) There is a Deputy National Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Any individual nominated for appointment as Deputy National Intelligence Director shall have extensive national security experience and management expertise. (3) The individual serving as Deputy National Intelligence Director may not serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community. (4) The Deputy National Intelligence Director shall assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director. (5) The Deputy National Intelligence Director shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the National Intelligence Director during the absence or disability of the National Intelligence Director or during a vacancy in the position of National Director of Intelligence. (b) Deputy National Intelligence Director for Foreign Intelligence.--(1) There is a Deputy National Intelligence Director for Foreign Intelligence. (2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 also serves as the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Foreign Intelligence. (3) In the capacity as Deputy National Intelligence Director for Foreign Intelligence, the Deputy Director shall-- (A) have the duties and responsibilities specified in subsection (e) with respect to the elements of the intelligence community (as determined by the National Intelligence Director) that are responsible for foreign intelligence matters; and (B) such other duties, responsibilities, and authorities with respect to foreign intelligence as the Director may assign. (c) Deputy National Intelligence Director for Defense Intelligence.--(1) There is a Deputy National Intelligence Director for Defense Intelligence. (2) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence under section 137 of title 10, United States Code, also serves as the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Defense Intelligence. (3) In the capacity as Deputy National Intelligence Director for Defense Intelligence, the Deputy Director shall-- (A) have the duties and responsibilities specified in subsection (e) with respect to the elements of the intelligence community (as determined by the National Intelligence Director) that are responsible for defense intelligence matters; and (B) such other duties, responsibilities, and authorities with respect to foreign intelligence as the Director may assign. (d) Deputy National Intelligence Director for Homeland Intelligence.--(1) There is a Deputy National Intelligence Director for Homeland Intelligence. (2)(A) At the election of the National Intelligence Director, one of the officials specified in subparagraph (B) also serves as the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Homeland Intelligence. (B) The officials specified in this subparagraph are as follows: (i) The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection under section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121). (ii) The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (3) In the capacity as Deputy National Intelligence Director for Homeland Intelligence, the Deputy Director shall-- (A) have the duties and responsibilities specified in subsection (e) with respect to the elements of the intelligence community (as determined by the National Intelligence Director) that are responsible for homeland intelligence matters; and (B) such other duties, responsibilities, and authorities with respect to homeland intelligence as the Director may assign. (e) Duties and Responsibilities Regarding Specific Intelligence Matters.--Each Deputy National Intelligence Director shall assist the National Intelligence Director and the Deputy National Intelligence Director under subsection (a) in-- (1) managing the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence in accordance with the standards, requirements, and priorities established by the National Intelligence Director; (2) ensuring the acquisition of collection systems in accordance with the standards, requirements, and priorities established by the National Intelligence Director; (3) setting standards, requirements, and priorities for the hiring and training of personnel; (4) assigning or detailing personnel as staff of the national intelligence centers; (5) overseeing the performance of the national intelligence centers, subject to the direction of the National Intelligence Director; (6) ensuring that the intelligence community makes better use of open source information and analysis; and (7) coordinating among the agencies, elements, and components of the intelligence community. (a) National Intelligence Council.--There is a National Intelligence Council. (b) Composition.--(1) The National Intelligence Council shall be composed of senior analysts within the intelligence community and substantive experts from the public and private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of, the National Intelligence Director. (2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector as a condition of service on the Council, or as contractors of the Council or employees of such contractors, to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods while avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this purpose. (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--(1) The National Intelligence Council shall-- (A) subject to paragraph (2), produce national intelligence estimates for the United States Government, including, whenever the Council considers appropriate, alternative views held by elements of the intelligence community; (B) evaluate community-wide collection and production of intelligence by the intelligence community and the requirements and resources of such collection and production; and (C) otherwise assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the responsibilities of the Director under section 131. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the Council satisfies the needs of policymakers and other consumers of intelligence by ensuring that each national intelligence estimate under paragraph (1)-- (A) states separately, and distinguishes between, the intelligence underlying such estimate and the assumptions and judgments of analysts with respect to such intelligence and such estimate; (B) describes the quality and reliability of the intelligence underlying such estimate; (C) presents and explains alternative conclusions, if any, with respect to the intelligence underlying such estimate and such estimate; and (D) characterizes the uncertainties, if any, and confidence in such estimate. (d) Service as Senior Intelligence Advisers.--Within their respective areas of expertise and under the direction of the National Intelligence Director, the members of the National Intelligence Council shall constitute the senior intelligence advisers of the intelligence community for purposes of representing the views of the intelligence community within the United States Government. (e) Authority To Contract.--Subject to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Director, the National Intelligence Council may carry out its responsibilities under this section by contract, including contracts for substantive experts necessary to assist the Council with particular assessments under this section. (f) Staff.--The National Intelligence Director shall make available to the National Intelligence Council such staff as may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its responsibilities under this section. (g) Availability of Council and Staff.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the National Intelligence Council and its staff satisfy the needs of policymaking officials and other consumers of intelligence. (2) The Council shall be readily accessible to policymaking officials and other appropriate individuals not otherwise associated with the intelligence community. (h) Support.--The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall, as appropriate, furnish such support to the National Intelligence Council, including the preparation of intelligence analyses, as may be required by the National Intelligence Director. (a) General Counsel of National Intelligence Authority.-- There is a General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (b) Prohibition on Dual Service as General Counsel of Another Agency.--The individual serving in the position of General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority may not, while so serving, also serve as the General Counsel of any other department, agency, or element of the United States Government. (c) Scope of Position.--The General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority is the chief legal officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (d) Functions.--The General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority shall perform such functions as the National Intelligence Director may prescribe. (a) Office of Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.--There is an Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority. (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority is to-- (1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently investigations, inspections, and audits relating to-- (A) the programs and operations of the National Intelligence Authority; (B) the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; and (C) the relationship of the Authority with the other elements of the intelligence community; (2) provide leadership and recommend policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations, and in the relationships described in paragraph (1), and to detect fraud and abuse in such programs, operations, and relationships; (3) provide a means for keeping the National Intelligence Director fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and in such relationships, and the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions; and (4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly informed of significant problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and in such relationships, as well as the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions. (c) Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.-- (1) There is an Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority, who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector General shall be made-- (A) without regard to political affiliation; (B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of the National Intelligence Authority, and prior experience in the field of intelligence or national security; and (C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or auditing. (3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the National Intelligence Director. (4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the President. The President shall immediately communicate in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal of any individual from the position of Inspector General. (d) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority-- (1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations, inspections, and audits relating to the programs and operations of the National Intelligence Authority, and in the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and regulations; (2) to keep the National Intelligence Director fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, and fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in such programs and operations, and in the relationships described in paragraph (1), and to report the progress made in implementing corrective action; (3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; and (4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities under this section, to comply with generally accepted government auditing standards. (e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may prohibit the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority from initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. (2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within seven days to the congressional intelligence committees. (3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time a report under paragraph (1) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such report. (4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General considers appropriate. (f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority shall have direct and prompt access to the National Intelligence Director when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. (2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or any employee of a contractor, of the National Intelligence Authority whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. (B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section. (C) The level of classification or compartmentation of information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any materials under subparagraph (B). (D) Failure on the part of any employee or contractor to cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate administrative actions by the Director, including loss of employment or the termination of an existing contractual relationship. (3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the Authority-- (A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; and (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint or disclosing such information may be taken by any employee of the Authority in a position to take such actions, unless such complaint was made or such information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity. (4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or before an officer having a seal. (5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of all information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General. (B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by subpoenas. (C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for or on behalf of any other element or component of the Authority. (D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the United States. (g) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority shall be provided with appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices. (2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the National Intelligence Director, the Inspector General shall select, appoint and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector General. (B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively. (C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the Inspector General shall create within the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General. (3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government. (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance. (h) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the National Intelligence Director a classified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority during the immediately preceding six-month periods ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. (B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following: (i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation, inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered by such report. (ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of the National Intelligence Authority identified by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report. (iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii). (iv) A statement whether or not corrective action has been completed on each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective action has been completed, a description of such corrective action. (v) An assessment of the effectiveness of all measures in place in the Authority for the protection of civil liberties and privacy of United States persons. (vi) A certification whether or not the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General. (vii) A description of the exercise of the subpoena authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report. (viii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy and efficiency in the administration of programs and operations undertaken by the Authority, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and operations. (C) Not later than 30 days after the date of the submittal of a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the report to the congressional intelligence committees together with any comments the Director considers appropriate. (2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or operations of the Authority or regarding relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program. (B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) within seven calendar days of receipt of such report, together with such comments as the Director considers appropriate. (3) In the event that-- (A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General; (B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by the Inspector General should focus on any current or former Authority official who holds or held a position in the Authority that is subject to appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, including such a position held on an acting basis; (C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a current or former official described in subparagraph (B); (D) the Inspector General receives notice from the Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current or former official described in subparagraph (B); or (E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit, (a) Intelligence Comptroller.--There is an Intelligence Comptroller who shall be appointed from civilian life by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Supervision.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director. (c) Duties.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in the preparation and execution of the budget of the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; (2) assist the Director in participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military intelligence programs and activities outside the National Intelligence Program; (3) provide unfettered access to the Director to financial information under the National Intelligence Program; (4) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of National Intelligence Authority.--There is an Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Supervision.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director. (c) Duties.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in ensuring that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties is appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures developed for and implemented by the National Intelligence Authority and in the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; (2) oversee compliance by the Authority, and in the relationships described in paragraph (1), with requirements under the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines relating to civil rights and civil liberties; (3) review, investigate, and assess complaints and other information indicating possible abuses of civil rights or civil liberties in the administration of the programs and operations of the Authority, and in the relationships described in paragraph (1), unless, in the determination of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority, the review, investigation, or assessment of a particular complaint or information can better be conducted by the Inspector General; and (4) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) Privacy Officer of National Intelligence Authority.-- There is a Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall have primary responsibility for the privacy policy of the National Intelligence Authority, including-- (1) assuring that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information; (2) assuring that personal information contained in Privacy Act systems of records is handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 1974; (3) conducting privacy impact assessments when appropriate or as required by law; and (4) performing such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) Chief Information Officer of National Intelligence Authority.--There is a Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in developing and implementing an integrated information technology network, as required by section 132(a)(14); (2) develop an enterprise architecture for the intelligence community and assist the Director in ensuring that elements of the intelligence community comply with such architecture; (3) ensure that the elements of the intelligence community have direct and continuous electronic access to all information (including unevaluated intelligence) necessary for appropriately cleared analysts to conduct comprehensive all-source analysis and for appropriately cleared policymakers to perform their duties; (4) review and provide recommendations to the Director on National Intelligence Program budget requests for information technology and national security systems; (5) assist the Director in promulgating and enforcing standards on information technology and national security systems that apply throughout the intelligence community; (6) provide for the elimination of duplicate information technology and national security systems within and between the elements of the intelligence community; and (7) perform such other duties with respect to the information systems and information technology of the National Intelligence Authority as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) In General.--Under the direction of the National Security Council, the National Intelligence Director shall be responsible for providing national intelligence-- (1) to the President; (2) to the heads of other departments and agencies of the executive branch; (3) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; and (4) where appropriate, to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof. (b) National Intelligence.--Such national intelligence should be timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community. (a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) develop and present to the President on an annual basis a unified budget for the intelligence and intelligence- related activities of the United States Government; (2) ensure a unified budget for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government that reflects an appropriate balance among the varieties of technical and human intelligence methods and analysis; (3) direct and manage the tasking of collection, analysis, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the intelligence community, including the establishment of requirements and priorities of such tasking; (4) approve collection and analysis requirements, determine collection and analysis priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection and analysis priorities levied on national intelligence collection and analysis assets; (5) establish and oversee the National Counterterrorism Center under section 141 and the national intelligence centers under section 142; (6) establish requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and provide assistance to the Attorney General to ensure that information derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches under that Act is disseminated so it may be used efficiently and effectively for foreign intelligence purposes, except that the Director shall have no authority to direct, manage, or undertake electronic surveillance or physical search operations pursuant to that Act unless otherwise authorized by statute or Executive order; (7) develop and implement, in consultation with the heads of the other elements of the intelligence community, personnel policies and programs applicable to the intelligence community that-- (A) facilitate assignments and details of personnel to the National Counterterrorism Center under section 141, to national intelligence centers under section 142, and across agency lines; (B) set standards for education and training; (C) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence community is sufficiently diverse for purposes of the collection and analysis of intelligence by ensuring the recruitment and training of women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds; (D) make service in more than one element of the intelligence community a condition of promotion to such positions within the intelligence community as the Director shall specify; (E) ensure the effective management and authority of intelligence community personnel who are responsible for intelligence community-wide matters; and (F) include the enhancements required under section 134; (8) promote and evaluate the utility of national intelligence to consumers within the United States Government; (9) ensure that appropriate officials of the United States Government and other appropriate individuals have access to a variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views; (10) protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; (11) establish requirements and procedures for the classification of information and for access to classified information; (12) establish requirements and procedures for the dissemination of classified information by elements of the intelligence community; (13) establish information sharing and intelligence reporting guidelines that maximize the dissemination of information while protecting intelligence sources and methods; (14) develop, in consultation with the heads of appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, an integrated information technology network that provides for the efficient and secure exchange of intelligence information among all elements of the intelligence community and such other entities and persons as the Director considers appropriate; (15) ensure compliance by the elements of the intelligence community with the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines of the United States, including all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines relating to the protection of civil liberties and privacy of United States persons; (16) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication within the intelligence community; and (17) perform such other functions as the President may direct. (b) Uniform Procedures for Sensitive Compartmented Information.--The President, acting through the National Intelligence Director, shall-- (1) establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to sensitive compartmented information to any officer or employee of any department, agency, or element of the United States Government, and to employees of contractors of such departments, agencies, and elements; (2) ensure the consistent implementation of such standards and procedures throughout the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government; and (3) ensure that security clearances granted by individual elements of the intelligence community are recognized by all elements of the intelligence community, and under contracts entered into by such elements. (a) Access to Intelligence.--To the extent approved by the President, the National Intelligence Director shall have access to all intelligence related to the national security which is collected by any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government. (b) Determination of Budgets for NIP and Other Intelligence Activities.--The National Intelligence Director shall determine the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government by-- (1) developing and presenting to the President an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program, including, in furtherance of such budget, the review, modification, and approval of budgets of the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program utilizing the budget authorities in subsection (d)(1); (2) providing guidance on the development of annual budgets for such elements of the intelligence community as are not within the National Intelligence Program utilizing the budget authorities in subsection (d)(2); (3) participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military intelligence programs and activities outside the National Intelligence Program; (4) having direct jurisdiction of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the National Intelligence Program as specified in subsection (e); and (5) managing and overseeing the execution, and, if necessary, the modification of the annual budget for the National Intelligence Program, including directing the reprogramming and reallocation of funds, and the transfer of personnel, among and between elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program utilizing the authorities in subsections (f) and (g). (c) Scope of NIP and JMIP.--The National Intelligence Director and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly review the programs, projects, and activities under the Joint Military Intelligence Program in order to identify the programs, projects, and activities within the Joint Military Intelligence Program as of the date of the enactment of this Act that pertain to national intelligence. Any programs, projects, and activities so identified are to be carried out instead within the National Intelligence Program. (d) Budget Authorities.--(1)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall direct, coordinate, prepare, modify, and present to the President the annual budgets of the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, in consultation with the heads of those elements. (B) The budget of an element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program may not be provided to the President for transmission to Congress unless the Director has approved such budget. (2)(A) The Director shall provide guidance for the development of the annual budgets for such elements of the intelligence community as are not within the National Intelligence Program; (B) The heads of the elements of the intelligence community referred to in subparagraph (A) shall coordinate closely with the Director in the development of the budgets of such elements, before the submission of their recommendations on such budgets to the President. (e) Jurisdiction of Funds Under NIP.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law and consistent with section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the National Intelligence Program shall be appropriated to, and under the direct jurisdiction of, the National Intelligence Director. (f) Role in Reprogramming.--(1) No funds made available under the National Intelligence Program may be reprogrammed by any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program without the prior approval of the National Intelligence Director except in accordance with procedures issued by the Director. (2) The Director shall consult with the appropriate committees of Congress regarding modifications of existing procedures to expedite the reprogramming of funds within the National Intelligence Program. (g) Transfer of Funds or Personnel Within National Intelligence Program.--(1)(A) In addition to any other authorities available under law for such purposes, the National Intelligence Director, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, may transfer funds appropriated for a program within the National Intelligence Program to another such program and, in accordance with procedures to be developed by the National Intelligence Director and the heads of the departments and agencies concerned, may transfer personnel authorized for an element of the intelligence community to another such element. (B) The National Intelligence Director may delegate a duty of the Director under this subsection only to the Deputy National Intelligence Director. (2) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made under this subsection only if-- (A) the funds or personnel are being transferred to an activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity; (B) the need for funds or personnel for such activity is based on unforeseen requirements; and (C) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds to the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency. (3) Funds transferred under this subsection shall remain available for the same period as the appropriations account to which transferred. (4) Any transfer of funds under this subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer for which notice is given to the appropriate congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report explaining the nature of the proposed transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In addition, the congressional intelligence committees shall be promptly notified of any transfer of funds made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the transfer would not have otherwise required reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of October 24, 1992. (5) The National Intelligence Director shall promptly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and, in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Defense, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, a report on any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this subsection. The Director shall include in any such report an explanation of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. (a) Rewards for Service in Certain Positions.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall, under regulations prescribed by the Director, provide incentives for service on the staff of the national intelligence centers, on the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center, and in other positions in support of the intelligence community management functions of the Director. (2) Incentives under paragraph (1) may include financial incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as the Director considers appropriate. (b) Enhanced Promotion for Service Under NID.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the personnel of an element of the intelligence community who are assigned or detailed to service under the National Intelligence Director shall be promoted at rates equivalent to or better than personnel of such element who are not so assigned or detailed. (2) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this section. (c) Joint Career Matters.--(1) In carrying out section 132(a)(7), the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the intelligence community through various elements of the intelligence community in the course of their careers in order to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods, and disciplines. (2) The mechanisms prescribed under paragraph (1) may include the following: (A) The establishment of special occupational categories involving service, over the course of a career, in more than one element of the intelligence community. (B) The provision of rewards for service in positions undertaking analysis and planning of operations involving two or more elements of the intelligence community. (C) The establishment of requirements for education, training, service, and evaluation that involve service in more than one element of the intelligence community. (3) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent practical, seek to duplicate within the intelligence community the joint officer management policies established by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) and the amendments on joint officer management made by that Act. (a) Recommendation of NID in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (3), the National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an individual for nomination to fill the vacancy. (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: (A) The Deputy National Intelligence Director. (B) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Foreign Intelligence. (b) Concurrence of Secretary of Defense in Certain Appointments Recommended by NID.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the National Intelligence Director shall obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense before recommending to the President an individual for nomination to fill such vacancy. If the Secretary does not concur in the recommendation, the Director may make the recommendation to the President without the concurrence of the Secretary, but shall include in the recommendation a statement that the Secretary does not concur in the recommendation. (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: (A) The Director of the National Security Agency. (B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (C) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (c) Concurrence of NID in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the National Intelligence Director before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency concerned may fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be) without the concurrence of the Director, but shall notify the President that the Director does not concur in appointment or recommendation (as the case may be). (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: (A) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. (B) The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. (C) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. (D) The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (d) Recommendation of NID in Termination of Service.--The National Intelligence Director may recommend to the President or the head of the department or agency concerned the termination of service of any individual serving in any position covered by this section. (a) National Counterterrorism Center.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority a National Counterterrorism Center. (b) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--(1) There is a Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Any individual nominated for appointment as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall have significant expertise in matters relating to the national security of the United States and matters relating to terrorism that threatens the national security of the United States. (c) Supervision.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall report to the National Intelligence Director on-- (A) the budget and programs of the National Counterterrorism Center; (B) the activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of the National Counterterrorism Center under subsection (f); and (C) the conduct of intelligence operations implemented by other elements of the intelligence community. (2) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall report directly to the President and the National Security Council on the planning and progress of joint counterterrorism operations (other than intelligence operations). (d) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National Counterterrorism Center shall be as follows: (1) To unify strategy for the civilian and military counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government. (2) To effectively integrate counterterrorism intelligence and operations across agency boundaries, both inside and outside the United States. (e) Duties and Responsibilities of Director.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, at the direction of the President and the National Security Council, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall-- (1) serve, through the National Intelligence Director, as the principal adviser to the President on intelligence operations relating to counterterrorism; (2) provide unified strategic direction for the civilian and military counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government and for the effective integration of counterterrorism intelligence and operations across agency boundaries, both inside and outside the United States; (3) advise the President and the National Intelligence Director on the extent to which the counterterrorism program recommendations and budget proposals of the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government conform to the priorities established by the President and the National Security Council; (4) concur in, or advise the President on, the selections of personnel to head the operating entities of the United States Government with principal missions relating to counterterrorism, including the head of the Central Intelligence Agency's Counterterrorist Center, the head of the Counterterrorism Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the coordinator for counterterrorism of the Department of State, and the commanders of the Special Operations Command and the Northern Command within the Department of Defense; and (5) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence Director may prescribe or are prescribed by law. (f) Directorate of Intelligence.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Intelligence. (2) The Directorate shall utilize the capabilities of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) transferred to the Directorate by section 182 and such other capabilities as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center considers appropriate. (3) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility within the United States Government for analysis of terrorism and terrorist organizations from all sources of intelligence, whether collected inside or outside the United States. (4) The Directorate shall-- (A) be the principal repository within the United States Government for all-source information on suspected terrorists, their organizations, and their capabilities; (B) propose intelligence collection requirements for action by elements of the intelligence community inside and outside the United States; (C) have primary responsibility within the United States Government for net assessments and warnings about terrorist threats, which assessments and warnings shall be based on a comparison of terrorist capabilities with assessed national vulnerabilities; and (D) perform such other duties and functions as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may prescribe. (g) Directorate of Operations.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Operations. (2)(A) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility within the United States Government for providing guidance and plans, including strategic plans, for joint counterterrorism operations conducted by the United States Government. (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), joint counterterrorism operations are counterterrorism operations that-- (i) involve, or are likely to involve, more than one executive agency of the United States Government (including the Armed Forces of the United States); or (ii) are designated as joint operations by the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. (3) The Directorate shall-- (A) provide guidance, and develop strategy and plans for operations, to counter terrorist activities based on policy objectives and priorities established by the National Security Council; (B) develop plans under subparagraph (A) utilizing input from personnel in other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government who have expertise in the priorities, functions, assets, programs, capabilities, and operations of such departments, agencies, and elements with respect to counterterrorism; (C) assign responsibilities for counterterrorism operations to the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government (including the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, and other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government), consistent with the authorities of such departments, agencies, and elements, which operations shall be conducted by the department, agency, or element to which assigned and, in the case of operations assigned to units of the Armed Forces, shall require the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense; (D) monitor the implementation of operations assigned under subparagraph (C) and update plans for such operations as necessary; (E) report to the President and the National Intelligence Director on the compliance of the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States with the plans developed under subparagraph (A); and (F) perform such other duties and functions as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may prescribe. (4) The Directorate may not direct the execution of operations assigned under paragraph (3). (h) Staff.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may, in the discretion of the Director, appoint deputy directors of the National Counterterrorism Center to oversee such portions of the operations of the National Counterterrorism Center as the Director considers appropriate. (2) To assist the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the Director under this section, the Director shall employ and utilize in the National Counterterrorism Center a professional staff having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and responsibilities. (3) In providing for a professional staff for the National Counterterrorism Center under paragraph (2), the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may establish as positions in the excepted service such positions in the Center as the Director considers appropriate. (4) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall ensure, with the approval of the National Intelligence Director, that the analytical staff of the National Counterterrorism Center is comprised primarily of experts from elements in the intelligence community and from such other personnel in the United States Government as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center considers appropriate. (5)(A) In order to meet the requirement in paragraph (4), the National Intelligence Director shall-- (i) transfer to the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center any personnel of another element of the intelligence community that the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate; and (ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or element of the United States Government outside the intelligence community, request the transfer of such personnel from the department, agency, or element concerned. (B) The head of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government receiving a request for the transfer of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request. (6) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center has access to all databases maintained by the elements of the intelligence community that are relevant to the duties of the Center. (7) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall evaluate the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center in the performance of their duties. (i) Support and Cooperation of Other Agencies.--(1) The elements of the intelligence community and the other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government shall support, assist, and cooperate with the National Counterterrorism Center in carrying out its missions under this section. (2) The support, assistance, and cooperation of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government under this subsection shall include, but not be limited to-- (A) the implementation of plans for operations, whether foreign or domestic, that are developed by the National Counterterrorism Center in a manner consistent with the laws and regulations of the United States; (B) cooperative work with the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center to ensure that ongoing operations of such department, agency, or element do not conflict with joint operations planned by the Center; (C) reports, upon request, to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center on the progress of such department, agency, or element in implementing responsibilities assigned to such department, agency, or element through joint operations plans; and (D) the provision to the analysts of the National Counterterrorism Center electronic access in real time to information and intelligence collected by such department, agency, or element that is relevant to the mission of the Center. (3)(A) In the event of a disagreement between the National Counterterrorism Center and the head of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government on a plan developed or responsibility assigned by the Center under this section, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall notify the National Security Council of the disagreement. (B) The National Security Council shall resolve each disagreement of which the Council is notified under subparagraph (A). (a) National Intelligence Centers.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall establish within the National Intelligence Authority centers (to be known as ``national intelligence centers'') to address intelligence priorities established by the National Security Council. (2) Each national intelligence center shall be assigned an area of intelligence responsibility, whether expressed in terms of a geographic region, in terms of function, or in other terms. (3) National intelligence centers shall be established at the direction of the President, as prescribed by law, or upon the initiative of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Establishment of Centers.--(1) In establishing a national intelligence center, the National Intelligence Director shall assign lead responsibility for such center to an element of the intelligence community selected by the Director for that purpose. (2) The Director shall determine the structure and size of each national intelligence center. (3) The Director shall notify Congress of the establishment of a national intelligence center at least 30 days before the date of the establishment of the center. (c) Directors of Centers.--(1) Each national intelligence center shall have as its head a Director who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director for that purpose. (2) The Director of a national intelligence center shall serve as the principal adviser to the National Intelligence Director on intelligence matters with respect to the area of intelligence responsibility assigned to the center. (3) In carrying out duties under paragraph (3), the Director of a national intelligence center shall-- (A) manage the operations of the center; (B) coordinate the provision of administration and support by the element of the intelligence community with lead responsibility for the center under subsection (b)(1); (C) submit budget and personnel requests for the center to the National Intelligence Director; (D) seek such assistance from other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government as are needed to fulfill the mission of the center; and (E) advise the National Intelligence Director of the information technology, personnel, and other requirements of the center for the performance of its mission. (4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the Director of a national intelligence center has sufficient authority, direction, and control over the center to effectively accomplish the mission of the center. (d) Mission of Centers.--(1) Each national intelligence center shall provide all-source analysis of intelligence and propose intelligence collection requirements in the area of intelligence responsibility assigned to the center by the National Intelligence Director pursuant to intelligence priorities established by the National Security Council. (2) Within its area of intelligence responsibility, a national intelligence center shall-- (A) have primary responsibility for strategic analysis of intelligence, fusing all-source intelligence from foreign and domestic sources; (B) be the principal repository within the United States Government for all-source information; (C) identify and propose requirements and priorities for intelligence collection; (D) have primary responsibility within the United States Government for net assessments, where applicable, and warnings; (E) ensure that appropriate officials of the United States Government and other appropriate individuals have access to a variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views; (F) provide advice and guidance to the President, the National Security Council, the National Intelligence Director, and the heads of other appropriate departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government; and (G) perform such other duties and responsibilities as the National Intelligence Director may prescribe. (e) Information Sharing.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the Directors of the national intelligence centers and the other elements of the intelligence community undertake appropriate sharing of intelligence analysis and plans for operations in order to facilitate the activities of the centers. (2) In order to facilitate information sharing under paragraph (1), the Directors of the national intelligence centers shall-- (A) report directly to the National Intelligence Director regarding their activities under this section; and (B) coordinate with the Deputy National Intelligence Director regarding such activities. (f) Termination of Centers.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may terminate a national intelligence center if the National Intelligence Director determines that the center is no longer required to meet an intelligence priority established by the National Security Council. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall notify Congress of the termination of a national intelligence center at least 30 days before the date of the termination of the center. (g) Staff of Centers.--(1) The head of an element of the intelligence community shall assign or detail to a national intelligence center such personnel as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate to carry out the mission of the center. (2) Personnel assigned or detailed to a national intelligence center under paragraph (1) shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the Director of the center on all matters for which the center has been assigned responsibility and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the mission of the center. (3) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or detailed to a national intelligence center under this subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such personnel at the center. (4) The supervisors of the staff of a national center may, with the approval of the National Intelligence Director, reward the staff of the center for meritorious performance by the provision of such performance awards as the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe. (5) The Director of a national intelligence center may recommend to the National Intelligence Director the reassignment to the home element concerned of any personnel previously assigned or detailed to the center from another element of the intelligence community. (h) Support.--The element of the intelligence community assigned lead responsibility for a national intelligence center under subsection (b)(1) shall be responsible for the provision of administrative support for the center, including the provision of funds to the center necessary for the administration of the center. (a) Disposal of Property.--(1) If specifically authorized to dispose of real property of the National Intelligence Authority under any law enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall, subject to paragraph (2), exercise such authority in strict compliance with subchapter IV of chapter 5 of title 40, United States Code. (2) The Director shall deposit the proceeds of any disposal of property of the National Intelligence Authority into the miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury in accordance with section 3302(b) of title 31, United States Code. (b) Gifts.--Gifts or donations of services or property of or for the National Intelligence Authority may not be accepted, used, or disposed of unless specifically permitted in advance in an appropriations Act and only under the conditions and for the purposes specified in such appropriations Act. (a) In General.--In the performance of its functions, the National Intelligence Authority may exercise the authorities referred to in section 3(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c(a)). (b) Treatment as Head of Agency.--For the purpose of the exercise of any authority referred to in subsection (a) with respect to the National Intelligence Authority, a reference to the head of an agency shall be deemed to be a reference to the National Intelligence Director or the Deputy National Intelligence Director. (c) Determination and Decisions.--(1) Any determination or decision to be made under an authority referred to in subsection (a) by the head of an agency may be made with respect to individual purchases and contracts or with respect to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall be final. (2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), the National Intelligence Director or the Deputy National Intelligence Director may, in such official's discretion, delegate to any officer or other official of the National Intelligence Authority any authority to make a determination or decision as the head of the agency under an authority referred to in subsection (a). (3) The limitations and conditions set forth in section 3(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c(d)) shall apply to the exercise by the National Intelligence Agency of an authority referred to in subsection (a). (4) Each determination or decision required by an authority referred to in the second sentence of section 3(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 shall be based upon written findings made by the official making such determination or decision, which findings shall be final and shall be available within the National Intelligence Authority for a period of at least six years following the date of such determination or decision. (a) In General.--In addition to the authorities provided in section 134, the National Intelligence Director may exercise with respect to the personnel of the National Intelligence Authority any authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment of this Act to the same extent, and subject to the same conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect to personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Rights and Protections of Employees and Applicants.-- Employees and applicants for employment of the National Intelligence Authority shall have the same rights and protections under the Authority as employees of the Central Intelligence Agency have under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Political Service of Personnel.--Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subclause (XII), by striking ``or'' at the end; and (2) by inserting after subclause (XIII) the following new subclause: ``(XIV) the National Intelligence Authority; or''. (b) Deletion of Information About Foreign Gifts.--Section 7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)''; (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking ``the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) In transmitting such listings for the National Intelligence Authority, the National Intelligence Director may delete the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources.''. (c) Exemption from Financial Disclosures.--Section 105(a)(1) of the Ethics in Government Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by inserting ``the National Intelligence Authority,'' before ``the Central Intelligence Agency''. (a) Amounts Requested Each Fiscal Year.--The President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005-- (1) the aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for the fiscal year concerned for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government; and (2) the aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for the fiscal year concerned for each element or component of the intelligence community. (b) Amounts Appropriated Each Fiscal Year.--Congress shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005-- (1) the aggregate amount of funds appropriated by Congress for the fiscal year concerned for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government; and (2) the aggregate amount of funds appropriated by Congress for the fiscal year concerned for each element or component of the intelligence community. (a) Merger of Homeland Security Council Into National Security Council.--Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended-- (1) in the fourth undesignated paragraph of subsection (a), by striking clauses (5) and (6) and inserting the following new clauses: ``(5) the Attorney General; ``(6) the Secretary of Homeland Security;''; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(3) assess the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in the interests of homeland security and make recommendations to the President based on such assessments; ``(4) oversee and review the homeland security policies of the Federal Government and make recommendations to the President based on such oversight and review; and ``(5) perform such other functions as the President may direct.''. (c) Repeal of Superseded Authority.--(1) Title IX of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 491 et seq.) is repealed. (2) The table of contents for that Act is amended by striking the items relating to title IX. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Covert operations tend to be highly tactical and require close attention. The Central Intelligence Agency should retain responsibility for the direction and execution of clandestine and covert operations. The Central Intelligence Agency should also concentrate on building capabilities to carry out such operations and on providing personnel who will be directing and executing such operations in the field. (2) The reconstitution of the analytic and human intelligence collection capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency requires the undiverted attention of the head of the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Transformation of Central Intelligence Agency.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall transform the intelligence and intelligence-related capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency by-- (1) building the human intelligence capabilities of the clandestine service; (2) building the analytic capabilities of the Agency; (3) developing a stronger language program; (4) renewing emphasis on the recruitment of operations officers of diverse background who can blend in more easily in foreign cities; (5) ensuring a seamless relationship between human source collection and signals collection at the operational level; and (6) providing for a better balance between unilateral operations and liaison operations. (c) Retention of Responsibility for Clandestine and Covert Operations.--The Central Intelligence Agency shall retain responsibility for the direction and execution of clandestine and covert operations as authorized by the President or the National Intelligence Director and assigned by a national intelligence center. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Prior to September 11, 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency relied on proxies to conduct paramilitary operations, with unsatisfactory results. (2) The United States cannot afford to build two separate capabilities for carrying out paramilitary operations, and therefore should concentrate responsibility and necessary legal authority for such operations in one entity. (3) In conducting future paramilitary operations, Central Intelligence Agency experts should be integrated into military training, exercises, and planning, and lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations should rest with the Department of Defense. (b) Sense of Congress on Lead Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations.--The Secretary of Defense should have lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert. (c) Sense of Congress on Discharge Through Special Operations Command.--In carrying out the responsibility under subsection (b) the Secretary of Defense should-- (1) assign the Special Operations Command lead responsibility within the Department of Defense for paramilitary operations; and (2) consolidate responsibility for such operations with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations. (d) Sense of Congress on Joint Planning.--The Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency should work jointly to plan paramilitary operations. (e) Paramilitary Operations Defined.--In this section, the term ``paramilitary operations'' means operations that, by their tactics and requirements in military-type personnel, equipment, and training, approximate conventional military operations, but that are distinguished from conventional military operations through reliance on light infantry, less capability to carry out sustained combat operations involving heavy weapons and less capability of sustaining long-term logistical support. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Federal Bureau of Investigation has made significant progress in improving its intelligence capabilities. (2) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must fully institutionalize the shift of the Bureau to a preventive counterterrorism posture. (b) Improvement of Intelligence Capabilities.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall continue efforts to improve the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau and to develop and maintain within the Bureau a national security workforce. (c) National Security Workforce.--(1) In developing and maintaining a national security workforce under subsection (b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, subject to the direction and control of the President, develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national security workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence within the Bureau of an institutional culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence and national security missions of the Bureau. (2) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the enactment of this Act shall receive basic training in both criminal justice matters and national security matters. (3) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the enactment of this Act shall, to the maximum extent practicable, be given the opportunity to undergo, during such agent's early service with the Bureau, meaningful assignments in criminal justice matters and in national security matters. (4) The Director shall-- (A) require agents and analysts of the Bureau to specialize in either criminal justice matters or national security matters; and (B) in furtherance of the requirement under subparagraph (A) and to the maximum extent practicable, afford agents and analysts of the Bureau the opportunity to work in the specialty selected by such agents and analysts over their entire career with the Bureau. (5) The Director shall carry out a program to enhance the capacity of the Bureau to recruit and retain individuals with backgrounds in intelligence, international relations, language, technology, and other skills relevant to the intelligence and national security missions of the Bureau. (6) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, afford the analysts of the Bureau training and career opportunities commensurate with the training and career opportunities afforded analysts in other elements of the intelligence community. (7) Commencing as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, each senior manager of the Bureau shall be a certified intelligence officer. (8) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, ensure that the successful completion of advanced training courses, and of one or more assignments to another element of the intelligence community, is a precondition to advancement to higher level national security assignments within the Bureau. (d) Field Office Matters.--(1) In improving the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under subsection (b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall ensure that each field office of the Bureau has an official at the deputy level or higher with responsibility for national security matters. (2) The Director shall provide for such expansion of the secure facilities in the field offices of the Bureau as is necessary to ensure the discharge by the field offices of the intelligence and national security missions of the Bureau. (3) The Director shall take appropriate actions to ensure the integration of analysts, agents, linguists, and surveillance personnel in the field. (e) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, modify the budget structure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to organize the budget according to the four principal missions of the Bureau as follows: (1) Intelligence. (2) Counterterrorism and counterintelligence. (3) Crime. (4) Criminal justice services. (f) Reports.--(1)(A) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to Congress a report on the progress made as of the date of such report in carrying out the requirements of this section. (B) The report required by subparagraph (A) shall include an estimate of the resources required to complete the expansion of secure facilities to carry out the national security mission of the field offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2) The Director shall include in each semiannual program review of the Bureau that is submitted to Congress a report on the progress made by each field office of the Bureau during the period covered by such review in addressing Bureau and national program priorities. (3) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every six months thereafter, the Director shall submit to Congress a report assessing the qualifications, status, and roles of analysts at Bureau headquarters and in the field offices of the Bureau. (4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every six months thereafter, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the progress of the Bureau in implementing information-sharing principles. (5) A report required by this subsection shall be submitted-- (A) to each committee of Congress that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of such report; and (B) in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall submit to Congress a report on the progress made in the implementation of this title, including the amendments made by this title. The report shall include a comprehensive description of the progress made, and may include such recommendations for additional legislative or administrative action as the Director considers appropriate. Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 102 through 104 and inserting the following new sections: (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director'': (A) Section 3(5)(B) (50 U.S.C. 401a(5)(B)). (B) Section 101(h)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(2)(A)). (C) Section 101(h)(5) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(5)). (D) Section 101(i)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(i)(2)(A)). (E) Section 101(j) (50 U.S.C. 402(j)). (F) Section 105(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)). (G) Section 105(b)(6)(A) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(b)(6)(A)). (H) Section 105B(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(1)). (I) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), the first place it appears. (J) Section 110(b) (50 U.S.C. 404e(b)). (K) Section 110(c) (50 U.S.C. 404e(c)). (L) Section 112(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(a)(1)). (M) Section 112(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)). (N) Section 113(b)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 404h(b)(2)(A)). (O) Section 114(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(a)(1)). (P) Section 114(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(b)(1)). (R) Section 115(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404j(a)(1)). (S) Section 115(b) (50 U.S.C. 404j(b)). (T) Section 115(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404j(c)(1)(B)). (U) Section 116(a) (50 U.S.C. 404k(a)). (V) Section 117(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404l(a)(1)). (W) Section 303(a) (50 U.S.C. 405(a)), both places it appears. (X) Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C. 413(d)). (Y) Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)). (Z) Section 502(c) (50 U.S.C. 413a(c)). (AA) Section 503(b) (50 U.S.C. 413b(b)). (BB) Section 504(a)(3)(C) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(C)). (CC) Section 504(d)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(d)(2)). (DD) Section 506A(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(a)(1)). (EE) Section 603(a) (50 U.S.C. 423(a)). (FF) Section 702(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(1)). (GG) Section 702(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(6)(B)(viii)). (HH) Section 702(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(b)(1)), both places it appears. (II) Section 703(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(a)(1)). (JJ) Section 703(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 432a(a)(6)(B)(viii)). (KK) Section 703(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(b)(1)), both places it appears. (LL) Section 704(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432b(a)(1)). (MM) Section 704(f)(2)(H) (50 U.S.C. 432b(f)(2)(H)). (NN) Section 704(g)(1)) (50 U.S.C. 432b(g)(1)), both places it appears. (OO) Section 1001(a) (50 U.S.C. 441g(a)). (PP) Section 1102(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(a)(1)). (QQ) Section 1102(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)(1)). (RR) Section 1102(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(c)(1)). (SS) Section 1102(d) (50 U.S.C. 442a(d)). (2) That Act is further amended by striking ``of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following provisions: (A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)). (B) Section 105B(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(2)). (C) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), the second place it appears. (3) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director'' each place it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director'': (A) Section 114(c) (50 U.S.C. 404i(c)). (B) Section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)). (C) Section 1001(b) (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)). (C) Section 1001(c) (50 U.S.C. 441g(c)), the first place it appears. (D) Section 1001(d)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 441g(d)(1)(B)). (E) Section 1001(e) (50 U.S.C. 441g(e)), the first place it appears. (4) Section 114A of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency'' (5) Section 504(a)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (6) Section 701 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``Operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency may be exempted by the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with the coordination of the National Intelligence Director, may exempt operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency''; and (B) in subsection (g)(1), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Director''. (7) The heading for section 114 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended to read as follows: (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) Section 101(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402(j)) is amended by striking ``Deputy Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Deputy National Intelligence Director''. (2) Section 112(d)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of this Act'' and inserting ``section 132(a)(9) of the National Intelligence Authority Act of 2004''. (3) Section 116(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended by striking ``to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director may delegate such authority to the Deputy Director for Operations'' and inserting ``to the Deputy National Intelligence Director, or with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (4) Section 506A(b)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''. (5) Section 701(c)(3) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431(c)(3)) is amended by striking ``Office of the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''. (6) Section 1001(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)) is amended by striking ``Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''. (b) Central Intelligence Act of 1949.--Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting ``section 132(a)(9) of the National Intelligence Authority Act of 2004''. (c) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended by striking ``paragraph (6) of section 103(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) that the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``section 132(a)(9) of the National Intelligence Authority Act of 2004 that the National Intelligence Director''. (d) Intelligence Authorization Acts.-- (1) Public law 107-306.--(A) Section 343(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 404n-2(c)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3((c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 132(a)(9) of the National Intelligence Authority Act of 2004''. (B) Section 904 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (i) in subsection (c), by striking ``Office of the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''; and (ii) in subsection (l), by striking ``Office of the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''. (2) Public law 108-177.--Section 317 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 403-3 note) is amended-- (A) in subsection (g), by striking ``Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production'' and inserting ``Deputy National Intelligence Director''; and (B) in subsection (h)(2)(C), by striking ``Assistant Director'' and inserting ``Deputy National Intelligence Director''. Paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as follows: ``(4) The term `intelligence community' includes the following: ``(A) The National Intelligence Authority. ``(B) The Central Intelligence Agency. ``(C) The National Security Agency. ``(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(F) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs. ``(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy. ``(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. ``(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. ``(K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard. ``(L) Such other elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the National Intelligence Director and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.''. (a) Redesignation.--Paragraph (6) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as follows: ``(6) The term `National Intelligence Program'-- ``(A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs, projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence community; and ``(ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities (whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland Security; but ``(B) does not refer-- ``(i) to any program, project, or activity pertaining solely to the requirements of a single department, agency, or element of the United States Government; or ``(ii) to any program, project, or activity of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by the United States Armed Forces.''. (b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The National Security Act of 1947, as amended by this Act, is further amended by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' each place it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Program'': (A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)). (B) Section 105(a)(3) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(3)). (C) Section 506(a) (50 U.S.C. 415a(a)). (2) Section 17(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(f)) is amended by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Program''. (c) Heading Amendments.--(1) The heading of section 105 of that Act is amended by striking ``foreign''. (2) The heading of section 506 of that Act is amended by striking ``foreign''. (a) Appointment of Certain Intelligence Officials.--Section 106 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is repealed. (b) Collection Tasking Authority.--Section 111 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404f) is repealed. The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended-- (1) by striking the items relating to sections 102 through 104 and inserting the following new items: (a) Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 1 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively; and (2) by striking paragraph (2), as so redesignated, and inserting the following new paragraph (2): ``(2) `Director' means the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and''. (b) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.--Section 137 of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``The appointment of an individual as Under Secretary is subject to the provisions of section 135(c) of the National Intelligence Authority Act of 2004.''; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; and (B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) In addition to the duties and powers provided for under paragraph (1), the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence also serves as Deputy National Intelligence Director for Defense Intelligence under section 114(c) of the National Intelligence Authority Act of 2004, and, in that capacity, has the duties and responsibilities set forth in paragraph (3) of such section.''. (c) Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.--Section 201(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 201(a)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``The appointment of an individual as Under Secretary is subject to the provisions of section 135(c) of the National Intelligence Authority Act of 2004.''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) Concurrent service as deputy national intelligence director for homeland intelligence.--Upon the election of the National Intelligence Director, the Under Secretary also serves as the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Homeland Intelligence under section 114(d) of the National Intelligence Authority Act of 2004, and, in that capacity, has the duties and responsibilities set forth in paragraph (3) of such section.''. (d) Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of FBI.-- Upon the election of the National Intelligence Director, the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation also serves as the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Homeland Intelligence under section 114(d), and, in that capacity, has the duties and responsibilities set forth in paragraph (3) of such section. Section 8H(a)(1) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(D) An employee of the National Intelligence Authority, or of a contractor of the Authority, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority in accordance with section 131(h)(5) of the National Intelligence Authority Act of 2004.''. (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of the National Intelligence Director the staff of the Community Management Staff as of the date of the enactment of this Act, including all functions and activities discharged by the Community Management Staff as of that date. (b) Administration.--The National Intelligence Director shall administer the Community Management Staff after the date of the enactment of this Act as a component of the Office of the National Intelligence Director under section 113(d)(2). (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the National Counterterrorism Center the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), including all functions and activities discharged by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Administration.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall administer the Terrorist Threat Integration Center after the date of the enactment of this Act as a component of the Directorate of Intelligence of the National Counterterrorism Center under section 141(f)(2). (a) Termination.--The positions within the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in subsection (b) are hereby abolished. (b) Covered Positions.--The positions within the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in this subsection are as follows: (1) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection. (2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. (3) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration. Effective as of October 1, 2005, the Joint Military Intelligence Program is abolished. (a) Executive Schedule Level I.--Section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding the end the following new item: ``National Intelligence Director.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new items: ``Deputy National Intelligence Director. ``Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.''. (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence. The National Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly take such actions as are appropriate to preserve the intelligence capabilities of the United States during the establishment of the National Intelligence Authority under this title. (a) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of Intelligence Community.--Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the National Intelligence Director. (b) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of CIA.--Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (c) Community Management Staff.--Any reference to the Community Management Staff in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the staff of the Office of the National Intelligence Director. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Network.--The term ``Network'' means the Information Sharing Network described in subsection (c). (2) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism information'' means all information, whether collected, produced, or distributed by intelligence, law enforcement, military, homeland security, or other activities, relating to-- (A) the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals, or of domestic groups or individuals involved in transnational terrorism; (B) threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other nations; (C) communications of or by such groups or individuals; or (D) information relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with such groups or individuals. (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The effective use of information, from all available sources, is essential to the fight against terror and the protection of our homeland. The biggest impediment to all- source analysis, and to a greater likelihood of ``connecting the dots'', is resistance to sharing information. (2) The United States Government has access to a vast amount of information, including not only traditional intelligence but also other government databases, such as those containing customs or immigration information. But the United States Government has a weak system for processing and using the information it has. (3) In the period leading up to September 11, 2001, there were instances of potentially helpful information that was available but that no person knew to ask for; information that was distributed only in compartmented channels; and information that was requested but could not be shared. (4) Current security requirements nurture overclassification and excessive compartmentalization of information among agencies. Each agency's incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks, including criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions, but few rewards for sharing information. (5) The current system, in which each intelligence agency has its own security practices, requires a demonstrated ``need to know'' before sharing. This approach assumes that it is possible to know, in advance, who will need to use the information. An outgrowth of the cold war, such a system implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. Such assumptions are no longer appropriate. Although counterintelligence concerns are still real, the costs of not sharing information are also substantial. The current ``need-to-know'' culture of information protection needs to be replaced with a ``need-to- share'' culture of integration. (6) A new approach to the sharing of terrorism information is urgently needed. An important conceptual model for a new ``trusted information network'' is the Systemwide Homeland Analysis and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Network proposed by a task force of leading professionals assembled by the Markle Foundation and described in reports issued in October 2002 and December 2003. (7) No single agency can create a meaningful information sharing system on its own. Alone, each agency can only modernize stovepipes, not replace them. Presidential leadership is required to bring about governmentwide change. (c) Information Sharing Network.-- (1) Establishment.--The President shall establish an information sharing network to promote the sharing of terrorism information, in a manner consistent with national security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties. (2) Attributes.--The Network shall promote coordination, communication and collaboration of people and information among all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State, tribal, and local authorities, and relevant private sector entities, including owners and operators of critical infrastructure, by using policy guidelines and technologies that support-- (A) a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment that connects existing systems where appropriate and allows users to share information horizontally across agencies, vertically between levels of government, and, as appropriate, with the private sector; (B) building on existing systems capabilities at relevant agencies; (C) utilizing industry best practices, including minimizing the centralization of data and seeking to use common tools and capabilities whenever possible; (D) employing an information rights management approach that controls access to data rather than to whole networks; (E) facilitating the sharing of information at and across all levels of security by using policy guidelines and technologies that support writing information that can be broadly shared; (F) providing directory services for locating people and information; (G) incorporating protections for individuals' privacy and civil liberties; (H) incorporating mechanisms for information security; and (I) access controls, authentication and authorization, audits, and other strong mechanisms for information security and privacy guideline enforcement across all levels of security, in order to enhance accountability and facilitate oversight. (d) Immediate Steps.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President, through the Director of Management and Budget and in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and such other Federal officials as the President shall designate, shall-- (1) establish electronic directory services to assist in locating in the Federal Government terrorism information and people with relevant knowledge about terrorism information; and (2) conduct a review of relevant current Federal agency capabilities, including a baseline inventory of current Federal systems that contain terrorism information, the money currently spent to maintain those systems, and identification of other information that should be included in the Network. (e) Guidelines.--As soon as possible, but in no event later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall-- (1) in consultation with the National Intelligence Director and the Advisory Council on Information Sharing established in subsection (g), issue guidelines for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using terrorism information, including guidelines to ensure such information is provided in its most shareable form, such as by separating out data from the sources and methods by which they are obtained; (2) in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board established under section 901, issue guidelines that-- (A) protect privacy and civil liberties in the development and use of the Network; and (B) shall be made public, unless, and only to the extent that, nondisclosure is clearly necessary to protect national security; (3) establish objective, systemwide performance measures to enable the assessment of progress toward achieving full implementation of the Network; and (4) require Federal departments and agencies to promote a culture of information sharing by-- (A) reducing disincentives to information sharing, including overclassification of information and unnecessary requirements for originator approval; and (B) providing affirmative incentives for information sharing, such as the incorporation of information sharing performance measures into agency and managerial evaluations, and employee awards for promoting innovative information sharing practices. (f) System Design and Implementation Plan.--Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a system design and implementation plan for the Network. The plan shall be prepared by the President through the Director of Management and Budget and in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and such other Federal officials as the President shall designate, and shall include-- (1) a description of the parameters of the proposed Network, including functions, capabilities, and resources; (2) a description of the technological, legal, and policy issues presented by the creation of the Network described in subsection (c), and the ways in which these issues will be addressed; (3)(A) a delineation of the roles of the Federal departments and agencies that will participate in the development of the Network, including-- (i) identification of any agency that will build the infrastructure needed to operate and manage the Network (as distinct from the individual agency components that are to be part of the Network); and (ii) identification of any agency that will operate and manage the Network (as distinct from the individual agency components that are to be part of the Network); (B) a provision that the delineation of roles under subparagraph (A) shall-- (i) be consistent with the authority of the National Intelligence Director, under this Act, to set standards for information sharing and information technology throughout the intelligence community; and (ii) recognize the role of the Department of Homeland Security in coordinating with State, tribal, and local officials and the private sector; (4) a description of the technological requirements to appropriately link and enhance existing networks and a description of the system design that will meet these requirements; (5) a plan, including a time line, for the development and phased implementation of the Network; (6) total budget requirements to develop and implement the Network, including the estimated annual cost for each of the 5 years following the date of enactment of this Act; and (7) proposals for any legislation that the President believes necessary to implement the Network. (g) Advisory Council on Information Sharing.-- (1) Establishment.--There is established an Advisory Council on Information Sharing (in this subsection referred to as the ``Council''). (2) Membership.--No more than 25 individuals may serve as members of the Council, which shall include-- (A) the National Intelligence Director, who shall serve as Chairman of the Council; (B) the Secretary of Homeland Security; (C) the Secretary of Defense; (D) the Attorney General; (E) the Secretary of State; (F) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; (G) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (H) the Director of Management and Budget; (I) such other Federal officials as the President shall designate; (J) representatives of State, tribal, and local governments, to be appointed by the President; (K) individuals from outside government with expertise in relevant technology, security and privacy concepts, to be appointed by the President; and (L) individuals who are employed in private businesses or nonprofit organizations that own or operate critical infrastructure, to be appointed by the President. (3) Responsibilities.--The Council shall-- (A) advise the President and the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies on the implementation of the Network; (B) ensure that there is coordination among participants in the Network in the development and implementation of the Network; (C) review, on an ongoing basis, policy, legal and technology issues related to the implementation of the Network; and (D) establish a dispute resolution process to resolve disagreements among departments and agencies about whether particular terrorism information should be shared and in what manner. (4) Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act.--The Council shall not be subject to the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). (5) Informing the public.--The Council shall hold public hearings and otherwise inform the public of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (6) Council reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the National Intelligence Director, in the capacity of Chairman of the Council, shall submit a report to Congress that shall include-- (A) a description of the activities and accomplishments of the Council in the preceding year; and (B) the number and dates of the meetings held by the Council and a list of attendees at each meeting. (h) Presidential Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress on the state of the Network. The report shall include-- (1) a progress report on the extent to which the Network has been implemented, including how the Network has fared on the governmentwide and agency-specific performance measures and whether the performance goals set in the preceding year have been met; (2) objective systemwide performance goals for the following year; (3) an accounting of how much was spent on the Network in the preceding year; (4) actions taken to ensure that agencies procure new technology that is consistent with the Network and information on whether new systems and technology are consistent with the Network; (5) the extent to which, in appropriate circumstances, all terrorism watch lists are available for combined searching in real time through the Network and whether there are consistent standards for placing individuals on, and removing individuals from, the watch lists, including the availability of processes for correcting errors; (6) the extent to which unnecessary roadblocks or disincentives to information sharing, including the inappropriate use of paper-only intelligence products and requirements for originator approval, have been eliminated; (7) the extent to which positive incentives for information sharing have been implemented; (8) the extent to which classified information is also made available through the Network, in whole or in part, in unclassified form; (9) the extent to which State, tribal, and local officials-- (A) are participating in the Network; (B) have systems which have become integrated into the Network; (C) are providing as well as receiving information; and (D) are using the Network to communicate with each other; (10) the extent to which-- (A) private sector data, including information from owners and operators of critical infrastructure, is incorporated in the Network; and (B) the private sector is both providing and receiving information; (11) where private sector data has been used by the Government or has been incorporated into the Network-- (A) the measures taken to protect sensitive business information; and (B) where the data involves information about individuals, the measures taken to ensure the accuracy of such data; (12) the measures taken by the Federal Government to ensure the accuracy of other information on the Network and, in particular, the accuracy of information about individuals; (13) an assessment of the Network's privacy protections, including actions taken in the preceding year to implement or enforce privacy protections and a report of complaints received about interference with an individual's privacy or civil liberties; and (14) an assessment of the security protections of the Network. (i) Agency Plans and Reports.--Each Federal department or agency that possesses or uses terrorism information or that otherwise participates, or expects to participate, in the Network, shall submit to the Director of Management and Budget and to Congress-- (1) not later than 1 year after the enactment of this Act, a report including-- (A) a strategic plan for implementation of the Network's requirements within the department or agency; (B) objective performance measures to assess the progress and adequacy of the department's or agency's information sharing efforts; and (C) budgetary requirements to integrate the department or agency into the Network, including projected annual expenditures for each of the following 5 years following the submission of the reports; and (2) annually thereafter, reports including-- (A) an assessment of the department's or agency's progress in complying with the Network's requirements, including how well the department or agency has performed on the objective measures developed under paragraph (1); (B) the department's or agency's expenditures to implement and comply with the Network's requirements in the preceding year; (C) the department's or agency's plans for further implementation of the Network in the year following the submission of the report. (j) Periodic Assessments.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and periodically thereafter, the Government Accountability Office shall review and evaluate the implementation of the Network, both generally and, at its discretion, within specific departments and agencies, to determine the extent of compliance with the Network's requirements and to assess the effectiveness of the Network in improving information sharing and collaboration and in protecting privacy and civil liberties, and shall report to Congress on its findings. (2) Inspectors general.--The Inspector General in any Federal department or agency that possesses or uses terrorism information or that otherwise participates in the Network shall, at the discretion of the Inspector General-- (A) conduct audits or investigations to-- (i) determine the compliance of that department or agency with the Network's requirements; and (ii) assess the effectiveness of that department or agency in improving information sharing and collaboration and in protecting privacy and civil liberties; and (B) issue reports on such audits and investigations. (k) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated-- (1) $50,000,000 to the Director of Management and Budget to carry out this section for fiscal year 2005; and (2) such sums as are necessary to carry out this section in each fiscal year thereafter, to be disbursed and allocated in accordance with the Network system design and implementation plan required by subsection (f). Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The American people are not served well by current congressional rules and resolutions governing intelligence and homeland security oversight. (2) A unified Executive Branch effort on fighting terrorism will not be effective unless it is matched by a unified effort in Congress, specifically a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give the intelligence agencies and Department of Homeland Security sound oversight, support, and leadership. (3) The intelligence committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives are not organized to provide strong leadership and oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism. (4) Jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security, which is scattered among many committees in each chamber, does not allow for the clear authority and responsibility needed for effective congressional oversight. (5) Congress should either create a new, joint Senate-House intelligence authorizing committee modeled on the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, or establish new intelligence committees in each chamber with combined authorization and appropriations authority. (6) Congress should establish a single, principal point of oversight and review in each chamber for the Department of Homeland Security and the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States stated that ``Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this department and its duties.''. (7) In August 2004, the joint Senate leadership created a bipartisan working group to examine how best to implement the Commission's recommendations with respect to reform of the Senate's oversight of intelligence and homeland security, and directed the working group to begin its work immediately and to present its findings and recommendations to Senate leadership as expeditiously as possible. The 108th Congress shall not adjourn until each House of Congress has adopted the necessary changes to its rules such that, effective the start of the 109th Congress-- (1) jurisdiction over proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the Department of Homeland Security shall be consolidated in a single committee in each House and such committee shall have a nonpartisan staff; and (2) jurisdiction over proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters related to intelligence shall reside in-- (A) either a joint Senate-House authorizing committee modeled on the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, or a committee in each chamber with combined authorization and appropriations authority; and (B) regardless of which committee structure is selected, the intelligence committee or committees shall have-- (i) not more than 9 members in each House, who shall serve without term limits and of which at least 1 each shall also serve on a committee on Armed Services, Judiciary, and Foreign Affairs and at least 1 on a Defense Appropriations subcommittee; (ii) authority to issue subpoenas; (iii) majority party representation that does not exceed minority party representation by more than 1 member in each House, and a nonpartisan staff; and (iv) a subcommittee devoted solely to oversight. (a) Services Provided President-Elect.--Section 3 of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note) is amended-- (1) by adding after subsection (a)(8)(A)(iv) the following: ``(v) Activities under this paragraph shall include the preparation of a detailed classified, compartmented summary by the relevant outgoing executive branch officials of specific operational threats to national security; major military or covert operations; and pending decisions on possible uses of military force. This summary shall be provided to the President-elect as soon as possible after the date of the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President under section 1 or 2 of title 3, United States Code.''; (2) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and (3) by adding after subsection (e) the following: ``(f)(1) The President-elect should submit to the agency designated by the President under section 401(d) of the 9/11 Commission Report Implementation Act of 2004 the names of candidates for high level national security positions through the level of undersecretary of cabinet departments as soon as possible after the date of the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President under section 1 or 2 of title 3, United States Code. ``(2) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, and any other appropriate agency, shall undertake and complete as expeditiously as possible the background investigations necessary to provide appropriate security clearances to the individuals who are candidates described under paragraph (1) before the date of the inauguration of the President-elect as President and the inauguration of the Vice-President-elect as Vice President.''. (b) Sense of the Senate Regarding Expedited Consideration of National Security Nominees.--It is the sense of the Senate that-- (1) the President-elect should submit the nominations of candidates for high-level national security positions, through the level of undersecretary of cabinet departments, to the Senate by the date of the inauguration of the President-elect as President; and (2) for all national security nominees received by the date of inauguration, the Senate committees to which these nominations are referred should, to the fullest extent possible, complete their consideration of these nominations, and, if such nominations are reported by the committees, the full Senate should vote to confirm or reject these nominations, within 30 days of their submission. (c) Security Clearances for Transition Team Members.-- (1) Definition.--In this section, the term ``major party'' shall have the meaning given under section 9002(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. (2) In general.--Each major party candidate for President, except a candidate who is the incumbent President, may submit, before the date of the general election, requests for security clearances for prospective transition team members who will have a need for access to classified information to carry out their responsibilities as members of the President- elect's transition team. (3) Completion date.--Necessary background investigations and eligibility determinations to permit appropriate prospective transition team members to have access to classified information shall be completed, to the fullest extent practicable, by the day after the date of the general election. (d) Consolidation of Responsibility for Personnel Security Investigations.-- (1) Consolidation.-- (A) In general.--Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall select a single Federal agency to provide and maintain all security clearances for Federal employees and Federal contractor personnel who require access to classified information, including conducting all investigation functions. (B) Considerations.--In selecting an agency under this paragraph, the President shall fully consider requiring the transfer of investigation functions to the Office of Personnel Management as described under section 906 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (5 U.S.C. 1101 note). (C) Coordination and consolidation of responsibilities.-- The Federal agency selected under this paragraph shall-- (i) take all necessary actions to carry out the responsibilities under this subsection, including entering into a memorandum of understanding with any agency carrying out such responsibilities before the date of enactment of this Act; and (ii) identify any legislative actions necessary to further implement this subsection. (D) Database.--The agency selected shall, as soon as practicable, establish and maintain a single database for tracking security clearance applications, investigations and eligibility determinations and ensure that security clearance investigations are conducted according to uniform standards, including uniform security questionnaires and financial disclosure requirements. (E) Polygraphs.--The President shall direct the agency selected under this paragraph to administer any polygraph examinations on behalf of agencies that require them. (2) Access.--The President, acting through the National Intelligence Director, shall-- (A) establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to classified information to any officer or employee of any agency or department of the United States and to employees of contractors of those agencies and departments; (B) ensure the consistent implementation of those standards and procedures throughout such agencies and departments; and (C) ensure that security clearances granted by individual elements of the intelligence community are recognized by all elements of the intelligence community, and under contracts entered into by such elements. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Complex terrorist operations require locations that provide such operations sanctuary from interference by government or law enforcement personnel. (2) A terrorist sanctuary existed in Afghanistan before September 11, 2001. (3) The terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan provided direct and indirect value to members of al Qaeda who participated in the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and in other terrorist operations. (4) Terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed and most lawless places in the world to find sanctuary. (5) During the twenty-first century, terrorists are focusing on remote regions and failing states as locations to seek sanctuary. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the United States Government should identify and prioritize locations that are or that could be used as terrorist sanctuaries; (2) the United States Government should have a realistic strategy that includes the use of all elements of national power to keep possible terrorists from using a location as a sanctuary; and (3) the United States Government should reach out, listen to, and work with countries in bilateral and multilateral fora to prevent locations from becoming sanctuaries and to prevent terrorists from using locations as sanctuaries. (c) Strategy on Terrorist Sanctuaries.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report that describes a strategy for addressing and, where possible, eliminating terrorist sanctuaries. (2) Content.--The report required under this section shall include the following: (A) A description of actual and potential terrorist sanctuaries, together with an assessment of the priorities of addressing and eliminating such sanctuaries. (B) An outline of strategies for disrupting or eliminating the security provided to terrorists by such sanctuaries. (C) A description of efforts by the United States Government to work with other countries in bilateral and multilateral fora to address or eliminate actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and disrupt or eliminate the security provided to terrorists by such sanctuaries. (D) A description of long-term goals and actions designed to reduce the conditions that allow the formation of terrorist sanctuaries, such as supporting and strengthening host governments, reducing poverty, increasing economic development, strengthening civil society, securing borders, strengthening internal security forces, and disrupting logistics and communications networks of terrorist groups. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Government of Pakistan has a critical role to perform in the struggle against Islamist terrorism. (2) The endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and frequent ineffectiveness of government in Pakistan create opportunities for Islamist recruitment. (3) The poor quality of education in Pakistan is particularly worrying, as millions of families send their children to madrassahs, some of which have been used as incubators for violent extremism. (4) The vast unpoliced regions in Pakistan make the country attractive to extremists seeking refuge and recruits and also provide a base for operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan. (5) A stable Pakistan, with a government advocating ``enlightened moderation'' in the Muslim world, is critical to stability in the region. (6) There is a widespread belief among the people of Pakistan that the United States has long treated them as allies of convenience. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the United States should make a long-term commitment to assisting in ensuring a promising, stable, and secure future in Pakistan, as long as its leaders remain committed to combatting extremists and implementing a strategy of ``enlightened moderation''; (2) the United States aid to Pakistan should be fulsome and, at a minimum, sustained at the fiscal year 2004 levels; (3) the United States should support the Government of Pakistan with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education; and (4) the United States Government should devote particular attention and resources to assisting in the improvement of the quality of education in Pakistan. (c) Report on Support for Pakistan.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the efforts of the United States Government to support Pakistan and encourage moderation in that country. (2) Content.--The report required under this section shall include the following: (A) An examination of the desirability of establishing a Pakistan Education Fund to direct resources toward improving the quality of secondary schools in Pakistan. (B) Recommendations on the funding necessary to provide various levels of educational support. (C) An examination of the current composition and levels of United States military aid to Pakistan, together with any recommendations for changes in such levels and composition that the President considers appropriate. (D) An examination of other major types of United States financial support to Pakistan, together with any recommendations for changes in the levels and composition of such support that the President considers appropriate. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States and its allies in the international community have made progress in promoting economic and political reform within Afghanistan, including the establishment of a central government with a democratic constitution, a new currency, and a new army, the increase of personal freedom, and the elevation of the standard of living of many Afghans. (2) A number of significant obstacles must be overcome if Afghanistan is to become a secure and prosperous democracy, and such a transition depends in particular upon-- (A) improving security throughout the country; (B) disarming and demobilizing militias; (C) curtailing the rule of the warlords; (D) promoting equitable economic development; (E) protecting the human rights of the people of Afghanistan; (F) holding elections for public office; and (G) ending the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics. (3) The United States and the international community must make a long-term commitment to addressing the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and the burgeoning narcotics trade, endemic poverty, and other serious problems in Afghanistan in order to prevent that country from relapsing into a sanctuary for international terrorism. (b) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States to take the following actions with respect to Afghanistan: (1) Working with other nations to obtain long-term security, political, and financial commitments and fulfillment of pledges to the Government of Afghanistan to accomplish the objectives of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.), especially to ensure a secure, democratic, and prosperous Afghanistan that respects the rights of its citizens and is free of international terrorist organizations. (2) Using the voice and vote of the United States in relevant international organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations Security Council, to strengthen international commitments to assist the Government of Afghanistan in enhancing security, building national police and military forces, increasing counter- narcotics efforts, and expanding infrastructure and public services throughout the country. (3) Taking appropriate steps to increase the assistance provided under programs of the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development throughout Afghanistan and to increase the number of personnel of those agencies in Afghanistan as necessary to support the increased assistance. (c) Authorization of Appropriations.-- (1) Fiscal year 2005.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for fiscal year 2005 for assistance for Afghanistan, in addition to any amounts otherwise available for the following purposes, the following amounts: (A) For Development Assistance to carry out the provisions of sections 103, 105, and 106 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151a, 2151c, and 2151d), $400,000,000. (B) For the Child Survival and Health Program Fund to carry out the provisions of section 104 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b), $100,000,000. (C) For the Economic Support Fund to carry out the provisions of chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.), $550,000,000. (D) For International Narcotics and Law Enforcement to carry out the provisions of section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291), $360,000,000. (E) For Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, $50,000,000. (F) For International Military Education and Training to carry out the provisions of section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347), $2,000,000. (G) For Foreign Military Financing Program grants to carry of the provision of section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763), $880,000,000. (H) For Peacekeeping Operations to carry out the provisions of section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348), $60,000,000. (2) Fiscal years 2006 through 2009.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for each of fiscal years 2006 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary for financial and other assistance to Afghanistan. (3) Conditions for assistance.--Assistance provided by the President under this subsection-- (A) shall be consistent with the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002; and (B) shall be provided with reference to the ``Securing Afghanistan's Future'' document published by the Government of Afghanistan. (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that Congress should, in consultation with the President, update and revise, as appropriate, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002. (e) Strategy and Support Regarding United States Aid to Afghanistan.-- (1) Requirement for strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a 5-year strategy for providing aid to Afghanistan. (2) Content.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall describe the resources that will be needed during the next 5 years to achieve specific objectives in Afghanistan, including in the following areas: (A) Fostering economic development. (B) Curtailing the cultivation of opium. (C) Achieving internal security and stability. (D) Eliminating terrorist sanctuaries. (E) Increasing governmental capabilities. (F) Improving essential infrastructure and public services. (G) Improving public health services. (H) Establishing a broad-based educational system. (I) Promoting democracy and the rule of law. (J) Building national police and military forces. (3) Updates.--Beginning not later than 1 year after the strategy is submitted to Congress under paragraph (1), the President shall submit to Congress an annual report-- (A) updating the progress made toward achieving the goals outlined in the strategy under this subsection; and (B) identifying shortfalls in meeting those goals and the (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Despite a long history of friendly relations with the United States, Saudi Arabia has been a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism. (2) Cooperation between the Governments of the United States and Saudi Arabia has traditionally been carried out in private. (3) The Government of Saudi Arabia has not always responded promptly and fully to United States requests for assistance in the global war on Islamist terrorism. (4) Counterterrorism cooperation between the Governments of the United States and Saudi Arabia has improved significantly since the terrorist bombing attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 12, 2003. (5) The Government of Saudi Arabia is now aggressively pursuing al Qaeda and appears to be acting to build a domestic consensus for some internal reforms. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the problems in the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia must be confronted openly, and the opportunities for cooperation between the countries must be pursued openly by those governments; (2) both governments must build a relationship that they can publicly defend and that is based on other national interests in addition to their national interests in oil; (3) this relationship should include a shared commitment to political and economic reform in Saudi Arabia; and (4) this relationship should also include a shared interest in greater tolerance and respect for other cultures in Saudi Arabia and a commitment to fight the violent extremists who foment hatred in the Middle East. (c) Report.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a strategy for expanding collaboration with the Government of Saudi Arabia on subjects of mutual interest and of importance to the United States. (2) Scope.--As part of this strategy, the President shall consider the utility of undertaking a periodic, formal, and visible high-level dialogue between senior United States Government officials of cabinet level or higher rank and their counterparts in the Government of Saudi Arabia to address challenges in the relationship between the 2 governments and to identify areas and mechanisms for cooperation. (3) Content.--The strategy under this subsection shall encompass-- (A) intelligence and security cooperation in the fight against Islamist terrorism; (B) ways to advance the Middle East peace process; (C) political and economic reform in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East; and (D) the promotion of greater tolerance and respect for cultural and religious diversity in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) While support for the United States has plummeted in the Islamic world, many negative views are uninformed, at best, and, at worst, are informed by coarse stereotypes and caricatures. (2) Local newspapers in Islamic countries and influential broadcasters who reach Islamic audiences through satellite television often reinforce the idea that the people and Government of the United States are anti-Muslim. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the Government of the United States should offer an example of moral leadership in the world that includes a commitment to treat all people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to the people and governments of other countries; (2) the United States should cooperate with governments of Islamic countries to foster agreement on respect for human dignity and opportunity, and to offer a vision of a better future that includes stressing life over death, individual educational and economic opportunity, widespread political participation, contempt for indiscriminate violence, respect for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences, and tolerance for opposing points of view; (3) the United States should encourage reform, freedom, democracy, and opportunity for Arabs and Muslims and promote moderation in the Islamic world; and (4) the United States should work to defeat extremist ideology in the Islamic world by providing assistance to moderate Arabs and Muslims to combat extremist ideas. (c) Report on the Struggle of Ideas in the Islamic World.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report that contains a cohesive long-term strategy for the United States Government to help win the struggle of ideas in the Islamic world. (2) Content.--The report required under this section shall include the following: (A) A description of specific goals related to winning this struggle of ideas. (B) A description of the range of tools available to the United States Government to accomplish these goals and the manner in which such tools will be employed. (C) A list of benchmarks for measuring success and a plan for linking resources to the accomplishment of these goals. (D) A description of any additional resources that may be necessary to help win this struggle of ideas. (E) Any recommendations for the creation of, and United States participation in, international institutions for the promotion of democracy and economic diversification in the Islamic world, and intra-regional trade in the Middle East. (F) An estimate of the level of United States financial assistance that would be sufficient to convince United States allies and people in the Islamic world that engaging in the struggle of ideas in the Islamic world is a top priority of the United States and that the United States intends to make a substantial and sustained commitment toward winning this struggle. (a) Finding.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress finds that short-term gains enjoyed by the United States through cooperation with the world's most repressive and brutal governments are too often outweighed by long-term setbacks for the stature and interests of the United States. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) United States foreign policy should promote the value of life and the importance of individual educational and economic opportunity, encourage widespread political participation, condemn indiscriminate violence, and promote respect for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences among people, and tolerance for opposing points of view; and (2) the United States Government must prevail upon the governments of all predominantly Muslim countries, including those that are friends and allies of the United States, to condemn indiscriminate violence, promote the value of life, respect and promote the principles of individual education and economic opportunity, encourage widespread political participation, and promote the rule of law, openness in discussing differences among people, and tolerance for opposing points of view. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Although the United States has demonstrated and promoted its values in defending Muslims against tyrants and criminals in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, this message is not always clearly presented in the Islamic world. (2) If the United States does not act to vigorously define its message in the Islamic world, the image of the United States will be defined by Islamic extremists who seek to demonize the United States. (3) Recognizing that many Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the United States Government has launched promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the United States must do more to defend and promote its values and ideals to the broadest possible audience in the Islamic world; (2) United States efforts to defend and promote these values and ideals are beginning to ensure that accurate expressions of these values reach large audiences in the Islamic world and should be robustly supported; (3) the United States Government could and should do more to engage the Muslim world in the struggle of ideas; and (4) the United States Government should more intensively employ existing broadcast media in the Islamic world as part of this engagement. (c) Report on Outreach Strategy.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the strategy of the United States Government for expanding its outreach to foreign Muslim audiences through broadcast media. (2) Content.--The report shall include the following: (A) The initiatives of the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the public diplomacy activities of the Department of State with respect to outreach to foreign Muslim audiences. (B) An outline of recommended actions that the United States Government should take to more regularly and comprehensively present a United States point of view through indigenous broadcast media in countries with sizable Muslim populations, including increasing appearances by United States Government officials, experts, and citizens. (C) An assessment of potential incentives for, and costs associated with, encouraging United States broadcasters to dub or subtitle into Arabic and other relevant languages their news and public affairs programs broadcast in the Muslim world in order to present those programs to a much broader Muslim audience than is currently reached. (D) Any recommendations the President may have for additional funding and legislation necessary to achieve the objectives of the strategy. (d) Authorizations of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out United States Government broadcasting activities under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1431 et seq.), the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6201 et seq.), and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6501 et seq.), and to carry out other activities under this section consistent with the purposes of such Acts, the following amounts: (1) International broadcasting operations.--For International Broadcasting Operations-- (A) $717,160,000 for fiscal year 2005; and (B) such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2006 through 2009. (2) Broadcasting capital improvements.--For Broadcasting Capital Improvements-- (A) $11,040,000 for fiscal year 2005; and (B) such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2006 through 2009. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Exchange, scholarship, and library programs are effective ways for the United States Government to promote internationally the values and ideals of the United States. (2) Exchange, scholarship, and library programs can expose young people from other countries to United States values and offer them knowledge and hope. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States should expand its exchange, scholarship, and library programs, especially those that benefit people in the Arab and Muslim worlds. (c) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Eligible country.--The term ``eligible country'' means a country or entity in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, or Southeast Asia that-- (A) has a sizable Muslim population; and (B) is designated by the Secretary of State as eligible to participate in programs under this section. (2) Secretary.--Except as otherwise specifically provided, the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of State. (3) United states entity.--The term ``United States entity'' means an entity that is organized under the laws of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, or any other territory or possession of the United States. (4) United states sponsoring organization.--The term ``United States sponsoring organization'' means a nongovernmental organization that is-- (A) based in the United States; and (B) controlled by a citizen of the United States or a United States entity that is designated by the Secretary, pursuant to regulations, to carry out a program authorized by subsection (e). (d) Expansion of Educational and Cultural Exchanges.-- (1) Purpose.--The purpose of this subsection is to provide for the expansion of international educational and cultural exchange programs between the United States and eligible countries. (2) Specific programs.--In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary is authorized to conduct or initiate programs in eligible countries as follows: (A) Fulbright exchange program.-- (i) Increased number of awards.--The Secretary is authorized to substantially increase the number of awards under the J. William Fulbright Educational Exchange Program. (ii) International support for fulbright program.--The Secretary shall work to increase support for the J. William Fulbright Educational Exchange Program in eligible countries in order to enhance academic and scholarly exchanges with those countries. (B) Hubert h. humphrey fellowships.--The Secretary is authorized to substantially increase the number of Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowships awarded to candidates from eligible countries. (C) Sister institutions programs.--The Secretary is authorized to facilitate the establishment of sister institution programs between cities and municipalities and other institutions in the United States and in eligible countries in order to enhance mutual understanding at the community level. (D) Library training exchanges.--The Secretary is authorized to develop a demonstration program, including training in the library sciences, to assist governments in eligible countries to establish or upgrade the public library systems of such countries for the purpose of improving literacy. (E) International visitors program.--The Secretary is authorized to expand the number of participants from eligible countries in the International Visitors Program. (F) Youth ambassadors.-- (i) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to establish a youth ambassadors program for visits by middle and secondary school students from eligible countries to the United States to participate in activities, including cultural and educational activities, that are designed to familiarize participating students with United States society and values. (ii) Visits.--The visits of students who are participating in the youth ambassador program under clause (i) shall be scheduled during the school holidays in the home countries of the students and may not exceed 4 weeks. (iii) Criteria.--Students selected to participate in the youth ambassador program shall reflect the economic and geographic diversity of eligible countries. (G) Education reform.--The Secretary is authorized-- (i) to expand programs that seek to improve the quality of primary and secondary school systems in eligible countries; and (ii) in order to foster understanding of the United States, to promote civic education through teacher exchanges, teacher training, textbook modernization, and other efforts. (H) Promotion of religious freedom.--The Secretary is authorized to establish a program to promote dialogue and exchange among leaders and scholars of all faiths from the United States and eligible countries. (I) Bridging the digital divide.--The Secretary is authorized to establish a program to help foster access to information technology among underserved populations and by civil society groups in eligible countries. (J) People-to-people diplomacy.--The Secretary is authorized to expand efforts to promote United States public diplomacy interests in eligible countries through cultural, arts, entertainment, sports and other exchanges. (K) College scholarships.-- (i) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to establish a program to offer scholarships to permit individuals to attend eligible colleges and universities. (ii) Eligibility for program.--To be eligible for the scholarship program, an individual shall be a citizen or resident of an eligible country who has graduated from a secondary school in an eligible country. (iii) Eligible college or university defined.--In this subparagraph, the term ``eligible college or university'' means a college or university that is organized under the laws of the United States, a State, or the District of Columbia, accredited by an accrediting agency recognized by the Secretary of Education, and primarily located in, but not controlled by, an eligible country. (L) Language training program.--The Secretary is authorized to provide travel and subsistence funding for students who are United States citizens to travel to eligible countries to participate in immersion training programs in languages used in such countries and to develop regulations governing the provision of such funding. (e) Secondary School Exchange Program.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to establish an international exchange visitor program, modeled on the Future Leaders Exchange Program established under the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.), for eligible students to-- (A) attend public secondary school in the United States; (B) live with a host family in the United States; and (C) participate in activities designed to promote a greater understanding of United States and Islamic values and culture. (2) Eligible student defined.--In this subsection, the term ``eligible student'' means an individual who-- (A) is a national of an eligible country; (B) is at least 15 years of age but not more than 18 years and 6 months of age at the time of enrollment in the program; (C) is enrolled in a secondary school in an eligible country; (D) has completed not more than 11 years of primary and secondary education, exclusive of kindergarten; (E) demonstrates maturity, good character, and scholastic aptitude, and has the proficiency in the English language necessary to participate in the program; (F) has not previously participated in an exchange program in the United States sponsored by the Government of the United States; and (G) is not prohibited from entering the United States under any provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) or any other provision of law related to immigration and nationality. (3) Compliance with visa requirements.--An eligible student may not participate in the exchange visitor program authorized by paragraph (1) unless the eligible student has the status of nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(J) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(J)). (4) Broad participation.--Whenever appropriate, the Secretary shall make special provisions to ensure the broadest possible participation in the exchange visitor program authorized by paragraph (1), particularly among females and less advantaged citizens of eligible countries. (5) Designated exchange visitor program.--The exchange visitor program authorized by paragraph (1) shall be a designated exchange visitor program for the purposes of section 641 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1372). (6) Regular reporting to the secretary.--If the Secretary utilizes a United States sponsoring organization to carry out the exchange visitor program authorized by paragraph (1), such United States sponsoring organization shall report regularly to the Secretary on the progress it has made to implement such program. (f) Report on Expediting Visas for Participants in Exchange, Scholarship, and Visitors Programs.-- (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to Congress a report on expediting the issuance of visas to individuals who are entering the United States for the purpose of participating in a scholarship, exchange, or visitor program authorized in subsection (d) or (e) without compromising the security of the United States. (2) Recommendations.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include-- (A) the recommendations of the Secretary and the Secretary of Homeland Security, if any, for methods to expedite the processing of requests for such visas; and (B) a proposed schedule for implementing any recommendations described in subparagraph (A). (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for educational and cultural exchange programs for fiscal year 2005, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $60,000,000 to carry out programs under this section. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs is a key element in any global strategy to eliminate Islamist terrorism. (2) Education in the Middle East about the world outside that region is weak. (3) The United Nations has rightly equated literacy with freedom. (4) The international community is moving toward setting a concrete goal of reducing by half the illiteracy rate in the Middle East by 2010, through the implementation of education programs targeting women and girls and programs for adult literacy, and by other means. (5) To be effective, the effort to improve education in the Middle East must also include-- (A) support for the provision of basic education tools, such as textbooks that translate more of the world's knowledge into local languages and local libraries to house such materials; and (B) more vocational education in trades and business skills. (6) The Middle East can benefit from some of the same programs to bridge the digital divide that already have been developed for other regions of the world. (b) International Youth Opportunity Fund.-- (1) Establishment.-- (A) In general.--The President shall establish an International Youth Opportunity Fund (hereafter in this section referred to as the ``Fund''). (B) International participation.--The President shall seek the cooperation of the international community in establishing and generously supporting the Fund. (2) Purpose.--The purpose of the Fund shall be to provide financial assistance for the improvement of public education in the Middle East, including assistance for the construction and operation of primary and secondary schools in countries that have a sizable Muslim population and that commit to sensibly investing their own financial resources in public education. (3) Eligibility for assistance.-- (A) Determination.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall determine which countries are eligible for assistance through the Fund. (B) Criteria.--In determining whether a country is eligible for assistance, the Secretary shall consider whether the government of that country is sensibly investing financial resources in public education and is committed to promoting a system of education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs. (4) Use of funds.--Financial assistance provided through the Fund shall be used for expanding literacy programs, providing textbooks, reducing the digital divide, expanding vocational and business education, constructing and operating public schools, establishing local libraries, training teachers in modern education techniques, and promoting public education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs. (c) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall jointly prepare and submit to Congress a report on the improvement of education in the Middle East. (2) Content.--Reports submitted under this subsection shall include the following: (A) A general strategy for working with eligible host governments in the Middle East toward establishing the International Youth Opportunity Fund and related programs. (B) A listing of countries that are eligible for assistance under such programs. (C) A description of the specific programs initiated in each eligible country and the amount expended in support of such programs. (D) A description of activities undertaken to close the digital divide and expand vocational and business skills in eligible countries. (E) A listing of activities that could be undertaken if additional funding were provided and the amount of funding that would be necessary to carry out such activities. (F) A strategy for garnering programmatic and financial support from international organizations and other countries in support of the Fund and activities related to the improvement of public education in eligible countries. (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for the establishment of the International Youth Opportunity Fund, in addition to any amounts otherwise available for such purpose, $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2006 through 2009. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) While terrorism is not caused by poverty, breeding grounds for terrorism are created by backward economic policies and repressive political regimes. (2) Policies that support economic development and reform also have political implications, as economic and political liberties are often linked. (3) The United States is working toward creating a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013 and implementing a free trade agreement with Bahrain, and free trade agreements exist between the United States and Israel and the United States and Jordan. (4) Existing and proposed free trade agreements between the United States and Islamic countries are drawing interest from other countries in the Middle East region, and Islamic countries can become full participants in the rules-based global trading system, as the United States considers lowering its barriers to trade with the poorest Arab countries. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) a comprehensive United States strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children's future; (2) 1 element of such a strategy should encompass the lowering of trade barriers with the poorest countries that have a significant population of Arab or Muslim individuals; (3) another element of such a strategy should encompass United States efforts to promote economic reform in countries that have a significant population of Arab or Muslim individuals, including efforts to integrate such countries into the global trading system; and (4) given the importance of the rule of law in promoting economic development and attracting investment, the United States should devote an increased proportion of its assistance to countries in the Middle East to the promotion of the rule of law. (c) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the efforts of the United States Government to encourage development and promote economic reform in countries that have a significant population of Arab or Muslim individuals. (2) Content.--The report required under this subsection shall describe-- (A) efforts to integrate countries with significant populations of Arab or Muslim individuals into the global trading system; and (B) actions that the United States Government, acting alone and in partnership with other governments in the Middle East, can take to promote intra-regional trade and the rule of law in the region. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 $200,000,000 for the Middle East Partnership Initiative. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, given the importance of the rule of law and economic reform to development in the Middle East, a significant portion of the funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a) should be made available to promote the rule of law in the Middle East. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Almost every aspect of the counterterrorism strategy of the United States relies on international cooperation. (2) Since September 11, 2001, the number and scope of United States Government contacts with foreign governments concerning counterterrorism have expanded significantly, but such contacts have often been ad hoc and not integrated as a comprehensive and unified approach. (b) International Contact Group on Counterterrorism.-- (1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the President-- (A) should seek to engage the leaders of the governments of other countries in a process of advancing beyond separate and uncoordinated national counterterrorism strategies to develop with those other governments a comprehensive coalition strategy to fight Islamist terrorism; and (B) to that end, should seek to establish an international counterterrorism policy contact group with the leaders of governments providing leadership in global counterterrorism efforts and governments of countries with sizable Muslim populations, to be used as a ready and flexible international means for discussing and coordinating the development of important counterterrorism policies by the participating governments. (2) Authority.--The President is authorized to establish an international counterterrorism policy contact group with the leaders of governments referred to in paragraph (1) for purposes as follows: (A) To develop in common with such other countries important policies and a strategy that address the various components of international prosecution of the war on terrorism, including policies and a strategy that address military issues, law enforcement, the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence, issues relating to interdiction of travel by terrorists, counterterrorism- related customs issues, financial issues, and issues relating to terrorist sanctuaries. (B) To address, to the extent (if any) that the President and leaders of other participating governments determine appropriate, such long-term issues as economic and political reforms that can contribute to strengthening stability and security in the Middle East. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Carrying out the global war on terrorism requires the development of policies with respect to the detention and treatment of captured international terrorists that is adhered to by all coalition forces. (2) Article 3 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316) was specifically designed for cases in which the usual rules of war do not apply, and the minimum standards of treatment pursuant to such Article are generally accepted throughout the world as customary international law. (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.-- The term ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment'' means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the 5th amendment, 8th amendment, or 14th amendment to the Constitution. (2) Geneva conventions.--The term ``Geneva Conventions'' means-- (A) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114); (B) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217); (C) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and (D) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516). (3) Prisoner.--The term ``prisoner'' means a foreign individual captured, detained, interned, or otherwise held in the custody of the United States. (4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Defense. (5) Torture.--The term ``torture'' has the meaning given that term in section 2340 of title 18, United States Code. (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the United States should engage countries that are participating in the coalition to fight terrorism to develop a common approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured international terrorists; and (2) an approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured international terrorists developed by the countries participating in the coalition to fight terrorism could draw upon Article 3 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the principles of which are commonly accepted as minimum basic standards for humane treatment of captured individuals. (d) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States-- (1) to treat any prisoner humanely and in accordance with standards that the Government of the United States would determine to be consistent with international law if such standards were applied to personnel of the United States captured by an enemy in the war on terrorism; (2) if there is any doubt as to whether a prisoner is entitled to the protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions, to provide the prisoner such protections until the status of the prisoner is determined under the procedures authorized by paragraph 1-6 of Army Regulation 190-8 (1997); and (3) to expeditiously prosecute cases of terrorism or other criminal acts alleged to have been committed by prisoners in the custody of the United States Armed Forces at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in order to avoid the indefinite detention of such prisoners. (e) Prohibition on Torture or Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.-- (1) In general.--No prisoner shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. (2) Relationship to geneva conventions.--Nothing in this section shall affect the status of any person under the Geneva Conventions or whether any person is entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions. (f) Rules, Regulations, and Guidelines.-- (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall prescribe the rules, regulations, or guidelines necessary to ensure compliance with the prohibition in subsection (e)(1) by the members of the Armed Forces of the United States and by any person providing services to the Department of Defense on a contract basis. (2) Report to congress.--The Secretary shall submit to Congress the rules, regulations, or guidelines prescribed under paragraph (1), and any modifications to such rules, regulations, or guidelines-- (A) not later than 30 days after the effective date of such rules, regulations, guidelines, or modifications; and (B) in a manner and form that will protect the national security interests of the United States. (g) Report on Possible Violations.-- (1) Requirement.--The Secretary shall submit, on a timely basis and not less than twice each year, a report to Congress on the circumstances surrounding any investigation of a possible violation of the prohibition in subsection (e)(1) by a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or by a person providing services to the Department of Defense on a contract basis. (2) Form of report.--A report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in a manner and form that-- (A) will protect the national security interests of the United States; and (B) will not prejudice any prosecution of an individual involved in, or responsible for, a violation of the prohibition in subsection (e)(1). (h) Report on a Coalition Approach Toward the Detention and Humane Treatment of Captured Terrorists.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report describing the efforts of the United States Government to develop an approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured international terrorists that will be adhered to by all countries that are members of the coalition against terrorism. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction since 1994 or earlier. (2) The United States doubtless would be a prime target for use of any such weapon by al Qaeda. (3) Although the United States Government has redoubled its international commitments to supporting the programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction and other nonproliferation assistance programs, nonproliferation experts continue to express deep concern about the United States Government's commitment and approach to securing the weapons of mass destruction and related highly dangerous materials that are still scattered among Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. (4) The cost of increased investment in the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related dangerous materials is greatly outweighed by the potentially catastrophic cost to the United States of use of weapons of mass destruction or related dangerous materials by the terrorists who are so eager to acquire them. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) maximum effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, wherever such proliferation may occur, is warranted; and (2) the programs of the United States Government to prevent or counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction, and other nonproliferation assistance programs, should be expanded, improved, and better funded to address the global dimensions of the proliferation threat. (c) Requirement for Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress-- (1) a strategy for expanding and strengthening the Proliferation Security Initiative, the programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction, and other nonproliferation assistance programs; and (2) an estimate of the funding necessary to execute that strategy. (d) Report on Reforming the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and Other Non-Proliferation Assistance Programs.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report evaluating whether the United States could more effectively address the global threat of nuclear proliferation by-- (1) establishing a central coordinator for the programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction; (2) eliminating the requirement that the President spend no more than $50,000,000 annually on programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction and other non-proliferation assistance programs carried out outside the former Soviet Union; or (3) repealing the provisions of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 2551 note) that place conditions on assistance to the former Soviet Union unrelated to bilateral cooperation on weapons dismantlement. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) While efforts to designate and freeze the assets of terrorist financiers have been relatively unsuccessful, efforts to target the relatively small number of al Qaeda financial facilitators have been valuable and successful. (2) The death or capture of several important financial facilitators has decreased the amount of money available to al Qaeda, and has made it more difficult for al Qaeda to raise and move money. (3) The capture of al Qaeda financial facilitators has provided a windfall of intelligence that can be used to continue the cycle of disruption. (4) The United States Government has rightly recognized that information about terrorist money helps in understanding terror networks, searching them out, and disrupting their operations. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the primary weapon in the effort to stop terrorist financing should be the targeting of terrorist financial facilitators by intelligence and law enforcement agencies; and (2) efforts to track terrorist financing must be paramount in United States counter-terrorism efforts. (c) Report on Terrorist Financing.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report evaluating the effectiveness of United States efforts to curtail the international financing of terrorism. (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall evaluate and make recommendations on-- (A) the effectiveness of efforts and methods to track terrorist financing; (B) ways to improve international governmental cooperation in this effort; (C) ways to improve performance of financial institutions in this effort; (D) the adequacy of agency coordination in this effort and ways to improve that coordination; and (E) recommendations for changes in law and additional resources required to improve this effort. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Travel documents are as important to terrorists as weapons since terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack sites. (2) International travel is dangerous for terrorists because they must surface to pass through regulated channels, present themselves to border security officials, or attempt to circumvent inspection points. (3) Terrorists use evasive, but detectable, methods to travel, such as altered and counterfeit passports and visas, specific travel methods and routes, liaisons with corrupt government officials, human smuggling networks, supportive travel agencies, and immigration and identity fraud. (4) Before September 11, 2001, no Federal agency systematically analyzed terrorist travel strategies. If an agency had done so, the agency could have discovered the ways in which the terrorist predecessors to al Qaeda had been systematically, but detectably, exploiting weaknesses in our border security since the early 1990s. (5) Many of the hijackers were potentially vulnerable to interception by border authorities. Analyzing their characteristic travel documents and travel patterns could have allowed authorities to intercept some of the hijackers and a more effective use of information available in Government databases could have identified some of the hijackers. (6) The routine operations of our immigration laws and the aspects of those laws not specifically aimed at protecting against terrorism inevitably shaped al Qaeda's planning and opportunities. (7) New insights into terrorist travel gained since September 11, 2001, have not been adequately integrated into the front lines of border security. (8) The small classified terrorist travel intelligence collection and analysis program currently in place has produced useful results and should be expanded. (b) Strategy.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to Congress unclassified and classified versions of a strategy for combining terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement into a cohesive effort to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility domestically and internationally. The report to Congress should include a description of the actions taken to implement the strategy. (2) Accountability.--The strategy submitted under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) describe a program for collecting, analyzing, disseminating, and utilizing information and intelligence regarding terrorist travel tactics and methods; and (B) outline which Federal intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement agencies will be held accountable for implementing each element of the strategy. (3) Coordination.--The strategy shall be developed in coordination with all relevant Federal agencies, including-- (A) the National Counterterrorism Center; (B) the Department of Transportation; (C) the Department of State; (D) the Department of the Treasury; (E) the Department of Justice; (F) the Department of Defense; (G) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (H) the Drug Enforcement Agency; and (I) the agencies that comprise the intelligence community. (4) Contents.--The strategy shall address-- (A) the intelligence and law enforcement collection, analysis, operations, and reporting required to identify and disrupt terrorist travel practices and trends, and the terrorist travel facilitators, document forgers, human smugglers, travel agencies, and corrupt border and transportation officials who assist terrorists; (B) the initial and ongoing training and training materials required by consular, border, and immigration officials to effectively detect and disrupt terrorist travel described under subsection (c)(3); (C) the new procedures required and actions to be taken to integrate existing counterterrorist travel and mobility intelligence into border security processes, including consular, port of entry, border patrol, maritime, immigration benefits, and related law enforcement activities; (D) the actions required to integrate current terrorist mobility intelligence into military force protection measures; (E) the additional assistance to be given to the interagency Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center for purposes of combatting terrorist travel, including further developing and expanding enforcement and operational capabilities that address terrorist travel; (F) the additional resources to be given to the Directorate of Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection to aid in the sharing of information between the frontline border agencies of the Department of Homeland Security and classified and unclassified sources of counterterrorist travel intelligence and information elsewhere in the Federal Government, including the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center; (G) the development and implementation of procedures to enable the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center to timely receive terrorist travel intelligence and documentation obtained at consulates and ports of entry, and by law enforcement officers and military personnel; (H) the use of foreign and technical assistance to advance border security measures and law enforcement operations against terrorist travel facilitators; (I) the development of a program to provide each consular, port of entry, and immigration benefits office with a counterterrorist travel expert trained and authorized to use the relevant authentication technologies and cleared to access all appropriate immigration, law enforcement, and intelligence databases; (J) the feasibility of digitally transmitting passport information to a central cadre of specialists until such time as experts described under subparagraph (I) are available at consular, port of entry, and immigration benefits offices; and (K) granting consular officers the security clearances necessary to access law enforcement sensitive databases. (c) Frontline Counterterrorist Travel Technology and Training.-- (1) Technology acquisition and dissemination plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, shall submit to Congress a plan describing how the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State can acquire and deploy, to all consulates, ports of entry, and immigration benefits offices, technologies that facilitate document authentication and the detection of potential terrorist indicators on travel documents. (2) Contents of plan.--The plan submitted under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) outline the timetable needed to acquire and deploy the authentication technologies; (B) identify the resources required to-- (i) fully disseminate these technologies; and (ii) train personnel on use of these technologies; and (C) address the feasibility of using these technologies to screen every passport submitted for identification purposes to a United States consular, border, or immigration official. (3) Training program.-- (A) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall develop and implement an initial and annual training program for consular, border, and immigration officials to teach such officials how to effectively detect and disrupt terrorist travel. The Secretary may assist State, local, and tribal governments, and private industry, in establishing training programs related to terrorist travel intelligence. (B) Training topics.--The training developed under this paragraph shall include training in-- (i) methods for identifying fraudulent documents; (ii) detecting terrorist indicators on travel documents; (iii) recognizing travel patterns, tactics, and behaviors exhibited by terrorists; (iv) the use of information contained in available databases and data systems and procedures to maintain the accuracy and integrity of such systems; and (v) other topics determined necessary by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State. (C) Certification.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act-- (i) the Secretary of Homeland Security shall certify to Congress that all border and immigration officials have received training under this paragraph; and (ii) the Secretary of State shall certify to Congress that all consular officers have received training under this paragraph. (4) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subsection. (d) Enhancing Classified Counterterrorist Travel Efforts.-- (1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director shall significantly increase resources and personnel to the small classified program that collects and analyzes intelligence on terrorist travel. (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary to carry out this subsection. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop a plan for a comprehensive integrated screening system. (b) Design.--The system planned under subsection (a) shall be designed to-- (1) encompass an integrated network of screening points that includes the Nation's border security system, transportation system, and critical infrastructure or facilities that the Secretary determines need to be protected against terrorist attack; (2) build upon existing border enforcement and security activities, and to the extent practicable, private sector security initiatives, in a manner that will enable the utilization of a range of security check points in a continuous and consistent manner throughout the Nation's screening system; (3) allow access to government databases to detect terrorists; and (4) utilize biometric identifiers that the Secretary determines to be appropriate and feasible. (c) Standards for Screening Procedures.-- (1) Authorization.--The Secretary may promulgate standards for screening procedures for-- (A) entering and leaving the United States; (B) accessing Federal facilities that the Secretary determines need to be protected against terrorist attack; (C) accessing critical infrastructure that the Secretary determines need to be protected against terrorist attack; and (D) accessing modes of transportation that the Secretary determines need to be protected against terrorist attack. (2) Scope.--Standards prescribed under this subsection may address a range of factors, including technologies required to be used in screening and requirements for secure identification. (3) Requirements.--In promulgating standards for screening procedures, the Secretary shall-- (A) consider and incorporate appropriate civil liberties and privacy protections; (B) comply with the Administrative Procedure Act; and (C) consult with other Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, and other interested parties, as appropriate. (4) Limitation.--This section does not confer to the Secretary new statutory authority, or alter existing authorities, over systems, critical infrastructure, and facilities. (5) Notification.--If the Secretary determines that additional regulatory authority is needed to fully implement the plan for an integrated screening system, the Secretary shall immediately notify Congress. (d) Compliance.--The Secretary may issue regulations to ensure compliance with the standards promulgated under this section. (e) Consultation.--For those systems, critical infrastructure, and facilities that the Secretary determines need to be protected against terrorist attack, the Secretary shall consult with other Federal agencies, State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector to ensure the development of consistent standards and consistent implementation of the integrated screening system. (f) Biometric Identifiers.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall continue to review biometric technologies and existing Federal and State programs using biometric identifiers. Such review shall consider the accuracy rate of available technologies. (g) Implementation.-- (1) Phase i.--The Secretary shall-- (A) issue standards for driver's licenses, personal identification cards, and birth certificates, as required under section 606; (B) develop plans for, and begin implementation of, a single program for registered travelers to expedite travel across the border, as required under section 603(e); (C) continue the implementation of a biometric exit and entry data system that links to relevant databases and data systems, as required by subsections (b) and (c) of section 603 and other existing authorities; (D) centralize the ``no-fly'' and ``automatic-selectee'' lists, making use of improved terrorists watch lists, as required by section 703; (E) develop plans, in consultation with other relevant agencies, for the sharing of terrorist information with trusted governments, as required by section 605; (F) initiate any other action determined appropriate by the Secretary to facilitate the implementation of this paragraph; and (G) report to Congress on the implementation of phase I, including-- (i) the effectiveness of actions taken, the efficacy of resources expended, compliance with statutory provisions, and safeguards for privacy and civil liberties; and (ii) plans for the development and implementation of phases II and III. (2) Phase ii.--The Secretary shall-- (A) complete the implementation of a single program for registered travelers to expedite travel across the border, as required by section 603(e); (B) complete the implementation of a biometric entry and exit data system that links to relevant databases and data systems, as required by subsections (b) and (c) of section 603, and other existing authorities; (C) in cooperation with other relevant agencies, engage in dialogue with foreign governments to develop plans for the use of common screening standards; (D) initiate any other action determined appropriate by the Secretary to facilitate the implementation of this paragraph; and (E) report to Congress on the implementation of phase II, including-- (i) the effectiveness of actions taken, the efficacy of resources expended, compliance with statutory provisions, and safeguards for privacy and civil liberties; and (ii) the plans for the development and implementation of phase III. (3) Phase iii.--The Secretary shall-- (A) finalize and deploy the integrated screening system required by subsection (a); (B) in cooperation with other relevant agencies, promote the implementation of common screening standards by foreign governments; and (C) report to Congress on the implementation of Phase III, including-- (i) the effectiveness of actions taken, the efficacy of resources expended, compliance with statutory provisions, and safeguards for privacy and civil liberties; and (ii) the plans for the ongoing operation of the integrated screening system. (h) Report.--After phase III has been implemented, the Secretary shall submit a report to Congress every 3 years that describes the ongoing operation of the integrated screening system, including its effectiveness, efficient use of resources, compliance with statutory provisions, and safeguards for privacy and civil liberties. (i) Authorizations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress finds that completing a biometric entry and exit data system as expeditiously as possible is an essential investment in efforts to protect the United States by preventing the entry of terrorists. (b) Plan and Report.-- (1) Development of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop a plan to accelerate the full implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data system required by applicable sections of-- (A) the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-208); (B) the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-205); (C) the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (Public Law 106- 396); (D) the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173); and (E) the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56). (2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to Congress on the plan developed under paragraph (1), which shall contain-- (A) a description of the current functionality of the entry and exit data system, including-- (i) a listing of ports of entry with biometric entry data systems in use and whether such screening systems are located at primary or secondary inspection areas; (ii) a listing of ports of entry with biometric exit data systems in use; (iii) a listing of databases and data systems with which the automated entry and exit data system are interoperable; (iv) a description of-- (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress finds that-- (1) existing procedures allow many individuals to enter the United States by showing minimal identification or without showing any identification; (2) the planning for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrates that terrorists study and exploit United States vulnerabilities; and (3) additional safeguards are needed to ensure that terrorists cannot enter the United States. (b) Biometric Passports.-- (1) Development of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall develop and implement a plan as expeditiously as possible to require biometric passports or other identification deemed by the Secretary to be at least as secure as a biometric passport, for all travel into the United States by United States citizens and by categories of individuals for whom documentation requirements have previously been waived under section 212(d)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(4)(B)). (2) Requirement to produce documentation.--The plan developed under paragraph (1) shall require all United States citizens, and categories of individuals for whom documentation requirements have previously been waived under section 212(d)(4)(B) of such Act, to carry and produce the documentation described in paragraph (1) when traveling from foreign countries into the United States. (c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--After the complete implementation of the plan described in subsection (b)-- (1) the Secretary of State and the Attorney General may no longer exercise discretion under section 212(d)(4)(B) of such Act to waive documentary requirements for travel into the United States; and (2) the President may no longer exercise discretion under section 215(b) of such Act to waive documentary requirements for United States citizens departing from or entering, or attempting to depart from or enter, the United States, unless the Secretary of State determines that the alternative documentation that is the basis for the waiver of the documentary requirement is at least as secure as a biometric passport. (d) Transit Without Visa Program.--The Secretary of State shall not use any authorities granted under section 212(d)(4)(C) of such Act until the Secretary, in conjunction with the Secretary of Homeland Security, completely implements a security plan to fully ensure secure transit passage areas to prevent aliens proceeding in immediate and continuous transit through the United States from illegally entering the United States. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress finds that-- (1) the exchange of terrorist information with other countries, consistent with privacy requirements, along with listings of lost and stolen passports, will have immediate security benefits; and (2) the further away from the borders of the United States that screening occurs, the more security benefits the United States will gain. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the United States Government should exchange terrorist information with trusted allies; (2) the United States Government should move toward real- time verification of passports with issuing authorities; (3) where practicable the United States Government should conduct screening before a passenger departs on a flight destined for the United States; (4) the United States Government should work with other countries to ensure effective inspection regimes at all airports; (5) the United States Government should work with other countries to improve passport standards and provide foreign assistance to countries that need help making the transition to the global standard for identification; and (6) the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Department of State and other agencies, should implement the initiatives called for in this subsection. (c) Report Regarding the Exchange of Terrorist Information.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with other agencies, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on Federal efforts to collaborate with allies of the United States in the exchange of terrorist information. (2) Contents.--The report shall outline-- (A) strategies for increasing such collaboration and cooperation; (B) progress made in screening passengers before their departure to the United States; and (C) efforts to work with other countries to accomplish the goals described under this section. (a) In General.--Subtitle H of title VIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 451 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(a) Security Enhancements.--The Commissioner of Social Security shall-- ``(1) within 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, issue regulations to restrict the issuance of multiple replacement social security cards to any individual to minimize fraud; ``(2) within 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, require independent verification of all records provided by an applicant for an original social security card, other than for purposes of enumeration at birth; and ``(3) within 18 months after the date of enactment of this section, add death, fraud, and work authorization indicators to the social security number verification system. ``(b) Interagency Security Task Force.--The Secretary and the Commissioner of Social Security shall form an interagency task force for the purpose of further improving the security of social security cards and numbers. Within 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, the task force shall establish security requirements, including-- ``(1) standards for safeguarding social security cards from counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft; ``(2) requirements for verifying documents submitted for the issuance of replacement cards; and ``(3) actions to increase enforcement against the fraudulent use or issuance of social security numbers and cards. ``(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commissioner of Social Security for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009, such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.''. (b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.-- (1) Section 656 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (5 U.S.C. 301 note) is repealed. (2) Section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 116 Stat. 2135) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 890 the following: In this title, the terms ``air carrier'', ``air transportation'', ``aircraft'', ``airport'', ``cargo'', ``foreign air carrier'', and ``intrastate air transportation'' have the meanings given such terms in section 40102 of title 49, United States Code. (a) Requirement for Strategy.-- (1) Responsibilities of secretary of homeland security.-- The Secretary of Homeland Security shall-- (A) develop and implement a National Strategy for Transportation Security; and (B) revise such strategy whenever necessary to improve or to maintain the currency of the strategy or whenever the Secretary otherwise considers it appropriate to do so. (2) Consultation with secretary of transportation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with the Secretary of Transportation in developing and revising the National Strategy for Transportation Security under this section. (b) Content.--The National Strategy for Transportation Security shall include the following matters: (1) An identification and evaluation of the transportation assets within the United States that, in the interests of national security, must be protected from attack or disruption by terrorist or other hostile forces, including aviation, bridge and tunnel, commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, urban mass transit, and other public transportation infrastructure assets that could be at risk of such an attack or disruption. (2) The development of the risk-based priorities, and realistic deadlines, for addressing security needs associated with those assets. (3) The most practical and cost-effective means of defending those assets against threats to their security. (4) A forward-looking strategic plan that assigns transportation security roles and missions to departments and agencies of the Federal Government (including the Armed Forces), State governments (including the Army National Guard and Air National Guard), local governments, and public utilities, and establishes mechanisms for encouraging private sector cooperation and participation in the implementation of such plan. (5) A comprehensive delineation of response and recovery responsibilities and issues regarding threatened and executed acts of terrorism within the United States. (6) A prioritization of research and development objectives that support transportation security needs, giving a higher priority to research and development directed toward protecting vital assets. (7) A budget and recommendations for appropriate levels and sources of funding to meet the objectives set forth in the strategy. (c) Submissions to Congress.-- (1) The national strategy.-- (A) Initial strategy.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit the National Strategy for Transportation Security developed under this section to Congress not later than April 1, 2005. (B) Subsequent versions.--After 2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit the National Strategy for Transportation Security, including any revisions, to Congress not less frequently than April 1 of each even-numbered year. (2) Periodic progress report.-- (A) Requirement for report.--Each year, in conjunction with the submission of the budget to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to Congress an assessment of the progress made on implementing the National Strategy for Transportation Security. (B) Content.--Each progress report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following matters: (i) An assessment of the adequacy of the resources committed to meeting the objectives of the National Strategy for Transportation Security. (ii) Any recommendations for improving and implementing that strategy that the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, considers appropriate. (3) Classified material.--Any part of the National Strategy for Transportation Security that involves information that is properly classified under criteria established by Executive order shall be submitted to Congress separately in classified form. (d) Priority Status.-- (1) In general.--The National Strategy for Transportation Security shall be the governing document for Federal transportation security efforts. (2) Other plans and reports.--The National Strategy for Transportation Security shall include, as an integral part or as an appendix-- (A) the current National Maritime Transportation Security Plan under section 70103 of title 46, United States Code; (B) the report of the Secretary of Transportation under section 44938 of title 49, United States Code; and (C) any other transportation security plan or report that the Secretary of Homeland Security determines appropriate for inclusion. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Transportation Security Administration, as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act but in no event later than 90 days after that date, shall-- (1) implement a procedure under which the Transportation Security Administration compares information about passengers who are to be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air transportation for flights and flight segments originating in the United States with a comprehensive, consolidated database containing information about known or suspected terrorists and their associates; and (2) use the information obtained by comparing the passenger information with the information in the database to prevent known or suspected terrorists and their associates from boarding such flights or flight segments or to subject them to specific additional security scrutiny, through the use of ``no fly'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists or other means. (b) Air Carrier Cooperation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, shall by order require air carriers to provide the passenger information necessary to implement the procedure required by subsection (a). (c) Maintaining the Accuracy and Integrity of the ``No Fly'' and ``Automatic Selectee'' Lists.-- (1) Watchlist database.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall design guidelines, policies, and operating procedures for the collection, removal, and updating of data maintained, or to be maintained, in the watchlist database described in subsection (a)(1) that are designed to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the database. (2) Accuracy of entries.--In developing the ``no fly'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists under subsection (a)(2), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a simple and timely method for correcting erroneous entries, for clarifying information known to cause false hits or misidentification errors, and for updating relevant information that is dispositive in the passenger screening process. The Secretary shall also establish a process to provide individuals whose names are confused with, or similar to, names in the database with a means of demonstrating that they are not a person named in the database. (a) Aircraft Passenger Screening at Checkpoints.-- (1) Detection of explosives.-- (A) Improvement of capabilities.--As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such action as is necessary to improve the capabilities at passenger screening checkpoints, especially at commercial airports, to detect explosives carried aboard aircraft by passengers or placed aboard aircraft by passengers. (B) Interim action.--Until measures are implemented that enable the screening of all passengers for explosives, the Secretary shall take immediate measures to require Transportation Security Administration or other screeners to screen for explosives any individual identified for additional screening before that individual may board an aircraft. (2) Implementation report.-- (A) Requirement for report.--Within 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall transmit to the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on how the Secretary intends to achieve the objectives of the actions required under paragraph (1). The report shall include an implementation schedule. (B) Classified information.--The Secretary may submit separately in classified form any information in the report under subparagraph (A) that involves information that is properly classified under criteria established by Executive order. (b) Acceleration of Research and Development on, and Deployment of, Detection of Explosives.-- (1) Required action.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall take such action as may be necessary to accelerate research and development and deployment of technology for screening aircraft passengers for explosives during or before the aircraft boarding process. (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary such sums as are necessary to carry out this subsection for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2009. (c) Improvement of Screener Job Performance.-- (1) Required action.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such action as may be necessary to improve the job performance of airport screening personnel. (2) Human factors study.--In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, conduct a human factors study in order better to understand problems in screener performance and to set attainable objectives for individual screeners and screening checkpoints. (d) Checked Baggage and Cargo.-- (1) In-line baggage screening.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such action as may be necessary to expedite the installation and use of advanced in-line baggage-screening equipment at commercial airports. (2) Cargo security.--The Secretary shall take such action as may be necessary to ensure that the Transportation Security Administration increases and improves its efforts to screen potentially dangerous cargo. (3) Hardened containers.--The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall require air carriers to deploy at least 1 hardened container for containing baggage or cargo items in each passenger aircraft that also carries cargo. (e) Cost-Sharing.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with representatives of air carriers, airport operators, and other interested parties, shall submit to the Senate and the House of Representatives-- (1) a proposed formula for cost-sharing, for the advanced in-line baggage screening equipment required by this title, between and among the Federal Government, State and local governments, and the private sector that reflects proportionate national security benefits and private sector benefits for such enhancement; and (2) recommendations, including recommended legislation, for an equitable, feasible, and expeditious system for defraying the costs of the advanced in-line baggage screening equipment required by this title, which may be based on the formula proposed under paragraph (1). (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Community.--The term ``community'' means a State, local government, or region. (2) Homeland security assistance.--The term ``homeland security assistance'' means grants or other financial assistance provided by the Department of Homeland Security under the State Homeland Security Grants Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, or the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program. (3) Local government.--The term ``local government'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(10) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(10)). (4) Region.--The term ``region'' means any intrastate or interstate consortium of local governments. (5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Homeland Security. (6) State.--The term ``State'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(14) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(14)). (7) Under secretary.--The term ``Under Secretary'' means the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. (b) In General.--The Secretary shall allocate homeland security assistance to communities based on-- (1) the level of threat faced by a community, as determined by the Secretary through the Under Secretary, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director; (2) the critical infrastructure in the community, and the risks to and vulnerability of that infrastructure, as identified and assessed by the Secretary through the Under Secretary; (3) the community's population and population density; (4) such other indicia of a community's risk and vulnerability as the Secretary determines is appropriate; (5) the benchmarks developed under subsection (d)(4)(A); and (6) the goal of achieving and enhancing essential emergency preparedness and response capabilities throughout the Nation. (c) Reallocation of Assistance.--A State receiving homeland security assistance may reallocate such assistance, in whole or in part, among local governments or other entities, only if such reallocation is made on the basis of an assessment of threats, risks, and vulnerabilities of the local governments or other entities that is consistent with the criteria set forth in subsection (b). (d) Advisory Panel.-- (1) Establishment.--Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall establish an advisory panel to assist the Secretary in determining how to allocate homeland security assistance funds most effectively among communities, consistent with the criteria set out in subsection (b). (2) Selection of members.--The Secretary shall appoint no fewer than 10 individuals to serve on the advisory panel. The individuals shall-- (A) be chosen on the basis of their knowledge, achievements, and experience; (B) be from diverse geographic and professional backgrounds; and (C) have demonstrated expertise in homeland security or emergency preparedness and response. (3) Term.--Each member of the advisory panel appointed by the Secretary shall serve a term the length of which is to be determined by the Secretary, but which shall not exceed 5 years. (4) Responsibilities.--The advisory panel shall-- (A) develop benchmarks by which the needs and capabilities of diverse communities throughout the Nation with respect to potential terrorist attacks may be assessed, and review and revise those benchmarks as appropriate; and (B) advise the Secretary on means of establishing appropriate priorities for the allocation of funding among applicants for homeland security assistance. (5) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the advisory panel shall provide the Secretary and Congress with a report on the benchmarks it has developed under paragraph (4)(A), including any revisions or modifications to such benchmarks. (6) Applicability of federal advisory committee act.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall apply to the advisory panel. (7) Administrative support services.--The Secretary shall provide administrative support services to the advisory panel. (e) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 1014(c) of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 3714(c)) is amended by striking paragraph (3). (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The attacks on September 11, 2001, demonstrated that even the most robust emergency response capabilities can be overwhelmed if an attack is large enough. (2) Teamwork, collaboration, and cooperation at an incident site are critical to a successful response to a terrorist attack. (3) Key decision makers who are represented at the incident command level help to ensure an effective response, the efficient use of resources, and responder safety. (4) Regular joint training at all levels is essential to ensuring close coordination during an actual incident. (5) Beginning with fiscal year 2005, the Department of Homeland Security is requiring that entities adopt the Incident Command System and other concepts of the National Incident Management System in order to qualify for funds distributed by the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System; (2) when multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should follow a unified command system; and (3) the Secretary of Homeland Security should require, as a further condition of receiving homeland security preparedness funds from the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, that grant applicants document measures taken to fully and aggressively implement the Incident Command System and unified command procedures. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Authorized representative of the federal government.-- The term ``authorized representative of the Federal Government'' means any individual or individuals designated by the President with respect to the executive branch, the Chief Justice with respect to the Federal judiciary, or the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives with respect to Congress, or their designees, to request assistance under a Mutual Aid Agreement for an emergency or public service event. (2) Chief operating officer.--The term ``chief operating officer'' means the official designated by law to declare an emergency in and for the locality of that chief operating officer. (3) Emergency.--The term ``emergency'' means a major disaster or emergency declared by the President, or a state of emergency declared by the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the Governor of the State of Maryland or the Commonwealth of Virginia, or the declaration of a local emergency by the chief operating officer of a locality, or their designees, that triggers mutual aid under the terms of a Mutual Aid Agreement. (4) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means the employees of the party, including its agents or authorized volunteers, who are committed in a Mutual Aid Agreement to prepare for or who respond to an emergency or public service event. (5) Locality.--The term ``locality'' means a county, city, or town within the State of Maryland or the Commonwealth of Virginia and within the National Capital Region. (6) Mutual aid agreement.--The term ``Mutual Aid Agreement'' means an agreement, authorized under subsection (b) for the provision of police, fire, rescue and other public safety and health or medical services to any party to the agreement during a public service event, an emergency, or pre-planned training event. (7) National capital region or region.--The term ``National Capital Region'' or ``Region'' means the area defined under section 2674(f)(2) of title 10, United States Code, and those counties with a border abutting that area and any municipalities therein. (8) Party.--The term ``party'' means the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the District of Columbia, and any of the localities duly executing a Mutual Aid Agreement under this section. (9) Public service event.--The term ``public service event''-- (A) means any undeclared emergency, incident or situation in preparation for or response to which the Mayor of the District of Columbia, an authorized representative of the Federal Government, the Governor of the State of Maryland, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, or the chief operating officer of a locality in the National Capital Region, or their designees, requests or provides assistance under a Mutual Aid Agreement within the National Capital Region; and (B) includes Presidential inaugurations, public gatherings, demonstrations and protests, and law enforcement, fire, rescue, emergency health and medical services, transportation, communications, public works and engineering, mass care, and other support that require human resources, equipment, facilities or services supplemental to or greater than the requesting jurisdiction can provide. (10) State.--The term ``State'' means the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the District of Columbia. (11) Training.--The term ``training'' means emergency and public service event-related exercises, testing, or other activities using equipment and personnel to simulate performance of any aspect of the giving or receiving of aid by National Capital Region jurisdictions during emergencies or public service events, such actions occurring outside actual emergency or public service event periods. (b) Mutual Aid Authorized.-- (1) In general.--The Mayor of the District of Columbia, any authorized representative of the Federal Government, the Governor of the State of Maryland, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, or the chief operating officer of a locality, or their designees, acting within his or her jurisdictional purview, may, subject to State law, enter into, request or provide assistance under Mutual Aid Agreements with localities, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, and any other governmental agency or authority for-- (A) law enforcement, fire, rescue, emergency health and medical services, transportation, communications, public works and engineering, mass care, and resource support in an emergency or public service event; (B) preparing for, mitigating, managing, responding to or recovering from any emergency or public service event; and (C) training for any of the activities described under subparagraphs (A) and (B). (2) Facilitating localities.--The State of Maryland and the Commonwealth of Virginia are encouraged to facilitate the ability of localities to enter into interstate Mutual Aid Agreements in the National Capital Region under this section. (3) Application and effect.--This section-- (A) does not apply to law enforcement security operations at special events of national significance under section 3056(e) of title 18, United States Code, or other law enforcement functions of the United States Secret Service; (B) does not diminish any authorities, express or implied, of Federal agencies to enter into Mutual Aid Agreements in furtherance of their Federal missions; and (C) does not-- (i) preclude any party from entering into supplementary Mutual Aid Agreements with fewer than all the parties, or with another party; or (ii) affect any other agreement in effect before the date of enactment of this Act among the States and localities, including the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. (4) Rights described.--Other than as described in this section, the rights and responsibilities of the parties to a Mutual Aid Agreement entered into under this section shall be as described in the Mutual Aid Agreement. (c) District of Columbia.-- (1) In general.--The District of Columbia may purchase liability and indemnification insurance or become self insured against claims arising under a Mutual Aid Agreement authorized under this section. (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out paragraph (1). (d) Liability and Actions at Law.-- (1) In general.--Any responding party or its officers or employees rendering aid or failing to render aid to the District of Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, under a Mutual Aid Agreement authorized under this section, and any party or its officers or employees engaged in training activities with another party under such a Mutual Aid Agreement, shall be liable on account of any act or omission of its officers or employees while so engaged or on account of the maintenance or use of any related equipment, facilities, or supplies, but only to the extent permitted under the laws and procedures of the State of the party rendering aid. (2) Actions.--Any action brought against a party or its officers or employees on account of an act or omission in the rendering of aid to the District of Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, or failure to render such aid or on account of the maintenance or use of any related equipment, facilities, or supplies may be brought only under the laws and procedures of the State of the party rendering aid and only in the Federal or State courts located therein. Actions against the United States under this section may be brought only in Federal courts. (3) Good faith exception.-- (A) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term ``good faith'' shall not include willful misconduct, gross negligence, or recklessness. (B) Exception.--No State or locality, or its officers or employees, rendering aid to another party, or engaging in training, under a Mutual Aid Agreement shall be liable under Federal law on account of any act or omission performed in good faith while so engaged, or on account of the maintenance or use of any related equipment, facilities, or supplies performed in good faith. (4) Immunities.--This section shall not abrogate any other immunities from liability that any party has under any other Federal or State law. (d) Workers Compensation.-- (1) Compensation.--Each party shall provide for the payment of compensation and death benefits to injured members of the emergency forces of that party and representatives of deceased members of such forces if such members sustain injuries or are killed while rendering aid to the District of Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, under a Mutual Aid Agreement, or engaged in training activities under a Mutual Aid Agreement, in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or death were sustained within their own jurisdiction. (2) Other state law.--No party shall be liable under the law of any State other than its own for providing for the payment of compensation and death benefits to injured members of the emergency forces of that party and representatives of deceased members of such forces if such members sustain injuries or are killed while rendering aid to the District of Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, under a Mutual Aid Agreement or engaged in training activities under a Mutual Aid Agreement. (e) Licenses and Permits.--If any person holds a license, certificate, or other permit issued by any responding party evidencing the meeting of qualifications for professional, mechanical, or other skills and assistance is requested by a receiving jurisdiction, such person will be deemed licensed, certified, or permitted by the receiving jurisdiction to render aid involving such skill to meet a public service event, emergency or training for any such events. Section 309(j)(14) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)(14)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(E) Extensions not permitted for channels (63, 64, 68 and 69) reassigned for public safety services.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (B), the Commission shall not grant any extension under such subparagraph from the limitation of subparagraph (A) with respect to the frequencies assigned, under section 337(a)(1), for public safety services. The Commission shall take all actions necessary to complete assignment of the electromagnetic spectrum between 764 and 776 megahertz, inclusive, and between 794 and 806 megahertz, inclusive, for public safety services and to permit operations by public safety services on those frequencies commencing not later than January 1, 2007.''. (a) In General.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Private sector organizations own 85 percent of the Nation's critical infrastructure and employ the vast majority of the Nation's workers. (2) Unless a terrorist attack targets a military or other secure government facility, the first people called upon to respond will likely be civilians. (3) Despite the exemplary efforts of some private entities, the private sector remains largely unprepared for a terrorist attack, due in part to the lack of a widely accepted standard for private sector preparedness. (4) Preparedness in the private sector and public sector for rescue, restart and recovery of operations should include-- (A) a plan for evacuation; (B) adequate communications capabilities; and (C) a plan for continuity of operations. (5) The American National Standards Institute recommends a voluntary national preparedness standard for the private sector based on the existing American National Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (NFPA 1600), with appropriate modifications. This standard would establish a common set of criteria and terminology for preparedness, disaster management, emergency management, and business continuity programs. (6) The mandate of the Department of Homeland Security extends to working with the private sector, as well as government entities. (b) Private Sector Preparedness Program.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.), as amended by section 805, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``The Secretary shall establish a program to promote private sector preparedness for terrorism and other emergencies, including promoting the adoption of a voluntary national preparedness standard such as the private sector preparedness standard developed by the American National Standards Institute and based on the National Fire Protection Association 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs.''. (2) Technical and conforming amendment.--Section 1(b) of that Act, as amended by section 805, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 510 the following: (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) Under section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C 121), the Department of Homeland Security, through the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, has the responsibility-- (A) to carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States, including the performance of risk assessments to determine the risks posed by particular types of terrorist attacks within the United States; (B) to identify priorities for protective and supportive measures; and (C) to develop a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States. (2) Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, issued on December 17, 2003, the Secretary of Homeland Security was given 1 year to develop a comprehensive plan to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources. (3) Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security should-- (A) identify those elements of the United States' transportation, energy, communications, financial, and other institutions that need to be protected; (B) develop plans to protect that infrastructure; and (C) exercise mechanisms to enhance preparedness. (b) Reports on Risk Assessment and Readiness.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report to Congress on-- (1) the Department of Homeland Security's progress in completing vulnerability and risk assessments of the Nation's critical infrastructure; (2) the adequacy of the Government's plans to protect such infrastructure; and (3) the readiness of the Government to respond to threats against the United States. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The primary responsibility for national defense is with the Department of Defense and the secondary responsibility for national defense is with the Department of Homeland Security, and the 2 departments must have clear delineations of responsibility. (2) Before September 11, 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (hereafter in this section referred to as ``NORAD''), which had responsibility for defending United States airspace on September 11, 2001-- (A) focused on threats coming from outside the borders of the United States; and (B) had not increased its focus on terrorism within the United States, even though the intelligence community had gathered intelligence on the possibility that terrorists might turn to hijacking and even the use of airplanes as missiles within the United States. (3) The United States Northern Command has been established to assume responsibility for defense within the United States. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the Secretary of Defense should regularly assess the adequacy of United States Northern Command's plans and strategies with a view to ensuring that the United States Northern Command is prepared to respond effectively to all military and paramilitary threats within the United States; and (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives should periodically review and assess the adequacy of such plans and strategies. (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report describing the United States Northern Command's plans and strategies to defend the United States against military and paramilitary threats within the United States. (a) In General.--There is established within the Executive Office of the President a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (referred to in this title as the ``Board''). (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the Government may need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of its existing powers. (2) This shift of power and authority to the Government calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of life and to ensure that the Government uses its powers for the purposes for which the powers were given. (c) Purpose.--The Board shall-- (1) analyze and review actions the Executive Branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism; and (2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism. (d) Functions.-- (1) Advice and counsel on policy development and implementation.--The Board shall-- (A) review proposed legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including the development and adoption of information sharing guidelines under section 201(e); (B) review the implementation of new and existing legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including the implementation of information sharing guidelines under section 201(e); (C) advise the President and Federal executive departments and agencies to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of such legislation, regulations, policies, and guidelines; and (D) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a particular governmental power, consider whether the executive department or agency has explained-- (i) that the power actually materially enhances security; and (ii) that there is adequate supervision of the executive's use of the power to ensure protection of civil liberties. (2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review-- (A) the regulations, policies, and procedures and the implementation of the regulations, policies, procedures, and related laws of Federal executive departments and agencies to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are protected; (B) the information sharing practices of Federal executive departments and agencies to determine whether they appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties and adhere to the information sharing guidelines promulgated under section 201(e) and to other governing laws, regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil liberties; and (C) other actions by the Executive Branch related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to determine whether such actions-- (i) appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties; and (ii) are consistent with governing laws, regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil liberties. (3) Relationship with privacy and civil liberties officers.--The Board shall review and assess the activities of privacy and civil liberties officers described in section 902 and, where appropriate, shall coordinate their activities. (e) Reports.-- (1) In general.--The Board shall-- (A) receive and review reports from privacy and civil liberties officers described in section 902; and (B) periodically submit, not less than semiannually, reports to Congress and the President. (2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each year under paragraph (1)(B) shall include-- (A) a description of the major activities of the Board during the relevant period; and (B) information on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and oversight functions under subsection (d). (f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall hold public hearings, release public reports, and otherwise inform the public of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (g) Access to Information.-- (1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this section, the Board may-- (A) secure directly from any Federal executive department or agency, or any Federal officer or employee, all relevant records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, or recommendations, including classified information consistent with applicable law; (B) interview, take statements from, or take public testimony from personnel of any Federal executive department or agency or any Federal officer or employee; (C) request information or assistance from any State, tribal, or local government; and (D) require, by subpoena, persons other than Federal executive departments and agencies to produce any relevant information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other documentary or testimonial evidence. (2) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(D), the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found may issue an order requiring such person to produce the evidence required by such subpoena. (h) Membership.-- (1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be selected solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, achievements, public stature, and relevant experience, and without regard to political affiliation. (3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected official, an officer, or an employee of the Federal Government, other than in the capacity as a member of the Board. (i) Compensation and Travel Expenses.-- (1) Compensation.-- (A) Chairman.--The chairman shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which the chairman is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Board. (B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Board. (2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for persons employed intermittently by the Government under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Board. (j) Staff.-- (1) Appointment and compensation.--The Chairman, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Board, shall appoint and fix the compensation of an executive director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Board to carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code. (2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed to the Board without reimbursement from the Board, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of the detailee's regular employment without interruption. (3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates that do not exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such title. (k) Security Clearances.--The appropriate Federal executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Board to expeditiously provide the Board members and staff with appropriate security clearances to the extent possible under existing procedures and requirements, except that no person shall be provided with access to classified information under this section without the appropriate security clearances. (l) Treatment as Agency, Not as Advisory Committee.--The Board-- (1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code); and (2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in section 3(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)). (m) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.", u'Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Angel Island Immigration Station Restoration and Preservation Act, with Senator Boxer as cosponsor. This legislation authorizes the use of up to $15 million in Federal funds for ongoing efforts to restore the Angel Island Immigration Station located on Angel Island within the San Francisco Bay. I offer this as companion legislation to H.R. 4469 which has been introduced by Congresswoman Lynn Woolsey and to date has 45 cosponsors. Last week this bill was reported out of the House Resources Committee by unanimous consent. The Angel Island Immigration Station is an important piece of American history, especially to our Nation\'s Asian American and immigrant communities. In the mid 19th Century millions of people, including ancestors of my own staff, came to America in pursuit of the American dream. Most people are familiar with Ellis Island and the stories of immigrants coming to America and seeing the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor, but often forgotten are the experiences of those who made it to America by way of Angel Island. Just like those who came to New York City, there are many stories of triumph and tribulation associated with Angel Island. However, for the Chinese and those from other Asian countries the story goes a bit further. The economic downturn in the 1870s brought political pressures to deal with the increasing population of Chinese who were coming through the Golden Gate in search of a better life. Amongst the harshest of measures taken was the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The passage of this law and its subsequent implementation led to the creation of a national system to regulate the immigration of the Chinese. Part of this process included opening the Angel Island Immigration Station in 1910 on Angel Island. The purpose of this new facility was to isolate Chinese immigrants from the City of San Francisco and the rest of the Bay Area. After a difficult journey across the Pacific Ocean, potential immigrants were brought to the Station where they faced separation from their family, embarrassing medical examinations, grueling interrogations and long detainments that lasted months, even years, in living conditions that were considered deplorable. Testaments to these experiences can be found today on the wooden walls of the barracks. Many of the detainees told their stories through poems that they carved on the barrack walls. Using allegories and historical references, they described their aspirations for coming to America as well as expressed their anger and sadness at the treatment they received. Concerns about the safety of the Station were realized when part of the Administration Building burned down in 1940 and all those being held were moved to a mainland facility. Three years later Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act. For the next 20 years the Station remained mostly unused except for a short term during World War II, when it was used as a prisoner of war camp. In 1963, Angel Island became a State park and the California Department of Parks and Recreation assumed stewardship of the Immigration Station. In 1997, the Station was a declared a National Historic Landmark and in 1999, Save America\'s Treasures named the Angel Island Immigration Station one of its Official Projects and provided $500,000 for the preservation of poems carved into the walls. The Station is supported by the people of California as well as numerous private interests. The voters of California voted in 2000 to set aside $15 million for restoration of the Station through Proposition 12 and in addition approximately $1.1 million in private funds has been raised so far. The amount authorized by this bill and the committed State resources will raise about half the amount needed to restore the Station. The remaining money will be raised through private means making this a true public-private partnership. Today, approximately 200,000 visits are made each year to Angel Island by ferry from San Francisco, Tiburon and Alameda. In addition, 60,000 visits are made to the Immigration Station, about half of which are students are on guided tours. The resources secured so far have set in motion designing and planning efforts to restore the Station. By Ms. SNOWE: S. 2834. A bill to enhance compliance assistance for small business; to the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Mr. President, in 1996, over eight years ago, the Senate passed without opposition the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) to make the Regulatory Flexibility Act more effective in curtailing the impact of regulations on small businesses. One of the most important provisions of SBREFA is a requirement that agencies produce compliance assistance materials to help small businesses meet the requirements of their regulations. Unfortunately, over the years, agencies have done a poor job of meeting this requirement. Consequently, small businesses have been forced to figure out on their own how to comply with these regulations. This makes compliance that much more difficult to achieve, and therefore reduces the effectiveness of the regulation. The GAO found that agencies have ignored this requirement or failed miserably in their attempts to satisfy it. GAO also found that the language of SBREFA is unclear in some places about what is actually required. That is why today I am introducing the Small Business Compliance Assistance Enhancement Act of 2004 to close those loopholes and make it clear that we were serious when we first told agencies we want them to produce quality compliance assistance materials to help small businesses understand how to deal with regulations. My bill is drawn directly from the GAO recommendations and is intended only to clarify an already existing requirement--not to add anything new. Similarly, the compliance guides that the agencies will produce will be suggestion about how to meet a regulations requirements, not further requirements, or subject to enforcement. Nor does this bill, in any way, interfere or undercut an agency\'s ability to enforce its regulations to the full extent they currently enjoy. Bad actors must be brought to justice, but if the only trigger for compliance is the threat of enforcement, then agencies will never achieve the impact their regulations must have to be effective. The key to helping small businesses comply is to provide assistance--show them what is necessary and how they will be able to tell when they have met their obligations. Too often, small businesses do not maintain the staff, or have the resources to figure out the answers to these questions. This puts them at a disadvantage compared to larger businesses, and reduces the effectiveness of the agency\'s regulations. SBA\'s Office of Advocacy has determined that compliance with regulations cost small businesses with less than 20 employees almost $7,000 per employee, compared to almost $4,500 for companies with more than 500 employees. If an agency cannot describe how to comply with its regulation, how can we expect a small business to figure it out? This was the reason the requirement to provide compliance assistance was included in SBREFA originally, and this reason is just as valid today as it was in 1996. Specifically, my bill would do the following: Clarify when a guide is required: To clarify when an agency must prepare a compliance guide section 212 of SBREFA would be amended to require a guide whenever the agency does not certify the rule under section 605(b) of title 5, United States Code (i.e. whenever an agency determines that a rule will have ``a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities\'\'). This would avoid confusion about whether the agency should produce a compliance guide when the agency produces a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis voluntarily (i.e. even though the agency certified that the regulation would not have ``a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities\'\'). Clarify how a guide shall be designated: Section 212 currently says that agencies must ``designate\'\' the publications prepared under the section as small entity compliance guides. However, the form in which those designations should occur is not clear. This term would be changed to ``entitle.\'\' Consistent use of the phrase ``Small Entity Compliance Guide\'\' in the title could make it easier for small entities to locate the guides that the agencies develop. This would also aid in using online searches--a technology that was not widely used when SBREFA was passed. Thus, agencies would be directed to publish guides entitled ``Small Entity Compliance Guide.\'\' Clarify how a guide shall be published: Section 212 currently says agencies ``shall publish\'\' the guides, but does not indicate where or how they should be published. At least one agency has published the guides as part of the preamble to the subject rule, thereby requiring affected small entities to read the Federal Register to obtain the guides. Agencies would be directed, at a minimum, to make their compliance guides available through their websites in an easily accessed way. In addition, agencies would be directed to forward their compliance guides to known industry contacts such as small businesses or associations with small business members that will be affected by the regulation. Clarify when a guide shall be published: Section 212 does not indicate when the compliance guides should be published. This means that even if an agency was required to produce a compliance guide, they can claim that they have not violated that requirement since there is no deadline established for when they had to produce that guide. Agencies would be instructed to publish the compliance guides coincident with, or as soon as possible after, the final rule is published, provided that the guides must be published no later than the effective date of the rule\'s compliance requirements. Clarify the term ``compliance requirements\'\': The term ``compliance requirements\'\' also needs to be clarified. At a minimum, this term means what a small business has to do to satisfy the regulation, and when they will know they have met these requirements. This should include a description of the procedures a small business might use to meet the requirements. If, as is the case with many OSHA and EPA regulations, testing is required, the agency should explain how that testing would be conducted. The bill makes clear that the procedural description should be merely suggestive--an agency would not be able to enforce this procedure if a small business was able to satisfy the requirements through a different approach. It is time we got serious about making sure small businesses have the assistance they need to deal with the maze of federal regulations we expect them to handle on a daily basis. The Small Business Compliance Assistance Enhancement Act will make a significant contribution to that effort. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Small Business Compliance Assistance Enhancement Act of 2004\'\'. (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) Small businesses represent 99.7 percent of all employers, employ half of all private sector employees, and pay 44.3 percent of total United States private payroll. (2) Small businesses generate 60 to 80 percent of net new jobs annually over the last decade. (3) Very small firms with fewer than 20 employees spend 60 percent more per employee than larger firms to comply with Federal regulations. Small firms spend twice as much on tax compliance as their larger counterparts. Based on an analysis in 2001, firms employing fewer than 20 employees face an annual regulatory burden of nearly $7,000 per employee, compared to a burden of almost $4,500 per employee for a firm with over 500 employees. (4) Section 212 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (5 U.S.C. 601 note) requires agencies to produce small entity compliance guides for each rule or group of rules for which an agency is required to prepare a final regulatory flexibility analysis under section 604 of title 5, United States Code. (5) The Government Accountability Office has found that agencies have rarely attempted to comply with section 212 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (5 U.S.C. 601 note). When agencies did try to comply with that requirement, they generally did not produce adequate compliance assistance materials. (6) The Government Accountability Office also found that section 212 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (5 U.S.C. 601 note) and other sections of that Act need clarification to be effective. (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are the following: (1) To clarify the requirement contained in section 212 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (5 U.S.C. 601 note) for agencies to produce small entity compliance guides. (2) To clarify other terms relating to the requirement in section 212 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (5 U.S.C. 601 note). (3) To ensure that agencies produce adequate and useful compliance assistance materials to help small businesses meet the obligations imposed by regulations affecting such small businesses, and thereby to increase compliance with these regulations. By Mr. GRAHAM of Florida (for himself and Mr. Nelson of Florida): S. 2835. A bill to amend the internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow penalty free withdrawals from retirement plans for victims of federally declared disasters; to the Committee on Finance. Mr. President, by now everyone is well aware of the destruction Florida has endured over the past 45 days. First, Tropical Storm Bonnie struck the panhandle. Then Hurricane Charley crashed into Florida\'s west coast. That was followed by Hurricane Frances, which wreaked havoc throughout the State. And last week Hurricane Ivan tore through the panhandle. As a result of these storms, today 61 of the State\'s 67 counties have been declared disaster areas. Floridians are grateful for the Senate\'s quick action in providing the initial $2 billion in relief funds. They also look forward to the Senate\'s quick consideration of the President\'s supplemental request for additional assistance. As important as this Federal assistance is, however, it represents only a fraction of the money needed for Florida\'s families to rebuild. The Insurance Information Institute estimates that insurance companies will pay out more than the $15.5 billion in insurance claims paid as a result of Hurricane Andrew. Of course, that amount is not the entirety of losses Floridians have suffered. In fact, as a result of the magnitude of the claims incurred from Hurricane Andrew Floridians will be responsible for a larger share of the losses from these storms than they incurred in 1992. Many Floridians will face thousands of dollars in out-of-pocket costs as a result of these storms. Those families with money in a retirement account, e.g. 401(k) or IRA, are quite likely to be forced to look to that money to rebuild their homes and their lives. Doing so, however, will come at a significant cost. First, any funds withdrawn are subject to the income tax. That\'s appropriate, since these funds have not been taxed previously. In addition to the income tax due on these withdrawals, taxpayers under age 59\\1/2\\ will face a 10 percent penalty for early withdrawal. Under normal circumstances this penalty serves a very worthwhile purpose. It encourages workers to leave funds in their retirement accounts for their intended purposes. The situation in Florida is far from normal, however, and in this instance the penalty serves as a ``ransom\'\' imposed by the Federal government on workers access to funds in times of desperation. The bill I am introducing today with Senator Nelson is a small but important step that we can take to help Floridians help themselves. It waives the 10 percent penalty for families that have suffered a loss as a result of a disaster. Although it was inspired by the storms that have ravaged our State, it is not exclusive to the victims of these storms. The penalty waiver is available to any taxpayer who suffered a loss as a result of a major disaster declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act. To qualify for this relief the taxpayer must have sustained a loss that has not been compensated by insurance or otherwise. The bill also gives taxpayers a five-year window within which they can reinvest these funds for their retirement. Mr. President, one of the greatest domestic challenges facing our country today is the soaring cost of health care. It\'s a serious problem for millions of families. But when the chief income earner in a family suddenly becomes unemployed, the problem can be critical, and we give a helping hand. We give them the opportunity to continue their coverage through their employer for a reasonable period. Families who lost loved ones on September 11, deserve the same opportunity until they can land on their feet again. The Continuing Care for Recovering Families Act I am introducing today with Senator Lautenberg and Senator Clinton recognizes that many of the September 11 families are still struggling to recover and we have an obligation to assist them. Some of the families have found ways to cover their health costs by purchasing private insurance or obtaining grant assistance on their own. For others, employers have agreed to provide coverage. For still other families, however, the safety net is about to fall apart, because their coverage is about to expire under COBRA--the temporary low--cost continuation of coverage available under current Federal law for those who change their job, lose their job or for families that lose their chief income earner through death. The Continuing Care for Recovering Families Act will give spouses and children of victims of September 11 the ability to purchase or continue to purchase coverage under COBRA indefinitely, as long as they enroll within 120 days after passage of the Act or 120 days after they lose their COBRA coverage. Eligibility for the program would expire only if they enroll in a private insurance plan or become eligible for Medicare. By Ms. COLLINS: S. 2840. An original bill to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, and for other purposes; from the Committee on Governmental Affairs; placed on the calendar. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, which the Committee on Governmental Affairs is reporting today, be printed in the Record. There being no objection the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004\'\'. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004\'\'. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Definitions. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004\'\'. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Definitions. TITLE I--NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004\'\'. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Definitions. TITLE I--NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY Subtitle A--National Intelligence Authority TITLE III--MODIFICATIONS OF LAWS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY In this Act: (1) The term ``intelligence\'\' includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. (2) The term ``foreign intelligence\'\' means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists. (3) The term ``counterintelligence\'\' means information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists. (4) The term ``intelligence community\'\' includes the following: (A) The National Intelligence Authority. (B) The Central Intelligence Agency. (C) The National Security Agency. (D) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (F) The National Reconnaissance Office. (G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs. (H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy. (I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. (J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. (K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard. (L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the National Intelligence Director and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community. (5) The terms ``national intelligence\'\' and ``intelligence related to the national security\'\'-- (A) each refer to intelligence which pertains to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government; and (B) do not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by the National Intelligence Director and the Attorney General, or otherwise as expressly provided for in this title. (6) The term ``National Intelligence Program\'\'-- (A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs, projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence community; (ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities (whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Information Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security; and (iii) includes any other program, project, or activity of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government relating to national intelligence unless the National Intelligence Director and the head of the department, agency, or element concerned determine otherwise; but (B) except as provided in subparagraph (A)(ii), does not refer to any program, project, or activity of the military departments, including any program, project, or activity of the Defense Intelligence Agency that is not part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the date of the enactment of this Act, to acquire intelligence principally for the planning and conduct of joint or tactical military operations by the United States Armed Forces. (7) The term ``congressional intelligence committees\'\' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) Independent Establishment.--There is hereby established as an independent establishment in the executive branch of government the National Intelligence Authority. (b) Composition.--The National Intelligence Authority is composed of the following: (1) The Office of the National Intelligence Director. (2) The elements specified in subtitle D. (3) Such other elements, offices, agencies, and activities as may be established by law or by the President or the National Intelligence Director. (c) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National Intelligence Authority are as follows: (1) To unify and strengthen the efforts of the intelligence community of the United States Government. (2) To ensure the organization of the efforts of the intelligence community of the United States Government in a joint manner relating to intelligence missions rather than through intelligence collection disciplines. (3) To provide for the operation of the National Counterterrorism Center and national intelligence centers under subtitle D. (4) To eliminate barriers that impede coordination of the counterterrorism activities of the United States Government between foreign intelligence activities located abroad and foreign intelligence activities located domestically while ensuring the protection of civil liberties. (5) To establish clear responsibility and accountability for counterterrorism and other intelligence matters relating to the national security of the United States. (d) Seal.--The National Intelligence Director shall have a seal for the National Intelligence Authority. The design of the seal is subject to the approval of the President. Judicial notice shall be taken of the seal. (a) National Intelligence Director.--There is a National Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (b) Individuals Eligible for Nomination.--Any individual nominated for appointment as National Intelligence Director shall have extensive national security expertise. (c) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service in Other Capacity in Intelligence Community.--The individual serving as National Intelligence Director may not, while so serving, serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community, except to the extent that the individual serving as National Intelligence Director does so in an acting capacity. (d) Principal Duties and Responsibilities.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) serve as head of the intelligence community in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law; (2) act as a principal adviser to the President for intelligence related to the national security; (3) serve as the head of the National Intelligence Authority; and (4) direct and oversee the National Intelligence Program. (e) General Responsibilities and Authorities.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities set forth in subsection (c), the National Intelligence Director shall have the responsibilities set forth in section 112 and the authorities set forth in section 113 and other applicable provisions of law. (a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall be responsible for providing national intelligence-- (1) to the President; (2) to the heads of other departments and agencies of the executive branch; (3) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; (4) to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof; and (5) to such other persons or entities as the President shall direct. (b) National Intelligence.--Such national intelligence shall be timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community. (a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) determine the annual budget for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States by-- (A) providing to the heads of the departments containing agencies or elements within the intelligence community and that have one or more programs, projects, or activities within the National Intelligence program, and to the heads of such agencies and elements, guidance for development the National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such agencies or elements; (B) developing and presenting to the President an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program after consultation with the heads of agencies or elements, and the heads of their respective departments, under subparagraph (A); (C) providing budget guidance to each element of the intelligence community that does not have one or more program, project, or activity within the National Intelligence Program regarding the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of such element; and (D) participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets for the military intelligence programs, projects, and activities not included in the National Intelligence Program; (2) manage and oversee the National Intelligence Program, including-- (A) the execution of funds within the National Intelligence Program; (B) the reprogramming of funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the National Intelligence Program; and (C) the transfer of funds and personnel under the National Intelligence Program; (3) establish the requirements and priorities to govern the collection, analysis, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the intelligence community; (4) establish collection and analysis requirements for the intelligence community, determine collection and analysis priorities, issue and manage collection and analysis tasking, and resolve conflicts in the tasking of elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the direction of the President; (5) provide advisory tasking on the collection of intelligence to elements of the United States Government having information collection capabilities that are not elements of the intelligence community; (6) manage and oversee the National Counterterrorism Center under section 143, and establish, manage, and oversee national intelligence centers under section 144; (7) establish requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and provide assistance to the Attorney General to ensure that information derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches under that Act is disseminated so it may be used efficiently and effectively for foreign intelligence purposes, except that the Director shall have no authority to direct, manage, or undertake electronic surveillance or physical search operations pursuant to that Act unless otherwise authorized by statute or Executive order; (8) develop and implement, in consultation with the heads of other agencies or elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective departments, personnel policies and programs applicable to the intelligence community that-- (A) encourage and facilitate assignments and details of personnel to the National Counterterrorism Center under section 143, to national intelligence centers under section 144, and between elements of the intelligence community; (B) set standards for education, training, and career development of personnel of the intelligence community; (C) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and retention by the intelligence community of highly qualified individuals for the effective conduct of intelligence activities; (D) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence community is sufficiently diverse for purposes of the collection and analysis of intelligence through the recruitment and training of women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds; (E) make service in more than one element of the intelligence community a condition of promotion to such positions within the intelligence community as the Director shall specify; (F) ensure the effective management of intelligence community personnel who are responsible for intelligence community-wide matters; (G) provide for the effective management of human capital within the intelligence community, including-- (i) the alignment of human resource policies and programs of the elements of the intelligence community with the missions, goals, and organizational objectives of such elements and of the intelligence community overall; (ii) the assessment of workforce characteristics and future needs and the establishment of workforce development strategies to meet those needs based on relevant organizational missions and strategic plans; (iii) the sustainment of a culture that encourages and allows for the development of a high performing workforce; and (iv) the alignment of expectations for personnel performance with relevant organizational missions and strategic plans; (H) are consistent with the public employment principles of merit and fitness set forth under section 2301 of title 5, United States Code; and (I) include the enhancements required under section 114; (9) promote and evaluate the utility of national intelligence to consumers within the United States Government; (10) ensure that appropriate officials of the United States Government and other appropriate individuals have access to a variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views; (11) protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; (12) establish requirements and procedures for the classification of intelligence information and for access to classified intelligence information; (13) establish requirements and procedures for the dissemination of classified information by elements of the intelligence community; (14) establish intelligence reporting guidelines that maximize the dissemination of information while protecting intelligence sources and methods; (15) develop, in consultation with the heads of appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, an integrated communications network that provides interoperable communications capabilities among all elements of the intelligence community and such other entities and persons as the Director considers appropriate; (16) establish standards for information technology and communications for the intelligence community; (17) ensure that the intelligence community makes efficient and effective use of open-source information and analysis; (18) ensure compliance by elements of the intelligence community with the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines of the United States applicable to the intelligence and intelligence- related activities of the United States Government, including the provisions of the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines of the United States applicable to the protection of the privacy and civil liberties of United States persons; (19) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication within the intelligence community; and (20) perform such other functions as the President may direct. (b) Uniform Procedures for Sensitive Compartmented Information.--The President, acting through the National Intelligence Director, shall establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant to sensitive compartmented information in accordance with section 115. (c) Performance of Common Services.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall, in consultation with the heads of departments and agencies of the United States Government containing elements within the intelligence community and with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, direct and coordinate the performance by the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program of such services as are of common concern to the intelligence community, which services the National Intelligence Director determines can be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner. (2) The services performed under paragraph (1) shall include research and development on technology for use in national intelligence missions. (d) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director may prescribe regulations relating to the discharge and enforcement of the responsibilities of the Director under this section. (a) Access to Intelligence.--Unless otherwise directed by the President, the National Intelligence Director shall have access to all intelligence related to the national security which is collected by any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government. (b) Determination of Budgets for NIP and Other Intelligence Activities.--The National Intelligence Director shall determine the annual budget for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government under section 112(a)(1) by-- (1) providing to the heads of the departments containing agencies or elements within the intelligence community and that have one or more programs, projects, or activities within the National Intelligence program, and to the heads of such agencies and elements, guidance for development the National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such agencies or elements; (2) developing and presenting to the President an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program after consultation with the heads of agencies or elements, and the heads of their respective departments, under paragraph (1), including, in furtherance of such budget, the review, modification, and approval of budgets of the agencies or elements of the intelligence community with one or more programs, projects, or activities within the National Intelligence Program utilizing the budget authorities in subsection (c)(1); (3) providing guidance on the development of annual budgets for each element of the intelligence community that does not have any program, project, or activity within the National Intelligence Program utilizing the budget authorities in subsection (c)(2); (4) participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military intelligence programs and activities outside the National Intelligence Program; (5) receiving the appropriations for the National Intelligence Program as specified in subsection (d) and allotting and allocating funds to agencies and elements of the intelligence community; and (6) managing and overseeing the execution by the agencies or elements of the intelligence community, and, if necessary, the modification of the annual budget for the National Intelligence Program, including directing the reprogramming and transfer of funds, and the transfer of personnel, among and between elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program utilizing the authorities in subsections (f) and (g). (c) Budget Authorities.--(1)(A) In developing and presenting an annual budget for the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program under subsection (b)(1), the National Intelligence Director shall coordinate, prepare, and present to the President the annual budgets of those elements, in consultation with the heads of those elements. (B) If any portion of the budget for an element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program is prepared outside the Office of the National Intelligence Director, the Director-- (i) shall approve such budget before submission to the President; and (ii) may require modifications of such budget to meet the requirements and priorities of the Director before approving such budget under clause (i). (C) The budget of an agency or element of the intelligence community with one or more programs, projects, or activities within the National Intelligence Program may not be provided to the President unless the Director has first approved such budget. (2)(A) The Director shall provide guidance for the development of the annual budgets for each agency or element of the intelligence community that does not have any program, project, or activity within the National Intelligence Program. (B) The heads of the agencies or elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective departments, referred to in subparagraph (A) shall coordinate closely with the Director in the development of the budgets of such agencies or elements, before the submission of their recommendations on such budgets to the President. (d) Jurisdiction of Funds Under NIP.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and consistent with section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the National Intelligence Program shall be appropriated to the National Intelligence Authority and, pursuant to subsection (e), under the direct jurisdiction of the National Intelligence Director. (2) The Director shall manage and oversee the execution by each element of the intelligence community of any amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to such element under the National Intelligence Program. (e) Accounts for Administration of NIP Funds.--(1) The Secretary of the Treasury shall, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, establish accounts for the funds under the jurisdiction of the Director under subsection (d) for purposes of carrying out the responsibilities and authorities of the Director under this Act with respect to the National Intelligence Program. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall-- (A) control and manage the accounts established under paragraph (1); and (B) with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, establish procedures governing the use (including transfers and reprogrammings) of funds in such accounts. (3)(A) To the extent authorized by law, a certifying official shall follow the procedures established under paragraph (2)(B) with regard to each account established under paragraph (1). Disbursements from any such account shall only be made against a valid obligation of such account. (B) In this paragraph, the term ``certifying official\', with respect to an element of the intelligence community, means an employee of the element who has responsibilities specified in section 3528(a) of title 31, United States Code. (4) The National Intelligence Director shall allot funds deposited in an account established under paragraph (1) directly to the head of the elements of the intelligence community concerned in accordance with the procedures established under paragraph (2)(B). (5) Each account established under paragraph (1) shall be subject to chapters 13 and 15 of title 31, United States Code, other than sections 1503 and 1556 of that title. (6) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority granted by subsection (g)(3) or by section 5 or 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f, 403j). (f) Role in Reprogramming or Transfer of NIP Funds by Elements of Intelligence Community.--(1) No funds made available under the National Intelligence Program may be reprogrammed or transferred by any agency or element of the intelligence community without the prior approval of the National Intelligence Director except in accordance with procedures issued by the Director. (2) The head of the department concerned shall consult with the Director before reprogramming or transferring funds appropriated or otherwise made available to an agency or element of the intelligence community that does not have any program, project, or activity within the National Intelligence Program. (3) The Director shall, before reprogramming funds appropriated or otherwise made available for an element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, consult with the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over such element regarding such reprogramming. (4)(A) The Director shall consult with the appropriate committees of Congress regarding modifications of existing procedures to expedite the reprogramming of funds within the National Intelligence Program. (B) Any modification of procedures under subparagraph (A) shall include procedures for the notification of the appropriate committees of Congress of any objection raised by the head of a department or agency to a reprogramming proposed by the Director as a result of consultations under paragraph (3). (g) Transfer or Reprogramming of Funds and Transfer of Personnel Within NIP.--(1) In addition to any other authorities available under law for such purposes, the National Intelligence Director, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and after consultation with the heads of the departments containing agencies or elements within the intelligence community to the extent their subordinate agencies or elements are affected, with the heads of such subordinate agencies or elements, and with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the extent the Central Intelligence Agency is affected, may-- (A) transfer or reprogram funds appropriated for a program within the National Intelligence Program to another such program; (B) review, and approve or disapprove, any proposal to transfer or reprogram funds from appropriations that are not for the National Intelligence Program to appropriations for the National Intelligence Program; (C) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the National Intelligence Director, transfer personnel of the intelligence community funded through the National Intelligence Program from one element of the intelligence community to another element of the intelligence community; and (D) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the National Intelligence Director and the heads of the departments and agencies concerned, transfer personnel of the intelligence community not funded through the National Intelligence Program from one element of the intelligence community to another element of the intelligence community. (2) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made under this subsection only if-- (A) the funds or personnel are being transferred to an activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity; (B) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds to the Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director; or (C) the transfer does not exceed applicable ceilings established in law for such transfers. (3) Funds transferred under this subsection shall remain available for the same period as the appropriations account to which transferred. (4) Any transfer of funds under this subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer for which notice is given to the appropriate congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report explaining the nature of the proposed transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In addition, the congressional intelligence committees shall be promptly notified of any transfer of funds made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the transfer would not have otherwise required reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of October 24, 1992. (5)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall promptly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this subsection. The Director shall include in any such report an explanation of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. (B) In this paragraph, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress\'\' means-- (i)(I) the Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (II) the Committee on Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; (ii) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Defense-- (I) the committees and select committees referred to in clause (i); (II) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (III) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; (iii) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation-- (I) the committees and select committees referred to in clause (i); (II) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and (III) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and (iv) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Homeland Security-- (I) the committees and select committees referred to in clause (i); (II) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and (III) the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives. (h) Information Technology and Communications.--(1) In conforming with section 205, in carrying out section 112(a)(16), the National Intelligence Director shall-- (A) establish standards for information technology and communications across the intelligence community; (B) develop an integrated information technology network and enterprise architecture for the intelligence community, including interface standards for interoperability to enable automated information-sharing among elements of the intelligence community; (C) maintain an inventory of critical information technology and communications systems, and eliminate unnecessary or duplicative systems; (D) establish contingency plans for the intelligence community regarding information technology and communications; and (E) establish policies, doctrine, training, and other measures necessary to ensure that the intelligence community develops an integrated information technology and communications network that ensures information-sharing. (2) Consistent with section 205, the Director shall take any action necessary, including the setting of standards for information technology and communications across the intelligence community, to develop an integrated information technology and communications network that ensures information-sharing across the intelligence community. (i) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--In a manner consistent with section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the National Intelligence Director shall oversee and direct the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in coordinating, under section 103(f) of the National Security Act of 1947, the relationships between elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments on all matters involving intelligence related to the national security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine means. (j) Open Source Information Collection.--The National Intelligence Director shall establish and maintain within the intelligence community an effective and efficient open-source information collection capability. (k) Access to Information.--Except as otherwise directed by the President, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall promptly provide the National Intelligence Director such information in the possession or under the control of such element as the Director may request in order to facilitate the exercise of the authorities and responsibilities of the Director under this Act. (a) Rewards for Service in Certain Positions.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations to provide incentives for service on the staff of the national intelligence centers, on the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center, and in other positions in support of the intelligence community management functions of the Director. (2) Incentives under paragraph (1) may include financial incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as the Director considers appropriate. (b) Enhanced Promotion for Service Under NID.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the National Intelligence Director shall ensure that personnel of an element of the intelligence community who are assigned or detailed to service under the National Intelligence Director shall be promoted at rates equivalent to or better than personnel of such element who are not so assigned or detailed. (c) Joint Career Matters.--(1) In carrying out section 112(a)(8), the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the intelligence community through various elements of the intelligence community in the course of their careers in order to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods, and disciplines. (2) The mechanisms prescribed under paragraph (1) may include the following: (A) The establishment of special occupational categories involving service, over the course of a career, in more than one element of the intelligence community. (B) The provision of rewards for service in positions undertaking analysis and planning of operations involving two or more elements of the intelligence community. (C) The establishment of requirements for education, training, service, and evaluation that involve service in more than one element of the intelligence community. (3) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent practical, seek to duplicate within the intelligence community the joint officer management policies established by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) and the amendments on joint officer management made by that Act. (a) In General.--The President, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, the department, agency, or element selected under (b), and other appropriate officials shall-- (1) establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to classified information for employees and contractor personnel of the United States Government who require access to such information; (2) ensure the consistent implementation of the standards and procedures established under paragraph (1) throughout the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government and under contracts entered into by such departments, agencies, and elements; (3) ensure that an individual who is granted or continued eligibility for access to classified information is treated by each department, agency, or element of the executive branch as eligible for access to classified information at that level for all purposes of each such department, agency, or element, regardless of which department, agency, or element of the executive branch granted or continued the eligibility of such individual for access to classified information; (4) establish uniform requirements and standards, including for security questionnaires, financial disclosure requirements, and standards for administering polygraph examinations, to be utilized for the performance of security clearance investigations, including by the contractors conducting such investigations; and (5) ensure that the database established under subsection (b)(2)(B) meets the needs of the intelligence community. (b) Performance of Security Clearance Investigations.--(1) Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall select a single department, agency, or element of the executive branch to conduct all security clearance investigations of employees and contractor personnel of the United States Government who require access to classified information and to provide and maintain all security clearances of such employees and contractor personnel. (2) The department, agency, or element selected under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) take all necessary actions to carry out the requirements of this section, including entering into a memorandum of understanding with any agency carrying out responsibilities relating to security clearances or security clearance investigations before the date of the enactment of this Act; (B) as soon as practicable, establish and maintain a single database for tracking security clearance applications, security clearance investigations, and determinations of eligibility for security clearances, which database shall incorporate applicable elements of similar databases in existence on the date of the enactment of this Act; and (C) ensure that security clearance investigations are conducted in accordance with uniform standards and requirements established under subsection (a)(4), including uniform security questionnaires and financial disclosure requirements. (c) Adjudication and Grant of Security Clearances.--(1) Each agency that adjudicates and grants security clearances as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to adjudicate and grant security clearances after that date. (2) Each agency that adjudicates and grants security clearances shall specify to the department, agency, or element selected under subsection (b) the level of security clearance investigation required for an individual under its jurisdiction. (3) Upon granting or continuing eligibility for access to classified information to an individual under its jurisdiction, an agency that adjudicates and grants security clearances shall submit to the department, agency, or element selected under subsection (b) notice of that action, including the level of access to classified information granted. (d) Utilization of Personnel.--There shall be transferred to the department, agency, or element selected under subsection (b) any personnel of any executive agency whose sole function as of the date of the enactment of this Act is the performance of security clearance investigations. (e) Transition.--The President shall take appropriate actions to ensure that the performance of security clearance investigations under this section commences not later than (a) Establishment.--The National Intelligence Director may provide for the establishment and training of a National Intelligence Reserve Corps (in this section referred to as ``National Intelligence Reserve Corps\'\') for the temporary reemployment on a voluntary basis of former employees of elements of the intelligence community during periods of emergency, as determined by the Director. (b) Eligible Individuals.--An individual may participate in the National Intelligence Reserve Corps only if the individual previously served as a full time employee of an element of the intelligence community. (c) Limitation on Membership.--The total number of individuals who are members of the National Intelligence Reserve Corps at any given time may not exceed 200 individuals. (d) Terms of Participation.--The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe the terms and conditions under which eligible individuals may participate in the National Intelligence Reserve Corps. (e) Expenses.--The National Intelligence Director may provide members of the National Intelligence Reserve Corps transportation and per diem in lieu of subsistence for purposes of participating in any training that relates to service as a member of the Reserve Corps. (f) Treatment of Annuitants.--(1) If an annuitant receiving an annuity from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund becomes temporarily reemployed pursuant to this section, such annuity shall not be discontinued thereby. (2) An annuitant so reemployed shall not be considered an employee for the purposes of chapter 83 or 84 of title 5, United States Code. (g) Treatment Under National Intelligence Authority Personnel Ceiling.--A member of the National Intelligence Reserve Corps who is reemployed on a temporary basis pursuant to this section shall not count against any personnel ceiling applicable to the National Intelligence Authority. (a) Recommendation of NID in Certain Appointment.--In the event of a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an individual for nomination to fill the vacancy. (b) Concurrence of Secretary of Defense in Certain Appointments Recommended by NID.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the National Intelligence Director shall obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense before recommending to the President an individual for nomination to fill such vacancy. If the Secretary does not concur in the recommendation, the Director may make the recommendation to the President without the concurrence of the Secretary, but shall include in the recommendation a statement that the Secretary does not concur in the recommendation. (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: (A) The Director of the National Security Agency. (B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (C) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (c) Concurrence of NID in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the National Intelligence Director before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency concerned may fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be) without the concurrence of the Director, but shall notify the President that the Director does not concur in appointment or recommendation (as the case may be). (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: (A) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. (B) The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis. (C) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. (D) The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (d) Recommendation of NID on Termination of Service.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may recommend to the President or the head of the department or agency concerned the termination of service of any individual serving in any position covered by this section. (2) In the event the Director intends to recommend to the President the termination of service of an individual under paragraph (1), the Director shall seek the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned. If the head of the department or agency concerned does not concur in the recommendation, the Director may make the recommendation to the President without the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned, but shall notify the President that the head of the department or agency concerned does not concur in the recommendation. (a) Establishment.--There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an account to be known as the Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Elements.--The Reserve shall consist of the following elements: (1) Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Reserve. (2) Any amounts authorized to be transferred to or deposited in the Reserve by law. (c) Availability.--Amounts in the Reserve shall be available for such purposes as are provided by law. (d) Transfer of Funds of Reserve for Contingencies of CIA.--There shall be transferred to the Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director all unobligated balances of the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Office of National Intelligence Director.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority an Office of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Function.--The function of the Office of the National Intelligence Director is to assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director under this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law, and to carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by the President or by law. (c) Composition.--The Office of the National Intelligence Director is composed of the following: (1) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director. (2) Any Deputy National Intelligence Director appointed under section 122(b). (3) The National Intelligence Council. (4) The General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority. (5) The Intelligence Comptroller. (6) The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority. (7) The Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (8) The Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (9) The Chief Human Capital Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (10) The Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (11) The National Counterintelligence Executive (including the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive). (12) Such other offices and officials as may be established by law or the Director may establish or designate in the Office. (d) Staff.--(1) To assist the National Intelligence Director in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the Director, the Director shall employ and utilize in the Office of the National Intelligence Director a professional staff having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and responsibilities, and may establish permanent positions and appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff. (2) The staff of the Office of the National Intelligence Director under paragraph (1) shall include the staff of the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management that is transferred to the Office of the National Intelligence Director under section 321. (e) Prohibition on Co-Location With Other Elements of Intelligence Community.--Commencing as of October 1, 2006, the Office of the National Intelligence Director may not be co-located with any other element of the intelligence community. (a) Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director.--(1) There is a Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) In the event of a vacancy in the position of Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director, the National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an individual for appointment as Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director. (3) Any individual nominated for appointment as Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director shall have extensive national security experience and management expertise. (4) The individual serving as Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director may not, while so serving, serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community, except to the extent that the individual serving as Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director is doing so in an acting capacity. (5) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director shall assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director. (6) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the National Intelligence Director during the absence or disability of the National Intelligence Director or during a vacancy in the position of National Director of Intelligence. (b) Deputy National Intelligence Directors.--(1) There may be not more than four Deputy National Intelligence Directors who shall be appointed by the President. (2) In the event of a vacancy in any position of Deputy National Intelligence Director established under this subsection, the National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an individual for appointment to such position. (3) Each Deputy National Intelligence Director appointed under this subsection shall have such duties, responsibilities, and authorities as the National Intelligence Director may assign or are specified by law. (a) National Intelligence Council.--There is a National Intelligence Council. (b) Composition.--(1) The National Intelligence Council shall be composed of senior analysts within the intelligence community and substantive experts from the public and private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of, the National Intelligence Director. (2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector as a condition of service on the Council, or as contractors of the Council or employees of such contractors, to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods while avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this purpose. (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--(1) The National Intelligence Council shall-- (A) produce national intelligence estimates for the United States Government, including alternative views held by elements of the intelligence community and other information as specified in paragraph (2); (B) evaluate community-wide collection and production of intelligence by the intelligence community and the requirements and resources of such collection and production; and (C) otherwise assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the responsibilities of the Director under section 111. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the Council satisfies the needs of policymakers and other consumers of intelligence by ensuring that each national intelligence estimate under paragraph (1)-- (A) states separately, and distinguishes between, the intelligence underlying such estimate and the assumptions and judgments of analysts with respect to such intelligence and such estimate; (B) describes the quality and reliability of the intelligence underlying such estimate; (C) presents and explains alternative conclusions, if any, with respect to the intelligence underlying such estimate and such estimate; and (D) characterizes the uncertainties, if any, and confidence in such estimate. (d) Service as Senior Intelligence Advisers.--Within their respective areas of expertise and under the direction of the National Intelligence Director, the members of the National Intelligence Council shall constitute the senior intelligence advisers of the intelligence community for purposes of representing the views of the intelligence community within the United States Government. (e) Authority To Contract.--Subject to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Director, the National Intelligence Council may carry out its responsibilities under this section by contract, including contracts for substantive experts necessary to assist the Council with particular assessments under this section. (f) Staff.--The National Intelligence Director shall make available to the National Intelligence Council such staff as may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its responsibilities under this section. (g) Availability of Council and Staff.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the National Intelligence Council and its staff satisfy the needs of policymaking officials and other consumers of intelligence. (2) The Council shall be readily accessible to policymaking officials and other appropriate individuals not otherwise associated with the intelligence community. (h) Support.--The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall, as appropriate, furnish such support to the National Intelligence Council, including the preparation of intelligence analyses, as may be required by the National Intelligence Director. (a) General Counsel of National Intelligence Authority.-- There is a General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (b) Prohibition on Dual Service as General Counsel of Another Agency.--The individual serving in the position of General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority may not, while so serving, also serve as the General Counsel of any other department, agency, or element of the United States Government. (c) Scope of Position.--The General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority is the chief legal officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (d) Functions.--The General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority shall perform such functions as the National Intelligence Director may prescribe. (a) Intelligence Comptroller.--There is an Intelligence Comptroller who shall be appointed from civilian life by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Supervision.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director. (c) Duties.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in the preparation and execution of the budget of the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; (2) assist the Director in participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military intelligence programs and activities outside the National Intelligence Program; (3) provide unfettered access to the Director to financial information under the National Intelligence Program; (4) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of National Intelligence Authority.--There is an Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the President. (b) Supervision.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director. (c) Duties.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in ensuring that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties, as provided in the Constitution, laws, regulations, and Executive orders of the United States, is appropriately incorporated in-- (A) the policies and procedures developed for and implemented by the National Intelligence Authority; (B) the policies and procedures regarding the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; and (C) the policies and procedures regarding the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community; (2) oversee compliance by the Authority, and in the relationships described in paragraph (1), with requirements under the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines relating to civil rights and civil liberties; (3) review, investigate, and assess complaints and other information indicating possible abuses of civil rights or civil liberties, as provided in the Constitution, laws, regulations, and Executive orders of the United States, in the administration of the programs and operations of the Authority, and in the relationships described in paragraph (1), unless, in the determination of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority, the review, investigation, or assessment of a particular complaint or information can better be conducted by the Inspector General; (4) coordinate with the Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority to ensure that programs, policies, and procedures involving civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner; and (5) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) Privacy Officer of National Intelligence Authority.-- There is a Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--(1) The Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall have primary responsibility for the privacy policy of the National Intelligence Authority (including in the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community). (2) In discharging the responsibility under paragraph (1), the Privacy Officer shall-- (A) assure that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information; (B) assure that personal information contained in Privacy Act systems of records is handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 1974; (C) conduct privacy impact assessments when appropriate or as required by law; and (D) coordinate with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority to ensure that programs, policies, and procedures involving civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner. (a) Chief Information Officer of National Intelligence Authority.--There is a Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in implementing the responsibilities and executing the authorities related to information technology under paragraphs (15) and (16) of section 112(a) and section 113(h); and (2) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) Chief Human Capital Officer of National Intelligence Authority.--There is a Chief Human Capital Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The Chief Human Capital Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) have the functions and authorities provided for Chief Human Capital Officers under sections 1401 and 1402 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to the National Intelligence Authority; and (2) advise and assist the National Intelligence Director in exercising the authorities and responsibilities of the Director with respect to the workforce of the intelligence community as a whole. (a) Chief Financial Officer of National Intelligence Authority.--There is a Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be designated by the President, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director. (b) Designation Requirements.--The designation of an individual as Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall be subject to applicable provisions of section 901(a) of title 31, United States Code. (c) Authorities and Functions.--The Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall have such authorities, and carry out such functions, with respect to the National Intelligence Authority as are provided for an agency Chief Financial Officer by section 902 of title 31, United States Code, and other applicable provisions of law. (d) Coordination With NIA Comptroller.--(1) The Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall coordinate with the Comptroller of the National Intelligence Authority in exercising the authorities and performing the functions provided for the Chief Financial Officer under this section. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall take such actions as are necessary to prevent duplication of effort by the Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority and the Comptroller of the National Intelligence Authority. (e) Integration of Financial Systems.--Subject to the supervision, direction, and control of the National Intelligence Director, the Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall take appropriate actions to ensure the timely and effective integration of the financial systems of the National Intelligence Authority (including any elements or components transferred to the Authority by this Act), and of the financial systems of the Authority with applicable portions of the financial systems of the other elements of the intelligence community, as soon as possible after the date of the enactment of this Act. (f) Protection of Annual Financial Statement From Disclosure.--The annual financial statement of the National Intelligence Authority required under section 3515 of title 31, United States Code-- (1) shall be submitted in classified form; and (2) notwithstanding any other provision of law, shall be withheld from public disclosure. (a) National Counterintelligence Executive.--The National Counterintelligence Executive under section 902 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402b et seq.), as amended by section 309 of this Act, is a component of the Office of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The National Counterintelligence Executive shall perform the duties provided in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, as so amended, and such other duties as may be prescribed by the National Intelligence Director or specified by law. (a) Office of Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority an Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority. (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority is to-- (1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently investigations, inspections, and audits relating to-- (A) the programs and operations of the National Intelligence Authority; (B) the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; and (C) the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community; (2) recommend policies designed-- (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations, and in such relationships; and (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs, operations, and relationships; (3) provide a means for keeping the National Intelligence Director fully and currently informed about-- (A) problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and to such relationships; and (C) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions; and (4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly informed of-- (A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and to such relationships; and (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions. (c) Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.-- (1) There is an Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority, who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector General shall be made-- (A) without regard to political affiliation; (B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of the National Intelligence Authority, and prior experience in the field of intelligence or national security; and (C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or auditing. (3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the National Intelligence Director. (4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the President. The President shall immediately communicate in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal of any individual from the position of Inspector General. (d) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority-- (1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations, inspections, and audits relating to the programs and operations of the National Intelligence Authority, the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, and the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and regulations; (2) to keep the National Intelligence Director fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, and fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in such programs and operations, and in such relationships, and to report the progress made in implementing corrective action; (3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; and (4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities under this section, to comply with generally accepted government auditing standards. (e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may prohibit the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority from initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. (2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within seven days to the congressional intelligence committees. (3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time a report under paragraph (1) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such report. (4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General considers appropriate. (f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority shall have direct and prompt access to the National Intelligence Director when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. (2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or any employee of a contractor, of the National Intelligence Authority, and of any other element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. (B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section. (C) The level of classification or compartmentation of information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any materials under subparagraph (B). (D) Failure on the part of any employee or contractor of the National Intelligence Authority to cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate administrative actions by the Director, including loss of employment or the termination of an existing contractual relationship. (3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the Federal government-- (A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; and (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any employee in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity. (4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or before an officer having a seal. (5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of all information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General. (B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by subpoenas. (C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for or on behalf of any other element or component of the Authority. (D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the United States. (g) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority shall be provided with appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices. (2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the National Intelligence Director, the Inspector General shall select, appoint and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector General. (B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively. (C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the Inspector General shall create within the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General. (3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government. (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance. (h) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the National Intelligence Director a classified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority during the immediately preceding six-month periods ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. (B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following: (i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation, inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered by such report. (ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of the National Intelligence Authority identified by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report. (iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii). (iv) A statement whether or not corrective action has been completed on each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective action has been completed, a description of such corrective action. (v) An assessment of the effectiveness of all measures in place in the Authority for the protection of civil liberties and privacy of United States persons. (vi) A certification whether or not the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General. (vii) A description of the exercise of the subpoena authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report. (viii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy and efficiency in the administration of programs and operations undertaken by the Authority, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and operations. (C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt of a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the report to the congressional intelligence committees together with any comments the Director considers appropriate. (2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or operations of the Authority, a relationship between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or a relationship between an element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and another element of the intelligence community. (B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) within seven calendar days of receipt of such report, together with such comments as the Director considers appropriate. (3) In the event that-- (A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General; (B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by the Inspector General should focus on any current or former Authority official who holds or held a position in the Authority that is subject to appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, including such a position held on an acting basis; (C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a current or former official described in subparagraph (B); (D) the Inspector General receives notice from the Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current or former official described in subparagraph (B); or (E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit, (a) Ombudsman of National Intelligence Authority.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority an Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) counsel, arbitrate, or offer recommendations on, and have the authority to initiate inquiries into, real or perceived problems of politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the National Intelligence Authority, or any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence community; (2) monitor the effectiveness of measures taken to deal with real or perceived politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the Authority, or any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence community; and (3) conduct reviews of the analytic product or products of the Authority, or any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or of any analysis of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence community, with such reviews to be conducted so as to ensure that analysis is timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community. (c) Analytic Review Unit.--(1) There is within the Office of the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority an Analytic Review Unit. (2) The Analytic Review Unit shall assist the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority in performing the duties and responsibilities of the Ombudsman set forth in subsection (b)(3). (3) The Ombudsman shall provide the Analytic Review Unit a staff who possess expertise in intelligence analysis that is appropriate for the function of the Unit. (4) In assisting the Ombudsman, the Analytic Review Unit shall, subject to the direction and control of the Ombudsman, conduct detailed evaluations of intelligence analysis by the following: (A) The National Intelligence Council. (B) The elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program. (C) To the extent involving the analysis of national intelligence, other elements of the intelligence community. (D) The divisions, offices, programs, officers, and employees of the elements specified in subparagraphs (B) and (C). (5) The results of the evaluations under paragraph (4) shall be provided to the congressional intelligence committees and, upon request, to appropriate heads of other departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch. (d) Access to Information.--In order to carry out the duties specified in subsection (c), the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority shall, unless otherwise directed by the President, have access to all analytic products, field reports, and raw intelligence of any element of the intelligence community, and to any reports or other material of an Inspector General, that might be pertinent to a matter under consideration by the Ombudsman. (e) Annual Reports.--The Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority shall submit to the National Intelligence Director and the congressional intelligence committees on an annual basis a report that includes-- (1) the assessment of the Ombudsman of the current level of politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the National Intelligence Authority, or any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence community; (2) such recommendations for remedial measures as the Ombudsman considers appropriate; and (3) an assessment of the effectiveness of remedial measures previously taken within the intelligence community on matters addressed by the Ombudsman. (f) Referral of Certain Matters for Investigation.--In addition to carrying out activities under this section, the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority may refer serious cases of misconduct related to politicization of intelligence information, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the intelligence community to the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority for investigation. (a) National Counterterrorism Center.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority a National Counterterrorism Center. (b) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--(1) There is a Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, and who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Any individual nominated for appointment as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall have significant expertise in matters relating to the national security of the United States and matters relating to terrorism that threatens the national security of the United States. (3) The individual serving as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may not, while so serving, serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community, except to the extent that the individual serving as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center is doing so in an acting capacity. (c) Supervision.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall report to the National Intelligence Director on-- (A) the budget and programs of the National Counterterrorism Center; and (B) the activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of the National Counterterrorism Center under subsection (g). (2) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall report to the President and the National Intelligence Director on the planning and progress of joint counterterrorism operations. (d) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National Counterterrorism Center shall be as follows: (1) To develop and unify strategy for the civilian and military counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government. (2) To integrate counterterrorism intelligence activities of the United States Government, both inside and outside the United States. (3) To develop interagency counterterrorism plans, which plans shall-- (A) involve more than one department, agency, or element of the executive branch (unless otherwise directed by the President); and (B) include the mission, objectives to be achieved, courses of action, parameters for such courses of action, coordination of agency operational activities, recommendations for operational plans, and assignment of departmental or agency responsibilities. (4) To ensure that the collection of counterterrorism intelligence, and the conduct of counterterrorism operations, by the United States Government are informed by the analysis of all-source intelligence. (e) Duties and Responsibilities of Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, at the direction of the President, the National Security Council, and the National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall-- (1) serve as the principal adviser to the President and the National Intelligence Director on joint operations relating to counterterrorism; (2) provide unified strategic direction for the civilian and military counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government and for the effective integration and deconfliction of counterterrorism intelligence and operations across agency boundaries, both inside and outside the United States; (3) advise the President and the National Intelligence Director on the extent to which the counterterrorism program recommendations and budget proposals of the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government conform to the priorities established by the President and the National Security Council; (4) in accordance with subsection (f), concur in, or advise the President on, the selections of personnel to head the operating entities of the United States Government with principal missions relating to counterterrorism; and (5) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence Director may prescribe or are prescribed by law. (f) Role of Director of National Counterterrorism Center in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual for nomination to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency concerned may fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be) without the concurrence of the Director, but shall notify the President that the Director does not concur in the appointment or recommendation (as the case may be). (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: (A) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency\'s Counterterrorist Center. (B) The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in charge of the Counterterrorism Division. (C) The Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the Department of State. (D) The head of such other operating entities of the United States Government having principal missions relating to counterterrorism as the President may designate for purposes of this subsection. (3) The President shall notify Congress of the designation of an operating entity of the United States Government under paragraph (2)*D) not later than 30 days after the date of such designation. (g) Directorate of Intelligence.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Intelligence. (2) The Directorate shall utilize the capabilities of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) transferred to the Directorate by section 323 and such other capabilities as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center considers appropriate. (3) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility within the United States Government for analysis of terrorism and terrorist organizations from all sources of intelligence, whether collected inside or outside the United States. (4) The Directorate shall-- (A) be the principal repository within the United States Government for all-source information on suspected terrorists, their organizations, and their capabilities; (B) propose intelligence collection requirements for action by elements of the intelligence community inside and outside the United States; (C) have primary responsibility within the United States Government for net assessments and warnings about terrorist threats, which assessments and warnings shall be based on a comparison of terrorist intentions and capabilities with assessed national vulnerabilities and countermeasures; and (D) perform such other duties and functions as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may prescribe. (h) Directorate of Planning.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Planning. (2) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility for developing interagency counterterrorism plans, as described in subsection (d)(3). (3) The Directorate shall-- (A) provide guidance, and develop strategy and interagency plans, to counter terrorist activities based on policy objectives and priorities established by the National Security Council; (B) develop interagency plans under subparagraph (A) utilizing input from personnel in other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government who have expertise in the priorities, functions, assets, programs, capabilities, and operations of such departments, agencies, and elements with respect to counterterrorism; (C) assign responsibilities for counterterrorism operations to the departments and agencies of the United States Government (including the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, and other departments and agencies of the United States Government), consistent with the authorities of such departments and agencies; (D) monitor the implementation of operations assigned under subparagraph (C) and update interagency plans for such operations as necessary; (E) report to the President and the National Intelligence Director on the compliance of the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States with the plans developed under subparagraph (A); and (F) perform such other duties and functions as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may prescribe. (4) The Directorate may not direct the execution of operations assigned under paragraph (3). (i) Staff.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may appoint deputy directors of the National Counterterrorism Center to oversee such portions of the operations of the Center as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate. (2) To assist the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center under this section, the National Intelligence Director shall employ in the National Counterterrorism Center a professional staff having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and responsibilities. (3) In providing for a professional staff for the National Counterterrorism Center under paragraph (2), the National Intelligence Director may establish as positions in the excepted service such positions in the Center as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate. (4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the analytical staff of the National Counterterrorism Center is comprised primarily of experts from elements in the intelligence community and from such other personnel in the United States Government as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate. (5)(A) In order to meet the requirements in paragraph (4), the National Intelligence Director shall, from time to time-- (i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to the National Counterterrorism Center from any other element of the intelligence community that the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate; and (ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or element of the United States Government and not funded within the National Intelligence Program, request the transfer, assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department, agency, or other element concerned. (B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director under subparagraph (A)(i). (ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government receiving a request for transfer, assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request. (6) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to the National Counterterrorism Center under this subsection shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center on all matters for which the Center has been assigned responsibility and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the missions of the Center. (7) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or detailed to the National Counterterrorism Center under this subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such personnel at the Center. (8) The supervisors of the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center may, with the approval of the National Intelligence Director, reward the staff of the Center for meritorious performance by the provision of such performance awards as the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe. (9) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center any responsibility, power, or authority of the National Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (8). (10) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center has access to all databases maintained by the elements of the intelligence community that are relevant to the duties of the Center. (j) Support and Cooperation of Other Agencies.--(1) The elements of the intelligence community and the other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government shall support, assist, and cooperate with the National Counterterrorism Center in carrying out its missions under this section. (2) The support, assistance, and cooperation of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government under this subsection shall include, but not be limited to-- (A) the implementation of interagency plans for operations, whether foreign or domestic, that are developed by the National Counterterrorism Center in a manner consistent with the laws and regulations of the United States and consistent with the limitation in subsection (h)(4); (B) cooperative work with the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center to ensure that ongoing operations of such department, agency, or element do not conflict with joint operations planned by the Center; (C) reports, upon request, to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center on the progress of such department, agency, or element in implementing responsibilities assigned to such department, agency, or element through joint operations plans; and (D) the provision to the analysts of the National Counterterrorism Center electronic access in real time to information and intelligence collected by such department, agency, or element that is relevant to the missions of the Center. (3) In the event of a disagreement between the National Intelligence Director and the head of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government on a plan developed or responsibility assigned by the National Counterterrorism Center under this subsection, the National Intelligence Director may either accede to the head of the department, agency, or element concerned or notify the President of the necessity of resolving the disagreement. (a) National Intelligence Centers.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may establish within the National Intelligence Authority one or more centers (to be known as ``national intelligence centers\'\') to address intelligence priorities established by the National Security Council. (2) Each national intelligence center established under this section shall be assigned an area of intelligence responsibility. (3) National intelligence centers shall be established at the direction of the President, as prescribed by law, or upon the initiative of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Establishment of Centers.--(1) In establishing a national intelligence center, the National Intelligence Director shall assign lead responsibility for administrative support for such center to an element of the intelligence community selected by the Director for that purpose. (2) The Director shall determine the structure and size of each national intelligence center. (3) The Director shall notify Congress of the establishment of each national intelligence center before the date of the establishment of such center. (c) Directors of Centers.--(1) Each national intelligence center shall have as its head a Director who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director for that purpose. (2) The Director of a national intelligence center shall serve as the principal adviser to the National Intelligence Director on intelligence matters with respect to the area of intelligence responsibility assigned to the center. (3) In carrying out duties under paragraph (2), the Director of a national intelligence center shall-- (A) manage the operations of the center; (B) coordinate the provision of administration and support by the element of the intelligence community with lead responsibility for the center under subsection (b)(1); (C) submit budget and personnel requests for the center to the National Intelligence Director; (D) seek such assistance from other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government as is needed to fulfill the mission of the center; and (E) advise the National Intelligence Director of the information technology, personnel, and other requirements of the center for the performance of its mission. (4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the Director of a national intelligence center has sufficient authority, direction, and control to effectively accomplish the mission of the center. (d) Mission of Centers.--Pursuant to the direction of the National Intelligence Director, each national intelligence center shall, in the area of intelligence responsibility assigned to the center by the Director pursuant to intelligence priorities established by the National Security Council-- (1) have primary responsibility for providing all-source analysis of intelligence based upon foreign intelligence gathered both abroad and domestically; (2) have primary responsibility for identifying and proposing to the National Intelligence Director intelligence collection and analysis requirements; (3) have primary responsibility for net assessments and warnings; (4) ensure that appropriate officials of the United States Government and other appropriate officials have access to a variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views; and (5) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence Director shall specify. (e) Information Sharing.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the Directors of the national intelligence centers and the other elements of the intelligence community undertake appropriate sharing of intelligence analysis and plans for operations in order to facilitate the activities of the centers. (2) In order to facilitate information sharing under paragraph (1), the Directors of the national intelligence centers shall-- (A) report directly to the National Intelligence Director regarding their activities under this section; and (B) coordinate with the Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director regarding such activities. (f) Staff.--(1) In providing for a professional staff for a national intelligence center, the National Intelligence Director may establish as positions in the excepted service such positions in the center as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate. (2)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall, from time to time-- (i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to a national intelligence center from any other element of the intelligence community that the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate; and (ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or element of the United States Government not funded within the National Intelligence Program, request the transfer, assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department, agency, or other element concerned. (B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director under subparagraph (A)(i). (ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government receiving a request for transfer, assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request. (3) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to a national intelligence center under this subsection shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the Director of the center on all matters for which the center has been assigned responsibility and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the mission of the center. (4) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or detailed to a national intelligence center under this subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such personnel at the center. (5) The supervisors of the staff of a national center may, with the approval of the National Intelligence Director, reward the staff of the center for meritorious performance by the provision of such performance awards as the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe. (6) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the Director of a national intelligence center any responsibility, power, or authority of the National Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (6). (7) The Director of a national intelligence center may recommend to the National Intelligence Director the reassignment to the home element concerned of any personnel previously assigned or detailed to the center from another element of the intelligence community. (g) Termination.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may terminate a national intelligence center if the National Intelligence Director determines that the center is no longer required to meet an intelligence priority established by the National Security Council. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall notify Congress of any determination made under paragraph (1) before carrying out such determination. The National Intelligence Director shall establish an integrated framework that brings together the educational components of the intelligence community in order to promote a more effective and productive intelligence community (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Agency.--The term ``agency\'\' means each element of the intelligence community as determined by the National Intelligence Director. (2) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution of higher education\'\' has the meaning given that term under section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001). (3) Program.--The term ``Program\'\' means the Intelligence Community Scholarship Program established under subsection (b). (b) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director, in consultation with the head of each agency, shall establish a scholarship program (to be known as the ``Intelligence Community Scholarship Program\'\') to award scholarships to individuals that is designed to recruit and prepare students for civilian careers in the intelligence community to meet the critical needs of the intelligence community agencies. (2) Selection of recipients.-- (A) Merit and agency needs.--Individuals shall be selected to receive scholarships under this section through a competitive process primarily on the basis of academic merit and the needs of the agency. (B) Demonstrated commitment.--Individuals selected under this section shall have a demonstrated commitment to the field of study for which the scholarship is awarded. (3) Contractual agreements.--To carry out the Program the head of each agency shall enter into contractual agreements with individuals selected under paragraph (2) under which the individuals agree to serve as full-time employees of the agency, for the period described in subsection (h)(1), in positions needed by the agency and for which the individuals are qualified, in exchange for receiving a scholarship. (c) Eligibility.--In order to be eligible to participate in the Program, an individual shall-- (1) be enrolled or accepted for enrollment as a full-time student at an institution of higher education and be pursuing or intend to pursue undergraduate or graduate education in an academic field or discipline described in the list made available under subsection (e); (2) be a United States citizen; and (3) at the time of the initial scholarship award, not be an employee (as defined under section 2105 of title 5, United States Code). (d) Application.-- An individual seeking a scholarship under this section shall submit an application to the National Intelligence Director at such time, in such manner, and containing such information, agreements, or assurances as the Director may require. (e) Programs and Fields of Study.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) make publicly available a list of academic programs and fields of study for which scholarships under the Program may be used; and (2) update the list as necessary. (f) Scholarships.-- (1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director may provide a scholarship under the Program for an academic year if the individual applying for the scholarship has submitted to the Director, as part of the application required under subsection (d), a proposed academic program leading to a degree in a program or field of study on the list made available under subsection (e). (2) Limitation on years.--An individual may not receive a scholarship under this section for more than 4 academic years, unless the National Intelligence Director grants a waiver. (3) Student responsibilities.--Scholarship recipients shall maintain satisfactory academic progress. (4) Amount.--The dollar amount of a scholarship under this section for an academic year shall be determined under regulations issued by the National Intelligence Director, but shall in no case exceed the cost of tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses as established by the Director. (5) Use of scholarships.--A scholarship provided under this section may be expended for tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses as established by the National Intelligence Director by regulation. (6) Payment to institution of higher education.--The National Intelligence Director may enter into a contractual agreement with an institution of higher education under which the amounts provided for a scholarship under this section for tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses are paid directly to the institution with respect to which the scholarship is provided. (g) Special Consideration for Current Employees.-- (1) Set aside of scholarships.--Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (c), 10 percent of the scholarships awarded under this section shall be set aside for individuals who are employees of agencies on the date of enactment of this section to enhance the education of such employees in areas of critical needs of agencies. (2) Full- or part-time education.--Employees who are awarded scholarships under paragraph (1) shall be permitted to pursue undergraduate or graduate education under the scholarship on a full-time or part-time basis. (h) Employee Service.-- (1) Period of service.--Except as provided in subsection (j)(2), the period of service for which an individual shall be obligated to serve as an employee of the agency is 24 months for each academic year for which a scholarship under this section is provided. Under no circumstances shall the total period of obligated service be more than 8 years. (2) Beginning of service.-- (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), obligated service under paragraph (1) shall begin not later than 60 days after the individual obtains the educational degree for which the scholarship was provided. (B) Deferral.--In accordance with regulations established by the National Intelligence Director, the Director or designee may defer the obligation of an individual to provide a period of service under paragraph (1) if the Director or designee determines that such a deferral is appropriate. (i) Repayment.-- (1) In general.--Scholarship recipients who fail to maintain a high level of academic standing, as defined by the National Intelligence Director, who are dismissed from their educational institutions for disciplinary reasons, or who voluntarily terminate academic training before graduation from the educational program for which the scholarship was awarded, shall be in breach of their contractual agreement and, in lieu of any service obligation arising under such agreement, shall be liable to the United States for repayment within 1 year after the date of default of all scholarship funds paid to them and to the institution of higher education on their behalf under the agreement, except as provided in subsection (j)(2). The repayment period may be extended by the Director when determined to be necessary, as established by regulation. (2) Liability.--Scholarship recipients who, for any reason, fail to begin or complete their service obligation after completion of academic training, or fail to comply with the terms and conditions of deferment established by the National Intelligence Director under subsection (h)(2)(B), shall be in breach of their contractual agreement. When recipients breach their agreements for the reasons stated in the preceding sentence, the recipient shall be liable to the United States for an amount equal to-- (A) the total amount of scholarships received by such individual under this section; and (B) the interest on the amounts of such awards which would be payable if at the time the awards were received they were loans bearing interest at the maximum legal prevailing rate, as determined by the Treasurer of the United States, multiplied by 3. (j) Cancellation, Waiver, or Suspension of Obligation.-- (1) Cancellation.--Any obligation of an individual incurred under the Program (or a contractual agreement thereunder) for service or payment shall be canceled upon the death of the individual. (2) Waiver or suspension.--The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations to provide for the partial or total waiver or suspension of any obligation of service or payment incurred by an individual under the Program (or a contractual agreement thereunder) whenever compliance by the individual is impossible or would involve extreme hardship to the individual, or if enforcement of such obligation with respect to the individual would be contrary to the best interests of the Government. (k) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations necessary to carry out this section. (a) Disposal of Property.--(1) If specifically authorized to dispose of real property of the National Intelligence Authority under any law enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall, subject to paragraph (2), exercise such authority in strict compliance with subchapter IV of chapter 5 of title 40, United States Code. (2) The Director shall deposit the proceeds of any disposal of property of the National Intelligence Authority into the miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury in accordance with section 3302(b) of title 31, United States Code. (b) Gifts.--Gifts or donations of services or property of or for the National Intelligence Authority may not be accepted, used, or disposed of unless specifically permitted in advance in an appropriations Act and only under the conditions and for the purposes specified in such appropriations Act. (a) Acquisitions of Major Systems.--(1) For each intelligence program for the acquisition of a major system, the National Intelligence Director shall-- (A) require the development and implementation of a program management plan that includes cost, schedule, and performance goals and program milestone criteria; (B) subject to paragraph (4), serve as the exclusive milestone decision authority; and (C) periodically-- (i) review and assess the progress made toward the achievement of the goals and milestones established in such plan; and (ii) submit to Congress a report on the results of such review and assessment. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe guidance for the development and implementation of program management plans under this subsection. In prescribing such guidance, the Director shall review Department of Defense guidance on program management plans for Department of Defense programs for the acquisition of major systems and, to the extent feasible, incorporate the principles of the Department of Defense guidance into the Director\'s guidance under this subsection. (3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the authority of the National Intelligence Director to delegate to any other official any authority to perform the responsibilities of the Director under this subsection. (4)(A) The authority conferred by paragraph (1)(B) shall not apply to Department of Defense programs until the National Intelligence Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that the National Intelligence Authority has the personnel and capability to fully and effectively carry out such authority. (B) The National Intelligence Director may assign any authority under this subsection to the Secretary of Defense. The assignment of such authority shall be made pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between the Director and the Secretary. (5) In this subsection: (A) The term ``intelligence program\'\', with respect to the acquisition of a major system, means a program that-- (i) is carried out to acquire such major system for an element of the intelligence community; and (ii) is funded in whole out of amounts available for the National Intelligence Program. (B) The term ``major system\'\' has the meaning given such term in section 4(9) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 403(9)). (b) Availability of Funds.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law (other than the provisions of this Act), sums appropriated or otherwise made available to the National Intelligence Authority may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its functions, including any function performed by the National Intelligence Authority that is described in section 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403j(a)). (c) Relationship of Director\'s Authority to Other Laws on Acquisition and Management of Property and Services.--Section 113(e) of title 40, United States Code, is amended-- (A) by striking ``or\'\' at the end of paragraph (18); (B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (19) and inserting ``; or\'\'; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(20) the National Intelligence Director.\'\'. (d) National Intelligence Director Report on Enhancement of NSA and NGIA Acquisition Authorities.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) review-- (A) the acquisition authority of the Director of the National Security Agency; and (B) the acquisition authority of the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and (2) submit to the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives a report setting forth any recommended enhancements of the acquisition authorities of the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency that the National Intelligence Director considers necessary. (e) Comptroller General Report on Acquisition Policies and Procedures.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to Congress a report on the extent to which the policies and procedures adopted for managing the acquisition of major systems for national intelligence purposes, as identified by the National Intelligence Director, are likely to result in successful cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. (a) In General.--In addition to the authorities provided in section 114, the National Intelligence Director may exercise with respect to the personnel of the National Intelligence Authority any authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment of this Act to the same extent, and subject to the same conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect to personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Rights and Protections of Employees and Applicants.-- Employees and applicants for employment of the National Intelligence Authority shall have the same rights and protections under the Authority as employees of the Central Intelligence Agency have under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Political Service of Personnel.--Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subclause (XII), by striking ``or\'\' at the end; and (2) by inserting after subclause (XIII) the following new subclause: ``(XIV) the National Intelligence Authority; or\'\'. (b) Deletion of Information About Foreign Gifts.--Section 7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)\'\' after ``(4)\'\'; (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking ``the Director of Central Intelligence\'\' and inserting ``the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency\'\'; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) In transmitting such listings for the National Intelligence Authority, the National Intelligence Director may delete the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources.\'\'. (c) Exemption from Financial Disclosures.--Section 105(a)(1) of the Ethics in Government Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by inserting ``the National Intelligence Authority,\'\' before ``the Central Intelligence Agency\'\'. (a) Amounts Requested Each Fiscal Year.--The President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. (b) Amounts Authorized and Appropriated Each Fiscal Year.-- Congress shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, by Congress for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. (c) Study of Disclosure of Additional Information.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall conduct a study to assess the advisability of disclosing to the public amounts as follows: (A) The aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for each fiscal year for each element of the intelligence community. (B) The aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, by Congress for each fiscal year for each element of the intelligence community. (2) The study under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) address whether or not the disclosure to the public of the information referred to in that paragraph would harm the national security of the United States; and (B) take into specific account concerns relating to the disclosure of such information for each element of the intelligence community. (3) Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this section, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the study under paragraph (1). (a) Merger of Homeland Security Council Into National Security Council.--Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended-- (1) in the fourth undesignated paragraph of subsection (a), by striking clauses (5) and (6) and inserting the following new clauses: ``(5) the Attorney General; ``(6) the Secretary of Homeland Security;\'\'; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and\'\' at the end; (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(3) assess the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in the interests of homeland security and make recommendations to the President based on such assessments; ``(4) oversee and review the homeland security policies of the Federal Government and make recommendations to the President based on such oversight and review; and ``(5) perform such other functions as the President may direct.\'\'. (c) Repeal of Superseded Authority.--(1) Title IX of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 491 et seq.) is repealed. (2) The table of contents for that Act is amended by striking the items relating to title IX. Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 101 the following new section: (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States in its final report stated that, under Director Robert Mueller, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has made significant progress in improving its intelligence capabilities. (2) In the report, the members of the Commission also urged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation fully institutionalize the shift of the Bureau to a preventive counterterrorism posture. (b) Improvement of Intelligence Capabilities.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall continue efforts to improve the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to develop and maintain within the Bureau a national intelligence workforce. (c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and maintaining a national intelligence workforce under subsection (b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, subject to the direction and control of the President, develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence within the Federal Bureau of Investigation an institutional culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau. (2) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the enactment of this Act shall receive basic training in both criminal justice matters and national intelligence matters. (3) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the enactment of this Act shall, to the maximum extent practicable, be given the opportunity to undergo, during such agent\'s early service with the Bureau, meaningful assignments in criminal justice matters and in national intelligence matters. (4) The Director shall-- (A) establish career positions in national intelligence matters for agents and analysts of the Bureau; and (B) in furtherance of the requirement under subparagraph (A) and to the maximum extent practicable, afford agents and analysts of the Bureau the opportunity to work in the career specialty selected by such agents and analysts over their entire career with the Bureau. (5) The Director shall carry out a program to enhance the capacity of the Bureau to recruit and retain individuals with backgrounds in intelligence, international relations, language, technology, and other skills relevant to the intelligence mission of the Bureau. (6) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, afford the analysts of the Bureau training and career opportunities commensurate with the training and career opportunities afforded analysts in other elements of the intelligence community. (7) Commencing as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, each direct supervisor of a Field Intelligence Group, and each Bureau Operational Manager at the Section Chief and Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) level and above, shall be a certified intelligence officer. (8) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, ensure that the successful discharge of advanced training courses, and of one or more assignments to another element of the intelligence community, is a precondition to advancement to higher level intelligence assignments within the Bureau. (d) Field Office Matters.--(1) In improving the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under subsection (b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall ensure that each Field Intelligence Group reports directly to a field office senior manager responsible for intelligence matters. (2) The Director shall provide for such expansion of the secure facilities in the field offices of the Bureau as is necessary to ensure the discharge by the field offices of the intelligence mission of the Bureau. (3) The Director shall require that each Field Intelligence Group manager ensures the integration of analysts, agents, linguists, and surveillance personnel in the field. (e) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, modify the budget structure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to organize the budget according to the four principal missions of the Bureau as follows: (1) Intelligence. (2) Counterterrorism and counterintelligence. (3) Criminal Enterprises/Federal Crimes. (4) Criminal justice services. (f) Reports.--(1) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to Congress a report on the progress made as of the date of such report in carrying out the requirements of this section. (2) The Director shall include in each annual program review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that is submitted to Congress a report on the progress made by each field office of the Bureau during the period covered by such review in addressing Bureau and national program priorities. (3) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the Director shall submit to Congress a report assessing the qualifications, status, and roles of analysts at Bureau headquarters and in the field offices of the Bureau. (4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the progress of the Bureau in implementing information-sharing principles. (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Career Service Authorization Act of 2005\'\'. (b) Establishment of Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Career Service.-- (1) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management-- (A) may establish positions for intelligence analysts, without regard to chapter 51 of title 5, United States Code; (B) shall prescribe standards and procedures for establishing and classifying such positions; and (C) may fix the rate of basic pay for such positions, without regard to subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, if the rate of pay is not greater than the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule. (2) Levels of performance.--Any performance management system established for intelligence analysts shall have at least 1 level of performance above a retention standard. (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not less than 60 days before the date of the implementation of authorities authorized under this section, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit an operating plan describing the Director\'s intended use of the authorities under this section to-- (1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives; (2) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; (3) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives; (4) the congressional intelligence committees; and (5) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (d) Annual Report.--Not later than December 31, 2005, and annually thereafter for 4 years, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit an annual report of the use of the permanent authorities provided under this section during the preceding fiscal year to-- (1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives; (2) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; (3) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives; (4) the congressional intelligence committees; and (5) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Advisory board.--The term ``Advisory Board\'\' means the Advisory Board on Information Sharing established under subsection (i). (2) Executive council.--The term ``Executive Council\'\' means the Executive Council on Information Sharing established under subsection (h). (3) Homeland security information.--The term ``homeland security information\'\' means all information, whether collected, produced, or distributed by intelligence, law enforcement, military, homeland security, or other activities relating to-- (A) the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals, or of domestic groups or individuals involved in transnational terrorism; (B) threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other nations; (C) communications of or by such groups or individuals; or (D) groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with such groups or individuals. (4) Network.--The term ``Network\'\' means the Information Sharing Network described under subsection (c). (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The effective use of information, from all available sources, is essential to the fight against terror and the protection of our homeland. The biggest impediment to all- source analysis, and to a greater likelihood of ``connecting the dots\'\', is resistance to sharing information. (2) The United States Government has access to a vast amount of information, including not only traditional intelligence but also other government databases, such as those containing customs or immigration information. However, the United States Government has a weak system for processing and using the information it has. (3) In the period preceding September 11, 2001, there were instances of potentially helpful information that was available but that no person knew to ask for; information that was distributed only in compartmented channels, and information that was requested but could not be shared. (4) Current security requirements nurture over- classification and excessive compartmentalization of information among agencies. Each agency\'s incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks, including criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions, but few rewards for sharing information. (5) The current system, in which each intelligence agency has its own security practices, requires a demonstrated ``need to know\'\' before sharing. This approach assumes that it is possible to know, in advance, who will need to use the information. An outgrowth of the cold war, such a system implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. Such assumptions are no longer appropriate. Although counterintelligence concerns are still real, the costs of not sharing information are also substantial. The current ``need-to-know\'\' culture of information protection needs to be replaced with a ``need-to- share\'\' culture of integration. (6) A new approach to the sharing of intelligence and homeland security information is urgently needed. An important conceptual model for a new ``trusted information network\'\' is the Systemwide Homeland Analysis and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Network proposed by a task force of leading professionals assembled by the Markle Foundation and described in reports issued in October 2002 and December 2003. (7) No single agency can create a meaningful information sharing system on its own. Alone, each agency can only modernize stovepipes, not replace them. Presidential leadership is required to bring about governmentwide change. (c) Information Sharing Network.-- (1) Establishment.--The President shall establish a trusted information network and secure information sharing environment to promote sharing of intelligence and homeland security information in a manner consistent with national security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties, and based on clearly defined and consistently applied policies and procedures, and valid investigative, analytical or operational requirements. (2) Attributes.--The Network shall promote coordination, communication and collaboration of people and information among all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State, tribal, and local authorities, and relevant private sector entities, including owners and operators of critical infrastructure, by using policy guidelines and technologies that support-- (A) a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment that connects existing systems where appropriate and allows users to share information among agencies, between levels of government, and, as appropriate, with the private sector; (B) the sharing of information in a form and manner that facilitates its use in analysis, investigations and operations; (C) building upon existing systems capabilities currently in use across the Government; (D) utilizing industry best practices, including minimizing the centralization of data and seeking to use common tools and capabilities whenever possible; (E) employing an information access management approach that controls access to data rather than to just networks; (F) facilitating the sharing of information at and across all levels of security by using policy guidelines and technologies that support writing information that can be broadly shared; (G) providing directory services for locating people and information; (H) incorporating protections for individuals\' privacy and civil liberties; (I) incorporating strong mechanisms for information security and privacy and civil liberties guideline enforcement in order to enhance accountability and facilitate oversight, including-- (i) multifactor authentication and access control; (ii) strong encryption and data protection; (iii) immutable audit capabilities; (iv) automated policy enforcement; (v) perpetual, automated screening for abuses of network and intrusions; and (vi) uniform classification and handling procedures; (J) compliance with requirements of applicable law and guidance with regard to the planning, design, acquisition, operation, and management of information systems; and (K) permitting continuous system upgrades to benefit from advances in technology while preserving the integrity of stored data. (d) Immediate Actions.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Executive Council, shall-- (1) submit to the President and to Congress a description of the technological, legal, and policy issues presented by the creation of the Network described in subsection (c), and the way in which these issues will be addressed; (2) establish electronic directory services to assist in locating in the Federal Government intelligence and homeland security information and people with relevant knowledge about intelligence and homeland security information; and (3) conduct a review of relevant current Federal agency capabilities, including-- (A) a baseline inventory of current Federal systems that contain intelligence or homeland security information; (B) the money currently spent to maintain those systems; and (C) identification of other information that should be included in the Network. (e) Guidelines and Requirements.--As soon as possible, but in no event later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall-- (1) in consultation with the Executive Council-- (A) issue guidelines for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using information, including guidelines to ensure that information is provided in its most shareable form, such as by separating out data from the sources and methods by which that data are obtained; and (B) on classification policy and handling procedures across Federal agencies, including commonly accepted processing and access controls; (2) in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board established under section 211, issue guidelines that-- (A) protect privacy and civil liberties in the development and use of the Network; and (B) shall be made public, unless, and only to the extent that, nondisclosure is clearly necessary to protect national security; and (3) require the heads of Federal departments and agencies to promote a culture of information sharing by-- (A) reducing disincentives to information sharing, including overclassification of information and unnecessary requirements for originator approval; and (B) providing affirmative incentives for information sharing, such as the incorporation of information sharing performance measures into agency and managerial evaluations, and employee awards for promoting innovative information sharing practices. (f) Enterprise Architecture and Implementation Plan.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Management and Budget shall submit to the President and to Congress an enterprise architecture and implementation plan for the Network. The enterprise architecture and implementation plan shall be prepared by the Director of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Executive Council, and shall include-- (1) a description of the parameters of the proposed Network, including functions, capabilities, and resources; (2) a delineation of the roles of the Federal departments and agencies that will participate in the development of the Network, including identification of any agency that will build the infrastructure needed to operate and manage the Network (as distinct from the individual agency components that are to be part of the Network), with the delineation of roles to be consistent with-- (A) the authority of the National Intelligence Director under this Act to set standards for information sharing and information technology throughout the intelligence community; and (B) the authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the role of the Department of Homeland Security in coordinating with State, tribal, and local officials and the private sector; (3) a description of the technological requirements to appropriately link and enhance existing networks and a description of the system design that will meet these requirements; (4) an enterprise architecture that-- (A) is consistent with applicable laws and guidance with regard to planning, design, acquisition, operation, and management of information systems; (B) will be used to guide and define the development and implementation of the Network; and (C) addresses the existing and planned enterprise architectures of the departments and agencies participating in the Network; (5) a description of how privacy and civil liberties will be protected throughout the design and implementation of the Network; (6) objective, systemwide performance measures to enable the assessment of progress toward achieving full implementation of the Network; (7) a plan, including a time line, for the development and phased implementation of the Network; (8) total budget requirements to develop and implement the Network, including the estimated annual cost for each of the 5 years following the date of the enactment of this Act; and (9) proposals for any legislation that the Director of Management and Budget determines necessary to implement the Network. (g) Director of Management and Budget Responsible for Information Sharing Across the Federal Government.-- (1) Additional duties and responsibilities.-- (A) In general.--The Director of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Executive Council, shall-- (i) implement and manage the Network; (ii) develop and implement policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards as appropriate to foster the development and proper operation of the Network; and (iii) assist, monitor, and assess the implementation of the Network by Federal departments and agencies to ensure adequate progress, technological consistency and policy compliance; and regularly report the findings to the President and to Congress. (B) Content of policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards.--The policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall-- (i) take into account the varying missions and security requirements of agencies participating in the Network; (ii) address development, implementation, and oversight of technical standards and requirements; (iii) address and facilitate information sharing between and among departments and agencies of the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, the Homeland Security community and the law enforcement community; (iv) address and facilitate information sharing between Federal departments and agencies and State, tribal and local governments; (v) address and facilitate, as appropriate, information sharing between Federal departments and agencies and the private sector; (vi) address and facilitate, as appropriate, information sharing between Federal departments and agencies with foreign partners and allies; and (vii) ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties. (2) Appointment of principal officer.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Management and Budget shall appoint, with approval of the President, a principal officer in the Office of Management and Budget whose primary responsibility shall be to carry out the day-to-day duties of the Director specified in this section. The officer shall report directly to the Director of Management and Budget, have the rank of a Deputy Director and shall be paid at the rate of pay payable for a position at level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code. (h) Executive Council on Information Sharing.-- (1) Establishment.--There is established an Executive Council on Information Sharing that shall assist the Director of Management and Budget in the execution of the Director\'s duties under this Act concerning information sharing. (2) Membership.--The members of the Executive Council shall be-- (A) the Director of Management and Budget, who shall serve as Chairman of the Executive Council; (B) the Secretary of Homeland Security or his designee; (C) the Secretary of Defense or his designee; (D) the Attorney General or his designee; (E) the Secretary of State or his designee; (F) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or his designee; (G) the National Intelligence Director or his designee; (H) such other Federal officials as the President shall designate; (I) representatives of State, tribal, and local governments, to be appointed by the President; and (J) individuals who are employed in private businesses or nonprofit organizations that own or operate critical infrastructure, to be appointed by the President. (3) Responsibilities.--The Executive Council shall assist the Director of Management and Budget in-- (A) implementing and managing the Network; (B) developing policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards necessary to establish and implement the Network; (C) ensuring there is coordination among departments and agencies participating in the Network in the development and implementation of the Network; (D) reviewing, on an ongoing basis, policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards related to the implementation of the Network; (E) establishing a dispute resolution process to resolve disagreements among departments and agencies about whether particular information should be shared and in what manner; and (F) considering such reports as are submitted by the Advisory Board on Information Sharing under subsection (i)(2). (4) Inapplicability of federal advisory committee act.--The Council shall not be subject to the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). (5) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of Management and Budget, in the capacity of Chair of the Executive Council, shall submit a report to the President and to Congress that shall include-- (A) a description of the activities and accomplishments of the Council in the preceding year; and (B) the number and dates of the meetings held by the Council and a list of attendees at each meeting. (6) Informing the public.--The Executive Council shall-- (A) make its reports to Congress available to the public to the greatest extent that is consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law; and (B) otherwise inform the public of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (i) Advisory Board on Information Sharing.-- (1) Establishment.--There is established an Advisory Board on Information Sharing to advise the President and the Executive Council on policy, technical, and management issues related to the design and operation of the Network. (2) Responsibilities.--The Advisory Board shall advise the Executive Council on policy, technical, and management issues related to the design and operation of the Network. At the request of the Executive Council, or the Director of Management and Budget in the capacity as Chair of the Executive Council, or on its own initiative, the Advisory Board shall submit reports to the Executive Council concerning the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Board regarding the design and operation of the Network. (3) Membership and qualifications.--The Advisory Board shall be composed of no more than 15 members, to be appointed by the President from outside the Federal Government. The members of the Advisory Board shall have significant experience or expertise in policy, technical and operational matters, including issues of security, privacy, or civil liberties, and shall be selected solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, achievements, public stature and relevant experience. (4) Chair.--The President shall designate one of the members of the Advisory Board to act as chair of the Advisory Board. (5) Administrative support.--The Office of Management and Budget shall provide administrative support for the Advisory Board. (j) Reports.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the President through the Director of Management and Budget shall submit a report to Congress on the state of the Network and of information sharing across the Federal Government. (2) Content.--Each report under this subsection shall include-- (A) a progress report on the extent to which the Network has been implemented, including how the Network has fared on the government-wide and agency-specific performance measures and whether the performance goals set in the preceding year have been met; (B) objective systemwide performance goals for the following year; (C) an accounting of how much was spent on the Network in the preceding year; (D) actions taken to ensure that agencies procure new technology that is consistent with the Network and information on whether new systems and technology are consistent with the Network; (E) the extent to which, in appropriate circumstances, all terrorism watch lists are available for combined searching in real time through the Network and whether there are consistent standards for placing individuals on, and removing individuals from, the watch lists, including the availability of processes for correcting errors; (F) the extent to which unnecessary roadblocks, impediments, or disincentives to information sharing, including the inappropriate use of paper-only intelligence products and requirements for originator approval, have been eliminated; (G) the extent to which positive incentives for information sharing have been implemented; (H) the extent to which classified information is also made available through the Network, in whole or in part, in unclassified form; (I) the extent to which State, tribal, and local officials-- (i) are participating in the Network; (ii) have systems which have become integrated into the Network; (iii) are providing as well as receiving information; and (iv) are using the Network to communicate with each other; (J) the extent to which-- (i) private sector data, including information from owners and operators of critical infrastructure, is incorporated in the Network; and (ii) the private sector is both providing and receiving information; (K) where private sector data has been used by the Government or has been incorporated into the Network-- (i) the measures taken to protect sensitive business information; and (ii) where the data involves information about individuals, the measures taken to ensure the accuracy of such data; (L) the measures taken by the Federal Government to ensure the accuracy of other information on the Network and, in particular, the accuracy of information about individuals; (M) an assessment of the Network\'s privacy and civil liberties protections, including actions taken in the preceding year to implement or enforce privacy and civil liberties protections and a report of complaints received about interference with an individual\'s privacy or civil liberties; and (N) an assessment of the security protections of the Network. (k) Agency Responsibilities.--The head of each department or agency possessing or using intelligence or homeland security information or otherwise participating in the Network shall-- (1) ensure full department or agency compliance with information sharing policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards established for the Network under subsections (c) and (g); (2) ensure the provision of adequate resources for systems and activities supporting operation of and participation in the Network; and (3) ensure full agency or department cooperation in the development of the Network and associated enterprise architecture to implement governmentwide information sharing, and in the management and acquisition of information technology consistent with applicable law. (l) Agency Plans and Reports.--Each Federal department or agency that possesses or uses intelligence and homeland security information, operates a system in the Network or otherwise participates, or expects to participate, in the Network, shall submit to the Director of Management and Budget-- (1) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, a report including-- (A) a strategic plan for implementation of the Network\'s requirements within the department or agency; (B) objective performance measures to assess the progress and adequacy of the department or agency\'s information sharing efforts; and (C) budgetary requirements to integrate the agency into the Network, including projected annual expenditures for each of the following 5 years following the submission of the report; and (2) annually thereafter, reports including-- (A) an assessment of the progress of the department or agency in complying with the Network\'s requirements, including how well the agency has performed on the objective measures developed under paragraph (1)(B); (B) the agency\'s expenditures to implement and comply with the Network\'s requirements in the preceding year; and (C) the agency\'s or department\'s plans for further implementation of the Network in the year following the submission of the report. (m) Periodic Assessments.-- (1) Comptroller general.-- (A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and periodically thereafter, the Comptroller General shall evaluate the implementation of the Network, both generally and, at the discretion of the Comptroller General, within specific departments and agencies, to determine the extent of compliance with the Network\'s requirements and to assess the effectiveness of the Network in improving information sharing and collaboration and in protecting privacy and civil liberties, and shall report to Congress on the findings of the Comptroller General. (B) Information available to the comptroller general.--Upon request by the Comptroller General, information relevant to an evaluation under subsection (a) shall be made available to the Comptroller General under section 716 of title 31, United States Code. (C) Consultation with congressional committees.--If a record is not made available to the Comptroller General within a reasonable time, before the Comptroller General files a report under section 716(b)(1) of title 31, United States Code, the Comptroller General shall consult with the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives concerning the Comptroller\'s intent to file a report. (2) Inspectors general.--The Inspector General in any Federal department or agency that possesses or uses intelligence or homeland security information or that otherwise participates in the Network shall, at the discretion of the Inspector General-- (A) conduct audits or investigations to-- (i) determine the compliance of that department or agency with the Network\'s requirements; and (ii) assess the effectiveness of that department or agency in improving information sharing and collaboration and in protecting privacy and civil liberties; and (B) issue reports on such audits and investigations. (n) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated-- (1) $50,000,000 to the Director of Management and Budget to carry out this section for fiscal year 2005; and (2) such sums as are necessary to carry out this section in each fiscal year thereafter, to be disbursed and allocated in accordance with the Network implementation plan required by subsection (f). (a) In General.--There is established within the Executive Office of the President a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (referred to in this subtitle as the ``Board\'\'). (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the Government may need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of its existing powers. (2) This shift of power and authority to the Government calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of life and to ensure that the Government uses its powers for the purposes for which the powers were given. (c) Purpose.--The Board shall-- (1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism; and (2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism. (d) Functions.-- (1) Advice and counsel on policy development and implementation.--The Board shall-- (A) review proposed legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including the development and adoption of information sharing guidelines under section 205(g); (B) review the implementation of new and existing legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including the implementation of information sharing guidelines under section 205(g); (C) advise the President and the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of such legislation, regulations, policies, and guidelines; and (D) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a particular governmental power, consider whether the department, agency, or element of the executive branch has explained-- (i) that the power actually materially enhances security; (ii) that there is adequate supervision of the use by the executive branch of the power to ensure protection of privacy and civil liberties; and (iii) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use. (2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review-- (A) the regulations, policies, and procedures, and the implementation of the regulations, policies, and procedures, of the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are protected; (B) the information sharing practices of the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch to determine whether they appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties and adhere to the information sharing guidelines prescribed under section 205(g) and to other governing laws, regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil liberties; and (C) other actions by the executive branch related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to determine whether such actions-- (i) appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties; and (ii) are consistent with governing laws, regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil liberties. (3) Relationship with privacy and civil liberties officers.--The Board shall-- (A) review and assess reports and other information from privacy officers and civil liberties officers described in section 212; (B) when appropriate, make recommendations to such privacy officers and civil liberties officers regarding their activities; and (C) when appropriate, coordinate the activities of such privacy officers and civil liberties officers on relevant interagency matters. (4) Testimony.--The Members of the Board shall appear and testify before Congress upon request. (e) Reports.-- (1) In general.--The Board shall-- (A) receive and review reports from privacy officers and civil liberties officers described in section 212; and (B) periodically submit, not less than semiannually, reports-- (i)(I) to the appropriate committees of Congress, including the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (II) to the President; and (ii) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary. (2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each year under paragraph (1)(B) shall include-- (A) a description of the major activities of the Board during the preceding period; and (B) information on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and oversight functions under subsection (d). (f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall-- (1) make its reports, including its reports to Congress, available to the public to the greatest extent that is consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law; and (2) hold public hearings and otherwise inform the public of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (g) Access To Information.-- (1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this section, the Board is authorized to-- (A) have access from any department, agency, or element of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or employee, to all relevant records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other relevant material, including classified information consistent with applicable law; (B) interview, take statements from, or take public testimony from personnel of any department, agency, or element of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or employee; (C) request information or assistance from any State, tribal, or local government; and (D) require, by subpoena issued at the direction of a majority of the members of the Board, persons (other than departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch) to produce any relevant information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other documentary or testimonial evidence. (2) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(D), the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found may issue an order requiring such person to produce the evidence required by such subpoena. (3) Agency cooperation.--Whenever information or assistance requested under subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) is, in the judgment of the Board, unreasonably refused or not provided, the Board shall report the circumstances to the head of the department, agency, or element concerned without delay. The head of the department, agency, or element concerned shall ensure that the Board is given access to the information, assistance, material, or personnel the Board determines to be necessary to carry out its functions. (h) Membership.-- (1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a full-time chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be selected solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, achievements, public stature, expertise in civil liberties and privacy, and relevant experience, and without regard to political affiliation, but in no event shall more than 3 members of the Board be members of the same political party. (3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected official, officer, or employee of the Federal Government, other than in the capacity as a member of the Board. (4) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a term of six years, except that-- (A) a member appointed to a term of office after the commencement of such term may serve under such appointment only for the remainder of such term; (B) upon the expiration of the term of office of a member, the member shall continue to serve until the member\'s successor has been appointed and qualified, except that no member may serve under this subparagraph-- (i) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session unless a nomination to fill the vacancy shall have been submitted to the Senate; or (ii) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the Senate in which such nomination is submitted; and (C) the members initially appointed under this subsection shall serve terms of two, three, four, five, and six years, respectively, from the effective date of this Act, with the term of each such member to be designated by the President. (5) Quorum and Meetings.--After its initial meeting, the Board shall meet upon the call of the chairman or a majority of its members. Three members of the Board shall constitute a quorum. (i) Compensation and Travel Expenses.-- (1) Compensation.-- (A) Chairman.--The chairman shall be compensated at the rate of pay payable for a position at level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code. (B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall be compensated at a rate of pay payable for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Board. (2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for persons employed intermittently by the Government under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Board. (j) Staff.-- (1) Appointment and compensation.--The Chairman, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Board, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a full-time executive director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Board to carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code. (2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed to the Board without reimbursement from the Board, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of the detailee\'s regular employment without interruption. (3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates that do not exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such title. (k) Security Clearances.--The appropriate departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch shall cooperate with the Board to expeditiously provide the Board members and staff with appropriate security clearances to the extent possible under existing procedures and requirements. (l) Treatment as Agency, Not as Advisory Committee.--The Board-- (1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code); and (2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in section 3(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)). (a) Designation and Functions.--The Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the National Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the head of any other department, agency, or element of the executive branch designated by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to be appropriate for coverage under this section shall designate not less than 1 senior officer to-- (1) assist the head of such department, agency, or element and other officials of such department, agency, or element in appropriately considering privacy and civil liberties concerns when such officials are proposing, developing, or implementing laws, regulations, policies, procedures, or guidelines related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism; (2) periodically investigate and review department, agency, or element actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, and related laws and their implementation to ensure that such department, agency, or element is adequately considering privacy and civil liberties in its actions; (3) ensure that such department, agency, or element has adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond to, and redress complaints from individuals who allege such department, agency, or element has violated their privacy or civil liberties; and (4) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a particular governmental power the officer shall consider whether such department, agency, or element has explained-- (i) that the power actually materially enhances security; (ii) that there is adequate supervision of the use by such department, agency, or element of the power to ensure protection of privacy and civil liberties; and (iii) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use. (b) Exception To Designation Authority.-- (1) Privacy officers.--In any department, agency, or element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the Board, which has a statutorily created privacy officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified in subsection (a) with respect to privacy. (2) Civil liberties officers.--In any department, agency, or element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the Board, which has a statutorily created civil liberties officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified in subsection (a) with respect to civil liberties. (c) Supervision and Coordination.--Each privacy officer or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b) shall-- (1) report directly to the head of the department, agency, or element concerned; and (2) coordinate their activities with the Inspector General of such department, agency, or element to avoid duplication of effort. (d) Agency Cooperation.--The head of each department, agency, or element shall ensure that each privacy officer and civil liberties officer-- (1) has the information, material, and resources necessary to fulfill the functions of such officer; (2) is advised of proposed policy changes; (3) is consulted by decision makers; and (4) is given access to material and personnel the officer determines to be necessary to carry out the functions of such officer. (e) Reprisal for Making Complaint.--No action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making a complaint or for disclosing information to a privacy officer or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b), or to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, that indicates a possible violation of privacy protections or civil liberties in the administration of the programs and operations of the Federal Government relating to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism shall be taken by any Federal employee in a position to take such action, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity. (f) Periodic Reports.-- (1) In general.--The privacy officers and civil liberties officers of each department, agency, or element referred to or described in subsection (a) or (b) shall periodically, but not less than quarterly, submit a report on the activities of such officers-- (A)(i) to the appropriate committees of Congress, including the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; (ii) to the head of such department, agency, or element; and (iii) to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; and (B) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary. (2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include information on the discharge of each of the functions of the officer concerned, including-- (A) information on the number and types of reviews undertaken; (B) the type of advice provided and the response given to such advice; (C) the number and nature of the complaints received by the department, agency, or element concerned for alleged violations; and (D) a summary of the disposition of such complaints, the reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the activities of such officer. (g) Informing the Public.--Each privacy officer and civil liberties officer shall-- (1) make the reports of such officer, including reports to Congress, available to the public to the greatest extent that is consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law; and (2) otherwise inform the public of the activities of such officer, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (h) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or otherwise supplant any other authorities or responsibilities provided by law to privacy officers or civil liberties officers. (a) Location Outside Executive Office of the President.-- The National Intelligence Director shall not be located within the Executive Office of the President. (b) Provision of National Intelligence.--The National Intelligence Director shall provide to the President and Congress national intelligence that is timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy goals. (a) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall provide to the President, Congress, and the National Intelligence Director national intelligence related to counterterrorism that is timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy goals. (b) Directors of National Intelligence Centers.--Each Director of a national intelligence center established under section 144 shall provide to the President, Congress, and the National Intelligence Director intelligence information that is timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy goals. (c) Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall ensure that intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is objective and independent of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy goals. (d) National Intelligence Council.--The National Intelligence Council shall produce national intelligence estimates for the United States Government that are timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and have not been shaped to serve policy goals. No officer, department, agency, or element of the executive branch shall have any authority to require the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center-- (1) to receive permission to testify before Congress; or (2) to submit testimony, legislative recommendations, or comments to any officer or agency of the United States for approval, comments, or review prior to the submission of such recommendations, testimony, or comments to Congress if such recommendations, testimony, or comments include a statement indicating that the views expressed therein are those of the agency submitting them and do not necessarily represent the views of the Administration. (a) Documents Required To Be Provided to Congressional Committees.--The National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and the Director of a national intelligence center shall provide to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and any other committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the subject matter to which the information relates, all intelligence assessments, intelligence estimates, sense of intelligence community memoranda, and daily senior executive intelligence briefs, other than the Presidential Daily Brief and those reports prepared exclusively for the President. (b) Response to Requests from Congress Required.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), in addition to providing material under subsection (a), the National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, or the Director of a national intelligence center shall, not later than 15 days after receiving a request for any intelligence assessment, report, or estimate or other intelligence information from the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, or any other committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the subject matter to which the information relates, make available to such committee such intelligence assessment, report, or estimate or other intelligence information. (2) Certain members.--In addition to requests described in paragraph (1), the National Intelligence Director shall respond to requests from the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. Upon making a request covered by this paragraph, the Chairman, Vice Chairman, or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of such committee shall notify the other of the Chairman, Vice Chairman, or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of such committee of such request. (3) Assertions of privilege.--In response to requests described under paragraph (1) or (2), the National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, or the Director of a national intelligence center shall provide information, unless the President certifies that such information is not being provided because the President is asserting a privilege pursuant to the United States Constitution. (a) Disclosure of Certain Information Authorized.-- (1) In general.--Employees of covered agencies and employees of contractors carrying out activities under classified contracts with covered agencies may disclose information described in paragraph (2) to the individuals referred to in paragraph (3) without first reporting such information to the appropriate Inspector General. (2) Covered information.--Paragraph (1) applies to information, including classified information, that an employee reasonably believes provides direct and specific evidence of a false or inaccurate statement to Congress contained in, or withheld from Congress, any intelligence information material to, any intelligence assessment, report, or estimate, but does not apply to information the disclosure of which is prohibited by rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (3) Covered individuals.-- (A) In general.--The individuals to whom information in paragraph (2) may be disclosed are-- (i) a Member of a committee of Congress having primary responsibility for oversight of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government to which the disclosed information relates and who is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed; (ii) any other Member of Congress who is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed; and (iii) an employee of Congress who has the appropriate security clearance and is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed. (B) Presumption of need for information.--An individual described in subparagraph (A) to whom information is disclosed under paragraph (2) shall be presumed to have a need to know such information. (b) Construction With Other Reporting Requirements.-- Nothing in this section may be construed to modify, alter, or otherwise affect-- (1) any reporting requirement relating to intelligence activities that arises under this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), or any other provision of law; or (2) the right of any employee of the United States Government to disclose to Congress in accordance with applicable law information not described in this section. (c) Covered Agencies Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered agencies\'\' means the following: (1) The National Intelligence Authority, including the National Counterterrorism Center. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (7) Any other Executive agency, or element or unit thereof, determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal function the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities. TITLE III--MODIFICATIONS OF LAWS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 102 through 104 and inserting the following new sections: (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence\'\' each place it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director\'\': (A) Section 3(5)(B) (50 U.S.C. 401a(5)(B)). (B) Section 101(h)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(2)(A)). (C) Section 101(h)(5) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(5)). (D) Section 101(i)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(i)(2)(A)). (E) Section 101(j) (50 U.S.C. 402(j)). (F) Section 105(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)). (G) Section 105(b)(6)(A) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(b)(6)(A)). (H) Section 105B(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(1)). (I) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)). (J) Section 110(b) (50 U.S.C. 404e(b)). (K) Section 110(c) (50 U.S.C. 404e(c)). (L) Section 112(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(a)(1)). (M) Section 112(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)). (N) Section 113(b)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 404h(b)(2)(A)). (O) Section 114(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(a)(1)). (P) Section 114(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(b)(1)). (R) Section 115(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404j(a)(1)). (S) Section 115(b) (50 U.S.C. 404j(b)). (T) Section 115(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404j(c)(1)(B)). (U) Section 116(a) (50 U.S.C. 404k(a)). (V) Section 117(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404l(a)(1)). (W) Section 303(a) (50 U.S.C. 405(a)), both places it appears. (X) Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C. 413(d)). (Y) Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)). (Z) Section 502(c) (50 U.S.C. 413a(c)). (AA) Section 503(b) (50 U.S.C. 413b(b)). (BB) Section 504(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)). (CC) Section 504(a)(3)(C) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(C)). (DD) Section 504(d)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(d)(2)). (EE) Section 506A(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(a)(1)). (FF) Section 603(a) (50 U.S.C. 423(a)). (GG) Section 702(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(1)). (HH) Section 702(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(6)(B)(viii)). (II) Section 702(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(b)(1)), both places it appears. (JJ) Section 703(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(a)(1)). (KK) Section 703(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 432a(a)(6)(B)(viii)). (LL) Section 703(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(b)(1)), both places it appears. (MM) Section 704(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432b(a)(1)). (NN) Section 704(f)(2)(H) (50 U.S.C. 432b(f)(2)(H)). (OO) Section 704(g)(1)) (50 U.S.C. 432b(g)(1)), both places it appears. (PP) Section 1001(a) (50 U.S.C. 441g(a)). (QQ) Section 1102(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(a)(1)). (RR) Section 1102(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)(1)). (SS) Section 1102(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(c)(1)). (TT) Section 1102(d) (50 U.S.C. 442a(d)). (2) That Act is further amended by striking ``of Central Intelligence\'\' each place it appears in the following provisions: (A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)). (B) Section 105B(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(2)). (C) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), the second place it appears. (3) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director\'\' each place it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director\'\': (A) Section 114(c) (50 U.S.C. 404i(c)). (B) Section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)). (C) Section 1001(b) (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)). (C) Section 1001(c) (50 U.S.C. 441g(c)), the first place it appears. (D) Section 1001(d)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 441g(d)(1)(B)). (E) Section 1001(e) (50 U.S.C. 441g(e)), the first place it appears. (4) Section 114A of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence\'\' and inserting ``National Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency\'\' (5) Section 701 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``Operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency may be exempted by the Director of Central Intelligence\'\' and inserting ``The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with the coordination of the National Intelligence Director, may exempt operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency\'\'; and (B) in subsection (g)(1), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence\'\' and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Director\'\'. (6) The heading for section 114 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended to read as follows: (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) Section 101(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402(j)) is amended by striking ``Deputy Director of Central Intelligence\'\' and inserting ``Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director\'\'. (2) Section 112(d)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of this Act\'\' and inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004\'\'. (3) Section 116(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended by striking ``to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director may delegate such authority to the Deputy Director for Operations\'\' and inserting ``to the Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director, or, with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency\'\'. (4) Section 504(a)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)) is amended by striking ``Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency\'\' and inserting ``Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director\'\'. (5) Section 506A(b)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence\'\' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director\'\'. (6) Section 701(c)(3) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431(c)(3)) is amended by striking ``or the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence\'\' and inserting ``the Office of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Office of the National Intelligence Director\'\'. (7) Section 1001(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)) is amended by striking ``Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration\'\' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director\'\'. (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))\'\' and inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004\'\'. (c) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended by striking ``paragraph (6) of section 103(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) that the Director of Central Intelligence\'\' and inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 that the National Intelligence Director\'\'. (d) Intelligence Authorization Acts.-- (1) Public law 107-306.--Section 343(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 404n-2(c)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3((c)(6))\'\' and inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004\'\'. (2) Public law 108-177.--Section 317 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 403-3 note) is amended-- (A) in subsection (g), by striking ``Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production\'\' and inserting ``Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director\'\'; and (B) in subsection (h)(2)(C), by striking ``Assistant Director\'\' and inserting ``Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director\'\'. Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities\'\' and inserting ``foreign persons, or international terrorists\'\'; and (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities\'\' and inserting ``foreign persons, or international terrorists\'\'. Paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as follows: ``(4) The term `intelligence community\' includes the following: ``(A) The National Intelligence Authority. ``(B) The Central Intelligence Agency. ``(C) The National Security Agency. ``(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(F) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs. ``(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy. ``(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. ``(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. ``(K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard. ``(L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the National Intelligence Director and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.\'\'. (a) Redesignation.--Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a), as amended by this Act, is further amended-- (1) by striking paragraph (6); and (2) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (6). (b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The National Security Act of 1947, as amended by this Act, is further amended by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program\'\' each place it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Program\'\': (A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)). (B) Section 105(a)(3) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(3)). (C) Section 506(a) (50 U.S.C. 415a(a)). (2) Section 17(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(f)) is amended by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program\'\' and inserting ``National Intelligence Program\'\'. (c) Heading Amendments.--(1) The heading of section 105 of that Act is amended to read as follows: Section 105(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``ensure\'\' and inserting ``assist the Director in ensuring\'\'. (a) Appointment of Certain Intelligence Officials.--Section 106 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is repealed. (b) Collection Tasking Authority.--Section 111 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404f) is repealed. The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended-- (1) by inserting after the item relating to section 101 the following new item: (a) Appointment of National Counterintelligence Executive.--Subsection (a)(2) of section 902 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2432; 50 U.S.C. 402b) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence\'\' and inserting ``National Intelligence Director, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency\'\'. (b) Component of Office of National Intelligence Director.--Such section is further amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b): ``(b) Component of Office of National Intelligence Director.--The National Counterintelligence Executive is a component of the Office of the National Intelligence Director under subtitle C of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.\'\'. (c) Duties.--Subsection (d) of such section, as redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(5) To perform such other duties as may be provided under section 131(b) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.\'\'. (d) Office of National Counterintelligence Executive.-- Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (116 Stat. 2434; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Office of the Director of Central Intelligence\'\' each place it appears in subsections (c) and (l)(1) and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director\'\'; (2) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence\'\' each place it appears in subsections (e)(4), (e)(5), (h)(1), and (h)(2) and inserting ``National Intelligence Director\'\'; and (3) in subsection (m), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence\'\' and inserting ``National Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency\'\'. Section 8H(a)(1) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(D) An employee of the National Intelligence Authority, an employee of an entity other than the Authority who is assigned or detailed to the Authority, or of a contractor of the Authority, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority in accordance with section 141(h)(5) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.\'\'. Section 901(b)(1) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(Q) The National Intelligence Authority.\'\'. (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of the National Intelligence Director the staff of the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management as of the date of the enactment of this Act, including all functions and activities discharged by the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management as of that date. (b) Administration.--The National Intelligence Director shall administer the staff of the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management after the date of the enactment of this Act as a component of the Office of the National Intelligence Director under (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of the National Intelligence Director the National Counterintelligence Executive and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402b et seq.), as amended by section 309 of this Act, including all functions and activities discharged by the National Counterintelligence Executive and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Administration.--The National Intelligence Director shall treat the National Counterintelligence Executive, and administer the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, after the date of the enactment of this Act as components of the Office of the National Intelligence Director under section 121(c). (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the National Counterterrorism Center the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), including all functions and activities discharged by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Administration.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall administer the Terrorist Threat Integration Center after the date of the enactment of this Act as a component of the Directorate of Intelligence of the National Counterterrorism Center under section 143(g)(2). (a) Termination.--The positions within the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in subsection (b) are hereby abolished. (b) Covered Positions.--The positions within the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in this subsection are as follows: (1) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management. (2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection. (3) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. (4) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration. (a) Executive Schedule Level I.--Section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding the end the following new item: ``National Intelligence Director.\'\'. (b) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence; and (2) by adding at the end the following new items: ``Deputy National Intelligence Directors (5). ``Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.\'\'. (c) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.\'\'. (d) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence. The National Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly take such actions as are appropriate to preserve the intelligence capabilities of the United States during the establishment of the National Intelligence Authority under this Act. (a) Reorganization.--The National Intelligence Director may, with the approval of the President and after consultation with the department, agency, or element concerned, allocate or reallocate functions among the officers of the National Intelligence Program, and may establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue organizational units within the Program, but only after providing notice of such action to Congress, which shall include an explanation of the rationale for the action. (b) Limitation.--The authority under subsection (a) does not extend to any action inconsistent with law. (c) Congressional Review.--An action may be taken under the authority under subsection (a) only with the approval of the following: (1) Each of the congressional intelligence committees. (2) Each of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives. Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall submit to Congress a report on the progress made in the implementation of this Act, including the amendments made by this Act. The report shall include a comprehensive description of the progress made, and may include such recommendations for additional legislative or administrative action as the Director considers appropriate. (a) Reports.--(1) Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report on the implementation of this Act and the amendments made by this Act. (2) The Comptroller General may submit to Congress at any time during the two-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, such reports on the progress made in the implementation of this Act and the amendments made by this Act as the Comptroller General considers appropriate. (b) Report Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) The assessment of the Comptroller General of the progress made in the implementation of this Act (and the amendments made by this Act) as of the date of such report. (2) A description of any delays or other shortfalls in the implementation of this Act that have been identified by the Comptroller General. (3) Any recommendations for additional legislative or administrative action that the Comptroller General considers appropriate. (c) Agency Cooperation.--Each department, agency, and element of the United States Government shall cooperate with the Comptroller General in the assessment of the implementation of this Act, and shall provide the Comptroller General timely and complete access to relevant documents in accordance with section 716 of title 31, United States Code. (a) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of Intelligence Community.--Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director\'s capacity as the head of the intelligence community in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the National Intelligence Director. (b) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of CIA.--Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director\'s capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (c) Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management.--Any reference to the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the staff of such office within the Office of the National Intelligence Director under section 121. (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall take effect 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Earlier Effective Date.--In order to ensure the rapid implementation of this Act while simultaneously ensuring a smooth transition that will safeguard the national security of the United States, the President may provide that this Act (including the amendments made by this Act), or one or more particular provisions of this Act (including the amendments made by such provision or provisions), shall take effect on such date that is earlier than the date otherwise provided under subsection (a) as the President shall specify. (c) Notification of Effective Dates.--If the President exercises the authority in subsection (b), the President shall-- (1) notify Congress of the exercise of such authority; and (2) publish in the Federal Register notice of the earlier effective date or dates involved, including each provision (and amendment) covered by such earlier effective date. If any provision of this Act, or an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act, or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those to which such provision is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby. By Mrs. BOXER (for herself, Mrs. Feinstein, and Mr. Jeffords): S. 2842. A bill to amend title 49, United States Code, to require motor carriers to comply with vehicle emission performance standards established by the Environmental Protection Agency, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Madam President, today I am introducing legislation to protect communities from pollution emitted by heavy-duty diesel trucks. I am pleased to be joined in this effort by Senators Feinstein and Jeffords. The Clean Trucks Act will require all trucks operating within the United States to comply with Federal clean air requirements. It will also require the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to collect and provide information on long-haul heavy-duty truck travel and fuel consumption to the United States Environmental Protection Agency to enable the EPA to estimate emissions. More than 130 million Americans continue to breathe dirty, unhealthy air. The Los Angeles and San Joaquin Valley air basins have the highest levels of ozone, or smog, pollution in the Nation, and are among the most polluted from particulate matter, or soot. Many other areas of California also face severe air quality threats, including the Imperial Valley as well as Riverside, Sacramento, and Ventura Counties. According to the California Air Resources Board, almost 59 percent of California\'s pollution is from mobile sources. Although overall mobile source emissions have decreased since 1975, the percentage contributed by diesel vehicles has increased. In California, heavy-duty diesel trucks account for 4 percent of vehicle traffic, but cause 40 percent of all nitrogen oxide emissions, which is a cause of smog. Emissions from diesel-fueled engines include over 40 other cancer causing substances, particulate matter, and ozone-forming pollutants. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, hazardous pollutants in the air increase the risk of cancer--and 78 percent of that increased risk is due to diesel exhaust. Individuals are also at greater risk of developing asthma, respiratory conditions, and cardiovascular disease. Pursuant to the NAFTA and a recent Supreme Court decision, the United States will begin allowing foreign heavy-duty diesel truck to operate freely within the United States. But, under current law, those trucks will not be required to meet Federal or state air quality standards. This will only make the air quality problem and the health risk worse. The Clean Trucks Act is a reasonable measure to protect our communities as millions of foreign trucks are added to our highways. It simply says that all trucks, foreign and domestic, must meet the same emissions standards. I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this measure. By Mr. CAMPBELL: S. 2843. A bill to make technical corrections to laws relating to Native Americans, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Indian Affairs. Mr. President today I am pleased to introduce the Native American Technical Corrections Act of 2004 to amend a variety of Federal statutes affecting Indian tribes and Indian people. The bill provides 13 amendments including changes to the Indian Arts and Craft Act, the Indian Financing Act, the Indian Pueblo Lands Act, and others. Though modest, this bill provides relief to the many tribes that seek Congress\'s assistance and I urge my colleagues to support it. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Native American Technical Corrections Act of 2004\'\'. In this Act, the term ``Secretary\'\' means the Secretary of the Interior. (a) Powers of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board.--Section 2 of the Act of August 27, 1935 (25 U.S.C. 305a), is amended by inserting before the period at the end the following: ``; (j) to investigate violations of this Act; (k) to enforce this Act through the imposition of penalties for violations under section 6; (l) to request the Secretary of the Interior, with advice of the Solicitor, to enforce this Act through injunctive relief; (m) notwithstanding any other provision of law, to enter into reimbursable support agreements with Federal, State, tribal, regional, and local investigative or law enforcement entities in furtherance of the purposes and provisions of this Act\'\'. (b) Appropriations.--Section 4 of the Act of August 27, 1935 (25 U.S.C. 305c), is amended to read as follows: (a) Powers of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board.--Section 2 of the Act of August 27, 1935 (25 U.S.C. 305a), is amended by inserting before the period at the end the following: ``; (j) to investigate violations of this Act; (k) to enforce this Act through the imposition of penalties for violations under section 6; (l) to request the Secretary of the Interior, with advice of the Solicitor, to enforce this Act through injunctive relief; (m) notwithstanding any other provision of law, to enter into reimbursable support agreements with Federal, State, tribal, regional, and local investigative or law enforcement entities in furtherance of the purposes and provisions of this Act\'\'. (b) Appropriations.--Section 4 of the Act of August 27, 1935 (25 U.S.C. 305c), is amended to read as follows: ``SEC. 4. APPROPRIATIONS. (a) Sale or Assignment of Loans and Underlying Security.-- Section 205 of the Indian Financing Act of 1974 (25 U.S.C. 1485) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Sec. 205.\'\' and all that follows through subsection (b) and inserting the following: ``(a) In General.--All or any portion of a loan guaranteed or insured under this title, including the security given for the loan-- ``(1) may be transferred by the lender by sale or assignment to any person; and ``(2) may be retransferred by the transferee. ``(b) Transfers of Loans.--With respect to a transfer described in subsection (a)-- ``(1) the transfer shall be consistent with such regulations as the Secretary shall promulgate under subsection (h); and ``(2) the transferee shall give notice of the transfer to the Secretary.\'\'; (2) by striking subsection (c); (3) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) as subsections (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively; (4) in subsection (c) (as redesignated by paragraph (3))-- (A) by striking ``Validity.--\'\' and all that follows through ``subparagraph (B),\'\' and inserting ``Validity.-- Except as provided by regulations in effect on the date on which a loan is made,\'\'; and (B) by striking ``incontestable\'\' and all that follows and inserting ``incontestable.\'\'; (5) in subsection (e) (as redesignated by paragraph (3))-- (A) by striking ``The Secretary\'\' and inserting the following: ``(1) In general.--The Secretary\'\'; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) Compensation of fiscal transfer agent.--A fiscal transfer agent designated under subsection (f) may be compensated through any of the fees assessed under this section and any interest earned on any funds or fees collected by the fiscal transfer agent while the funds or fees are in the control of the fiscal transfer agent and before the time at which the fiscal transfer agent is contractually required to transfer such funds to the Secretary or to transferees or other holders.\'\'; and (6) in subsection (f) (as redesignated by paragraph (3))-- (A) by striking ``subsection (i)\'\' and inserting ``subsection (h)\'\'; and (B) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking ``, and issuance of acknowledgments,\'\'. (a) In General.--The Act of June 7, 1924 (43 Stat. 636, chapter 331), is amended by adding at the end the following: Section 17 of the Act of June 18, 1936 (25 U.S.C. 477) (commonly known as the ``Indian Reorganization Act\'\') is amended in the second sentence by striking ``with law\'\' and all that follows through ``twenty-five\'\' and inserting ``with law, and not for purposes of conducting gaming (within the meaning of section 4 of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2703)), but no authority shall be granted to sell or mortgage or to lease for a period exceeding 99\'\'. (a) In General.--The Secretary of the Army shall convey all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to the land described in subsection (b), including all improvements, cultural resources, and sites on the land, subject to the flowage and sloughing easement described in subsection (d) and to the conditions stated in subsection (f), to the Secretary, to be-- (1) held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Prairie Island Indian Community in Minnesota; and (2) included in the Prairie Island Indian Community Reservation in Goodhue County, Minnesota. (b) Land Description.--The land to be conveyed under subsection (a) is the approximately 1290 acres of land associated with the Lock and Dam #3 on the Mississippi River in Goodhue County, Minnesota, located in tracts identified as GO-251, GO-252, GO-271, GO-277, GO-278, GO-284, GO-301 through GO-313, GO-314A, GO-314B, GO-329, GO-330A, GO-330B, GO-331A, GO-331B, GO-331C, GO-332, GO-333, GO-334, GO-335A, GO-335B, GO-336 through GO-338, GO-339A, GO-339B, GO-339C, GO-339D, GO-339E, GO-340A, GO-340B, GO-358, GO-359A, GO-359B, GO-359C, GO-359D, and GO-360, as depicted on the map entitled ``United States Army Corps of Engineers survey map of the Upper Mississippi River 9-Foot Project, Lock & Dam No. 3 (Red Wing), Land & Flowage Rights\'\' and dated December 1936. (c) Boundary Survey.--Not later than 5 years after the date of conveyance under subsection (a), the boundaries of the land conveyed shall be surveyed as provided in section 2115 of the Revised Statutes (25 U.S.C. 176). (d) Easement.-- (1) In general.--The Corps of Engineers shall retain a flowage and sloughing easement for the purpose of navigation and purposes relating to the Lock and Dam No. 3 project over the portion of the land described in subsection (b) that lies below the elevation of 676.0. (2) Inclusions.--The easement retained under paragraph (1) includes-- (A) the perpetual right to overflow, flood, and submerge property as the District Engineer determines to be necessary in connection with the operation and maintenance of the Mississippi River Navigation Project; and (B) the continuing right to clear and remove any brush, debris, or natural obstructions that, in the opinion of the District Engineer, may be detrimental to the project. (e) Ownership of Sturgeon Lake Bed Unaffected.--Nothing in this section diminishes or otherwise affects the title of the State of Minnesota to the bed of Sturgeon Lake located within the tracts of land described in subsection (b). (f) Conditions.--The conveyance under subsection (a) is subject to the conditions that the Prairie Island Indian Community shall not-- (1) use the conveyed land for human habitation; (2) construct any structure on the land without the written approval of the District Engineer; or (3) conduct gaming (within the meaning of section 4 of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2703)) on the land. (g) No Effect on Eligibility for Certain Projects.-- Notwithstanding the conveyance under subsection (a), the land shall continue to be eligible for environmental management planning and other recreational or natural resource development projects on the same basis as before the conveyance. (h) Effect of Section.--Nothing in this section diminishes or otherwise affects the rights granted to the United States pursuant to letters of July 23, 1937, and November 20, 1937, from the Secretary to the Secretary of War and the letters of the Secretary of War in response to the Secretary dated August 18, 1937, and November 27, 1937, under which the Secretary granted certain rights to the Corps of Engineers to overflow the portions of Tracts A, B, and C that lie within the Mississippi River 9-Foot Channel Project boundary and as more particularly shown and depicted on the map entitled ``United States Army Corps of Engineers survey map of the Upper Mississippi River 9-Foot Project, Lock & Dam No. 3 (Red Wing), Land & Flowage Rights\'\' and dated December 1936. (a) Amendments.--Subsection (f) of the first section of the Act of August 9, 1955 (25 U.S.C. 415(f)), is amended-- (1) in the first sentence-- (A) by striking ``Any lease\'\' and all that follows through ``affecting land\'\' and inserting ``Any contract, including a lease, affecting land\'\'; and (B) in the second sentence, by striking ``such leases or contracts entered into pursuant to such Acts\'\' and inserting ``Such contracts\'\'. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the Act of August 9, 1955 (69 Stat. 539, chapter 615) and Public 107-159 (116 Stat. 122). (a) In general.--Subsection (d)(3) of section 36 of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1629b) (as amended by subsection (b)) is amended-- (1) by inserting after ``of this section\'\' the following: ``or an amendment to the articles of incorporation described in section 7(g)(1)(B)\'\'; and (2) by inserting ``or amendment\'\' after ``meeting relating to such resolution\'\' each place it appears. (b) Technical Corrections.-- (1)(A) Section 337(a) of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2003 (Division F of Public Law 108-7; 117 Stat. 278; February 20, 2003) is amended-- (i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``Section 1629b of title 43, United States Code,\'\' and inserting ``Section 36 of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1629b)\'\'; and (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``by creating the following new subsection:\'\' and inserting ``in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following:\'\'. (B) Section 36 of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1629b) is amended-- (i) in subsection (d)(3), by striking ``(d)\'\'; and (ii) in subsection (f), by striking ``section 1629e of this title\'\' and inserting ``section 39\'\'. (2)(A) Section 337(b) of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2003 (Division F of Public Law 108-7; 117 Stat. 278; February 20, 2003) is amended by striking ``Section 1629e(a)(3) of title 43, United States Code,\'\' and inserting ``Section 39(a)(3) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1629e(a)(3))\'\'. (B) Section 39(a)(3)(B)(ii) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1629e(a)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended by striking ``(a)(4) of section 1629b of this title\'\' and inserting ``section 36(a)(4)\'\'. (3) The amendments made by this subsection take effect on February 20, 2003. (a) In General.--The Secretary shall execute such instruments as are necessary to release the condition on a portion of land situated adjacent to the community of Beaver, Alaska, conveyed pursuant to Patent No. 50-69-0130 and dated August 23, 1968, that the land revert to the United States if the land is not used for airport purposes. (b) Tracts.--The release of the condition provided for in subsection (a)-- (1) shall apply to approximately 33 acres of land identified as tracts II through VI of the Beaver Airport, a part of U.S. Survey No. 3798, Alaska (referred to in this section as the ``community expansion land\'\'); (2) shall be without any requirement for receipt of fair market value for the release and conveyance of the conditions otherwise applicable to the community expansion land; and (3) shall be contingent on the conveyance by the State of Alaska of the community expansion land to the Beaver Kwit\'chin corporation, the Village Corporation of the village of Beaver, Alaska. (c) Reconveyance.--The Beaver Kwit\'chin Corporation-- (1) shall reconvey to any individual who currently occupies a portion of the land, or successor in interest to such an individual, title to such land as is currently occupied; and (2) may subsequently-- (A) convey the remaining land to other individuals or persons for community expansion purposes; or (B) retain the remaining land in whole or in part for community uses. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary shall-- (1) accept the conveyance of the parcels of land within the Puyallup Reservation described in subsection (b); and (2) hold the land in trust for the benefit of the Puyallup Indian Tribe. (b) Land Description.--The parcels of land referred to in subsection (a) are as follows: (1) Parcel a.--Lot B, boundary line adjustment 9508150496: according to the map thereof recorded August 15, 1995, records of Pierce County Auditor, situate in the city of Fife, county of Pierce, State of Washington. (2) Parcel b.--Lots 3 and 4, Pierce County Short Plat No. 8908020412: according to the map thereof recorded August 2, 1989, records of Pierce County Auditor, together with portion of SR 5 abutting lot 4, conveyed by deed recorded under recording number 9309070433, described as follows: That portion of Government lot 1, sec. 07, T. 20 N., R. 4 E., of the Willamette Meridian, described as commencing at Highway Engineer\'s Station (hereinafter referred to as HES) AL 26 6+38.0 P.O.T. on the AL26 line survey of SR 5, Tacoma to King County line: Thence S88 deg.54\'30" E., along the north line of said lot 1 a distance of 95 feet to the true point of beginning: Thence S01 deg.05\'30" W87.4\' feet: Thence westerly to a point opposite HES AL26 5+0.6 P.O.T. on said AL26 line survey and 75 feet easterly therefrom; Thence northwesterly to a point opposite AL26 5+80.6 on said AL26 line survey and 55 feet easterly therefrom: Thence northerly parallel with said line survey to the north line of said lot 1: Thence N88 deg.54\'30" E., to the true point of beginning. Except that portion of lot 4 conveyed to the State of Washington by deed recorded under recording number 9308100165 and more particularly described as follows: Commencing at the northeast corner of said lot 4: Thence N80 deg.53\'30" W., along the north line of said lot 4 a distance of 147.44 feet to the true point of beginning and a point of curvature; thence southwesterly along a curve to the left, the center of which bears S0 deg.06\'30" W., 55.00 feet distance, through a central angle of 89 deg.01\'00", an arc distance of 85.45 feet; Thence S01 deg.05\'30" W., 59.43 feet; Thence N88 deg.54\'30" W., 20.00 feet to a point on the westerly line of said lot 4; Thence N0 deg.57\'10" E., along said westerly line 113.15 feet to the northwest corner of said lot 4; Thence S89 deg.53\'30" east along said north line, a distance of 74.34 feet to the true point of beginning. Chicago Title Insurance Company Order No. 4293514 Lot A boundary line adjustment recorded under Recording No. 9508150496. According to the map thereof recorded August 15, 1995, records of Pierce County Auditor. Situate in the city of Fife, county of Pierce, State of Washington. (a) Disbursement Provisions of the State of South Dakota and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe Terrestrial Wildlife Habitat Restoration Trust Funds.-- Section 602(a)(4) of the Water Resources Development Act of 1999 (113 Stat. 386) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A)-- (A) in clause (i), by inserting ``and the Secretary of the Treasury\'\' after ``Secretary\'\'; and (B) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following: ``(ii) Availability of funds.--On notification in accordance with clause (i), the Secretary of the Treasury shall make available to the State of South Dakota funds from the State of South Dakota Terrestrial Wildlife Habitat Restoration Trust Fund established under section 603, to be used to carry out the plan for terrestrial wildlife habitat restoration submitted by the State of South Dakota after the State certifies to the Secretary of the Treasury that the funds to be disbursed will be used in accordance with section 603(d)(3) and only after the Trust Fund is fully capitalized.\'\'; and (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following: ``(ii) Availability of funds.--On notification in accordance with clause (i), the Secretary of the Treasury shall make available to the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe funds from the Cheyenne River Sioux Terrestrial Wildlife Habitat Restoration Trust Fund and the Lower Brule Sioux Terrestrial Wildlife Habitat Restoration Trust Fund, respectively, established under section 604, to be used to carry out the plans for terrestrial wildlife habitat restoration submitted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, respectively, after the respective tribe certifies to the Secretary of the Treasury that the funds to be disbursed will be used in accordance with section 604(d)(3) and only after the Trust Fund is fully capitalized.\'\'. (b) Investment Provisions of the State of South Dakota Terrestrial Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund.--Section 603 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1999 (113 Stat. 388) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following: ``(c) Investments.-- ``(1) Eligible obligations.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Treasury shall invest the amounts deposited under subsection (b) and the interest earned on those amounts only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States issued directly to the Fund. ``(2) Investment requirements.-- ``(A) In general.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall invest the Fund in accordance with all of the requirements of this paragraph. ``(B) Separate investments of principal and interest.-- ``(i) Principal account.--The amounts deposited in the Fund under subsection (b) shall be credited to an account within the Fund (referred to in this paragraph as the `principal account\') and invested as provided in subparagraph (C). ``(ii) Interest account.--The interest earned from investing amounts in the principal account of the Fund shall be transferred to a separate account within the Fund (referred to in this paragraph as the `interest account\') and invested as provided in subparagraph (D). ``(iii) Crediting.--The interest earned from investing amounts in the interest account of the Fund shall be credited to the interest account. ``(C) Investment of principal account.-- ``(i) Initial investment.--Each amount deposited in the principal account of the Fund shall be invested initially in eligible obligations having the shortest maturity then available until the date on which the amount is divided into 3 substantially equal portions and those portions are invested in eligible obligations that are identical (except for transferability) to the next-issued publicly issued Treasury obligations having a 2-year maturity, a 5-year maturity, and a 10-year maturity, respectively. ``(ii) Subsequent investment.--As each 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year eligible obligation matures, the principal of the maturing eligible obligation shall also be invested initially in the shortest-maturity eligible obligation then available until the principal is reinvested substantially equally in the eligible obligations that are identical (except for transferability) to the next-issued publicly issued Treasury obligations having 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year maturities. ``(iii) Discontinuance of issuance of obligations.--If the Department of the Treasury discontinues issuing to the public obligations having 2-year, 5-year, or 10-year maturities, the principal of any maturing eligible obligation shall be reinvested substantially equally in eligible obligations that are identical (except for transferability) to the next-issued publicly issued Treasury obligations of the maturities longer than 1 year then available. ``(D) Investment of interest account.-- ``(i) Before full capitalization.--Until the date on which the Fund is fully capitalized, amounts in the interest account of the Fund shall be invested in eligible obligations that are identical (except for transferability) to publicly issued Treasury obligations that have maturities that coincide, to the greatest extent practicable, with the date on which the Fund is expected to be fully capitalized. ``(ii) After full capitalization.--On and after the date on which the Fund is fully capitalized, amounts in the interest account of the Fund shall be invested and reinvested in eligible obligations having the shortest maturity then available until the amounts are withdrawn and transferred to fund the activities authorized under subsection (d)(3). ``(E) Par purchase price.--The price to be paid for eligible obligations purchased as investments of the principal account shall not exceed the par value of the obligations so that the amount of the principal account shall be preserved in perpetuity. ``(F) Highest yield.--Among eligible obligations having the same maturity and purchase price, the obligation to be purchased shall be the obligation having the highest yield. ``(G) Holding to maturity.--Eligible obligations purchased shall generally be held to their maturities. ``(3) Annual review of investment activities.--Not less frequently than once each calendar year, the Secretary of the Treasury shall review with the State of South Dakota the results of the investment activities and financial status of the Fund during the preceding 12-month period.\'\'; and (2) in subsection (d)(2), by inserting ``of the Treasury\'\' after Secretary\'\'. (c) Investment Provisions for the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and Lower Brule Sioux Tribe Trust Funds.--Section 604 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1999 (113 Stat. 389) is amended by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following: ``(c) Investments.-- ``(1) Eligible obligations.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Treasury shall invest the amounts deposited under subsection (b) and the interest earned on those amounts only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States issued directly to the Funds. ``(2) Investment requirements.-- ``(A) In general.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall invest each of the Funds in accordance with all of the requirements of this paragraph. ``(B) Separate investments of principal and interest.-- ``(i) Principal account.--The amounts deposited in each Fund under subsection (b) shall be credited to an account within the Fund (referred to in this paragraph as the `principal account\') and invested as provided in subparagraph (C). ``(ii) Interest account.--The interest earned from investing amounts in the principal account of each Fund shall be transferred to a separate account within the Fund (referred to in this paragraph as the `interest account\') and invested as provided in subparagraph (D). ``(iii) Crediting.--The interest earned from investing amounts in the interest account of each Fund shall be credited to the interest account. ``(C) Investment of principal account.-- ``(i) Initial investment.--Each amount deposited in the principal account of each Fund shall be invested initially in eligible obligations having the shortest maturity then available until the date on which the amount is divided into 3 substantially equal portions and those portions are invested in eligible obligations that are identical (except for transferability) to the next-issued publicly issued Treasury obligations having a 2-year maturity, a 5-year maturity, and a 10-year maturity, respectively. ``(ii) Subsequent investment.--As each 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year eligible obligation matures, the principal of the maturing eligible obligation shall also be invested initially in the shortest-maturity eligible obligation then available until the principal is reinvested substantially equally in the eligible, obligations that are identical (except for transferability) to the next-issued publicly issued Treasury obligations having 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year maturities. ``(iii) Discontinuation of issuance of obligations.--If the Department of the Treasury discontinues issuing to the public obligations having 2-year, 5-year, or 10-year maturities, the principal of any maturing eligible obligation shall be reinvested substantially equally in eligible obligations that are identical (except for transferability) to the next-issued publicly issued Treasury obligations of the maturities longer than 1 year then available. ``(D) Investment of the interest account.-- ``(i) Before full capitalization.--Until the date on which each Fund is fully capitalized, amounts in the interest account of the Fund shall be invested in eligible obligations that are identical (except for transferability) to publicly issued Treasury obligations that have maturities that coincide, to the greatest extent practicable, with the date on which the Fund is expected to be fully capitalized. ``(ii) After full capitalization.--On and after the date on which each Fund is fully capitalized, amounts in the interest account of the Fund shall be invested and reinvested in eligible obligations having the shortest maturity then available until the amounts are withdrawn and transferred to fund the activities authorized under subsection (d)(3). ``(E) Par purchase price.--The price to be paid for eligible obligations purchased as investments of the principal account shall not exceed the par value of the obligations so that the amount of the principal account shall be preserved in perpetuity. ``(F) Highest yield.--Among eligible obligations having the same maturity and purchase price, the obligation to be purchased shall be the obligation having the highest yield. ``(G) Holding to maturity.--Eligible obligations purchased shall generally be held to their maturities. ``(3) Annual review of investment activities.--Not less frequently than once each calendar year, the Secretary of the Treasury shall review with the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe the results of the investment activities and financial status of the Funds during the preceding 12-month period.\'\'. (a) In General.--Public Law 98-513 is amended by striking section 5 (98 Stat. 2413) and inserting the following: ``SEC. 5. INHERITANCE OF SMALL FRACTIONAL INTERESTS.', u"Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment in the nature of a substitute. The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows: Amendment No. 1 in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Menendez: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Definitions. TITLE III--MODIFICATIONS OF LAWS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY In this Act: (1) The term ``intelligence'' includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. (2) The term ``foreign intelligence'' means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists. (3) The term ``counterintelligence'' means information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists. (4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the following: (A) The National Intelligence Authority. (B) The Central Intelligence Agency. (C) The National Security Agency. (D) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (F) The National Reconnaissance Office. (G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs. (H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy. (I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. (J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. (K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard. (L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the National Intelligence Director and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community. (5) The terms ``national intelligence'' and ``intelligence related to the national security''-- (A) each refer to intelligence which pertains to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government; and (B) do not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by the National Intelligence Director and the Attorney General, or otherwise as expressly provided for in this title. (6) The term ``National Intelligence Program''-- (A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs, projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence community; (ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities (whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Information Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security; and (iii) includes any other program, project, or activity of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government relating to national intelligence unless the National Intelligence Director and the head of the department, agency, or element concerned determine otherwise; but (B) except as provided in subparagraph (A)(ii), does not refer to any program, project, or activity of the military departments, including any program, project, or activity of the Defense Intelligence Agency that is not part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the date of the enactment of this Act, to acquire intelligence principally for the planning and conduct of joint or tactical military operations by the United States Armed Forces. (7) The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) Independent Establishment.--There is hereby established as an independent establishment in the executive branch of government the National Intelligence Authority. (b) Composition.--The National Intelligence Authority is composed of the following: (1) The Office of the National Intelligence Director. (2) The elements specified in subtitle D. (3) Such other elements, offices, agencies, and activities as may be established by law or by the President or the National Intelligence Director. (c) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National Intelligence Authority are as follows: (1) To unify and strengthen the efforts of the intelligence community of the United States Government. (2) To ensure the organization of the efforts of the intelligence community of the United States Government in a joint manner relating to intelligence missions rather than through intelligence collection disciplines. (3) To provide for the operation of the National Counterterrorism Center and national intelligence centers under subtitle D. (4) To eliminate barriers that impede coordination of the counterterrorism activities of the United States Government between foreign intelligence activities located abroad and foreign intelligence activities located domestically while ensuring the protection of civil liberties. (5) To establish clear responsibility and accountability for counterterrorism and other intelligence matters relating to the national security of the United States. (d) Seal.--The National Intelligence Director shall have a seal for the National Intelligence Authority. The design of the seal is subject to the approval of the President. Judicial notice shall be taken of the seal. (a) National Intelligence Director.--There is a National Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (b) Individuals Eligible for Nomination.--Any individual nominated for appointment as National Intelligence Director shall have extensive national security expertise. (c) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service in Other Capacity in Intelligence Community.--The individual serving as National Intelligence Director may not, while so serving, serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community, except to the extent that the individual serving as National Intelligence Director does so in an acting capacity. (d) Principal Duties and Responsibilities.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) serve as head of the intelligence community in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law; (2) act as a principal adviser to the President for intelligence related to the national security; (3) serve as the head of the National Intelligence Authority; and (4) direct and oversee the National Intelligence Program. (e) General Responsibilities and Authorities.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities set forth in subsection (c), the National Intelligence Director shall have the responsibilities set forth in section 112 and the authorities set forth in section 113 and other applicable provisions of law. (a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall be responsible for providing national intelligence-- (1) to the President; (2) to the heads of other departments and agencies of the executive branch; (3) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; (4) to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof; and (5) to such other persons or entities as the President shall direct. (b) National Intelligence.--Such national intelligence shall be timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community. (a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) determine the annual budget for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States by-- (A) providing to the heads of the departments containing agencies or elements within the intelligence community and that have one or more programs, projects, or activities within the National Intelligence program, and to the heads of such agencies and elements, guidance for development the National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such agencies or elements; (B) developing and presenting to the President an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program after consultation with the heads of agencies or elements, and the heads of their respective departments, under subparagraph (A); (C) providing budget guidance to each element of the intelligence community that does not have one or more program, project, or activity within the National Intelligence Program regarding the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of such element; and (D) participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets for the military intelligence programs, projects, and activities not included in the National Intelligence Program; (2) manage and oversee the National Intelligence Program, including-- (A) the execution of funds within the National Intelligence Program; (B) the reprogramming of funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the National Intelligence Program; and (C) the transfer of funds and personnel under the National Intelligence Program; (3) establish the requirements and priorities to govern the collection, analysis, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the intelligence community; (4) establish collection and analysis requirements for the intelligence community, determine collection and analysis priorities, issue and manage collection and analysis tasking, and resolve conflicts in the tasking of elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the direction of the President; (5) provide advisory tasking on the collection of intelligence to elements of the United States Government having information collection capabilities that are not elements of the intelligence community; (6) manage and oversee the National Counterterrorism Center under section 143, and establish, manage, and oversee national intelligence centers under section 144; (7) establish requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and provide assistance to the Attorney General to ensure that information derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches under that Act is disseminated so it may be used efficiently and effectively for foreign intelligence purposes, except that the Director shall have no authority to direct, manage, or undertake electronic surveillance or physical search operations pursuant to that Act unless otherwise authorized by statute or Executive order; (8) develop and implement, in consultation with the heads of other agencies or elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective departments, personnel policies and programs applicable to the intelligence community that-- (A) encourage and facilitate assignments and details of personnel to the National Counterterrorism Center under section 143, to national intelligence centers under section 144, and between elements of the intelligence community; (B) set standards for education, training, and career development of personnel of the intelligence community; (C) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and retention by the intelligence community of highly qualified individuals for the effective conduct of intelligence activities; (D) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence community is sufficiently diverse for purposes of the collection and analysis of intelligence through the recruitment and training of women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds; (E) make service in more than one element of the intelligence community a condition of promotion to such positions within the intelligence community as the Director shall specify; (F) ensure the effective management of intelligence community personnel who are responsible for intelligence community-wide matters; (G) provide for the effective management of human capital within the intelligence community, including-- (i) the alignment of human resource policies and programs of the elements of the intelligence community with the missions, goals, and organizational objectives of such elements and of the intelligence community overall; (ii) the assessment of workforce characteristics and future needs and the establishment of workforce development strategies to meet those needs based on relevant organizational missions and strategic plans; (iii) the sustainment of a culture that encourages and allows for the development of a high performing workforce; and (iv) the alignment of expectations for personnel performance with relevant organizational missions and strategic plans; (H) are consistent with the public employment principles of merit and fitness set forth under section 2301 of title 5, United States Code; and (I) include the enhancements required under section 114; (9) promote and evaluate the utility of national intelligence to consumers within the United States Government; (10) ensure that appropriate officials of the United States Government and other appropriate individuals have access to a variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views; (11) protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; (12) establish requirements and procedures for the classification of intelligence information and for access to classified intelligence information; (13) establish requirements and procedures for the dissemination of classified information by elements of the intelligence community; (14) establish intelligence reporting guidelines that maximize the dissemination of information while protecting intelligence sources and methods; (15) develop, in consultation with the heads of appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, an integrated communications network that provides interoperable communications capabilities among all elements of the intelligence community and such other entities and persons as the Director considers appropriate; (16) establish standards for information technology and communications for the intelligence community; (17) ensure that the intelligence community makes efficient and effective use of open-source information and analysis; (18) ensure compliance by elements of the intelligence community with the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines of the United States applicable to the intelligence and intelligence- related activities of the United States Government, including the provisions of the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines of the United States applicable to the protection of the privacy and civil liberties of United States persons; (19) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication within the intelligence community; and (20) perform such other functions as the President may direct. (b) Uniform Procedures for Sensitive Compartmented Information.--The President, acting through the National Intelligence Director, shall establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant to sensitive compartmented information in accordance with section 115. (c) Performance of Common Services.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall, in consultation with the heads of departments and agencies of the United States Government containing elements within the intelligence community and with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, direct and coordinate the performance by the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program of such services as are of common concern to the intelligence community, which services the National Intelligence Director determines can be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner. (2) The services performed under paragraph (1) shall include research and development on technology for use in national intelligence missions. (d) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director may prescribe regulations relating to the discharge and enforcement of the responsibilities of the Director under this section. (a) Access to Intelligence.--Unless otherwise directed by the President, the National Intelligence Director shall have access to all intelligence related to the national security which is collected by any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government. (b) Determination of Budgets for NIP and Other Intelligence Activities.--The National Intelligence Director shall determine the annual budget for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government under section 112(a)(1) by-- (1) providing to the heads of the departments containing agencies or elements within the intelligence community and that have one or more programs, projects, or activities within the National Intelligence program, and to the heads of such agencies and elements, guidance for development the National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such agencies or elements; (2) developing and presenting to the President an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program after consultation with the heads of agencies or elements, and the heads of their respective departments, under paragraph (1), including, in furtherance of such budget, the review, modification, and approval of budgets of the agencies or elements of the intelligence community with one or more programs, projects, or activities within the National Intelligence Program utilizing the budget authorities in subsection (c)(1); (3) providing guidance on the development of annual budgets for each element of the intelligence community that does not have any program, project, or activity within the National Intelligence Program utilizing the budget authorities in subsection (c)(2); (4) participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military intelligence programs and activities outside the National Intelligence Program; (4) receiving the appropriations for the National Intelligence Program as specified in subsection (d) and allotting and allocating funds to agencies and elements of the intelligence community; and (5) managing and overseeing the execution by the agencies or elements of the intelligence community, and, if necessary, the modification of the annual budget for the National Intelligence Program, including directing the reprogramming and transfer of funds, and the transfer of personnel, among and between elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program utilizing the authorities in subsections (f) and (g). (c) Budget Authorities.--(1)(A) In developing and presenting an annual budget for the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program under subsection (b)(1), the National Intelligence Director shall coordinate, prepare, and present to the President the annual budgets of those elements, in consultation with the heads of those elements. (B) If any portion of the budget for an element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program is prepared outside the Office of the National Intelligence Director, the Director-- (i) shall approve such budget before submission to the President; and (ii) may require modifications of such budget to meet the requirements and priorities of the Director before approving such budget under clause (i). (C) The budget of an agency or element of the intelligence community with one or more programs, projects, or activities within the National Intelligence Program may not be provided to the President unless the Director has first approved such budget. (2)(A) The Director shall provide guidance for the development of the annual budgets for each agency or element of the intelligence community that does not have any program, project, or activity within the National Intelligence Program. (B) The heads of the agencies or elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective departments, referred to in subparagraph (A) shall coordinate closely with the Director in the development of the budgets of such agencies or elements, before the submission of their recommendations on such budgets to the President. (d) Jurisdiction of Funds Under NIP.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and consistent with section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the National Intelligence Program shall be appropriated to the National Intelligence Authority and, pursuant to subsection (e), under the direct jurisdiction of the National Intelligence Director. (2) The Director shall manage and oversee the execution by each element of the intelligence community of any amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to such element under the National Intelligence Program. (e) Accounts for Administration of NIP Funds.--(1) The Secretary of the Treasury shall, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, establish accounts for the funds under the jurisdiction of the Director under subsection (d) for purposes of carrying out the responsibilities and authorities of the Director under this Act with respect to the National Intelligence Program. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall-- (A) control and manage the accounts established under paragraph (1); and (B) with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, establish procedures governing the use (including transfers and reprogrammings) of funds in such accounts. (3)(A) To the extent authorized by law, a certifying official shall follow the procedures established under paragraph (2)(B) with regard to each account established under paragraph (1). Disbursements from any such account shall only be made against a valid obligation of such account. (B) In this paragraph, the term ``certifying official', with respect to an element of the intelligence community, means an employee of the element who has responsibilities specified in section 3528(a) of title 31, United States Code. (4) The National Intelligence Director shall allot funds deposited in an account established under paragraph (1) directly to the head of the elements of the intelligence community concerned in accordance with the procedures established under paragraph (2)(B). (5) Each account established under paragraph (1) shall be subject to chapters 13 and 15 of title 31, United States Code, other than sections 1503 and 1556 of that title. (6) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority granted by subsection (g)(3) or by section 5 or 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f, 403j). (f) Role in Reprogramming or Transfer of NIP Funds by Elements of Intelligence Community.--(1) No funds made available under the National Intelligence Program may be reprogrammed or transferred by any agency or element of the intelligence community without the prior approval of the National Intelligence Director except in accordance with procedures issued by the Director. (2) The head of the department concerned shall consult with the Director before reprogramming or transferring funds appropriated or otherwise made available to an agency or element of the intelligence community that does not have any program, project, or activity within the National Intelligence Program. (3) The Director shall, before reprogramming funds appropriated or otherwise made available for an element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, consult with the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over such element regarding such reprogramming. (4)(A) The Director shall consult with the appropriate committees of Congress regarding modifications of existing procedures to expedite the reprogramming of funds within the National Intelligence Program. (B) Any modification of procedures under subparagraph (A) shall include procedures for the notification of the appropriate committees of Congress of any objection raised by the head of a department or agency to a reprogramming proposed by the Director as a result of consultations under paragraph (3). (g) Transfer or Reprogramming of Funds and Transfer of Personnel Within NIP.--(1) In addition to any other authorities available under law for such purposes, the National Intelligence Director, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and after consultation with the heads of the departments containing agencies or elements within the intelligence community to the extent their subordinate agencies or elements are affected, with the heads of such subordinate agencies or elements, and with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the extent the Central Intelligence Agency is affected, may-- (A) transfer or reprogram funds appropriated for a program within the National Intelligence Program to another such program; (B) review, and approve or disapprove, any proposal to transfer or reprogram funds from appropriations that are not for the National Intelligence Program to appropriations for the National Intelligence Program; (C) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the National Intelligence Director, transfer personnel of the intelligence community funded through the National Intelligence Program from one element of the intelligence community to another element of the intelligence community; and (D) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the National Intelligence Director and the heads of the departments and agencies concerned, transfer personnel of the intelligence community not funded through the National Intelligence Program from one element of the intelligence community to another element of the intelligence community. (2) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made under this subsection only if-- (A) the funds or personnel are being transferred to an activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity; (B) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds to the Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director; or (C) the transfer does not exceed applicable ceilings established in law for such transfers. (3) Funds transferred under this subsection shall remain available for the same period as the appropriations account to which transferred. (4) Any transfer of funds under this subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer for which notice is given to the appropriate congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report explaining the nature of the proposed transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In addition, the congressional intelligence committees shall be promptly notified of any transfer of funds made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the transfer would not have otherwise required reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of October 24, 1992. (5)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall promptly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this subsection. The Director shall include in any such report an explanation of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. (B) In this paragraph, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (i)(I) the Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (II) the Committee on Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; (ii) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Defense-- (I) the committees and select committees referred to in clause (i); (II) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (III) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; (iii) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation-- (I) the committees and select committees referred to in clause (i); (II) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and (III) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and (iv) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Homeland Security-- (I) the committees and select committees referred to in clause (i); (II) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and (III) the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives. (h) Information Technology and Communications.--(1) In conforming with section 205, in carrying out section 112(a)(16), the National Intelligence Director shall-- (A) establish standards for information technology and communications across the intelligence community; (B) develop an integrated information technology network and enterprise architecture for the intelligence community, including interface standards for interoperability to enable automated information-sharing among elements of the intelligence community; (C) maintain an inventory of critical information technology and communications systems, and eliminate unnecessary or duplicative systems; (D) establish contingency plans for the intelligence community regarding information technology and communications; and (E) establish policies, doctrine, training, and other measures necessary to ensure that the intelligence community develops an integrated information technology and communications network that ensures information-sharing. (2) Consistent with section 205, the Director shall take any action necessary, including the setting of standards for information technology and communications across the intelligence community, to develop an integrated information technology and communications network that ensures information-sharing across the intelligence community. (i) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--In a manner consistent with section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the National Intelligence Director shall oversee and direct the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in coordinating, under section 103(f) of the National Security Act of 1947, the relationships between elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments on all matters involving intelligence related to the national security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine means. (j) Open Source Information Collection.--The National Intelligence Director shall establish and maintain within the intelligence community an effective and efficient open-source information collection capability. (k) Access to Information.--Except as otherwise directed by the President, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall promptly provide the National Intelligence Director such information in the possession or under the control of such element as the Director may request in order to facilitate the exercise of the authorities and responsibilities of the Director under this Act. (a) Rewards for Service in Certain Positions.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations to provide incentives for service on the staff of the national intelligence centers, on the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center, and in other positions in support of the intelligence community management functions of the Director. (2) Incentives under paragraph (1) may include financial incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as the Director considers appropriate. (b) Enhanced Promotion for Service Under NID.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the National Intelligence Director shall ensure that personnel of an element of the intelligence community who are assigned or detailed to service under the National Intelligence Director shall be promoted at rates equivalent to or better than personnel of such element who are not so assigned or detailed. (c) Joint Career Matters.--(1) In carrying out section 112(a)(8), the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the intelligence community through various elements of the intelligence community in the course of their careers in order to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods, and disciplines. (2) The mechanisms prescribed under paragraph (1) may include the following: (A) The establishment of special occupational categories involving service, over the course of a career, in more than one element of the intelligence community. (B) The provision of rewards for service in positions undertaking analysis and planning of operations involving two or more elements of the intelligence community. (C) The establishment of requirements for education, training, service, and evaluation that involve service in more than one element of the intelligence community. (3) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent practical, seek to duplicate within the intelligence community the joint officer management policies established by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) and the amendments on joint officer management made by that Act. (a) In General.--The President, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, the department, agency, or element selected under (b), and other appropriate officials shall-- (1) establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to classified information for employees and contractor personnel of the United States Government who require access to such information; (2) ensure the consistent implementation of the standards and procedures established under paragraph (1) throughout the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government and under contracts entered into by such departments, agencies, and elements; (3) ensure that an individual who is granted or continued eligibility for access to classified information is treated by each department, agency, or element of the executive branch as eligible for access to classified information at that level for all purposes of each such department, agency, or element, regardless of which department, agency, or element of the executive branch granted or continued the eligibility of such individual for access to classified information; (4) establish uniform requirements and standards, including for security questionnaires, financial disclosure requirements, and standards for administering polygraph examinations, to be utilized for the performance of security clearance investigations, including by the contractors conducting such investigations; and (5) ensure that the database established under subsection (b)(2)(B) meets the needs of the intelligence community. (b) Performance of Security Clearance Investigations.--(1) Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall select a single department, agency, or element of the executive branch to conduct all security clearance investigations of employees and contractor personnel of the United States Government who require access to classified information and to provide and maintain all security clearances of such employees and contractor personnel. (2) The department, agency, or element selected under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) take all necessary actions to carry out the requirements of this section, including entering into a memorandum of understanding with any agency carrying out responsibilities relating to security clearances or security clearance investigations before the date of the enactment of this Act; (B) as soon as practicable, establish and maintain a single database for tracking security clearance applications, security clearance investigations, and determinations of eligibility for security clearances, which database shall incorporate applicable elements of similar databases in existence on the date of the enactment of this Act; and (C) ensure that security clearance investigations are conducted in accordance with uniform standards and requirements established under subsection (a)(4), including uniform security questionnaires and financial disclosure requirements. (c) Adjudication and Grant of Security Clearances.--(1) Each agency that adjudicates and grants security clearances as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to adjudicate and grant security clearances after that date. (2) Each agency that adjudicates and grants security clearances shall specify to the department, agency, or element selected under subsection (b) the level of security clearance investigation required for an individual under its jurisdiction. (3) Upon granting or continuing eligibility for access to classified information to an individual under its jurisdiction, an agency that adjudicates and grants security clearances shall submit to the department, agency, or element selected under subsection (b) notice of that action, including the level of access to classified information granted. (d) Utilization of Personnel.--There shall be transferred to the department, agency, or element selected under subsection (b) any personnel of any executive agency whose sole function as of the date of the enactment of this Act is the performance of security clearance investigations. (e) Transition.--The President shall take appropriate actions to ensure that the performance of security clearance investigations under this section commences not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Establishment.--The National Intelligence Director may provide for the establishment and training of a National Intelligence Reserve Corps (in this section referred to as ``National Intelligence Reserve Corps'') for the temporary reemployment on a voluntary basis of former employees of elements of the intelligence community during periods of emergency, as determined by the Director. (b) Eligible Individuals.--An individual may participate in the National Intelligence Reserve Corps only if the individual previously served as a full time employee of an element of the intelligence community. (c) Limitation on Membership.--The total number of individuals who are members of the National Intelligence Reserve Corps at any given time may not exceed 200 individuals. (d) Terms of Participation.--The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe the terms and conditions under which eligible individuals may participate in the National Intelligence Reserve Corps. (e) Expenses.--The National Intelligence Director may provide members of the National Intelligence Reserve Corps transportation and per diem in lieu of subsistence for purposes of participating in any training that relates to service as a member of the Reserve Corps. (f) Treatment of Annuitants.--(1) If an annuitant receiving an annuity from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund becomes temporarily reemployed pursuant to this section, such annuity shall not be discontinued thereby. (2) An annuitant so reemployed shall not be considered an employee for the purposes of chapter 83 or 84 of title 5, United States Code. (g) Treatment Under National Intelligence Authority Personnel Ceiling.--A member of the National Intelligence Reserve Corps who is reemployed on a temporary basis pursuant to this section shall not count against any personnel ceiling applicable to the National Intelligence Authority. (a) Recommendation of NID in Certain Appointment.--In the event of a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an individual for nomination to fill the vacancy. (b) Concurrence of Secretary of Defense in Certain Appointments Recommended by NID.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the National Intelligence Director shall obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense before recommending to the President an individual for nomination to fill such vacancy. If the Secretary does not concur in the recommendation, the Director may make the recommendation to the President without the concurrence of the Secretary, but shall include in the recommendation a statement that the Secretary does not concur in the recommendation. (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: (A) The Director of the National Security Agency. (B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (C) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (c) Concurrence of NID in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the National Intelligence Director before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency concerned may fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be) without the concurrence of the Director, but shall notify the President that the Director does not concur in appointment or recommendation (as the case may be). (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: (A) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. (B) The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis. (C) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. (D) The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (d) Recommendation of NID on Termination of Service.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may recommend to the President or the head of the department or agency concerned the termination of service of any individual serving in any position covered by this section. (2) In the event the Director intends to recommend to the President the termination of service of an individual under paragraph (1), the Director shall seek the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned. If the head of the department or agency concerned does not concur in the recommendation, the Director may make the recommendation to the President without the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned, but shall notify the President that the head of the department or agency concerned does not concur in the recommendation. (a) Establishment.--There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an account to be known as the Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Elements.--The Reserve shall consist of the following elements: (1) Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Reserve. (2) Any amounts authorized to be transferred to or deposited in the Reserve by law. (c) Availability.--Amounts in the Reserve shall be available for such purposes as are provided by law. (d) Transfer of Funds of Reserve for Contingencies of CIA.--There shall be transferred to the Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director all unobligated balances of the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Office of National Intelligence Director.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority an Office of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Function.--The function of the Office of the National Intelligence Director is to assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director under this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law, and to carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by the President or by law. (c) Composition.--The Office of the National Intelligence Director is composed of the following: (1) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director. (2) Any Deputy National Intelligence Director appointed under section 122(b). (3) The National Intelligence Council. (4) The General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority. (5) The Intelligence Comptroller. (6) The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority. (7) The Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (8) The Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (9) The Chief Human Capital Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (10) The Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (11) The National Counterintelligence Executive (including the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive). (12) Such other offices and officials as may be established by law or the Director may establish or designate in the Office. (d) Staff.--(1) To assist the National Intelligence Director in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the Director, the Director shall employ and utilize in the Office of the National Intelligence Director a professional staff having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and responsibilities, and may establish permanent positions and appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff. (2) The staff of the Office of the National Intelligence Director under paragraph (1) shall include the staff of the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management that is transferred to the Office of the National Intelligence Director under section 321. (e) Prohibition on Co-Location With Other Elements of Intelligence Community.--Commencing as of October 1, 2006, the Office of the National Intelligence Director may not be co-located with any other element of the intelligence community. (a) Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director.--(1) There is a Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) In the event of a vacancy in the position of Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director, the National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an individual for appointment as Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director. (3) Any individual nominated for appointment as Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director shall have extensive national security experience and management expertise. (4) The individual serving as Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director may not, while so serving, serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community, except to the extent that the individual serving as Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director is doing so in an acting capacity. (5) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director shall assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director. (6) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the National Intelligence Director during the absence or disability of the National Intelligence Director or during a vacancy in the position of National Director of Intelligence. (b) Deputy National Intelligence Directors.--(1) There may be not more than four Deputy National Intelligence Directors who shall be appointed by the President. (2) In the event of a vacancy in any position of Deputy National Intelligence Director established under this subsection, the National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an individual for appointment to such position. (3) Each Deputy National Intelligence Director appointed under this subsection shall have such duties, responsibilities, and authorities as the National Intelligence Director may assign or are specified by law. (a) National Intelligence Council.--There is a National Intelligence Council. (b) Composition.--(1) The National Intelligence Council shall be composed of senior analysts within the intelligence community and substantive experts from the public and private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of, the National Intelligence Director. (2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector as a condition of service on the Council, or as contractors of the Council or employees of such contractors, to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods while avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this purpose. (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--(1) The National Intelligence Council shall-- (A) produce national intelligence estimates for the United States Government, including alternative views held by elements of the intelligence community and other information as specified in paragraph (2); (B) evaluate community-wide collection and production of intelligence by the intelligence community and the requirements and resources of such collection and production; and (C) otherwise assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the responsibilities of the Director under section 111. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the Council satisfies the needs of policymakers and other consumers of intelligence by ensuring that each national intelligence estimate under paragraph (1)-- (A) states separately, and distinguishes between, the intelligence underlying such estimate and the assumptions and judgments of analysts with respect to such intelligence and such estimate; (B) describes the quality and reliability of the intelligence underlying such estimate; (C) presents and explains alternative conclusions, if any, with respect to the intelligence underlying such estimate and such estimate; and (D) characterizes the uncertainties, if any, and confidence in such estimate. (d) Service as Senior Intelligence Advisers.--Within their respective areas of expertise and under the direction of the National Intelligence Director, the members of the National Intelligence Council shall constitute the senior intelligence advisers of the intelligence community for purposes of representing the views of the intelligence community within the United States Government. (e) Authority To Contract.--Subject to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Director, the National Intelligence Council may carry out its responsibilities under this section by contract, including contracts for substantive experts necessary to assist the Council with particular assessments under this section. (f) Staff.--The National Intelligence Director shall make available to the National Intelligence Council such staff as may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its responsibilities under this section. (g) Availability of Council and Staff.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the National Intelligence Council and its staff satisfy the needs of policymaking officials and other consumers of intelligence. (2) The Council shall be readily accessible to policymaking officials and other appropriate individuals not otherwise associated with the intelligence community. (h) Support.--The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall, as appropriate, furnish such support to the National Intelligence Council, including the preparation of intelligence analyses, as may be required by the National Intelligence Director. (a) General Counsel of National Intelligence Authority.-- There is a General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (b) Prohibition on Dual Service as General Counsel of Another Agency.--The individual serving in the position of General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority may not, while so serving, also serve as the General Counsel of any other department, agency, or element of the United States Government. (c) Scope of Position.--The General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority is the chief legal officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (d) Functions.--The General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority shall perform such functions as the National Intelligence Director may prescribe. (a) Intelligence Comptroller.--There is an Intelligence Comptroller who shall be appointed from civilian life by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Supervision.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director. (c) Duties.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in the preparation and execution of the budget of the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; (2) assist the Director in participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military intelligence programs and activities outside the National Intelligence Program; (3) provide unfettered access to the Director to financial information under the National Intelligence Program; (4) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of National Intelligence Authority.--There is an Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the President. (b) Supervision.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director. (c) Duties.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in ensuring that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties, as provided in the Constitution, laws, regulations, and Executive orders of the United States, is appropriately incorporated in-- (A) the policies and procedures developed for and implemented by the National Intelligence Authority; (B) the policies and procedures regarding the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; and (C) the policies and procedures regarding the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community; (2) oversee compliance by the Authority, and in the relationships described in paragraph (1), with requirements under the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines relating to civil rights and civil liberties; (3) review, investigate, and assess complaints and other information indicating possible abuses of civil rights or civil liberties, as provided in the Constitution, laws, regulations, and Executive orders of the United States, in the administration of the programs and operations of the Authority, and in the relationships described in paragraph (1), unless, in the determination of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority, the review, investigation, or assessment of a particular complaint or information can better be conducted by the Inspector General; (4) coordinate with the Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority to ensure that programs, policies, and procedures involving civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner; and (5) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) Privacy Officer of National Intelligence Authority.-- There is a Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--(1) The Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall have primary responsibility for the privacy policy of the National Intelligence Authority (including in the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community). (2) In discharging the responsibility under paragraph (1), the Privacy Officer shall-- (A) assure that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information; (B) assure that personal information contained in Privacy Act systems of records is handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 1974; (C) conduct privacy impact assessments when appropriate or as required by law; and (D) coordinate with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority to ensure that programs, policies, and procedures involving civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner. (a) Chief Information Officer of National Intelligence Authority.--There is a Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in implementing the responsibilities and executing the authorities related to information technology under paragraphs (15) and (16) of section 112(a) and section 113(h); and (2) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) Chief Human Capital Officer of National Intelligence Authority.--There is a Chief Human Capital Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The Chief Human Capital Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) have the functions and authorities provided for Chief Human Capital Officers under sections 1401 and 1402 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to the National Intelligence Authority; and (2) advise and assist the National Intelligence Director in exercising the authorities and responsibilities of the Director with respect to the workforce of the intelligence community as a whole. (a) Chief Financial Officer of National Intelligence Authority.--There is a Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be designated by the President, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director. (b) Designation Requirements.--The designation of an individual as Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall be subject to applicable provisions of section 901(a) of title 31, United States Code. (c) Authorities and Functions.--The Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall have such authorities, and carry out such functions, with respect to the National Intelligence Authority as are provided for an agency Chief Financial Officer by section 902 of title 31, United States Code, and other applicable provisions of law. (d) Coordination With NIA Comptroller.--(1) The Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall coordinate with the Comptroller of the National Intelligence Authority in exercising the authorities and performing the functions provided for the Chief Financial Officer under this section. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall take such actions as are necessary to prevent duplication of effort by the Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority and the Comptroller of the National Intelligence Authority. (e) Integration of Financial Systems.--Subject to the supervision, direction, and control of the National Intelligence Director, the Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall take appropriate actions to ensure the timely and effective integration of the financial systems of the National Intelligence Authority (including any elements or components transferred to the Authority by this Act), and of the financial systems of the Authority with applicable portions of the financial systems of the other elements of the intelligence community, as soon as possible after the date of the enactment of this Act. (f) Protection of Annual Financial Statement From Disclosure.--The annual financial statement of the National Intelligence Authority required under section 3515 of title 31, United States Code-- (1) shall be submitted in classified form; and (2) notwithstanding any other provision of law, shall be withheld from public disclosure. (a) National Counterintelligence Executive.--The National Counterintelligence Executive under section 902 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402b et seq.), as amended by section 309 of this Act, is a component of the Office of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The National Counterintelligence Executive shall perform the duties provided in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, as so amended, and such other duties as may be prescribed by the National Intelligence Director or specified by law. Subtitle D--Additional Elements of National Intelligence Authority (a) Office of Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority an Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority. (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority is to-- (1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently investigations, inspections, and audits relating to-- (A) the programs and operations of the National Intelligence Authority; (B) the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; and (C) the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community; (2) recommend policies designed-- (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations, and in such relationships; and (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs, operations, and relationships; (3) provide a means for keeping the National Intelligence Director fully and currently informed about-- (A) problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and to such relationships; and (B the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions; and (4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly informed of-- (A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and to such relationships; and (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions. (c) Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.-- (1) There is an Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority, who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector General shall be made-- (A) without regard to political affiliation; (B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of the National Intelligence Authority, and prior experience in the field of intelligence or national security; and (C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or auditing. (3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the National Intelligence Director. (4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the President. The President shall immediately communicate in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal of any individual from the position of Inspector General. (d) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority-- (1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations, inspections, and audits relating to the programs and operations of the National Intelligence Authority, the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, and the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and regulations; (2) to keep the National Intelligence Director fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, and fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in such programs and operations, and in such relationships, and to report the progress made in implementing corrective action; (3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; and (4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities under this section, to comply with generally accepted government auditing standards. (e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may prohibit the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority from initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. (2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within seven days to the congressional intelligence committees. (3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time a report under paragraph (1) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such report. (4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General considers appropriate. (f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority shall have direct and prompt access to the National Intelligence Director when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. (2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or any employee of a contractor, of the National Intelligence Authority, and of any other element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. (B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section. (C) The level of classification or compartmentation of information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any materials under subparagraph (B). (D) Failure on the part of any employee or contractor of the National Intelligence Authority to cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate administrative actions by the Director, including loss of employment or the termination of an existing contractual relationship. (3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the Federal government-- (A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; and (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any employee in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity. (4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or before an officer having a seal. (5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of all information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General. (B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by subpoenas. (C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for or on behalf of any other element or component of the Authority. (D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the United States. (g) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority shall be provided with appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices. (2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the National Intelligence Director, the Inspector General shall select, appoint and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector General. (B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively. (C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the Inspector General shall create within the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General. (3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government. (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance. (h) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the National Intelligence Director a classified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority during the immediately preceding six-month periods ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. (B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following: (i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation, inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered by such report. (ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of the National Intelligence Authority identified by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report. (iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii). (iv) A statement whether or not corrective action has been completed on each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective action has been completed, a description of such corrective action. (v) An assessment of the effectiveness of all measures in place in the Authority for the protection of civil liberties and privacy of United States persons. (vi) A certification whether or not the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General. (vii) A description of the exercise of the subpoena authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report. (viii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy and efficiency in the administration of programs and operations undertaken by the Authority, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and operations. (C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt of a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the report to the congressional intelligence committees together with any comments the Director considers appropriate. (2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or operations of the Authority, a relationship between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or a relationship between an element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and another element of the intelligence community. (B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) within seven calendar days of receipt of such report, together with such comments as the Director considers appropriate. (3) In the event that-- (A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General; (B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by the Inspector General should focus on any current or former Authority official who holds or held a position in the Authority that is subject to appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, including such a position held on an acting basis; (C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a current or former official described in subparagraph (B); (D) the Inspector General receives notice from the Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current or former official described in subparagraph (B); or (E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit, (a) Ombudsman of National Intelligence Authority.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority an Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) counsel, arbitrate, or offer recommendations on, and have the authority to initiate inquiries into, real or perceived problems of politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the National Intelligence Authority, or any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence community; (2) monitor the effectiveness of measures taken to deal with real or perceived politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the Authority, or any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence community; and (3) conduct reviews of the analytic product or products of the Authority, or any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or of any analysis of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence community, with such reviews to be conducted so as to ensure that analysis is timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community. (c) Analytic Review Unit.--(1) There is within the Office of the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority an Analytic Review Unit. (2) The Analytic Review Unit shall assist the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority in performing the duties and responsibilities of the Ombudsman set forth in subsection (b)(3). (3) The Ombudsman shall provide the Analytic Review Unit a staff who possess expertise in intelligence analysis that is appropriate for the function of the Unit. (4) In assisting the Ombudsman, the Analytic Review Unit shall, subject to the direction and control of the Ombudsman, conduct detailed evaluations of intelligence analysis by the following: (A) The National Intelligence Council. (B) The elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program. (C) To the extent involving the analysis of national intelligence, other elements of the intelligence community. (D) The divisions, offices, programs, officers, and employees of the elements specified in subparagraphs (B) and (C). (5) The results of the evaluations under paragraph (4) shall be provided to the congressional intelligence committees and, upon request, to appropriate heads of other departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch. (d) Access to Information.--In order to carry out the duties specified in subsection (c), the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority shall, unless otherwise directed by the President, have access to all analytic products, field reports, and raw intelligence of any element of the intelligence community, and to any reports or other material of an Inspector General, that might be pertinent to a matter under consideration by the Ombudsman. (e) Annual Reports.--The Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority shall submit to the National Intelligence Director and the congressional intelligence committees on an annual basis a report that includes-- (1) the assessment of the Ombudsman of the current level of politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the National Intelligence Authority, or any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence community; (2) such recommendations for remedial measures as the Ombudsman considers appropriate; and (3) an assessment of the effectiveness of remedial measures previously taken within the intelligence community on matters addressed by the Ombudsman. (f) Referral of Certain Matters for Investigation.--In addition to carrying out activities under this section, the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority may refer serious cases of misconduct related to politicization of intelligence information, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the intelligence community to the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority for investigation. (a) National Counterterrorism Center.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority a National Counterterrorism Center. (b) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--(1) There is a Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, and who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Any individual nominated for appointment as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall have significant expertise in matters relating to the national security of the United States and matters relating to terrorism that threatens the national security of the United States. (3) The individual serving as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may not, while so serving, serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community, except to the extent that the individual serving as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center is doing so in an acting capacity. (c) Supervision.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall report to the National Intelligence Director on-- (A) the budget and programs of the National Counterterrorism Center; and (B) the activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of the National Counterterrorism Center under subsection (g). (2) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall report to the President and the National Intelligence Director on the planning and progress of joint counterterrorism operations. (d) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National Counterterrorism Center shall be as follows: (1) To develop and unify strategy for the civilian and military counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government. (2) To integrate counterterrorism intelligence activities of the United States Government, both inside and outside the United States. (3) To develop interagency counterterrorism plans, which plans shall-- (A) involve more than one department, agency, or element of the executive branch (unless otherwise directed by the President); and (B) include the mission, objectives to be achieved, courses of action, parameters for such courses of action, coordination of agency operational activities, recommendations for operational plans, and assignment of departmental or agency responsibilities. (4) To ensure that the collection of counterterrorism intelligence, and the conduct of counterterrorism operations, by the United States Government are informed by the analysis of all-source intelligence. (e) Duties and Responsibilities of Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, at the direction of the President, the National Security Council, and the National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall-- (1) serve as the principal adviser to the President and the National Intelligence Director on joint operations relating to counterterrorism; (2) provide unified strategic direction for the civilian and military counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government and for the effective integration and deconfliction of counterterrorism intelligence and operations across agency boundaries, both inside and outside the United States; (3) advise the President and the National Intelligence Director on the extent to which the counterterrorism program recommendations and budget proposals of the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government conform to the priorities established by the President and the National Security Council; (4) in accordance with subsection (f), concur in, or advise the President on, the selections of personnel to head the operating entities of the United States Government with principal missions relating to counterterrorism; and (5) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence Director may prescribe or are prescribed by law. (f) Role of Director of National Counterterrorism Center in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual for nomination to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency concerned may fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be) without the concurrence of the Director, but shall notify the President that the Director does not concur in the appointment or recommendation (as the case may be). (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: (A) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency's Counterterrorist Center. (B) The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in charge of the Counterterrorism Division. (C) The Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the Department of State. (D) The head of such other operating entities of the United States Government having principal missions relating to counterterrorism as the President may designate for purposes of this subsection. (3) The President shall notify Congress of the designation of an operating entity of the United States Government under paragraph (2)(D) not later than 30 days after the date of such designation. (g) Directorate of Intelligence.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Intelligence. (2) The Directorate shall utilize the capabilities of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) transferred to the Directorate by section 323 and such other capabilities as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center considers appropriate. (3) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility within the United States Government for analysis of terrorism and terrorist organizations from all sources of intelligence, whether collected inside or outside the United States. (4) The Directorate shall-- (A) be the principal repository within the United States Government for all-source information on suspected terrorists, their organizations, and their capabilities; (B) propose intelligence collection requirements for action by elements of the intelligence community inside and outside the United States; (C) have primary responsibility within the United States Government for net assessments and warnings about terrorist threats, which assessments and warnings shall be based on a comparison of terrorist intentions and capabilities with assessed national vulnerabilities and countermeasures; and (D) perform such other duties and functions as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may prescribe. (h) Directorate of Planning.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Planning. (2) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility for developing interagency counterterrorism plans, as described in subsection (d)(3). (3) The Directorate shall-- (A) provide guidance, and develop strategy and interagency plans, to counter terrorist activities based on policy objectives and priorities established by the National Security Council; (B) develop interagency plans under subparagraph (A) utilizing input from personnel in other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government who have expertise in the priorities, functions, assets, programs, capabilities, and operations of such departments, agencies, and elements with respect to counterterrorism; (C) assign responsibilities for counterterrorism operations to the departments and agencies of the United States Government (including the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, and other departments and agencies of the United States Government), consistent with the authorities of such departments and agencies; (D) monitor the implementation of operations assigned under subparagraph (C) and update interagency plans for such operations as necessary; (E) report to the President and the National Intelligence Director on the compliance of the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States with the plans developed under subparagraph (A); and (F) perform such other duties and functions as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may prescribe. (4) The Directorate may not direct the execution of operations assigned under paragraph (3). (i) Staff.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may appoint deputy directors of the National Counterterrorism Center to oversee such portions of the operations of the Center as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate. (2) To assist the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center under this section, the National Intelligence Director shall employ in the National Counterterrorism Center a professional staff having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and responsibilities. (3) In providing for a professional staff for the National Counterterrorism Center under paragraph (2), the National Intelligence Director may establish as positions in the excepted service such positions in the Center as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate. (4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the analytical staff of the National Counterterrorism Center is comprised primarily of experts from elements in the intelligence community and from such other personnel in the United States Government as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate. (5)(A) In order to meet the requirements in paragraph (4), the National Intelligence Director shall, from time to time-- (i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to the National Counterterrorism Center from any other element of the intelligence community that the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate; and (ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or element of the United States Government and not funded within the National Intelligence Program, request the transfer, assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department, agency, or other element concerned. (B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director under subparagraph (A)(i). (ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government receiving a request for transfer, assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request. (6) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to the National Counterterrorism Center under this subsection shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center on all matters for which the Center has been assigned responsibility and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the missions of the Center. (7) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or detailed to the National Counterterrorism Center under this subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such personnel at the Center. (8) The supervisors of the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center may, with the approval of the National Intelligence Director, reward the staff of the Center for meritorious performance by the provision of such performance awards as the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe. (9) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center any responsibility, power, or authority of the National Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (8). (10) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center has access to all databases maintained by the elements of the intelligence community that are relevant to the duties of the Center. (j) Support and Cooperation of Other Agencies.--(1) The elements of the intelligence community and the other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government shall support, assist, and cooperate with the National Counterterrorism Center in carrying out its missions under this section. (2) The support, assistance, and cooperation of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government under this subsection shall include, but not be limited to-- (A) the implementation of interagency plans for operations, whether foreign or domestic, that are developed by the National Counterterrorism Center in a manner consistent with the laws and regulations of the United States and consistent with the limitation in subsection (h)(4); (B) cooperative work with the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center to ensure that ongoing operations of such department, agency, or element do not conflict with joint operations planned by the Center; (C) reports, upon request, to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center on the progress of such department, agency, or element in implementing responsibilities assigned to such department, agency, or element through joint operations plans; and (D) the provision to the analysts of the National Counterterrorism Center electronic access in real time to information and intelligence collected by such department, agency, or element that is relevant to the missions of the Center. (3) In the event of a disagreement between the National Intelligence Director and the head of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government on a plan developed or responsibility assigned by the National Counterterrorism Center under this subsection, the National Intelligence Director may either accede to the head of the department, agency, or element concerned or notify the President of the necessity of resolving the disagreement. (a) National Intelligence Centers.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may establish within the National Intelligence Authority one or more centers (to be known as ``national intelligence centers'') to address intelligence priorities established by the National Security Council. (2) Each national intelligence center established under this section shall be assigned an area of intelligence responsibility. (3) National intelligence centers shall be established at the direction of the President, as prescribed by law, or upon the initiative of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Establishment of Centers.--(1) In establishing a national intelligence center, the National Intelligence Director shall assign lead responsibility for administrative support for such center to an element of the intelligence community selected by the Director for that purpose. (2) The Director shall determine the structure and size of each national intelligence center. (3) The Director shall notify Congress of the establishment of each national intelligence center before the date of the establishment of such center. (c) Directors of Centers.--(1) Each national intelligence center shall have as its head a Director who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director for that purpose. (2) The Director of a national intelligence center shall serve as the principal adviser to the National Intelligence Director on intelligence matters with respect to the area of intelligence responsibility assigned to the center. (3) In carrying out duties under paragraph (2), the Director of a national intelligence center shall-- (A) manage the operations of the center; (B) coordinate the provision of administration and support by the element of the intelligence community with lead responsibility for the center under subsection (b)(1); (C) submit budget and personnel requests for the center to the National Intelligence Director; (D) seek such assistance from other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government as is needed to fulfill the mission of the center; and (E) advise the National Intelligence Director of the information technology, personnel, and other requirements of the center for the performance of its mission. (4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the Director of a national intelligence center has sufficient authority, direction, and control to effectively accomplish the mission of the center. (d) Mission of Centers.--Pursuant to the direction of the National Intelligence Director, each national intelligence center shall, in the area of intelligence responsibility assigned to the center by the Director pursuant to intelligence priorities established by the National Security Council-- (1) have primary responsibility for providing all-source analysis of intelligence based upon foreign intelligence gathered both abroad and domestically; (2) have primary responsibility for identifying and proposing to the National Intelligence Director intelligence collection and analysis requirements; (3) have primary responsibility for net assessments and warnings; (4) ensure that appropriate officials of the United States Government and other appropriate officials have access to a variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views; and (5) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence Director shall specify. (e) Information Sharing.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the Directors of the national intelligence centers and the other elements of the intelligence community undertake appropriate sharing of intelligence analysis and plans for operations in order to facilitate the activities of the centers. (2) In order to facilitate information sharing under paragraph (1), the Directors of the national intelligence centers shall-- (A) report directly to the National Intelligence Director regarding their activities under this section; and (B) coordinate with the Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director regarding such activities. (f) Staff.--(1) In providing for a professional staff for a national intelligence center, the National Intelligence Director may establish as positions in the excepted service such positions in the center as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate. (2)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall, from time to time-- (i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to a national intelligence center from any other element of the intelligence community that the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate; and (ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or element of the United States Government not funded within the National Intelligence Program, request the transfer, assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department, agency, or other element concerned. (B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director under subparagraph (A)(i). (ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government receiving a request for transfer, assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request. (3) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to a national intelligence center under this subsection shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the Director of the center on all matters for which the center has been assigned responsibility and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the mission of the center. (4) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or detailed to a national intelligence center under this subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such personnel at the center. (5) The supervisors of the staff of a national center may, with the approval of the National Intelligence Director, reward the staff of the center for meritorious performance by the provision of such performance awards as the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe. (6) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the Director of a national intelligence center any responsibility, power, or authority of the National Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (6). (7) The Director of a national intelligence center may recommend to the National Intelligence Director the reassignment to the home element concerned of any personnel previously assigned or detailed to the center from another element of the intelligence community. (g) Termination.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may terminate a national intelligence center if the National Intelligence Director determines that the center is no longer required to meet an intelligence priority established by the National Security Council. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall notify Congress of any determination made under paragraph (1) before carrying out such determination. The National Intelligence Director shall establish an integrated framework that brings together the educational components of the intelligence community in order to promote a more effective and productive intelligence community through cross-disciplinary education and joint training. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means each element of the intelligence community as determined by the National Intelligence Director. (2) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given that term under section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001). (3) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the Intelligence Community Scholarship Program established under subsection (b). (b) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director, in consultation with the head of each agency, shall establish a scholarship program (to be known as the ``Intelligence Community Scholarship Program'') to award scholarships to individuals that is designed to recruit and prepare students for civilian careers in the intelligence community to meet the critical needs of the intelligence community agencies. (2) Selection of recipients.-- (A) Merit and agency needs.--Individuals shall be selected to receive scholarships under this section through a competitive process primarily on the basis of academic merit and the needs of the agency. (B) Demonstrated commitment.--Individuals selected under this section shall have a demonstrated commitment to the field of study for which the scholarship is awarded. (3) Contractual agreements.--To carry out the Program the head of each agency shall enter into contractual agreements with individuals selected under paragraph (2) under which the individuals agree to serve as full-time employees of the agency, for the period described in subsection (h)(1), in positions needed by the agency and for which the individuals are qualified, in exchange for receiving a scholarship. (c) Eligibility.--In order to be eligible to participate in the Program, an individual shall-- (1) be enrolled or accepted for enrollment as a full-time student at an institution of higher education and be pursuing or intend to pursue undergraduate or graduate education in an academic field or discipline described in the list made available under subsection (e); (2) be a United States citizen; and (3) at the time of the initial scholarship award, not be an employee (as defined under section 2105 of title 5, United States Code). (d) Application.-- An individual seeking a scholarship under this section shall submit an application to the National Intelligence Director at such time, in such manner, and containing such information, agreements, or assurances as the Director may require. (e) Programs and Fields of Study.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) make publicly available a list of academic programs and fields of study for which scholarships under the Program may be used; and (2) update the list as necessary. (f) Scholarships.-- (1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director may provide a scholarship under the Program for an academic year if the individual applying for the scholarship has submitted to the Director, as part of the application required under subsection (d), a proposed academic program leading to a degree in a program or field of study on the list made available under subsection (e). (2) Limitation on years.--An individual may not receive a scholarship under this section for more than 4 academic years, unless the National Intelligence Director grants a waiver. (3) Student responsibilities.--Scholarship recipients shall maintain satisfactory academic progress. (4) Amount.--The dollar amount of a scholarship under this section for an academic year shall be determined under regulations issued by the National Intelligence Director, but shall in no case exceed the cost of tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses as established by the Director. (5) Use of scholarships.--A scholarship provided under this section may be expended for tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses as established by the National Intelligence Director by regulation. (6) Payment to institution of higher education.--The National Intelligence Director may enter into a contractual agreement with an institution of higher education under which the amounts provided for a scholarship under this section for tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses are paid directly to the institution with respect to which the scholarship is provided. (g) Special Consideration for Current Employees.-- (1) Set aside of scholarships.--Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (c), 10 percent of the scholarships awarded under this section shall be set aside for individuals who are employees of agencies on the date of enactment of this section to enhance the education of such employees in areas of critical needs of agencies. (2) Full- or part-time education.--Employees who are awarded scholarships under paragraph (1) shall be permitted to pursue undergraduate or graduate education under the scholarship on a full-time or part-time basis. (h) Employee Service.-- (1) Period of service.--Except as provided in subsection (j)(2), the period of service for which an individual shall be obligated to serve as an employee of the agency is 24 months for each academic year for which a scholarship under this section is provided. Under no circumstances shall the total period of obligated service be more than 8 years. (2) Beginning of service.-- (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), obligated service under paragraph (1) shall begin not later than 60 days after the individual obtains the educational degree for which the scholarship was provided. (B) Deferral.--In accordance with regulations established by the National Intelligence Director, the Director or designee may defer the obligation of an individual to provide a period of service under paragraph (1) if the Director or designee determines that such a deferral is appropriate. (i) Repayment.-- (1) In general.--Scholarship recipients who fail to maintain a high level of academic standing, as defined by the National Intelligence Director, who are dismissed from their educational institutions for disciplinary reasons, or who voluntarily terminate academic training before graduation from the educational program for which the scholarship was awarded, shall be in breach of their contractual agreement and, in lieu of any service obligation arising under such agreement, shall be liable to the United States for repayment within 1 year after the date of default of all scholarship funds paid to them and to the institution of higher education on their behalf under the agreement, except as provided in subsection (j)(2). The repayment period may be extended by the Director when determined to be necessary, as established by regulation. (2) Liability.--Scholarship recipients who, for any reason, fail to begin or complete their service obligation after completion of academic training, or fail to comply with the terms and conditions of deferment established by the National Intelligence Director under subsection (h)(2)(B), shall be in breach of their contractual agreement. When recipients breach their agreements for the reasons stated in the preceding sentence, the recipient shall be liable to the United States for an amount equal to-- (A) the total amount of scholarships received by such individual under this section; and (B) the interest on the amounts of such awards which would be payable if at the time the awards were received they were loans bearing interest at the maximum legal prevailing rate, as determined by the Treasurer of the United States, multiplied by 3. (j) Cancellation, Waiver, or Suspension of Obligation.-- (1) Cancellation.--Any obligation of an individual incurred under the Program (or a contractual agreement thereunder) for service or payment shall be canceled upon the death of the individual. (2) Waiver or suspension.--The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations to provide for the partial or total waiver or suspension of any obligation of service or payment incurred by an individual under the Program (or a contractual agreement thereunder) whenever compliance by the individual is impossible or would involve extreme hardship to the individual, or if enforcement of such obligation with respect to the individual would be contrary to the best interests of the Government. (k) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations necessary to carry out this section. (a) Disposal of Property.--(1) If specifically authorized to dispose of real property of the National Intelligence Authority under any law enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall, subject to paragraph (2), exercise such authority in strict compliance with subchapter IV of chapter 5 of title 40, United States Code. (2) The Director shall deposit the proceeds of any disposal of property of the National Intelligence Authority into the miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury in accordance with section 3302(b) of title 31, United States Code. (b) Gifts.--Gifts or donations of services or property of or for the National Intelligence Authority may not be accepted, used, or disposed of unless specifically permitted in advance in an appropriations Act and only under the conditions and for the purposes specified in such appropriations Act. (a) Acquisitions of Major Systems.--(1) For each intelligence program for the acquisition of a major system, the National Intelligence Director shall-- (A) require the development and implementation of a program management plan that includes cost, schedule, and performance goals and program milestone criteria; (B) subject to paragraph (4), serve as the exclusive milestone decision authority; and (C) periodically-- (i) review and assess the progress made toward the achievement of the goals and milestones established in such plan; and (ii) submit to Congress a report on the results of such review and assessment. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe guidance for the development and implementation of program management plans under this subsection. In prescribing such guidance, the Director shall review Department of Defense guidance on program management plans for Department of Defense programs for the acquisition of major systems and, to the extent feasible, incorporate the principles of the Department of Defense guidance into the Director's guidance under this subsection. (3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the authority of the National Intelligence Director to delegate to any other official any authority to perform the responsibilities of the Director under this subsection. (4)(A) The authority conferred by paragraph (1)(B) shall not apply to Department of Defense programs until the National Intelligence Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that the National Intelligence Authority has the personnel and capability to fully and effectively carry out such authority. (B) The National Intelligence Director may assign any authority under this subsection to the Secretary of Defense. The assignment of such authority shall be made pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between the Director and the Secretary. (5) In this subsection: (A) The term ``intelligence program'', with respect to the acquisition of a major system, means a program that-- (i) is carried out to acquire such major system for an element of the intelligence community; and (ii) is funded in whole out of amounts available for the National Intelligence Program. (B) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given such term in section 4(9) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 403(9)). (b) Availability of Funds.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law (other than the provisions of this Act), sums appropriated or otherwise made available to the National Intelligence Authority may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its functions, including any function performed by the National Intelligence Authority that is described in section 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403j(a)). (c) Relationship of Director's Authority to Other Laws on Acquisition and Management of Property and Services.--Section 113(e) of title 40, United States Code, is amended-- (A) by striking ``or'' at the end of paragraph (18); (B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (19) and inserting ``; or''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(20) the National Intelligence Director.''. (d) National Intelligence Director Report on Enhancement of NSA and NGIA Acquisition Authorities.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) review-- (A) the acquisition authority of the Director of the National Security Agency; and (B) the acquisition authority of the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and (2) submit to the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives a report setting forth any recommended enhancements of the acquisition authorities of the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency that the National Intelligence Director considers necessary. (e) Comptroller General Report on Acquisition Policies and Procedures.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to Congress a report on the extent to which the policies and procedures adopted for managing the acquisition of major systems for national intelligence purposes, as identified by the National Intelligence Director, are likely to result in successful cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. (a) In General.--In addition to the authorities provided in section 114, the National Intelligence Director may exercise with respect to the personnel of the National Intelligence Authority any authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment of this Act to the same extent, and subject to the same conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect to personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Rights and Protections of Employees and Applicants.-- Employees and applicants for employment of the National Intelligence Authority shall have the same rights and protections under the Authority as employees of the Central Intelligence Agency have under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Political Service of Personnel.--Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subclause (XII), by striking ``or'' at the end; and (2) by inserting after subclause (XIII) the following new subclause: ``(XIV) the National Intelligence Authority; or''. (b) Deletion of Information About Foreign Gifts.--Section 7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)''; (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking ``the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) In transmitting such listings for the National Intelligence Authority, the National Intelligence Director may delete the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources.''. (c) Exemption from Financial Disclosures.--Section 105(a)(1) of the Ethics in Government Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by inserting ``the National Intelligence Authority,'' before ``the Central Intelligence Agency''. (a) Amounts Requested Each Fiscal Year.--The President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. (b) Amounts Authorized and Appropriated Each Fiscal Year.-- Congress shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, by Congress for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. (c) Study of Disclosure of Additional Information.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall conduct a study to assess the advisability of disclosing to the public amounts as follows: (A) The aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for each fiscal year for each element of the intelligence community. (B) The aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, by Congress for each fiscal year for each element of the intelligence community. (2) The study under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) address whether or not the disclosure to the public of the information referred to in that paragraph would harm the national security of the United States; and (B) take into specific account concerns relating to the disclosure of such information for each element of the intelligence community. (3) Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this section, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the study under paragraph (1). (a) Merger of Homeland Security Council Into National Security Council.--Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended-- (1) in the fourth undesignated paragraph of subsection (a), by striking clauses (5) and (6) and inserting the following new clauses: ``(5) the Attorney General; ``(6) the Secretary of Homeland Security;''; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(3) assess the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in the interests of homeland security and make recommendations to the President based on such assessments; ``(4) oversee and review the homeland security policies of the Federal Government and make recommendations to the President based on such oversight and review; and ``(5) perform such other functions as the President may direct.''. (c) Repeal of Superseded Authority.--(1) Title IX of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 491 et seq.) is repealed. (2) The table of contents for that Act is amended by striking the items relating to title IX. Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 101 the following new section: (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States in its final report stated that, under Director Robert Mueller, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has made significant progress in improving its intelligence capabilities. (2) In the report, the members of the Commission also urged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation fully institutionalize the shift of the Bureau to a preventive counterterrorism posture. (b) Improvement of Intelligence Capabilities.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall continue efforts to improve the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to develop and maintain within the Bureau a national intelligence workforce. (c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and maintaining a national intelligence workforce under subsection (b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, subject to the direction and control of the President, develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence within the Federal Bureau of Investigation an institutional culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau. (2) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the enactment of this Act shall receive basic training in both criminal justice matters and national intelligence matters. (3) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the enactment of this Act shall, to the maximum extent practicable, be given the opportunity to undergo, during such agent's early service with the Bureau, meaningful assignments in criminal justice matters and in national intelligence matters. (4) The Director shall-- (A) establish career positions in national intelligence matters for agents and analysts of the Bureau; and (B) in furtherance of the requirement under subparagraph (A) and to the maximum extent practicable, afford agents and analysts of the Bureau the opportunity to work in the career specialty selected by such agents and analysts over their entire career with the Bureau. (5) The Director shall carry out a program to enhance the capacity of the Bureau to recruit and retain individuals with backgrounds in intelligence, international relations, language, technology, and other skills relevant to the intelligence mission of the Bureau. (6) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, afford the analysts of the Bureau training and career opportunities commensurate with the training and career opportunities afforded analysts in other elements of the intelligence community. (7) Commencing as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, each direct supervisor of a Field Intelligence Group, and each Bureau Operational Manager at the Section Chief and Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) level and above, shall be a certified intelligence officer. (8) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, ensure that the successful discharge of advanced training courses, and of one or more assignments to another element of the intelligence community, is a precondition to advancement to higher level intelligence assignments within the Bureau. (d) Field Office Matters.--(1) In improving the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under subsection (b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall ensure that each Field Intelligence Group reports directly to a field office senior manager responsible for intelligence matters. (2) The Director shall provide for such expansion of the secure facilities in the field offices of the Bureau as is necessary to ensure the discharge by the field offices of the intelligence mission of the Bureau. (3) The Director shall require that each Field Intelligence Group manager ensures the integration of analysts, agents, linguists, and surveillance personnel in the field. (e) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, modify the budget structure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to organize the budget according to the four principal missions of the Bureau as follows: (1) Intelligence. (2) Counterterrorism and counterintelligence. (3) Criminal Enterprises/Federal Crimes. (4) Criminal justice services. (f) Reports.--(1) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to Congress a report on the progress made as of the date of such report in carrying out the requirements of this section. (2) The Director shall include in each annual program review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that is submitted to Congress a report on the progress made by each field office of the Bureau during the period covered by such review in addressing Bureau and national program priorities. (3) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the Director shall submit to Congress a report assessing the qualifications, status, and roles of analysts at Bureau headquarters and in the field offices of the Bureau. (4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the progress of the Bureau in implementing information-sharing principles. (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Career Service Authorization Act of 2005''. (b) Establishment of Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Career Service.-- (1) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management-- (A) may establish positions for intelligence analysts, without regard to chapter 51 of title 5, United States Code; (B) shall prescribe standards and procedures for establishing and classifying such positions; and (C) may fix the rate of basic pay for such positions, without regard to subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, if the rate of pay is not greater than the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule. (2) Levels of performance.--Any performance management system established for intelligence analysts shall have at least 1 level of performance above a retention standard. (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not less than 60 days before the date of the implementation of authorities authorized under this section, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit an operating plan describing the Director's intended use of the authorities under this section to-- (1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives; (2) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; (3) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives; (4) the congressional intelligence committees; and (5) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (d) Annual Report.--Not later than December 31, 2005, and annually thereafter for 4 years, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit an annual report of the use of the permanent authorities provided under this section during the preceding fiscal year to-- (1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives; (2) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; (3) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives; (4) the congressional intelligence committees; and (5) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Advisory board.--The term ``Advisory Board'' means the Advisory Board on Information Sharing established under subsection (i). (2) Executive council.--The term ``Executive Council'' means the Executive Council on Information Sharing established under subsection (h). (3) Homeland security information.--The term ``homeland security information'' means all information, whether collected, produced, or distributed by intelligence, law enforcement, military, homeland security, or other activities relating to-- (A) the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals, or of domestic groups or individuals involved in transnational terrorism; (B) threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other nations; (C) communications of or by such groups or individuals; or (D) groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with such groups or individuals. (4) Network.--The term ``Network'' means the Information Sharing Network described under subsection (c). (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The effective use of information, from all available sources, is essential to the fight against terror and the protection of our homeland. The biggest impediment to all- source analysis, and to a greater likelihood of ``connecting the dots'', is resistance to sharing information. (2) The United States Government has access to a vast amount of information, including not only traditional intelligence but also other government databases, such as those containing customs or immigration information. However, the United States Government has a weak system for processing and using the information it has. (3) In the period preceding September 11, 2001, there were instances of potentially helpful information that was available but that no person knew to ask for; information that was distributed only in compartmented channels, and information that was requested but could not be shared. (4) Current security requirements nurture over- classification and excessive compartmentalization of information among agencies. Each agency's incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks, including criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions, but few rewards for sharing information. (5) The current system, in which each intelligence agency has its own security practices, requires a demonstrated ``need to know'' before sharing. This approach assumes that it is possible to know, in advance, who will need to use the information. An outgrowth of the cold war, such a system implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. Such assumptions are no longer appropriate. Although counterintelligence concerns are still real, the costs of not sharing information are also substantial. The current ``need-to-know'' culture of information protection needs to be replaced with a ``need-to- share'' culture of integration. (6) A new approach to the sharing of intelligence and homeland security information is urgently needed. An important conceptual model for a new ``trusted information network'' is the Systemwide Homeland Analysis and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Network proposed by a task force of leading professionals assembled by the Markle Foundation and described in reports issued in October 2002 and December 2003. (7) No single agency can create a meaningful information sharing system on its own. Alone, each agency can only modernize stovepipes, not replace them. Presidential leadership is required to bring about governmentwide change. (c) Information Sharing Network.-- (1) Establishment.--The President shall establish a trusted information network and secure information sharing environment to promote sharing of intelligence and homeland security information in a manner consistent with national security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties, and based on clearly defined and consistently applied policies and procedures, and valid investigative, analytical or operational requirements. (2) Attributes.--The Network shall promote coordination, communication and collaboration of people and information among all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State, tribal, and local authorities, and relevant private sector entities, including owners and operators of critical infrastructure, by using policy guidelines and technologies that support-- (A) a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment that connects existing systems where appropriate and allows users to share information among agencies, between levels of government, and, as appropriate, with the private sector; (B) the sharing of information in a form and manner that facilitates its use in analysis, investigations and operations; (C) building upon existing systems capabilities currently in use across the Government; (D) utilizing industry best practices, including minimizing the centralization of data and seeking to use common tools and capabilities whenever possible; (E) employing an information access management approach that controls access to data rather than to just networks; (F) facilitating the sharing of information at and across all levels of security by using policy guidelines and technologies that support writing information that can be broadly shared; (G) providing directory services for locating people and information; (H) incorporating protections for individuals' privacy and civil liberties; (I) incorporating strong mechanisms for information security and privacy and civil liberties guideline enforcement in order to enhance accountability and facilitate oversight, including-- (i) multifactor authentication and access control; (ii) strong encryption and data protection; (iii) immutable audit capabilities; (iv) automated policy enforcement; (v) perpetual, automated screening for abuses of network and intrusions; and (vi) uniform classification and handling procedures; (J) compliance with requirements of applicable law and guidance with regard to the planning, design, acquisition, operation, and management of information systems; and (K) permitting continuous system upgrades to benefit from advances in technology while preserving the integrity of stored data. (d) Immediate Actions.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Executive Council, shall-- (1) submit to the President and to Congress a description of the technological, legal, and policy issues presented by the creation of the Network described in subsection (c), and the way in which these issues will be addressed; (2) establish electronic directory services to assist in locating in the Federal Government intelligence and homeland security information and people with relevant knowledge about intelligence and homeland security information; and (3) conduct a review of relevant current Federal agency capabilities, including-- (A) a baseline inventory of current Federal systems that contain intelligence or homeland security information; (B) the money currently spent to maintain those systems; and (C) identification of other information that should be included in the Network. (e) Guidelines and Requirements.--As soon as possible, but in no event later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall-- (1) in consultation with the Executive Council-- (A) issue guidelines for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using information, including guidelines to ensure that information is provided in its most shareable form, such as by separating out data from the sources and methods by which that data are obtained; and (B) on classification policy and handling procedures across Federal agencies, including commonly accepted processing and access controls; (2) in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board established under section 211, issue guidelines that-- (A) protect privacy and civil liberties in the development and use of the Network; and (B) shall be made public, unless, and only to the extent that, nondisclosure is clearly necessary to protect national security; and (3) require the heads of Federal departments and agencies to promote a culture of information sharing by-- (A) reducing disincentives to information sharing, including overclassification of information and unnecessary requirements for originator approval; and (B) providing affirmative incentives for information sharing, such as the incorporation of information sharing performance measures into agency and managerial evaluations, and employee awards for promoting innovative information sharing practices. (f) Enterprise Architecture and Implementation Plan.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Management and Budget shall submit to the President and to Congress an enterprise architecture and implementation plan for the Network. The enterprise architecture and implementation plan shall be prepared by the Director of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Executive Council, and shall include-- (1) a description of the parameters of the proposed Network, including functions, capabilities, and resources; (2) a delineation of the roles of the Federal departments and agencies that will participate in the development of the Network, including identification of any agency that will build the infrastructure needed to operate and manage the Network (as distinct from the individual agency components that are to be part of the Network), with the delineation of roles to be consistent with-- (A) the authority of the National Intelligence Director under this Act to set standards for information sharing and information technology throughout the intelligence community; and (B) the authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the role of the Department of Homeland Security in coordinating with State, tribal, and local officials and the private sector; (3) a description of the technological requirements to appropriately link and enhance existing networks and a description of the system design that will meet these requirements; (4) an enterprise architecture that-- (A) is consistent with applicable laws and guidance with regard to planning, design, acquisition, operation, and management of information systems; (B) will be used to guide and define the development and implementation of the Network; and (C) addresses the existing and planned enterprise architectures of the departments and agencies participating in the Network; (5) a description of how privacy and civil liberties will be protected throughout the design and implementation of the Network; (6) objective, systemwide performance measures to enable the assessment of progress toward achieving full implementation of the Network; (7) a plan, including a time line, for the development and phased implementation of the Network; (8) total budget requirements to develop and implement the Network, including the estimated annual cost for each of the 5 years following the date of the enactment of this Act; and (9) proposals for any legislation that the Director of Management and Budget determines necessary to implement the Network. (g) Director of Management and Budget Responsible for Information Sharing Across the Federal Government.-- (1) Additional duties and responsibilities.-- (A) In general.--The Director of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Executive Council, shall-- (i) implement and manage the Network; (ii) develop and implement policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards as appropriate to foster the development and proper operation of the Network; and (iii) assist, monitor, and assess the implementation of the Network by Federal departments and agencies to ensure adequate progress, technological consistency and policy compliance; and regularly report the findings to the President and to Congress. (B) Content of policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards.--The policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall-- (i) take into account the varying missions and security requirements of agencies participating in the Network; (ii) address development, implementation, and oversight of technical standards and requirements; (iii) address and facilitate information sharing between and among departments and agencies of the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, the Homeland Security community and the law enforcement community; (iv) address and facilitate information sharing between Federal departments and agencies and State, tribal and local governments; (v) address and facilitate, as appropriate, information sharing between Federal departments and agencies and the private sector; (vi) address and facilitate, as appropriate, information sharing between Federal departments and agencies with foreign partners and allies; and (vii) ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties. (2) Appointment of principal officer.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Management and Budget shall appoint, with approval of the President, a principal officer in the Office of Management and Budget whose primary responsibility shall be to carry out the day-to-day duties of the Director specified in this section. The officer shall report directly to the Director of Management and Budget, have the rank of a Deputy Director and shall be paid at the rate of pay payable for a position at level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code. (h) Executive Council on Information Sharing.-- (1) Establishment.--There is established an Executive Council on Information Sharing that shall assist the Director of Management and Budget in the execution of the Director's duties under this Act concerning information sharing. (2) Membership.--The members of the Executive Council shall be-- (A) the Director of Management and Budget, who shall serve as Chairman of the Executive Council; (B) the Secretary of Homeland Security or his designee; (C) the Secretary of Defense or his designee; (D) the Attorney General or his designee; (E) the Secretary of State or his designee; (F) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or his designee; (G) the National Intelligence Director or his designee; (H) such other Federal officials as the President shall designate; (I) representatives of State, tribal, and local governments, to be appointed by the President; and (J) individuals who are employed in private businesses or nonprofit organizations that own or operate critical infrastructure, to be appointed by the President. (3) Responsibilities.--The Executive Council shall assist the Director of Management and Budget in-- (A) implementing and managing the Network; (B) developing policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards necessary to establish and implement the Network; (C) ensuring there is coordination among departments and agencies participating in the Network in the development and implementation of the Network; (D) reviewing, on an ongoing basis, policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards related to the implementation of the Network; (E) establishing a dispute resolution process to resolve disagreements among departments and agencies about whether particular information should be shared and in what manner; and (F) considering such reports as are submitted by the Advisory Board on Information Sharing under subsection (i)(2). (4) Inapplicability of federal advisory committee act.--The Council shall not be subject to the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). (5) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of Management and Budget, in the capacity of Chair of the Executive Council, shall submit a report to the President and to Congress that shall include-- (A) a description of the activities and accomplishments of the Council in the preceding year; and (B) the number and dates of the meetings held by the Council and a list of attendees at each meeting. (6) Informing the public.--The Executive Council shall-- (A) make its reports to Congress available to the public to the greatest extent that is consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law; and (B) otherwise inform the public of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (i) Advisory Board on Information Sharing.-- (1) Establishment.--There is established an Advisory Board on Information Sharing to advise the President and the Executive Council on policy, technical, and management issues related to the design and operation of the Network. (2) Responsibilities.--The Advisory Board shall advise the Executive Council on policy, technical, and management issues related to the design and operation of the Network. At the request of the Executive Council, or the Director of Management and Budget in the capacity as Chair of the Executive Council, or on its own initiative, the Advisory Board shall submit reports to the Executive Council concerning the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Board regarding the design and operation of the Network. (3) Membership and qualifications.--The Advisory Board shall be composed of no more than 15 members, to be appointed by the President from outside the Federal Government. The members of the Advisory Board shall have significant experience or expertise in policy, technical and operational matters, including issues of security, privacy, or civil liberties, and shall be selected solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, achievements, public stature and relevant experience. (4) Chair.--The President shall designate one of the members of the Advisory Board to act as chair of the Advisory Board. (5) Administrative support.--The Office of Management and Budget shall provide administrative support for the Advisory Board. (j) Reports.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the President through the Director of Management and Budget shall submit a report to Congress on the state of the Network and of information sharing across the Federal Government. (2) Content.--Each report under this subsection shall include-- (A) a progress report on the extent to which the Network has been implemented, including how the Network has fared on the government-wide and agency-specific performance measures and whether the performance goals set in the preceding year have been met; (B) objective systemwide performance goals for the following year; (C) an accounting of how much was spent on the Network in the preceding year; (D) actions taken to ensure that agencies procure new technology that is consistent with the Network and information on whether new systems and technology are consistent with the Network; (E) the extent to which, in appropriate circumstances, all terrorism watch lists are available for combined searching in real time through the Network and whether there are consistent standards for placing individuals on, and removing individuals from, the watch lists, including the availability of processes for correcting errors; (F) the extent to which unnecessary roadblocks, impediments, or disincentives to information sharing, including the inappropriate use of paper-only intelligence products and requirements for originator approval, have been eliminated; (G) the extent to which positive incentives for information sharing have been implemented; (H) the extent to which classified information is also made available through the Network, in whole or in part, in unclassified form; (I) the extent to which State, tribal, and local officials-- (i) are participating in the Network; (ii) have systems which have become integrated into the Network; (iii) are providing as well as receiving information; and (iv) are using the Network to communicate with each other; (J) the extent to which-- (i) private sector data, including information from owners and operators of critical infrastructure, is incorporated in the Network; and (ii) the private sector is both providing and receiving information; (K) where private sector data has been used by the Government or has been incorporated into the Network-- (i) the measures taken to protect sensitive business information; and (ii) where the data involves information about individuals, the measures taken to ensure the accuracy of such data; (L) the measures taken by the Federal Government to ensure the accuracy of other information on the Network and, in particular, the accuracy of information about individuals; (M) an assessment of the Network's privacy and civil liberties protections, including actions taken in the preceding year to implement or enforce privacy and civil liberties protections and a report of complaints received about interference with an individual's privacy or civil liberties; and (N) an assessment of the security protections of the Network. (k) Agency Responsibilities.--The head of each department or agency possessing or using intelligence or homeland security information or otherwise participating in the Network shall-- (1) ensure full department or agency compliance with information sharing policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards established for the Network under subsections (c) and (g); (2) ensure the provision of adequate resources for systems and activities supporting operation of and participation in the Network; and (3) ensure full agency or department cooperation in the development of the Network and associated enterprise architecture to implement governmentwide information sharing, and in the management and acquisition of information technology consistent with applicable law. (l) Agency Plans and Reports.--Each Federal department or agency that possesses or uses intelligence and homeland security information, operates a system in the Network or otherwise participates, or expects to participate, in the Network, shall submit to the Director of Management and Budget-- (1) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, a report including-- (A) a strategic plan for implementation of the Network's requirements within the department or agency; (B) objective performance measures to assess the progress and adequacy of the department or agency's information sharing efforts; and (C) budgetary requirements to integrate the agency into the Network, including projected annual expenditures for each of the following 5 years following the submission of the report; and (2) annually thereafter, reports including-- (A) an assessment of the progress of the department or agency in complying with the Network's requirements, including how well the agency has performed on the objective measures developed under paragraph (1)(B); (B) the agency's expenditures to implement and comply with the Network's requirements in the preceding year; and (C) the agency's or department's plans for further implementation of the Network in the year following the submission of the report. (m) Periodic Assessments.-- (1) Comptroller general.-- (A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and periodically thereafter, the Comptroller General shall evaluate the implementation of the Network, both generally and, at the discretion of the Comptroller General, within specific departments and agencies, to determine the extent of compliance with the Network's requirements and to assess the effectiveness of the Network in improving information sharing and collaboration and in protecting privacy and civil liberties, and shall report to Congress on the findings of the Comptroller General. (B) Information available to the comptroller general.--Upon request by the Comptroller General, information relevant to an evaluation under subsection (a) shall be made available to the Comptroller General under section 716 of title 31, United States Code. (C) Consultation with congressional committees.--If a record is not made available to the Comptroller General within a reasonable time, before the Comptroller General files a report under section 716(b)(1) of title 31, United States Code, the Comptroller General shall consult with the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives concerning the Comptroller's intent to file a report. (2) Inspectors general.--The Inspector General in any Federal department or agency that possesses or uses intelligence or homeland security information or that otherwise participates in the Network shall, at the discretion of the Inspector General-- (A) conduct audits or investigations to-- (i) determine the compliance of that department or agency with the Network's requirements; and (ii) assess the effectiveness of that department or agency in improving information sharing and collaboration and in protecting privacy and civil liberties; and (B) issue reports on such audits and investigations. (n) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated-- (1) $50,000,000 to the Director of Management and Budget to carry out this section for fiscal year 2005; and (2) such sums as are necessary to carry out this section in each fiscal year thereafter, to be disbursed and allocated in accordance with the Network implementation plan required by subsection (f). (a) In General.--There is established within the Executive Office of the President a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (referred to in this subtitle as the ``Board''). (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the Government may need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of its existing powers. (2) This shift of power and authority to the Government calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of life and to ensure that the Government uses its powers for the purposes for which the powers were given. (c) Purpose.--The Board shall-- (1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism; and (2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism. (d) Functions.-- (1) Advice and counsel on policy development and implementation.--The Board shall-- (A) review proposed legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including the development and adoption of information sharing guidelines under section 205(g); (B) review the implementation of new and existing legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including the implementation of information sharing guidelines under section 205(g); (C) advise the President and the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of such legislation, regulations, policies, and guidelines; and (D) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a particular governmental power, consider whether the department, agency, or element of the executive branch has explained-- (i) that the power actually materially enhances security; (ii) that there is adequate supervision of the use by the executive branch of the power to ensure protection of privacy and civil liberties; and (iii) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use. (2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review-- (A) the regulations, policies, and procedures, and the implementation of the regulations, policies, and procedures, of the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are protected; (B) the information sharing practices of the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch to determine whether they appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties and adhere to the information sharing guidelines prescribed under section 205(g) and to other governing laws, regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil liberties; and (C) other actions by the executive branch related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to determine whether such actions-- (i) appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties; and (ii) are consistent with governing laws, regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil liberties. (3) Relationship with privacy and civil liberties officers.--The Board shall-- (A) review and assess reports and other information from privacy officers and civil liberties officers described in section 212; (B) when appropriate, make recommendations to such privacy officers and civil liberties officers regarding their activities; and (C) when appropriate, coordinate the activities of such privacy officers and civil liberties officers on relevant interagency matters. (4) Testimony.--The Members of the Board shall appear and testify before Congress upon request. (e) Reports.-- (1) In general.--The Board shall-- (A) receive and review reports from privacy officers and civil liberties officers described in section 212; and (B) periodically submit, not less than semiannually, reports-- (i)(I) to the appropriate committees of Congress, including the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (II) to the President; and (ii) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary. (2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each year under paragraph (1)(B) shall include-- (A) a description of the major activities of the Board during the preceding period; and (B) information on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and oversight functions under subsection (d). (f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall-- (1) make its reports, including its reports to Congress, available to the public to the greatest extent that is consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law; and (2) hold public hearings and otherwise inform the public of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (g) Access To Information.-- (1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this section, the Board is authorized to-- (A) have access from any department, agency, or element of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or employee, to all relevant records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other relevant material, including classified information consistent with applicable law; (B) interview, take statements from, or take public testimony from personnel of any department, agency, or element of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or employee; (C) request information or assistance from any State, tribal, or local government; and (D) require, by subpoena issued at the direction of a majority of the members of the Board, persons (other than departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch) to produce any relevant information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other documentary or testimonial evidence. (2) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(D), the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found may issue an order requiring such person to produce the evidence required by such subpoena. (3) Agency cooperation.--Whenever information or assistance requested under subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) is, in the judgment of the Board, unreasonably refused or not provided, the Board shall report the circumstances to the head of the department, agency, or element concerned without delay. The head of the department, agency, or element concerned shall ensure that the Board is given access to the information, assistance, material, or personnel the Board determines to be necessary to carry out its functions. (h) Membership.-- (1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a full-time chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be selected solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, achievements, public stature, expertise in civil liberties and privacy, and relevant experience, and without regard to political affiliation, but in no event shall more than 3 members of the Board be members of the same political party. (3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected official, officer, or employee of the Federal Government, other than in the capacity as a member of the Board. (4) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a term of six years, except that-- (A) a member appointed to a term of office after the commencement of such term may serve under such appointment only for the remainder of such term; (B) upon the expiration of the term of office of a member, the member shall continue to serve until the member's successor has been appointed and qualified, except that no member may serve under this subparagraph-- (i) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session unless a nomination to fill the vacancy shall have been submitted to the Senate; or (ii) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the Senate in which such nomination is submitted; and (C) the members initially appointed under this subsection shall serve terms of two, three, four, five, and six years, respectively, from the effective date of this Act, with the term of each such member to be designated by the President. (5) Quorum and Meetings.--After its initial meeting, the Board shall meet upon the call of the chairman or a majority of its members. Three members of the Board shall constitute a quorum. (i) Compensation and Travel Expenses.-- (1) Compensation.-- (A) Chairman.--The chairman shall be compensated at the rate of pay payable for a position at level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code. (B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall be compensated at a rate of pay payable for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Board. (2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for persons employed intermittently by the Government under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Board. (j) Staff.-- (1) Appointment and compensation.--The Chairman, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Board, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a full-time executive director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Board to carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code. (2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed to the Board without reimbursement from the Board, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of the detailee's regular employment without interruption. (3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates that do not exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such title. (k) Security Clearances.--The appropriate departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch shall cooperate with the Board to expeditiously provide the Board members and staff with appropriate security clearances to the extent possible under existing procedures and requirements. (l) Treatment as Agency, Not as Advisory Committee.--The Board-- (1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code); and (2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in section 3(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)). (a) Designation and Functions.--The Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the National Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the head of any other department, agency, or element of the executive branch designated by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to be appropriate for coverage under this section shall designate not less than 1 senior officer to-- (1) assist the head of such department, agency, or element and other officials of such department, agency, or element in appropriately considering privacy and civil liberties concerns when such officials are proposing, developing, or implementing laws, regulations, policies, procedures, or guidelines related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism; (2) periodically investigate and review department, agency, or element actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, and related laws and their implementation to ensure that such department, agency, or element is adequately considering privacy and civil liberties in its actions; (3) ensure that such department, agency, or element has adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond to, and redress complaints from individuals who allege such department, agency, or element has violated their privacy or civil liberties; and (4) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a particular governmental power the officer shall consider whether such department, agency, or element has explained-- (i) that the power actually materially enhances security; (ii) that there is adequate supervision of the use by such department, agency, or element of the power to ensure protection of privacy and civil liberties; and (iii) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use. (b) Exception To Designation Authority.-- (1) Privacy officers.--In any department, agency, or element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the Board, which has a statutorily created privacy officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified in subsection (a) with respect to privacy. (2) Civil liberties officers.--In any department, agency, or element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the Board, which has a statutorily created civil liberties officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified in subsection (a) with respect to civil liberties. (c) Supervision and Coordination.--Each privacy officer or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b) shall-- (1) report directly to the head of the department, agency, or element concerned; and (2) coordinate their activities with the Inspector General of such department, agency, or element to avoid duplication of effort. (d) Agency Cooperation.--The head of each department, agency, or element shall ensure that each privacy officer and civil liberties officer-- (1) has the information, material, and resources necessary to fulfill the functions of such officer; (2) is advised of proposed policy changes; (3) is consulted by decision makers; and (4) is given access to material and personnel the officer determines to be necessary to carry out the functions of such officer. (e) Reprisal for Making Complaint.--No action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making a complaint or for disclosing information to a privacy officer or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b), or to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, that indicates a possible violation of privacy protections or civil liberties in the administration of the programs and operations of the Federal Government relating to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism shall be taken by any Federal employee in a position to take such action, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity. (f) Periodic Reports.-- (1) In general.--The privacy officers and civil liberties officers of each department, agency, or element referred to or described in subsection (a) or (b) shall periodically, but not less than quarterly, submit a report on the activities of such officers-- (A)(i) to the appropriate committees of Congress, including the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; (ii) to the head of such department, agency, or element; and (iii) to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; and (B) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary. (2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include information on the discharge of each of the functions of the officer concerned, including-- (A) information on the number and types of reviews undertaken; (B) the type of advice provided and the response given to such advice; (C) the number and nature of the complaints received by the department, agency, or element concerned for alleged violations; and (D) a summary of the disposition of such complaints, the reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the activities of such officer. (g) Informing the Public.--Each privacy officer and civil liberties officer shall-- (1) make the reports of such officer, including reports to Congress, available to the public to the greatest extent that is consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law; and (2) otherwise inform the public of the activities of such officer, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (h) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or otherwise supplant any other authorities or responsibilities provided by law to privacy officers or civil liberties officers. (a) Location Outside Executive Office of the President.-- The National Intelligence Director shall not be located within the Executive Office of the President. (b) Provision of National Intelligence.--The National Intelligence Director shall provide to the President and Congress national intelligence that is timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy goals. (a) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall provide to the President, Congress, and the National Intelligence Director national intelligence related to counterterrorism that is timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy goals. (b) Directors of National Intelligence Centers.--Each Director of a national intelligence center established under section 144 shall provide to the President, Congress, and the National Intelligence Director intelligence information that is timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy goals. (c) Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall ensure that intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is objective and independent of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy goals. (d) National Intelligence Council.--The National Intelligence Council shall produce national intelligence estimates for the United States Government that are timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and have not been shaped to serve policy goals. No officer, department, agency, or element of the executive branch shall have any authority to require the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center-- (1) to receive permission to testify before Congress; or (2) to submit testimony, legislative recommendations, or comments to any officer or agency of the United States for approval, comments, or review prior to the submission of such recommendations, testimony, or comments to Congress if such recommendations, testimony, or comments include a statement indicating that the views expressed therein are those of the agency submitting them and do not necessarily represent the views of the Administration. (a) Documents Required To Be Provided to Congressional Committees.--The National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and the Director of a national intelligence center shall provide to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and any other committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the subject matter to which the information relates, all intelligence assessments, intelligence estimates, sense of intelligence community memoranda, and daily senior executive intelligence briefs, other than the Presidential Daily Brief and those reports prepared exclusively for the President. (b) Response to Requests from Congress Required.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), in addition to providing material under subsection (a), the National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, or the Director of a national intelligence center shall, not later than 15 days after receiving a request for any intelligence assessment, report, or estimate or other intelligence information from the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, or any other committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the subject matter to which the information relates, make available to such committee such intelligence assessment, report, or estimate or other intelligence information. (2) Certain members.--In addition to requests described in paragraph (1), the National Intelligence Director shall respond to requests from the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. Upon making a request covered by this paragraph, the Chairman, Vice Chairman, or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of such committee shall notify the other of the Chairman, Vice Chairman, or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of such committee of such request. (3) Assertions of privilege.--In response to requests described under paragraph (1) or (2), the National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, or the Director of a national intelligence center shall provide information, unless the President certifies that such information is not being provided because the President is asserting a privilege pursuant to the United States Constitution. (a) Disclosure of Certain Information Authorized.-- (1) In general.--Employees of covered agencies and employees of contractors carrying out activities under classified contracts with covered agencies may disclose information described in paragraph (2) to the individuals referred to in paragraph (3) without first reporting such information to the appropriate Inspector General. (2) Covered information.--Paragraph (1) applies to information, including classified information, that an employee reasonably believes provides direct and specific evidence of a false or inaccurate statement to Congress contained in, or withheld from Congress, any intelligence information material to, any intelligence assessment, report, or estimate, but does not apply to information the disclosure of which is prohibited by rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (3) Covered individuals.-- (A) In general.--The individuals to whom information in paragraph (2) may be disclosed are-- (i) a Member of a committee of Congress having primary responsibility for oversight of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government to which the disclosed information relates and who is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed; (ii) any other Member of Congress who is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed; and (iii) an employee of Congress who has the appropriate security clearance and is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed. (B) Presumption of need for information.--An individual described in subparagraph (A) to whom information is disclosed under paragraph (2) shall be presumed to have a need to know such information. (b) Construction With Other Reporting Requirements.-- Nothing in this section may be construed to modify, alter, or otherwise affect-- (1) any reporting requirement relating to intelligence activities that arises under this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), or any other provision of law; or (2) the right of any employee of the United States Government to disclose to Congress in accordance with applicable law information not described in this section. (c) Covered Agencies Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered agencies'' means the following: (1) The National Intelligence Authority, including the National Counterterrorism Center. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (7) Any other Executive agency, or element or unit thereof, determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal function the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities. TITLE III--MODIFICATIONS OF LAWS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 102 through 104 and inserting the following new sections: (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director'': (A) Section 3(5)(B) (50 U.S.C. 401a(5)(B)). (B) Section 101(h)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(2)(A)). (C) Section 101(h)(5) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(5)). (D) Section 101(i)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(i)(2)(A)). (E) Section 101(j) (50 U.S.C. 402(j)). (F) Section 105(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)). (G) Section 105(b)(6)(A) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(b)(6)(A)). (H) Section 105B(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(1)). (I) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)). (J) Section 110(b) (50 U.S.C. 404e(b)). (K) Section 110(c) (50 U.S.C. 404e(c)). (L) Section 112(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(a)(1)). (M) Section 112(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)). (N) Section 113(b)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 404h(b)(2)(A)). (O) Section 114(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(a)(1)). (P) Section 114(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(b)(1)). (R) Section 115(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404j(a)(1)). (S) Section 115(b) (50 U.S.C. 404j(b)). (T) Section 115(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404j(c)(1)(B)). (U) Section 116(a) (50 U.S.C. 404k(a)). (V) Section 117(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404l(a)(1)). (W) Section 303(a) (50 U.S.C. 405(a)), both places it appears. (X) Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C. 413(d)). (Y) Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)). (Z) Section 502(c) (50 U.S.C. 413a(c)). (AA) Section 503(b) (50 U.S.C. 413b(b)). (BB) Section 504(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)). (CC) Section 504(a)(3)(C) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(C)). (DD) Section 504(d)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(d)(2)). (EE) Section 506A(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(a)(1)). (FF) Section 603(a) (50 U.S.C. 423(a)). (GG) Section 702(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(1)). (HH) Section 702(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(6)(B)(viii)). (II) Section 702(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(b)(1)), both places it appears. (JJ) Section 703(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(a)(1)). (KK) Section 703(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 432a(a)(6)(B)(viii)). (LL) Section 703(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(b)(1)), both places it appears. (MM) Section 704(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432b(a)(1)). (NN) Section 704(f)(2)(H) (50 U.S.C. 432b(f)(2)(H)). (OO) Section 704(g)(1)) (50 U.S.C. 432b(g)(1)), both places it appears. (PP) Section 1001(a) (50 U.S.C. 441g(a)). (QQ) Section 1102(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(a)(1)). (RR) Section 1102(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)(1)). (SS) Section 1102(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(c)(1)). (TT) Section 1102(d) (50 U.S.C. 442a(d)). (2) That Act is further amended by striking ``of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following provisions: (A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)). (B) Section 105B(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(2)). (C) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), the second place it appears. (3) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director'' each place it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director'': (A) Section 114(c) (50 U.S.C. 404i(c)). (B) Section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)). (C) Section 1001(b) (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)). (C) Section 1001(c) (50 U.S.C. 441g(c)), the first place it appears. (D) Section 1001(d)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 441g(d)(1)(B)). (E) Section 1001(e) (50 U.S.C. 441g(e)), the first place it appears. (4) Section 114A of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency'' (5) Section 701 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``Operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency may be exempted by the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with the coordination of the National Intelligence Director, may exempt operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency''; and (B) in subsection (g)(1), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Director''. (6) The heading for section 114 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended to read as follows: (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) Section 101(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402(j)) is amended by striking ``Deputy Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director''. (2) Section 112(d)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of this Act'' and inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004''. (3) Section 116(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended by striking ``to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director may delegate such authority to the Deputy Director for Operations'' and inserting ``to the Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director, or, with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (4) Section 504(a)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)) is amended by striking ``Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency'' and inserting ``Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director''. (5) Section 506A(b)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''. (6) Section 701(c)(3) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431(c)(3)) is amended by striking ``or the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Office of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Office of the National Intelligence Director''. (7) Section 1001(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)) is amended by striking ``Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''. (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004''. (c) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended by striking ``paragraph (6) of section 103(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) that the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 that the National Intelligence Director''. (d) Intelligence Authorization Acts.-- (1) Public law 107-306.--Section 343(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 404n-2(c)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3((c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004''. (2) Public law 108-177.--Section 317 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 403-3 note) is amended-- (A) in subsection (g), by striking ``Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production'' and inserting ``Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director''; and (B) in subsection (h)(2)(C), by striking ``Assistant Director'' and inserting ``Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director''. Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities'' and inserting ``foreign persons, or international terrorists''; and (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities'' and inserting ``foreign persons, or international terrorists''. Paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as follows: ``(4) The term `intelligence community' includes the following: ``(A) The National Intelligence Authority. ``(B) The Central Intelligence Agency. ``(C) The National Security Agency. ``(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(F) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs. ``(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy. ``(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. ``(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. ``(K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard. ``(L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the National Intelligence Director and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.''. (a) Redesignation.--Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a), as amended by this Act, is further amended-- (1) by striking paragraph (6); and (2) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (6). (b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The National Security Act of 1947, as amended by this Act, is further amended by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' each place it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Program'': (A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)). (B) Section 105(a)(3) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(3)). (C) Section 506(a) (50 U.S.C. 415a(a)). (2) Section 17(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(f)) is amended by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Program''. (c) Heading Amendments.--(1) The heading of section 105 of that Act is amended to read as follows: Section 105(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``ensure'' and (a) Appointment of Certain Intelligence Officials.--Section 106 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is repealed. (b) Collection Tasking Authority.--Section 111 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404f) is repealed. The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended-- (1) by inserting after the item relating to section 101 the following new item:``Sec. 101A. Joint Intelligence Community Council.''; (2) by striking the items relating to sections 102 through 104 and inserting the following new items:``Sec. 102. Central Intelligence Agency.``Sec. 103. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''; (3) by striking the item relating to section 105 and inserting the following new item:``Sec 105. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense pertaining to the National Intelligence Program.''; (4) by striking the item relating to section 114 and inserting the following new item:``Sec. 114. Additional annual reports from the National Intelligence Director.''; and (5) by striking the item relating to section 506 and inserting the following new item: (a) Appointment of National Counterintelligence Executive.--Subsection (a)(2) of section 902 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2432; 50 U.S.C. 402b) is amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Director, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (b) Component of Office of National Intelligence Director.--Such section is further amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b): ``(b) Component of Office of National Intelligence Director.--The National Counterintelligence Executive is a component of the Office of the National Intelligence Director under subtitle C of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.''. (c) Duties.--Subsection (d) of such section, as redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(5) To perform such other duties as may be provided under section 131(b) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.''. (d) Office of National Counterintelligence Executive.-- Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (116 Stat. 2434; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Office of the Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in subsections (c) and (l)(1) and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''; (2) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in subsections (e)(4), (e)(5), (h)(1), and (h)(2) and inserting ``National Intelligence Director''; and (3) in subsection (m), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. Section 8H(a)(1) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(D) An employee of the National Intelligence Authority, an employee of an entity other than the Authority who is assigned or detailed to the Authority, or of a contractor of the Authority, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority in accordance with section 141(h)(5) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.''. Section 901(b)(1) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(Q) The National Intelligence Authority.''. (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of the National Intelligence Director the staff of the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management as of the date of the enactment of this Act, including all functions and activities discharged by the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management as of that date. (b) Administration.--The National Intelligence Director shall administer the staff of the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management after the date of the enactment of this Act as a component of the Office of the National Intelligence Director under section 121(d). (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of the National Intelligence Director the National Counterintelligence Executive and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402b et seq.), as amended by section 309 of this Act, including all functions and activities discharged by the National Counterintelligence Executive and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Administration.--The National Intelligence Director shall treat the National Counterintelligence Executive, and administer the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, after the date of the enactment of this Act as components of the Office of the National Intelligence Director under section 121(c). (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the National Counterterrorism Center the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), including all functions and activities discharged by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Administration.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall administer the Terrorist Threat Integration Center after the date of the enactment of this Act as a component of the Directorate of Intelligence of the National Counterterrorism Center under section 143(g)(2). (a) Termination.--The positions within the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in subsection (b) are hereby abolished. (b) Covered Positions.--The positions within the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in this subsection are as follows: (1) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management. (2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection. (3) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. (4) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration. (a) Executive Schedule Level I.--Section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding the end the following new item: ``National Intelligence Director.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence; and (2) by adding at the end the following new items: ``Deputy National Intelligence Directors (5). ``Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.''. (c) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (d) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence. The National Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly take such actions as are appropriate to preserve the intelligence capabilities of the United States during the establishment of the National Intelligence Authority under this Act. (a) Reorganization.--The National Intelligence Director may, with the approval of the President and after consultation with the department, agency, or element concerned, allocate or reallocate functions among the officers of the National Intelligence Program, and may establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue organizational units within the Program, but only after providing notice of such action to Congress, which shall include an explanation of the rationale for the action. (b) Limitation.--The authority under subsection (a) does not extend to any action inconsistent with law. (c) Congressional Review.--An action may be taken under the authority under subsection (a) only with the approval of the following: (1) Each of the congressional intelligence committees. (2) Each of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall submit to Congress a report on the progress made in the implementation of this Act, including the amendments made by this Act. The report shall include a comprehensive description of the progress made, and may include such recommendations for additional legislative or administrative action as the Director considers appropriate. (a) Reports.--(1) Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report on the implementation of this Act and the amendments made by this Act. (2) The Comptroller General may submit to Congress at any time during the two-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, such reports on the progress made in the implementation of this Act and the amendments made by this Act as the Comptroller General considers appropriate. (b) Report Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) The assessment of the Comptroller General of the progress made in the implementation of this Act (and the amendments made by this Act) as of the date of such report. (2) A description of any delays or other shortfalls in the implementation of this Act that have been identified by the Comptroller General. (3) Any recommendations for additional legislative or administrative action that the Comptroller General considers appropriate. (c) Agency Cooperation.--Each department, agency, and element of the United States Government shall cooperate with the Comptroller General in the assessment of the implementation of this Act, and shall provide the Comptroller General timely and complete access to relevant documents in accordance with section 716 of title 31, United States Code. (a) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of Intelligence Community.--Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the National Intelligence Director. (b) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of CIA.--Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (c) Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management.--Any reference to the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the staff of such office within the Office of the National Intelligence Director under section 121. (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall take effect 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Earlier Effective Date.--In order to ensure the rapid implementation of this Act while simultaneously ensuring a smooth transition that will safeguard the national security of the United States, the President may provide that this Act (including the amendments made by this Act), or one or more particular provisions of this Act (including the amendments made by such provision or provisions), shall take effect on such date that is earlier than the date otherwise provided under subsection (a) as the President shall specify. (c) Notification of Effective Dates.--If the President exercises the authority in subsection (b), the President shall-- (1) notify Congress of the exercise of such authority; and (2) publish in the Federal Register notice of the earlier effective date or dates involved, including each provision (and amendment) covered by such earlier effective date. If any provision of this Act, or an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act, or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those to which such provision is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby. There are specifically authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act and the amendments made by this Act. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Network.--The term ``Network'' means the Information Sharing Network described in subsection (c). (2) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism information'' means all information, whether collected, produced, or distributed by intelligence, law enforcement, military, homeland security, or other activities, relating to-- (A) the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals, or of domestic groups or individuals involved in transnational terrorism; (B) threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other nations; (C) communications of or by such groups or individuals; or (D) information relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with such groups or individuals. (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The effective use of information, from all available sources, is essential to the fight against terror and the protection of our homeland. The biggest impediment to all- source analysis, and to a greater likelihood of ``connecting the dots'', is resistance to sharing information. (2) The United States Government has access to a vast amount of information, including not only traditional intelligence but also other government databases, such as those containing customs or immigration information. But the United States Government has a weak system for processing and using the information it has. (3) In the period leading up to September 11, 2001, there were instances of potentially helpful information that was available but that no person knew to ask for; information that was distributed only in compartmented channels; and information that was requested but could not be shared. (4) Current security requirements nurture overclassification and excessive compartmentalization of information among agencies. Each agency's incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks, including criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions, but few rewards for sharing information. (5) The current system, in which each intelligence agency has its own security practices, requires a demonstrated ``need to know'' before sharing. This approach assumes that it is possible to know, in advance, who will need to use the information. An outgrowth of the cold war, such a system implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. Such assumptions are no longer appropriate. Although counterintelligence concerns are still real, the costs of not sharing information are also substantial. The current ``need-to-know'' culture of information protection needs to be replaced with a ``need-to- share'' culture of integration. (6) A new approach to the sharing of terrorism information is urgently needed. An important conceptual model for a new ``trusted information network'' is the Systemwide Homeland Analysis and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Network proposed by a task force of leading professionals assembled by the Markle Foundation and described in reports issued in October 2002 and December 2003. (7) No single agency can create a meaningful information sharing system on its own. Alone, each agency can only modernize stovepipes, not replace them. Presidential leadership is required to bring about governmentwide change. (c) Information Sharing Network.-- (1) Establishment.--The President shall establish an information sharing network to promote the sharing of terrorism information, in a manner consistent with national security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties. (2) Attributes.--The Network shall promote coordination, communication and collaboration of people and information among all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State, tribal, and local authorities, and relevant private sector entities, including owners and operators of critical infrastructure, by using policy guidelines and technologies that support-- (A) a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment that connects existing systems where appropriate and allows users to share information horizontally across agencies, vertically between levels of government, and, as appropriate, with the private sector; (B) building on existing systems capabilities at relevant agencies; (C) utilizing industry best practices, including minimizing the centralization of data and seeking to use common tools and capabilities whenever possible; (D) employing an information rights management approach that controls access to data rather than to whole networks; (E) facilitating the sharing of information at and across all levels of security by using policy guidelines and technologies that support writing information that can be broadly shared; (F) providing directory services for locating people and information; (G) incorporating protections for individuals' privacy and civil liberties; (H) incorporating mechanisms for information security; and (I) access controls, authentication and authorization, audits, and other strong mechanisms for information security and privacy guideline enforcement across all levels of security, in order to enhance accountability and facilitate oversight. (d) Immediate Steps.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President, through the Director of Management and Budget and in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and such other Federal officials as the President shall designate, shall-- (1) establish electronic directory services to assist in locating in the Federal Government terrorism information and people with relevant knowledge about terrorism information; and (2) conduct a review of relevant current Federal agency capabilities, including a baseline inventory of current Federal systems that contain terrorism information, the money currently spent to maintain those systems, and identification of other information that should be included in the Network. (e) Guidelines.--As soon as possible, but in no event later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall-- (1) in consultation with the National Intelligence Director and the Advisory Council on Information Sharing established in subsection (g), issue guidelines for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using terrorism information, including guidelines to ensure such information is provided in its most shareable form, such as by separating out data from the sources and methods by which they are obtained; (2) in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board established under section 901, issue guidelines that-- (A) protect privacy and civil liberties in the development and use of the Network; and (B) shall be made public, unless, and only to the extent that, nondisclosure is clearly necessary to protect national security; (3) establish objective, systemwide performance measures to enable the assessment of progress toward achieving full implementation of the Network; and (4) require Federal departments and agencies to promote a culture of information sharing by-- (A) reducing disincentives to information sharing, including overclassification of information and unnecessary requirements for originator approval; and (B) providing affirmative incentives for information sharing, such as the incorporation of information sharing performance measures into agency and managerial evaluations, and employee awards for promoting innovative information sharing practices. (f) System Design and Implementation Plan.--Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a system design and implementation plan for the Network. The plan shall be prepared by the President through the Director of Management and Budget and in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and such other Federal officials as the President shall designate, and shall include-- (1) a description of the parameters of the proposed Network, including functions, capabilities, and resources; (2) a description of the technological, legal, and policy issues presented by the creation of the Network described in subsection (c), and the ways in which these issues will be addressed; (3)(A) a delineation of the roles of the Federal departments and agencies that will participate in the development of the Network, including-- (i) identification of any agency that will build the infrastructure needed to operate and manage the Network (as distinct from the individual agency components that are to be part of the Network); and (ii) identification of any agency that will operate and manage the Network (as distinct from the individual agency components that are to be part of the Network); (B) a provision that the delineation of roles under subparagraph (A) shall-- (i) be consistent with the authority of the National Intelligence Director, under this Act, to set standards for information sharing and information technology throughout the intelligence community; and (ii) recognize the role of the Department of Homeland Security in coordinating with State, tribal, and local officials and the private sector; (4) a description of the technological requirements to appropriately link and enhance existing networks and a description of the system design that will meet these requirements; (5) a plan, including a time line, for the development and phased implementation of the Network; (6) total budget requirements to develop and implement the Network, including the estimated annual cost for each of the 5 years following the date of enactment of this Act; and (7) proposals for any legislation that the President believes necessary to implement the Network. (g) Advisory Council on Information Sharing.-- (1) Establishment.--There is established an Advisory Council on Information Sharing (in this subsection referred to as the ``Council''). (2) Membership.--No more than 25 individuals may serve as members of the Council, which shall include-- (A) the National Intelligence Director, who shall serve as Chairman of the Council; (B) the Secretary of Homeland Security; (C) the Secretary of Defense; (D) the Attorney General; (E) the Secretary of State; (F) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; (G) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (H) the Director of Management and Budget; (I) such other Federal officials as the President shall designate; (J) representatives of State, tribal, and local governments, to be appointed by the President; (K) individuals from outside government with expertise in relevant technology, security and privacy concepts, to be appointed by the President; and (L) individuals who are employed in private businesses or nonprofit organizations that own or operate critical infrastructure, to be appointed by the President. (3) Responsibilities.--The Council shall-- (A) advise the President and the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies on the implementation of the Network; (B) ensure that there is coordination among participants in the Network in the development and implementation of the Network; (C) review, on an ongoing basis, policy, legal and technology issues related to the implementation of the Network; and (D) establish a dispute resolution process to resolve disagreements among departments and agencies about whether particular terrorism information should be shared and in what manner. (4) Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act.--The Council shall not be subject to the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). (5) Informing the public.--The Council shall hold public hearings and otherwise inform the public of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (6) Council reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the National Intelligence Director, in the capacity of Chairman of the Council, shall submit a report to Congress that shall include-- (A) a description of the activities and accomplishments of the Council in the preceding year; and (B) the number and dates of the meetings held by the Council and a list of attendees at each meeting. (h) Presidential Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress on the state of the Network. The report shall include-- (1) a progress report on the extent to which the Network has been implemented, including how the Network has fared on the governmentwide and agency-specific performance measures and whether the performance goals set in the preceding year have been met; (2) objective systemwide performance goals for the following year; (3) an accounting of how much was spent on the Network in the preceding year; (4) actions taken to ensure that agencies procure new technology that is consistent with the Network and information on whether new systems and technology are consistent with the Network; (5) the extent to which, in appropriate circumstances, all terrorism watch lists are available for combined searching in real time through the Network and whether there are consistent standards for placing individuals on, and removing individuals from, the watch lists, including the availability of processes for correcting errors; (6) the extent to which unnecessary roadblocks or disincentives to information sharing, including the inappropriate use of paper-only intelligence products and requirements for originator approval, have been eliminated; (7) the extent to which positive incentives for information sharing have been implemented; (8) the extent to which classified information is also made available through the Network, in whole or in part, in unclassified form; (9) the extent to which State, tribal, and local officials-- (A) are participating in the Network; (B) have systems which have become integrated into the Network; (C) are providing as well as receiving information; and (D) are using the Network to communicate with each other; (10) the extent to which-- (A) private sector data, including information from owners and operators of critical infrastructure, is incorporated in the Network; and (B) the private sector is both providing and receiving information; (11) where private sector data has been used by the Government or has been incorporated into the Network-- (A) the measures taken to protect sensitive business information; and (B) where the data involves information about individuals, the measures taken to ensure the accuracy of such data; (12) the measures taken by the Federal Government to ensure the accuracy of other information on the Network and, in particular, the accuracy of information about individuals; (13) an assessment of the Network's privacy protections, including actions taken in the preceding year to implement or enforce privacy protections and a report of complaints received about interference with an individual's privacy or civil liberties; and (14) an assessment of the security protections of the Network. (i) Agency Plans and Reports.--Each Federal department or agency that possesses or uses terrorism information or that otherwise participates, or expects to participate, in the Network, shall submit to the Director of Management and Budget and to Congress-- (1) not later than 1 year after the enactment of this Act, a report including-- (A) a strategic plan for implementation of the Network's requirements within the department or agency; (B) objective performance measures to assess the progress and adequacy of the department's or agency's information sharing efforts; and (C) budgetary requirements to integrate the department or agency into the Network, including projected annual expenditures for each of the following 5 years following the submission of the reports; and (2) annually thereafter, reports including-- (A) an assessment of the department's or agency's progress in complying with the Network's requirements, including how well the department or agency has performed on the objective measures developed under paragraph (1); (B) the department's or agency's expenditures to implement and comply with the Network's requirements in the preceding year; (C) the department's or agency's plans for further implementation of the Network in the year following the submission of the report. (j) Periodic Assessments.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and periodically thereafter, the Government Accountability Office shall review and evaluate the implementation of the Network, both generally and, at its discretion, within specific departments and agencies, to determine the extent of compliance with the Network's requirements and to assess the effectiveness of the Network in improving information sharing and collaboration and in protecting privacy and civil liberties, and shall report to Congress on its findings. (2) Inspectors general.--The Inspector General in any Federal department or agency that possesses or uses terrorism information or that otherwise participates in the Network shall, at the discretion of the Inspector General-- (A) conduct audits or investigations to-- (i) determine the compliance of that department or agency with the Network's requirements; and (ii) assess the effectiveness of that department or agency in improving information sharing and collaboration and in protecting privacy and civil liberties; and (B) issue reports on such audits and investigations. (k) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated-- (1) $50,000,000 to the Director of Management and Budget to carry out this section for fiscal year 2005; and (2) such sums as are necessary to carry out this section in each fiscal year thereafter, to be disbursed and allocated in accordance with the Network system design and implementation plan required by subsection (f). Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The American people are not served well by current congressional rules and resolutions governing intelligence and homeland security oversight. (2) A unified Executive Branch effort on fighting terrorism will not be effective unless it is matched by a unified effort in Congress, specifically a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give the intelligence agencies and Department of Homeland Security sound oversight, support, and leadership. (3) The intelligence committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives are not organized to provide strong leadership and oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism. (4) Jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security, which is scattered among many committees in each chamber, does not allow for the clear authority and responsibility needed for effective congressional oversight. (5) Congress should either create a new, joint Senate-House intelligence authorizing committee modeled on the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, or establish new intelligence committees in each chamber with combined authorization and appropriations authority. (6) Congress should establish a single, principal point of oversight and review in each chamber for the Department of Homeland Security and the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States stated that ``Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this department and its duties.''. (7) In August 2004, the joint Senate leadership created a bipartisan working group to examine how best to implement the Commission's recommendations with respect to reform of the Senate's oversight of intelligence and homeland security, and directed the working group to begin its work immediately and to present its findings and recommendations to Senate leadership as expeditiously as possible. The 108th Congress shall not adjourn until each House of Congress has adopted the necessary changes to its rules such that, effective the start of the 109th Congress-- (1) jurisdiction over proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the Department of Homeland Security shall be consolidated in a single committee in each House and such committee shall have a nonpartisan staff; and (2) jurisdiction over proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters related to intelligence shall reside in-- (A) either a joint Senate-House authorizing committee modeled on the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, or a committee in each chamber with combined authorization and appropriations authority; and (B) regardless of which committee structure is selected, the intelligence committee or committees shall have-- (i) not more than 9 members in each House, who shall serve without term limits and of which at least 1 each shall also serve on a committee on Armed Services, Judiciary, and Foreign Affairs and at least 1 on a Defense Appropriations subcommittee; (ii) authority to issue subpoenas; (iii) majority party representation that does not exceed minority party representation by more than 1 member in each House, and a nonpartisan staff; and (iv) a subcommittee devoted solely to oversight. (a) Services Provided President-Elect.--Section 3 of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note) is amended-- (1) by adding after subsection (a)(8)(A)(iv) the following: ``(v) Activities under this paragraph shall include the preparation of a detailed classified, compartmented summary by the relevant outgoing executive branch officials of specific operational threats to national security; major military or covert operations; and pending decisions on possible uses of military force. This summary shall be provided to the President-elect as soon as possible after the date of the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President under section 1 or 2 of title 3, United States Code.''; (2) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and (3) by adding after subsection (e) the following: ``(f)(1) The President-elect should submit to the agency designated by the President under section 601(d) of the 9/11 Commission Report Implementation Act of 2004 the names of candidates for high level national security positions through the level of undersecretary of cabinet departments as soon as possible after the date of the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President under section 1 or 2 of title 3, United States Code. ``(2) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, and any other appropriate agency, shall undertake and complete as expeditiously as possible the background investigations necessary to provide appropriate security clearances to the individuals who are candidates described under paragraph (1) before the date of the inauguration of the President-elect as President and the inauguration of the Vice-President-elect as Vice President.''. (b) Sense of Congress Regarding Expedited Consideration of National Security Nominees.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the President-elect should submit the nominations of candidates for high-level national security positions, through the level of undersecretary of cabinet departments, to the Senate by the date of the inauguration of the President-elect as President; and (2) for all national security nominees received by the date of inauguration, the Senate committees to which these nominations are referred should, to the fullest extent possible, complete their consideration of these nominations, and, if such nominations are reported by the committees, the full Senate should vote to confirm or reject these nominations, within 30 days of their submission. (c) Security Clearances for Transition Team Members.-- (1) Definition.--In this section, the term ``major party'' shall have the meaning given under section 9002(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. (2) In general.--Each major party candidate for President, except a candidate who is the incumbent President, may submit, before the date of the general election, requests for security clearances for prospective transition team members who will have a need for access to classified information to carry out their responsibilities as members of the President- elect's transition team. (3) Completion date.--Necessary background investigations and eligibility determinations to permit appropriate prospective transition team members to have access to classified information shall be completed, to the fullest extent practicable, by the day after the date of the general election. (d) Consolidation of Responsibility for Personnel Security Investigations.-- (1) Consolidation.-- (A) In general.--Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall select a single Federal agency to provide and maintain all security clearances for Federal employees and Federal contractor personnel who require access to classified information, including conducting all investigation functions. (B) Considerations.--In selecting an agency under this paragraph, the President shall fully consider requiring the transfer of investigation functions to the Office of Personnel Management as described under section 906 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (5 U.S.C. 1101 note). (C) Coordination and consolidation of responsibilities.-- The Federal agency selected under this paragraph shall-- (i) take all necessary actions to carry out the responsibilities under this subsection, including entering into a memorandum of understanding with any agency carrying out such responsibilities before the date of enactment of this Act; and (ii) identify any legislative actions necessary to further implement this subsection. (D) Database.--The agency selected shall, as soon as practicable, establish and maintain a single database for tracking security clearance applications, investigations and eligibility determinations and ensure that security clearance investigations are conducted according to uniform standards, including uniform security questionnaires and financial disclosure requirements. (E) Polygraphs.--The President shall direct the agency selected under this paragraph to administer any polygraph examinations on behalf of agencies that require them. (2) Access.--The President, acting through the National Intelligence Director, shall-- (A) establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to classified information to any officer or employee of any agency or department of the United States and to employees of contractors of those agencies and departments; (B) ensure the consistent implementation of those standards and procedures throughout such agencies and departments; and (C) ensure that security clearances granted by individual elements of the intelligence community are recognized by all elements of the intelligence community, and under contracts entered into by such elements. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Complex terrorist operations require locations that provide such operations sanctuary from interference by government or law enforcement personnel. (2) A terrorist sanctuary existed in Afghanistan before September 11, 2001. (3) The terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan provided direct and indirect value to members of al Qaeda who participated in the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and in other terrorist operations. (4) Terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed and most lawless places in the world to find sanctuary. (5) During the twenty-first century, terrorists are focusing on remote regions and failing states as locations to seek sanctuary. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the United States Government should identify and prioritize locations that are or that could be used as terrorist sanctuaries; (2) the United States Government should have a realistic strategy that includes the use of all elements of national power to keep possible terrorists from using a location as a sanctuary; and (3) the United States Government should reach out, listen to, and work with countries in bilateral and multilateral fora to prevent locations from becoming sanctuaries and to prevent terrorists from using locations as sanctuaries. (c) Strategy on Terrorist Sanctuaries.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report that describes a strategy for addressing and, where possible, eliminating terrorist sanctuaries. (2) Content.--The report required under this section shall include the following: (A) A description of actual and potential terrorist sanctuaries, together with an assessment of the priorities of addressing and eliminating such sanctuaries. (B) An outline of strategies for disrupting or eliminating the security provided to terrorists by such sanctuaries. (C) A description of efforts by the United States Government to work with other countries in bilateral and multilateral fora to address or eliminate actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and disrupt or eliminate the security provided to terrorists by such sanctuaries. (D) A description of long-term goals and actions designed to reduce the conditions that allow the formation of terrorist sanctuaries, such as supporting and strengthening host governments, reducing poverty, increasing economic development, strengthening civil society, securing borders, strengthening internal security forces, and disrupting logistics and communications networks of terrorist groups. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Government of Pakistan has a critical role to perform in the struggle against Islamist terrorism. (2) The endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and frequent ineffectiveness of government in Pakistan create opportunities for Islamist recruitment. (3) The poor quality of education in Pakistan is particularly worrying, as millions of families send their children to madrassahs, some of which have been used as incubators for violent extremism. (4) The vast unpoliced regions in Pakistan make the country attractive to extremists seeking refuge and recruits and also provide a base for operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan. (5) A stable Pakistan, with a government advocating ``enlightened moderation'' in the Muslim world, is critical to stability in the region. (6) There is a widespread belief among the people of Pakistan that the United States has long treated them as allies of convenience. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the United States should make a long-term commitment to assisting in ensuring a promising, stable, and secure future in Pakistan, as long as its leaders remain committed to combatting extremists and implementing a strategy of ``enlightened moderation''; (2) the United States aid to Pakistan should be fulsome and, at a minimum, sustained at the fiscal year 2004 levels; (3) the United States should support the Government of Pakistan with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education; and (4) the United States Government should devote particular attention and resources to assisting in the improvement of the quality of education in Pakistan. (c) Report on Support for Pakistan.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the efforts of the United States Government to support Pakistan and encourage moderation in that country. (2) Content.--The report required under this section shall include the following: (A) An examination of the desirability of establishing a Pakistan Education Fund to direct resources toward improving the quality of secondary schools in Pakistan. (B) Recommendations on the funding necessary to provide various levels of educational support. (C) An examination of the current composition and levels of United States military aid to Pakistan, together with any recommendations for changes in such levels and composition that the President considers appropriate. (D) An examination of other major types of United States financial support to Pakistan, together with any recommendations for changes in the levels and composition of such support that the President considers appropriate. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States and its allies in the international community have made progress in promoting economic and political reform within Afghanistan, including the establishment of a central government with a democratic constitution, a new currency, and a new army, the increase of personal freedom, and the elevation of the standard of living of many Afghans. (2) A number of significant obstacles must be overcome if Afghanistan is to become a secure and prosperous democracy, and such a transition depends in particular upon-- (A) improving security throughout the country; (B) disarming and demobilizing militias; (C) curtailing the rule of the warlords; (D) promoting equitable economic development; (E) protecting the human rights of the people of Afghanistan; (F) holding elections for public office; and (G) ending the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics. (3) The United States and the international community must make a long-term commitment to addressing the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and the burgeoning narcotics trade, endemic poverty, and other serious problems in Afghanistan in order to prevent that country from relapsing into a sanctuary for international terrorism. (b) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States to take the following actions with respect to Afghanistan: (1) Working with other nations to obtain long-term security, political, and financial commitments and fulfillment of pledges to the Government of Afghanistan to accomplish the objectives of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.), especially to ensure a secure, democratic, and prosperous Afghanistan that respects the rights of its citizens and is free of international terrorist organizations. (2) Using the voice and vote of the United States in relevant international organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations Security Council, to strengthen international commitments to assist the Government of Afghanistan in enhancing security, building national police and military forces, increasing counter- narcotics efforts, and expanding infrastructure and public services throughout the country. (3) Taking appropriate steps to increase the assistance provided under programs of the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development throughout Afghanistan and to increase the number of personnel of those agencies in Afghanistan as necessary to support the increased assistance. (c) Authorization of Appropriations.-- (1) Fiscal year 2005.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for fiscal year 2005 for assistance for Afghanistan, in addition to any amounts otherwise available for the following purposes, the following amounts: (A) For Development Assistance to carry out the provisions of sections 103, 105, and 106 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151a, 2151c, and 2151d), $400,000,000. (B) For the Child Survival and Health Program Fund to carry out the provisions of section 104 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b), $100,000,000. (C) For the Economic Support Fund to carry out the provisions of chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.), $550,000,000. (D) For International Narcotics and Law Enforcement to carry out the provisions of section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291), $360,000,000. (E) For Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, $50,000,000. (F) For International Military Education and Training to carry out the provisions of section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347), $2,000,000. (G) For Foreign Military Financing Program grants to carry of the provision of section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763), $880,000,000. (H) For Peacekeeping Operations to carry out the provisions of section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348), $60,000,000. (2) Fiscal years 2006 through 2009.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for each of fiscal years 2006 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary for financial and other assistance to Afghanistan. (3) Conditions for assistance.--Assistance provided by the President under this subsection-- (A) shall be consistent with the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002; and (B) shall be provided with reference to the ``Securing Afghanistan's Future'' document published by the Government of Afghanistan. (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that Congress should, in consultation with the President, update and revise, as appropriate, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002. (e) Strategy and Support Regarding United States Aid to Afghanistan.-- (1) Requirement for strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a 5-year strategy for providing aid to Afghanistan. (2) Content.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall describe the resources that will be needed during the next 5 years to achieve specific objectives in Afghanistan, including in the following areas: (A) Fostering economic development. (B) Curtailing the cultivation of opium. (C) Achieving internal security and stability. (D) Eliminating terrorist sanctuaries. (E) Increasing governmental capabilities. (F) Improving essential infrastructure and public services. (G) Improving public health services. (H) Establishing a broad-based educational system. (I) Promoting democracy and the rule of law. (J) Building national police and military forces. (3) Updates.--Beginning not later than 1 year after the strategy is submitted to Congress under paragraph (1), the President shall submit to Congress an annual report-- (A) updating the progress made toward achieving the goals outlined in the strategy under this subsection; and (B) identifying shortfalls in meeting those goals and the resources needed to fully achieve them. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Despite a long history of friendly relations with the United States, Saudi Arabia has been a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism. (2) Cooperation between the Governments of the United States and Saudi Arabia has traditionally been carried out in private. (3) The Government of Saudi Arabia has not always responded promptly and fully to United States requests for assistance in the global war on Islamist terrorism. (4) Counterterrorism cooperation between the Governments of the United States and Saudi Arabia has improved significantly since the terrorist bombing attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 12, 2003. (5) The Government of Saudi Arabia is now aggressively pursuing al Qaeda and appears to be acting to build a domestic consensus for some internal reforms. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the problems in the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia must be confronted openly, and the opportunities for cooperation between the countries must be pursued openly by those governments; (2) both governments must build a relationship that they can publicly defend and that is based on other national interests in addition to their national interests in oil; (3) this relationship should include a shared commitment to political and economic reform in Saudi Arabia; and (4) this relationship should also include a shared interest in greater tolerance and respect for other cultures in Saudi Arabia and a commitment to fight the violent extremists who foment hatred in the Middle East. (c) Report.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a strategy for expanding collaboration with the Government of Saudi Arabia on subjects of mutual interest and of importance to the United States. (2) Scope.--As part of this strategy, the President shall consider the utility of undertaking a periodic, formal, and visible high-level dialogue between senior United States Government officials of cabinet level or higher rank and their counterparts in the Government of Saudi Arabia to address challenges in the relationship between the 2 governments and to identify areas and mechanisms for cooperation. (3) Content.--The strategy under this subsection shall encompass-- (A) intelligence and security cooperation in the fight against Islamist terrorism; (B) ways to advance the Middle East peace process; (C) political and economic reform in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East; and (D) the promotion of greater tolerance and respect for cultural and religious diversity in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) While support for the United States has plummeted in the Islamic world, many negative views are uninformed, at best, and, at worst, are informed by coarse stereotypes and caricatures. (2) Local newspapers in Islamic countries and influential broadcasters who reach Islamic audiences through satellite television often reinforce the idea that the people and Government of the United States are anti-Muslim. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the Government of the United States should offer an example of moral leadership in the world that includes a commitment to treat all people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to the people and governments of other countries; (2) the United States should cooperate with governments of Islamic countries to foster agreement on respect for human dignity and opportunity, and to offer a vision of a better future that includes stressing life over death, individual educational and economic opportunity, widespread political participation, contempt for indiscriminate violence, respect for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences, and tolerance for opposing points of view; (3) the United States should encourage reform, freedom, democracy, and opportunity for Arabs and Muslims and promote moderation in the Islamic world; and (4) the United States should work to defeat extremist ideology in the Islamic world by providing assistance to moderate Arabs and Muslims to combat extremist ideas. (c) Report on the Struggle of Ideas in the Islamic World.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report that contains a cohesive long-term strategy for the United States Government to help win the struggle of ideas in the Islamic world. (2) Content.--The report required under this section shall include the following: (A) A description of specific goals related to winning this struggle of ideas. (B) A description of the range of tools available to the United States Government to accomplish these goals and the manner in which such tools will be employed. (C) A list of benchmarks for measuring success and a plan for linking resources to the accomplishment of these goals. (D) A description of any additional resources that may be necessary to help win this struggle of ideas. (E) Any recommendations for the creation of, and United States participation in, international institutions for the promotion of democracy and economic diversification in the Islamic world, and intra-regional trade in the Middle East. (F) An estimate of the level of United States financial assistance that would be sufficient to convince United States allies and people in the Islamic world that engaging in the struggle of ideas in the Islamic world is a top priority of the United States and that the United States intends to make a substantial and sustained commitment toward winning this struggle. (a) Finding.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress finds that short-term gains enjoyed by the United States through cooperation with the world's most repressive and brutal governments are too often outweighed by long-term setbacks for the stature and interests of the United States. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) United States foreign policy should promote the value of life and the importance of individual educational and economic opportunity, encourage widespread political participation, condemn indiscriminate violence, and promote respect for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences among people, and tolerance for opposing points of view; and (2) the United States Government must prevail upon the governments of all predominantly Muslim countries, including those that are friends and allies of the United States, to condemn indiscriminate violence, promote the value of life, respect and promote the principles of individual education and economic opportunity, encourage widespread political participation, and promote the rule of law, openness in discussing differences among people, and tolerance for opposing points of view. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Although the United States has demonstrated and promoted its values in defending Muslims against tyrants and criminals in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, this message is not always clearly presented in the Islamic world. (2) If the United States does not act to vigorously define its message in the Islamic world, the image of the United States will be defined by Islamic extremists who seek to demonize the United States. (3) Recognizing that many Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the United States Government has launched promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the United States must do more to defend and promote its values and ideals to the broadest possible audience in the Islamic world; (2) United States efforts to defend and promote these values and ideals are beginning to ensure that accurate expressions of these values reach large audiences in the Islamic world and should be robustly supported; (3) the United States Government could and should do more to engage the Muslim world in the struggle of ideas; and (4) the United States Government should more intensively employ existing broadcast media in the Islamic world as part of this engagement. (c) Report on Outreach Strategy.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the strategy of the United States Government for expanding its outreach to foreign Muslim audiences through broadcast media. (2) Content.--The report shall include the following: (A) The initiatives of the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the public diplomacy activities of the Department of State with respect to outreach to foreign Muslim audiences. (B) An outline of recommended actions that the United States Government should take to more regularly and comprehensively present a United States point of view through indigenous broadcast media in countries with sizable Muslim populations, including increasing appearances by United States Government officials, experts, and citizens. (C) An assessment of potential incentives for, and costs associated with, encouraging United States broadcasters to dub or subtitle into Arabic and other relevant languages their news and public affairs programs broadcast in the Muslim world in order to present those programs to a much broader Muslim audience than is currently reached. (D) Any recommendations the President may have for additional funding and legislation necessary to achieve the objectives of the strategy. (d) Authorizations of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out United States Government broadcasting activities under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1431 et seq.), the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6201 et seq.), and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6501 et seq.), and to carry out other activities under this section consistent with the purposes of such Acts, the following amounts: (1) International broadcasting operations.--For International Broadcasting Operations-- (A) $717,160,000 for fiscal year 2005; and (B) such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2006 through 2009. (2) Broadcasting capital improvements.--For Broadcasting Capital Improvements-- (A) $11,040,000 for fiscal year 2005; and (B) such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2006 through 2009. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Exchange, scholarship, and library programs are effective ways for the United States Government to promote internationally the values and ideals of the United States. (2) Exchange, scholarship, and library programs can expose young people from other countries to United States values and offer them knowledge and hope. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States should expand its exchange, scholarship, and library programs, especially those that benefit people in the Arab and Muslim worlds. (c) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Eligible country.--The term ``eligible country'' means a country or entity in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, or Southeast Asia that-- (A) has a sizable Muslim population; and (B) is designated by the Secretary of State as eligible to participate in programs under this section. (2) Secretary.--Except as otherwise specifically provided, the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of State. (3) United states entity.--The term ``United States entity'' means an entity that is organized under the laws of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, or any other territory or possession of the United States. (4) United states sponsoring organization.--The term ``United States sponsoring organization'' means a nongovernmental organization that is-- (A) based in the United States; and (B) controlled by a citizen of the United States or a United States entity that is designated by the Secretary, pursuant to regulations, to carry out a program authorized by subsection (e). (d) Expansion of Educational and Cultural Exchanges.-- (1) Purpose.--The purpose of this subsection is to provide for the expansion of international educational and cultural exchange programs between the United States and eligible countries. (2) Specific programs.--In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary is authorized to conduct or initiate programs in eligible countries as follows: (A) Fulbright exchange program.-- (i) Increased number of awards.--The Secretary is authorized to substantially increase the number of awards under the J. William Fulbright Educational Exchange Program. (ii) International support for fulbright program.--The Secretary shall work to increase support for the J. William Fulbright Educational Exchange Program in eligible countries in order to enhance academic and scholarly exchanges with those countries. (B) Hubert h. humphrey fellowships.--The Secretary is authorized to substantially increase the number of Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowships awarded to candidates from eligible countries. (C) Sister institutions programs.--The Secretary is authorized to facilitate the establishment of sister institution programs between cities and municipalities and other institutions in the United States and in eligible countries in order to enhance mutual understanding at the community level. (D) Library training exchanges.--The Secretary is authorized to develop a demonstration program, including training in the library sciences, to assist governments in eligible countries to establish or upgrade the public library systems of such countries for the purpose of improving literacy. (E) International visitors program.--The Secretary is authorized to expand the number of participants from eligible countries in the International Visitors Program. (F) Youth ambassadors.-- (i) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to establish a youth ambassadors program for visits by middle and secondary school students from eligible countries to the United States to participate in activities, including cultural and educational activities, that are designed to familiarize participating students with United States society and values. (ii) Visits.--The visits of students who are participating in the youth ambassador program under clause (i) shall be scheduled during the school holidays in the home countries of the students and may not exceed 4 weeks. (iii) Criteria.--Students selected to participate in the youth ambassador program shall reflect the economic and geographic diversity of eligible countries. (G) Education reform.--The Secretary is authorized-- (i) to expand programs that seek to improve the quality of primary and secondary school systems in eligible countries; and (ii) in order to foster understanding of the United States, to promote civic education through teacher exchanges, teacher training, textbook modernization, and other efforts. (H) Promotion of religious freedom.--The Secretary is authorized to establish a program to promote dialogue and exchange among leaders and scholars of all faiths from the United States and eligible countries. (I) Bridging the digital divide.--The Secretary is authorized to establish a program to help foster access to information technology among underserved populations and by civil society groups in eligible countries. (J) People-to-people diplomacy.--The Secretary is authorized to expand efforts to promote United States public diplomacy interests in eligible countries through cultural, arts, entertainment, sports and other exchanges. (K) College scholarships.-- (i) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to establish a program to offer scholarships to permit individuals to attend eligible colleges and universities. (ii) Eligibility for program.--To be eligible for the scholarship program, an individual shall be a citizen or resident of an eligible country who has graduated from a secondary school in an eligible country. (iii) Eligible college or university defined.--In this subparagraph, the term ``eligible college or university'' means a college or university that is organized under the laws of the United States, a State, or the District of Columbia, accredited by an accrediting agency recognized by the Secretary of Education, and primarily located in, but not controlled by, an eligible country. (L) Language training program.--The Secretary is authorized to provide travel and subsistence funding for students who are United States citizens to travel to eligible countries to participate in immersion training programs in languages used in such countries and to develop regulations governing the provision of such funding. (e) Secondary School Exchange Program.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to establish an international exchange visitor program, modeled on the Future Leaders Exchange Program established under the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.), for eligible students to-- (A) attend public secondary school in the United States; (B) live with a host family in the United States; and (C) participate in activities designed to promote a greater understanding of United States and Islamic values and culture. (2) Eligible student defined.--In this subsection, the term ``eligible student'' means an individual who-- (A) is a national of an eligible country; (B) is at least 15 years of age but not more than 18 years and 6 months of age at the time of enrollment in the program; (C) is enrolled in a secondary school in an eligible country; (D) has completed not more than 11 years of primary and secondary education, exclusive of kindergarten; (E) demonstrates maturity, good character, and scholastic aptitude, and has the proficiency in the English language necessary to participate in the program; (F) has not previously participated in an exchange program in the United States sponsored by the Government of the United States; and (G) is not prohibited from entering the United States under any provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) or any other provision of law related to immigration and nationality. (3) Compliance with visa requirements.--An eligible student may not participate in the exchange visitor program authorized by paragraph (1) unless the eligible student has the status of nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(J) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(J)). (4) Broad participation.--Whenever appropriate, the Secretary shall make special provisions to ensure the broadest possible participation in the exchange visitor program authorized by paragraph (1), particularly among females and less advantaged citizens of eligible countries. (5) Designated exchange visitor program.--The exchange visitor program authorized by paragraph (1) shall be a designated exchange visitor program for the purposes of section 641 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1372). (6) Regular reporting to the secretary.--If the Secretary utilizes a United States sponsoring organization to carry out the exchange visitor program authorized by paragraph (1), such United States sponsoring organization shall report regularly to the Secretary on the progress it has made to implement such program. (f) Report on Expediting Visas for Participants in Exchange, Scholarship, and Visitors Programs.-- (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to Congress a report on expediting the issuance of visas to individuals who are entering the United States for the purpose of participating in a scholarship, exchange, or visitor program authorized in subsection (d) or (e) without compromising the security of the United States. (2) Recommendations.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include-- (A) the recommendations of the Secretary and the Secretary of Homeland Security, if any, for methods to expedite the processing of requests for such visas; and (B) a proposed schedule for implementing any recommendations described in subparagraph (A). (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for educational and cultural exchange programs for fiscal year 2005, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $60,000,000 to carry out programs under this section. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs is a key element in any global strategy to eliminate Islamist terrorism. (2) Education in the Middle East about the world outside that region is weak. (3) The United Nations has rightly equated literacy with freedom. (4) The international community is moving toward setting a concrete goal of reducing by half the illiteracy rate in the Middle East by 2010, through the implementation of education programs targeting women and girls and programs for adult literacy, and by other means. (5) To be effective, the effort to improve education in the Middle East must also include-- (A) support for the provision of basic education tools, such as textbooks that translate more of the world's knowledge into local languages and local libraries to house such materials; and (B) more vocational education in trades and business skills. (6) The Middle East can benefit from some of the same programs to bridge the digital divide that already have been developed for other regions of the world. (b) International Youth Opportunity Fund.-- (1) Establishment.-- (A) In general.--The President shall establish an International Youth Opportunity Fund (hereafter in this section referred to as the ``Fund''). (B) International participation.--The President shall seek the cooperation of the international community in establishing and generously supporting the Fund. (2) Purpose.--The purpose of the Fund shall be to provide financial assistance for the improvement of public education in the Middle East, including assistance for the construction and operation of primary and secondary schools in countries that have a sizable Muslim population and that commit to sensibly investing their own financial resources in public education. (3) Eligibility for assistance.-- (A) Determination.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall determine which countries are eligible for assistance through the Fund. (B) Criteria.--In determining whether a country is eligible for assistance, the Secretary shall consider whether the government of that country is sensibly investing financial resources in public education and is committed to promoting a system of education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs. (4) Use of funds.--Financial assistance provided through the Fund shall be used for expanding literacy programs, providing textbooks, reducing the digital divide, expanding vocational and business education, constructing and operating public schools, establishing local libraries, training teachers in modern education techniques, and promoting public education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs. (c) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall jointly prepare and submit to Congress a report on the improvement of education in the Middle East. (2) Content.--Reports submitted under this subsection shall include the following: (A) A general strategy for working with eligible host governments in the Middle East toward establishing the International Youth Opportunity Fund and related programs. (B) A listing of countries that are eligible for assistance under such programs. (C) A description of the specific programs initiated in each eligible country and the amount expended in support of such programs. (D) A description of activities undertaken to close the digital divide and expand vocational and business skills in eligible countries. (E) A listing of activities that could be undertaken if additional funding were provided and the amount of funding that would be necessary to carry out such activities. (F) A strategy for garnering programmatic and financial support from international organizations and other countries in support of the Fund and activities related to the improvement of public education in eligible countries. (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for the establishment of the International Youth Opportunity Fund, in addition to any amounts otherwise available for such purpose, $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2006 through 2009. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) While terrorism is not caused by poverty, breeding grounds for terrorism are created by backward economic policies and repressive political regimes. (2) Policies that support economic development and reform also have political implications, as economic and political liberties are often linked. (3) The United States is working toward creating a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013 and implementing a free trade agreement with Bahrain, and free trade agreements exist between the United States and Israel and the United States and Jordan. (4) Existing and proposed free trade agreements between the United States and Islamic countries are drawing interest from other countries in the Middle East region, and Islamic countries can become full participants in the rules-based global trading system, as the United States considers lowering its barriers to trade with the poorest Arab countries. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) a comprehensive United States strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children's future; (2) 1 element of such a strategy should encompass the lowering of trade barriers with the poorest countries that have a significant population of Arab or Muslim individuals; (3) another element of such a strategy should encompass United States efforts to promote economic reform in countries that have a significant population of Arab or Muslim individuals, including efforts to integrate such countries into the global trading system; and (4) given the importance of the rule of law in promoting economic development and attracting investment, the United States should devote an increased proportion of its assistance to countries in the Middle East to the promotion of the rule of law. (c) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the efforts of the United States Government to encourage development and promote economic reform in countries that have a significant population of Arab or Muslim individuals. (2) Content.--The report required under this subsection shall describe-- (A) efforts to integrate countries with significant populations of Arab or Muslim individuals into the global trading system; and (B) actions that the United States Government, acting alone and in partnership with other governments in the Middle East, can take to promote intra-regional trade and the rule of law in the region. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 $200,000,000 for the Middle East Partnership Initiative. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, given the importance of the rule of law and economic reform to development in the Middle East, a significant portion of the funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a) should be made available to promote the rule of law in the Middle East. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Almost every aspect of the counterterrorism strategy of the United States relies on international cooperation. (2) Since September 11, 2001, the number and scope of United States Government contacts with foreign governments concerning counterterrorism have expanded significantly, but such contacts have often been ad hoc and not integrated as a comprehensive and unified approach. (b) International Contact Group on Counterterrorism.-- (1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the President-- (A) should seek to engage the leaders of the governments of other countries in a process of advancing beyond separate and uncoordinated national counterterrorism strategies to develop with those other governments a comprehensive coalition strategy to fight Islamist terrorism; and (B) to that end, should seek to establish an international counterterrorism policy contact group with the leaders of governments providing leadership in global counterterrorism efforts and governments of countries with sizable Muslim populations, to be used as a ready and flexible international means for discussing and coordinating the development of important counterterrorism policies by the participating governments. (2) Authority.--The President is authorized to establish an international counterterrorism policy contact group with the leaders of governments referred to in paragraph (1) for purposes as follows: (A) To develop in common with such other countries important policies and a strategy that address the various components of international prosecution of the war on terrorism, including policies and a strategy that address military issues, law enforcement, the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence, issues relating to interdiction of travel by terrorists, counterterrorism- related customs issues, financial issues, and issues relating to terrorist sanctuaries. (B) To address, to the extent (if any) that the President and leaders of other participating governments determine appropriate, such long-term issues as economic and political reforms that can contribute to strengthening stability and security in the Middle East. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Carrying out the global war on terrorism requires the development of policies with respect to the detention and treatment of captured international terrorists that is adhered to by all coalition forces. (2) Article 3 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316) was specifically designed for cases in which the usual rules of war do not apply, and the minimum standards of treatment pursuant to such Article are generally accepted throughout the world as customary international law. (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.-- The term ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment'' means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the 5th amendment, 8th amendment, or 14th amendment to the Constitution. (2) Geneva conventions.--The term ``Geneva Conventions'' means-- (A) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114); (B) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217); (C) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and (D) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516). (3) Prisoner.--The term ``prisoner'' means a foreign individual captured, detained, interned, or otherwise held in the custody of the United States. (4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Defense. (5) Torture.--The term ``torture'' has the meaning given that term in section 2340 of title 18, United States Code. (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the United States should engage countries that are participating in the coalition to fight terrorism to develop a common approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured international terrorists; and (2) an approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured international terrorists developed by the countries participating in the coalition to fight terrorism could draw upon Article 3 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the principles of which are commonly accepted as minimum basic standards for humane treatment of captured individuals. (d) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States-- (1) to treat any prisoner humanely and in accordance with standards that the Government of the United States would determine to be consistent with international law if such standards were applied to personnel of the United States captured by an enemy in the war on terrorism; (2) if there is any doubt as to whether a prisoner is entitled to the protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions, to provide the prisoner such protections until the status of the prisoner is determined under the procedures authorized by paragraph 1-6 of Army Regulation 190-8 (1997); and (3) to expeditiously prosecute cases of terrorism or other criminal acts alleged to have been committed by prisoners in the custody of the United States Armed Forces at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in order to avoid the indefinite detention of such prisoners. (e) Prohibition on Torture or Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.-- (1) In general.--No prisoner shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. (2) Relationship to geneva conventions.--Nothing in this section shall affect the status of any person under the Geneva Conventions or whether any person is entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions. (f) Rules, Regulations, and Guidelines.-- (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall prescribe the rules, regulations, or guidelines necessary to ensure compliance with the prohibition in subsection (e)(1) by the members of the Armed Forces of the United States and by any person providing services to the Department of Defense on a contract basis. (2) Report to congress.--The Secretary shall submit to Congress the rules, regulations, or guidelines prescribed under paragraph (1), and any modifications to such rules, regulations, or guidelines-- (A) not later than 30 days after the effective date of such rules, regulations, guidelines, or modifications; and (B) in a manner and form that will protect the national security interests of the United States. (g) Report on Possible Violations.-- (1) Requirement.--The Secretary shall submit, on a timely basis and not less than twice each year, a report to Congress on the circumstances surrounding any investigation of a possible violation of the prohibition in subsection (e)(1) by a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or by a person providing services to the Department of Defense on a contract basis. (2) Form of report.--A report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in a manner and form that-- (A) will protect the national security interests of the United States; and (B) will not prejudice any prosecution of an individual involved in, or responsible for, a violation of the prohibition in subsection (e)(1). (h) Report on a Coalition Approach Toward the Detention and Humane Treatment of Captured Terrorists.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report describing the efforts of the United States Government to develop an approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured international terrorists that will be adhered to by all countries that are members of the coalition against terrorism. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction since 1994 or earlier. (2) The United States doubtless would be a prime target for use of any such weapon by al Qaeda. (3) Although the United States Government has redoubled its international commitments to supporting the programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction and other nonproliferation assistance programs, nonproliferation experts continue to express deep concern about the United States Government's commitment and approach to securing the weapons of mass destruction and related highly dangerous materials that are still scattered among Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. (4) The cost of increased investment in the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related dangerous materials is greatly outweighed by the potentially catastrophic cost to the United States of use of weapons of mass destruction or related dangerous materials by the terrorists who are so eager to acquire them. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) maximum effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, wherever such proliferation may occur, is warranted; and (2) the programs of the United States Government to prevent or counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction, and other nonproliferation assistance programs, should be expanded, improved, and better funded to address the global dimensions of the proliferation threat. (c) Requirement for Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress-- (1) a strategy for expanding and strengthening the Proliferation Security Initiative, the programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction, and other nonproliferation assistance programs; and (2) an estimate of the funding necessary to execute that strategy. (d) Report on Reforming the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and Other Non-Proliferation Assistance Programs.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report evaluating whether the United States could more effectively address the global threat of nuclear proliferation by-- (1) establishing a central coordinator for the programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction; (2) eliminating the requirement that the President spend no more than $50,000,000 annually on programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction and other non-proliferation assistance programs carried out outside the former Soviet Union; or (3) repealing the provisions of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 2551 note) that place conditions on assistance to the former Soviet Union unrelated to bilateral cooperation on weapons dismantlement. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) While efforts to designate and freeze the assets of terrorist financiers have been relatively unsuccessful, efforts to target the relatively small number of al Qaeda financial facilitators have been valuable and successful. (2) The death or capture of several important financial facilitators has decreased the amount of money available to al Qaeda, and has made it more difficult for al Qaeda to raise and move money. (3) The capture of al Qaeda financial facilitators has provided a windfall of intelligence that can be used to continue the cycle of disruption. (4) The United States Government has rightly recognized that information about terrorist money helps in understanding terror networks, searching them out, and disrupting their operations. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the primary weapon in the effort to stop terrorist financing should be the targeting of terrorist financial facilitators by intelligence and law enforcement agencies; and (2) efforts to track terrorist financing must be paramount in United States counter-terrorism efforts. (c) Report on Terrorist Financing.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report evaluating the effectiveness of United States efforts to curtail the international financing of terrorism. (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall evaluate and make recommendations on-- (A) the effectiveness of efforts and methods to track terrorist financing; (B) ways to improve international governmental cooperation in this effort; (C) ways to improve performance of financial institutions in this effort; (D) the adequacy of agency coordination in this effort and ways to improve that coordination; and (E) recommendations for changes in law and additional resources required to improve this effort. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Travel documents are as important to terrorists as weapons since terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack sites. (2) International travel is dangerous for terrorists because they must surface to pass through regulated channels, present themselves to border security officials, or attempt to circumvent inspection points. (3) Terrorists use evasive, but detectable, methods to travel, such as altered and counterfeit passports and visas, specific travel methods and routes, liaisons with corrupt government officials, human smuggling networks, supportive travel agencies, and immigration and identity fraud. (4) Before September 11, 2001, no Federal agency systematically analyzed terrorist travel strategies. If an agency had done so, the agency could have discovered the ways in which the terrorist predecessors to al Qaeda had been systematically, but detectably, exploiting weaknesses in our border security since the early 1990s. (5) Many of the hijackers were potentially vulnerable to interception by border authorities. Analyzing their characteristic travel documents and travel patterns could have allowed authorities to intercept some of the hijackers and a more effective use of information available in Government databases could have identified some of the hijackers. (6) The routine operations of our immigration laws and the aspects of those laws not specifically aimed at protecting against terrorism inevitably shaped al Qaeda's planning and opportunities. (7) New insights into terrorist travel gained since September 11, 2001, have not been adequately integrated into the front lines of border security. (8) The small classified terrorist travel intelligence collection and analysis program currently in place has produced useful results and should be expanded. (b) Strategy.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to Congress unclassified and classified versions of a strategy for combining terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement into a cohesive effort to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility domestically and internationally. The report to Congress should include a description of the actions taken to implement the strategy. (2) Accountability.--The strategy submitted under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) describe a program for collecting, analyzing, disseminating, and utilizing information and intelligence regarding terrorist travel tactics and methods; and (B) outline which Federal intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement agencies will be held accountable for implementing each element of the strategy. (3) Coordination.--The strategy shall be developed in coordination with all relevant Federal agencies, including-- (A) the National Counterterrorism Center; (B) the Department of Transportation; (C) the Department of State; (D) the Department of the Treasury; (E) the Department of Justice; (F) the Department of Defense; (G) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (H) the Drug Enforcement Agency; and (I) the agencies that comprise the intelligence community. (4) Contents.--The strategy shall address-- (A) the intelligence and law enforcement collection, analysis, operations, and reporting required to identify and disrupt terrorist travel practices and trends, and the terrorist travel facilitators, document forgers, human smugglers, travel agencies, and corrupt border and transportation officials who assist terrorists; (B) the initial and ongoing training and training materials required by consular, border, and immigration officials to effectively detect and disrupt terrorist travel described under subsection (c)(3); (C) the new procedures required and actions to be taken to integrate existing counterterrorist travel and mobility intelligence into border security processes, including consular, port of entry, border patrol, maritime, immigration benefits, and related law enforcement activities; (D) the actions required to integrate current terrorist mobility intelligence into military force protection measures; (E) the additional assistance to be given to the interagency Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center for purposes of combatting terrorist travel, including further developing and expanding enforcement and operational capabilities that address terrorist travel; (F) the additional resources to be given to the Directorate of Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection to aid in the sharing of information between the frontline border agencies of the Department of Homeland Security and classified and unclassified sources of counterterrorist travel intelligence and information elsewhere in the Federal Government, including the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center; (G) the development and implementation of procedures to enable the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center to timely receive terrorist travel intelligence and documentation obtained at consulates and ports of entry, and by law enforcement officers and military personnel; (H) the use of foreign and technical assistance to advance border security measures and law enforcement operations against terrorist travel facilitators; (I) the development of a program to provide each consular, port of entry, and immigration benefits office with a counterterrorist travel expert trained and authorized to use the relevant authentication technologies and cleared to access all appropriate immigration, law enforcement, and intelligence databases; (J) the feasibility of digitally transmitting passport information to a central cadre of specialists until such time as experts described under subparagraph (I) are available at consular, port of entry, and immigration benefits offices; and (K) granting consular officers the security clearances necessary to access law enforcement sensitive databases. (c) Frontline Counterterrorist Travel Technology and Training.-- (1) Technology acquisition and dissemination plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, shall submit to Congress a plan describing how the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State can acquire and deploy, to all consulates, ports of entry, and immigration benefits offices, technologies that facilitate document authentication and the detection of potential terrorist indicators on travel documents. (2) Contents of plan.--The plan submitted under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) outline the timetable needed to acquire and deploy the authentication technologies; (B) identify the resources required to-- (i) fully disseminate these technologies; and (ii) train personnel on use of these technologies; and (C) address the feasibility of using these technologies to screen every passport submitted for identification purposes to a United States consular, border, or immigration official. (3) Training program.-- (A) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall develop and implement an initial and annual training program for consular, border, and immigration officials to teach such officials how to effectively detect and disrupt terrorist travel. The Secretary may assist State, local, and tribal governments, and private industry, in establishing training programs related to terrorist travel intelligence. (B) Training topics.--The training developed under this paragraph shall include training in-- (i) methods for identifying fraudulent documents; (ii) detecting terrorist indicators on travel documents; (iii) recognizing travel patterns, tactics, and behaviors exhibited by terrorists; (iv) the use of information contained in available databases and data systems and procedures to maintain the accuracy and integrity of such systems; and (v) other topics determined necessary by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State. (C) Certification.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act-- (i) the Secretary of Homeland Security shall certify to Congress that all border and immigration officials have received training under this paragraph; and (ii) the Secretary of State shall certify to Congress that all consular officers have received training under this paragraph. (4) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subsection. (d) Enhancing Classified Counterterrorist Travel Efforts.-- (1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director shall significantly increase resources and personnel to the small classified program that collects and analyzes intelligence on terrorist travel. (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary to carry out this subsection. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop a plan for a comprehensive integrated screening system. (b) Design.--The system planned under subsection (a) shall be designed to-- (1) encompass an integrated network of screening points that includes the Nation's border security system, transportation system, and critical infrastructure or facilities that the Secretary determines need to be protected against terrorist attack; (2) build upon existing border enforcement and security activities, and to the extent practicable, private sector security initiatives, in a manner that will enable the utilization of a range of security check points in a continuous and consistent manner throughout the Nation's screening system; (3) allow access to government databases to detect terrorists; and (4) utilize biometric identifiers that the Secretary determines to be appropriate and feasible. (c) Standards for Screening Procedures.-- (1) Authorization.--The Secretary may promulgate standards for screening procedures for-- (A) entering and leaving the United States; (B) accessing Federal facilities that the Secretary determines need to be protected against terrorist attack; (C) accessing critical infrastructure that the Secretary determines need to be protected against terrorist attack; and (D) accessing modes of transportation that the Secretary determines need to be protected against terrorist attack. (2) Scope.--Standards prescribed under this subsection may address a range of factors, including technologies required to be used in screening and requirements for secure identification. (3) Requirements.--In promulgating standards for screening procedures, the Secretary shall-- (A) consider and incorporate appropriate civil liberties and privacy protections; (B) comply with the Administrative Procedure Act; and (C) consult with other Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, and other interested parties, as appropriate. (4) Limitation.--This section does not confer to the Secretary new statutory authority, or alter existing authorities, over systems, critical infrastructure, and facilities. (5) Notification.--If the Secretary determines that additional regulatory authority is needed to fully implement the plan for an integrated screening system, the Secretary shall immediately notify Congress. (d) Compliance.--The Secretary may issue regulations to ensure compliance with the standards promulgated under this section. (e) Consultation.--For those systems, critical infrastructure, and facilities that the Secretary determines need to be protected against terrorist attack, the Secretary shall consult with other Federal agencies, State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector to ensure the development of consistent standards and consistent implementation of the integrated screening system. (f) Biometric Identifiers.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall continue to review biometric technologies and existing Federal and State programs using biometric identifiers. Such review shall consider the accuracy rate of available technologies. (g) Implementation.-- (1) Phase i.--The Secretary shall-- (A) issue standards for driver's licenses, personal identification cards, and birth certificates, as required under section 806; (B) develop plans for, and begin implementation of, a single program for registered travelers to expedite travel across the border, as required under section 803(e); (C) continue the implementation of a biometric exit and entry data system that links to relevant databases and data systems, as required by subsections (b) and (c) of section 803 and other existing authorities; (D) centralize the ``no-fly'' and ``automatic-selectee'' lists, making use of improved terrorists watch lists, as required by section 903; (E) develop plans, in consultation with other relevant agencies, for the sharing of terrorist information with trusted governments, as required by section 805; (F) initiate any other action determined appropriate by the Secretary to facilitate the implementation of this paragraph; and (G) report to Congress on the implementation of phase I, including-- (i) the effectiveness of actions taken, the efficacy of resources expended, compliance with statutory provisions, and safeguards for privacy and civil liberties; and (ii) plans for the development and implementation of phases II and III. (2) Phase ii.--The Secretary shall-- (A) complete the implementation of a single program for registered travelers to expedite travel across the border, as required by section 803(e); (B) complete the implementation of a biometric entry and exit data system that links to relevant databases and data systems, as required by subsections (b) and (c) of section 803, and other existing authorities; (C) in cooperation with other relevant agencies, engage in dialogue with foreign governments to develop plans for the use of common screening standards; (D) initiate any other action determined appropriate by the Secretary to facilitate the implementation of this paragraph; and (E) report to Congress on the implementation of phase II, including-- (i) the effectiveness of actions taken, the efficacy of resources expended, compliance with statutory provisions, and safeguards for privacy and civil liberties; and (ii) the plans for the development and implementation of phase III. (3) Phase iii.--The Secretary shall-- (A) finalize and deploy the integrated screening system required by subsection (a); (B) in cooperation with other relevant agencies, promote the implementation of common screening standards by foreign governments; and (C) report to Congress on the implementation of Phase III, including-- (i) the effectiveness of actions taken, the efficacy of resources expended, compliance with statutory provisions, and safeguards for privacy and civil liberties; and (ii) the plans for the ongoing operation of the integrated screening system. (h) Report.--After phase III has been implemented, the Secretary shall submit a report to Congress every 3 years that describes the ongoing operation of the integrated screening system, including its effectiveness, efficient use of resources, compliance with statutory provisions, and safeguards for privacy and civil liberties. (i) Authorizations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress finds that completing a biometric entry and exit data system as expeditiously as possible is an essential investment in efforts to protect the United States by preventing the entry of terrorists. (b) Plan and Report.-- (1) Development of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop a plan to accelerate the full implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data system required by applicable sections of-- (A) the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-208); (B) the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-205); (C) the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (Public Law 106- 396); (D) the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173); and (E) the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56). (2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to Congress on the plan developed under paragraph (1), which shall contain-- (A) a description of the current functionality of the entry and exit data system, including-- (i) a listing of ports of entry with biometric entry data systems in use and whether such screening systems are located at primary or secondary inspection areas; (ii) a listing of ports of entry with biometric exit data systems in use; (iii) a listing of databases and data systems with which the automated entry and exit data system are interoperable; (iv) a description of-- (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress finds that-- (1) existing procedures allow many individuals to enter the United States by showing minimal identification or without showing any identification; (2) the planning for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrates that terrorists study and exploit United States vulnerabilities; and (3) additional safeguards are needed to ensure that terrorists cannot enter the United States. (b) Biometric Passports.-- (1) Development of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall develop and implement a plan as expeditiously as possible to require biometric passports or other identification deemed by the Secretary to be at least as secure as a biometric passport, for all travel into the United States by United States citizens and by categories of individuals for whom documentation requirements have previously been waived under section 212(d)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(4)(B)). (2) Requirement to produce documentation.--The plan developed under paragraph (1) shall require all United States citizens, and categories of individuals for whom documentation requirements have previously been waived under section 212(d)(4)(B) of such Act, to carry and produce the documentation described in paragraph (1) when traveling from foreign countries into the United States. (c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--After the complete implementation of the plan described in subsection (b)-- (1) the Secretary of State and the Attorney General may no longer exercise discretion under section 212(d)(4)(B) of such Act to waive documentary requirements for travel into the United States; and (2) the President may no longer exercise discretion under section 215(b) of such Act to waive documentary requirements for United States citizens departing from or entering, or attempting to depart from or enter, the United States, unless the Secretary of State determines that the alternative documentation that is the basis for the waiver of the documentary requirement is at least as secure as a biometric passport. (d) Transit Without Visa Program.--The Secretary of State shall not use any authorities granted under section 212(d)(4)(C) of such Act until the Secretary, in conjunction with the Secretary of Homeland Security, completely implements a security plan to fully ensure secure transit passage areas to prevent aliens proceeding in immediate and continuous transit through the United States from illegally entering the United States. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress finds that-- (1) the exchange of terrorist information with other countries, consistent with privacy requirements, along with listings of lost and stolen passports, will have immediate security benefits; and (2) the further away from the borders of the United States that screening occurs, the more security benefits the United States will gain. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the United States Government should exchange terrorist information with trusted allies; (2) the United States Government should move toward real- time verification of passports with issuing authorities; (3) where practicable the United States Government should conduct screening before a passenger departs on a flight destined for the United States; (4) the United States Government should work with other countries to ensure effective inspection regimes at all airports; (5) the United States Government should work with other countries to improve passport standards and provide foreign assistance to countries that need help making the transition to the global standard for identification; and (6) the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Department of State and other agencies, should implement the initiatives called for in this subsection. (c) Report Regarding the Exchange of Terrorist Information.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with other agencies, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on Federal efforts to collaborate with allies of the United States in the exchange of terrorist information. (2) Contents.--The report shall outline-- (A) strategies for increasing such collaboration and cooperation; (B) progress made in screening passengers before their departure to the United States; and (C) efforts to work with other countries to accomplish the goals described under this section. (a) In General.--Subtitle H of title VIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 451 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(a) Security Enhancements.--The Commissioner of Social Security shall-- ``(1) within 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, issue regulations to restrict the issuance of multiple replacement social security cards to any individual to minimize fraud; ``(2) within 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, require independent verification of all records provided by an applicant for an original social security card, other than for purposes of enumeration at birth; and ``(3) within 18 months after the date of enactment of this section, add death, fraud, and work authorization indicators to the social security number verification system. ``(b) Interagency Security Task Force.--The Secretary and the Commissioner of Social Security shall form an interagency task force for the purpose of further improving the security of social security cards and numbers. Within 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, the task force shall establish security requirements, including-- ``(1) standards for safeguarding social security cards from counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft; ``(2) requirements for verifying documents submitted for the issuance of replacement cards; and ``(3) actions to increase enforcement against the fraudulent use or issuance of social security numbers and cards. ``(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commissioner of Social Security for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009, such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.''. (b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.-- (1) Section 656 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (5 U.S.C. 301 note) is repealed. (2) Section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 116 Stat. 2135) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 890 the following: In this title, the terms ``air carrier'', ``air transportation'', ``aircraft'', ``airport'', ``cargo'', ``foreign air carrier'', and ``intrastate air transportation'' have the meanings given such terms in section 40102 of title 49, United States Code. (a) Requirement for Strategy.-- (1) Responsibilities of secretary of homeland security.-- The Secretary of Homeland Security shall-- (A) develop and implement a National Strategy for Transportation Security; and (B) revise such strategy whenever necessary to improve or to maintain the currency of the strategy or whenever the Secretary otherwise considers it appropriate to do so. (2) Consultation with secretary of transportation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with the Secretary of Transportation in developing and revising the National Strategy for Transportation Security under this section. (b) Content.--The National Strategy for Transportation Security shall include the following matters: (1) An identification and evaluation of the transportation assets within the United States that, in the interests of national security, must be protected from attack or disruption by terrorist or other hostile forces, including aviation, bridge and tunnel, commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, urban mass transit, and other public transportation infrastructure assets that could be at risk of such an attack or disruption. (2) The development of the risk-based priorities, and realistic deadlines, for addressing security needs associated with those assets. (3) The most practical and cost-effective means of defending those assets against threats to their security. (4) A forward-looking strategic plan that assigns transportation security roles and missions to departments and agencies of the Federal Government (including the Armed Forces), State governments (including the Army National Guard and Air National Guard), local governments, and public utilities, and establishes mechanisms for encouraging private sector cooperation and participation in the implementation of such plan. (5) A comprehensive delineation of response and recovery responsibilities and issues regarding threatened and executed acts of terrorism within the United States. (6) A prioritization of research and development objectives that support transportation security needs, giving a higher priority to research and development directed toward protecting vital assets. (7) A budget and recommendations for appropriate levels and sources of funding to meet the objectives set forth in the strategy. (c) Submissions to Congress.-- (1) The national strategy.-- (A) Initial strategy.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit the National Strategy for Transportation Security developed under this section to Congress not later than April 1, 2005. (B) Subsequent versions.--After 2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit the National Strategy for Transportation Security, including any revisions, to Congress not less frequently than April 1 of each even-numbered year. (2) Periodic progress report.-- (A) Requirement for report.--Each year, in conjunction with the submission of the budget to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to Congress an assessment of the progress made on implementing the National Strategy for Transportation Security. (B) Content.--Each progress report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following matters: (i) An assessment of the adequacy of the resources committed to meeting the objectives of the National Strategy for Transportation Security. (ii) Any recommendations for improving and implementing that strategy that the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, considers appropriate. (3) Classified material.--Any part of the National Strategy for Transportation Security that involves information that is properly classified under criteria established by Executive order shall be submitted to Congress separately in classified form. (d) Priority Status.-- (1) In general.--The National Strategy for Transportation Security shall be the governing document for Federal transportation security efforts. (2) Other plans and reports.--The National Strategy for Transportation Security shall include, as an integral part or as an appendix-- (A) the current National Maritime Transportation Security Plan under section 70103 of title 46, United States Code; (B) the report of the Secretary of Transportation under section 44938 of title 49, United States Code; and (C) any other transportation security plan or report that the Secretary of Homeland Security determines appropriate for inclusion. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Transportation Security Administration, as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act but in no event later than 90 days after that date, shall-- (1) implement a procedure under which the Transportation Security Administration compares information about passengers who are to be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air transportation for flights and flight segments originating in the United States with a comprehensive, consolidated database containing information about known or suspected terrorists and their associates; and (2) use the information obtained by comparing the passenger information with the information in the database to prevent known or suspected terrorists and their associates from boarding such flights or flight segments or to subject them to specific additional security scrutiny, through the use of ``no fly'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists or other means. (b) Air Carrier Cooperation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, shall by order require air carriers to provide the passenger information necessary to implement the procedure required by subsection (a). (c) Maintaining the Accuracy and Integrity of the ``No Fly'' and ``Automatic Selectee'' Lists.-- (1) Watchlist database.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall design guidelines, policies, and operating procedures for the collection, removal, and updating of data maintained, or to be maintained, in the watchlist database described in subsection (a)(1) that are designed to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the database. (2) Accuracy of entries.--In developing the ``no fly'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists under subsection (a)(2), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a simple and timely method for correcting erroneous entries, for clarifying information known to cause false hits or misidentification errors, and for updating relevant information that is dispositive in the passenger screening process. The Secretary shall also establish a process to provide individuals whose names are confused with, or similar to, names in the database with a means of demonstrating that they are not a person named in the database. (a) Aircraft Passenger Screening at Checkpoints.-- (1) Detection of explosives.-- (A) Improvement of capabilities.--As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such action as is necessary to improve the capabilities at passenger screening checkpoints, especially at commercial airports, to detect explosives carried aboard aircraft by passengers or placed aboard aircraft by passengers. (B) Interim action.--Until measures are implemented that enable the screening of all passengers for explosives, the Secretary shall take immediate measures to require Transportation Security Administration or other screeners to screen for explosives any individual identified for additional screening before that individual may board an aircraft. (2) Implementation report.-- (A) Requirement for report.--Within 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall transmit to the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on how the Secretary intends to achieve the objectives of the actions required under paragraph (1). The report shall include an implementation schedule. (B) Classified information.--The Secretary may submit separately in classified form any information in the report under subparagraph (A) that involves information that is properly classified under criteria established by Executive order. (b) Acceleration of Research and Development on, and Deployment of, Detection of Explosives.-- (1) Required action.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall take such action as may be necessary to accelerate research and development and deployment of technology for screening aircraft passengers for explosives during or before the aircraft boarding process. (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary such sums as are necessary to carry out this subsection for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2009. (c) Improvement of Screener Job Performance.-- (1) Required action.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such action as may be necessary to improve the job performance of airport screening personnel. (2) Human factors study.--In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, conduct a human factors study in order better to understand problems in screener performance and to set attainable objectives for individual screeners and screening checkpoints. (d) Checked Baggage and Cargo.-- (1) In-line baggage screening.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such action as may be necessary to expedite the installation and use of advanced in-line baggage-screening equipment at commercial airports. (2) Cargo security.--The Secretary shall take such action as may be necessary to ensure that the Transportation Security Administration increases and improves its efforts to screen potentially dangerous cargo. (3) Hardened containers.--The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall require air carriers to deploy at least 1 hardened container for containing baggage or cargo items in each passenger aircraft that also carries cargo. (e) Cost-Sharing.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with representatives of air carriers, airport operators, and other interested parties, shall submit to the Senate and the House of Representatives-- (1) a proposed formula for cost-sharing, for the advanced in-line baggage screening equipment required by this title, between and among the Federal Government, State and local governments, and the private sector that reflects proportionate national security benefits and private sector benefits for such enhancement; and (2) recommendations, including recommended legislation, for an equitable, feasible, and expeditious system for defraying the costs of the advanced in-line baggage screening equipment required by this title, which may be based on the formula proposed under paragraph (1). (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Community.--The term ``community'' means a State, local government, or region. (2) Homeland security assistance.--The term ``homeland security assistance'' means grants or other financial assistance provided by the Department of Homeland Security under the State Homeland Security Grants Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, or the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program. (3) Local government.--The term ``local government'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(10) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(10)). (4) Region.--The term ``region'' means any intrastate or interstate consortium of local governments. (5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Homeland Security. (6) State.--The term ``State'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(14) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(14)). (7) Under secretary.--The term ``Under Secretary'' means the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. (b) In General.--The Secretary shall allocate homeland security assistance to communities based on-- (1) the level of threat faced by a community, as determined by the Secretary through the Under Secretary, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director; (2) the critical infrastructure in the community, and the risks to and vulnerability of that infrastructure, as identified and assessed by the Secretary through the Under Secretary; (3) the community's population and population density; (4) such other indicia of a community's risk and vulnerability as the Secretary determines is appropriate; (5) the benchmarks developed under subsection (d)(4)(A); and (6) the goal of achieving and enhancing essential emergency preparedness and response capabilities throughout the Nation. (c) Reallocation of Assistance.--A State receiving homeland security assistance may reallocate such assistance, in whole or in part, among local governments or other entities, only if such reallocation is made on the basis of an assessment of threats, risks, and vulnerabilities of the local governments or other entities that is consistent with the criteria set forth in subsection (b). (d) Advisory Panel.-- (1) Establishment.--Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall establish an advisory panel to assist the Secretary in determining how to allocate homeland security assistance funds most effectively among communities, consistent with the criteria set out in subsection (b). (2) Selection of members.--The Secretary shall appoint no fewer than 10 individuals to serve on the advisory panel. The individuals shall-- (A) be chosen on the basis of their knowledge, achievements, and experience; (B) be from diverse geographic and professional backgrounds; and (C) have demonstrated expertise in homeland security or emergency preparedness and response. (3) Term.--Each member of the advisory panel appointed by the Secretary shall serve a term the length of which is to be determined by the Secretary, but which shall not exceed 5 years. (4) Responsibilities.--The advisory panel shall-- (A) develop benchmarks by which the needs and capabilities of diverse communities throughout the Nation with respect to potential terrorist attacks may be assessed, and review and revise those benchmarks as appropriate; and (B) advise the Secretary on means of establishing appropriate priorities for the allocation of funding among applicants for homeland security assistance. (5) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the advisory panel shall provide the Secretary and Congress with a report on the benchmarks it has developed under paragraph (4)(A), including any revisions or modifications to such benchmarks. (6) Applicability of federal advisory committee act.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall apply to the advisory panel. (7) Administrative support services.--The Secretary shall provide administrative support services to the advisory panel. (e) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 1014(c) of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 3714(c)) is amended by striking paragraph (3). (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The attacks on September 11, 2001, demonstrated that even the most robust emergency response capabilities can be overwhelmed if an attack is large enough. (2) Teamwork, collaboration, and cooperation at an incident site are critical to a successful response to a terrorist attack. (3) Key decision makers who are represented at the incident command level help to ensure an effective response, the efficient use of resources, and responder safety. (4) Regular joint training at all levels is essential to ensuring close coordination during an actual incident. (5) Beginning with fiscal year 2005, the Department of Homeland Security is requiring that entities adopt the Incident Command System and other concepts of the National Incident Management System in order to qualify for funds distributed by the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System; (2) when multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should follow a unified command system; and (3) the Secretary of Homeland Security should require, as a further condition of receiving homeland security preparedness funds from the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, that grant applicants document measures taken to fully and aggressively implement the Incident Command System and unified command procedures. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Authorized representative of the federal government.-- The term ``authorized representative of the Federal Government'' means any individual or individuals designated by the President with respect to the executive branch, the Chief Justice with respect to the Federal judiciary, or the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives with respect to Congress, or their designees, to request assistance under a Mutual Aid Agreement for an emergency or public service event. (2) Chief operating officer.--The term ``chief operating officer'' means the official designated by law to declare an emergency in and for the locality of that chief operating officer. (3) Emergency.--The term ``emergency'' means a major disaster or emergency declared by the President, or a state of emergency declared by the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the Governor of the State of Maryland or the Commonwealth of Virginia, or the declaration of a local emergency by the chief operating officer of a locality, or their designees, that triggers mutual aid under the terms of a Mutual Aid Agreement. (4) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means the employees of the party, including its agents or authorized volunteers, who are committed in a Mutual Aid Agreement to prepare for or who respond to an emergency or public service event. (5) Locality.--The term ``locality'' means a county, city, or town within the State of Maryland or the Commonwealth of Virginia and within the National Capital Region. (6) Mutual aid agreement.--The term ``Mutual Aid Agreement'' means an agreement, authorized under subsection (b) for the provision of police, fire, rescue and other public safety and health or medical services to any party to the agreement during a public service event, an emergency, or pre-planned training event. (7) National capital region or region.--The term ``National Capital Region'' or ``Region'' means the area defined under section 2674(f)(2) of title 10, United States Code, and those counties with a border abutting that area and any municipalities therein. (8) Party.--The term ``party'' means the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the District of Columbia, and any of the localities duly executing a Mutual Aid Agreement under this section. (9) Public service event.--The term ``public service event''-- (A) means any undeclared emergency, incident or situation in preparation for or response to which the Mayor of the District of Columbia, an authorized representative of the Federal Government, the Governor of the State of Maryland, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, or the chief operating officer of a locality in the National Capital Region, or their designees, requests or provides assistance under a Mutual Aid Agreement within the National Capital Region; and (B) includes Presidential inaugurations, public gatherings, demonstrations and protests, and law enforcement, fire, rescue, emergency health and medical services, transportation, communications, public works and engineering, mass care, and other support that require human resources, equipment, facilities or services supplemental to or greater than the requesting jurisdiction can provide. (10) State.--The term ``State'' means the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the District of Columbia. (11) Training.--The term ``training'' means emergency and public service event-related exercises, testing, or other activities using equipment and personnel to simulate performance of any aspect of the giving or receiving of aid by National Capital Region jurisdictions during emergencies or public service events, such actions occurring outside actual emergency or public service event periods. (b) Mutual Aid Authorized.-- (1) In general.--The Mayor of the District of Columbia, any authorized representative of the Federal Government, the Governor of the State of Maryland, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, or the chief operating officer of a locality, or their designees, acting within his or her jurisdictional purview, may, subject to State law, enter into, request or provide assistance under Mutual Aid Agreements with localities, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, and any other governmental agency or authority for-- (A) law enforcement, fire, rescue, emergency health and medical services, transportation, communications, public works and engineering, mass care, and resource support in an emergency or public service event; (B) preparing for, mitigating, managing, responding to or recovering from any emergency or public service event; and (C) training for any of the activities described under subparagraphs (A) and (B). (2) Facilitating localities.--The State of Maryland and the Commonwealth of Virginia are encouraged to facilitate the ability of localities to enter into interstate Mutual Aid Agreements in the National Capital Region under this section. (3) Application and effect.--This section-- (A) does not apply to law enforcement security operations at special events of national significance under section 3056(e) of title 18, United States Code, or other law enforcement functions of the United States Secret Service; (B) does not diminish any authorities, express or implied, of Federal agencies to enter into Mutual Aid Agreements in furtherance of their Federal missions; and (C) does not-- (i) preclude any party from entering into supplementary Mutual Aid Agreements with fewer than all the parties, or with another party; or (ii) affect any other agreement in effect before the date of enactment of this Act among the States and localities, including the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. (4) Rights described.--Other than as described in this section, the rights and responsibilities of the parties to a Mutual Aid Agreement entered into under this section shall be as described in the Mutual Aid Agreement. (c) District of Columbia.-- (1) In general.--The District of Columbia may purchase liability and indemnification insurance or become self insured against claims arising under a Mutual Aid Agreement authorized under this section. (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out paragraph (1). (d) Liability and Actions at Law.-- (1) In general.--Any responding party or its officers or employees rendering aid or failing to render aid to the District of Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, under a Mutual Aid Agreement authorized under this section, and any party or its officers or employees engaged in training activities with another party under such a Mutual Aid Agreement, shall be liable on account of any act or omission of its officers or employees while so engaged or on account of the maintenance or use of any related equipment, facilities, or supplies, but only to the extent permitted under the laws and procedures of the State of the party rendering aid. (2) Actions.--Any action brought against a party or its officers or employees on account of an act or omission in the rendering of aid to the District of Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, or failure to render such aid or on account of the maintenance or use of any related equipment, facilities, or supplies may be brought only under the laws and procedures of the State of the party rendering aid and only in the Federal or State courts located therein. Actions against the United States under this section may be brought only in Federal courts. (3) Good faith exception.-- (A) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term ``good faith'' shall not include willful misconduct, gross negligence, or recklessness. (B) Exception.--No State or locality, or its officers or employees, rendering aid to another party, or engaging in training, under a Mutual Aid Agreement shall be liable under Federal law on account of any act or omission performed in good faith while so engaged, or on account of the maintenance or use of any related equipment, facilities, or supplies performed in good faith. (4) Immunities.--This section shall not abrogate any other immunities from liability that any party has under any other Federal or State law. (d) Workers Compensation.-- (1) Compensation.--Each party shall provide for the payment of compensation and death benefits to injured members of the emergency forces of that party and representatives of deceased members of such forces if such members sustain injuries or are killed while rendering aid to the District of Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, under a Mutual Aid Agreement, or engaged in training activities under a Mutual Aid Agreement, in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or death were sustained within their own jurisdiction. (2) Other state law.--No party shall be liable under the law of any State other than its own for providing for the payment of compensation and death benefits to injured members of the emergency forces of that party and representatives of deceased members of such forces if such members sustain injuries or are killed while rendering aid to the District of Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, under a Mutual Aid Agreement or engaged in training activities under a Mutual Aid Agreement. (e) Licenses and Permits.--If any person holds a license, certificate, or other permit issued by any responding party evidencing the meeting of qualifications for professional, mechanical, or other skills and assistance is requested by a receiving jurisdiction, such person will be deemed licensed, certified, or permitted by the receiving jurisdiction to render aid involving such skill to meet a public service event, emergency or training for any such events. Section 309(j)(14) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)(14)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(E) Extensions not permitted for channels (63, 64, 68 and 69) reassigned for public safety services.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (B), the Commission shall not grant any extension under such subparagraph from the limitation of subparagraph (A) with respect to the frequencies assigned, under section 337(a)(1), for public safety services. The Commission shall take all actions necessary to complete assignment of the electromagnetic spectrum between 764 and 776 megahertz, inclusive, and between 794 and 806 megahertz, inclusive, for public safety services and to permit operations by public safety services on those frequencies commencing not later than January 1, 2007.''. (a) In General.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) Private sector organizations own 85 percent of the Nation's critical infrastructure and employ the vast majority of the Nation's workers. (2) Unless a terrorist attack targets a military or other secure government facility, the first people called upon to respond will likely be civilians. (3) Despite the exemplary efforts of some private entities, the private sector remains largely unprepared for a terrorist attack, due in part to the lack of a widely accepted standard for private sector preparedness. (4) Preparedness in the private sector and public sector for rescue, restart and recovery of operations should include-- (A) a plan for evacuation; (B) adequate communications capabilities; and (C) a plan for continuity of operations. (5) The American National Standards Institute recommends a voluntary national preparedness standard for the private sector based on the existing American National Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (NFPA 1600), with appropriate modifications. This standard would establish a common set of criteria and terminology for preparedness, disaster management, emergency management, and business continuity programs. (6) The mandate of the Department of Homeland Security extends to working with the private sector, as well as government entities. (b) Private Sector Preparedness Program.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.), as amended by section 1005, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``The Secretary shall establish a program to promote private sector preparedness for terrorism and other emergencies, including promoting the adoption of a voluntary national preparedness standard such as the private sector preparedness standard developed by the American National Standards Institute and based on the National Fire Protection Association 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs.''. (2) Technical and conforming amendment.--Section 1(b) of that Act, as amended by section 1005, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 510 the following: (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) Under section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C 121), the Department of Homeland Security, through the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, has the responsibility-- (A) to carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States, including the performance of risk assessments to determine the risks posed by particular types of terrorist attacks within the United States; (B) to identify priorities for protective and supportive measures; and (C) to develop a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States. (2) Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, issued on December 17, 2003, the Secretary of Homeland Security was given 1 year to develop a comprehensive plan to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources. (3) Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security should-- (A) identify those elements of the United States' transportation, energy, communications, financial, and other institutions that need to be protected; (B) develop plans to protect that infrastructure; and (C) exercise mechanisms to enhance preparedness. (b) Reports on Risk Assessment and Readiness.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report to Congress on-- (1) the Department of Homeland Security's progress in completing vulnerability and risk assessments of the Nation's critical infrastructure; (2) the adequacy of the Government's plans to protect such infrastructure; and (3) the readiness of the Government to respond to threats against the United States. (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The primary responsibility for national defense is with the Department of Defense and the secondary responsibility for national defense is with the Department of Homeland Security, and the 2 departments must have clear delineations of responsibility. (2) Before September 11, 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (hereafter in this section referred to as ``NORAD''), which had responsibility for defending United States airspace on September 11, 2001-- (A) focused on threats coming from outside the borders of the United States; and (B) had not increased its focus on terrorism within the United States, even though the intelligence community had gathered intelligence on the possibility that terrorists might turn to hijacking and even the use of airplanes as missiles within the United States. (3) The United States Northern Command has been established to assume responsibility for defense within the United States. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the Secretary of Defense should regularly assess the adequacy of United States Northern Command's plans and strategies with a view to ensuring that the United States Northern Command is prepared to respond effectively to all military and paramilitary threats within the United States; and (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives should periodically review and assess the adequacy of such plans and strategies. (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report describing the United States Northern Command's plans and strategies to defend the United States against military and paramilitary threats within the United States. (a) In General.--There is established within the Executive Office of the President a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (referred to in this title as the ``Board''). (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the Government may need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of its existing powers. (2) This shift of power and authority to the Government calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of life and to ensure that the Government uses its powers for the purposes for which the powers were given. (c) Purpose.--The Board shall-- (1) analyze and review actions the Executive Branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism; and (2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism. (d) Functions.-- (1) Advice and counsel on policy development and implementation.--The Board shall-- (A) review proposed legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including the development and adoption of information sharing guidelines under section 401(e); (B) review the implementation of new and existing legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including the implementation of information sharing guidelines under section 401(e); (C) advise the President and Federal executive departments and agencies to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of such legislation, regulations, policies, and guidelines; and (D) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a particular governmental power, consider whether the executive department or agency has explained-- (i) that the power actually materially enhances security; and (ii) that there is adequate supervision of the executive's use of the power to ensure protection of civil liberties. (2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review-- (A) the regulations, policies, and procedures and the implementation of the regulations, policies, procedures, and related laws of Federal executive departments and agencies to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are protected; (B) the information sharing practices of Federal executive departments and agencies to determine whether they appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties and adhere to the information sharing guidelines promulgated under section 401(e) and to other governing laws, regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil liberties; and (C) other actions by the Executive Branch related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to determine whether such actions-- (i) appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties; and (ii) are consistent with governing laws, regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil liberties. (3) Relationship with privacy and civil liberties officers.--The Board shall review and assess the activities of privacy and civil liberties officers described in section 1012 and, where appropriate, shall coordinate their activities. (e) Reports.-- (1) In general.--The Board shall-- (A) receive and review reports from privacy and civil liberties officers described in section 1012; and (B) periodically submit, not less than semiannually, reports to Congress and the President. (2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each year under paragraph (1)(B) shall include-- (A) a description of the major activities of the Board during the relevant period; and (B) information on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and oversight functions under subsection (d). (f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall hold public hearings, release public reports, and otherwise inform the public of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (g) Access To Information.-- (1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this section, the Board may-- (A) secure directly from any Federal executive department or agency, or any Federal officer or employee, all relevant records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, or recommendations, including classified information consistent with applicable law; (B) interview, take statements from, or take public testimony from personnel of any Federal executive department or agency or any Federal officer or employee; (C) request information or assistance from any State, tribal, or local government; and (D) require, by subpoena, persons other than Federal executive departments and agencies to produce any relevant information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other documentary or testimonial evidence. (2) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(D), the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found may issue an order requiring such person to produce the evidence required by such subpoena. (h) Membership.-- (1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be selected solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, achievements, public stature, and relevant experience, and without regard to political affiliation. (3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected official, an officer, or an employee of the Federal Government, other than in the capacity as a member of the Board. (i) Compensation and Travel Expenses.-- (1) Compensation.-- (A) Chairman.--The chairman shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which the chairman is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Board. (B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Board. (2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for persons employed intermittently by the Government under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Board. (j) Staff.-- (1) Appointment and compensation.--The Chairman, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Board, shall appoint and fix the compensation of an executive director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Board to carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code. (2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed to the Board without reimbursement from the Board, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of the detailee's regular employment without interruption. (3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates that do not exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such title. (k) Security Clearances.--The appropriate Federal executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Board to expeditiously provide the Board members and staff with appropriate security clearances to the extent possible under existing procedures and requirements, except that no person shall be provided with access to classified information under this section without the appropriate security clearances. (l) Treatment as Agency, Not as Advisory Committee.--The Board-- (1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code); and (2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in section 3(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)). (m) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section. (a) Designation and Functions.--The Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Health and Human Services, National Intelligence Director, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the head of any other executive department or agency designated by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to be appropriate for coverage under this section shall designate not less than 1 senior officer to-- (1) assist the department or agency head and other department or agency officials in appropriately considering privacy and civil liberties concerns when such officials are proposing, developing, or implementing laws, regulations, policies, procedures, or guidelines related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism; (2) periodically investigate and review department or agency actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, and related laws and their implementation to ensure that the department or agency is adequately considering privacy and civil liberties in its actions; (3) ensure that the department or agency has adequate procedures to receive, investigate, and respond to complaints from individuals who allege the department or agency has violated their privacy or civil liberties; and (4) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a particular governmental power the officer shall consider whether the department or agency has explained-- (i) that the power actually materially enhances security; and (ii) that there is adequate supervision of the department's or agency's use of the power to ensure protection of civil liberties. (b) Exception To Designation Authority.-- (1) Privacy officers.--In any department or agency referenced in subsection (a) or designated by the Board, which has a statutorily created privacy officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified in subsection (a) with respect to privacy. (2) Civil liberties officers.--In any department or agency referenced in subsection (a) or designated by the Board, which has a statutorily created civil liberties officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified in subsection (a) with respect to civil liberties. (c) Supervision and Coordination.--Each privacy or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b) shall-- (1) report directly to the department or agency head; and (2) coordinate their activities with the Inspector General of the agency to avoid duplication of effort. (d) Agency Cooperation.--Each department or agency head shall ensure that each privacy and civil liberties officer-- (1) has the information and material necessary to fulfill the officer's functions; (2) is advised of proposed policy changes; (3) is consulted by decision makers; and (4) is given access to material and personnel the officer determines to be necessary to carry out the officer's functions. (e) Periodic Reports.-- (1) In general.--The privacy and civil liberties officers of each department or agency referenced or designated under subsection (a) shall periodically, but not less than quarterly, submit a report on the officers' activities to Congress, the department or agency head, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. (2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include information on the discharge of each of the officer's functions, including-- (A) information on the number and types of reviews undertaken; (B) the type of advice provided and the response given to such advice; (C) the number and nature of the complaints received by the agency for alleged violations; and (D) a summary of the disposition of such complaints, the reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the officer's activities. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez) and a Member opposed each will control 30 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez).", u"TITLE III--MODIFICATIONS OF LAWS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY In this Act: (1) The term ``intelligence'' includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. (2) The term ``foreign intelligence'' means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists. (3) The term ``counterintelligence'' means information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists. (4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the following: (A) The National Intelligence Authority. (B) The Central Intelligence Agency. (C) The National Security Agency. (D) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (F) The National Reconnaissance Office. (G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs. (H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy. (I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. (J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. (K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard. (L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the National Intelligence Director and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community. (5) The terms ``national intelligence'' and ``intelligence related to the national security''-- (A) each refer to intelligence which pertains to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government; and (B) do not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by the National Intelligence Director and the Attorney General, or otherwise as expressly provided for in this title. (6) The term ``National Intelligence Program''-- (A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs, projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence community; (ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities (whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Information Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security; and (iii) includes any other program, project, or activity of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government relating to national intelligence unless the National Intelligence Director and the head of the department, agency, or element concerned determine otherwise; but (B) except as provided in subparagraph (A)(ii), does not refer to any program, project, or activity of the military departments, including any program, project, or activity of the Defense Intelligence Agency that is not part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the date of the enactment of this Act, to acquire intelligence principally for the planning and conduct of joint or tactical military operations by the United States Armed Forces. (7) The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (a) Independent Establishment.--There is hereby established as an independent establishment in the executive branch of government the National Intelligence Authority. (b) Composition.--The National Intelligence Authority is composed of the following: (1) The Office of the National Intelligence Director. (2) The elements specified in subtitle D. (3) Such other elements, offices, agencies, and activities as may be established by law or by the President or the National Intelligence Director. (c) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National Intelligence Authority are as follows: (1) To unify and strengthen the efforts of the intelligence community of the United States Government. (2) To ensure the organization of the efforts of the intelligence community of the United States Government in a joint manner relating to intelligence missions rather than through intelligence collection disciplines. (3) To provide for the operation of the National Counterterrorism Center and national intelligence centers under subtitle D. (4) To eliminate barriers that impede coordination of the counterterrorism activities of the United States Government between foreign intelligence activities located abroad and foreign intelligence activities located domestically while ensuring the protection of civil liberties. (5) To establish clear responsibility and accountability for counterterrorism and other intelligence matters relating to the national security of the United States. (d) Seal.--The National Intelligence Director shall have a seal for the National Intelligence Authority. The design of the seal is subject to the approval of the President. Judicial notice shall be taken of the seal. (a) National Intelligence Director.--There is a National Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (b) Individuals Eligible for Nomination.--Any individual nominated for appointment as National Intelligence Director shall have extensive national security expertise. (c) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service in Other Capacity in Intelligence Community.--The individual serving as National Intelligence Director may not, while so serving, serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community, except to the extent that the individual serving as National Intelligence Director does so in an acting capacity. (d) Principal Duties and Responsibilities.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) serve as head of the intelligence community in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law; (2) act as a principal adviser to the President for intelligence related to the national security; (3) serve as the head of the National Intelligence Authority; and (4) direct and oversee the National Intelligence Program. (e) General Responsibilities and Authorities.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities set forth in subsection (c), the National Intelligence Director shall have the responsibilities set forth in section 112 and the authorities set forth in section 113 and other applicable provisions of law. (a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall be responsible for providing national intelligence-- (1) to the President; (2) to the heads of other departments and agencies of the executive branch; (3) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; (4) to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof; and (5) to such other persons or entities as the President shall direct. (b) National Intelligence.--Such national intelligence shall be timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community. (a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) determine the annual budget for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States by-- (A) providing to the heads of the departments containing agencies or elements within the intelligence community and that have one or more programs, projects, or activities within the National Intelligence program, and to the heads of such agencies and elements, guidance for development the National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such agencies or elements; (B) developing and presenting to the President an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program after consultation with the heads of agencies or elements, and the heads of their respective departments, under subparagraph (A); (C) providing budget guidance to each element of the intelligence community that does not have one or more program, project, or activity within the National Intelligence Program regarding the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of such element; and (D) participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets for the military intelligence programs, projects, and activities not included in the National Intelligence Program; (2) manage and oversee the National Intelligence Program, including-- (A) the execution of funds within the National Intelligence Program; (B) the reprogramming of funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the National Intelligence Program; and (C) the transfer of funds and personnel under the National Intelligence Program; (3) establish the requirements and priorities to govern the collection, analysis, and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the intelligence community; (4) establish collection and analysis requirements for the intelligence community, determine collection and analysis priorities, issue and manage collection and analysis tasking, and resolve conflicts in the tasking of elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the direction of the President; (5) provide advisory tasking on the collection of intelligence to elements of the United States Government having information collection capabilities that are not elements of the intelligence community; (6) manage and oversee the National Counterterrorism Center under section 143, and establish, manage, and oversee national intelligence centers under section 144; (7) establish requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and provide assistance to the Attorney General to ensure that information derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches under that Act is disseminated so it may be used efficiently and effectively for foreign intelligence purposes, except that the Director shall have no authority to direct, manage, or undertake electronic surveillance or physical search operations pursuant to that Act unless otherwise authorized by statute or Executive order; (8) develop and implement, in consultation with the heads of other agencies or elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective departments, personnel policies and programs applicable to the intelligence community that-- (A) encourage and facilitate assignments and details of personnel to the National Counterterrorism Center under section 143, to national intelligence centers under section 144, and between elements of the intelligence community; (B) set standards for education, training, and career development of personnel of the intelligence community; (C) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and retention by the intelligence community of highly qualified individuals for the effective conduct of intelligence activities; (D) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence community is sufficiently diverse for purposes of the collection and analysis of intelligence through the recruitment and training of women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds; (E) make service in more than one element of the intelligence community a condition of promotion to such positions within the intelligence community as the Director shall specify; (F) ensure the effective management of intelligence community personnel who are responsible for intelligence community-wide matters; (G) provide for the effective management of human capital within the intelligence community, including-- (i) the alignment of human resource policies and programs of the elements of the intelligence community with the missions, goals, and organizational objectives of such elements and of the intelligence community overall; (ii) the assessment of workforce characteristics and future needs and the establishment of workforce development strategies to meet those needs based on relevant organizational missions and strategic plans; (iii) the sustainment of a culture that encourages and allows for the development of a high performing workforce; and (iv) the alignment of expectations for personnel performance with relevant organizational missions and strategic plans; (H) are consistent with the public employment principles of merit and fitness set forth under section 2301 of title 5, United States Code; and (I) include the enhancements required under section 114; (9) promote and evaluate the utility of national intelligence to consumers within the United States Government; (10) ensure that appropriate officials of the United States Government and other appropriate individuals have access to a variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views; (11) protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; (12) establish requirements and procedures for the classification of intelligence information and for access to classified intelligence information; (13) establish requirements and procedures for the dissemination of classified information by elements of the intelligence community; (14) establish intelligence reporting guidelines that maximize the dissemination of information while protecting intelligence sources and methods; (15) develop, in consultation with the heads of appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, an integrated communications network that provides interoperable communications capabilities among all elements of the intelligence community and such other entities and persons as the Director considers appropriate; (16) establish standards for information technology and communications for the intelligence community; (17) ensure that the intelligence community makes efficient and effective use of open-source information and analysis; (18) ensure compliance by elements of the intelligence community with the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines of the United States applicable to the intelligence and intelligence- related activities of the United States Government, including the provisions of the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines of the United States applicable to the protection of the privacy and civil liberties of United States persons; (19) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication within the intelligence community; and (20) perform such other functions as the President may direct. (b) Uniform Procedures for Sensitive Compartmented Information.--The President, acting through the National Intelligence Director, shall establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant to sensitive compartmented information in accordance with section 115. (c) Performance of Common Services.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall, in consultation with the heads of departments and agencies of the United States Government containing elements within the intelligence community and with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, direct and coordinate the performance by the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program of such services as are of common concern to the intelligence community, which services the National Intelligence Director determines can be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner. (2) The services performed under paragraph (1) shall include research and development on technology for use in national intelligence missions. (d) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director may prescribe regulations relating to the discharge and enforcement of the responsibilities of the Director under this section. (a) Access to Intelligence.--Unless otherwise directed by the President, the National Intelligence Director shall have access to all intelligence related to the national security which is collected by any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government. (b) Determination of Budgets for NIP and Other Intelligence Activities.--The National Intelligence Director shall determine the annual budget for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government under section 112(a)(1) by-- (1) providing to the heads of the departments containing agencies or elements within the intelligence community and that have one or more programs, projects, or activities within the National Intelligence program, and to the heads of such agencies and elements, guidance for development the National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such agencies or elements; (2) developing and presenting to the President an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program after consultation with the heads of agencies or elements, and the heads of their respective departments, under paragraph (1), including, in furtherance of such budget, the review, modification, and approval of budgets of the agencies or elements of the intelligence community with one or more programs, projects, or activities within the National Intelligence Program utilizing the budget authorities in subsection (c)(1); (3) providing guidance on the development of annual budgets for each element of the intelligence community that does not have any program, project, or activity within the National Intelligence Program utilizing the budget authorities in subsection (c)(2); (4) participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military intelligence programs and activities outside the National Intelligence Program; (4) receiving the appropriations for the National Intelligence Program as specified in subsection (d) and allotting and allocating funds to agencies and elements of the intelligence community; and (5) managing and overseeing the execution by the agencies or elements of the intelligence community, and, if necessary, the modification of the annual budget for the National Intelligence Program, including directing the reprogramming and transfer of funds, and the transfer of personnel, among and between elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program utilizing the authorities in subsections (f) and (g). (c) Budget Authorities.--(1)(A) In developing and presenting an annual budget for the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program under subsection (b)(1), the National Intelligence Director shall coordinate, prepare, and present to the President the annual budgets of those elements, in consultation with the heads of those elements. (B) If any portion of the budget for an element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program is prepared outside the Office of the National Intelligence Director, the Director-- (i) shall approve such budget before submission to the President; and (ii) may require modifications of such budget to meet the requirements and priorities of the Director before approving such budget under clause (i). (C) The budget of an agency or element of the intelligence community with one or more programs, projects, or activities within the National Intelligence Program may not be provided to the President unless the Director has first approved such budget. (2)(A) The Director shall provide guidance for the development of the annual budgets for each agency or element of the intelligence community that does not have any program, project, or activity within the National Intelligence Program. (B) The heads of the agencies or elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective departments, referred to in subparagraph (A) shall coordinate closely with the Director in the development of the budgets of such agencies or elements, before the submission of their recommendations on such budgets to the President. (d) Jurisdiction of Funds Under NIP.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and consistent with section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the National Intelligence Program shall be appropriated to the National Intelligence Authority and, pursuant to subsection (e), under the direct jurisdiction of the National Intelligence Director. (2) The Director shall manage and oversee the execution by each element of the intelligence community of any amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to such element under the National Intelligence Program. (e) Accounts for Administration of NIP Funds.--(1) The Secretary of the Treasury shall, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, establish accounts for the funds under the jurisdiction of the Director under subsection (d) for purposes of carrying out the responsibilities and authorities of the Director under this Act with respect to the National Intelligence Program. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall-- (A) control and manage the accounts established under paragraph (1); and (B) with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, establish procedures governing the use (including transfers and reprogrammings) of funds in such accounts. (3)(A) To the extent authorized by law, a certifying official shall follow the procedures established under paragraph (2)(B) with regard to each account established under paragraph (1). Disbursements from any such account shall only be made against a valid obligation of such account. (B) In this paragraph, the term ``certifying official', with respect to an element of the intelligence community, means an employee of the element who has responsibilities specified in section 3528(a) of title 31, United States Code. (4) The National Intelligence Director shall allot funds deposited in an account established under paragraph (1) directly to the head of the elements of the intelligence community concerned in accordance with the procedures established under paragraph (2)(B). (5) Each account established under paragraph (1) shall be subject to chapters 13 and 15 of title 31, United States Code, other than sections 1503 and 1556 of that title. (6) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority granted by subsection (g)(3) or by section 5 or 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f, 403j). (f) Role in Reprogramming or Transfer of NIP Funds by Elements of Intelligence Community.--(1) No funds made available under the National Intelligence Program may be reprogrammed or transferred by any agency or element of the intelligence community without the prior approval of the National Intelligence Director except in accordance with procedures issued by the Director. (2) The head of the department concerned shall consult with the Director before reprogramming or transferring funds appropriated or otherwise made available to an agency or element of the intelligence community that does not have any program, project, or activity within the National Intelligence Program. (3) The Director shall, before reprogramming funds appropriated or otherwise made available for an element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, consult with the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over such element regarding such reprogramming. (4)(A) The Director shall consult with the appropriate committees of Congress regarding modifications of existing procedures to expedite the reprogramming of funds within the National Intelligence Program. (B) Any modification of procedures under subparagraph (A) shall include procedures for the notification of the appropriate committees of Congress of any objection raised by the head of a department or agency to a reprogramming proposed by the Director as a result of consultations under paragraph (3). (g) Transfer or Reprogramming of Funds and Transfer of Personnel Within NIP.--(1) In addition to any other authorities available under law for such purposes, the National Intelligence Director, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and after consultation with the heads of the departments containing agencies or elements within the intelligence community to the extent their subordinate agencies or elements are affected, with the heads of such subordinate agencies or elements, and with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the extent the Central Intelligence Agency is affected, may-- (A) transfer or reprogram funds appropriated for a program within the National Intelligence Program to another such program; (B) review, and approve or disapprove, any proposal to transfer or reprogram funds from appropriations that are not for the National Intelligence Program to appropriations for the National Intelligence Program; (C) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the National Intelligence Director, transfer personnel of the intelligence community funded through the National Intelligence Program from one element of the intelligence community to another element of the intelligence community; and (D) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the National Intelligence Director and the heads of the departments and agencies concerned, transfer personnel of the intelligence community not funded through the National Intelligence Program from one element of the intelligence community to another element of the intelligence community. (2) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made under this subsection only if-- (A) the funds or personnel are being transferred to an activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity; (B) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds to the Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director; or (C) the transfer does not exceed applicable ceilings established in law for such transfers. (3) Funds transferred under this subsection shall remain available for the same period as the appropriations account to which transferred. (4) Any transfer of funds under this subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer for which notice is given to the appropriate congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report explaining the nature of the proposed transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In addition, the congressional intelligence committees shall be promptly notified of any transfer of funds made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the transfer would not have otherwise required reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of October 24, 1992. (5)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall promptly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this subsection. The Director shall include in any such report an explanation of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. (B) In this paragraph, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (i)(I) the Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (II) the Committee on Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; (ii) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Defense-- (I) the committees and select committees referred to in clause (i); (II) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (III) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; (iii) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation-- (I) the committees and select committees referred to in clause (i); (II) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and (III) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and (iv) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Homeland Security-- (I) the committees and select committees referred to in clause (i); (II) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and (III) the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives. (h) Information Technology and Communications.--(1) In conforming with section 205, in carrying out section 112(a)(16), the National Intelligence Director shall-- (A) establish standards for information technology and communications across the intelligence community; (B) develop an integrated information technology network and enterprise architecture for the intelligence community, including interface standards for interoperability to enable automated information-sharing among elements of the intelligence community; (C) maintain an inventory of critical information technology and communications systems, and eliminate unnecessary or duplicative systems; (D) establish contingency plans for the intelligence community regarding information technology and communications; and (E) establish policies, doctrine, training, and other measures necessary to ensure that the intelligence community develops an integrated information technology and communications network that ensures information-sharing. (2) Consistent with section 205, the Director shall take any action necessary, including the setting of standards for information technology and communications across the intelligence community, to develop an integrated information technology and communications network that ensures information-sharing across the intelligence community. (i) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--In a manner consistent with section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the National Intelligence Director shall oversee and direct the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in coordinating, under section 103(f) of the National Security Act of 1947, the relationships between elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments on all matters involving intelligence related to the national security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine means. (j) Open Source Information Collection.--The National Intelligence Director shall establish and maintain within the intelligence community an effective and efficient open-source information collection capability. (k) Access to Information.--Except as otherwise directed by the President, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall promptly provide the National Intelligence Director such information in the possession or under the control of such element as the Director may request in order to facilitate the exercise of the authorities and responsibilities of the Director under this Act. (a) Rewards for Service in Certain Positions.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations to provide incentives for service on the staff of the national intelligence centers, on the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center, and in other positions in support of the intelligence community management functions of the Director. (2) Incentives under paragraph (1) may include financial incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as the Director considers appropriate. (b) Enhanced Promotion for Service Under NID.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the National Intelligence Director shall ensure that personnel of an element of the intelligence community who are assigned or detailed to service under the National Intelligence Director shall be promoted at rates equivalent to or better than personnel of such element who are not so assigned or detailed. (c) Joint Career Matters.--(1) In carrying out section 112(a)(8), the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the intelligence community through various elements of the intelligence community in the course of their careers in order to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods, and disciplines. (2) The mechanisms prescribed under paragraph (1) may include the following: (A) The establishment of special occupational categories involving service, over the course of a career, in more than one element of the intelligence community. (B) The provision of rewards for service in positions undertaking analysis and planning of operations involving two or more elements of the intelligence community. (C) The establishment of requirements for education, training, service, and evaluation that involve service in more than one element of the intelligence community. (3) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent practical, seek to duplicate within the intelligence community the joint officer management policies established by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) and the amendments on joint officer management made by that Act. (a) In General.--The President, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, the department, agency, or element selected under (b), and other appropriate officials shall-- (1) establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant of access to classified information for employees and contractor personnel of the United States Government who require access to such information; (2) ensure the consistent implementation of the standards and procedures established under paragraph (1) throughout the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government and under contracts entered into by such departments, agencies, and elements; (3) ensure that an individual who is granted or continued eligibility for access to classified information is treated by each department, agency, or element of the executive branch as eligible for access to classified information at that level for all purposes of each such department, agency, or element, regardless of which department, agency, or element of the executive branch granted or continued the eligibility of such individual for access to classified information; (4) establish uniform requirements and standards, including for security questionnaires, financial disclosure requirements, and standards for administering polygraph examinations, to be utilized for the performance of security clearance investigations, including by the contractors conducting such investigations; and (5) ensure that the database established under subsection (b)(2)(B) meets the needs of the intelligence community. (b) Performance of Security Clearance Investigations.--(1) Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall select a single department, agency, or element of the executive branch to conduct all security clearance investigations of employees and contractor personnel of the United States Government who require access to classified information and to provide and maintain all security clearances of such employees and contractor personnel. (2) The department, agency, or element selected under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) take all necessary actions to carry out the requirements of this section, including entering into a memorandum of understanding with any agency carrying out responsibilities relating to security clearances or security clearance investigations before the date of the enactment of this Act; (B) as soon as practicable, establish and maintain a single database for tracking security clearance applications, security clearance investigations, and determinations of eligibility for security clearances, which database shall incorporate applicable elements of similar databases in existence on the date of the enactment of this Act; and (C) ensure that security clearance investigations are conducted in accordance with uniform standards and requirements established under subsection (a)(4), including uniform security questionnaires and financial disclosure requirements. (c) Adjudication and Grant of Security Clearances.--(1) Each agency that adjudicates and grants security clearances as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to adjudicate and grant security clearances after that date. (2) Each agency that adjudicates and grants security clearances shall specify to the department, agency, or element selected under subsection (b) the level of security clearance investigation required for an individual under its jurisdiction. (3) Upon granting or continuing eligibility for access to classified information to an individual under its jurisdiction, an agency that adjudicates and grants security clearances shall submit to the department, agency, or element selected under subsection (b) notice of that action, including the level of access to classified information granted. (d) Utilization of Personnel.--There shall be transferred to the department, agency, or element selected under subsection (b) any personnel of any executive agency whose sole function as of the date of the enactment of this Act is the performance of security clearance investigations. (e) Transition.--The President shall take appropriate actions to ensure that the performance of security clearance investigations under this section commences not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Establishment.--The National Intelligence Director may provide for the establishment and training of a National Intelligence Reserve Corps (in this section referred to as ``National Intelligence Reserve Corps'') for the temporary reemployment on a voluntary basis of former employees of elements of the intelligence community during periods of emergency, as determined by the Director. (b) Eligible Individuals.--An individual may participate in the National Intelligence Reserve Corps only if the individual previously served as a full time employee of an element of the intelligence community. (c) Limitation on Membership.--The total number of individuals who are members of the National Intelligence Reserve Corps at any given time may not exceed 200 individuals. (d) Terms of Participation.--The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe the terms and conditions under which eligible individuals may participate in the National Intelligence Reserve Corps. (e) Expenses.--The National Intelligence Director may provide members of the National Intelligence Reserve Corps transportation and per diem in lieu of subsistence for purposes of participating in any training that relates to service as a member of the Reserve Corps. (f) Treatment of Annuitants.--(1) If an annuitant receiving an annuity from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund becomes temporarily reemployed pursuant to this section, such annuity shall not be discontinued thereby. (2) An annuitant so reemployed shall not be considered an employee for the purposes of chapter 83 or 84 of title 5, United States Code. (g) Treatment Under National Intelligence Authority Personnel Ceiling.--A member of the National Intelligence Reserve Corps who is reemployed on a temporary basis pursuant to this section shall not count against any personnel ceiling applicable to the National Intelligence Authority. (a) Recommendation of NID in Certain Appointment.--In the event of a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an individual for nomination to fill the vacancy. (b) Concurrence of Secretary of Defense in Certain Appointments Recommended by NID.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the National Intelligence Director shall obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense before recommending to the President an individual for nomination to fill such vacancy. If the Secretary does not concur in the recommendation, the Director may make the recommendation to the President without the concurrence of the Secretary, but shall include in the recommendation a statement that the Secretary does not concur in the recommendation. (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: (A) The Director of the National Security Agency. (B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (C) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (c) Concurrence of NID in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the National Intelligence Director before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency concerned may fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be) without the concurrence of the Director, but shall notify the President that the Director does not concur in appointment or recommendation (as the case may be). (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: (A) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. (B) The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis. (C) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. (D) The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (d) Recommendation of NID on Termination of Service.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may recommend to the President or the head of the department or agency concerned the termination of service of any individual serving in any position covered by this section. (2) In the event the Director intends to recommend to the President the termination of service of an individual under paragraph (1), the Director shall seek the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned. If the head of the department or agency concerned does not concur in the recommendation, the Director may make the recommendation to the President without the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned, but shall notify the President that the head of the department or agency concerned does not concur in the recommendation. (a) Establishment.--There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an account to be known as the Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Elements.--The Reserve shall consist of the following elements: (1) Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Reserve. (2) Any amounts authorized to be transferred to or deposited in the Reserve by law. (c) Availability.--Amounts in the Reserve shall be available for such purposes as are provided by law. (d) Transfer of Funds of Reserve for Contingencies of CIA.--There shall be transferred to the Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director all unobligated balances of the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Office of National Intelligence Director.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority an Office of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Function.--The function of the Office of the National Intelligence Director is to assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director under this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law, and to carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by the President or by law. (c) Composition.--The Office of the National Intelligence Director is composed of the following: (1) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director. (2) Any Deputy National Intelligence Director appointed under section 122(b). (3) The National Intelligence Council. (4) The General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority. (5) The Intelligence Comptroller. (6) The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority. (7) The Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (8) The Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (9) The Chief Human Capital Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (10) The Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (11) The National Counterintelligence Executive (including the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive). (12) Such other offices and officials as may be established by law or the Director may establish or designate in the Office. (d) Staff.--(1) To assist the National Intelligence Director in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the Director, the Director shall employ and utilize in the Office of the National Intelligence Director a professional staff having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and responsibilities, and may establish permanent positions and appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff. (2) The staff of the Office of the National Intelligence Director under paragraph (1) shall include the staff of the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management that is transferred to the Office of the National Intelligence Director under section 321. (e) Prohibition on Co-Location With Other Elements of Intelligence Community.--Commencing as of October 1, 2006, the Office of the National Intelligence Director may not be co-located with any other element of the intelligence community. (a) Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director.--(1) There is a Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) In the event of a vacancy in the position of Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director, the National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an individual for appointment as Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director. (3) Any individual nominated for appointment as Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director shall have extensive national security experience and management expertise. (4) The individual serving as Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director may not, while so serving, serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community, except to the extent that the individual serving as Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director is doing so in an acting capacity. (5) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director shall assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director. (6) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the National Intelligence Director during the absence or disability of the National Intelligence Director or during a vacancy in the position of National Director of Intelligence. (b) Deputy National Intelligence Directors.--(1) There may be not more than four Deputy National Intelligence Directors who shall be appointed by the President. (2) In the event of a vacancy in any position of Deputy National Intelligence Director established under this subsection, the National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an individual for appointment to such position. (3) Each Deputy National Intelligence Director appointed under this subsection shall have such duties, responsibilities, and authorities as the National Intelligence Director may assign or are specified by law. (a) National Intelligence Council.--There is a National Intelligence Council. (b) Composition.--(1) The National Intelligence Council shall be composed of senior analysts within the intelligence community and substantive experts from the public and private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of, the National Intelligence Director. (2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector as a condition of service on the Council, or as contractors of the Council or employees of such contractors, to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods while avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this purpose. (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--(1) The National Intelligence Council shall-- (A) produce national intelligence estimates for the United States Government, including alternative views held by elements of the intelligence community and other information as specified in paragraph (2); (B) evaluate community-wide collection and production of intelligence by the intelligence community and the requirements and resources of such collection and production; and (C) otherwise assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying out the responsibilities of the Director under section 111. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the Council satisfies the needs of policymakers and other consumers of intelligence by ensuring that each national intelligence estimate under paragraph (1)-- (A) states separately, and distinguishes between, the intelligence underlying such estimate and the assumptions and judgments of analysts with respect to such intelligence and such estimate; (B) describes the quality and reliability of the intelligence underlying such estimate; (C) presents and explains alternative conclusions, if any, with respect to the intelligence underlying such estimate and such estimate; and (D) characterizes the uncertainties, if any, and confidence in such estimate. (d) Service as Senior Intelligence Advisers.--Within their respective areas of expertise and under the direction of the National Intelligence Director, the members of the National Intelligence Council shall constitute the senior intelligence advisers of the intelligence community for purposes of representing the views of the intelligence community within the United States Government. (e) Authority To Contract.--Subject to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Director, the National Intelligence Council may carry out its responsibilities under this section by contract, including contracts for substantive experts necessary to assist the Council with particular assessments under this section. (f) Staff.--The National Intelligence Director shall make available to the National Intelligence Council such staff as may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its responsibilities under this section. (g) Availability of Council and Staff.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the National Intelligence Council and its staff satisfy the needs of policymaking officials and other consumers of intelligence. (2) The Council shall be readily accessible to policymaking officials and other appropriate individuals not otherwise associated with the intelligence community. (h) Support.--The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall, as appropriate, furnish such support to the National Intelligence Council, including the preparation of intelligence analyses, as may be required by the National Intelligence Director. (a) General Counsel of National Intelligence Authority.-- There is a General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (b) Prohibition on Dual Service as General Counsel of Another Agency.--The individual serving in the position of General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority may not, while so serving, also serve as the General Counsel of any other department, agency, or element of the United States Government. (c) Scope of Position.--The General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority is the chief legal officer of the National Intelligence Authority. (d) Functions.--The General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority shall perform such functions as the National Intelligence Director may prescribe. (a) Intelligence Comptroller.--There is an Intelligence Comptroller who shall be appointed from civilian life by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Supervision.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director. (c) Duties.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in the preparation and execution of the budget of the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; (2) assist the Director in participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military intelligence programs and activities outside the National Intelligence Program; (3) provide unfettered access to the Director to financial information under the National Intelligence Program; (4) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of National Intelligence Authority.--There is an Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the President. (b) Supervision.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority shall report directly to the National Intelligence Director. (c) Duties.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in ensuring that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties, as provided in the Constitution, laws, regulations, and Executive orders of the United States, is appropriately incorporated in-- (A) the policies and procedures developed for and implemented by the National Intelligence Authority; (B) the policies and procedures regarding the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; and (C) the policies and procedures regarding the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community; (2) oversee compliance by the Authority, and in the relationships described in paragraph (1), with requirements under the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing guidelines relating to civil rights and civil liberties; (3) review, investigate, and assess complaints and other information indicating possible abuses of civil rights or civil liberties, as provided in the Constitution, laws, regulations, and Executive orders of the United States, in the administration of the programs and operations of the Authority, and in the relationships described in paragraph (1), unless, in the determination of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority, the review, investigation, or assessment of a particular complaint or information can better be conducted by the Inspector General; (4) coordinate with the Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority to ensure that programs, policies, and procedures involving civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner; and (5) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) Privacy Officer of National Intelligence Authority.-- There is a Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--(1) The Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall have primary responsibility for the privacy policy of the National Intelligence Authority (including in the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community). (2) In discharging the responsibility under paragraph (1), the Privacy Officer shall-- (A) assure that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information; (B) assure that personal information contained in Privacy Act systems of records is handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 1974; (C) conduct privacy impact assessments when appropriate or as required by law; and (D) coordinate with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority to ensure that programs, policies, and procedures involving civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner. (a) Chief Information Officer of National Intelligence Authority.--There is a Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) assist the National Intelligence Director in implementing the responsibilities and executing the authorities related to information technology under paragraphs (15) and (16) of section 112(a) and section 113(h); and (2) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director or specified by law. (a) Chief Human Capital Officer of National Intelligence Authority.--There is a Chief Human Capital Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The Chief Human Capital Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) have the functions and authorities provided for Chief Human Capital Officers under sections 1401 and 1402 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to the National Intelligence Authority; and (2) advise and assist the National Intelligence Director in exercising the authorities and responsibilities of the Director with respect to the workforce of the intelligence community as a whole. (a) Chief Financial Officer of National Intelligence Authority.--There is a Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be designated by the President, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director. (b) Designation Requirements.--The designation of an individual as Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall be subject to applicable provisions of section 901(a) of title 31, United States Code. (c) Authorities and Functions.--The Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall have such authorities, and carry out such functions, with respect to the National Intelligence Authority as are provided for an agency Chief Financial Officer by section 902 of title 31, United States Code, and other applicable provisions of law. (d) Coordination With NIA Comptroller.--(1) The Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall coordinate with the Comptroller of the National Intelligence Authority in exercising the authorities and performing the functions provided for the Chief Financial Officer under this section. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall take such actions as are necessary to prevent duplication of effort by the Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority and the Comptroller of the National Intelligence Authority. (e) Integration of Financial Systems.--Subject to the supervision, direction, and control of the National Intelligence Director, the Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall take appropriate actions to ensure the timely and effective integration of the financial systems of the National Intelligence Authority (including any elements or components transferred to the Authority by this Act), and of the financial systems of the Authority with applicable portions of the financial systems of the other elements of the intelligence community, as soon as possible after the date of the enactment of this Act. (f) Protection of Annual Financial Statement From Disclosure.--The annual financial statement of the National Intelligence Authority required under section 3515 of title 31, United States Code-- (1) shall be submitted in classified form; and (2) notwithstanding any other provision of law, shall be withheld from public disclosure. (a) National Counterintelligence Executive.--The National Counterintelligence Executive under section 902 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402b et seq.), as amended by section 309 of this Act, is a component of the Office of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The National Counterintelligence Executive shall perform the duties provided in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, as so amended, and such other duties as may be prescribed by the National Intelligence Director or specified by law. (a) Office of Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority an Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority. (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority is to-- (1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently investigations, inspections, and audits relating to-- (A) the programs and operations of the National Intelligence Authority; (B) the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; and (C) the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community; (2) recommend policies designed-- (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations, and in such relationships; and (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs, operations, and relationships; (3) provide a means for keeping the National Intelligence Director fully and currently informed about-- (A) problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and to such relationships; and (C) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions; and (4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly informed of-- (A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and to such relationships; and (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions. (c) Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.-- (1) There is an Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority, who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector General shall be made-- (A) without regard to political affiliation; (B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of the National Intelligence Authority, and prior experience in the field of intelligence or national security; and (C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or auditing. (3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the National Intelligence Director. (4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the President. The President shall immediately communicate in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal of any individual from the position of Inspector General. (d) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority-- (1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations, inspections, and audits relating to the programs and operations of the National Intelligence Authority, the relationships among the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, and the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the intelligence community to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and regulations; (2) to keep the National Intelligence Director fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, and fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in such programs and operations, and in such relationships, and to report the progress made in implementing corrective action; (3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; and (4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities under this section, to comply with generally accepted government auditing standards. (e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may prohibit the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority from initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. (2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within seven days to the congressional intelligence committees. (3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time a report under paragraph (1) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such report. (4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General considers appropriate. (f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority shall have direct and prompt access to the National Intelligence Director when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. (2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or any employee of a contractor, of the National Intelligence Authority, and of any other element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties of the Inspector General. (B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section. (C) The level of classification or compartmentation of information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any materials under subparagraph (B). (D) Failure on the part of any employee or contractor of the National Intelligence Authority to cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate administrative actions by the Director, including loss of employment or the termination of an existing contractual relationship. (3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the Federal government-- (A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; and (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any employee in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity. (4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or before an officer having a seal. (5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of all information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General. (B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by subpoenas. (C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for or on behalf of any other element or component of the Authority. (D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the United States. (g) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority shall be provided with appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices. (2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the National Intelligence Director, the Inspector General shall select, appoint and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector General. (B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively. (C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the Inspector General shall create within the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General. (3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government. (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance. (h) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the National Intelligence Director a classified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority during the immediately preceding six-month periods ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. (B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following: (i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation, inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered by such report. (ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of the National Intelligence Authority identified by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report. (iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii). (iv) A statement whether or not corrective action has been completed on each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective action has been completed, a description of such corrective action. (v) An assessment of the effectiveness of all measures in place in the Authority for the protection of civil liberties and privacy of United States persons. (vi) A certification whether or not the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General. (vii) A description of the exercise of the subpoena authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report. (viii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy and efficiency in the administration of programs and operations undertaken by the Authority, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and operations. (C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt of a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the report to the congressional intelligence committees together with any comments the Director considers appropriate. (2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or operations of the Authority, a relationship between the elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or a relationship between an element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program and another element of the intelligence community. (B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) within seven calendar days of receipt of such report, together with such comments as the Director considers appropriate. (3) In the event that-- (A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General; (B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by the Inspector General should focus on any current or former Authority official who holds or held a position in the Authority that is subject to appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, including such a position held on an acting basis; (C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a current or former official described in subparagraph (B); (D) the Inspector General receives notice from the Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current or former official described in subparagraph (B); or (E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit, (a) Ombudsman of National Intelligence Authority.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority an Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director. (b) Duties.--The Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority shall-- (1) counsel, arbitrate, or offer recommendations on, and have the authority to initiate inquiries into, real or perceived problems of politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the National Intelligence Authority, or any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence community; (2) monitor the effectiveness of measures taken to deal with real or perceived politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the Authority, or any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence community; and (3) conduct reviews of the analytic product or products of the Authority, or any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or of any analysis of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence community, with such reviews to be conducted so as to ensure that analysis is timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community. (c) Analytic Review Unit.--(1) There is within the Office of the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority an Analytic Review Unit. (2) The Analytic Review Unit shall assist the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority in performing the duties and responsibilities of the Ombudsman set forth in subsection (b)(3). (3) The Ombudsman shall provide the Analytic Review Unit a staff who possess expertise in intelligence analysis that is appropriate for the function of the Unit. (4) In assisting the Ombudsman, the Analytic Review Unit shall, subject to the direction and control of the Ombudsman, conduct detailed evaluations of intelligence analysis by the following: (A) The National Intelligence Council. (B) The elements of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program. (C) To the extent involving the analysis of national intelligence, other elements of the intelligence community. (D) The divisions, offices, programs, officers, and employees of the elements specified in subparagraphs (B) and (C). (5) The results of the evaluations under paragraph (4) shall be provided to the congressional intelligence committees and, upon request, to appropriate heads of other departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch. (d) Access to Information.--In order to carry out the duties specified in subsection (c), the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority shall, unless otherwise directed by the President, have access to all analytic products, field reports, and raw intelligence of any element of the intelligence community, and to any reports or other material of an Inspector General, that might be pertinent to a matter under consideration by the Ombudsman. (e) Annual Reports.--The Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority shall submit to the National Intelligence Director and the congressional intelligence committees on an annual basis a report that includes-- (1) the assessment of the Ombudsman of the current level of politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the National Intelligence Authority, or any element of the intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence community; (2) such recommendations for remedial measures as the Ombudsman considers appropriate; and (3) an assessment of the effectiveness of remedial measures previously taken within the intelligence community on matters addressed by the Ombudsman. (f) Referral of Certain Matters for Investigation.--In addition to carrying out activities under this section, the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority may refer serious cases of misconduct related to politicization of intelligence information, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the intelligence community to the Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority for investigation. (a) National Counterterrorism Center.--There is within the National Intelligence Authority a National Counterterrorism Center. (b) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--(1) There is a Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, and who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Any individual nominated for appointment as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall have significant expertise in matters relating to the national security of the United States and matters relating to terrorism that threatens the national security of the United States. (3) The individual serving as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may not, while so serving, serve in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence community, except to the extent that the individual serving as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center is doing so in an acting capacity. (c) Supervision.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall report to the National Intelligence Director on-- (A) the budget and programs of the National Counterterrorism Center; and (B) the activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of the National Counterterrorism Center under subsection (g). (2) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall report to the President and the National Intelligence Director on the planning and progress of joint counterterrorism operations. (d) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National Counterterrorism Center shall be as follows: (1) To develop and unify strategy for the civilian and military counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government. (2) To integrate counterterrorism intelligence activities of the United States Government, both inside and outside the United States. (3) To develop interagency counterterrorism plans, which plans shall-- (A) involve more than one department, agency, or element of the executive branch (unless otherwise directed by the President); and (B) include the mission, objectives to be achieved, courses of action, parameters for such courses of action, coordination of agency operational activities, recommendations for operational plans, and assignment of departmental or agency responsibilities. (4) To ensure that the collection of counterterrorism intelligence, and the conduct of counterterrorism operations, by the United States Government are informed by the analysis of all-source intelligence. (e) Duties and Responsibilities of Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, at the direction of the President, the National Security Council, and the National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall-- (1) serve as the principal adviser to the President and the National Intelligence Director on joint operations relating to counterterrorism; (2) provide unified strategic direction for the civilian and military counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government and for the effective integration and deconfliction of counterterrorism intelligence and operations across agency boundaries, both inside and outside the United States; (3) advise the President and the National Intelligence Director on the extent to which the counterterrorism program recommendations and budget proposals of the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government conform to the priorities established by the President and the National Security Council; (4) in accordance with subsection (f), concur in, or advise the President on, the selections of personnel to head the operating entities of the United States Government with principal missions relating to counterterrorism; and (5) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence Director may prescribe or are prescribed by law. (f) Role of Director of National Counterterrorism Center in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual for nomination to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency concerned may fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be) without the concurrence of the Director, but shall notify the President that the Director does not concur in the appointment or recommendation (as the case may be). (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions: (A) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency's Counterterrorist Center. (B) The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in charge of the Counterterrorism Division. (C) The Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the Department of State. (D) The head of such other operating entities of the United States Government having principal missions relating to counterterrorism as the President may designate for purposes of this subsection. (3) The President shall notify Congress of the designation of an operating entity of the United States Government under paragraph (2)(D) not later than 30 days after the date of such designation. (g) Directorate of Intelligence.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Intelligence. (2) The Directorate shall utilize the capabilities of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) transferred to the Directorate by section 323 and such other capabilities as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center considers appropriate. (3) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility within the United States Government for analysis of terrorism and terrorist organizations from all sources of intelligence, whether collected inside or outside the United States. (4) The Directorate shall-- (A) be the principal repository within the United States Government for all-source information on suspected terrorists, their organizations, and their capabilities; (B) propose intelligence collection requirements for action by elements of the intelligence community inside and outside the United States; (C) have primary responsibility within the United States Government for net assessments and warnings about terrorist threats, which assessments and warnings shall be based on a comparison of terrorist intentions and capabilities with assessed national vulnerabilities and countermeasures; and (D) perform such other duties and functions as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may prescribe. (h) Directorate of Planning.--(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Planning. (2) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility for developing interagency counterterrorism plans, as described in subsection (d)(3). (3) The Directorate shall-- (A) provide guidance, and develop strategy and interagency plans, to counter terrorist activities based on policy objectives and priorities established by the National Security Council; (B) develop interagency plans under subparagraph (A) utilizing input from personnel in other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government who have expertise in the priorities, functions, assets, programs, capabilities, and operations of such departments, agencies, and elements with respect to counterterrorism; (C) assign responsibilities for counterterrorism operations to the departments and agencies of the United States Government (including the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, and other departments and agencies of the United States Government), consistent with the authorities of such departments and agencies; (D) monitor the implementation of operations assigned under subparagraph (C) and update interagency plans for such operations as necessary; (E) report to the President and the National Intelligence Director on the compliance of the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States with the plans developed under subparagraph (A); and (F) perform such other duties and functions as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may prescribe. (4) The Directorate may not direct the execution of operations assigned under paragraph (3). (i) Staff.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may appoint deputy directors of the National Counterterrorism Center to oversee such portions of the operations of the Center as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate. (2) To assist the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center under this section, the National Intelligence Director shall employ in the National Counterterrorism Center a professional staff having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and responsibilities. (3) In providing for a professional staff for the National Counterterrorism Center under paragraph (2), the National Intelligence Director may establish as positions in the excepted service such positions in the Center as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate. (4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the analytical staff of the National Counterterrorism Center is comprised primarily of experts from elements in the intelligence community and from such other personnel in the United States Government as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate. (5)(A) In order to meet the requirements in paragraph (4), the National Intelligence Director shall, from time to time-- (i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to the National Counterterrorism Center from any other element of the intelligence community that the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate; and (ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or element of the United States Government and not funded within the National Intelligence Program, request the transfer, assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department, agency, or other element concerned. (B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director under subparagraph (A)(i). (ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government receiving a request for transfer, assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request. (6) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to the National Counterterrorism Center under this subsection shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center on all matters for which the Center has been assigned responsibility and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the missions of the Center. (7) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or detailed to the National Counterterrorism Center under this subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such personnel at the Center. (8) The supervisors of the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center may, with the approval of the National Intelligence Director, reward the staff of the Center for meritorious performance by the provision of such performance awards as the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe. (9) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center any responsibility, power, or authority of the National Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (8). (10) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center has access to all databases maintained by the elements of the intelligence community that are relevant to the duties of the Center. (j) Support and Cooperation of Other Agencies.--(1) The elements of the intelligence community and the other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government shall support, assist, and cooperate with the National Counterterrorism Center in carrying out its missions under this section. (2) The support, assistance, and cooperation of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government under this subsection shall include, but not be limited to-- (A) the implementation of interagency plans for operations, whether foreign or domestic, that are developed by the National Counterterrorism Center in a manner consistent with the laws and regulations of the United States and consistent with the limitation in subsection (h)(4); (B) cooperative work with the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center to ensure that ongoing operations of such department, agency, or element do not conflict with joint operations planned by the Center; (C) reports, upon request, to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center on the progress of such department, agency, or element in implementing responsibilities assigned to such department, agency, or element through joint operations plans; and (D) the provision to the analysts of the National Counterterrorism Center electronic access in real time to information and intelligence collected by such department, agency, or element that is relevant to the missions of the Center. (3) In the event of a disagreement between the National Intelligence Director and the head of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government on a plan developed or responsibility assigned by the National Counterterrorism Center under this subsection, the National Intelligence Director may either accede to the head of the department, agency, or element concerned or notify the President of the necessity of resolving the disagreement. (a) National Intelligence Centers.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may establish within the National Intelligence Authority one or more centers (to be known as ``national intelligence centers'') to address intelligence priorities established by the National Security Council. (2) Each national intelligence center established under this section shall be assigned an area of intelligence responsibility. (3) National intelligence centers shall be established at the direction of the President, as prescribed by law, or upon the initiative of the National Intelligence Director. (b) Establishment of Centers.--(1) In establishing a national intelligence center, the National Intelligence Director shall assign lead responsibility for administrative support for such center to an element of the intelligence community selected by the Director for that purpose. (2) The Director shall determine the structure and size of each national intelligence center. (3) The Director shall notify Congress of the establishment of each national intelligence center before the date of the establishment of such center. (c) Directors of Centers.--(1) Each national intelligence center shall have as its head a Director who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director for that purpose. (2) The Director of a national intelligence center shall serve as the principal adviser to the National Intelligence Director on intelligence matters with respect to the area of intelligence responsibility assigned to the center. (3) In carrying out duties under paragraph (2), the Director of a national intelligence center shall-- (A) manage the operations of the center; (B) coordinate the provision of administration and support by the element of the intelligence community with lead responsibility for the center under subsection (b)(1); (C) submit budget and personnel requests for the center to the National Intelligence Director; (D) seek such assistance from other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government as is needed to fulfill the mission of the center; and (E) advise the National Intelligence Director of the information technology, personnel, and other requirements of the center for the performance of its mission. (4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the Director of a national intelligence center has sufficient authority, direction, and control to effectively accomplish the mission of the center. (d) Mission of Centers.--Pursuant to the direction of the National Intelligence Director, each national intelligence center shall, in the area of intelligence responsibility assigned to the center by the Director pursuant to intelligence priorities established by the National Security Council-- (1) have primary responsibility for providing all-source analysis of intelligence based upon foreign intelligence gathered both abroad and domestically; (2) have primary responsibility for identifying and proposing to the National Intelligence Director intelligence collection and analysis requirements; (3) have primary responsibility for net assessments and warnings; (4) ensure that appropriate officials of the United States Government and other appropriate officials have access to a variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views; and (5) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence Director shall specify. (e) Information Sharing.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that the Directors of the national intelligence centers and the other elements of the intelligence community undertake appropriate sharing of intelligence analysis and plans for operations in order to facilitate the activities of the centers. (2) In order to facilitate information sharing under paragraph (1), the Directors of the national intelligence centers shall-- (A) report directly to the National Intelligence Director regarding their activities under this section; and (B) coordinate with the Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director regarding such activities. (f) Staff.--(1) In providing for a professional staff for a national intelligence center, the National Intelligence Director may establish as positions in the excepted service such positions in the center as the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate. (2)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall, from time to time-- (i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to a national intelligence center from any other element of the intelligence community that the National Intelligence Director considers appropriate; and (ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or element of the United States Government not funded within the National Intelligence Program, request the transfer, assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department, agency, or other element concerned. (B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director under subparagraph (A)(i). (ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government receiving a request for transfer, assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request. (3) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to a national intelligence center under this subsection shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the Director of the center on all matters for which the center has been assigned responsibility and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the mission of the center. (4) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or detailed to a national intelligence center under this subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such personnel at the center. (5) The supervisors of the staff of a national center may, with the approval of the National Intelligence Director, reward the staff of the center for meritorious performance by the provision of such performance awards as the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe. (6) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the Director of a national intelligence center any responsibility, power, or authority of the National Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (6). (7) The Director of a national intelligence center may recommend to the National Intelligence Director the reassignment to the home element concerned of any personnel previously assigned or detailed to the center from another element of the intelligence community. (g) Termination.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may terminate a national intelligence center if the National Intelligence Director determines that the center is no longer required to meet an intelligence priority established by the National Security Council. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall notify Congress of any determination made under paragraph (1) before carrying out such determination. The National Intelligence Director shall establish an integrated framework that brings together the educational components of the intelligence community in order to promote a more effective and productive intelligence community through cross-disciplinary education and joint training. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means each element of the intelligence community as determined by the National Intelligence Director. (2) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given that term under section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001). (3) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the Intelligence Community Scholarship Program established under subsection (b). (b) Establishment.-- (1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director, in consultation with the head of each agency, shall establish a scholarship program (to be known as the ``Intelligence Community Scholarship Program'') to award scholarships to individuals that is designed to recruit and prepare students for civilian careers in the intelligence community to meet the critical needs of the intelligence community agencies. (2) Selection of recipients.-- (A) Merit and agency needs.--Individuals shall be selected to receive scholarships under this section through a competitive process primarily on the basis of academic merit and the needs of the agency. (B) Demonstrated commitment.--Individuals selected under this section shall have a demonstrated commitment to the field of study for which the scholarship is awarded. (3) Contractual agreements.--To carry out the Program the head of each agency shall enter into contractual agreements with individuals selected under paragraph (2) under which the individuals agree to serve as full-time employees of the agency, for the period described in subsection (h)(1), in positions needed by the agency and for which the individuals are qualified, in exchange for receiving a scholarship. (c) Eligibility.--In order to be eligible to participate in the Program, an individual shall-- (1) be enrolled or accepted for enrollment as a full-time student at an institution of higher education and be pursuing or intend to pursue undergraduate or graduate education in an academic field or discipline described in the list made available under subsection (e); (2) be a United States citizen; and (3) at the time of the initial scholarship award, not be an employee (as defined under section 2105 of title 5, United States Code). (d) Application.-- An individual seeking a scholarship under this section shall submit an application to the National Intelligence Director at such time, in such manner, and containing such information, agreements, or assurances as the Director may require. (e) Programs and Fields of Study.--The National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) make publicly available a list of academic programs and fields of study for which scholarships under the Program may be used; and (2) update the list as necessary. (f) Scholarships.-- (1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director may provide a scholarship under the Program for an academic year if the individual applying for the scholarship has submitted to the Director, as part of the application required under subsection (d), a proposed academic program leading to a degree in a program or field of study on the list made available under subsection (e). (2) Limitation on years.--An individual may not receive a scholarship under this section for more than 4 academic years, unless the National Intelligence Director grants a waiver. (3) Student responsibilities.--Scholarship recipients shall maintain satisfactory academic progress. (4) Amount.--The dollar amount of a scholarship under this section for an academic year shall be determined under regulations issued by the National Intelligence Director, but shall in no case exceed the cost of tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses as established by the Director. (5) Use of scholarships.--A scholarship provided under this section may be expended for tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses as established by the National Intelligence Director by regulation. (6) Payment to institution of higher education.--The National Intelligence Director may enter into a contractual agreement with an institution of higher education under which the amounts provided for a scholarship under this section for tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses are paid directly to the institution with respect to which the scholarship is provided. (g) Special Consideration for Current Employees.-- (1) Set aside of scholarships.--Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (c), 10 percent of the scholarships awarded under this section shall be set aside for individuals who are employees of agencies on the date of enactment of this section to enhance the education of such employees in areas of critical needs of agencies. (2) Full- or part-time education.--Employees who are awarded scholarships under paragraph (1) shall be permitted to pursue undergraduate or graduate education under the scholarship on a full-time or part-time basis. (h) Employee Service.-- (1) Period of service.--Except as provided in subsection (j)(2), the period of service for which an individual shall be obligated to serve as an employee of the agency is 24 months for each academic year for which a scholarship under this section is provided. Under no circumstances shall the total period of obligated service be more than 8 years. (2) Beginning of service.-- (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), obligated service under paragraph (1) shall begin not later than 60 days after the individual obtains the educational degree for which the scholarship was provided. (B) Deferral.--In accordance with regulations established by the National Intelligence Director, the Director or designee may defer the obligation of an individual to provide a period of service under paragraph (1) if the Director or designee determines that such a deferral is appropriate. (i) Repayment.-- (1) In general.--Scholarship recipients who fail to maintain a high level of academic standing, as defined by the National Intelligence Director, who are dismissed from their educational institutions for disciplinary reasons, or who voluntarily terminate academic training before graduation from the educational program for which the scholarship was awarded, shall be in breach of their contractual agreement and, in lieu of any service obligation arising under such agreement, shall be liable to the United States for repayment within 1 year after the date of default of all scholarship funds paid to them and to the institution of higher education on their behalf under the agreement, except as provided in subsection (j)(2). The repayment period may be extended by the Director when determined to be necessary, as established by regulation. (2) Liability.--Scholarship recipients who, for any reason, fail to begin or complete their service obligation after completion of academic training, or fail to comply with the terms and conditions of deferment established by the National Intelligence Director under subsection (h)(2)(B), shall be in breach of their contractual agreement. When recipients breach their agreements for the reasons stated in the preceding sentence, the recipient shall be liable to the United States for an amount equal to-- (A) the total amount of scholarships received by such individual under this section; and (B) the interest on the amounts of such awards which would be payable if at the time the awards were received they were loans bearing interest at the maximum legal prevailing rate, as determined by the Treasurer of the United States, multiplied by 3. (j) Cancellation, Waiver, or Suspension of Obligation.-- (1) Cancellation.--Any obligation of an individual incurred under the Program (or a contractual agreement thereunder) for service or payment shall be canceled upon the death of the individual. (2) Waiver or suspension.--The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations to provide for the partial or total waiver or suspension of any obligation of service or payment incurred by an individual under the Program (or a contractual agreement thereunder) whenever compliance by the individual is impossible or would involve extreme hardship to the individual, or if enforcement of such obligation with respect to the individual would be contrary to the best interests of the Government. (k) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations necessary to carry out this section. (a) Disposal of Property.--(1) If specifically authorized to dispose of real property of the National Intelligence Authority under any law enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall, subject to paragraph (2), exercise such authority in strict compliance with subchapter IV of chapter 5 of title 40, United States Code. (2) The Director shall deposit the proceeds of any disposal of property of the National Intelligence Authority into the miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury in accordance with section 3302(b) of title 31, United States Code. (b) Gifts.--Gifts or donations of services or property of or for the National Intelligence Authority may not be accepted, used, or disposed of unless specifically permitted in advance in an appropriations Act and only under the conditions and for the purposes specified in such appropriations Act. (a) Acquisitions of Major Systems.--(1) For each intelligence program for the acquisition of a major system, the National Intelligence Director shall-- (A) require the development and implementation of a program management plan that includes cost, schedule, and performance goals and program milestone criteria; (B) subject to paragraph (4), serve as the exclusive milestone decision authority; and (C) periodically-- (i) review and assess the progress made toward the achievement of the goals and milestones established in such plan; and (ii) submit to Congress a report on the results of such review and assessment. (2) The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe guidance for the development and implementation of program management plans under this subsection. In prescribing such guidance, the Director shall review Department of Defense guidance on program management plans for Department of Defense programs for the acquisition of major systems and, to the extent feasible, incorporate the principles of the Department of Defense guidance into the Director's guidance under this subsection. (3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the authority of the National Intelligence Director to delegate to any other official any authority to perform the responsibilities of the Director under this subsection. (4)(A) The authority conferred by paragraph (1)(B) shall not apply to Department of Defense programs until the National Intelligence Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that the National Intelligence Authority has the personnel and capability to fully and effectively carry out such authority. (B) The National Intelligence Director may assign any authority under this subsection to the Secretary of Defense. The assignment of such authority shall be made pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between the Director and the Secretary. (5) In this subsection: (A) The term ``intelligence program'', with respect to the acquisition of a major system, means a program that-- (i) is carried out to acquire such major system for an element of the intelligence community; and (ii) is funded in whole out of amounts available for the National Intelligence Program. (B) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given such term in section 4(9) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 403(9)). (b) Availability of Funds.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law (other than the provisions of this Act), sums appropriated or otherwise made available to the National Intelligence Authority may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its functions, including any function performed by the National Intelligence Authority that is described in section 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403j(a)). (c) Relationship of Director's Authority to Other Laws on Acquisition and Management of Property and Services.--Section 113(e) of title 40, United States Code, is amended-- (A) by striking ``or'' at the end of paragraph (18); (B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (19) and inserting ``; or''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(20) the National Intelligence Director.''. (d) National Intelligence Director Report on Enhancement of NSA and NGIA Acquisition Authorities.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall-- (1) review-- (A) the acquisition authority of the Director of the National Security Agency; and (B) the acquisition authority of the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and (2) submit to the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives a report setting forth any recommended enhancements of the acquisition authorities of the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency that the National Intelligence Director considers necessary. (e) Comptroller General Report on Acquisition Policies and Procedures.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to Congress a report on the extent to which the policies and procedures adopted for managing the acquisition of major systems for national intelligence purposes, as identified by the National Intelligence Director, are likely to result in successful cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. (a) In General.--In addition to the authorities provided in section 114, the National Intelligence Director may exercise with respect to the personnel of the National Intelligence Authority any authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment of this Act to the same extent, and subject to the same conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect to personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Rights and Protections of Employees and Applicants.-- Employees and applicants for employment of the National Intelligence Authority shall have the same rights and protections under the Authority as employees of the Central Intelligence Agency have under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Political Service of Personnel.--Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subclause (XII), by striking ``or'' at the end; and (2) by inserting after subclause (XIII) the following new subclause: ``(XIV) the National Intelligence Authority; or''. (b) Deletion of Information About Foreign Gifts.--Section 7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)''; (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking ``the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) In transmitting such listings for the National Intelligence Authority, the National Intelligence Director may delete the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources.''. (c) Exemption from Financial Disclosures.--Section 105(a)(1) of the Ethics in Government Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by inserting ``the National Intelligence Authority,'' before ``the Central Intelligence Agency''. (a) Amounts Requested Each Fiscal Year.--The President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. (b) Amounts Authorized and Appropriated Each Fiscal Year.-- Congress shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, by Congress for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. (c) Study of Disclosure of Additional Information.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall conduct a study to assess the advisability of disclosing to the public amounts as follows: (A) The aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for each fiscal year for each element of the intelligence community. (B) The aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, by Congress for each fiscal year for each element of the intelligence community. (2) The study under paragraph (1) shall-- (A) address whether or not the disclosure to the public of the information referred to in that paragraph would harm the national security of the United States; and (B) take into specific account concerns relating to the disclosure of such information for each element of the intelligence community. (3) Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this section, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the study under paragraph (1). (a) Merger of Homeland Security Council Into National Security Council.--Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended-- (1) in the fourth undesignated paragraph of subsection (a), by striking clauses (5) and (6) and inserting the following new clauses: ``(5) the Attorney General; ``(6) the Secretary of Homeland Security;''; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(3) assess the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in the interests of homeland security and make recommendations to the President based on such assessments; ``(4) oversee and review the homeland security policies of the Federal Government and make recommendations to the President based on such oversight and review; and ``(5) perform such other functions as the President may direct.''. (c) Repeal of Superseded Authority.--(1) Title IX of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 491 et seq.) is repealed. (2) The table of contents for that Act is amended by striking the items relating to title IX. Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 101 the following new section: (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States in its final report stated that, under Director Robert Mueller, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has made significant progress in improving its intelligence capabilities. (2) In the report, the members of the Commission also urged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation fully institutionalize the shift of the Bureau to a preventive counterterrorism posture. (b) Improvement of Intelligence Capabilities.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall continue efforts to improve the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to develop and maintain within the Bureau a national intelligence workforce. (c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and maintaining a national intelligence workforce under subsection (b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, subject to the direction and control of the President, develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence within the Federal Bureau of Investigation an institutional culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau. (2) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the enactment of this Act shall receive basic training in both criminal justice matters and national intelligence matters. (3) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the enactment of this Act shall, to the maximum extent practicable, be given the opportunity to undergo, during such agent's early service with the Bureau, meaningful assignments in criminal justice matters and in national intelligence matters. (4) The Director shall-- (A) establish career positions in national intelligence matters for agents and analysts of the Bureau; and (B) in furtherance of the requirement under subparagraph (A) and to the maximum extent practicable, afford agents and analysts of the Bureau the opportunity to work in the career specialty selected by such agents and analysts over their entire career with the Bureau. (5) The Director shall carry out a program to enhance the capacity of the Bureau to recruit and retain individuals with backgrounds in intelligence, international relations, language, technology, and other skills relevant to the intelligence mission of the Bureau. (6) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, afford the analysts of the Bureau training and career opportunities commensurate with the training and career opportunities afforded analysts in other elements of the intelligence community. (7) Commencing as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, each direct supervisor of a Field Intelligence Group, and each Bureau Operational Manager at the Section Chief and Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) level and above, shall be a certified intelligence officer. (8) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, ensure that the successful discharge of advanced training courses, and of one or more assignments to another element of the intelligence community, is a precondition to advancement to higher level intelligence assignments within the Bureau. (d) Field Office Matters.--(1) In improving the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under subsection (b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall ensure that each Field Intelligence Group reports directly to a field office senior manager responsible for intelligence matters. (2) The Director shall provide for such expansion of the secure facilities in the field offices of the Bureau as is necessary to ensure the discharge by the field offices of the intelligence mission of the Bureau. (3) The Director shall require that each Field Intelligence Group manager ensures the integration of analysts, agents, linguists, and surveillance personnel in the field. (e) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, modify the budget structure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to organize the budget according to the four principal missions of the Bureau as follows: (1) Intelligence. (2) Counterterrorism and counterintelligence. (3) Criminal Enterprises/Federal Crimes. (4) Criminal justice services. (f) Reports.--(1) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to Congress a report on the progress made as of the date of such report in carrying out the requirements of this section. (2) The Director shall include in each annual program review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that is submitted to Congress a report on the progress made by each field office of the Bureau during the period covered by such review in addressing Bureau and national program priorities. (3) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the Director shall submit to Congress a report assessing the qualifications, status, and roles of analysts at Bureau headquarters and in the field offices of the Bureau. (4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the progress of the Bureau in implementing information-sharing principles. (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Career Service Authorization Act of 2005''. (b) Establishment of Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Career Service.-- (1) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management-- (A) may establish positions for intelligence analysts, without regard to chapter 51 of title 5, United States Code; (B) shall prescribe standards and procedures for establishing and classifying such positions; and (C) may fix the rate of basic pay for such positions, without regard to subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, if the rate of pay is not greater than the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule. (2) Levels of performance.--Any performance management system established for intelligence analysts shall have at least 1 level of performance above a retention standard. (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not less than 60 days before the date of the implementation of authorities authorized under this section, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit an operating plan describing the Director's intended use of the authorities under this section to-- (1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives; (2) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; (3) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives; (4) the congressional intelligence committees; and (5) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (d) Annual Report.--Not later than December 31, 2005, and annually thereafter for 4 years, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit an annual report of the use of the permanent authorities provided under this section during the preceding fiscal year to-- (1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives; (2) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; (3) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives; (4) the congressional intelligence committees; and (5) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Advisory board.--The term ``Advisory Board'' means the Advisory Board on Information Sharing established under subsection (i). (2) Executive council.--The term ``Executive Council'' means the Executive Council on Information Sharing established under subsection (h). (3) Homeland security information.--The term ``homeland security information'' means all information, whether collected, produced, or distributed by intelligence, law enforcement, military, homeland security, or other activities relating to-- (A) the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals, or of domestic groups or individuals involved in transnational terrorism; (B) threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other nations; (C) communications of or by such groups or individuals; or (D) groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with such groups or individuals. (4) Network.--The term ``Network'' means the Information Sharing Network described under subsection (c). (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) The effective use of information, from all available sources, is essential to the fight against terror and the protection of our homeland. The biggest impediment to all- source analysis, and to a greater likelihood of ``connecting the dots'', is resistance to sharing information. (2) The United States Government has access to a vast amount of information, including not only traditional intelligence but also other government databases, such as those containing customs or immigration information. However, the United States Government has a weak system for processing and using the information it has. (3) In the period preceding September 11, 2001, there were instances of potentially helpful information that was available but that no person knew to ask for; information that was distributed only in compartmented channels, and information that was requested but could not be shared. (4) Current security requirements nurture over- classification and excessive compartmentalization of information among agencies. Each agency's incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks, including criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions, but few rewards for sharing information. (5) The current system, in which each intelligence agency has its own security practices, requires a demonstrated ``need to know'' before sharing. This approach assumes that it is possible to know, in advance, who will need to use the information. An outgrowth of the cold war, such a system implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. Such assumptions are no longer appropriate. Although counterintelligence concerns are still real, the costs of not sharing information are also substantial. The current ``need-to-know'' culture of information protection needs to be replaced with a ``need-to-share'' culture of integration. (6) A new approach to the sharing of intelligence and homeland security information is urgently needed. An important conceptual model for a new ``trusted information network'' is the Systemwide Homeland Analysis and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Network proposed by a task force of leading professionals assembled by the Markle Foundation and described in reports issued in October 2002 and December 2003. (7) No single agency can create a meaningful information sharing system on its own. Alone, each agency can only modernize stovepipes, not replace them. Presidential leadership is required to bring about governmentwide change. (c) Information Sharing Network.-- (1) Establishment.--The President shall establish a trusted information network and secure information sharing environment to promote sharing of intelligence and homeland security information in a manner consistent with national security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties, and based on clearly defined and consistently applied policies and procedures, and valid investigative, analytical or operational requirements. (2) Attributes.--The Network shall promote coordination, communication and collaboration of people and information among all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State, tribal, and local authorities, and relevant private sector entities, including owners and operators of critical infrastructure, by using policy guidelines and technologies that support-- (A) a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment that connects existing systems where appropriate and allows users to share information among agencies, between levels of government, and, as appropriate, with the private sector; (B) the sharing of information in a form and manner that facilitates its use in analysis, investigations and operations; (C) building upon existing systems capabilities currently in use across the Government; (D) utilizing industry best practices, including minimizing the centralization of data and seeking to use common tools and capabilities whenever possible; (E) employing an information access management approach that controls access to data rather than to just networks; (F) facilitating the sharing of information at and across all levels of security by using policy guidelines and technologies that support writing information that can be broadly shared; (G) providing directory services for locating people and information; (H) incorporating protections for individuals' privacy and civil liberties; (I) incorporating strong mechanisms for information security and privacy and civil liberties guideline enforcement in order to enhance accountability and facilitate oversight, including-- (i) multifactor authentication and access control; (ii) strong encryption and data protection; (iii) immutable audit capabilities; (iv) automated policy enforcement; (v) perpetual, automated screening for abuses of network and intrusions; and (vi) uniform classification and handling procedures; (J) compliance with requirements of applicable law and guidance with regard to the planning, design, acquisition, operation, and management of information systems; and (K) permitting continuous system upgrades to benefit from advances in technology while preserving the integrity of stored data. (d) Immediate Actions.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Executive Council, shall-- (1) submit to the President and to Congress a description of the technological, legal, and policy issues presented by the creation of the Network described in subsection (c), and the way in which these issues will be addressed; (2) establish electronic directory services to assist in locating in the Federal Government intelligence and homeland security information and people with relevant knowledge about intelligence and homeland security information; and (3) conduct a review of relevant current Federal agency capabilities, including-- (A) a baseline inventory of current Federal systems that contain intelligence or homeland security information; (B) the money currently spent to maintain those systems; and (C) identification of other information that should be included in the Network. (e) Guidelines and Requirements.--As soon as possible, but in no event later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall-- (1) in consultation with the Executive Council-- (A) issue guidelines for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using information, including guidelines to ensure that information is provided in its most shareable form, such as by separating out data from the sources and methods by which that data are obtained; and (B) on classification policy and handling procedures across Federal agencies, including commonly accepted processing and access controls; (2) in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board established under section 211, issue guidelines that-- (A) protect privacy and civil liberties in the development and use of the Network; and (B) shall be made public, unless, and only to the extent that, nondisclosure is clearly necessary to protect national security; and (3) require the heads of Federal departments and agencies to promote a culture of information sharing by-- (A) reducing disincentives to information sharing, including overclassification of information and unnecessary requirements for originator approval; and (B) providing affirmative incentives for information sharing, such as the incorporation of information sharing performance measures into agency and managerial evaluations, and employee awards for promoting innovative information sharing practices. (f) Enterprise Architecture and Implementation Plan.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Management and Budget shall submit to the President and to Congress an enterprise architecture and implementation plan for the Network. The enterprise architecture and implementation plan shall be prepared by the Director of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Executive Council, and shall include-- (1) a description of the parameters of the proposed Network, including functions, capabilities, and resources; (2) a delineation of the roles of the Federal departments and agencies that will participate in the development of the Network, including identification of any agency that will build the infrastructure needed to operate and manage the Network (as distinct from the individual agency components that are to be part of the Network), with the delineation of roles to be consistent with-- (A) the authority of the National Intelligence Director under this Act to set standards for information sharing and information technology throughout the intelligence community; and (B) the authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the role of the Department of Homeland Security in coordinating with State, tribal, and local officials and the private sector; (3) a description of the technological requirements to appropriately link and enhance existing networks and a description of the system design that will meet these requirements; (4) an enterprise architecture that-- (A) is consistent with applicable laws and guidance with regard to planning, design, acquisition, operation, and management of information systems; (B) will be used to guide and define the development and implementation of the Network; and (C) addresses the existing and planned enterprise architectures of the departments and agencies participating in the Network; (5) a description of how privacy and civil liberties will be protected throughout the design and implementation of the Network; (6) objective, systemwide performance measures to enable the assessment of progress toward achieving full implementation of the Network; (7) a plan, including a time line, for the development and phased implementation of the Network; (8) total budget requirements to develop and implement the Network, including the estimated annual cost for each of the 5 years following the date of the enactment of this Act; and (9) proposals for any legislation that the Director of Management and Budget determines necessary to implement the Network. (g) Director of Management and Budget Responsible for Information Sharing Across the Federal Government.-- (1) Additional duties and responsibilities.-- (A) In general.--The Director of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Executive Council, shall-- (i) implement and manage the Network; (ii) develop and implement policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards as appropriate to foster the development and proper operation of the Network; and (iii) assist, monitor, and assess the implementation of the Network by Federal departments and agencies to ensure adequate progress, technological consistency and policy compliance; and regularly report the findings to the President and to Congress. (B) Content of policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards.--The policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall-- (i) take into account the varying missions and security requirements of agencies participating in the Network; (ii) address development, implementation, and oversight of technical standards and requirements; (iii) address and facilitate information sharing between and among departments and agencies of the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, the Homeland Security community and the law enforcement community; (iv) address and facilitate information sharing between Federal departments and agencies and State, tribal and local governments; (v) address and facilitate, as appropriate, information sharing between Federal departments and agencies and the private sector; (vi) address and facilitate, as appropriate, information sharing between Federal departments and agencies with foreign partners and allies; and (vii) ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties. (2) Appointment of principal officer.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Management and Budget shall appoint, with approval of the President, a principal officer in the Office of Management and Budget whose primary responsibility shall be to carry out the day-to-day duties of the Director specified in this section. The officer shall report directly to the Director of Management and Budget, have the rank of a Deputy Director and shall be paid at the rate of pay payable for a position at level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code. (h) Executive Council on Information Sharing.-- (1) Establishment.--There is established an Executive Council on Information Sharing that shall assist the Director of Management and Budget in the execution of the Director's duties under this Act concerning information sharing. (2) Membership.--The members of the Executive Council shall be-- (A) the Director of Management and Budget, who shall serve as Chairman of the Executive Council; (B) the Secretary of Homeland Security or his designee; (C) the Secretary of Defense or his designee; (D) the Attorney General or his designee; (E) the Secretary of State or his designee; (F) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or his designee; (G) the National Intelligence Director or his designee; (H) such other Federal officials as the President shall designate; (I) representatives of State, tribal, and local governments, to be appointed by the President; and (J) individuals who are employed in private businesses or nonprofit organizations that own or operate critical infrastructure, to be appointed by the President. (3) Responsibilities.--The Executive Council shall assist the Director of Management and Budget in-- (A) implementing and managing the Network; (B) developing policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards necessary to establish and implement the Network; (C) ensuring there is coordination among departments and agencies participating in the Network in the development and implementation of the Network; (D) reviewing, on an ongoing basis, policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards related to the implementation of the Network; (E) establishing a dispute resolution process to resolve disagreements among departments and agencies about whether particular information should be shared and in what manner; and (F) considering such reports as are submitted by the Advisory Board on Information Sharing under subsection (i)(2). (4) Inapplicability of federal advisory committee act.--The Council shall not be subject to the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). (5) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of Management and Budget, in the capacity of Chair of the Executive Council, shall submit a report to the President and to Congress that shall include-- (A) a description of the activities and accomplishments of the Council in the preceding year; and (B) the number and dates of the meetings held by the Council and a list of attendees at each meeting. (6) Informing the public.--The Executive Council shall-- (A) make its reports to Congress available to the public to the greatest extent that is consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law; and (B) otherwise inform the public of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (i) Advisory Board on Information Sharing.-- (1) Establishment.--There is established an Advisory Board on Information Sharing to advise the President and the Executive Council on policy, technical, and management issues related to the design and operation of the Network. (2) Responsibilities.--The Advisory Board shall advise the Executive Council on policy, technical, and management issues related to the design and operation of the Network. At the request of the Executive Council, or the Director of Management and Budget in the capacity as Chair of the Executive Council, or on its own initiative, the Advisory Board shall submit reports to the Executive Council concerning the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Board regarding the design and operation of the Network. (3) Membership and qualifications.--The Advisory Board shall be composed of no more than 15 members, to be appointed by the President from outside the Federal Government. The members of the Advisory Board shall have significant experience or expertise in policy, technical and operational matters, including issues of security, privacy, or civil liberties, and shall be selected solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, achievements, public stature and relevant experience. (4) Chair.--The President shall designate one of the members of the Advisory Board to act as chair of the Advisory Board. (5) Administrative support.--The Office of Management and Budget shall provide administrative support for the Advisory Board. (j) Reports.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the President through the Director of Management and Budget shall submit a report to Congress on the state of the Network and of information sharing across the Federal Government. (2) Content.--Each report under this subsection shall include-- (A) a progress report on the extent to which the Network has been implemented, including how the Network has fared on the government-wide and agency-specific performance measures and whether the performance goals set in the preceding year have been met; (B) objective systemwide performance goals for the following year; (C) an accounting of how much was spent on the Network in the preceding year; (D) actions taken to ensure that agencies procure new technology that is consistent with the Network and information on whether new systems and technology are consistent with the Network; (E) the extent to which, in appropriate circumstances, all terrorism watch lists are available for combined searching in real time through the Network and whether there are consistent standards for placing individuals on, and removing individuals from, the watch lists, including the availability of processes for correcting errors; (F) the extent to which unnecessary roadblocks, impediments, or disincentives to information sharing, including the inappropriate use of paper-only intelligence products and requirements for originator approval, have been eliminated; (G) the extent to which positive incentives for information sharing have been implemented; (H) the extent to which classified information is also made available through the Network, in whole or in part, in unclassified form; (I) the extent to which State, tribal, and local officials-- (i) are participating in the Network; (ii) have systems which have become integrated into the Network; (iii) are providing as well as receiving information; and (iv) are using the Network to communicate with each other; (J) the extent to which-- (i) private sector data, including information from owners and operators of critical infrastructure, is incorporated in the Network; and (ii) the private sector is both providing and receiving information; (K) where private sector data has been used by the Government or has been incorporated into the Network-- (i) the measures taken to protect sensitive business information; and (ii) where the data involves information about individuals, the measures taken to ensure the accuracy of such data; (L) the measures taken by the Federal Government to ensure the accuracy of other information on the Network and, in particular, the accuracy of information about individuals; (M) an assessment of the Network's privacy and civil liberties protections, including actions taken in the preceding year to implement or enforce privacy and civil liberties protections and a report of complaints received about interference with an individual's privacy or civil liberties; and (N) an assessment of the security protections of the Network. (k) Agency Responsibilities.--The head of each department or agency possessing or using intelligence or homeland security information or otherwise participating in the Network shall-- (1) ensure full department or agency compliance with information sharing policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards established for the Network under subsections (c) and (g); (2) ensure the provision of adequate resources for systems and activities supporting operation of and participation in the Network; and (3) ensure full agency or department cooperation in the development of the Network and associated enterprise architecture to implement governmentwide information sharing, and in the management and acquisition of information technology consistent with applicable law. (l) Agency Plans and Reports.--Each Federal department or agency that possesses or uses intelligence and homeland security information, operates a system in the Network or otherwise participates, or expects to participate, in the Network, shall submit to the Director of Management and Budget-- (1) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, a report including-- (A) a strategic plan for implementation of the Network's requirements within the department or agency; (B) objective performance measures to assess the progress and adequacy of the department or agency's information sharing efforts; and (C) budgetary requirements to integrate the agency into the Network, including projected annual expenditures for each of the following 5 years following the submission of the report; and (2) annually thereafter, reports including-- (A) an assessment of the progress of the department or agency in complying with the Network's requirements, including how well the agency has performed on the objective measures developed under paragraph (1)(B); (B) the agency's expenditures to implement and comply with the Network's requirements in the preceding year; and (C) the agency's or department's plans for further implementation of the Network in the year following the submission of the report. (m) Periodic Assessments.-- (1) Comptroller general.-- (A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and periodically thereafter, the Comptroller General shall evaluate the implementation of the Network, both generally and, at the discretion of the Comptroller General, within specific departments and agencies, to determine the extent of compliance with the Network's requirements and to assess the effectiveness of the Network in improving information sharing and collaboration and in protecting privacy and civil liberties, and shall report to Congress on the findings of the Comptroller General. (B) Information available to the comptroller general.--Upon request by the Comptroller General, information relevant to an evaluation under subsection (a) shall be made available to the Comptroller General under section 716 of title 31, United States Code. (C) Consultation with congressional committees.--If a record is not made available to the Comptroller General within a reasonable time, before the Comptroller General files a report under section 716(b)(1) of title 31, United States Code, the Comptroller General shall consult with the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives concerning the Comptroller's intent to file a report. (2) Inspectors general.--The Inspector General in any Federal department or agency that possesses or uses intelligence or homeland security information or that otherwise participates in the Network shall, at the discretion of the Inspector General-- (A) conduct audits or investigations to-- (i) determine the compliance of that department or agency with the Network's requirements; and (ii) assess the effectiveness of that department or agency in improving information sharing and collaboration and in protecting privacy and civil liberties; and (B) issue reports on such audits and investigations. (n) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated-- (1) $50,000,000 to the Director of Management and Budget to carry out this section for fiscal year 2005; and (2) such sums as are necessary to carry out this section in each fiscal year thereafter, to be disbursed and allocated in accordance with the Network implementation plan required by subsection (f). (a) In General.--There is established within the Executive Office of the President a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (referred to in this subtitle as the ``Board''). (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the following findings: (1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the Government may need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of its existing powers. (2) This shift of power and authority to the Government calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of life and to ensure that the Government uses its powers for the purposes for which the powers were given. (c) Purpose.--The Board shall-- (1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism; and (2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism. (d) Functions.-- (1) Advice and counsel on policy development and implementation.--The Board shall-- (A) review proposed legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including the development and adoption of information sharing guidelines under section 205(g); (B) review the implementation of new and existing legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including the implementation of information sharing guidelines under section 205(g); (C) advise the President and the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of such legislation, regulations, policies, and guidelines; and (D) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a particular governmental power, consider whether the department, agency, or element of the executive branch has explained-- (i) that the power actually materially enhances security; (ii) that there is adequate supervision of the use by the executive branch of the power to ensure protection of privacy and civil liberties; and (iii) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use. (2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review-- (A) the regulations, policies, and procedures, and the implementation of the regulations, policies, and procedures, of the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are protected; (B) the information sharing practices of the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch to determine whether they appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties and adhere to the information sharing guidelines prescribed under section 205(g) and to other governing laws, regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil liberties; and (C) other actions by the executive branch related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to determine whether such actions-- (i) appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties; and (ii) are consistent with governing laws, regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil liberties. (3) Relationship with privacy and civil liberties officers.--The Board shall-- (A) review and assess reports and other information from privacy officers and civil liberties officers described in section 212; (B) when appropriate, make recommendations to such privacy officers and civil liberties officers regarding their activities; and (C) when appropriate, coordinate the activities of such privacy officers and civil liberties officers on relevant interagency matters. (4) Testimony.--The Members of the Board shall appear and testify before Congress upon request. (e) Reports.-- (1) In general.--The Board shall-- (A) receive and review reports from privacy officers and civil liberties officers described in section 212; and (B) periodically submit, not less than semiannually, reports-- (i)(I) to the appropriate committees of Congress, including the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (II) to the President; and (ii) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary. (2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each year under paragraph (1)(B) shall include-- (A) a description of the major activities of the Board during the preceding period; and (B) information on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and oversight functions under subsection (d). (f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall-- (1) make its reports, including its reports to Congress, available to the public to the greatest extent that is consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law; and (2) hold public hearings and otherwise inform the public of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (g) Access to Information.-- (1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this section, the Board is authorized to-- (A) have access from any department, agency, or element of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or employee, to all relevant records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other relevant material, including classified information consistent with applicable law; (B) interview, take statements from, or take public testimony from personnel of any department, agency, or element of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or employee; (C) request information or assistance from any State, tribal, or local government; and (D) require, by subpoena issued at the direction of a majority of the members of the Board, persons (other than departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch) to produce any relevant information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other documentary or testimonial evidence. (2) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(D), the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found may issue an order requiring such person to produce the evidence required by such subpoena. (3) Agency cooperation.--Whenever information or assistance requested under subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) is, in the judgment of the Board, unreasonably refused or not provided, the Board shall report the circumstances to the head of the department, agency, or element concerned without delay. The head of the department, agency, or element concerned shall ensure that the Board is given access to the information, assistance, material, or personnel the Board determines to be necessary to carry out its functions. (h) Membership.-- (1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a full-time chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be selected solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, achievements, public stature, expertise in civil liberties and privacy, and relevant experience, and without regard to political affiliation, but in no event shall more than 3 members of the Board be members of the same political party. (3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected official, officer, or employee of the Federal Government, other than in the capacity as a member of the Board. (4) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a term of six years, except that-- (A) a member appointed to a term of office after the commencement of such term may serve under such appointment only for the remainder of such term; (B) upon the expiration of the term of office of a member, the member shall continue to serve until the member's successor has been appointed and qualified, except that no member may serve under this subparagraph-- (i) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session unless a nomination to fill the vacancy shall have been submitted to the Senate; or (ii) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the Senate in which such nomination is submitted; and (C) the members initially appointed under this subsection shall serve terms of two, three, four, five, and six years, respectively, from the effective date of this Act, with the term of each such member to be designated by the President. (5) Quorum and meetings.--After its initial meeting, the Board shall meet upon the call of the chairman or a majority of its members. Three members of the Board shall constitute a quorum. (i) Compensation and Travel Expenses.-- (1) Compensation.-- (A) Chairman.--The chairman shall be compensated at the rate of pay payable for a position at level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code. (B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall be compensated at a rate of pay payable for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Board. (2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for persons employed intermittently by the Government under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Board. (j) Staff.-- (1) Appointment and compensation.--The Chairman, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Board, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a full-time executive director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Board to carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code. (2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed to the Board without reimbursement from the Board, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of the detailee's regular employment without interruption. (3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates that do not exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such title. (k) Security Clearances.--The appropriate departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch shall cooperate with the Board to expeditiously provide the Board members and staff with appropriate security clearances to the extent possible under existing procedures and requirements. (l) Treatment as Agency, Not as Advisory Committee.--The Board-- (1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code); and (2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in section 3(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)). (a) Designation and Functions.--The Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the National Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the head of any other department, agency, or element of the executive branch designated by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to be appropriate for coverage under this section shall designate not less than 1 senior officer to-- (1) assist the head of such department, agency, or element and other officials of such department, agency, or element in appropriately considering privacy and civil liberties concerns when such officials are proposing, developing, or implementing laws, regulations, policies, procedures, or guidelines related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism; (2) periodically investigate and review department, agency, or element actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, and related laws and their implementation to ensure that such department, agency, or element is adequately considering privacy and civil liberties in its actions; (3) ensure that such department, agency, or element has adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond to, and redress complaints from individuals who allege such department, agency, or element has violated their privacy or civil liberties; and (4) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a particular governmental power the officer shall consider whether such department, agency, or element has explained-- (i) that the power actually materially enhances security; (ii) that there is adequate supervision of the use by such department, agency, or element of the power to ensure protection of privacy and civil liberties; and (iii) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use. (b) Exception to Designation Authority.-- (1) Privacy officers.--In any department, agency, or element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the Board, which has a statutorily created privacy officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified in subsection (a) with respect to privacy. (2) Civil liberties officers.--In any department, agency, or element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the Board, which has a statutorily created civil liberties officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified in subsection (a) with respect to civil liberties. (c) Supervision and Coordination.--Each privacy officer or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b) shall-- (1) report directly to the head of the department, agency, or element concerned; and (2) coordinate their activities with the Inspector General of such department, agency, or element to avoid duplication of effort. (d) Agency Cooperation.--The head of each department, agency, or element shall ensure that each privacy officer and civil liberties officer-- (1) has the information, material, and resources necessary to fulfill the functions of such officer; (2) is advised of proposed policy changes; (3) is consulted by decision makers; and (4) is given access to material and personnel the officer determines to be necessary to carry out the functions of such officer. (e) Reprisal for Making Complaint.--No action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making a complaint or for disclosing information to a privacy officer or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b), or to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, that indicates a possible violation of privacy protections or civil liberties in the administration of the programs and operations of the Federal Government relating to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism shall be taken by any Federal employee in a position to take such action, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity. (f) Periodic Reports.-- (1) In general.--The privacy officers and civil liberties officers of each department, agency, or element referred to or described in subsection (a) or (b) shall periodically, but not less than quarterly, submit a report on the activities of such officers-- (A)(i) to the appropriate committees of Congress, including the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; (ii) to the head of such department, agency, or element; and (iii) to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; and (B) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary. (2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include information on the discharge of each of the functions of the officer concerned, including-- (A) information on the number and types of reviews undertaken; (B) the type of advice provided and the response given to such advice; (C) the number and nature of the complaints received by the department, agency, or element concerned for alleged violations; and (D) a summary of the disposition of such complaints, the reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the activities of such officer. (g) Informing the Public.--Each privacy officer and civil liberties officer shall-- (1) make the reports of such officer, including reports to Congress, available to the public to the greatest extent that is consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law; and (2) otherwise inform the public of the activities of such officer, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law. (h) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or otherwise supplant any other authorities or responsibilities provided by law to privacy officers or civil liberties officers. (a) Location Outside Executive Office of the President.-- The National Intelligence Director shall not be located within the Executive Office of the President. (b) Provision of National Intelligence.--The National Intelligence Director shall provide to the President and Congress national intelligence that is timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy goals. (a) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall provide to the President, Congress, and the National Intelligence Director national intelligence related to counterterrorism that is timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy goals. (b) Directors of National Intelligence Centers.--Each Director of a national intelligence center established under section 144 shall provide to the President, Congress, and the National Intelligence Director intelligence information that is timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy goals. (c) Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall ensure that intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is objective and independent of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy goals. (d) National Intelligence Council.--The National Intelligence Council shall produce national intelligence estimates for the United States Government that are timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and have not been shaped to serve policy goals. No officer, department, agency, or element of the executive branch shall have any authority to require the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center-- (1) to receive permission to testify before Congress; or (2) to submit testimony, legislative recommendations, or comments to any officer or agency of the United States for approval, comments, or review prior to the submission of such recommendations, testimony, or comments to Congress if such recommendations, testimony, or comments include a statement indicating that the views expressed therein are those of the agency submitting them and do not necessarily represent the views of the Administration. (a) Documents Required To Be Provided to Congressional Committees.--The National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and the Director of a national intelligence center shall provide to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and any other committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the subject matter to which the information relates, all intelligence assessments, intelligence estimates, sense of intelligence community memoranda, and daily senior executive intelligence briefs, other than the Presidential Daily Brief and those reports prepared exclusively for the President. (b) Response to Requests From Congress Required.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), in addition to providing material under subsection (a), the National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, or the Director of a national intelligence center shall, not later than 15 days after receiving a request for any intelligence assessment, report, or estimate or other intelligence information from the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, or any other committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the subject matter to which the information relates, make available to such committee such intelligence assessment, report, or estimate or other intelligence information. (2) Certain members.--In addition to requests described in paragraph (1), the National Intelligence Director shall respond to requests from the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. Upon making a request covered by this paragraph, the Chairman, Vice Chairman, or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of such committee shall notify the other of the Chairman, Vice Chairman, or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of such committee of such request. (3) Assertions of privilege.--In response to requests described under paragraph (1) or (2), the National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, or the Director of a national intelligence center shall provide information, unless the President certifies that such information is not being provided because the President is asserting a privilege pursuant to the United States Constitution. (a) Disclosure of Certain Information Authorized.-- (1) In general.--Employees of covered agencies and employees of contractors carrying out activities under classified contracts with covered agencies may disclose information described in paragraph (2) to the individuals referred to in paragraph (3) without first reporting such information to the appropriate Inspector General. (2) Covered information.--Paragraph (1) applies to information, including classified information, that an employee reasonably believes provides direct and specific evidence of a false or inaccurate statement to Congress contained in, or withheld from Congress, any intelligence information material to, any intelligence assessment, report, or estimate, but does not apply to information the disclosure of which is prohibited by rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (3) Covered individuals.-- (A) In general.--The individuals to whom information in paragraph (2) may be disclosed are-- (i) a Member of a committee of Congress having primary responsibility for oversight of a department, agency, or element of the United States Government to which the disclosed information relates and who is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed; (ii) any other Member of Congress who is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed; and (iii) an employee of Congress who has the appropriate security clearance and is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed. (B) Presumption of need for information.--An individual described in subparagraph (A) to whom information is disclosed under paragraph (2) shall be presumed to have a need to know such information. (b) Construction With Other Reporting Requirements.-- Nothing in this section may be construed to modify, alter, or otherwise affect-- (1) any reporting requirement relating to intelligence activities that arises under this Act, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), or any other provision of law; or (2) the right of any employee of the United States Government to disclose to Congress in accordance with applicable law information not described in this section. (c) Covered Agencies Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered agencies'' means the following: (1) The National Intelligence Authority, including the National Counterterrorism Center. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (7) Any other Executive agency, or element or unit thereof, determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal function the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities.", u" TITLE IX--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT Subtitle A--Duties and Functions of Department of Defense (a) Study Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a study of the roles and authorities of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. (b) Content of Study.--The study under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) An examination of the past and current roles and authorities of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. (2) An analysis to determine appropriate future roles and authorities for the Director, including an analysis of the following matters: (A) The relationship of the Director to other senior science and technology and acquisition officials of the military departments and the Defense Agencies (B) The relationship of the Director to the performance of the following functions: (i) The planning, programming, and budgeting of the science and technology programs of the Department of Defense, including those of the military departments and the Defense Agencies. (ii) The management of Department of Defense laboratories and technical centers, including the management of the Federal Government scientific and technical workforce for such laboratories and centers. (iii) The promotion of the rapid transition of technologies to acquisition programs within the Department of Defense. (iv) The promotion of the transfer of technologies into and from the commercial sector. (v) The coordination of Department of Defense science and technology activities with organizations outside the Department of Defense, including other Federal Government agencies, international research organizations, industry, and academia. (vi) The technical review of Department of Defense acquisition programs and policies. (vii) The training and educational activities for the national scientific and technical workforce. (viii) The development of science and technology policies and programs relating to the maintenance of the national technology and industrial base. (ix) The development of new technologies in support of the transformation of the Armed Forces. (3) An examination of the duties of the Director as the Chief Technology Officer of the Department of Defense as prescribed by Department of Defense Directive 5134.3, dated November 3, 2003, especially in comparison to the duties of similar positions in the Federal Government and industry. (4) An examination of any other matter that the Secretary considers appropriate for the study. (c) Report.--(1) Not later than February 1, 2006, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on the results of the study under this section. (2) The report shall include recommendations regarding the appropriate roles and authorities that should be assigned and resources that should be provided to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. (d) Role of Defense Science Board in Study and Report.--The Secretary shall act through the Defense Science Board in carrying out the study under subsection (a) and in preparing (a) Membership of Council Under Section 179.--Subsection (a) of section 179 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.''. (b) Conforming and Clarifying Amendments.--Such subsection is further amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1)-- (1) by striking ``Joint''; and (2) by striking ``composed of three members as follows:'' and inserting ``operated as a joint activity of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. The membership of the Council is comprised of the following officers of those departments:''. (c) Other Technical and Clarifying Amendments.--Such section is further amended as follows: (1) Subsection (c)(3)(B) is amended by striking ``appointed'' and inserting ``designated''. (2) Subsection (e) is amended by striking ``In addition'' and all that follows through ``also'' and inserting ``The Council shall''. (3) Subsection (f) is amended by striking ``Committee on'' the first place it appears and all that follows through ``Representatives'' and inserting ``congressional defense committees''. (d) Stylistic Amendments.--Such section is further amended as follows: (1) Subsection (a) is amended by inserting ``Establishment; Membership.--'' after ``(a)''. (2) Subsection (b) is amended by inserting ``Chairman; Meetings.--'' after ``(b)''. (3) Subsection (c) is amended by inserting ``Staff and Administrative Services; Staff Director.--'' after ``(c)''. (4) Subsection (d) is amended by inserting ``Responsibilities.--'' after ``(d)''. (5) Subsection (e) is amended by inserting ``Report on Difficulties Relating to Safety or Reliability.--'' after ``(e)''. (6) Subsection (f) is amended by inserting ``Annual Report.--'' after ``(f)''. (e) Further Conforming Amendments.--Section 3212(e) of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2402(e)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Joint'' in the subsection heading; and (2) by striking ``Joint''. (a) Requirement for Comprehensive Review.--In order to clarify the national security space policy and strategy of the United States for the near term, the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a comprehensive review of the space posture of the United States over the posture review period. (b) Elements of Review.--The review conducted under subsection (a) shall include, for the posture review period, the following: (1) The definition, policy, requirements, and objectives for each of the following: (A) Space situational awareness. (B) Space control. (C) Space superiority, including defensive and offensive counterspace. (D) Force enhancement and force application. (E) Space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance from space. (F) Any other matter the Secretary considers relevant to understanding the United States space posture. (2) Current and planned space acquisition programs that are in acquisition categories 1 and 2, including how each such program will address the policy, requirements, and objectives described under each of subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1). (3) Future space systems and technology development (other than those in development as of the date of the enactment of this Act) necessary to address the policy, requirements, and objectives described under each of subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1). (4) The relationship among-- (A) United States military space policy; (B) national security space policy; (C) national security space objectives; and (D) arms control policy. (5) Effect of United States military and national security space policy on the proliferation of weapons capable of targeting objects in space or objects on Earth from space. (c) Reports.--(1) Not later than March 15, 2005, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional committees specified in paragraph (4) an interim report on the review conducted under subsection (a). (2) Not later than December 31, 2005, the Secretary shall submit to those committees a final report on that review. (3) Each report under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (4) The reports under this subsection shall be submitted to the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (d) Joint Undertaking With the Director of Central Intelligence (or Successor).--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct the review under this section, and shall submit the reports under subsection (c), jointly with the Director of Central Intelligence (or any successor official who has responsibility for management of the intelligence community). (e) Posture Review Period.--In this section, the term ``posture review period'' means the 10-year period beginning on the first day of the first month beginning more than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) In General.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall enter into a contract with a federally funded research and development center to establish a panel on the future national security space launch requirements of the United States, including means of meeting those requirements. (2) The Secretary shall enter into the contract not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Membership and Administration of Panel.--(1) The panel shall consist of individuals selected by the federally funded research and development center from among private citizens of the United States with knowledge and expertise in one or more of the following areas: (A) Space launch operations. (B) Space launch technologies. (C) Satellite and satellite payloads. (D) State and national launch complexes. (E) Space launch economics. (2) The federally funded research and development center shall establish appropriate procedures for the administration of the panel, including designation of the chairman of the panel from among its members. (3) All panel members shall hold security clearances appropriate for the work of the panel. (4) The panel shall convene its first meeting not later than 30 days after the date on which all members of the panel have been selected. (c) Duties.--(1) The panel shall conduct a review and assessment of the future national security space launch requirements of the United States, including the means of meeting those requirements. (2) The review and assessment shall take into account the following matters: (A) Launch economics. (B) Operational concepts and architectures. (C) Launch technologies, including-- (i) reusable launch vehicles; (ii) expendable launch vehicles; (iii) low cost options; and (iv) revolutionary approaches. (D) Payloads, including the implications of payloads for launch requirements. (E) Launch infrastructure. (F) Launch industrial base. (G) Relationships among military, civilian, and commercial launch requirements. (3) The review and assessment shall address national security space launch requirements over each of the 5-year, 10-year, and 15-year periods beginning with 2005. (d) Information From Federal and State Agencies.--(1) The panel may secure directly from the Department of Defense, from any other department or agency of the Federal Government, and any State government any information that the panel considers necessary to carry out its duties. (2) The Secretary of Defense shall designate at least one senior civilian employee of the Department of Defense and at least one general or flag officer of an Armed Force to serve as liaison between the Department, the Armed Forces, and the panel. (e) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the first meeting of the panel under subsection (b)(4), the panel shall submit to the Secretary of Defense, the congressional defense committees, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on the results of the review and assessment under subsection (c). The report shall include-- (1) the findings and conclusions of the panel on the future national security space launch requirements of the United States, including means of meeting such requirements; (2) the assessment of panel, and any recommendations of the panel, on-- (A) launch operational concepts and architectures; (B) launch technologies; (C) launch enabling technologies; and (D) priorities for funding; and (3) the assessment of the panel as to the best means of meeting the future national security space launch requirements of the United States. (f) Termination.--The panel shall terminate 16 months after the date of the first meeting of the panel under subsection (b)(4). (g) Funding.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense shall be available to the Secretary of Defense for purposes of the contract required by subsection (a). (a) Planning, Programming, and Management.--(1) Chapter 135 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2273 the following new section: (a) Mandatory Disclosure Requirements Inapplicable.--The requirements to make information available under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, shall not apply to land remote sensing information. (b) Land Remote Sensing Information Defined.--In this section, the term ``land remote sensing information''-- (1) means any data that-- (A) are collected by land remote sensing; and (B) are prohibited from sale to customers other than the United States Government and United States Government- approved customers for reasons of national security pursuant to the terms of an operating license issued pursuant to the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (15 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.); and (2) includes any imagery and other product that is derived from such data and which is prohibited from sale to customers other than the United States Government and United States Government-approved customers for reasons of national security pursuant to the terms of an operating license described in paragraph (1)(B). (c) State or Local Government Disclosures.--Land remote sensing information provided by the head of a department or agency of the United States to a State, local, or tribal government may not be made available to the general public under any State, local, or tribal law relating to the disclosure of information or records. (d) Safeguarding Information.--The head of each department or agency of the United States having land remote sensing information within that department or agency or providing such information to a State, local, or tribal government shall take such actions, commensurate with the sensitivity of that information, as are necessary to protect that information from disclosure other than in accordance with this section and other applicable law. (e) Additional Definition.--In this section, the term ``land remote sensing'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (15 U.S.C. 5602). (f) Disclosure to Congress.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the withholding of information from the appropriate committees of Congress. Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ``December 31, 2004'' and inserting ``December 31, 2006''. (a) Program Authorized.--The Director of the National Security Agency may carry out a pilot program on cryptologic service training for the intelligence community. (b) Objective of Program.--The objective of the pilot program is to increase the number of qualified entry-level language analysts and intelligence analysts available to the National Security Agency and the other elements of the intelligence community through the directed preparation and recruitment of qualified entry-level language analysts and intelligence analysts who commit to a period of service or a career in the intelligence community. (c) Program Scope.--The pilot program shall be national in scope. (d) Program Participants.--(1) Subject to the provisions of this subsection, the Director shall select the participants in the pilot program from among individuals qualified to participate in the pilot program utilizing such procedures as the Director considers appropriate for purposes of the pilot program. (2) Each individual who receives financial assistance under the pilot program shall perform one year of obligated service with the National Security Agency, or another element of the intelligence community approved by the Director, for each academic year for which such individual receives such financial assistance upon such individual's completion of post-secondary education. (3) Each individual selected to participate in the pilot program shall be qualified for a security clearance appropriate for the individual under the pilot program. (4) The total number of participants in the pilot program at any one time may not exceed 400 individuals. (e) Program Management.--In carrying out the pilot program, the Director shall-- (1) identify individuals interested in working in the intelligence community, and committed to taking college-level courses that will better prepare them for a career in the intelligence community as a language analyst or intelligence analyst; (2) provide each individual selected for participation in the pilot program-- (A) financial assistance for the pursuit of courses at institutions of higher education selected by the Director in fields of study that will qualify such individual for employment by an element of the intelligence community as a language analyst or intelligence analyst; and (B) educational counseling on the selection of courses to be so pursued; and (3) provide each individual so selected information on the opportunities available for employment in the intelligence community. (f) Duration of Program.--(1) The Director shall terminate the pilot program not later than six years after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) The termination of the pilot program under paragraph (1) shall not prevent the Director from continuing to provide assistance, counseling, and information under subsection (e) to individuals who are participating in the pilot program on the date of termination of the pilot program throughout the academic year in progress as of that date. Subsection (d) of section 1412 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (50 U.S.C. 1521), is amended to read as follows: ``(d) Requirement for Strategic Plan.--(1) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Secretary of the Army shall jointly prepare, and from time to time shall update as appropriate, a strategic plan for future activities for destruction of the United States' stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions. ``(2) The plan shall include, at a minimum, the following considerations: ``(A) Realistic budgeting for stockpile destruction and related support programs. ``(B) Contingency planning for foreseeable or anticipated problems. ``(C) A management approach and associated actions that address compliance with the obligations of the United States under the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty and that take full advantage of opportunities to accelerate destruction of the stockpile. ``(3) The Secretary of Defense shall each year submit to the Committee on the Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives the strategic plan as most recently prepared and updated under paragraph (1). Such submission shall be made each year at the time of the submission to the Congress that year of the President's budget for the next fiscal year.''. (a) Criteria for Critical Information.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall establish criteria for determining categories of critical information that should be made known expeditiously to senior civilian and military officials in the Department of Defense. Those categories should be limited to matters of extraordinary significance and strategic impact to which rapid access by those officials is essential to the successful accomplishment of the national security strategy or a major military mission. The Secretary may from time to time modify the list to suit the current strategic situation. (2) The Secretary shall provide the criteria established under paragraph (1) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the military departments, the commanders of the unified and specified commands, the commanders of deployed forces, and such other elements of the Department of Defense as the Secretary considers necessary. (b) Matters To Be Included.--The criteria established under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, requirement for identification of the following: (1) Any incident that may result in a contingency operation, based on the incident's nature, gravity, or potential for significant adverse consequences to United States citizens, military personnel, interests, or assets, including an incident that could result in significant adverse publicity having a major strategic impact. (2) Any event, development, or situation that could be reasonably assumed to escalate into an incident described in paragraph (1). (3) Any deficiency or error in policy, standards, or training that could be reasonably assumed to have the effects described in paragraph (1). (c) Requirements for Transmission of Critical Information.--The criteria under subsection (a) shall include such requirements for transmission of such critical information to such senior civilian and military officials of the Department of Defense as the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate. (d) Time for Issuance of Criteria.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish the criteria required by subsection (a) not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Authority To Transfer Authorizations.--(1) Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary in the national interest, the Secretary may transfer amounts of authorizations made available to the Department of Defense in this division for fiscal year 2005 between any such authorizations for that fiscal year (or any subdivisions thereof). Amounts of authorizations so transferred shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes as the authorization to which transferred. (2) The total amount of authorizations that the Secretary may transfer under the authority of this section may not exceed $3,500,000,000. (b) Limitations.--The authority provided by this section to transfer authorizations-- (1) may only be used to provide authority for items that have a higher priority than the items from which authority is transferred; and (2) may not be used to provide authority for an item that has been denied authorization by Congress. (c) Effect on Authorization Amounts.--A transfer made from one account to another under the authority of this section shall be deemed to increase the amount authorized for the account to which the amount is transferred by an amount equal to the amount transferred. (d) Notice to Congress.--The Secretary shall promptly notify Congress of each transfer made under subsection (a). (a) Fiscal Year 2005 Limitation.--The total amount contributed by the Secretary of Defense in fiscal year 2005 for the common-funded budgets of NATO may be any amount up to, but not in excess of, the amount specified in subsection (b) (rather than the maximum amount that would otherwise be applicable to those contributions under the fiscal year 1998 baseline limitation). (b) Total Amount.--The amount of the limitation applicable under subsection (a) is the sum of the following: (1) The amounts of unexpended balances, as of the end of fiscal year 2004, of funds appropriated for fiscal years before fiscal year 2005 for payments for those budgets. (2) The amount specified in subsection (c)(1). (3) The amount specified in subsection (c)(2). (4) The total amount of the contributions authorized to be made under section 2501. (c) Authorized Amounts.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated by titles II and III of this Act are available for contributions for the common-funded budgets of NATO as follows: (1) Of the amount provided in section 201(1), $756,000 for the Civil Budget. (2) Of the amount provided in section 301(1), $222,492,000 for the Military Budget. (d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section: (1) Common-funded budgets of nato.--The term ``common- funded budgets of NATO'' means the Military Budget, the Security Investment Program, and the Civil Budget of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (and any successor or additional account or program of NATO). (2) Fiscal year 1998 baseline limitation.--The term ``fiscal year 1998 baseline limitation'' means the maximum annual amount of Department of Defense contributions for common-funded budgets of NATO that is set forth as the annual limitation in section 3(2)(C)(ii) of the resolution of the Senate giving the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (as defined in section 4(7) of that resolution), approved by the Senate on April 30, 1998. (a) In General.--(1) Chapter 9 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding after section 232, as added by section 214(a), the following new section: (a) Authority.--Subchapter II of chapter 134 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Repeal.--Section 2370a of title 10, United States Code, is repealed. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 139 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to that section. (a) Secretary of Defense Report.--(1) Not later than December 1, 2004, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on the foreign currency exchange rate projection used in annual Department of Defense budget presentations. (2) In the report under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall-- (A) identify alternative approaches for selecting foreign currency exchange rates that would produce more realistic estimates of amounts required to be appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of Defense to accommodate foreign currency exchange rate fluctuations; (B) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each approach identified pursuant to subparagraph (A); and (C) identify the Secretary's preferred approach among the alternatives identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) and provide the Secretary's rationale for preferring that approach. (3) In identifying alternative approaches pursuant to paragraph (2)(A), the Secretary shall examine-- (A) approaches used by other Federal departments and agencies; and (B) the feasibility of using private economic forecasting. (b) Comptroller General Review and Report.--The Comptroller General shall review the report under subsection (a), including the basis for the Secretary's conclusions stated in the report, and shall submit, not later than January 15, 2005, to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report containing the results of that review. Section 1001(a)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136; 117 Stat. 1582) is amended by striking ``$2,500,000,000'' and inserting ``$2,800,000,000''. For the purposes of applying sections 204 and 605 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2004 (division B of Public Law 108-199) to matters in title II of such Act under the heading ``National Institute of Standards and Technology'' (118 Stat. 69), in the account under the heading ``industrial technology services'', the Secretary of Commerce shall make all determinations based on the Industrial Technology Services funding level of $218,782,000 for reprogramming and transferring of funds for the Manufacturing Extension Partnership program and may submit such a reprogramming or transfer, as the case may be, to the appropriate committees within 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Section 2208 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(r) Notification of Transfers.--(1) Notwithstanding any authority provided in this section to transfer funds, the transfer of funds from a working-capital fund, including a transfer to another working-capital fund, shall not be made under such authority unless the Secretary of Defense submits, in advance, a notification of the proposed transfer to the congressional defense committees in accordance with customary procedures. ``(2) The amount of a transfer covered by a notification under paragraph (1) that is made in a fiscal year does not count toward any limitation on the total amount of transfers that may be made for that fiscal year under authority provided to the Secretary of Defense in a law authorizing appropriations for a fiscal year for military activities of the Department of Defense or a law making appropriations for the Department of Defense.''. (a) Authority.--Subchapter I of chapter 8 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) In General.--Chapter 633 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 7305 the following new section: (a) Costs of Preparation for Disposal.--(1) Chapter 633 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 7311 the following new section: (a) Transfers by Grant.--The President is authorized to transfer vessels to foreign recipients on a grant basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j), as follows: (1) Chile.--To the Government of Chile, the SPRUANCE class destroyer USS O'BANNON (DD-987). (2) Portugal.--To the Government of Portugal, the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigates GEORGE PHILIP (FFG-12) and SIDES (FFG-14). (b) Transfers by Sale.--The President is authorized to transfer vessels to foreign recipients on a sale basis under section 21 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2761), as follows: (1) Chile.--To the Government of Chile, the SPRUANCE class destroyer FLETCHER (DD-992). (2) Taiwan.--To the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office of the United States (which is the Taiwan instrumentality designated pursuant to section 10(a) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3309(a))), the ANCHORAGE class dock landing ship ANCHORAGE (LSD-36). (c) Grants Not Counted in Annual Total of Transferred Excess Defense Articles.--The value of a vessel transferred to another country on a grant basis pursuant to authority provided by subsection (a) shall not be counted against the aggregate value of excess defense articles transferred to countries in any fiscal year under section 516(g) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(g)). (d) Costs of Transfers.--Any expense incurred by the United States in connection with a transfer authorized under subsection (a) or (b) shall be charged to the recipient. (e) Repair and Refurbishment in United States Shipyards.-- To the maximum extent practicable, the President shall require, as a condition of the transfer of a vessel under this section, that the country to which the vessel is transferred have such repair or refurbishment of the vessel as is needed, before the vessel joins the naval forces of that country, performed at a shipyard located in the United States, including a United States Navy shipyard. (f) Expiration of Authority.--The authority to transfer a vessel under this section shall expire at the end of the two- year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall provide for a study of the cost effectiveness of the ship construction program of the Navy. The study shall be conducted by a group of industrial experts independent of the Department of Defense. The study shall examine both-- (1) a variety of approaches by which the Navy ship construction program could be made more efficient in the near term; and (2) a variety of approaches by which, with a nationally integrated effort over the next decade, the United States shipbuilding industry might enhance its health and viability. (b) Near-Term Improvements in Efficiency.--With respect to the examination under subsection (a)(1) of approaches by which the Navy ship construction program could be made more efficient in the near term, the Secretary shall provide for the persons conducting the study to-- (1) determine the potential cost savings on an annual basis, with an estimate of return on investment, from implementation of each approach examined; and (2) establish priorities for potential implementation of the approaches examined. (c) United States Shipbuilding Infrastructure Modernization Plan.--With respect to the examination under subsection (a)(2) of approaches by which the United States shipbuilding industry might enhance its health and viability through a nationally integrated effort over the next decade, the Secretary shall provide for the persons conducting the study to-- (1) propose a plan incorporating a variety of approaches that would modernize the United States shipbuilding infrastructure within the next decade, resulting in a healthier and more viable shipbuilding industrial base; (2) establish priorities for potential implementation of the approaches examined; and (3) estimate the resources required to implement each of the approaches examined. (d) Report.--Not later than October 1, 2005, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the congressional defense committees providing the results of the study under subsection (a). The report shall include the matters specified in subsections (b) and (c). The Secretary of the Navy may not dispose of the decommissioned destroyer ex-Edson (DD-946) before October 1, 2007, to an entity that is not a nonprofit organization unless the Secretary first determines that there is no nonprofit organization that meets the criteria for donation of that vessel under section 7306(a)(3) of title 10, United States Code. (a) Authority.--(1) In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, funds available to the Department of Defense to provide assistance to the Government of Colombia may be used by the Secretary of Defense to support a unified campaign by the Government of Colombia against narcotics trafficking and against activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). (2) The authority to provide assistance for a campaign under this subsection includes authority to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including the undertaking of rescue operations. (b) Applicability of Certain Laws and Limitations.--The use of funds pursuant to the authority in subsection (a) shall be subject to the following: (1) Sections 556, 567, and 568 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (Public Law 107-115; 115 Stat. 2160, 2165, and 2166). (2) Section 8076 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-287; 118 Stat. 988). (c) Numerical Limitation on Assignment of United States Personnel.--Notwithstanding section 3204(b) of the Emergency Supplemental Act, 2000 (Division B of Public Law 106-246; 114 Stat. 575), as amended by the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (Public Law 107-115; 115 Stat. 2131), the number of United States personnel assigned to conduct activities in Colombia in connection with support of Plan Colombia under subsection (a) in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 shall be subject to the following limitations: (1) The number of United States military personnel assigned for temporary or permanent duty in Colombia in connection with support of Plan Colombia may not exceed 800. (2) The number of United States individual citizens retained as contractors in Colombia in connection with support of Plan Colombia who are funded by Federal funds may not exceed 600. (d) Limitation on Participation of United States Personnel.--No United States Armed Forces personnel, United States civilian employees, or United States civilian contractor personnel employed by the United States may participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance using funds pursuant to the authority in subsection (a), except for the purpose of acting in self defense or of rescuing any United States citizen, including any United States Armed Forces personnel, United States civilian employee, or civilian contractor employed by the United States. (e) Relation to Other Authority.--The authority provided by subsection (a) is in addition to any other authority in law to provide assistance to the Government of Colombia. (f) Report on Relationships Between Terrorist Organizations in Colombia and Foreign Governments and Organizations.--(1) Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives a report that describes-- (A) any relationships between foreign governments or organizations and organizations based in Colombia that have been designated as foreign terrorist organizations under United States law, including the provision of any direct or indirect assistance to such organizations; and (B) United States policies that are designed to address such relationships. (2) The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the President should make the substantial reduction of illegal drug trafficking in Afghanistan a priority in the Global War on Terrorism; (2) the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, should expand cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan and international organizations involved in counter-drug activities to assist in providing a secure environment for counter-drug personnel in Afghanistan; and (3) the United States, in conjunction with the Government of Afghanistan and coalition partners, should undertake additional efforts to reduce illegal drug trafficking and related activities that provide financial support for terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and neighboring countries. (b) Report Required.--(1) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall jointly prepare a report that describes-- (A) the progress made towards substantially reducing poppy cultivation and heroin production capabilities in Afghanistan; and (B) the extent to which profits from illegal drug activity in Afghanistan are used to financially support terrorist organizations and groups seeking to undermine the Government of Afghanistan. (2) The report required by this subsection shall be submitted to Congress not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Liberty Memorial Museum in Kansas City, Missouri, was built in honor of those individuals who served in World War I in defense of liberty and the United States. (2) The Liberty Memorial Association, the nonprofit organization that originally built the Liberty Memorial Museum, is responsible for the finances, operations, and collections management of the Liberty Memorial Museum. (3) The Liberty Memorial Museum is the only public museum in the United States that exists for the exclusive purpose of interpreting the experiences of the United States and its allies in the World War I years (1914-1918), both on the battlefield and on the home front. (4) The Liberty Memorial Museum project began after the 1918 Armistice through the efforts of a large-scale, grass- roots civic and fundraising effort by the citizens of the Kansas City metropolitan area, including veterans of World War I. After the conclusion of a national architectural design competition, ground was broken in 1921, construction began in 1923, and the Liberty Memorial Museum was opened to the public in 1926. (5) In 1994, the Liberty Memorial Museum closed for a massive restoration and expansion project. The restored museum reopened to the public on Memorial Day in 2002 during a gala rededication ceremony. (6) Exhibits prepared for the original museum buildings presaged the dramatic, underground expansion of core exhibition gallery space, with over 30,000 square feet of new interpretive and educational exhibits currently in development. The new exhibits, along with an expanded research library and archives, will more fully utilize the many thousands of historical objects, books, maps, posters, photographs, diaries, letters, and reminiscences of World War I participants that are preserved for posterity in the collections of the Liberty Memorial Museum. The new core exhibition is scheduled to open on Veterans Day in 2006. (7) The City of Kansas City, the State of Missouri, and thousands of private donors and philanthropic foundations have contributed millions of dollars to first build and later restore the Liberty Memorial Museum. The Liberty Memorial Museum continues to receive the strong support of residents from the States of Missouri and Kansas and across the United States. (8) Since its restoration and rededication in 2002, the Liberty Memorial Museum has attracted thousands of visitors from across the United States and many foreign countries. (9) There remains a need to preserve in a museum setting evidence of the honor, courage, patriotism, and sacrifice of those Americans who offered their services and who gave their lives in defense of liberty during World War I, evidence of the roles of women and African Americans during World War I, and evidence of other relevant subjects. (10) The Liberty Memorial Museum seeks to educate a diverse group of audiences through its comprehensive collection of historical materials, emphasizing eyewitness accounts of the participants on the battlefield and the home front and the impact of World War I on individuals, then and now. The Liberty Memorial Museum continues to actively acquire and preserve such materials. (11) A great opportunity exists to use the invaluable resources of the Liberty Memorial Museum to teach the ``Lessons of Liberty'' to schoolchildren in the United States through on-site visits, classroom curriculum development, distance-learning activities, and other educational initiatives. (12) The Liberty Memorial Museum should remain the foremost museum in the United States regarding the national experience in the World War I years, which people can visit to learn about World War I and where the history of this monumental struggle will be preserved so that current and future generations may understand the role played by the United States in the preservation and advancement of democracy, freedom, and liberty in the early 20th century. (13) The work of the Liberty Memorial Museum to recognize and preserve the history of the Nation's sacrifices in World War I will take on added significance as the centennial observance of the war approaches. (14) It is fitting and proper to refer to the Liberty Memorial Museum as ``America's National World War I Museum''. (b) Congressional Recognition.--Congress-- (1) recognizes the Liberty Memorial Museum in Kansas City, Missouri, including the museum's future and expanded exhibits, collections, library, archives, and educational programs, as ``America's National World War I Museum''; (2) recognizes that the continuing collection, preservation, and interpretation of the historical objects and other historical materials held by the Liberty Memorial Museum will enhance the knowledge and understanding of the experiences of the United States and its allies in the World War I years (1914-1918), both on the battlefield and on the home front; (3) commends the ongoing development and visibility of the ``Lessons of Liberty'' educational outreach programs prepared by the Liberty Memorial Museum for teachers and students throughout the United States; and (4) encourages present generations of Americans to understand the magnitude of World War I, how it shaped the United States, other countries, and later world events, and how the sacrifices made by Americans then helped preserve liberty, democracy, and other founding principles of the United States for generations to come. (a) In General.--For fiscal year 2005, the Secretary of Defense may conduct a program-- (1) to commemorate the 60th anniversary of World War II; and (2) to coordinate, support, and facilitate other such commemoration programs and activities of the Federal Government, State and local governments, and other persons. (b) Program Activities.--The program referred to in subsection (a) may include activities and ceremonies-- (1) to provide the people of the United States with a clear understanding and appreciation of the lessons and history of World War II; (2) to thank and honor veterans of World War II and their families; (3) to pay tribute to the sacrifices and contributions made on the home front by the people of the United States; (4) to foster an awareness in the people of the United States that World War II was the central event of the 20th century that defined the postwar world; (5) to highlight advances in technology, science, and medicine related to military research conducted during World War II; (6) to inform wartime and postwar generations of the contributions of the Armed Forces of the United States to the United States; (7) to recognize the contributions and sacrifices made by World War II allies of the United States; and (8) to highlight the role of the Armed Forces of the United States, then and now, in maintaining world peace through strength. (c) Establishment of Account.--(1) There is established in the Treasury of the United States an account to be known as the ``Department of Defense 60th Anniversary of World War II Commemoration Account'' which shall be administered by the Secretary as a single account. (2) There shall be deposited in the account, from amounts appropriated to the Department of Defense for operation and maintenance of Defense Agencies, such amounts as the Secretary considers appropriate to conduct the program referred to in subsection (a). (3) The Secretary may use the funds in the account established in paragraph (1) only for the purpose of conducting the program referred to in subsection (a). (4) Not later than 60 days after the termination of the authority of the Secretary to conduct the program referred to in subsection (a), the Secretary shall transmit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report containing an accounting of all the funds deposited into and expended from the account or otherwise expended under this section, and of any amount remaining in the account. Unobligated funds which remain in the account after termination of the authority of the Secretary under this section shall be held in the account until transferred by law after the Committees receive the report. (d) Acceptance of Voluntary Services.--(1) Notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary may accept from any person voluntary services to be provided in furtherance of the program referred to in subsection (a). (2) A person providing voluntary services under this subsection shall be considered to be an employee for the purposes of chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, relating to compensation for work-related injuries. Such a person who is not otherwise employed by the Federal Government shall not be considered to be a Federal employee for any other purposes by reason of the provision of such service. (3) The Secretary may reimburse a person providing voluntary services under this subsection for incidental expenses incurred by such person in providing such services. The Secretary shall determine which expenses are eligible for reimbursement under this paragraph. (a) Report Required.--Chapter 23 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Quarterly Accounting.--Not later than 45 days after the end of each quarter of a year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees, for each operation specified in subsection (b)-- (1) a full accounting of all costs incurred for such operation during such quarter and all amounts expended during such quarter for such operation; and (2) a description of the purposes for which those costs were incurred and those amounts were expended. (b) Operations Covered.--The operations referred to in subsection (a) are the following: (1) Operation Iraqi Freedom. (2) Operation Enduring Freedom. (3) Operation Noble Eagle. (4) Any other operation that the President designates as being an operation of the Global War on Terrorism. (c) Requirement for Comprehensiveness.--For the purpose of providing a full and complete accounting of the costs and expenditures under subsection (a) for an operation specified in subsection (b), the Secretary shall account in the quarterly submission under subsection (a) for all costs and expenditures that are reasonably attributable to that operation, including personnel costs. (a) Report Required.--(1) Not later than June 1, 2005, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the conduct of military operations during the post-major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. (2) The report shall be prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander of the United States Central Command, and such other officials as the Secretary considers appropriate. (b) Content.--(1) The report shall include a discussion of the matters described in paragraph (2), with a particular emphasis on accomplishments and shortcomings and on near-term and long-term corrective actions to address such shortcomings. (2) The matters to be discussed in the report are as follows: (A) The military and political objectives of the international coalition conducting the post-major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the military strategy selected to achieve such objectives, together with an assessment of the execution of the military strategy. (B) The mobilization process for the reserve components of the Armed Forces, including the timeliness of notification, training and certification, and subsequent demobilization. (C) The use and performance of major items of United States military equipment, weapon systems, and munitions (including non-lethal weapons and munitions, items classified under special access procedures, and items drawn from prepositioned stocks) and any expected effects of the experience with the use and performance of such items on the doctrinal and tactical employment of such items and on plans for continuing the acquisition of such items. (D) Any additional requirements for military equipment, weapon systems, munitions, force structure, or other capability identified during the post-major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including changes in type or quantity for future operations. (E) The effectiveness of joint air operations, together with an assessment of the effectiveness of-- (i) the employment of close air support; and (ii) attack helicopter operations. (F) The use of special operations forces, including operational and intelligence uses. (G) The scope of logistics support, including support to and from other nations and from international organizations and organizations and individuals from the private sector in Iraq. (H) The incidents of accidental fratricide, including a discussion of the effectiveness of the tracking of friendly forces and the use of the combat identification systems in mitigating friendly fire incidents. (I) The adequacy of spectrum and bandwidth to transmit information to operational forces and assets, including unmanned aerial vehicles, ground vehicles, and individual soldiers. (J) The effectiveness of strategic, operational, and tactical information operations, including psychological operations and assets, organization, and doctrine related to civil affairs, in achieving established objectives, together with a description of technological and other restrictions on the use of information operations capabilities. (K) The readiness of the reserve component forces used in the post-major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including an assessment of the success of the reserve component forces in accomplishing their missions. (L) The adequacy of intelligence support during the post- major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including the adequacy of such support in searches for weapons of mass destruction. (M) The rapid insertion and integration, if any, of developmental but mission-essential equipment, organizations, or procedures during the post-major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. (N) A description of the coordination, communication, and unity of effort between the Armed Forces, the Coalition Provisional Authority, other United States government agencies and organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and political, security, and nongovernmental organizations of Iraq, including an assessment of the effectiveness of such efforts. (O) The adequacy of training for military units once deployed to the area of operations of the United States Central Command, including training for changes in unit mission and continuation training for high-intensity conflict missions. (P) An estimate of the funding required to return or replace equipment used through the period covered by the report in Operation Iraqi Freedom, including equipment in prepositioned stocks, to mission-ready condition. (Q) A description of military civil affairs and reconstruction efforts, including efforts through the Commanders Emergency Response Program, and an assessment of the effectiveness of such efforts and programs. (R) The adequacy of the requirements determination and acquisition processes, acquisition, and distribution of force protection equipment, including personal gear, vehicles, helicopters, and defense devices. (S) The most critical lessons learned that could lead to long-term doctrinal, organizational, and technological changes, and the probable effects that an implementation of those changes would have on current visions, goals, and plans for transformation of the Armed Forces or the Department of Defense. (T) The planning for and implementation of morale, welfare, and recreation programs for deployed forces and support to dependents, including rest and recuperation programs and personal communication benefits such as telephone, mail, and email services, including an assessment of the effectiveness of such programs. (U) An analysis of force rotation plans, including individual personnel and unit rotations, differing deployment lengths, and in-theater equipment repair and leave behinds. (V) The organization of United States Central Command to conduct post-conflict operations and lessons for other combatant commands to conduct other such operations in the future. (c) Form of Report.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (d) Post-Major Combat Operations Phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom Defined.--In this section, the term ``post-major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom'' means the period of Operation Iraqi Freedom beginning on May 2, 2003, and ending on December 31, 2004. (a) Study on Training.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study to determine the extent to which members of the Armed Forces assigned to duty in support of contingency operations receive training in preparation for post-conflict operations and to evaluate the quality of such training. (b) Matters To Be Included in Study.--As part of the study under subsection (a), the Secretary shall specifically evaluate the following: (1) The doctrine, training, and leader-development system necessary to enable members of the Armed Forces to successfully operate in post-conflict operations. (2) The adequacy of the curricula at military educational facilities to ensure that the Armed Forces has a cadre of members skilled in post-conflict duties, including a familiarity with applicable foreign languages and foreign cultures. (3) The training time and resources available to members and units of the Armed Forces to develop awareness about ethnic backgrounds, religious beliefs, and political structures of the people living in areas in which the Armed Forces operate and areas in which post-conflict operations are likely to occur. (4) The adequacy of training transformation to emphasize post-conflict operations, including interagency coordination in support of commanders of combatant commands. (c) Report on Study.--Not later than May 1, 2005, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on the result of the study conducted under this section. (a) Report Required.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the need for one or more national centers of excellence for unmanned aerial and ground vehicles. (b) Goal of Centers.--The goal of the centers covered by the report is to promote interservice cooperation and coordination in the following areas: (1) Development of joint doctrine for the organization, training, and use of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles. (2) Joint research, development, test, and evaluation, and joint procurement of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles. (3) Identification and coordination, in conjunction with the private sector and academia, of the future development of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles. (4) Monitoring of the development and utilization of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles in other nations for both military and non-military purposes. (5) The providing of joint training and professional development opportunities in the use and operation of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles to military personnel of all ranks and levels of responsibility. (c) Report Requirements.--The report shall include, at a minimum, the following: (1) A list of facilities at which the Department of Defense currently conducts or plans to conduct research, development, and testing activities on unmanned aerial and ground vehicles. (2) A list of facilities at which the Department of Defense currently deploys or has committed to deploying unmanned aerial or ground vehicles. (3) The extent to which existing facilities described in paragraphs (1) and (2) have sufficient unused capacity and expertise to research, develop, test, and deploy the current and next generations of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles and to provide for the development of doctrine on the use and training of operators of such vehicles. (4) The extent to which efficiencies with respect to research, development, testing, and deployment of existing or future unmanned aerial and ground vehicles can be achieved through consolidation at one or more national centers of excellence for unmanned aerial and ground vehicles. (5) A list of potential locations for the national centers of excellence under this section. (d) Considerations.--In determining the potential locations for the national centers of excellence under this section, the Secretary of Defense shall take into consideration existing military facilities that have-- (1) a workforce of skilled personnel; (2) existing capacity of runways and other facilities to accommodate the research, development, testing, and deployment of current and future unmanned aerial vehicles; and (3) minimal restrictions on the research, development, testing, and deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles resulting from proximity to large population centers or airspace heavily utilized by commercial flights. (a) Study and Determination.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study of whether the practice of using two alternating crews (referred to as the ``Gold Crew'' and the ``Blue Crew'') for manning of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) continues to be justified under the changed circumstances since the end of the Cold War and, based on that study, shall make a determination of whether that two- crew manning practice should be continued or should be modified or terminated. (b) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report providing notice of the Secretary's determination under subsection (a) and the reasons for that determination. (a) Secretary of Defense Assessment and Report.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct an assessment of the programs of the Armed Forces for the prepositioning of materiel and equipment. Such assessment shall focus on how those programs will support the goal of the Secretary to have the capability, from the onset of a contingency situation, to-- (A) deploy forces to a distant theater within 10 days; (B) defeat an enemy within 30 days; and (C) be ready for an additional conflict within another 30 days. (2) The Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on such assessment not later than October 1, 2005. (b) Matters to Be Included.--The assessment under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) A review of the prepositioning of materiel and equipment used in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, including identification of challenges and potential solutions. (2) A description of changes to doctrine, strategy, and transportation plans that could be necessary to support the goal of the Secretary described in subsection (a). (3) A description of modifications to prepositioning programs that could be required in order to incorporate modularity concepts, future force structure changes, and sea- basing concepts. (4) A discussion of joint operations and training that support force projection requirements, including-- (A) theater opening requirements at potential aerial and sea ports of debarkation; (B) joint force reception capabilities; (C) joint theater distribution operations; and (D) use of joint prepositioned stocks, materiel, and systems. (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report on the activities of al Qaeda and associated groups in Latin America and the Caribbean, including-- (1) an assessment of the extent to which such groups have established a presence in the area; (2) a description of the activities of such groups in the area, including fundraising, money laundering, narcotrafficking, and associations with criminal groups; (3) an assessment of the threat posed by such groups to the peace and stability of the nations in the area and to United States interests; and (4) a description of United States policies intended to deal with such a threat. (b) Form of Report.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) Authority.--Chapter 155 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Determination Required.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall determine the feasibility and advisability of dedicating an airlift capability of the Armed Forces to the support of homeland defense operations, including operations in support of contingent requirements for transportation of any of the following in response to a disaster: (A) Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. (B) National Guard Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High Explosive Enhanced Response Force Packages. (C) Air Force expeditionary medical teams. (D) Department of Energy emergency response teams. (2) In making the determination under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall take into consideration the results of the study required under subsection (b). (b) Requirement for Study and Plan.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study of the plans and capabilities of the Department of Defense for meeting contingent requirements for transporting teams and packages specified in subsection (a)(1) in response to disasters. (2) The Secretary shall prepare a plan for resolving any deficiencies in the plans and capabilities for meeting the transportation requirements described in paragraph (1). (3) The Secretary of Defense shall require the commander of the United States Northern Command and the commander of the United States Transportation Command to carry out jointly the study required under paragraph (1) and to prepare jointly the plan required under paragraph (2). (c) Report.--Not later than April 1, 2005, the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the results of the study under subsection (b). The report shall include the following matters: (1) The Secretary's determination under subsection (a). (2) An assessment and discussion of the adequacy of existing plans and capabilities of the Department of Defense for meeting the transportation requirements described in subsection (b)(1). (3) The plan required under subsection (b)(2). (d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team'' has the meaning given that term in section 305b(e) of title 37, United States Code. (a) Requirement for Implementation Plan.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a plan, for implementation by the Department of Defense, that sets forth a systematic approach for ensuring the survivability of defense critical systems upon contamination of any such system by chemical or biological agents. (b) Content.--At a minimum, the plan under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) Policies for ensuring that the survivability of defense critical systems in the event of contamination by chemical or biological agents is adequately addressed throughout the Department of Defense. (2) A systematic process for identifying those systems which are defense critical systems. (3) Specific testing procedures to be used during the design and development of new defense critical systems. (4) A centralized database that-- (A) contains comprehensive information on the effects of chemical and biological agents and decontaminants on materials used in defense critical systems; and (B) is easily accessible to personnel who have duties to ensure the survivability of defense critical systems upon contamination of such systems by chemical and biological agents. (c) Defense Critical System Defined.--In this section, the term ``defense critical system'' means a Department of Defense system that, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, is vital to an essential defense mission. Section 30305(b) of title 49, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (9) through (11) as paragraphs (10) through (12), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraph: ``(9) An individual who has or is seeking access to national security information for purposes of Executive Order No. 12968, or any successor Executive order, or an individual who is being investigated for Federal employment under authority of Executive Order No. 10450, or any successor Executive order, may request the chief driver licensing official of a State to provide information about the individual pursuant to subsection (a) of this section to a Federal department or agency that is authorized to investigate the individual for the purpose of assisting in the determination of the eligibility of the individual for access to national security information or for Federal employment in a position requiring access to national security information. A Federal department or agency that receives information about an individual under the preceding sentence may use such information only for purposes of the authorized investigation and only in accordance with applicable law.''. (a) Disqualified Persons.--Subsection (c)(1) of section 986 of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' and inserting ``, was''; and (2) by inserting before the period at the end the following: ``, and was incarcerated as a result of that sentence for not less than one year''. (b) Waiver Authority.--Subsection (d) of such section is amended to read as follows: ``(d) Waiver Authority.--In a meritorious case, an exception to the prohibition in subsection (a) may be authorized for a person described in paragraph (1) or (4) of subsection (c) if there are mitigating factors. Any such waiver may be authorized only in accordance with standards and procedures prescribed by, or under the authority of, an Executive order or other guidance issued by the President.''. (a) Authority for Use of Military Aircraft.--Section 3401 of title 39, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``title 49,'' and inserting ``title 49, or on military aircraft at rates not to exceed those so fixed and determined for scheduled United States air carriers,''; and (B) in the sentence following paragraph (3), by striking ``carriers'' each place it appears and inserting ``carriers and military aircraft''; and (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) in the first sentence, by striking ``title 49,'' and inserting ``title 49, or on military aircraft at rates not to exceed those so fixed and determined for scheduled United States air carriers,''; and (B) in the second sentence-- (i) by inserting ``and military aircraft'' after ``carriers'' the first place it appears; and (ii) by striking ``by air carriers other than scheduled United States air carriers'' and inserting ``by other than scheduled United States air carriers and military aircraft''. (b) Definition.--Such section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) In this section: ``(1) The term `military aircraft' means an aircraft owned, operated, or chartered by the Department of Defense. ``(2) The term `United States air carrier' has the meaning given the term `air carrier' in section 40102 of title 49.''. (a) Transfer of Certain Transportation Authorities.-- Sections 4744, 4745, 4746, and 4747 of title 10, United States Code, are transferred to chapter 157 of such title, inserted (in that order) at the end of such chapter, and redesignated as sections 2648, 2649, 2650, and 2651, respectively. (b) Clarification of Applicability of Transferred Authorities Throughout the Department of Defense.--(1) Section 2648 of such title, as transferred and redesignated by subsection (a), is amended-- (A) by striking ``Secretary of the Army'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``Secretary of Defense''; (B) by striking ``Army transport agencies'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and all that follows through ``military transport agency of''; (C) by striking paragraphs (1), (2), and (3); (D) by redesignating paragraph (4), (5), (6), and (7) as paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4), respectively; (E) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (5) and in that paragraph striking ``persons described in clauses (1), (2), (4), (5), and (7)'' and inserting ``members of the armed forces, officers and employees of the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard, and persons described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (4)''; and (F) by striking ``clause (7) or (8)'' in the last sentence and inserting ``paragraph (4) or (5)''. (2) Section 2649 of such title, as transferred and redesignated by subsection (a), is amended-- (A) by striking the section heading and inserting the following: (a) Evaluation Requirement.--The Secretary of Defense shall evaluate the procurement practices of the Department of Defense in the award of service contracts for domestic freight transportation for security-sensitive cargo (such as arms, ammunitions, explosives, and classified material) to determine whether such practices are in the best interests of the Department of Defense. (b) Report.--Not later than January 1, 2005, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the results of the evaluation conducted under subsection (a). Section 1588(d)(1)(B) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting before the period at the end the following: ``and the Act of March 9, 1920, commonly known as the `Suits in Admiralty Act' (41 Stat. 525; 46 U.S.C. App. 741 et seq.) and the Act of March 3, 1925, commonly known as the `Public Vessels Act' (43 Stat. 1112; 46 U.S.C. App. 781 et seq.) (relating to claims for damages or loss on navigable waters)''. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Department of Defense, since 1991, has relied on a policy of no media coverage of the transfers of the remains of deceased members of the Armed Forces-- (A) at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany; (B) at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, and the Port Mortuary Facility at Dover Air Force Base; and (C) at interim stops en route to the point of final destination in the transfer of the remains. (2) The principal focus and purpose of the policy is to protect the wishes and the privacy of families of deceased members of the Armed Forces during their time of great loss and grief and to give families and friends of the dead the privilege to decide whether to allow media coverage at the member's duty or home station, at the interment site, or at or in connection with funeral and memorial services. (3) In a 1991 legal challenge to the Department of Defense policy, as applied during Operation Desert Storm, the policy was upheld by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and on appeal, by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of JB Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Defense and Donald B. Rice, Secretary of the Air Force on the basis that denying the media the right to view the return of remains at Dover Air Force Base does not violate the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. (4) The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in that case cited the following two key Government interests that are served by the Department of Defense policy: (A) Reducing the hardship on the families and friends of the war dead, who may feel obligated to travel great distances to attend arrival ceremonies at Dover Air Force Base if such ceremonies were held. (B) Protecting the privacy of families and friends of the dead, who may not want media coverage of the unloading of caskets at Dover Air Force Base. (5) The Court also noted, in that case, that the bereaved may be upset at the public display of the caskets of their loved ones and that the policy gives the family the right to grant or deny access to the media at memorial or funeral services at the home base and that the policy is consistent in its concern for families. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Department of Defense policy regarding no media coverage of the transfer of the remains of deceased members of the Armed Forces-- (1) appropriately protects the privacy of the families and friends of the deceased; and (2) is consistent with United States constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. (a) Authority to Convey.--The Secretary of the Navy may convey, without consideration, to Lex Cralley of Princeton Minnesota (in this section referred to as ``transferee''), all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to a F3A-1 Brewster Corsair aircraft (Bureau Number 04634). The conveyance shall be made by means of a deed of gift. (b) Condition of Aircraft.--The aircraft shall be conveyed under subsection (a) in its current unflyable, ``as is'' condition. The Secretary is not required to repair or alter the condition of the aircraft before conveying ownership of the aircraft. (c) Conveyance at No Cost to the United States.--The conveyance of the aircraft under subsection (a) shall be made at no cost to the United States. Any costs associated with the conveyance and costs of operation and maintenance of the aircraft conveyed shall be borne by the transferee. (d) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may require such additional terms and conditions in connection with a conveyance under this section as the Secretary considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United States. (a) Clarification of Definition of ``Operational Range''.-- Section 101(e)(3) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ``Secretary of Defense'' and inserting ``Secretary of a military department''. (b) Amendments Relating to Definition of Congressional Defense Committees.--Title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows: (1) Section 2215 is amended-- (A) by striking ``(a) Certification Required.--''; (B) by striking ``congressional committees specified in subsection (b)'' and inserting ``congressional defense committees''; and (C) by striking subsection (b). (2) Section 2306b(g) is amended by striking ``Committee on'' the first place it appears and all that follows through ``House of Representatives'' and inserting ``congressional defense committees''. (3) Section 2515(d) is amended-- (A) by striking ``(1)'' before ``The Secretary''; (B) by striking ``congressional committees specified in paragraph (2)'' and inserting ``congressional defense committees''; and (C) by striking paragraph (2). (4) Section 2676(d) is amended by striking ``appropriate committees of Congress'' at the end of the first sentence and inserting ``congressional defense committees''. (c) Amendments Relating to Change of Name of GAO.--Title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows: (1) Section 1084 is amended by striking ``General Accounting Office'' and inserting ``Comptroller General''. (2) Section 1102(d)(2) is amended by striking ``General Accounting Office'' and inserting ``Comptroller General''. (3) Section 2014(g) is amended by striking ``General Accounting Office'' and inserting ``Government Accountability Office''. (d) Miscellaneous Amendments to Title 10, United States Code.--Title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows: (1) The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A, and at the beginning of part I of subtitle A, are amended by striking ``481'' in the item relating to chapter 23 and inserting ``480''. (2) Section 130a is amended-- (A) by striking ``Effective October 1, 2002, the'' in subsection (a) and inserting ``The''; (B) by striking ``baseline number'' in subsection (a) and all that follows through ``means the'' in subsection (c); (C) by transferring subsection (e) so as to appear before subsection (d) and redesignating that subsection as subsection (b); (D) by redesignating subsections (d) and (f) as subsection (c) and (d), respectively; and (E) by striking subsection (g). (3) Section 437(c) is amended by inserting ``(50 U.S.C. 415b)'' after ``National Security Act of 1947''. (4) Section 487(d) is amended by striking ``Other Definitions'' and inserting ``Inapplicability to Coast Guard''. (5) Section 503(c)(1)(B) is amended by striking ``education'' in the second sentence and inserting ``educational''. (6) Section 632(c)(1) is amended-- (A) by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and inserting ``paragraph (3)''; and (B) by striking ``under that paragraph'' and inserting ``under that subsection''. (7) The item relating to section 1076b in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 55 is amended to read as follows: The Secretary of Defense may not reduce or eliminate search and rescue capabilities at any military installation in the United States unless the Secretary first certifies to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives that equivalent search and rescue capabilities will be provided, without interruption and consistent with the policies and objectives set forth in the United States National Search and Rescue Plan entered into force on January 1, 1999, by-- (1) the Department of Interior, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Transportation, the Federal Communications Commission, or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; or (2) the Department of Defense, either directly or through a Department of Defense contract with an emergency medical service provider or other private entity to provide such (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The National Interagency Fire Center does not possess an adequate number of aircraft for use in aerial firefighting, and personnel at the Center rely on military aircraft to provide such firefighting services. (2) It is in the national security interest of the United States for the National Interagency Fire Center to acquire aircraft for use in aerial firefighting so that the military aircraft made available for aerial firefighting will instead be available for use by the Armed Forces. (b) Authority To Purchase Aerial Firefighting Equipment.-- (1) The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to purchase 10 aircraft, as described in paragraph (2), for the National Interagency Fire Center for use in aerial firefighting. (2) The aircraft referred to in paragraph (1) shall be aircraft that are-- (A) specifically designed and built for aerial firefighting; (B) certified by the Chief of the Forest Service as suited for conditions commonly experienced in aerial firefighting operations carried out in the United States, including Alaska; and (C) manufactured in a manner that is consistent with the recommendations for aircraft used in aerial firefighting contained in-- (i) the Blue Ribbon Panel Report to the Chief of the Forest Service and the Director of the Bureau of Land Management dated December 2002; and (ii) the Safety Recommendation of the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board related to aircraft used in aerial firefighting dated April 23, 2004. (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Agriculture for fiscal year 2005 such funds as may be necessary to purchase the 10 aircraft described in subsection (b). Section 502(a)(5)(C) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a(a)(5)(C)) is amended by inserting before the period the following: ``, which assurances-- ``(i) may employ statistical extrapolation using appropriate data from the Bureau of the Census or other appropriate Federal or State sources; and ``(ii) the Secretary shall consider as meeting the requirements of this subparagraph, unless the Secretary determines, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that the assurances do not meet the requirements''. Section 3267(1)(A) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(A) employed as-- ``(i) a civilian employee of-- Section 2340(3) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(3) `United States' means the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States.''. (a) In General.--Section 801(c) of the National Energy Conservation Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 8287(c)) is amended by striking ``2003'' and inserting ``2006''. (b) Payment of Costs.--Section 802 of the National Energy Conservation Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 8287a) is amended by inserting ``, water, or wastewater treatment'' after ``payment of energy''. (c) Energy Savings.--Section 804(2) of the National Energy Conservation Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 8287c(2)) is amended to read as follows: ``(2) The term `energy savings' means a reduction in the cost of energy, water, or wastewater treatment, from a base cost established through a methodology set forth in the contract, used in an existing federally owned building or buildings or other federally owned facilities as a result of-- ``(A) the lease or purchase of operating equipment, improvements, altered operation and maintenance, or technical services; ``(B) the increased efficient use of existing energy sources by cogeneration or heat recovery, excluding any cogeneration process for other than a federally owned building or buildings or other federally owned facilities; or ``(C) the increased efficient use of existing water sources in either interior or exterior applications.''. (d) Energy Savings Contract.--Section 804(3) of the National Energy Conservation Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 8287c(3)) is amended to read as follows: ``(3) The terms `energy savings contract' and `energy savings performance contract' mean a contract that provides for the performance of services for the design, acquisition, installation, testing, and, where appropriate, operation, maintenance, and repair, of an identified energy or water conservation measure or series of measures at 1 or more locations. Such contracts shall, with respect to an agency facility that is a public building (as such term is defined in section 3301 of title 40, United States Code), be in compliance with the prospectus requirements and procedures of section 3307 of title 40, United States Code.''. (e) Energy or Water Conservation Measure.--Section 804(4) of the National Energy Conservation Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 8287c(4)) is amended to read as follows: ``(4) The term `energy or water conservation measure' means-- ``(A) an energy conservation measure, as defined in section 551; or ``(B) a water conservation measure that improves the efficiency of water use, is life-cycle cost-effective, and involves water conservation, water recycling or reuse, more efficient treatment of wastewater or stormwater, improvements in operation or maintenance efficiencies, retrofit activities, or other related activities, not at a Federal hydroelectric facility.''. (f) Review.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall complete a review of the Energy Savings Performance Contract program to identify statutory, regulatory, and administrative obstacles that prevent Federal agencies from fully utilizing the program. In addition, this review shall identify all areas for increasing program flexibility and effectiveness, including audit and measurement verification requirements, accounting for energy use in determining savings, contracting requirements, including the identification of additional qualified contractors, and energy efficiency services covered. The Secretary shall report these findings to Congress and shall implement identified administrative and regulatory changes to increase program flexibility and effectiveness to the extent that such changes are consistent with statutory authority. (g) Extension of Authority.--Any energy savings performance contract entered into under section 801 of the National Energy Conservation Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 8287) after October 1, 2003, and before the date of enactment of this Act, shall be deemed to have been entered into pursuant to such section 801 as amended by subsection (a) of this section. (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that -- (1) the abuses inflicted upon detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, Iraq, are inconsistent with the professionalism, dedication, standards, and training required of individuals who serve in the United States Armed Forces; (2) the vast majority of members of the Armed Forces have upheld the highest possible standards of professionalism and morality in the face of illegal tactics and terrorist attacks and attempts on their lives; (3) the abuse of persons in United States custody in Iraq is appropriately condemned and deplored by the American people; (4) the Armed Forces are moving swiftly and decisively to identify, try, and, if found guilty, punish persons who perpetrated such abuse; (5) the Department of Defense and appropriate military authorities must continue to undertake corrective action, as appropriate, to address chain-of-command deficiencies and the systemic deficiencies identified in the incidents in question; (6) the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States and the applicable guidance and regulations of the United States Government prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of foreign prisoners held in custody by the United States; (7) the alleged crimes of a handful of individuals should not detract from the commendable sacrifices of over 300,000 members of the Armed Forces who have served, or who are serving, in Operation Iraqi Freedom; and (8) no detainee shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of United States. (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to-- (1) ensure that no detainee shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; (2) investigate and prosecute, as appropriate, all alleged instances of unlawful treatment of detainees in a manner consistent with the international obligations, laws, or policies of the United States; (3) ensure that all personnel of the United States Government understand their obligations in both wartime and peacetime to comply with the legal prohibitions against torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees in the custody of the United States; (4) ensure that, in a case in which there is doubt as to whether a detainee is entitled to prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions, such detainee receives the protections accorded to prisoners of war until the detainee's status is determined by a competent tribunal; and (5) expeditiously process and, if appropriate, prosecute detainees in the custody of the United States, including those in the custody of the United States Armed Forces at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (c) Detainees.--For purposes of this section, the term ``detainee'' means a person in the custody or under the physical control of the United States as a result of armed conflict. (a) Policies Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that policies are prescribed not later than 150 days after the date of the enactment of this Act regarding procedures for Department of Defense personnel and contractor personnel of the Department of Defense intended to ensure that members of the Armed Forces, and all persons acting on behalf of the Armed Forces or within facilities of the Armed Forces, treat persons detained by the United States Government in a humane manner consistent with the international obligations and laws of the United States and the policies set forth in section 1091(b). (b) Matters to Be Included.--In order to achieve the objective stated in subsection (a), the policies under that subsection shall specify, at a minimum, procedures for the following: (1) Ensuring that each commander of a Department of Defense detention facility or interrogation facility-- (A) provides all assigned personnel with training, and documented acknowledgment of receiving training, regarding the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions; and (B) establishes standard operating procedures for the treatment of detainees. (2) Ensuring that each Department of Defense contract in which contract personnel in the course of their duties interact with individuals detained by the Department of Defense on behalf of the United States Government include a requirement that such contract personnel have received training, and documented acknowledgment of receiving training, regarding the international obligations and laws of the United States applicable to the detention of personnel. (3) Providing all detainees with information, in their own language, of the applicable protections afforded under the Geneva Conventions. (4) Conducting periodic unannounced and announced inspections of detention facilities in order to provide continued oversight of interrogation and detention operations. (5) Ensuring that, to the maximum extent practicable, detainees and detention facility personnel of a different gender are not alone together. (c) Secretary of Defense Certification.--The Secretary of Defense shall certify that all Federal employees and civilian contractors engaged in the handling or interrogation of individuals detained by the Department of Defense on behalf of the United States Government have fulfilled an annual training requirement on the law of war, the Geneva Conventions, and the obligations of the United States under international law. (a) Transmission of Regulations, Etc.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which regulations, policies, and orders are first prescribed under section 1092(a), the Secretary of Defense shall transmit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives copies of such regulations, policies, or orders, together with a report on steps taken to the date of the report to implement section 1092. (b) One-Year Implementation Report.--Not later than one year after the date on which regulations, policies, and orders are first prescribed under section 1092(a), the Secretary shall submit to such committees a report on further steps taken to implement section 1092 to the date of such report. (c) Annual Report.--Nine months after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report for the preceding 12-months containing the following: (1) Notice of any investigation into any violation of international obligations or laws of the United States regarding the treatment of individuals detained by the United States Armed Forces or by a person providing services to the Department of Defense on a contractual basis, if the notice will not compromise any ongoing criminal or administrative investigation or prosecution. (2) General information on the foreign national detainees in the custody of the Department of Defense during the 12- month period covered by the report, including the following: (A) The best estimate of the Secretary of Defense of the total number of detainees in the custody of the Department as of the date of the report. (B) The best estimate of the Secretary of Defense of the total number of detainees released from the custody of the Department during the period covered by the report. (C) An aggregate summary of the number of persons detained as enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, and unlawful combatants, including information regarding the average length of detention for persons in each category. (D) An aggregate summary of the nationality of persons detained. (E) Aggregate information as to the transfer of detainees to the jurisdiction of other countries, and the countries to which transferred. (d) Classification of Reports.--Reports submitted under this section shall be submitted, to the extent practicable, in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex as necessary to protect the national security of the United States. (e) Termination.--The requirements of this section shall cease to be in effect on December 31, 2007. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The need to act in accord with one's conscience, risking one's career and even the esteem of one's colleagues by pursuing what is right is especially important today. (2) While the Department of Defense investigates the horrific abuses in American detention facilities in Iraq, the Nation should bear in mind that the abuses were only brought to light because of the courage of an American soldier. (3) By alerting his superiors to abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Army Specialist Joseph Darby demonstrated the courage to speak out and do what is right for his country. (4) Such an action is especially important in light of the many challenges facing the country. (5) Specialist Darby deserves the Nation's thanks for speaking up and for standing up for what is right. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the Secretary of Defense should make every protection available to Army Specialist Joseph Darby and others who demonstrate such courage; and (2) Specialist Darby should be commended appropriately by the Secretary of the Army. (a) Authority to Continue Benefit Coverage.--Section 8905a of title 5, United States Code is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``paragraph (1) or (2) of''; (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) in paragraph (2)(C), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) any employee who-- ``(A) is enrolled in a health benefits plan under this chapter; ``(B) is a member of a reserve component of the armed forces; ``(C) is called or ordered to active duty in support of a contingency operation (as defined in section 101(a)(13) of title 10); ``(D) is placed on leave without pay or separated from service to perform active duty; and ``(E) serves on active duty for a period of more than 30 consecutive days.''; and (4) in subsection (e)(1)-- (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' at the end; (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; or''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(C) in the case of an employee described in subsection (b)(3), the date which is 24 months after the employee is placed on leave without pay or separated from service to perform active duty.''. (b) Authority for Agencies To Pay Premiums.--Subparagraph (C) of section 8906(e)(3) of such title is amended by striking ``18 months'' and inserting ``24 months''. (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to Federal employees called or ordered to active duty on or after September 14, 2001. (a) Eligibility for Service Not Related to Contingency Operations.--Section 1596a(a)(2) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ``during a contingency operation supported by the armed forces''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment by this section shall take effect on the first day of the first month that begins after the date of the enactment of this Act. (a) Pay Rates.--Section 1602 of title 10, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``in relation to the rates of pay provided in subpart D of part III of title 5 for positions subject to that subpart which have corresponding levels of duties and responsibilities'' and inserting ``in relation to the rates of pay provided for comparable positions in the Department of Defense and subject to the same limitations on maximum rates of pay established for employees of the Department of Defense by law or regulation''; (2) by striking subsection (b); and (3) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (b). (b) Performance Appraisal System.--Section 1606 of such title is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d) Performance Appraisals.--(1) The Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service shall be subject to a performance appraisal system which, as designed and applied, is certified by the Secretary of Defense under section 5307 of title 5 as making meaningful distinctions based on relative performance. ``(2) The performance appraisal system applicable to the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service under paragraph (1) may be the same performance appraisal system that is established and implemented within the Department of Defense for members of the Senior Executive Service.''. (a) Authority.--Chapter 81 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1587 the following new section: (a) Requirement for Program.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a pilot program to provide financial assistance for education in science, mathematics, engineering, and technology skills and disciplines that, as determined by the Secretary, are critical to the national security functions of the Department of Defense and are needed in the Department of Defense workforce. (2) The pilot program under this section shall be carried out for three years beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Scholarships.--(1) Under the pilot program, the Secretary of Defense may award a scholarship in accordance with this section to a person who-- (A) is a citizen of the United States; (B) is pursuing an undergraduate or advanced degree in a critical skill or discipline described in subsection (a) at an institution of higher education; and (C) enters into a service agreement with the Secretary of Defense as described in subsection (c). (2) The amount of the financial assistance provided under a scholarship awarded to a person under this subsection shall be the amount determined by the Secretary of Defense as being necessary to pay all educational expenses incurred by that person, including tuition, fees, cost of books, laboratory expenses, and expenses of room and board. The expenses paid, however, shall be limited to those educational expenses normally incurred by students at the institution of higher education involved. (c) Service Agreement for Recipients of Assistance.--(1) To receive financial assistance under this section-- (A) in the case of an employee of the Department of Defense, the employee shall enter into a written agreement to continue in the employment of the department for the period of obligated service determined under paragraph (2); and (B) in the case of a person not an employee of the Department of Defense, the person shall enter into a written agreement to accept and continue employment in the Department of Defense for the period of obligated service determined under paragraph (2). (2) For the purposes of this subsection, the period of obligated service for a recipient of a scholarship under this section shall be the period determined by the Secretary of Defense as being appropriate to obtain adequate service in exchange for the financial assistance provided under the scholarship. In no event may the period of service required of a recipient be less than the total period of pursuit of a degree that is covered by the scholarship. The period of obligated service is in addition to any other period for which the recipient is obligated to serve in the civil service of the United States. (3) An agreement entered into under this subsection by a person pursuing an academic degree shall include any terms and conditions that the Secretary of Defense determines necessary to protect the interests of the United States or otherwise appropriate for carrying out this section. (d) Refund for Period of Unserved Obligated Service.--(1) A person who voluntarily terminates service before the end of the period of obligated service required under an agreement entered into under subsection (c) shall refund to the United States an amount determined by the Secretary of Defense as being appropriate to obtain adequate service in exchange for financial assistance. (2) An obligation to reimburse the United States imposed under paragraph (1) is for all purposes a debt owed to the United States. (3) The Secretary of Defense may waive, in whole or in part, a refund required under paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines that recovery would be against equity and good conscience or would be contrary to the best interests of the United States. (4) A discharge in bankruptcy under title 11, United States Code, that is entered less than five years after the termination of an agreement under this section does not discharge the person signing such agreement from a debt arising under such agreement or under this subsection. (e) Relationship to Other Programs.--The pilot program under this section is in addition to the authorities provided in chapter 111 of title 10, United States Code. The Secretary of Defense shall coordinate the provision of financial assistance under the authority of this section with the provision of financial assistance under the authorities provided in such chapter in order to maximize the benefits derived by the Department of Defense from the exercise of all such authorities. (f) Recommendation on Pilot Program.--Not later than February 1, 2007, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives a plan for expanding and improving the national defense science and engineering workforce educational assistance pilot program carried out under this section as appropriate to improve recruitment and retention to meet the requirements of the Department of Defense for its science and engineering workforce on a short-term basis and on a long-term basis. (g) Critical Hiring Need.--Section 3304(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following: ``(B)(i) the Office of Personnel Management has determined that there exists a severe shortage of candidates or there is a critical hiring need; or ``(ii) the candidate is a participant in the Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART) Defense Scholarship Pilot Program under section 1105 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.''. (h) Institution of Higher Education Defined.--In this section, the term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given such term in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (21 U.S.C. 1001). Not later than March 31, 2005, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, a plan for expanding and improving the national security foreign language workforce of the Department of Defense as appropriate to improve recruitment and retention to meet the requirements of the Department for its foreign language workforce on a short-term basis and on a long-term basis. (a) Plan Required.--The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall jointly develop a plan for the effective utilization of the personnel management authorities referred to in subsection (b) in order to increase the mission responsiveness, efficiency, and effectiveness of Department of Defense laboratories. (b) Covered Authorities.--The personnel management authorities referred to in this subsection are the personnel management authorities granted to the Secretary of Defense by the provisions of law as follows: (1) Section 342(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 2721), as amended by section 1114 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398 (114 Stat. 1654A- 315)). (2) Section 1101 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261; 5 U.S.C. 3104 note). (3) Section 9902(c) of title 5, United States Code. (4) Such other provisions of law as the Under Secretaries jointly consider appropriate for purposes of this section. (c) Plan Elements.--The plan under subsection (a) shall-- (1) include such elements as the Under Secretaries jointly consider appropriate to provide for the effective utilization of the personnel management authorities referred to in subsection (b) as described in subsection (a), including the recommendations of the Under Secretaries for such additional authorities, including authorities for demonstration programs or projects, as are necessary to achieve the effective utilization of such personnel management authorities; and (2) include procedures, including a schedule for review and decisions, on proposals to modify current demonstration programs or projects, or to initiate new demonstration programs or projects, on flexible personnel management at Department laboratories (d) Submittal to Congress.--The Under Secretaries shall jointly submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives the plan under subsection (a) not later than December 1, 2005. (a) Fiscal Year 2005 Authority.--During fiscal year 2005, from funds made available to the Department of Defense for operation and maintenance pursuant to title XV, not to exceed $300,000,000 may be used to provide funds-- (1) for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program, established by the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority for the purpose of enabling United States military commanders in Iraq to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people; and (2) for a similar program to assist the people of Afghanistan. (b) Quarterly Reports.--Not later than 15 days after the end of each fiscal-year quarter (beginning with the first quarter of fiscal year 2005), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report regarding the source of funds and the allocation and use of funds during that quarter that were made available pursuant to the authority provided in this section or under any other provision of law for the purposes stated in subsection (a). (c) Waiver Authority.--For purposes of the exercise of the authority provided by this section or any other provision of law making funding available for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program referred to in subsection (a) (including a program referred to in paragraph (2) of that subsection), the Secretary may waive any provision of law not contained in this section that would (but for the waiver) prohibit, restrict, limit, or otherwise constrain the exercise of that authority. (d) Review of Laws.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report identifying all provisions of law that (if not waived) would prohibit, restrict, limit, or otherwise constrain the exercise of the authority provided in this section or any other provision of law using funds available for the purposes stated in subsection (a). (a) Authority.--The Secretary of Defense may provide assistance under this section to Iraq and Afghanistan military and security forces. Such assistance shall be provided, subject to the provisions of this section, solely to enhance the ability of such forces to combat terrorism and support United States or coalition military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. (b) Type of Assistance.--Assistance provided under subsection (a) may include equipment, supplies, services, and training. (c) Limitations.--Assistance under this section or under any other provision of law for the purpose described in subsection (a) may be provided only from funds available to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2005 for operation and maintenance under title XV. The total amount of such assistance may not exceed $500,000,000. (d) Congressional Notification.--Before any provision of assistance under this section or any other provision of law for the purpose described in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a notification of the assistance proposed to be provided. Any such notification shall be submitted not less than 15 days before the provision of such assistance. (e) Military and Security Forces Defined.--For purposes of this section, the term ``military and security forces'' means national armies, national guard forces, border security forces, civil defense forces, infrastructure protection forces, and police. (a) Redesignation.--(1) Subsections (b) and (c)(1) of section 3001 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Public Law 108-106; 117 Stat. 1234; 5 U.S.C. App. 3 section 8G note) are each amended by striking ``Office of the Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority'' and inserting ``Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction''. (2) Subsection (c)(1) of such section is further amended by striking ``Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority'' and inserting ``Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (in this section referred to as the `Inspector General')''. (3)(A) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows: (a) Stabilization Strategy.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress an unclassified report (with classified annex, if necessary) on the strategy of the United States and coalition forces for stabilizing Iraq. The report shall contain a detailed explanation of the strategy, together with the following: (1) A description of the efforts of the President to work with the United Nations to provide support for, and assistance to, the transitional government in Iraq and, in particular, the efforts of the President to negotiate and secure adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 1546. (2) A description of the efforts of the President to continue to work with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states and non-NATO member states to provide support for and augment coalition forces, including-- (A) the current military forces of coalition countries deployed to Iraq; (B) the current police forces of coalition countries deployed to Iraq; (C) the current financial resources of coalition countries pledged and provided for the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq; and (D) a list of countries that have pledged to deploy military or police forces, including the schedule and level of such deployments. (3) The strategic plan referred to in subsection (b) relating to Iraqi security forces. (4) A description of the efforts of the United States and coalition forces to assist in the reconstruction of essential infrastructure of Iraq, including the oil industry, electricity generation, roads, schools, and hospitals. (5) A description of the efforts of the United States, coalition partners, and relevant international agencies to assist in the development of political institutions and prepare for democratic elections in Iraq. (6) A description of the obstacles, including financial, technical, logistic, personnel, political, and other obstacles, faced by NATO in generating and deploying military forces out of theater to locations such as Iraq. (b) Iraqi Security Forces.--The President shall include in the report under subsection (a) a strategic plan setting forth the manner in which the coaltion will achieve the goal of establishing viable and professional Iraqi security forces able to provide for the long-term security of the Iraqi people. That strategic plan shall include at least the following: (1) Recruiting and retention goals, shown for each service of the Iraqi security forces. (2) Training plans for each service of the Iraqi security forces. (3) A description of metrics by which progress toward the goal of Iraqi provision for its own security can be measured. (4) A description of equipment needs, shown for each service of the Iraqi security forces. (5) A resourcing plan for achieving the goals of the strategic plan. (6) Personnel plans in terms of United States military and contractor personnel to be used in training each such service. (7) A description of challenges faced and opportunities presented in particular regions of Iraq and a plan for addressing those challenges. (8) A discussion of training and deployment successes and failures to the date of the report and how lessons from those successes and failures will be incorporated into the strategic plan. (c) Quarterly Reports.--Not later than 30 days after the end of each quarter of calendar year 2005, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress a report on the actions taken under the strategic plan set forth pursuant to subsection (b) since the date of the enactment of this Act. Each such report shall be prepared in conjunction with the Secretary of State. (a) Guidance.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall issue guidance on how the Department of Defense shall manage contractor personnel who support deployed forces and shall direct the Secretaries of the military departments to develop procedures to ensure implementation of that guidance. The guidance shall-- (1) establish policies for the use of contractors to support deployed forces; (2) delineate the roles and responsibilities of commanders regarding the management and oversight of contractor personnel who support deployed forces; and (3) integrate into a single document other guidance and doctrine that may affect Department of Defense responsibilities to contractors in locations where members of the Armed Forces are deployed. (b) Issues to be Addressed.--The guidance issued under subsection (a) shall address at least the following matters: (1) Warning contractor security personnel of potentially hazardous situations. (2) Coordinating the movement of contractor security personnel, especially through areas of increased risk or planned or ongoing military operations. (3) Rapidly identifying contractor security personnel by members of the Armed Forces. (4) Sharing relevant threat information with contractor security personnel and receiving information gathered by contractor security personnel for use by United States and coalition forces. (5) Providing appropriate assistance to contractor personnel who become engaged in hostile situations. (6) Providing medical assistance for, and evacuation of, contractor personnel who become casualties as a result of enemy actions. (7) Investigating background and qualifications of contractor security personnel and organizations. (8) Establishing rules of engagement for armed contractor security personnel, and ensuring proper training and compliance with the rules of engagement. (9) Establishing categories of security, intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice functions that are-- (A) inherently governmental functions under Subpart 7.5 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation; or (B) although not inherently governmental functions, should not ordinarily be performed by contractors in areas of operations. (10) Establishing procedures for making and documenting determinations about which security, intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice functions will be performed by military personnel and which will be performed by private companies. (c) Report.--Not later than 30 days after issuing the guidance required under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report on the guidance issued under subsection (a). (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on contractors supporting deployed forces and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. (b) Matters To Be Included.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following matters with respect to contractors, and employees of contractors, described in subsection (a): (1) A description of the overall chain of command and oversight mechanisms that are in place to ensure adequate command and supervision of such contractor employees in critical security roles. (2) A description of sanctions that are available to be imposed on such a contractor employee who-- (A) fails to comply with a requirement of law or regulation that applies to such employee; or (B) engages in other misconduct. (3) A description of disciplinary and criminal actions brought against contractor employees during the period beginning on May 1, 2003, and ending on the date of the enactment of this Act. (4) An explanation of the legal status of contractor employees engaged in the performance of security functions in Iraq after the transfer of sovereign power to Iraq on June 28, 2004. (5) A specification of casualty and fatality figures for contractor employees supporting deployed forces and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, shown, to the extent practicable, in the following categories: (A) Total casualties and total fatalities. (B) Casualties and fatalities among-- (i) nationals of the United States; (ii) nationals of Iraq; and (iii) nationals of states other than the United States and Iraq. (6) A description, to the maximum extent practicable, of incidents in which contractor employees supporting deployed forces and reconstruction efforts in Iraq have been engaged in hostile fire or other incidents of note during the period beginning on May 1, 2003, and ending on the date of the enactment of this Act. (c) Plans.--The Secretary shall include with the report under subsection (a) the following plans: (1) A plan for establishing and implementing a process for collecting data on individual contractors, the value of the contracts, the number of casualties incurred, and the number of personnel in Iraq performing the following services for the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies: (A) Personal security details. (B) Nonmilitary site security. (C) Nonmilitary convoy security. (D) Interrogation services at interrogation centers operated by the Department of Defense. (2) A plan for ensuring that military commanders in the theater of operations have accurate information on the number, types, and sources of weapons and other critical equipment (such as body armor, armored vehicles, secure communications and friend-foe identification) that contractor personnel performing services specified in paragraph (1) are authorized to possess. (d) Coordination.--In the preparation of the report under this section (including the plans under subsection (c)), the Secretary of Defense shall coordinate, as appropriate, with the head of any Federal agency that is involved in the procurement of services from contractors supporting deployed forces and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The head of any such agency shall provide to the Secretary of Defense such information as the Secretary may require about such contractors to complete the report. (a) Access to Documents.--It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should seek to conclude a memorandum of understanding with the Interim Government of Iraq to ensure that the United States will have access to all documents in the possession of that Government related to the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program. (b) Information From the United Nations.--(1) The Secretary of State shall use the voice and vote of the United States in the United Nations to urge the Secretary General of the United Nations to provide to the United States copies of all audits and core documents related to the United Nations Oil- for-Food Program, including all audits, examinations, studies, reviews, or similar documents prepared by the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services and all responses to such documents. (2) It is the sense of Congress that, pursuant to section 941(b)(6) of the United Nations Reform Act of 1999 (title IX of division A of H.R. 3427 of the 106th Congress, as enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113; 113 Stat. 1501A-483), the Comptroller General should have full and complete access to financial information relating to the United Nations, including information related to the financial transactions, organization, and activities of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program. (3) The Secretary of State shall facilitate access by the Comptroller General to the financial information described in paragraph (2). (c) Cooperation in Investigations.--The head of any Executive agency (including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) shall, upon a request in connection with an investigation of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program made by a committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or House of Representatives, promptly provide to the chairman of that committee-- (1) access to any information or document described in subsection (a) or (b) that is under the control of such agency and responsive to the request; and (2) cooperation in gaining access to information and documents described in subsections (a) and (b) that are not under the control of such agency, as appropriate. (d) Review of Oil-for-Food Program by Comptroller General.--(1) The Comptroller General shall conduct a review of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program, including the role of the United States in that program. The review-- (A) in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, should not interfere with any ongoing criminal investigation or inquiry related to that program; and (B) may take into account the results of any investigation or inquiry related to that program. (2) The head of each Executive agency shall fully cooperate with the review of the Comptroller General under paragraph (1). (e) Executive Agency Defined.--In this section, the term ``Executive agency'' has the meaning given that term in section 105 of title 5, United States Code. (a) Authority.--The Secretary of Defense may expend up to $25,000,000 during any fiscal year during which this subsection is in effect to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by United States special operations forces to combat terrorism. (b) Procedures.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish procedures for the exercise of the authority under subsection (a). The Secretary shall notify the congressional defense committees of those procedures before any exercise of that authority. (c) Notification.--Upon using the authority provided in subsection (a) to make funds available for support of an approved military operation, the Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees expeditiously, and in any event in not less than 48 hours, of the use of such authority with respect to that operation. Such a notification need be provided only once with respect to any such operation. Any such notification shall be in writing. (d) Limitation on Delegation.--The authority of the Secretary of Defense to make funds available under subsection (a) for support of a military operation may not be delegated. (e) Intelligence Activities.--This section does not constitute authority to conduct a covert action, as such term is defined in section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(e)). (f) Annual Report.--Not later than 30 days after the close of each fiscal year during which subsection (a) is in effect, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on support provided under that subsection during that fiscal year. Each such report shall describe the support provided, including a statement of the recipient of the support and the amount obligated to provide the support. (g) Fiscal Year 2005 Limitation.--Support may be provided under subsection (a) during fiscal year 2005 only from funds made available for operations and maintenance pursuant to title XV of this Act. (h) Period of Authority.--The authority under subsection (a) is in effect during each of fiscal years 2005 through 2007. (a) International Security Program to Prevent Unauthorized Transfer and Transportation of WMDs.--Subsection (b) of section 1424 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2333) is amended to read as follows: ``(b) Other Countries.--The Secretary of Defense may carry out programs under subsection (a) in a country other than a country specified in that subsection if the Secretary determines that there exists in that country a significant threat of the unauthorized transfer and transportation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or related materials.''. (b) International Training Program to Deter WMD Proliferation.--Section 1504(e)(3)(A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 2918) is amended-- (1) by striking ``The training program referred to in paragraph (1)(B) is a'' and inserting `The Secretary of Defense may participate in a''; (2) by inserting ``of'' after ``acquisition''; (3) by striking ``and'' after ``countries,''; and (4) by inserting before the period at the end the following: ``, and in other countries in which, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, there exists a significant threat of such proliferation and acquisition''. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) Certain countries are seeking to acquire ballistic missiles and related technologies that could be used to attack the United States or place at risk United States interests, deployed members of the Armed Forces, and allies of the United States and other friendly foreign countries. (2) Certain countries continue to actively transfer or sell ballistic missile technologies in contravention of standards of behavior established by the United States and allies of the United States and other friendly foreign countries. (3) The spread of ballistic missiles and related technologies worldwide has been slowed by a combination of national and international export controls, forward-looking diplomacy, and multilateral interdiction activities to restrict the development and transfer of such missiles and technologies. (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to develop, support, and strengthen international accords and other cooperative efforts to curtail the proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technologies which could threaten the territory of the United States, allies of the United States and other friendly foreign countries, and deployed members of the Armed Forces of the United States with weapons of mass destruction. (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the United States should vigorously pursue foreign policy initiatives aimed at eliminating, reducing, or retarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technologies; and (2) the United States and the international community should continue to support and strengthen established international accords and other cooperative efforts, including United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (April 28, 2004) and the Missile Technology Control Regime, that are designed to eliminate, reduce, or retard the proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technologies. (a) Commendation of President.--Congress commends the President for the steps taken at the G-8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, on June 8-10, 2004-- (1) to demonstrate continued support for the Global Partnership against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; and (2) to expand the Partnership (A) by welcoming new members, and (B) by using the Partnership to coordinate nonproliferation projects in Libya, Iraq, and other countries. (b) Future Actions.--It is the sense of Congress that the President should seek to-- (1) expand the membership of donor nations to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; (2) ensure that the Russian Federation remains the primary focus of the Partnership, but also seek to fund, through the Partnership, efforts in other countries that need assistance to secure or dismantle their own potentially vulnerable weapons or materials; (3) develop for the Partnership clear program goals; (4) develop for the Partnership transparent project prioritization and planning; (5) develop for the Partnership project implementation milestones under periodic review; (6) develop under the Partnership agreements between partners for project implementation; and (7) give high priority and senior-level attention to resolving disagreements on site access and worker liability under the Partnership. Not later than November 1, 2005, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on collaborative measures between the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce the risks of a launch of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile as a result of accident, misinformation, miscalculation, or unauthorized use. The report shall provide-- (1) a description and assessment of the collaborative measures that are currently in effect; (2) a description and assessment of other collaborative measures that could be pursued in the future; (3) an assessment of the potential contributions of such collaborative measures to the national security of the United States; (4) an assessment of the effect of such collaborative measures on relations between the United States and the Russian Federation; (5) a description of the obstacles and opportunities associated with pursuing such collaborative measures; and (6) an assessment of the future of the Joint Data Exchange Center. (a) Extension of Authority.--Subsection (e)(5) of section 401 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``and other explosive remnants of war'' after ``landmines'' both places it appears. (b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(4)(A), by inserting ``or other explosive remnants of war'' after ``landmines''; and (2) in subsection (c)(2)(B), by striking ``landmine clearing equipment or supplies'' and inserting ``equipment or supplies for clearing landmines or other explosive remnants of war''. Section 1237(b)(4)(B)(i) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``, or affiliated with,'' after ``or controlled by''; and (2) by inserting after ``the People's Liberation Army'' the following: ``or a ministry of the government of the People's Republic of China or that is owned or controlled by an entity affiliated with the defense industrial base of the People's Republic of China''. (a) In General.--Chapter 631 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Availability of Funds.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 301(5) for operation and maintenance, defense-wide activities, and available for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for the Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF), $4,000,000 may be available only in fiscal year 2005 for the participation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members set forth in subsection (b) in the exercises and programs of the Partnership for Peace program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (b) NATO Members.--The North Atlantic Treaty Organization members set forth in this subsection are as follows: (1) Bulgaria. (2) Estonia. (3) Latvia. (4) Lithuania. (5) Romania. (6) Slovakia. (7) Slovenia. (a) Policy.--It is the policy of Congress that bilateral exchanges and trade in defense articles and defense services between the United States and the United Kingdom and Australia are in the national security interest of the United States and that such exchanges and trade should be subjected to accelerated review and processing consistent with national security and the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). (b) Requirement.--The Secretary of State shall ensure that any license application submitted for the export of defense articles or defense services to Australia or the United Kingdom is expeditiously processed by the Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Defense, without referral to any other Federal department or agency, except where the item is classified or exceptional circumstances apply. (c) Regulations.--The President shall ensure that regulations are prescribed to implement this section. (a) Requirement for Study.--The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall carry out a study to determine the advisability of authorizing or requiring-- (1) the Secretary of State to establish procedures for considering technical assistance agreements and related amendments and munitions license applications for the export of defense items related to missile defense not later than 30 days after receiving such agreements, amendments, and munitions license applications, except in cases in which the Secretary of State determines that additional time is required to complete a review of a technical assistance agreement or related amendment or a munitions license application for foreign policy or national security reasons, including concerns regarding the proliferation of ballistic missile technology; and (2) the Secretary of Defense to establish procedures to increase the efficiency and transparency of the practices used by the Department of Defense to review technical assistance agreements and related amendments and munitions license applications related to international cooperation on missile defense that are referred to the Department. (b) Feasibility of Requiring Comprehensive Authorizations for Missile Defense.--In carrying out the study under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall examine the feasibility of providing major project authorizations for programs related to missile defense similar to the comprehensive export authorization specified in section 126.14 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (section 126.14 of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations). (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, submit to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives a report on the results of the study under subsection (a). The report shall include-- (1) the determinations resulting from the study, including a determination on the feasibility of providing the major project authorization for projects related to missile defense described in subsection (b); and (2) a discussion of the justification for each such determination. (d) Definition of Defense Items.--In this section, the term ``defense items'' has the meaning given that term in section 38(j)(4)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(j)(4)(A)).", u"``Budget treatment of costs of acquisition of major systems by the ``Sec. 506A. (a) Independent Cost Estimates.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of each element of the intelligence community concerned, prepare an independent cost estimate of the full life-cycle cost of development, procurement, and operation of each major system to be acquired by the intelligence community. ``(2) Each independent cost estimate for a major system shall, to the maximum extent practicable, specify the amount required to be appropriated and obligated to develop, procure, and operate the major system in each fiscal year of the proposed period of development, procurement, and operation of the major system. ``(3)(A) In the case of a program of the intelligence community that qualifies as a major system, an independent cost estimate shall be prepared before the submission to Congress of the budget of the President for the first fiscal year in which appropriated funds are anticipated to be obligated for the development or procurement of such major system. ``(B) In the case of a program of the intelligence community for which an independent cost estimate was not previously required to be prepared under this section, including a program for which development or procurement commenced before the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, if the aggregate future costs of development or procurement (or any combination of such activities) of the program will exceed $500,000,000 (in current fiscal year dollars), the program shall qualify as a major system for purposes of this section, and an independent cost estimate for such major system shall be prepared before the submission to Congress of the budget of the President for the first fiscal year thereafter in which appropriated funds are anticipated to be obligated for such major system. ``(4) The independent cost estimate for a major system shall be updated upon-- ``(A) the completion of any preliminary design review associated with the major system; ``(B) any significant modification to the anticipated design of the major system; or ``(C) any change in circumstances that renders the current independent cost estimate for the major system inaccurate. ``(5) Any update of an independent cost estimate for a major system under paragraph (4) shall meet all requirements for independent cost estimates under this section, and shall be treated as the most current independent cost estimate for the major system until further updated under that paragraph. ``(b) Preparation of Independent Cost Estimates.--(1) The Director shall establish within the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management an office which shall be responsible for preparing independent cost estimates, and any updates thereof, under subsection (a), unless a designation is made under paragraph (2). ``(2) In the case of the acquisition of a major system for an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense, the Director and the Secretary of Defense shall provide that the independent cost estimate, and any updates thereof, under subsection (a) be prepared by an entity jointly designated by the Director and the Secretary in accordance with section 2434(b)(1)(A) of title 10, United States Code. ``(c) Utilization in Budgets of President.--(1) If the budget of the President requests appropriations for any fiscal year for the development or procurement of a major system by the intelligence community, the President shall, subject to paragraph (2), request in such budget an amount of appropriations for the development or procurement, as the case may be, of the major system that is equivalent to the amount of appropriations identified in the most current independent cost estimate for the major system for obligation for each fiscal year for which appropriations are requested for the major system in such budget. ``(2) If the amount of appropriations requested in the budget of the President for the development or procurement of a major system is less than the amount of appropriations identified in the most current independent cost estimate for the major system for obligation for each fiscal year for which appropriations are requested for the major system in such budget, the President shall include in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of such budget-- ``(A) an explanation for the difference between the amount of appropriations requested and the amount of appropriations identified in the most current independent cost estimate; ``(B) a description of the importance of the major system to the national security; ``(C) an assessment of the consequences for the funding of all programs of the National Foreign Intelligence Program in future fiscal years if the most current independent cost estimate for the major system is accurate and additional appropriations are required in future fiscal years to ensure the continued development or procurement of the major system, including the consequences of such funding shortfalls on the major system and all other programs of the National Foreign Intelligence Program; and ``(D) such other information on the funding of the major system as the President considers appropriate. ``(d) Inclusion of Estimates in Budget Justification Materials.--The budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the budget of the President shall include the most current independent cost estimate under this section for each major system for which appropriations are requested in such budget for any fiscal year. ``(e) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) The term `budget of the President' means the budget of the President for a fiscal year as submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code. ``(2) The term `independent cost estimate' means a pragmatic and neutral analysis, assessment, and quantification of all costs and risks associated with the acquisition of a major system, which shall be based on programmatic and technical specifications provided by the office within the element of the intelligence community with primary responsibility for the development, procurement, or operation of the major system. ``(3) The term `major system' means any significant program of an element of the intelligence community with projected total development and procurement costs exceeding $500,000,000 (in current fiscal year dollars), which costs shall include all end-to-end program costs, including costs associated with the development and procurement of the program and any other costs associated with the development and procurement of systems required to support or utilize the program.''. (2) The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506 the following new item: (a) Modification.--Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is repealed. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for that Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 905. (a) Increase of Thresholds for Notice.--Subsection (a) of section 602 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 U.S.C. 403- 2b(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``$750,000'' each place it appears and inserting ``$5,000,000''; and (2) by striking ``$500,000'' each place it appears and inserting ``$1,000,000''. (b) Notice and Wait Requirements for Emergency Projects.-- Subsection (b)(2) of that section is amended-- (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as clauses (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively; (2) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2) Report.--''; (3) by striking ``21-day period'' and inserting ``7-day period''; and (4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), a project referred to in paragraph (1) may begin on the date the notification is received by the appropriate committees of Congress under that paragraph if the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine that-- ``(i) an emergency exists with respect to the national security or the protection of health, safety, or environmental quality; and ``(ii) any delay in the commencement of the project would harm any or all of those interests.''. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking ``September 1, 2003'' and inserting ``September 1, 2004''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. (a) Training Program for State and Local Officials.-- Section 892(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 482) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3)(A) The Secretary shall establish a program to provide appropriate training to officials described in subparagraph (B) in order to assist such officials in-- ``(i) identifying sources of potential terrorist threats through such methods as the Secretary determines appropriate; ``(ii) reporting information relating to such potential terrorist threats to the appropriate Federal agencies in the appropriate form and manner; ``(iii) assuring that all reported information is systematically submitted to and passed on by the Department for use by appropriate Federal agencies; and ``(iv) understanding the mission and roles of the intelligence community to promote more effective information sharing among Federal, State, and local officials and representatives of the private sector to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States. ``(B) The officials referred to in subparagraph (A) are officials of State and local government agencies and representatives of private sector entities with responsibilities relating to the oversight and management of first responders, counterterrorism activities, or critical infrastructure. ``(C) The Secretary shall consult with the Attorney General to ensure that the training program established in subparagraph (A) does not duplicate the training program established in section 908 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56; 28 U.S.C. 509 note). ``(D) The Secretary shall carry out this paragraph in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General.''. (b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to Congress a report that describes the Secretary's plan for implementing section 892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and includes an estimated date of completion of the implementation. (a) In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, carry out a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of permitting intelligence analysts of various elements of the intelligence community to access and analyze intelligence from the databases of other elements of the intelligence community in order to achieve the objectives set forth in subsection (c). (b) Covered Intelligence.--The intelligence to be analyzed under the pilot program under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) Signals intelligence of the National Security Agency. (2) Such intelligence of other elements of the intelligence community as the Director shall select for purposes of the pilot program. (c) Objectives.--The objectives set forth in this subsection are as follows: (1) To enhance the capacity of the intelligence community to undertake ``all source fusion'' analysis in support of the intelligence and intelligence-related missions of the intelligence community. (2) To reduce, to the extent possible, the amount of intelligence collected by the intelligence community that is not assessed, or reviewed, by intelligence analysts. (3) To reduce the burdens imposed on analytical personnel of the elements of the intelligence community by current practices regarding the sharing of intelligence among elements of the intelligence community. (d) Commencement.--The Director shall commence the pilot program under subsection (a) not later than December 31, 2003. (e) Various Mechanisms Required.--In carrying out the pilot program under subsection (a), the Director shall develop and utilize various mechanisms to facilitate the access to, and the analysis of, intelligence in the databases of the intelligence community by intelligence analysts of other elements of the intelligence community, including the use of so-called ``detailees in place''. (f) Security.--(1) In carrying out the pilot program under subsection (a), the Director shall take appropriate actions to protect against the disclosure and unauthorized use of intelligence in the databases of the elements of the intelligence community which may endanger sources and methods which (as determined by the Director) warrant protection. (2) The actions taken under paragraph (1) shall include the provision of training on the accessing and handling of information in the databases of various elements of the intelligence community and the establishment of limitations on access to information in such databases regarding United States persons. (g) Assessment.--Not later than February 1, 2004, after the commencement under subsection (d) of the pilot program under subsection (a), the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production shall jointly carry out an assessment of the progress of the pilot program in meeting the objectives set forth in subsection (c). (h) Report.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the assessment carried out under subsection (g). (2) The report shall include-- (A) a description of the pilot program under subsection (a); (B) the findings of the Under Secretary and Assistant Director as a result of the assessment; (C) any recommendations regarding the pilot program that the Under Secretary and the Assistant Director jointly consider appropriate in light of the assessment; and (D) any recommendations that the Director and Secretary consider appropriate for purposes of the report. (i) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (a) Pilot Program.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out a pilot program to ensure that selected students or former students are provided funds to continue academic training, or are reimbursed for academic training previously obtained, in areas of specialization that the Director, in consultation with the other heads of the elements of the intelligence community, identifies as areas in which the current analytic capabilities of the intelligence community are deficient or in which future analytic capabilities of the intelligence community are likely to be deficient. (2) A student or former student selected for participation in the pilot program shall commit to employment with an element of the intelligence community, following completion of appropriate academic training, under such terms and conditions as the Director considers appropriate. (3) The pilot program shall be known as the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program. (b) Elements.--In carrying out the pilot program under subsection (a), the Director shall-- (1) establish such requirements relating to the academic training of participants as the Director considers appropriate to ensure that participants are prepared for employment as intelligence analysts; and (2) periodically review the areas of specialization of the elements of the intelligence community to determine the areas in which such elements are, or are likely to be, deficient in analytic capabilities. (c) Duration.--The Director shall carry out the pilot program under subsection (a) during fiscal years 2004 through 2006. (d) Limitation on Number of Members During Fiscal Year 2004.--The total number of individuals participating in the pilot program under subsection (a) during fiscal year 2004 may not exceed 150 students. (e) Responsibility.--The Director shall carry out the pilot program under subsection (a) through the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. (f) Reports.--(1) Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to Congress a preliminary report on the pilot program under subsection (a), including a description of the pilot program and the authorities to be utilized in carrying out the pilot program. (2) Not later than one year after the commencement of the pilot program, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the pilot program. The report shall include-- (A) a description of the activities under the pilot program, including the number of individuals who participated in the pilot program and the training provided such individuals under the pilot program; (B) an assessment of the effectiveness of the pilot program in meeting the purpose of the pilot program; and (C) any recommendations for additional legislative or administrative action that the Director considers appropriate in light of the pilot program. (g) Funding.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act, $4,000,000 shall be available until expended to carry out this section. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) It is the recommendation of the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, that the Intelligence Community should enhance recruitment of a more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce and devise a strategy to capitalize upon the unique cultural and linguistic capabilities of first generation Americans. (2) The Intelligence Community could greatly benefit from an increased number of employees who are proficient in foreign languages and knowledgeable of world cultures, especially in foreign languages that are critical to the national security interests of the United States. Particular emphasis should be given to the recruitment of United States citizens whose linguistic capabilities are acutely required for the improvement of the overall intelligence collection and analysis effort of the United States Government. (3) The Intelligence Community has a significantly lower percentage of women and minorities than the total workforce of the Federal government and the total civilian labor force. (4) Women and minorities continue to be under-represented in senior grade levels, and in core mission areas, of the intelligence community. (b) Pilot Project To Promote Equality of Employment Opportunities for Women and Minorities Throughout the Intelligence Community Using Innovative Methodologies.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out a pilot project under this section to test and evaluate alternative, innovative methods to promote equality of employment opportunities in the intelligence community for women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, skills, language proficiency, and expertise. (c) Methods.--In carrying out the pilot project, the Director shall employ methods to increase diversity of officers and employees in the intelligence community. (d) Duration of Project.--The Director shall carry out the project under this section for a 3-year period. (e) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date the Director implements the pilot project under this section, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the project. The report shall include-- (1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and (2) recommendations on the continuation of the project, as well recommendations as for improving the effectiveness of the project in meeting the goals of promoting equality of employment opportunities in the intelligence community for women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, skills, language proficiency, and expertise. (f) Diversity Plan.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report which describes the plan of the Director, entitled the ``DCI Diversity Strategic Plan'', and any subsequent revision to that plan, to increase diversity of officers and employees in the intelligence community, including the short- and long-term goals of the plan. The report shall also provide a detailed description of the progress that has been made by each element of the intelligence community in implementing the plan. (2) In implementing the plan, the Director shall incorporate innovative methods for recruitment and hiring that the Director has determined to be effective from the pilot project carried out under this section. (g) Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4)). It is the sense of Congress that the elements of the intelligence community should, in the course of their civilian recruitment efforts in the United States, endeavor to recruit as personnel of the intelligence community citizens and, as appropriate, nationals of the United States who are members of the Armed Forces who participated in Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other campaigns undertaken abroad upon the separation, discharge, or release of such individuals from the Armed Forces. The President may establish an External Collection Capabilities and Requirements Review Panel as specified in the classified annex to this Act. Subtitle C--Counterintelligence (a) In General.--(1) Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: (a) Report Required.--The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the risks to the national security of the United States of the current computer security practices of the elements of the intelligence community and of the Department of Defense. (b) Assessments.--The report under subsection (a) shall include an assessment of the following: (1) The vulnerability of the computers and computer systems of the elements of the intelligence community, and of the Department of Defense, to various threats from foreign governments, international terrorist organizations, and organized crime, including information warfare (IW), Information Operations (IO), Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), and Computer Network Attack (CNA). (2) The risks of providing users of local area networks (LANs) or wide-area networks (WANs) of computers that include classified information with capabilities for electronic mail, upload and download, or removable storage media without also deploying comprehensive computer firewalls, accountability procedures, or other appropriate security controls. (3) Any other matters that the Director and the Secretary jointly consider appropriate for purposes of the report. (c) Information on Access to Networks.--The report under subsection (a) shall also include information as follows: (1) An estimate of the number of access points on each classified computer or computer system of an element of the intelligence community or the Department of Defense that permit unsupervised uploading or downloading of classified information, set forth by level of classification. (2) An estimate of the number of individuals utilizing such computers or computer systems who have access to input-output devices on such computers or computer systems. (3) A description of the policies and procedures governing the security of the access points referred to in paragraph (1), and an assessment of the adequacy of such policies and procedures. (4) An assessment of the viability of utilizing other technologies (including so-called ``thin client servers'') to achieve enhanced security of such computers and computer systems through more rigorous control of access to such computers and computer systems. (d) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall also include such recommendations for modifications or improvements of the current computer security practices of the elements of the intelligence community, and of the Department of Defense, as the Director and the Secretary jointly consider appropriate as a result of the assessments under subsection (b) and the information under subsection (c). (e) Submittal Date.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than February 15, 2004. (f) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, at the election of the Director. (g) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (2) The term ``elements of the intelligence community'' means the elements of the intelligence community set forth in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (a) Report Required.--The Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies (as determined by the President) shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the utility and effectiveness of the current security background investigations and security clearance procedures of the Federal Government in meeting the purposes of such investigations and procedures. (b) Particular Report Matters.--The report shall address in particular the following: (1) A comparison of the costs and benefits of conducting background investigations for Secret clearance with the costs and benefits of conducting full field background investigations. (2) The standards governing the revocation of security clearances. (c) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall include such recommendations for modifications or improvements of the current security background investigations or security clearance procedures of the Federal Government as are considered appropriate as a result of the preparation of the report under that subsection. (d) Submittal Date.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than February 15, 2004. (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (a) Report Required.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on means of improving the detail or transfer of civilian intelligence personnel between and among the various elements of the intelligence community for the purpose of enhancing the flexibility and effectiveness of the intelligence community in responding to changes in requirements for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. (b) Report Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall-- (1) set forth a variety of proposals on means of improving the detail or transfer of civilian intelligence personnel as described in that subsection; (2) identify the proposal or proposals determined by the heads of the elements of the intelligence community most likely to meet the purpose described in that subsection; and (3) include such recommendations for such legislative or administrative action as the heads of the elements of the intelligence community consider appropriate to implement the proposal or proposals identified under paragraph (2). (c) Submittal Date.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than February 15, 2004. (d) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services, Governmental Affairs, and the Judiciary of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services, Government Reform, and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (2) The term ``elements of the intelligence community'' means the elements of the intelligence community set forth in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (3) The term ``heads of the elements of the intelligence community'' includes the Secretary of Defense with respect to each element of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense or the military departments. (a) Report.--Not later than four months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that-- (1) identifies impediments in current policy and regulations to the sharing of classified information horizontally across and among Federal departments and agencies, and vertically between the Federal Government and agencies of State and local governments and the private sector, for national security purposes, including homeland security; and (2) proposes appropriate modifications of policy, law, and regulations to eliminate such impediments in order to facilitate such sharing of classified information for national security purposes, including homeland security. (b) Considerations.--In preparing the report under subsection (a), the President shall-- (1) consider the extent to which the reliance on a document-based approach to the protection of classified information impedes the sharing of classified information; and (2) consider the extent to which the utilization of a database-based approach, or other electronic approach, to the protection of classified information might facilitate the sharing of classified information. (c) Coordination With Other Information Sharing Activities.--In preparing the report under subsection (a), the President shall, to the maximum extent practicable, take into account actions being undertaken under the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act (subtitle I of title VIII of Public Law 107-296; 116 Stat. 2252; 6 U.S.C. 481 et seq.). (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services, Governmental Affairs, and the Judiciary of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (a) Report.--Not later than February 15, 2004, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses progress in the following: (1) The development by the Department of Defense and the intelligence community of a comprehensive and uniform analytical capability to assess the utility and advisability of various sensor and platform architectures and capabilities for the collection of intelligence. (2) The improvement of coordination between the Department and the intelligence community on strategic and budgetary planning. (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form. (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (a) Report.--Not later than February 15, 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the extent of United States dependence on computer hardware or software that is manufactured overseas. (b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall address the following: (1) The extent to which the United States currently depends on computer hardware or software that is manufactured overseas. (2) The extent to which United States dependence, if any, on such computer hardware or software is increasing. (3) The vulnerabilities of the national security and economy of the United States as a result of United States dependence, if any, on such computer hardware or software. (4) Any other matters relating to United States dependence, if any, on such computer hardware or software that the Director considers appropriate. (c) Consultation With Private Sector.--(1) In preparing the report under subsection (a), the Director may consult, and is encouraged to consult, with appropriate persons and entities in the computer hardware or software industry and with other appropriate persons and entities in the private sector. (2) Consultations of the Director with persons or entities under paragraph (1) shall not be treated as the activities of an advisory committee for purposes of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). (d) Form.--(1) The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (2) The report may be in the form of a National Intelligence Estimate. (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (a) Report.--As soon as possible, but not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the intelligence lessons learned as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including lessons relating to the following: (1) The tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. (2) The accuracy, timeliness, and objectivity of intelligence analysis. (3) The intelligence support available to policymakers and members of the Armed Forces in combat. (4) The coordination of intelligence activities and operations with military operations. (5) The strengths and limitations of intelligence systems and equipment. (6) Such other matters as the Director considers appropriate. (b) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall include such recommendations on improvement in the matters described in subsection (a) as the Director considers appropriate. (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. (a) Preliminary Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall, after such consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General as the Director considers appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a preliminary report on all information obtained by the Department of Defense and the intelligence community on the conventional weapons and ammunition obtained by Iraq in violation of applicable resolutions of the United Nations Security Council adopted since the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990. (b) Final Report.--(1) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a final report on the information described in subsection (a). (2) The final report under paragraph (1) shall include such updates of the preliminary report under subsection (a) as the Director considers appropriate. (c) Elements.--Each report under this section shall set forth, to the extent practicable, with respect to each shipment of weapons or ammunition addressed in such report the following: (1) The country of origin. (2) Any country of transshipment. (d) Form.--Each report under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Armed Services and International Relations of the House of Representatives. (a) Report Required.--The President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the operations of the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland Security and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The report shall include the following: (1) An assessment of the operations of the Directorate and the Center, including the capabilities of each-- (A) to meet personnel requirements, including requirements to employ qualified analysts, and the status of efforts to employ qualified analysts; (B) to share intelligence information with the other elements of the intelligence community, including the sharing of intelligence information through secure information technology connections between the Directorate, the Center, and the other elements of the intelligence community; (C) to disseminate intelligence information, or analyses of intelligence information, to other departments and agencies of the Federal Government and, as appropriate, to State and local governments; (D) to coordinate with State and local counterterrorism and law enforcement officials; (E) to receive information from Federal, State, and local officials, and private sector entities, relating to the respective responsibilities and authorities of the Directorate and the Center; and (F) to access information, including intelligence and law enforcement information, from the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, including the ability of the Directorate to access, in a timely and efficient manner, all information authorized by section 202 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 122). (2) An assessment of the ability of the Center to fulfill the responsibilities assigned to it by the President given its structure, authorities, current assets, and capabilities. (3) An assessment of the ability of the Directorate to fulfill the responsibilities set forth in section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) given its current assets and capabilities. (4) A plan of action (including appropriate milestones, funding, and sources of funding) for bringing the Center to its full operational capacity as called for in the Information on the State of the Union given by the President to Congress under section 3 of Article II of the Constitution of the United States in 2003. (5) A delineation of the responsibilities and duties of the Directorate and of the responsibilities and duties of the Center. (6) A delineation and summary of the areas in which the responsibilities and duties of the Directorate, the Center, and other elements of the Federal Government overlap. (7) An assessment of whether the areas of overlap, if any, delineated under paragraph (6) represent an inefficient utilization of resources. (8) A description of the policies and procedures to ensure that the Directorate and the Center comply with the Constitution and applicable statutes, Executive orders, and regulations of the United States. (9) The practical impact, if any, of the operations of the Center on individual liberties and privacy. (10) Such information as the President considers appropriate to explain the basis for the establishment and operation of the Center as a ``joint venture'' of participating agencies rather than as an element of the Directorate reporting directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. (b) Submittal Date.--The report required by this section shall be submitted not later than May 1, 2004. (c) Form.--The report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Governmental Affairs, the Judiciary, and Appropriations of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committees on the Judiciary and Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (a) Report.--Not later than September 16, 2004, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the establishment and operation of the Terrorist Screening Center, established on September 16, 2003, by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, including the matters described in subsection (b). (b) Covered Matters.--The matters referred to in subsection (a) are the following: (1) An analysis of the operations of the Terrorist Screening Center to ensure that the Terrorist Screening Center does not violate the Constitution, or any statute, Executive order, or regulation of the United States. (2) A description of the architecture of the database system of the Terrorist Screening Center, including the number of databases maintained, operated, or administered by the Terrorist Screening Center, and the extent to which these databases have been integrated. (3) A determination of whether data from all watch lists detailed in the April 2003 report of the Comptroller General of the United States, entitled ``Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists should be Consolidated to promote Better Integration and Sharing,'' have been incorporated into the Terrorist Screening Center database system. (4) A determination of whether there remain any relevant databases that are not yet part of the Terrorist Screening Center database system. (5) A schedule that specifies the dates on which each Federal watch list database identified in the report referred to in paragraph (3), or determined under paragraph (4) to be not yet part of the Terrorist Screening Center database system, were, or will be, integrated into the Terrorist Screening Center database system. (6) A description of the protocols in effect to ensure the protection of classified and sensitive information contained in the Terrorist Screening Center database system. (7) A description of-- (A) the process by which databases in the Terrorist Screening Center database system are reviewed for accuracy and timeliness of data and the frequency of updates of such reviews; and (B) the mechanism used to ensure that data within a particular database is synchronized and replicated throughout the database system of the Terrorist Screening Center. (8) A description of the extent to which the Terrorist Screening Center makes information available to the private sector and critical infrastructure components, and the criteria for determining which private sector and critical infrastructure components receive that information. (9) The number of individuals listed in the Terrorist Screening Center database system. (10) The estimated operating budget of, and sources of funding for, the Terrorist Screening Center for each of fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006. (11) An assessment of the impact of the Terrorist Screening Center on current law enforcement systems. (12) The practical impact, if any, of the operations of the Terrorist Screening Center on individual liberties and privacy. (13) Such recommendations as the President considers appropriate for modifications of law or policy to ensure the continuing operation of the Terrorist Screening Center. (c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) Annual Evaluation of Performance and Responsiveness of Intelligence Community.--Section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5) is amended by striking subsection (d). (b) Periodic Reports on Disclosure of Intelligence Information to United Nations.--Section 112(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g(b)(1)) is amended-- (1) in the subsection caption, by striking ``Periodic'' and inserting ``Annual''; (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``semiannually'' and inserting ``annually''; and (3) in paragraph (3), by striking ``periodic'' and inserting ``the annual''. (c) Annual Report on Intelligence Community Cooperation With Counterdrug Activities.--Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (a); and (2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as subsections (a) through (e), respectively. (d) Annual Report on Covert Leases.--Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by this section, is further amended-- (1) by striking subsection (d); and (2) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d). (e) Annual Report on Certain Foreign Companies Involved in Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.--Section 827 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2430; 50 U.S.C. 404n-3) is repealed. (f) Annual Report on Intelligence Activities of People's Republic of China.--Section 308 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-107; 111 Stat. 2253; 50 U.S.C. 402a note) is repealed. (g) Annual Report on Coordination of Counterintelligence Matters With FBI.--Section 811(c) of the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 (title VIII of Public Law 103-359; 50 U.S.C. 402a(c)) is amended-- (1) by striking paragraph (6); and (2) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8) as paragraphs (6) and (7), respectively. (h) Annual Report on Postemployment Assistance for Terminated Intelligence Employees.--Section 1611 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking subsection (e). (i) Annual Report on Activities of FBI Personnel Outside the United States.--Section 540C of title 28, United States Code, is repealed. (j) Annual Report on Exceptions to Consumer Disclosure Requirements for National Security Investigations.--Section 604(b)(4) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681b(b)(4)) is amended-- (1) by striking subparagraphs (D) and (E); and (2) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (D). (k) Reports on Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-293; 50 U.S.C. 2366) is amended by striking ``a semiannual'' and inserting ``an annual''. (l) Conforming Amendments.--Section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) by striking subparagraphs (A), (C), (G), (I), (J), and (L); (ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (D), (E), (H), (K), (M), and (N) as subparagraphs (A), (C), (D), (G), (H), and (I), respectively; (iii) by inserting after subparagraph (A), as so redesignated, the following new subparagraph (B): ``(B) The annual report on intelligence provided to the United Nations required by section 112(b)(1).''; and (iv) by inserting after subparagraph (D), as so redesignated, the following new subparagraph (E): ``(E) The annual report on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions required by section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-293; 50 U.S.C. 2366).''; and (B) in paragraph (2)-- (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``section 114(b)'' and inserting ``section 114(a)''; (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``section 114(d)'' and inserting ``section 114(c)''; (iii) by striking subparagraphs (C), (E), and (F); and (iv) by redesignating subparagraphs (D) and (G) as subparagraphs (C) and (D), respectively; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) by striking paragraphs (1) and (4); and (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), (5), (6), (7), and (8) as paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), respectively. (m) Clerical Amendments.-- (1) National security act of 1947.--The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item relating to section 603. (2) Title 28, united states code.--The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 33 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 540C. (n) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take effect on December 31, 2003. Subtitle E--Other Matters Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``TWO-YEAR'' before ``SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION''; and (2) in the text, by striking ``ending on October 1, 2003'' and inserting ``ending on the date that is 60 days after the appropriate congressional committees of jurisdiction (as defined in section 324(d) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 7304(d)) are notified jointly by the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (or the Director's designee) that the operational framework for the office has been terminated''. (a) Clarification of Aliens Authorized To Distribute Explosive Materials.--Section 842(d)(7) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (B)-- (A) by inserting ``or'' at the end of clause (i); and (B) by striking clauses (iii) and (iv); and (3) by adding the following new subparagraphs: ``(C) is a member of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or other friendly foreign military force, as determined by the Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, who is present in the United States under military orders for training or other military purpose authorized by the United States and the shipping, transporting, possession, or receipt of explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized military purpose; or ``(D) is lawfully present in the United States in cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence, and the shipment, transportation, receipt, or possession of the explosive materials is in furtherance of such cooperation;''. (b) Clarification of Aliens Authorized To Possess or Receive Explosive Materials.--Section 842(i)(5) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (B)-- (A) by inserting ``or'' at the end of clause (i); and (B) by striking clauses (iii) and (iv); and (3) by adding the following new subparagraphs: ``(C) is a member of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or other friendly foreign military force, as determined by the Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, who is present in the United States under military orders for training or other military purpose authorized by the United States and the shipping, transporting, possession, or receipt of explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized military purpose; or ``(D) is lawfully present in the United States in cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence, and the shipment, transportation, receipt, or possession of the explosive materials is in furtherance of such cooperation;''. Section 313(e)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1424(e)(4)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``when Department of Defense activities are relevant to the determination'' after ``Secretary of Defense''; and (2) by inserting ``and the Secretary of Homeland Security'' after ``Attorney General''. (a) Modification of Definition.--Section 1114 of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(d) For purposes of this section, and sections 1115 and 1117 insofar as they relate to the operation of this section, the term `financial institution' has the same meaning as in subsections (a)(2) and (c)(1) of section 5312 of title 31, United States Code, except that, for purposes of this section, such term shall include only such a financial institution any part of which is located inside any State or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or the United States Virgin Islands.''. (b) Cross Reference Modification.--Section 1101(1) of such Act (12 U.S.C. 3401(1)) is amended by inserting ``, except as provided in section 1114,'' before ``means any office''. (a) Workshops for Coordination of Research.--The National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall jointly sponsor not less than two workshops on the coordination of Federal Government research on the use of behavioral, psychological, and physiological assessments of individuals in the conduct of security evaluations. (b) Deadline for Completion of Activities.--The activities of the workshops sponsored under subsection (a) shall be completed not later than March 1, 2004. (c) Purposes.--The purposes of the workshops sponsored under subsection (a) are as follows: (1) To provide a forum for cataloging and coordinating federally funded research activities relating to the development of new techniques in the behavioral, psychological, or physiological assessment of individuals to be used in security evaluations. (2) To develop a research agenda for the Federal Government on behavioral, psychological, and physiological assessments of individuals, including an identification of the research most likely to advance the understanding of the use of such assessments of individuals in security evaluations. (3) To distinguish between short-term and long-term areas of research on behavioral, psychological, and physiological assessments of individuals in order to maximize the utility of short-term and long-term research on such assessments. (4) To identify the Federal agencies best suited to support research on behavioral, psychological, and physiological assessments of individuals. (5) To develop recommendations for coordinating future federally funded research for the development, improvement, or enhancement of security evaluations. (d) Advisory Group.--(1) In order to assist the National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy in carrying out the activities of the workshops sponsored under subsection (a), there is hereby established an interagency advisory group with respect to such workshops. (2) The advisory group shall be composed of the following: (A) A representative of the Social, Behavioral, and Economic Directorate of the National Science Foundation. (B) A representative of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. (C) The Secretary of Defense, or a designee of the Secretary. (D) The Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary. (E) The Attorney General, or a designee of the Attorney General. (F) The Secretary of Energy, or a designee of the Secretary. (G) The Secretary of Homeland Security, or a designee of the Secretary. (H) The Director of Central Intelligence, or a designee of the Director. (I) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a designee of the Director. (J) The National Counterintelligence Executive, or a designee of the National Counterintelligence Executive. (K) Any other official assigned to the advisory group by the President for purposes of this section. (3) The members of the advisory group under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) shall jointly head the advisory group. (4) The advisory group shall provide the Foundation and the Office such information, advice, and assistance with respect to the workshops sponsored under subsection (a) as the advisory group considers appropriate. (5) The advisory group shall not be treated as an advisory committee for purposes of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). (e) FOIA Exemption.--All files of the National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy for purposes of administering this section, including any files of a Federal, State, or local department or agency or of a private sector entity provided to or utilized by a workshop or advisory group under this section, shall be exempt from the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, that require publication, disclosure, search, or review in connection therewith. (f) Report.--Not later than March 1, 2004, the National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall jointly submit to Congress a report on the results of activities of the workshops sponsored under subsection (a), including the findings and recommendations of the Foundation and the Office as a result of such activities. (g) Funding.--(1) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by section 104(a), $500,000 shall be available to the National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology Policy to carry out this section. (2) The amount authorized to be appropriated by paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended. Section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(f) Classified Information.--In any judicial review of a finding of the existence of a primary money laundering concern, or of the requirement for 1 or more special measures with respect to a primary money laundering concern, made under this section, if the designation or imposition, or both, were based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.), such information may be submitted by the Secretary to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review of any finding made or any requirement imposed under this section.''. (a) National Security Act of 1947.--Section 112(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6)'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7)''. (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``(c)(6)'' each place it appears and inserting ``(c)(7)''. (2) Section 6 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''. (3) Section 15 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``special policemen of the General Services Administration perform under the first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318),'' and inserting ``officers and agents of the Department of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United States Code,''; and (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``the fourth section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) of this section (40 U.S.C. 318c)'' and inserting ``section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code''. (c) National Security Agency Act of 1959.--Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``special policemen of the General Services Administration perform under the first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318)'' and inserting ``officers and agents of the Department of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United States Code,''; and (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``the fourth section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) (40 U.S.C. 318c)'' and inserting ``section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code''. (d) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.-- Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''; and (2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 103(c)(6)'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7)''. (e) Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.-- Section 3535(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added by section 1001(b)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), and section 3545(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added by section 301(b)(1) of the E- Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347), are each amended by inserting ``or any other law'' after ``1978''. (f) Public Law 107-173.--Section 201(c)(3)(F) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173; 116 Stat. 548; 8 U.S.C. 1721(c)(3)(F)) is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))''. TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Section 4(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403e(b)(5)) is amended by inserting ``, other than regulations under paragraph (1),'' after ``Regulations''. Section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Agency personnel designated by the Director under subsection (a), or designated by the Director under section 5(a)(4) to carry firearms for the protection of current or former Agency personnel and their immediate families, defectors and their immediate families, and other persons in the United States under Agency auspices, shall be considered for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office or employment when such Agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include the use of force, to-- ``(A) protect an individual in the presence of such Agency personnel from a crime of violence; ``(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or ``(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such Agency personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of violence in the presence of such Agency personnel. ``(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the Attorney General under section 2679 of title 28, United States Code. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United States Code.''. Section 21(f)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u(f)(2)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Director'' and inserting ``The Director''; and (2) by striking subparagraph (B). Notwithstanding section 4124 of title 18, United States Code, purchases by the Central Intelligence Agency from Federal Prison Industries shall be made only if the Director of Central Intelligence determines that the product or service to be purchased from Federal Prison Industries best meets the needs of the Agency. (a) Postponement of Compensation Reform Plan.--Section 402(a)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2403; 50 U.S.C. 403- 4 note) is amended by striking ``February 1, 2004,'' and all that follows through the end and inserting ``the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.''. (b) Contribution by CIA Employees of Certain Bonus Pay to Thrift Savings Plan.-- (1) Civil service retirement system participants.--Section 8351(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(d)''; and (B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2)(A) Only those employees of the Central Intelligence Agency participating in the pilot project required by section 402(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) and making contributions to the Thrift Savings Fund out of basic pay may also contribute (by direct transfer to the Fund) any part of bonus pay received by the employee as part of the pilot project. ``(B) Contributions under this paragraph are subject to section 8432(d) of this title.''. (2) Federal employees' retirement system participants.-- Section 8432 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(k)(1) Only those employees of the Central Intelligence Agency participating in the pilot project required by section 402(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) and making contributions to the Thrift Savings Fund out of basic pay may also contribute (by direct transfer to the Fund) any part of bonus pay received by the employee as part of the pilot project. ``(2) Contributions under this subsection are subject to subsection (d). ``(3) For purposes of subsection (c), basic pay of an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency participating in the pilot project referred to in paragraph (1) shall include bonus pay received by the employee as part of the pilot project.''. (c) Report.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the amount of compensation (including basic pay, bonuses, and employer contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan) of each employee of the Central Intelligence Agency participating in the pilot project required by section 402(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2403; 50 U.S.C. 403-4 note), and on the amount that each such employee would have received had such employee received compensation under the existing system of compensation used by the Agency. (2) The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted together with the report required by paragraph (3) of such section 402(b). (3) In this subsection, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given that term in section 402(d) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, agency personnel designated by the Director of the National Security Agency under subsection (a) shall be considered for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office or employment when such agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include the use of force, to-- ``(A) protect an individual in the presence of such agency personnel from a crime of violence; ``(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or ``(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such agency personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of violence in the presence of such agency personnel. ``(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the Attorney General under section 2679 of title 28, United States Code. ``(3) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United States Code.''. (a) Authority.--Funds designated for intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for assistance to the Government of Colombia for counterdrug activities for fiscal year 2004, and any unobligated funds available to any element of the intelligence community for such activities for a prior fiscal year, shall be available-- (1) to support a unified campaign by the Government of Colombia against narcotics trafficking and against activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)); and (2) to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue operations. (b) Applicability of Certain Laws and Limitations.--The use of funds pursuant to the authority in subsection (a) shall be subject to the following: (1) Sections 556, 567, and 568 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (Public Law 107-115; 115 Stat. 2160, 2165, and 2166). (2) Section 8077 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-87; 117 Stat. 1090). (3) The numerical limitations on the number of United States military personnel and United States individual civilian contractors in section 3204(b)(1) of the Emergency Supplemental Act, 2000 (division B of Public Law 106-246; 114 Stat. 575), as amended by the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (115 Stat. 2131). (c) Limitation on Participation of United States Personnel.--No United States Armed Forces personnel or United States civilian contractor employed by the United States Armed Forces will participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance made available under this section, except for the purpose of acting in self defense or during the course of search and rescue operations for United States citizens. Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by this Act, $2,500,000 shall be available for the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA) for scene visualization technologies. (a) Research Program.--(1) The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly carry out a program to incorporate the results of basic research on sensors into the measurement and signatures intelligence systems of the United States, to the extent the results of such research are applicable to such systems. (2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence shall act through the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection (hereinafter in this section referred to as the ``Director''). (b) Program Components.--The program under subsection (a) shall review and assess basic research on sensors and technologies conducted both by the United States Government and by non-governmental entities. In carrying out the program, the Director shall protect intellectual property rights, maintain organizational flexibility, and establish research projects, funding levels, and potential benefits in an equitable manner through the Directorate. (c) Advisory Panel.--(1) The Director shall establish an advisory panel to assist the Director in carrying out the program under subsection (a). (2) The advisory panel shall be headed by the Director who shall determine the selection, review, and assessment of the research projects under the program. (3)(A) The Director shall appoint as members of the advisory panel representatives of each entity of the MASINT community, and may appoint as such members representatives of national laboratories, universities, and private sector entities. (B) For purposes of this subsection the term ``MASINT community'' means academic, professional, industrial, and government entities that are committed towards the advancement of the sciences in measurement and signatures intelligence. (C) The term for a member of the advisory panel shall be established by the Director, but may not exceed a period of 5 consecutive years. (D) Members of the advisory panel may not receive additional pay, allowances, or benefits by reason of their service on the advisory panel, but may receive per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code. (4) The Director may accept contributions from non- governmental participants on the advisory panel to defray the expenses of the advisory panel. (5) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the activities of the advisory panel established under this subsection. (d) FOIA Exemption.--All files in the possession of the Defense Intelligence Agency for purposes of administering the program under this section, including any files of a Federal, State, or local department or agency or of a private sector entity provided to or utilized by the program, shall be exempt from the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, that require publication, disclosure, search, or review in connection therewith. (a) Availability of Funds.--Any funds authorized to be appropriated for the National Security Agency for a fiscal year after fiscal year 2003 may be made available to the Independent College Fund of Maryland (also known as the ``I- Fund'') for the purpose of the establishment and provision of national security scholarships to the extent such funds are specifically authorized for that purpose. (b) Mechanisms of Availability.--Funds may be made available to the Independent College Fund of Maryland under subsection (a) by grant, contract, cooperative agreement, or such other appropriate mechanisms as the Director of the National Security Agency considers appropriate. And the Senate agree to the same.", u'Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to discuss security issues facing this country and to focus the bulk of my discussion on the issue that is going to be, I think, a major issue for the rest of this year and well into the Presidential elections next year, and that is a national debate on who lost Russia. What caused the current economic and political instability that is occurring in that nation that still possesses a vast supply of nuclear material, weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and pose a significant security threat to America? Before I talk about Russia and present some perspectives, I would like to first of all commend the Congress, Members on both sides of the aisle, for the passage today of the final conference report on the defense authorization bill. This bill, which passed the House with an overwhelming margin, is a tribute to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence) and the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the two leaders on defense issues in this Congress, and to all the Members who worked hard on giving our military the best possible support in terms of resources to meet the challenges and threats of the 21st Century. I am concerned that the bill does not have enough in the way of resources to meet the level of deployments that have been entered into by this administration and by the President. In fact, the level of deployments over the past 7 years are now at 33, and that, in fact, compares to 10 deployments in the previous 40 years from World War II until 1990. We cannot continue to have our troops stationed around the world, involved in harm\'s way in every possible place, from the Balkans and Kosovo to Macedonia and Somalia and Central America and now perhaps East Timor, and provide less resources to pay for all these deployments. That has been our big problem over the past several years. So while this bill does not address all of our needs, it certainly is the best possible legislation that we can come up with given the amount of dollars that the administration made available and the amount that we in the Congress were able to plus up above the President\'s request. I would hope the President would sign this bill into law as quickly as possible. There was some last-minute controversy raised because of provisions dealing with changes in the management of our Department of Energy-run laboratories. But I can say this, Mr. Speaker, that those changes are needed. They are important, and they are critical. We could not have passed DOE reform legislation in my mind that the President would have signed had it been in a freestanding bill, and, therefore, including it as a part of our defense authorization bill was extremely important. The second issue I would discuss briefly, Mr. Speaker, is an announcement that is going to be made tomorrow by the administration regarding a change in the policy over encryption. Encryption is the technology that we use in the information age to protect and secure transmissions of data. Up until this point in time, we have had strict limitations on the type and capability of encrypted software that we allow our companies to sell overseas. The reason is that we do not want terrorist groups in rogue States to be able to get the capability to classify their communications so that our national security agency and intelligence community cannot get into the kinds of transmissions involving illegal activities and drug sales and arms transfers that is so important to our security. For the past several years, it has been a stalemate. Many of the software companies have been pushing very hard to pass legislation to remove all limitations on being able to sell encryption software abroad at any bit strength, any capability. Many of us in the Congress who are concerned about security issues and Members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on both sides of the aisle have raised our voices and have said we cannot just in one fell swoop wipe away the controls that allow us to maintain the kind of access to secure systems that allow America to protect our troops abroad as well as our homeland here. In fact, in each of the last two sessions of Congress, I have offered successfully amendments in the Subcommittee on Defense to the encryption bill, overwhelmingly supported by Democrats and Republicans, to slow down this process and to force us to look at the security concerns. We have said during our opportunities to amend this bill, both last year and most recently in July or August, this past summer, that we were looking for a compromise, that we were looking for a way that we, in fact, could allow our companies to maintain their market share worldwide but also, at the same time, provide mechanisms for the national security agency and the intelligence community to make sure that they were being consulted when this technology was being sold. In a meeting I had with Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre just 1 hour ago in my office, he told me that tomorrow the administration will be announcing what I think will be a successful compromise that will allow industry to be happy but will allow those of us who have security concerns to be happy that we are, in fact, not giving away capability to our adversaries that may come back to haunt us. This compromise which has yet to be worked out in terms of legislative language will do three things. It will allow a process to be kept in place to make sure that our intelligence and defense community have a process before an application is granted for an encrypted software to be sold overseas above the 64-bit strength capability. This gives our technical people the ability to monitor the kind of software encryption that we are selling so that they understand the implications of the sale. Secondarily, the companies will certify the end user of this encrypted algorithm software so that we know where the encryption is going, to make sure it is not going near the hands of a terrorist group or perhaps a nation that is a direct opponent of the U.S., thus could cause security problems for us. The third provision would allow the Defense Department and the administration and intelligence community to oppose the sale of this more capable encryption to a nation or to an entity that we feel would pose a security threat to America. Based on these three conditions, the administration and Dr. Hamre are going to announce this change tomorrow, and I am convinced that this change would not have occurred were it not for the efforts of members of the national security committee, and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligences who stood up and cast very difficult votes. The intense lobbying campaign by the private software companies who have significant PACs and who were having a significant influence on Republican and Democrat Members brought tremendous pressure to bear on many Members who wanted to make sure that our security was not being jeopardized. In last year\'s vote in the House Subcommittee on Defense and last year\'s Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and in this year\'s votes in the House Subcommittee on Defense and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligences, Democrats and Republicans stood together. They said that we want to make sure, in spite of the tremendous pressure by these software companies, that we give every possible consideration to our security concerns. Those security concerns apparently are now being met. Tomorrow we will hear the outline of the specifics from the administration. I have offered my support to Dr. Hamre to work to develop bipartisan legislation to amend the Safe Act, the Goodlatte bill, to provide for a compromised solution to what has been a stalemate in this country over the exportation of encrypted software. I want to particularly thank the Members of Congress who were leaders in this effort and who, without their support, this compromise would not have occurred. On the Committee on Armed Services in particular, I want to thank the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Sisisky). He was the cosponsor of the amendment that I offered this year which passed in the committee with a vote of 46 to 8. Overwhelming support by Republicans and Democrats. That bipartisan support was obtained because of the leadership of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Sisisky) on the Democrat side. I would also thank our distinguished ranking member the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) who took a leadership role in this effort in the committee, supported by the gentleman from South Carolina (Chairman Spence). The other leaders on the Committee on Armed Services were the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie), and the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons). Each of these Members took the tough stand. They stood up under tremendous pressure and intense lobbying by private industry to say that we had to stand up for the security concerns of the intelligence community, the national security agency. It is because of their efforts and the efforts of the leaders on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, particularly the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) that we were able to reach this compromise which, hopefully, all of us can rally around legislatively. I am looking forward to working together to achieve a balance. I have already discussed this in a very preliminary way with the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) who is the chief sponsor of this legislation. I want to applaud him for being responsive to our reaching out to try to find a way to deal with the concerns of industry and their economic success and the concerns that we have relative to America\'s security. Mr. Speaker, the real topic that I wanted to address tonight is the beginning of what I think will be a major national debate over the next 14 months that should occur over the issue of who lost Russia. Mr. Speaker, 8 years ago the people inside of the Communist-dominated Soviet Union were excited, were anxious, and were looking forward to what they saw coming: A major revolution of a Communist-dominated superpower, one of only two superpowers in the world at that time, that was repressive of their rights, that was repressive of the freedom of information and access to the kinds of freedoms we enjoy in America in free markets. The Soviet people were just chomping at the bit to throw off communism and become a free market democratic nation. What happened? That revolution occurred. Gorbachev started it in a very heoric manner, followed by Boris Yeltsin, who, again in a very heroic manner, held the effort to lead the Soviet Union away from communism, away from a closed central economy to free markets and democracies. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, here we are 8 years later, those Russian people who for 70 years were dominated by communism are today looking back and they are saying to America, where is the realization of the dream that you promised? Where is the success of our economy? Where are the freedoms from the kinds of oppression and criminal activity that we see all over our country today? Where is the growth of our country economically as a major player in the world\'s economy? Where is the economic benefit? Instead, many of those same people are worse off today than they were under communism. Senior citizens, who rely on pensions, have seen inflation running up in the hundreds and thousands of percentage increases over the last 8 years, have looked at their savings dwindle to nothing. The people who have relied on job growth have not seen any significant job increase except for a very small percentage of Russians, many of whom were connected to Yeltsin\'s inner circle, members of the Intelligencia, or, ironically, members who were well connected to the communist leadership of the previous 70 years. In fact, Mr. Speaker, the amount of dismay in Russia today is unbelievable. I think it was best summed up by a member of the Russian Duma who I had the pleasure of doing a press conference with at the height of our bombing of Kosovo, which the Russians found offensive and because it did not initially involve them, found the running contradictory to our trying to improve relations. He said, for 72 years, the Soviet communist party spent billions of dollars to try to convince the Russian people that America and its people were evil. But the Russian people, the 95 percent who were never able to join the communist party, did not believe the propaganda, did not believe the rhetoric coming out of Moscow that America was an evil nation. They rejected the plea of the communists that America was their long-term enemy. He went on to say that, in a matter of a few short months and years, we have managed to do what the Soviet communist party could not do in 70 years. Because of our failed policies, because of our situation involving Kosovo, we have, in fact, convinced many Russians that we are an evil nation, that we are the enemy of Russia, that the success that we guaranteed would occur with free markets and democracy has not occurred, and that we are, in fact, part of the reason why Russia is having the economic and political turmoil that exists in that country today. Mr. Speaker, I do not think any one of us in this country can blame any one person for Russia\'s problems, but I can tell my colleagues they are severe. It hit me 2 years ago when I was asked by the Speaker of the Russian Duma to attend a conference in Moscow representing the U.S. to talk about why more western companies were not investing in the Russian economy. I went over and represented America and was there joined by parliamentarians and ministerial leaders from 13 other western nations. I was accompanied by representatives of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia and the U.S. Russian-American Business Council, both groups representing the bulk of our American companies doing business in Russia. And I had to be given, in a very embarrassing way, the following statistic: Since the Russians threw off communism and went to a democracy and a free market economy in 1991, there had been only $10 billion of western investment into the Russian economy. During that same period of time, there had been $350 billion of investment in the Chinese economy. Now, I am not here to say that we should not invest in China. In fact, I have supported the normalization of our relations with China. But how is it that the reward for the world\'s only other superpower in transforming from a communist nation to its free democracy would have such little positive impact yet the reward for a nation that retains communist domination would be so much greater in terms of western and U.S. investment? Three hundred fifty billion to China, $10 billion to Russia, just in the 6 years from 1991 until 1997, which was when this conference occurred. The Russian people throw up their hands and they ask the question, what went wrong? The members of the Duma, people who I have worked with for the past 5 years, friends of mine, all the factions, say to me, Congressman Weldon, how is it that America has guaranteed and helped support $20 billion of U.S. guaranteed IMF and World Bank funding, and actually it is much higher than that, and $1 billion a year of U.S. Treasury funding, taxpayer dollars, into our country and yet most, if not all, of that money has been siphoned off by crooks, by corrupt business leaders, by thugs, by friends of Boris Yeltsin, by people who are well connected in Moscow who took hard-earned American and western individuals\' money through their taxes paid to their governments and put that money in Swiss bank accounts and U.S. real estate investments instead of benefiting the changes that were necessary for the Russian people? Mr. Speaker, for those people, who I agree with, who say that, well, we cannot blame one person, we cannot blame Bill Clinton for the fiasco in Russia, I would agree. But I would say this, Mr. Speaker: There certainly is, in my opinion, a significant amount of responsibility that this administration must bear for where Russia is today. Just 3 years ago, former Russian Ambassador Pickering, who is now the number-three person in the State Department, was touting around the world in speeches that within 3 years Russia will be a stable economy, it will be a world-class economy, it will solve its economic problems. And look at where we are today. Last August, a major economic collapse, devaluation of the ruble, long lines at banks with Russian people trying to withdraw their savings, instability. Now we have revelation after revelation of Russian bankers, Boris Yeltsin\'s friends, friends of the establishment, who siphoned off hundreds of millions of dollars, western dollars designed to help build homes and bridges and schools and roads and to reform the coal industry, gone, evaporated, benefiting a few and leaving the Russian people in disarray and in dismay. It is absolutely essential, Mr. Speaker, that this body conduct a thorough examination of what happened and what went wrong with our policies toward Russia since 1991. Now, I am not going to be partisan and say that we should not look back to the Bush administration. Because we should, because that is when the reforms in Russia started. But, Mr. Speaker, I can say without any hesitation that there is no doubt in my mind that the policies of this administration, starting with the president and those of the chief Russian advisor to the President, Strobe Talbott, have had a direct impact on the destabilization of Russia\'s economy and their political situation. Why would I make such statements, Mr. Speaker? Well, let me try to explain them. And in explaining them, let me look at where we have been, the kinds of decisions we have made, and perhaps what we should do in the future to change our position with Russia. First of all, Mr. Speaker, our policy for the past 8 years has largely been focused around a president-to-president relationship. Everything focused on Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin. As long as those two men were cooperating, were trustworthy of each other, had a common understanding of the working relationship, that was the most important thing our country focused on, reinforcing Boris Yeltsin under any circumstance. And that was the policy of our State Department and that was and still is the policy of our administration. When Boris Yeltsin called the Duma a bunch of rogues and crooks and thieves, which some of them are, what did our administration say? It did not disagree with Boris Yeltsin and say that we should help to build a more stable institution of a parliament. It remained silent. And those people in Russia mistook that silence as though somehow we were embracing Boris Yeltsin\'s notion that the parliament in Russia did not matter. In fact, Mr. Speaker, last year I arrived in Moscow in September, the day that President Clinton was leaving; and one of the most respected members of the Russian Duma, the former Soviet ambassador to Washington, speaks fluent English, current chairman of the Committee on International Affairs, and a pro-Western leader, the Vladimir Luhkin, called me into his office and he said, Curt, I have some very disturbing news that is running through our Duma and you need to confront the administration to see if this happened. I said, What is the matter, Vladimir? He said, We have received word that Boris Yeltsin and your president had discussions privately as to what the position of the U.S. would be if Yeltsin decided to disband and ignore the Duma completely, in direct violation of the Russian constitution. Vladimir Luhkin said to me, Curt, if that discussion took place, that is going to cause serious problems because our Constitution mandates that we have a balance of power, similar to what you have in America, and for your president to even engage in that kind of a discussion would be very destabilizing. I went back to the administration and I raised that issue, and I was assured at that time that our President never had that discussion with Boris Yeltsin. We will probably never know the answer to that, but I took the administration at face value. But I did believe, with no doubt in my mind, that all of our policy considerations for 7 years, 8 years, have been focused around the premise that under every circumstance we must make sure that Boris Yeltsin is strong. And if we follow that, a similar attitude prevailed in the relationship between Vice President Gore and Victor Chernomyrdin, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, much of which I supported, was designed to focus on their relationship. Where we failed, Mr. Speaker, was to reach out to the other power centers in Russia, to reach out to the other factions and the Duma. Some of the administration officials would say to me, Well, wait a minute. What did you want us to do? Help the communist gain more power in Russia? Negotiate with the communists? To that I say this, Mr. Speaker: How does the administration rectify that statement when the communists in Russia were, at least, elected in free and fair elections, when the administration has put so much effort into a government in China that is entirely communist with no free and fair elections? So if their policy is that in Russia we will reinforce Yeltsin under any circumstance at any cost because we were fearful of the communists, what in the heck is our relationship with China, which is totally dominated by one party communist regime, with no free and fair elections and many concerns about human rights and access to markets? So I do not buy that argument. But the policies of this administration, constantly reinforcing the notion that under any circumstance we could not let anything to happen to embarrass Boris Yeltsin, have contributed to where we are today and the instability in Russia today. Let us look at the facts, Mr. Speaker. We have arms control agreements with Russia. Those arms control agreements require that when there is a violation, we hold those Russian entities accountable. Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, on the House floor, in spite of a memo from the administration that the President would veto the bill, every Member of this body, every Republican and every Democrat who voted, voted in favor and against the President in favor of requiring the administration to impose sanctions on entities transferring technologies to Iran. That is as direct a slap in the face of the policies of this administration as anything I have seen in the 13 years I have been here. It was not a partisan issue, because every Democrat joined every Republican. Now, why would we have to resort to passing this legislation forcing the administration to impose sanctions when violations occur? The reason is, Mr. Speaker, because over the past 7 years we have seen time and time again violations of arms control agreements by Russia and China, and we have ignored them. Mr. Speaker, I was in Moscow the December before the presidential election of Boris Yeltsin to his second term. The Washington Post had just reported a front page story that we had caught Russia transferring accelerometers and gyroscopes to Iraq. Mr. Speaker, accelerometers and gyroscopes are the guidance systems that guide missiles. They are the devices that make missiles more accurate, the kind of missiles that killed our 28 young troops in Desert Storm when Saddam fired that Scud missile into the barracks, the kind of guidance system that North Korea wants for their missiles aimed at America and aimed at South Korea. The Washington Post reported in a front page story, above the fold, we have caught the Russian entities illegally transferring this technology. I was in Ambassador Pickering\'s office in January of that year and I said, ``Mr. Ambassador, I\'m sure you saw the Washington Post article. What was the response of the Russians when you asked them to explain what we found them doing?\'\' And he said, ``Congressman, I haven\'t asked the Russians yet.\'\' I said, ``Why would you not ask them? The Washington Post reported the story in December and they reported this transfer took place 6 months beforehand. Why wouldn\'t you ask the Russians? You\'re our representative here.\'\' He said, ``Mr. Congressman, that request has got to come from the White House.\'\' So I came back to Washington and I wrote to President Clinton. I said, ``Mr. President, you must have read the Washington Post story. This would be a gross violation of an arms control agreement, the Missile Technology Control Regime. If this occurred, what are you doing? And have you asked the Russians yet to explain what we have found?\'\' The President wrote me a three-page response in April of that year. ``Dear Congressman Weldon,\'\' to paraphrase, ``if what the Post said is true, you\'re right, it would be a gross violation of that treaty, and I assure you we will take aggressive steps to implement the requirements of that treaty.\'\' But the President went on to say, ``We have no evidence, we have no proof that it occurred.\'\' Mr. Speaker, here is the proof. A Soviet accelerometer and a Soviet gyroscope, markings in Russian on both of them. These were clipped from Russian SSN-19 missiles that were on their submarines aimed at American cities. Evidently, as Russia decommissioned some of these nuclear devices and ICBMs, someone clipped off the guidance systems which only three countries manufacture, the U.S., Russia and China, although some European countries, but in terms of our relationship, the U.S., Russia and China, very expensive devices. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea cannot build this quality of device. This is the proof, Mr. Speaker. They are real. And it was not just one time and it was not just one set. Mr. Speaker, we have in America over 100 sets of these devices. They are the ones we caught. And it did not happen once. It did not happen twice. We caught the Russians transferring these devices to Iraq three times. What did the administration do in spite of President Clinton\'s letter? We did nothing. When I questioned the administration, why did we not do anything when the President told me that we were going to hold Russian entities accountable? The response was very quietly, ``Well, Congressman, we got assurances from Russia that they would conduct a criminal investigation and they would go after anyone they caught who had done this.\'\' That criminal investigation ended that year, Mr. Speaker. There were no sanctions filed. The devices were transferred, perhaps thousands of them, and these guidance systems then can be placed into missiles or redesigned or reverse engineered so Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and North Korea have better ways to aim their missiles with accuracy at American cities and American troops. Now, why would we not impose sanctions that are required, Mr. Speaker, especially if this administration claims that arms control agreements are so important? In fact, Mr. Speaker, I did a floor speech 14 months ago, and people can get this from the Congressional Record at that time where I documented 37 violations of arms control agreements like this one by the Russians and the Chinese since 1991, since the President took office. In those 37 violations, we caught the Russians and the Chinese sending these kinds of devices to Iraq, sending other technology to Iran, sending chemical and biological and nuclear technology to Syria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, China, North Korea, Pakistan and India, 37 times. That was not my investigation. That research work was done by the Congressional Research Service, an agency that serves Republicans and Democrats, has no partisan nature to it, they simply do the work that we ask them to do. Their study documented 37 violations. How many times did we impose sanctions? Twice. The two times we imposed sanctions were when we caught China transferring M-11 missiles and ring magnets to Pakistan and then we waived the sanctions after 2 years. Now, why would we not impose the required sanctions when we caught the Russian entities transferring technology? It gets back to the policy of this administration toward Russia. Boris Yeltsin was running for election as the President of Russia. We did not want to embarrass Boris Yeltsin. Every step of the way, the President gave Boris Yeltsin the benefit of the doubt. ``We won\'t embarrass you, Mr. President, we won\'t do anything to undermine your leadership in Russia, even if you\'re allowing things to occur that we know are direct violations of these agreements.\'\' In fact, Mr. Speaker, in a book that was written by Washington Times defense writer Bill Gertz called ``Betrayal\'\' which I encourage every one of our colleagues to read, in the back of that book is an irrefutable document. In the back of Bill Gertz\' book ``Betrayal\'\' is the presidential memo cabled from Bill Clinton to Boris Yeltsin in the year he was running for reelection that basically said this and people can read it for themselves: ``Mr. President, I\'ll make sure that we don\'t do anything to undermine your chances for reelection. I will make sure that we don\'t do anything to embarrass you as you embark upon your effort to be reelected.\'\' Mr. Speaker, that has been our policy for 7 years, not just during the election year. We have been so enamored with the relationship between Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin that even when Yeltsin was not dealing with the problems that we knew were there, we ignored them, we pretended it did not happen, we made up excuses. The same policy, Mr. Speaker, applied to a Navy lieutenant in what in my mind is the most outrageous story I have heard in the 13 years I have been in Congress. A 16-year career Navy officer by the name of Lieutenant Jack Daly, in our naval intelligence service, was assigned duty up in the Seattle area working with our Canadian military friends to monitor Russian trawlers that we knew were spying on our nuclear submarine fleet. Lieutenant Daly and his Canadian counterpart would fly helicopter missions and take photographs of these Russian trawlers that we knew were spying on our ships. We knew that because we had seen evidence in the trawlers of sonobuoys, devices that are used to put out in the water to monitor the routes of submarines. And we saw these ships coming into port with no cargo and leaving with no cargo. We knew they were spy ships for the Russians. Mr. Speaker, Lieutenant Daly and his Canadian counterpart who were assigned to intelligence operations made a mistake. They did their job. They were flying in a helicopter, taking photographs of a Russian ship called the Kapitan Man. They were photographing the ship because it was a Russian spy ship spying on our submarines. They were taking photographs of the ship from their helicopter. The Russian ship saw the helicopter, and they activated a laser generator, aimed the laser at the helicopter and lasered the eyes of both of the individuals, Lieutenant Daly and his Canadian colleague. They knew immediately they had some problem. They did not know what it was. They landed, they went to the medical site at their base there, and the doctors examined them and said, ``You\'ve had some kind of damage.\'\' They flew them down to our laser specialist in Texas at our military medical facility and they confirmed that he had been lasered by a laser that is not normally available anyplace that ordinary people can access. They were told that the laser came from that Russian ship. Now, Mr. Speaker when they came back to shore from the helicopter and reported to the DOD command officers that they think something had happened, DOD immediately wanted to go on board the ship, to board it, to see whether or not they had been lasered. Bill Gertz in his book, Mr. Speaker, for every Member of this body to know and to read and to document, for the first time reveals the classified cables between the State Department and the Department of Defense and our embassy in Moscow and the Russians. An American was harmed, doing his job, and yet we find evidence that there were discussions by the man who is currently our ambassador in Moscow, Jim Collins, about how we have to control this situation, we do not want to offend Russia, we do not want to embarrass Boris Yeltsin. So the military was told, ``Don\'t board the ship. Don\'t board the Russian trawler. Don\'t look for that device.\'\' And the military said, ``Wait a minute. We\'ve had a career officer harmed. We want to go on board the ship.\'\' ``Then fine,\'\' the State Department said, ``you can only board the public areas of the vessel.\'\' Mr. Speaker, how stupid are we? We are going to board a Russian trawler that we know is a spy ship, we are going to look for a laser generator, and we are telling the inspectors that they cannot go into the nonpublic areas? Where do we think the Russians are going to put the laser generator, on the front deck? I mean, cut me a break. Are we that stupid or naive? No, Mr. Speaker, the point was we wanted to give Russia an out. We knew what happened. Again, the policy, ``Don\'t do anything to embarrass Boris Yeltsin. Ignore the reality. Pretend it did not occur.\'\' That is what we did. But the worst part about that, Mr. Speaker, is Lieutenant Daly\'s career was ruined. He had had a stellar career up until that point in time, he was bypassed for two promotions, his superior officer told him this, and I want to quote what he said to him. He said, ``Jack, you don\'t know the pressure I\'m under to get rid of your case.\'\' Amazing, Mr. Speaker, in America, that a 16-year career naval intelligence officer who is harmed by a Russian laser generator, only trying to get the satisfaction of his country defending him, would be told by his superior officer, ``Jack, you don\'t know the pressure I\'m under to get rid of this case.\'\' Finally, because of the pressure of Norm Dicks, a good friend on the Democrat side, and Members on this side, including myself who have raised a stink on this issue, who have told Secretary Cohen and the Navy that we will not tolerate this activity, just last week the administration announced they are now going to re-review whether or not Lieutenant Daly has been mistreated in his effort to secure a promotion to the next rank in the service, another indication of this overriding policy of reinforcing Yeltsin and that relationship under any circumstances. But let us get to the real problem, and that deals with the IMF funding. Mr. Speaker, we had a golden opportunity. The reformers took over and when Yeltsin first started out, he was a Godsend. He was standing up, reinforcing Gorbachev, standing on top of those tanks and defying the Communists to take him out as Russia was moving toward democracy and free markets. All of us, and me included, stood behind him and said, ``We want you to succeed.\'\' But we got mixed up along the way, Mr. Speaker. We got so enamored with Yeltsin that when he did stupid things, instead of saying, ``Mr. President, these people that you\'re putting in charge of these state enterprises, these multibillion-dollar enterprises that are going to become your banking system, these people that are going to run your huge state enterprises, are not qualified. You\'re picking them on the basis of friendship and ties as opposed to what is best for your country.\'\' We set in motion the beginning, in my opinion, of the economic turmoil that Russia is experiencing today. Mr. Speaker, all along the way, when we saw Yeltsin doing stupid things, when we saw the oligarchs, the seven oligarchs, most of whom were no more qualified to be the manager of a big bank than I am in Russia, we stood back and we did not engage, because we did not want to offend Boris Yeltsin, we did not want to offend the group of intelligentsia and the oligarchy that was running Russia, because we felt that was our solution. For the first few years it worked, when Yeltsin was strong and Clinton was strong, the policy worked and our countries were making some progress but we were not willing to be candid. Where are we today? Yeltsin\'s popularity is less than 5 percent, our own President has his own problems, but in Russia, what are the Russian people saying? ``America, you\'re not our friend. You saw these things occurring and you did nothing.\'\' You knew what was going on. How can the Russian people respect us today, Mr. Speaker? They saw what was happening. How can the members of the elected Duma respect us? The only time we came to them was when after the fact and all the economic problems occurred, and the IMF was very weary about putting more money into Russia. We said to the Duma, ``You\'ve got to pass tough legislation. You\'ve got to reform your finance system. You\'ve got to collect more taxes. You\'ve got to make your people pay electric bills and water bills, which they never paid before under communism. You\'ve got to get tough with your people or we\'re not going to give you more money.\'\' And the Duma basically thumbed their nose at the IMF, they thumbed their nose at Yeltsin, and they thumbed their nose at America. Why? Because the Duma deputy said, and I think rightfully so, ``Wait a minute. You now come to us in 1998 and 1999, and you ask us to pass tough reforms, but you did not involve us when all of this honey was being given out. You didn\'t involve us when you were sending Boris Yeltsin\'s friends the billions of dollars of IMF and World Bank money, when you were sending everything through central Moscow siphoned off by Yeltsin\'s crony friends instead of helping the Russian people, and now you want us to make the tough decisions. You want us to go to our constituents who see the turmoil in our country, and you want us to do the right thing.\'\' Is there any wonder the Duma said, ``No way\'\'? Mr. Speaker, our policies failed. We failed to help Russia establish a true democracy, a strong president, and Yeltsin could have been for the long term a strong President, ended up not being a strong President. And a strong parliament, one that could work in tandem, as we have in this country, a check and a balance. Instead, we put all of our eggs into Yeltsin\'s basket, and we ended up with a basket of broken eggs, and now we are being asked to pay the price, and it is not small chicken feed, Mr. Speaker. Twenty billion dollars at a minimum into Russia\'s economy. Is there any benefit to the Russian people? I would say no. Three hundred million dollars for the coal industry to help Russian coal miners; where did that money go? It ended up lining somebody\'s pocket, building some residences on the French Riviera, buying real estate property in America, and leaving the Russian people holding the bag to pay all that money back. And where was America? Where was America telling the Russians the tough things they had to hear? When we saw the Russians transferring technology, we did not have to embarrass Boris Yeltsin. We simply had to offer him our help to work with him to identify the people selling this technology and to tell him we are going to take efforts to go after those companies. We do that in America all the time. If a company in America is illegally selling products to nations that are unstable, we make no hesitation about punishing them. I do not care if they are in my district or not. I want them punished. The same thing should have applied in Russia. If we had entities that we knew were violating arms control agreements, we should have punished them, and we should have been consistent, and we should have been fair, and we should have showed them that our goal was not to embarrass Yeltsin, it was not to embarrass Russia. It was to stop proliferation to nations like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea. That is the problem. And when we saw the IMF money being drained away, we should have told President Yeltsin that we are not going to tolerate this, we are not going to stand for this. But what did we do? We turned our head. We turned our cheek. There is a report running in the media that Vice President Gore was given at least one major CIA brief that linked Chernomyrdin directly to corruption in Russia. The Vice President is a good friend, was a good friend of Chernomyrdin, wrote across that document: Bull, and you complete the rest, and sent it back to the CIA. He did not want to hear it; he did not want to hear the facts. We wonder why Russia is an economic and political basket case today, Mr. Speaker. Our policies encouraged the kind of disarray that we are currently seeing in Russia\'s economy. There is an alternative way, Mr. Speaker, and as we begin hearings on who lost Russia, as we saw the New York Times 3 weeks ago on a front-page magazine story on who lost Russia and then followed that up with a Washington Post story this past weekend, and as the Congress begins to hold hearings on this whole issue, and by the way, Mr. Speaker, I think that Congress also has to bear some of the responsibility, and that includes my own party, and as I said before, some of these policies started under President Bush, so I am not saying it is all partisan, but I can tell you this President and his administration have exacerbated the problem unbelievably. But how do we solve it? Well, there are some solutions. Mr. Speaker, I am Russia\'s toughest critic, but I am Russia\'s best friend. I have been there 19 times. I know the Russian people; I know their leaders. When I saw the possibility that this Congress would not support more IMF funding and that Russia perhaps could have a meltdown, complete meltdown, with a major nuclear force still in place, more destabilized today than any point in time under communism because under communism they had discipline, they had the rule of law, they did not have the corruption they have today. Today they have corruption, they do not have the rule of law, and they have instability. So I was concerned that I needed to get our colleagues to support the President even though I disagree with the positions he was taking in terms of IMF funding. So I went to Moscow and arrived the day the President left a year ago, and I took with me, Mr. Speaker, a set of eight principles because I knew the Duma was opposed to IMF funding just as the Congress was. Now you might say why would the Russian Duma be against us putting another $4 billion in the Russian economy. Well, why? Because the Duma knew Yeltsin\'s cronies and friends, and they were going to be left to hold the bag to pay the bill, and they were going to be asked to pass the reforms and had no say in where the money was going or how it was being spent. That is why they opposed IMF funding. So I said to my Duma friends, ``Here are eight principles. Look at these eight principles. If you can agree with these principles, I will go back to Washington, to my leadership in Congress, and I\'ll see if they\'ll agree that you pass these principles in the Duma in the morning,\'\' since it was an 8-hour time difference, ``and we\'ll pass these eight principles in the Congress in the afternoon on the same day. These principles will guide all funding going into your country from the west, international funding, World Bank funding, funding from the IMF and U.S. funding, a billion dollars a year going to Russia.\'\' What are the eight principles? Here they are, Mr. Speaker, in summary. I will put the full eight principles in the Congressional Record. Number one, Mr. Speaker, that we establish a joint U.S.-Russian legislative oversight commission of elected officials to monitor every dime of money going into Russia, not to say where it should go; that is up to administrations; but to monitor where it is going. Today there is no such capability, and much of the money is being siphoned off illegally, and the Russian Duma has no ability to monitor what Yeltsin does with the money or his people. So establish a legislative oversight commission, Democrats and Republicans joining with all the factions of the Duma and the Federation Council and monitor where the money is going. Number two, to focus our resources on programs like housing mortgages that benefit and create a Russian middle class. If you look at America\'s economy, our success economically is because when housing starts are up, our economy is strong, and our housing starts are up when mortgage rates are low. Russia has no mortgage system. Three years ago, Charles Taylor and I went to Moscow and we said to the Russian leaders, ``Work with us on a private mortgage program like our Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and if you agree to our tight discipline, we will go to the Congress and try to get some seed money.\'\' The Duma deputies agreed. Here is the document we produced, Mr. Speaker, 2 years ago: Housing For Our People, a picture of the Capitol Building and the Duma. You know there is no White House in either picture? There is no Washington White House, and there is no White House where President Yeltsin works. It is the two capital buildings. It is where the two parliaments work, the parliaments of the Duma wanting to establish a private, western style housing mortgage financing system. Our goal was in this second principle to say that programs that encourage a middle class are what we should be providing funds for. Number three, that we should agree that western resources should be made available to reform-minded regional governments. Russia is a large Nation, over 60 States and oblasts, and many of the regions are doing good things. They are privatizing their property, they are collecting more taxes, they are having people pay for their utilities. But because all the money went through Yeltsin in Moscow, those regions were not being recognized and rewarded. The money was being siphoned off to Yeltsin\'s cronies, and the regions who are reforming were standing there saying, ``We\'re doing the things you told us, America; when are you going to help us?\'\' And the help never came, and our policy was let us focus on regions where they are doing good things and help them continue to do good things. All around Russia, out in Siberia, Vladivostok, St. Petersburg, Nizhni- novgorod, Samara, all around the country, the fourth principal: Deny Moscow-based institutions any additional funds where we know they have abused IMF World Bank and U.S. dollars. If we know a bank is corrupt, hard and fast rule, they get no more money. And in fact let us go after those perpetrators and try to collect the money they abused. Number five, reform International Monetary Fund. This was a recommendation that I got after talking to George Soros in his office in New York to convene a blue ribbon task force that the IMF would then listen to that would tell it how to be responsive and make reforms to be more accountable to emerging economies like Russia. Number six, and boy is this significant to put the horse in front of the cart. Reforms would precede and not follow. Resources. No reforms, no money. You make the reforms you have asked for, and then we will provide the resources you need, but no money until you do the reforms. Number seven, have a 90-day plan to establish a relationship between CEOs of American companies and Russian enterprises, a one-on-one relationship so they can learn how we develop profits in America to make their companies more profitable in Russia, to learn how to motivate workers, how to manage their costs. And the last item: To bring 15,000 young Russian students to America, undergraduate and graduate, have them attend our business, economic and finance schools all across the country, pay their way over, and get our schools to give them an education with the understanding they must go back to Russia to live. They cannot stay in America, in effect creating a new generation, the next generation of Russia\'s free market leaders. Mr. Speaker, the Duma agreed to all eight principles, all eight principles. They said, ``We\'ll do the reforms if you tell us that you\'re going to let us march to where the money\'s gone. If you let us have a say, if the regions are recognized, we\'ll do it,\'\' and they passed it. It came back to Washington, and I went to Speaker Gingrich. Speaker Gingrich said, ``Well, Curt, I don\'t know whether we want to do this, that is the administration\'s prerogative. Let me talk to the White House.\'\' The White House said, ``We don\'t need those guidelines. We don\'t need those principles. The eight principles in their entirety are as follows: Funds flowing from Western governments and International Financial Institutions (IFI) should be directed to segments of the Russian economy where they will help develop a broad Russia middle class, who will in turn have an economic stake in democratic institutions and greater economic reform. One such sector is housing, where there is an overwhelming need for greater investment and the Russian people face tremendous shortages. A major impediment to a robust housing market is that all but the most wealthy Russians lack a mechanism to finance the purchase of a home. Development of a mortgage finance system, with longer term loans (20 to 30 years) and reasonable interest rates, would greatly strengthen the Russian economy, increasing employment, tax revenues, and economic and political stability. (2) Make Western resources available to reform minded regional governments Some significant portion of the funds from Western governments and IFIs should flow from the Russian central government to the Oblasts and Krais, which are the source of most of the economic reforms occurring in Russia. Tax reform, privatization, land reform are all areas where the regions have accomplished far more than the central government in Moscow. In determining the flow of these resources to the regions, priority should be given to those regions that have and are implementing the strongest reform programs. The criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of regional economic reform programs should be clearly identified, which will assure all regions that they are being treated equitably and provide the necessary incentives for regions to implement viable economic reform agendas. (3) Deny corrupt Moscow-based financial institutions access to Western resources Greater steps must be taken to ensure accountability for previous and future resources provided by Western governments and IFIs. The simple notion that any bank, government agency, regional government, or NGO that cannot account for previously supplied funding should be ineligible for future funds must be strictly enforced. This will have the practical effect of preventing the large, corrupt Moscow based banks from accessing future IFI resources. (4) Establish a joint Russian--U.S. legislative oversight commission to monitor Western resources Opposition to further assistance from IFIs run strong in both the U.S. Congress and the Russian Duma. One way to counter this tendency and promote a stronger Duma is to create a joint Russian-U.S. Legislative Oversight Commission, composed of Members of Congress and Duma Deputies and staffed by experts in both legislatures, to monitor the use of Western government and IFI funding to ensure that the designated end recipient, not only receives the resources but uses them for the intended purposes. (5) Reform the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Both the Congress and Duma should urge the International Monetary Fund to establish an International Blue Ribbon Commission composed of the most prominent financial experts to make recommendations for reforming the IMF to achieve greater transparency and more effective programs with less financial risk. If the IMF is unwilling to create such a commission, then the Congress and Duma should consider creating its own commission of experts and then press the IMF to implement the recommendations. (6) Put the horse in front of the cart: make reforms precede--not follow--resources In all too many cases, resources from IFIs come first and promised reforms come much later, if at all. It is time to make reform precede--not follow--important economic reforms at the national and regional levels. The Yeltsin administration, the Duma, and the financial oligarches have every incentive to promise reform prior to receiving financial assistance, but they have very little incentive to make good on the promises of reform, which in the short term are often difficult for the government to implement and painful for the Russian citizens to endure. (7) Jointly develop a 90 Day Action Plan to reform de facto bankrupt industrial giants Working the Congress and the Duma, the Administrations should empanel a group of international financial experts and give them 90 days to develop a comprehensive program to reform, privatize, or shutter the industrial behemoths that are essentially bankrupt and uncompetitive in a market economy but are kept limping along by subsidies because of local political imperatives and the fact that in many areas they represent the only source of employment. Many formerly state owned enterprises (for example--food processing plants, breweries, and confectionary enterprises) have made successful transitions which make products without government subsidies that compete with imported items--clear evidence that Russian enterprises can be competitive. (8) Western government and IFI resources should go to civilian agencies and programs--not to prop up the Russian military industrial complex Nothing could do more to endanger U.S.-Russian cooperation, especially in the eyes of the Republican Congress, than using funding from Western governments and IFIs to prop up the ailing military and military-industrial complex. Both the Administrations and the legislatures need to make sure that proper controls are put in place to prevent such an eventuality. This Act may be cited as the ``Russian Economic Restoration and Justice Act of 1999\'\'. The Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286-286mm) is amended by adding at the end the following: (a) In General.--The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate shall seek to enter into negotiations with the State Duma and the Federation Council of the Russian Federation for the establishment of a commission which would-- (1) be composed of 8 Members of the United States Congress and a total of 8 Deputies from the State Duma and Federation Council; (2) monitor expenditures of the funds provided to the government of the Russian Federation or a political subdivision of the Russian Federation by the United States or the international community, for the purpose of evaluating that the funds are used for only for the purposes for which provided; and (3) create a working group of financial experts tasked with developing a comprehensive program to reform, privatize, or close industrial enterprises in the Russian Federation that are bankrupt and are (or would be) not competitive under conditions of a market economy without significant government financial support. (b) Membership.--On the successful conclusion of negotiations under subsection (a), the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate are jointly authorized to appoint 8 Members of Congress to the commission established pursuant subsection (a). It is the sense of the Congress that the United States and the government of the Russian Federation should conclude an agreement under which students in the Russian Federation would enroll in colleges and universities in the United States at undergraduate and graduate levels for the purpose of developing a network of financial specialists in the Russian Federation, and students so enrolled would, on completion of their studies in the United States, be required to return to the Russian Federation and work for the federal or a regional government in Russia. The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at the Fund to use the voice and vote of the United States to urge the Fund to create a commission, composed of prominent international financial experts, for the purpose of drawing up recommendations for reforming the Fund, with a view to achieving more transparency in the structures of the Fund and increasing the effectiveness of Fund programs while decreasing financial risk. (a) Loan Program.--There is hereby established a pilot housing loan program for the people of Russia, with such funds as may be made available, as the means by which the average Russian citizen may attain affordable home ownership. (b) Restrictions.--None of the funds under this section may be made available-- (1) for transfer to the Government of Russia; or (2) for the purposes of providing Russian military housing. (c) Establishment of Administering Corporation.--Funds appropriated under this section shall be administered in the following manner: (1) Such sums as may be made available for this pilot Russian housing loan program shall be administered directly through a nonprofit corporation (hereinafter the ``Corporation\'\'), consisting of a 12-member Board of Directors, the members of which shall be: (A) Former President George Bush or his designee. (B) Former President Jimmy Carter or his designee. (C) Two members appointed by the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. (D) One member appointed by the minority leader of the United States House of Representatives. (E) Two members appointed by the majority leader of the United States Senate. (F) One member appointed by the minority leader of the United States Senate. (G) Two members appointed by the Chairman of the Russian State Duma. (H) Two members appointed by the Chairman of the Russian Federation Council. (2) A Chairman of the Board of Directors shall be selected from among the 12 board members. The chairman shall serve a single 2-year term. The entire Board of Directors shall serve a 2-year term and have the authority to select other officers and employees to carry out the purposes of the Fund and the program. (d) Loan Size and Type.--Since it is the intent of the housing loan program to provide loans for the average middle- income potential Russian home buyer, loans shall range between the equivalent of $10,000 to $50,000 (U.S.). This amount shall be determined by the Corporation and shall fluctuate in accordance upon market conditions. Loans shall be for a term of 10 to 30 years and may be prepaid at any time without penalty. Loan payments shall be amortized on a basis of level monthly payments. (c) Working Groups.--The Corporation shall have the authority to establish working groups comprised of Russian and American experts, for the purpose of making recommendations on topics essential to the success of the program, including, but not limited to-- (1) the preparation of the necessary legal and regulatory changes; (2) the involvement of United States housing trade and labor associations in providing materials, training, and joint venture capital; (3) ensuring adequate offsite infrastructure for new housing sites; and (4) other issues as deemed appropriate by the Corporation. The Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286-286mm) is amended by adding at the end the following: (a) In General.--The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate shall seek to enter into negotiations with the State Duma of the Russian Federation for the establishment of a bipartisan commission which would-- (1) be composed of 8 Members of the United States Congress representing both political parties, and 8 Deputies of the State Duma who are broadly representative of political interests; (2) monitor expenditures of the funds provided to the government of the Russian Federation or a political subdivision of the Russian Federation by the United States or the international community, for the purpose of evaluating that the funds are used only for the purposes for which provided; and (3) create a working group of financial experts tasked with developing a comprehensive program to reform, privatize, or close industrial enterprises in the Russian Federation that are bankrupt and are (or would be) not competitive under conditions of a market economy without significant government financial support. (b) Membership.--On the successful conclusion of negotiations under subsection (a), the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate are jointly authorized to appoint 8 Members of Congress to the commission established pursuant subsection (a). It is the sense of the Congress that the United States and the government of the Russian Federation should conclude an agreement under which students in the Russian Federation would enroll in colleges and universities in the United States at undergraduate and graduate levels for the purpose of developing a network of financial specialists in the Russian Federation, and students so enrolled would, on completion of their studies in the United States, be required to return to the Russian Federation and work for the federal or a regional government in Russia. Speaker Gingrich, my Republican leader, said,\'\' I\'m not going to bring that up, Curt, as a bill.\'\' So it is not just the Democrats\' fault, Mr. Speaker. The President of the United States did not listen, Strobe Talbott thought he knew it all, and our Speaker did not respond either. Speaker is gone now, Mr. Speaker, and I am asking this Congress to consider a new dialogue with Russia where we in the Congress, the Senate and the House, the Duma and the Federation Council come together and we take control of this relationship in setting out some basic parameters, not in dictating when and where money should be used, but laying out parameters like the ones that I negotiated and discussed with my Russian friends as the chairman of the Duma Congress initiative with the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) and passed this in both bodies and tell whatever President wins election next year these are the parameters for our relationship with Russia in the future. Mr. Speaker, I also developed what I call a new vision for Russia, a series of principles of how we can assist Russia in getting through these difficult times. I would also ask to insert in the Record at this time my new vision for Russia: establishing a new framework for u.s.-russian relations Working with my colleagues in the Duma, I have developed a joint statement of principles governing Western and IFI assistance to Russia. For too long, the United States has poured money into Russia without proper control or oversight. As a result, this money has lined the pockets of the wealthy, while average Russians have seen no improvement in their standards of living. Therefore, I am working on a bold new agenda so that this money will be made available to reform-minded regional governments. In order for financial assistance to make an effect on the lives of the Russian people, we must ensure that the system is reformed before the money is invested. An original supporter of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, I have worked tirelessly against proposed funding reductions in that effort--working to defeat amendments that would cut CTR funds and related amendments which would withhold CTR funds pending official reports and action from the Russian government. I was also instrumental in extending Nunn-Lugar assistance beyond dismantlement support to assisting former Soviet states with better protection of their nuclear assets, as well as establishing better systems of control and accountability. In 1996, I created the Duma-Congress Study Group, an on-going parliamentary exchange between the U.S. Congress and the Russian Duma. The goal of the Study Group is to foster closer relations between our two legislatures so that we can help address key bilateral issues, across a wide range of substantive issues. The future of Russian\'s democracy is dependent on the strength of the Duma, and I hope that these continuing discussions on substantive issues will provide a basis upon which to continue building. I have also initiated a similar exchange program for staff members of the U.S. Congress and the Russian Duma in an effort to establish a personal and direct communication link for the staff support of our two countries\' legislatures. A successful mortgage finance system will reduce unemployment, increase democratization, strengthen the banking system, create wealth for Russian families, encourage commercial reforms, and increase the housing stock. With mutual support between the Russian Duma and the United States Congress, I believe that these goals can be achieved. I remain committed to the establishment of a mortgage finance system, and I will continue to pursue legislation in this area in the U.S. Congress. In 1992, recognizing that energy was the key to transforming the former Soviet republics, and that energy cooperation between the United States and the FSU could infuse much-needed hard currency into the three energy-producing republics of the former Soviet Union, I formed the United States-Former Soviet Union Energy Caucus. The group, composed of U.S. legislators, works with U.S. oil companies and Russian Duma and government counterparts to enable energy development projects in oil and gas-rich Russia. Development benefits Russians by ensuring economic development in their country and providing them with sorely-needed cash, and U.S. energy companies and the American people with new sources to meet our continuing energy needs. In January of 1998, I was the U.S. representative to Speaker Seleznev\'s conference on Russian Economic Development. I have also been working actively in my home state of Pennsylvania to encourage U.S. companies to invest in Russia. My work in this arena has included the creation of the Pennsylvania-Russia Business Council which has, with my assistance, conducted five successful workshops on U.S. investment in Russia. Education is the key to the future. In order for Russia\'s democracy to succeed, a new generation of Russians must be educated in the tenets of freedom. I am currently advocating a program which would enroll 15,000 Russian students in American colleges and universities. Following their graduation from these programs, these students would be required to return to Russia and become part of a qualified corps of future leaders and specialists. Healthcare is rapidly becoming a global service. In Greater Philadelphia, the region which I represent, I am currently supporting an effort in which the hospitals have agreed to work cooperatively on a new initiative to jointly provide healthcare services for international patients. I am also working on a proposal to bring modular hospitals to Russia. These two unique efforts will provide increased access to quality healthcare for the Russian people. As Chairman of the House Military Research and Development Subcommittee, I have played a lead role in sustaining and expanding U.S.-Russian cooperative technology development programs. Not only have I worked to ensure funding for early warning sharing programs like RAMOS and APEX, but I established a separate line item in the missile defense budget specifically for cooperative work in this field. This year, the Clinton Administration has canceled the RAMOS program, suggesting that alternative cooperative projects be pursued. Recognizing the critical role of this program in establishing cooperative links on early warning sharing and in enabling pursuit of mutual defenses, I will lead the fight this year to preserve the RAMOS effort. In an effort to sustain the work of Russian scientists and prevent proliferation of critical technologies, I have asked Academician Velikhov of the Kurchatov Institute to develop a proposal that would enable Russian scientists and engineers who developed missile technology comparable to that which was transferred to Iran for application in its Shabab-3 to work with the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization in identifying those technologies transferred to Iran and in helping the U.S. counter that technology. In addition, I am supporting other proposals that would ensure continued U.S. support for underemployed Russian scientists and engineers. I have been a leader in the U.S. Congress in raising awareness regarding the need to confront and cooperatively address the issue of radioactive waste dumping in the Arctic Ocean. I held hearings on this matter, and called Alexei Yablokov to testify on the findings of the Bellona Foundation, which documented volumes of evidence on Russian nuclear dumping which was previously unconfirmed. I have since worked to fund Navy research on this issue and worked through Global Legislators for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE) to encourage continued attention to and research on this problem. I have also supported U.S.-Russia collaboration on nuclear waste identification and cleanup work, holding several hearings on U.S. and Russian waste problems and potential cooperative projects, and securing funding through the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation program in 1999 for sponsorship of a conference in Russia to address this issue. And finally, Mr. Speaker, I would say that in dealing with Russia it is very simple, and you know I think Ronald Reagan had it right. Remember when Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union ``Evil Empire"? Well, you know something, Mr. Speaker? The 95 percent of the Russians who were not members of the Communist Party heard him and agreed with him. They knew that their country was the Evil Empire. They knew that it was abusing their rights. They knew the communism was not good for them. They respected Ronald Reagan because he spoke the truth. Russians respect strength, they respect consistency, and they respect candor. When they see you turning your cheek, when they know that you know that things are going wrong, when they see you pretend things are not what they are, when they see you bolster up a man who is not doing what is in the best interest for Russia, they lose respect. That is why the Russians today have no respect for us, in my opinion, Mr. Speaker. We have to earn the respect of the Russians by being strong, by being candid, and by being transparent and consistent. If we do that, I am convinced Russia can be an equal, stable partner of us. We have to ask the tough questions. We have to ask what Russia is doing building a multibillion underground complex in the Ural Mountains at Yamantau Mountain, the size of the Washington beltway, deep enough to withstand a nuclear first strike hit. This administration has not been able to get the answer to that question because they will not pursue the issue. I work with the CIA on a regular basis; and I can say today, the administration knows no more about that project today than they did 5 years ago when I first raised it. We do not have the respect of the Russians under the current relationship and policies. Therefore, I am convinced that this body needs to explore in great detail what we have done wrong, what we have done right and, most importantly, lay out a plan for the future, a plan that looks at where Russia is today; and what we can do as a Nation, working with the Russian people who are our friends, to build a new Russia, a strong Russia, a Russia with a freely elected president who works closely with our President and a new Duma that works with our Congress, a freely elected Duma, even if it includes Communists. Remember what I said, Mr. Speaker. How can this administration say that we had to work with Yeltsin because of our fear of the Communists? At least the Communists in Russia were elected in free and fair elections, as much as we did not like it. I wish I could say the same about the Communists in China, which this administration falls all over on a regular basis. If the Communists are those elected by the Russian people, we have to work with them. It does not mean we have to embrace them. It does not mean we do not want to help the pro-Western forces, the formers like the Apple party, the Yabloko party, the Nash Dom, the People\'s Power party. We still work with them, but we work with all factions in Russia. My hope is, as we complete this first half of this session, the focus on Russia becomes a dominant focus. As we approach the presidential elections, this country needs to have a national debate in a constructive way over what happened, why did it happen, where did $20 billion go, what did we get for that investment, and why are the Russian people more negative about America today than they were when they were dominated by a Soviet Communist system?', u" Mr. GOSS submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 1555), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes: Conference Report (H. Rept. 106-457) The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 1555), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amendment, insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIESSec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.Sec. 105. Authorization of emergency supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1999. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEMSec. 201. Authorization of appropriations. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONSSec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.Sec. 303. Diplomatic intelligence support centers.Sec. 304. Protection of identity of retired covert agents.Sec. 305. Access to computers and computer data of executive branch employees with access to classified information.Sec. 306. Naturalization of certain persons affiliated with a Communist or similar party.Sec. 307. Technical amendment.Sec. 308. Declassification review of intelligence estimate on Vietnam- era prisoners of war and missing in action personnel and critical assessment of estimate.Sec. 309. Report on legal standards applied for electronic surveillance.Sec. 310. Report on effects of foreign espionage on the United States.Sec. 311. Report on activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile.Sec. 312. Report on Kosova Liberation Army.Sec. 313. Reaffirmation of longstanding prohibition against drug trafficking by employees of the intelligence community.Sec. 314. Sense of Congress on classification and declassification.Sec. 315. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting. TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYSec. 401. Improvement and extension of central services program.Sec. 402. Extension of CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act. TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIESSec. 501. Protection of operational files of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Sec. 502. Funding for infrastructure and quality of life improvements at Menwith Hill and Bad Aibling stations. TITLE VI--FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONSSec. 601. Expansion of definition of ``agent of a foreign power'' for purposes of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.Sec. 602. Federal Bureau of Investigation reports to other executive agencies on results of counterintelligence activities. TITLE VII--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICESec. 701. Findings.Sec. 702. National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office.Sec. 703. Duties of commission.Sec. 704. Powers of commission.Sec. 705. Staff of commission.Sec. 706. Compensation and travel expenses.Sec. 707. Treatment of information relating to national security.Sec. 708. Final report; termination.Sec. 709. Assessments of final report.Sec. 710. Inapplicability of certain administrative provisions.Sec. 711. Funding.Sec. 712. Congressional intelligence committees defined. TITLE VIII--INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKINGSec. 801. Short title.Sec. 802. Findings and policy.Sec. 803. Purpose.Sec. 804. Public identification of significant foreign narcotics traffickers and required reports.Sec. 805. Blocking assets and prohibiting transactions.Sec. 806. Authorities.Sec. 807. Enforcement.Sec. 808. Definitions.Sec. 809. Exclusion of persons who have benefited from illicit activities of drug traffickers.Sec. 810. Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Asset Control.Sec. 811. Effective date. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2000 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The National Reconnaissance Office. (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2000, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 1555 of the One Hundred Sixth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the Executive branch. SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2000 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2000 the sum of $170,672,000. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized a total of 348 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2000. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Community Management Account element or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account by subsection (a), there is also authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2000 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until September 30, 2001. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Community Management Account as of September 30, 2000, there is hereby authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as is specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2000, any officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of an element within the Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $27,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2001, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2002. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the United States funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for activities of the Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. SEC. 105. AUTHORIZATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999. (a) Authorization.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1999 under section 101 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-272) for the conduct of the intelligence activities of elements of the United States Government listed in such section are hereby increased, with respect to any such authorized amount, by the amount by which appropriations pursuant to such authorization were increased by the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (Public Law 106-31), for such amounts as are designated by Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(b)(2)(A)). (b) Ratification.--For purposes of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any obligation or expenditure of amounts appropriated in the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for intelligence activities is hereby ratified and confirmed, to the extent such amounts are designated by Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2000 the sum of $209,100,000. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. SEC. 303. DIPLOMATIC INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CENTERS. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``limitation on establishment or operation of diplomatic intelligence support centers ``Sec. 115. (a) In General.--(1) A diplomatic intelligence support center may not be established, operated, or maintained without the prior approval of the Director of Central Intelligence. ``(2) The Director may only approve the establishment, operation, or maintenance of a diplomatic intelligence support center if the Director determines that the establishment, operation, or maintenance of such center is required to provide necessary intelligence support in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States. ``(b) Prohibition of Use of Appropriations.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to authorizations by law for intelligence and intelligence-related activities may not be obligated or expended for the establishment, operation, or maintenance of a diplomatic intelligence support center that is not approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. ``(c) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) The term `diplomatic intelligence support center' means an entity to which employees of the various elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4)) are detailed for the purpose of providing analytical intelligence support that-- ``(A) consists of intelligence analyses on military or political matters and expertise to conduct limited assessments and dynamic taskings for a chief of mission; and ``(B) is not intelligence support traditionally provided to a chief of mission by the Director of Central Intelligence. ``(2) The term `chief of mission' has the meaning given that term by section 102(3) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3902(3)), and includes ambassadors at large and ministers of diplomatic missions of the United States, or persons appointed to lead United States offices abroad designated by the Secretary of State as diplomatic in nature. ``(d) Termination.--This section shall cease to be effective on October 1, 2000.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents contained in the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 114 the following new item:``Sec. 115. Limitation on establishment or operation of diplomatic intelligence support centers.''. SEC. 304. PROTECTION OF IDENTITY OF RETIRED COVERT AGENTS. (a) In General.--Section 606(4)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 426(4)(A)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``an officer or employee'' and inserting ``a present or retired officer or employee''; and (2) by striking ``a member'' and inserting ``a present or retired member''. (b) Prison Sentences for Violations.-- (1) Imposition of consecutive sentences.--Section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d) A term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be consecutive to any other sentence of imprisonment.''. (2) Technical amendments.--Such section 601 is further amended-- (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``shall be fined not more than $50,000'' and inserting ``shall be fined under title 18, United States Code,''; (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``shall be fined not more than $25,000'' and inserting ``shall be fined under title 18, United States Code,''; and (C) in subsection (c), by striking ``shall be fined not more than $15,000'' and inserting ``shall be fined under title 18, United States Code,''. SEC. 305. ACCESS TO COMPUTERS AND COMPUTER DATA OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH EMPLOYEES WITH ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. (a) Access.--Section 801(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 435(a)(3)) is amended by striking ``and travel records'' and inserting ``travel records, and computers used in the performance of government duties''. (b) Computer Defined.--Section 804 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 438) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (6); (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (7) and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(8) the term `computer' means any electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device and any data or other information stored or contained in such device.''. (c) Applicability.--The President shall modify the procedures required by section 801(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 to take into account the amendment to that section made by subsection (a) of this section not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 306. NATURALIZATION OF CERTAIN PERSONS AFFILIATED WITH A COMMUNIST OR SIMILAR PARTY. Section 313 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1424) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e) A person may be naturalized under this title without regard to the prohibitions in subsections (a)(2) and (c) of this section if the person-- ``(1) is otherwise eligible for naturalization; ``(2) is within the class described in subsection (a)(2) solely because of past membership in, or past affiliation with, a party or organization described in that subsection; ``(3) does not fall within any other of the classes described in that subsection; and ``(4) is determined by the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, and with the concurrence of the Attorney General, to have made a contribution to the national security or to the national intelligence mission of the United States.''. SEC. 307. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT. Section 305(b)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-293, 110 Stat. 3465; 8 U.S.C. 1427 note) is amended by striking ``subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of section 243(h)(2) of such Act'' and inserting ``clauses (i) through (iv) of section 241(b)(3)(B) of such Act''. SEC. 308. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON VIETNAM-ERA PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION PERSONNEL AND CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF ESTIMATE. (a) Declassification Review.--Subject to subsection (b), the Director of Central Intelligence shall review for declassification the following: (1) National Intelligence Estimate 98-03 dated April 1998 and entitled ``Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue''. (2) The assessment dated November 1998 and entitled ``A Critical Assessment of National Intelligence Estimate 98-03 prepared by the United States Chairman of the Vietnam War Working Group of the United States-Russia Joint Commission on POWs and MIAs''. (b) Limitations.--The Director shall not declassify any text contained in the estimate or assessment referred to in subsection (a) which would-- (1) reveal intelligence sources and methods; or (2) disclose by name the identity of a living foreign individual who has cooperated with United States efforts to account for missing personnel from the Vietnam era. (c) Deadline.--The Director shall complete the declassification review of the estimate and assessment under subsection (a) not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 309. REPORT ON LEGAL STANDARDS APPLIED FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE. (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Attorney General shall jointly prepare, and the Director of the National Security Agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, a report in classified and unclassified form providing a detailed analysis of the legal standards employed by elements of the intelligence community in conducting signals intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance. (b) Matters Specifically Addressed.--The report shall specifically include a statement of each of the following legal standards: (1) The legal standards for interception of communications when such interception may result in the acquisition of information from a communication to or from United States persons. (2) The legal standards for intentional targeting of the communications to or from United States persons. (3) The legal standards for receipt from non-United States sources of information pertaining to communications to or from United States persons. (4) The legal standards for dissemination of information acquired through the interception of the communications to or from United States persons. (c) Definitions.--As used in this section: (1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (2) The term ``United States persons'' has the meaning given that term under section 101(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(i)). (3) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate. SEC. 310. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE ON THE UNITED STATES. Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report describing the effects of espionage against the United States, conducted by or on behalf of other nations, on United States trade secrets, patents, and technology development. The report shall also include an analysis of other effects of such espionage on the United States. SEC. 311. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN CHILE. (a) In General.--By not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing all activities of officers, covert agents, and employees of all elements in the intelligence community with respect to the following events in the Republic of Chile: (1) The assassination of President Salvador Allende in September 1973. (2) The accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency of the Republic of Chile. (3) Violations of human rights committed by officers or agents of former President Pinochet. (b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. SEC. 312. REPORT ON KOSOVA LIBERATION ARMY. (a) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report (in both classified and unclassified form) on the organized resistance in Kosovo known as the Kosova Liberation Army. The report shall include the following: (1) A summary of the history of the Kosova Liberation Army. (2) As of the date of the enactment of this Act-- (A) the number of individuals currently participating in or supporting combat operations of the Kosova Liberation Army (fielded forces), and the number of individuals in training for such service (recruits); (B) the types, and quantity of each type, of weapon employed by the Kosova Liberation Army, the training afforded to such fielded forces in the use of such weapons, and the sufficiency of such training to conduct effective military operations; and (C) minimum additional weaponry and training required to improve substantially the efficacy of such military operations. (3) An estimate of the percentage of funding (if any) of the Kosova Liberation Army that is attributable to profits from the sale of illicit narcotics. (4) A description of the involvement (if any) of the Kosova Liberation Army in terrorist activities. (5) A description of the number of killings of noncombatant civilians (if any) carried out by the Kosova Liberation Army since its formation. (6) A description of the leadership of the Kosova Liberation Army, including an analysis of-- (A) the political philosophy and program of the leadership; and (B) the sentiment of the leadership toward the United States. (b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--As used in this section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. SEC. 313. REAFFIRMATION OF LONGSTANDING PROHIBITION AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING BY EMPLOYEES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Finding.--Congress finds that longstanding statutes, regulations, and policies of the United States prohibit employees, agents, and assets of the elements of the intelligence community, and of every other Federal department and agency, from engaging in the illegal manufacture, purchase, sale, transport, and distribution of drugs. (b) Obligation of Employees of Intelligence Community.--Any employee of the intelligence community having knowledge of a fact or circumstance that reasonably indicates that an employee, agent, or asset of an element of the intelligence community is involved in any activity that violates a statute, regulation, or policy described in subsection (a) shall report such knowledge to an appropriate official. (c) Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION. It is the sense of Congress that the systematic declassification of records of permanent historical value is in the public interest and that the management of classification and declassification by Executive branch agencies requires comprehensive reform and the dedication by the Executive branch of additional resources. SEC. 315. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING. It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the United States. TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SEC. 401. IMPROVEMENT AND EXTENSION OF CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM. (a) Scope of Provision of Items and Services.--Subsection (a) of section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended by striking ``and to other'' and inserting ``, nonappropriated fund entities or instrumentalities associated or affiliated with the Agency, and other''. (b) Deposits in Central Services Working Capital Fund.-- Subsection (c)(2) of that section is amended-- (1) by amending subparagraph (D) to read as follows: ``(D) Amounts received in payment for loss or damage to equipment or property of a central service provider as a result of activities under the program.''; (2) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F); and (3) by inserting after subparagraph (D), as so amended, the following new subparagraph (E): ``(E) Other receipts from the sale or exchange of equipment or property of a central service provider as a result of activities under the program.''. (c) Availability of Fees.--Subsection (f)(2)(A) of that section is amended by inserting ``central service providers and any'' before ``elements of the Agency''. (d) Extension of Program.--Subsection (h)(1) of that section is amended by striking ``March 31, 2000'' and inserting ``March 31, 2002''. SEC. 402. EXTENSION OF CIA VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT. (a) Extension of Authority.--Section 2(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended by striking ``September 30, 1999'' and inserting ``September 30, 2002''. (b) Remittance of Funds.--Section 2(i) of that Act is amended by striking ``or fiscal year 1999'' and inserting ``, 1999, 2000, 2001, or 2002''. TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SEC. 501. PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY. (a) In General.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 105A (50 U.S.C. 403-5a) the following new section: ``protection of operational files of the national imagery and mapping agency ``Sec. 105B. (a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files From Search, Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) The Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, with the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence, may exempt operational files of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency from the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, which require publication, disclosure, search, or review in connection therewith. ``(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for the purposes of this section, the term `operational files' means files of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as `NIMA') concerning the activities of NIMA that before the establishment of NIMA were performed by the National Photographic Interpretation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency (NPIC), that document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems. ``(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated intelligence are not operational files. ``(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational files shall continue to be subject to search and review for information concerning-- ``(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have requested information on themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 or 552a of title 5, United States Code; ``(B) any special activity the existence of which is not exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code; or ``(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the conduct of an intelligence activity: ``(i) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. ``(ii) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. ``(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board. ``(iv) The Department of Justice. ``(v) The Office of General Counsel of NIMA. ``(vi) The Office of the Director of NIMA. ``(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) which contain information derived or disseminated from exempted operational files shall be subject to search and review. ``(B) The inclusion of information from exempted operational files in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) shall not affect the exemption under paragraph (1) of the originating operational files from search, review, publication, or disclosure. ``(C) Records from exempted operational files which have been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) and which have been returned to exempted operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review. ``(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded except by a provision of law which is enacted after the date of the enactment of this section, and which specifically cites and repeals or modifies its provisions. ``(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever any person who has requested agency records under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, alleges that NIMA has withheld records improperly because of failure to comply with any provision of this section, judicial review shall be available under the terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code. ``(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows: ``(i) In any case in which information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court by NIMA, such information shall be examined ex parte, in camera by the court. ``(ii) The court shall, to the fullest extent practicable, determine the issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties. ``(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records are improperly withheld because of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of operational files, NIMA shall meet its burden under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission that exempted operational files likely to contain responsible records currently perform the functions set forth in paragraph (2). ``(II) The court may not order NIMA to review the content of any exempted operational file or files in order to make the demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the complainant disputes NIMA's showing with a sworn written submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence. ``(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 36. ``(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NIMA has improperly withheld requested records because of failure to comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall order NIMA to search and review the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records and make such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance with the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and such order shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to comply with this subsection. ``(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint pursuant to this paragraph NIMA agrees to search the appropriate exempted operational file or files for the requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based upon such complaint. ``(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated with the Director of Central Intelligence prior to submission to the court. ``(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) Not less than once every ten years, the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions may be removed from the category of exempted files or any portion thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must approve any determination to remove such exemptions. ``(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of the particular category of files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying a significant part of the information contained therein. ``(3) A complainant that alleges that NIMA has improperly withheld records because of failure to comply with this subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of the United States of the district in which any of the parties reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, the court's review shall be limited to determining the following: ``(A) Whether NIMA has conducted the review required by paragraph (1) before the expiration of the ten-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this section or before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the date of the most recent review. ``(B) Whether NIMA, in fact, considered the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.''. (2) The table of contents contained in the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 105A the following new item:``Sec. 105B. Protection of operational files of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.''. (b) Treatment of Certain Transferred Records.--Any record transferred to the National Imagery and Mapping Agency from exempted operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency covered by section 701(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431(a)) shall be placed in the operational files of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency that are established pursuant to section 105B of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a). SEC. 502. FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND QUALITY OF LIFE IMPROVEMENTS AT MENWITH HILL AND BAD AIBLING STATIONS. Section 506(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-93; 109 Stat. 974), as amended by section 502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-107; 111 Stat. 2262), is further amended by striking ``for fiscal years 1998 and 1999'' and inserting ``for fiscal years 2000 and 2001''. TITLE VI--FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS SEC. 601. EXPANSION OF DEFINITION OF ``AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER'' FOR PURPOSES OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978. Section 101(b)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(b)(2)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``or'' at the end; (2) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E); and (3) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new subparagraph (D): ``(D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or''. SEC. 602. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION REPORTS TO OTHER EXECUTIVE AGENCIES ON RESULTS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. Section 811(c)(2) of the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 (title VIII of Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3455; 50 U.S.C. 402a(c)(2)) is amended by striking ``after a report has been provided pursuant to paragraph (1)(A)''. TITLE VII--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE SEC. 701. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) Imagery and signals intelligence satellites are vitally important to the security of the Nation. (2) The National Reconnaissance Office (in this title referred to as the ``NRO'') and its predecessor organizations have helped protect and defend the United States for more than 30 years. (3) The end of the Cold War and the enormous growth in usage of information technology have changed the environment in which the intelligence community must operate. At the same time, the intelligence community has undergone significant changes in response to dynamic developments in strategy and in budgetary matters. The acquisition and maintenance of satellite systems are essential to providing timely intelligence to national policymakers and achieving information superiority for military leaders. (4) There is a need to evaluate the roles and mission, organizational structure, technical skills, contractor relationships, use of commercial imagery, acquisition of launch vehicles, launch services, and launch infrastructure, mission assurance, acquisition authorities, and relationship to other agencies and departments of the Federal Government of the NRO in order to assure continuing success in satellite reconnaissance in the new millennium. SEC. 702. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE. (a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be known as the ``National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office'' (in this title referred to as the ``Commission''). (b) Composition.--The Commission shall be composed of eleven members, as follows: (1) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management. (2) Three members appointed by the Majority Leader of the Senate, in consultation with the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, one from Members of the Senate and two from private life. (3) Two members appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate, in consultation with the Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, one from Members of the Senate and one from private life. (4) Three members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, in consultation with the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, one from Members of the House of Representatives and two from private life. (5) Two members appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, in consultation with the ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, one from Members of the House of Representatives and one from private life. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be an ex officio member of the Commission. (c) Membership.--(1) The individuals appointed as members of the Commission shall be individuals who are nationally recognized for expertise, knowledge, or experience in-- (A) technical intelligence collection systems and methods; (B) research and development programs; (C) acquisition management; (D) use of intelligence information by national policymakers and military leaders; or (E) the implementation, funding, or oversight of the national security policies of the United States. (2) An official who appoints members of the Commission may not appoint an individual as a member of the Commission if, in the judgment of the official, such individual possesses any personal or financial interest in the discharge of any of the duties of the Commission. (3) All members of the Commission appointed from private life shall possess an appropriate security clearance in accordance with applicable laws and regulations concerning the handling of classified information. (d) Co-Chairs.--(1) The Commission shall have two co- chairs, selected from among the members of the Commission. (2) One co-chair of the Commission shall be a member of the Democratic Party, and one co-chair shall be a member of the Republican Party. (3) The individuals who serve as the co-chairs of the Commission shall be jointly agreed upon by the President, the Majority Leader of the Senate, the Minority Leader of the Senate, and Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. (e) Appointment; Initial Meeting.--(1) Members of the Commission shall be appointed not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) The Commission shall hold its initial meeting on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (f) Meetings; Quorum; Vacancies.--(1) After its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the call of the co- chairs of the Commission. (2) Six members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for purposes of conducting business, except that two members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for purposes of receiving testimony. (3) Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made. (4) If vacancies in the Commission occur on any day after 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a quorum shall consist of a majority of the members of the Commission as of such day. (g) Actions of Commission.--(1) The Commission shall act by resolution agreed to by a majority of the members of the Commission voting and present. (2) The Commission may establish panels composed of less than the full membership of the Commission for purposes of carrying out the duties of the Commission under this title. The actions of any such panel shall be subject to the review and control of the Commission. Any findings and determinations made by such a panel shall not be considered the findings and determinations of the Commission unless approved by the Commission. (3) Any member, agent, or staff of the Commission may, if authorized by the co-chairs of the Commission, take any action which the Commission is authorized to take pursuant to this title. SEC. 703. DUTIES OF COMMISSION. (a) In General.--The duties of the Commission shall be-- (1) to conduct, until not later than the date on which the Commission submits the report under section 708(a), the review described in subsection (b); and (2) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense a final report on the results of the review. (b) Review.--The Commission shall review the current organization, practices, and authorities of the NRO, in particular with respect to-- (1) roles and mission; (2) organizational structure; (3) technical skills; (4) contractor relationships; (5) use of commercial imagery; (6) acquisition of launch vehicles, launch services, and launch infrastructure, and mission assurance; (7) acquisition authorities; and (8) relationships with other agencies and departments of the Federal Government. SEC. 704. POWERS OF COMMISSION. (a) In General.--(1) The Commission or, on the authorization of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this title-- (A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, and administer such oaths, and (B) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents, as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or designated member considers necessary. (2) Subpoenas may be issued under paragraph (1)(B) under the signature of the co-chairs of the Commission, and may be served by any person designated by such co-chairs. (3) The provisions of sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192-194) shall apply in the case of any failure of a witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section. (b) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts, enter into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its duties under this title. (c) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Commission may secure directly from any executive department, agency, bureau, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Government information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this title. Each such department, agency, bureau, board, commission, office, establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon request of the co-chairs of the Commission. The Commission shall handle and protect all classified information provided to it under this section in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations. (d) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide to the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, such administrative services, funds, staff, facilities, and other support services as are necessary for the performance of the Commission's duties under this title. (2) The Secretary of Defense may provide the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, with such administrative services, staff, and other support services as the Commission may request. (3) In addition to the assistance set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2), other departments and agencies of the United States may provide the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support as such departments and agencies consider advisable and as may be authorized by law. (4) The Commission shall receive the full and timely cooperation of any official, department, or agency of the United States Government whose assistance is necessary for the fulfillment of the duties of the Commission under this title, including the provision of full and current briefings and analyses. (e) Prohibition on Withholding Information.--No department or agency of the Government may withhold information from the Commission on the grounds that providing the information to the Commission would constitute the unauthorized disclosure of classified information or information relating to intelligence sources or methods. (f) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as the departments and agencies of the United States. (g) Gifts.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property in carrying out its duties under this title. SEC. 705. STAFF OF COMMISSION. (a) In General.--(1) The co-chairs of the Commission, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Commission, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its duties, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III or chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable to a person occupying a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title. (2) Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her regular employment without interruption. (3) All staff of the Commission shall possess a security clearance in accordance with applicable laws and regulations concerning the handling of classified information. (b) Consultant Services.--(1) The Commission may procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such title. (2) All experts and consultants employed by the Commission shall possess a security clearance in accordance with applicable laws and regulations concerning the handling of classified information. SEC. 706. COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES. (a) Compensation.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Commission may be compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission under this title. (2) Members of the Commission who are officers or employees of the United States or Members of Congress shall receive no additional pay by reason of their service on the Commission. (b) Travel Expenses.--While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, members of the Commission may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code. SEC. 707. TREATMENT OF INFORMATION RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY. (a) In General.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall assume responsibility for the handling and disposition of any information related to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission under this title. (2) Any information related to the national security of the United States that is provided to the Commission by a congressional intelligence committee may not be further provided or released without the approval of the chairman of such committee. (b) Access After Termination of Commission.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after the termination of the Commission under section 708, only the Members and designated staff of the congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central Intelligence and the designees of the Director, and such other officials of the executive branch as the President may designate shall have access to information related to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission. SEC. 708. FINAL REPORT; TERMINATION. (a) Final Report.--Not later than November 1, 2000, the Commission shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense a final report as required by section 703(a). (b) Termination.--(1) The Commission, and all the authorities of this title, shall terminate at the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date on which the final report under subsection (a) is transmitted to the congressional intelligence committees. (2) The Commission may use the 120-day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purposes of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning the final report referred to in that paragraph and disseminating the report. SEC. 709. ASSESSMENTS OF FINAL REPORT. Not later than 60 days after receipt of the final report under section 708(a), the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall each submit to the congressional intelligence committees an assessment by the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, of the final report. Each assessment shall include such comments on the findings and recommendations contained in the final report as the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, considers appropriate. SEC. 710. INAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS. (a) Federal Advisory Committee Act.--The provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the activities of the Commission under this title. (b) Freedom of Information Act.--The provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the Freedom of Information Act), shall not apply to the activities, records, and proceedings of the Commission under this title. SEC. 711. FUNDING. (a) Transfer From NRO.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the National Reconnaissance Office, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall transfer to the Director of Central Intelligence $5,000,000 for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this title. (b) Availability In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall make available to the Commission, from the amount transferred to the Director under subsection (a), such amounts as the Commission may require for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this title. (c) Duration of Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission under subsection (b) shall remain available until expended. SEC. 712. CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES DEFINED. In this title, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means the following: (1) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. TITLE VIII--INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE. This title may be cited as the ``Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act''. SEC. 802. FINDINGS AND POLICY. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) Presidential Decision Directive 42, issued on October 21, 1995, ordered agencies of the executive branch of the United States Government to, inter alia, increase the priority and resources devoted to the direct and immediate threat international crime presents to national security, work more closely with other governments to develop a global response to this threat, and use aggressively and creatively all legal means available to combat international crime. (2) Executive Order No. 12978 of October 21, 1995, provides for the use of the authorities in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to target and apply sanctions to 4 international narcotics traffickers and their organizations that operate from Colombia. (3) IEEPA was successfully applied to international narcotics traffickers in Colombia and based on that successful case study, Congress believes similar authorities should be applied worldwide. (4) There is a national emergency resulting from the activities of international narcotics traffickers and their organizations that threatens the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. (b) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States to apply economic and other financial sanctions to significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their organizations worldwide to protect the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States from the threat described in subsection (a)(4). SEC. 803. PURPOSE. The purpose of this title is to provide authority for the identification of, and application of sanctions on a worldwide basis to, significant foreign narcotics traffickers, their organizations, and the foreign persons who provide support to those significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their organizations, whose activities threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. SEC. 804. PUBLIC IDENTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND REQUIRED REPORTS. (a) Provision of Information to the President.--The Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall consult among themselves and provide the appropriate and necessary information to enable the President to submit the report under subsection (b). This information shall also be provided to the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. (b) Public Identification and Sanctioning of Significant Foreign Narcotics Traffickers.--Not later than June 1, 2000, and not later than June 1 of each year thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committees on the Judiciary, International Relations, Armed Services, and Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and to the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committees on the Judiciary, Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Finance of the Senate-- (1) identifying publicly the foreign persons that the President determines are appropriate for sanctions pursuant to this title; and (2) detailing publicly the President's intent to impose sanctions upon these significant foreign narcotics traffickers pursuant to this title. The report required in this subsection shall not include information on persons upon which United States sanctions imposed under this title, or otherwise on account of narcotics trafficking, are already in effect. (c) Unclassified Report Required.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form and made available to the public. (d) Classified Report.--(1) Not later than July 1, 2000, and not later than July 1 of each year thereafter, the President shall provide the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate with a report in classified form describing in detail the status of the sanctions imposed under this title, including the personnel and resources directed towards the imposition of such sanctions during the preceding fiscal year, and providing background information with respect to newly-identified significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their activities. (2) Such classified report shall describe actions the President intends to undertake or has undertaken with respect to such significant foreign narcotics traffickers. (3) The report required under this subsection is in addition to the President's obligations to keep the intelligence committees of Congress fully and currently informed pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. (e) Exclusion of Certain Information.-- (1) Intelligence.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the reports described in subsections (b) and (d) shall not disclose the identity of any person, if the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such disclosure could compromise an intelligence operation, activity, source, or method of the United States. (2) Law enforcement.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the reports described in subsections (b) and (d) shall not disclose the name of any person if the Attorney General, in coordination as appropriate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Secretary of the Treasury, determines that such disclosure could reasonably be expected to-- (A) compromise the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution that furnished information on a confidential basis; (B) jeopardize the integrity or success of an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution; (C) endanger the life or physical safety of any person; or (D) cause substantial harm to physical property. (f) Notification Required.--(1) Whenever either the Director of Central Intelligence or the Attorney General makes a determination under subsection (e), the Director of Central Intelligence or the Attorney General shall notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and explain the reasons for such determination. (2) The notification required under this subsection shall be submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate not later than July 1, 2000, and on an annual basis thereafter. (g) Determinations Not To Apply Sanctions.--(1) The President may waive the application to a significant foreign narcotics trafficker of any sanction authorized by this title if the President determines that the application of sanctions under this title would significantly harm the national security of the United States. (2) When the President determines not to apply sanctions that are authorized by this title to any significant foreign narcotics trafficker, the President shall notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committees on the Judiciary, International Relations, Armed Services, and Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committees on the Judiciary, Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Finance of the Senate not later than 21 days after making such determination. (h) Changes in Determinations to Impose Sanctions.-- (1) Additional determinations.--(A) If at any time after the report required under subsection (b) the President finds that a foreign person is a significant foreign narcotics trafficker and such foreign person has not been publicly identified in a report required under subsection (b), the President shall submit an additional public report containing the information described in subsection (b) with respect to such foreign person to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committees on the Judiciary, International Relations, Armed Services, and Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committees on the Judiciary, Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Finance of the Senate. (B) The President may apply sanctions authorized under this title to the significant foreign narcotics trafficker identified in the report submitted under subparagraph (A) as if the trafficker were originally included in the report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. (C) The President shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of any determination made under this paragraph. (2) Revocation of determination.--(A) Whenever the President finds that a foreign person that has been publicly identified as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker in the report required under subsection (b) or this subsection no longer engages in those activities for which sanctions under this title may be applied, the President shall issue public notice of such a finding. (B) Not later than the date of the public notice issued pursuant to subparagraph (A), the President shall notify, in writing and in classified or unclassified form, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committees on the Judiciary, International Relations, Armed Services, and Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committees on the Judiciary, Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Finance of the Senate of actions taken under this paragraph and a description of the basis for such actions. SEC. 805. BLOCKING ASSETS AND PROHIBITING TRANSACTIONS. (a) Applicability of Sanctions.--A significant foreign narcotics trafficker publicly identified in the report required under subsection (b) or (h)(1) of section 804 and foreign persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall be subject to any and all sanctions as authorized by this title. The application of sanctions on any foreign person pursuant to subsection (b) or (h)(1) of section 804 or subsection (b) of this section shall remain in effect until revoked pursuant to section 804(h)(2) or subsection (e)(1)(A) of this section or waived pursuant to section 804(g)(1). (b) Blocking of Assets.--Except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, instructions, licenses, or directives issued pursuant to this title, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date on which the President submits the report required under subsection (b) or (h)(1) of section 804, there are blocked as of such date, and any date thereafter, all such property and interests in property within the United States, or within the possession or control of any United States person, which are owned or controlled by-- (1) any significant foreign narcotics trafficker publicly identified by the President in the report required under subsection (b) or (h)(1) of section 804; (2) any foreign person that the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State, designates as materially assisting in, or providing financial or technological support for or to, or providing goods or services in support of, the international narcotics trafficking activities of a significant foreign narcotics trafficker so identified in the report required under subsection (b) or (h)(1) of section 804, or foreign persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to this subsection; (3) any foreign person that the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State, designates as owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting for or on behalf of, a significant foreign narcotics trafficker so identified in the report required under subsection (b) or (h)(1) of section 804, or foreign persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to this subsection; and (4) any foreign person that the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State, designates as playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking. (c) Prohibited Transactions.--Except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, instructions, licenses, or directives issued pursuant to this title, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date on which the President submits the report required under subsection (b) or (h)(1) of section 804, the following transactions are prohibited: (1) Any transaction or dealing by a United States person, or within the United States, in property or interests in property of any significant foreign narcotics trafficker so identified in the report required pursuant to subsection (b) or (h)(1) of section 804, and foreign persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. (2) Any transaction or dealing by a United States person, or within the United States, that evades or avoids, or has the effect of evading or avoiding, and any endeavor, attempt, or conspiracy to violate, any of the prohibitions contained in this title. (d) Law Enforcement and Intelligence Activities Not Affected.--Nothing in this title prohibits or otherwise limits the authorized law enforcement or intelligence activities of the United States, or the law enforcement activities of any State or subdivision thereof. (e) Implementation.--(1) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State, is authorized to take such actions as may be necessary to carry out this title, including-- (A) making those designations authorized by paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of subsection (b) of this section and revocation thereof; (B) promulgating rules and regulations permitted under this title; and (C) employing all powers conferred on the Secretary of the Treasury under this title. (2) Each agency of the United States shall take all appropriate measures within its authority to carry out the provisions of this title. (3) Section 552(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, shall not apply to any record or information obtained or created in the implementation of this title. (f) Judicial Review.--The determinations, identifications, findings, and designations made pursuant to section 804 and subsection (b) of this section shall not be subject to judicial review. SEC. 806. AUTHORITIES. (a) In General.--To carry out the purposes of this title, the Secretary of the Treasury may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise-- (1) investigate, regulate, or prohibit-- (A) any transactions in foreign exchange, currency, or securities; and (B) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interests of any foreign country or a national thereof; and (2) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, placement into foreign or domestic commerce of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. (b) Recordkeeping.--Pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury may require recordkeeping, reporting, and production of documents to carry out the purposes of this title. (c) Defenses.-- (1) Full and actual compliance with any regulation, order, license, instruction, or direction issued under this title shall be a defense in any proceeding alleging a violation of any of the provisions of this title. (2) No person shall be held liable in any court for or with respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration of, or pursuant to, and in reliance on this title, or any regulation, instruction, or direction issued under this title. (d) Rulemaking.--The Secretary of the Treasury may issue such other regulations or orders, including regulations prescribing recordkeeping, reporting, and production of documents, definitions, licenses, instructions, or directions, as may be necessary for the exercise of the authorities granted by this title. SEC. 807. ENFORCEMENT. (a) Criminal Penalties.--(1) Whoever willfully violates the provisions of this title, or any license rule, or regulation issued pursuant to this title, or willfully neglects or refuses to comply with any order of the President issued under this title shall be-- (A) imprisoned for not more than 10 years, (B) fined in the amount provided in title 18, United States Code, or, in the case of an entity, fined not more than $10,000,000, or both. (2) Any officer, director, or agent of any entity who knowingly participates in a violation of the provisions of this title shall be imprisoned for not more than 30 years, fined not more than $5,000,000, or both. (b) Civil Penalties.--A civil penalty not to exceed $1,000,000 may be imposed by the Secretary of the Treasury on any person who violates any license, order, rule, or regulation issued in compliance with the provisions of this title. (c) Judicial Review of Civil Penalty.--Any penalty imposed under subsection (b) shall be subject to judicial review only to the extent provided in section 702 of title 5, United States Code. SEC. 808. DEFINITIONS. As used in this title: (1) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a partnership, joint venture, association, corporation, organization, network, group, or subgroup, or any form of business collaboration. (2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means any citizen or national of a foreign state or any entity not organized under the laws of the United States, but does not include a foreign state. (3) Narcotics trafficking.--The term ``narcotics trafficking'' means any illicit activity to cultivate, produce, manufacture, distribute, sell, finance, or transport narcotic drugs, controlled substances, or listed chemicals, or otherwise endeavor or attempt to do so, or to assist, abet, conspire, or collude with others to do so. (4) Narcotic drug; controlled substance; listed chemical.-- The terms ``narcotic drug'', ``controlled substance'', and ``listed chemical'' have the meanings given those terms in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802). (5) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or entity. (6) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' means any United States citizen or national, permanent resident alien, an entity organized under the laws of the United States (including its foreign branches), or any person within the United States. (7) Significant foreign narcotics trafficker.--The term ``significant foreign narcotics trafficker'' means any foreign person that plays a significant role in international narcotics trafficking, that the President has determined to be appropriate for sanctions pursuant to this title, and that the President has publicly identified in the report required under subsection (b) or (h)(1) of section 804. SEC. 809. EXCLUSION OF PERSONS WHO HAVE BENEFITED FROM ILLICIT ACTIVITIES OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS. Section 212(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(C)) is amended to read as follows: ``(C) Controlled substance traffickers.--Any alien who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe-- ``(i) is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance or in any listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), or is or has been a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such controlled or listed substance or chemical, or endeavored to do so; or ``(ii) is the spouse, son, or daughter of an alien inadmissible under clause (i), has, within the previous 5 years, obtained any financial or other benefit from the illicit activity of that alien, and knew or reasonably should have known that the financial or other benefit was the product of such illicit activity, is inadmissible.''. SEC. 810. JUDICIAL REVIEW COMMISSION ON FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL. (a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be known as the ``Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Asset Control'' (in this section referred to as the ``Commission''). (b) Membership and Procedural Matters.--(1) The Commission shall be composed of five members, as follows: (A) One member shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (B) One member shall be appointed by the Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (C) One member shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (D) One member shall be appointed by the Ranking Minority Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (E) One member shall be appointed jointly by the members appointed under subparagraphs (A) through (D). (2) Each member of the Commission shall, for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this section, possess or obtain an appropriate security clearance in accordance with applicable laws and regulations regarding the handling of classified information. (3) The members of the Commission shall choose the chairman of the Commission from among the members of the Commission. (4) The members of the Commission shall establish rules governing the procedures and proceedings of the Commission. (c) Duties.--The Commission shall have as its duties the following: (1) To conduct a review of the current judicial, regulatory, and administrative authorities relating to the blocking of assets of foreign persons by the United States Government. (2) To conduct a detailed examination and evaluation of the remedies available to United States persons affected by the blocking of assets of foreign persons by the United States Government. (d) Powers.--(1) The Commission may hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out the purposes of this section. (2) The Commission may secure directly from any executive department, agency, bureau, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Government information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this section. Each such department, agency, bureau, board, commission, office, establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon request of the chairman of the Commission. The Commission shall handle and protect all classified information provided to it under this section in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations. (3) The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide to the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, such administrative services, funds, facilities, and other support services as are necessary for the performance of the Commission's duties under this section. (4) The Commission shall receive the full and timely cooperation of any official, department, or agency of the United States Government whose assistance is necessary for the fulfillment of the duties of the Commission under this section, including the provision of full and current briefings and analyses. (5) No department or agency of the Government may withhold information from the Commission on the grounds that providing the information to the Commission would constitute the unauthorized disclosure of classified information or information relating to intelligence sources or methods. (6) The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as the departments and agencies of the United States. (e) Staff.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the chairman of the Commission, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Commission, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its duties, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III or chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable to a person occupying a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title. (2)(A) Any employee of a department or agency referred to in subparagraph (B) may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her regular employment without interruption. (B) The departments and agencies referred to in this subparagraph are as follows: (i) The Department of Justice. (ii) The Department of the Treasury. (iii) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) All staff of the Commission shall possess a security clearance in accordance with applicable laws and regulations concerning the handling of classified information. (f) Compensation and Travel Expenses.--(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), each member of the Commission may be compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission under this section. (B) Members of the Commission who are officers or employees of the United States shall receive no additional pay by reason of their service on the Commission. (2) While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, members of the Commission may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code. (g) Report.--(1) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissions shall submit to the committees of Congress referred to in paragraph (4) a report on the activities of the Commission under this section, including the findings, conclusions, and recommendations, if any, of the Commission as a result of the review under subsection (c)(1) and the examination and evaluation under subsection (c)(2). (2) The report under paragraph (1) shall include any additional or dissenting views of a member of the Commission upon the request of the member. (3) The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (4) The committees of Congress referred to in this paragraph are the following: (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Foreign Relations and the Judiciary of the Senate. (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on International Relations and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (h) Termination.--The Commission shall terminate at the end of the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the report required by subsection (g) is submitted to the committees of Congress referred to in that subsection. (i) Inapplicability of Certain Administrative Provisions.-- (1) The provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the activities of the Commission under this section. (2) The provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the Freedom of Information Act), shall not apply to the activities, records, and proceedings of the Commission under this title. (j) Funding.--The Attorney General shall, from amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Attorney General by this Act, make available to the Commission $1,000,000 for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this section. Amounts made available to the Commission under the preceding sentence shall remain available until expended. SEC. 811. EFFECTIVE DATE. This title shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. And the Senate agree to the same. From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for consideration of the Senate amendment, and the House bill, and modifications committed to conference: Porter Goss, Jerry Lewis, Bill McCollum, Michael N. Castle, Sherwood Boehlert, Charles F. Bass, Jim Gibbons, Ray LaHood, Heather Wilson, Julian C. Dixon, Nancy Pelosi, Sanford Bishop, Jr., Norman Sisisky, Gary Condit. From the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of defense tactical intelligence and related activities: Floyd Spence, Bob Stump, Robert E. Andrews, Managers on the Part of the House. From the Select Committee on Intelligence: Richard Shelby, Bob Kerrey, Richard G. Lugar, Mike DeWine, Jon Kyl, Jim Inhofe, Orrin Hatch, Pat Roberts, Wayne Allard, Richard H. Bryan, Bob Graham, John F. Kerry, Max Baucus, Chuck Robb, Frank R. Lautenberg. From the Committee on Armed Services: John Warner, Managers on the Part of the Senate. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE The managers on the part of the Senate and the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 1555) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence and the intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, submit the following joint statement to the Senate and the House in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying conference report: The Senate amendments struck all of the House bill after the enacting clause and inserted a substitute text. The House recedes from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate with an amendment that is a substitute for the House bill and the Senate amendment. The differences between the House bill, the Senate amendment, and the substitute agreed to in conference are noted below, except for clerical corrections, conforming changes made necessary by agreements reached by the conferees, and minor drafting and clerical changes. The managers agree that the congressionally directed actions described in the respective committee reports or classified annexes should be undertaken to the extent that such congressional directed actions are not amended, altered, or otherwise specifically addressed in either this Joint Explanatory Statement or in the classified annex to the conference report on the bill H.R. 1555. Title I--Intelligence Activities sec. 101. authorization of appropriations Section 101 of the conference report report lists the departments, agencies, and other elements of the United States Government for whose intelligence and intelligence related activities the Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2000. Section 101 is identical to section 101 of the Senate amendment. sec. 102. classified schedule of authorizations Section 102 of the conference report makes clear that the details of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities and applicable personnel ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 2000 are contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the Act by this section. The details of the Schedule are explained in the classified annex to this report. Section 102 is similar to section 102 of the House bill and section 102 of the Senate amendment. sec. personnel ceiling adjustments Section 103 of the conference report authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in fiscal year 2000 to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the Intelligence Community under section 102 by an amount not to exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under section 102. The Director of Central Intelligence may exercise this authority only when doing so is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions. Any exercise of this authority must be reported to the two intelligence committees of the Congress. The managers emphasize that the authority conferred by section 103 is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of personnel strength in any intelligence component. Rather, the section provides the Director of Central Intelligence with flexibility to adjust personnel levels temporarily for contingencies and for overages caused by an imbalance between hiring of new employees and attrition of current employees. The managers do not expect the Director of Central Intelligence to allow heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed levels set in the Schedule of Authorizations except for the satisfaction of clearly identified hiring needs which are consistence with the authorization of personnel strengths in this bill. In no case is this authority to be used to provide for positions denied by this bill. Section 103 is identical to section 103 of the House bill and section 103 of the Senate amendment. sec. 104. intelligence community management account Section 104 of the conference report authorizes appropriations for the Community Management Account for the Director of Central Intelligence and sets the personnel end- strength for the Intelligence Community Management Staff for fiscal year 2000. Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $170,672,000 for fiscal year 2000 for the activities of the Community Management Account (CMA) of the Director of Central Intelligence. The House bill and the Senate amendment were nearly identical. The Senate amendment, however, contained a provision earmarking funds from the CMA for the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO). The House bill did not include a similar provision. The House recedes to the Senate position with a modification. The managers have agreed to delete the provision earmarking Community Management funds for the ISOO. The managers agree that authorizing funds from the CMA for the ISOO is an inappropriate allocation of intelligence community funds. Subsection (b) authorizes 347 full-time personnel for the Community Management Staff for fiscal year 2000 and provides that such personnel may be permanent employees of the Staff or detailed from various elements of the United States Government. Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and personnel for the Community Management Account as specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and permits these additional amounts to remain available through September 30, 2001. Subsection (d) requires, except as provided in Section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 or for temporary situations of less than one year, that personnel from another element of the United States Government be detailed to an element of the Community Management Account on a reimbursable basis. Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 of the amount authorized in subsection (a) to be made available for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Sec. 105. AUTHORIZATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999 Section 105 specifically authorizes, for purposes of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947, those intelligence and intelligence-related activities that were deemed to have been authorized, pursuant to that section, through the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L 106-31). A provision similar to section 105 was included in the House bill but was not included in the Senate amendment. The Senate recedes to the House position. The managers agreed to include this provision based on the requirements of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947. Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System sec. 201. authorization of appropriations Section 201 is identical to section 201 of the House bill and section 201 of the Senate amendment. Title III--General ProvisionsSEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW Section 301 is identical to section 301 of the House bill and section 301 of the Senate amendment. sec. 302. restriction on conduct of intelligence activities Section 302 is identical to section 302 of the House bill and section 302 of the Senate amendment. sec. 303. diplomatic intelligence support centers Section 303 of the conference report limits the establishment, operation, or maintenance of Diplomatic Intelligence Support Centers (DISCs) in fiscal year 2000 and precludes the obligation or expenditure of any funds appropriated for fiscal year 2000 for any purpose related to DISCs, without the prior approval of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The managers direct that prior to any NFIP funds being spent to establish a DISC, the DCI must, within three days of his approval of the establishment of a DISC, advise the congressional intelligence committees of his determination that the approved DISC is required to provide necessary intelligence support in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States. Neither the House bill nor the Senate amendment contained a similar provision. Prior to the meeting of conferees, however, the managers learned of efforts by the Department of State to establish a DISC and found the concept unwise. The managers are not convinced that the DISC model is an appropriate means for providing intelligence support to diplomatic missions. This is specifically so where there is already ample intelligence support at the disposal of the chief of a diplomatic mission. Nothwithstanding this provision limiting the establishment, operation, or maintenance of DISCs, the managers strongly believe that intelligence support to diplomatic missions is one of the very highest intelligence priorities. Nothing in this provision precludes the Department of State from deploying Bureau of Intelligence and Research analysts to any location where the Secretary of State determines there is a need for such support. Likewise, this provision does not inhibit the Director of Central Intelligence from deciding the appropriate level of, or the manner in which, intelligence support to U.S. diplomatic missions shall be accomplished. The managers have specifically identified in the classified annex to this conference report the type of intelligence support that is unaffected by this provision. sec. 304. protection of identity of retired covert agents The House bill contained a similar provision. The Senate amendment did not. The Senate recedes to the House with a modification replacing the mandatory minimum sentencing provision in the House bill with a provision specifying that terms of imprisonment imposed under the section shall be served consecutively to any other sentence of imprisonment. Sec. 305. access to computers and computer data of executive branch employees with access to classified information The Senate amendment contained a similar provision. The House bill did not. The House recedes to the Senate position.sec. 306. naturalization of certain persons affiliated with a communist or similar party The Senate amendment contained a similar provision. The House bill did not. The House recedes to the Senate position. sec. 307. technical amendment The Senate amendment contained a similar provision. The House bill did not. The House recedes to the Senate position. Sec. 308. declassification review of intelligence estimate on vietnam- era prisoners of war and missing in action personnel and critical assessment of estimate The Senate amendment contained a similar provision. the House bill did not. the House recedes to the Senate position.sec. 309. report on legal standards applied for electronic surveillance The House bill and Senate amendment contained similar provisions. The Senate recedes to the House provision with a modification. sec. 310. report on effects of foreign espionage on the united states The House bill contained a similar provision. The Senate amendment did not. The Senate recedes to the House position. sec. 311. report on activities of the central intelligence agency in chile Section 311 requires the Director of Central Intelligence to submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress no later than nine months after this Act is enacted describing all activities of officers, covert agents, and employees of all elements in the intelligence community with respect to the assassination of President Salvador Allende in September 1973; the accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency of the Republic of Chile; and, violations of human rights committed by officers or agents of former President Pinochet. The conferees note that the National Security Council on February 1, 1999, directed the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the National Archives to compile and review for public release all documents that shed light on human rights abuses, terrorism, and other acts of political violence during and prior to the Pinochet era in Chile. In addition, the conferees note that the Department of Justice is conducting a search for documents pertaining to the requests of the Spanish court investigating the abuses of the Pinochet regime. The managers expect the appropriate committees of Congress, as set forth in this section, to be given access to the documents responsive to these two searches, whether classified or publicly released. Section 311 is similar to Section 306(a) of the House bill but provides additional time for the submission of the report. sec. 312. report on kosova liberation army The House bill contained a similar provision. The Senate amendment did not. The Senate recedes to the House position. sec. 313. reaffirmation of longstanding prohibition against drug trafficking by employees of the intelligence community The House bill contained a similar provision. The Senate amendment did not. The Senate recedes to the House position with a modification upon the insistence of the Senate. sec. 314. sense of congress on classification and declassification The Senate amendment contained a similar provision. The House bill did not. The House recedes to the Senate position. sec. 315. sense of congress on intelligence community contracting The House bill contained a similar provision. The Senate amendment did not. The Senate recedes to the House position. Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency sec. 401. improvement and extension of central services program The Senate amendment contained a similar provision. The House bill did not. The House recedes to the Senate position, with a modification. sec. 402. extension of cia voluntary separation pay act The Senate amendment contained a similar provision. The House bill did not. The House recedes to the Senate position, upon the insistence of the Senate. Title V--Department of Defense Intelligence Activities sec. 501. protection of operational files of the national imagery and mapping agency The House bill contained a similar provision. The Senate amendment did not. The Senate recedes to the House position, with a modification making this amendment to title 50, United States Code, rather than in title 10, United States Code. sec. 502. funding for infrastructure and quality of life improvements at menwith hill and bad aibling stations The Senate amendment contained a similar provision. The House bill did not. The House recedes to the Senate position. Title VI--Foreign Counterintelligence and International Terrorism Investigations sec. 601. expansion of definition of ``agent of a foreign power'' for purposes of the foreign intelligence surveillance act of 1978 The Senate amendment contained a similar provision. The House bill did not. The House recedes to the Senate position. sec. 602. federal bureau of investigation reports to other executive agencies on results of counterintelligence activities The Senate amendment contained a similar provision. The House bill did not. The House recedes to the Senate position. Title VII--National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office sec. 701. findings Neither the House bill nor the Senate amendment contained a similar provision. Prior to the meeting of conferees, however, the managers determined that an independent review of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) must be conducted to ensure that the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) must be conducted to ensure that the Intelligence Community will acquire the most efficient, technologically capable, and economical satellite collection systems, and that the national policymakers and military leaders receive the intelligence they require to keep our nation secure. Therefore, the managers have included a provision creating the Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office. The managers agreed that the functions and missions carried out by the NRO are essential to the provision of timely intelligence to policymakers and military leaders. However, the changing threat environment and emerging technologies have altered both what information satellites can collect and how they collect it. Additionally, Congress wants to ensure that future generations of intelligence collection satellites both perform to their requirements and are purchased at a fair cost to the taxpayer. sec. 702. national commission for the review of the national reconnaissance office The Commission will have eleven members. The Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, in consultation with the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, will each appoint one commission member from their respective Chamber and two from private life. The Minority Leaders of the Senate and House, in consultation with the Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, will each appoint one commission member from their respective Chamber and one from private life. Additionally, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management will be a voting member of the Commission and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office will be an ex officio, i.e., non- voting, member of the Commission. The managers have included requirements that individuals appointed to the Commission will have experience and expertise in technical intelligence collection systems and methods; research and development programs; acquisition management; use of intelligence information by national policymakers and military leaders; and/or the implementation, funding, or oversight of the national security policies of the United States. The Co-Chairs of the Commission will be selected from among the members of the Commission and agreed upon by the President, the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate, and the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House. sec. 703. duties of commission The Commission is tasked with reviewing the roles and mission of the NRO; its organizational structure; technical skills of its employees; its contractor relationships; its use of commercial imagery; its acquisition of launch vehicles, launch services, launch infrastructure, and mission assurance; its acquisition authorities; and the relationship to other agencies and departments of the Federal Government. sec. 704. powers of commission The Commission is authorized to hold hearings, receive testimony from witnesses, receive information from federal agencies, and receive assistance from the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense in order to discharge its duties under this title. sec. 705. staff of commission The Commission is authorized to hire staff, procure consultant services, and receive assistance from Federal Government employees detailed to the Commission in order to discharge its duties under this title. The managers agree that any member of the Commission is authorized to designate his or her staff to serve as liaison staff to the Commission. Liaison staff are required to possess the requisite security clearances before being given any access to classified information. Liaison staff shall have the same access to the information considered by the Commission as staff directly hired by the Commission. SEC. 706. COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES Members of the Commission are authorized to be compensated and be allowed travel expenses for the performance of their duties under this title. SEC. 707. TREATMENT OF INFORMATION RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY The Director of Central Intelligence shall assume responsibility for the handling and disposition of national security information received, considered, and used by Commission. SEC. 708. FINAL REPORT; TERMINATION The Commission is to produce a report with recommendations to the congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense by November 1, 2000. A copy of this report shall also be made available to the committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The managers realize that the nature of the subject matter involved in a review of the NOR may of necessity require that Classified report be produced, but believe strongly that an unclassified report should also be made available to the public. SEC. 709. ASSESSMENTS OF FINAL REPORT The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall each submit to the congressional intelligence committees as assessment of the report of the Commission within 30 days of receipt of the report. A copy of these assessments shall also be made available to the Commission on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. SEC. 710. INAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS The provisions of the Federal advisory Committee Act and the Freedom of Information Act shall not apply to the activities of the Commission. SEC. 711. FUNDING The Director of Central Intelligence shall make available for purposes of the activities of the Commission $5.0 million from the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the National Reconnaissance Office. SEC. 712. CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES DEFINED The congressional intelligence committees referred to in this title refer to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Title VIII--Blocking Assets of Significant Foreign Narcotics Traffickers SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE This section provides the short title for this title: ``Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act.'' SEC. 802. FINDINGS AND POLICY The provisions in title VIII are intended to be global in scope--not country-specific--and specifically focus on the major cocaine, heroin, marijuana, amphetamine, and emerging synthetic narcotics produced and sold by foreign narco- trafficking organizations. The managers believe that the enactment of these provisions will encourage U.S. law enforcement an intelligence agencies to better coordinate their efforts against the leaders of the world's most dangerous multinational criminal organizations. This initiative will assist U.S. Government efforts to identify the assets, financial networks, and business associates of major narcotics trafficking groups. If effectively implemented, this strategy will disrupt these criminal organizations and bankrupt their leadership. The provisions in this title are intended to supplement-- not to replace--the United States' policy of annual certification of countries based on their performance in combating narcotics trafficking. This title will properly focus our Government's efforts against the specific individuals most responsible for trafficking in illegal narcotics by attacking their sources of income and undermining their efforts to launder the profits generated by drug-trafficking into legitimate business activities. The intention of this legislation is to strengthen the ability of United States law enforcement effectively to target international narcotics traffickers attaching the fabric of our society. The legislation is based on the successful application of the International emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) against Colombian narcotics traffickers. There is no intention that this legislation affect Americans who are not knowingly and willfully engaged in international narcotics trafficking. Nor is it intended in any way to derogate from existing constitutional and statutory due process protections for those whose assets are blocked or seized pursuant to law. sec. 803. purpose The legal precedent for this title was the successful application of sanctions in 1995 and 1996 against the Cali Cartel narco-trafficking organization and its key leaders. Executive Order 12978, issued by the Clinton Administration in October 1995, had the effect of dismantling and defunding numerous business entities conclusively tied to the Cali Cartel. Relying on the authorities provided within the IEEPA, President Clinton found that the activities of several Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers (SDNTs) constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the United States' national security, foreign policy, and economy. In a June 1998 publication of the Treasury Department, the SDNT program was described as follows: Companies and individuals are identified as SDNTs and placed on the SDNT list if they are determined, (a) to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking centered in Colombia, (b) to materially assist in or provide financial or technological support for, or goods and services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities of persons designated in or pursuant to the executive order, or (c) to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of, persons designated in or pursuant to Executive order 12978. The objectives of the SDNT program are to identify, expose, isolate and incapacitate the businesses and agents of the Colombian cartels and to deny them access to the U.S. financial system and to the benefits of trade and transactions involving United States businesses and individuals. Coordinated law enforcement efforts by the U.S. and Colombian Governments in support of these sanctions put the Cali Cartel kingpins out of business. This legislation is intended to follow up on the success of the Colombian SDNT precedent by applying similar U.S. Government authorities and resources against significant foreign narcotics traffickers around the globe--including, but not limited to, major narcotics traffickers and trafficking organizations based in Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Laos, Mexico, Pakistan, People's Republic of China, Peru, Russia, and Thailand. The bottom line objective of these provisions is to bankrupt and disrupt the major narcotics trafficking organizations. The targets of this legislation are not only the drug kingpins, but those involved in their illicit activities, such as: money laundering, acquiring chemical precursors to manufacture narcotics, manufacturing the drugs, transporting narcotics from the drug source countries to the United States, and managing the assets of these criminal enterprises. sec. 804. public identification of significant foreign narcotics traffickers and required reports This section requires the Secretary of the Treasury--in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State--to provide the appropriate and necessary information to enable the President to prepare the congressionally-mandated classified and unclassified reports on significant foreign narcotics traffickers. The President then shall make the determination to formally designate any significant foreign narcotics traffickers on June 1, 2000 (and not later than June 1st of each year thereafter) as constituting an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and the economy of the United States. On June 1, 2000 (and not later than June 1st of each year thereafter), the President shall submit an unclassified report to the Committees on Intelligence, International Relations, Judiciary, Armed Services, and Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on Intelligence, Foreign Relations, Judiciary, Armed Services, and Finance of the Senate for official review. This unclassified report shall: (1) identify publicly the foreign persons that the President determines are appropriate for sanctions pursuant to this title; and (b) detail publicly the President's intent to impose sanctions upon these significant foreign narcotics traffickers pursuant to this title. Individuals and entities linked to major narcotics trafficking groups may be added to or withdrawn from the kingpins' list by the President at any time during the year. The managers expect that the President will provide a classified report on July 1, 2000 (and not later than July 1st of each year thereafter) to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence detailing the overall status of the program, including personnel and resources directed towards the program, and providing background information with respect to newly identified significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their activities. The managers intend that the executive branch shall provide a detailed briefing after publication of the annual classified report with respect to its findings. If the Director of Central Intelligence or the Attorney General make a determination not to designate a foreign individual on the Global Kingpins list due to a possible compromise of intelligence or law enforcement sources and methods, the legislation requires that they shall notify the House and Senate Intelligence Committees delineating the basis of their determination. A formal notification of a determination not to designate shall be provided to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees not later than July 1, 2000, and on an annual basis thereafter. As a general matter, it is contemplated that the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury will determine to exclude the name of an individual from the Global Kingpins list only: (1) under circumstances where the mere appearance of the name on the list could compromise an intelligence source or method; (2) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential law enforcement source; (3) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement prosecutions; (4) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual; or (5) where there is an insufficient basis upon which to rely to support that individual's inclusion. A similar version of this legislation, offered in the House as the ``Drug Kingpins Bankruptcy Act of 1999,'' established a precedent for the future content and scope of the Global Kingpins list, by specifically identifying the first group of twelve of the world's most significant narco-traffickers from Burma, the Caribbean Region, Colombia, Mexico and Thailand. The first proposed Global Kingpins/SDNT list was developed in consultation with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of investigation, the State Department, the Treasury Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center. The managers also believe that the annual unclassified and classified reports to the Congress will serve as vital oversight tools by providing additional data for the annual drug certification process. The certification process requires the President to certify on March 1st of each year the level of cooperation that the United States Government is receiving from major drug producing and major transit nations. The action or lack of action by both the Administration and these nations on the ``majors list'' with respect to the drug kingpins will become a significant annual indicator of counterdrug cooperation. The managers note that the Colombian Kingpins/SDNT initiative under Executive Order 12978 in October 1995 was prepared within 6 months and was based upon information already collected on these kingpins and their operations. The managers recognize that the implementation of the Global Kingpins list will require significant additional resources and personnel from the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The managers urge that the Administration provide significant additional funding in the FY2001 Budget for the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to fully implement the Global Kingpins program in 2000 on a worldwide basis. As an interim measure, the managers recommend that the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control receive analytical assistance and technical support from the Treasury Department's Office of Intelligence Support, the Justice Department's National Drug Intelligence Center, and the CIA's Crime and Narcotics Center. sec. 805. blocking assets and prohibiting transactions The effect of this provision will be to block all property and interests in property within the United States that are under the direct or indirect ownership or control of significant foreign narcotics traffickers. Second, it will block all assets of any foreign persons who materially assist, provide financial or technical support, or offer goods and services to such significant foreign narcotics traffickers. Third, it will block the assets of any foreign persons, who are determined by the United States Government as controlled by or acting on behalf of significant foreign narcotics traffickers. Fourth, it will block the assets of any foreign persons that the Secretary of the Treasury--in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense--designates as playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking. The sanctions that would take effect against the kingpins designated by the President, and their organizations and subordinates, would include the following: (a) All assets of the kingpins and their organizations and subordinates subject to United States jurisdiction would be blocked; other law enforcement tools such as seizure and forfeiture would be available if appropriate. (b) U.S. individuals and companies would be prohibited from engaging in unlicensed transactions, including any commercial or financial dealings, with any of the named kingpins and their organizations and subordinates. Following the Colombia IEEPA-SDNT precedent, the Secretary of the Treasury will have the authority to determine and list persons and entities deemed to be materially assisting in, providing financial or technological support for, or providing goods or services in support of the narcotics trafficking activities of significant foreign narcotics traffickers. In order to develop this second-level list of facilitating persons and entities, the Secretary of the Treasury will rely on information collected by the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities as well as on information provided by foreign government intelligence and law enforcement organizations. This information must pass through a rigorous interagency review process; the information must be material, factual and verifiable, and able to withstand scrutiny in a United States Federal Court. The success of the Colombia IEEPA-SDNT program has largely been the product of close U.S. cooperation with Colombian law enforcement and regulatory agencies. It is expected that global implementation of the kingpins list will promote closer U.S. cooperation with foreign law enforcement and regulatory agencies. As with the Colombia IEEPA-SDNT program, the Secretary of the Treasury will issue all necessary administrative regulations and specifications to implement the Kingpins program on a global basis. Notification of United States persons and entities linked to significant foreign narcotics traffickers will also follow the precedents established under the Colombia IEEPA-SDNT program. Due to threats made against the U.S. officials responsible for implementation of the Colombia SDNT program, records and information obtained or created in the preparation of the Global Kingpins/SDNT list as well as the specific details on the implementation of sanctions against significant foreign narcotics traffickers would be exempted from the Freedom of Information Act. All SDNT programs require that such designations pass an ``arbitrary and capricious'' test; and all designations are based upon a non-criminal standard of ``reasonable cause to believe'' that the party is owned or controlled by, or acts, or purports to act, for or on behalf of the sanctioned non- state party. Furthermore, the Colombia IEEPA-SDNT executive order uses an additional designation basis for foreign firms or individuals that ``materially * * * assist in or provide financial or technological support for or goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities'' of the named drug kingpins or other, already designated SDNTs. In implementing the Colombia IEEPA-SDNT program, OFAC analysts identify and research foreign targets that can be linked by evidence to individuals or entities already designated pursuant to E.O. 12978. To establish sufficient linkage, OFAC initially relied upon a significant body of documentary evidence through criminal law enforcement raids and seizures. The President's involvement was required in the designation of the original four Cali cartel kingpins named in the annex to E.O. 12978. Additional kingpin listings in Colombia have been developed through close coordination between OFAC and the Department of Justice, and the preponderance of Colombian SDNTs have been designated as a product of OFAC's research and collection efforts. In the Colombia IEEPA-SDNT program, OFAC has reached designation determinations only after extensive reviews of the evidence internally and with the Department of Justice. E.O. 12978 has required that the State and Justice Departments be consulted by the Treasury prior to a designation. As noted above, Justice is deeply involved in examining the sufficiency of the evidence that occurs before any parties are added to the list. OFAC regulations provide for post-designation review and remedies. The usual forum for considering removal of a designation (such as a change in circumstances or behavior) is one in which the named person or entity petitions OFAC for removal. Most petitioners initiate the review process simply by writing OFAC. Exchanges of correspondence, additional fact-finding and meetings occur before OFAC decides whether there is a basis for removal. Although a number of persons have been removed through this means, only a very few persons or entities on the SDNT and other SDNT lists have ever petitioned for removal. Federal courts have held that no pre- deprivation hearing is required in blocking of assets because of the Executive Branch's plenary authority to act in the area of foreign policy and the obvious need to take immediate action upon designation to avoid dissipation of affected assets. sec. 806. authorities This section generally restates the applicable provisions of the International Economic Emergency Powers Act. sec. 807. enforcement This section generally restates the applicable provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act. sec. 808. definitions This section defines specific terms used in this title. sec. 809. exclusion of persons who have benefited from illicit activities of drug traffickers This section restates the applicable provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as amended in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(c). Designation on this list will result in the denial of visas and inadmissibility of specially designated narcotics traffickers, their immediate families, and their business associates. sec. 810. judicial review commission on foreign asset control This section creates a commission to review the current judicial, regulatory, and administrative authorities under which the United States government blocks assets of foreign persons and to provide a detailed constitutional examination and evaluation of remedies available to United States persons affected by the blocking of assets of foreign persons. The commission is required to report back to Congress no later than one year after the date of enactment of this act on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations, if any, on the matters under their review. The managers believe that the public interest can best be served if the commission can reach consensus on its conclusions. The managers acknowledge, however, that consensus may not be able to reach on the significant issues on which the commission will deliberate. To that end, therefore, the managers have provided that the report to be submitted to Congress at the end of the commission's review period shall include all additional or dissenting views, if any. Four of the commission members are to be appointed by the Chairmen and Ranking Democrats of the congressional intelligence committees. The fifth member of the Commission shall be appointed by the four members of the commission appointed by the intelligence committee Chairmen and Ranking Democrats. The commission shall also be provided the cooperation and assistance that it requests from any agency in the federal government. The managers are determined to ensure that the judicial, regulatory, and administrative remedies and procedures available to U.S. persons affected by the blocking of assets of foreign persons pass constitutional muster. As expected, the managers concern centers on the fundamental question of due process and whether that principle is affirmed and sustained in the execution of this legislation. The managers expect the members of the Commission to examine and report on at least the following constitutional and other issues: (1) whether reasonable protections of innocent U.S. businesses are available under the regime currently in place that is utilized to carry out the provisions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (``IEEPA''); (2) whether advance notice prior to blocking of one's assets is required as a matter of constitutional due process; (3) whether there are reasonable opportunities under the current IEEPA regulatory regime and the Administrative Procedures Act for an erroneous blocking of assets or mistaken listing under IEEPA to be remedied; (4) whether the level of proof that is required under the current judicial, regulatory, or administrative scheme is adequate to protect legitimate business interests from irreparable financial harm; (5) whether there is constitutionally adequate accessibility to the courts to challenge agency actions under IEEPA, or the designation of persons or entities under IEEPA; (6) whether there are remedial measures and legislative amendments that should be enacted to improve the current asset blocking scheme under IEEPA or this title; and (7) whether the resources made available for the Office of Foreign Assets Control (``OFAC'') at the Department of Treasury in the fiscal year 2001 budget submission are adequate to carry out the provisions of this title or the other programs currently in effect under IEEPA. sec. 811. effective date This section establishes the effective date for this title. From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for consideration of the Senate amendment, and the House bill, and modifications committed to conference: Porter Goss, Jerry Lewis, Bill McCollum, Michael N. Castle, Sherwood Boehlert, Charles F. Bass, Jim Gibbons, Ray LaHood, Heather Wilson, Julian C. Dixon, Nancy Pelosi, Sanford Bishop, Jr., Norman Sisisky, Gary Condit. From the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of defense tactical intelligence and related activities: Floyd Spence, Bob Stump, Robert E. Andrews, Managers on the Part of the House. From the Select Committee on Intelligence: Richard Shelby, Bob Kerrey, Richard G. Lugar, Mike DeWine, Jon Kyl, Jim Inhofe, Orrin Hatch, Pat Roberts, Wayne Allard, Richard H. Bryan, Bob Graham, John F. Kerry, Max Baucus, Chuck Robb, Frank R. Lautenberg. From the Committee on Armed Services: John Warner, Managers on the Part of the Senate.", u" SA 2581. Mrs. HUTCHISON (for herself, Mr. McCain, Mr. Chambliss, Mr. Grassley, Ms. Murkowski, Mr. Coats, Mr. Burr, and Mr. Johnson of Wisconsin) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 3414, to enhance the security and resiliency of the cyber and communications infrastructure of the United States; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education, Information, and Technology Act of 2012'' or ``SECURE IT''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. TITLE I--FACILITATING SHARING OF CYBER THREAT INFORMATIONSec. 101. Definitions.Sec. 102. Authorization to share cyber threat information.Sec. 103. Information sharing by the Federal government.Sec. 104. Construction.Sec. 105. Report on implementation.Sec. 106. Inspector General review.Sec. 107. Technical amendments.Sec. 108. Access to classified information. TITLE II--COORDINATION OF FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY POLICYSec. 201. Coordination of Federal information security policy.Sec. 202. Management of information technology.Sec. 203. No new funding.Sec. 204. Technical and conforming amendments.Sec. 205. Clarification of authorities. TITLE III--CRIMINAL PENALTIESSec. 301. Penalties for fraud and related activity in connection with computers.Sec. 302. Trafficking in passwords.Sec. 303. Conspiracy and attempted computer fraud offenses.Sec. 304. Criminal and civil forfeiture for fraud and related activity in connection with computers.Sec. 305. Damage to critical infrastructure computers.Sec. 306. Limitation on actions involving unauthorized use.Sec. 307. No new funding. TITLE IV--CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTSec. 401. National High-Performance Computing Program planning and coordination.Sec. 402. Research in areas of national importance.Sec. 403. Program improvements.Sec. 404. Improving education of networking and information technology, including high performance computing.Sec. 405. Conforming and technical amendments to the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991.Sec. 406. Federal cyber scholarship-for-service program.Sec. 407. Study and analysis of certification and training of information infrastructure professionals.Sec. 408. International cybersecurity technical standards.Sec. 409. Identity management research and development.Sec. 410. Federal cybersecurity research and development. TITLE I--FACILITATING SHARING OF CYBER THREAT INFORMATION SEC. 101. DEFINITIONS. In this title: (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code. (2) Antitrust laws.--The term ``antitrust laws''-- (A) has the meaning given the term in section 1(a) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)); (B) includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that section 5 of that Act applies to unfair methods of competition; and (C) includes any State law that has the same intent and effect as the laws under subparagraphs (A) and (B). (3) Countermeasure.--The term ``countermeasure'' means an automated or a manual action with defensive intent to mitigate cyber threats. (4) Cyber threat information.--The term ``cyber threat information'' means information that indicates or describes-- (A) a technical or operation vulnerability or a cyber threat mitigation measure; (B) an action or operation to mitigate a cyber threat; (C) malicious reconnaissance, including anomalous patterns of network activity that appear to be transmitted for the purpose of gathering technical information related to a cybersecurity threat; (D) a method of defeating a technical control; (E) a method of defeating an operational control; (F) network activity or protocols known to be associated with a malicious cyber actor or that signify malicious cyber intent; (G) a method of causing a user with legitimate access to an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system to inadvertently enable the defeat of a technical or operational control; (H) any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat or cyber defense information that would foster situational awareness of the United States cybersecurity posture, if disclosure of such attribute or information is not otherwise prohibited by law; (I) the actual or potential harm caused by a cyber incident, including information exfiltrated when it is necessary in order to identify or describe a cybersecurity threat; or (J) any combination of subparagraphs (A) through (I). (5) Cybersecurity center.--The term ``cybersecurity center'' means the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center, the Intelligence Community Incident Response Center, the United States Cyber Command Joint Operations Center, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, the National Security Agency/Central Security Service Threat Operations Center, the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, and any successor center. (6) Cybersecurity system.--The term ``cybersecurity system'' means a system designed or employed to ensure the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of, or to safeguard, a system or network, including measures intended to protect a system or network from-- (A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such system or network; or (B) theft or misappropriations of private or government information, intellectual property, or personally identifiable information. (7) Entity.-- (A) In general.--The term ``entity'' means any private entity, non-Federal government agency or department, or State, tribal, or local government agency or department (including an officer, employee, or agent thereof). (B) Inclusions.--The term ``entity'' includes a government agency or department (including an officer, employee, or agent thereof) of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United States. (8) Federal information system.--The term ``Federal information system'' means an information system of a Federal department or agency used or operated by an executive agency, by a contractor of an executive agency, or by another organization on behalf of an executive agency. (9) Information security.--The term ``information security'' means protecting information and information systems from disruption or unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, or destruction in order to provide-- (A) integrity, by guarding against improper information modification or destruction, including by ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity; (B) confidentiality, by preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information; or (C) availability, by ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. (10) Information system.--The term ``information system'' has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code. (11) Local government.--The term ``local government'' means any borough, city, county, parish, town, township, village, or other general purpose political subdivision of a State. (12) Malicious reconnaissance.--The term ``malicious reconnaissance'' means a method for actively probing or passively monitoring an information system for the purpose of discerning technical vulnerabilities of the information system, if such method is associated with a known or suspected cybersecurity threat. (13) Operational control.--The term ``operational control'' means a security control for an information system that primarily is implemented and executed by people. (14) Operational vulnerability.--The term ``operational vulnerability'' means any attribute of policy, process, or procedure that could enable or facilitate the defeat of an operational control. (15) Private entity.--The term ``private entity'' means any individual or any private group, organization, or corporation, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof. (16) Significant cyber incident.--The term ``significant cyber incident'' means a cyber incident resulting in, or an attempted cyber incident that, if successful, would have resulted in-- (A) the exfiltration from a Federal information system of data that is essential to the operation of the Federal information system; or (B) an incident in which an operational or technical control essential to the security or operation of a Federal information system was defeated. (17) Technical control.--The term ``technical control'' means a hardware or software restriction on, or audit of, access or use of an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system that is intended to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of that system. (18) Technical vulnerability.--The term ``technical vulnerability'' means any attribute of hardware or software that could enable or facilitate the defeat of a technical control. (19) Tribal.--The term ``tribal'' has the meaning given the term ``Indian tribe'' in section 4 of the Indian Self- Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b). SEC. 102. AUTHORIZATION TO SHARE CYBER THREAT INFORMATION. (a) Voluntary Disclosure.-- (1) Private entities.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a private entity may, for the purpose of preventing, investigating, or otherwise mitigating threats to information security, on its own networks, or as authorized by another entity, on such entity's networks, employ countermeasures and use cybersecurity systems in order to obtain, identify, or otherwise possess cyber threat information. (2) Entities.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an entity may disclose cyber threat information to-- (A) a cybersecurity center; or (B) any other entity in order to assist with preventing, investigating, or otherwise mitigating threats to information security. (3) Information security providers.--If the cyber threat information described in paragraph (1) is obtained, identified, or otherwise possessed in the course of providing information security products or services under contract to another entity, that entity shall be given, at any time prior to disclosure of such information, a reasonable opportunity to authorize or prevent such disclosure, to request anonymization of such information, or to request that reasonable efforts be made to safeguard such information that identifies specific persons from unauthorized access or disclosure. (b) Significant Cyber Incidents Involving Federal Information Systems.-- (1) In general.--An entity providing electronic communication services, remote computing services, or information security services to a Federal department or agency shall inform the Federal department or agency of a significant cyber incident involving the Federal information system of that Federal department or agency that-- (A) is directly known to the entity as a result of providing such services; (B) is directly related to the provision of such services by the entity; and (C) as determined by the entity, has impeded or will impede the performance of a critical mission of the Federal department or agency. (2) Advance coordination.--A Federal department or agency receiving the services described in paragraph (1) shall coordinate in advance with an entity described in paragraph (1) to develop the parameters of any information that may be provided under paragraph (1), including clarification of the type of significant cyber incident that will impede the performance of a critical mission of the Federal department or agency. (3) Report.--A Federal department or agency shall report information provided under this subsection to a cybersecurity center. (4) Construction.--Any information provided to a cybersecurity center under paragraph (3) shall be treated in the same manner as information provided to a cybersecurity center under subsection (a). (c) Information Shared With or Provided to a Cybersecurity Center.--Cyber threat information provided to a cybersecurity center under this section-- (1) may be disclosed to, retained by, and used by, consistent with otherwise applicable Federal law, any Federal agency or department, component, officer, employee, or agent of the Federal government for a cybersecurity purpose, a national security purpose, or in order to prevent, investigate, or prosecute any of the offenses listed in section 2516 of title 18, United States Code, and such information shall not be disclosed to, retained by, or used by any Federal agency or department for any use not permitted under this paragraph; (2) may, with the prior written consent of the entity submitting such information, be disclosed to and used by a State, tribal, or local government or government agency for the purpose of protecting information systems, or in furtherance of preventing, investigating, or prosecuting a criminal act, except that if the need for immediate disclosure prevents obtaining written consent, such consent may be provided orally with subsequent documentation of such consent; (3) shall be considered the commercial, financial, or proprietary information of the entity providing such information to the Federal government and any disclosure outside the Federal government may only be made upon the prior written consent by such entity and shall not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege or protection provided by law, except that if the need for immediate disclosure prevents obtaining written consent, such consent may be provided orally with subsequent documentation of such consent; (4) shall be deemed voluntarily shared information and exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and any State, tribal, or local law requiring disclosure of information or records; (5) shall be, without discretion, withheld from the public under section 552(b)(3)(B) of title 5, United States Code, and any State, tribal, or local law requiring disclosure of information or records; (6) shall not be subject to the rules of any Federal agency or department or any judicial doctrine regarding ex parte communications with a decision-making official; (7) shall not, if subsequently provided to a State, tribal, or local government or government agency, otherwise be disclosed or distributed to any entity by such State, tribal, or local government or government agency without the prior written consent of the entity submitting such information, notwithstanding any State, tribal, or local law requiring disclosure of information or records, except that if the need for immediate disclosure prevents obtaining written consent, such consent may be provided orally with subsequent documentation of such consent; and (8) shall not be directly used by any Federal, State, tribal, or local department or agency to regulate the lawful activities of an entity, including activities relating to obtaining, identifying, or otherwise possessing cyber threat information, except that the procedures required to be developed and implemented under this title shall not be considered regulations within the meaning of this paragraph. (d) Procedures Relating to Information Sharing With a Cybersecurity Center.--Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the heads of each department or agency containing a cybersecurity center shall jointly develop, promulgate, and submit to Congress procedures to ensure that cyber threat information shared with or provided to-- (1) a cybersecurity center under this section-- (A) may be submitted to a cybersecurity center by an entity, to the greatest extent possible, through a uniform, publicly available process or format that is easily accessible on the website of such cybersecurity center, and that includes the ability to provide relevant details about the cyber threat information and written consent to any subsequent disclosures authorized by this paragraph; (B) shall immediately be further shared with each cybersecurity center in order to prevent, investigate, or otherwise mitigate threats to information security across the Federal government; (C) is handled by the Federal government in a reasonable manner, including consideration of the need to protect the privacy and civil liberties of individuals through anonymization or other appropriate methods, while fully accomplishing the objectives of this title, and the Federal government may undertake efforts consistent with this subparagraph to limit the impact on privacy and civil liberties of the sharing of cyber threat information with the Federal government; and (D) except as provided in this section, shall only be used, disclosed, or handled in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c); and (2) a Federal agency or department under subsection (b) is provided immediately to a cybersecurity center in order to prevent, investigate, or otherwise mitigate threats to information security across the Federal government. (e) Information Shared Between Entities.-- (1) In general.--An entity sharing cyber threat information with another entity under this title may restrict the use or sharing of such information by such other entity. (2) Further sharing.--Cyber threat information shared by any entity with another entity under this title-- (A) shall only be further shared in accordance with any restrictions placed on the sharing of such information by the entity authorizing such sharing, such as appropriate anonymization of such information; and (B) may not be used by any entity to gain an unfair competitive advantage to the detriment of the entity authorizing the sharing of such information, except that the conduct described in paragraph (3) shall not constitute unfair competitive conduct. (3) Information shared with state, tribal, or local government or government agency.--Cyber threat information shared with a State, tribal, or local government or government agency under this title-- (A) may, with the prior written consent of the entity sharing such information, be disclosed to and used by a State, tribal, or local government or government agency for the purpose of protecting information systems, or in furtherance of preventing, investigating, or prosecuting a criminal act, except if the need for immediate disclosure prevents obtaining written consent, consent may be provided orally with subsequent documentation of the consent; (B) shall be deemed voluntarily shared information and exempt from disclosure under any State, tribal, or local law requiring disclosure of information or records; (C) shall not be disclosed or distributed to any entity by the State, tribal, or local government or government agency without the prior written consent of the entity submitting such information, notwithstanding any State, tribal, or local law requiring disclosure of information or records, except if the need for immediate disclosure prevents obtaining written consent, consent may be provided orally with subsequent documentation of the consent; and (D) shall not be directly used by any State, tribal, or local department or agency to regulate the lawful activities of an entity, including activities relating to obtaining, identifying, or otherwise possessing cyber threat information, except that the procedures required to be developed and implemented under this title shall not be considered regulations within the meaning of this subparagraph. (4) Antitrust exemption.--The exchange or provision of cyber threat information or assistance between 2 or more private entities under this title shall not be considered a violation of any provision of antitrust laws if exchanged or provided in order to assist with-- (A) facilitating the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of threats to information security; or (B) communicating or disclosing of cyber threat information to help prevent, investigate or otherwise mitigate the effects of a threat to information security. (5) No right or benefit.--The provision of cyber threat information to an entity under this section shall not create a right or a benefit to similar information by such entity or any other entity. (f) Federal Preemption.-- (1) In general.--This section supersedes any statute or other law of a State or political subdivision of a State that restricts or otherwise expressly regulates an activity authorized under this section. (2) State law enforcement.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede any statute or other law of a State or political subdivision of a State concerning the use of authorized law enforcement techniques. (3) Public disclosure.--No information shared with or provided to a State, tribal, or local government or government agency pursuant to this section shall be made publicly available pursuant to any State, tribal, or local law requiring disclosure of information or records. (g) Civil and Criminal Liability.-- (1) General protections.-- (A) Private entities.--No cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court against any private entity for-- (i) the use of countermeasures and cybersecurity systems as authorized by this title; (ii) the use, receipt, or disclosure of any cyber threat information as authorized by this title; or (iii) the subsequent actions or inactions of any lawful recipient of cyber threat information provided by such private entity. (B) Entities.--No cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court against any entity for-- (i) the use, receipt, or disclosure of any cyber threat information as authorized by this title; or (ii) the subsequent actions or inactions of any lawful recipient of cyber threat information provided by such entity. (2) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as creating any immunity against, or otherwise affecting, any action brought by the Federal government, or any agency or department thereof, to enforce any law, executive order, or procedure governing the appropriate handling, disclosure, and use of classified information. (h) Otherwise Lawful Disclosures.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or prohibit otherwise lawful disclosures of communications, records, or other information by a private entity to any other governmental or private entity not covered under this section. (i) Whistleblower Protection.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to preempt or preclude any employee from exercising rights currently provided under any whistleblower law, rule, or regulation. (j) Relationship to Other Laws.--The submission of cyber threat information under this section to a cybersecurity center shall not affect any requirement under any other provision of law for an entity to provide information to the Federal government. SEC. 103. INFORMATION SHARING BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. (a) Classified Information.-- (1) Procedures.--Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, and as otherwise determined appropriate, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of the appropriate Federal departments or agencies, shall develop and promulgate procedures to facilitate and promote-- (A) the immediate sharing, through the cybersecurity centers, of classified cyber threat information in the possession of the Federal government with appropriately cleared representatives of any appropriate entity; and (B) the declassification and immediate sharing, through the cybersecurity centers, with any entity or, if appropriate, public availability of cyber threat information in the possession of the Federal government; (2) Handling of classified information.--The procedures developed under paragraph (1) shall ensure that each entity receiving classified cyber threat information pursuant to this section has acknowledged in writing the ongoing obligation to comply with all laws, executive orders, and procedures concerning the appropriate handling, disclosure, or use of classified information. (b) Unclassified Cyber Threat Information.--The heads of each department or agency containing a cybersecurity center shall jointly develop and promulgate procedures that ensure that, consistent with the provisions of this section, unclassified, including controlled unclassified, cyber threat information in the possession of the Federal government-- (1) is shared, through the cybersecurity centers, in an immediate and adequate manner with appropriate entities; and (2) if appropriate, is made publicly available. (c) Development of Procedures.-- (1) In general.--The procedures developed under this section shall incorporate, to the greatest extent possible, existing processes utilized by sector specific information sharing and analysis centers. (2) Coordination with entities.--In developing the procedures required under this section, the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of each department or agency containing a cybersecurity center shall coordinate with appropriate entities to ensure that protocols are implemented that will facilitate and promote the sharing of cyber threat information by the Federal government. (d) Additional Responsibilities of Cybersecurity Centers.-- Consistent with section 102, a cybersecurity center shall-- (1) facilitate information sharing, interaction, and collaboration among and between cybersecurity centers and-- (A) other Federal entities; (B) any entity; and (C) international partners, in consultation with the Secretary of State; (2) disseminate timely and actionable cybersecurity threat, vulnerability, mitigation, and warning information, including alerts, advisories, indicators, signatures, and mitigation and response measures, to improve the security and protection of information systems; and (3) coordinate with other Federal entities, as appropriate, to integrate information from across the Federal government to provide situational awareness of the cybersecurity posture of the United States. (e) Sharing Within the Federal Government.--The heads of appropriate Federal departments and agencies shall ensure that cyber threat information in the possession of such Federal departments or agencies that relates to the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of threats to information security across the Federal government is shared effectively with the cybersecurity centers. (f) Submission to Congress.--Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the appropriate head of a department or an agency containing a cybersecurity center, shall submit the procedures required by this section to Congress. SEC. 104. CONSTRUCTION. (a) Information Sharing Relationships.--Nothing in this title shall be construed-- (1) to limit or modify an existing information sharing relationship; (2) to prohibit a new information sharing relationship; (3) to require a new information sharing relationship between any entity and the Federal government, except as specified under section 102(b); or (4) to modify the authority of a department or agency of the Federal government to protect sources and methods and the national security of the United States. (b) Anti-tasking Restriction.--Nothing in this title shall be construed to permit the Federal government-- (1) to require an entity to share information with the Federal government, except as expressly provided under section 102(b); or (2) to condition the sharing of cyber threat information with an entity on such entity's provision of cyber threat information to the Federal government. (c) No Liability for Non-participation.--Nothing in this title shall be construed to subject any entity to liability for choosing not to engage in the voluntary activities authorized under this title. (d) Use and Retention of Information.--Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize, or to modify any existing authority of, a department or agency of the Federal government to retain or use any information shared under section 102 for any use other than a use permitted under subsection 102(c)(1). (e) No New Funding.--An applicable Federal agency shall carry out the provisions of this title with existing facilities and funds otherwise available, through such means as the head of the agency considers appropriate. SEC. 105. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION. (a) Content of Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and biennially thereafter, the heads of each department or agency containing a cybersecurity center shall jointly submit, in coordination with the privacy and civil liberties officials of such departments or agencies and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, a detailed report to Congress concerning the implementation of this title, including-- (1) an assessment of the sufficiency of the procedures developed under section 103 of this Act in ensuring that cyber threat information in the possession of the Federal government is provided in an immediate and adequate manner to appropriate entities or, if appropriate, is made publicly available; (2) an assessment of whether information has been appropriately classified and an accounting of the number of security clearances authorized by the Federal government for purposes of this title; (3) a review of the type of cyber threat information shared with a cybersecurity center under section 102 of this Act, including whether such information meets the definition of cyber threat information under section 101, the degree to which such information may impact the privacy and civil liberties of individuals, any appropriate metrics to determine any impact of the sharing of such information with the Federal government on privacy and civil liberties, and the adequacy of any steps taken to reduce such impact; (4) a review of actions taken by the Federal government based on information provided to a cybersecurity center under section 102 of this Act, including the appropriateness of any subsequent use under section 102(c)(1) of this Act and whether there was inappropriate stovepiping within the Federal government of any such information; (5) a description of any violations of the requirements of this title by the Federal government; (6) a classified list of entities that received classified information from the Federal government under section 103 of this Act and a description of any indication that such information may not have been appropriately handled; (7) a summary of any breach of information security, if known, attributable to a specific failure by any entity or the Federal government to act on cyber threat information in the possession of such entity or the Federal government that resulted in substantial economic harm or injury to a specific entity or the Federal government; and (8) any recommendation for improvements or modifications to the authorities under this title. (b) Form of Report.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but shall include a classified annex. SEC. 106. INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW. (a) In General.--The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency are authorized to review compliance by the cybersecurity centers, and by any Federal department or agency receiving cyber threat information from such cybersecurity centers, with the procedures required under section 102 of this Act. (b) Scope of Review.--The review under subsection (a) shall consider whether the Federal government has handled such cyber threat information in a reasonable manner, including consideration of the need to protect the privacy and civil liberties of individuals through anonymization or other appropriate methods, while fully accomplishing the objectives of this title. (c) Report to Congress.--Each review conducted under this section shall be provided to Congress not later than 30 days after the date of completion of the review. SEC. 107. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS. Section 552(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``or''; (2) in paragraph (9), by striking ``wells.'' and inserting ``wells; or''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(10) information shared with or provided to a cybersecurity center under section 102 of title I of the Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education, Information, and Technology Act of 2012.''. SEC. 108. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. (a) Authorization Required.--No person shall be provided with access to classified information (as defined in section 6.1 of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 435 note; relating to classified national security information)) relating to cyber security threats or cyber security vulnerabilities under this title without the appropriate security clearances. (b) Security Clearances.--The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall, consistent with applicable procedures and requirements, and if otherwise deemed appropriate, assist an individual in timely obtaining an appropriate security clearance where such individual has been determined to be eligible for such clearance and has a need-to-know (as defined in section 6.1 of that Executive Order) classified information to carry out this title. TITLE II--COORDINATION OF FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY SEC. 201. COORDINATION OF FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY. (a) In General.--Chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by striking subchapters II and III and inserting the following: ``SUBCHAPTER II--INFORMATION SECURITY ``Sec. 3551. Purposes ``The purposes of this subchapter are-- ``(1) to provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over information resources that support Federal operations and assets; ``(2) to recognize the highly networked nature of the current Federal computing environment and provide effective government-wide management of policies, directives, standards, and guidelines, as well as effective and nimble oversight of and response to information security risks, including coordination of information security efforts throughout the Federal civilian, national security, and law enforcement communities; ``(3) to provide for development and maintenance of controls required to protect agency information and information systems and contribute to the overall improvement of agency information security posture; ``(4) to provide for the development of tools and methods to assess and respond to real-time situational risk for Federal information system operations and assets; and ``(5) to provide a mechanism for improving agency information security programs through continuous monitoring of agency information systems and streamlined reporting requirements rather than overly prescriptive manual reporting. ``Sec. 3552. Definitions ``In this subchapter: ``(1) Adequate security.--The term `adequate security' means security commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from the unauthorized access to or loss, misuse, destruction, or modification of information. ``(2) Agency.--The term `agency' has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44. ``(3) Cybersecurity center.--The term `cybersecurity center' means the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center, the Intelligence Community Incident Response Center, the United States Cyber Command Joint Operations Center, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, the National Security Agency/Central Security Service Threat Operations Center, the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, and any successor center. ``(4) Cyber threat information.--The term `cyber threat information' means information that indicates or describes-- ``(A) a technical or operation vulnerability or a cyber threat mitigation measure; ``(B) an action or operation to mitigate a cyber threat; ``(C) malicious reconnaissance, including anomalous patterns of network activity that appear to be transmitted for the purpose of gathering technical information related to a cybersecurity threat; ``(D) a method of defeating a technical control; ``(E) a method of defeating an operational control; ``(F) network activity or protocols known to be associated with a malicious cyber actor or that signify malicious cyber intent; ``(G) a method of causing a user with legitimate access to an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system to inadvertently enable the defeat of a technical or operational control; ``(H) any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat or cyber defense information that would foster situational awareness of the United States cybersecurity posture, if disclosure of such attribute or information is not otherwise prohibited by law; ``(I) the actual or potential harm caused by a cyber incident, including information exfiltrated when it is necessary in order to identify or describe a cybersecurity threat; or ``(J) any combination of subparagraphs (A) through (I). ``(5) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director of the Office of Management and Budget unless otherwise specified. ``(6) Environment of operation.--The term `environment of operation' means the information system and environment in which those systems operate, including changing threats, vulnerabilities, technologies, and missions and business practices. ``(7) Federal information system.--The term `Federal information system' means an information system used or operated by an executive agency, by a contractor of an executive agency, or by another organization on behalf of an executive agency. ``(8) Incident.--The term `incident' means an occurrence that-- ``(A) actually or imminently jeopardizes the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of an information system or the information that system controls, processes, stores, or transmits; or ``(B) constitutes a violation of law or an imminent threat of violation of a law, a security policy, a security procedure, or an acceptable use policy. ``(9) Information resources.--The term `information resources' has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44. ``(10) Information security.--The term `information security' means protecting information and information systems from disruption or unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, or destruction in order to provide-- ``(A) integrity, by guarding against improper information modification or destruction, including by ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity; ``(B) confidentiality, by preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information; or ``(C) availability, by ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. ``(11) Information system.--The term `information system' has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44. ``(12) Information technology.--The term `information technology' has the meaning given the term in section 11101 of title 40. ``(13) Malicious reconnaissance.--The term `malicious reconnaissance' means a method for actively probing or passively monitoring an information system for the purpose of discerning technical vulnerabilities of the information system, if such method is associated with a known or suspected cybersecurity threat. ``(14) National security system.-- ``(A) In general.--The term `national security system' means any information system (including any telecommunications system) used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency-- ``(i) the function, operation, or use of which-- ``(I) involves intelligence activities; ``(II) involves cryptologic activities related to national security; ``(III) involves command and control of military forces; ``(IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system; or ``(V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions; or ``(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for information that have been specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. ``(B) Limitation.--Subparagraph (A)(i)(V) does not include a system that is to be used for routine administrative and business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management applications). ``(15) Operational control.--The term `operational control' means a security control for an information system that primarily is implemented and executed by people. ``(16) Person.--The term `person' has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44. ``(17) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary of Commerce unless otherwise specified. ``(18) Security control.--The term `security control' means the management, operational, and technical controls, including safeguards or countermeasures, prescribed for an information system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information. ``(19) Significant cyber incident.--The term `significant cyber incident' means a cyber incident resulting in, or an attempted cyber incident that, if successful, would have resulted in-- ``(A) the exfiltration from a Federal information system of data that is essential to the operation of the Federal information system; or ``(B) an incident in which an operational or technical control essential to the security or operation of a Federal information system was defeated. ``(20) Technical control.--The term `technical control' means a hardware or software restriction on, or audit of, access or use of an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system that is intended to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of that system. ``Sec. 3553. Federal information security authority and coordination ``(a) In General.--The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall-- ``(1) issue compulsory and binding policies and directives governing agency information security operations, and require implementation of such policies and directives, including-- ``(A) policies and directives consistent with the standards and guidelines promulgated under section 11331 of title 40 to identify and provide information security protections prioritized and commensurate with the risk and impact resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of-- ``(i) information collected or maintained by or on behalf of an agency; or ``(ii) information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency; ``(B) minimum operational requirements for Federal Government to protect agency information systems and provide common situational awareness across all agency information systems; ``(C) reporting requirements, consistent with relevant law, regarding information security incidents and cyber threat information; ``(D) requirements for agencywide information security programs; ``(E) performance requirements and metrics for the security of agency information systems; ``(F) training requirements to ensure that agencies are able to fully and timely comply with the policies and directives issued by the Secretary under this subchapter; ``(G) training requirements regarding privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, and information oversight for agency information security personnel; ``(H) requirements for the annual reports to the Secretary under section 3554(d); ``(I) any other information security operations or information security requirements as determined by the Secretary in coordination with relevant agency heads; and ``(J) coordinating the development of standards and guidelines under section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) with agencies and offices operating or exercising control of national security systems (including the National Security Agency) to assure, to the maximum extent feasible, that such standards and guidelines are complementary with standards and guidelines developed for national security systems; ``(2) review the agencywide information security programs under section 3554; and ``(3) designate an individual or an entity at each cybersecurity center, among other responsibilities-- ``(A) to receive reports and information about information security incidents, cyber threat information, and deterioration of security control affecting agency information systems; and ``(B) to act on or share the information under subparagraph (A) in accordance with this subchapter. ``(b) Considerations.--When issuing policies and directives under subsection (a), the Secretary shall consider any applicable standards or guidelines developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology under section 11331 of title 40. ``(c) Limitation of Authority.--The authorities of the Secretary under this section shall not apply to national security systems. Information security policies, directives, standards and guidelines for national security systems shall be overseen as directed by the President and, in accordance with that direction, carried out under the authority of the heads of agencies that operate or exercise authority over such national security systems. ``(d) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter or amend any law regarding the authority of any head of an agency over such agency. ``Sec. 3554. Agency responsibilities ``(a) In General.--The head of each agency shall-- ``(1) be responsible for-- ``(A) complying with the policies and directives issued under section 3553; ``(B) providing information security protections commensurate with the risk resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of-- ``(i) information collected or maintained by the agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency; and ``(ii) information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency; ``(C) complying with the requirements of this subchapter, including-- ``(i) information security standards and guidelines promulgated under section 11331 of title 40; ``(ii) for any national security systems operated or controlled by that agency, information security policies, directives, standards and guidelines issued as directed by the President; and ``(iii) for any non-national security systems operated or controlled by that agency, information security policies, directives, standards and guidelines issued under section 3553; ``(D) ensuring that information security management processes are integrated with agency strategic and operational planning processes; ``(E) reporting and sharing, for an agency operating or exercising control of a national security system, information about information security incidents, cyber threat information, and deterioration of security controls to the individual or entity designated at each cybersecurity center and to other appropriate entities consistent with policies and directives for national security systems issued as directed by the President; and ``(F) reporting and sharing, for those agencies operating or exercising control of non-national security systems, information about information security incidents, cyber threat information, and deterioration of security controls to the individual or entity designated at each cybersecurity center and to other appropriate entities consistent with policies and directives for non-national security systems as prescribed under section 3553(a), including information to assist the entity designated under section 3555(a) with the ongoing security analysis under section 3555; ``(2) ensure that each senior agency official provides information security for the information and information systems that support the operations and assets under the senior agency official's control, including by-- ``(A) assessing the risk and impact that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of such information or information systems; ``(B) determining the level of information security appropriate to protect such information and information systems in accordance with policies and directives issued under section 3553(a), and standards and guidelines promulgated under section 11331 of title 40 for information security classifications and related requirements; ``(C) implementing policies, procedures, and capabilities to reduce risks to an acceptable level in a cost-effective manner; ``(D) actively monitoring the effective implementation of information security controls and techniques; and ``(E) reporting information about information security incidents, cyber threat information, and deterioration of security controls in a timely and adequate manner to the entity designated under section 3553(a)(3) in accordance with paragraph (1); ``(3) assess and maintain the resiliency of information technology systems critical to agency mission and operations; ``(4) designate the agency Inspector General (or an independent entity selected in consultation with the Director and the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency if the agency does not have an Inspector General) to conduct the annual independent evaluation required under section 3556, and allow the agency Inspector General to contract with an independent entity to perform such evaluation; ``(5) delegate to the Chief Information Officer or equivalent (or to a senior agency official who reports to the Chief Information Officer or equivalent)-- ``(A) the authority and primary responsibility to implement an agencywide information security program; and ``(B) the authority to provide information security for the information collected and maintained by the agency (or by a contractor, other agency, or other source on behalf of the agency) and for the information systems that support the operations, assets, and mission of the agency (including any information system provided or managed by a contractor, other agency, or other source on behalf of the agency); ``(6) delegate to the appropriate agency official (who is responsible for a particular agency system or subsystem) the responsibility to ensure and enforce compliance with all requirements of the agency's agencywide information security program in coordination with the Chief Information Officer or equivalent (or the senior agency official who reports to the Chief Information Officer or equivalent) under paragraph (5); ``(7) ensure that an agency has trained personnel who have obtained any necessary security clearances to permit them to assist the agency in complying with this subchapter; ``(8) ensure that the Chief Information Officer or equivalent (or the senior agency official who reports to the Chief Information Officer or equivalent) under paragraph (5), in coordination with other senior agency officials, reports to the agency head on the effectiveness of the agencywide information security program, including the progress of any remedial actions; and ``(9) ensure that the Chief Information Officer or equivalent (or the senior agency official who reports to the Chief Information Officer or equivalent) under paragraph (5) has the necessary qualifications to administer the functions described in this subchapter and has information security duties as a primary duty of that official. ``(b) Chief Information Officers.--Each Chief Information Officer or equivalent (or the senior agency official who reports to the Chief Information Officer or equivalent) under subsection (a)(5) shall-- ``(1) establish and maintain an enterprise security operations capability that on a continuous basis-- ``(A) detects, reports, contains, mitigates, and responds to information security incidents that impair adequate security of the agency's information or information system in a timely manner and in accordance with the policies and directives under section 3553; and ``(B) reports any information security incident under subparagraph (A) to the entity designated under section 3555; ``(2) develop, maintain, and oversee an agencywide information security program; ``(3) develop, maintain, and oversee information security policies, procedures, and control techniques to address applicable requirements, including requirements under section 3553 of this title and section 11331 of title 40; and ``(4) train and oversee the agency personnel who have significant responsibility for information security with respect to that responsibility. ``(c) Agencywide Information Security Programs.-- ``(1) In general.--Each agencywide information security program under subsection (b)(2) shall include-- ``(A) relevant security risk assessments, including technical assessments and others related to the acquisition process; ``(B) security testing commensurate with risk and impact; ``(C) mitigation of deterioration of security controls commensurate with risk and impact; ``(D) risk-based continuous monitoring and threat assessment of the operational status and security of agency information systems to enable evaluation of the effectiveness of and compliance with information security policies, procedures, and practices, including a relevant and appropriate selection of security controls of information systems identified in the inventory under section 3505(c); ``(E) operation of appropriate technical capabilities in order to detect, mitigate, report, and respond to information security incidents, cyber threat information, and deterioration of security controls in a manner that is consistent with the policies and directives under section 3553, including-- ``(i) mitigating risks associated with such information security incidents; ``(ii) notifying and consulting with the entity designated under section 3555; and ``(iii) notifying and consulting with, as appropriate-- ``(I) law enforcement and the relevant Office of the Inspector General; and ``(II) any other entity, in accordance with law and as directed by the President; ``(F) a process to ensure that remedial action is taken to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; and ``(G) a plan and procedures to ensure the continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. ``(2) Risk management strategies.--Each agencywide information security program under subsection (b)(2) shall include the development and maintenance of a risk management strategy for information security. The risk management strategy shall include-- ``(A) consideration of information security incidents, cyber threat information, and deterioration of security controls; and ``(B) consideration of the consequences that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency, including any information system provided or managed by a contractor, other agency, or other source on behalf of the agency; ``(3) Policies and procedures.--Each agencywide information security program under subsection (b)(2) shall include policies and procedures that-- ``(A) are based on the risk management strategy under paragraph (2); ``(B) reduce information security risks to an acceptable level in a cost-effective manner; ``(C) ensure that cost-effective and adequate information security is addressed as part of the acquisition and ongoing management of each agency information system; and ``(D) ensure compliance with-- ``(i) this subchapter; and ``(ii) any other applicable requirements. ``(4) Training requirements.--Each agencywide information security program under subsection (b)(2) shall include information security, privacy, civil rights, civil liberties, and information oversight training that meets any applicable requirements under section 3553. The training shall inform each information security personnel that has access to agency information systems (including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency) of-- ``(A) the information security risks associated with the information security personnel's activities; and ``(B) the individual's responsibility to comply with the agency policies and procedures that reduce the risks under subparagraph (A). ``(d) Annual Report.--Each agency shall submit a report annually to the Secretary of Homeland Security on its agencywide information security program and information systems. ``Sec. 3555. Multiagency ongoing threat assessment ``(a) Implementation.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall designate an entity to implement ongoing security analysis concerning agency information systems-- ``(1) based on cyber threat information; ``(2) based on agency information system and environment of operation changes, including-- ``(A) an ongoing evaluation of the information system security controls; and ``(B) the security state, risk level, and environment of operation of an agency information system, including-- ``(i) a change in risk level due to a new cyber threat; ``(ii) a change resulting from a new technology; ``(iii) a change resulting from the agency's mission; and ``(iv) a change resulting from the business practice; and ``(3) using automated processes to the maximum extent possible-- ``(A) to increase information system security; ``(B) to reduce paper-based reporting requirements; and ``(C) to maintain timely and actionable knowledge of the state of the information system security. ``(b) Standards.--The National Institute of Standards and Technology may promulgate standards, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to assist an agency with its duties under this section. ``(c) Compliance.--The head of each appropriate department and agency shall be responsible for ensuring compliance and implementing necessary procedures to comply with this section. The head of each appropriate department and agency, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall-- ``(1) monitor compliance under this section; ``(2) develop a timeline and implement for the department or agency-- ``(A) adoption of any technology, system, or method that facilitates continuous monitoring and threat assessments of an agency information system; ``(B) adoption or updating of any technology, system, or method that prevents, detects, or remediates a significant cyber incident to a Federal information system of the department or agency that has impeded, or is reasonably likely to impede, the performance of a critical mission of the department or agency; and ``(C) adoption of any technology, system, or method that satisfies a requirement under this section. ``(d) Limitation of Authority.--The authorities of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and of the Secretary of Homeland Security under this section shall not apply to national security systems. ``(e) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of the Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education, Information, and Technology Act of 2012, the Government Accountability Office shall issue a report evaluating each agency's status toward implementing this section. ``Sec. 3556. Independent evaluations ``(a) In General.--The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, in consultation with the Director and the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Defense, shall issue and maintain criteria for the timely, cost-effective, risk-based, and independent evaluation of each agencywide information security program (and practices) to determine the effectiveness of the agencywide information security program (and practices). The criteria shall include measures to assess any conflicts of interest in the performance of the evaluation and whether the agencywide information security program includes appropriate safeguards against disclosure of information where such disclosure may adversely affect information security. ``(b) Annual Independent Evaluations.--Each agency shall perform an annual independent evaluation of its agencywide information security program (and practices) in accordance with the criteria under subsection (a). ``(c) Distribution of Reports.--Not later than 30 days after receiving an independent evaluation under subsection (b), each agency head shall transmit a copy of the independent evaluation to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Defense. ``(d) National Security Systems.--Evaluations involving national security systems shall be conducted as directed by President. ``Sec. 3557. National security systems. ``The head of each agency operating or exercising control of a national security system shall be responsible for ensuring that the agency-- ``(1) provides information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the information contained in such system; and ``(2) implements information security policies and practices as required by standards and guidelines for national security systems, issued in accordance with law and as directed by the President.''. (b) Savings Provisions.-- (1) Policy and compliance guidance.--Policy and compliance guidance issued by the Director before the date of enactment of this Act under section 3543(a)(1) of title 44, United States Code (as in effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act), shall continue in effect, according to its terms, until modified, terminated, superseded, or repealed pursuant to section 3553(a)(1) of title 44, United States Code. (2) Standards and guidelines.--Standards and guidelines issued by the Secretary of Commerce or by the Director before the date of enactment of this Act under section 11331(a)(1) of title 40, United States Code, (as in effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act) shall continue in effect, according to their terms, until modified, terminated, superseded, or repealed pursuant to section 11331(a)(1) of title 40, United States Code, as amended by this Act. (c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.-- (1) Chapter analysis.--The chapter analysis for chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, is amended-- (A) by striking the items relating to sections 3531 through 3538; (B) by striking the items relating to sections 3541 through 3549; and (C) by inserting the following:``3551. Purposes.``3552. Definitions.``3553. Federal information security authority and coordination.``3554. Agency responsibilities.``3555. Multiagency ongoing threat assessment.``3556. Independent evaluations.``3557. National security systems.''. (2) Other references.-- (A) Section 1001(c)(1)(A) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 511(1)(A)) is amended by striking ``section 3532(3)'' and inserting ``section 3552''. (B) Section 2222(j)(5) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ``section 3542(b)(2)'' and inserting ``section 3552''. (C) Section 2223(c)(3) of title 10, United States Code, is amended, by striking ``section 3542(b)(2)'' and inserting ``section 3552''. (D) Section 2315 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ``section 3542(b)(2)'' and inserting ``section 3552''. (E) Section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) is amended-- (i) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``section 3532(b)(2)'' and inserting ``section 3552''; (ii) in subsection (c)(3), by striking ``Director of the Office of Management and Budget'' and inserting ``Secretary of Commerce''; (iii) in subsection (d)(1), by striking ``Director of the Office of Management and Budget'' and inserting ``Secretary of Commerce''; (iv) in subsection (d)(8) by striking ``Director of the Office of Management and Budget'' and inserting ``Secretary of Commerce''; (v) in subsection (d)(8), by striking ``submitted to the Director'' and inserting ``submitted to the Secretary''; (vi) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 3532(1) of such title'' and inserting ``section 3552 of title 44''; and (vii) in subsection (e)(5), by striking ``section 3532(b)(2) of such title'' and inserting ``section 3552 of title 44''. (F) Section 8(d)(1) of the Cyber Security Research and Development Act (15 U.S.C. 7406(d)(1)) is amended by striking ``section 3534(b)'' and inserting ``section 3554(b)(2)''. SEC. 202. MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. (a) In General.--Section 11331 of title 40, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``Sec. 11331. Responsibilities for Federal information systems standards ``(a) Standards and Guidelines.-- ``(1) Authority to prescribe.--Except as provided under paragraph (2), the Secretary of Commerce shall prescribe standards and guidelines pertaining to Federal information systems-- ``(A) in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security; and ``(B) on the basis of standards and guidelines developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 20(a) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g- 3(a)(2) and (a)(3)). ``(2) National security systems.--Standards and guidelines for national security systems shall be developed, prescribed, enforced, and overseen as otherwise authorized by law and as directed by the President. ``(b) Mandatory Standards and Guidelines.-- ``(1) Authority to make mandatory standards and guidelines.--The Secretary of Commerce shall make standards and guidelines under subsection (a)(1) compulsory and binding to the extent determined necessary by the Secretary of Commerce to improve the efficiency of operation or security of Federal information systems. ``(2) Required mandatory standards and guidelines.-- ``(A) In general.--Standards and guidelines under subsection (a)(1) shall include information security standards that-- ``(i) provide minimum information security requirements as determined under section 20(b) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3(b)); and ``(ii) are otherwise necessary to improve the security of Federal information and information systems. ``(B) Binding effect.--Information security standards under subparagraph (A) shall be compulsory and binding. ``(c) Exercise of Authority.--To ensure fiscal and policy consistency, the Secretary of Commerce shall exercise the authority conferred by this section subject to direction by the President and in coordination with the Director. ``(d) Application of More Stringent Standards and Guidelines.--The head of an executive agency may employ standards for the cost-effective information security for information systems within or under the supervision of that agency that are more stringent than the standards and guidelines the Secretary of Commerce prescribes under this section if the more stringent standards and guidelines-- ``(1) contain at least the applicable standards and guidelines made compulsory and binding by the Secretary of Commerce; and ``(2) are otherwise consistent with the policies, directives, and implementation memoranda issued under section 3553(a) of title 44. ``(e) Decisions on Promulgation of Standards and Guidelines.--The decision by the Secretary of Commerce regarding the promulgation of any standard or guideline under this section shall occur not later than 6 months after the date of submission of the proposed standard to the Secretary of Commerce by the National Institute of Standards and Technology under section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3). ``(f) Notice and Comment.--A decision by the Secretary of Commerce to significantly modify, or not promulgate, a proposed standard submitted to the Secretary by the National Institute of Standards and Technology under section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) shall be made after the public is given an opportunity to comment on the Secretary's proposed decision. ``(g) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) Federal information system.--The term `Federal information system' has the meaning given the term in section 3552 of title 44. ``(2) Information security.--The term `information security' has the meaning given the term in section 3552 of title 44. ``(3) National security system.--The term `national security system' has the meaning given the term in section 3552 of title 44.''. SEC. 203. NO NEW FUNDING. An applicable Federal agency shall carry out the provisions of this title with existing facilities and funds otherwise available, through such means as the head of the agency considers appropriate. SEC. 204. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS. Section 21(b) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-4(b)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget'' and inserting ``, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Homeland Security''; and (2) in paragraph (3), by inserting ``, the Secretary of Homeland Security,'' after ``the Secretary of Commerce''. SEC. 205. CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES. Nothing in this title shall be construed to convey any new regulatory authority to any government entity implementing or complying with any provision of this title. TITLE III--CRIMINAL PENALTIES SEC. 301. PENALTIES FOR FRAUD AND RELATED ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION WITH COMPUTERS. Section 1030(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(c) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or (b) of this section is-- ``(1) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section; ``(2)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2); or ``(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2) of this section, if-- ``(i) the offense was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain; ``(ii) the offense was committed in the furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of any State; or ``(iii) the value of the information obtained, or that would have been obtained if the offense was completed, exceeds $5,000; ``(3) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(3) of this section; ``(4) a fine under this title or imprisonment of not more than 20 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(4) of this section; ``(5)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (C), a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(5)(A) of this section, if the offense caused-- ``(i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value; ``(ii) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals; ``(iii) physical injury to any person; ``(iv) a threat to public health or safety; ``(v) damage affecting a computer used by, or on behalf of, an entity of the United States Government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security; or ``(vi) damage affecting 10 or more protected computers during any 1-year period; ``(B) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(5)(B), if the offense caused a harm provided in clause (i) through (vi) of subparagraph (A) of this subsection; ``(C) if the offender attempts to cause or knowingly or recklessly causes death from conduct in violation of subsection (a)(5)(A), a fine under this title, imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or both; ``(D) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, for any other offense under subsection (a)(5); ``(E) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(6) of this section; or ``(F) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(7) of this section.''. SEC. 302. TRAFFICKING IN PASSWORDS. Section 1030(a)(6) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as defined in section 1029) in any password or similar information or means of access through which a protected computer (as defined in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (e)(2)) may be accessed without authorization.''. SEC. 303. CONSPIRACY AND ATTEMPTED COMPUTER FRAUD OFFENSES. Section 1030(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``as if for the completed offense'' after ``punished as provided''. SEC. 304. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL FORFEITURE FOR FRAUD AND RELATED ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION WITH COMPUTERS. Section 1030 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking subsections (i) and (j) and inserting the following: ``(i) Criminal Forfeiture.-- ``(1) The court, in imposing sentence on any person convicted of a violation of this section, or convicted of conspiracy to violate this section, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed and irrespective of any provision of State law, that such person forfeit to the United States-- ``(A) such persons interest in any property, real or personal, that was used, or intended to be used, to commit or facilitate the commission of such violation; and ``(B) any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from any gross proceeds, or any property traceable to such property, that such person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation. ``(2) The criminal forfeiture of property under this subsection, including any seizure and disposition of the property, and any related judicial or administrative proceeding, shall be governed by the provisions of section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except subsection (d) of that section. ``(j) Civil Forfeiture.-- ``(1) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right, real or personal, shall exist in them: ``(A) Any property, real or personal, that was used, or intended to be used, to commit or facilitate the commission of any violation of this section, or a conspiracy to violate this section. ``(B) Any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from any gross proceeds obtained directly or indirectly, or any property traceable to such property, as a result of the commission of any violation of this section, or a conspiracy to violate this section. ``(2) Seizures and forfeitures under this subsection shall be governed by the provisions in chapter 46 relating to civil forfeitures, except that such duties as are imposed on the Secretary of the Treasury under the customs laws described in section 981(d) shall be performed by such officers, agents and other persons as may be designated for that purpose by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General.''. SEC. 305. DAMAGE TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE COMPUTERS. (a) In General.--Chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1030 the following: ``Sec. 1030A. Aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure computer ``(a) Definitions.--In this section-- ``(1) the term `computer' has the meaning given the term in section 1030; ``(2) the term `critical infrastructure computer' means a computer that manages or controls systems or assets vital to national defense, national security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of those matters, whether publicly or privately owned or operated, including-- ``(A) oil and gas production, storage, conversion, and delivery systems; ``(B) water supply systems; ``(C) telecommunication networks; ``(D) electrical power generation and delivery systems; ``(E) finance and banking systems; ``(F) emergency services; ``(G) transportation systems and services; and ``(H) government operations that provide essential services to the public; and ``(3) the term `damage' has the meaning given the term in section 1030. ``(b) Offense.--It shall be unlawful, during and in relation to a felony violation of section 1030, to knowingly cause or attempt to cause damage to a critical infrastructure computer if the damage results in (or, in the case of an attempt, if completed, would have resulted in) the substantial impairment-- ``(1) of the operation of the critical infrastructure computer; or ``(2) of the critical infrastructure associated with the computer. ``(c) Penalty.--Any person who violates subsection (b) shall be-- ``(1) fined under this title; ``(2) imprisoned for not less than 3 years but not more than 20 years; or ``(3) penalized under paragraphs (1) and (2). ``(d) Consecutive Sentence.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law-- ``(1) a court shall not place on probation any person convicted of a violation of this section; ``(2) except as provided in paragraph (4), no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this section shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, including any term of imprisonment imposed on the person under any other provision of law, including any term of imprisonment imposed for a felony violation of section 1030; ``(3) in determining any term of imprisonment to be imposed for a felony violation of section 1030, a court shall not in any way reduce the term to be imposed for such crime so as to compensate for, or otherwise take into account, any separate term of imprisonment imposed or to be imposed for a violation of this section; and ``(4) a term of imprisonment imposed on a person for a violation of this section may, in the discretion of the court, run concurrently, in whole or in part, only with another term of imprisonment that is imposed by the court at the same time on that person for an additional violation of this section, provided that such discretion shall be exercised in accordance with any applicable guidelines and policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28.''. (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1030 the following:``1030A. Aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure computer.''. SEC. 306. LIMITATION ON ACTIONS INVOLVING UNAUTHORIZED USE. Section 1030(e)(6) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``alter;'' and inserting ``alter, but does not include access in violation of a contractual obligation or agreement, such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement, with an Internet service provider, Internet website, or non-government employer, if such violation constitutes the sole basis for determining that access to a protected computer is unauthorized;''. SEC. 307. NO NEW FUNDING. An applicable Federal agency shall carry out the provisions of this title with existing facilities and funds otherwise available, through such means as the head of the agency considers appropriate. TITLE IV--CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SEC. 401. NATIONAL HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTING PROGRAM PLANNING AND COORDINATION. (a) Goals and Priorities.--Section 101 of the High- Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5511) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(d) Goals and Priorities.--The goals and priorities for Federal high-performance computing research, development, networking, and other activities under subsection (a)(2)(A) shall include-- ``(1) encouraging and supporting mechanisms for interdisciplinary research and development in networking and information technology, including-- ``(A) through collaborations across agencies; ``(B) through collaborations across Program Component Areas; ``(C) through collaborations with industry; ``(D) through collaborations with institutions of higher education; ``(E) through collaborations with Federal laboratories (as defined in section 4 of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3703)); and ``(F) through collaborations with international organizations; ``(2) addressing national, multi-agency, multi-faceted challenges of national importance; and ``(3) fostering the transfer of research and development results into new technologies and applications for the benefit of society.''. (b) Development of Strategic Plan.--Section 101 of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5511) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(e) Strategic Plan.-- ``(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of the Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education, Information, and Technology Act of 2012, the agencies under subsection (a)(3)(B), working through the National Science and Technology Council and with the assistance of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall develop a 5-year strategic plan to guide the activities under subsection (a)(1). ``(2) Contents.--The strategic plan shall specify-- ``(A) the near-term objectives for the Program; ``(B) the long-term objectives for the Program; ``(C) the anticipated time frame for achieving the near- term objectives; ``(D) the metrics that will be used to assess any progress made toward achieving the near-term objectives and the long- term objectives; and ``(E) how the Program will achieve the goals and priorities under subsection (d). ``(3) Implementation roadmap.-- ``(A) In general.--The agencies under subsection (a)(3)(B) shall develop and annually update an implementation roadmap for the strategic plan. ``(B) Requirements.--The information in the implementation roadmap shall be coordinated with the database under section 102(c) and the annual report under section 101(a)(3). The implementation roadmap shall-- ``(i) specify the role of each Federal agency in carrying out or sponsoring research and development to meet the research objectives of the strategic plan, including a description of how progress toward the research objectives will be evaluated, with consideration of any relevant recommendations of the advisory committee; ``(ii) specify the funding allocated to each major research objective of the strategic plan and the source of funding by agency for the current fiscal year; and ``(iii) estimate the funding required for each major research objective of the strategic plan for the next 3 fiscal years. ``(4) Recommendations.--The agencies under subsection (a)(3)(B) shall take into consideration when developing the strategic plan under paragraph (1) the recommendations of-- ``(A) the advisory committee under subsection (b); and ``(B) the stakeholders under section 102(a)(3). ``(5) Report to congress.--The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall transmit the strategic plan under this subsection, including the implementation roadmap and any updates under paragraph (3), to-- ``(A) the advisory committee under subsection (b); ``(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and ``(C) the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives.''. (c) Periodic Reviews.--Section 101 of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5511) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(f) Periodic Reviews.--The agencies under subsection (a)(3)(B) shall-- ``(1) periodically assess the contents and funding levels of the Program Component Areas and restructure the Program when warranted, taking into consideration any relevant recommendations of the advisory committee under subsection (b); and ``(2) ensure that the Program includes national, multi- agency, multi-faceted research and development activities, including activities described in section 104.''. (d) Additional Responsibilities of Director.--Section 101(a)(2) of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5511(a)(2)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) and (F) as subparagraphs (G) and (H), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following: ``(E) encourage and monitor the efforts of the agencies participating in the Program to allocate the level of resources and management attention necessary-- ``(i) to ensure that the strategic plan under subsection (e) is developed and executed effectively; and ``(ii) to ensure that the objectives of the Program are met; ``(F) working with the Office of Management and Budget and in coordination with the creation of the database under section 102(c), direct the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the agencies participating in the Program to establish a mechanism (consistent with existing law) to track all ongoing and completed research and development projects and associated funding;''. (e) Advisory Committee.--Section 101(b) of the High- Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5511(b)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)-- (A) by inserting after the first sentence the following: ``The co-chairs of the advisory committee shall meet the qualifications of committee members and may be members of the Presidents Council of Advisors on Science and Technology.''; and (B) by striking ``high-performance'' in subparagraph (D) and inserting ``high-end''; and (2) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows: ``(2) In addition to the duties under paragraph (1), the advisory committee shall conduct periodic evaluations of the funding, management, coordination, implementation, and activities of the Program. The advisory committee shall report its findings and recommendations not less frequently than once every 3 fiscal years to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives. The report shall be submitted in conjunction with the update of the strategic plan.''. (f) Report.--Section 101(a)(3) of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5511(a)(3)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (C)-- (A) by striking ``is submitted,'' and inserting ``is submitted, the levels for the previous fiscal year,''; and (B) by striking ``each Program Component Area'' and inserting ``each Program Component Area and each research area supported in accordance with section 104''; (2) in subparagraph (D)-- (A) by striking ``each Program Component Area,'' and inserting ``each Program Component Area and each research area supported in accordance with section 104,''; (B) by striking ``is submitted,'' and inserting ``is submitted, the levels for the previous fiscal year,''; and (C) by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; (3) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (G); and (4) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following: ``(E) include a description of how the objectives for each Program Component Area, and the objectives for activities that involve multiple Program Component Areas, relate to the objectives of the Program identified in the strategic plan under subsection (e); ``(F) include-- ``(i) a description of the funding required by the Office of Science and Technology Policy to perform the functions under subsections (a) and (c) of section 102 for the next fiscal year by category of activity; ``(ii) a description of the funding required by the Office of Science and Technology Policy to perform the functions under subsections (a) and (c) of section 102 for the current fiscal year by category of activity; and ``(iii) the amount of funding provided for the Office of Science and Technology Policy for the current fiscal year by each agency participating in the Program; and''. (g) Definitions.--Section 4 of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5503) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively; (2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (6); (3) by redesignating paragraphs (6) and (7) as paragraphs (7) and (8), respectively; (4) by inserting before paragraph (2), as redesignated, the following: ``(1) `cyber-physical systems' means physical or engineered systems whose networking and information technology functions and physical elements are deeply integrated and are actively connected to the physical world through sensors, actuators, or other means to perform monitoring and control functions;''; (5) in paragraph (3), as redesignated, by striking ``high- performance computing'' and inserting ``networking and information technology''; (6) in paragraph (6), as redesignated-- (A) by striking ``high-performance computing'' and inserting ``networking and information technology''; and (B) by striking ``supercomputer'' and inserting ``high-end computing''; (7) in paragraph (5), by striking ``network referred to as'' and all that follows through the semicolon and inserting ``network, including advanced computer networks of Federal agencies and departments''; and (8) in paragraph (7), as redesignated, by striking ``National High-Performance Computing Program'' and inserting ``networking and information technology research and development program''. SEC. 402. RESEARCH IN AREAS OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE. (a) Research in Areas of National Importance.--Title I of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5511 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 104. RESEARCH IN AREAS OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE. ``(a) In General.--The Program shall encourage agencies under section 101(a)(3)(B) to support, maintain, and improve national, multi-agency, multi-faceted, research and development activities in networking and information technology directed toward application areas that have the potential for significant contributions to national economic competitiveness and for other significant societal benefits. ``(b) Technical Solutions.--An activity under subsection (a) shall be designed to advance the development of research discoveries by demonstrating technical solutions to important problems in areas including-- ``(1) cybersecurity; ``(2) health care; ``(3) energy management and low-power systems and devices; ``(4) transportation, including surface and air transportation; ``(5) cyber-physical systems; ``(6) large-scale data analysis and modeling of physical phenomena; ``(7) large scale data analysis and modeling of behavioral phenomena; ``(8) supply chain quality and security; and ``(9) privacy protection and protected disclosure of confidential data. ``(c) Recommendations.--The advisory committee under section 101(b) shall make recommendations to the Program for candidate research and development areas for support under this section. ``(d) Characteristics.-- ``(1) In general.--Research and development activities under this section-- ``(A) shall include projects selected on the basis of applications for support through a competitive, merit-based process; ``(B) shall leverage, when possible, Federal investments through collaboration with related State initiatives; ``(C) shall include a plan for fostering the transfer of research discoveries and the results of technology demonstration activities, including from institutions of higher education and Federal laboratories, to industry for commercial development; ``(D) shall involve collaborations among researchers in institutions of higher education and industry; and ``(E) may involve collaborations among nonprofit research institutions and Federal laboratories, as appropriate. ``(2) Cost-sharing.--In selecting applications for support, the agencies under section 101(a)(3)(B) shall give special consideration to projects that include cost sharing from non- Federal sources. ``(3) Multidisciplinary research centers.--Research and development activities under this section shall be supported through multidisciplinary research centers, including Federal laboratories, that are organized to investigate basic research questions and carry out technology demonstration activities in areas described in subsection (a). Research may be carried out through existing multidisciplinary centers, including those authorized under section 7024(b)(2) of the America COMPETES Act (42 U.S.C. 1862o-10(2)).''. (b) Cyber-Physical Systems.--Section 101(a)(1) of the High- Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5511(a)(1)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; (2) in subparagraph (I), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(J) provide for increased understanding of the scientific principles of cyber-physical systems and improve the methods available for the design, development, and operation of cyber-physical systems that are characterized by high reliability, safety, and security; and ``(K) provide for research and development on human- computer interactions, visualization, and big data.''. (c) Task Force.--Title I of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5511 et seq.), as amended by section 402(a) of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 105. TASK FORCE. ``(a) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment the Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education, Information, and Technology Act of 2012, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy under section 102 shall convene a task force to explore mechanisms for carrying out collaborative research and development activities for cyber-physical systems (including the related technologies required to enable these systems) through a consortium or other appropriate entity with participants from institutions of higher education, Federal laboratories, and industry. ``(b) Functions.--The task force shall-- ``(1) develop options for a collaborative model and an organizational structure for such entity under which the joint research and development activities could be planned, managed, and conducted effectively, including mechanisms for the allocation of resources among the participants in such entity for support of such activities; ``(2) propose a process for developing a research and development agenda for such entity, including guidelines to ensure an appropriate scope of work focused on nationally significant challenges and requiring collaboration and to ensure the development of related scientific and technological milestones; ``(3) define the roles and responsibilities for the participants from institutions of higher education, Federal laboratories, and industry in such entity; ``(4) propose guidelines for assigning intellectual property rights and for transferring research results to the private sector; and ``(5) make recommendations for how such entity could be funded from Federal, State, and non-governmental sources. ``(c) Composition.--In establishing the task force under subsection (a), the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall appoint an equal number of individuals from institutions of higher education and from industry with knowledge and expertise in cyber-physical systems, and may appoint not more than 2 individuals from Federal laboratories. ``(d) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of the Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, Education, Information, and Technology Act of 2012, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall transmit to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives a report describing the findings and recommendations of the task force. ``(e) Termination.--The task force shall terminate upon transmittal of the report required under subsection (d). ``(f) Compensation and Expenses.--Members of the task force shall serve without compensation.''. SEC. 403. PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS. Section 102 of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5512) is amended to read as follows: ``SEC. 102. PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS. ``(a) Functions.--The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall continue-- ``(1) to provide technical and administrative support to-- ``(A) the agencies participating in planning and implementing the Program, including support needed to develop the strategic plan under section 101(e); and ``(B) the advisory committee under section 101(b); ``(2) to serve as the primary point of contact on Federal networking and information technology activities for government agencies, academia, industry, professional societies, State computing and networking technology programs, interested citizen groups, and others to exchange technical and programmatic information; ``(3) to solicit input and recommendations from a wide range of stakeholders during the development of each strategic plan under section 101(e) by convening at least 1 workshop with invitees from academia, industry, Federal laboratories, and other relevant organizations and institutions; ``(4) to conduct public outreach, including the dissemination of the advisory committee's findings and recommendations, as appropriate; ``(5) to promote access to and early application of the technologies, innovations, and expertise derived from Program activities to agency missions and systems across the Federal Government and to United States industry; ``(6) to ensure accurate and detailed budget reporting of networking and information technology research and development investment; and ``(7) to encourage agencies participating in the Program to use existing programs and resources to strengthen networking and information technology education and training, and increase participation in such fields, including by women and underrepresented minorities. ``(b) Source of Funding.-- ``(1) In general.--The functions under this section shall be supported by funds from each agency participating in the Program. ``(2) Specifications.--The portion of the total budget of the Office of Science and Technology Policy that is provided by each agency participating in the Program for each fiscal year shall be in the same proportion as each agency's share of the total budget for the Program for the previous fiscal year, as specified in the database under section 102(c). ``(c) Database.-- ``(1) In general.--The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall develop and maintain a database of projects funded by each agency for the fiscal year for each Program Component Area. ``(2) Public accessibility.--The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall make the database accessible to the public. ``(3) Database contents.--The database shall include, for each project in the database-- ``(A) a description of the project; ``(B) each agency, industry, institution of higher education, Federal laboratory, or international institution involved in the project; ``(C) the source funding of the project (set forth by agency); ``(D) the funding history of the project; and ``(E) whether the project has been completed.''. SEC. 404. IMPROVING EDUCATION OF NETWORKING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTING. Section 201(a) of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5521(a)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (4) as paragraphs (3) through (5), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following: ``(2) the National Science Foundation shall use its existing programs, in collaboration with other agencies, as appropriate, to improve the teaching and learning of networking and information technology at all levels of education and to increase participation in networking and information technology fields;''. SEC. 405. CONFORMING AND TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE HIGH- PERFORMANCE COMPUTING ACT OF 1991. (a) Section 3.--Section 3 of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5502) is amended-- (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``high-performance computing'' and inserting ``networking and information technology''; (2) in paragraph (1)-- (A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``high-performance computing'' and inserting ``networking and information technology''; (B) in subparagraphs (A), (F), and (G), by striking ``high- performance computing'' each place it appears and inserting ``networking and information technology''; and (C) in subparagraph (H), by striking ``high-performance'' and inserting ``high-end''; and (3) in paragraph (2)-- (A) by striking ``high-performance computing and'' and inserting ``networking and information technology, and''; and (B) by striking ``high-performance computing network'' and inserting ``networking and information technology''. (b) Title Heading.--The heading of title I of the High- Performance Computing Act of 1991 (105 Stat. 1595) is amended by striking ``HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTING'' and inserting ``NETWORKING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY''. (c) Section 101.--Section 101 of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5511) is amended-- (1) in the section heading, by striking ``high-performance computing'' and inserting ``networking and information technology research and development''; (2) in subsection (a)-- (A) in the subsection heading, by striking ``National High- Performance Computing'' and inserting ``Networking and Information Technology Research and Development''; (B) in paragraph (1)-- (i) by striking ``National High-Performance Computing Program'' and inserting ``networking and information technology research and development program''; (ii) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``high-performance computing, including networking'' and inserting ``networking and information technology''; (iii) in subparagraphs (B) and (G), by striking ``high- performance'' each place it appears and inserting ``high- end''; and (iv) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``high-performance computing and networking'' and inserting ``high-end computing, distributed, and networking''; and (C) in paragraph (2)-- (i) in subparagraphs (A) and (C)-- (I) by striking ``high-performance computing'' each place it appears and inserting ``networking and information technology''; and (II) by striking ``development, networking,'' each place it appears and inserting ``development,''; and (ii) in subparagraphs (G) and (H), as redesignated by section 401(d) of this Act, by striking ``high-performance'' each place it appears and inserting ``high-end''; (3) in subsection (b)(1), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``high-performance computing'' each place it appears and inserting ``networking and information technology''; and (4) in subsection (c)(1)(A), by striking ``high-performance computing'' and inserting ``networking and information technology''. (d) Section 201.--Section 201(a)(1) of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5521(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``high-performance computing and advanced high-speed computer networking'' and inserting ``networking and information technology research and development''. (e) Section 202.--Section 202(a) of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5522(a)) is amended by striking ``high-performance computing'' and inserting ``networking and information technology''. (f) Section 203.--Section 203(a) of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5523(a)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``high-performance computing and networking'' and inserting ``networking and information technology''; and (2) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ``high-performance'' and inserting ``high-end''. (g) Section 204.--Section 204 of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5524) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1)-- (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``high-performance computing systems and networks'' and inserting ``networking and information technology systems and capabilities''; (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``interoperability of high-performance computing systems in networks and for common user interfaces to systems'' and inserting ``interoperability and usability of networking and information technology systems''; and (C) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``high-performance computing'' and inserting ``networking and information technology''; and (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) by striking ``High-Performance Computing and Network'' in the heading and inserting ``Networking and Information Technology''; and (B) by striking ``sensitive''. (h) Section 205.--Section 205(a) of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5525(a)) is amended by striking ``computational'' and inserting ``networking and information technology''. (i) Section 206.--Section 206(a) of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5526(a)) is amended by striking ``computational research'' and inserting ``networking and information technology research''. (j) Section 207.--Section 207 of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5527) is amended by striking ``high-performance computing'' and inserting ``networking and information technology''. (k) Section 208.--Section 208 of the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5528) is amended-- (1) in the section heading, by striking ``HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTING'' and inserting ``NETWORKING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY''; and (2) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``High-performance computing and associated'' and inserting ``Networking and information''; (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``high-performance computing'' and inserting ``networking and information technologies''; (C) in paragraph (3), by striking ``high-performance'' and inserting ``high-end''; (D) in paragraph (4), by striking ``high-performance computers and associated'' and inserting ``networking and information''; and (E) in paragraph (5), by striking ``high-performance computing and associated'' and inserting ``networking and information''. SEC. 406. FEDERAL CYBER SCHOLARSHIP-FOR-SERVICE PROGRAM. (a) In General.--The Director of the National Science Foundation, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall carry out a Federal cyber scholarship-for- service program to recruit and train the next generation of information technology professionals and security managers to meet the needs of the cybersecurity mission for the Federal government. (b) Program Description and Components.--The program shall-- (1) annually assess the workforce needs of the Federal government for cybersecurity professionals, including network engineers, software engineers, and other experts in order to determine how many scholarships should be awarded annually to ensure that the workforce needs following graduation match the number of scholarships awarded; (2) provide scholarships for up to 1,000 students per year in their pursuit of undergraduate or graduate degrees in the cybersecurity field, in an amount that may include coverage for full tuition, fees, and a stipend; (3) require each scholarship recipient, as a condition of receiving a scholarship under the program, to serve in a Federal information technology workforce for a period equal to one and one-half times each year, or partial year, of scholarship received, in addition to an internship in the cybersecurity field, if applicable, following graduation; (4) provide a procedure for the National Science Foundation or a Federal agency, consistent with regulations of the Office of Personnel Management, to request and fund a security clearance for a scholarship recipient, including providing for clearance during a summer internship and upon graduation; and (5) provide opportunities for students to receive temporary appointments for meaningful employment in the Federal information technology workforce during school vacation periods and for internships. (c) Hiring Authority.-- (1) In general.--For purposes of any law or regulation governing the appointment of an individual in the Federal civil service, upon the successful completion of the student's studies, a student receiving a scholarship under the program may-- (A) be hired under section 213.3102(r) of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations; and (B) be exempt from competitive service. (2) Competitive service.--Upon satisfactory fulfillment of the service term under paragraph (1), an individual may be converted to a competitive service position without competition if the individual meets the requirements for that position. (d) Eligibility.--The eligibility requirements for a scholarship under this section shall include that a scholarship applicant-- (1) be a citizen of the United States; (2) be eligible to be granted a security clearance; (3) maintain a grade point average of 3.2 or above on a 4.0 scale for undergraduate study or a 3.5 or above on a 4.0 scale for postgraduate study; (4) demonstrate a commitment to a career in improving the security of the information infrastructure; and (5) has demonstrated a level of proficiency in math or computer sciences. (e) Failure to Complete Service Obligation.-- (1) In general.--A scholarship recipient under this section shall be liable to the United States under paragraph (2) if the scholarship recipient-- (A) fails to maintain an acceptable level of academic standing in the educational institution in which the individual is enrolled, as determined by the Director; (B) is dismissed from such educational institution for disciplinary reasons; (C) withdraws from the program for which the award was made before the completion of such program; (D) declares that the individual does not intend to fulfill the service obligation under this section; (E) fails to fulfill the service obligation of the individual under this section; or (F) loses a security clearance or becomes ineligible for a security clearance. (2) Repayment amounts.-- (A) Less than 1 year of service.--If a circumstance under paragraph (1) occurs before the completion of 1 year of a service obligation under this section, the total amount of awards received by the individual under this section shall be repaid. (B) One or more years of service.--If a circumstance described in subparagraph (D) or (E) of paragraph (1) occurs after the completion of 1 year of a service obligation under this section, the total amount of scholarship awards received by the individual under this section, reduced by the ratio of the number of years of service completed divided by the number of years of service required, shall be repaid. (f) Evaluation and Report.--The Director of the National Science Foundation shall-- (1) evaluate the success of recruiting individuals for scholarships under this section and of hiring and retaining those individuals in the public sector workforce, including the annual cost and an assessment of how the program actually improves the Federal workforce; and (2) periodically report the findings under paragraph (1) to Congress. (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--From amounts made available under section 503 of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (124 Stat. 4005), the Secretary may use funds to carry out the requirements of this section for fiscal years 2012 through 2013. SEC. 407. STUDY AND ANALYSIS OF CERTIFICATION AND TRAINING OF INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROFESSIONALS. (a) Study.--The President shall enter into an agreement with the National Academies to conduct a comprehensive study of government, academic, and private-sector accreditation, training, and certification programs for personnel working in information infrastructure. The agreement shall require the National Academies to consult with sector coordinating councils and relevant governmental agencies, regulatory entities, and nongovernmental organizations in the course of the study. (b) Scope.--The study shall include-- (1) an evaluation of the body of knowledge and various skills that specific categories of personnel working in information infrastructure should possess in order to secure information systems; (2) an assessment of whether existing government, academic, and private-sector accreditation, training, and certification programs provide the body of knowledge and various skills described in paragraph (1); (3) an analysis of any barriers to the Federal Government recruiting and hiring cybersecurity talent, including barriers relating to compensation, the hiring process, job classification, and hiring flexibility; and (4) an analysis of the sources and availability of cybersecurity talent, a comparison of the skills and expertise sought by the Federal Government and the private sector, an examination of the current and future capacity of United States institutions of higher education, including community colleges, to provide current and future cybersecurity professionals, through education and training activities, with those skills sought by the Federal Government, State and local entities, and the private sector. (c) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the National Academies shall submit to the President and Congress a report on the results of the study. The report shall include-- (1) findings regarding the state of information infrastructure accreditation, training, and certification programs, including specific areas of deficiency and demonstrable progress; and (2) recommendations for the improvement of information infrastructure accreditation, training, and certification programs. SEC. 408. INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY TECHNICAL STANDARDS. (a) In General.--The Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, in coordination with appropriate Federal authorities, shall-- (1) as appropriate, ensure coordination of Federal agencies engaged in the development of international technical standards related to information system security; and (2) not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, develop and transmit to Congress a plan for ensuring such Federal agency coordination. (b) Consultation With the Private Sector.--In carrying out the activities under subsection (a)(1), the Director shall ensure consultation with appropriate private sector stakeholders. SEC. 409. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. The Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall continue a program to support the development of technical standards, metrology, testbeds, and conformance criteria, taking into account appropriate user concerns-- (1) to improve interoperability among identity management technologies; (2) to strengthen authentication methods of identity management systems; (3) to improve privacy protection in identity management systems, including health information technology systems, through authentication and security protocols; and (4) to improve the usability of identity management systems. SEC. 410. FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. (a) National Science Foundation Computer and Network Security Research Grant Areas.--Section 4(a)(1) of the Cyber Security Research and Development Act (15 U.S.C. 7403(a)(1)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; (2) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``property.'' and inserting ``property;''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(J) secure fundamental protocols that are at the heart of inter-network communications and data exchange; ``(K) system security that addresses the building of secure systems from trusted and untrusted components; ``(L) monitoring and detection; and ``(M) resiliency and rapid recovery methods.''. (b) National Science Foundation Computer and Network Security Grants.--Section 4(a)(3) of the Cyber Security Research and Development Act (15 U.S.C. 7403(a)(3)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``and''; (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``2007.'' and inserting ``2007;''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(F) such funds from amounts made available under section 503 of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (124 Stat. 4005), as the Secretary finds necessary to carry out the requirements of this subsection for fiscal years 2012 through 2013.''. (c) Computer and Network Security Centers.--Section 4(b)(7) of the Cyber Security Research and Development Act (15 U.S.C. 7403(b)(7)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``and''; (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``2007.'' and inserting ``2007;''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(F) such funds from amounts made available under section 503 of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (124 Stat. 4005), as the Secretary finds necessary to carry out the requirements of this subsection for fiscal years 2012 through 2013.''. (d) Computer and Network Security Capacity Building Grants.--Section 5(a)(6) of the Cyber Security Research and Development Act (15 U.S.C. 7404(a)(6)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``and''; (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``2007.'' and inserting ``2007;''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(F) such funds from amounts made available under section 503 of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (124 Stat. 4005), as the Secretary finds necessary to carry out the requirements of this subsection for fiscal years 2012 through 2013.''. (e) Scientific and Advanced Technology Act Grants.--Section 5(b)(2) of the Cyber Security Research and Development Act (15 U.S.C. 7404(b)(2)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``and''; (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``2007.'' and inserting ``2007;''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(F) such funds from amounts made available under section 503 of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (124 Stat. 4005), as the Secretary finds necessary to carry out the requirements of this subsection for fiscal years 2012 through 2013.''. (f) Graduate Traineeships in Computer and Network Security Research.--Section 5(c)(7) of the Cyber Security Research and Development Act (15 U.S.C. 7404(c)(7)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``and''; (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``2007.'' and inserting ``2007;''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(F) such funds from amounts made available under section 503 of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (124 Stat. 4005), as the Secretary finds necessary to carry out the requirements of this subsection for fiscal years 2012 through 2013.''.", u" The text of the bill is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, This Act may be cited as the ``Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012''. (a) In General.--Section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ``a violation'' and inserting ``any violation''; and (2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``a violation'' and inserting ``any violation (other than a violation of this section)''. (b) Prohibited Personnel Practices Under Section 2302(b)(9).-- (1) Technical and conforming amendments.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended in subsections (a)(3), (b)(4)(A), and (b)(4)(B)(i) of section 1214, in subsections (a), (e)(1), and (i) of section 1221, and in subsection (a)(2)(C)(i) of section 2302, by inserting ``or section 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D)'' after ``section 2302(b)(8)'' or ``(b)(8)'' each place it appears. (2) Other references.--(A) Title 5, United States Code, is amended in subsection (b)(4)(B)(i) of section 1214 and in subsection (e)(1) of section 1221, by inserting ``or protected activity'' after ``disclosure'' each place it appears. (B) Section 2302(b)(9) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (i) by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting the following: ``(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation-- ``(i) with regard to remedying a violation of paragraph (8); or ``(ii) other than with regard to remedying a violation of paragraph (8);''; and (ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``(i) or (ii)'' after ``subparagraph (A)''. (C) Section 2302 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(f)(1) A disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection (b)(8) because-- ``(A) the disclosure was made to a person, including a supervisor, who participated in an activity that the employee or applicant reasonably believed to be covered by subsection (b)(8)(A)(ii); ``(B) the disclosure revealed information that had been previously disclosed; ``(C) of the employee's or applicant's motive for making the disclosure; ``(D) the disclosure was not made in writing; ``(E) the disclosure was made while the employee was off duty; or ``(F) of the amount of time which has passed since the occurrence of the events described in the disclosure. ``(2) If a disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection (b)(8) if any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action with respect to the employee making the disclosure, took, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to that employee in reprisal for the disclosure.''. Section 2302(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``and'' at the end; (2) in subparagraph (C)(iii), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) `disclosure' means a formal or informal communication or transmission, but does not include a communication concerning policy decisions that lawfully exercise discretionary authority unless the employee or applicant providing the disclosure reasonably believes that the disclosure evidences-- ``(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or ``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.''. Section 2302(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by amending the matter following paragraph (12) to read as follows: ``This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the withholding of information from Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to Congress. For purposes of paragraph (8), (i) any presumption relating to the performance of a duty by an employee whose conduct is the subject of a disclosure as defined under subsection (a)(2)(D) may be rebutted by substantial evidence, and (ii) a determination as to whether an employee or applicant reasonably believes that such employee or applicant has disclosed information that evidences any violation of law, rule, regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety shall be made by determining whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee or applicant could reasonably conclude that the actions of the Government evidence such violations, mismanagement, waste, abuse, or danger.''. (a) Personnel Action.--Section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in clause (x), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; and (2) by redesignating clause (xi) as clause (xii) and inserting after clause (x) the following: ``(xi) the implementation or enforcement of any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement; and''. (b) Prohibited Personnel Practice.-- (1) In general.--Section 2302(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (A) in paragraph (11), by striking ``or'' at the end; (B) in paragraph (12), by striking the period and inserting ``; or''; and (C) by inserting after paragraph (12) the following: ``(13) implement or enforce any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement, if such policy, form, or agreement does not contain the following statement: `These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to (1) classified information, (2) communications to Congress, (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.'.''. (2) Agency websites.--Agencies making use of any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement shall also post the statement required under section 2302(b)(13) of title 5, United States Code, (as added by this Act) on the agency website, accompanied by the specific list of controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions. (3) Nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement in effect before the effective date.--With respect to a nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement that was in effect before the effective date of this Act, but that does not contain the statement required under section 2302(b)(13) of title 5, United States Code, (as added by this Act) for implementation or enforcement-- (A) it shall not be a prohibited personnel practice to enforce that policy, form, or agreement with regard to a current employee if the agency gives such employee notice of the statement; and (B) it shall not be a prohibited personnel practice to enforce that policy, form, or agreement after the effective date of this Act with regard to a former employee if the agency complies with paragraph (2). (c) Retaliatory Investigations.-- (1) Agency investigation.--Section 1214 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(h) Any corrective action ordered under this section to correct a prohibited personnel practice may include fees, costs, or damages reasonably incurred due to an agency investigation of the employee, if such investigation was commenced, expanded, or extended in retaliation for the disclosure or protected activity that formed the basis of the corrective action.''. (2) Damages.--Section 1221(g) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(4) Any corrective action ordered under this section to correct a prohibited personnel practice may include fees, costs, or damages reasonably incurred due to an agency investigation of the employee, if such investigation was commenced, expanded, or extended in retaliation for the disclosure or protected activity that formed the basis of the corrective action.''. Section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following: ``(ii)(I) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and ``(II) as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, provided that the determination be made prior to a personnel action; or''. Section 1215(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(3)(A) A final order of the Board may impose-- ``(i) disciplinary action consisting of removal, reduction in grade, debarment from Federal employment for a period not to exceed 5 years, suspension, or reprimand; ``(ii) an assessment of a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000; or ``(iii) any combination of disciplinary actions described under clause (i) and an assessment described under clause (ii). ``(B) In any case brought under paragraph (1) in which the Board finds that an employee has committed a prohibited personnel practice under section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), the Board may impose disciplinary action if the Board finds that the activity protected under section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) was a significant motivating factor, even if other factors also motivated the decision, for the employee's decision to take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take a personnel action, unless that employee demonstrates, by preponderance of evidence, that the employee would have taken, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take the same personnel action, in the absence of such protected activity.''. (a) Attorney Fees.--Section 1204(m)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``agency involved'' and inserting ``agency where the prevailing party was employed or had applied for employment at the time of the events giving rise to the case''. (b) Damages.--Sections 1214(g)(2) and 1221(g)(1)(A)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, are amended by striking all after ``travel expenses,'' and inserting ``any other reasonable and foreseeable consequential damages, and compensatory damages (including interest, reasonable expert witness fees, and costs).'' each place it appears. (a) In General.--Section 7703(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the matter preceding paragraph (2) and inserting the following: ``(b)(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and paragraph (2) of this subsection, a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board. ``(B) During the 5-year period beginning on the effective date of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board that raises no challenge to the Board's disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction as provided under paragraph (2).''. (b) Review Obtained by Office of Personnel Management.-- Section 7703(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(d)(1) Except as provided under paragraph (2), this paragraph shall apply to any review obtained by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. The Director of the Office of Personnel Management may obtain review of any final order or decision of the Board by filing, within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board, a petition for judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit if the Director determines, in the discretion of the Director, that the Board erred in interpreting a civil service law, rule, or regulation affecting personnel management and that the Board's decision will have a substantial impact on a civil service law, rule, regulation, or policy directive. If the Director did not intervene in a matter before the Board, the Director may not petition for review of a Board decision under this section unless the Director first petitions the Board for a reconsideration of its decision, and such petition is denied. In addition to the named respondent, the Board and all other parties to the proceedings before the Board shall have the right to appear in the proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The granting of the petition for judicial review shall be at the discretion of the Court of Appeals. ``(2) During the 5-year period beginning on the effective date of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, this paragraph shall apply to any review obtained by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management that raises no challenge to the Board's disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). The Director of the Office of Personnel Management may obtain review of any final order or decision of the Board by filing, within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board, a petition for judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction as provided under subsection (b)(2) if the Director determines, in the discretion of the Director, that the Board erred in interpreting a civil service law, rule, or regulation affecting personnel management and that the Board's decision will have a substantial impact on a civil service law, rule, regulation, or policy directive. If the Director did not intervene in a matter before the Board, the Director may not petition for review of a Board decision under this section unless the Director first petitions the Board for a reconsideration of its decision, and such petition is denied. In addition to the named respondent, the Board and all other parties to the proceedings before the Board shall have the right to appear in the proceeding before the court of appeals. The granting of the petition for judicial review shall be at the discretion of the court of appeals.''. (a) In General.--Chapter 23 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating sections 2304 and 2305 as sections 2305 and 2306, respectively; and (2) by inserting after section 2303 the following: (a) Definitions.--In this subsection-- (1) the term ``agency'' has the meaning given under section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code; (2) the term ``applicant'' means an applicant for a covered position; (3) the term ``censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information'' means any effort to distort, misrepresent, or suppress research, analysis, or technical information; (4) the term ``covered position'' has the meaning given under section 2302(a)(2)(B) of title 5, United States Code; (5) the term ``employee'' means an employee in a covered position in an agency; and (6) the term ``disclosure'' has the meaning given under section 2302(a)(2)(D) of title 5, United States Code. (b) Protected Disclosure.-- (1) In general.--Any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant for employment that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is evidence of censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information-- (A) shall come within the protections of section 2302(b)(8)(A) of title 5, United States Code, if-- (i) the employee or applicant reasonably believes that the censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information is or will cause-- (I) any violation of law, rule, or regulation; or (II) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; and (ii) such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law or such information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs; and (B) shall come within the protections of section 2302(b)(8)(B) of title 5, United States Code, if-- (i) the employee or applicant reasonably believes that the censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information is or will cause-- (I) any violation of law, rule, or regulation; or (II) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; and (ii) the disclosure is made to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector General of an agency or another person designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, consistent with the protection of sources and methods. (2) Disclosures not excluded.--A disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) for any reason described under section 2302(f)(1) or (2) of title 5, United States Code. (3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to imply any limitation on the protections of employees and applicants afforded by any other provision of law, including protections with respect to any disclosure of information believed to be evidence of censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information. Section 214(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 133(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``For purposes of this section a permissible use of independently obtained information includes the disclosure of such information under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code.''. Section 2302(c) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, including how to make a lawful disclosure of information that is specifically required by law or Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs to the Special Counsel, the Inspector General of an agency, Congress, or other agency employee designated to receive such disclosures'' after ``chapter 12 of this title''. Section 1212 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(h)(1) The Special Counsel is authorized to appear as amicus curiae in any action brought in a court of the United States related to section 2302(b) (8) or (9), or as otherwise authorized by law. In any such action, the Special Counsel is authorized to present the views of the Special Counsel with respect to compliance with section 2302(b) (8) or (9) and the impact court decisions would have on the enforcement of such provisions of law. ``(2) A court of the United States shall grant the application of the Special Counsel to appear in any such action for the purposes described under subsection (a).''. (a) Special Counsel.--Section 1214(b)(4)(B)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, after a finding that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor,'' after ``ordered if''. (b) Individual Action.--Section 1221(e)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, after a finding that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor,'' after ``ordered if''. (a) In General.-- (1) Requirement.--Each agreement in Standard Forms 312 and 4414 of the Government and any other nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement of the Government shall contain the following statement: ``These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to (1) classified information, (2) communications to Congress, (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.''. (2) Agency websites.--Agencies making use of any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement shall also post the statement required under paragraph (1) on the agency website, accompanied by the specific list of controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions. (3) Enforceability.-- (A) In general.--Any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement described under paragraph (1) that does not contain the statement required under paragraph (1) may not be implemented or enforced to the extent such policy, form, or agreement is inconsistent with that statement. (B) Nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement in effect before the effective date.--With respect to a nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement that was in effect before the effective date of this Act, but that does not contain the statement required under paragraph (1) for implementation or enforcement-- (i) it shall not be a prohibited personnel practice to enforce that policy, form, or agreement with regard to a current employee if the agency gives such employee notice of the statement; and (ii) it shall not be a prohibited personnel practice to enforce that policy, form, or agreement after the effective date of this Act with regard to a former employee if the agency complies with paragraph (2). (b) Persons Other Than Government Employees.-- Notwithstanding subsection (a), a nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement that is to be executed by a person connected with the conduct of an intelligence or intelligence-related activity, other than an employee or officer of the United States Government, may contain provisions appropriate to the particular activity for which such document is to be used. Such policy, form, or agreement shall, at a minimum, require that the person will not disclose any classified information received in the course of such activity unless specifically authorized to do so by the United States Government. Such nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement shall also make it clear that such forms do not bar disclosures to Congress or to an authorized official of an executive agency or the Department of Justice that are essential to reporting a substantial violation of law, consistent with the protection of sources and methods. (a) Government Accountability Office.-- (1) Report.--Not later than 48 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit a report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives on the implementation of this title. (2) Contents.--The report under this paragraph shall include-- (A) an analysis of any changes in the number of cases filed with the United States Merit Systems Protection Board alleging violations of section 2302(b) (8) or (9) of title 5, United States Code, since the effective date of this Act; (B) the outcome of the cases described under subparagraph (A), including whether or not the United States Merit Systems Protection Board, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, or any other court determined the allegations to be frivolous or malicious; (C) an analysis of the outcome of cases described under subparagraph (A) that were decided by a United States District Court and the impact the process has on the Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal court system; and (D) any other matter as determined by the Comptroller General. (b) Merit Systems Protection Board.-- (1) In general.--Each report submitted annually by the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 1116 of title 31, United States Code, shall, with respect to the period covered by such report, include as an addendum the following: (A) Information relating to the outcome of cases decided during the applicable year of the report in which violations of section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B)(i), (C), or (D) of title 5, United States Code, were alleged. (B) The number of such cases filed in the regional and field offices, the number of petitions for review filed in such cases, and the outcomes of such cases. (2) First report.--The first report described under paragraph (1) submitted after the date of enactment of this Act shall include an addendum required under that subparagraph that covers the period beginning on the effective date of this Act and ending at the end of the fiscal year in which such effective date occurs. (a) In General.--Section 1221 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(k)(1) In this subsection, the term `appropriate United States district court', as used with respect to an alleged prohibited personnel practice, means the United States district court for the judicial district in which-- ``(A) the prohibited personnel practice is alleged to have been committed; or ``(B) the employee, former employee, or applicant for employment allegedly affected by such practice resides. ``(2)(A) An employee, former employee, or applicant for employment in any case to which paragraph (3) or (4) applies may file an action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate United States district court in accordance with this subsection. ``(B) Upon initiation of any action under subparagraph (A), the Board shall stay any other claims of such employee, former employee, or applicant pending before the Board at that time which arise out of the same set of operative facts. Such claims shall be stayed pending completion of the action filed under subparagraph (A) before the appropriate United States district court and any associated appellate review. ``(3) This paragraph applies in any case in which-- ``(A) an employee, former employee, or applicant for employment-- ``(i) seeks corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 1221(a) based on an alleged prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542; or ``(ii) files an appeal under section 7701(a) alleging as an affirmative defense the commission of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542; ``(B) no final order or decision is issued by the Board within 270 days after the date on which a request for that corrective action or appeal has been duly submitted, unless the Board determines that the employee, former employee, or applicant for employment engaged in conduct intended to delay the issuance of a final order or decision by the Board; and ``(C) such employee, former employee, or applicant provides written notice to the Board of filing an action under this subsection before the filing of that action. ``(4) This paragraph applies in any case in which-- ``(A) an employee, former employee, or applicant for employment-- ``(i) seeks corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 1221(a) based on an alleged prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542; or ``(ii) files an appeal under section 7701(a) alleging as an affirmative defense the commission of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542; ``(B)(i) within 30 days after the date on which the request for corrective action or appeal was duly submitted, such employee, former employee, or applicant for employment files a motion requesting a certification consistent with subparagraph (C) to the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title and assigned to the case, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board and assigned to the case; and ``(ii) such employee has not previously filed a motion under clause (i) related to that request for corrective action or that appeal; and ``(C) the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title and assigned to the case, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board and assigned to the case certifies that-- ``(i) under the standards applicable to the review of motions to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including rule 12(d), the request for corrective action or the appeal (including any allegations made with the motion under subparagraph (B)) would not be subject to dismissal; and ``(ii)(I) the Board is not likely to dispose of the case within 270 days after the date on which the request for corrective action or the appeal has been duly submitted; or ``(II) the case-- ``(aa) consists of multiple claims; ``(bb) requires complex or extensive discovery; ``(cc) arises out of the same set of operative facts as any civil action against the Government filed by the employee, former employee, or applicant pending in a Federal court; or ``(dd) involves a novel question of law. ``(5) The Board shall grant or deny any motion requesting a certification described under paragraph (4)(ii) within 90 days after the submission of such motion and the Board may not issue a decision on the merits of a request for corrective action within 15 days after granting or denying a motion requesting certification. ``(6)(A) Any decision of the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title and assigned to the case, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board and assigned to the case to grant or deny a certification described under paragraph (4)(ii) shall be reviewed on appeal of a final order or decision of the Board under section 7703 only if-- ``(i) a motion requesting a certification was denied; and ``(ii) the reviewing court vacates the decision of the Board on the merits of the claim under the standards set forth in section 7703(c). ``(B) The decision to deny the certification shall be overturned by the reviewing court, and an order granting certification shall be issued by the reviewing court, if such decision is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. ``(C) The reviewing court's decision shall not be considered evidence of any determination by the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board on the merits of the underlying allegations during the course of any action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate United States district court in accordance with this subsection. ``(7) In any action filed under this subsection-- ``(A) the district court shall have jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy; ``(B) at the request of either party, such action shall be tried by the court with a jury; ``(C) the court-- ``(i) subject to clause (iii), shall apply the standards set forth in subsection (e); and ``(ii) may award any relief which the court considers appropriate under subsection (g), except-- ``(I) relief for compensatory damages may not exceed $300,000; and ``(II) relief may not include punitive damages; and ``(iii) notwithstanding subsection (e)(2), may not order relief if the agency demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of such disclosure; and ``(D) the Special Counsel may not represent the employee, former employee, or applicant for employment. ``(8) An appeal from a final decision of a district court in an action under this subsection shall be taken to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. ``(9) This subsection applies with respect to any appeal, petition, or other request for corrective action duly submitted to the Board, whether under section 1214(b)(2), the preceding provisions of this section, section 7513(d), section 7701, or any otherwise applicable provisions of law, rule, or regulation.''. (b) Sunset.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided under paragraph (2), the amendments made by this section shall cease to have effect 5 years after the effective date of this Act. (2) Pending claims.--The amendments made by this section shall continue to apply with respect to any claim pending before the Board on the last day of the 5-year period described under paragraph (1). (a) In General.--Section 1204(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following: ``(3) With respect to a request for corrective action based on an alleged prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) (8) or (9) (A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) for which the associated personnel action is an action covered under section 7512 or 7542, the Board, any administrative law judge appointed by the Board under section 3105 of this title, or any employee of the Board designated by the Board may, with respect to any party, grant a motion for summary judgment when the Board or the administrative law judge determines that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.''. (b) Sunset.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided under paragraph (2), the amendments made by this section shall cease to have effect 5 years after the effective date of this Act. (2) Pending claims.--The amendments made by this section shall continue to apply with respect to any claim pending before the Board on the last day of the 5-year period described under paragraph (1). (a) Prohibited Personnel Practices.--Section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' after the semicolon; (2) in subparagraph (B), by adding ``or'' after the semicolon; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(C) any communication that complies with subsection (a)(1), (d), and (h) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);''. (b) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1), by adding at the end the following: ``(D) An employee of any agency, as that term is defined under section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report the complaint or information to the Inspector General (or designee) of the agency at which that employee is employed.''; (2) in subsection (c), by striking ``intelligence committees'' and inserting ``appropriate committees''; (3) in subsection (d)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``either or both of the intelligence committees'' and inserting ``any of the appropriate committees''; and (B) in paragraphs (2) and (3), by striking ``intelligence committees'' each place that term appears and inserting ``appropriate committees''; (4) in subsection (h)-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``intelligence''; and (ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``or an activity involving classified information'' after ``an intelligence activity''; and (B) by striking paragraph (2), and inserting the following: ``(2) The term `appropriate committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, except that with respect to disclosures made by employees described in subsection (a)(1)(D), the term `appropriate committees' means the committees of appropriate jurisdiction.''. (a) In General.--Section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking subsection (d) and inserting the following: ``(d)(1) Each Inspector General shall, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations governing the civil service-- ``(A) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Auditing who shall have the responsibility for supervising the performance of auditing activities relating to programs and operations of the establishment; ``(B) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Investigations who shall have the responsibility for supervising the performance of investigative activities relating to such programs and operations; and ``(C) designate a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman who shall educate agency employees-- ``(i) about prohibitions on retaliation for protected disclosures; and ``(ii) who have made or are contemplating making a protected disclosure about the rights and remedies against retaliation for protected disclosures. ``(2) The Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman shall not act as a legal representative, agent, or advocate of the employee or former employee. ``(3) For the purposes of this section, the requirement of the designation of a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman under paragraph (1)(C) shall not apply to-- ``(A) any agency that is an element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))); or ``(B) as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counter intelligence activities.''. (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 8D(j) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) by striking ``section 3(d)(1)'' and inserting ``section 3(d)(1)(A)''; and (2) by striking ``section 3(d)(2)'' and inserting ``section 3(d)(1)(B)''. (c) Sunset.-- (1) In general.--The amendments made by this section shall cease to have effect on the date that is 5 years after the date of enactment of this Act. (2) Return to prior authority.--Upon the date described in paragraph (1), section 3(d) and section 8D(j) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) shall read as such sections read on the day before the date of enactment of this Act. TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS (a) In General.--Chapter 23 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2303 the following: (a) In General.--Section 3001(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b(b)) is amended-- (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``Not'' and inserting ``Except as otherwise provided, not''; (2) in paragraph (5), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; (3) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (4) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following: ``(7) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011-- ``(A) developing policies and procedures that permit, to the extent practicable, individuals who in good faith appeal a determination to suspend or revoke a security clearance or access to classified information to retain their government employment status while such challenge is pending; and ``(B) developing and implementing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure proper protections during the process for denying, suspending, or revoking a security clearance or access to classified information, including the provision of a right to appeal such a denial, suspension, or revocation, except that there shall be no appeal of an agency's suspension of a security clearance or access determination for purposes of conducting an investigation, if that suspension lasts no longer than 1 year or the head of the agency certifies that a longer suspension is needed before a final decision on denial or revocation to prevent imminent harm to the national security. ``Any limitation period applicable to an agency appeal under paragraph (7) shall be tolled until the head of the agency (or in the case of any component of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense) determines, with the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, that the policies and procedures described in paragraph (7) have been established for the agency or the Director of National Intelligence promulgates the policies and procedures under paragraph (7). The policies and procedures for appeals developed under paragraph (7) shall be comparable to the policies and procedures pertaining to prohibited personnel practices defined under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, and provide-- ``(A) for an independent and impartial fact-finder; ``(B) for notice and the opportunity to be heard, including the opportunity to present relevant evidence, including witness testimony; ``(C) that the employee or former employee may be represented by counsel; ``(D) that the employee or former employee has a right to a decision based on the record developed during the appeal; ``(E) that not more than 180 days shall pass from the filing of the appeal to the report of the impartial fact- finder to the agency head or the designee of the agency head, unless-- ``(i) the employee and the agency concerned agree to an extension; or ``(ii) the impartial fact-finder determines in writing that a greater period of time is required in the interest of fairness or national security; ``(F) for the use of information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs in a manner consistent with the interests of national security, including ex parte submissions if the agency determines that the interests of national security so warrant; and ``(G) that the employee or former employee shall have no right to compel the production of information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs, except evidence necessary to establish that the employee made the disclosure or communication such employee alleges was protected by subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subsection (j)(1).''. (b) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access Determinations.--Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(j) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access Determinations.-- ``(1) In general.--Agency personnel with authority over personnel security clearance or access determinations shall not take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, any action with respect to any employee's security clearance or access determination because of-- ``(A) any disclosure of information to the Director of National Intelligence (or an employee designated by the Director of National Intelligence for such purpose) or the head of the employing agency (or employee designated by the head of that agency for such purpose) by an employee that the employee reasonably believes evidences-- ``(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or ``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; ``(B) any disclosure to the Inspector General of an agency or another employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the employee reasonably believes evidences-- ``(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or ``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; ``(C) any communication that complies with-- ``(i) subsection (a)(1), (d), and (h) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.); ``(ii) subsection (d)(5)(A), (D), and (G) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q); or ``(iii) subsection (k)(5)(A), (D), and (G), of section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3h); ``(D) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation; ``(E) testifying for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of any right referred to in subparagraph (D); or ``(F) cooperating with or disclosing information to the Inspector General of an agency, in accordance with applicable provisions of law in connection with an audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the Inspector General, if the actions described under subparagraphs (D) through (F) do not result in the employee or applicant unlawfully disclosing information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs. ``(2) Rule of construction.--Consistent with the protection of sources and methods, nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to authorize the withholding of information from the Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to the Congress. ``(3) Disclosures.-- ``(A) In general.--A disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) because-- ``(i) the disclosure was made to a person, including a supervisor, who participated in an activity that the employee reasonably believed to be covered by paragraph (1)(A)(ii); ``(ii) the disclosure revealed information that had been previously disclosed; ``(iii) of the employee's motive for making the disclosure; ``(iv) the disclosure was not made in writing; ``(v) the disclosure was made while the employee was off duty; or ``(vi) of the amount of time which has passed since the occurrence of the events described in the disclosure. ``(B) Reprisals.--If a disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) if any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action with respect to the employee making the disclosure, took, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to that employee in reprisal for the disclosure. ``(4) Agency adjudication.-- ``(A) Remedial procedure.--An employee or former employee who believes that he or she has been subjected to a reprisal prohibited by paragraph (1) of this subsection may, within 90 days after the issuance of notice of such decision, appeal that decision within the agency of that employee or former employee through proceedings authorized by paragraph (7) of subsection (a), except that there shall be no appeal of an agency's suspension of a security clearance or access determination for purposes of conducting an investigation, if that suspension lasts not longer than 1 year (or a longer period in accordance with a certification made under subsection (b)(7)). ``(B) Corrective action.--If, in the course of proceedings authorized under subparagraph (A), it is determined that the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1) of this subsection, the agency shall take specific corrective action to return the employee or former employee, as nearly as practicable and reasonable, to the position such employee or former employee would have held had the violation not occurred. Such corrective action shall include reasonable attorney's fees and any other reasonable costs incurred, and may include back pay and related benefits, travel expenses, and compensatory damages not to exceed $300,000. ``(C) Contributing factor.--In determining whether the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1) of this subsection, the agency shall find that paragraph (1) of this subsection was violated if a disclosure described in paragraph (1) was a contributing factor in the adverse security clearance or access determination taken against the individual, unless the agency demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence of such disclosure, giving the utmost deference to the agency's assessment of the particular threat to the national security interests of the United States in the instant matter. ``(5) Appellate review of security clearance access determinations by director of national intelligence.-- ``(A) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term `Board' means the appellate review board established under section 204 of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012. ``(B) Appeal.--Within 60 days after receiving notice of an adverse final agency determination under a proceeding under paragraph (4), an employee or former employee may appeal that determination to the Board. ``(C) Policies and procedures.--The Board, in consultation with the Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and implement policies and procedures for adjudicating the appeals authorized by subparagraph (B). The Director of National Intelligence and Secretary of Defense shall jointly approve any rules, regulations, or guidance issued by the Board concerning the procedures for the use or handling of classified information. ``(D) Review.--The Board's review shall be on the complete agency record, which shall be made available to the Board. The Board may not hear witnesses or admit additional evidence. Any portions of the record that were submitted ex parte during the agency proceedings shall be submitted ex parte to the Board. ``(E) Further fact-finding or improper denial.--If the Board concludes that further fact-finding is necessary or finds that the agency improperly denied the employee or former employee the opportunity to present evidence that, if admitted, would have a substantial likelihood of altering the outcome, the Board shall remand the matter to the agency from which it originated for additional proceedings in accordance with the rules of procedure issued by the Board. ``(F) De novo determination.--The Board shall make a de novo determination, based on the entire record and under the standards specified in paragraph (4), of whether the employee or former employee received an adverse security clearance or access determination in violation of paragraph (1). In considering the record, the Board may weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact. In doing so, the Board may consider the prior fact-finder's opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. ``(G) Adverse security clearance or access determination.-- If the Board finds that the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1), it shall then separately determine whether reinstating the security clearance or access determination is clearly consistent with the interests of national security, with any doubt resolved in favor of national security, under Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access to classified information) or any successor thereto (including any adjudicative guidelines promulgated under such orders) or any subsequent Executive order, regulation, or policy concerning access to classified information. ``(H) Remedies.-- ``(i) Corrective action.--If the Board finds that the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1), it shall order the agency head to take specific corrective action to return the employee or former employee, as nearly as practicable and reasonable, to the position such employee or former employee would have held had the violation not occurred. Such corrective action shall include reasonable attorney's fees and any other reasonable costs incurred, and may include back pay and related benefits, travel expenses, and compensatory damages not to exceed $300,000. The Board may recommend, but may not order, reinstatement or hiring of a former employee. The Board may order that the former employee be treated as though the employee were transferring from the most recent position held when seeking other positions within the executive branch. Any corrective action shall not include the reinstating of any security clearance or access determination. The agency head shall take the actions so ordered within 90 days, unless the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Energy, or the Secretary of Defense, in the case of any component of the Department of Defense, determines that doing so would endanger national security. ``(ii) Recommended action.--If the Board finds that reinstating the employee or former employee's security clearance or access determination is clearly consistent with the interests of national security, it shall recommend such action to the head of the entity selected under subsection (b) and the head of the affected agency. ``(I) Congressional notification.-- ``(i) Orders.--Consistent with the protection of sources and methods, at the time the Board issues an order, the Chairperson of the Board shall notify-- ``(I) the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate; ``(II) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; ``(III) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives; ``(IV) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and ``(V) the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives that have jurisdiction over the employing agency, including in the case of a final order or decision of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, or the National Reconnaissance Office, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. ``(ii) Recommendations.--If the agency head and the head of the entity selected under subsection (b) do not follow the Board's recommendation to reinstate a clearance, the head of the entity selected under subsection (b) shall notify the committees described in subclauses (I) through (V) of clause (i). ``(6) Judicial review.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit or require judicial review of any-- ``(A) agency action under this section; or ``(B) action of the appellate review board established under section 204 of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012. ``(7) Private cause of action.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit, authorize, or require a private cause of action to challenge the merits of a security clearance determination.''. (c) Access Determination Defined.--Section 3001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(9) The term `access determination' means the determination regarding whether an employee-- ``(A) is eligible for access to classified information in accordance with Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access to classified information), or any successor thereto, and Executive Order 10865 (25 Fed. Reg. 1583; relating to safeguarding classified information with industry); and ``(B) possesses a need to know under that Order.''. (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b), as amended by this Act, shall be construed to require the repeal or replacement of agency appeal procedures implementing Executive Order 12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to classified national security information), or any successor thereto, and Executive Order 10865 (25 Fed. Reg. 1583; relating to safeguarding classified information with industry), or any successor thereto, that meet the requirements of section 3001(b)(7) of such Act, as so amended. (a) In General.--Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) If the head of an establishment determines that a complaint or information transmitted under paragraph (1) would create a conflict of interest for the head of the establishment, the head of the establishment shall return the complaint or information to the Inspector General with that determination and the Inspector General shall make the transmission to the Director of National Intelligence and, if the establishment is within the Department of Defense, to the Secretary of Defense. In such a case, the requirements of this section for the head of the establishment apply to each recipient of the Inspector General's transmission. Each recipient of the Inspector General's transmission shall consult with the members of the appellate review board established under section 204 of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 regarding all transmissions under this paragraph.''; (2) by designating subsection (h) as subsection (i); and (3) by inserting after subsection (g), the following: ``(h) An individual who has submitted a complaint or information to an Inspector General under this section may notify any member of Congress or congressional staff member of the fact that such individual has made a submission to that particular Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was made.''. (b) Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B)-- (A) by inserting ``(i)'' after ``(B)''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(ii) If the Director determines that a complaint or information transmitted under paragraph (1) would create a conflict of interest for the Director, the Director shall return the complaint or information to the Inspector General with that determination and the Inspector General shall make the transmission to the Director of National Intelligence. In such a case, the requirements of this subsection for the Director apply to the Director of National Intelligence. The Director of National Intelligence shall consult with the members of the appellate review board established under section 204 of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 regarding all transmissions under this clause.''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(H) An individual who has submitted a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this section may notify any member of Congress or congressional staff member of the fact that such individual has made a submission to the Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was made.''. (a) Definitions.--In this section-- (1) the term ``congressional oversight committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate; (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; (C) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives; and (D) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the term ``intelligence community element''-- (A) means-- (i) the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and (ii) any executive agency or unit thereof determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal function the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities; and (B) does not include the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (b) Regulations.-- (1) In general.--In consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe regulations to ensure that a personnel action shall not be taken against an employee of an intelligence community element as a reprisal for any disclosure of information described in section 2303A(b) of title 5, United States Code, as added by this Act. (2) Appellate review board.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the heads of appropriate agencies, shall establish an appellate review board that is broadly representative of affected Departments and agencies and is made up of individuals with expertise in merit systems principles and national security issues-- (A) to hear whistleblower appeals related to security clearance access determinations described in section 3001(j) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b), as added by this Act; and (B) that shall include a subpanel that reflects the composition of the intelligence community, which shall-- (i) be composed of intelligence community elements and inspectors general from intelligence community elements, for the purpose of hearing cases that arise in elements of the intelligence community; and (ii) include the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. (c) Report on the Status of Implementation of Regulations.--Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a report on the status of the implementation of the regulations promulgated under subsection (b) to the congressional oversight committees. (d) Nonapplicability to Certain Terminations.--Section 2303A of title 5, United States Code, as added by this Act, and section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b), as amended by this Act, shall not apply if the affected employee is concurrently terminated under-- (1) section 1609 of title 10, United States Code; (2) the authority of the Director of National Intelligence under section 102A(m) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(m)), if-- (A) the Director personally summarily terminates the individual; and (B) the Director-- (i) determines the termination to be in the interest of the United States; (ii) determines that the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termination of the employment of such employee cannot be invoked in a manner consistent with the national security; and (iii) not later than 5 days after such termination, notifies the congressional oversight committees of the termination; (3) the authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 104A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(e)), if-- (A) the Director personally summarily terminates the individual; and (B) the Director-- (i) determines the termination to be in the interest of the United States; (ii) determines that the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termination of the employment of such employee cannot be invoked in a manner consistent with the national security; and (iii) not later than 5 days after such termination, notifies the congressional oversight committees of the termination; or (4) section 7532 of title 5, United States Code, if-- (A) the agency head personally terminates the individual; and (B) the agency head-- (i) determines the termination to be in the interest of the United States; (ii) determines that the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termination of the employment of such employee cannot be invoked in a manner consistent with the national security; and (iii) not later than 5 days after such termination, notifies the congressional oversight committees of the termination. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to imply any limitation on any protections afforded by any other provision of law to employees and applicants. This Act shall take effect 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act.", u"Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the time. I just wanted to thank everyone again, as Mr. Hoyer indicated. I believe every Member in this body cares about our national security, and I also believe that this is a good bill, a good compromise and is worthy of supporting. Madam Speaker, on March 14th I voted in favor of H.R. 3773 which modernized the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This bill successfully updated the law to accommodate the current day communications technology while at the same time providing the much-needed protection of the court in sanctioning the surveillance of Americans. Moreover, the bill was also remarkable for what it did not contain; it did not provide retroactive immunity for telephone companies who are defendants in pending lawsuits. These suits have been brought to uncover the full extent of the Administration's program to conduct unauthorized surveillance on Americans. I am deeply troubled that the Senate does not have the votes to pass the House bill. The Senate instead passed its own bill, S. 2248, which was unacceptable to me from the outset because it reduced the role of the FISA Court to merely review the procedures for targeting surveillance subjects and minimizing the information collected. Moreover, the Senate bill established retroactive immunity for the phone companies that have been used to carry out the Administration's illicit surveillance program. Madam Speaker, when are we going to stop pulling the wool over the eyes of the American people? The proposed FISA law protects no one other than the administration and those within it who may use this new-found power to snoop and spy in areas where they have no business looking. We are giving broad new powers to political appointees who have repeatedly disregarded the Constitution and ignored the most basic rights of Americans to live their lives without Big Brother peeking his nose into their private matters. This FISA bill gives the federal government sweeping powers to gather wide swaths of information from foreign sources while providing little or no justification for the national security value of that information. The FISA Court set up to police the process isn't a court at all. Under this bill, the government can gather as much intelligence as it chooses for seven days prior to going to the court. Then, if the court says ``No'' to the request, the government can continue to gather intelligence for 60 days while they appeal. Any first year law student knows that is not how courts work. If this were a real court, the government would be required to abide by the decision of the court and seek the warrant prior to conducting surveillance. It is fundamentally untrue to say that Americans will not be placed under surveillance after this bill becomes law. The truth is, any American will subject their phone and e-mail conversations to the broad government surveillance web simply by calling a son or daughter studying abroad, sending an e-mail to a foreign relative, even calling an American company whose customer service center is located overseas. Once again, our government puts a feel-good name on something that doesn't live up to its billing. Calling the FISA rubber stamp panel a court is akin to the President's ``Clear Skies Initiative'' which relaxed pollution regulations or ``No Child Left Behind'' which instead of helping schools, punishes them if they have children who are, indeed, lagging behind. This bill sets out to reassure Americans that, because there are warrants and a ``court'', due process is taking place. But like the pseudo-court, FISA warrants aren't warrants at all. A warrant is permission by the court to look for a specific thing from a specific person or group for a specific reason. The FISA warrant is given after the fact and can be as broad as gathering all electronic communication coming into or out of a foreign country. Madam Speaker, America isn't simply `guided'' by our Constitution, it isn't a set of ``suggestions'' but rather, the law of the land. It is the existence of this great document and our unswerving loyalty to it that makes America the greatest nation in the history of our planet. We can't be sacrificing basic constitutional principles like the fourth amendment simply because it's an election year and we want to make it look like we're fighting terrorism. I join my colleagues in our unified fight to defeat the global terrorist movement. But we don't do that by sacrificing our hard-earned Constitutional rights and forgiving telephone companies who knowingly violate those rights. The bottom line is, this FISA bill permits the collection of Americans' emails and phone calls if they are communicating with someone outside of the U.S. This is especially true when it comes to emails, because the World Wide Web has no area codes, so it is impossible to tell where email communications originate from. The Government is under no obligation to seek a warrant in order to monitor an email account unless it knows the account belongs to an American. And once your email account is swept up in the system, it can be monitored. Regardless of the relevance of your personal information, once it is gathered by the government, it is never destroyed. One only has to recall the recent incident in the State Department where candidates' passport information was breached to know that this information isn't handled by robots, but people. And people can do any number of things with personal informations. Out of respect to the United States Constitution and the basic rights of Americans to live free of intrusive eavesdropping by their government, I strongly oppose HR 6034, the FISA Reauthorization Act. Madam Speaker; first I want to commend the Chairman and the Majority leader for the work they've done to bring this legislation to the floor of the House. It has been a challenge for all of us on the Intelligence Committee and in the Congress. This legislation is a vast improvement over the previous law, and indeed over the Protect America Act passed by the House last August which I opposed. The bill very importantly establishes a process for electronic surveillance that includes prior approval by the independent courts, and in some respects, this legislation goes even further than the existing FISA statute or the House-passed RESTORE Act in protecting the civil liberties of U.S. persons. Under this bill the Administration would have to seek a court order before conducting surveillance on U.S. persons abroad. Until now and under the Protect America Act, the executive branch could conduct electronic surveillance of U.S. persons without prior judicial approval. This legislation also allows the lawsuits against the telecommunications companies to go forward in a limited fashion, which would not have occurred at all under current law. Having said this I must oppose this bill. Under the original structure of FISA, telecommunications carriers served an important gate-keeping function. They were not permitted to provide access to private communications in the United States unless the government made a lawful request to conduct surveillance, pursuant to a FISA order. For decades, the government has sought and obtained thousands of FISA warrants prior to beginning surveillance, or in urgent cases shortly thereafter. We all remember the shocking news when the President had to acknowledge that his Administration created an illegal, warrantless electronic surveillance program outside of the FISA legal framework. This legislation would essentially grant retroactive immunity to telecommunications carriers who relied on statements made by this Administration that the program was lawful. However, as we've seen in numerous instances, this Administration pushed new and aggressive interpretations of the law, including in this area. We all recall vividly the days following \\9/11\\, and the urgency that prevailed, but suspending our laws and allowing the Attorney General to unilaterally issue a ``get out of jail free card'' is not appropriate under any circumstances. There should be at least some minimal inquiry into whether the telecommunications carriers reliance on the statements made by this Administration was reasonable. If so, the they would be able to assert their existing statutory immunity defenses. Throughout our Nation's history, the judiciary has been the most important check on an overzealous executive, and it is often through the judicial process that we uncover and remedy some of the most egregious executive misconduct. This legislation undermines and effectively nullifies the courts' ability to hold the Administration accountable for its actions, which likely violated the Constitution. Our Nation was founded on the principle of separation of powers. The executive branch should be subject to independent oversight by the judicial branch. This legislation does not go far enough to allow the judicial branch to conduct an independent, reasoned inquiry into this critical issue. Therefore, I must oppose this legislation. Madam Speaker, I will support this bill. I will do so because, as I have consistently said, I do think the basic law in this area--the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA--needs to be updated to respond to changes in technology, which was the purpose of the current, temporary law. That is why, last August, I voted for a bill (H.R. 3356) to provide such an update--a bill that was supported by a majority of the House, but did not pass because it was considered under a procedure that required a two-thirds vote for passage, which did not occur because of the opposition of the Bush Administration. It was supported by all but three of our Republican colleagues. That is also why I voted for another bill to update FISA--H.R. 3773, the ``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseer, Reviewed, and Effective'' (or RESTORE) Act--which the House passed on November 15th of last year. Like those bills I supported earlier, this bill will replace the Protect America Act, enacted in August 2007--which I opposed. The bill makes it very clear that to conduct surveillance targeting a person in the United States, the government first must obtain an individual warrant from the FISA Court, based upon probable cause. And, importantly, it explicitly states that FISA and Title III of the U.S. criminal code are the exclusive means by which the government may conduct surveillance on American soil, and adds that any future statute must expressly authorize surveillance if the government is going to rely on it to conduct domestic surveillance. It also includes new legal protections for Americans abroad, requiring an individual probable cause determination by the FISA Court when the government seeks to conduct surveillance of U.S. persons located outside the United States. It requires prior review and approval by the FISA Court of the targeting and minimization procedures used to conduct surveillance of any foreign targets (unless in an emergency, in which case the government may authorize the surveillance and then apply to the FISA Court for approval within 7 days), and requires that this surveillance be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. And it requires the government to establish guidelines to ensure that Americans are not targeted by this surveillance (``reverse targeting guidelines''), and requires the government to provide those reverse targeting guidelines to Congress and the FISA Court. The legislation also includes important provisions to increase transparency and accountability. For example, it requires there be a comprehensive review of the President's warrantless surveillance program by the Inspectors General of the Justice Department, the Directorate of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Department--and it provides for them to report the results to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. This report will review ``all of the facts necessary to describe the establishment, implementation, product, and use of the Program,'' as well as ``communications with, and participation of, individuals and entities in the private sector related to the Program.'' I do not find equally satisfactory another aspect of the bill that involves accountability--the treatment of pending lawsuits against various telecommunication companies that acted to implement President Bush's clandestine surveillance program. Like the bills I supported earlier, this measure would provide civil liability protection for private sector companies that provide lawful assistance to the government in the future. But it differs significantly in the way it addresses those pending lawsuits, which deal with the previous actions of the defendant companies. Those lawsuits have been consolidated and are pending in one court, but evidently have made little progress because of the Administration's argument, still awaiting court resolution, that the suits are barred because they involve state secrets. My understanding is that the defendant companies have argued that government's invocation of the state-secrets privilege has had the result of preventing them from defending themselves, although at least one company has stated in regulatory filings that the cases against it are without merit. President Bush has insisted that Congress throw these cases out of court by giving the companies retroactive immunity for whatever they might have done in connection with the surveillance program, even though the Administration and the companies themselves insist that those actions were lawful and that the plaintiffs' complaints against the companies have no merit. Regrettably, the Senate decided to comply with the president's demand on this point, and its version of this legislation would provide that retroactive immunity. I do not think that was the right decision because I agree with the Rocky Mountain News, which in a February 15th editorial said ``Letting this litigation proceed would not, as Bush [has] said . . .punish companies that want to `help America.' Businesses that want to help America need to be mindful of the Constitution--and so should the government.'' I supported removing that ``state secret'' barrier and allowing the companies to defend themselves by demonstrating to the court the evidence they say supports their arguments in a way that assures the continued security of that evidence and that avoids the public disclosure the Administration says would be adverse to the national interest. This is a process that has worked well in criminal cases, and while I am certainly not an expert on the matter, I think it can work when applied to these civil cases. In that respect, this bill is similar to the legislation I supported earlier this year. But it is not identical, and I do not think it is quite as sound. Under this bill, a district court hearing such a case will decide whether the Attorney General's certification attesting that the liability protection standard has been met and is supported by substantial evidence. In making that determination, the court will have the opportunity to examine the highly classified letters to the providers that indicated the President had authorized the activity and that it had been determined to be lawful. That is not as strong a requirement for accountability as I would prefer. However, in such cases both plaintiffs and defendants will have the opportunity to file public briefs on legal issues and the court should include in any public order a description of the legal standards that govern the order. And, importantly, this immunity provision does not apply to any actions against the Government for any alleged injuries caused by government officials. Madam Speaker, as Benjamin Franklin has warned us, people who value security over liberty will get neither--and the Bush Administration has finally agreed to end its disregard for liberty and agree to effective judicial oversight and involvement in intelligence surveillance. That agreement that is embodied in this bill, and the choice before us now is whether to reject it or to support the compromise measure now before us. After careful review, I have concluded that the bill adequately meets the test of protecting civil liberties while giving our country tools needed to effectively combat terrorism. So, while--like any compromise--the bill is not ideal, I have decided the correct decision--the one that will fulfill my responsibility to protect both our national security and the civil liberties that make our nation worth defending--is to vote for it. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 6304, FISA Amendments Act. This bipartisan bill takes steps to increase our Nation's security while also protecting Americans' civil liberties. H.R. 6304, FISA Amendments Act, provides the critical tools that our intelligence community needs to ensure the safety of our Nation. With many surveillance warrants set to expire in the coming weeks, the intelligence community needs a strong and dependable set of guidelines to follow while conducting surveillance. H.R. 6304 allows the Government to authorize surveillance in the case of an emergency situation, provided that they return to the FISA court within 7 days to apply for a warrant. This bill also includes a number of provisions that significantly strengthen the protection of our civil rights. H.R. 6304 clarifies that FISA is the exclusive means for conducting surveillance in the United States, prohibiting any President from using executive power to conduct a warrantless wiretapping program. This bill also requires the Government to obtain an individual warrant from the FISA Court before conducting surveillance on a United States citizen. This warrant must be based on probable cause, and the provision now includes American citizens abroad as well. H.R. 6304 requires prior review and approval of the intelligence community's targeting and minimization procedures that ensure that any inadvertently intercepted communications by American citizens are destroyed. Finally, the FISA Amendments Act adds a strong layer of oversight to this process by directing the Inspectors General from Justice, State, Defense, the DNI, and NSA to review surveillance procedures and submit their findings to Congress. H.R. 6304 rejects blanket immunity for telecommunications companies that may have participated in the administration's warrantless wiretapping program. Under this bill, lawsuits against these companies would be determined by Federal district courts. These telecommunications companies will have to prove that the Administration provided written assurance that their activities were legal. There is no immunity for any government official who may have violated the law included in this legislation. This bill is much stronger than the Senate version, and will protect both our security and the civil liberties that we enjoy. I support the passage of H.R. 6304, FISA Amendments Act, and I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this bipartisan measure as well. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I know we must give our intelligence community the proper tools to protect us while upholding the civil liberties of Americans. Today's compromise illustrates what this House can do when it deliberates with care, holds steady against fear-mongering, and acts in the best interest of the country and its citizens. This bill is strong on civil liberties, and includes protections against infringement of our Constitutional right to privacy. First, the bill clarifies that FISA is the exclusive means by which the executive branch may conduct electronic surveillance on U.S. soil. No President will have the power to do an end-run around the legal requirements of FISA. This provision will prevent the types of abuses we have witnessed under this administration. Second, this Act requires a warrant from the FISA court to conduct surveillance of Americans abroad. Americans will no longer leave their constitutional protections at home when working, studying, or traveling abroad. Third, it requires prior approval by the FISA court of procedures the Government will use when carrying out foreign electronic surveillance. This will ensure that the Government's efforts are not aimed at targeting Americans, and that, if an American's communication is inadvertently intercepted, it is dealt with in a manner that guarantees legal protections. One issue that has been repeatedly addressed is whether telecommunications companies should be granted immunity against pending lawsuits for their involvement in the earlier surveillance program. For a long period of time, the Bush Administration stonewalled and did not provide Congress the documents we demanded to ascertain the role that the telecommunications companies played. Since then, I have reviewed a large number of classified documents on this matter, and I am deeply concerned about the manner in which the Bush administration conducted its surveillance program. Therefore, I am pleased that this legislation preserves a role for the U.S. court system, which will review the documents produced by the White House and other relevant documents to decide independently whether the telecommunications companies acted in good faith when cooperating with the Government. Only after that review would the courts decide whether the telecommunications companies deserve any form of liability protection. Furthermore, the legislation authorizes a joint investigation by the Inspectors General from the U.S. Department of Justice, National Security Agency, Department of Defense, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence to review the past actions of the U.S. Government and report to Congress on their findings so that we may take appropriate action. Many today have said that the legislation before us is not a perfect bill, and I agree. Nevertheless, it is significantly better than the bill passed by the Senate and an immense improvement over the Bush administration's program, neither of which took sufficient steps to protect Americans' civil liberties. I know that the Democratic leadership negotiated a good compromise, and I will support it. However, as I have said before, this legislation will only work if everyone involved follows the rules and remains within the confines of the law. Congress must continue to conduct robust oversight to make sure the law is implemented as intended to maintain the critical and fragile balance of protecting our Nation and protecting civil liberties. Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to the bill. I appreciate the hard work that Mr. Hoyer and others have done on this legislation. The bill before the House is a vast improvement over the administration's Protect America Act, which I strongly opposed last August. The legislation is also a significant improvement over the seriously flawed FISA legislation approved by the Senate earlier this year. In many respects, the bill before the House strikes a reasonable balance between giving the Government the tools it needs to protect U.S. national security and protecting Americans' constitutional rights. In particular, I am pleased that the bill reaffirms that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is the exclusive legal means by which the Government may conduct surveillance. This stands in stark contrast to the Bush administration's warrantless surveillance program. I also support the provisions of this bill that protect Americans traveling abroad. They need no longer leave their constitutional protections at home. At the end of the day, I oppose this bill because of the provisions that would confer retroactive immunity on the telecommunications companies that participated in the Bush administration's warrantless surveillance program. We are a nation of laws, and it sets a dangerous precedent for Congress to approve a law that dismisses ongoing court cases simply on the basis that the companies can show that the administration told them that its warrantless surveillance program was legal. A program is not legal just because the administration claims that it is. The retroactive immunity provisions in this bill shield the administration from accountability for its actions. The goal here is not to harm the telecommunications carriers, but rather to get to the truth of what happened. A much better alternative would be to grant indemnification to the companies and go forward with the trials. Irrespective of the outcome of today's vote, we need a full accounting of the administration's surveillance program, and the bill before the House provides for an Inspectors General audit describing all Federal programs involving warrantless surveillance conducted since September 11, 2001. The audit is to be completed within 1 year. Congress must get to the bottom of what happened and prevent it from happening again. It is essential that Congress follow up on the audit's findings with robust oversight. Madam Speaker, while l cannot support the legislation before us today, I commend Majority Leader Hoyer for the work he has done to negotiate a bill that is substantially better than the version that passed in the Senate. This legislation, which will be the exclusive mechanism for the Government to conduct surveillance within the United States, contains provisions that will provide greater protections against unwarranted and unconstitutional searches of American citizens. Despite the many improvements Mr. Hoyer was able to obtain, I unfortunately still cannot support this legislation because it contains a provision that will grant immunity to the telecommunications companies that assisted the President with his illegal and unauthorized warrantless wiretapping program. I have consistently said that it is not appropriate for Congress to grant these companies immunity for their actions without having an understanding of what it is that they did. This is not only because it will hold the telecommunications companies accountable for their actions, but because it is the only way of finding out just how extensive the President's illegal wiretapping program really was. In other words, this provision will enable the Bush administration to continue suppressing facts and information about the Government's own misbehavior and wrongdoing. The immunity provision contained in this bill purporting to allow for judicial review to determine whether immunity is appropriate is a sham. As drafted, courts will have no real discretion and will be forced to grant immunity so long as the Government claims its actions were legal. However, the court is under no obligation to investigate whether the Government's claims are true. Anyone following the headlines recently, who has read about the recent Supreme Court decision overturning the administration's argument that it has the authority to detain people indefinitely in Guantanamo Bay, or about the hearings held by Senator Carl Levin and the Senate Armed Services Committee uncovering evidence that top civilian leadership at the Department of Defense authored memos arguing it was legal for the military to torture detainees, should be extremely wary of trusting President Bush to decide whether or not it is legal to spy on Americans. I have consistently supported modernizing the existing FISA law to give our Government the tools it needs to identify and defeat terrorists in today's high-tech world, while at the same time preserving the freedoms and rights that define America. I have voted three times to pass legislation that would strengthen and modernize FISA and reaffirm the rule of law. Despite some improvements over previous attempts to update FISA, the bill considered by the House today regrettably falls short of achieving that critical balance. The rule of law lies at the core of America's founding principles, and the language in this bill was too weak to ensue that any breach of our laws that may have occurred under the warrantless wiretapping program will be fully addressed. It is not appropriate to deny Americans the right to pursue these matters in court, or to short-circuit the judicial review that lies at the heart of our system of checks and balances, which is the bedrock of our Constitution. Accordingly, I voted against this bill. Madam Speaker, I appreciate the hard work put in by my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and in both chambers. For the past year we've participated in substantial and sometimes heated debate on the issue of surveillance and foreign intelligence. I appreciate the good faith efforts of our leadership, particularly Mr. Hoyer, as we try to craft legislation that keeps both our liberties and our persons safe. For the past seven years I have been highly critical of Republican wiretapping legislation. I voted against past efforts to expand this administration's ability to intrude in the lives of unknowing and innocent Americans. I supported the expiration of the disgraceful Protect America Act. And I remain confident that the dedicated members of the intelligence community do not need to violate the rights of Americans in order to protect them. I have heard some say that the enemies of America take on many forms. To them I say: Let us be sure one of those forms is not our own government. Ultimately this is a compromise that falls short. Any gains in security that may be achieved are temporary and are more than outweighed by the longer-term loss of civil liberties and oversight. Although this bill is comparatively better than the Senate's version, I am troubled by the lack of robust government oversight, the absence of meaningful court review, and the risk to American liberties. Of particular concern is the granting of de facto retroactive immunity to the telecommunications companies that cooperated with the administration. A `doctor's note' from the Attorney General cannot be allowed to circumvent the entire judicial process. I am equally concerned with the timeline of this bill, and strongly oppose authorizing this legislation for four years. This will extend the Bush legacy throughout the next administration and the next two sessions of Congress. Frankly I see no reason to rush into a compromise that comes up this short. The American people would be better served if we continued to debate this issue and took up a bill after we have seen the last of this administration. Americans demand and deserve protection of their basic civil rights and this can be accomplished while providing the means necessary for our intelligence community to do its job. Madam Speaker, Members of the House must decide today whether to uphold the rule of low and the supremacy of the Constitution or whether to protect and reward the lawless behavior of the administration and of the telecommunications companies that participated in its clearly illegal program of spying on innocent Americans. This bill limits the courts hearing lawsuits alleging illegal wiretapping to consider only whether the telecom companies received a ``written request or directive . . . indicating that the activity was [ ] authorized by the President; and [ ] determined to be lawful''--not whether the request was actually lawful or whether the telecom companies knew that it was unlawful. The bill is a fig-leaf, granting blanket immunity to the telecom companies for illegal acts without allowing the courts to consider the facts or the law. It denies people whose rights were violated their fair day in court, and it denies the American people their right to have the actions of the administration subjected to fair and independent scrutiny. Even the courts' limited review will remain secret. The lawsuits will be dismissed, but the basis for the dismissal--that the defendants were innocent of misconduct, or that they were guilty but Congress commands their immunity--must remain secret. And the constitutionality of the immunity granted by this bill is very questionable. As Judge Walker put it in the AT&T case: AT&T's alleged actions here violate the constitutional rights clearly established in [the] Keith decision. Moreover, because `the very action in question has previously been held unlawful,' AT&T cannot seriously contend that a reasonable entity in its position could have believed that the alleged domestic dragnet was legal. I would hope that the courts will find that, because the Constitutional rights of Americans have been violated, Congress' attempt to prevent court review is unconstitutional. The bill also reiterates than FISA and specified other statutes are the exclusive legal authority for electronic surveillance. The Act has always said that. This bill adds some new mechanisms to ensure that any future legislation may not be read to override this exclusivity by implication, but only by explicitly saying that that is its purpose. No one and no court should draw the false conclusion that we are thereby implying that the exclusivity provision was, or could have been, overridden either by the President's claim of inherent authority under Article II of the Constitution, or by the Authorization for the Use of Military Force of 2001. This bill does not say or imply that. If there is any doubt of this point, the blanket immunity provisions of this bill reflect Congress' understanding that this domestic spying was not legal. If it were, there would not be any necessity for these provisions. This bill abandons the Constitution's protections and insulates lawless behavior from legal scrutiny. I urge a ``no'' vote. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 6304. This is the kind of work I came to Congress hoping for--bipartisan legislation that protects our security and our liberty. It's a solid compromise that does what it needs to do for the country. One of my specific concerns in FISA reform over the last year has been finding a way to protect reasonable private companies, who assisted government out of patriotism. This bill does that. It doesn't give anyone a free pass, but it allows companies to come before the courts and make their case in order to be protected from lawsuits. That's a good result, and I thank Chairman Reyes for his work in reaching this reasonable bipartisan compromise. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes.'' Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 6304, a bill to reauthorize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and to protect America from foreign threats. For the past several months, I have heard from hundreds of constituents on the issue of FISA. Each one of them expressed their alarm and disbelief that the House Majority would repeatedly refuse to call a vote on bipartisan legislation to extend FISA and address our grave vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Today I am pleased that the Majority leadership has finally reached across the aisle to put together a compromise bill, and fulfill one of its fundamental tasks--to ensure the security of this great Nation. This compromise is also a reminder of what I have always believed, that no one side can do it alone; both parties must work together to ensure our safety. In such uncertain times, when it is essential that our government utilize every available tool to protect American citizens, having the ability to collect intelligence responsibly is essential. While there is no excuse for the delay in bringing this critical bill to the floor, we must now move forward together to pass H.R. 6304 and restore our Nation's intelligence capabilities. Madam Speaker, I yield back the remainder of our time. All time for debate has expired. Pursuant to House Resolution 1285, the bill is considered read and the previous question is ordered. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time. The question is on the passage of the bill. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 293, nays 129, not voting 13, as follows:", u"SA 1208. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SA 1209. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SA 1210. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: SA 1211. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: (a) Inadmissibility on Criminal and Related Grounds; Waivers.--Section 212 (8 U.S.C. 1182) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) in subparagraph (A)(i)-- (i) in subclause (I), by striking ``, or'' and inserting a semicolon; (ii) in subclause (II), by striking the comma at the end and inserting ``; or''; and (iii) by inserting after subclause (II) the following: (a) Inadmissibility on Criminal and Related Grounds; Waivers.--Section 212 (8 U.S.C. 1182) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) in subparagraph (A)(i)-- (i) in subclause (I), by striking ``, or'' and inserting a semicolon; (ii) in subclause (II), by striking the comma at the end and inserting ``; or''; and (iii) by inserting after subclause (II) the following: ``(III) a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) an offense described in section 208 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 408) (relating to social security account numbers or social security cards) or section 1028 of title 18, United States Code (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents, authentication features, and information),''; and SA 1212. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SA 1213. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: After section 203, insert the following: SA 1214. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: After section 305, insert the following: SA 1215. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SA 1216. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SA 1217. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SA 1218. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place, insert the following: SEC. ___. ACCESS TO NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER'S INTERSTATE IDENTIFICATION INDEX. At the appropriate place, insert the following: SEC. ___. ACCESS TO NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER'S INTERSTATE IDENTIFICATION INDEX. (a) Criminal Justice Activities.--Section 104 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1104) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(f) Criminal Justice Activities.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Department of State personnel with authority to grant or refuse visas or passports may carry out activities that have a criminal justice purpose.''. (b) Liaison With Internal Security Officers; Data Exchange.--Section 105 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1105) is amended by striking subsections (b) and (c) and inserting the following: ``(b) Access to NCIC-IIII.-- ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State access to the criminal history record information contained in the National Crime Information Center's Interstate Identification Index (NCIC-III) and the Wanted Persons File and to any other files maintained by the National Crime Information Center for the purpose of determining whether an applicant or petitioner for a visa, admission, or any benefit, relief, or status under the immigration laws, or any beneficiary of an application or petition under the immigration laws, has a criminal history record indexed in the file. ``(2) Authorized activities.-- ``(A) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State-- ``(i) shall have direct access, without any fee or charge, to the information described in paragraph (1) to conduct name-based searches, file number searches, and any other searches that any criminal justice or other law enforcement officials are entitled to conduct; and ``(ii) may contribute to the records maintained by the National Crime Information Center. ``(B) Secretary of homeland security.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall receive, on request by the Secretary of Homeland Security, access to the information described in paragraph (1) by means of extracts of the records for placement in the appropriate database without any fee or charge. ``(c) Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement Purposes.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, adjudication of eligibility for benefits under the immigration laws and other purposes relating to citizenship and immigration services, shall be considered to be criminal justice or law enforcement purposes with respect to access to or use of any information maintained by the National Crime Information Center or other criminal history information or records.''. SA 1219. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: In subsections (e)(2) and (f)(1) of section 503, strike ``May 1, 2005'' each place it appears and insert ``January 1, 2007''. SA 1220. Mr. GREGG submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: Strike subsection (c) of section 418 and all that follows through subsection (d) of section 420, and insert the following: (c) Granting Dual Intent to Certain Nonimmigrant Students.--Subsection (h) of section 214 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1184(h)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``(H)(i)(b) or (c),'' and inserting ``(F)(iv), (H)(i)(b), (H)(i)(c),''; and (2) by striking ``if the alien had obtained a change of status'' and inserting ``if the alien had been admitted as, provided status as, or obtained a change of status''. (a) H-1B Amendments.-- (1) In general.--Section 214(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1184(g)) is amended-- (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking clauses (i) through (vii) and inserting the following: ``(i) 150,000 in fiscal year 2008; ``(ii) in any subsequent fiscal year, subject to clause (iii), the number for the previous fiscal year as adjusted in accordance with the method set forth in paragraph (2); and ``(iii) 215,000 for any fiscal year; or''; (B) in paragraph (6), as redesignated by section 409-- (i) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a semicolon; (ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``until the number of aliens who are exempted from such numerical limitation during such fiscal year exceeds 20,000.'' and inserting ``; or''; and (iii) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) has earned a master's or higher degree in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics from an institution of higher education outside of the United States.''; and (C) in paragraph (9), as redesignated by section 409-- (i) in subparagraph (B)-- (a) H-1B Amendments.-- (1) In general.--Section 214(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1184(g)) is amended-- (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking clauses (i) through (vii) and inserting the following: ``(i) 150,000 in fiscal year 2008; ``(ii) in any subsequent fiscal year, subject to clause (iii), the number for the previous fiscal year as adjusted in accordance with the method set forth in paragraph (2); and ``(iii) 215,000 for any fiscal year; or''; (B) in paragraph (6), as redesignated by section 409-- (i) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a semicolon; (ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``until the number of aliens who are exempted from such numerical limitation during such fiscal year exceeds 20,000.'' and inserting ``; or''; and (iii) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) has earned a master's or higher degree in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics from an institution of higher education outside of the United States.''; and (C) in paragraph (9), as redesignated by section 409-- (i) in subparagraph (B)-- (I) in clause (iii), by striking ``The annual numerical limitations described in clause (i) shall not exceed'' and inserting ``Without respect to the annual numerical limitations described in clause (i), the Secretary may issue a visa or otherwise grant nonimmigrant status pursuant to section 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) in the following quantities:''; and (a) H-1B Amendments.-- (1) In general.--Section 214(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1184(g)) is amended-- (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking clauses (i) through (vii) and inserting the following: ``(i) 150,000 in fiscal year 2008; ``(ii) in any subsequent fiscal year, subject to clause (iii), the number for the previous fiscal year as adjusted in accordance with the method set forth in paragraph (2); and ``(iii) 215,000 for any fiscal year; or''; (B) in paragraph (6), as redesignated by section 409-- (i) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a semicolon; (ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``until the number of aliens who are exempted from such numerical limitation during such fiscal year exceeds 20,000.'' and inserting ``; or''; and (iii) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) has earned a master's or higher degree in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics from an institution of higher education outside of the United States.''; and (C) in paragraph (9), as redesignated by section 409-- (i) in subparagraph (B)-- (I) in clause (iii), by striking ``The annual numerical limitations described in clause (i) shall not exceed'' and inserting ``Without respect to the annual numerical limitations described in clause (i), the Secretary may issue a visa or otherwise grant nonimmigrant status pursuant to section 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) in the following quantities:''; and (ii) by striking clause (iv); and (iii) by striking subparagraph (D). (2) Applicability.--The amendments made by paragraph (1)(B) shall apply with respect to any petition or visa application pending on the date of the enactment of this Act and to any petition or visa application filed on or after such date of enactment. (b) Requiring a Degree.--Paragraph (2) of section 214(i) (8 U.S.C. 1184(i)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking the comma at the end and inserting ``; or''; (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``, or'' and inserting a period; and (3) by striking subparagraph (C). (c) Provision of W-2 Forms.--Section 214(g)(5), as redesignated by section 409, is amended to read as follows: ``(5) In the case of a nonimmigrant described in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)-- ``(A) the period of authorized admission as such a nonimmigrant may not exceed 6 years (except for a nonimmigrant who has filed a petition for an immigrant visa under section 203(b)(1), if 365 days or more have elapsed since filing and it has not been denied, in which case the Secretary of Homeland Security may extend the stay of an alien in 1-year increments until such time as a final decision is made on the alien's lawful permanent residence); ``(B) if the alien is granted an initial period of admission less than 6 years, any subsequent application for an extension of stay for such alien shall include the Form W- 2 Wage and Tax Statement filed by the employer for such employee, and such other form or information relating to such employment as the Secretary of Homeland Security, in the discretion of the Secretary, may specify, with respect to such nonimmigrant alien employee for the period of admission granted to the alien; and ``(C) notwithstanding section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any other law, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration shall upon request of the Secretary confirm whether the Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statement filed by the employer under subparagraph (B) matches a Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statement filed with the Internal Revenue Service or the Social Security Administration, as the case may be.''. (d) Extension of H-1B Status for Merit-based Adjustment Applicants.-- (1) In general.--Section 214(g)(4), as redesignated by section 409, is amended-- (A) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)''; (B) by striking ``If an alien'' and inserting the following: ``(B) If an alien''; and (C) by adding at the end the following: ``(C) Subparagraph (B) shall not apply to such a nonimmigrant who has filed a petition for an immigrant visa accompanied by a qualifying employer recommendation under section 203(b)(1), if 365 days or more have elapsed since filing and it has not been denied, in which case the Secretary of Homeland Security may extend the stay of an alien in 1-year increments until such time as a final decision is made on the alien's lawful permanent residence.''. (2) Repeal.--Section 106 of the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 (8 U.S.C. 1184 note) is amended by striking subsections (a) and (b). (a) Nondisplacement Requirement.-- (1) Extending time period for nondisplacement.--Section 212(n) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(n)) is amended-- (A) in paragraph (1)-- (i) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``90 days'' each place it appears and inserting ``180 days''; and (ii) in subparagraph (F)(ii), by striking ``90 days'' each place it appears and inserting ``180 days''; and (B) in paragraph (2)(C)(iii), by striking ``90 days'' each place it appears and inserting ``180 days''. (2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1)-- (A) shall apply to applications filed on or after the date of the enactment of this Act; and (B) shall not apply to displacements for periods occurring more than 90 days before such date. (b) H-1B Nonimmigrants Not Admitted for Jobs Advertised or Offered Only to H-1B Nonimmigrants.--Section 212(n)(1) of such Act, as amended by this section, is further amended-- (1) by inserting after subparagraph (G) the following: ``(H)(i) The employer has not advertised the available jobs specified in the application in an advertisement that states or indicates that-- ``(I) the job or jobs are only available to persons who are or who may become H-1B nonimmigrants; or ``(II) persons who are or who may become H-1B nonimmigrants shall receive priority or a preference in the hiring process. ``(ii) The employer has not only recruited persons who are, or who may become, H-1B nonimmigrants to fill the job or jobs.''; and (2) in the flush text at the end, by striking ``The employer'' and inserting the following: ``(K) The employer''. (c) Limit on Percentage of H-1B Employees.--Section 212(n)(1) of such Act, as amended by this section, is further amended by inserting after subparagraph (H), as added by subsection (b)(1), the following: ``(I) If the employer employs not less than 50 employees in the United States, not more than 50 percent of such employees are H-1B nonimmigrants.''. SA 1221. Mr. CARDIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place insert the following: Section 402(a)(2) of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1612(a)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(M) SSI extension through fiscal year 2010.-- ``(i) In general.--With respect to eligibility for benefits for the specified Federal program described in paragraph (3)(A), the 7-year period described in subparagraph (A) shall be deemed to be a 9-year period during the period that begins on the date of enactment of this subparagraph and ends on September 30, 2010. ``(ii) Aliens whose benefits ceased in prior fiscal years.-- Section 402(a)(2) of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1612(a)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(M) SSI extension through fiscal year 2010.-- ``(i) In general.--With respect to eligibility for benefits for the specified Federal program described in paragraph (3)(A), the 7-year period described in subparagraph (A) shall be deemed to be a 9-year period during the period that begins on the date of enactment of this subparagraph and ends on September 30, 2010. ``(ii) Aliens whose benefits ceased in prior fiscal years.-- ``(I) In general.--Beginning on the date of enactment of this subparagraph, any qualified alien rendered ineligible for the specified Federal program described in paragraph (3)(A) during fiscal years prior to the fiscal year in which such subparagraph is enacted solely by reason of the termination of the 7-year period described in subparagraph (A) shall be eligible for such program for an additional 2- year period in accordance with this subparagraph, if such alien meets all other eligibility factors under title XVI of the Social Security Act. ``(II) Payment of benefits.--Benefits paid under subclause (I) shall be paid prospectively over the duration of the qualified alien's renewed eligibility.''. SA 1222. Mr. CORNYN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: Strike section 604 (relating to mandatory disclosure of information) and insert the following: (a) In General.--Except as otherwise provided in this section, no Federal agency or bureau, or any officer or employee of such agency or bureau, may-- (1) use the information furnished by the applicant pursuant to an application filed under section 601 and 602, for any purpose, other than to make a determination on the application; (2) make any publication through which the information furnished by any particular applicant can be identified; or (3) permit anyone other than the sworn officers, employees or contractors of such agency, bureau, or approved entity, as approved by the Secretary of Homeland Security, to examine individual applications that have been filed. (b) Required Disclosures.--The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall provide the information furnished pursuant to an application filed under section 601 and 602, and any other information derived from such furnished information, to-- (1) a law enforcement entity, intelligence agency, national security agency, component of the Department of Homeland Security, court, or grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution or a national security investigation or prosecution, in each instance about an individual suspect or group of suspects, when such information is requested by such entity; (2) a law enforcement entity, intelligence agency, national security agency, or component of the Department of Homeland Security in connection with a duly authorized investigation of a civil violation, in each instance about an individual suspect or group of suspects, when such information is requested by such entity; or (3) an official coroner for purposes of affirmatively identifying a deceased individual, whether or not the death of such individual resulted from a crime. (c) Inapplicability After Denial.--The limitations under subsection (a)-- (1) shall apply only until an application filed under section 601 and 602 is denied and all opportunities for administrative appeal of the denial have been exhausted; and (2) shall not apply to the use of the information furnished pursuant to such application in any removal proceeding or other criminal or civil case or action relating to an alien whose application has been granted that is based upon any violation of law committed or discovered after such grant. (d) Criminal Convictions.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, information concerning whether the applicant has at any time been convicted of a crime may be used or released for immigration enforcement and law enforcement purposes. (e) Auditing and Evaluation of Information.--The Secretary may audit and evaluate information furnished as part of any application filed under sections 601 and 602, any application to extend such status under section 601(k), or any application to adjust status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence under section 602, for purposes of identifying fraud or fraud schemes, and may use any evidence detected by means of audits and evaluations for purposes of investigating, prosecuting or referring for prosecution, denying, or terminating immigration benefits. (f) Use of Information in Petitions and Applications Subsequent to Adjustment of Status.--If the Secretary has adjusted an alien's status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence pursuant to section 602, then at any time thereafter the Secretary may use the information furnished by the alien in the application for adjustment of status or in the applications for status pursuant to sections 601 or 602 to make a determination on any petition or application. (g) Criminal Penalty.--Whoever knowingly uses, publishes, or permits information to be examined in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000. (h) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the use, or release, for immigration enforcement purposes of information contained in files or records of the Secretary or Attorney General pertaining to an applications filed under sections 601 or 602, other than information furnished by an applicant pursuant to the application, or any other information derived from the application, that is not available from any other source. (i) References.--References in this section to section 601 or 602 are references to sections 601 and 602 of this Act and the amendments made by those sections. SA 1223. Mr. SANDERS proposed an amendment to amendment SA 1150 proposed by Mr. Reid (for Mr. Kennedy (for himself and Mr. Specter)) to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; as follows: At the end of title VII, insert the following: At the end of title VII, insert the following: Subtitle C--American Competitiveness Scholarship Program (a) Establishment.--The Director of the National Science Foundation (referred to in this section as the ``Director'') shall award scholarships to eligible individuals to enable such individuals to pursue associate, undergraduate, or graduate level degrees in mathematics, engineering, health care, or computer science. (b) Eligibility.-- (1) In general.--To be eligible to receive a scholarship under this section, an individual shall-- (A) be a citizen of the United States, a national of the United States (as defined in section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)), an alien admitted as a refugee under section 207 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1157), or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence; (B) prepare and submit to the Director an application at such time, in such manner, and containing such information as the Director may require; and (C) certify to the Director that the individual intends to use amounts received under the scholarship to enroll or continue enrollment at an institution of higher education (as defined in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)) in order to pursue an associate, undergraduate, or graduate level degree in mathematics, engineering, computer science, nursing, medicine, or other clinical medical program, or technology, or science program designated by the Director. (2) Ability.--Awards of scholarships under this section shall be made by the Director solely on the basis of the ability of the applicant, except that in any case in which 2 or more applicants for scholarships are deemed by the Director to be possessed of substantially equal ability, and there are not sufficient scholarships available to grant one to each of such applicants, the available scholarship or scholarships shall be awarded to the applicants in a manner that will tend to result in a geographically wide distribution throughout the United States of recipients' places of permanent residence. (c) Amount of Scholarship; Renewal.-- (1) Amount of scholarship.--The amount of a scholarship awarded under this section shall be $15,000 per year, except that no scholarship shall be greater than the annual cost of tuition and fees at the institution of higher education in which the scholarship recipient is enrolled or will enroll. (2) Renewal.--The Director may renew a scholarship under this section for an eligible individual for not more than 4 years. (d) Funding.--The Director shall carry out this section only with funds made available under section 286(x) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as added by section 712) (8 U.S.C. 1356). (e) Federal Register.--Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director shall publish in the Federal Register a list of eligible programs of study for a scholarship under this section. Section 286 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1356) (as amended by this Act) is further amended by inserting after subsection (w) the following: ``(x) Supplemental H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner Account.-- ``(1) In general.--There is established in the general fund of the Treasury a separate account, which shall be known as the `Supplemental H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner Account'. Notwithstanding any other section of this Act, there shall be deposited as offsetting receipts into the account all fees collected under section 214(c)(15). ``(2) Use of fees for american competitiveness scholarship program.--The amounts deposited into the Supplemental H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner Account shall remain available to the Director of the National Science Foundation until expended for scholarships described in section 711 of the Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007 for students enrolled in a program of study leading to a degree in mathematics, engineering, health care, or computer science.''. SA 1224. Mr. COBURN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: SA 1225. Mr. LEVIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 1348, to provide for comprehensive immigration reform and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: In section 601(d)(1), strike subparagraph (I) and insert the following: (I) The Secretary, in the discretion of the Secretary-- (i) may waive ineligibility under subparagraph (B) or (C) if the alien-- In section 601(d)(1), strike subparagraph (I) and insert the following: (I) The Secretary, in the discretion of the Secretary-- (i) may waive ineligibility under subparagraph (B) or (C) if the alien-- (I) has not been physically removed from the United States; and (II) demonstrates that the departure of the alien from the United States would result in extreme hardship to the alien or the spouse, parent, or child of the alien; and In section 601(d)(1), strike subparagraph (I) and insert the following: (I) The Secretary, in the discretion of the Secretary-- (i) may waive ineligibility under subparagraph (B) or (C) if the alien-- (I) has not been physically removed from the United States; and (II) demonstrates that the departure of the alien from the United States would result in extreme hardship to the alien or the spouse, parent, or child of the alien; and (ii) shall, unless the Secretary or the Attorney General determines that a waiver is not in the public interest based on the particular facts of the application for asylum of the alien, waive ineligibility under subparagraph (B) if-- In section 601(d)(1), strike subparagraph (I) and insert the following: (I) The Secretary, in the discretion of the Secretary-- (i) may waive ineligibility under subparagraph (B) or (C) if the alien-- (I) has not been physically removed from the United States; and (II) demonstrates that the departure of the alien from the United States would result in extreme hardship to the alien or the spouse, parent, or child of the alien; and (ii) shall, unless the Secretary or the Attorney General determines that a waiver is not in the public interest based on the particular facts of the application for asylum of the alien, waive ineligibility under subparagraph (B) if-- (I) notwithstanding subparagraph (B), the alien is admissible to the United States as an immigrant; (II) the alien filed an application for asylum before December 31, 2004, which was not found to be frivolous by the Attorney General under section 208(d)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (11 U.S.C. 1158(d)(6)); (III) an immigration judge specifically cited changed country conditions as the basis, in whole or in part, for denying the application of the alien for asylum; (IV) the alien applies for the adjustment of status; (V) the alien-- In section 601(d)(1), strike subparagraph (I) and insert the following: (I) The Secretary, in the discretion of the Secretary-- (i) may waive ineligibility under subparagraph (B) or (C) if the alien-- (I) has not been physically removed from the United States; and (II) demonstrates that the departure of the alien from the United States would result in extreme hardship to the alien or the spouse, parent, or child of the alien; and (ii) shall, unless the Secretary or the Attorney General determines that a waiver is not in the public interest based on the particular facts of the application for asylum of the alien, waive ineligibility under subparagraph (B) if-- (I) notwithstanding subparagraph (B), the alien is admissible to the United States as an immigrant; (II) the alien filed an application for asylum before December 31, 2004, which was not found to be frivolous by the Attorney General under section 208(d)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (11 U.S.C. 1158(d)(6)); (III) an immigration judge specifically cited changed country conditions as the basis, in whole or in part, for denying the application of the alien for asylum; (IV) the alien applies for the adjustment of status; (V) the alien-- (aa) has been physically present in the United States for at least 3 years; and (bb) was physically present in the United States on the date the application for the adjustment of status was filed; In section 601(d)(1), strike subparagraph (I) and insert the following: (I) The Secretary, in the discretion of the Secretary-- (i) may waive ineligibility under subparagraph (B) or (C) if the alien-- (I) has not been physically removed from the United States; and (II) demonstrates that the departure of the alien from the United States would result in extreme hardship to the alien or the spouse, parent, or child of the alien; and (ii) shall, unless the Secretary or the Attorney General determines that a waiver is not in the public interest based on the particular facts of the application for asylum of the alien, waive ineligibility under subparagraph (B) if-- (I) notwithstanding subparagraph (B), the alien is admissible to the United States as an immigrant; (II) the alien filed an application for asylum before December 31, 2004, which was not found to be frivolous by the Attorney General under section 208(d)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (11 U.S.C. 1158(d)(6)); (III) an immigration judge specifically cited changed country conditions as the basis, in whole or in part, for denying the application of the alien for asylum; (IV) the alien applies for the adjustment of status; (V) the alien-- (aa) has been physically present in the United States for at least 3 years; and (bb) was physically present in the United States on the date the application for the adjustment of status was filed; (VI) the alien has not returned to the country of nationality or last habitual residence of the alien since the filing of the application for asylum; and (VII) the alien pays a fee, in an amount determined by the Secretary, for the processing of the application.", u"(The parts of the bill intended to be stricken are shown in boldface brackets and the parts of the bill intended to be inserted are shown in italic.) Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (11) The National Reconnaissance Office. (12) The Central Imagery Office. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1997, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill ____ of the One Hundred Fourth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 1997 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorizations of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1997 the sum of $95,526,000. Within such amounts authorized, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee and the Environmental Task Force shall remain available until September 30, 1998. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The staff of the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized 265 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1997. Such personnel of the Community Management Staff may be permanent employees of the Community Management Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Reimbursement.--During fiscal year 1997, any officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a non- reimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1997 the sum of $184,200,000. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is amended by striking ``the date which is one year after the date of the enactment of this title'' and inserting ``January 6, 1998''. (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall prescribe regulations requiring each new and current employee of the Central Intelligence Agency to sign a written agreement restricting the activities of that employee upon ceasing employment with the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Agreement Elements.--The regulations shall provide that an agreement contain provisions specifying that the employee concerned not represent or advise the government, or any political party, of a foreign country during the five-year period beginning on the termination of the employee's employment with the Central Intelligence Agency. (c) Disciplinary Actions.--The regulations shall specify appropriate disciplinary actions (including loss of retirement benefits) to be taken against any employee determined by the Director of Central Intelligence to have violated the agreement of the employee under this section. (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report setting forth the actions that have been taken to ensure adequate oversight by the executive branch of the budget of the National Reconnaissance Office and the budgets of other elements of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense. (b) Report Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall-- (1) describe the extent to which the elements of the intelligence community carrying out programs and activities in the National Foreign Intelligence Program are subject to requirements imposed on other elements and components of the Department of Defense under the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576), and the amendments made by that Act, and the Federal Financial Management Act of 1994 (title IV of Public Law 103-356), and the amendments made by that Act; (2) describe the extent to which such elements submit to the Office of Management and Budget budget justification materials and execution reports similar to the budget justification materials and execution reports submitted to the Office of Management and Budget by the non-intelligence components of the Department of Defense; (3) describe the extent to which the National Reconnaissance Office submits to the Office of Management and Budget, the Community Management Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense-- (A) complete information on the cost, schedule, performance, and requirements for any new major acquisition before initiating the acquisition; (B) yearly reports (including baseline cost and schedule information) on major acquisitions; (C) planned and actual expenditures in connection with major acquisitions; and (D) variances from any cost baselines for major acquisitions (including explanations of such variances); and (4) assess the extent to which the National Reconnaissance Office has submitted to Office of Management and Budget, the Community Management Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a monthly basis a detailed budget execution report similar to the budget execution report prepared for Department of Defense programs. (c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section: (1) The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' shall mean the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) The term ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6)). TITLE IV--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (a) Access for Counterintelligence Purposes.--Section 2709(b)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``local and long distance'' before ``toll billing records''. (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 2703(c)(1)(C) of such title is amended by inserting ``local and long distance'' after ``address,''. (c) Civil Remedy.--Section 2707 of such title is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``customer'' and inserting ``other person''; (2) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following: ``If the violation is willful or intentional, the court may assess punitive damages. In the case of a successful action to enforce liability under this section, the court may assess the costs of the action, together with reasonable attorney fees determined by the court.''; (3) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections (e) and (f), respectively; and (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection (d): ``(d) Disciplinary Actions for Violations.--If a court determines that any agency or department of the United States has violated this chapter and the court finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise the question whether or not an officer or employee of the agency or department acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the violation, the agency or department concerned shall promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether or not disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or employee.''. TITLE V--ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE This title may be cited as the ``Economic Espionage Act of 1996''. (a) In General.--Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 27 the following new chapter: This title may be cited as the ``Combatting Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996''.Subtitle A--Assessment of Organization and Structure of Government for Combatting Proliferation (a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be known as the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (in this subtitle referred to as the ``Commission''). (b) Membership.--The Commission shall be composed of eight members of whom-- (1) four shall be appointed by the President; (2) one shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of the Senate; (3) one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate; (4) one shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and (5) one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. (c) Qualifications of Members.--(1) To the maximum extent practicable, the individuals appointed as members of the Commission shall be individuals who are nationally recognized for expertise regarding-- (A) the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (B) the efficient and effective implementation of United States nonproliferation policy; or (C) the implementation, funding, or oversight of the national security policies of the United States. (2) An official who appoints members of the Commission may not appoint an individual as a member if, in the judgment of the official, the individual possesses any personal or financial interest in the discharge of any of the duties of the Commission. (d) Period of Appointment; Vacancies.--Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment. (e) Initial Meeting.--No later than 30 days after the date on which all members of the Commission have been appointed, the Commission shall hold its first meeting. (f) Quorum.--A majority of the members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number of members may hold hearings. (g) Chairman and Vice Chairman.--The Commission shall select a Chairman and Vice Chairman from among its members. (h) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chairman. (a) Study.-- (1) In general.--The Commission shall carry out a thorough study of the organization of the Federal Government, including the elements of the intelligence community, with respect to combatting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (2) Specific requirements.--In carrying out the study, the Commission shall-- (A) assess the current structure and organization of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government having responsibilities for combatting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and (B) assess the effectiveness of United States cooperation with foreign governments with respect to nonproliferation activities, including cooperation-- (i) between elements of the intelligence community and elements of the intelligence-gathering services of foreign governments; (ii) between other departments and agencies of the Federal Government and the counterparts to such departments and agencies in foreign governments; and (iii) between the Federal Government and international organizations. (3) Assessments.--In making the assessments under paragraph (2), the Commission should address-- (A) the organization of the export control activities (including licensing and enforcement activities) of the Federal Government relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (B) arrangements for coordinating the funding of United States nonproliferation activities; (C) existing arrangements governing the flow of information among departments and agencies of the Federal Government responsible for nonproliferation activities; (D) the effectiveness of the organization and function of interagency groups in ensuring implementation of United States treaty obligations, laws, and policies with respect to nonproliferation; (E) the administration of sanctions for purposes of nonproliferation, including the measures taken by departments and agencies of the Federal Government to implement, assess, and enhance the effectiveness of such sanctions; (F) the organization, management, and oversight of United States counterproliferation activities; (G) the recruitment, training, morale, expertise, retention, and advancement of Federal Government personnel responsible for the nonproliferation functions of the Federal Government, including any problems in such activities; (H) the role in United States nonproliferation activities of the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and other offices in the Executive Office of the President having responsibilities for such activities; (I) the organization of the activities of the Federal Government to verify government-to-government assurances and commitments with respect to nonproliferation, including assurances regarding the future use of commodities exported from the United States; and (J) the costs and benefits to the United States of increased centralization and of decreased centralization in the administration of the nonproliferation activities of the Federal Government. (b) Recommendations.--In conducting the study, the Commission shall develop recommendations on means of improving the effectiveness of the organization of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government in meeting the national security interests of the United States with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Such recommendations shall include specific recommendations to eliminate duplications of effort, and other inefficiencies, in and among such departments and agencies. (c) Report.--(1) Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to Congress a report containing a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission, together with its recommendations for such legislation and administrative actions as it considers appropriate. (2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) Hearings.--The Commission may hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out the purposes of this subtitle. (b) Information From Federal Agencies.-- (1) In general.--The Commission may secure directly from any Federal department or agency such information as the Commission considers necessary to carry out the provisions of this subtitle. Upon request of the Chairman of the Commission, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission. (2) Classified information.--A department or agency may furnish the Commission classified information under this subsection. The Commission shall take appropriate actions to safeguard classified information furnished to the Commission under this paragraph. (c) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government. (d) Gifts.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property. (a) Compensation of Members.--Each member of the Commission who is not an officer or employee of the Federal Government shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which such member is engaged in the performance of the duties of the Commission. All members of the Commission who are officers or employees of the United States shall serve without compensation in addition to that received for their services as officers or employees of the United States. (b) Travel Expenses.--The members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission. (c) Staff.-- (1) In general.--The Chairman of the Commission may, without regard to the civil service laws and regulations, appoint and terminate an executive director and such other additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to perform its duties. The employment of an executive director shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission. (2) Compensation.--The Chairman of the Commission may fix the compensation of the executive director and other personnel without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay for the executive director and other personnel may not exceed the rate payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title. (d) Detail of Government Employees.--Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege. (e) Procurement of Temporary and Intermittent Services.-- The Chairman of the Commission may procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals which do not exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title. The Commission shall terminate 60 days after the date on which the Commission submits its report under section 612(c). For purposes of this subtitle, the term ``intelligence community'' shall have the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated for the Commission for fiscal year 1997 such sums as may be necessary for the Commission to carry out its duties under this subtitle. (b) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in subsection (a) shall remain available for expenditure until the termination of the Commission under section 615. Subtitle B--Other Matters (a) Reports.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on-- (1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and (2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries. (b) Form of Reports.--The reports submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. TITLE VII--RENEWAL AND REFORM OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES This title may be cited as the ``Intelligence Activities Renewal and Reform Act of 1996''. Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (j); and (2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new subsection (h): ``(h)(1) There is established within the National Security Council a committee to be known as the `Committee on Foreign Intelligence'. ``(2) The Committee shall be composed of the following: ``(A) The Director of Central Intelligence. ``(B) The Secretary of State. ``(C) The Secretary of Defense. ``(D) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who shall serve as the chairperson of the Committee. ``(E) Such other members as the President may designate. ``(3) The function of the Committee shall be to assist the Council in its activities by-- ``(A) identifying the intelligence required to address the national security interests of the United States as specified by the President; ``(B) establishing priorities (including funding priorities) among the programs, projects, and activities that address such interests and requirements; and ``(C) establishing policies relating to the conduct of intelligence activities of the United States, including appropriate roles and missions for the elements of the intelligence community and appropriate targets of intelligence collection activities. ``(4) In carrying out its function, the Committee shall-- ``(A) conduct an annual review of the national security interests of the United States; ``(B) identify on an annual basis, and at such other times as the Council may require, the intelligence required to meet such interests and establish an order of priority for the collection and analysis of such intelligence; and ``(C) conduct an annual review of the elements of the intelligence community in order to determine the success of such elements in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating the intelligence identified under subparagraph (B). ``(5) The Committee shall submit each year to the Council and to the Director of Central Intelligence a comprehensive report on its activities during the preceding year, including its activities under paragraphs (3) and (4).''. (a) In General.--Section 109 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404d) is amended by striking out subsections (a) and (b) and inserting in lieu thereof the following new subsections: ``Sec. 109. (a) In General.--(1) Not later than January 31 each year, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the requirements of the United States for intelligence and the activities of the intelligence community. ``(2) The purpose of the report is to facilitate an assessment of the activities of the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal year and to assist in the development of a mission and a budget for the intelligence community for the fiscal year beginning in the year in which the report is submitted. ``(3) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. ``(b) Matters Covered.--(1) Each report under subsection (a) shall-- ``(A) specify the intelligence required to meet the national security interests of the United States, and set forth an order of priority for the collection and analysis of intelligence required to meet such interests, for the fiscal year beginning in the year in which the report is submitted; and ``(B) evaluate the performance of the intelligence community in collecting and analyzing intelligence required to meet such interests during the fiscal year ending in the year preceding the year in which the report is submitted, including a description of the significant successes and significant failures of the intelligence community in such collection and analysis during that fiscal year. ``(2) The report shall specify matters under paragraph (1)(A) in sufficient detail to assist Congress in making decisions with respect to the allocation of resources for the matters specified. ``(c) Definition.--In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees' means the following: ``(1) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. ``(2) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives.''. (b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The section heading of such section is amended to read as follows: Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended by inserting after subsection (h), as amended by section 702 of this Act, the following new subsection: ``(i)(1) There is established within the National Security Council a committee to be known as the `Committee on Transnational Threats'. ``(2) The Committee shall include the following members: ``(A) The Director of Central Intelligence. ``(B) The Secretary of State. ``(C) The Secretary of Defense. ``(D) The Attorney General. ``(E) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who shall serve as the chairperson of the Committee. ``(F) Such other members as the President may designate. ``(3) The function of the Committee shall be to coordinate and direct the activities of the United States Government relating to combatting transnational threats. ``(4) In carrying out its function, the Committee shall-- ``(A) identify transnational threats; ``(B) develop strategies to enable the United States Government to respond to transnational threats identified under subparagraph (A); ``(C) monitor implementation of such strategies; ``(D) make recommendations as to appropriate responses to specific transnational threats; ``(E) assist in the resolution of operational and policy differences among Federal departments and agencies in their responses to transnational threats; ``(F) develop policies and procedures to ensure the effective sharing of information about transnational threats among Federal departments and agencies, including law enforcement agencies and the elements of the intelligence community; and ``(G) develop guidelines to enhance and improve the coordination of activities of Federal law enforcement agencies and elements of the intelligence community outside the United States with respect to transnational threats. ``(5) For purposes of this subsection, the term `transnational threat' means the following: ``(A) Any transnational activity (including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the national security of the United States. ``(B) Any individual or group that engages in an activity referred to in subparagraph (A).''. (a) In General.--Title I of The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 102 (50 U.S.C. 403)-- (A) by striking the section heading and all that follows through paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and inserting the following: Section 103(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(b)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)(B), by inserting ``, or as contractors of the Council or employees of such contractors,'' after ``on the Council''; (2) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively; (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4): ``(4) Subject to the direction and control of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Center may carry out its responsibilities under this subsection by contract, including contracts for substantive experts necessary to assist the Center with particular assessments under this subsection.''; and (4) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by adding at the end the following: ``The Center shall also be readily accessible to policymaking officials and other appropriate individuals not otherwise associated with the intelligence community.''. (a) In General.--Section 103(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) is amended-- (1) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following new paragraph (1): ``(1) facilitate the development of an annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States by-- ``(A) developing and presenting to the President an annual budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program; and [``(B) concurring in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for the Joint Military Intelligence Program; and [``(C) consulting with the Secretary of Defense in the development of the annual budget for the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities program;'';] ``(B) participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program;''; (2) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (6) as paragraphs (4) through (7), respectively; and (3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (3): [``(3) manage the national collection activities of the intelligence community in order to ensure that such activities, and the intelligence collected through such activities, meet the national security requirements of the United States;''.] ``(3) approve collection requirements, determine collection priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection priorities levied on national collection assets, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the direction of the President;''. [(b) Use of Funds.-- [(1) Reprogramming.--Subsection (c) of such section is amended by inserting ``or under the Joint Military Intelligence Program'' after ``the National Foreign Intelligence Program''. [(2) Transfers.--Subsection (d)(2)(E) of such section is amended by striking ``does not object to'' and inserting ``is consulted by the Director before''. [(3) Direction of expenditures.--Such section is further amended-- [(A) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), and (g) as subsections (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and [(B) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection (e): [``(e) Use of Funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and subject to applicable provisions of law (including provisions of authorization Acts and appropriations Acts), direct and oversee the allocation, allotment, obligation, and expenditure of funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the national intelligence programs, projects, and activities that are managed by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.''.] (b) Use of Funds.--Section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4) is amended-- (1) by adding at the end of subsection (c) the following: ``The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director of Central Intelligence before reprogramming funds made available under the Joint Military Intelligence Program.''; (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), and (g) as subsections (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and (3) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection (e): ``(e) Database and Budget Execution Information.--The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly issue guidance for the development and implementation by the year 2000 of a database to provide timely and accurate information on the amounts and status of resources, including periodic budget execution updates, for national, defense-wide, and tactical intelligence activities.''. [(c) Personnel, Training, and Administrative Activities.-- Subsection (g) of such section, as redesignating by subsection (b)(3)(A) of this section, is amended-- [(1) by striking ``Use of Personnel.--'' and inserting ``Personnel, Training, and Administrative Functions.--''; [(2) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)-- [(A) by striking ``in coordination with'' and inserting ``after consultation with''; and [(B) by inserting ``national elements of'' after ``policies and programs within''; and [(3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``personnel,'' and all that follows through ``programs'' and inserting ``personnel programs, administrative programs, training programs, and security programs and management activities''. [(a) Consultation of Secretary of Defense With DCI Regarding General Responsibilities.--Subsection (a) of section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 405-5) is amended-- [(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting ``, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence,'' after ``Secretary of Defense''; and [(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``appropriate''. [(b) Joint Responsibility of DCI and Secretary of Defense for Performance of Certain Specific Functions.--Subsection (b) of that section is amended-- [(1) by striking ``Responsibility'' and inserting ``Joint Responsibility of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense''; [(2) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``Consistent with sections 103 and 104 of this Act,'' and inserting ``The Director of Central Intelligence and''; [(3) in paragraph (2)-- [(A) by striking ``within the Department of Defense''; and [(B) by adding ``and'' after the semicolon at the end; and [(4) by striking the semicolon at the end of paragraph (3) and inserting a period. [(c) Responsibility of Secretary of Defense for Performance of Other Specific Functions.--Such section is further amended-- [(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); [(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) of subsection (b) the following: [``(c) Responsibility of Secretary of Defense for the Performance of Specific Functions.--Consistent with section 103 and 104 of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall--''; [(3) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively, of subsection (c), as added by paragraph (2) of this subsection; and [(4) in paragraph (2), as redesignated by paragraph (3) of this subsection, by inserting ``(other than clandestine collection)'' before ``human intelligence activities''. [(d) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The section heading of that section is amended to read as follows:", u" Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred, as follows: By Mr. RAHALL: H.R. 3380. A bill to delay any increases in premium rates for flood insurance coverage under the National Flood Insurance Program until the Federal Emergency Management Agency completes a comprehensive review and updating of all flood insurance rate maps and the Army Corps of Engineers reviews and certifies that such maps include all flood mitigation and flood control projects completed by the Corps; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. ROGERS of Michigan: H.R. 3381. A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2014 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select). By Mr. LABRADOR (for himself, Mr. Scott of Virginia, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Mr. Richmond, Mr. Bachus, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Jeffries, and Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois): H.R. 3382. A bill to focus limited Federal resources on the most serious offenders; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Ms. ESTY: H.R. 3383. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to extend to all veterans with a serious service-connected injury eligibility to participate in the family caregiver services program; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. BENTIVOLIO (for himself, Mr. Stockman, and Mr. Rohrabacher): H.R. 3384. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to ensure that veterans may attend pre-apprenticeship programs using certain educational assistance provided by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. CARTWRIGHT (for himself, Mr. Ellison, Mr. Jones, Mr. Olson, Ms. Tsongas, Mr. Michaud, Mr. Hinojosa, Mr. Nolan, Mr. Cummings, Ms. Lee of California, Mr. Grijalva, Ms. Esty, Mr. Deutch, Mr. Enyart, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Holt, Mr. Engel, Mr. Huffman, Mr. Lipinski, Mr. McGovern, Mr. Andrews, Mr. Owens, Ms. Jackson Lee, Mr. O'Rourke, Mr. Fattah, Mr. Tonko, and Ms. Kaptur): H.R. 3385. A bill to amend title 31, United States Code, to require the Secretary of the Treasury to provide for the purchase of paper United States savings bonds with tax refunds; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. SMITH of Texas (for himself and Ms. Bass): H.R. 3386. A bill to require Certificates of Citizenship and other Federal documents to reflect name and date of birth determinations made by a State court and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Ms. SINEMA (for herself, Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania, Mr. Benishek, Ms. Gabbard, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, and Mr. Hunter): H.R. 3387. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to improve the mental health treatment provided by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to veterans who served in classified missions; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. CHABOT (for himself and Mr. Deutch): H.R. 3388. A bill to authorize the Attorney General to provide a grant to assist Federal, State, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies in the rapid recovery of missing individuals; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mrs. CAPITO (for herself, Mr. Huizenga of Michigan, Mr. Westmoreland, Mr. Cotton, Mr. Garrett, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Luetkemeyer, Mr. Duffy, Mr. Bachus, Mr. Posey, and Mr. Pittenger): H.R. 3389. A bill to repeal the Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund and to deposit existing amounts in such Fund into the Treasury, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. AMODEI (for himself, Mr. Heck of Nevada, Mr. Horsford, Ms. Titus, and Mr. Garamendi): H.R. 3390. A bill to provide for environmental restoration activities and forest management activities in the Lake Tahoe Basin, to amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the importation or shipment of quagga mussels, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Natural Resources, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, Agriculture, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. VALADAO (for himself, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, Mr. Grijalva, Ms. McCollum, Mr. Cole, Mr. Cook, Mr. Larsen of Washington, Mr. Blumenauer, Mr. Ruiz, Mr. LaMalfa, Mr. Calvert, Mr. Huffman, Mr. Kind, Mr. Young of Alaska, Mr. Pearce, Mr. Joyce, and Mr. Costa): H.R. 3391. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude from gross income payments under the Indian Health Service Loan Repayment Program and certain amounts received under the Indian Health Professions Scholarships Program; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. BILIRAKIS (for himself and Mr. Ben Ray Lujan of New Mexico): H.R. 3392. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for a PDP safety program to prevent fraud and abuse in the dispensing of controlled substances under part D of the Medicare program, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mrs. BLACK (for herself and Mr. Danny K. Davis of Illinois): H.R. 3393. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to consolidate certain tax benefits for educational expenses, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. BROWNLEY of California: H.R. 3394. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make the work opportunity tax credit permanent; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. BROWNLEY of California: H.R. 3395. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend the work opportunity credit for hiring veterans, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. BURGESS (for himself, Mrs. Christensen, Mr. Michaud, Ms. McCollum, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. King of New York, Mr. Latta, Mr. Whitfield, Mr. Wittman, Mrs. Bustos, and Mr. Honda): H.R. 3396. A bill to provide for the issuance of a Veterans Health Care Stamp; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mrs. CAPPS: H.R. 3397. A bill to require the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, to develop guidelines regarding the use by the Secretaries of the military departments and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs of unofficial sources of information to determine the eligibility of a member or former member of the Armed Forces for benefits and decorations when the member's service records are incomplete because of damage to the records, including records damaged by a 1973 fire at the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri; to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. CHABOT (for himself, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, and Ms. McCollum): H.R. 3398. A bill to authorize the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development to provide assistance to support the rights of women and girls in developing countries, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. By Ms. CHU (for herself, Mr. Takano, Mr. Cook, and Mr. Denham): H.R. 3399. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to make certain clarifications and improvements in the academic and vocational counseling programs administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. CLAY (for himself, Mr. Fortenberry, Mr. Serrano, and Mrs. Noem): H.R. 3400. A bill to adopt the North American bison as the national mammal of the United States; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. By Mr. COHEN (for himself, Mr. Meeks, Mr. Danny K. Davis of Illinois, Mr. Ellison, Ms. Lee of California, and Ms. Norton): H.R. 3401. A bill to amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to allow a local educational agency that receives a subgrant under section 2121 of such Act to use the funds to provide professional development activities that train school personnel about restorative justice and conflict resolution; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mr. COHEN (for himself, Mr. Conyers, Ms. Norton, and Ms. Moore): H.R. 3402. A bill to improve the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by explicitly barring debt collectors from bringing legal action on a debt in which the statute of limitations has expired against any consumer, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. CRAWFORD (for himself, Mr. Ribble, Mr. Griffin of Arkansas, Mr. Womack, and Mr. Cotton): H.R. 3403. A bill to amend title 49, United States Code, to allow motor carriers to use hair testing as a method of detecting the use of controlled substances by operators of commercial motor vehicles, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Ms. DeLAURO (for herself, Mr. Israel, Ms. Brown of Florida, Ms. Castor of Florida, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Connolly, Mr. Conyers, Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Gutierrez, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Mr. Larson of Connecticut, Mrs. Lowey, Ms. Moore, Mr. Moran, Ms. Norton, Mr. Rush, Mr. Schiff, Ms. Tsongas, and Mr. Wolf): H.R. 3404. A bill to require that every mammography summary delivered to a patient after a mammography examination, as required by section 354 of the Public Health Service Act (commonly referred to as the ``Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992''), contain information regarding the patient's breast density and language communicating that individuals with more dense breasts may benefit from supplemental screening tests, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. DENHAM (for himself and Mr. Walz): H.R. 3405. A bill to better connect current and former members of the Armed Forces with employment opportunities by consolidating duplicative Federal Government Internet websites into a single portal, to conserve resources by merging redundant and competing programs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. DeSANTIS (for himself, Mr. Jordan, Mr. Yoho, Mr. Barr, Mr. LaMalfa, Mr. Broun of Georgia, Mr. Rice of South Carolina, Mr. Smith of Missouri, Mr. Salmon, Mr. Huizenga of Michigan, Mr. McKinley, Mrs. Bachmann, Mr. Wittman, Mr. King of Iowa, Mr. Posey, Mr. Price of Georgia, Mr. Harris, Mr. Cole, Mr. Massie, Mr. Labrador, Mr. Scalise, Mr. Bridenstine, Mr. Rothfus, Mr. Cotton, Mr. Bentivolio, Mr. Amash, Mr. Mica, Mr. Meadows, Mr. Gowdy, Mr. Chaffetz, Mr. Stutzman, Mr. Bishop of Utah, Mr. Franks of Arizona, and Mr. Rokita): H.R. 3406. A bill to amend the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to ensure that individuals can keep their health insurance coverage; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. DEUTCH (for himself, Mr. Conyers, and Mr. Scott of Virginia): H.R. 3407. A bill to establish the National Center for the Right to Counsel; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mrs. ELLMERS (for herself, Mr. Roe of Tennessee, Ms. Brownley of California, Mr. McIntyre, Mr. Ruiz, Mr. Coble, Mr. Price of North Carolina, and Mr. Pittenger): H.R. 3408. A bill to direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to educate certain staff of the Department of Veterans Affairs and to inform veterans about the Injured and Amputee Veterans Bill of Rights, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. FINCHER: H.R. 3409. A bill to amend the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966 to require that any expansion of a national wildlife refuge must be expressly authorized by statute; to the Committee on Natural Resources. By Mr. FRANKS of Arizona (for himself and Mr. Sessions): H.R. 3410. A bill to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to secure critical infrastructure against electromagnetic pulses, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Homeland Security. By Mr. GOHMERT (for himself, Mr. Fleming, Mr. Stockman, Mr. Brady of Texas, and Mr. Hall): H.R. 3411. A bill to provide for an exchange of land between the United States Department of Agriculture and the Sabine River Authority of Texas; to the Committee on Agriculture, and in addition to the Committee on Natural Resources, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. GOWDY (for himself and Mr. Welch): H.R. 3412. A bill to establish the Higher Education Regulatory Reform Task Force, to expand the experimental sites initiative under the Higher Education Act of 1965 to reduce college costs for students, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. HANNA (for himself, Mr. Rice of South Carolina, and Mr. Michaud): H.R. 3413. A bill to require a study and report by the Comptroller General regarding the restart provision of the Hours of Service Rules for Commercial Truck Drivers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Ms. HERRERA BEUTLER (for herself, Mr. Blumenauer, Mr. Schrader, and Ms. Bonamici): H.R. 3414. A bill to amend the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 with respect to ecosystem restoration in the lower Columbia River and Tillamook Bay estuaries; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committee on Natural Resources, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. HORSFORD (for himself and Mr. Amodei): H.R. 3415. A bill to facilitate planning, permitting, administration, implementation, and monitoring of pinyon- juniper dominated landscape restoration projects within Lincoln County, Nevada, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Natural Resources. By Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas (for himself and Mr. Olson): H.R. 3416. A bill to amend titles 5, 10, and 32, United States Code, to require congressional approval before any change may be made to the oaths required for enlistment in the Armed Forces, appointment to an office in the civil service or uniformed services, or appointment as a cadet or midshipman at a military service academy, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas: H.R. 3417. A bill to prohibit the consideration of any bill by Congress unless a statement on tax transparency is provided in the bill; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. KILMER (for himself and Mr. Cole): H.R. 3418. A bill to establish a demonstration program to provide rental assistance and supportive housing for homeless or at-risk Indian Veterans; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. KINGSTON: H.R. 3419. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exempt certain small businesses from the employer health insurance mandate and to modify the definition of full-time employee for purposes of such mandate; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. KINGSTON: H.R. 3420. A bill to require any communication using Federal funds to advertise or educate the public on certain provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 to state that such communication was produced at taxpayer expense, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, and Education and the Workforce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (for herself, Mr. Gosar, Mr. Schweikert, and Mr. Franks of Arizona): H.R. 3421. A bill to remove use and disposal restrictions on property located in the City of Winslow, Navajo County, Arizona; to the Committee on Natural Resources. By Mr. LANGEVIN (for himself, Mr. Cook, and Mr. Hastings of Florida): H.R. 3422. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a credit for veteran first-time homebuyers and for adaptive housing and mobility improvements for disabled veterans, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. LANGEVIN (for himself, Mr. Wittman, Ms. Wilson of Florida, Mr. Sean Patrick Maloney of New York, Ms. Norton, Ms. Bass, and Mr. Grimm): H.R. 3423. A bill to ensure the safety and well-being of adopted children; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. LARSON of Connecticut: H.R. 3424. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a credit against income tax for facilities using a qualified methane conversion technology to provide transportation fuels and chemicals; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. LIPINSKI (for himself, Ms. Sinema, Mr. Peters of California, Mr. Gallego, Mr. Barber, Mr. Murphy of Florida, Mr. Barrow of Georgia, Mr. Vela, and Mr. Garcia): H.R. 3425. A bill to amend the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to delay the individual health insurance mandate and any penalties for violating the individual mandate until after there is a certification that the healthcare.gov website is fully operational, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. BEN RAY LUJAN of New Mexico (for himself and Mr. Bilirakis): H.R. 3426. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to add physical therapists to the list of providers allowed to utilize locum tenens arrangements under Medicare; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York (for herself, Mr. Poe of Texas, Ms. Moore, and Ms. Bass): H.R. 3427. A bill to amend the Crime Control Act of 1990 to require certification of State and law enforcement agency reports related to missing children, to require that certain information be provided to individuals reporting a missing child, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. McKINLEY (for himself and Mr. Enyart): H.R. 3428. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow an increased credit for development and to extend and simplify the credit for increasing research; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mrs. McMORRIS RODGERS (for herself and Mr. Lankford): H.R. 3429. A bill to protect personal and financial information by requiring certain certifications by entities awarded funds under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act for the operation of a Navigator program or certain other Exchange activities; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. McNERNEY (for himself, Mrs. Napolitano, and Mrs. Negrete McLeod): H.R. 3430. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to encourage hiring unemployed individuals; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. O'ROURKE (for himself and Mr. Pearce): H.R. 3431. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to promote family unity, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. PEARCE: H.R. 3432. A bill to expedite the planning and implementation of salvage timber sales as part of Forest Service and Department of the Interior restoration and rehabilitation activities for lands within the Gila and Lincoln National Forests and for Bureau of Land Management lands in New Mexico adversely impacted by the 2012 and 2013 fire seasons, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture, and in addition to the Committee on Natural Resources, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. POLIS (for himself, Mr. Cardenas, Mr. Carson of Indiana, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. Delaney, Ms. DelBene, Mr. Himes, Mr. Holt, Mr. Huffman, Mr. Loebsack, and Mr. Kind): H.R. 3433. A bill to amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to invest in innovation for education; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mr. REED (for himself, Mr. Southerland, and Mr. Young of Indiana): H.R. 3434. A bill to amend part A of title IV of the Social Security Act to require a State to deny assistance under the program of block grants to States for temporary assistance for needy families to a parent, caretaker relative, or legal guardian of a child who is not attending enough school, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. LINDA T. SANCHEZ of California (for herself, Mr. Grijalva, Ms. Brown of Florida, Mr. Cummings, Ms. Chu, Ms. Norton, Ms. Roybal-Allard, Mr. Ryan of Ohio, Ms. Wilson of Florida, Mr. Cartwright, Mr. Carson of Indiana, Ms. Jackson Lee, Mr. Honda, Mr. Hinojosa, Mrs. Napolitano, Mrs. Negrete McLeod, Mr. Polis, Ms. Kaptur, Ms. Clarke, Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California, Mr. Rangel, Mrs. Davis of California, Mr. Pierluisi, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. Lowenthal, Mr. Holt, Mr. Garamendi, Ms. Bass, and Mr. Takano): H.R. 3435. A bill to amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to create a demonstration project to fund additional secondary school counselors in troubled title I schools to reduce the dropout rate; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mr. SANFORD (for himself, Mr. Broun of Georgia, Mr. Mulvaney, Mr. Grayson, Mr. Bentivolio, Mr. Rice of South Carolina, Ms. Norton, Mr. Massie, Mr. Amash, Mr. Gowdy, Mr. Sensenbrenner, Mr. Duncan of South Carolina, and Mr. Wilson of South Carolina): H.R. 3436. A bill to require the Director of the National Security Agency and the Inspector General of the National Security Agency to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and in addition to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Ms. SCHWARTZ: H.R. 3437. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to consolidate, with modifications, the Hope Scholarship Credit, the Lifetime Learning Credit, and the American Opportunity Tax Credit, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. SWALWELL of California (for himself, Mr. Simpson, Ms. Lofgren, Ms. Michelle Lujan Grisham of New Mexico, Mr. Ben Ray Lujan of New Mexico, Mr. Foster, and Mrs. Napolitano): H.R. 3438. A bill to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to authorize use of grants under the Urban Area Security Initiative and the State Homeland Security Grant Program to work in conjunction with a Department of Energy national laboratory; to the Committee on Homeland Security. By Mr. THOMPSON of California (for himself and Mr. Hall): H.R. 3439. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide for the permanent application of the new markets tax credit for the redevelopment of communities impacted by realignment or closure of military installations; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. TITUS: H.R. 3440. A bill to designate a peak in the State of Nevada as Maude Frazier Mountain; to the Committee on Natural Resources. By Ms. TITUS: H.R. 3441. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to expand the Marine Gunnery Sergeant John David Fry scholarship to include spouses of members of the Armed Forces who die in the line of duty, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Ms. TITUS: H.R. 3442. A bill to direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to make grants to eligible non-profit entities to establish clearinghouses for local information about employment opportunities and services for veterans; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Ms. TITUS (for herself, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Mr. Honda, Ms. Sinema, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Delaney, and Ms. Shea-Porter): H.R. 3443. A bill to amend titles 38 and 37, United States Code, to expand eligibility for certain caregiver services provided by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and to modify the Department of Defense special compensation program to make eligible members of the uniformed services with serious injuries or illnesses and to exempt payments of such compensation from taxation, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, and Veterans' Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. WALDEN (for himself and Mr. Kind): H.R. 3444. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide flexibility in the manner in which beds are counted for purposes of determining whether a hospital may be designated as a critical access hospital under the Medicare program; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. WELCH (for himself and Mr. Gutierrez): H.R. 3445. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to disallow deductions for the payment of compensatory and punitive damages to a government, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California: H.J. Res. 100. A joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2014, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Appropriations, and in addition to the Committee on the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. PALAZZO: H.J. Res. 101. A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to limit the number of consecutive terms that a Member of Congress may serve; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. WOODALL: H. Con. Res. 62. Concurrent resolution providing for a conditional adjournment of the House of Representatives; considered and agreed to. By Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (for herself, Mrs. Negrete McLeod, Ms. Norton, Mr. O'Rourke, Mr. Cardenas, Mr. Vargas, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Cole, Mr. Honda, Mr. Mullin, Mr. Denham, Mr. Grijalva, Ms. McCollum, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Mr. Ruiz, Mr. Michaud, Mr. Cook, Mr. McIntyre, Mr. Moran, Ms. Hanabusa, and Mr. Benishek): H. Con. Res. 63. Concurrent resolution honoring the service of Native American Indians in the United States Armed Forces; to the Committee on Armed Services. By Mr. BACHUS (for himself and Ms. Sewell of Alabama): H. Res. 395. A resolution recognizing Birmingham, Alabama, as home to the first and longest-running celebration of Veterans Day and home of the National Veteran Award; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. FATTAH (for himself and Mr. Thompson of Pennsylvania): H. Res. 396. A resolution supporting the goals and ideals of November as National Alzheimer's Disease Awareness Month; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. HASTINGS of Florida (for himself, Ms. Brown of Florida, Ms. Clarke, Ms. Wilson of Florida, Mr. Jeffries, Mr. Conyers, Ms. Norton, and Mr. Lewis): H. Res. 397. A resolution recognizing the 40th anniversary of the independence of the Bahamas; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. By Mr. HONDA (for himself, Ms. Wilson of Florida, Ms. Bordallo, Mr. Engel, Mr. Loebsack, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Mr. Higgins, Mr. Clay, Ms. Hahn, Ms. Lee of California, Ms. McCollum, Mr. McGovern, Mr. Rangel, Ms. Linda T. Sanchez of California, Mr. Pocan, Ms. Matsui, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. Takano, Mr. Sean Patrick Maloney of New York, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Grijalva, Ms. Jackson Lee, Mr. Payne, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, Ms. Slaughter, Ms. Norton, Ms. Speier, Mr. Smith of Washington, Mr. Vargas, Mr. Holt, Ms. Kuster, Mrs. Carolyn B. Maloney of New York, Mr. Moran, Mr. Sablan, Mr. Barber, Ms. Chu, Mr. Ellison, Mr. Swalwell of California, Mr. Watt, Mr. Farr, Mr. Himes, Mrs. Napolitano, Mr. Garamendi, Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas, Mr. Polis, Ms. Titus, and Mr. Lowenthal): H. Res. 398. A resolution expressing support for designation of October 2013 as ``National Anti-Bullying Month''; to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. By Mr. LANGEVIN: H. Res. 399. A resolution supporting the goals and ideals of National Cyber Security Awareness Month and raising awareness and enhancing the state of cybersecurity in the United States; to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. By Mr. PERLMUTTER (for himself and Mr. Polis): H. Res. 400. A resolution honoring the life and work of Commander M. Scott Carpenter, the second American to orbit the Earth; to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. By Mr. PETERS of California (for himself, Mr. Grimm, Mr. Murphy of Florida, Mr. Cardenas, Ms. Bordallo, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. Vargas, Ms. Kuster, Mr. Rice of South Carolina, Mrs. Davis of California, Ms. DelBene, Ms. Esty, Mr. Loebsack, Mr. Peters of Michigan, Mr. Payne, Mr. Lowenthal, Mrs. Negrete McLeod, Ms. Chu, Mr. Polis, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Honda, Mr. Kilmer, Mr. Larsen of Washington, Mr. Kind, Mr. Heck of Washington, Mr. Foster, and Mr. Bentivolio): H. Res. 401. A resolution expressing support for designation of the third Tuesday of November as ``National Entrepreneurs Day''; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.", u"Mr. President, I rise to join Senators Lieberman and Carper in introducing the Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010. This vital legislation would fortify the government's efforts to safeguard America's cyber networks from attack. It would build a public/private partnership to promote national cyber security priorities. It would strengthen the government's ability to set, monitor compliance with, and enforce standards and policies for securing Federal civilian systems and the sensitive information they contain. The marriage of increasingly robust computer technology to expanding and nearly instantaneous global telecommunications networks is a truly seismic event in human history. This information revolution touches everything, from personal relationships and entertainment to commerce, scientific research, and the most sensitive national security information. Cyberspace is a place of great, even unparalleled, power. But, to tweak the familiar saying, with great power comes great vulnerability. Cyberspace is under increasing assault on all fronts: cyber vandalism, cyber crime, cyber sabotage, and cyber espionage. Across the world at this moment, computer networks are being hacked, probed, and infiltrated relentlessly. The purpose of these cyber exploits ranges from simple mischief and massive theft to societal mayhem and geopolitical advantage. In February, Dennis Blair, the former Director of National Intelligence, gave this chilling assessment before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: ``Malicious cyber activity is occurring on an unprecedented scale with extraordinary sophistication. While both the threats and technologies associated with cyberspace are dynamic, the existing balance in network technology favors malicious actors, and is likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future.'' Consider these sobering facts: Cyber crime costs our national economy nearly $8 billion annually. Hackers can operate in relative safety and anonymity from a laptop or desktop anywhere in the world. The expanding capabilities of wireless hand-held devices strengthen this cloak of cyber invisibility. As our national and global economies become ever more intertwined, cyber terrorists have greater potential to attack high-value targets. From anywhere in the world, they could disrupt telecommunications systems, shut down electric power grids, or freeze financial markets. With sufficient know-how and a few keystrokes, they could cause billions of dollars in damage and put thousands of lives in jeopardy. As the hackers' techniques advance, the number of hacking attempts is exploding. Just this March, the Senate's Sergeant at Arms reported that the computer systems of Congress and Executive Branch agencies now are under cyber attack an average of 1.8 billion times per month. Recent examples of cyber attacks are myriad and disturbing: Press reports a year ago stated that China and Russia had penetrated the computer systems of America's electrical grid. The hackers allegedly left behind malicious hidden software that could be activated later to disrupt the grid during a war or other national crisis. At about the same time, we learned that, beginning in 2007 and continuing well into 2008, hackers repeatedly broke into the computer systems of the Pentagon's $300-billion Joint Strike Fighter project. They stole crucial information about the Defense Department's costliest weapons program ever. In 2007, the country of Estonia was attacked in cyberspace. A 3-week onslaught of botnets overwhelmed the computer systems of the nation's parliament, government ministries, banks, telecommunications networks, and news organizations. This attack on Estonia is a wake-up call that has yet to be sufficiently heeded. The private sector is also under attack. In January, Google announced that attacks originating in China had targeted its systems as well as the networks of more than 30 other companies. The attacks on Google sought to access the email accounts of Chinese human rights activists. For the other companies, lucrative information, such as critical corporate data and software source codes, were targeted. Last year, cyber thieves secretly implanted circuitry into keypads sold to British supermarkets, which were then used to steal account information and PIN numbers. This same tactic was used against a large supermarket chain in Maine, compromising more than 4 million credit cards. Nor are small businesses immune. Last summer, a small Maine construction firm found that cyber crooks had stolen nearly $600,000 through an elaborate scheme involving dozens of coconspirators throughout the United States. These attacks, and the hundreds like them that are occurring at any given time whether on our government or private sector systems, have ushered us into a new age of cyber crime and, indeed, cyber warfare. They underscore the high priority we must give to the security of our information technology systems. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, exposed the vulnerability of our nation to catastrophic attacks. Since that terrible day, we have done much to protect potential targets such as ports, chemical facilities, transportation systems, water supplies, government buildings, and other vital assets. We cannot afford to wait for a ``cyber 9/11'' before our government finally realizes the importance of protecting our digital resources, limiting our vulnerabilities, and mitigating the consequences of penetrations of our networks. Chairman Lieberman and I have held a number of hearings on cyber security in the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Senator Carper has been similarly active, particularly on exploring modifications to the Federal Information Security Management Act that are designed to enhance protections of Federal networks and information. From our examinations of this issue, we know that there are threats to and vulnerabilities in our cyber networks. We also know that the tactics used to exploit these vulnerabilities are constantly evolving and growing increasingly dangerous. Now, it is time to take action. A strong and sustained Federal effort to promote cyber security is a key component of effective deterrence. For too long, our approach to cyber security has been disjointed and uncoordinated. This cannot continue. The United States requires a comprehensive cyber security strategy backed by aggressive implementation of effective security measures. There must be strong coordination among law enforcement, intelligence agencies, the military, and the private owners and operators of critical infrastructure. This bill would establish the essential point of coordination. The Office of Cyberspace Policy in the Executive Office of the President would be run by a Senate-confirmed Director who would advise the President on all cyber security matters. The Director would lead and harmonize Federal efforts to secure cyberspace and would develop a national strategy that incorporates all elements of cyber security policy, including military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomacy. The Director would oversee all Federal activities related to the national strategy to ensure efficiency and coordination. The Director would report regularly to Congress to ensure transparency and oversight. To be clear, the White House official would not be another unaccountable czar. The Cyber Director would be a Senate-confirmed position and thus would testify before Congress. The important responsibilities given to the Director of the Office of Cyberspace Policy related to cybersecurity are similar to the responsibilities of the current Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Cyber Director would advise the President and coordinate efforts across the Executive Branch to protect and improve our cybersecurity posture and communications networks. By working with a strong operational and tactical partner at the Department of Homeland Security, the Director would help improve the security of Federal and private sector networks. This strong DHS partner would be the National Center for Cybersecurity and Communications, or Cyber Center. It would be located within the Department of Homeland Security to elevate and strengthen the Department's cyber security capabilities and authorities. This Center also would be led by a Senate-confirmed Director. The Cyber Center, anchored at DHS, with a strong and empowered leader, will close the coordination gaps that currently exist in our disjointed federal cyber security efforts. For day-to-day operations, the Center would use the resources of DHS, and the Center Director would report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. On interagency matters related to the security of federal networks, the Director would regularly advise the President--a relationship similar to the Director of the NCTC on counterterrorism matters or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military issues. These dual relationships would give the Center Director sufficient rank and stature to interact effectively with the heads of other departments and agencies, and with the private sector. Congress has dealt with complex challenges involving the need for interagency coordination in the past with a similar construct. We have established strong leaders with supporting organizational structures to coordinate and implement action across agencies, while recognizing and respecting disparate agency missions. The establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is a prime example of a successful reorganization that fused the missions of multiple agencies. The Director of NCTC is responsible for the strategic planning of joint counterterrorism operations, and in this role reports to the President. When implementing the information analysis, integration, and sharing mission of the Center, the Director reports to the Director of National Intelligence. These dual roles provide access to the President on strategic, interagency matters, yet provide NCTC with the structural support and resources of the office of the DNI to complete the day-to-day work of the NCTC. The DHS Cyber Center would replicate this successful model for cyber security. As we have seen repeatedly, from the financial crisis to the environmental catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico, what happens in the private sector does not always affect just the private sector. The ramifications for government and for the taxpayers often are enormous. This bill would establish a public/private partnership to improve cyber security. Working collaboratively with the private sector, the Center would produce and share useful warning, analysis, and threat information with the private sector, other Federal agencies, international partners, and state and local governments. By developing and promoting best practices and providing voluntary technical assistance to the private sector, the Center would improve cyber security across the nation. Best practices developed by the Center would be based on collaboration and information sharing with the private sector. Information shared with the Center by the private sector would be protected. With respect to the owners and operators of our most critical systems and assets, the bill would mandate compliance with certain risk-based performance requirements to close security gaps. These requirements would apply to vital components of the electric grid, telecommunications networks, financial systems, or other critical infrastructure systems that could cause a national or regional catastrophe if disrupted. This approach would be similar to the current model that DHS employs with the chemical industry. Rather than setting specific standards, DHS would employ a risk-based approach to evaluating cyber vulnerabilities, and the owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure would develop a plan for protecting those vulnerabilities and mitigating the consequences of an attack. These owners and operators would be able to choose which security measures to implement to meet applicable risk-based performance requirements. The bill does not authorize any new surveillance authorities or permit the government to ``take over'' private networks. This model would allow for continued innovation and dynamism that are fundamental to the success of the IT sector. The bill would provide limited liability protections to the owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure that comply with the new risk-based performance requirements. Covered critical infrastructure also would be required to report certain significant breaches affecting vital system functions to the center. These reports would help ensure that the Federal Government has comprehensive awareness of the security risks facing these critical networks. If a cyber attack is imminent or occurring, the bill would provide a responsible framework, developed in coordination with the private sector, for the President to authorize emergency measures to protect the Nation's most critical infrastructure. The President would be required to notify Congress in advance of the declaration of a national cyber emergency, or as soon thereafter as possible. This notice would include the nature of the threat, the reason existing protective measures are insufficient to respond to the threat, and the emergency actions necessary to mitigate the threat. The emergency measures would be limited in duration and scope. Any emergency actions directed by the President during the 30-day period covered by the declaration must be the least disruptive means feasible to respond to the threat. Liability protections would apply to owners and operators required to implement these measures, and if other mitigation options were available, owners and operators could propose those alternative measures to the Director and, once approved, implement those in lieu of the mandatory emergency measures. The center also would share information, including threat analysis, with owners and operators of critical infrastructure regarding risks affecting the security of their sectors. The center would work with sector-specific agencies and other Federal agencies with existing regulatory authority to avoid duplication of requirements, to use existing expertise, and to ensure government resources are employed in the most efficient and effective manner. With regard to Federal networks, the Federal Information Security Management Act--known as FISMA--gives the Office of Management and Budget broad authority to oversee agency information security measures. In practice, however, FISMA is frequently criticized as a ``paperwork exercise'' that offers little real security and leads to a disjointed cyber security regime in which each Federal agency haphazardly implements its own security measures. The bill we introduce today would transform FISMA from paper-based to real-time responses. It would codify and strengthen DHS authorities to establish complete situational awareness for Federal networks and develop tools to improve resilience of Federal Government systems and networks. The legislation also would take advantage of the Federal Government's massive purchasing power to help bring heightened cyber security standards to the marketplace. Specifically, the Director of the Center would be charged with developing a supply chain risk management strategy applicable to Federal procurements. This strategy would emphasize the security of information systems from development to acquisition and throughout their operational life cycle. While the Director should not be responsible for micromanaging individual procurements or directing investments, we have seen far too often that security is not a primary concern when agencies procure their IT systems. Recommending security investments to OMB and providing strategic guidance on security enhancements early in the development and acquisition process will help ``bake in'' security. Cyber security can no longer be an afterthought in our government agencies. These improvements in Federal acquisition policy should have beneficial ripple effects in the larger commercial market. As a large customer, the Federal Government can contract with companies to innovate and improve the security of their IT services and products. With the Government's vast purchasing power, these innovations can establish new security baselines for services and products offered to the private sector and the general public. Finally, the legislation would direct the Office of Personnel Management to reform the way cyber security personnel are recruited, hired, and trained to ensure that the Federal Government and the private sector have the talent necessary to lead this national effort and protect its own networks. The bill would also provide DHS with temporary hiring and pay flexibilities to assist in the establishment of the center. Some have suggested that this effort can be led from the White House alone--why create a new center at DHS and two Senate-confirmed Director positions? One of the great lessons of 9/11 is that true security demands aggressive oversight, expert evaluation, and thorough testing of systems. There must be constant, real-time monitoring of security and analysis of threats. This task requires much more than a cyber czar. It requires strong civilian counterparts to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence. These Directors, at the White House and at DHS, would serve as those counterparts. The National Security Agency and other intelligence agencies possess enormous skills and resources, but privacy and civil liberties demands preclude these agencies from shouldering a leadership role in the security of our civilian information technology systems. The intelligence community must play a critical part in providing threat information, but it cannot lead the cyber security effort. We are all acutely aware that there are those who seek to do harm to this country and to our people. If hackers can nearly bring Estonia to its knees through cyber attacks, infiltrate our military's most closely-guarded project, and, in the case of Google, hack the computers owned and operated by some of the world's most successful computer experts, we must assume even more spectacular and potentially devastating attacks lie ahead. We must be ready. It is vitally important that we build a strong public-private partnership to protect cyberspace. It is a vital engine of our economy, our government, our country and our future. I urge my colleagues to support this crucial legislation. By Mr. CARDIN: S. 3481. A bill to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to clarify Federal responsibility for stormwater pollution; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.", u"I thank my good friend, Congressman Stutzman, for his remarks, and I really appreciate you taking your time to come down here tonight. Congressman Stutzman talked a little bit about the military, and I really appreciate that because we have thousands, hundreds of thousands of men and women in the military defending our freedoms all around the world, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and we have them in Germany and we have them in Korea. We have them in bases all around the world making sure that the freedoms we enjoy today and tonight will be there tomorrow for us and our kids and our grandkids. But tonight I'd like to read a little bit of an article that was written just yesterday by a fellow named Marc Ambinder with the National Journal. And I think it's really well done, and it points out all the hard work that went into going after Osama bin Laden. The team that killed Osama bin Laden were members of the counterterrorism unit for the Navy, known as the Navy SEAL Team 6. It's a highly elusive group that was developed in the 1980s to rescue American hostages in Iran. They exist outside the military protocol and engage in operations that are at the highest level of classification. The fact that Team 6 is front page news today is a measure of how important the publicity about bin Laden's killing is to the U.S., because normally you don't hear about these guys. The President gave the order on Friday morning for the operation to pursue bin Laden. The strike began early Sunday morning, at the Ghazi Air Base in Pakistan, the MH-60 helicopters made their way to Osama bin Laden's tightly guarded compound, which is 70 miles from the center of Islamabad. The helicopter carrying the team of SEALs malfunctioned. Can you imagine that? They're over their target and the helicopter stops working. As it hovered outside the high walls, the pilot gently landed inside the walls of the 3-story condo, but he couldn't get the helicopter going again. And yet the assault team disembarked to raid the massive, walled compound, prepared to take bin Laden dead or alive, even though they knew there was a chance they wouldn't have a ride back. Their lives were at risk, and yet they went ahead and carried out their mission. Bin Laden was discovered using women as human shields as American forces fired at him. One of the women was his wife. Bin Laden was shot in the face by the SEALs during a firefight after resisting capture. Three other males were killed along with bin Laden. One of them was his adult son. With the team still in the compound, the commander on the ground told a remote commander that they had found bin Laden. The Special Forces blew up the malfunctioned chopper, helicopter, then escaped in a reinforcement close to 4:15 p.m., just 40 minutes after they landed. The West Wing staff worked most of the day on the operation. President Obama joined senior national security officials in the Situation Room that afternoon as the firefight was monitored. Leon Panetta, one of our old colleagues here, was in his conference room at the CIA headquarters, which he had turned into a conference center to give him constant contact with the tactical leaders of the strike team. And I want to compliment Leon as well. I hope he's paying attention to this. Less than 12 hours after the raid, bin Laden's body was taken to the aircraft carrier, USS Carl Vinson, and he was buried in the North Arabian Sea overnight. A DNA match from the remains confirmed that bin Laden was dead at age 54. And of course President Obama made the official announcement of his death from the East Room of the White House at 11:35 p.m., and he said what all of us really agree with: ``Justice has been done.'' But we still have a lot of those guys out there that we have to watch out for; and the message needs to be sent again and again today and in the days to come that anybody that takes up the mantle of leadership like Osama bin Laden, we're going to go after them. And we have the elite military people, the Special Forces, the people in the Air Force, the Marines, and the Navy SEALs, that will get the job done. They know how to do it, and they are willing to risk their lives to get it done. Mr. Speaker, I would now like to go through a minute-by-minute description of what happened. And once again, it's an article that was written on national security by the secret team that killed bin Laden. It was an article written for the National Journal by Marc Ambinder, and it's very well done. I'd like to go through this with my colleagues because it tells almost everything that took place during this operation. ``The two sides of the Joint Special Operations Command Challenge Coin, which was given out by the JSOC Commander, Vice Admiral William McRaven. ``From Ghazi Air Base in Pakistan, the modified MH-60 helicopters made their way to the garrison suburb of Abbottabad, about 70 miles from the center of Islamabad.'' ``Aboard were Navy SEALs, flown across the border from Afghanistan, along with tactical signals, intelligence collectors, and navigators using highly classified hyperspectral imagers. ``After bursts of fire of over 40 minutes, 22 people were killed or captured. One of the dead was Osama bin Laden, done in by a double tap--boom, boom--to the left side of his face. His body was aboard the choppers that made the trip back. One had experienced mechanical failure and was destroyed by U.S. forces, military and White House officials tell National Journal. ``Were it not for this high-value target, it might have been a routine mission for the specially trained and highly mythologized SEAL Team Six, officially called the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, but known even to the locals at their home base Dam Neck in Virginia as just DevGru. ``This HVT was special, and the raids required practice, so they replicated the 1-acre compound. Trial runs were held in early April. ``DevGru belongs to the Joint Special Operations Command, an extraordinary and unusual collection of classified standing task forces and special missions units. They report to the President and operate worldwide based on the legal (or extra-legal) premises of classified Presidential directives. Though the general public knows about the special SEALs and their brothers in Delta Force, most JSOC missions never leak. We only hear about JSOC when something goes bad (a British aid worker is accidentally killed) or when something really big happens (a merchant marine captain is rescued at sea), and even then, the military remains especially sensitive about their existence. Several dozen JSOC operatives have died in Pakistan over the past several years.'' These are heroic people that go in and risk their lives on a daily basis on special operations to kill and destroy the enemy before they get to us. ``Their names are released by the Defense Department in the usual manner, but with a cover story--generally, they were killed in training accidents in eastern Afghanistan. That's the code.'' So they don't get the glory that is due them because they know that they have gone into a secret mission that cannot be exposed, and they risk their lives defending this country. And many of them will never be known, but they fought and died to save us all. ``How did the helicopters elude the Pakistani air defense network? Did they spoof transponder codes? Were they painted and tricked out with Pakistan Air Force equipment? If so--and we may never know--two other JSOC units, the Technical Application Programs Office and the Aviation Technology Evaluation Group, were responsible. These truly are the silent squirrels, never getting public credit and not caring one whit. Since 9/11, the JSOC units and their task forces have become the U.S. government's most effective and lethal weapon against terrorists and their networks, drawing plenty of unwanted, and occasionally unflattering, attention to themselves in the process.'' When things don't go exactly right, they get criticized, even though they are going in and risking their lives without being glorified or being well-known. And yet, when something goes wrong, they are criticized, but they rarely get the credit that's due them. ``JSOC costs the country more than $1 billion annually. The command has its critics, but it has escaped significant congressional scrutiny and has operated largely with impunity since 9/11. Some of its interrogators and operators were involved in torture and rendition''--and I don't believe that's the case. I would take issue with this part of the article, because I never did think waterboarding was torture. I think it was a system that was used to get information that would save us from terrorists, and that waterboarding may very well have led to the information that got Osama bin Laden a couple of days ago--``and the line between its intelligence-gathering activities and the CIA's has been blurred. ``But Sunday's operation provides strong evidence that the CIA and JSOC work well together. Sometimes intelligence needs to be developed rapidly, to get inside the enemy's operational loop. And sometimes it needs to be cultivated, grown as if it were a delicate bacteria in a petri dish. ``In an interview at CIA headquarters 2 weeks ago, a senior intelligence official said the two proud groups of American secret warriors had been `deconflicted and basically integrated'--finally--10 years after 9/11. Indeed, according to accounts given to journalists by five senior administration officials Sunday night, the CIA gathered the intelligence that led to bin Laden's location. A memo from CIA Director Leon Panetta sent Sunday night provides some hints of how the information was collected and analyzed. In it, he thanked the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for their help. NSA figured out, somehow, that there was no telephone or Internet service in the compound. How it did this without Pakistan's knowledge is a secret. The NGIA makes the military's maps but also develops their pattern recognition software--no doubt used to help establish, by February of this year, that the CIA could say `with high probability' that bin Laden and his family were living there. ``Recently, JSOC built a new Targeting and Analysis Center in Rosslyn, Virginia. Where the National Counterterrorism Center tends to focus on threats to the homeland, TAAC, whose existence was first disclosed by the Associated Press, focuses outward, on active `kinetic'--or lethal--counterterrorism missions abroad. ``That the Center could be stood up under the nose of some of the Nation's most senior intelligence officials without their full knowledge testifies to the power and reach of JSOC, whose size has tripled since 9/11. The command now includes more than 4,000 soldiers and civilians. It has its own intelligence division, which may or may not have been involved in last night's effort, and has gobbled up a number of free-floating Defense Department entities that allowed it to rapidly acquire, test, and field new technologies. ``Under a variety of standing orders, JSOC is involved in more than 50 current operations spanning a dozen countries, and its units, supported by so-called `white' or acknowledged, special operations entities like Rangers, Special Forces battalions, SEAL teams, and Air Force special ops units from the larger Special Operations Command, are responsible for most of the `kinetic' actions in Afghanistan. ``Pentagon officials are conscious of the enormous stress that 10 years of war have placed on the command. JSOC resources are heavily taxed by the operational tempo in Afghanistan and Pakistan, officials have said. The current commander, Vice Admiral William McRaven, and Major General Joseph Votel, McRaven's nominated replacement, have been pushing to add people and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technology to areas outside the war theater where al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to thrive. ``Earlier this year, it seemed that the elite units would face the same budget pressures that the entire military was experiencing. Not anymore. The military found a way, largely by reducing contracting staff and borrowing others from Special Operations Command, to add 50 positions to the JSOC. And Votel wants to add several squadrons to the `Tier One' units--Delta and the SEALs.'' And, boy, he will have my vote for that. ``When General Stanley McChrystal became JSOC's commanding general in 2004, he and his intelligence chief, Major General Michael Flynn, set about transforming the way the subordinate units analyze and act on intelligence. Insurgents in Iraq were exploiting the slow decision loop that coalition commanders used, and enhanced interrogation techniques were frowned upon after the Abu Ghraib scandal. But the hunger for actionable tactical intelligence on insurgents was palpable.'' I want to add one more time, and this was not in the article, but I really believe when we are talking about dealing with terrorists and getting information that will stop terrorists from attacking us in the United States or elsewhere in the world, we ought to use whatever techniques that we possibly can to get that information. And I'm not talking about torture. Some of the newspaper people and news people that we see on television have actually experienced waterboarding on television to show how it works, and it was not torture and it is not torture, and we ought to use those techniques to make sure we protect our homeland and our people here and abroad. ``The way JSOC solved this problem remains a carefully guarded secret, but people familiar with the unit suggest that McChrystal and Flynn introduced hardened commandos to basic criminal forensic techniques and then used highly advanced and still-classified technology to transform bits of information into actionable intelligence.'' ``One way they did this was to create forward-deployed fusion cells, where JSOC units were paired with intelligence analysts from the NSA and the NGA. Such analysis helped the CIA to establish with a high degree of probability that Osama bin Laden and his family were hiding in that compound where he was hit. ``These technicians could `exploit and analyze' data obtained from the battlefield instantly, using their access to the government's various biometric, facial-recognition, and voice-print databases. These cells also used highly advanced surveillance technology and computer-based pattern analysis to layer predictive models of insurgent behavior into real-time observations. ``The military has begun to incorporate these techniques across the services. And Flynn will soon be promoted to a job within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, where he will be tasked with transforming the way intelligence is gathered, analyzed, and utilized.'' That article tells just about everything about how this all came about and how it was carried out. But the one thing that isn't really hit hard enough, in my opinion, is the men and women in the military who do the job for us every single day. Sometimes we fight about spending in this body. We fight about who gets the money. But the one thing we should never fight about is the money that goes to our Armed Forces, our men and women who do risk their lives every single day. My hat goes off to those who were in the command that got Osama bin Laden, and the people, the Navy SEALs that got the job done, even though their helicopter failed to work. They went in, 40 of them, and risked their lives, knowing that they might not come out. They got Osama bin Laden, they got 22 others, they got his body out of there, and they got back to freedom without any casualties. So my hat goes off to you, Navy SEALs, and to all of those in the military who risk their lives every single day protecting and preserving our freedoms. And for those Special Ops guys in all the branches of the service, well done.", u" There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2011''or the ``DREAM Act of 2011''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Definitions.Sec. 3. Conditional permanent resident status for certain long-term residents who entered the United States as children.Sec. 4. Terms of conditional permanent resident status.Sec. 5. Removal of conditional basis of permanent resident status.Sec. 6. Regulations.Sec. 7. Penalties for false statements.Sec. 8. Confidentiality of information.Sec. 9. Higher education assistance. In this Act: (1) In general.--Except as otherwise specifically provided, a term used in this Act that is used in the immigration laws shall have the meaning given such term in the immigration laws. (2) Immigration laws.--The term ``immigration laws'' has the meaning given such term in section 101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(17)). (3) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given such term in section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1002), except that the term does not include an institution of higher education outside the United States. (4) Secretary.--Except as otherwise specifically provided, the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Homeland Security. (5) Uniformed services.--The term ``Uniformed Services'' has the meaning given the term ``uniformed services'' in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code. (a) Conditional Basis for Status.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien shall be considered, at the time of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence under this section, to have obtained such status on a conditional basis subject to the provisions of this Act. (b) Requirements.-- (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States or is in temporary protected status under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a), if the alien demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that-- (A) the alien has been continuously physically present in the United States since the date that is 5 years before the date of the enactment of this Act; (B) the alien was 15 years of age or younger on the date the alien initially entered the United States; (C) the alien has been a person of good moral character since the date the alien initially entered the United States; (D) subject to paragraph (2), the alien-- (i) is not inadmissible under paragraph (2), (3), (6)(E), (6)(G), (8), (10)(A), (10)(C), or (10)(D) of section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)); (ii) has not ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; and (iii) has not been convicted of-- (I) any offense under Federal or State law punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of more than 1 year; or (II) 3 or more offenses under Federal or State law, for which the alien was convicted on different dates for each of the 3 offenses and imprisoned for an aggregate of 90 days or more; (E) the alien-- (i) has been admitted to an institution of higher education in the United States; or (ii) has earned a high school diploma or obtained a general education development certificate in the United States; and (F) the alien was 35 years of age or younger on the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Waiver.--With respect to any benefit under this Act, the Secretary may waive the grounds of inadmissibility under paragraph (6)(E), (6)(G), or (10)(D) of section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)) for humanitarian purposes or family unity or when it is otherwise in the public interest. (3) Submission of biometric and biographic data.--The Secretary may not grant permanent resident status on a conditional basis to an alien under this section unless the alien submits biometric and biographic data, in accordance with procedures established by the Secretary. The Secretary shall provide an alternative procedure for applicants who are unable to provide such biometric or biographic data because of a physical impairment. (4) Background checks.-- (A) Requirement for background checks.--The Secretary shall utilize biometric, biographic, and other data that the Secretary determines is appropriate-- (i) to conduct security and law enforcement background checks of an alien seeking permanent resident status on a conditional basis under this section; and (ii) to determine whether there is any criminal, national security, or other factor that would render the alien ineligible for such status. (B) Completion of background checks.--The security and law enforcement background checks required by subparagraph (A) for an alien shall be completed, to the satisfaction of the Secretary, prior to the date the Secretary grants permanent resident status on a conditional basis to the alien. (5) Medical examination.--An alien applying for permanent resident status on a conditional basis under this section shall undergo a medical examination. The Secretary, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall prescribe policies and procedures for the nature and timing of such examination. (6) Military selective service.--An alien applying for permanent resident status on a conditional basis under this section shall establish that the alien has registered under the Military Selective Service Act (50 U.S.C. App. 451 et seq.), if the alien is subject to such registration under that Act. (c) Determination of Continuous Presence.-- (1) Termination of continuous period.--Any period of continuous physical presence in the United States of an alien who applies for permanent resident status on a conditional basis under this section shall not terminate when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 239(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1229(a)). (2) Treatment of certain breaks in presence.-- (A) In general.--An alien shall be considered to have failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the United States under subsection (b)(1)(A) if the alien has departed from the United States for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days. (B) Extensions for extenuating circumstances.--The Secretary may extend the time periods described in subparagraph (A) for an alien if the alien demonstrates that the failure to timely return to the United States was due to extenuating circumstances beyond the alien's control. (d) Application.-- (1) In general.--An alien seeking lawful permanent resident status on a conditional basis shall file an application for such status in such manner as the Secretary may require. (2) Deadline for submission of application.--An alien shall submit an application for relief under this section not later than the date that is 1 year after the later of-- (A) the date the alien earned a high school diploma or obtained a general education development certificate in the United States; or (B) the effective date of the final regulations issued pursuant to section 6. (e) Limitation on Removal of Certain Aliens.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary or the Attorney General may not remove an alien who-- (A) has a pending application for relief under this section; and (B) establishes prima facie eligibility for relief under this section. (2) Certain aliens enrolled in primary or secondary school.-- (A) Stay of removal.--The Attorney General shall stay the removal proceedings of an alien who-- (i) meets all the requirements of subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), and (F) of subsection (b)(1); (ii) is at least 5 years of age; and (iii) is enrolled full-time in a primary or secondary school. (B) Aliens not in removal proceedings.--If an alien is not in removal proceedings, the Secretary shall not commence such proceedings with respect to the alien if the alien is described in clauses (i) through (iii) of subparagraph (A). (C) Employment.--An alien whose removal is stayed pursuant to subparagraph (A) or who may not be placed in removal proceedings pursuant to subparagraph (B) shall, upon application to the Secretary, be granted an employment authorization document. (D) Lift of stay.--The Secretary or Attorney General may lift the stay granted to an alien under subparagraph (A) if the alien-- (i) is no longer enrolled in a primary or secondary school; or (ii) ceases to meet the requirements of such paragraph. (f) Exemption From Numerical Limitations.--Nothing in this section or in any other law may be construed to apply a numerical limitation on the number of aliens who may be eligible for adjustment of status under this Act. (a) Period of Status.--Permanent resident status on a conditional basis granted under this Act is-- (1) valid for a period of 6 years, unless such period is extended by the Secretary; and (2) subject to termination under subsection (c). (b) Notice of Requirements.-- (1) At time of obtaining status.--At the time an alien obtains permanent resident status on a conditional basis under this Act, the Secretary shall provide for notice to the alien regarding the provisions of this Act and the requirements to have the conditional basis of such status removed. (2) Effect of failure to provide notice.--The failure of the Secretary to provide a notice under this subsection-- (A) shall not affect the enforcement of the provisions of this Act with respect to the alien; and (B) shall not give rise to any private right of action by the alien. (c) Termination of Status.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary shall terminate the conditional permanent resident status of an alien, if the Secretary determines that the alien-- (A) ceases to meet the requirements of subparagraph (C) or (D) of section 3(b)(1); or (B) was discharged from the Uniformed Services and did not receive an honorable discharge. (d) Return to Previous Immigration Status.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), an alien whose permanent resident status on a conditional basis expires under subsection (a)(1) or is terminated under subsection (c) or whose application for such status is denied shall return to the immigration status the alien had immediately prior to receiving permanent resident status on a conditional basis or applying for such status, as appropriate. (2) Special rule for temporary protected status.--In the case of an alien whose permanent resident status on a conditional basis expires under subsection (a)(1) or is terminated under subsection (c) or whose application for such status is denied and who had temporary protected status immediately prior to receiving or applying for such status, as appropriate, the alien may not return to temporary protected status if-- (A) the relevant designation under section 244(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)) has been terminated; or (B) the Secretary determines that the reason for terminating the permanent resident status on a conditional basis renders the alien ineligible for temporary protected status. (e) Information Systems.--The Secretary shall use the information systems of the Department of Homeland Security to maintain current information on the identity, address, and immigration status of aliens granted permanent resident status on a conditional basis under this Act. (a) Eligibility for Removal of Conditional Basis.-- (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary may remove the conditional basis of an alien's permanent resident status granted under this Act if the alien demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that-- (A) the alien has been a person of good moral character during the entire period of conditional permanent resident status; (B) the alien is described in section 3(b)(1)(D); (C) the alien has not abandoned the alien's residence in the United States; (D) the alien-- (i) has acquired a degree from an institution of higher education in the United States or has completed at least 2 years, in good standing, in a program for a bachelor's degree or higher degree in the United States; or (ii) has served in the Uniformed Services for at least 2 years and, if discharged, received an honorable discharge; and (E) the alien has provided a list of each secondary school (as that term is defined in section 9101 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801)) that the alien attended in the United States. (2) Hardship exception.-- (A) In general.--The Secretary may, in the Secretary's discretion, remove the conditional basis of an alien's permanent resident status if the alien-- (i) satisfies the requirements of subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (E) of paragraph (1); (ii) demonstrates compelling circumstances for the inability to satisfy the requirements of subparagraph (D) of such paragraph; and (iii) demonstrates that the alien's removal from the United States would result in extreme hardship to the alien or the alien's spouse, parent, or child who is a citizen or a lawful permanent resident of the United States. (B) Extension.--Upon a showing of good cause, the Secretary may extend the period of permanent resident status on a conditional basis for an alien so that the alien may complete the requirements of subparagraph (D) of paragraph (1). (3) Treatment of abandonment or residence.--For purposes of paragraph (1)(C), an alien-- (A) shall be presumed to have abandoned the alien's residence in the United States if the alien is absent from the United States for more than 365 days, in the aggregate, during the alien's period of conditional permanent resident status, unless the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the alien has not abandoned such residence; and (B) who is absent from the United States due to active service in the Uniformed Services has not abandoned the alien's residence in the United States during the period of such service. (4) Citizenship requirement.-- (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the conditional basis of an alien's permanent resident status may not be removed unless the alien demonstrates that the alien satisfies the requirements of section 312(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1423(a)). (B) Exception.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an alien who is unable because of a physical or developmental disability or mental impairment to meet the requirements of such subparagraph. (5) Submission of biometric and biographic data.--The Secretary may not remove the conditional basis of an alien's permanent resident status unless the alien submits biometric and biographic data, in accordance with procedures established by the Secretary. The Secretary shall provide an alternative procedure for applicants who are unable to provide such biometric data because of a physical impairment. (6) Background checks.-- (A) Requirement for background checks.--The Secretary shall utilize biometric, biographic, and other data that the Secretary determines appropriate-- (i) to conduct security and law enforcement background checks of an alien applying for removal of the conditional basis of the alien's permanent resident status; and (ii) to determine whether there is any criminal, national security, or other factor that would render the alien ineligible for removal of such conditional basis. (B) Completion of background checks.--The security and law enforcement background checks required by subparagraph (A) for an alien shall be completed, to the satisfaction of the Secretary, prior to the date the Secretary removes the conditional basis of the alien's permanent resident status. (b) Application To Remove Conditional Basis.-- (1) In general.--An alien seeking to have the conditional basis of the alien's lawful permanent resident status removed shall file an application for such removal in such manner as the Secretary may require. (2) Deadline for submission of application.-- (A) In general.--An alien shall file an application under this subsection during the period beginning 6 months prior to and ending on the date that is later of-- (i) 6 years after the date the alien was initially granted conditional permanent resident status; or (ii) any other expiration date of the alien's conditional permanent resident status, as extended by the Secretary in accordance with this Act. (B) Status during pendency.--An alien shall be deemed to have permanent resident status on a conditional basis during the period that the alien's application submitted under this subsection is pending. (3) Adjudication of application.-- (A) In general.--The Secretary shall make a determination on each application filed by an alien under this subsection as to whether the alien meets the requirements for removal of the conditional basis of the alien's permanent resident status. (B) Adjustment of status if favorable determination.--If the Secretary determines that the alien meets such requirements, the Secretary shall notify the alien of such determination and remove the conditional basis of the alien's permanent resident status, effective as of the date of such determination. (C) Termination if adverse determination.--If the Secretary determines that the alien does not meet such requirements, the Secretary shall notify the alien of such determination and, if the period of the alien's conditional permanent resident status under section 4(a)(1) has ended, terminate the conditional permanent resident status granted the alien under this Act as of the date of such determination. (c) Treatment for Purposes of Naturalization.-- (1) In general.--For purposes of title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1401 et seq.), an alien granted permanent resident status on a conditional basis under this Act shall be considered to have been admitted as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence and to be in the United States as an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence. (2) Limitation on application for naturalization.--An alien may not apply for naturalization during the period that the alien is in permanent resident status on a conditional basis under this Act. (a) Initial Publication.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall publish regulations implementing this Act. Such regulations shall allow eligible individuals to apply affirmatively for the relief available under section 3 without being placed in removal proceedings. (b) Interim Regulations.--Notwithstanding section 553 of title 5, United States Code, the regulations required by subsection (a) shall be effective, on an interim basis, immediately upon publication but may be subject to change and revision after public notice and opportunity for a period of public comment. (c) Final Regulations.--Within a reasonable time after publication of the interim regulations in accordance with subsection (b), the Secretary shall publish final regulations implementing this Act. (d) Paperwork Reduction Act.--The requirements of chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code (commonly known as the ``Paperwork Reduction Act'') shall not apply to any action to implement this Act. Whoever files an application for any relief or benefit under this Act and willfully and knowingly falsifies, misrepresents, or conceals a material fact or makes any false or fraudulent statement or representation, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined in accordance with title 18, United States Code, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. (a) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsection (b), no officer or employee of the United States may-- (1) use the information furnished by an individual pursuant to an application filed under this Act in removal proceedings against any person identified in the application; (2) make any publication whereby the information furnished by any particular individual pursuant to an application under this Act can be identified; or (3) permit anyone other than an officer, employee or authorized contractor of the United States Government or, in the case of an application filed under this Act with a designated entity, that designated entity, to examine such application filed under such sections. (b) Required Disclosure.--The Attorney General or the Secretary shall provide the information furnished under this Act, and any other information derived from such furnished information, to-- (1) a Federal, State, tribal, or local law enforcement agency, intelligence agency, national security agency, component of the Department of Homeland Security, court, or grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, a background check conducted pursuant to section 103 of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act (Public Law 103-159; 18 U.S.C. 922 note), or national security purposes, if such information is requested by such entity or consistent with an information sharing agreement or mechanism; or (2) an official coroner for purposes of affirmatively identifying a deceased individual (whether or not such individual is deceased as a result of a crime). (c) Fraud in Application Process or Criminal Conduct.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, information concerning whether an alien seeking relief under this Act has engaged in fraud in an application for such relief or at any time committed a crime may be used or released for immigration enforcement, law enforcement, or national security purposes. (d) Penalty.--Whoever knowingly uses, publishes, or permits information to be examined in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), with respect to assistance provided under title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1070 et seq.), an alien who has permanent resident status on a conditional basis under this Act shall be eligible only for the following assistance under such title: (1) Student loans under parts D and E of such title IV (20 U.S.C. 1087a et seq. and 1087aa et seq.), subject to the requirements of such parts. (2) Federal work-study programs under part C of such title IV (42 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), subject to the requirements of such part. (3) Services under such title IV (20 U.S.C. 1070 et seq.), subject to the requirements for such services. (b) Restoration of State Option to Determine Residency for Purposes of Higher Education Benefits.-- (1) In general.--Section 505 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1623) is repealed. (2) Effective date.--The repeal under paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (division C of Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 3009-546).", u"Mr. President, I know that both chairmen, Senator Leahy of Judiciary and Senator Rockefeller of Intelligence, are coming to the floor to speak on the FISA bill. I wish to take this opportunity, as a member of both those committees, to speak about two amendments I will offer when the time is appropriate. This is in morning business and, therefore, I cannot offer them at this time. The first amendment will deal with a new question, and that question is: court review of telecom immunity. Let me explain what that means. First, this amendment is submitted on behalf of Senators Bill Nelson, Cardin, and myself. Senator Nelson is on the Intelligence Committee. Senator Cardin is on the Judiciary Committee. I have also worked with Senator Whitehouse on this, though I believe he is going in a slightly different direction. As Members know, the bill before us provides full retroactive immunity for electronic service providers--that is the legal language--that are alleged to have provided assistance as part of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. The amendment I am offering creates a judicial review by putting forth the issue of whether immunity should be granted before the FISA Court. There would be no immunity for any individual, private or public official--that is in the underlying bill--or any other company other than electronic service providers. So the immunity provision in the Intelligence bill only relates to those providers of electronic surveillance--no one else and no other company. I hear talk this would apply to Blackwater. It does not. This is strictly for electronic surveillance. The FISA Court has the most experience with FISA practice and surveillance law. It has an unblemished record for protecting national security secrets. It has 11 judges. They sit 24/7. It has an appellate branch, and it is knowledgeable and skilled in intelligence matters. Under the amendment, there would be a narrowly tailored three-part review. First, the FISA Court would determine whether a telecommunications company provided the assistance alleged in the cases against them. If not, those cases are dismissed. Second, if assistance was provided, the court would determine whether the letter sent by the Government to the telecommunications company met the requirements of 18 USC 2511. That is part of the FISA law. If they did, the companies would be shielded from lawsuits. Let me tell you quickly what that law says. That law, in 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A) and (ii)(B), allows for a certification in writing by a person specified in section 2518(7) of this title--which means the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State who reasonably determines that a series of conditions are met: that an emergency situation exists, immediate danger of death or physical injury to any person, conspiratorial activity threatening the national security interest or conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime. All those provisions, in one way or another, did exist. So a certification in writing under section 2511 must be by one of the people I enumerated, or by the Attorney General of the United States, and say that no warrant or court order is required by law, that all statutory requirements have been met, and that the specified assistance is required. Then there are some provisions setting forth the period of time during which the provision of the information, facilities, technical assistance is authorized, et cetera. That is the law. So the question is: Were the certifications provided adequate under this law that I have read? If they were, the companies would be shielded from lawsuits. The third part is the hardest. In any case where the defendant company did provide assistance but did not have a certification that complied with the sections I have read in 2511, the FISA Court would assess whether the company acted in good faith, as is the standard under common law. The FISA Court would determine whether the company had an objectively reasonable belief that compliance with the Government's written request or directives for assistance were lawful. In the underlying bill, all the cases against the phone companies will be dismissed as long as the Attorney General can tell the court that the Federal Government assured the companies that the assistance it was seeking was legally permitted. That is the way it works in the underlying bill. Under this formulation, there is no court review of whether the assistance was, in fact, legal and adequate under the law or whether the companies had an objectively reasonable belief they were legal. This is a major shortcoming of any legislative or executive grant of immunity. I thought this when I voted for the immunity provision in Intelligence. I had hoped it would be revised in the Judiciary Committee. I hadn't come upon this solution until I discussed it at length with Senator Whitehouse and also with several professors of law and also with a Member of the House of Representatives. Then I thought, I wonder if this is a way to handle the immunity question that is fair and objective and handled by a court that is trained and deals with these matters on a continuing basis. I believe it is. There are many Senators who believe the immunity provision should be taken out wholesale and that the current court case should continue. That is why I have introduced this amendment with Senators Nelson and Cardin, which puts before the Senate a court review option. This amendment would allow phone companies to receive the immunity they are seeking, but only if the independent review by the FISA Court determines whether the assistance that was provided is lawful on its face or the companies had a good-faith, objectively reasonable belief that it was in fact lawful. The arguments run hot and heavy on both sides of the immunity question. They may well prevent the successful passage of a bill by both Houses. Here is some history, though. Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Government reached out to telecommunications companies to request their assistance in what has become known as the terrorist surveillance program. Within 5 weeks of 9/11, letters were sent from senior Government officials to these companies that put a governmental directive by the executive branch, and these letters were sent every 30 to 45 days to the telecoms, from October of 2001 to January of 2007, when the program was, in fact, put under FISA Court orders. Only a very small number of people in these companies had the security clearances to be allowed to read and evaluate these letters or directives. And then even they could only discuss the legal ramifications internally. They could not go out and get other opinions and vet it. That is a fact. We also know that at the time the requests and directives were made, there was an ongoing acute national threat. The administration was warning that more attacks might be imminent, and we now know there was a plot to launch a second wave of attacks against the west coast. In such an environment, I believe, and I think most of us believe, the private sector should help the Government when it is legal to do so. In fact, we should want the private sector to do all it can to help protect our Nation. In addition, there has been a longstanding principle in common law that if the Government asks a private party for help and makes such assurances the help is legal, the person or company should be allowed to provide assistance without fear of being held liable. One would think this should especially be true in the case of protecting our Nation's security. However, this is not a situation that had not been contemplated or prepared for. Congress passed FISA and included language in that statute to address such situations regarding how and when the Federal Government may seek assistance from private companies when conducting electronic surveillance, where there is no court warrant. Those are the sections I have read to you. In fact, the law is very clear on this and under what circumstances a telecommunications company may provide such information and services to the Government, again, as I have indicated. Assistance can always be provided when there is a court warrant. In this case, unfortunately, the administration did not even attempt to get a FISA Court warrant. It essentially dismissed FISA out of hand as a remedy. That is most unfortunate. The question comes, should the telecoms be blamed for that? I think that is something we need to grapple with. The administration could have gone to the FISA Court. It chose under its article II power or its misinterpretation of the AUMF that it would not do that. Is that the responsibility of the telecoms? As I have said, under United States Code, title 18, section 2511, the sections I have read, assistance may be provided without warrant if the Government provides a certification in writing that ``no warrant or court order is required by law, that all statutory requirements have been met, and that the specified assistance is required.'' That is the law. With that said, I have read the letters that were sent to the telecom companies every 30 to 45 days for several years requesting assistance and providing legal assurances. No one can say now with legal certainty that the certification requirements of section 2511 were or were not met. I believe this is a question that should be addressed by a Federal court, and I further believe that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is the court to do it. The administration has had its own view that article II of the Constitution provided the President with the authority to conduct international electronic surveillance outside the law, as long as it complied with the Fourth Amendment. To what extent the phone companies relied on this legal theory I do not know, nor does anyone else at this time, I believe. But the companies have a reasonable argument. They relied on written assurances in which the Attorney General, the top law enforcement officer of the country, said their assistance was lawful. They were not able to do due diligence because of security limitations. We have no way of knowing the full content of their deliberations regarding article II authority of the President, despite testimony they have given to us on the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. In addition, these companies face serious, potentially extraordinarily costly, litigation and are unable at the present time to defend themselves in court or in public because of the Government's use of the state secrets defense. This places the companies in a fundamentally unfair place. Individuals and groups have made allegations to which the companies cannot answer, nor can they respond to what they believe are misstatements of fact and untruths. I asked the companies, when somebody opposed to their position came to testify before a committee of the other body: Why don't you testify and respond? They said: Because our hands are tied; we cannot. So today we are in a situation that creates a difficult and consequential problem for Congress to address. The way Senator Nelson of Florida and Senator Cardin and I see this is that the question of whether telecommunications companies should receive immunity hinges on whether the letters the Government sent to these companies meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 2511. If not, did the companies have a good-faith reason to believe there was a lawful reason to comply? In other words, we should not grant immunity if companies were willingly and knowingly violating the law. I believe the best solution is to allow an independent court, skilled in intelligence matters, to review the applicable law and determine whether the requirements of the law or the common law principle were, in fact, met. If they were, the companies would receive immunity. If not, they would not. I wish to briefly speak on the second amendment which I will broach at the appropriate time, and that is the question of exclusivity. This amendment is cosponsored by both chairmen, Senators Rockefeller and Leahy, Senators Nelson, Whitehouse, Wyden, Hagel, Menendez, and Snowe. I will describe it briefly. We add language to reinforce the existing FISA exclusivity language in Title 18 by making that language part of the FISA bill which is codified in Title 50. The second provision answers the so-called AUMF, the authorization to use military force, resolution loophole. The administration has argued that the authorization of military force against al-Qaida and the Taliban implicitly authorized warrantless electronic surveillance. My amendment states that only an express statutory authorization for electronic surveillance in future legislation shall constitute an additional authority outside of FISA. This makes clear that only specific future law that provides an exception to FISA can supersede FISA. Third, the amendment makes a similar change to the penalty section of FISA. Currently, FISA says it is a criminal penalty to conduct electronic surveillance except as authorized by statute. This amendment replaces the general language with a prohibition on any electronic surveillance except as authorized by FISA by the corresponding parts of title 18 that govern domestic criminal wiretapping or any future express statutory authorization for surveillance. And finally, the amendment requires more clarity in a certification that the Government provides to a telecom company when it requests assistance for surveillance and there is no court order. Remember, on the question of immunity, we have existing law. The law I read earlier is vague and it is subject to interpretation. The question is whether we do the interpretation or whether a proper authority does the interpretation which, of course, is a court of law, namely, in this case, the FISA Court. Currently, certifications must say under 18 U.S.C. 2511 that all statutory requirements for assistance must be met. The telecom official receiving that certification is not given any specifics on what those statutory requirements are, so the company cannot conduct its own legal review. This amendment would require that if the assistance is based on statutory authorization, the certification must specify what provision in law provides that authority and that the conditions of that provision have been met. I believe our amendment will strengthen the exclusivity of FISA, and I believe it is absolutely critical. Without this, we leave the door open for future violations of FISA. When FISA was first enacted in 1978, there was a big debate between the Congress and the executive branch over whether the President was bound by law. We have had a repeat of that debate over the past 2 years since learning of the existence of the terrorist surveillance program. But the end result of the debate in the 1970s was clear. FISA was established as the exclusive means by which the Government may conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, period. FISA was meant to be exclusive, and section 2511(f) of title 18 of the United States Code states that it is, in fact, the exclusive authority for domestic criminal wiretapping and that ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted for foreign intelligence purposes.'' The legislative history is clear--ignored, but clear. In stating that ``FISA would prohibit the President, notwithstanding any inherent powers, from violating the terms of that legislation,'' the 1978 report language was a clear statement of the intent of the Congress at that time, just as this amendment is now. Congress also wrote in 1978 that in terms of authority for conducting surveillance, ``FISA does not simply leave Presidential powers where it finds them. To the contrary. The bill substitutes a clear legislative authorization pursuant to statutory, not constitutional, standards.'' President Carter signed the 1978 bill. His signing statement said this: This bill requires for the first time a prior judicial warrant for all In italics-- all electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes in the United States in which communications of U.S. persons might be intercepted. So it is crystal clear on its face that FISA was the only legal authority under which the President could proceed when he authorized the ``Terrorist Surveillance Program'' after September 11. He chose not to. And this is where the issue becomes joined, I believe, one day before the highest Court of the land: whether the President's Article II power essentially still supersedes these clear statements of legislative intent and clear drafting of law over many decades. To make matters worse, the administration claimed and still does claim that the resolution to authorize the use of force against al-Qaida and the Taliban provided authority to institute the Terrorist Surveillance Program. It does not. I do not know one Member of Congress who believes they voted for the TSP when they voted to authorize the use of force. It was never contemplated, and I was present at many of those discussions, in private and in public. It was never considered. In fact, FISA allows for 15 days of warrantless surveillance following a declaration of war. So Congress in 1978 had spoken on the issue of wartime authorities, and it did not leave open the possibility of open-ended warrantless surveillance. Then the Department of Justice came to the Congress in September of 2001 with the PATRIOT Act. The legislation included numerous changes needed to FISA to wage this new war, but the administration did not request changes that would allow the TSP, the Terrorist Surveillance Program, to function lawfully. Nor did the administration express the limitations on FISA surveillance that the TSP was created to overcome. In effect, we have a claim from this administration, which has never been recanted, that the President has the authority to conduct surveillance outside of FISA. We are spending enormous time and effort to rewrite FISA, but there is no guarantee that the President will not again authorize some new surveillance program outside the law. That is why those of us who put this amendment together have taken so much time to write strong exclusivity language right into this law. When I have asked the Director of National Intelligence about this, he has said that with the new FISA authorities in this bill, the intelligence community wouldn't need to go outside of FISA. I would like to find comfort in this response, but I don't, and that is why I am offering this exclusivity amendment. The President does not have the right to collect the content of Americans' communications without obeying the governing law, and that law is FISA. I recognize the administration disagrees with me on this point. The White House believes the President's Article II authority allows him to conduct intelligence surveillance regardless of what Congress legislates. I disagree. However, we are not going to resolve that question. As I said, ultimately it is for the Supreme Court to decide. But here now we must make the strongest case that the only authority for electronic surveillance is FISA, and we must again be as clear as possible exactly when FISA authorizes such surveillance. That is our function under article I of the Constitution. Let me say, however, despite the fundamental differences of views over separation of powers, this amendment has been carefully negotiated with officials at the Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Security Agency. The executive branch has not raised operational problems or concerns with this language. This exclusivity amendment will not affect ongoing or planned surveillance operations. Of course, I should also say clearly that the executive branch does not support the language. They do not want FISA to be the exclusive authority. But, legislatively, that has been the intention of this Congress since 1978. I have tried to perform my due diligence on this whole terrorist surveillance program and the FISA issue since the news of the warrantless surveillance broke in December of 2005. I have become convinced that without strong exclusivity language such as provided in this amendment, another Congress in the future will be faced with exactly the same thing we are now. I will repeat what I said in December: I cannot support a bill that does not clearly reestablish the primacy of FISA. We took the first step with very modest language in the Intelligence Committee. The Judiciary Committee passed very strong language, but unfortunately it has not been added to the bill before us. Both committee chairmen have cosponsored this amendment, as well as the others I have listed. The Department of Justice and the intelligence community have thoroughly reviewed the amendment. There is no operational impact. I hope we end the question once and for all whether the President can go around the law. At the appropriate time, I will move this amendment, and I hope it will be accepted by this body, as well as the court review of the immunity amendment.", u"I would like to thank the gentleman from Texas and the gentlewoman from New Mexico for their strong leadership and advocacy on this critical national security issue. I think the colloquy engaged in really does represent the essence of the issue. Former Director Bobby Inman was just quoted saying that it seems that there is greater concern around this Congress by a minority, frankly, to grant constitutional protections to foreign terrorists, really at the expense of protecting Americans. I think we all know that is wrong. I think the colloquy you both just engaged in, and I heard the frustration expressed in your voice, I think that is also the frustration we are hearing from the American people. The American people do believe that Washington is broken, and I have said this many times. They are angry because Congress is not getting things done on their behalf, and this issue is just proof positive of this terrible failure. It has been pointed out that we have a bipartisan agreement in the Senate, 68 votes. We have more than a majority in this House to pass this critical legislation, the Protect America Act. It will pass, if only the Speaker will allow this legislation to come up for a vote. They simply want us to put the national interests ahead of the special interests. As you pointed out, the most litigious among us in this society are driving this issue and preventing the protection of the American people. I think it is just wrong, and we all know it is wrong. The bipartisan solution on FISA has been reached. There really are no more excuses. It is time for this leadership of the House to take ``yes'' for an answer. It is time to get the job done. It has been 45 days, 45 days, since the Protect America Act has expired. Senator Rockefeller, the Chair of the Intelligence Committee in the Senate, the Democrat from West Virginia, has made a plea, and I am going to quote him. He said, ``What people have to understand around here is that the quality of the intelligence we are going to be receiving is going to be degraded. It is going to be degraded. It is already going to be degraded as telecommunication companies lose interest.'' That was Senator Rockefeller, not me. The gentleman from Texas pointed out earlier too the letter that was sent to the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Silvestre Reyes, from the Director of National Intelligence, Mr. McConnell, and Attorney General Mukasey, essentially saying something very, very similar. I will read a quote from them in that letter of February 27, 2008. I will be happy to submit that letter for the Record here this evening. But I am going to quote what they said about the degradation of our intelligence capabilities, pretty much agreeing with what Senator Rockefeller said, a Democrat. What they said is, ``That is exactly what has happened since the Protect America Act expired 6 days ago without enactment of the bipartisan Senate bill. We have lost intelligence information this past week as a direct result of the uncertainty created by Congress' failure to act.'' That was 6 days after the act. It is 45 days today. They go on to say, ``Because of this uncertainty, some partners have reduced cooperation. In particular they have delayed or refused compliance with our requests to initiate new surveillances of terrorists and other foreign intelligence targets under existing directives issued pursuant to the Protect America Act.'' Mr. Speaker, I include the letter for the Record. Deaer Chairman Reyes, the President asked us to respond to your letter of February 14, 2008, concerning the urgent need to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). Your assertion that there is no harm in allowing the temporary authorities provided by the Protect America Act to expire without enacting the Senate's FISA reform bill is inaccurate and based on a number of misunderstandings concerning our intelligence capabilities. We address those misunderstandings below. We hope that you find this letter helpful and that you will reconsider your opposition to the bill passed last week by a strong bipartisan majority in the Senate and, when Congress returns from its recess, support immediately bringing the Senate bill to the floor, where it enjoys the support of a majority of your fellow members. It is critical to our national security that Congress acts as soon as possible to pass the Senate bill. Intelligence collection Our experience since Congress allowed the Protect America Act to expire without passing the bipartisan Senate bill demonstrates why the Nation is now more vulnerable to terrorist attack and other foreign threats. In our letter to Senator Reid on February 5, 2008, we explained that: ``the expiration of the authorities in the Protect America Act would plunge critical intelligence programs into a state of uncertainty which could cause us to delay the gathering of, or simply miss, critical foreign intelligence information.'' That is exactly what has happened since the Protect America Act expired six days ago without enactment of the bipartisan Senate bill. We have lost intelligence information this past week as a direct result of the uncertainty created by Congress' failure to act. Because of this uncertainty, some partners have reduced cooperation. In particular, they have delayed or refused compliance with our requests to initiate new surveillances of terrorist and other foreign intelligence targets under existing directives issued pursuant to the Protect America Act. Although most partners intend to cooperate for the time being, they have expressed deep misgivings about doing so in light of the uncertainty and have indicated that they may well cease to cooperate if the uncertainty persists. We are working to mitigate these problems and are hopeful that our efforts will be successful. Nevertheless, the broader uncertainty caused by the Act's expiration will persist unless and until the bipartisan Senate bill is passed. This uncertainty may well continue to cause us to miss information that we otherwise would be collecting. Thus, although it is correct that we can continue to conduct certain activities authorized by the Protect America Act for a period of one year from the time they were first authorized, the Act's expiration has and may well continue to adversely affect such activities. Any adverse effects will result in a weakening of critical tools necessary to protect the Nation. As we explained in our letter to Senator Reid, expiration would create uncertainty concerning: The ability to modify certifications and procedures issued under the Protect America Act to reflect operational needs and the implementation of procedures to ensure that agencies are fully integrated protecting the Nation; The continuing validity of liability protection for those who assist us according to the procedures under the Protect America Act; The continuing validity of the judicial mechanism for compelling the assistance of private parties needed to protect our national security; The ability to cover intelligence gaps created by new communication paths or technologies. Our experience in the past few days since the expiration of the Act demonstrates that these concerns are neither speculative nor theoretical: allowing the Act to expire without passing the bipartisan Senate bill has had real and negative consequences for our national security. Indeed, this has led directly to a degraded intelligence capability. It is imperative that our intelligence agencies retain the tools they need to collect vital intelligence information. As we have explained before, the core authorities provided by the Protect America Act have helped us to obtain exactly the type of information we need to keep America safe, and it is essential that Congress reauthorize the Act's core authorities while also extending liability protection to those companies who assisted our Nation following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Using the authorities provided in the Protect America Act, we have obtained information about efforts of an individual to become a suicide operative, efforts by terrorists to obtain guns and ammunition, and terrorists transferring money. Other information obtained using the authorities provided by the Protect America Act has led to the disruption of planned terrorist attacks. The bipartisan Senate bill would preserve these core authorities and improve on the Protect America Act in certain critical ways, including by providing liability protection to companies that assisted in defending the country after September 11. In your letter, you assert that the Intelligence Community's ability to protect the Nation has not been weakened, because the Intelligence Community continues to have the ability to conduct surveillance abroad in accordance with Executive Order 12333. We respectfully disagree. Surveillance conducted under Executive Order 12333 in a manner that does not implicate FISA or the Protect America Act is not always as effective, efficient, or safe for our intelligence professionals as acquisitions conducted under the Protect America Act. And, in any event, surveillance under the Protect America Act served as an essential adjunct to our other intelligence tools. This is particularly true in light of the changes since 1978 in the manner in which communications are transmitted. As a result of these changes, the Government often has been required to obtain a FISA Court order prior to surveillance of foreign terrorists and other national security threats located outside the Untied States. This hampered our intelligence collection targeting these individuals overseas in a way that Congress never intended, and it is what led to the dangerous intelligence gaps last summer. Congress addressed this issue temporarily by passing the Protect America Act but long-term FISA reform is critical to the national security. We have provided Congress with examples in which difficulties with collections under the Executive Order resulted in the Intelligence Community missing crucial information. For instance, one of the September 11th hijackers communicated with a known overseas terrorist facility while he was living in the Untied States. Because that collection was conducted under Executive Order 12333, the Intelligence Community could not identify the domestic end of the communication prior to September 11, 2001, when it could have stopped that attack. The failure to collect such communications was one of the central criticisms of the Congressional Joint Inquiry that looked into intelligence failures associated with the attacks of September 11. The bipartisan bill passed by the Senate would address such flaws in our capabilities that existed before the enactment of the Protect America Act and that are now resurfacing. We have provided Congress with additional and detailed examples of how the Protect America Act temporarily fixed this problem and have demonstrated the operational need to provide a long- term legislative foundation for these authorities by passing the bipartisan Senate bill. In your letter, you also posit that our intelligence capabilities have not been weakened, because the Government can employ the outdated provisions of FISA as they existed before the Protect America Act. We respectfully disagree. It was that very framework that created dangerous intelligence gaps in the past and that led Congress to pass the Protect America Act last summer. As we have explained in letters, briefings and hearings, FISA's requirements, unlike those of the Protect America Act and the bipartisan Senate bill, impair our ability to collect information on foreign intelligence targets located overseas. Most importantly, FISA was designed to govern foreign intelligence surveillance of persons in the United States and therefore requires a showing of ``probable cause'' before such surveillance can begin. This standard makes sense in the context of targeting persons in the United States for surveillance, where the Fourth Amendment itself often requires probable cause and where the civil liberties of Americans are most implicated. But it makes no sense to require a showing of probable cause for surveillance of overseas foreign targets who are not entitled to the Fourth Amendment protections guaranteed by our Constitution. Put simply, imposing this requirement in the context of surveillance of foreign targets located overseas results in the loss of potentially vital intelligence by, for example, delaying intelligence collection and thereby losing some intelligence forever. In addition, the requirement to make such a showing requires us to divert our linguists and analysts covering al-Qa'ida and other foreign threats from their core role--protecting the Nation--to the task of providing detailed facts for FISA Court applications related to surveillance of such foreign targets. Our intelligence professionals need to be able to obtain foreign intelligence from foreign targets with speed and agility. If we revert to a legal framework in which the Intelligence Community needs to make probable cause showings for foreign terrorists and other national security threats located overseas, we are certain to experience more intelligence gaps and miss collecting information. You imply that the emergency authorization process under FISA is an adequate substitute for the legislative authorities that have lapsed. This assertion reflects a basic misunderstanding about FISA's emergency authorization provisions. Specifically, you assert that the National Security Agency (NSA) or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ``may begin surveillance immediately'' in an emergency situation. FISA requires far more, and it would be illegal to proceed as you suggest. Before surveillance begins the Attorney General must determine that there is probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that FISA's other requirements are met. As explained above, the process of compiling the facts necessary for such a determination and preparing applications for emergency authorizations takes time and results in delays. Again, it makes no sense to impose this requirement in the context of foreign intelligence surveillance of targets located overseas. Because of the hurdles under FISA's emergency authorization provisions and the requirement to go to the FISA Court within 72 hours, our resource constraints limit our use of emergency authorizations to certain high-priority circumstances and cannot simply be employed for every foreign intelligence target. It is also inaccurate to state that because Congress has amended FISA several times, there is no need to modernize FISA. This statement runs counter to the very basis for Congress's passage last August of the Protect America Act. It was not until the passage of this Act that Congress amended those provisions of FISA that had become outdated due to the communications revolution we have experienced sine 1978. As we explained, those outdated provisions resulted in dangerous intelligence gaps by causing constitutional protections to be extended to foreign terrorists overseas. It is critical that Congress enact long-term FISA modernization to ensure that the Intelligence Community can collect effectively the foreign intelligence information it needs to protect the Nation. The bill passed by the Senate would achieve this goal, while safeguarding the privacy interests of Americans. Liability protection Your assertion that the failure to provide liability protection for those private-sector firms that helped defend the Nation after the September 11 attacks does not affect our intelligence collection capability is inaccurate and contrary to the experience of intelligence professionals and to the conclusions the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reached after careful study of the matter. It also ignores that providing liability protection to those companies sued for answering their country's call for assistance in the aftermath of September 11 is simply the right thing to do. Through briefings and documents, we have provided the members of your committee with access to thei nformation that shows that immunity is the fair and just result. Private party assistance is necessary and critical to ensuring that the Intelligence Community can collect the information needed to protect our country from attack. In its report on S. 2248, the Intelligence Committee stated that ``the intelligence community cannot obtain the intelligence it needs without assistance'' from electronic communication service providers. The Committee also concluded that ``without retroactive immunity, the private sector might be unwilling to cooperate with lawful Government requests in the future without unnecessary court involvement and protracted litigation. The possible recution in intelligence that might result from this delay is simply unacceptable for the safety of our Nation.'' Senior intelligence officials also have testified regarding the importance of providing liability protection to such companies for this very reason. Even prior to the expiration of the Protest America Act, we expereinced significant difficulties in working with the private sector because of the continued failure to provide liability protection for such companies. These difficultures have only grown since expiration of the Act without passage of the bipartisan Senate bill, which would provide fair and just liability protection. Exposing the private sector to the continued risk of billion-dollar class action suites for assisting in efforts to defend the country understandably makes the private sector much more reluctant to cooperate. Without their cooperation, our efforts to protect the country cannot succeed. Pending legislation Finally, as you note, the House passed a bill in November to amend FiSA, but we immediately made clear that the bill is unworkable and unaceptable. Over three months ago, the Administration issued a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) that stated that the House bill ``falls far short of providing the Intelligence Community with the tools it needs to collect effecively the foreign intelligence information vital for the security of the Nation'' and that ``the Director of National Intelligence and the President's other senior advises would recommend that the President veto the bill.'' We adhere to that view today. The House bill has several grave deficiencies. First, although numerous senior intelligence officials have testified regarding the improtance of affording liability protection for companies that assisted the Government in the aftermath of September 11, the House bill does not address the critical issue of liability protection. Second, the House bill contains certains provisions and serious technical flaws that would fatally undermine our ability to collect effectively the intelligence needed to protect the Nation. In contrast, the Senate bill deals with the issue of liability protection in a way that is fair and that protects the national security. In addition, the Senate bill is carefully drafted and has been amended toa void technical flaws similar to the ones in the House bill. We note that the privacy protections for Americans in the Senate bill exceed the protections contained in both the Protect America Act and the House bill. The Department of Justice and the Intelligence Community are taking the steps we can to try to keep the country safe during this current period of uncertainty. These measures are remedial at best, however, and do not provide the tools our intelligence professionals need to protect the Nation or the certainty needed by our intelligence professionals and our private partners. The Senate passed a strong and balanced bill by an overwhelming and bipartisan margin. That bill would modernize FISA, ensure the future cooperation of the private sector, and guard the civil liberties we value. We hope that you will support giving your fellow members the chance to vote on this bill. Sincerely, Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney General. J.M. McConnell, Director of National Intelligence.", u" Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National IntelligenceSec. 401. Requirements for accountability reviews by the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 402. Additional authorities of the Director of National Intelligence on intelligence information sharing.Sec. 403. Modification of limitation on delegation by the Director of National Intelligence of the protection of intelligence sources and methods.Sec. 404. Additional administrative authority of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 405. Enhancement of authority of the Director of National Intelligence for flexible personnel management among the elements of the intelligence community.Sec. 406. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 407. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 408. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 409. Reserve for Contingencies of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 410. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.Sec. 411. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.Sec. 412. National Space Intelligence Office.Sec. 413. Operational files in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.Sec. 414. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2008 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Department of State. (8) The Department of the Treasury. (9) The Department of Energy. (10) The Department of Justice. (11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (12) The National Reconnaissance Office. (13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (14) The Coast Guard. (15) The Department of Homeland Security. (16) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel levels (expressed as full-time equivalent positions) as of September 30, 2008, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill ___ of the One Hundred Tenth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number of authorized full-time equivalent positions for fiscal year 2008 under section 102 when the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 5 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Authority for Conversion of Activities Performed by Contractors.--In addition to the authority in subsection (a), upon a determination by the head of an element in the intelligence community that activities currently being performed by contractor employees should be performed by government employees, the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence in such determination, and the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of additional full-time equivalent personnel in such element of the intelligence community equal to the number of full-time equivalent contractor employees performing such activities. (c) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives in writing at least 15 days before each exercise of the authority in subsection (a) or (b). (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2008 the sum of $715,076,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2009. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 1768 full-time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2008. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available to the Director of National Intelligence under section 103 are also available to the Director for the adjustment of personnel levels in elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account. (d) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2008 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2009. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2008, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill ___ of the One Hundred Tenth Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law. (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. Of the funds appropriated for the National Intelligence Program for fiscal year 2008, and of funds currently available for obligation for any prior fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall transfer not less than the amount specified in the classified annex to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to fund the development and acquisition of the program specified in the classified annex. The funds as so transferred shall be available without fiscal year limitation. (a) Amounts Requested Each Fiscal Year.--The President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2008 the aggregate amount of appropriations requested by the President for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. (b) Amounts Authorized and Appropriated Each Fiscal Year.-- Congress shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2007 the aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, by Congress for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2008 the sum of $262,500,000. Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)(A)) is amended by striking ``receiving compensation under the Senior Intelligence Service pay schedule at the rate'' and inserting ``who is at the Senior Intelligence Service rank''. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking ``other'' the second place it appears. (a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director''; (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may only delegate'' and all that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority in subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the intelligence community.''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such senior officials of such element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''. (b) Submittal of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe and submit to the congressional intelligence committees the guidelines referred to in paragraph (2) of section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a). (c) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows: ``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and''. (a) Disclosure of Agent After Access to Information Identifying Agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''. (b) Disclosure of Agent After Access to Classified Information.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking ``five years'' and inserting ``ten years''. Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the head of such element certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods. ``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence. ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `element of the intelligence community' means an element of the intelligence community listed in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''. The Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 435 note) is amended-- (1) in section 704(e)-- (A) by striking ``If requested'' and inserting the following: ``(1) In general.--If requested''; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) Authority of board.--Upon receiving a congressional request described in section 703(b)(5), the Board may conduct the review and make the recommendations described in that section, regardless of whether such a review is requested by the President. ``(3) Reporting.--Any recommendations submitted to the President by the Board under section 703(b)(5), shall be submitted to the chairman and ranking member of the committee of Congress that made the request relating to such recommendations.''; and (2) in section 710(b), by striking ``8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting ``on December (a) In General.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h) and section 904(g)(2) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c(g)(2)) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any fiscal year after fiscal year 2007 an officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces may be detailed to the staff of an element of the intelligence community funded through the Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis, as jointly agreed to by the Director of National Intelligence and the head of the detailing element (or the designees of such officials), for a period not to exceed three years. (b) Element of the Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the term ``element of the intelligence community'' means an element of the intelligence community listed in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (a) Report Required.--Not later than September 1, 2007, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the [congressional intelligence committees] appropriate committees of Congress a comprehensive report on all measures taken by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and by each element, if any, of the intelligence community with relevant responsibilities to comply with the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of division A of Public Law 109-148) and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-366). (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) A description of the detention or interrogation methods, if any, that have been determined to comply with section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 2739; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd) and section 6 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (120 Stat. 2632; 18 U.S.C. 2441 note) (including the amendments made by such section 6), and, with respect to each such method-- (A) an identification of the official making such determination; and (B) a statement of the basis for such determination. (2) A description of the detention or interrogation methods, if any, whose use has been discontinued pursuant to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or the Military Commission Act of 2006, and, with respect to each such method-- (A) an identification of the official making the determination to discontinue such method; and (B) a statement of the basis for such determination. (3) A description of any actions that have been taken to implement section 1004 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 2740; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd-1), and, with respect to each such action-- (A) an identification of the official taking such action; and (B) a statement of the basis for such action. (4) Any other matters that the Director considers necessary to fully and currently inform the [congressional intelligence committees] appropriate committees of Congress about the implementation of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. (5) An appendix containing-- (A) all guidelines for the application of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to the detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence community; and (B) all legal justifications of any office or official of the Department of Justice about the meaning or application of Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 with respect to the detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence community. (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form. (d) Definitions.--In this section: [(1) The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee of the House of Representatives.] (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) The term ``element of the intelligence community'' means the elements of the intelligence community specified in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). Section 1016 of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 6 U.S.C. 485) is amended-- (1) in subsection (f)(1), by striking ``during the two-year period beginning on the date of designation under this paragraph unless sooner'' and inserting ``until''; and (2) in subsection (g)(1), by striking ``during the two-year period beginning on the date of the initial designation of the program manager by the President under subsection (f)(1), unless sooner'' and inserting ``until''. (a) Notice on Information Not Disclosed.-- (1) In general.--Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended-- (A) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and (B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b): ``(b) Notice on Information Not Disclosed.-- ``(1) If the Director of National Intelligence or the head of a department, agency, or other entity of the United States Government does not provide information required by subsection (a) in full or to all the members of the congressional intelligence committees, and requests that such information not be provided, the Director shall, in a timely fashion, notify such committees of the determination not to provide such information in full or to all members of such committees. Such notice shall be submitted in writing in a classified form, include a statement of the reasons for such determination and description that provides the main features of the intelligence activities covered by such determination, and contain no restriction on access to this notice by all members of the committee. ``(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as authorizing less than full and current disclosure to all the members of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives of any information necessary to keep all the members of such committees fully and currently informed on all intelligence activities covered by this section.''. (2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (d) of such section, as redesignated by paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection, is amended by striking ``subsection (b)'' and inserting ``subsections (b) and (c)''. (b) Reports and Notice on Covert Actions.-- (1) Form and content of certain reports.--Subsection (b) of section 503 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended-- (A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; (B) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) Any report relating to a covert action that is submitted to the congressional intelligence committees for the purposes of paragraph (1) shall be in writing, and shall contain the following: ``(A) A concise statement of any facts pertinent to such report. ``(B) An explanation of the significance of the covert action covered by such report.''. (2) Notice on information not disclosed.--Subsection (c) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(5) If the Director of National Intelligence or the head of a department, agency, or other entity of the United States Government does not provide information required by subsection (b) in full or to all the members of the congressional intelligence committees, and requests that such information not be so provided, the Director shall, in a timely fashion, notify such committees of the determination not to provide such information in full or to all members of such committees. Such notice shall be submitted in writing in a classified form, include a statement of the reasons for such determination and a description that provides the main features of the covert action covered by such determination, and contain no restriction on access to this notice by all members of the committee.''. (3) Modification of nature of change of covert action triggering notice requirements.--Subsection (d) of such section is amended by striking ``significant'' the first place it appears. Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``the congressional intelligence committees have been fully and currently informed of such activity and if'' after ``only if''; (2) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively; and (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b): ``(b) In any case in which notice to the congressional intelligence committees on an intelligence or intelligence- related activity is covered by section 502(b), or in which notice to the congressional intelligence committees on a covert action is covered by section 503(c)(5), the congressional intelligence committees shall be treated as being fully and currently informed on such activity or covert action, as the case may be, for purposes of subsection (a) if the requirements of such section 502(b) or 503(c)(5), as applicable, have been met.''. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506A the following new section: (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 314, is further amended by inserting after section 506B, as added by section 314(a), the following new section:", u" There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Statement of Administration PolicyS. 2248--To amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, to Protection of the American people and American interests at home and abroad requires access to timely, accurate, and insightful intelligence on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, including terrorists. The Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA), which amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) this past August, has greatly improved the Intelligence Community's ability to protect the Nation from terrorist attacks and other national security threats. The PAA has allowed us to close intelligence gaps, and it has enabled our intelligence professionals to collect foreign intelligence information from targets overseas more efficiently and effectively. The Intelligence Community has implemented the PAA under a robust oversight regime that has protected the civil liberties and privacy rights of Americans. Unfortunately, the benefits conferred by the PAA are only temporary because the act sunsets on February 1, 2008. The Director of National Intelligence has frequently discussed what the Intelligence Community needs in permanent FISA legislation, including two key principles. First, judicial authorization should not be required to gather foreign intelligence from targets located in foreign countries. Second, the law must provide liability protection for the private sector. The Senate is considering two bills to extend the core authorities provided by the PAA and modernize FISA. In October, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) passed a consensus, bipartisan bill (S. 2248) that would establish a sound foundation for our Intelligence Community's efforts to target terrorists and other foreign intelligence targets located overseas. Although the bill is not perfect and its flaws must be addressed, it nevertheless represents a bipartisan compromise that will ensure that the Intelligence Community retains the authorities it needs to protect the Nation. Indeed, the SSCI bill is an improvement over the PAA in one essential way-it would provide retroactive liability protection to electronic communication service providers that are alleged to have assisted the Government with intelligence activities in the aftermath of September 11th. In sharp contrast to the SSCI's bipartisan approach to modernizing FISA, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported an amendment to the SSCI bill that would have devastating consequences to the Intelligence Community's ability to detect and prevent terrorist attacks and to protect the Nation from other national security threats. The Judiciary Committee proposal would degrade our foreign intelligence collection capabilities. The Judiciary Committee's amendment would impose unacceptable and potentially crippling burdens on the collection of foreign intelligence information by expanding FISA to restrict facets of foreign intelligence collection never intended to be covered under the statute. Furthermore, the Judiciary Committee amendment altogether fails to address the critical issue of liability protection. Accordingly, if the Judiciary Committee's substitute amendment is part of a bill that is presented to the President the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the President's other senior advisors will recommend that he veto the bill. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence bill Building on the authorities and oversight protections included in the PAA, the SSCI drafted S. 2248 to provide a sound legal framework for essential foreign intelligence collection in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment. As in the PAA, S. 2248 permits the targeting of foreign terrorists and other foreign intelligence targets outside the United States based upon the approval of the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General. The SSCI drafted its bill in extensive coordination with Intelligence Community and national security professionals-- those who are most familiar with the needs of the Intelligence Community and the complexities of our intelligence laws. The SSCI also heard testimony from privacy experts in order to craft a balanced approach. As a result, the SSCI bill recognizes the importance of clarity in laws governing intelligence operations. Although the Administration would strongly prefer that the provisions of the PAA be made permanent without modification, the Administration engaged in extensive consultation in the interest of achieving permanent legislation in a bipartisan manner. The SSCI bill is not perfect, however. Indeed, certain provisions represent a major modification of the PAA and will create additional burdens for the Intelligence Community, including by dramatically expanding the role of the FISA Court in reviewing foreign intelligence operations targeted at persons located outside the United States, a role never envisioned when Congress created the FISA court. In particular, the SSCI bill contains two provisions that must be modified in order to avoid significant negative impacts on intelligence operations. Both of these provisions are also included in the Judiciary Committee substitute, detailed further below. First, as part of the debate over FISA modernization, concerns have been raised regarding acquiring information from U.S. persons outside the United States. Accordingly, the SSCI bill provides for FISA Court approval of surveillance of U.S. persons abroad. The Administration opposes this provision. Under executive orders in place since before the enactment of FISA in 1978, Attorney General approval is required before foreign intelligence surveillance and searches may be conducted against a U.S. person abroad under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. More specifically, section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333 requires that the Attorney General find probable cause that the U.S. person target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. S. 2248 dramatically increases the role of the FISA Court by requiring court approval of this probable cause determination before an intelligence operation may be conducted beyond the borders of the United States. This provision imposes burdens on foreign intelligence collection abroad that frequently do not exist even with respect to searches and surveillance abroad for law enforcement purposes. Were the Administration to consider accepting FISA Court approval for foreign intelligence searches and surveillance of U.S. persons overseas, technical corrections would be necessary. The Administration appreciates the efforts that have been made by Congress to address these issues, but notes that while it may be willing to accept that the FISA Court, rather than the Attorney General, must make the required findings, limitations on the scope of the collection currently allowed are unacceptable. Second, the Senate Intelligence Committee bill contains a requirement that intelligence analysts count ``the number of persons located in the United States whose communications were reviewed.'' This provision would likely be impossible to implement. It places potentially insurmountable burdens on intelligence professionals without meaningfully protecting the privacy of Americans, and takes scarce analytic resources away from protecting our country. The Intelligence Community has provided Congress with a detailed classified explanation of this problem. Although the Administration believes that the PAA achieved foreign intelligence objectives with reasonable and robust oversight protections, S. 2248, as drafted by the Senate Intelligence Committee, provides a workable alternative and improves on the PAA in one critical respect by providing retroactive liability protection. The Senate Intelligence Committee bill would achieve an effective legislative result by returning FISA to its appropriate focus on the protection of privacy interests of persons inside the United States, while retaining our improved capability under PAA to collect timely foreign intelligence information needed to protect the Nation. The Senate Judiciary Committee proposal The Senate Judiciary Committee amendment contains a number of provisions that would have a devastating impact on our foreign intelligence operations. Among the provisions of greatest concern are: An Overbroad Exclusive Means Provision That Threatens Worldwide Foreign Intelligence Operations. Consistent with current law, the exclusive means provision in the SSCI's bill addresses only ``electronic surveillance'' and ``the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications.'' But the exclusive means provision in the Judiciary Committee substitute goes much further and would dramatically expand the scope of activities covered by that provision. The Judiciary Committee substitute makes FISA the exclusive means for acquiring ``communications information'' for foreign intelligence purposes. The term ``communications information'' is not defined and potentially covers a vast array of information--and effectively bars the acquisition of much of this information that is currently authorized under other statues such as the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. It is unprecedented to require specific statutory authorization for every activity undertaken worldwide by the Intelligence Community. In addition, the exclusivity provision in the Judiciary Committee substitute ignores FISA's complexity and its interrelationship with other federal laws and, as a result, could operate to preclude the Intelligence Community from using current tools and authorities, or preclude Congress from acting quickly to give the Intelligence Community the tools it may need in the aftermath of a terrorist attack in the United States or in response to a grave threat to the national security. In short, the Judiciary Committee's exclusive means provision would radically reshape the intelligence collection framework and is unacceptable. Limits on Foreign Intelligence Collection. The Judiciary Committee substitute would require the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to certify for certain acquisitions that they are ``limited to communications to which at least one party is a specific individual target who is reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.'' This provision is unacceptable because it could hamper U.S. intelligence operations that are currently authorized to be conducted overseas and that could be conducted more effectively from the United States without harming U.S. privacy rights. Significant Purpose Requirement. The Judiciary Committee substitute would require a FISA court order if a ``significant purpose'' of an acquisition targeting a person abroad is to acquire the communications of a specific person reasonably believed to be in the United States. If the concern driving this proposal is so-called ``reverse targeting''--circumstances in which the Government would conduct surveillance of a person overseas when the Government's actual target is a person in the United States with whom the person overseas is communicating--that situation is already addressed in FISA today: If the person in the United States is the target, a significant purpose of the acquisition must be to collect foreign intelligence information, and an order from the FISA court is required. Indeed, the SSCI bill codifies this longstanding Executive Branch interpretation of FISA. The Judiciary Committee substitute would place an unnecessary and debilitating burden on our Intelligence Community's ability to conduct surveillance without enhancing the protection of the privacy of Americans. Part of the value of the PAA, and any subsequent legislation, is to enable the Intelligence Community to collect expeditiously the communications of terrorists in foreign countries who may contact an associate in the United States. The Intelligence Community was heavily criticized by numerous reviews after September 11, including by the Congressional Joint Inquiry into September 11, regarding its insufficient attention to detecting communications indicating homeland attack plotting. To quote the Congressional Joint Inquiry: ``The Joint Inquiry has learned that one of the future hijackers communicated with a known terrorist facility in the Middle East while he was living in the United States. The Intelligence Community did not identify the domestic origin of those communications prior to September 11, 2001 so that additional FBI investigative efforts could be coordinated. Despite this country's substantial advantages, there was insufficient focus on what many would have thought was among the most critically important kinds of terrorist- related communications, at least in terms of protecting the Homeland.'' (S. Rept. No. 107-351, H. Rept. No. 107-792 at 36.) To be clear, a ``significant purpose'' of Intelligence Community activities is to detect communications that may provide warning of homeland attacks and that may include communication between a terrorist overseas who places a call to associates in the United States. A provision that bars the Intelligence Community from collecting these communications is unacceptable, as Congress has stated previously. Liability Protection. In contrast to the Senate Intelligence Committee bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee substitute would not protect electronic communication service providers who are alleged to have assisted the Government with communications intelligence activities in the aftermath of September 11th from potentially debilitating lawsuits. Providing liability protection to these companies is a just result. In its Conference Report, the Senate Intelligence Committee ``concluded that the providers . . . had a good faith basis for responding to the requests for assistance they received.'' The Committee further recognized that ``the Intelligence Community cannot obtain the intelligence it needs without assistance from these companies.'' Companies in the future may be less willing to assist the Government if they face the threat of private lawsuits each time they are alleged to have provided assistance. The Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that: ``The possible reduction in intelligence that might result from this delay is simply unacceptable for the safety of our Nation.'' Allowing continued litigation also risks the disclosure of highly classified information regarding intelligence sources and methods. In addition to providing an advantage to our adversaries by revealing sources and methods during the course of litigation, the potential disclosure of classified information puts both the facilities and personnel of electronic communication service providers and our country's continued ability to protect our homeland at risk. It is imperative that Congress provide liability protection to those who cooperated with this country in its hour of need. The ramifications of the Judiciary Committee's decision to afford no relief to private parties that cooperated in good faith with the U.S. Government in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11 could extend well beyond the particular issues and activities that have been of primary interest and concern to the Committee. The Intelligence Community, as well as law enforcement and homeland security agencies, continue to rely on the voluntary cooperation and assistance of private parties. A decision by the Senate to abandon those who may have provided assistance after September 11 will invariably be noted by those who may someday be called upon again to help the Nation. Mandates an Unnecessary Review of Historical Programs. The Judiciary Committee substitute would require that inspectors general of the Department of Justice and relevant Intelligence Community agencies audit the Terrorist Surveillance Program and ``any closely related intelligence activities.'' If this ``audit'' is intended to look at operational activities, there has been an ongoing oversight activity by the Inspector General of the National Security Agency (NSA) of operational activities and the Senate Intelligence Committee has that material. Mandating a new and undefined ``audit'' will divert significant operational resources from current issues to redoing past audits. The Administration understands, however, the ``audit'' may in fact not be related to technical NSA operations. If it is the case that in fact the Judiciary Committee is interested in historical reviews of legal issues, the provision is unnecessary. The Department of Justice Inspector General and the Office of Professional Responsibility are already doing a comprehensive review. In addition, the phrase ``closely related intelligence activities'' would introduce substantial ambiguities in the scope of this review. Finally, this provision would require the inspectors general to acquire ``all documents relevant to such programs'' and submit those documents with its report to the congressional intelligence and judiciary committees. The requirement to collect and disseminate this wide range of highly classified documents-- including all those ``relevant'' to activities ``closely related'' to the Terrorist Surveillance Program-- unnecessarily risks the disclosure of extremely sensitive information about our intelligence activities, as does the audit requirement itself. Taking such national security risks for a backwards-looking purpose is unacceptable. Allows for Dangerous Intelligence Gaps During the Pendency of an Appeal. The Judiciary Committee substitute would delete an important provision in the SSCI bill that enables the Intelligence Community to collect foreign intelligence from overseas terrorists and other foreign intelligence targets during an appeal. Without that provision, we could lose vital intelligence necessary to protect the Nation because of the views of one judge. Limits Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence Information. The Judiciary Committee substitute would impose significant new restrictions on the use of foreign intelligence information, including information not concerning United States persons, obtained or derived from acquisitions using targeting procedures that the FISA Court later found to be unsatisfactory for any reason. By requiring analysts to go back to the databases and pull out certain information, as well as to determine what other information is derived from that information, this requirement would place a difficult, and perhaps insurmountable, burden on the Intelligence Community. Moreover, this provision would degrade privacy protections, as it would require analysts to locate and examine U.S. person information that would otherwise not be reviewed. Requires FISA Court Approval of All ``Targeting'' for Foreign Intelligence Purposes. The Judiciary Committee substitute potentially requires the FISA Court to approve ``[a]ny targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.'' Although we assume that the Committee did not intend to require these procedures to govern all ``targeting'' done of any person in the world for any purpose--whether it is to gather human intelligence, communications intelligence, or for other reasons--the text as passed by the Committee contains no limitation. Such a requirement would bring within the FISA Court a vast range of overseas intelligence activities with little or no connection to civil liberties and privacy rights of Americans. Imposes Court Review of Compliance with Minimization Procedures. The Judiciary Committee substitute would require the FISA Court to review and assess compliance with minimization procedures. Together with provisions discussed above, this would constitute a massive expansion of the Court's role in overseeing the Intelligence Community's implementation of foreign intelligence collection abroad. Amends FISA to Impose Burdensome Document Production Requirements. The Judiciary Committee substitute would amend FISA to require the Government to submit to oversight committees a copy of any decision, order, or opinion issued by the FISA Court or the FISA Court of Review that includes significant construction or interpretation of any provision of FISA, including any pleadings associated with those documents, no later than 45 days after the document is issued. The Judiciary Committee substitute also would require the Government to retrieve historical documents of this nature from the last 5 years. As drafted, this provision could impose significant burdens on Department of Justice staff assigned to support national security operational and oversight missions. Includes an Even Shorter Sunset Provision Than That Contained in the SSCI Bill. The Judiciary Committee substitute and the SSCI bill share the same flaw of failing to achieve permanent FISA reform. The Judiciary Committee substitute worsens this flaw, however, by shortening the sunset provision in the SSCI bill from 6 years to 4 years. Any sunset provision, but particularly one as short as contemplated in the Judiciary Committee substitute, would adversely impact the Intelligence Community's ability to conduct its mission efficiently and effectively by introducing uncertainty and requiring re-training of all intelligence professionals on new policies and procedures implementing ever-changing authorities. Moreover, over the past year, in the interest of providing an extensive legislative record and allowing public discussion on this issue, the Intelligence Community has discussed in open settings extraordinary information dealing with intelligence operations. To repeat this process in several years will unnecessarily highlight our intelligence sources and methods to our adversaries. There is now a lengthy factual record on the need for this legislation, and it is time to provide the Intelligence Community the permanent stability it needs. Fails to Provide Procedures for Implementing Existing Statutory Defenses. The Judiciary Committee substitute fails to include the important provisions in the SSCI bill that would establish procedures for implementing existing statutory defenses and that would preempt state investigations of assistance allegedly provided by an electronic communication service provider to an element of the Intelligence Community. These provisions are important to ensure that electronic communication service providers can take full advantage of existing liability protection and to protect highly classified information. Fails to Address Transition Procedures. Unlike the SSCI bill, the Judiciary Committee bill contains no procedures designed to ensure a smooth transition from the PAA to new legislation, and for a potential transition resulting from an expiration of the new legislation. This omission could result in uncertainty regarding the continuing validity of authorizations and directives under the Protect America Act that are in effect on the date of enactment of this legislation. Fails to Include a Severability Provision. The Judiciary Committee substitute, unlike the SSCI bill, lacks a severability provision. Such a provision should be included in the bill. The Administration is prepared to continue to work with Congress towards the passage of a permanent FISA modernization bill that would strengthen the Nation's intelligence capabilities while protecting the constitutional rights of Americans, so that the President can sign such a bill into law. The Senate Intelligence Committee bill provides a solid foundation to meet the needs of our Intelligence Community, but the Senate Judiciary Committee bill represents a major step backwards from the PAA and would compromise our Intelligence Community's ability to protect the Nation. The Administration calls on Congress to forge ahead and pass legislation that will protect our national security, not weaken it in critical ways.", u"Mr. President, I wish to share some thoughts about NSA, the National Security Agency, and the wiretaps that have taken place, the brouhaha that has occurred in the press and in Congress, and why I believe this program is necessary, why I believe it is legal. I know the Presiding Officer has been, perhaps, the most eloquent spokesman in the Senate on this subject. He believes this is legal and proper and has articulated those views very ably. I shared some thoughts the other day about why it is so important, why there is much political goings-on here instead of substance, and why we need to continue with the program. I would like to share a few more thoughts today about the care the administration took to be respectful of Congress, to not overreach their legal authority, and how they worked to keep Congress briefed on what the program was about. The administration officials briefed congressional leaders more than a dozen times on the terrorist surveillance program. More than a dozen times they went before the proper senior officials of the U.S. Congress--in the House and Senate, both Republican and Democrat--to advise them about what this program was about and what they were doing. That includes the majority leader of the Senate, who is Republican, the Democratic leader, Mr. Reid, and before him, Mr. Daschle. In the House, it includes the Speaker of the House and the Democratic leader. It includes the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee; the Senate Intelligence Committee chairman and the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee. Those are what they call the big 8--or The 8. The Intelligence Committees deal with these highly classified programs involving national security. We have always understood that you cannot tell 100 Senators and 435 Congressmen a bunch of secrets because if you do, they will leak. As a matter of fact, I am sometimes even amazed the eight can keep a secret, but apparently they have done well, at least until the recent leak, and we don't know where it came from. It may well have come from another source. These eight are briefed on the program. These are the top people in Congress. They are not children. They are not people who can be pushed around. They are grownups holding particularly high offices. If they have a problem with the program, they are not children; they know when it is time for them to speak up, if they have an objection, to raise it, and they did not object. There were no objections made, no call to stop this program by any of those eight people who, over a period of years, were informed. It actually is more than eight. As I noted, we have had two Democratic leaders, Senator Daschle and Senator Reid. We had Senator Trent Lott, as well as Senator Bill Frist. We had Senator Richard Shelby, as well as Senator Pat Roberts. So there are 15 members who have been briefed on it and had an opportunity to object and have not objected. Then all this stuff hits the fan in the newspapers and everybody gets excited about it. We have some Democrats saying it is illegal and that it ought to be stopped. They are saying it is illegal. But if you noticed one word they didn't utilize, it was ``stop.'' They caused all this fuss revealing to the world many of the capabilities of the system, making the system less effective than it could be. In fact, Porter Goss, the head of the CIA, has said it has rendered severe damage to our intelligence capability. They did not say stop. Nobody is saying stop. Nobody has submitted a resolution in the Senate to say stop. Nobody has introduced legislation, which they have every right to do, and which we in Congress have a right to do, to cut off funds for this program. We could end this program tomorrow. All we would have to do is come together as a Congress and say there shall be no Federal dollars expended to carry out a program of surveillance such as this. They would end it just like that. That has not been proposed. Why has it not been proposed? Because it is idiotic to stop a program such as this. How stupid can we be if we eliminate a program such as this? There is an article in the Washington Post--it is breathtaking really--in which Senator Biden said: I don't understand why you would limit your eavesdropping to only foreign conversations,'' said Senator Biden to Attorney General Gonzales. The article seems to suggest, after complaining about the program, they should have wiretapped more people when both ends of the conversation were in the United States. Perhaps we should consider that. I think there is a realistic basis to conclude that the President has that power if it is relevant to the security of the United States of America. You just have to read through the lines. I was not in the meetings. I am on the Armed Services Committee and I am on the Judiciary Committee where we had a lot of these discussions and hearings. The President and his team at one point said: What about legislation, can we pass legislation? All the people who apparently discussed this matter were in uniform agreement that if we brought a bill up to specifically authorize this kind of wiretapping, it would cause a lot of discussion in the Senate, and it would reveal to the world the program. So the President basically said: I believe under the authorization of force you gave me to act against al-Qaida, who has declared a war on us and we have declared a war on them, I have the power to do that on international calls; I am confident in that. His lawyers have written opinions and briefs. They researched the history, and he concluded that he did, and that is what he basically told the eight Members of Congress, and they did not object. They could have said: No, you have to introduce legislation. That is a reasonable statement for any Member of Congress to make to the executive branch: Mr. President, if you think we can write legislation that would allow technology like this to be legal, explicitly by statute, we will have to write it in such a way that it will obviously reveal to those we are trying to surveil what we are doing and what our capabilities are, and it will undermine the program. President Bush told us straight up in more than one speech: It is my responsibility to defend the people of the United States of America. That is what he said his responsibility was, and I believed it and the American people believed it and we said yes. He said: I am going to use every tool I have to defend this country. We said yes, and this is one of the tools he has, and he decided to use it. I think he did so in a very appropriate way. Congress has been advised of that. Some have said it broke the FISA law; it did not comply with FISA. Attorney General Gonzales made a very nice point, a very important point. FISA claims to be the exclusive means of electronic surveillance, and people have cited that principle, but it actually contains numerous exceptions, such as a 15-day exception after a declaration of war in section 111 of FISA, a 72-hour exception for emergency surveillance under section 105, and finally there is an exception for surveillance authorized by statute in section 109. The idea clearly is that there would be further statutes passed that would expand the FISA law as circumstances develop. Then Congress, after 9/11, passed the authorization for use of military force against those whom the President finds are responsible for attacking us on 9/11. He has defined that narrowly as al-Qaida. We authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate powers to surveil or to attack al-Qaida, to go after al-Qaida. As the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdi declared, they said the U.S. military can capture, detain, lock up, put in jail as a prisoner of war an American citizen who has associated himself with al-Qaida in the war against the United States without a trial. We have authorized our military under the authorization to use force, to go out and kill the al-Qaida people wherever they are in the world as they are deemed to be at war against us. So it stretches a bit to say you can't intercept their telephone calls. You can lock them up without trial, put them in jail and restrain their freedom--even an American citizen, you can kill them on the battlefield without a trial or a Miranda warning, but you cannot surveil their phone calls. What the Supreme Court said in Hamdi was that although the authorization to use force did not specifically authorize locking up people and holding them as prisoners of war, it is a natural incident to the power given to the President to conduct war. The power to conduct war is also the power to detain and restrain people who are at war against you. Attorney General Gonzales has made a very compelling argument. How much less of an invasion of a person's liberty is it to listen to their phone conversation than it is to lock them up in jail? So a natural incident to the conduct of a military operation, since the beginning of warfare--certainly in modern times--has been surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations. We worked tirelessly to break the German code. We worked tirelessly and broke the Japanese code. We were able to listen in on their conversations. That is what you do against an enemy; you try to find out what they are doing and how they are planning it so you can stop them. I am confident a rational interpretation of the authorization to use force to go after somebody militarily includes the power to detain prisoners, as the Supreme Court has said, and also would include the power to intercept the communications of the enemy. This is consistent. Maybe ``amendment'' is not the right word to FISA, but it is a statute passed in harmony with the concept of FISA when it was passed. It is a subsequent statute that would take priority over the past statute. Another argument is the past statute was more explicit about these intelligence matters and said this was the sole way to do it. But I don't think you can interpret an authorization to go to war in any way that would prohibit intelligence-gathering operations. Indeed, the Hamdi case held that previous statutes that said you could not lock people up under these circumstances were overridden by the authorization to use force because a necessary incident to utilizing military action against the enemy is to lock up people you capture. There is also, I believe, a good argument to be made that the President has inherent authority as Commander in Chief and a duty consistent with that authority and responsibility to protect the people of the United States. Every Federal court to have decided the issue has held--including the Third Circuit, Fourth Circuit, Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals--that this is so. These cases involve surveillance that occurred before the FISA was passed, true; but in 2002 a FISA court of review relied on those cases. The FISA Court, created by FISA, relied on those previous cases to make this ruling: FISA could not encroach on the President's constitutional power. That is In Re Sealed Case, in 2002. Former Attorney General Griffin Bell, himself a long-time Federal judge who was called in to be President Jimmy Carter's Attorney General when FISA was being considered, was asked about this and the President's inherent power. Judge Bell, if you have known him, in that inimitable way he has, said, ``We can't change the Constitution by agreement.'' I would add, a statute can't amend the Constitution. FISA cannot eliminate the powers of the President, those inherent powers to defend America or to authorize electronic surveillance of an enemy with whom we are in combat, al-Qaida, in a time of war. Authorization for force, the President's inherent power--these are clear, I believe, authorizations of force. We will have a lot of debate about it. We will have a lot of discussion about it. But as you look at it more and more, I think people are becoming confident that these powers exist. Now we have a recent article saying, Why don't you do even more, if you have this power? Should we pass legislation? Let's talk about it. I think one thing we need to take out of the FISA law is the pretension that it represents the only authority the President has in these areas; that every act has to be done within the FISA. To that extent I believe it is clearly unconstitutional. Those words are not legitimate. They need to come out. We should not pretend to say we have the exclusive power in the legislative branch to override the President's responsibility to defend this country. Then if there are other ways we can write the statute, I will discuss it. But I frankly am not sure it is going to be a successful enterprise. It is going to be difficult to write a statute that would draw the line on where the President's authority exists and where it does not. Tell you what, I get nervous, I get a little worried when we at a given point in history start writing a statute to define the ultimate power of the President and propose to contain that power because you never know when we will have a problem with it. The Church Committee came out with this wall, a wall of separation between the CIA and the FBI, and many believed that wall was responsible for the lack of sharing of information between the FBI and CIA. They thought they were doing it for constitutional reasons. They thought they were doing a good thing. But we realized that was a disaster and we tore that wall down many years later, 20 years later, as a result of the experience we had with 9/11. So I would express my concern about statutes dealing with treatment of prisoners or surveillance, that we need to be careful about how we do that. I think the American people believe there should be some flexibility for the President in matters that could relate to our national security and the lives of our own citizens. We need to be careful as we go forward with that. But to date, we can say a couple of things with certainty: that the leaders of the House and the Senate were informed fully of what the President was doing. They did not object. And the Attorney General has made a compelling case, I believe, that he was authorized to do these national security intercepts, both by the authorization to use force and by the inherent powers given to the President. I would note, also, that the President's narrow use of a power is something that should be appreciated by the critics. He said it can only involve a phone call that is international and a phone call from al-Qaida, in which one member of the call was al-Qaida. If we do those two things, the average American can be sure they are not getting caught up in it. To hear the news articles, of course, it was domestic spying. That is far from the reality of this situation. I ask unanimous consent that the recent editorials of the Washington Times and the Washington Post be printed in the Record.", u"I thank the Chair. Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating the Senator from Minnesota for an absolutely superb presentation of the arguments that are at stake in this choice which the Senate faces. I think he has done a terrific job of summarizing a great many of those issues in the broad scope of those issues, and I particularly appreciate the last comments he made about the absence of unanimity and the divisions in the Senate over their vote. None of us should forget the debate Harriet Miers met with a storm of criticism--not from this side but from the other, from the rightwing. In fact, she became more unacceptable to the Republicans because she did not make clear which ideological direction she would take the Court, rather than for the very broad-based appeal she would pose to the country. The reason we are here with this decision is not because of a choice we have made. It is because of a choice the President has made. It is because that is the direction the President wants to move in. We have had countless opportunities in the Senate where we have had votes on nominees which have garnered 100 votes, 98 votes, 95, 90. Anyone who is watching understands that the Senate is divided on this nominee. At this pivotal moment in our country's history with the issues we face, that is not the way to tip the balance of the Court or to move the Court in an ideological direction. The critical question here is, Why are we so compelled to accept in such a rush a nominee who has so clearly been chosen for political and ideological reasons? That is the real question. Our job is to advise and consent. No one understands better than I do the consequences of an election and what happens when a President wins. I have heard colleagues say: Well, the President won. He has a right to make his choice. Yes, he does. And the choice he has made is an ideological choice to take the Court in a certain direction. That is his choice. Our choice depends on our rights as Senators and depends on what the Constitution tells us we should do in terms of giving advice and consent. My question to the Senate is, What is our advice with respect to the rights of a young person to be strip-searched or with respect to people in their homes or with respect to a whole series of other critical things that define this country? What is the advice of the Senate in this year? These are not small issues to be expedited away by some kind of a symbolic timetable, a State of the Union Message. Our advice and consent ought to be weighed just as carefully and as importantly as the impact this choice is going to have on the Court for years to come. This is not just the vote of Monday afternoon. This is a vote of history. Deciding on whether to confirm Judge Sam Alito to be an Associate Justice is one of the most important votes I will cast in the time I have been in the Senate because of what it means to the Court and to these critical choices. Confirming Judge Alito to a lifetime appointment on the Supreme Court would have irreversible consequences that are already defined if Senators will take the time to measure them. In my judgment, it will take the country backward on critical issues. I will not talk about them all now; we do not have time. I know there is a pre-agreement. I understand that, and I respect that. I am proud to join my friend, the senior Senator from Massachusetts, in taking a stand against this nomination. I know it is an uphill battle. I have heard many of my colleagues. I hear the arguments: Reserve your gunpowder for the future. What is the future if it changes so dramatically at this moment in time? What happens to those people who count on us to stand up and protect them now, not later, not at some future time? This is the choice for the Court now. I reject those notions that there ought to somehow be some political calculus about the future. This impact is going to be now. This choice is now. This ideological direction is defined now. This fight is not a fight for the short term. This is a fight over two very fundamentally different views about what defines us, what is appropriate in the relationship between government and citizen, and the right of our citizens to be free from unlawful government action. These are not just words. This is not something we just casually throw out there. ``Unlawful government action'' is part of what motivated people to come here in the first place and to fight for what we love and cherish. I used to be a prosecutor, and I worked closely with police. I loved my work with the police. I respect the police. They do unbelievably dangerous work on behalf of our country every single day. They may walk into a home, into a dark corner, not knowing who is there or what evil awaits. I understand that. I also understand when you assume that responsibility, you assume a responsibility to uphold the law, to uphold the Constitution, and to help protect people. That is part of the risk, part of what you take on. What about the right to equal justice under the law? I heard one Senator the other day come to the Senate and say it isn't the job of a Supreme Court Justice to protect the downtrodden or the disenfranchised, it is their job to interpret the law. On countless occasions we all know the weight that comes to bear in that decision-making process between powerful interests and those who do not have a voice. That is also part of what defines us. What makes America different from every country on the face of the Earth is that the average citizen can go into a courthouse in America and hold the most powerful corporation to account for their safety, for their livelihood, for their welfare. These are rights that Americans care about deeply. The importance of this choice is highlighted by focusing on the seat that this nominee has been chosen to replace. Look at Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a deciding vote, a vote that will likely be lost if Judge Alito takes her place. Look at the case of Grutter v. Bollinger, which held that State colleges and universities have the right to use affirmative action in their admission policies to increase educational opportunities for minorities and promote racial diversity on campuses. What about Tennessee v. Lane, which upheld the constitutionality of title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act that required that courtrooms be physically accessible to the disabled. Or Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, which upheld State laws giving people the right to a second doctor's opinion if their HMO tries to deny them treatment. That is a classic example of power against the powerless. It happens every day in America. An HMO decides, no; an individual citizen wants the coverage they think they got. Will they have the right to have the access on that? Hunt v. Cromartie, affirming the right of State legislatures to take race into account to secure minority voting rights and redistricting--we all know what has happened in this country, the challenge to the rights of minorities to vote. We still see it. As recently as in the last election we saw minorities denied opportunities to register, opportunities to have equal numbers of voting machines in their district. These are the things that define us. Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, which maintained the key source of funding for legal assistance for the poor; Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, which allowed the EPA to step in and take action to reduce air pollution under the Clean Air Act when a State conservation agency fails to act--there is not an American that doesn't understand we are going backwards with respect to air quality. What are the rights of the EPA going to be where Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was the swing vote, 5-4, the only one who held the line on the right of the EPA to do that? Stenburg v. Carhart, which overturned a State law that would have banned abortion as early as the 12th week of pregnancy without providing an exception to a woman's health--the list goes on. These are the issues which are at stake. Throughout his legal career--these are not things that are made up. These are defined by the writings, by the decisions, by the memoranda, by the speeches that Judge Alito has made. In each of those, in all of those, there is a startling lack of skepticism that is healthy in judges towards government power that infringes on individual rights and liberties. Professor Goodwin Liu of the University of Berkeley Law School concluded after analyzing those: Judge Alito ``is less concerned about the government overreaching than Federal appeals judges nationwide, less concerned than Republican-appointed appeals judges nationwide, and less concerned than his Republican-appointed colleagues on the Third Circuit.'' Aren't we going to be concerned that he is less concerned than those of the same stripe? Not only is his record outside the mainstream of the judicial spectrum, but ``it is at odds with the Supreme Court's vital role in protecting privacy, freedom, and due process of law.'' That is Professor Liu. In 1984, for example, Judge Alito wrote a Justice Department memorandum concluding that the use of deadly force against a fleeing unarmed suspect did not violate the fourth amendment. The victim was a 15-year-old African American. He was 5 foot 4. He weighed 100 to 110 pounds. This unarmed eighth grader was attempting to jump a fence with a stolen purse containing $10 when he was shot in the back of the head in order to prevent escape. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found the shooting unconstitutional because deadly force can only be used when there is ``probable cause that the suspect poses a threat to the safety of the officers or a danger to the community if left at large.'' That is what we teach law enforcement officials. But Judge Alito disagreed. Judge Alito said: No, he believed the shooting was reasonable because ``the State is justified in using whatever force is necessary to enforce its laws''--even deadly force. That is his conclusion. That is the standard that is going to go to the Supreme Court if ratified. It is OK to shoot a 15-year-old, 110 pounds, a 5-foot-4-inch kid who is trying to get over a fence with a purse, shoot him in the back of the head. Otherwise, Judge Alito believed that any suspect could evade arrest by making the State choose between killing them or letting them escape. That is the conclusion. Think about that. Judge Alito believed that the State could use whatever force was necessary to enforce its laws regardless of whether the suspect was armed or dangerous. Does the Chair believe that? Do the other Senators believe that? I don't think so. Do mainstream Americans believe that? Lucky for us, we did not have to answer that question. Why? Because in 1985, Justice White rejected Judge Alito's position, and the court held that deadly force is not justified ``where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others''. The court stated unequivocally, ``a police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.'' So Judge Alito is out of touch with mainstream juris prudence with respect to the use of force in America. Becoming a Federal judge did not make Judge Alito any more protective of an American's personal privacy and freedoms when it comes to government intrusion. That ought to concern every conservative in this Nation. Every conservative in America ought to care about the government's power to just walk into your home, to intrude on the rights of individual Americans. In Baker v. Monroe Township, over a dozen local and Federal narcotics agents raided the apartment of Clement Griffin, just as his mother and her three children were arriving for a family dinner. Officers forced the family down to the ground, pointed guns at them, handcuffed and searched them. Two Reagan appointees to the court held that a jury should decide whether excessive force was used, but Judge Alito disagreed. He agreed that the search was ``terrifying'' and ``most unfortunate''. But he did not believe that the family had a right to make their case to a jury in court. He would have denied those American citizens, terrified as they were, their day in court. Judge Alito, I regret to say, often goes out of his way to justify excessive government actions. Many have talked in the Senate about Doe v. Groody, where Judge Alito, dissenting in an opinion by our current head of the Department of Homeland Security, then-Judge Michael Chertoff, concluded that the strip-search of a 10-year-old girl was unreasonable. That was the conclusion of Judge Chertoff. Judge Alito concluded that the strip-search of a 10-year-old girl was reasonable. He reached this astonishing conclusion on a technicality. Rather than relying on the search warrant to determine whether the strip search of a child was authorized, Judge Alito argued that the court ought to look to the police officer's supporting affidavits. As a rule, however--now, I can say this as a former prosecutor because we used to labor over those warrants very carefully, knowing they were going to be scrutinized--affidavits are not part of the search warrants unless the trial judge decides they are. That ``goes to the heart of the constitutional requirement that judges, not the police, authorize the warrants. But Judge Alito said: No, no, no, no, it is OK to go look behind what they were intending, and decided they must have intended to include the search of the entire family, including a 10-year-old child. Is that the standard we want on the Court? Judge Alito's minimalist view of the fourth amendment's right to privacy is not limited to claims of excessive force. In United States v. Lee, he upheld the FBI's installation of a video and audio surveillance device in a hotel room in order to record conversations between the target of a bribery sting and a police informant. The FBI conducted the surveillance without a warrant, arguing, first, that the target had no expectation of privacy in a hotel room, and, second, that the device was turned on only when the informant was in the room. Judge Alito accepted the FBI's argument, and found no constitutional violation. His eagerness to buy the FBI's arguments, particularly in light of the Supreme Court decisions to the contrary, raises serious questions about how he would approach serious constitutional violations to the National Security Agency's program of domestic eavesdropping. Americans across the board are concerned about the violation of the law with respect to what we passed in the Congress overwhelmingly. After all, with the eavesdropping in Lee and the eavesdropping being conducted now, we see some startling similarity. Both are defended on the basis of Executive discretion and self-restraint. The fourth amendment is not defined that way. It is defined by judicial restraint itself, not the Executive restraint, and by judicial review. We also should never forget, as we think about this issue, the words of an eminent Justice, Justice Brandeis, who said: Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. I believe that is what we need to protect ourselves against. That is what the Framers created the judiciary to do. And that is what I fear the record shows Judge Alito has not been willing to do. Now, if his judicial opinions and legal memoranda do not convince you of these things, you can take a look at the speech he gave to the Federalist Society in which, as a sitting judge, he ``preached the gospel'' of the Reagan Justice Department nearly 15 years after he left it; a speech in which he announced his support of the ``unitary executive theory'' on the grounds that it ``best captures the meaning of the Constitution's text and structure.'' As Beth Nolan, former White House counsel to President Clinton, describes it: ``Unitary executive'' is a small phrase with almost limitless import: At the very least, it embodies the concept of Presidential control over all Executive functions, including those that have traditionally been exercised by ``independent'' agencies and other actors not subject to the President's direct control. Under this meaning, Congress may not, by statute, insulate the Federal Reserve or the Federal Election Commission . . . from Presidential control. Judge Alito believes you can. The phrase is also used to embrace expansive interpretations of the President's substantive powers, and strong limits on the Legislative and Judicial branches. This is the apparent meaning of the phrase in many of this Administration's signing statements. Now, most recently, one of those signing statements was used to preserve the President's right to just outright ignore the ban on torture that was passed overwhelmingly by the Congress. We had a long fight on this floor. I believe the vote was somewhere in the 90s, if I recall correctly. Ninety-something said this is the intent of Congress: to ban torture. But the President immediately turned around and did a signing in which he suggested an alternative interpretation. And Judge Alito has indicated his support for that Executive power. During the hearings, Judge Alito attempted to convince the committee that the unitary executive theory is not about the scope of Presidential power. But that is just flat wrong. Not only does the theory read Executive power very broadly, but, by necessity, it reads congressional power very narrowly. In other words, as the President gains exclusive power over a matter, the Constitution withholds Congress's authority to regulate in that field. That is not, by any originalist interpretation, what the Founding Fathers intended. Let me give you a real-life example, as described again by Beth Nolan: [W]hen the Reagan Administration undertook the covert arms- for-hostages operation that eventually grew into the Iran- Contra scandal, it triggered the requirement of the National Security Act that the Administration provide Congress ``timely notification'' of the covert operation. Reading the phrase ``timely notification'' against the background of the unitary executive theory, the Justice Department stated, ``The President's authority to act in the field of international relations is plenary, exclusive, and subject to no legal limitations save those derived from the applicable provisions of the Constitution itself.'' According to Justice, under that interpretation, Congress's role in this matter was limited because its only constitutional powers in the area of foreign affairs were those that directly involved the exercise of legal authority over American citizens. Justice even qualified this statement, saying that by ``American citizens'' it meant ``the private citizenry'' and not the President or other executive officials. According to Ms. Nolan: [I]f such claims are taken seriously, then the President is largely impervious to statutory law in the areas of foreign affairs, national security, and war, and Congress is effectively powerless to act as a constraint against presidential aggrandizement in these areas. Does that sound familiar? It ought to sound familiar. The Bush administration's legal opinion on torture, the administration's response to the McCain antitorture amendment, and the justifications given for the NSA's domestic spying program have all been based, in large part, on this exact same theory of the unitary executive. Given Judge Alito's history in the Reagan Justice Department, given his writings on the Third Circuit, given the year 2000 speech to the Federalist Society, a central question is whether you can trust that he, in fact, is going to protect the rights of the Congress and the legislative branch as well as those personal freedoms of individual Americans from those governmental intrusions? I believe the record says ``no.'' Now, as I mentioned earlier, I know this is flying against some of the sort of political punditry of Washington. I understand that. But this is a fight worth making because it is a fight for a lifetime appointment on the Supreme Court of the United States, with a series of decisions that suggest a view--however brilliant a legal mind--he has a brilliant legal mind. I met with him. He is a nice fellow--we all understand that--well regarded by some people in the judicial system. He was looked at by the ABA. And they make a judgment based on sort of just legal decisions, not necessarily the ideological impact, the larger implication, all the other conditions that we need to consider as we give advice and consent. Perhaps Professor Liu of the Berkeley Law School put it best when he wrote this. He said: Judge Alito's record envisions an America where police may shoot and kill an unarmed boy to stop him from running away with a stolen purse; where federal agents may point guns at ordinary citizens during a raid, even after no sign of resistance; where the FBI may install a camera where you sleep on the promise that they won't turn it on unless an informant is in the room; where a black man may be sentenced to death by an all-white jury for killing a white man, absent a multiple regression analysis showing discrimination; and where police may search what a warrant permits, and then some. He says: [T]his is not the America we know. Nor is it the America we aspire to be. So these are the reasons we need to take a hard look at what we are doing, even if it means swimming upstream. There are consequences to this nomination that I do not believe all the American people got out of the hearings because the hearings did not answer questions. And when you pose some of these choices to Americans, they come down on the side that I have described: being protected, not making those kinds of choices about a young kid, making sure that our privacy is protected. So for those reasons, and others I will discuss starting on Monday, I oppose Judge Alito's nomination. And I hope that colleagues, others, will join in that effort in the end. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.", u" Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred, as follows: H.R. 5477. A bill to provide for the establishment at the National Science Foundation of a program to promote and assist the teaching of inventiveness and innovation; to the Committee on Science, and in addition to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. HALL: H.R. 5478. A bill to clarify the Congressional intent on Federal preemption under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act with respect to energy conservation for consumer products; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. WELLER (for himself, Mr. Ramstad, Mr. Bishop of Georgia, Mr. Shuster, Mr. Smith of Washington, and Mr. Renzi): H.R. 5479. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to treat certain amounts paid for exercise equipment and physical fitness programs as amounts paid for medical care; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. McDERMOTT (for himself, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Rangel, Mr. Payne, Mr. English of Pennsylvania, Ms. McCollum of Minnesota, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Berman, Mr. Doggett, Ms. Millender-McDonald, Mr. Meeks of New York, Mr. McNulty, Mr. McGovern, Ms. Bordallo, Ms. Watson, Ms. Corrine Brown of Florida, Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas, Mr. Gonzalez, Mr. Miller of North Carolina, and Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas): H.R. 5480. A bill to promote economic diversification, entrepreneurship, and private sector development in Africa, and to promote partnerships among small and medium enterprises in the United States and the African private sector in qualified sub-Saharan African countries; to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Small Business, and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. NORWOOD: H.R. 5481. A bill to amend the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 to improve the safety of mines and mining; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mrs. MALONEY: H.R. 5482. A bill to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to provide individuals the ability to control access to their credit reports, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. YOUNG of Alaska (for himself, Mr. Oberstar, Mr. LaTourette, and Ms. Corrine Brown of Florida): H.R. 5483. A bill to increase the disability earning limitation under the Railroad Retirement Act and to index the amount of allowable earnings consistent with increases in the substantial gainful activity dollar amount under the Social Security Act; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Mr. McHENRY: H.R. 5484. A bill to allow border States to use a portion of certain Department of Homeland Security grants to build physical barriers to deter illegal crossings; to the Committee on Homeland Security. By Mr. BAIRD (for himself and Mr. Wu): H.R. 5485. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a study to determine the feasibility of establishing the Columbia-Pacific National Heritage Area in the States of Washington and Oregon, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Resources. By Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas (for herself, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Kucinich, Mr. Lewis of Georgia, Ms. Moore of Wisconsin, Mr. Watt, Mr. Towns, Mr. Jackson of Illinois, Mr. Meeks of New York, and Mr. McDermott): H.R. 5486. A bill to prevent the Executive from encroaching upon the Congressional prerogative to make laws, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Government Reform. By Ms. HOOLEY (for herself, Mr. LaTourette, Ms. Bean, Mr. Baker, Mr. Moore of Kansas, Mr. Kanjorski, Mr. Crowley, Mrs. McCarthy, Mr. Meeks of New York, Mr. Hinojosa, Ms. Moore of Wisconsin, Mr. Clay, Mrs. Kelly, Ms. Harman, Mr. Larson of Connecticut, Mr. Rahall, Mr. Delahunt, Ms. Corrine Brown of Florida, Mr. Kucinich, Mr. Michaud, Mr. Davis of Alabama, Mr. Al Green of Texas, Mr. Scott of Georgia, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Grijalva, Ms. DeGette, Ms. Bordallo, Mr. Baca, Mr. Smith of Washington, Mr. Clyburn, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, Mr. Dicks, Mr. Inslee, Mr. Pomeroy, Mr. Filner, Mr. Ramstad, Ms. Wasserman Schultz, Mr. Walden of Oregon, Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Baird, and Ms. Herseth): H.R. 5487. A bill to require the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to take certain actions to mitigate the effects of the breach of data security that occurred, or is likely to have occurred, in May, 2006, at the Department of Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. ADERHOLT: H.R. 5488. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend the period of limitation for filing a claim for credit or refund of an estate tax overpayment attributable to litigation continuing after the return for the estate is filed; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. ANDREWS: H.R. 5489. A bill to direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to make grants to States to provide for the publication of security and emergency information in telephone directories; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Mr. ANDREWS: H.R. 5490. A bill to require the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to establish a personal identification number for each veteran in order to help preserve the confidentiality of Department of Veterans Affairs information on veterans, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. BAKER (for himself, Mr. McHenry, and Mr. Hensarling): H.R. 5491. A bill to protect investors by fostering transparency and accountability of attorneys in private securities litigation; to the Committee on Financial Services, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania: H.R. 5492. A bill to amend the Constitution Heritage Act of 1988 to provide for the operation of the National Constitution Center; to the Committee on Resources. By Mrs. CUBIN (for herself, Mr. Ramstad, Mr. Osborne, Mr. Souder, Mr. Peterson of Minnesota, and Mr. Terry): H.R. 5493. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act regarding residential treatment programs for pregnant and parenting women, a program to reduce substance abuse among nonviolent offenders, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mrs. DAVIS of California: H.R. 5494. A bill to require the distribution by the National Technical Information Service of monthly updates of the Death Master List prepared by the Social Security Administration to all nationwide consumer reporting agencies, to require such consumer reporting agencies to maintain a permanent fraud alert in each file of a consumer whose name appears on the Death Master List, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. ENGLISH of Pennsylvania: H.R. 5495. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to add human papillomavirus vaccines to the list of taxable vaccines for purposes of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. FERGUSON: H.R. 5496. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide special treatment of certain cancer hospitals under the Medicare Program; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. HARMAN (for herself and Mr. Calvert): H.R. 5497. A bill to limit the reduction in the number of personnel of the Air Force Space Command, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services. By Mr. HONDA (for himself, Mr. Abercrombie, Ms. Bordallo, Mr. Case, Mr. Faleomavaega, Mr. Al Green of Texas, Ms. Matsui, Mr. Scott of Virginia, Mr. Wu, Mr. Watt, Mrs. Napolitano, and Mr. Becerra): H.R. 5498. A bill to amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to improve the provision of disaster relief and preparedness services with respect to persons with limited English proficiency, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut: H.R. 5499. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to expand and make permanent the Department of Veterans Affairs benefit for Government markers for marked graves of veterans buried in private cemeteries, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. KELLER (for himself, Mr. Boren, Mrs. Musgrave, Mr. Hensarling, Mr. Herger, Mr. Kuhl of New York, Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut, Mr. McCaul of Texas, Mr. Ney, and Mr. Davis of Tennessee): H.R. 5500. A bill to prevent undue disruption of interstate commerce by limiting civil actions brought against persons whose only role with regard to a product in the stream of commerce is as a lawful seller of the product; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. McHUGH (for himself, Mr. Hinchey, Mr. Sanders, Mr. Boehlert, Mr. Walsh, Mr. Kuhl of New York, Mr. Reynolds, Mrs. Kelly, Mr. Fossella, Mr. Sweeney, Mr. King of New York, Mrs. Maloney, Mr. McNulty, Mr. Nadler, Mr. Higgins, and Mrs. McCarthy): H.R. 5501. A bill to establish the Champlain Quadricentennial Commemoration Commission, the Hudson-Fulton 400th Commemoration Commission, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Government Reform. By Miss McMORRIS: H.R. 5502. A bill to improve the academic competitiveness of students in the United States; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mr. GARY G. MILLER of California (for himself and Mr. Frank of Massachusetts): H.R. 5503. A bill to amend the National Housing Act to increase the mortgage amount limits applicable to FHA mortgage insurance for multifamily housing located in high- cost areas; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. MOORE of Kansas (for himself, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Ryun of Kansas, and Mr. Moran of Kansas): H.R. 5504. A bill to designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 6029 Broadmoor Street in Mission, Kansas, as the ``Larry Winn, Jr. Post Office Building''; to the Committee on Government Reform. By Mrs. MYRICK: H.R. 5505. A bill to require the debarment from Federal contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements of employers who hire unauthorized aliens, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mrs. MYRICK: H.R. 5506. A bill to preclude the acceptance of a driver's license as a document establishing identity, for purposes of employment eligibility verification, if the State issuing the license permits use of a taxpayer identification number that is not a social security account number in the application process; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mrs. MYRICK: H.R. 5507. A bill to establish procedures for the issuance by the Commissioner of Social Security of ``no match'' letters to employers, and for the notification of the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding such letters; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. NORTON: H.R. 5508. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to increase the Federal medical assistance percentage for the District of Columbia under the Medicaid Program to 75 percent; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. NUNES: H.R. 5509. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify the tax credit for electricity produced from open-loop biomass; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. OBERSTAR: H.R. 5510. A bill to direct the Administrator of General Services to install a photovoltaic system for the headquarters building of the Department of Energy; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Mr. ROHRABACHER: H.R. 5511. A bill to amend title 28, United States Code, to ensure that the validity of foreign judgments against United States citizens is adjudicated in Federal courts; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. RYAN of Ohio (for himself and Mr. Kildee): H.R. 5512. A bill to direct the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to establish an urban blight demolition program to provide grants for the demolition of condemned and tax-foreclosed residential housing; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. SCHWARZ of Michigan (for himself, Mr. Price of Georgia, Mr. Regula, Mr. Tiberi, Mr. Hobson, and Mr. Ryan of Ohio): H.R. 5513. A bill to amend part B of title XVIII of the Social Security Act to restore the Medicare treatment of ownership of oxygen equipment to that in effect before enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. SHAW: H.R. 5514. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide coverage for lung cancer screening tests for certain high-risk individuals under the Medicare Program; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. STRICKLAND (for himself, Mr. Rangel, Mr. Brown of Ohio, Mr. Frank of Massachusetts, Mr. Costello, Ms. Moore of Wisconsin, and Mr. McGovern): H.R. 5515. A bill to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to authorize trade readjustment allowances under chapter 2 of title II of such Act to adversely affected workers who are subject to a lockout; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. THOMPSON of California: H.R. 5516. A bill to allow for the renegotiation of the payment schedule of contracts between the Secretary of the Interior and the Redwood Valley County Water District, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Resources. By Mr. UDALL of New Mexico (for himself, Mrs. Emerson, Mrs. Kelly, and Mr. Michaud): H.R. 5517. A bill to amend the Small Business Act to establish a temporary loan program and a temporary vocational development program for small business concerns owned and controlled by veterans; to the Committee on Small Business. By Mr. WEXLER: H.R. 5518. A bill to repeal the Medicare cost containment provisions contained in subtitle A of title VIII of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. WICKER (for himself, Mr. Shays, Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California, Mr. Case, Mr. Van Hollen, Mr. Pomeroy, and Mr. Moran of Kansas): H.R. 5519. A bill to improve and expand geographic literacy among kindergarten through grade 12 students in the United States by improving professional development programs for kindergarten through grade 12 teachers offered through institutions of higher education; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico (for herself, Mr. Platts, Mr. Renzi, Mr. Hayworth, Mr. Gutknecht, Mr. Garrett of New Jersey, Mr. Leach, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Simmons, Mrs. Kelly, Mr. Hefley, Mr. Cole of Oklahoma, Mr. Kline, Mr. Barrett of South Carolina, Mrs. Blackburn, Ms. Granger, Mr. Carter, Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut, Mr. Sweeney, Mrs. Miller of Michigan, Mr. Skelton, Mr. Spratt, Mr. Hall, Mr. Sherwood, Mr. Gerlach, Mrs. Northup, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Rogers of Michigan, Mr. Reichert, Mr. McCaul of Texas, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Gohmert, Mr. Mario Diaz- Balart of Florida, Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart of Florida, Ms. Ginny Brown-Waite of Florida, Mr. Davis of Kentucky, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Mr. Abercrombie, Mr. Meehan, Mr. Miller of Florida, Mr. Aderholt, Mr. Crenshaw, Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Goode, Mr. Jones of North Carolina, Mrs. Cubin, Mr. Rogers of Alabama, Mr. Everett, Mr. Bradley of New Hampshire, Mr. Beauprez, Mr. Gingrey, Mr. Istook, Mr. Tom Davis of Virginia, Mrs. Drake, Mrs. Schmidt, Mr. Lucas, Mr. Kirk, Mr. Wolf, Mr. Rothman, Mr. Shimkus, Mr. Taylor of Mississippi, Mr. Hulshof, Ms. Hart, Mr. Shays, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Wamp, Mr. Salazar, Mr. Porter, Mr. Franks of Arizona, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Hoekstra, and Mr. Hastings of Washington): H.R. 5520. A bill to establish the Office of Veterans Identity Protection Claims to reimburse injured persons for injuries suffered as a result of the unauthorized use, disclosure, or dissemination of identifying information stolen from the Department of Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (for himself, Mr. Markey, Mr. McGovern, Mr. Berman, Ms. Watson, and Ms. McKinney): H.J. Res. 87. A joint resolution requiring the President to notify Congress if the President makes a determination at the time of signing a bill into law to ignore a duly enacted provision of such newly enacted law, establishing expedited procedures for the consideration of legislation in the House of Representatives in response to such a determination, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. UDALL of Colorado (for himself and Mr. Schwarz of Michigan): H. Con. Res. 417. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress in support of a broad-based political settlement in Iraq; to the Committee on International Relations. By Mr. HASTINGS of Washington: H. Con. Res. 418. Concurrent resolution providing for an adjournment or recess of the two Houses; considered and agreed to. By Mrs. KELLY (for herself, Mr. Hinchey, Mrs. Maloney, Mrs. McCarthy, Mr. Bishop of New York, Mr. Sweeney, Mr. Fossella, and Mr. Israel): H. Con. Res. 419. Concurrent resolution recognizing and supporting the efforts of the State of New York develop the National Purple Heart Hall of Honor in New Windsor, New York, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services. By Mr. PALLONE: H. Con. Res. 420. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that a commemorative postage stamp should be issued to promote public awareness of, and additional research relating to, Crohn's Disease; to the Committee on Government Reform. By Mr. PRICE of Georgia (for himself, Mr. McKeon, Mr. Udall of Colorado, Mr. Schwarz of Michigan, Mr. Castle, Ms. Kaptur, Mr. Kingston, Mr. Crowley, Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut, Mr. Wu, and Ms. Baldwin): H. Con. Res. 421. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress and support for Greater Opportunities for Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (GO-STEM) programs; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mrs. DRAKE: H. Res. 843. A resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States should seek to achieve complete energy independence by 2015; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. ENGEL (for himself, Mr. King of New York, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Berman, Mr. Brown of Ohio, Mr. Wexler, Ms. Lee, Mr. Crowley, Ms. McCollum of Minnesota, Mr. Carnahan, Mr. Sweeney, Mr. Pallone, Mr. Waxman, Mrs. Capps, Mr. Nadler, Mr. McNulty, Mrs. Maloney, Mr. Towns, Mr. Higgins, Mr. Hinojosa, Ms. Bordallo, Mr. McDermott, Ms. Millender-McDonald, Mr. McGovern, Mr. Cummings, Mrs. McCarthy, Mr. Rush, Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas, Mr. Doyle, and Ms. Baldwin): H. Res. 844. A resolution congratulating the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative on ten years of significant achievement in the search for an HIV/AIDS vaccine, and for other purposes; to the Committee on International Relations. By Mr. HINCHEY (for himself, Mr. Waxman, Mr. Lewis of Georgia, and Ms. Woolsey): H. Res. 845. A resolution requesting the President and directing the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General to transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution, documents relating to the termination of the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility's investigation of the involvement of Department of Justice personnel in the creation and administration of the National Security Agency's warrantless surveillance program, including documents relating to Office of Professional Responsibility's request for and denial of security clearances; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Ms. LEE: H. Res. 846. A resolution requesting the President and directing the Secretary of State to provide to the House of Representatives certain documents in their possession relating to strategies and plans either designed to cause regime change in or for the use of military force against Iran; to the Committee on International Relations. By Mr. RANGEL: H. Res. 847. A resolution honoring the life and accomplishments of Katherine Dunham and extending condolences to her family on her death; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Ferguson, and Mr. Nadler): H. Res. 848. A resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the creation of refugee populations in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf region as a result of human rights violations; to the Committee on International Relations.", u" Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred, as follows: H.R. 5477. A bill to provide for the establishment at the National Science Foundation of a program to promote and assist the teaching of inventiveness and innovation; to the Committee on Science, and in addition to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. HALL: H.R. 5478. A bill to clarify the Congressional intent on Federal preemption under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act with respect to energy conservation for consumer products; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. WELLER (for himself, Mr. Ramstad, Mr. Bishop of Georgia, Mr. Shuster, Mr. Smith of Washington, and Mr. Renzi): H.R. 5479. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to treat certain amounts paid for exercise equipment and physical fitness programs as amounts paid for medical care; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. McDERMOTT (for himself, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Rangel, Mr. Payne, Mr. English of Pennsylvania, Ms. McCollum of Minnesota, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Berman, Mr. Doggett, Ms. Millender-McDonald, Mr. Meeks of New York, Mr. McNulty, Mr. McGovern, Ms. Bordallo, Ms. Watson, Ms. Corrine Brown of Florida, Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas, Mr. Gonzalez, Mr. Miller of North Carolina, and Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas): H.R. 5480. A bill to promote economic diversification, entrepreneurship, and private sector development in Africa, and to promote partnerships among small and medium enterprises in the United States and the African private sector in qualified sub-Saharan African countries; to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Small Business, and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. NORWOOD: H.R. 5481. A bill to amend the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 to improve the safety of mines and mining; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mrs. MALONEY: H.R. 5482. A bill to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to provide individuals the ability to control access to their credit reports, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. YOUNG of Alaska (for himself, Mr. Oberstar, Mr. LaTourette, and Ms. Corrine Brown of Florida): H.R. 5483. A bill to increase the disability earning limitation under the Railroad Retirement Act and to index the amount of allowable earnings consistent with increases in the substantial gainful activity dollar amount under the Social Security Act; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Mr. McHENRY: H.R. 5484. A bill to allow border States to use a portion of certain Department of Homeland Security grants to build physical barriers to deter illegal crossings; to the Committee on Homeland Security. By Mr. BAIRD (for himself and Mr. Wu): H.R. 5485. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a study to determine the feasibility of establishing the Columbia-Pacific National Heritage Area in the States of Washington and Oregon, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Resources. By Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas (for herself, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Kucinich, Mr. Lewis of Georgia, Ms. Moore of Wisconsin, Mr. Watt, Mr. Towns, Mr. Jackson of Illinois, Mr. Meeks of New York, and Mr. McDermott): H.R. 5486. A bill to prevent the Executive from encroaching upon the Congressional prerogative to make laws, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Government Reform. By Ms. HOOLEY (for herself, Mr. LaTourette, Ms. Bean, Mr. Baker, Mr. Moore of Kansas, Mr. Kanjorski, Mr. Crowley, Mrs. McCarthy, Mr. Meeks of New York, Mr. Hinojosa, Ms. Moore of Wisconsin, Mr. Clay, Mrs. Kelly, Ms. Harman, Mr. Larson of Connecticut, Mr. Rahall, Mr. Delahunt, Ms. Corrine Brown of Florida, Mr. Kucinich, Mr. Michaud, Mr. Davis of Alabama, Mr. Al Green of Texas, Mr. Scott of Georgia, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Grijalva, Ms. DeGette, Ms. Bordallo, Mr. Baca, Mr. Smith of Washington, Mr. Clyburn, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, Mr. Dicks, Mr. Inslee, Mr. Pomeroy, Mr. Filner, Mr. Ramstad, Ms. Wasserman Schultz, Mr. Walden of Oregon, Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Baird, and Ms. Herseth): H.R. 5487. A bill to require the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to take certain actions to mitigate the effects of the breach of data security that occurred, or is likely to have occurred, in May, 2006, at the Department of Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. ADERHOLT: H.R. 5488. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend the period of limitation for filing a claim for credit or refund of an estate tax overpayment attributable to litigation continuing after the return for the estate is filed; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. ANDREWS: H.R. 5489. A bill to direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to make grants to States to provide for the publication of security and emergency information in telephone directories; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Mr. ANDREWS: H.R. 5490. A bill to require the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to establish a personal identification number for each veteran in order to help preserve the confidentiality of Department of Veterans Affairs information on veterans, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. BAKER (for himself, Mr. McHenry, and Mr. Hensarling): H.R. 5491. A bill to protect investors by fostering transparency and accountability of attorneys in private securities litigation; to the Committee on Financial Services, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania: H.R. 5492. A bill to amend the Constitution Heritage Act of 1988 to provide for the operation of the National Constitution Center; to the Committee on Resources. By Mrs. CUBIN (for herself, Mr. Ramstad, Mr. Osborne, Mr. Souder, Mr. Peterson of Minnesota, and Mr. Terry): H.R. 5493. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act regarding residential treatment programs for pregnant and parenting women, a program to reduce substance abuse among nonviolent offenders, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mrs. DAVIS of California: H.R. 5494. A bill to require the distribution by the National Technical Information Service of monthly updates of the Death Master List prepared by the Social Security Administration to all nationwide consumer reporting agencies, to require such consumer reporting agencies to maintain a permanent fraud alert in each file of a consumer whose name appears on the Death Master List, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. ENGLISH of Pennsylvania: H.R. 5495. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to add human papillomavirus vaccines to the list of taxable vaccines for purposes of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. FERGUSON: H.R. 5496. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide special treatment of certain cancer hospitals under the Medicare Program; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. HARMAN (for herself and Mr. Calvert): H.R. 5497. A bill to limit the reduction in the number of personnel of the Air Force Space Command, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services. By Mr. HONDA (for himself, Mr. Abercrombie, Ms. Bordallo, Mr. Case, Mr. Faleomavaega, Mr. Al Green of Texas, Ms. Matsui, Mr. Scott of Virginia, Mr. Wu, Mr. Watt, Mrs. Napolitano, and Mr. Becerra): H.R. 5498. A bill to amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to improve the provision of disaster relief and preparedness services with respect to persons with limited English proficiency, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut: H.R. 5499. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to expand and make permanent the Department of Veterans Affairs benefit for Government markers for marked graves of veterans buried in private cemeteries, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. By Mr. KELLER (for himself, Mr. Boren, Mrs. Musgrave, Mr. Hensarling, Mr. Herger, Mr. Kuhl of New York, Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut, Mr. McCaul of Texas, Mr. Ney, and Mr. Davis of Tennessee): H.R. 5500. A bill to prevent undue disruption of interstate commerce by limiting civil actions brought against persons whose only role with regard to a product in the stream of commerce is as a lawful seller of the product; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. McHUGH (for himself, Mr. Hinchey, Mr. Sanders, Mr. Boehlert, Mr. Walsh, Mr. Kuhl of New York, Mr. Reynolds, Mrs. Kelly, Mr. Fossella, Mr. Sweeney, Mr. King of New York, Mrs. Maloney, Mr. McNulty, Mr. Nadler, Mr. Higgins, and Mrs. McCarthy): H.R. 5501. A bill to establish the Champlain Quadricentennial Commemoration Commission, the Hudson-Fulton 400th Commemoration Commission, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Government Reform. By Miss McMORRIS: H.R. 5502. A bill to improve the academic competitiveness of students in the United States; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mr. GARY G. MILLER of California (for himself and Mr. Frank of Massachusetts): H.R. 5503. A bill to amend the National Housing Act to increase the mortgage amount limits applicable to FHA mortgage insurance for multifamily housing located in high- cost areas; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. MOORE of Kansas (for himself, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Ryun of Kansas, and Mr. Moran of Kansas): H.R. 5504. A bill to designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 6029 Broadmoor Street in Mission, Kansas, as the ``Larry Winn, Jr. Post Office Building''; to the Committee on Government Reform. By Mrs. MYRICK: H.R. 5505. A bill to require the debarment from Federal contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements of employers who hire unauthorized aliens, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mrs. MYRICK: H.R. 5506. A bill to preclude the acceptance of a driver's license as a document establishing identity, for purposes of employment eligibility verification, if the State issuing the license permits use of a taxpayer identification number that is not a social security account number in the application process; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mrs. MYRICK: H.R. 5507. A bill to establish procedures for the issuance by the Commissioner of Social Security of ``no match'' letters to employers, and for the notification of the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding such letters; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Ms. NORTON: H.R. 5508. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to increase the Federal medical assistance percentage for the District of Columbia under the Medicaid Program to 75 percent; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. NUNES: H.R. 5509. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify the tax credit for electricity produced from open-loop biomass; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. OBERSTAR: H.R. 5510. A bill to direct the Administrator of General Services to install a photovoltaic system for the headquarters building of the Department of Energy; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. By Mr. ROHRABACHER: H.R. 5511. A bill to amend title 28, United States Code, to ensure that the validity of foreign judgments against United States citizens is adjudicated in Federal courts; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. RYAN of Ohio (for himself and Mr. Kildee): H.R. 5512. A bill to direct the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to establish an urban blight demolition program to provide grants for the demolition of condemned and tax-foreclosed residential housing; to the Committee on Financial Services. By Mr. SCHWARZ of Michigan (for himself, Mr. Price of Georgia, Mr. Regula, Mr. Tiberi, Mr. Hobson, and Mr. Ryan of Ohio): H.R. 5513. A bill to amend part B of title XVIII of the Social Security Act to restore the Medicare treatment of ownership of oxygen equipment to that in effect before enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. SHAW: H.R. 5514. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide coverage for lung cancer screening tests for certain high-risk individuals under the Medicare Program; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. STRICKLAND (for himself, Mr. Rangel, Mr. Brown of Ohio, Mr. Frank of Massachusetts, Mr. Costello, Ms. Moore of Wisconsin, and Mr. McGovern): H.R. 5515. A bill to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to authorize trade readjustment allowances under chapter 2 of title II of such Act to adversely affected workers who are subject to a lockout; to the Committee on Ways and Means. By Mr. THOMPSON of California: H.R. 5516. A bill to allow for the renegotiation of the payment schedule of contracts between the Secretary of the Interior and the Redwood Valley County Water District, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Resources. By Mr. UDALL of New Mexico (for himself, Mrs. Emerson, Mrs. Kelly, and Mr. Michaud): H.R. 5517. A bill to amend the Small Business Act to establish a temporary loan program and a temporary vocational development program for small business concerns owned and controlled by veterans; to the Committee on Small Business. By Mr. WEXLER: H.R. 5518. A bill to repeal the Medicare cost containment provisions contained in subtitle A of title VIII of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003; to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. WICKER (for himself, Mr. Shays, Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California, Mr. Case, Mr. Van Hollen, Mr. Pomeroy, and Mr. Moran of Kansas): H.R. 5519. A bill to improve and expand geographic literacy among kindergarten through grade 12 students in the United States by improving professional development programs for kindergarten through grade 12 teachers offered through institutions of higher education; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico (for herself, Mr. Platts, Mr. Renzi, Mr. Hayworth, Mr. Gutknecht, Mr. Garrett of New Jersey, Mr. Leach, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Simmons, Mrs. Kelly, Mr. Hefley, Mr. Cole of Oklahoma, Mr. Kline, Mr. Barrett of South Carolina, Mrs. Blackburn, Ms. Granger, Mr. Carter, Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut, Mr. Sweeney, Mrs. Miller of Michigan, Mr. Skelton, Mr. Spratt, Mr. Hall, Mr. Sherwood, Mr. Gerlach, Mrs. Northup, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Rogers of Michigan, Mr. Reichert, Mr. McCaul of Texas, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Gohmert, Mr. Mario Diaz- Balart of Florida, Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart of Florida, Ms. Ginny Brown-Waite of Florida, Mr. Davis of Kentucky, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Mr. Abercrombie, Mr. Meehan, Mr. Miller of Florida, Mr. Aderholt, Mr. Crenshaw, Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Goode, Mr. Jones of North Carolina, Mrs. Cubin, Mr. Rogers of Alabama, Mr. Everett, Mr. Bradley of New Hampshire, Mr. Beauprez, Mr. Gingrey, Mr. Istook, Mr. Tom Davis of Virginia, Mrs. Drake, Mrs. Schmidt, Mr. Lucas, Mr. Kirk, Mr. Wolf, Mr. Rothman, Mr. Shimkus, Mr. Taylor of Mississippi, Mr. Hulshof, Ms. Hart, Mr. Shays, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Wamp, Mr. Salazar, Mr. Porter, Mr. Franks of Arizona, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Hoekstra, and Mr. Hastings of Washington): H.R. 5520. A bill to establish the Office of Veterans Identity Protection Claims to reimburse injured persons for injuries suffered as a result of the unauthorized use, disclosure, or dissemination of identifying information stolen from the Department of Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (for himself, Mr. Markey, Mr. McGovern, Mr. Berman, Ms. Watson, and Ms. McKinney): H.J. Res. 87. A joint resolution requiring the President to notify Congress if the President makes a determination at the time of signing a bill into law to ignore a duly enacted provision of such newly enacted law, establishing expedited procedures for the consideration of legislation in the House of Representatives in response to such a determination, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. By Mr. UDALL of Colorado (for himself and Mr. Schwarz of Michigan): H. Con. Res. 417. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress in support of a broad-based political settlement in Iraq; to the Committee on International Relations. By Mr. HASTINGS of Washington: H. Con. Res. 418. Concurrent resolution providing for an adjournment or recess of the two Houses; considered and agreed to. By Mrs. KELLY (for herself, Mr. Hinchey, Mrs. Maloney, Mrs. McCarthy, Mr. Bishop of New York, Mr. Sweeney, Mr. Fossella, and Mr. Israel): H. Con. Res. 419. Concurrent resolution recognizing and supporting the efforts of the State of New York develop the National Purple Heart Hall of Honor in New Windsor, New York, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services. By Mr. PALLONE: H. Con. Res. 420. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that a commemorative postage stamp should be issued to promote public awareness of, and additional research relating to, Crohn's Disease; to the Committee on Government Reform. By Mr. PRICE of Georgia (for himself, Mr. McKeon, Mr. Udall of Colorado, Mr. Schwarz of Michigan, Mr. Castle, Ms. Kaptur, Mr. Kingston, Mr. Crowley, Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut, Mr. Wu, and Ms. Baldwin): H. Con. Res. 421. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress and support for Greater Opportunities for Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (GO-STEM) programs; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Mrs. DRAKE: H. Res. 843. A resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States should seek to achieve complete energy independence by 2015; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. By Mr. ENGEL (for himself, Mr. King of New York, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Berman, Mr. Brown of Ohio, Mr. Wexler, Ms. Lee, Mr. Crowley, Ms. McCollum of Minnesota, Mr. Carnahan, Mr. Sweeney, Mr. Pallone, Mr. Waxman, Mrs. Capps, Mr. Nadler, Mr. McNulty, Mrs. Maloney, Mr. Towns, Mr. Higgins, Mr. Hinojosa, Ms. Bordallo, Mr. McDermott, Ms. Millender-McDonald, Mr. McGovern, Mr. Cummings, Mrs. McCarthy, Mr. Rush, Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas, Mr. Doyle, and Ms. Baldwin): H. Res. 844. A resolution congratulating the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative on ten years of significant achievement in the search for an HIV/AIDS vaccine, and for other purposes; to the Committee on International Relations. By Mr. HINCHEY (for himself, Mr. Waxman, Mr. Lewis of Georgia, and Ms. Woolsey): H. Res. 845. A resolution requesting the President and directing the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General to transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution, documents relating to the termination of the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility's investigation of the involvement of Department of Justice personnel in the creation and administration of the National Security Agency's warrantless surveillance program, including documents relating to Office of Professional Responsibility's request for and denial of security clearances; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Ms. LEE: H. Res. 846. A resolution requesting the President and directing the Secretary of State to provide to the House of Representatives certain documents in their possession relating to strategies and plans either designed to cause regime change in or for the use of military force against Iran; to the Committee on International Relations. By Mr. RANGEL: H. Res. 847. A resolution honoring the life and accomplishments of Katherine Dunham and extending condolences to her family on her death; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. By Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Ferguson, and Mr. Nadler): H. Res. 848. A resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the creation of refugee populations in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf region as a result of human rights violations; to the Committee on International Relations.", u"Mr. Speaker, the rule before us makes in order a conference report for the fiscal year 2007 defense appropriations bill. It will be the first conference agreement to pass both Chambers, and it would do so on time. That should be commended. However, the majority leadership has yet to come to an agreement on much else. As a result, the conferees were forced to include a continuing resolution that will keep the Federal Government open for business through November 17. Mr. Speaker, the conference agreement itself is a responsible effort to support our troops in the field. Thanks to the effort of Subcommittee Chairman Young and Ranking Member Murtha, we will continue to invest in modernizing our military. But, just as important, we will fund the training and equipment our troops need to complete their mission, wherever they are stationed. No one disagrees that the war in Iraq has placed a significant strain on our Armed Forces. An article in yesterday's New York Times describes the situation starkly: ``Other than the 17 brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan, only two or three combat brigades in the entire army, perhaps 7,000 to 10,000 troops, are fully trained and sufficiently equipped to respond quickly to crises, said a senior army general.'' Fort Stewart, GA.--The pressures that the conflict in Iraq is putting on the Army are apparent amid the towering pine trees of southeast Georgia, where the Third Infantry Division is preparing for the likelihood that it will go back to Iraq for a third tour. Col. Tom James, who commands the division's Second Brigade, acknowledged that his unit's equipment levels had fallen so low that it now had no tanks or other armored vehicles to use in training and that his soldiers were rated as largely untrained in attack and defense. The rest of the division, which helped lead the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and conducted the first probes into Baghdad, is moving back to full strength after many months of being a shell of its former self. But at a time when Pentagon officials are saying the Army is stretched so thin that it may be forced to go back on its pledge to limit National Guard deployment overseas, the division's situation is symptomatic of how the shortages are playing out on the ground. The enormous strains on equipment and personnel, because of longer-than-expected deployments, have left active Army units with little combat power in reserve. The Second Brigade, for example, has only half of the roughly 3,500 soldiers it is supposed to have. The unit trains on computer simulators, meant to recreate the experience of firing a tank's main gun or driving in a convoy under attack. ``It's a good tool before you get the equipment you need,'' Colonel James said. But a few years ago, he said, having a combat brigade in a mechanized infantry division at such a low state of readiness would have been ``unheard of.'' Other than the 17 brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan, only two or three combat brigades in the entire Army--perhaps 7,000 to 10,000 troops--are fully trained and sufficiently equipped to respond quickly to crises, said a senior Army general. Most other units of the active-duty Army, which is growing to 42 brigades, are resting or being refitted at their home bases. But even that cycle, which is supposed to take two years, is being compressed to a year or less because of the need to prepare units quickly to return to Iraq. After coming from Iraq in 2003, the Third Infantry Division was sent back in 2005. Then, within weeks of returning home last January, it was told by the Army that one of its four brigades had to be ready to go back again, this time in only 11 months. The three other brigades would have to be ready by mid-2007, Army planners said. Yet almost all of the division's equipment had been left in Iraq for their replacements, and thousands of its soldiers left the Army or were reassigned shortly after coming home, leaving the division largely hollow. Most senior officers were replaced in June. In addition to preparing for Iraq, the Army assigned the division other missions it had to be ready to execute, including responding to hurricanes and other natural disasters and deploying to Korea if conflict broke out there. Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, who took command in June, says officials at Army headquarters ask him every month how ready his division is to handle a crisis in Korea. The answer, General Lynch says, is that he is getting there. Since this summer, 1,000 soldiers a month have been arriving at Fort Stewart, 400 of them just out of basic training. As a result, the First and Third Brigades are now at or near their authorized troop strength, but many of the soldiers are raw. The two brigades started receiving tanks and other equipment to begin training in the field only in the last month, leaving the division only partly able to respond immediately if called to Korea, General Lynch said. ``I'm confident two of the four brigade combat teams would say, `O.K., let's go,' '' General Lynch said in an interview. ``The Second and Fourth Brigades would say, `O.K., boss, but we've got no equipment. What are we going to use?' So we'd have to figure out where we're going to draw their equipment.'' Meanwhile, the division is also preparing for deployment to Iraq on an abbreviated timeline. The brief time at home does not sit well with some soldiers. Specialist George Patterson, who reenlisted after returning from Iraq in January, said last week that he was surprised to learn he could end up being home with his wife and daughter for only a year. ``I knew I would be going back,'' Specialist Patterson said. ``Did I think I would leave and go back in the same year? No. It kind of stinks.'' Instead of allowing more than a year to prepare to deploy, the First Brigade training schedule has been squeezed into only a few months, so the brigade can be ready to deploy as ordered by early December. Though the unit has not yet been formally designated for Iraq, most soldiers say there is little doubt they are headed there early next year. Some combat-skills training not likely to be used in Iraq has been shortened substantially, said Col. John Charlton, the brigade commander. ``It's about taking all the requirements and compressing them, which is a challenge,'' he said. The timetable also leaves officers and their soldiers less time to form close relationships that can be vital, several officers said. And soldiers have less time to learn their weapons systems. Many of the major weapons systems, like artillery and even tanks, are unlikely to be used frequently in a counterinsurgency fight like Iraq. The division has only a few dozen fully armored Humvees for training because most of the vehicles are in use in Iraq. Nor does it have all the tanks and trucks it is supposed to have when at full strength. ``There is enough equipment, and I would almost say just enough equipment,'' said Lt. Col. Sean Morrissey, the division's logistics officer. ``We're accustomed to, `I need 100 trucks. Where's my hundred trucks?' Well, we're nowhere near that.'' Last week, in training areas deep in the Fort Stewart woods, First Brigade soldiers were still learning to use other systems important in Iraq, like unmanned aerial vehicles, which are used for conducting surveillance. Standing at a training airfield with three of the aircraft nearby, Sgt. Mark Melbourne, the senior noncommissioned officer for the brigade's unmanned aerial vehicles platoon, said only 6 of the brigade's 15 operators had qualified so far in operating the aircraft from a ground station. All of them are supposed to be qualified by next month, but the training has been slowed by frequent rain, Sergeant Melbourne said. This week, the First Brigade began a full-scale mission rehearsal for Iraq. Normally, armored units preparing for Iraq are sent to Fort Irwin, Calif., for such training, but transporting a brigade's worth of equipment and soldiers there takes a month, which the schedule would not permit. So the trainers and Arabic-speaking role players, who will simulate conditions the unit is likely to encounter in Iraq, were brought here to conduct the three-week exercise in a Georgia pine forest, rather than in the California desert. Mr. Speaker, I was pleased that the conferees recognize this growing crisis in the military and took steps to mitigate it. Specifically, the conference agreement provides $20 billion in additional funds to ensure that the needs of the Army and the Marine Corps for fiscal year 2007 are fully funded. This agreement also includes forward-thinking provisions. Ranking Member Murtha included language in the House bill prohibiting permanent U.S. bases in Iraq. I was pleased to join many of my colleagues in supporting that language. I appreciate that conferees preserved and strengthened this policy in the final agreement. Quite simply, intentions matter. And clarity in the United States' intentions is needed more so in Iraq than anywhere else. There are many other smart provisions included in this agreement. The bill includes a 2.2 percent pay increase for all members of the Armed Forces. It increases mental health and posttraumatic stress syndrome research, and it provides funds for the replacement of National Guard and Reserve equipment lost in Iraq and Afghanistan. But, finally, Mr. Speaker, I appreciate this agreement for the simple fact that it is on time. Conferees worked together over several weeks to produce a very balanced conference agreement. It should be a model for the work Congress still has to do. With only a few days remaining in this fiscal year, not a single appropriations bill has been signed into law. This is not new. In the last 5 years, only six of the 68 appropriations bills were finished on time. Some may try to shift blame to the other Chamber, but the majority has no one to blame but itself. Again, I turn to another article in yesterday's New York Times, which summarizes the situation quite clearly: ``While Republicans prefer to blame Democrats for the backlog, intramural fights and sharp differences between House and Senate Republicans have been chief impediments to major legislation.'' Washington.--A Congress derided as do-nothing has a week to do something, and the prospects are cloudy. Procrastination, power struggles and partisanship have left Congress with substantial work to finish before taking a break at the end of the week for the midterm elections. The fast-approaching recess and the Republican focus on national security legislation make it inevitable that much of the remainder will fall by the wayside. At best, it appears that only two of the 11 required spending bills will pass, and not one has been approved so far, forcing a stopgap measure to keep the federal government open. No budget was enacted. A popular package of business and education tax credits is teetering. A lobbying overhaul, once a top priority in view of corruption scandals, is dead. The drive for broad immigration changes has derailed. An offshore oil drilling bill, painted as an answer to high gas prices, is stalled. Plans to cut the estate tax and raise the minimum wage have foundered, and an important nuclear pact with India sought by the White House is not on track to clear Congress. New problems surfaced over the weekend for the annual military authorization bill. And numerous other initiatives await a planned lame-duck session in mid-November or a future Congress. ``It is disappointing where we are, and I think Republicans need to be upfront about this,'' said Representative Jack Kingston, Republican of Georgia and a member of the House leadership. ``We have not accomplished what we need to accomplish.'' Given the practical and political realities, Republicans have chosen to concentrate on legislation emphasizing their security credentials, like the bill governing interrogations and trials of terrorism detainees, a National Security Agency surveillance program and spending on the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security. ``With obstruction from the Democrats at an all-time high, we have focused on four security issues in an effort to enact some solid, substantive accomplishments,'' said Eric Ueland, chief of staff to Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee, the majority leader, who is stepping down at the end of this session. While Republicans prefer to blame Democrats for the backlog, intramural fights and sharp differences between House and Senate Republicans have been chief impediments to major legislation. The fissures over terrorism detainees and how far to go in changing immigration law are merely the latest and most public examples of serious policy differences among Republicans. Circumstances have changed in Washington from the days when Republicans were famous for party discipline. President George W. Bush, weakened by his sliding popularity, has been unable to hold sway over Congress. The Republican leadership in the House and the Senate is in transition and lacks the muscle of the former House majority leader, Tom DeLay. Republican lawmakers, many facing their most serious electoral opposition in years, are fending for themselves. ``We have no central core of political authority driving things in Washington,'' said James Thurber, director of the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies at American University. ``Individuals and expressions of individual will by committees, and also by strong people like John McCain, have dominated, and the result is internal fighting.'' Democrats have made no secret of their intention to try to brand this Congress as worse than lackluster. ``When we say this is the most do-nothing Congress in the history of our country, this isn't just flippant,'' said Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the Democratic leader. ``This is true.'' Besides denouncing the legislative output, Democrats are mounting an effort to chastise Republicans as failing to conduct sufficient oversight of the Iraq war. Republican leaders dispute the notion that this has been an unproductive session, pointing to legislation on bankruptcy, class action, highway spending, energy policy and pensions, as well as to two Supreme Court confirmations. And they say they already plan to be back Nov. 13 to finish whatever remains at the end of the week. Democrats have been happy throughout the year to stand almost united in both the House and the Senate against many of the Republican initiatives, forcing the majority to find enough votes to pass legislation from its own membership. That has often forced major concessions from the leadership. In other cases, Republicans in the House and the Senate have simply been unable to find common ground. ``In the 26 years I have been here,'' said Representative Barney Frank, Democrat of Massachusetts, ``I don't think I have ever seen so much tension between the House and the Senate, and it is all among Republicans.'' The immigration measure was a notable example as House Republicans refused to entertain the bipartisan Senate bill that took a comprehensive approach to the flood of illegal immigrants. A push for a formal budget plan collapsed because of differences over spending between House and Senate Republicans. A House-Senate Republican feud over the handling of a pension measure, which ultimately passed, left a collection of tax breaks in limbo despite nearly unanimous support in Congress. Those tax benefits included a deduction for college tuition costs and a research and development tax credit for businesses. The leadership has been reluctant to bring the benefits to a vote independently because they could be used to help advance more contentious legislation, like the cut in the estate tax sought by Republicans. A new struggle between rank-and-file Republicans and the leadership threatens to engulf the must-pass spending measure for domestic security. Lawmakers were insisting that a provision allowing Americans to bring back cheaper prescription drugs from Canada be added to the bill even though House leaders and the pharmaceutical industry oppose the Plan. Mr. Speaker, the 109th Congress has had fewer voting days than almost any other Congress in history. We have lost precious weeks on politics as we debated bills that would never become law; and, as a result, Congress will leave Washington this week with many of the American people's priorities unfinished. There will be no lobbying reform, no comprehensive immigration reform. Congress will have ignored the millions of seniors stuck in the prescription drug benefit doughnut hole. As I said last year when I also managed a prior continuing resolution, this Congress needs new and better priorities. Until then, delays will continue and deadlines will be missed and we will end up here every year with last-minute solutions to keep the Federal Government open for business. In closing, Mr. Speaker, the conference report made in order under this rule affirms our support for the men and women of the United States military. I commend the conferees for their work, especially Subcommittee Chairman Young and Ranking Member Murtha. They made great progress in a short time by working together. I would challenge the rest of my colleagues to do the same. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.", u"The text of the remainder of the bill through page 210, line 18, is as follows: Sec. 901. Funds appropriated in this or any other Act may be used to pay travel to the United States for the immediate family of employees serving abroad in cases of death or life threatening illness of said employee. Sec. 902. No department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States receiving appropriated funds under this or any other Act for fiscal year 2006 shall obligate or expend any such funds, unless such department, agency, or instrumentality has in place, and will continue to administer in good faith, a written policy designed to ensure that all of its workplaces are free from the illegal use, possession, or distribution of controlled substances (as defined in the Controlled Substances Act) by the officers and employees of such department, agency, or instrumentality. Sec. 903. Unless otherwise specifically provided, the maximum amount allowable during the current fiscal year in accordance with section 16 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (60 Stat. 810), for the purchase of any passenger motor vehicle (exclusive of buses, ambulances, law enforcement, and undercover surveillance vehicles), is hereby fixed at $8,100 except station wagons for which the maximum shall be $9,100: Provided, That these limits may be exceeded by not to exceed $3,700 for police-type vehicles, and by not to exceed $4,000 for special heavy-duty vehicles: Provided further, That the limits set forth in this section may not be exceeded by more than 5 percent for electric or hybrid vehicles purchased for demonstration under the provisions of the Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1976: Provided further, That the limits set forth in this section may be exceeded by the incremental cost of clean alternative fuels vehicles acquired pursuant to Public Law 101-549 over the cost of comparable conventionally fueled vehicles. Sec. 904. Appropriations of the executive departments and independent establishments for the current fiscal year available for expenses of travel, or for the expenses of the activity concerned, are hereby made available for quarters allowances and cost-of-living allowances, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 5922-5924. Sec. 905. Unless otherwise specified during the current fiscal year, no part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be used to pay the compensation of any officer or employee of the Government of the United States (including any agency the majority of the stock of which is owned by the Government of the United States) whose post of duty is in the continental United States unless such person: (1) is a citizen of the United States; (2) is a person in the service of the United States on the date of the enactment of this Act who, being eligible for citizenship, has filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States prior to such date and is actually residing in the United States; (3) is a person who owes allegiance to the United States; (4) is an alien from Cuba, Poland, South Vietnam, the countries of the former Soviet Union, or the Baltic countries lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence; (5) is a South Vietnamese, Cambodian, or Laotian refugee paroled in the United States after January 1, 1975; or (6) is a national of the People's Republic of China who qualifies for adjustment of status pursuant to the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992: Provided, That for the purpose of this section, an affidavit signed by any such person shall be considered prima facie evidence that the requirements of this section with respect to his or her status have been complied with: Provided further, That any person making a false affidavit shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be fined no more than $4,000 or imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both: Provided further, That the above penal clause shall be in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other provisions of existing law: Provided further, That any payment made to any officer or employee contrary to the provisions of this section shall be recoverable in action by the Federal Government. This section shall not apply to citizens of Ireland, Israel, or the Republic of the Philippines, or to nationals of those countries allied with the United States in a current defense effort, or to international broadcasters employed by the United States Information Agency, or to temporary employment of translators, or to temporary employment in the field service (not to exceed 60 days) as a result of emergencies. Sec. 906. Appropriations available to any department or agency during the current fiscal year for necessary expenses, including maintenance or operating expenses, shall also be available for payment to the General Services Administration for charges for space and services and those expenses of renovation and alteration of buildings and facilities which constitute public improvements performed in accordance with the Public Buildings Act of 1959 (73 Stat. 749), the Public Buildings Amendments of 1972 (87 Stat. 216), or other applicable law. Sec. 907. In addition to funds provided in this or any other Act, all Federal agencies are authorized to receive and use funds resulting from the sale of materials, including Federal records disposed of pursuant to a records schedule recovered through recycling or waste prevention programs. Such funds shall be available until expended for the following purposes: (1) Acquisition, waste reduction and prevention, and recycling programs as described in Executive Order No. 13101 (September 14, 1998), including any such programs adopted prior to the effective date of the Executive order. (2) Other Federal agency environmental management programs, including, but not limited to, the development and implementation of hazardous waste management and pollution prevention programs. (3) Other employee programs as authorized by law or as deemed appropriate by the head of the Federal agency. Sec. 908. Funds made available by this or any other Act for administrative expenses in the current fiscal year of the corporations and agencies subject to chapter 91 of title 31, United States Code, shall be available, in addition to objects for which such funds are otherwise available, for rent in the District of Columbia; services in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 3109; and the objects specified under this head, all the provisions of which shall be applicable to the expenditure of such funds unless otherwise specified in the Act by which they are made available: Provided, That in the event any functions budgeted as administrative expenses are subsequently transferred to or paid from other funds, the limitations on administrative expenses shall be correspondingly reduced. Sec. 909. No part of any appropriation for the current fiscal year contained in this or any other Act shall be paid to any person for the filling of any position for which he or she has been nominated after the Senate has voted not to approve the nomination of said person. Sec. 910. No part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be available for interagency financing of boards (except Federal Executive Boards), commissions, councils, committees, or similar groups (whether or not they are interagency entities) which do not have a prior and specific statutory approval to receive financial support from more than one agency or instrumentality. Sec. 911. Funds made available by this or any other Act to the Postal Service Fund (39 U.S.C. 2003) shall be available for employment of guards for all buildings and areas owned or occupied by the Postal Service or under the charge and control of the Postal Service. The Postal Service may give such guards with respect to such property, any of the powers of special policemen provided under 40 U.S.C. 1315. The Postmaster General, or his designee, may take any action that the Secretary of Homeland Security may take under such section with respect to that property. Sec. 912. None of the funds made available pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall be used to implement, administer, or enforce any regulation which has been disapproved pursuant to a joint resolution duly adopted in accordance with the applicable law of the United States. Sec. 913. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as otherwise provided in this section, no part of any of the funds appropriated for fiscal year 2006, by this or any other Act, may be used to pay any prevailing rate employee described in section 5342(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code-- (1) during the period from the date of expiration of the limitation imposed by the comparable section for previous fiscal years until the normal effective date of the applicable wage survey adjustment that is to take effect in fiscal year 2006, in an amount that exceeds the rate payable for the applicable grade and step of the applicable wage schedule in accordance with such section; and (2) during the period consisting of the remainder of fiscal year 2006, in an amount that exceeds, as a result of a wage survey adjustment, the rate payable under paragraph (1) by more than the sum of-- (A) the percentage adjustment taking effect in fiscal year 2006 under section 5303 of title 5, United States Code, in the rates of pay under the General Schedule; and (B) the difference between the overall average percentage of the locality-based comparability payments taking effect in fiscal year 2006 under section 5304 of such title (whether by adjustment or otherwise), and the overall average percentage of such payments which was effective in the previous fiscal year under such section. (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no prevailing rate employee described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of section 5342(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, and no employee covered by section 5348 of such title, may be paid during the periods for which subsection (a) is in effect at a rate that exceeds the rates that would be payable under subsection (a) were subsection (a) applicable to such employee. (c) For the purposes of this section, the rates payable to an employee who is covered by this section and who is paid from a schedule not in existence on September 30, 2005, shall be determined under regulations prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management. (d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, rates of premium pay for employees subject to this section may not be changed from the rates in effect on September 30, 2005, except to the extent determined by the Office of Personnel Management to be consistent with the purpose of this section. (e) This section shall apply with respect to pay for service performed after September 30, 2005. (f) For the purpose of administering any provision of law (including any rule or regulation that provides premium pay, retirement, life insurance, or any other employee benefit) that requires any deduction or contribution, or that imposes any requirement or limitation on the basis of a rate of salary or basic pay, the rate of salary or basic pay payable after the application of this section shall be treated as the rate of salary or basic pay. (g) Nothing in this section shall be considered to permit or require the payment to any employee covered by this section at a rate in excess of the rate that would be payable were this section not in effect. (h) The Office of Personnel Management may provide for exceptions to the limitations imposed by this section if the Office determines that such exceptions are necessary to ensure the recruitment or retention of qualified employees. Sec. 914. During the period in which the head of any department or agency, or any other officer or civilian employee of the Government appointed by the President of the United States, holds office, no funds may be obligated or expended in excess of $5,000 to furnish or redecorate the office of such department head, agency head, officer, or employee, or to purchase furniture or make improvements for any such office, unless advance notice of such furnishing or redecoration is expressly approved by the Committees on Appropriations. For the purposes of this section, the term ``office'' shall include the entire suite of offices assigned to the individual, as well as any other space used primarily by the individual or the use of which is directly controlled by the individual. Sec. 915. Notwithstanding section 1346 of title 31, United States Code, or section 910 of this Act, funds made available for the current fiscal year by this or any other Act shall be available for the interagency funding of national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications initiatives which benefit multiple Federal departments, agencies, or entities, as provided by Executive Order No. 12472 (April 3, 1984). Sec. 916. (a) None of the funds appropriated by this or any other Act may be obligated or expended by any Federal department, agency, or other instrumentality for the salaries or expenses of any employee appointed to a position of a confidential or policy-determining character excepted from the competitive service pursuant to section 3302 of title 5, United States Code, without a certification to the Office of Personnel Management from the head of the Federal department, agency, or other instrumentality employing the Schedule C appointee that the Schedule C position was not created solely or primarily in order to detail the employee to the White House. (b) The provisions of this section shall not apply to Federal employees or members of the armed services detailed to or from-- (1) the Central Intelligence Agency; (2) the National Security Agency; (3) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (4) the offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs; (5) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; (6) any agency, office, or unit of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy performing intelligence functions; and (7) the Director of National Intelligence or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Sec. 917. No department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States receiving appropriated funds under this or any other Act for the current fiscal year shall obligate or expend any such funds, unless such department, agency, or instrumentality has in place, and will continue to administer in good faith, a written policy designed to ensure that all of its workplaces are free from discrimination and sexual harassment and that all of its workplaces are not in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Sec. 918. No part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be available for the payment of the salary of any officer or employee of the Federal Government, who-- (1) prohibits or prevents, or attempts or threatens to prohibit or prevent, any other officer or employee of the Federal Government from having any direct oral or written communication or contact with any Member, committee, or subcommittee of the Congress in connection with any matter pertaining to the employment of such other officer or employee or pertaining to the department or agency of such other officer or employee in any way, irrespective of whether such communication or contact is at the initiative of such other officer or employee or in response to the request or inquiry of such Member, committee, or subcommittee; or (2) removes, suspends from duty without pay, demotes, reduces in rank, seniority, status, pay, or performance of efficiency rating, denies promotion to, relocates, reassigns, transfers, disciplines, or discriminates in regard to any employment right, entitlement, or benefit, or any term or condition of employment of, any other officer or employee of the Federal Government, or attempts or threatens to commit any of the foregoing actions with respect to such other officer or employee, by reason of any communication or contact of such other officer or employee with any Member, committee, or subcommittee of the Congress as described in paragraph (1). Sec. 919. (a) None of the funds made available in this or any other Act may be obligated or expended for any employee training that-- (1) does not meet identified needs for knowledge, skills, and abilities bearing directly upon the performance of official duties; (2) contains elements likely to induce high levels of emotional response or psychological stress in some participants; (3) does not require prior employee notification of the content and methods to be used in the training and written end of course evaluation; (4) contains any methods or content associated with religious or quasi-religious belief systems or ``new age'' belief systems as defined in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Notice N-915.022, dated September 2, 1988; or (5) is offensive to, or designed to change, participants' personal values or lifestyle outside the workplace. (b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit, restrict, or otherwise preclude an agency from conducting training bearing directly upon the performance of official duties. Sec. 920. No funds appropriated in this or any other Act may be used to implement or enforce the agreements in Standard Forms 312 and 4414 of the Government or any other nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement if such policy, form, or agreement does not contain the following provisions: ``These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by Executive Order No. 12958; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents); and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by said Executive order and listed statutes are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.'': Provided, That notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, a nondisclosure policy form or agreement that is to be executed by a person connected with the conduct of an intelligence or intelligence-related activity, other than an employee or officer of the United States Government, may contain provisions appropriate to the particular activity for which such document is to be used. Such form or agreement shall, at a minimum, require that the person will not disclose any classified information received in the course of such activity unless specifically authorized to do so by the United States Government. Such nondisclosure forms shall also make it clear that they do not bar disclosures to Congress or to an authorized official of an executive agency or the Department of Justice that are essential to reporting a substantial violation of law. Sec. 921. No part of any funds appropriated in this or any other Act shall be used by an agency of the executive branch, other than for normal and recognized executive-legislative relationships, for publicity or propaganda purposes, and for the preparation, distribution or use of any kit, pamphlet, booklet, publication, radio, television or film presentation designed to support or defeat legislation pending before the Congress, except in presentation to the Congress itself. Sec. 922. None of the funds appropriated by this or any other Act may be used by an agency to provide a Federal employee's home address to any labor organization except when the employee has authorized such disclosure or when such disclosure has been ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Sec. 923. None of the funds made available in this Act or any other Act may be used to provide any non-public information such as mailing or telephone lists to any person or any organization outside of the Federal Government without the approval of the Committees on Appropriations.", u"Mr. President, those of us working constructively to extend the USA PATRIOT Act have repeatedly offered to enter into a short-term extension while we work out the differences and improve this reauthorization legislation. The extension we are passing for 6 months is a commonsense solution that allows us to take a few more weeks to get this right for all Americans. A majority of Senators--Republicans, Democrats, those Senators who voted for cloture, those who voted against cloture on the conference report that failed to pass the Senate--have joined on a letter urging the Republican leader to act on this commonsense offer by calling up a short-term extension bill. As soon as it became apparent that the conference report filed by the Republican leadership would be unacceptable to the Senate, I joined on Thursday, December 8, in urging a 3-month extension to work out a better bill. On the first day the Senate was in session, Monday, December 12, Senator Sununu and I introduced such a bill, S. 2082. We sent out a Dear Colleague letter to other Senators on December 13 and that bipartisan bill now has 47 cosponsors. We offered this solution before the vote on the Senate floor last Friday. Contrary to the false claims and misrepresentations by some, there is no effort to do away with the PATRIOT Act. That is just not true. Along with others here in the Senate, I am seeking to mend and extend the PATRIOT Act, not to end it. There is no reason why the American people cannot have a PATRIOT Act that is both effective and that adequately protects their rights and their privacy. Republican and Democratic Senators joined together last week to say we can do better to protect Americans' liberties while ensuring our national security is as strong as it can be. Every single Senator--Republican and Democratic--voted in July to mend and extend the PATRIOT Act. I have joined with Senators of both parties in an effort to enact a short-term extension so that we can keep working to improve the bill. This is standard operating procedure in the Congress where we pass extensions in the nature of continuing resolutions regularly. The Sununu-Leahy bill to provide a 6-month extension, S. 2167, accomplishes this purpose. I thank the majority leader and Democratic leader for their leadership in passing this measure. A clear majority of the Senate, Republican and Democrats, have come together and requested a short-term extension. These are Senators who voted for cloture and Senators who voted against cloture in an effort to improve the long-term extension of the PATRIOT Act. These are Republicans and Democrats. No Democratic Senator opposes extending the PATRIOT Act. All of the 52 Senators who signed the letter to the majority leader urged its extension. Our Nation is a democracy, founded on the principles of balanced government. We need to restore checks and balances in this country to protect us all and all that we hold dear. Our Congress and our courts provide checks on the abuse of executive authority and should protect our liberties. We need to write the law so that Congress has provided its check in the law and so that courts can play their role, as well. All Americans need to take notice and need to demand that their liberties be maintained. We can do better and must do better for the American people. Just this week, we celebrated the 214th anniversary of the passage of the Bill of Rights, the first 10 amendments to the Constitution of the United States. These amendments ensure some of our most vital freedoms, including the freedom of speech, religion and press in the first amendment. Within these amendments is also the right ``to be secure in our persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'' The Bill of Rights made clear not only the rights of the American people, but also the limitations on the power of government. Just as we cannot allow ourselves to be lulled into a sense of false security when it comes to our national security, we cannot allow ourselves to be lulled into a blind trust regarding our freedoms and rights. We must remain vigilant on both counts or we stand to lose much that we hold dear. In arguing for reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales sought to assure us that ``concerns raised about the act's impact on civil liberties, while sincere, were unfounded.'' I am not reassured, however. We need only pick up a morning newspaper to see how the overreaching of the Bush administration plagues our efforts to uphold democracy at home and throughout the world. We have seen secret arrests and secret hearings of hundreds of people for the first time in U.S. history; the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody; detentions without charges and denial of access to counsel; and the misapplication of the material witness statute as a sort of general preventive detention law. Such abuses harm our national security as well as our civil liberties because they serve as recruiting tools for terrorists, intimidate American communities from cooperating with law enforcement, and, by misusing limited antiterrorism resources, make it more likely that real terrorists will escape detection. We have learned that the Pentagon maintains a secret database containing information on a wide cross-section of ordinary Americans. It keeps track of people like those in Vermont who planned peaceful protests of military recruiters, including one organized by Veterans for Peace. It monitored the activities of an antiwar group that met at the Quaker Meeting House in Lake Worth, FL, a year ago to plan a protest against military recruiting at local high schools. Similarly, the FBI also engages in monitoring other ordinary, law-abiding citizens. Records show that the FBI kept information on Greenpeace, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, and on students and peace activists who attended a conference at Stanford University in 2002. In a similar story, a student at the University of Massachusetts/Dartmouth reportedly was visited by Federal agents in October, after he requested a copy of Mao Tse-Tung's tome on Communism called, ``The Little Red Book'' through the University's interlibrary loan program. If the FBI is investigating what book a college senior is borrowing, what is it that they are not investigating that they should be? The New York Times reports that after September 11, 2001, when former Attorney General John Ashcroft loosened restrictions on the FBI to permit it to monitor Web sites, mosques, and other public entities, ``the FBI has used that authority to investigate not only groups with suspected ties to foreign terrorists, but also protest groups suspected of having links to violent or disruptive activities.'' For example, recently disclosed agency records show that FBI counterterrorism agents have conducted surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations on groups concerning the environment, animal cruelty, and poverty relief. Now we are learning that President Bush has, for more than 4 years, been secretly authorizing warrantless surveillance of Americans inside the United States. In fact, he acknowledges issuing secret Presidential orders to authorize such warrantless surveillance more than 30 times since September 11, 2001. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held for nearly 40 years that the monitoring and recording of private conversations constitutes a ``search and seizure'' within the meaning of the fourth amendment, extending as far back as the 1967 case, Katz v. United States. It was because of concerns over unconstitutional surveillance of Americans in the 1960s and 1970s that Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978 to provide a legal mechanism for the Government to engage in searches of Americans in connection with intelligence gathering. Unless pursuant to a criminal search warrant issued by a judge on a showing of probable cause, FISA warrants are the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and the interception of electronic communications may be undertaken pursuant to the rule of law. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has been amended over time, and it has been adjusted several times since 9/11. Indeed, much of the PATRIOT Act includes FISA amendments. The law has been further amended since the PATRIOT Act, as well. Congress allows the FISA Court to operate in secret and authorizes the Government to begin immediate surveillance in an emergency situation, so long as it seeks a warrant from the FISA Court within 72 hours. In addition, Congress has provided that following a declaration of war, the President may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order for a period not to exceed 15 days. There has never been a leak reported out of the FISA Court. Furthermore, it has never been alleged that FISA's emergency procedures are inadequate or that FISA ties the hands of law enforcement. If the Bush administration believed that FISA was inadequate, it should have alerted Congress to these flaws. It did not. Instead, it worked with me and with others in the days following 9/11 to amend FISA. I chaired the Senate Judiciary Committee at that time, apparently the same time that the Bush administration began surveillance outside FISA. I was not informed of the President's secret eavesdropping program while I chaired the Judiciary Committee in 2001 and 2002. I read about it for the first time in the press last week. Spying on Americans without safeguards to protect against the abuse of government power is unnecessary, and it is wrong. Over the last week, we have learned of long-term, widespread eavesdropping on Americans by the Bush administration without compliance to the law, without court oversight, and without congressional authorization. Compounding that already troubling discovery were new, disturbing reports that the FBI has been monitoring U.S. advocacy groups working on behalf of the environment and civil rights issues, Quaker meetings and students checking out books to write school papers. This is all too reminiscent of the dark days when a Republican President compiled ``enemies lists'' and eavesdropped on political opponents and broke into doctors' offices and used the vast power of the executive branch to violate the constitutional rights of Americans. I was elected to the Senate in the aftermath of Watergate and the White House plumbers and the secret wars that led to the impeachment articles being considered against President Nixon. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was passed in 1978 as part of the reform and reaction to those abuses. As I have noted, this law has been extensively updated in accordance with the Bush administration's requests in the aftermath of 9/11 and has been modified further in the last 4 years with respect to so-called lone wolf terrorists. Neither in the first year of his Presidency or in the aftermath of 9/11 or in the 4 years since enactment of the PATRIOT Act has President Bush come to Congress and asked us for authority to engage in the kind of extensive surveillance on Americans by the National Security Agency that The New York Times reported and the President has now confirmed that he secretly ordered and has reaffirmed more than 30 times. We are a nation of laws, and the fact that no person is above the law is a bedrock principle upon which this Nation was founded and one we are defending and fighting for abroad. This type of covert spying on American citizens and targeted groups on American soil betrays that principle. The chairman of the Judiciary Committee has the right instinct and was right to announce that we need hearings and an explanation, and the American people deserve an accounting for this troubling revelation. Earlier this week, I joined with Senators Reid and Rockefeller in requesting specific information from the Bush administration on its covert spying operations domestically. I cannot emphasize strongly enough how important it is for the Bush administration to cooperate with Congress on this matter. No one should be able to conduct secret, illegal spying programs on our soil with no accountability to Congress or the American people. Congress has passed laws that established a legal way to eavesdrop on al-Qaida and other potential terrorist organizations. Internationally that monitoring should have been done more effectively before 9/11 by this administration. We have established legal authority in emergency circumstances for the Attorney General to proceed first so long as he promptly seeks court approval thereafter. We even provided a 15-day window after a declaration of war. This program has apparently been going on for not 4 days or 14 days but for more than 4 years. That is not pursuant to or consistent with FISA. In the PATRIOT Act and other actions since 9/11, Congress has created additional authorities. But it is Congress that passes laws. The President cannot simply declare when he wishes to follow the law and when he chooses not to. What happens to the rule of law if those in power abuse it and only adhere to it selectively? What happens to our liberties when the Government decides it would rather not follow the rules designed to protect them? The Bush administration, in secret legal justifications for a secret eavesdropping program, apparently argues that when the Congress authorized the use of force in September 2001 to attack al-Qaida in Afghanistan, it authorized warrantless searches and eavesdropping on Americans. I voted for that authorization. This program is not what I voted for. Congress did not sign a blank check. The power to eavesdrop on Americans is not even authority that the Bush administration asked for from Congress. I was chairman of the Judiciary Committee when the President's program was undertaken, and I was never informed of the program or its purported legal justification. In this, as with its detention and interrogation practices, this administration has chosen to go it alone. That is wrong, and it is corrosive to our system of checks and balances. This is a Government with three co-equal branches. As Justice O'Connor reminded the Bush administration, even wartime does not give the President a blank check with regard to power. As I said last week, the same lawyers who advised the President that he was above the law when it came to torture, in a memorandum the Bush administration has had to disavow and withdraw when it was brought to light, have apparently advised the Bush administration that this President has authority to conduct warrantless surveillance of Americans. That is wrong. Accountability is sacrificed when there is rampant unilateralism. No one can just ignore the law or the constitutional limits on Executive authority that protect Americans' liberties. Accordingly, I urge the Bush administration to make public its purported legal justification for what I view as an illegal program of spying on Americans without court approval. I urge them not just to recite bumper sticker slogans or conclusory statements that they view their actions as consistent with the self-serving rewriting of the law they have secretly made amongst themselves, but to provide that legal justification in the light of day so that Congress and Americans can consider it. Provide and post the legal memoranda. Al-Qaida knows that we eavesdrop and wiretap. Whether we do so legally, whether we protect the liberties of Americans by respecting the constitutional requirements for court-issued warrants, these aspects are of little concern to terrorists but matter greatly to Americans. I expect that when the supposed legal underpinnings for the President's eavesdropping program are examined, they, too, will be withdrawn and disavowed by this administration. I also expect that they will be rejected by an honest review in Congress, in the courts, and certainly by the American people. I ask that a copy of a letter to the President of which I referred be printed in the Record.", u"Mr. President, today the Senate begins an important debate on the National Intelligence Reform Act. This legislation, which I have introduced with my good friend and colleague, Senator Joe Lieberman, represents the most sweeping reform of our intelligence structures in more than 50 years. It reorganizes an intelligence community designed for the Cold War into one designed for the war against global terrorism and future national security threats. It recognizes that the fundamental obligation of government is to protect its citizens and that those protections must evolve along with the threats. It reorders the priorities of an intelligence structure that was devised for a different time and a different enemy. On July 22, the 9/11 Commission released its final report on terrorist attacks against the United States. On that same day, our leaders, Senator Frist and Senator Daschle, assigned the Governmental Affairs Committee the task of developing legislation addressing the Commission's recommendations to restructure the intelligence agencies within the executive branch. Our committee performed that task with dedication and diligence, and with the active participation of its talented members. From late July until mid-September, we held eight indepth hearings to assess the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We heard testimony from more than two dozen witnesses, including Secretary of State Powell, Secretary of Homeland Security Ridge, FBI Director Mueller, CIA Director McLaughlin, the 9/11 Commission Cochairmen, Kean and Hamilton, Commissioners Fielding and Gorelick, intelligence experts, field operatives, professors, and representatives of the 9/11 families. As a result of this unprecedented effort and wide-ranging input, the committee has produced the legislation now before the Senate. It is legislation that is comprehensive, bipartisan--indeed, unanimous--and historic. This legislation is not, however, merely the product of 2 months' work by our committee. It is based upon the work of the 9/11 Commission and the inquiry that spanned 20 months, with 19 days of hearings and 160 witnesses, the review of 2.5 million documents, and interviews of more than 1,200 individuals in 10 countries. The new intelligence structure we propose in our legislation is built upon a rock-solid foundation of inquiry and information. In crafting a structure designed for today and for the future, the committee built on the strengths of our current system, recognized the progress that has been made since 9/11, and charted a new course to strengthen our intelligence community. We understood that the 15 agencies that comprise the intelligence community provide a wide range of unique experience, expertise, and viewpoints that must be preserved. We realize that the barriers to information sharing, cooperation, and coordination--what the 9/11 Commission referred to as ``stovepipes''--must be demolished. We set as our goal an intelligence structure with the agility that the times and the threats demand, not simply another layer of bureaucracy. We were determined that this new structure not infringe upon the freedoms that Americans cherish. This legislation uses the Commission's recommendations as our guide and these principles as our compass. It begins with the creation of the position of national intelligence director. The NID will be the head of our intelligence community and the principal adviser to the President of the United States. As the head of the new National Intelligence Authority, this Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed official will truly be in charge of our intelligence community. No longer will there be confusion and doubt about who is in charge and accountable. The answer will clearly be the national intelligence director. The director will have broad authority to unify and strengthen our intelligence community's efforts and to eliminate barriers that impede the coordination of intelligence activities. He or she will set standards for information sharing and classification across the intelligence community and develop an integrated, coordinated communications network. His responsibility will be to turn the stovepipes that separate our intelligence community into conduits that promote cooperation. Along with this responsibility will come strong authority to direct budgetary and personnel resources where they are needed most. To illustrate why these authorities are crucial, consider this passage from the 9/11 Commission Report. In late 1998, it had become increasingly apparent that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida posed a direct, immediate, and deadly threat to the United States. On December 4 of that year, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet issued this memorandum. I quote from it: We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community. You may ask, What is the result of this clear, concise and direct order from the head of our intelligence community. According to the Commission: The memorandum had little overall effect on mobilizing the CIA or the intelligence community. Why did it have so little impact? The expert witnesses before our committee and before the Commission provided the answer. Under the current structure, the DCI is responsible for managing the intelligence community but does not have the real authority to do so. No organization can succeed with such a disconnect between responsibility and authority. At our committee hearing on September 13, I asked Secretaries Powell and Ridge what I consider to be the bottom-line question in this debate. I asked them both: Do you believe that a strong national intelligence director with enhanced power to set collection priorities, to task the collection of intelligence, will improve the quality of intelligence that you both need in your capacity as policymakers? Each answered with an enthusiastic and unambiguous ``yes.'' As Secretary Powell put it, our intelligence team needs, and I quote the Secretary, ``a stronger, empowered quarterback.'' The Collins-Lieberman bill would provide that quarterback. Perhaps the most important power that we provide to the national intelligence director is the power of the purse. In order to foster cooperation throughout the intelligence community, the NID will have control over the budget for national intelligence. Currently, that funding is largely funneled through the Department of Defense, and the director of the CIA has only very limited authority over the overall resources of the intelligence community. Under the Collins-Lieberman bill, the NID, in consultation with the agency and department heads, will develop and recommend an intelligence budget to the President. After congressional action, it will be the NID who receives the appropriations for what will be known as the national intelligence program. The NID will also have significant authority to reprogram and transfer funds so that he can marshal the resources needed to counter a threat. Never again should we have the kind of situation we saw with the directives issued by George Tenet in December of 1998, calling on the marshaling of resources and yet nothing happens. After careful consideration, the committee decided to declassify only the aggregate figure for the national intelligence program. The Collins-Lieberman bill does not require the declassification of the budget totals for the various agencies that make up the NIP. Our witnesses generally urged great caution in going that far; instead, we require the directors to report to Congress on whether further declassification of budget totals is appropriate. The NID will allocate the budget to the various intelligence agencies in accordance with the appropriations determined by the Congress. That includes agencies such as the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and parts of the Defense Intelligence Agency which serve national intelligence consumers but are located within the Department of Defense. In recognition of the dual roles played by these important agencies, which provide critical intelligence not only to the Department of Defense but also to the CIA and other national customers, our bill keeps these agencies within the department but strengthens the NID's authority over them. It is important to emphasize that nothing in the national intelligence agency's authority will in any way hinder military operations or readiness. Tactical and joint military intelligence programs will remain under the control of the Pentagon and outside the national intelligence program as they are today. The Collins-Lieberman bill will not affect the tactical intelligence assets of the Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marines. This bill will not impede the flow of real-time actionable intelligence that our war fighters require. In fact, by strengthening and improving the collection and analysis of intelligence, our legislation should improve the quality of intelligence provided to Pentagon officials and the combatant commanders. The members of the intelligence community collect a vast amount of information, but the Commission found that we have a weak system for processing and transmitting this information where it is needed. As the 9/11 report reveals, this weakness has been evident during many terrorist attacks over many years. It took an attack that claimed the lives of 3,000 people for this weakness to be fully exposed, and now it cannot be ignored. Our legislation contains strong provisions that make information sharing the rule, not the exception, and requires integrated communications networks to be developed, a serious deficiency in our current system which Senator Durbin highlighted in our hearings. We simply can no longer tolerate a system where the pieces of the puzzle are not assembled, where the CIA and the FBI each have vital, urgent, and compelling information, but no one puts the picture together. The second major Commission recommendation included in our bill is the establishment of a national counterterrorism center. It would expand the communitywide intelligence analysis capabilities of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center established by the President last year. A major benefit of this new center is that much of its staff will be drawn from the various intelligence agencies now scattered across the Federal Government. These intelligence experts will work side by side sharing and analyzing information, gaining an understanding of each other's mission, and creating a culture of cooperation. A significant responsibility of the NCTC will be joint planning. The center will have the authority to develop plans that include a mission, objectives to be achieved, courses of action, and recommendations from operational plans. Moreover, the center will assign responsibilities for counterterrorism operations to the agencies as set forth in these plans. As an example of how this might work, the NCTC would have the authority to create an interagency plan to dismantle a particular al-Qaida cell. The center would assign specific tasks to the appropriate agencies. But I want to be clear that the NCTC would not have the authority to tell any agency how it must execute that task, nor will it be in the military chain of command. Should an agency object to the NCTC assignment, the national intelligence director could either accede to the objection or appeal to the President to resolve the conflict. These provisions are important. They will ensure an integrated approach to operational planning. We are not telling the various agencies precisely how to carry out the plan, how to execute it, but we will make sure that someone is looking at plans that span agencies, and in doing the planning when it affects more than one agency, when it is joint. The legislation also includes provisions recommended by the Commission and authored by Senator Voinovich that streamline and standardize the system for security clearances, a system that we have heard, over and over again, is inconsistent, slow, and backlogged. An important provision requires the President to designate a single agency to handle security clearances for Government employees and contractors. The final chapter of the 9/11 report, the chapter that outlines the recommendations we seek to implement, begins with this statement: Some of the saddest aspects of the 9/11 story are the outstanding efforts of so many individual officials straining, often without success, against the boundaries of the possible. Good people can overcome bad structures. They should not have to. This summarizes one of the major reasons we need reform. We have a system now that does not allow us to respond with agility to the threats we face today. As this next chart shows, in our legislation we are not adding a layer of bureaucracy, nor are we breaking up individual agencies, nor are we creating a new department of intelligence. We are, instead, creating a new structure for cooperation, accountability, and results. Our legislation gives the good people in our intelligence community the structure they deserve. It also takes steps recommended by Senator Jay Rockefeller, the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, to ensure that we will always have good people. It creates a scholarship program to encourage bright young Americans to join the intelligence community and it will enable veteran intelligence officers to enhance their skills. Intelligence reform requires this investment in human capital. We also create a reserve corps of retired intelligence officers who can be called upon when their special skills and judgment are needed. Our bill also creates a civil liberties board as recommended by the Commission and strengthened by amendments offered by Senator Durbin. Nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the members of this board will advise agencies of the civil liberties ramifications of policies before they are adopted and then will conduct oversight. In addition, our legislation will create both a civil liberties and privacy officer as part of the new national intelligence authority. The fundamental obligation of any government is to protect its citizens. The American Government has an additional obligation to protect the freedom of its citizens. Our legislation does not ask the American people to choose between security and liberty. We firmly believe that no such choice is necessary. Our structure reflects that belief. To help ensure a smooth transition from the current structure to the new, the bill provides a 6-month phase-in period that gives the President considerable discretion in implementing these reforms. We will not let our guard down during any point in this process. We also recognize that reforms of this magnitude require continued and careful congressional oversight and review. The bill includes a provision recommended by former Senator Warren Rudman that requires a report to Congress on implementation of these reforms after 1 year. As a result of an amendment offered by Senator Pryor, it also includes a useful requirement for a government accountability study and report to Congress. As I have indicated, this legislation is the product of a concerted effort by the Governmental Affairs Committee. It reflects the recommendations of other committees and it builds upon the work of the 9/11 Commission. But it is important to know that the 9/11 Commission did not start from scratch, either. Its work takes into account nearly a half century of studies on intelligence reform dating back to the Eisenhower administration. The titles of the studies and commissions reads like a ``Who's Who'' of 20th century military, intelligence, and diplomatic expertise: Hoover, Doolittle, Schlesinger, Rockefeller, Scowcroft, to name just a few. These studies were conducted under a variety of conditions and threats but a central theme emerges: America's intelligence system is hindered by a fragmented structure and compartmentalized thinking. Our past failure to act on these many studies, which spans decades, which is repeated over and over again, is why we are here today. For example, the Boren-McCurdy legislation of 1992 realized the emerging threat of the post-Cold War era, terrorism, and weapons proliferation. Using the successful restructurings of the military since World War II as models, the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, this legislation called for the creation--yes, you guessed it, Mr. President--the creation of a national director of intelligence with strong authority similar to what we propose today. The Boren-McCurdy Act was not adopted. At the same time that those reforms were being set aside for another day, one component of our intelligence community had identified Osama bin Laden as the mastermind behind a foiled plot to bomb American troops. Another noted bin Laden's close ties to a known terrorist who was later revealed as the architect of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Yet another considered bin Laden to be nothing more than an extremist financier. Information that could have led to effective action against bin Laden a decade ago was there, but it was not shared or acted on. In 1996, the Aspin-Brown Commission reached the same post-Cold War conclusion and made very similar reform recommendations. The result: yet another failure by Congress to take action. Meanwhile, our intelligence community was starting to agree that bin Laden had started something called al-Qaida and that it was some kind of terrorist army. As the 9/11 Commission notes, however, every relevant member of the intelligence community had a different plan for dealing with bin Laden and al-Qaida, from cruise missiles to diplomacy with the Taliban. While these conflicting plans were butting heads, two American Embassies in Africa were bombed, the attack on the USS Cole was approved, and what became known as the Planes Operation was taking shape. The need for reform was made clear by the 9/11 Commission's exhaustive study on the intelligence failures that preceded the murder of 3,000 innocent people on September 11, 2001. In late July of this year, as the Governmental Affairs Committee's work began, Washington, New York City, and northern New Jersey were placed under elevated terrorist alert, an alert that is still very much evident at the intersections of this city today. Our committee work neared its conclusion as terrorists murdered once again, this time at a schoolhouse in Russia. These terrible events, combined with the slaughter we have seen in Bali, Istanbul, Madrid, Jerusalem, Jakarta, and so many other places, leaves no doubt that the enemy we face has both a global reach and an unlimited capacity for cruelty. Our response must be far reaching, and it must unleash America's capacity to meet any challenge. This legislation is an essential part of that response. The calls for reform go back 50 years. For nearly 2 years, the 9/11 Commission conducted an investigation of unprecedented depth. Our committee produced comprehensive legislation with unanimous support. Hardly a day passes in which we do not see new evidence of terrorism's depravity. Yet there are still some who say: We should wait. We need more information. Under the current threat of terrorist attack, the time is not right. The charged atmosphere of the election season is not the right environment for such important decisions. I ask, What more information do we need? Look at the list of witnesses who appeared before the 9/11 Commission and our committee. What point of view has not been heard? What area of expertise was not explored? What more compelling evidence do we need before we act? I ask, If the time is not right now, when will the right time come? When will there be no threats? I ask, What could be more cynical than our failure to act on something of such critical importance to the citizens of our country? At our very first Commission hearing on July 30, Commission Chairman Thomas Kean spoke on the need to move forward with these reforms. This is what he said--and I hope we will heed his words-- These people are planning to attack us again and trying to attack us sooner, rather than later. Every delay we have in changing structures or changing people . . . to make that less likely is a delay the American people can't tolerate. Yes, we can wait. We can wait until the day when we know everything we possibly can know, when there are no more threats, when the American people do not expect their leaders to lead. We can wait until the day another attack leaves us all wondering once again why we did not see it coming. That first day will never come. If we do not act, the second surely will. Thank you, Mr. President.", u"Madam President, I rise in support of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the bill that Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman have discussed. I speak not only as the Senator from West Virginia but also as the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I begin by expressing my thanks for the bipartisan cooperation of Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman, their staffs, and members of their committee for the way in which they worked and reached out across the intelligence community. It was an extraordinary thing, something one does not see around here very often. I lend my voice as strongly as I can to theirs in saying that Congress--and by that I mean both the Senate and the House--should pass and enact this critical legislation before we recess. I certainly am committed to making that happen, as I know Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman are. With an equal level of commitment from the Senate leadership, the House leadership, and the President of the United States, we can meet this ambitious goal, a goal about which, a month ago, even 3 weeks ago, people would have said is absolutely impossible. This has to not be put off. Distinguished statesmen from eras gone by have said we can't do these things, we have to take our time. I say, from time to time, when you give Congress the time to do something, we may not. If you give us a little bit of time to do something very important, we may very well. I believe this is one of those cases. In just the past 2 years, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has put forth not one, but two, frankly, quite devastating investigative reports about what surely rank among the greatest intelligence failures in the history of our country, to wit, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the intelligence estimates prior to the war in Iraq, particularly those that related to weapons of mass destruction. In December of 2002, after 2 years of painstaking work by a congressional joint inquiry--it was the House and Senate Intelligence Committees acting together as one, for a very long period of about a year and a half, where we worked side by side and we also issued a report and series of recommendations reflecting the suggestions about the 9/11 attacks. It is extraordinary when one reads that and one reads the 9/11 Commission Report, how much is familiar, as between the one and the other; more eloquently expressed by far in the 9/11 Commission Report but nevertheless in both reports. In early July of this year, less than 3 months ago, we released a report on the collection and analysis and dissemination of prewar intelligence leading up to the war in Iraq, as I have indicated. That 511-page investigation, reported out of our committee by a unanimous vote of 17 to nothing, thoroughly detailed how the analytical judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs were flawed, exaggerated, and misleading. And there were no doubters. There were no doubters. There were different points of view, but there were no doubters on those central premises. It showed in plain terms that the intelligence community had failed to provide intelligence assessments prior to the war that were timely, objective, and in this Senator's opinion, independent of political considerations, as is legally required under the National Security Act which defines so much of what we do. Then, a few weeks later, the independent national 9/11 Commission, led by Governor Tom Kean and Congressman Lee Hamilton, himself a former chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, published its findings and recommendations, and in so doing took our work a much needed, a very critical step down the road. The 9/11 Commission not only very powerfully described the individual organizational and systematic failures prior to the attacks, but they also set forth a very specific agenda for reform in what I thought were clearly readable, logical, and understandable ways. They addressed our intelligence shortcomings and proposed restructuring the intelligence community so that it would be more effectively managed, better prepared to deal both offensively and defensively with the terrorist threat that faces our Nation. By the end of July, mere days before this Senate was scheduled to adjourn for a lengthy recess that is called August, the case for reforming the intelligence community had been described in more convincing detail than ever before, and the question suddenly became no longer should the intelligence community be reformed, but when. Most Members of Congress understood this. The American people certainly understood this. Even the leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies seemed to have concluded on their own that the intelligence communities, after 57 years of largely static existence, denigrating nothing that they have done following its Cold War birth, rooted in that tradition and in that culture, is in need of an overhaul. One does not simply say let us have an overhaul. One produces legislation to create it, and that is exactly what the Governmental Affairs Committee has so brilliantly done, which is not to say that this is all new, or even a reflection of only recent events. I am aware of no fewer than 46 significant studies, reviews, and commissions on the organization of the U.S. intelligence community, dating back to 1949. Nearly half of those were completed in the past 10 years, each proposing ways to improve and restructure our intelligence operation. The issue of reforming the intelligence community has been swirling about Capitol Hill for decades now. The concept of creating a position such as a national intelligence director, in fact, dates back to the Nixon administration. These past commissions' recommendations were never enacted, for a whole host of reasons, some of which we will not discuss at the present time, not the least of which was that there was really no momentum. There was no sort of galvanizing event or series of events and the will, therefore, in the Congress, joining with the administration, never came to be. Today we have that commitment, largely and sadly because we are gripped by present and growing signs of terrorism around the world and at home, true terrorism in which violence is not merely a means but also an end unto itself. I am talking now beyond even the tragedy of the 9/11 event itself. Madam President, 95 percent of the population growth in this next generation throughout the world will take place in precisely the 5 percent of the land on the Earth which is poorest. If that is not a precalculated formula for the unleashing of people who want to find a cause or reason for justifying themselves as young men and women--I talk about 14- and 15-year-olds. One looks at the average age of people in Iraq, which is 19. 40 percent of them were born either during or after the Persian Gulf war. They have known nothing but violence. So it is a part of our future. Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman understand that, and they have created legislation to help us deal with that from the intelligence perspective. As Senator Lieberman said, intelligence has taken on a new role because terrorists, jihadists, those who misinterpret good doctrine in the Koran, religious doctrine--they are not afraid in the same way of military might as they used to be. Still very much so, still very much in play, the attempts to find Osama bin Laden have shown us, in a peculiarly unpleasant way, that it is not just airplanes and bombs and laser bombs and smart bombs and the rest of it that can find the people we must find. It is, indeed, intelligence or the lack of intelligence which has made that impossible. So we have now the best chance in at least a generation, thanks to Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman and their committee, for getting at the heart of the problem in the intelligence community. It is past time to get the work done. The Senate bill we are considering is serious, comprehensive, and careful. On the other hand, I must say I am somewhat dismayed at reports of the efforts in the House--I must be frank; I mean to offend nobody--where I understand the bill which is under consideration may be much weaker, perhaps by design, and contains unnecessary and highly controversial items meant to slow debate. I pray that I am wrong on that. But we must have that in mind. If reports are also true that the minority has been shut out of the process, with exactly the opposite of what happened in the Collins-Lieberman approach to crafting this bill, then the House leadership has a great deal of work to get things back on track. I think the President will face a great test of his leadership. Will he step forward to encourage full and far-reaching intelligence reform, as he has partly done so far already, taking steps which some were not sure that he would be willing to take? Or will he look the other way, and let things happen as they will? We need him and his influence in this Chamber and in the House Chamber, and I am confident that will happen. If the Senate and the House and the President squander this opportunity to allow the momentum behind the reform to lapse in the next year, we will have failed--and we will not fail. Other things will grab our attention even as exacting and devastating as this problem is. So we must not fail. We must not fail the American people. They expect reform, and we are not going to fail them. As to the substance, briefly: The Governmental Affairs Committee's work embraces the key principles of the 9/11 Commission except in a few instances where they saw things otherwise, such as the 9/11 Commission suggested locating the new national intelligence director inside the Executive Office of the President. The Commission felt that was a good idea. The committee felt that was not such a good idea, so it is not happening. They dealt in the same way with the suggestions made by paramilitary activities ongoing by the CIA, with respect to changing those. And once again the Collins-Lieberman committee made those changes. As my colleagues know, the lead recommendations of the 9/11 Commission are the creation of a national intelligence director and a national counter-terrorism center. Senators Lieberman and Collins have both explained those very thoroughly here today. The Commission correctly saw in the intelligence community's current organizational arrangement a fragmented array of budget, personnel, and tasking authorities that inhibit the sharing of information and prevent coordination of efforts under a single accountable individual. This lack of consolidated authority undercuts the ability and the willing ability of the intelligence community to function as a true community, and more specifically prevents America from bringing the maximum force of intelligence, military, and law enforcement weapons to bear against al-Qaida and other terrorists both here and abroad. I have had a chance to carefully review the bill. I don't enjoy reading bills, but I have read this bill of the Governmental Affairs Committee. And it is, so far as this Senator can say, and many others, faithful to the 9/11 Commission's most important recommendations, and creates many of its own. The bill creates a national intelligence director, of course, and a national counter-terrorism center with unified authorities that will correct the inefficiencies and lack of accountability that exists. That was the beginning. Some will say--it is important to say these things--that the national intelligence director established in this legislation is too strong because the position will manage the budget and operations of three national intelligence agencies currently under the Pentagon's control. Here we get onto somewhat sacred ground. I speak of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. Others will criticize the bill by saying that the national intelligence director is too weak because the position does not have so-called ``day-to-day operational control'' over these three agencies I have just mentioned which also serve important combat functions inside the Pentagon. These critics are advocating in effect the creation of a new department of national intelligence. Senator Lieberman indicated that was not what they wanted to do, and thankfully that is not what they have done. In my view, the bill that was reported out unanimously by the Governmental Affairs Committee strikes precisely the right balance between these two positions. The budgetary, personnel, and management tasking authorities consolidated under the national intelligence director are substantial improvements over those now at the disposal of the current Director of Central Intelligence. I remember asking George Tenet when he was Director of the CIA, on several occasions--I think he was not happy with the question, but he was forthright with his answer--if you could control, don't you want to control what goes on at NSA, or NRO, or the Geospatial folks--it wasn't called that then--and he said, I can only and will only seek to have authority over what in fact I have budgetary authority. I cannot exercise control beyond that. The committee has reached that point to say that we have to have one person who has the budgetary control to do these things. The budgetary control of personnel, management, and tasking authorities consolidated in the national intelligence director is an enormous improvement over those now at the disposal of the current Director of Central Intelligence. Moreover, the bill recognizes that the national intelligence director will have to rely on the expertise of the newly created deputies and the agency heads beneath them to manage the intelligence collected from domestic, foreign, and military forces. It acknowledges implicitly and explicitly the connection of the time and attention between military and intelligence. Chairman Collins addressed this very directly. It accommodates the military's legitimate need to control its own operations without giving short shrift to all of the nonmilitary consumers of intelligence, one of whom, incidentally, happens to be President of the United States. To put it another way, this bill achieves the fundamental restructuring of the intelligence community while preserving an underlying management arrangement that can implement the new director's directives in a coordinated way which is altogether missing today. Fifteen pairs of oars pulling at the same time under the direction of one captain--that is the concept at the heart of this legislation. I would also like to highlight a couple of additional items the committee made which I feel very good about. Both have been mentioned by Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman. The communitywide ombudsman to handle concern from the analysts--we heard a great deal about this--over the shaping or politicalization or potential, referring to the future, of intelligence, such as were voiced by analysts in the preparation of intelligence reports on Iraq in the fall of 2002. Creating this ombudsman, which the bill does, is an important way to ensure that policy considerations do not compromise the independence and objectivity of the intelligence community's judgment. Second, Senator Lieberman referred to this--I believe we need an intelligence reserve corps. The intelligence community can get stretched very thin. It was, for example, during Kosovo. We saw that during that time. Currently, in Afghanistan and Iraq, we see it now. We simply stop doing other important intelligence work, which in fact must continue in other parts of the world because resources are moved from some important place which is evolving into the current situation. One can't afford to do that in intelligence. We need to support the war site foremost at all costs, but we need to have the backup to make sure we are looking at intelligence on a worldwide basis. The intelligence reserve corps will do that. We don't want to miss a nuclear test. I am sorry; we have in the past. The intelligence community has missed it. We don't want that to happen again. Finally, I do think that our reform bill should establish a permanent analytical red team under the national intelligence director to test the key underlying--I use the word ``assumptions'' in analytical reports. The legislation before us includes a review unit under the office of the new ombudsman which is helpful but, if I may be allowed to say so, I don't think goes quite far enough and simply will be a matter of discussion for the floor. I believe we need a red team unit to work inside the analytical process before it has produced a product. In other words, as intelligence reports are being formulated, not after the fact of their formulation into a product. I hope we can work on that concept as we debate the legislation. In closing, I believe the bill before the Senate has taken an extremely complex and in certain respects arcane subject matter, the organization of the U.S. intelligence community, and proposed a sensible approach to long overdue reform. This bill will make considerable headway toward learning from the mistakes of the past and strengthening our national security. I again thank Senator Collins, Senator Lieberman, and their staff for working in the highest tradition of this body. I also want to extend my appreciation to Majority Leader Frist and Minority Leader Daschle for making the national intelligence reform the top priority of the Senate in the waning days of this Congress. Two weeks from the third anniversary of the September 11 attacks, we stand on the threshold of passing landmark legislation that few would have thought possible even 3 weeks ago. The planets are aligned. Let's finish our work and pass this legislation. I ask unanimous consent I be added as a cosponsor.", u"Madam President, I express my deep gratitude for the kind words of the Senator from Maine and my gratitude for the incredible work she and the Senator from Connecticut did in pulling us together in doing a series of hearings--I believe eight--with countless hours of testimony, a very thorough review of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and then an analysis of how do we take those recommendations and somehow move forward in a way that improves, increases the level of safety and security in this great country of ours. That was the challenge and it certainly is a challenge. I think the chairman has been challenged with drafting a bill that represents a kind of balance here between ambitious reform of our intelligence services and the continuity of the existing intelligence assets we rely upon to keep our country safe. There was discussion during the hearings about the nature of change and some of the challenges of concern--a concern that if we are to make changes, is that going to make us more vulnerable during that period of time. There was great thought that went into the balance we see in this bill: The balance between the creation of a powerful national intelligence director, on the one hand, and this concept of departmental autonomy on the other; and the right balance between centralization of the information sharing and the balance of civil liberties we cherish as Americans. How do you provide those protections without undermining the ability to do the hard work that has to be done in intelligence, and that keeps up the morale of those on the front lines every day making us safer--folks who, in many ways, are simply unknown; we will never know who they are. At one of our hearings, which was classified, even the name of the witness was classified. I sat there as a relatively new Member of the Senate listening to the incredible work that is going on day to day to keep our country safe. I was struck by that, and I am deeply committed to making sure as we move forward in reform that we keep the morale up and the appreciation up, that we strike the right kind of balance. After hours of hearings and countless study, I believe the bill drafted by the chair and ranking member represents the kind of balance we need. Today and tomorrow, we are going to vote on a number of amendments that would unravel this carefully constructed balance by weakening the national intelligence director. I urge my colleagues to oppose any such efforts to undermine this balance. I agree with the sponsors of these amendments that it is vitally important soldiers in combat get timely, accurate information that is relevant to their immediate needs. I also agree the military chain of command needs to be respected. However, I disagree on their interpretation of how the Collins-Lieberman bill would affect the armed services. Last week, we debated and voted on an amendment that would have effectively removed several intelligence agencies from the Defense Department. We defeated the amendment because a strong majority of the body thought, as I do, that the Department of Defense needs to retain its combat support relationship with such agencies as the National Security Agency and National Reconnaissance Office. I think that vote reflects the importance we attach to the Department's role in intelligence. The central finding of the 9/11 Commission was that prior to 2001, the safety of Americans was substantially weakened by the absence of a strong entity to make sure that the use of intelligence assets reflected national priorities and that the intelligence gathered was shared with officials who needed it, even if those officials were located in different agencies. I note that the Chair, on a number of occasions, talked about a George Tenet memo in 1998, where he declared war on al-Qaida and nobody knew about it. There were agencies throughout Government that never got this declaration of war from the head of the CIA. As the Commission put it, no one was in charge. As I say that, I do want to say, having listened to the testimony, today we have a new level of cooperation and collaboration between those involved in intelligence gathering. And because of that new level of cooperation and collaboration, we are moving forward and this country is safer today than it was on 9/11. But the reality of the case is that with no one in charge, institutional silos arose to prevent important pieces of information from being collected into an overall threat assessment that might have alerted officials to the danger we faced. So it is clear to me, and as recommended in this bill, we need a strong national intelligence director, strong enough to enforce common policies throughout the intelligence community whenever and wherever intelligence collected by one agency might be useful to another. We do not need a mere coordinator. That is what we have now; we have a coordinator. We need someone who can focus resources and attention on the most vital threats, national priorities. That person can only succeed if we give him or her the strong powers they need over the budget and personnel. I have heard members point out that the 9/11 Commission did not point to any institutional policy that prevented the sharing of information. The argument is, if we can do all this today, why do we have to make institutional change? They argue the problem is due to individuals who failed to perform their jobs by failing to convey information they were supposed to share. It is true that the commission's report discusses several specific instances of this type of bureaucratic behavior, and in the end things that should have been done were not done, none of which seem to have led to disciplinary action. Nevertheless, there were policies such as the wall between domestic and foreign intelligence that inhibited the full sharing of information. But even that is not quite the full story. It is my belief such insular behavior will always exist, unless and until we have a strong national intelligence director who can effectively enforce common information policies. That is what the Collins-Lieberman bill creates. That is why keeping these powers is so important. In the committee markup, the Senator from Michigan pointed out instances where language could have been made clearer. I agree with him that clearer lines of authority are important. But I fear that the amendments being offered today are not mere clarifications but, rather, represent a fundamental tip in the balance and will result in erosion of the power of the NID. I believe the Department of Defense will have a strong role in the new intelligence constructs that the Collins-Lieberman bill creates. The DOD will retain full authority over tactical intelligence. It will have a seat at both the National Counterterrorism Center and the Joint Intelligence Community Council to argue for institutional interests and ensure that its needs are met. The bill also leaves direct, day-to-day command of the Department of Defense intelligence agencies with the DOD. Most of the staff of the intelligence agencies will remain uniformed service men and women. The Department will remain the intelligence community's largest consumer of information. The Secretary of Defense will remain one of the most senior members of the Cabinet, with close communication with the President. If we are going to create a NID with actual clout when it comes to enforcing common intelligence standards, the NID must have the ability to transfer funds and personnel within the intelligence community. Witness after witness came before us and said: With budget authority, there is power. Whoever controls the purse has power. We understand that in this body. He or she must be able to move assets where they are needed most and ensure full compliance with communitywide requirements. The chairman of the 9/11 Commission has admonished Congress, saying, ``If you are not going to create a NID who has the powers of budget and appointment, don't do it.'' These powers are necessary to ensure that intelligence gathered by intelligence agencies reflects national priorities and is shared among all parts of the Government that need it. The Collins-Lieberman bill gives the national intelligence director a number of important powers. He is supposed to develop common policies of personnel, budget practices, information networks, security classifications, and communication systems. If we want him to succeed in these tasks, we must also give him or her the powers to accomplish them. This body voted last week to retain day-to-day control of the Defense intelligence services with the DOD, and I supported that sentiment. But since the NID will not have direct day-to-day control, it is even more important that he have the ability to transfer money and personnel. We all know that bureaucracies have a natural tendency to resist change. So the question is, Will the national intelligence director be able to enforce his policies in the face of the inertia that normally characterizes existing agencies? Not unless everybody knows he is in charge of the resources and has the power to shift them according to agency performance and his evaluation of needs. The bill contains numerous provisions to ensure that this power is used responsibly. We make it clear that only the national intelligence director can make these transfers of resources and personnel. We also retain Congress's authority to approve transfers before they occur. That way, it will be clear who is responsible for them and who will have to justify them. We create the joint intelligence community council made up of the users of intelligence, including the Secretary of Defense, to advise and evaluate the national intelligence director. We require the NID to notify Congress, including the Committee on Armed Services, whenever there are transfers of personnel to or from the Department of Defense. In light of these protections, it is extremely unlikely that the intelligence community will fail to support our armed services. In fact, it is stronger than that. It simply is not going to happen. We have set in place the kind of measures, the kind of safeguards, the kind of oversight, the kind coordination that will ensure the needs of the armed services are met. The intelligence needs of the armed services will be met. Another amendment would remove the section of the bill that would disclose the total funding for intelligence. I must respectfully disagree with those who believe this disclosure will harm our national security. Again, this was an issue in which we had very clear testimony before the committee. By the way, after all, reliable estimates of this number already appear in the trade press. Moreover, the 9/11 Commission recommended going further. They wanted to disclose the totals for each agency. But here we have a balance. In our history as a nation, we have found the benefits of disclosure usually outweigh the costs. What we have in the way of disclosure makes policymakers accountable to their actions. But again, we have struck a balance. I note in his testimony before the committee last month, then-acting CIA Director John McLaughlin agreed that declassification of the top line figure would make sense. He testified: It reinforces responsibility and accountability on those receiving the money, because you can see whether it's going up, down, or so forth. . . . It also does the same thing for Congress. . . . I don't think declassifying the top line would be a major security threat. Given all this, it is difficult for me to believe that disclosure would weaken our safety in any meaningful way. It would, however, lead to more open debate about how much we need to spend to keep America safe, and I think that is a good thing. There are also proposals to exempt military personnel from the national intelligence director's transfer, detail, and assignment authority. I can understand the desire to maintain the military chain of command, but if we want the national intelligence director to develop and enforce common intelligence policies even in the face of agency silos, then he or she is going to need to draft his or her own players and make sure they are playing on the same team. When the national intelligence director transfers a soldier out of an intelligence agency, that soldier returns to the Armed Forces where he or she will be, once again, safely in the chain of command. But as long as they remain in the intelligence community, they are responsible for meeting the needs of the entire community, not just the Department of Defense, and that is why that individual must have the confidence of the national intelligence director. There is a second reason for keeping personnel authority in the national intelligence director. We all agree on the creation of a National Counter-ter-rorism Center--there has not been a lot of debate over that--and intelligence centers that represent other national priorities. We mean for these centers to contain the best people from each agency. Assuming, for example, that the National Count-er-ter-rorism Center consists of the best terrorism experts from each element of the intelligence community, it makes sense for it to be the forum for negotiating common policies and planning joint operations. But in order to prevent each agency from creating its own counterterrorism unit and sending the NCTC only junior workers or workers sitting out their final years until retirement, the national intelligence director must have the power to bring the best and the brightest to the National Counter-ter-rorism Center. I note that the Chair talked about her visit to the current TTIC, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the forerunner of the NCTC. She noticed how young some of the personnel there were. At this stage in time, it is not seen as the best place to be, but with a strong national intelligence director and a clear National Counterterrorism Center, we want the best and the brightest, and the national intelligence director should have the right to bring those people to the table to work with him or her. Finally, we will vote on amendments that would take one agency or another out of the definition of ``national intelligence program'' and thereby move their budgets away from the national intelligence director's authority and back under the Defense Secretary's authority. This might be wise if we make the Secretary of Defense responsible for enforcing common intelligence policies and meeting the intelligence needs of the entire Government, but in that case we would not need a national intelligence director. In that case, we ought to also transfer the CIA into Defense. On the other hand, if we want a strong coordinator of intelligence and we do not want that person to be the Secretary of Defense, then the national intelligence director must have the budget power over all parts of the intelligence community that service common needs. It simply would not make sense to break agencies, such as the NSA or NRO, up into pieces depending on whether this program or that fell into the national intelligence program. They should either be part of a coordinated approach to intelligence or they should be totally separate. I submit they are too important not to be brought into the national intelligence policy. I note that even under the Collins-Lieberman bill, these agencies would remain under the day-to-day control of the Department of Defense. Most of their personnel will still consist of uniformed military officers. The relevant congressional committees will remain actively involved in ensuring the needs of the military are met, and the Secretary of Defense will remain a senior Cabinet member with a direct line to the President. With all this, it is difficult for me to believe that the intelligence our combat forces receive will diminish in any material way. It seems more probable that through better coordination and sharing, the Armed Forces will have access to better intelligence under the Collins-Lieberman bill than they would have in a watered-down version, and I think that is the key here. In this post-9/11 world in which we live, where we understand the nature of the importance of intelligence, we must understand the importance of breaking down the silos that in the past prohibited folks from working together. It is clear we all will benefit. The Department of Defense benefits and the intelligence agencies benefit, but most importantly, the people of this great country benefit. When we have and will have a strong national intelligence director, a clear sense of somebody in charge with accountability and credibility, with the support and confidence of the President, we will all be able to sleep easier at night. I urge my colleagues to resist the natural hesitation in the face of major change. Everybody likes change until it happens to them. The events of 9/11 changed the world, and we must change our mindsets in response. I believe the Collins-Lieberman bill represents the right balance and will make America safe. I urge my colleagues to reject those amendments that would weaken the balance, that would weaken the strength of the national intelligence director. Let's move America forward. Let's make the change. Let's support this bill. Madam President, I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, I rise to join with Chairman Collins in recommending the adoption of this conference report on the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which, of course, implements the key recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission Report. I begin by thanking Senator Collins for her extraordinary leadership in this effort. In the 16 years I have been here--and it is self-evident to the Presiding Officer and others that I am much the senior of Senator Collins--I have never had a better legislative experience. This task came to us quickly. There was an enormous amount of work to do. As I said yesterday, it was a long and winding road we walked down, but we ended up where we needed to be and where the Nation needed us to be, and it simply could not have happened without Susan Collins' leadership. She has an extraordinary sense of purpose and principle. She understands the difference between right and wrong and, in a legislative context, perhaps, the difference between better and worse because that is often where we are. She is a persistent and very effective negotiator, knows when to hold them and when to fold them. She is a wonderful person--I think maybe I should be that explicit--and that doesn't hurt around here, either, because it gains the confidence of the people who work with her. Part of her being a great person is her great sense of humor which got us through some of our darker moments. I was thinking one of the great moments in the process was when we decided, late in the process, that the original title we gave to the central position we created, the National Intelligence Director, would have the acronym NID. It doesn't resonate the strength that we wanted. Some member of our conference with an inferior sense of humor said it would lead to a lot of ``NIDpicking.'' A lot of laughter led to the change of the title to the Director of National Intelligence, the DNI. You can feel the force radiating. We laughed a lot about that and about a lot of other things. It is a familiar saying in public service and life, and certainly in campaigns, that victory has a thousand parents and defeat is an orphan. This is a victory for the American people. Many people have a right, here in the Senate, on the 9/11 Commission, the families of the 9/11 victims, the President of the United States, the Vice President of the United States--so many people can say, and we might say: Without their involvement this would not have happened. But nobody, really, can say that more or feel that more than Senator Susan Collins of Maine. I thank her very much for her friendship, for her partnership, for her leadership here, and I, too, look forward to working with you in many similar collaborations in the years ahead. Before I get to the substance of the bill, I do want to say something about the process here. As we end the 108th session of Congress, unfortunately a session that was very often polarized and partisan, it is really great--besides the specifics of this accomplishment that is so critical to our national security--that we have ended it with a bipartisan, nonpartisan triumph. It ought to send a message to the American people, and perhaps just as important to us here, that we are capable of doing this. When the chips are down, we are capable of getting together across party lines and doing what is right for the country. That, ultimately, is why we all came here. That gives us the greatest satisfaction and, incidentally, it is probably the smartest and most productive thing we can do politically as well. This simply would not have happened in the Senate without the chairman of the committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and ultimately the chairman of the conference, Senator Collins, setting exactly that tone. I thank Peter Hoekstra on the House side, Jane Harman, and all the members of the conference committee for all they contributed. This legislation is a testament to the courage and persistence of the families of the victims of September 11. Their personal sacrifices, transformed into a steadfast devotion to see this bill to passage, will help make the rest of America safer. This bill was conceived in the memory of their husbands and wives, their sons and daughters, their mothers and fathers and brothers and sisters, and simply would not have been possible without the constancy of effort and the increasingly sophisticated advocacy by the surviving family members. I thank them. We have worked hard for this historic agreement because we believe, quite simply, that the security of our Nation depends on it. There were various times at which people in this Chamber and the other body said we were moving too quickly; what was the cause for haste? I can tell you it didn't seem we were moving too quickly to Senator Collins and me. But what was the cause for our haste? Our enemies, our terrorist enemies, al-Qaida and their ilk, are not waiting, as we know. They are here. They are planning. We are at peril. Accordingly, we approached this task with a real sense of urgency, a grave and growing sense of urgency because we know we face a clear and present danger from terrorists. The bill before us today is a landmark achievement because, as others have said and will say throughout the day, for the first time in over half a century we are going to modernize our national intelligence structure to meet the new challenges we face in today's world. With this bill, we recognize we can no longer keep the American people safe simply by projecting military force abroad. The world has changed. Our terrorist enemies today make no distinction between soldiers and civilians, between foreign and domestic locations when they attack us. To defeat them, we must have the best possible intelligence about their plans before they strike so we can stop them before they strike. This legislation moves us toward that goal significantly by transforming our intelligence community from a Cold-War model--and after all, it was at the outset of the Cold War that the current structure was conceived--a Cold-War model that shared information only if there was a need to know, to a 21st-century model that will share information to maximize the intelligence community's substantial resources and expertise and, yes, guarantee greater returns for the billions and billions of dollars of taxpayer money that are invested in intelligence to protect the American people. The 9/11 Commission supports our compromise. Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton said in a statement: We believe this is a good bill and a strong bill. We believe it will make our country safer and more secure. They support this compromise because it implements the Commission's key recommendations to establish that DNI and a National Counterterrorism Center that will improve coordination and collaboration, as the Commission puts it, ``to forge unity of effort'' between the 15 intelligence agencies scattered throughout the Government, and to ensure that, unlike up until now, someone is genuinely in charge. I said to a business executive in my home State this morning, talking about this bill, explaining why I couldn't be with him today at a meeting in Connecticut, that if anybody in business really got inside and looked at how we are spending the billions of dollars we do on intelligence, they--well, they wouldn't believe it because no one is in charge. The Commission indicted the status quo of America's intelligence community. The 9/11 Commission report is an indictment of the status quo. Those who pick and try to look for loopholes in this reform have to remember that the status quo failed to protect the American people on 9/11 and it has failed in different ways to provide us with the quality, accuracy and reliability of intelligence that we need. Vice Chairman Hamilton memorably told our committee in our hearings on this Commission report: A critical theme that emerged throughout our inquiry was the difficulty of answering the question: Who's in charge? Who ensures that agencies pool resources, avoid duplication and plan jointly? Who oversees the massive integration and unity of effort to keep America safe? Too often [the 9/11 Commission said] the answer is no one. The fact is, below the level of the President no one has been in charge of overseeing the entire intelligence community and its multibillion-dollar budget. Today, as testimony before our committee validated, no one is clearly in charge of the hunt for Osama bin Laden. No one has had the authority to knit together the efforts of the 15 disparate agencies working on intelligence for the American people, and, therefore, no one has ultimately been accountable for the deadly mistakes that have been made. This legislation changes all of that, putting a clear command structure in place so that in the future the puzzle pieces will be put together, the dots will be connected, and so, I hope, pray, and believe, we will never have to suffer through another attack like the one we did suffer through, and still do, on September 11, 2001. I wish to briefly discuss some of the key provisions, starting with intelligence reform. Under our current intelligence structure, the CIA Director has to perform three jobs: acting as the President's principal intelligence adviser, overseeing the intelligence community as a whole, and directing the CIA. The 9/11 Commission reported what many had said before: The tasks are simply too much to expect of any one person. So we have created a Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed Director of National Intelligence, who will lead the national intelligence community but be separate from the Director of the CIA. The DNI will be the President's principal intelligence adviser and will focus exclusively on breaking down those barriers that have obstructed information sharing and professional collaboration in the public interest. With the CIA Director in charge of daily CIA operations, the DNI will be able to forge that unity of effort which we need to better protect the American people. The DNI will exercise significant budget authority over the intelligence community both in the development and the execution of the budget, and he or she will consult closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, the head of the FBI, and other intelligence leaders on both funding and personnel issues. The DNI will have unprecedented authority in the implementation and execution of all funding under our national intelligence program. Our bill makes clear that the DNI will have the power to ``develop and determine'' the intelligence budget and that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget must apportion the national intelligence program funds at the ``exclusive direction'' of the DNI. The DNI is further responsible for managing the appropriations by ``directing the allotment and allocation'' of appropriations through the heads of Departments containing the elements of the intelligence community. Just to make sure there is no slow-walking in moving those funds forward, the Department comptrollers must then allot, allocate, reprogram, or transfer funds--in the words of the report--``in an expeditious manner.'' The DNI will have a major hand in the appointment of key officials across the intelligence community, thus elevating the authority of that position. He or she will recommend appointment of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the President. The Secretary of Defense will have to obtain the DNI's concurrence in appointing the heads of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The Secretary will consult with the DNI before appointing the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Secretaries of the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Treasury, State, and the Attorney General will need the concurrence of the DNI to appoint the heads of intelligence agencies under their immediate jurisdiction and under the DNI's overall jurisdiction. That is real authority in this new office. The DNI will also have significantly expanded authority to transfer personnel and funds beyond those of the current DCI so that he or she may react quickly to changing threats and direct intelligence resources where they are needed. In addition to creating the DNI, this conference report will create--as recommended by the Commission--the National Counterterrorism Center and a series of National Intelligence Centers to ensure that critical national security issues are addressed with maximum coordination and teamwork. This may well be the most significant process we have begun with this bill, the authority of DNI, but creating a model, and a model built on the most effective, modern corporate models of joint team efforts to deal with problems. But it really deals directly and grows out of the experience of the Pentagon post-Goldwater-Nichols, in joint warfare. This says when we have a critical national security problem the best way to deal with it will be to create a center to deal with it, a table at which every element of our Government involved in dealing with that problem is present so they can collect intelligence together, analyze it together, and then plan how to combat the problem. Specifically created in this bill, of course, is the National Counterterrorism Center which will seek to make ensure the disastrous disconnect between the FBI and the CIA that occurred prior to 9/11 will never occur again. It will develop plans, assign roles, and monitor the agencies' implementation of those plans in order to thwart the next terror attack. This is not a narrowly focused, constricted center. The Center's planning will be at the strategic level such as how do we best win the ``hearts and minds'' of the great majority of people in the Muslim world. It will be at the tactical level--for instance, how we are going to capture Osama bin Laden. The National Counterterrorism Center Director will be confirmed by the Senate and it will report to the Director of National Intelligence, and in some cases to the President himself. Let me talk about those other centers. This bill creates one other center to deal with a most pressing threat to our security; that is, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This part of the bill was inserted as a result of the leadership of the majority leader, Senator Frist. It is an enormous step forward in dealing with the threat of WMD. These are the central structures of the intelligence reform, but our legislation goes beyond that. The 9/11 Commission documented that, in a period preceding September 11, 2001, potentially helpful information available to one part of the Government was not shared with others which could have used it. This legislation takes that direction from the Commission to heart and requires the President to establish a network of technologies and policies that will resolve conflicts between the need to share and the need to protect sources and methods. It will create and allow us to use the best technology to make sure we are sharing and culling and filtering and applying the vast amount of data we get from our intelligence networks most effectively. Beyond intelligence reform, this bill contains much more. In fact, the 9/11 Commission made 41 recommendations to protect our Nation from terrorism. In August, Senator McCain and I drafted legislation to address them all. I am pleased and proud to say I am grateful for the conferees, to the Senate, and to the House that most of those initiatives have become part of this conference report. For example, the 9/11 Commission observed that many of the actions necessary to protect us in the war against terror also involves a consolidation of governmental authority and the increased presence of government in our lives to protect us. In response, the Commission called for ``an enhanced system of checks and balances'' to protect the civil liberties that define us as Americans. In fact, this conference report creates a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The Board will have two functions. First, to advise the President and Federal agencies at the front end of policymaking and, second, to conduct oversight at the back end, investigating and reviewing Government actions to determine whether executive branch officials are appropriately respecting the individual freedoms of the American people. The 9/11 Commission also recognized the futility of combating terrorism only by military means. Of course, we have been, and will continue, doing our best to capture and kill all the terrorists we can as soon as possible. But we understand that ultimately what is required to stop the growth of terrorism are initiatives of foreign policy, diplomacy, economics, and of politics. Our legislation--this conference report--includes many of the provisions recommended by the Commission which will do just that, including increased American foreign assistance to Afghanistan and a renewed U.S. commitment to Pakistan. It provides enabling authorities to help us win ``the struggle of ideas'' through the greater funding and use of much more imagination in American broadcasts to the Islamic world. It calls for broadening and growth of scholarships and exchange programs between the United States and the Muslim world, with students and faculty going back and forth. The bill also takes aggressive measures to prevent attacks, as well, by targeting terrorist travel, improving screening at entry and exit points, and securing identification documents. Our legislation requires secure identification for travel documents for all travel into the United States. This was a topic about which much was said and debated in the conference, and before, during, and after House adoption of this conference report yesterday. I guess the conferees, in their wisdom, decided some of the immigration reform in the House bill would have weighted the bill down and inhibited or prohibited its passage. It is urgently needed and we cannot afford to do that. We will get to that next year. Make no mistake, this conference report contains some tough antiterrorist law enforcement measures, and some tough immigration enforcement measure. It specifically implements the 9/11 Commission Report recommendation for the Federal Government to establish minimum standards for birth certificates, driver's licenses, and personal identification cards. Those provisions will help decrease fraud so terrorists are not able to hide their identity. They will not deprive the States of the right that States understandably want, to determine, not the form of the driver's license, but who is eligible to receive a driver's license within their States. Other measures in this conference report will go far to tighten border security. It will increase the number of border guards, immigration officers, and detention beds for those who are being held for legal action and other action to determine their immigration status and whether they should be deported. No longer will we have a case, as in the past, where a challenge is made to someone's immigration status but they are allowed to wander and disappear into the vastness of America. There will be thousands of new beds created, detention facilities, to hold those people while their cases are being reviewed. We added a provision allowing the Government to deport anyone who has received military training from a terrorist organization. The Government will also be able to obtain a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrant for anyone engaging in terrorist activities even if they are not clearly connected to a specific terrorist organization. That is common sense, but it is not in the law now. To better safeguard the Nation's transportation networks, this legislation also requires the Department of Homeland Security to produce a national transportation strategy that evaluates the risks faced by all modes of transportation, not just aviation, and sets some clear priorities and deadlines for security needs. We also have included measures to help first responders, the hundreds of thousands of men and women, largely in uniform, some out, at the local and State levels. We want to help them obtain interoperable communications equipment so in a crisis they can talk with each other and work cooperatively. I have long believed if we are going to make sense of what happened on September 11 we need to look back honestly with clear eyes and honest hearts. The 9/11 Commission's extraordinary work enabled us to do just that. Its 587-page report did not close the book on September 11. It will never be closed. The legislation does not close the book on September 11. It will live alongside December 7 as a day that will live in infamy throughout American history and America's future. The work on this conference report and its adoption today will open a new chapter for a safer America. Chairman Kean has said: Our biggest weapon of defense is our intelligence system. If that doesn't work, our chances of being attacked are so much greater. So our major recommendation is to fix that intelligence system and do it as fast as possible. That is exactly what this historic legislation does. In this Congress, this President fulfills our constitutional duty to provide for the common defense of our Nation. I said before that many can claim to be parents of this victory. Members of both parties in Congress, leaders of both parties, bipartisan leadership in this Chamber certainly stood by Senator Collins and me all the way. This simply would not have happened without the support of the President of the United States, the Vice President of the United States, and their staffs, working hard and long to do something that institutions and government do not do easily, which is to change. If it was easy, the 20-some-odd attempts made in the last half century to reform our intelligence system would have worked, would have succeeded. They did not. This is about to succeed because of the effort that has been made across party lines in the national interests by everyone from the President of the United States to every single Member of Congress who worked hard on this measure. Maybe I should add another thank you. Maybe I should go from the President to our staffs. Senator Collins has said the legions of staff members on both sides of the aisle and both sides of the Capitol put their lives on hold and worked through nights and weekends for the cause of a safer America. I particularly thank Kevin Landy on my staff, whose work started with the legislation to create the 9/11 Commission--that was a story in itself--and who has been single minded in his devotion to crafting this legislation in a way that was real and excellent. I also single out the work of Majority Staff Director Michael Bopp, and all of his team. Michael has terrific legislative skills and leadership abilities and has served the conference and the country extraordinarily well. On my staff I also thank my staff director Joyce Rechtschaffen, and Dave Barton, Mike Alexander, Raj De, Christine Healey, Holly Idelson, Beth Grossman, Larry Novey, Jason Yanussi, Kathy Seddon, Dave Berick, Mary Beth Schultz, Tim Profeta, Fred Downey, Andrew Weinshenk, and Donny Ray Williams, Leslie Phillips, Bill Bonvillian and Laurie Rubenstein. I could go on and on. Many other staffers of other Senators contributed much to this bill and I thank them. I would especially like to thank Marianne Upton and Joe Zogby from Senator Durbin's staff. And I particularly express my personal appreciation, in this and so many partnerships we have been involved in, to Senator John McCain of Arizona, and to his staff. We worked in close partnership to craft the legislation implementing the 9/11 Commission recommendations. Many provisions were adopted in the Senate and are integral parts of the conference report. I thank them all. I come back to the beginning to particularly thank my colleague and friend, our chairman, Senator Susan Collins of Maine. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record two documents from the 9/11 Public Discourse Project regarding driver's licenses and military chain of command.", u"Mr. President, I have been listening with a great degree of interest at the comments of my colleagues. I, for one, as one of the prime authors of the Americans with Disabilities Act, contend that Mr. Sutton does agree with the bill and that he is an advocate for those who are suffering from disability, in spite of what has been said. I rise today in support of the nomination of Jeffery Sutton to be a Judge on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Mr. Sutton is one of the top appellate lawyers in this country today. He has argued over 45 appeals for a diversity of clients in Federal and State courts across the country, including an impressive number--12--before the U.S. Supreme Court. We have not had nominees like this for years, who have the ability, experience, capacity, knowledge and the decency that some of these nominees of President Bush have. In 2001, he had the best record of any advocate before the Court, arguing 4 cases and winning all of them. On January 2, 2003, the American Lawyer named him one of the best 45 lawyers in the country under the age of 45. He is an outstanding nominee, and I urge all of my colleagues to support him. Mr. Sutton served as a law clerk for United States Supreme Court Justices Lewis Powell and Antonin Scalia. Like his mentor Justice Powell, Sutton is a moderate who favors judicial pragmatism: According to Sutton, Justice Powell ``believed in people more than in ideas, in experience more than ideology and in the end, embraced a judicial pragmatism that served the country well.'' Mr. Sutton served as State Solicitor for the State of Ohio and currently is a partner in the prestigious law firm of Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. He also serves as an Adjunct Professor at Ohio State University School of Law. During his legal career, he has not only demonstrated keen intellect, strong advocacy skills and a commitment to the rule of law, but has dedicated a substantial amount of his time to providing pro bono legal services to a variety of individuals and groups. He enjoys strong support from lawyers in Ohio and across the country, who have written to praise not only his first-rate legal abilities, but also his fairness, open-mindedness, and personal integrity. There can be no serious question as to Mr. Sutton's qualifications for this position. He represents the best of the legal profession and it is shameful to indicate otherwise. Unfortunately, some of my colleagues seem to be looking past his unassailable credentials in search of issues that could be used to disparage him. I would like to address those points and explain why my colleagues need not be concerned--maybe that is a nice word to use here. There have been suggestions that Mr. Sutton's record somehow demonstrates a bias against Americans with disabilities. However, there is no evidence in his record to suggest that he has a personal bias against those with disabilities or any other group of individuals. In fact, even the People for the American Way has conceded that ``No one has seriously contended that Sutton is personally biased against people with disabilities.'' I think that is a very important point. When he was young, Mr. Sutton regularly assisted at his father's school for children with cerebral palsy, and a closer look at his legal record demonstrates that Mr. Sutton has taken up the causes of disabled Americans several times. He represented a talented young woman named Cheryl Fisher, who sought to get into medical school, but was turned down because she was blind. In a letter of support of Mr. Sutton, Ms. Fisher wrote: I recall with much pride just how committed Jeff was to my case. He believed in my position. He cared and listened and wanted badly to win for me . . . I realized just how fortunate I was to have a lawyer of Jeff's caliber so devoted to working for me and the countless others with both similar disabilities and interests. In National Coalition of Students with Disabilities v. Taft, he successfully argued that Ohio Universities were violating the federal motor-voter law by failing to provide disabled students with voter registration materials. Again he received high praise from someone involved in the case. Benson A. Wolman, former Director of the ACLU for Ohio and currently a member of its National Advisory Council, who recruited Mr. Sutton to work on the case, wrote: Mr. Sutton's commitment to individual rights, his civility as an opposing counsel, his sense of fairness, his devotion to civic responsibilities, and his keen and demonstrated intellect all reflect the best that is to be found in the legal profession. Mr. Sutton also served on the Board of the Equal Justice Foundation, a public interest organization that provides pro bono legal services to the disadvantaged. During his tenure on the board, the Foundation has sued three Ohio cities to force them to build curb cuts to make their sidewalks wheelchair accessible, sued an amusement park company that banned disabled individuals from their rides, represented a mentally disabled woman in an eviction proceeding against her landlord who tried to evict her based on her disability, and represented a girl with tubular sclerosis in a case alleging that the school was not properly handling her individual education plan. There are also many in the disabled community who, though not directly involved with Mr. Sutton's cases, understand that he is committed to the law and support his nomination. Francis Beytagh, Legal Director of the National Center for Law and the Handicapped wrote: I believe Jeff Sutton would make an excellent federal appellate judge. He is a very bright, articulate and personable individual who values fairness highly . . . I do not regard him as a predictable ideologue . . . I recommend and support his confirmation without reservation. We should pay attention to this person. James Leonard, co-director of the University of Alabama's Disability Law Institute, writes: In my opinion, Jeffery Sutton is well-qualified to sit on the Sixth Circuit Court and should be confirmed . . . I also see no ``agenda'' on Mr. Sutton's part to target disabled citizens. . . . Just as I would not infer an anti-disabled agenda from Mr. Sutton's participation in Garrett, neither would I assume from his role in the Fisher case that he had the opposite inclination. Rather, he seemed to be a good lawyer acting in his client's interest. Gee, that is what he is, a good lawyer who represents clients and wins. Beverly Long, Immediate Past President of the World Federation of Mental Health and former Commissioner of President Carter's Commission on Mental Health writes: I have followed news reports of the intense lobbying against Mr. Sutton by various people who advocate on behalf of the disabled. This effort is unfortunate and, I am convinced, misguided. I have no doubt that Mr. Sutton would be an outstanding circuit court judge and would rule fairly in all cases, including those involving persons with disabilities. I assume, after listening to my colleagues on the other side, what they are trying to do is beat up Mr. Sutton now so that he will bend over backwards in every way for persons with disabilities. I don't think they have to worry about that. But I think it is unfortunate that they are beating up on a man who basically understands the disability community and who has long fought for it, but who has represented some clients with interests that my friends on the other side don't like. I agree with Ms. Long, and I have no doubt Mr. Sutton would rule fairly in all cases, including those cases involving disabled Americans. Mr. Sutton's critics hold up the Garrett case as evidence to his insensitivity to the disabled community. I want to take just a few moments to discuss why that criticism is misguided. Mr. Sutton did not seek to represent the State of Alabama in that case out of any desire to curb the Americans with Disabilities Act. Instead, he was approached by Alabama's attorney general to represent Alabama at the appellate stages of the litigation. He was approached because he is an excellent lawyer and one of the best appellate lawyers in the country. As an attorney looking to build a practice before the Supreme Court, Mr. Sutton accepted that representation. I do not see anything wrong with a young lawyer accepting cases in order to gain more experience before our Nation's highest tribunal. I concur with my distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from the State of California who pointed out that she hears from lawyers all the time that they were trying to build Supreme Court practices and picked up cases to do so. It is a common practice for those who are fortunate enough to try cases before the Supreme Court. I give Mr. Sutton marks for candor for explaining that reason at his hearing. Mr. Sutton did nothing wrong in accepting that representation--State governments are certainly entitled to representation under our legal system. Yet, I can understand the frustration that some of my colleagues may feel to see the protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act limited by the Supreme Court. I worked many long hours to see that piece of legislation enacted. However, I do not blame Mr. Sutton for the Supreme Court's decision--he is guilty of nothing more than being a very good lawyer for his client. The principle of judicial review is very well-established in American jurisprudence. If anything, we should be thankful that there are lawyers as able as Mr. Sutton to ensure the effective working of our system of checks and balances. It was the Supreme Court that made the decision; Mr. Sutton was simply representing his client. And, by the way, that is what attorneys do. He had a right to do it. It was legitimate to do it. He did a very good job. There is no evidence that Mr. Sutton was motivated by a personal agenda when he represented those State governments. In fact, former Clinton Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman, and Sutton's opposing Counsel in the Garrett case, wrote, ``I argued the case against Mr. Sutton, and I discerned no such personal antipathy. Mr. Sutton vigorously advanced the constitutional position of his client in the case, the State of Alabama; doing so was entirely consistent with the finest traditions of the adversarial system.'' It is important to note that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that no inference about a lawyer's personal views should be gleaned from the positions of his client. The rule states, ``A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.'' My distinguished colleague, the junior Senator from New York, seems to agree. Back in February, on the Senate floor she noted, ``A long time ago, I used to practice law. I represented a lot of clients of different kinds, all sorts of folks. Their views and positions were not necessarily mine. I won some and I lost some in the trial court, in the appellate court, and in the administrative hearing room, but I do not believe that any of my clients spoke for me. My advocacy on behalf of clients was not the same as my positions about the law, about constitutional issues, and about many other matters.'' I personally think that was very well said by the distinguished junior Senator from New York. Obviously, I do not think anybody in this body would seriously consider voting against a nominee because of a dislike of the nominee's clients. All of those of us who practice law and try cases represent clients with whom some in the Senate might disagree. We had an important discussion about clients in connection with the nomination of Marsha Berzon, now a judge on the Ninth Circuit, and the Senate decided not to hold her responsible for her clients' views and confirmed her. I advocated for her even though I probably disagree with her philosophy in many respects. Judge Berzon is well qualified. Judge Berzon had been a long-time member of the ACLU, serving on the Board of Directors and as the Vice President of the Northern California Branch. She testified that: ``[I]f I am confirmed as a judge, not only will the ACLU's positions be irrelevant, but the positions of my former clients, indeed, my own positions on any policy matters will be quite irrelevant and I will be required to and I commit to look at the statute, the constitutional provisions, and the precedents only in deciding the case.'' Mr. Sutton made similar assurances at his hearing that he will follow the law as an appellate court judge. He stated, ``. . . there's no doubt that when a Federal statute is passed, as the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear, there's a heavy presumption of constitutionality. And there's no doubt that a Court of Appeals judge has every obligation to follow that presumption.'' We accepted Judge Berzon's answer and we should do the same for Mr. Sutton instead of trying to destroy his reputation. If there are members of this body who nevertheless try to hold Mr. Sutton responsible for the views of the states that he represented, I ask that they at least judge Mr. Sutton on his entire record and not just on a select handful of cases--or here a case, there a case, once in awhile another isolated case, and not just a select handful of cases. Mr. Sutton has represented a wide range of clients in his legal practice. Most of the clients in the cases that displease his critics paid him to represent them, but he has represented a significant number of clients with very diverse interests on a pro bono basis. These clients include death row defendants, prisoner rights plaintiffs, the National Coalition for Students with Disabilities, the NAACP and the Center for Handgun Violence--to name a few. In 2001, he was appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court to represent--pro se--Dale Becker in a prisoner rights complaint. Opposing counsel, and former General Counsel of the National Security Agency during the Bush and Clinton Administrations, Stewart A. Baker, wrote in support of Mr. Sutton stating, ``If Mr. Sutton is to be judged by the positions he takes on behalf of his clients, the Becker case suggests that he favors increased inmate litigation in federal courts as well as a broad and flexible reading of the courts' rules, at least when a literal reading does harm to pro se litigants. In fact, the Becker case illustrates the fallacy of claims that Mr. Sutton's judicial philosophy can be gleamed from the positions he has advocated in court. Although he has apparently taken conservative positions on behalf of some clients, Mr. Sutton has also championed left-liberal positions when his client's welfare called for such arguments.'' Take for example, Mr. Sutton's defense of Ohio's minority set-aside statute when he was Solicitor General. Fred Pressley, Ohio attorney and Democrat who worked with Sutton on the case wrote, ``As Solicitor General, Mr. Sutton was a tenacious defender of all Ohioans, regardless of their race, gender, disability or nationality.'' In addition, I recently received a supportive letter from Mr. Riyaz Kanji, a former law clerk to Supreme Court Justice David Souter and Judge Betty Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit. He said that he contacted Mr. Sutton in August to ask for assistance on an amicus brief for the National Congress of American Indians in an Indian Law case pending before the United States Supreme Court. Mr. Kanji wrote, ``Mr. Sutton took the time to call me back from vacation the very next morning to express a strong interest in working on the case. In our ensuing conversations, it became apparent to me that Mr. Sutton did not simply want to work on the matter for the small amount of compensation it would bring him--he readily agreed to charge far below his usual rates for the brief--but that he instead had a genuine interest in understanding why Native American tribes have fared as poorly as they have in front of the Supreme Court in recent years . . . I think it is fair to say that most individuals who are committed to furthering the cause of State's rights without regard to any other values or interests in our society do not evidence that type of concern for tribal interests.'' I could go on and on in discussing the numerous letters of support that I have received on Mr. Sutton's behalf, but I think the best spokesperson for Mr. Sutton is Mr. Sutton himself. In a 12-hour hearing, Mr. Sutton answered all questions put to him candidly and honestly. He was extremely considerate and deferential, displaying a respect for the process as well as his very impressive legal ability. Jeffrey Sutton is the best the legal profession has to offer. I urge my colleagues to examine his full and accurate record. I am confident if they do, my colleagues will vote overwhelmingly to confirm Mr. Sutton. Mr. President, let me just take a moment to address some of my colleagues' concern about the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett. I was a prime cosponsor of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and I am very proud of it. But this debate is not about whether this body did the right thing in passing that legislation. I personally think we did the right thing, and I could talk for hours on how important that legislation is. However, in our system of checks and balances, the Supreme Court has a role here. And all parties before the Court deserve to have competent, in fact, zealous legal representation--States as well as individuals. In the Garrett case, the State of Alabama sought the representation of Jeffrey Sutton. Mr. Sutton argued zealously on behalf of the State. However, nowhere--nowhere--does Alabama's brief suggest that Congress does not have the power to protect Americans with disabilities. Mr. Sutton did not, as some have contended, argue the Americans with Disabilities Act as a whole was not needed or should be repealed. Statements to this effect are a mischaracterization of both the nature of the question before the Court in the Garrett case and the arguments Mr. Sutton advanced on behalf of the State of Alabama. In fact, Alabama's brief stated: The ADA advances a commendable objective--mandatory accommodation of the disabled. . . . Further, the brief stated specifically that: Alabama . . . has not challenged Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate State employees through the ADA, [or] an individual's authority to bring an injunction action against State officials in Federal court, or the Federal government's authority to bring a claim for injunctive or monetary relief against States in Federal court. Alabama's brief also specifically credited the Federal Government for prohibiting Government-based discrimination against the disabled, and affirmatively requiring all manner of employment and public-access accommodations designed to provide the disabled with the kind of equal opportunity and dignity all individuals deserve. Finally, at oral argument before the Court, Mr. Sutton clarified that his client was ``happy that the ADA was enacted.'' Even if his client's statements or sentiments are deemed his own--which they should not be--Mr. Sutton's written and oral statements in the Garrett case dispel any credible notion that he believes the ADA is not needed. Mr. President, I have no doubt that every litigant appearing in Jeffrey Sutton's courtroom will get a fair shake. Now, some of my colleagues have tried to distort his record, have tried to imply he is not the man that he is, have tried to indicate he is against the Americans with Disabilities Act because he represented clients with which some of my colleagues disagree, and that he is not worthy to be on this court. The total record suggests and demands otherwise. We should be lucky if we can get other nominees, whichever party is in charge of the White House, who have the kind of abilities and capacities that Jeffrey Sutton has. I have no doubt every litigant appearing before Mr. Sutton will be treated fairly, with dignity, and that the laws will be interpreted appropriately. This is an honest man. This is a great lawyer, although young, and he is a person who will, I think, bring a great deal of balance, integrity, capacity, and ability to the Federal courts of this country and, in particular, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. So I hope our colleagues in the Senate will ignore some of the, I think, disparaging remarks that have been made and look at the real record. And if they do, they will vote for Jeffrey Sutton. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"Mr. President, as we approach the anniversary of the September 11 tragedy, our Nation is in the midst of a national debate about war with Iraq. I am sure the presiding Senator recalls, as I do, graphically, that day just a year ago, on September 11, when the Capitol Building was evacuated. During the course of that evacuation, it finally hit me, as I stood on the grass outside the Capitol and was looking at this building, I was looking at the last building ever invaded by a foreign army on the continental United States soil, when the British attacked the Capitol during the War of 1812. That struck me as I stood there and reflected that once again an enemy had struck the United States home. I never would have imagined, when I came to work that week, that by the end of the week I would be voting unanimously with my colleagues in the Senate, Democrats and Republicans, to give to the President of the United States the authority to go to war and the resources to go to war. It happened so quickly, but it was the right thing to do. We understood that the United States was in peril, was in danger--and still is--from the forces of terrorism around the world. We stood as one, in a bipartisan way, to back the President, to fight this war on terrorism, to go after those who were responsible for the September 11 tragedy which struck the United States. Now, here we are a year later. The war on terrorism continues. Few, if any, would say that it is resolved or that we have won it. And we are debating the possibility of another war against another enemy. Osama bin Laden has not been captured or accounted for. The major leaders in al-Qaida are still on the loose somewhere. We believe al-Qaida still has a network of sleepers in 60 nations around the world. Afghanistan, the first battleground in the war against terrorism in the 21st century, is still not a stable and safe country. Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan, barely survived an assassination attempt last week. We have thousands of American troops still on the ground there. I had the honor to meet with some of them last January; our hearts and prayers are with them every single day. But that war on terrorism still continues. Yet the administration comes forward and tells us we still have to think about the possibility of another war, in this case a war against Iraq. Indeed, it is possible that within a few days or maybe a few weeks the people of the United States of America, through their Members of Congress, will be asked to vote on whether to go to war against Iraq. It is hard to believe the events are moving so quickly that we would be declaring a second war within little more than a year of the September 11 attack. Last Sunday on ``Meet the Press,'' Vice President Cheney indicated that the administration would like the Congress to vote on Iraq prior to adjourning this October. Do you realize that is a matter of weeks--weeks, before we would be called on to make this momentous decision? Because this is not a matter of high-altitude bombing when it comes to Iraq. We wouldn't have the luxury of that type of warfare. We are talking about, in the President's words, ``regime change.'' We are talking about removing Saddam Hussein from power, not peacefully but with force. That would involve, I am afraid, land forces invading, the type of war we have not seen in many decades in the United States. We recall the Persian Gulf war. It was a much different situation, a little over 10 years ago, precipitated by Saddam Hussein's invasion and occupation of Kuwait: The formation of a coalition led by the United States but also with the United Nations and allies around the world, including many Arab States who joined us. We fought to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. We were successful in doing that. We had logistical support. We positioned our troops in Saudi Arabia and nearby. We had a broad coalition. We were forcing Saddam Hussein out of a territory he had occupied. This is a far different challenge if we invade Iraq--different in that the coalition today consists of England and the United States, and no others. Logistical support is hard to find because the countries surrounding Iraq have basically told us they will not support us in this effort. Frankly, we would be fighting Saddam Hussein on his own territory, which gives him a home field advantage, which most military experts concede. Would we be successful ultimately? Yes--at some cost and at some price over some period of time. I have no doubt the American military--the very best in the world. Hussein would be gone. I can't tell you what it would cost. In the midst of the Kuwait situation, Saddam Hussein didn't use chemical and biological weapons, which we believe he has, but instead he decided to fire Scud missiles on Israel--kind of a third party to this conversation--hoping, I am sure, that he would destabilize the Middle East and cause such an uproar and consternation that the United States would withdraw. It didn't work. Sadly, Israelis died in the process. This time, we are not talking about moving Iraqi troops out of Kuwait but actually killing and capturing Saddam Hussein. To what lengths would he go in response? What victims would he seek? He doesn't have missiles to reach the United States, but he has the capacity to train what missiles he does have on nearby neighbors such as Israel. Vice President Cheney said that before the October adjournment, Congress would be asked to ``take a position and support whatever the President needs to have done in order to deal with this very critical problem.'' By most definitions, that is article I, section 8, clause 11, of the Constitution which gives the Congress, and the Congress alone, the power to declare war. The people who wrote that Constitution--the Founding Fathers--had seen a king in action, a king who had dragged his country into wars, and said that the United States would be different. We will never have a President to take us into a war. The American people will make that choice through Members of Congress--Members of the House elected every 2 years, and the Senate every 6 years. They will make the call, and do it very explicitly. Vice President Cheney is saying to Congress: It is your turn to make this decision. The decision to go to war is the most significant decision any government can make, and Congress plays an essential role. We and the executive branch need to have all the relevant facts analyzed as thoroughly and objectively as possible before making the decision to put America's military men and women in harm's way. Senior administration officials publicly identified Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction and the potential of Iraq's transfer of these weapons to terrorist groups as the primary threat to our Nation. Ultimately, our Government must rely on the intelligence community to make the most thorough and unbiased analytic assessment of the current and projected status of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction infrastructure, regardless of whether the analytic judgments conform or conflict with stated U.S. policy. In other words, we are saying that the intelligence community should give us the unvarnished truth, tell us what Iraq has and its likely capability. It is interesting, if you look at the countries that the Bush administration designated as part of the axis of evil--North Korea, Iran, and Iraq--of the three, the military capabilities of North Korea and Iran far surpass the capability of Iraq. We know that in the case with North Korea, and probably Iran as well, they have nuclear weapons today. We also know they are working on developing long-range missiles. We believe North Korea is the closest to developing missiles which could make it to the shores of the United States. But we think Iran is trying to do the same thing. All that I am telling you is a matter of public information. We know this. We know what their capability is. When you look at the status of the three countries which the President said are the axis of evil, Iraq clearly ranks third. If all three are threats and enemies to the United States, why is it that the administration has focused in on Iraq, which to our knowledge does not have nuclear weapons today nor the ability to deliver any type of long-range weaponry against the United States? As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am deeply concerned that the intelligence community has not completed the most basic document which is asked of them before the United States makes such a critical life-or-death decision. It is within the power of the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, to order a national intelligence estimate, known as an NIE. National intelligence estimates bring together all the agencies of the Federal Government involved in intelligence, sits them down, and collects and coordinate all of their information to reach the best possible conclusion he can come up with. I was stunned to learn last week that we have not produced a national intelligence estimate showing the current state of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. What is incredible, with all of the statements made by members of this administration about those weapons, is the fact that the intelligence community has not been brought together. If we learned anything from September 11 of last year, we learned, when it came to the intelligence out there at the FBI and the CIA and other agencies, that no one ever brought it together. Had we been able to bring it together by September 10, could we have avoided September 11? I am not sure. I wouldn't say that. But we certainly would have appreciated the threat a lot better, and perhaps we would have been prepared a lot better. Maybe--just maybe--we might have avoided some or all of the tragedy. But we didn't do it. Time and again since then as we looked back on last year, we have said we have to be better prepared, with better communications and better coordination of information from outside the country and inside, and bring it all together so we can make the best decision. When we are talking about a possible invasion of Iraq and a war against Iraq, why haven't we really created the most basic document that we have the power to create in this Government--the national intelligence estimate--so we know exactly what we may be up against in Iraq? It has not been done. This morning, I handed a letter to the deputy to Director Tenet asking that he give it to the Director personally, asking that they move as quickly as possible to establish and create this national intelligence estimate. Once it is established, I think we should meet on Capitol Hill--the Senate and the House Intelligence Committees. We should have classified hearing on things that can't be discussed publicly about this NIE, and then a public hearing as well to share with the American people, without compromising in any way the safety and security of the United States, as much information as we possibly can about the current state of affairs in Iraq. National intelligence estimates are the Director of Central Intelligence's most authoritative written judgments concerning national security issues. They contain the coordinated judgments of the entire intelligence community regarding the likely course of future events. They provide not just a snapshot of a particular national security problem today but a coordinated assessment of how that problem might evolve over the next several years. This is the vital policy planning tool for our Nation's policymakers. Let me tell you the many components of the U.S. intelligence community are worthy agencies. Each and every one of them does a good job of intelligence collection--the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State Intelligence and Research Bureau, and the Department of Energy's Intelligence Office which is critical to doing an assessment of nuclear capability, and the National Security Agency, just to name a few. They provide analytic assessments on an hour-to-hour, day-to-day basis. They can tell us better than any other group the current situation in Iraq. We need to know what their consensus opinion is before we decide in advance whether or not this war should be undertaken. I firmly believe that policymakers in both the executive branch and the Congress--the President, the White House, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Congress--would benefit from the production of a coordinated consensus document produced by all relevant components of the intelligence community on the current and projected status of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The letter I sent to Director Tenet asked him to initiate this process as quickly as possible and to produce the NIE within several weeks. I requested that an unclassified summary of it be produced, as has been done in the past, so the American public can better understand this vitally important national security issue. Let me tell you that during the time I served in the Congress--the House and the Senate--there is no moment I recall with more pain in my heart than the debate a little over 10 years ago about the Persian Gulf war. After we persuaded President Bush's father to follow the Constitution, to come to Congress and to seek the authority of the American people and the permission and approval of Congress before initiating that war, we then engaged in a debate--a long debate. I think virtually every Member of the House of Representatives took the floor over a 2- or 3-day period of time. The House met continuously. In that period of time, each of us stood in the well of the House of Representatives--as we did in the Senate Chamber here--and spoke our hearts about the challenge we faced and the vote we faced. We knew that if a vote were cast to go to war, innocent people would die and that American soldiers and American sailors and marines and airmen would have their lives on the line. It meant a lot to me personally because of a friend of mine, who was a Marine at the time--I knew his parents well. They were from Springfield, IL. I had known his mother and father for many years. They came to me early on when the debate got started and said: We are worried to death about our son. Really, our hope for the future of our family is in the Marines. He is there in the Persian Gulf, and we sure don't want to see anything happen to him. I assured them that I would think about him constantly as I made my decision on the Persian Gulf war. Of course, we all recall what happened. Finally, after the approval was given, the war was initiated. The land war did not take but 2 or 3 days and it was over. And I thought, at the time, what a great relief it was to be able to call his parents and tell them that it had ended so quickly and so well. Little did I know that Christian Porter of the U.S. Marine Corps from Springfield, IL, was one of the several hundred American casualties in that war. This young man, whom we all worried about so much, was the victim of friendly fire. I went to his funeral service in Springfield and to the veterans cemetery afterwards. My heart was broken for that family. But it was a good reminder for this Member of Congress--now a Member of the Senate--to remember what war is all about. It is about the potential loss of life of many innocent people. It is about being in harm's way for many Americans in uniform. We have to take this responsibility very seriously. And if we are going to take it seriously, we must insist, in Congress, that the administration produce the clear and convincing evidence that an invasion of Iraq is the only option available to us to bring this potential threat under control. If this administration cannot produce a National Intelligence Estimate which comes to that same conclusion, then, frankly, those of us who have listened to the heavy rhetoric over the last several weeks will understand that, when it comes to the evidence, there is something lacking. It is time for the administration to rise to the occasion, to produce this evidence, as has been asked for and been produced so many times in the past when America's national security was at risk. We cannot accept anything less than that before any Member of the House or the Senate is asked to vote on this critical question of going to war. We have to say to the administration: Bring forward your best evidence and your best arguments so that, ultimately, when we make this momentous and historic decision, we can go back to the States and people who we represent and say that we have dispatched our responsibility in a credible, good-faith manner, that we have done everything possible to understand the nature of the threat, and the best response of the United States. War is the last option. We have to know every element before we make that decision. We have to exhaust every other opportunity before we reach it. On Thursday, the President will be at the United Nations in New York. I am certain he is going to remind them that Saddam Hussein is a thug, that he has been a threat to his own people, to the region, and to people around the world with his weapons of mass destruction. He will, undoubtedly, remind them of his cruel invasion of Kuwait, which mobilized the United Nations to defeat him and to displace his troops from Kuwait. He will, undoubtedly, remind them of what has happened since: when the United Nations resolution, which condemns and prohibits Iraq from ever having weapons of mass destruction, has been ignored by Saddam Hussein; how the inspectors, some 4 years ago, were pushed out of his country; and how this man has literally, as a thug, ruled this nation in a manner and form that most civilized countries in the world find reprehensible. All of those things, I will concede, are true. But the next question facing the United Nations and facing the United States and its people, through its elected representatives in Congress, is: Is it the right thing for us to do? We cannot make the right decision without the best information. And the production of the National Intelligence Estimate will give us that information. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.", u"A lot of people are approaching this issue on the basis that there has to be some demonstration that, in the relatively near future, Saddam Hussein is going to use a weapon of mass destruction against us or else this is not the time that we should take military action against him. That is a rational position to take, in a way. If you do not think that there is a real threat or that it is imminent, you could reach the conclusion that we should not engage in war, or at least ought to be continuing to try to engage in diplomacy or whatever. But there is another side to the coin. It is the way the President has chosen to look at it. I think, because he has chosen to look at it this way, he will go down in history as a very prescient leader. Noemie Emery, who is a fine writer, in an article in a periodical a week ago, observed that most Presidents have had to fight a war but only two Presidents have had to perceive a war. Harry Truman perceived the cold war. He instinctively knew at the end of World War II, when the Soviet Union was beginning to assert its power in regions of southern Europe, for example, and elsewhere, that it was important for the United States and other Western allies to stand and say no to the further expansion of the Soviet Union and communism, even though that was going to mean a longtime confrontation with the Soviet Union which might even escalate into a hot war. The Marshall plan to assist countries in southern Europe was a part of that perception, and we are well aware of all the other events that followed that. He perceived the need to stand and thwart the continued aggression of an evil power, and we are grateful to him for that. Emery said the other President to perceive a war is George W. Bush. Of course, September 11, you can say, made that easy. But I submit it is not necessarily that easy. Over time, people will begin to wonder whether our commitment to a war on terror is really all that important if there are not further attacks. If we go another several months, hopefully even a year or two, without a major terrorist attack on the United States, will the American people continue to believe that this is a war worth fighting? Or was it a one-time-only proposition? George W. Bush perceived the need to conduct a war on terror because he understood that from a historical point of view, over the course of the last dozen or 15 years, there had been a whole series of attacks against the United States or our interests, and when we in Congress Monday morning quarterback the FBI and CIA and say, ``You failed to connect the dots,'' I wonder what those same people say about President Bush's understanding of the history leading up to September 11. He is connecting the dots between the Khobar Towers and the Cole bombing and the embassy bombings in Africa. You can even go back further than that, bringing it on forward all the way up to September 11. Does an event have to occur every 6 months for us to believe this is really a war worth stopping or worth winning and bringing to conclusion? I do not think so. I think the President, when he said to the American people, we are going to have to be patient in this war, understood that we would have to be patient, that it could take a long time. I have been very gratified at the response of the American people in not being as impatient as we usually are as a people. Americans love to get in, get the job done, and move on. That is a great trait of Americans. But the President here is saying be patient. So far, I have been very impressed that the American people have been very patient. What the President has perceived, that not everybody has perceived, is that this is a struggle that has been going on for some time and it is going to continue in that same vein for as far out as we can see, unless we defeat terrorism. So the wrong question to be asking at this time is: Can you prove that there is an imminent threat to the United States as a result of which we have to take military action against Iraq? That is the wrong question. There are many fronts in this war on terror, from Lackawanna in New York where we get the six people who we think were connected to terrorism, to Tora Bora, Afghanistan, where we had to rout out members of al-Qaida; to Pakistan, where we are fighting remnants of al-Qaida; to places such as Yemen and Sudan and Somalia and the Philippines and Malaysia; Hamburg, Germany, where we have had to roll up al-Qaida operatives; and then other places in the Middle East where there is terrorism going on every day and when there are people such as Saddam Hussein building weapons of mass terror who would not be doing that, would not be spending the resources and trying to hide them, simply to play some kind of game. They are obviously serious people with evil intentions. I think everybody concedes that. Then the question becomes: Why should you put the burden on the President to prove that at a particular time Saddam Hussein is going to strike the United States in order to conclude that we have to do something about him? It is the same kind of thinking as in the late 1930s, that, in retrospect, we look back on and say: Anybody could have realized that Hitler was somebody who had to be stopped. Why did Neville Chamberlain act so foolishly when he came back from Munich and said, ``Peace in our time''? I submit there are people today who are hoping against hope that Saddam Hussein will never use these weapons, weapons that are far greater than anything Adolph Hitler ever had in terms of their potential for destruction and death. I just wonder whether there are people who really believe we should wait until something specific and objective happens before we have a right to act, or whether preventative action is called for. Some call it preemption; some call it prevention. But the idea is that with war on terrorism you shouldn't have to wait until you are attacked to respond. That creates too many deaths, too much misery, and is unthinkable after September 11. The President, based upon good intelligence, has concluded that Saddam Hussein has a very large stock of very lethal weapons of mass destruction. By that, we mean chemical agents and biological agents which have been or can be ``weaponized''; that is to say, there are means of delivering those agents that can cause massive amounts of casualties; that he has been working to acquire a nuclear weapon. All of this is in open, public debate. And there is no doubt about any of it. The only doubt with respect to nuclear weapons is exactly where he is in the process. Of course, we don't know because he hasn't allowed us to inspect the places in his country where we believe he is trying to produce these nuclear weapons or, more specifically, the enriched uranium that would be a part of the weapons. For 4 years now, we have had no inspectors in the country, and before that most of the information that we got was based upon information from defectors--people who came out of Iraq and told us: You guys are missing what Saddam Hussein is doing. This is where you need to look. This is what you need to look for. When our inspectors then demanded to go to those places, one of three things happened. Either they said, no, you can't go there; that is a Presidential palace or whatever it is, or they went there and as they were walking in the front door satellite photos showed people running out of the backdoors with the stuff, or in the couple of cases we actually did find evidence of these weapons of mass destruction. Of course, at that point, Saddam Hussein said: Oh, that's right. I forgot about that. But whatever the defector said, that is all there is. So he was confirming exactly what we already knew and gave us nothing more than that. Yet there are those who believe through some kind of new inspection process that we are going to learn more than we did before; that this will be an adequate substitute for going in and finding these weapons of mass destruction in an unrestricted way. Saddam Hussein first said, You can have total access with no conditions, and he immediately began tying on conditions, the basis of which are laughable. You can't go into the Presidential palaces. They are grounds or areas with 1,000 buildings the size of the District of Columbia. We are going to send three inspectors in there? OK. There is the District of Columbia with all the buildings, and so on. Have at it. We are not going to find anything. We are going to be running around for years. So inspections are merely a means to an end. They are not the end. The goal here is not to have inspections. The goal is disarmament. And we know from intelligence that he has certain things he has not disarmed; that he hasn't done what he promised to do--both to the United States and the United Nations; that he hasn't complied with the United Nations resolutions. In fact, we see his violation of those resolutions almost every day. We don't have inspectors in there anymore who he was harassing and precluding from doing their job. But we do have aircraft flying in the no-fly zones and having American pilots and British pilots shot at every month, necessitating our taking those SAM sites and radar sites out of action by military force. So, in a sense, this is unfinished business from the gulf war which has never stopped. At a low level we have been trying to enforce the resolutions ever since the end of the gulf war. Our effort to rid many of these weapons of mass destruction is but the latest chapter. We made the decision in 1998 that Saddam Hussein had to go. We voted on a resolution here, and everybody was for it in 1998. If it was the right thing to do then, why is it no longer necessarily the right thing to do? He has had 4 more years to develop these weapons and to get closer to a nuclear capability. We now have a group of terrorists in the world who we know talk to each other, help each other, and give each other safe passage and access and places for training, and so on. We are developing information on connections with these terrorists and the State of Iraq. All of this has happened in the meantime. But now, suddenly, it is not the time. If we establish too high a burden of proof here we are going to be fiddling until we become absolutely sure it is time, and then it will be too late. That is why I believe the President is on the right track to say we don't know exactly when, where, or how but we know that this is a man who has very evil intentions and is working very hard to be able to strike at us. We can't let it happen. We can't wait until he has hit us to get him. For those reasons, and a variety of others that I will be talking about, I believe it is important for us to go into this debate with a view towards supporting the President, and the action that he has called for publicly and in the resolution that he has negotiated with congressional leaders and which has been placed on the floor. I believe at the end of the day we will conclude that the President should be supported and that we should authorize the use of force, and that we will have intelligence satisfactory for all of us to back up this resolution. And the final point--going back to the original point of my conversation today--that it is a phony issue to somehow demand that the intelligence community provide us with information to which we haven't been given access. We have gotten all that we need to have access to. Our Members have asked for that information, and they can get it. The only information that they can't get is information that should not be provided anybody, including you, Mr. President, myself, and the distinguished minority leader who now joins us on the floor. I will have more to say later. I know the minority leader has some things he would like to say. At this point, I yield the floor. Washington, October 2.--The Central Intelligence Agency has refused to provide Congress a comprehensive report on its role in a possible American campaign against Iraq, setting off a bitter dispute between the agency and leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Congressional leaders said today. In a contentious, closed-door Senate hearing today, agency officials refused to comply with a request from the committee for a broad review of how the intelligence community's clandestine role against the government of Saddam Hussein would be coordinated with the diplomatic and military actions that the Bush administration is planning. Lawmakers said they were further incensed because the director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet, who had been expected to testify about the Iraq report, did not appear at the classified hearing. A senior intelligence official said Mr. Tenet was meeting with President Bush. Instead, the agency was represented by the deputy director, John McLaughlin, and Robert Walpole, the national intelligence officer for strategic and nuclear programs. The agency rejected the committee's request for a report. After the rejection, Congressional leaders accused the administration of not providing the information out of fear of revealing divisions among the State Department, C.I.A., Pentagon and other agencies over the Bush administration's Iraq strategy. Government officials said that the agency's response also strongly suggested that Mr. Bush had already made important decisions on how to use the C.I.A. in a potential war with Iraq. One senior government official said it appeared that the C.I.A. did not want to issue an assessment of the Bush strategy that might appear to be ``second-guessing'' of the president's plans. The dispute was the latest of several confrontations between the C.I.A. and Congress over access to information about a range of domestic and foreign policy matters. Just last week, lawyers for the General Accounting Office and Vice President Dick Cheney argued in federal court over whether the White House must turn over confidential information on the energy policy task force that Mr. Cheney headed last year. The C.I.A.'s rejection of the Congressional request, which some lawmakers contend was heavily influenced by the White House, comes as relations between the agency and Congress have badly deteriorated. The relations have soured over the ongoing investigation by a joint House-Senate inquiry-- composed of members of the Senate and House intelligence committees--into the missed signals before the Sept. 11 attacks. Mr. Tenet in particular has been a target of lawmakers. Last Friday, Mr. Tenet, a former Senate staffer himself, wrote a scathing letter to the leaders of the joint Congressional inquiry, denouncing the panel for writing a briefing paper that questioned the honesty of a senior C.I.A. official before he even testified. A senior intelligence official said Mr. Tenet's absence at the hearing today was unavoidable, and that no slight was intended. The official said that he missed the hearing because he was at the White House with Mr. Bush, helping to brief other Congressional leaders Iraq. The official said Mr. Tenet had advised the committee staff several days ago that he would not be able to attend. Mr. Tenet has promised to testify about the matter in another classified hearing on Friday, officials said. One Congressional official said that the incident has badly damaged Mr. Tenet's relations with Congress, something that Mr. Tenet had always worked hard to cultivate. ``I hope we aren't seeing some schoolyard level of petulance,'' by the C.I.A., the official said. While the House and Senate intelligence oversight committee have received classified information about planned covert operations against Iraq, the C.I.A. has not told lawmakers how the agency and the Bush administration see those operations fitting into the larger war on Iraq, or the global war on terrorism, Congressional officials said. ``What they haven't told us is how does the intelligence piece fit into the larger offensive against Iraq, or how do these extra demands on our intelligence capabilities affect our commitment to the war on terrorism in Afghanistan,'' said one official. Congressional leaders complained that they have been left in the dark on how the intelligence community will be used just as they are about to debate a resolution to support war with Iraq. Congressional leaders said the decision to fight the Congressional request may stem from a fear of exposing divisions within the intelligence community over the administration's Iraq strategy, perhaps including a debate between the agency and the Pentagon over the military's role in intelligence operations in Iraq. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has been moving to strengthen his control over the military's intelligence apparatus, potentially setting up a turf war for dominance among American intelligence officials. Mr. Rumsfeld has also been pushing to expand the role of American Special Operations Forces into covert operations, including activities that have traditionally been the preserve of the C.I.A. Congressional leaders asked for the report in July, and expressed particular discontent that the C.I.A. did not respond for two months. Lawmakers had asked that the report be provided in the form of a national intelligence estimate, a formal document that is supposed to provide a consensus judgment by the several intelligence agencies. The committee wanted to see whether analysts at different agencies, including the C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the State Department, have sharply differing views about the proper role of the intelligence community in Iraq. But intelligence officials say that a national intelligence estimate is designed to assess the policies of foreign countries--not those of the United States. ``They were asking for an assessment of U.S. policy, and that falls outside the realm of the N.I.E., and it gets into the purview of the commander in chief,'' an intelligence official said. Committee members have also expressed anger that the C.I.A. refused to fully comply with a separate request for another national intelligence estimate, one that would have provided an overview of the intelligence community's latest assessment on Iraq. Instead, the C.I.A. provided a narrower report, dealing specifically with Iraq's program to develop weapons of mass destruction. Lawmakers said that Mr. Tenet had assured the committee in early September that intelligence officials were in the midst of producing an updated national intelligence estimate on Iraq, and that the committee would receive it as soon as it was completed. Instead, the Senate panel received the national intelligence estimate on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program after 10 p.m. on Tuesday night, too late for members to read it before Wednesday's hearing. The committee had ``set out an explicit set of requests'' for what was to be included in the Iraq national intelligence estimate, said one official. Those requirements were not met. ``We wanted to know what the intelligence community's assessment of the effect on a war in Iraq on neighboring states, and they did not answer that question,'' the official said. A senior intelligence official said the 100-page report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program was completed in three weeks under very tight Congressional deadlines, and the writing had to be coordinated with several agencies.", u"Mr. President, the comment that not always right but never in doubt may well apply to every Senator. I must say to my colleague from Texas that I intend for a few moments on Monday to say a word about the Senator from Texas, and my colleagues from South Carolina and North Carolina, and others who are leaving the Senate. I don't know if Senator Byrd indicated that he wished there were more such as the Senator from Texas, and he is, indeed, an extraordinarily bright and talented Senator. There are times at midnight when he is objecting to all kinds of provisions that I suspect the Senator from West Virginia and a few others would not wish that we had 25 more exactly in the same mood at midnight on important pieces of legislation. But he and so many others contribute in very significant ways to this body. This body produces for the American people best when it achieves the best ideas that everyone has to offer. There are times when we end up with the worst rather than the best. I have always thought that politics and our political system is not who is the worst; it is who is the best, who has the best ideas, and who can best manifest those ideas in public debate to achieve a result for this country. Regrettably, too much of American politics--especially if you are coming off recent campaigns--is not at all about who is the best but rather who is the worst. That, in my judgment, becomes an anvil on the body politic. John F. Kennedy used to say with some beautiful prose that mother kind of hopes her child might grow up to be President, as long as they don't have to become active in politics. But, of course, politics is the way we make decisions in America. I am enormously proud of this political system of the participation by Republicans, Democrats, Conservatives, Liberals, Independents, and moderates. I think all bring a great deal to the public debate and discussion, and strengthen our country. Having said that, on Monday I will say a few words about our colleagues who will be leaving us--Senator Cleland, Senator Carnahan, and others who have been mentioned on the Republican side. I believe that it is a great privilege to serve with each and every one of them, even though we from time to time have our differences. It is a remarkable privilege to be here and to serve with them. I wish to make a point about homeland security that is not a part of this bill but I think a part of something that is very important. To underscore how important it is, I would note that we have been told by the head of the CIA that the threat of attack by al-Qaida and other terrorists now is as high as it was the day before September 11. On October 25 of this year, a task force headed by former Senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart issued a report on America's homeland security. That report was entitled ``America Still Unprepared, America Still In Danger.'' It was a bipartisan task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, which included former Secretaries of State, Warren Christopher, George Shultz, ADM William Crow, Retired, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They found that 1 year after the September 11 attacks America remains dangerously unprepared for another terrorist attack. I specifically wish to talk about one of their concerns raised in this report that I read, which gave me great personal concern. In the report, the task force concluded that the 650,000 local and State law enforcement officials around the country ``continue to operate in a virtual intelligence vacuum without access to the terrorist watch list provided by the U.S. Department of State to Immigration and consular officials.'' Our government has a watchlist to identify foreign nationals suspected of ties to terrorist organizations. That watch list is at the State Department. It is provided to the Immigration Department and to consular officials. It sets out the names of people whom we ought to watch because they are known terrorists. They are people who associate with terrorists; they are a terrorist threat to this country. Guess what. That watch list is unavailable to state and local law enforcement officials around this country. Thirty-six hours before the September 11 attack, one of the hijackers was pulled over by a Maryland State police trooper for driving 90 miles an hour on Interstate 95. The hijacker's name was Ziad Jarrah. He was a 26-year-old Lebanese national. He was one of the key organizers of the al-Qaida terrorist cell formed in Germany 3 years ago. He shared an apartment with Mohammed Atta. And he was at the controls of flight 93 when it crashed in a rural area of Pennsylvania. When that hijacker--or at that point the potential hijacker--was pulled over by the Maryland trooper, he was driving a car rented under his own name. There are a couple of things with respect to this issue that are interesting. No. 1, his name was not on the watch list. No. 2, had it been on the watch list, it wouldn't have mattered because a highway patrolman or a city police officer has no access to that watch list. The officer can run the name of an individual through the NCIC computer and find out if that individual has an outstanding warrant, or if there are law enforcement warnings about him but the officer has no way of knowing if the individual is on the State Department terrorism watch list. The State Department watch list has the names of 80,000 terrorists or suspected terrorists on it. And 2,000 names are being added each and every month. The watch list is drawn from a good many area intelligence agencies. And as we speak, there is no way for law enforcement authorities to access the database. Let me read in detail an excerpt from the Hart-Rudman report: `With just fifty-six field offices around the nation, the burden of identifying and intercepting terrorists in our midst is a task well beyond the scope of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This burden could and should be shared with 650,000 local, county, and state law enforcement officers, but they clearly cannot lend a hand in a counterterrorism information void. When it comes to combating terrorism, the police officers on the beat are effectively operating deaf, dumb, and blind. Terrorist watch lists provided by the U.S. Department of State to immigration and consular officials are still out of bounds for state and local police. In the interim period as information sharing issues get worked out, known terrorists will be free to move about to plan and execute their attack.' This comes from the report of former Senators Hart and Rudman, entitled ``America Still Unprepared, America Still In Danger.'' I asked my staff--after I read this in the Report--to contact the task force. The task force, through my staff, has told me that they are not aware of any administration initiative to fix the problem. This, despite the fact that this is a top recommendation of a blue-ribbon task force. So I asked the Congressional Research Service to contact the White House Office of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice. They have done this in recent days. My understanding is that after I made these inquiries the White House convened a meeting with State and Justice officials, and they are now apparently looking into ways to integrate the State Department terrorist watch list--called the ``Tipoff'' database--with the National Crime Information Center, which is accessible by State and local law enforcement authorities. This effort must be expedited. Let me quote from the article in the Washington Post of just yesterday: U.S. intelligence officials, increasingly confident that al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden is the speaker on a new audiotape released this week, said yesterday that the message was part of a disturbing pattern indicating that terrorist groups may be planning a new wave of attacks on Western targets. Even before the purported bin Laden tape surfaced on the al-Jazeera satellite network on Tuesday, the CIA, FBI and National Security Agency had detected a significant spike in intelligence ``chatter'' over the previous 10 days that strongly indicated new assaults are being planned, officials in U.S. intelligence agencies said. That is from the Washington Post. They continue to say: The amount of alarming information was approaching the volume seen in the weeks before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in Washington and New York, and again in the middle of last month following a wave of attacks on overseas targets, some sources said. The point is this: Homeland security and homeland protection rests, yes, with our intelligence-gathering agencies, yes, with the FBI, the CIA, and all of the officials who are working very hard, spending a lot of hours doing the best job they can to make it work. But beyond that, it also rests with cooperation with all of the local responders, especially local law enforcement officials across this country. There are 650,000 of them. If, today, a terrorist drives through a rural county in North Dakota this afternoon, or a rural county in Vermont, or Kentucky, or in the middle of New York City, and is picked up for a traffic violation, and is a known terrorist on a watch list--guess what-- that highway patrolman, that city police officer is going to run that terrorist's name through the database at the NCIC, and they are going to get no warning that what they have on their hands is a terrorist in the car in front of them. There would be no warning at all because they cannot access the watch list. If we have a watch list in which we have identified the names of terrorists and suspected terrorists, it makes no sense at all to withhold that information from law enforcement officers, who every single day climb out of bed and go protect this country on America's streets, on our highways. They are our eyes and ears. They are also watching out for the security of this country. They ought to have access to that watch list. Again, let me say, this was the No. 1 recommendation in the report offered by former Senator Rudman and former Senator Hart. The report, which I would urge everyone to read, is entitled: ``America Still Unprepared--America Still in Danger.'' These are former Secretaries of State, former Senators, Republicans, Democrats, evaluating what needs to be done to protect this country for this country's security. I want to go back to read just a portion of the report. The task force had this to say: With just fifty-six field offices around the nation, the burden of identifying and intercepting terrorists in our midst is a task well beyond the scope of the FBI. The burden could and should be shared with 650,000 local, county, and state law enforcement officers, but they clearly cannot lend a hand in a counterterrorism information void. Yesterday, I was on the phone with a community in North Dakota, and the county sheriff was there in the room, and we talked by conference phone. We talked about this issue. He is not too far from the Canadian border. If one of his deputies or that county's sheriff stops a car on a rural highway, and it turns out to be a terrorist driving a rented car, he is not going to know because he does not have access to the watch list, he does not have access to the information. The FBI will not know, the CIA will not know, no one will know that terrorist was driving a car on that rural road because the person who apprehended him--the county sheriff, the city police officer--had no access to the information the State Department has, the consular officials have, the CIA has. It is not that the information does not exist, it is that it is not shared with local law enforcement officers across this country for the purpose of securing this country's homeland. So this was the task force's top recommendation. This was not No. 5 or No. 10, it was the top recommendation of this group, a group that included several former Secretaries of State under Republican and Democratic administrations, Republican and Democratic former Senators, and others. So I implore the President and the folks who are apparently now working on this to do everything they can in this regard. When a trooper stops someone for speeding tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, or the day after that, and the individual that was pulled over is a terrorist, I want that trooper to realize who he has in that car--for the trooper's protection, and for the protection of this country. Let me talk briefly about one other piece of homeland security, and we addressed part of it yesterday. I have told my colleagues previously, I was recently at a port in Seattle. I don't know much about ports because I come from a landlocked State. I don't come from a State near an ocean. So I went down to see how the ports worked. They showed me all these ships that come in with all these containers. I asked: What is in all these containers? They said: We have all these bills of lading and invoices, so we know what is in them. I asked: Can I see? And they showed me some containers they were opening. They showed me a container from Poland that had frozen broccoli in it in 100-pound bags. They pulled out a bag of frozen broccoli and cut it open. Sure enough, it was frozen broccoli. I asked: What is in the middle of the container? I know what is in this bag. And they said: Well, we just know what's on the invoice. We are spending $7 to $8 billion to see if we can stop an incoming missile because we are very afraid a terrorist group might get hold of an ICBM. But it is more likely a terrorist group might put a weapon of mass destruction in a container on a container ship that comes in at 3 miles an hour pulling up to a dock in New York City or Los Angeles. We have 5.7 million containers every year coming into our ports. So 5.7 million containers every single year; 100,000 are inspected, 5.6 million are not. Is that a matter of homeland security? You bet your life it is. A fellow in the Middle East--many of you read about this fellow--decided he was going to ship himself to Toronto and then come into this country. He had a GPS, a computer, a toilet, fresh water, a cot, all in a container loaded on a container ship, shipping himself to Toronto, Canada, with the intention, apparently, of coming into this country. Do we need to be concerned about these things? You better believe it. And many of these issues, even if we passed a homeland security bill, will not be resolved. The first issue I mentioned today is not resolved, and will not be resolved with the passage Monday of this bill: The fact that 650,000 local law enforcement authorities have no ability to access a watch list to determine who is a terrorist and who isn't. And 5.6 million uninspected containers coming into our ports will not be inspected next Tuesday when the homeland security bill is passed. So my point is, there is much left to be done for those of us--and I am sure that is all of us--who care deeply about homeland security in this country. Mr. President, I yield the floor.", u"Madam President, I feel obliged to voice my strong opposition to S. 149, the pending Export Administration Act of 2001. I do this because this bill does not protect the national security of the American people. It does not control the export of our most sensitive dual-use items. It does not promote U.S. foreign policy. Instead, this is an indiscriminate trade promotion bill, and I am obliged to state that I am troubled by the fact that this bill, S. 149, was written in fact, by the business community to maximize future sales to Communist China, and to other such countries that represent the highest risk of technology diversion and proliferation. Make no mistake about it, this legislation will enable dangerous regimes around the world to arm themselves through the use of the best dual-use technology America has to offer. This bill's sponsors argue that because the cold war is over, the world is a much safer place and that we need to rid ourselves of outdated export controls that inhibit trade and harm the economy. These Pollyannas could not be more mistaken. As the ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, I feel obliged to make clear that I hold a very different view. It is a view based on years of experience in foreign policy and national security matters, and sharpened by ongoing intelligence assessments. My view is shared by the other ranking members of the national security committees of the Senate; that is why we have joined together in opposing this legislation. The fact is, despite the fall of the Soviet Union, the world is actually a far more complicated and dangerous place due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. During the past 30 years alone, the number of countries pursuing nuclear weapons programs has doubled, the number of countries pursuing ballistic missile programs has tripled, and more than a dozen countries, including most state sponsors of terrorism, have offensive biological and chemical weapons programs. Even worse, this activity is being fueled by Russia and Communist China, two members of the United Nations Security Council who are illicitly selling to rogue countries the dual-use technologies so critical to their weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. For years, some other Senators and I have cautioned the Senate about these growing threats; we have argued forcefully for a national missile defense system to make the United States less vulnerable to blackmail or missile attack itself. But missile defense cannot alone keep us safe. What we desperately need, and don't have, is a comprehensive strategy that ranges from a credible strategic deterrent to rigorus export controls as our first line of defense. At a time when the United States of America is becoming increasingly vulnerable to rogue states and others armed with WMD-tipped ballistic missiles, it makes absolutely no sense for the United States to liberalize its export controls over the technology and know-how so critical to these weapons programs. Moreover, doing so sends all of the wrong signals to our allies, and others, about our commitment to nonproliferation. I have also tried as best I can to make clear my view about the need to deal firmly with Communist China, which is dramatically increasing its military spending and modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces. China's leaders talk openly about preparing for a future conflict with the United States. Meanwhile, Communist China is making every effort to acquire U.S. technology and know-how, through theft, circumvention of export laws, or legitimate commercial activity. In the past year and a half alone, Communist China illegally used U.S. supercomputers to improve its nuclear weapons. And just a few months ago, we learned that Chinese technicians were installing fiber optic cable for Iraq's air defenses, a clear violation of U.N. sanctions. Worse yet, this assistance and technology--which was provided to Chinese companies by American business firms when the previous administration mistakenly decontrolled this equipment over--and I must emphasize ``over''--the objections of the National Security Agency in 1994--has been of great help to Saddam Hussein in his quest to shoot down American pilots. Seven months ago, a CIA report made clear that China continues ``to take a very narrow interpretation of their non-proliferation commitments with the United States.'' Just recently, we learned that the Communist Chinese are continuing to ship missile parts and components to Pakistan despite Beijing's pledge in November 2000 to stop all such transfers and set up an export control system. Consideration of this bill by the Senate sends all of the wrong signals, wrong messages, to China. It reminds Beijing that the United States is all too willing to place profit before principle. Let me address some of the major elements of this legislation that have convinced me that its passage will seriously jeopardize the national security of the United States. To begin, no one--and I repeat no one--has conducted a thorough national security risk assessment to determine the possible impact of this bill's sweeping changes on our national security. Rather, many have blindly accepted the anecdotes and assertions of industry as the basis for changes in the bill. Second, this bill does not adequately cover ``deemed exports,'' more commonly understood as the transfers of sensitive knowledge from one person to another within the United States. Under this bill, the information and know-how passed to visiting scientists and others does not appear to be illegal. Third, this bill creates a new licensing exemption category called mass marketed items, which allows companies to produce their products off of the control lists, notwithstanding the sensitivity of the item. If an item is widely available in the United States, then the bill's authors argue that it shouldn't be controlled. Fourth, when coupled with a new definition of foreign availability that further loosens controls, this bill has the potential to decontrol large numbers of items. For example, according to one outside expert, under S. 149, the high-precision electronic switches needed to detonate atomic bombs could be up for sale by claiming that they are needed as spare parts for medical equipment; this is what Iraq tried as recently as 1998. Fifth, despite the fact that the purpose of the EAA is to safeguard our nation's security, the various advisory committees and consultative requirements placed on the administration in the bill do not require that national security or non-proliferation experts be included, while labor organizations and the business community are clearly mentioned. Sixth, this legislation prohibits export controls on sensitive parts if they are incorporated into more expensive commercial items or if the controlled item in shipping overseas for final assembly. In other words, despite the national security importance of an item, whether or not it's controlled depends to some degree on its relative monetary value and where it is produced. So if a special airborne navigation or radar system requires a license when exported individually, a license would not be required if it were merely a part of an expensive aircraft. And last, but certainly not least, S. 149 provides extraordinary authority to the Secretary of Commerce on important procedural issues such as commodity classifications, license referrals, dispute resolutions, and the development of export administration regulations. If national security concerns are to be given adequate consideration in export decisions, then the Departments of State and Defense must be given greater authority in the export licensing process. And if these two departments are found already to have sufficient authority under current practice, then why not codify it? The bottom line is that there seem to be more loopholes and exemptions from export controls in this bill than there are export controls. Could it be that the drafters of this legislation assume that any effort to obtain a license will meet with failure, and that no effort should therefore be spared in ensuring that companies need not bother to ask for one. I cannot understand why the bill goes to such great lengths to ensure that no exporter will ever be required to tell the U.S. government what he proposes to export, and to whom he intends to sell it. Just because an exporter is required to obtain a license for a sale does not mean that the sale is going to be denied. In fact, over 80 percent of all license applications are approved. At the same time, the requirement for a license enables the United States Government to ensure that U.S. companies do not contribute, either intentionally or unintentionally, to the arming of potentially hostile regimes. Licenses also allow the government to track acquisition efforts by various countries and groups. Without the licensing of dual-use commodities, the U.S. will know less about the potential proliferation of dangerous technologies, will be less able to combat that proliferation, and will lose the ability to exhort other nations to take steps to strengthen their regimes. Notwithstanding these facts, the bill's authors will argue that they have made considerable changes to the bill that address many of the concerns my colleagues and others have raised in the past. For example, the Banking Committee will argue that: Penalties for violations of this Act have been raised in order to punish violators and deter others. While this is true, this bill also raises the evidentiary standard for illicit transfers. Moreover, raising penalties doesn't make much difference when fewer items are being controlled, or when enforcement procedures--such as the mandatory conduct of post-shipment verifications on high-performance computers--are stripped from the law. An Executive order will be issued to cover deemed exports, give the Department of Defense more visibility and a larger role in the commodity classification process, and strengthen the voice and role of other agencies. However, to date, a draft of the Executive order has yet to be provided for review. But more importantly, given the significance of these matters, doesn't it make sense to make these changes part of the law? It doesn't make sense to control mass marketed items that can be purchased at Radio Shack and carried out of the country. The problem with this argument is that if items were controlled, they wouldn't be available for purchase at Radio Shack. But beyond that, acquiring widely available items illegally denies end-users the parts, maintenance, and servicing agreements essential to their long-term operation. Since most licenses are approved anyway, requiring a licensing only harms U.S. companies by slowing them down. The fact is, DoD and the intelligence community benefit greatly from the opportunity to look at and understand complex dual-use items before they are shipped abroad, and the licensing data provides an important audit trail that is useful for conducting cumulative effects analyses and other follow-ups. This bill addresses all of the major findings and recommendations of the Cox commission report. Upon closer examination, many of the Cox commission's conclusions are not addressed, but are simply explained away. For example, the Cox commission recommended that the government conduct a comprehensive review of the national security implications of exporting high-performance computers to the PRC, yet S. 149 does away with that requirement. The Cox commission also recommended that current licensing procedures be modified to provide longer review periods when deemed necessary by any reviewing department or agency on national security grounds, and require a consensus by all reviewing departments and agencies for license approval. Unfortunately, S. 149 also fails to fully adopt these proposals as well. The Wassenaar arrangement is a weak multilateral regime that fails to control many dual-use items to the advantage of our European partners. It is true that Wassenaar is an inadequate agreement, but it is also true that the U.S. government has contributed to its weakness by making changes to our export control laws that seemed to undercut our Wassenaar partners. But rather than pushing for greater decontrol, we should follow up on President Bush's statement that we need a stronger regime--closer to what we had under COCOM--to prevent the proliferation of sensitive dual-use items to rogue states. It is unfortunate that the United States is giving up its leadership role on this issue and walking away from years of progress in the export control and nonproliferation field. Finally, some have argued that failure to pass S. 149 will result in economic harm to our country and the loss of thousands of U.S. jobs. These claims ignore the fact that, according to the Congressional Research Service, controlled exports represented less than 3 percent of total U.S. exports in 1998. And since over 80 percent of all licenses are approved, only a few billion dollars in sales were lost due to denied licenses--an extremely low percentage of the United States' $10 trillion GDP. These numbers also demonstrate that while exports are being controlled--and mainly to embargoed countries or those at high risk of diversion, such as China--American firms are not losing out to foreign competition. Industry simply does not want the U.S. government reviewing the export of sensitive dual-use items, even if it is for national security purposes. If current licensing procedures are cumbersome for business, then the solution is to improve the efficiency and operations of the export process, not decontrol sensitive items simply to avoid the process altogether. Despite all of these dubious arguments by the drafters and supporters of this flawed bill, the core problem with S. 149 is its fundamental refusal to recognize that sometimes the United States must go it alone to make a point. The structure of S. 149 fails to take into account the ability of the U.S. to lead other nations by demonstrating self-restraint and a commitment to principle. It restricts the U.S. ability to control exports unless other nations are already doing likewise, or can be guaranteed to do the same in the near term. I do not believe in the contrived arguments of those who say if you can't beat them, join them. Industry reasons that if America cannot stop rogue states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, then why should we be ceding market share to our competitors? They say that the United States cannot stop dictators or communist governments from denying their people certain basic rights and freedoms, so why not conduct business as usual with them? Well, that is not the American way. Americans do not support profit at any price, especially if that price is our national security or our moral dignity. The American people will not support the prospect of fueling our economy by selling sensitive technologies to tyrants and potential adversaries. This is what we witnessed in the eight years of the Clinton-Gore administration, and it is time for this type of nonsense to stop. We don't need another eight years of intelligence reports that are leaked to the press, outlining in great detail how the PRC is using American technology to improve its armed forces; how Russian and Communist Chinese entities are transferring American technology to rogue states around the world; how American security, interests and friends have been jeopardized; and how it is completely legal thanks to the Export Administration Act of 2001. Rather, the Senate should follow the wisdom and courage of the House International Relations Committee. Under the fine leadership of Chairman Henry Hyde and Tom Lantos, the HIRC was able to pass, with overwhelming bipartisan support, numerous amendments--similar to the ones my colleagues and I will offer this week--that put national security back into this legislation. While the United States does need a new Export Administration Act, the bill should protect our national security, not jeopardize it at the expense of marginal increases in trade. The bill should give every government department a role commensurate with its expertise and responsibilities. And the bill should send the right message to our allies, friends and adversaries, that United States takes non-proliferation issues seriously, and will continue to take the lead in the efforts. We need a new EAA but not this one.", u"Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, in the minute and a half I have remaining, I want to join our distinguished chairman in remembering those people in the defense intelligence community who lost their lives at the Pentagon, indeed all of the people who lost their lives at the Pentagon. Those of us who have had the opportunity to spend any time over there to extend the condolences of this entire Congress and of our own constituents know that the sorrow that we all experienced has moved to resolve. I also wanted to mention John O'Neill, a former FBI special agent in charge of the National Security Division, who lost his life in the World Trade Center attack. His service is well known to many of us in the intelligence community; and we extend condolences to his family, and, indeed, to the families of all who lost their lives, whether it is in planes or in the buildings that were attacked. There have been unimaginable acts of terrorism designed to instill fear in the American people, but the terrorists will not succeed in that. Their behavior is outside the circle of civilized human behavior, and I agree with President Bush that we will bring them to justice or bring justice to them; but justice must be done. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the remainder of my time be a moment of silence in honor of those that lost their lives. The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule by title, and each title shall be considered read. No amendment to that amendment shall be in order except those printed in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for that purpose and pro forma amendments for the purpose of debate. Amendments printed in the Record may be offered only by the Member who caused it to be printed or his designee and shall be considered read. The Clerk will designate section 1. The text of section 1 is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows: The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to section 1? If not, the Clerk will designate title I. The text of title I is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2002 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The National Reconnaissance Office. (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (12) The Coast Guard. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2002, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2883 of the One Hundred Seventh Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2002 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2002 the sum of $152,776,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available until September 30, 2003. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 313 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2002. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2002 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until September 30, 2003. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2002, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2002, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period not to exceed one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $27,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2004. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(H) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' before ``the Department of Energy''; and (2) by inserting ``, and the Coast Guard'' before the semicolon. The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title I? If not, the Clerk will designate title II. The text of title II is as follows: There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2002 the sum of $212,000,000. The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title II? If not, the Clerk will designate title III. The text of title III is as follows: Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. It is the sense of the Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the United States. Section 113(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404(h)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``An employee''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) The head of an agency of an employee detailed under subsection (a) may pay a lodging allowance for the employee subject to the following conditions: ``(A) The allowance shall be the lesser of the cost of the lodging or a maximum amount payable for the lodging as established jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and-- ``(i) with respect to detailed employees of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense; and ``(ii) with respect to detailed employees of other agencies and departments, the head of such agency or department. ``(B) The detailed employee maintains a primary residence for the employee's immediate family in the local commuting area of the parent agency duty station from which the employee regularly commuted to such duty station before the detail. ``(C) The lodging is within a reasonable proximity of the host agency duty station. ``(D) The distance between the detailed employee's parent agency duty station and the host agency duty station is greater than 20 miles. ``(E) The distance between the detailed employee's primary residence and the host agency duty station is 10 miles greater than the distance between such primary residence and the employees parent duty station. ``(F) The rate of pay applicable to the detailed employee does not exceed the rate of basic pay for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule.''. Section 106(b)(2)(C) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)(C)) is amended by striking ``Nonproliferation and National Security'' and inserting ``Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Counterintelligence''. (a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be known as the ``Commission on Preparedness and Performance of the Federal Government for the September 11 Acts of Terrorism'' (in this section referred to as the ``Commission''). (b) Duty.-- (1) Assessment of agency performance.--The Commission shall, with respect to the acts of terrorism committed against the United States on September 11, 2001, assess the performance of those agencies and departments of the United States charged with the responsibility to prevent, prepare for, or respond to acts of terrorism up to and including that date. For purposes of the preceding sentence, those agencies and departments include-- (A) the Department of Defense (including the intelligence elements of the Department), (B) the Department of Justice (including the intelligence elements of the Department), (C) the Department of State (including the intelligence elements of the Department), (D) the Department of the Transportation (including the intelligence elements of the Department), (E) the Department of the Treasury (including the intelligence elements of the Department), (F) the Central Intelligence Agency, and (G) the Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2) Report.--The Commission shall submit the report described in subsection (g). (c) Membership.-- (1) Number and appointment.--The Commission shall be composed of 10 members appointed as follows: (A) The President shall appoint 4 members. (B) The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall appoint 2 members. (C) The majority leader of the Senate shall appoint 2 members. (D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives shall appoint 1 member. (E) The minority leader of the Senate shall appoint 1 member. (2) Terms.-- (A) In general.--Each member shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. (B) Vacancies.--Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of the term for which the member's predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder of that term. A member may serve after the expiration of that member's term until a successor has taken office. A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made. (3) Basic pay.-- (A) Rates of pay.--Members shall serve without pay. (B) Travel expenses.--Each member shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code. (4) Quorum.--6 members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum but a lesser number may hold hearings. (5) Chairperson.--The Chairperson of the Commission shall be elected by the members. (d) Director and Staff of Commission.-- (1) Director.--The Commission shall have a Director who shall be appointed by the Chairperson. (2) Staff.--The Chairperson may appoint and fix the pay of additional personnel as the Director considers appropriate. (3) Applicability of certain civil service laws.--The Director and staff of the Commission shall be appointed subject to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that an individual so appointed may not receive pay in excess of the annual rate of basic pay for GS-15 of the General Schedule. (4) Experts and consultants.--With the approval of the Chairperson, the Director may procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, but at rates for individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic pay for GS-15 of the General Schedule. (5) Staff of federal agencies.--Upon request of the Chairperson, the head of any Federal department or agency may detail, on a reimbursable basis, any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to assist it in carrying out its duties under this section. (e) Powers of Commission.-- (1) Hearings and sessions.--The Commission may, for the purpose of carrying out this section, hold hearings, sit and act at times and places, take testimony, and receive evidence as the Commission considers appropriate. The Commission may administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses appearing before it. (2) Powers of members and agents.--Any member or agent of the Commission may, if authorized by the Commission, take any action which the Commission is authorized to take by this section. (3) Obtaining official data.--The Commission may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States information, including classified information, necessary to enable it to carry out this Act. Upon request of the Chairperson of the Commission, the head of that department or agency shall furnish that information to the Commission. (4) Mails.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the United States. (5) Administrative support services.--Upon the request of the Commission, the Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Commission, on a reimbursable basis, the administrative support services necessary for the Commission to carry out its responsibilities under this section. (6) Subpoena power.-- (A) In general.--The Commission may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence relating to any matter under investigation by the Commission. The attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence may be required from any place within the United States at any designated place of hearing within the United States. (B) Failure to obey a subpoena.--If a person refuses to obey a subpoena issued under subparagraph (A), the Commission may apply to a United States district court for an order requiring that person to appear before the Commission to give testimony, produce evidence, or both, relating to the matter under investigation. The application may be made within the judicial district where the hearing is conducted or where that person is found, resides, or transacts business. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as civil contempt. (C) Service of subpoenas.--The subpoenas of the Commission shall be served in the manner provided for subpoenas issued by a United States district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States district courts. (D) Service of process.--All process of any court to which application is made under subparagraph (B) may be served in the judicial district in which the person required to be served resides or may be found. (E) Immunity.--Except as provided in this paragraph, a person may not be excused from testifying or from producing evidence pursuant to a subpoena on the ground that the testimony or evidence required by the subpoena may tend to incriminate or subject that person to criminal prosecution. A person, after having claimed the privilege against self- incrimination, may not be criminally prosecuted by reason of any transaction, matter, or thing which that person is compelled to testify about or produce evidence relating to, except that the person may be prosecuted for perjury committed during the testimony or made in the evidence. (7) Contract authority.--The Commission may contract with and compensate government and private agencies or persons for supplies and services, without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5). (f) Report.--The Commission shall transmit a report to the President and the Congress not later than 6 months after the date by which the Director has been appointed by the Chairperson. The report shall contain a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission, together with its recommendations for legislation and administrative actions the Commission considers appropriate. (g) Termination.--The Commission shall terminate on 30 days after submitting the report required under subsection (g). The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title III?", u"The bill (H.R. 2883), as amended, was passed, as follows: Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives (H.R. 2883) entitled ``An Act to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.'', do pass with the following amendment:Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert: (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows: Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2002 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The National Reconnaissance Office. (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2002, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 2883 of the One Hundred Seventh Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2002 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2002 the sum of $238,496,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the advanced research and development committee shall remain available until September 30, 2003. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 343 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2002. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2002 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until September 30, 2003. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Community Management Account as of September 30, 2002, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2002 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $27,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2004. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2002 the sum of $212,000,000. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Section 805 of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (title VIII of Public Law 106-120; 113 Stat. 1629; 21 U.S.C. 1904) is amended by striking subsection (f). Section 106(b)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is amended by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the following new subparagraphs: ``(C) The Director of the Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy. ``(D) The Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy''. Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(a) In General.--'' before ``To the extent''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsections: ``(b) Form and Contents of Certain Reports.--Any report relating to a significant anticipated intelligence activity or a significant intelligence failure that is submitted to the intelligence committees for purposes of subsection (a)(1) shall be in writing, and shall contain the following: ``(1) A concise statement of any facts pertinent to such report. ``(2) An explanation of the significance of the intelligence activity or intelligence failure covered by such report. ``(c) Standards and Procedures for Certain Reports.--The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the departments, agencies, and entities referred to in subsection (a), shall establish standards and procedures applicable to reports covered by subsection (b).''. (a) Authority of Inspector General of Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(5)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking the second sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``Upon making the determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the Director notice of the determination, together with the complaint or information.''; and (2) in subparagraph (D)(i), by striking ``does not transmit,'' and all that follows through ``subparagraph (B),'' and inserting ``does not find credible under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B),''. (b) Authorities of Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community.--Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b), by striking the second sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``Upon making the determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the head of the establishment notice of the determination, together with the complaint or information.''; and (2) in subsection (d)(1), by striking ``does not transmit,'' and all that follows through ``subsection (b),'' and inserting ``does not find credible under subsection (b) a complaint or information submitted to the Inspector General under subsection (a), or does not transmit the complaint or information to the head of the establishment in accurate form under subsection (b),''. (a) Requirement.--The Attorney General shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of Energy, Director of Central Intelligence, and heads of such other departments, agencies, and entities of the United States Government as the Attorney General considers appropriate, carry out a comprehensive review of current protections against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including-- (1) any mechanisms available under civil or criminal law, or under regulation, to detect the unauthorized disclosure of such information; and (2) any sanctions available under civil or criminal law, or under regulation, to deter and punish the unauthorized disclosure of such information. (b) Particular Considerations.--In carrying out the review required by subsection (a), the Attorney General shall consider, in particular-- (1) whether the administrative regulations and practices of the intelligence community are adequate, in light of the particular requirements of the intelligence community, to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information; and (2) whether recent developments in technology, and anticipated developments in technology, necessitate particular modifications of current protections against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information in order to further protect against the unauthorized disclosure of such information. (c) Report.--(1) Not later than May 1, 2002, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report on the review carried out under subsection (a). The report shall include the following: (A) A comprehensive description of the review, including the findings of the Attorney General as a result of the review. (B) An assessment of the efficacy and adequacy of current laws and regulations against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including whether or not modifications of such laws or regulations, or additional laws or regulations, are advisable in order to further protect against the unauthorized disclosure of such information. (C) Any recommendations for legislative or administrative action that the Attorney General considers appropriate, including a proposed draft for any such action, and a comprehensive analysis of the Constitutional and legal ramifications of any such action. (2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (a) Certification Required for Immunity.--Subsection (a)(2) of section 1012 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 2837; 22 U.S.C. 2291-4) is amended by striking ``, before the interdiction occurs, has determined'' and inserting ``has, during the 12-month period ending on the date of the interdiction, certified to Congress''. (b) Annual Reports.--That section is further amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection (c): ``(c) Annual Reports.--(1) Not later than February 1 each year, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the assistance provided under subsection (b) during the preceding calendar year. Each report shall include for the calendar year covered by such report the following: ``(A) A list specifying each country for which a certification referred to in subsection (a)(2) was in effect for purposes of that subsection during any portion of such calendar year, including the nature of the illicit drug trafficking threat to each such country. ``(B) A detailed explanation of the procedures referred to in subsection (a)(2)(B) in effect for each country listed under subparagraph (A), including any training and other mechanisms in place to ensure adherence to such procedures. ``(C) A complete description of any assistance provided under subsection (b). ``(D) A summary description of the aircraft interception activity for which the United States Government provided any form of assistance under subsection (b). ``(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''. Notwithstanding any provision of subtitle B of title III of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-567; 114 Stat. 2843; 22 U.S.C. 7301 et seq.), relating to the reorganization of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office, no provision of that subtitle shall be effective during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on October 1, 2002. The National Counterintelligence Strategy, and each National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment, produced under Presidential Decision Directive 75, dated December 28, 2000, entitled ``U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness--Counterintelligence for the 21st Century'', including any modification of the Strategy or any such Assessment, shall be approved by the President, and shall be submitted to the appropriate committees of Congress. (a) Consultation in Preparation.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure that any report, review, study, or plan required to be prepared or conducted by a provision of this Act, including a provision of the classified Schedule of Authorizations or a classified annex to this Act, that involves the intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense shall be prepared or conducted in consultation with the Secretary of Defense or an appropriate official of the Department designated by the Secretary for that purpose. (b) Submittal.--Any report, review, study, or plan referred to in subsection (a) shall be submitted, in addition to any other committee of Congress specified for submittal in the provision concerned, to the following committees of Congress: (1) The Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) The Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. ``(l) No later than 3 months from the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall submit a report to Congress concerning the effect and efficacy of Alien Terrorist Removal proceedings, including the reasons why proceedings pursuant to this section have not been used by the Attorney General in the past, and the effect on the use of these proceedings after the enactment of the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001.''. The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide, prior to conference, any technical modifications to existing legal authorities needed to facilitate Intelligence Community counterterrorism efforts. Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (f), by striking ``September 30, 2002'' and inserting ``September 30, 2003''; and (2) in subsection (i), by striking ``or 2002'' and inserting ``2002, or 2003''. (a) Annual Audits.--Subsection (g)(1) of section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended-- (1) by striking ``December 31'' and inserting ``January 31''; and (2) by striking ``conduct'' and inserting ``complete''. (b) Permanent Authority.--Subsection (h) of that section is amended-- (1) by striking paragraph (1); (2) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (1) and (2), respectively; (3) in paragraph (1), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (3)'' and inserting ``paragraph (2)''; and (4) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1)''.", u" TITLE VI--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended-- (1) by redesignating title IV as title VI and section 401 as section 601, respectively; and (2) by inserting after title III the following new title: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), as amended by section 601 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after title IV, as added by such section 601, the following new title: (a) Conforming Amendment.--Section 601 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as redesignated by section 601(1) of this Act, is amended by striking out ``other than title III'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``other than titles III, IV, and V''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the beginning of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is amended by striking out the items relating to title IV and section 401 and inserting in lieu thereof the following: (a) In General.--Section 2518(11)(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in clause (ii), by striking ``of a purpose'' and all that follows through the end of such clause and inserting ``that there is probable cause to believe that the person's actions could have the effect of thwarting interception from a specified facility;''; (2) in clause (iii), by striking ``such purpose'' and all that follows through the end of such clause and inserting ``such showing has been adequately made; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following clause: ``(iv) the order authorizing or approving the interception is limited to interception only for such time as it is reasonable to presume that the person identified in the application is or was reasonably proximate to the instrument through which such communication will be or was transmitted.''. (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 2518(12) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(a)'' after ``by reason of subsection (11)''; (2) by striking ``the facilities from which, or''; and (3) by striking the comma following ``where''. Section 524(d)(1) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``or services'' after ``property''. (a) Short Title.--This title may be cited as the ``Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998''. (b) Findings.--The Congress finds that-- (1) national security is a shared responsibility, requiring joint efforts and mutual respect by Congress and the President; (2) the principles of comity between the Branches of Government apply to the handling of national security information; (3) Congress, as a co-equal Branch of Government, is empowered by the Constitution to serve as a check on the Executive Branch; in that capacity, it has a ``need to know'' of allegations of wrongdoing within the Executive Branch, including allegations of wrongdoing in the Intelligence Community; (4) no basis in law exists for requiring prior authorization of disclosures to the intelligence committees of Congress by employees of the Executive Branch of classified information about wrongdoing within the Intelligence Community; (5) the risk of reprisal perceived by employees and contractors of the Intelligence Community for reporting serious or flagrant problems to Congress may have impaired the flow of information needed by the intelligence committees to carry out oversight responsibilities; and (6) to encourage such reporting, an additional procedure should be established that provides a means for such employees and contractors to report to Congress while safeguarding the classified information involved in such reporting. (a) Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.-- (1) In general.--Subsection (d) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(5)(A) An employee of the Agency, or of a contractor to the Agency, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report such complaint or information to the Inspector General. ``(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall determine whether the complaint or information appears credible. If the Inspector General determines that the complaint or information appears credible, the Inspector General shall, before the end of such period, transmit the complaint or information to the Director. ``(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the intelligence committees, together with any comments the Director considers appropriate. ``(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not transmit, or does not transmit in an accurate form, the complaint or information described in subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or both of the intelligence committees directly. ``(ii) The employee may contact the intelligence committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee-- ``(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the employee's complaint or information and notice of the employee's intent to contact the intelligence committees directly; and ``(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices. ``(iii) A member or employee of one of the intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information under clause (i) does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a member or employee of that committee. ``(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is taken. ``(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review. ``(G) In this paragraph: ``(i) The term `urgent concern' means any of the following: ``(I) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operations of an intelligence activity involving classified information, but does not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters. ``(II) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity. ``(III) An action, including a personnel action described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection (e)(3)(B) in response to an employee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph. ``(ii) The term `intelligence committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.''. (2) Clerical amendment.--The heading to subsection (d) of such section is amended by inserting ``; Reports to Congress on Urgent Concerns'' before the period. (b) Additional Provisions With Respect to Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community.-- (1) In general.--The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by redesignating section 8H as section 8I and by inserting after section 8G the following new section: ``Sec. 8H. (a)(1)(A) An employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, or the National Security Agency, or of a contractor of any of those Agencies, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (or designee). ``(B) An employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or of a contractor of the Bureau, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of the Department of Justice (or designee). ``(C) Any other employee of, or contractor to, an executive agency, or element or unit thereof, determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal function the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report the complaint or information to the appropriate Inspector General (or designee) under this Act or section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. ``(2) If a designee of an Inspector General under this section receives a complaint or information of an employee with respect to an urgent concern, that designee shall report the complaint or information to the Inspector General within 7 calendar days of receipt. ``(b) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period beginning on the date of receipt of an employee complaint or information under subsection (a), the Inspector General shall determine whether the complaint or information appears credible. If the Inspector General determines that the complaint or information appears credible, the Inspector General shall, before the end of such period, transmit the complaint or information to the head of the establishment. ``(c) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General under subsection (b), the head of the establishment shall, within 7 calendar days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the intelligence committees, together with any comments the head of the establishment considers appropriate. ``(d)(1) If the Inspector General does not transmit, or does not transmit in an accurate form, the complaint or information described in subsection (b), the employee (subject to paragraph (2)) may submit the complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or both of the intelligence committees directly. ``(2) The employee may contact the intelligence committees directly as described in paragraph (1) only if the employee-- ``(A) before making such a contact, furnishes to the head of the establishment, through the Inspector General, a statement of the employee's complaint or information and notice of the employee's intent to contact the intelligence committees directly; and ``(B) obtains and follows from the head of the establishment, through the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices. ``(3) A member or employee of one of the intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information under paragraph (1) does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a member or employee of that committee. ``(e) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who reports a complaint or information under this section of each action taken under this section with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is taken. ``(f) An action taken by the head of an establishment or an Inspector General under this section shall not be subject to judicial review. ``(g) In this section: ``(1) The term `urgent concern' means any of the following: ``(A) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operations of an intelligence activity involving classified information, but does not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters. ``(B) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity. ``(C) An action, including a personnel action described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under section 7(c) in response to an employee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this section. ``(2) The term `intelligence committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.''. (2) Conforming Amendment.--Section 8I of such Act (as redesignated by paragraph (1)) is amended by striking out ``or 8E'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``8E, or 8H''. Section 101 of the conference report lists the departments, agencies, and other elements of the United States government for whose intelligence and intelligence-related activities the Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 1999. Section 101 is identical to section 101 of the House bill and section 101 of the Senate amendment. Section 102 of the conference report makes clear that the details of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities and applicable personnel ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 1999 are contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the Act by this section. The classified annex provides the details of the Schedule, including a cost cap to the five year and ten year costs of the Future Imagery Architecture. Section 102 is identical to section 102 of the House bill and section 102 of the Senate amendment. Section 103 of the conference report authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in fiscal year 1999 to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the Intelligence Community under section 102 by an amount not to exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under section 102. The Director of Central Intelligence may exercise this authority only if necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions. Any exercise of this authority must be reported to the intelligence committees of the Congress. The managers emphasize that the authority conferred by section 103 is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of personnel strength in any intelligence component. Rather, the section provides the Director of Central Intelligence with flexibility to adjust personnel levels temporarily for contingencies and for overages caused by an imbalance between hiring of new employees and attrition of current employees. The managers do not expect the Director of Central Intelligence to allow heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed levels set in the Schedule of Authorizations except for the satisfaction of clearly identified hiring needs which are consistent with the authorization of personnel strengths in this bill. In no case is this authority to be used to provide for positions denied by this bill. Section 103 is identical to section 103 of the House bill and section 103 of the Senate amendment. Section 104 of the conference report authorizes appropriations for the Community Management Account (CMA) of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and sets the personnel end-strength for the Intelligence Community management staff for fiscal year 1999. Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $129,123,000 for fiscal year 1999 for the activities of the CMA of the DCI. This amount includes funds identified for the Advanced Research and Development Committee and the Advanced Technology Group, which shall remain available until September 30, 2000. Beginning in fiscal year 1999, the Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program will be funded through the DCI's Environmental Center, rather than through this account. Subsection (b) authorizes 283 full-time personnel for the Community Management Staff for fiscal year 1999 and provides that such personnel may be permanent employees of the Staff or detailed from various elements of the United States government. Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and personnel for the CMA as specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and permits these additional amounts to remain available through September 30, 2000. Subsection (d) requires, except as provided in Section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947, or for temporary situations of less than one year, that personnel from another element of the United States government be detailed to an element of the CMA on a reimbursable basis. Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 of the amount authorized in subsection (a) to be made available for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Subsection (e) is identical to subsection (e) of the House bill and subsection (e) of the Senate amendment. The Senate, in its report on this provision, would have fenced the entire $27,000,000 until the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) issued its overdue report on the National Counter-Narcotics Architecture Review, which was directed by Congress to be completed by April 1, 1998. The House had no such fence. While the managers continue to require the prompt production of this report, they do not wish to impede any part of the government's counter-narcotics efforts. Consequently, the Senate recedes. The failure of the Director of the ONDCP to comply with a congressional requirement for this report is of concern. The managers strongly believe that the NDIC should be the facility that brings together all law enforcement and intelligence information for integrated, all-source, cross- case analysis. The continued isolation of domestic and foreign aspects of the drug trafficking organizations for separate analysis by different intelligence centers ignores the transnational character of the drug trafficking threat to national security. The Architecture Review should analyze the ability and capacity of NDIC to serve as the focal point for integrated analysis of foreign and domestic law enforcement information combined with foreign intelligence information. Subsection (f) authorizes the DCI to transfer funds to be appropriated to the CMA for fiscal year 1999 to the Department of State for specific purposes to be identified by the Director. The House bill contained a similar provision. The Senate amendment contained no such provision. The Senate agrees with the House position. The managers identified a shortfall in certain Intelligence Community security arrangements at certain overseas locations. The State Department has been aware of these shortcomings for some time, but claims it lacks resources to fund improvements. Thus, in order to alleviate the Intelligence Community security concerns at those locations, the transfer authority is provided. This section allows the DCI to transfer funds from the CMA only for the specific purposes, and in the specific amounts, listed in the Classified Annex to this Joint Explanatory Statement. Clearly, however, the managers do not intend this section to create any new budget authority. Rather, it is intended that the funds to be transferred will derive from those funds to be appropriated to the CMA for fiscal year 1999. The managers only agreed to this grant of authority with the firm expectation that this will be a one-time action only. This authority will expire at the end of fiscal year 1999. This transfer authority is only being authorized to insure that the State Department will immediately, in fiscal year 1999, begin architectural and engineering security support at various overseas locations. Without this immediate transfer authority, the Intelligence Community would be required to rely on practices that are flawed, as well as being extremely costly. The managers acknowledge that the Intelligence Community has worked hard over the past two years with the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Office of Management and Budget to provide a permanent solution to the situation at issue. The Intelligence Community, in response to the seriousness of the hostile intelligence threat directed at United States interests, agreed to a one-time special cost-sharing arrangement in fiscal year 1999 to alleviate any continued concern.", u"Mr. President, today the Senate takes up S. 1718, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997. In addition to containing the annual authorization for appropriations for elements of the U.S. intelligence community, this bill includes a number of important provisions intended to ensure that our intelligence agencies operate more effectively and more efficiently in the post-cold-war world. The end of the cold war did not solve America's national security concerns. As evidenced by the bombing in June of the Khobar Towers facility in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and the possible complicity of international terrorists in the downing of TWA flight 800 in July, the focus of those concerns can shift with the speed and force of an explosion. The need for a national security apparatus that is equally dynamic is clear. Title VII of S. 1718--the Intelligence Activities Renewal and Reform Act of 1996--contains measures designed to improve our Nation's intelligence capabilities in order to meet the rapidly changing threats to our national security. Title VII takes significant steps toward this objective in two ways: First, it improves an institutional framework for ensuring that the decisionmakers who rely on intelligence can provide prompt, clear guidance to the intelligence community on what their needs are and what the priorities are. Second, it improves the Director of Central Intelligence's authority and improves the structure he needs to respond quickly in an effective, efficient, and responsible manner. S. 1718, as originally reported out by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, reflected the conclusions this committee had reached after 6 years of focused examination of the missions, functions, and organizational arrangements for the intelligence community. Triggered by the end of the cold war, this examination had gained momentum in 1994 in the wake of the Ames espionage case and the revelation that the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO] had built an expensive new building without adequately informing Congress. I do not need to remind my colleagues that just 2 years ago members of this body from both parties--angered by what appeared to be a lack of direction and accountability in the intelligence community, and particularly in the CIA--stood in this Chamber to call for a massive overhaul of our intelligence apparatus. In order to avoid precipitous action, the Senate adopted a proposal offered by Senators Warner, Graham, and others to create a bipartisan Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community to conduct a credible, independent, and objective review of U.S. intelligence. The Commission was given a deadline of March 1, 1996, with the expectation that its report would inform a legislative debate resulting in enactment of needed changes during the 104th Congress. The Commission was chaired by former Congressman and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin until his untimely death and later by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. The 17-member Commission included two of our distinguished colleagues, John Warner and Jim Exon, and two of our former colleagues, Warren Rudman, who served as vice chairman, and Wyche Fowler. While the Aspin-Brown Commission was conducting its review, our committee and its staff also held a number of hearings, received briefings, and conducted interviews regarding the appropriate missions and organizational structure of the intelligence community. During the course of these efforts, two additional incidents--the failure of CIA officials to inform Congress of the possible involvement of CIA assets in human rights abuses in Guatemala and the failure of NRO officials to tell either the DCI or Congress that the NRO had accumulated over $1 billion in unused funds--further convinced our Committee that the intelligence community needed greater central direction and accountability. Based on the Aspin-Brown Commission's recommendations and on the results of our own review, the committee reported out S. 1718 on April 24, 1996. The bill was subsequently taken on sequential referral by the Armed Services Committee, which informed the Intelligence Committee that it did not want to consider any intelligence reform this year. The Intelligence Committee did not believe that intelligence reforms could be put off for another year. The rapidly changing world, the recent incidents that have undermined public confidence in our intelligence agencies, and the work already done by the Aspin-Brown Commission and other groups--all of these factors led us to believe that the time was ripe for intelligence reform. We marked up our bill in April in order to ensure that the Armed Services Committee would have plenty of time to consider it. The Department of Defense, from the outset, opposed anything in the bill that enhanced the authority of the DCI at the expense of the Secretary of Defense. In an April 29 letter to the Armed Services Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense John White stated that ``clear and unambiguous lines of authority from the Secretary of Defense to the Defense intelligence agencies and the embedded Service intelligence elements are crucial'' to ensuring ``that those who depend on intelligence--especially our nation's military forces--receive the timely and responsive intelligence they require.'' Deputy Secretary White argued that enhancing the DCI's authorities over NSA, NRO, and CIO would ``unnecessarily complicate those lines of command and control.'' I agree completely that intelligence consumers, especially military consumers whose lives may be at risk, must have timely and responsive intelligence. I do not agree, however, that this objective can be accomplished through exclusive management by the Secretary of Defense of NSA, NRO, and CIO. The fact is that in the course of running an over $240 billion department the Secretary of Defense simply does not have time to exercise any degree of command and control over Defense intelligence agencies. The consequences of continuing the fiction of Secretary of Defense management of these intelligence agencies at the expense of real management by the DCI is significant. The country needs to vest the authority in the DCI so that intelligence, such as that produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency in mid-June warning of threats to United States troops at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, is certain to receive the kind of attention it is warranted. We need a DCI who can rattle the cages when necessary, so that consumers of intelligence cannot attribute policy failures to intelligence shortcomings. Both the Downing Commission and the staff report of the SSCI concluded that the tragedy at Khobar Towers was not attributable to an intelligence failure. It is deeply regrettable that, as a result of changes insisted upon by the Armed Services Committee, the country will have to wait for another Congress and perhaps additional bitter experiences before the needed changes can be made. Testifying before our committee on April 24, 1996, Director Deutch provided some interesting insights on the ability of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to exercise the authorities DOD fought so desperately to retain. When asked whether we should hold the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the DCI accountable for problems at the NRO, a key national intelligence agency within the Department of Defense, he responded: The Deputy Secretary of Defense has got a tremendous set of issues covering a much larger range of resources--10 times-- managing ten times the resources we're talking about for the whole intelligence community. So to say that you are going to go to the deputy--and I am not talking about personalities--and say to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, why didn't you catch this, he's going to say, well, I count on the DCI to keep track of this and to let the Secretary of Defense know. So in some sense, if we are going to say that the Director of Central Intelligence does not view himself or herself as being responsible for the NRO, fundamentally nobody will be. In light of these realities, this committee sought to give the DCI greater authority and responsibility to manage the intelligence community. The Armed Services Committee, asserting their jurisdiction over the Defense Department, insisted on a number of changes to keep provisions that affected the intelligence agencies within DOD. The Armed Services Committee and the Defense Department were most concerned about those provisions that would have given the DCI greater authority to manage the intelligence community, including those elements of the community that are part of the Department of Defense such as the National Security Agency [NSA], the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO], and the Central Imagery Office. These provisions would have given the DCI, as head of the intelligence community, authority to execute the budgets for NSA, NRO, and CIO as well as shared responsibility, together with the Secretary of Defense and for ensuring that these agencies perform their national missions. The DCI would also have been given authority to reprogram funds from one program to another within the National Foreign Intelligence Program--which is the portion of the overall U.S. intelligence budget the DCI is responsible for developing each year--even if the affected department or agency head objected to that transfer. Finally, the Intelligence Committee had voted for a provision to require DCI concurrence on the decision as to who should head the major collection agencies: NSA, NRO, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. This was watered down by Armed Services to a qualified concurrence, allowing the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense to be forwarded to the President over the DCI's objection so long as that objection is noted. Given the length of time the Armed Services Committee and, then, the Government Affairs Committee held this bill, and in light of the abbreviated legislative schedule, we were unable to bring these important issues to the floor of the Senate for debate and a vote. Nevertheless, despite the Defense Department's initial refusal to relinquish any significant authority to ensure more efficient and effective management of intelligence, we were able to get a bill out of the Armed Services Committee that contains important new statutory assurances of DCI authority and should enhance the prospects that future DCI's will not have to rely merely on the good will of the Secretary of Defense in order to effectively manage intelligence. The bill before you today contains much of what the Intelligence Committee initially proposed, but not as much as the country needs. That greater objective will require continued efforts. In addition to the amendments made to our bill by the Armed Services Committee, the Government Affairs Committees took the bill for 53 days. At the end of that time, they reported it out with minor modifications to the provision providing for a Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Finally, the Rules Committee also originally requested sequential referral of our bill in order to review a provision that would have amended Senate Resolution 400, the charter for our committee, to eliminate the 8-year term limit on committee membership. After consultations between our two committees and in response to concerns expressed by the majority leader, we agree to delete this provision and the Rules Committee withdrew its request for sequential referral of our bill. We remain convinced that extending the terms for membership of the oversight committee is an essential step in improving congressional oversight of intelligence, and I note that elimination of term limits was recommended by the Aspin-Brown Commission, on which Senator Warner served. But in order to ensure consideration of S. 1718 in this shortened legislative year, we have agreed to put off this issue for now. Now let me summarize the provisions in our bill. I will begin with the reform provisions in title VII. The key provisions enhance the ability of the DCI to manage the intelligence community by providing him with new statutory authority and an improved management structure. Specifically, section 707 of the bill gives the DCI new statutory authority to participate in the development of the budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for tactical intelligence and related activities; to approve all collection requirements and priorities and to resolve conflicts among priorities; and the right to be consulted by the Secretary of Defense before the Secretary reprograms funds within joint military intelligence programs. Section 707 would also require the DCI and the Secretary of Defense to develop a database of all intelligence programs and activities, including resource and budget execution information. The Office of Science and Technology Policy within the White House has recently developed a database of all research and development activities within the Federal Government, and this database has been invaluable for identifying duplication among Federal R&D programs. The committee believes that the DCI has been hampered in his ability to manage the intelligence community by a lack of accurate and comprehensive information about all intelligence community activities. Development of a database for intelligence activities should give the DCI one of the key tools he needs to provide greater direction and control of U.S. intelligence programs. In addition, section 716 of the bill would require the DCI to concur in recommendations by the Secretary of Defense to the President of individuals to be directors of NSA, NRO, or the newly created National Imagery and Mapping Agency, or to have his lack of concurrence noted. The DCI would also have to be consulted by the appropriate department head when appointing the heads of the major elements of the National Foreign Intelligence Program, including the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the Assistant Director in charge of the FBI's National Security Division, the Director of DIA, and the Director of the Department of Energy's Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. This new authority will help to remedy a situation in which DCI's--despite their statutory role as head of the intelligence community--have had little or no say in the appointments of the heads of major intelligence community elements. The Armed Services Committee also agreed to include in the DOD authorization bill a requirement that the DCI provide to the Secretary of Defense an annual performance evaluation of the heads of NSA, NRO, and NIMA. The bill would also establish three new Senate-confirmed Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence to assist the DCI in managing the intelligence community. One would focus on managing the intelligence community's collection activities; the second would coordinate community-wide intelligence analysis and production; and the third would coordinate community administrative programs. The committee believes that one reason that successive DCI's have been unable to exercise stronger management over the intelligence community is that they have lacked an adequate management structure. We believe these new positions will help the DCI fulfill his community role. In addition to strengthening the authorities of the DCI, the bill also creates two new committees of the National Security Council--a Committee on Foreign Intelligence and a Committee on Transnational Threats--to provide better policy guidance for the intelligence community and for departments and agencies involving in fighting international terrorism and crime. The creation of both committees were recommended by the Aspin-Brown Commission. Section 715 clarifies that intelligence collection agencies may accept tasking from law enforcement agencies to collect intelligence about non-U.S. persons outside the United States. This provision is necessary because CIA and NSA read their legal authorities as preventing them accepting tasking from law enforcement agencies lest they be considered to be exercising law enforcement powers. The provision is narrowly tailored to apply only to collection outside the United States about non-U.S. persons. Section 717 of the bill calls for disclosure of the intelligence budget top line--that is, the aggregate of NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA. This number has been in the public domain for some time, without carrying us down the so-called slippery slope of more detailed disclosures. The DCI supports disclosure, the Aspin-Brown Commission supports disclosure, and the administration supports disclosure. Disclosure of the top line provides no new information to our enemies. In fact, I believe this disclosure will actually strengthen our ability to protect vital national secrets by bolstering the credibility of our classification decisions--officially revealing the budget total tells the American public is that we are using classification to protect vital national secrets, not to conceal information that might be inconvenient to defend. And I think it would not be difficult to defend the size of the intelligence budget, given the complex world we live in today. These are the principal reform provisions contained in the Intelligence Authorization Act. The bill contains a number of additional important provisions. Title V of the bill criminalizes theft of economic proprietary information by a person acting on behalf of a foreign government or its agent. This provision is the result of nearly 4 years of hearing and study by our committee. We held hearings on this provision earlier this year, and we are convinced by both the classified and unclassified testimony that economic espionage is a problem that needs to be remedied immediately in the interests of our national economy and thus our national security. Title VI would create a Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The eight members of the Commission are to be appointed by the President and the congressional leadership. The Commission is required to conduct a study of the organization of the Federal Government, including the intelligence community, for combating weapons proliferation. Finally, title VIII of the bill, as amended by the Armed Services Committee, codifies the national mission and tasking authorities of the DCI for the new National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA]. NIMA is a new agency within the Department of Defense formed from the current Central Imagery Office, the Defense Mapping Agency, CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center, and certain other imagery related elements. As originally reported by our committee, title VIII included provisions that would have established NIMA. The DOD authorization bill, which was reported by the Armed Services Committee later than our bill, included a more comprehensive statutory framework governing NIMA, and we agreed to the removal of the provisions establishing NIMA in our bill and their replacement with provisions in the National Security Act defining the new agency's national mission and the DCI's tasking authorities. The DCI's tasking authorities are especially important. For the first time in statute, the DCI now has the specific authority to approve collection requirements, determine collection priorities, and resolve conflicts in priorities levied on our national imagery satellites and other imagery assets. I also want to mention that the Armed Services Committee attempted to establish NIMA as a combat support agency of the Department of Defense. We strongly opposed this formulation because it slighted the critical imagery needs of the National Security Council, the Department of State, and other non-DOD consumers. Our committee was unwilling to have NIMA cater to the exclusive needs of the Defense Department. Accordingly, we modified the language in the DOD authorization bill, which we took on sequential referral, to provide that NIMA is not only a combat support agency but also has significant national missions. I also want to note that although NIMA has been added to the list of combat support agencies in 10 U.S.C. 193(f), subsection (d) of section 193, as amended by the DOD authorization bill, specifically provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chief's oversight over NIMA shall apply ``only with respect to combat support functions [the Agency] performs for the Department of Defense.'' This language makes clear that NIMA has important noncombat support functions that are not subject to the control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. This concludes my summary of this year's intelligence authorization bill, including the reform provisions in title VII. Congress has been considering legislation to reform the intelligence community to meet the challenges of the post-cold-war world since at least 1990. Today, despite continuing bureaucratic resistance, the Senate is taking significant steps toward finally achieving that objective. I want to thank the distinguished vice chairman, Senator Kerrey, for his unflagging and nonpartisan commitment to the work of the committee. Senator Kerrey brings to this committee a unique understanding of the business of intelligence and a willingness and ability to master even the most complex technical issues. His insights and efforts were absolutely essential to the passage of this bill and to the committee's work overall. In addition, I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the excellent work of the committee staff, particularly Charlie Battaglia, Chris Straub, Suzanne Spaulding, John Bellinger, and Ed Levine.", u"Without objection, it is so ordered. [See exhibit 1.] Mr. Speaker, the conclusion of the 104th Congress also marks the end of my term as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Thanks in large measure to the commitment of the Vice Chairman, Senator Bob Kerrey, and a dedicated staff, it has been a productive tenure. Beginning in early 1995 with the confirmation of a new Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and culminating with the passage today of significant legislation to strengthen the ability of the intelligence community to meet the needs of the post-cold-war world, the past 2 years have seen this committee address virtually all of the important national security issues confronting the country. Through hearings, intensive inquiries, committee reports, and legislation, the SSCI has examined the growing transnational threats of terrorism, narcotics, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, and economic espionage. We have continued the committee's focus on counterintelligence and the fallout from the treachery of Aldrich Ames, reopened longstanding inquiries into the role of the intelligence community in Central America, explored the risks and benefits of economic intelligence collection, overseen intelligence support to military operations in Bosnia, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, and elsewhere, and provided insights to the Senate on intelligence-related aspects of arms control. The role that the Vice Chairman has played in these committee endeavors cannot be overstated. Senator Kerrey brings a keen mind and deep personal commitment to the committee's task of ensuring that this country has the best possible intelligence capability--one that is effective, efficient, and operates in a manner fully consistent with American laws and values. The Vice Chairman and I have not always agreed on every aspect of every issue, although the areas of disagreement have been remarkably rare. Senator Kerrey has always approached these issues with characteristic grace and good humor. A determined advocate, he nevertheless finds ways to work through problems in a principled manner totally devoid of partisanship. As those of you who have had the privilege to serve on the Intelligence Committee know, the issues do not all have the glamour of James Bond adventures or the sensationalism of front page scandals. Senator Kerrey has shown a willingness and an acumen for tackling even the most technical and obscure aspects of the committee's work where the effectiveness of our intelligence capability is at stake. Senator Kerrey's outstanding attributes are echoed in his staff director for the committee, Chris Straub. Mr. Straub has brought the same kind of nonpartisan professionalism to his work for the committee over the past 8 years. I have always found Chris fair, tough, and knowledgeable. I also want to recognize Art Grant, the minority deputy staff director, whose command of the complex and at times arcane world of intelligence satellites has contributed greatly to the committee's oversight responsibilities in this area. Which brings me to the committee's staff director, Charles Battaglia. When I first joined the committee in 1984, I was determined to hire a staff person with extensive intelligence experience and an excellent reputation within his field. I was lucky enough to find someone who not only had these qualities but also possessed the patience, perspective, and perseverance that are essential to a successful working relationship in this hectic institution. It was Charles Battaglia who urged that the committee move from the designee system, where each Member could bring on their own staff person--often resulting in staffers with little or no intelligence background who's focus was more on individual Member issues than on the core work of the committee--to a fully professional, nonpartisan staff. This was not an easy transition, but Charles Battaglia has managed to ensure Members' needs are met without sacrificing the essential work of the committee staff. The result is a stronger, more cohesive staff and committee. Mr. Battaglia has been an excellent manager, valued adviser, and good friend. In addition, I would like to thank the other members of the committee staff, particularly Suzanne Spaulding, the committee's general counsel, and her legal staff, Mark Heilbrun and John Bellinger, for their hard work on this legislation and on the many legal issues which have confronted the committee over the last 2 years; senior staff member Ed Levine, who has led the committee's inquires into issues such as the flow of Iranian arms into Bosnia and human rights abuses in Guatemala, managing to draft committee reports on these potentially divisive issues in a manner that is fair, accurate, and thorough; the committee's budget director, Mary Sturtevant, whose mastery of every nook and cranny of the dispersed and complex intelligence community apparatus has been essential to our oversight function; and Pat Hanback, whose audit team has provided professional, detailed reviews of areas of oversight concern and has made many important recommendations for improvements. I would like to express my gratitude as well to the committee's support staff for its professionalism in the face of continuing demands. Jim Wolfe, the committee's security director, and his staff did yeoman work in successfully maintaining the security of a vast array of classified material. Kathleen McGhee, the committee's chief clerk, and the rest of the staff literally made the engine run. I will thank each of them personally at a later time. Mr. President, the outstanding efforts of the entire committee staff and membership is reflected in this Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 and I urge its passage. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was established in 1976 directly as a result of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, or the Church Committee, which was set up to examine allegations of intelligence abuses by various intelligence agencies. The findings of this Committee were ample evidence that existing Congressional mechanisms were inadequate to meet the need for continual, focused, institutionalized oversight of the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Committee responded promptly to the need for changes highlighted by the Church Committee. Working with the Judiciary Committees of each house, the intelligence committees developed legislation known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 which, for the first time, required that a court order be obtained from a special court established under the Act as a condition for undertaking electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes within the United States. Prior to that time, such surveillance had been carried out without a search warrant or court order, pursuant to the asserted constitutional authority of the President. The Committee, in the 95th Congress, also was the first to begin work on legislation to address the problem of ``Graymail'', i.e., the threat by defendants to disclose highly classified information if they were prosecuted. The committees were instrumental in the enactment of the Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980, which established statutory procedures for handling classified information involved in a Federal criminal proceeding. Perhaps the most striking fact that we encounter when we look back 20 years, however, is how many of the issues then confronting the Committee are still relevant. Hearings were held in 1977 on the question of whether or not to declose the bottom line amount of the intelligence budget, a question with which we are still wrestling. The Committee looked into the involvement of the National Security Agency in developing the Data Encryption Standard. Today, we are looking into the development of new encryption standards in an effort headed by NSA. Again, in the 95th Congress the Committee published a case study on ``Activities of `Friendly' Foreign Intelligence Services in the United States.'' Presently, in Congress we are looking into activities within the continental United States of the intelligence services of allies and adversaries in the field of economic espionage. The Committee also published its first report on terrorism in the 1970's. One of the most important activities of the Senate Select Committee in the 1970's was its involvement in S. 2525, The National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, for out of this effort was born the duty of the Intelligence Community to ensure that both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees were ``fully and currently informed of all the national intelligence activities,'' to include, ``any significant anticipated intelligence activity.'' This has proven to be central to the Committee's ability to carry out its oversight responsibilities. As we moved into the 1980's, a new Administration brought a new Director of Central Intelligence. The legislative underpinnings in place were to be sorely tested in the coming years, but in the end, they held up under great pressure. In the early 1980's the Committee looked into and reported on such disparate matters as the U.S. capability to monitor the SALT II treaty; Soviet succession; political violence in El Salvador; the Soviet presence in the United Nations; unrest in the Philippines; and renewed counterintelligence and security concerns in the United States. In 1983 the Committee hired, as a full time staff employee, a Court Reported because of the sensitivity of hearing information. The Select Committee on Intelligence remains the only Committee of either House to have a Reporter as a staffer. In late November 1986, the Select Committee on Intelligence was the first Committee to begin an investigation into the Iran-Contra matter. Between the initiation of its investigation on December 1, 1986, and the publication of its public report on January 29, 1987, the Select Committee held over 50 hearings and interviews into the Iran-Contra matter. Following these events, S. 1721, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1987, and S. 1818, the National Security Act of 1987, were introduced and brought clearly into focus the need for agreement between the Administration and the Congress on reporting requirements and covert action finding notification. The Committee reported on many other matters of concern during 1987 and 1988. An extensive investigation resulted in a report on the security at the United States mission in Moscow and other areas of high risk. An exhaustive Committee and staff inquiry resulted in the publication of a report on the monitoring and verification of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, the INF Treaty. The Committee further investigated and reported on the FBI's mishandling of a domestic case involving the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, or CISPES. While the Committee determined that there were improprieties in the FBI investigation, it also determined that this was an aberration, and that the Bureau continually held to the high standards that were demanded of it. The 1980's were also the ``Decade of the Spy.'' By the end of 1987, over 20 Americans had been implicated in espionage or were investigated on counterintelligence grounds. In hindsight, we now know that beginning with the Walker- Whitworth, Pollard and Pelton cases in 1985, was Aldrich Ames, who began his traitorous career in 1985 and lasted until 1994. Following hearings in 1987 and 1988, the Committee established an independent Inspection General for the CIA. This legislation was included in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1990, and the first statutory Inspection General at the Central Intelligence Agency was confirmed in the fall of that year. In the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair, legislation was introduced with the objective of clarifying the roles of the President and the Congress in approving and overseeing intelligence activities, particularly covert actions. The legislation also provided that Presidential finding must be written, and defined what a covert action is and is not. After much negotiation, the FY 1991 bills was signed into law in August 1991. Convinced of the growing threat posed to international stability by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Committee, through the FY91 Intelligence Authorization Bill, instructed the DCI to establish a mechanism to deal with these growing threats. This led to the development of the DCI's Nonproliferation Center to look into the spread of chemical biological and nuclear weapons. Robert M. Gates, who had been Deputy Director of Central Intelligence under Director Casey, had been nominated for the position of DCI after Director Casey's death in 1987. He pulled his nomination when Members raised questions about his role in Iran-Contra. In mid-1991 he was again nominated to the Director of Central Intelligence. The confirmation hearings for Mr. Gates to be DCI in September and October 1991 were unprecedented in terms of their scope and substance. Eight days of hearings were held, including seven in public session. The nominee's role in the so-called Iran-Contra affair was explored at length, as were allegations that during the tenure of the nominee as Deputy Director for Intelligence the nominee undertook actions resulting in the ``politicization'' of intelligence, or the shaping of intelligence for political purposes. At the conclusion of the Committee's inquiry, the Committee issued a 225 page report of its findings. In the end, the nomination was approved by the Committee and subsequently approved by the full Senate. In October 1992, the Committee began an inquiry into the Intelligence Community's role in the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, or BNL, affair. This initial inquiry by the Committee resulted in a full staff investigation of the matter. After an intensive investigation, the staff prepared a 163 page report released on February 4, 1993, which focused on the Intelligence Community's involvement in the affair, and found numerous institutional weaknesses in the relationship between intelligence and law enforcement, as well as serious errors in judgment by officials of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Justice. Other efforts by the Committee in 1992 included the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, which fostered the release of materials concerning the assassination of President John Kennedy; a report on the Treaty on the Reduction of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, or START; and many other activities surrounding chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, Iraqi disarmament, covert action, and so forth. Counterintelligence rose to the fore with the February 1994 arrest of CIA employee Aldrich Ames. After extensive hearings the Committee issued an analysis of the Ames case in November 1994. In addition to criticizing the leniency of the internal disciplinary actions promulgated by the DCI, the Committee found ``numerous and egregious'' shortcomings in the handling of the Ames case. In its report, the Committee proposed 23 separate recommendations for change at the agency. Counterterrorism jumped to the front with the January 1993 murder of two CIA employees at the main gate to CIA headquarters, and a month later the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City. Economic intelligence also emerged in the 1990's to lay claim to the time and assets of the Intelligence Committee and the Intelligence Community. Unfortunately, one of the more noteworthy events which combined the new direction of intelligence gathering with the continued and even enhanced need for counterintelligence occurred when the French government accused the CIA in France of targeting French government officials and high ranking officials in key French commercial firms. Six people were requested to leave the country, and several CIA personnel in other European cities were identified. The Intelligence Committee requested the CIA Inspector General to ``analyze the events of this case in detail and report to the Committee on the mistakes that occurred and any necessary corrective measures.'' In the end, it was poor counterintelligence and poor tradecraft which led to the events in France. The Committee, in addition, addressed such disparate issues as the Clipper Chip digital telephony, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Russian and East European organized crime, environmental intelligence, NSA support to law enforcement, as well as the traditional budget and program oversight. Controversy, however, seems to have found a home in the Intelligence Community. Charges arose in the mid-1990's that the Central Intelligence Agency had been involved with and had knowledge of several events in Guatemala. The Committee, again through hearings, staff interviews and record reviews, investigated the events surrounding the abduction and murder of an American who ran a small hotel in Guatemala, Michael DeVine; the kidnapping, rape and torture of Sister Diana Ortiz; and the disappearing of Efraim Bamaca, a Guatemalan guerrilla married to an American, Jennifer Harbury. In each of these cases, claims have been made that the CIA had knowledge of or that agents of the CIA were involved in the events themselves. Following up on information learned as a result of the Ames inquiry, the Committee investigated a series of events in the CIA's Intelligence Directorate where material prepared for the highest policymakers in the nation was inappropriately identified as to its source. For a period of time, intelligence that the CIA knew was from controlled or co- opted sources was delivered to policymakers without proper warnings that the reports did come from controlled sources. The Committee is presently involved in investigating the role of U.S. officials in the flow of arms from Iran to Bosnia at a time when there were U.S. and UN sanctions active against such shipments. Throughout this 20 year period, two things have stood true. The dedication of the Members of the Senate to this Committee--a Committee assignment which garners more headaches than headlines--and the dedication of a truly professional staff which handles the most sensitive material our nation produces. Since 1976, 61 Senators have served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and there have been a total of 221 staff members. As the Senate begins its third decade of oversight of the Intelligence Community, it can look back with some pride on the successes of the institutional framework it established. Oversight of intelligence has indeed been conducted in the nonpartisan, focused manner intended. This pride must be tempered, however, with a serious examination of how this oversight can be improved. The Committee advocated one such improvement this year, with the effort to remove the eight- year term limit for membership. This restriction, initially put in place out of concern that members might become captives of the intelligence community over time, has proven unnecessary and counterproductive. The concern of cooptation has been belied by the unerring vigilance of long-time members such as Senators William Cohen and John Glenn, whose unswerving principles have led them to be both ardent advocates for and among the harshest critics of the intelligence community. Instead, the term limit has hampered the ability of the Committee to develop the kind of expertise, institutional memory, and dedication the complex field of intelligence requires. While the Committee failed in its effort to remove this limit this year, it will no doubt try again and eventually succeed. Additional issues involving the Committee's ability to ensure that it is fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities, the Committee's relationship with other Senate committees, and measures which undermine the authorizing authority of the Committee may require further legislative efforts. Intelligence is a uniquely challenging area of Congressional oversight. Its activities must often be shrouded in secrecy, sheltered from the scrutiny of investigative journalists who so often uncover problems in other areas of government. It is essential, therefore, that Congress have sufficiently strong and effective institutional mechanisms to perform that crucial oversight.", u"Mr. Speaker, I do not know that I will take up that entire 60 minutes. I want to briefly respond actually to some of the comments that we heard in the previous hour, and then talk about the new economy and how we can adopt our government to address the issues that it brings to the fore. I was interested to hear for an hour, the 2000 campaign is still a ways away, and for any of those who are wondering whether or not it is going to be positive, I guess the gentlemen who preceded me have answered that question in the negative. It is going to be relentlessly negative. Amongst the charges that we heard tonight, I understand now that Vice President Gore wants to get rid of ambulances and fire trucks. If the other people are to be believed, that is a core of his policy. Those who were not listening to the comments, what they were saying is Mr. Gore has concerns about the internal combustion engine and would like to replace it. They implied that since these engines are now in ambulances and fire trucks, for him to oppose the internal combustion engine must mean he wants to get rid of ambulances and fire trucks. I think this sort of extreme negative campaigning is bad for our entire system of government. I think my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, many of their issues I actually agree with. I think we can get up and talk about what we stand for and move the country forward, instead of relentlessly trying to pummel whoever emerges as the leader of the party we are opposed to. I do not think that serves democracy and I am somewhat saddened to see that, as I said, 20-some months before the campaign even starts we are full bore on the ripping apart of the person who we think is going to lead the opposite party. Let us talk about a few positive issues, what we stand for and the direction we want to take the country in. Towards that end, that is what I want to talk about today. I talk as a member of the New Democratic Caucus. We try to each week as new Democrats to present a message, an issue that we want to talk about, that we think the country needs to address and that our government needs to address. New Democrats are essentially moderate, pro-business, pro-growth Democrats within our caucus, and the issue that I want to talk about today has to do with the new economy and how our government can institute policies that address the changes that that new economy brings to our country. First of all I want to talk about what I mean by the new economy. Everyone has heard about the Information Age, about the global economy. It has almost become a cliche to say that we live in a global economy that is based far more on technology, but just because it is a cliche does not make it any less true. It is the dominant feature of the last few years of the 20th century and will be the dominant feature as we move into the 21st century, as our economy changes. We must adjust to it. We must understand what moves and motivates this new economy and adopt the policies that adjust to those changes to best serve the people of this country. It is a good news/bad news situation. The good news is it creates so much opportunity, the advances that we have had in the technology from computers to telecommunications to all points in between, to software, have created tremendous amounts of choices and tremendous amounts of opportunities in a wide variety of fields. It also creates challenges. The central challenge that it creates is adjusting to change. The world simply changes more rapidly today than it did previously. Therefore, we have to be ready to make the adjustments as new technologies come on board, as the world changes. I am 100 percent confident that we can do this; no question about it. We can benefit from the dramatic increase in productivity, in growth, that high tech industries give us and adjust to the changes, but not if we do not think about the issues in a new light, think about what the Information Age, what the global economy means to the policies that we need to adopt. To strip this to its core, what I am talking about is people. The reason I care about technology issues is because of the district I represent. The Ninth District of the State of Washington, it is a blue collar district, and one of the most important things that the leaders in our community, whether they be government or business, can do is ensure that a strong economy exists so that the people of districts like mine and throughout the country can get good jobs, make enough money to take care of their family and pursue their dreams and their interests as they see fit. Maintaining that economy is what is going to bring it home to everybody. Not just the top 5 percent, not just the Bill Gateses of the world, but every single person in the country who needs to have a good job to support their family or just support themselves can benefit from policies that embrace the high tech new economy. It is going to be important to real people from one end of this country to the other. I think when we talk about the high tech new economy it is important to break it down. There are really five areas of the new economy. First of all we have computers, and in that I include software and hardware. We have the Internet. We have telecommunications; biotech, which is primarily health care products that are developed; and lastly we have all of the products that those first four things help create. I think there is a mistake sometimes that people make, that technology is just a certain sector of our economy; there are certain, quote, high, unquote companies and then there are low tech companies. Every company is affected by technology. Obviously, some are more affected by it. Intel, Cisco Systems, Microsoft, these are companies directly in high tech. But even a company, even a retail store that sells clothing apparel is affected by the quality of the software that they have, that can track their inventory and track their customers and find out new opportunities. One of the examples that I think shows this is a small company that is actually starting up in my district that is trying to develop, coincidentally, back to the internal combustion engine, a new engine that will generate power. I have not figured out a way to make it drive an automobile, but what it can do is it can generate energy and replace some of the old methods of generating that energy. The advantage of this new engine that is based on the ram jet physics, stuff that I do not even begin to understand except to say that it works and it generates energy much more cleanly and much more efficiently than current methods, the person who was able to generate this product had worked on the technology in the defense sector. He had worked on it with jet airplanes but they had never quite made the connection down to the more civilian use of generating energy. He was able to generate that because of the rapid advancing in computers and software that enabled him to test theories more rapidly. Stuff that would have taken decades to get through to test, he could literally do in a matter of weeks, and that enabled him to test theories and move forward and get to the point where he actually developed the engine. In the biotech sphere, I talked to some folks in the biotech industry just last week, and they said from 1985 to today they have been able, through the use of computers and software, to reduce the time it takes them to analyze data to the point where a project that they did in the mid-1980s took them 5 years to analyze, that data today they could do in an afternoon. This application spreads all across our economy. So those five sectors need to be encouraged and fostered to grow because they impact all aspects of our business. As we get into an increasingly competitive global economy, we want our companies in the U.S. to be the ones that advance fastest and furthest and do it first so that we can take the advantage and get the economic benefit of that for our country. Therefore, we need to adopt policies that reflect this. We need to look to the future and say, as the world changes, as technology moves forward, what do we need to do to be ready for it? Certainly we cannot go with policies that we had 50, 20, even 10 years ago, when technology has changed. Remember 5 years ago the Internet was pretty much a nonfactor. It was an idea. It was out there, certainly, but the explosive growth in the last five years was not foreseen but by the smallest number of people. Now that affects every aspect of our economy. We need to be ready for those sorts of changes. Towards that end, I have six main policy areas that I want to make people aware of, that we in government need to address to try to adjust to this high tech economy. The first one has to do with export controls, and this is one that actually applies to more than just the high tech economy. It just becomes more of a factor because of the global nature of our economy that the Information Age makes possible. We have a number of policies in this country that restrict the exportation of our products, specifically restrict the exportation of technology products or create unilateral economic sanctions against the export of all products. This creates a problem for one simple fact, and for one simple reason: Ninety-six percent of the people of this world live someplace other than the United States, yet the United States is currently responsible for 20 percent of the world's consumption. What that means is that if our companies are going to grow, if markets are going to increase, they are going to have to have access to markets outside of this country. Currently, our policy on unilateral economic sanctions places sanctions on dozens of different countries that limit our ability to export. Now, the reason we place those economic sanctions is because we disapprove of something that that country has done, and that makes a certain amount of sense, if our action to place those sanctions would change the action by that other country that we disapprove of. But the reality is it does not. All it means is they go someplace else to buy their products. In essence, what we are doing is we are punishing these other countries by telling them that we will not take their money and that is not much of a punishment. It drives them into the arms of our competitors. We need to rethink our unilateral economic sanctions policy. Multilateral sanctions make sense. If we can get enough people together, enough of our allies together to condemn an action, condemn a country and place sanctions on them, then that can work. But taking the action unilaterally does nothing to advance the policy aims and only hurts us economically. In the technology realm, we place restrictions on the exportation of encryption technology; that is, technology that is used basically to protect data on a computer, to make sure that people cannot access it who you do not want to access your information. We also place restrictions on the exportation of so-called supercomputers. The problem with that is because computers are leaping ahead so fast and so quickly, a laptop basically could have been, will some day be a supercomputer and is close to getting there under the definition that we have in policy today. We need to understand that in trying to restrict the exportation of this technology, the world has changed. I think this is one of the key areas that shows how we need to adjust. In the old days, we did not want this technology to get out there because it had national security implications, and it clearly does. If one has good encryption technology, if one has good computing technology, it affects one's ability to have weapons basically to commit harm, to do a variety of things. It has military significance. But the question is, how do we prevent other people from getting that technology. Can we simply as the United States put our arms around it and say we are not going to let it out and nobody else is going to get it? No. Encryption technology in particular. One can download it off the Internet, dozens of other countries sell it. It is going to get out there. In fact, this is going to hurt our national security. Because if we restrict the exportation of encryption technology in this country, our companies will slowly fall behind. They will not be able to get the customers because they will not be providing the best product. As we fall behind and other countries get further ahead of us in this technology, we lose our ability to be the leaders in the technology. The encryption companies, software companies in this company who produce encryption technology cooperate with the FBI and the NSA to help them, show them the advances in the technology. That helps us be ready to deal with the national security implications. If we lose that leadership role, countries in other parts of the world are not going to share that information with our National Security Agency or the FBI. We need to be sure that we allow the exportation of that encryption technology so that we can continue to be the leaders in that area. Another important area is education, and that gets to the change points. In a rapidly changing world, we need to constantly update our skills. We live in a society where all of us are going to need to continually be learning. We need to adjust our education system to understand that. In the good old days when basically all one needed was a high school education and could go out and get a job and probably take care of their family; my father did, he had a high school education, got a job as a ramp serviceman for an airline and ready did not update his skills very much during his 32 years with that airline and was able to take care of his family. In today's world, we need to update our skills. We need to make sure that our education system is ready for that, and that our education system is also ready to educate our children in technology issues and to enable them to change as rapidly as they need and update their skills. The Internet is the key to all of this. The way the system basically works, what computers and software enable us to do is they enable us to generate and store a large amount of data, and that is very valuable, as in the engine example I cited earlier. By being able to generate that information, they were able to develop a product. That is the start of it. The Internet basically is the step that enables one to transmit that data. Back to the example of a retail clothing shop, if it is a chain, if they have 25 or 30 stores spread throughout the country, they can share data. Basically being in any one of those stores is like being in the home office and by being able to share that data enables the company to move forward, or, if they are designing something, they can trade the design back and forth and not have to be in the same place. What we need to do is we need to encourage the Internet. Overregulating the Internet would be one of the biggest mistakes our government could make. It would put us in a position of restricting its ability to grow, and it is very important that we allow the Internet to grow and prosper and do the things for our economy that it has already started to do. There is also an issue, and this is primarily in the area of biotech, but also in other areas of patents. We need patent reform so that people have the incentives necessary to develop new products, secure in the knowledge that they will be able to keep the patents on those products and benefit from them. Otherwise, they will not get into the field and try to develop them. Research and development is also a critical element. We have in this country the research and development tax credit. Unfortunately, it is only good for one year and every year we have to come back and renew it. Well, we need to make that permanent. The reason is because if one is a company planning for the future and deciding how much to put into research, a lot of these products are not developed in one year, and if one does not know if the resources are going to be able to be there for more than one year, it hampers one's ability to make that investment. We have the opportunity to permanently extend the R&D tax credit this year and give companies that incentive to go out there and continue to develop the new products that they need to develop. Lastly, and this is tied into the Internet, we have the issue of broad band, basically access to the Internet. The Internet is great, but currently only about 20 percent of households in this country have access to it, and a much smaller number, very minute number, have access to so-called broad band Internet access. Put simply, broad band means that the Internet moves more quickly for us. Now, if one is just sending e-mail or simply surfing the net, that may not be such a big issue, but if one is trying to send data, if one is developing that new design, if one is in the automobile industry, one develops a new design for an automobile and one wants to send it out to one's top 25 executives throughout the world, to be able to send that much data over the Internet requires a larger pipe. Otherwise, it will take forever to send the data out and to download it to whoever has received it. The most important thing in this area is we need to build the infrastructure. Think of the Internet today in the same way that the railroad was in the 20th century. In the 20th century, the railroad gave us the ability to connect our country, but first, we had to build the track, and it was very expensive to build that track, so we gave incentives to go out there and build it, and it made a lot of sense because it helped grow our economy rapidly. We need to do the exact same thing with broad band technology. We need to give companies ever incentive out there to go out there and build the infrastructure. Lay the fiber, lay the cable, put in the phone lines, do whatever is necessary to connect as many people in this country as possible, not just to Internet access, but to fast, broad band Internet access. Overregulation can kill this. If we regulate companies too much so that they do not have the proper economic incentives to go out there and build the infrastructure, it will not happen. Because yes, there is a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow if you are the company that best develops Internet access, but you have to make a major investment up front to get there and you may not be willing to do that if the environment is too regulated. Those are just six issues that I think we need to touch on, but the important thing is simply to embrace change, understand the new economy. We cannot fight it. It is not an option. It is here. We need to understand it and try to make sure it works. I think one of the greatest challenges for this country is to make sure that it works for everybody. Because right now, it works fairly well for the top 20 percent, but the potential is there to make it work for everybody, and we need to understand it and go about addressing the issues in a way that make it available to the entire country, because it has the massive potential to keep our economy moving forward, to keep productivity high, and to create good jobs. That is why I think that the new economy and the high tech aspects of that new economy is so critical. I am pleased to have with me the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), who is going to address these issues as well.", u"Madam President, this bill doesn't normally get a lot of attention, but because of the concern over the loss of secrets through our laboratories at the DOE, we are going to have a debate about an amendment to restructure the Department of Energy. I want to make a point that I made earlier, which is that secrecy and security are not the same thing. Sometimes secrecy equals security. Sometimes secrecy can make security more difficult, harder for us to accomplish the mission of keeping the United States of America as secure as we possibly can. I am not going to offer an amendment to this bill, because it has been defeated pretty soundly in the past--although I must say I am tempted to do so--to disclose to the American people how much is spent on intelligence gathering. Right now, under law, we cannot do that. I want to call my colleagues' attention to what is happening. Our first vote is on cloture. I think cloture will be invoked pretty easily. Our leader is not going to hold anybody up from voting for cloture. Maybe we can go right to the bill. Listening to Senators Domenici and Levin earlier, I think they may be able to solve their differences. The vote may end up being unanimous, which is my wish. I hope we can continue to move closer together on that piece of legislation, an important piece of legislation on which Senator Domenici and others have been working. I want to call my colleagues' attention to what we do every year basically, and that is, the authorization of appropriations for the intelligence bill is very small, as a consequence of not being able to disclose to the American people what is in the bill. The House bill contains six titles. The Senate bill, which will be offered as a substitute for the House bill, also contains six titles. The first two titles are identical. Titles I and II in the House bills are identical. Then there are general provisions, and then each bill has additional things in there. But you can see the problem we have getting public support for intelligence collection. That is one step in the process of intelligence. We collect with imaging efforts, we collect with signals intercepts, we collect with human intelligence, and we have measurement intelligence. We have all sorts of various what are called INTs that are used to gather raw data. Then somebody has to take that data and analyze it. What does it mean? What does this data mean? What is the interpretation of it? Oftentimes secrecy can be a problem because one compartment may not be talking to another. This administration and others have worked to try to bring various people together so there is more consultation than there has been in the past. But oftentimes decisions have to be made very quickly. Sometimes interpretations of public information are made, and an adjustment is made. Let me be very specific. About 80 percent, in my view, of the decisions that most elected people make in Congress having to do with national security are made as a result of something they acquired in a nonclassified fashion in a TV report, in a radio report, in a newspaper report, or a published document. Staff analyze it and come and say: This is what we think is going on--about 80 percent of the information that we process. I would say that would probably be on the low side. It may be even higher than that. Indeed, the President may be in a similar situation. He may be making a decision on a very high percentage of publicly accessible information as opposed to classified information. That is quite the trend. The trend is both healthy and at times disturbing because more and more information is being made available to the public that was not available in the past. The good news is citizens have more information. They process that information. We have a lot of independent analysts out there. In a couple of years, when metering satellite photographs are available, we are going to see competing analyses being done over images. This is what I see when I take that photograph. I say this because I think it is true that it is very difficult, for any length of time for the Congress and the President to do something the public doesn't support, especially when it comes to spending their money. In this case, I just hazard a guess. I never polled on this. But certainly I take a lot of anecdotal stories on board from citizens who question whether or not they are getting their money's worth. Is all the money we are spending worthwhile when we aren't able to tell where the Chinese Embassy is in Belgrade? A $2 map would have told us where it was. When we were unable to forecast a class of facility, when we were unable to foresee that India was going to test a nuclear weapon following an election, during which the party that was successful campaigned, and their platform said, if we are elected and we come to power, we are going to test a nuclear weapon? Many failures, in short, are out in the public, and the public acquires the information. I think it has caused them to lose confidence that they are getting their money's worth. It is a real crisis for us. It is a real challenge for us because, again, if you look at the document we will be voting on sometime in the next couple of days--usually this thing goes through very quickly and we don't have much time to consider it. In an odd way, I thank the Senator from New Mexico for bringing so much attention to the Department of Energy's need for restructuring because it has given us some time to pause and look at this piece of legislation. As I said, the two most important titles, the ones you will see in almost every intelligence authorization bill, is title I and title II. Title I has five sections. It authorizes appropriations. It give us classified schedule authorization, personnel ceiling adjustment authorization, community management account authorization, and emergency supplemental appropriations. That is in the House bill. The Senate bill has four titles. It is quite revealing when you go into title I. Again, normally, if this is a Department of Defense authorization, each one of these titles would provide the detailed and specific number of how much is being spent, all the way down to the very small individual accounts that would be disclosed to the public. There would be a great debate going on. The committee report comes out. The budget comes out. The bill is reported by the Armed Services Committee. Editorials are written. Journalists and specialists say we are spending too little; we are spending too much; we need to build this weapons system, and so forth. A great public debate then ensues when the committee brings the bill up and reports it out for full consideration by the Senate. I think that debate is healthy. The public participates and helps us decide what it is we ought not be doing. Sometimes we still put things in we shouldn't and some things we should. We still make mistakes. That public debate helps us. Under this authorization, what you see in section 101 is the following: The funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2000 for the conduct of intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the U.S. Government: the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Air Force, the Department of State, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Conference Office, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency--11 different Government agencies are named but no dollar figure is included. The only dollar figure in this entire budget comes in section 104 where the public learns we are authorizing $171 million to be appropriated for the Community Management Act of the Director of Central Intelligence. We have that piece of information. Later in the bill that we will be voting on, we learn $27 million is available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Then later, a third time we get another number. We learn $209.1 million is authorized to be appropriated to the Central Intelligence Agency's retirement and disability fund for fiscal year 2000. That is all the public learns. That is all the public knows. The public does not know how much we spend in each one of these agencies, nor how much the committee is recommending in this authorization bill, nor the total amount of dollars being spent. We have had debates about this before. There are good arguments usually filed against it: This is going to deteriorate our national security; we need to maintain, in short, a secret in order to preserve national security. I have reached the opposite conclusion, that this is a situation where the preservation of a secret deteriorates our national security as a consequence, first of all, of not having a public debate about whether this is the right allocation but, most importantly, as a consequence of deteriorating citizens' confidence that we are authorizing and appropriating the correct amount. In short, keeping this secret from the American people has caused difficulty in retaining their consensus that we ought to be spending an amount of money they do not know in order to collect, analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence. I think that is a problem for us. Again, I have not done any polling on this, so I don't know. I typically don't poll before I make a decision, to the consternation of my staff and supporters. But my guess is, just from anecdotes, there is a deterioration of confidence. It bothers me because my term on the Intelligence Committee--thanks to the original appointment by our former Democratic leader, George Mitchell, from the great State of Maine, and also Leader Daschle's confidence in retaining me on this committee--over time my confidence has increased. Indeed, the argument in my opening statement about this bill is that we have drawn down intelligence investments in the 1990s as we have drawn down our military from roughly 2 million men and women under active duty uniform to 1.35 million. We have also drawn down our intelligence efforts to a point where I don't believe we can do all of the things that need to be done either today or in the future. As I said, I have to collect intelligence. I have to analyze the information. I have skilled people who can analyze it. These images delivered from space very often mean nothing to me when I look at them. It requires somebody who is not only skilled but can process it in a hurry and can make something of it in a hurry. In the situation with India, where we had difficulty warning the President that a test might occur, again, according to published accounts, the Indians were aware that we, first, were able to identify a year earlier they were about to test, and we warned them not to test, as a result of overhead imaging. And they took evasive measures in the future. These are very difficult things to tell. You have to hire skilled people to do it. That is the analysis. The next piece is the production. It is getting very exciting but also very complicated. There is a lot of competition with the private sector to do this production work. Back in the ice age when I was on the U.S. Navy SEAL team, we were given a map if we were going to do an operation in an area in Vietnam. We would look at a map and say: This is the area we will operate in. The map might be 10 years old. Then we would supplement that with human intelligence. Somebody would say: There are some changes here that aren't quite the same as the map. Today an image is used. It is enhanced. It is remarkable how quickly we can deliver very accurate pictures of theaters of operation to the warfighter to disseminate differently, produced in a much different way, and enable that warfighter to have a competitive edge on the battlefield. Indeed, anybody who is thinking about becoming an enemy of the United States of America knows we have tremendous capability on the intelligence side. We get warnings, and those warnings are delivered when threats begin to build. Oftentimes a mere warning enables the heading off of a potential threat that could have erupted into a serious conflict and would have resulted in a loss of lives. The effort to collect, analyze, produce, and disseminate to the right person at the right time, and to make a decision, is not only complicated, but it is also quite expensive. It is not done accidentally. I hope this year is a watershed year and we are able to authorize additional resources for our intelligence agencies. If we don't, at some point we will have a Director of Central Intelligence in the future deliver the bad news to Congress that there is something we want to do but we can't because we cannot accomplish the mission we want to accomplish--not just because of resources but also because it is getting harder and harder to do things we have in the past taken for granted, such as intercept signals, conversations, or communications of some kind between one bad person and another bad person with hostile intent against the United States. Increasingly, we are seeing a shift in two big ways away from nation states. In the old days, we could pass sanctions legislation or do something against a government that was doing something we didn't like. What do we do if Osama bin Laden starts killing Americans or narcoterrorists or cyberterrorists say they hate the United States of America and are going to take action against us? It is very difficult--indeed, it is impossible--for diplomacy to reduce that threat. We need to intercept and try to prevent it and, very often, try to prevent it with a forceful intervention. Not only is it shifting away from the nation state, making it harder both to collect and to do the other work--the analysis, the processing and dissemination, or production of dissemination--the signals are becoming more complex and difficult to process, and they are becoming more and more encrypted. I have had conversations with the private sector, people in the software business, who say we have to change this export regimen that makes it difficult for these companies to sell encryption overseas. This administration has made tremendous accommodation within the industry to try to accommodate their need to sell to companies that are doing business all over the world. Don't doubt there is a national security issue here. There is significant interception, both on the national security side and the law enforcement side. That encryption at 128 bits or higher is actually deployed. We will find our people in the intelligence side coming back and saying: Look, I know something bad happened, and do you want to know why I didn't know? I will tell you why I didn't know. I couldn't make sense of the signal. We intercept, and all we get is a buzz and background noise. We cannot interpret it. We can't convert it. In the old days, we converted with a linguist or some other technological application. In the new world, we are being increasingly denied access to the signals. As described by the technical advisory group that was established on the Intelligence Committee, it was described as number of needles in the haystack but the haystack is getting larger and larger and harder, as a result, for the intelligence people to do the work they need to do. The chairman is moving to the floor. I know he will make a brilliant and articulate statement. Earlier, the Senator from New Mexico offered a statement on his amendment that he hopes to offer tomorrow. Senator Levin was here as well. I believe there is reason to be encouraged that we will move this bill quickly tomorrow, and reasonably encouraged, as well, that the differences which still exist on this bill can be resolved, and we can get a big bipartisan vote and move this on to conference. I yield the floor.", u"Mr. President, first, I commend my good friend from Virginia for his work on this bill and his leadership in the committee. It is a bipartisan style of leadership, and it is very productive. I commend him on it. It sets the kind of style which I hope will permeate this body in all the things we do, but it is absolutely essential in the national security area that we act in this way. He carries on a great tradition in doing so. The conference report for the national defense for the fiscal year 2000 is a good bill, with one problem, and that problem is the provisions relating to the reorganization of the Department of Energy nuclear weapons complex. Because of the deficiencies in the DOE reorganization provisions, I declined to sign the conference report on this bill, but, at the time, I stated I would decide how to vote on the bill after a more careful analysis and a public airing of the provisions. Back to the Department of Defense side of the bill because this is almost two bills but one conference report. We have a Department of Defense authorization bill, in its more traditional style, addressing the issues which we typically address, and we have this new kid on the block, this Department of Energy reorganization part of this bill, which is the problematic part. The Department of Defense portion of the bill is a good agreement. It was reached through bipartisan and cooperative discussion among ourselves in the Senate and with our House colleagues. This conference report should go--and will go, in my judgment--a long way to meet the priorities established for our military by Secretary Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I very much agree with our good friend, Senator Warner, as to what he said about this part of the bill and the priorities it sets, how it spends the additional funds. In accordance with the fiscal year 2000 budget resolution, the bill includes an $8.3 billion increase in budget authority above the level provided in the President's budget. Unlike the budget increases in past years, the added money in this bill will be spent in a manner in which the Department of Defense indicates it has the highest priorities. That is a very important point. The chairman made the point in his remarks that, relative to the additional funds, we solicited from the Department what their highest priorities are and tried to reflect those priorities. The bottom line is that this bill will go a long way to improve the quality of life for our men and women in uniform, it will improve the readiness of our military, and it will continue the process of modernizing our Armed Forces to meet the threats of the future. Some of the add-ons, as I have indicated, the so-called increases, represent the highest-priority readiness items identified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including an added $788 million for real property maintenance, something we frequently neglect and delay but which is essential--real property maintenance is not a glamorous item, but it is very important to quality of life and to readiness--$380 million was added for base operations; $172 million for ammunition; $112 million for training center support; $151 million for depot maintenance. These are items that too frequently get shortchanged. In each case, these items will significantly enhance the ability of our Armed Forces to carry out their full range of missions. As far as the members of the military are concerned, this is probably the most important Defense Authorization Act in recent years because of the improvements it will make in pay and benefits for the women and men in uniform. The bill includes the triad of pay and retirement initiatives sought by Secretary Cohen and the Joint Chiefs: A 4.8-percent military pay raise for fiscal year 2000, reform of the military pay table to increase pay for midcareer NCOs and officers, and changes to the military retirement system. These changes should go a long way in addressing recruiting and retention problems in the services. My greatest disappointment in this area is that we were not able to enact the GI bill improvements that were proposed by Senator Cleland this year. I think every Member of this body wants to do everything they can to ensure the men and women in uniform receive fair compensation for the service they provide to their country. Secretary Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff made a persuasive case that the military is facing real recruiting and retention problems and that improvements in pay and benefits in the conference report are a critical element of any plan to address the recruiting and retention problems. There are other important provisions in this bill as well. For example, the bill reported by the Armed Services Committee provides full funding for the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program with Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, although it would terminate work on the Russian chemical weapons destruction facility. Unfortunately, two of the three companion programs at the Department of Energy, the initiative for proliferation prevention and the nuclear cities initiatives, received less funding than requested by the administration. The bill also contains some unfortunate restrictions on those two programs at the Department of Energy which are going to limit the effectiveness of these programs. Nonetheless, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and those related Department of Energy programs are a cornerstone of our relationship with Russia, and although the DOE programs were not funded at the level requested, nonetheless they are funded at a significant level and these programs play an important role in our national security by reducing the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from Russia and rogue nations with which Russia may form closer ties in the absence of those programs. There were other disappointments as well. In addition to the reduction of the requests for the DOE programs that I mentioned, Senator Well-stone's amendment to provide some relief for a group of veterans who contracted serious illnesses after being exposed to radiation while participating in nuclear tests or while serving at Hiroshima or Nagasaki after the war, adopted in the Senate, was not accepted in conference because when we got to conference, the House conferees said the amendment would increase the so-called mandatory or entitlement spending, and they had no jurisdiction on that issue. As a result, they would not agree to include this provision in the conference report. That is a disappointment. It is a disappointment to me, and I think it will be a disappointment to those veterans who were so exposed. But the conference report, again, has so many important provisions that we should look at the whole DOD report and weigh that as a whole. When we do that, it seems to me the Department of Defense portion of this bill makes a very large contribution to national security and the effective management of the Department of Defense--including other provisions such as the provision establishing new procedures to protect the military's access to essential frequency spectrum; such as the provision requiring the Department to establish specific budget reporting procedures for all funds to combat terrorism, both at home and abroad; such as a series of provisions to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of health care provided to service men and women under the TRICARE program; such as provisions promoting reform of the Department of Defense financial management systems; such as the provisions promoting more effective management of the defense laboratories and test and evaluation facilities; such as provisions extending the Department's small disadvantaged business goals and its mentor-protegee program for small disadvantaged businesses for 3 years. As I indicated, this conference report is really two bills. It is a DOD authorization bill, but it is also a reorganization of the entire Department of Energy nuclear weapons complex. It does the latter in a way which is inconsistent with the bill that was passed by the Senate by a vote of 96-1 earlier this year, inconsistent in a number of important ways. It goes beyond anything that has even been considered by the House of Representatives. While there is a broad consensus that we need to address the management and accountability programs at DOE, particularly in the areas of security and counterintelligence, the provisions in this bill could undermine Secretary Richardson's efforts to secure our nuclear secrets and make the Department even more difficult to manage than it is today. That is the question we struggle with and that I and a number of the members of our committee have struggled with, and I know Members of this body are struggling with that as well--the final provisions that were put in the conference report to try to analyze: What is the difference, if any, between these provisions in the conference report and the Senate provisions which we adopted to implement the semiautonomous agency recommendation of Senator Rudman? So I wrote a letter to the Congressional Research Service requesting an independent assessment of the impact of the conference report on the ability of the Secretary of Energy to manage the Department's nuclear weapons programs. The CRS memorandum prepared in response to my letter this month raises serious questions about the impact of the Department of Energy reorganization provisions in this conference report. The CRS concluded that the Secretary's authority over the new National Nuclear Security Administration ``may be problematic in view of the overall scheme of the proposed legislation.'' For instance, the CRS memorandum raises the question about ``whether it is possible, or desirable in practice, to split policy and operations in organizational terms''; and asks whether the practice of insulating administration staff offices from departmental staff offices ``effectively vitiate[s] the meaning of the earlier provisions assigning the Secretary full authority and control over any function of the Administration and its personnel.'' The CRS memorandum also points out the legislation would permit the administrator of the new National Nuclear Security Agency to ``establish Administration-specific policies, unless disapproved by the Secretary of Energy.'' And the CRS points out that ``This procedure reverses the general practice in the departments and to the extent that the Secretary is not the issuing authority, a major tool of management and accountability is shifted to a subordinate office.'' If this legislation were interpreted, as the CRS indicates it could be interpreted, to undermine the authority of the Secretary, it would have the perverse effect of diffusing responsibility in the Department, leaving reporting channels even more ``convoluted, confusing, and contradictory'' than those observed by the Rudman Commission. I supported the Rudman recommendation and still do. The Rudman recommendation recommends a semiautonomous entity inside the Department of Energy. But what the CRS report does is raise questions about whether or not this language--which is different from the Senate language which was overwhelmingly adopted--in this conference report goes beyond semiautonomous. None of the models of a semiautonomous agency cited by the Rudman Commission in its report--the National Reconnaissance Office; the National Security Agency; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA; or the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA--limit the authority of the Cabinet Secretary responsible for the agency as much as these provisions seem to do. However, the ambiguities in this bill may leave open another choice. We are dealing with ambiguities in language. So we have to look at: Are there other interpretations, other choices which may be available in light of these ambiguities? In particular, there is language which can be construed to give authority to the Secretary which might allow him to run this agency, called the Department of Energy, in a way which will provide accountability in the Secretary because he is the one to whom we must look to be accountable. We want him to be able to run the agency. That is why it is called a semiautonomous entity in the Rudman report. They do not recommend an autonomous entity. They recommend a semiautonomous entity. They cite models, the ones I have just indicated, which allow the Secretary of the agency in question to run his agency, including all parts of it, including the semiautonomous parts. There is language in this conference report which remains which does point towards the ability of the Secretary to run his entire agency, to be accountable and responsible for it. I want to just read some of that language. For instance, the new administration--this new entity--is established ``within the Department of Energy'', and is therefore subject to the direction and control of the Secretary. The Secretary of Energy, in this conference report--not the head of the new entity, the under secretary, but the Secretary of Energy--is responsible for ``developing the security, counterintelligence, and intelligence policies of the Department'' under section 214. For instance, the Department's counterintelligence chief, not his subordinate in the new administration, is ``responsible for establishing policy for counterintelligence programs and activities at Department facilities in order to reduce the threat of disclosure or loss of classified and other sensitive information at such facilities'' under section 215. Another example of language pointing toward accountability in the Secretary--where we want it, ultimately, in this Department or any Department--is that the Secretary of Energy, not the new under secretary but the Secretary of Energy himself, is given continuing responsibility for the security and counterintelligence problems within the Department's nuclear energy defense programs by sections 3150, 3152, 3154, and 3164 of the bill. Other language which may give some comfort to those of us who are concerned about the diffusion of accountability in this new language--not adopted by the Senate, not adopted by the House, but put into the conference report--other language which may hopefully give some comfort is that the Secretary of Energy, not the new under secretary, is given the responsibility for appointing the Chief of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence and the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security within the new administration. I think one can fairly argue that the authority to establish Department-wide policies carries with it the authority to ensure that such policies are carried out. On that basis and on the basis of these other provisions I have just quoted, this legislation could be interpreted to give the Secretary of Energy continuing authority to manage the Department, including the authority to direct and control the new National Nuclear Security Administration. So while it is unfortunate that this bill has confused reporting relationships and blurred lines of authority, I believe a strong Secretary of Energy may be able to overcome these difficulties and address the Department's problems in an effective manner. He should not have to be confronted with these difficulties, but he may be able to overcome them. We will need to continually reexamine these provisions and modify them as appropriate to ensure that the Secretary and the Department have the tools they need to ensure the security of our nuclear deterrent. The National Association of Attorneys General has raised an important concern about this legislation. In two letters dated September 3, 1999, to the President and the congressional leadership, the National Association of Attorneys General states that the DOE reorganization provisions in this bill ``would weaken the existing internal and external oversight structure for DOE's environment, safety, and health operations.'' Here again, the Secretary of Energy may be able to overcome the ambiguities in the bill and exercise strong independent oversight over the new administration, ensuring that applicable laws, regulations, and agreements protecting health, safety, and the environment continue to be enforced. This legislation then may be ratified by the courts consistent with its intent--which we put in the Senate version of this bill--to make no change to existing substantive and procedural mechanisms for enforcing such laws, regulations, and agreements. I wish these flawed DOE reorganization provisions had not been added in conference. As a matter of fact, adding extraneous material in this way is a dubious legislative practice that too often results in unsound legislation. The concerns raised by attorneys general should serve as a reminder to all of us of the hazards of trying to legislate on complex issues in a conference committee convened to deliberate on unrelated matters. I am going to vote for this bill because I believe it is possible that the DOE reorganization provisions can be interpreted in a manner that will permit the sound management of the Department of Energy and because the provisions are a part of what is otherwise a good bill. If the DOE reorganization mandated by this bill proves to create problems, we will then have to consider solutions to those problems in the future. We are going to need to monitor this bill closely as it is implemented. We don't know if the President will or will not veto this bill. Perhaps the President indicated to my good friend from Virginia last night at the meeting. But we do not have any indication as to whether or not the President will veto this bill.", u"Mr. President, in the waning days of his administration, President Eisenhower proposed a test ban treaty to end all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and under the ground. Nearly four decades later, the Senate stands on the verge of a vote on ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I will vote in favor of ratification. I regret the move to postpone a vote because I am of the firm conviction this treaty will help end the proliferation of nuclear weapons and increase the safety of the American people. President Eisenhower proposed the test ban having recognized the increasing danger posed by nuclear weapons. At that time, the threat was very real. The American people had a vivid understanding of the devastating consequences of nuclear weapons. Those of us in our fifties remember the threat and the fear that we had as children--the duck and cover drills, the constant reminders of the devastation that a single nuclear weapon could produce to our cities and to our communities. In many ways, the problem we have today comes from our success because the fear we once had has been displaced by a false sense of complacency, a sense of security that, in my view, is not justified, given the facts. I would like to illustrate this danger by a realistic scenario, in my view, with a single Russian nuclear weapon. It is possible for a small band of discontented or terroristic members of either the Russian society or some other nation to raid a silo of Russian missiles in the Russian wilderness. Soldiers who are poorly trained, sparsely equipped, and irate at not having been paid in a year are easily overtaken or are willing to cooperate. Let's pick one city to illustrate the damage. I, again, call to my colleagues' attention that this kind of game playing, this kind of example was quite common as recently as 10 years ago. But today, when you ask what kind of damage could occur as a result of a single nuclear blast, you are apt to have people scratching their heads, wondering what could happen. So let me take Chicago as an example. First of all, unlike many of the other threats in the world, if a rocket left Russia, it would arrive in Chicago within an hour, probably taking a trajectory over the top of the world across the Arctic pole. It would detonate in Chicago within an hour, and on a bad day it would hit a target within a few hundred yards off Lake Michigan. We spent a great deal of time assessing the danger of the nation of China. Their missiles are not connected to their warheads. Their warheads are disconnected; they are not together. It would take them several days and they are not targeted with the accuracy and would not arrive with the same swiftness as an unauthorized or accidental launch coming from Russia. The first effect of the blast would be the nuclear flash. The air would be heated to 10 million degrees Celsius. The blast would move out at a few hundred kilometers a second and its heat would be sufficient to set fire to anything combustible at a distance of 14 kilometers. People within 80 kilometers would be blinded. The blast effect would follow. It would travel out from ground zero. Within 3 kilometers, those who had not already been killed would die from this percussive force. The details of this kind of a blast needs to be understood by the American people as this debate goes forward, because the good news of the end of the cold war has been replaced with the bad news that we are increasingly at risk of individuals or nonnation state people who choose to do damage to the United States of America and do not care if they die in the execution of their mission. They are willing to attack the United States of America and they are willing to take American lives without regard to the fact that they may die in the execution of their mission. A single Russian nuclear weapon launched accidentally, or a single nuclear weapon assembled by some rogue nation and delivered by whatever the means to the United States of America, would do more damage than any other threat we currently have on the horizon. A single Russian submarine that was taken over by a similar sort of dissident faction could launch 64 one-hundred-kiloton weapons at the United States. I do not come here to alarm anybody about this. I come simply to remind people that nuclear weapons are still the only threat that could kill every single American. It would not take thousands to bring the United States of America to its knees. It would not take the kind of total attack we once feared from the Soviet Union to bring America from being the most powerful economic and military force on the Earth to being somewhat short of No. 1, not only putting us at increasing risk but putting the rest of the world at risk as well. CTBT is by no means the only thing we must do in order to reduce the risk of proliferation. I would like to go through a few ideas prior to talking about both our capacity to verify and the confidence I have that we can maintain our stockpile without the need to test. First, we have to maintain our intelligence capabilities: our ability to collect intelligence, to process, to disseminate, to deliver that intelligence to warfighters is far and away the best in the world. Talk to our allies in Kosovo, in Bosnia, in Desert Storm; talk to any of those whose lives were at risk and were allied with the United States of America in a military effort and they will tell you our intelligence collection and dissemination capability gave us the capacity to do the impossible. Our intelligence agencies, from time to time, make very highly publicized mistakes. Unfortunately, the publicity given to those mistakes gives some a lack of confidence in our capability of doing our mission. That lack of confidence is misplaced. We are an open society. As a consequence, we tend--correctly so--to examine the things we do when we make mistakes. Unfortunately, at times it produces a situation where we are afraid of doing things because we are worried we are going to make a highly publicized mistake and therefore that mistake is going to ruin our career or make it difficult for us to advance. As a consequence, we sometimes are a little too cautious. Americans should not suffer the illusion we currently have the intelligence capacity to know everything that is going on in the world; we simply do not. Indeed, we should not. We are not, as well, allocating enough resources, in my view, to make certain policymakers of the future are informed so conflicts that might occur can be avoided and so nuclear threats can be confronted before they emerge to be challenges. The second tool that must be maintained to confront the emerging nuclear threat is not only a strong military but an intent to use that military to meet any individual or nation state that threatens the United States of America. Our military is the envy of the world. While we must avoid the temptation of using our military forces in situations not vital to U.S. interests, we must also continue to maintain the will to use military force in instances in which our national security is at risk. The third tool is national missile defense. I support the creation of a limited national missile defense designed to protect the United States of America from rogue state ballistic missile launches and accidental launches. While the success of the recent test of a prototype missile defense system demonstrates that limited national missile defense is possible, we must also realize it is not a panacea for the dangers we will confront. The fourth tool in our effort to secure the post-cold-war peace is further reductions in the American and Russian nuclear arsenals. I have argued on the Senate floor previously